Politics

Sententia libri Politicorum

Commentary on the Politics

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Prooemium

Prologue

Sicut Philosophus docet in secundo physicorum, ars imitatur naturam. Cuius ratio est, quia sicut se habent principia adinvicem, ita proportionabiliter se habent operationes et effectus. Principium autem eorum quae secundum artem fiunt est intellectus humanus, qui secundum similitudinem quamdam derivatur ab intellectu divino, qui est principium rerum naturalium. Unde necesse est, quod et operationes artis imitentur operationes naturae; et ea quae sunt secundum artem, imitentur ea quae sunt in natura. Si enim aliquis instructor alicuius artis opus artis efficeret; oporteret discipulum, qui ab eo artem suscepisset, ad opus illius attendere, ut ad eius similitudinem et ipse operaretur. Et ideo intellectus humanus ad quem intelligibile lumen ab intellectu divino derivatur, necesse habet in his quae facit informari ex inspectione eorum quae sunt naturaliter facta, ut similiter operetur.

As the Philosopher teaches in Book II of the Physics, art imitates nature. The reason for this is that, as principles are related to each other, so proportionally are their works and effects related. Now the principle of those things that come to be from art is the human intellect, which is derived, after a sort of likeness, from the divine intellect, the principle of natural objects. From this, it is necessary both that art’s work imitate nature’s work, and that those things which exist by art imitate those which exist in nature. For if some instructor of some art were to effect some work of art, it would be necessary for the student, who takes up his art from it, to attend to the instructor's work, so that according to its likeness he might himself also work. And therefore, the human intellect—whose intelligible light is derived from the divine intellect—necessarily has to be informed, in those things that it makes, by looking into those things that are naturally made, so that it might work similarly.

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Et inde est quod Philosophus dicit, quod si ars faceret ea quae sunt naturae, similiter operaretur sicut et natura: et e converso, si natura faceret ea quae sunt artis, similiter faceret sicut et ars facit. Sed natura quidem non perficit ea quae sunt artis, sed solum quaedam principia praeparat, et exemplar operandi quodam modo artificibus praebet. Ars vero inspicere quidem potest ea quae sunt naturae, et eis uti ad opus proprium perficiendum; perficere vero ea non potest. Ex quo patet quod ratio humana eorum quae sunt secundum naturam est cognoscitiva tantum: eorum vero quae sunt secundum artem, est et cognoscitiva et factiva: unde oportet quod scientiae humanae, quae sunt de rebus naturalibus, sint speculativae; quae vero sunt de rebus ab homine factis, sint practicae, sive operativae secundum imitationem naturae.

And because of this, the Philosopher says that if art were to make those things which are of nature, it would work similarly to nature; and also the converse, that if nature were to make those things which are of art, it would make as art makes. But nature, of course, does not perfect those things which are art's, but only prepares principles, and, in some way, supplies art with an exemplar of how to do work. Now art is indeed able to look into those things which are of nature and use them to perfect its own proper work, but it is not able to perfect the things of nature. From this it is clear that human reason is only a knower of those things that exist by nature, but of those things that exist by art, it is both a knower and a maker. From this it follows that the human science which concerns natural objects must be speculative, but that which concerns objects made by human beings must be practical, or able to do work by imitating nature.

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Procedit autem natura in sua operatione ex simplicibus ad composita; ita quod in eis quae per operationem naturae fiunt, quod est maxime compositum est perfectum et totum et finis aliorum, sicut apparet in omnibus totis respectu suarum partium. Unde et ratio hominis operativa ex simplicibus ad composita procedit tamquam ex imperfectis ad perfecta.

Now nature, in its work, proceeds from what is simple towards what is complex, such that in those things which come to be through the work of nature, what is most complex is perfect and whole and the end of the others, as is apparent in every whole with respect to its parts. So also the reason of human beings, when at work, proceeds from what is simple to what is complex as from the imperfect to the perfect.

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Cum autem ratio humana disponere habeat non solum de his quae in usum hominis veniunt, sed etiam de ipsis hominibus qui ratione reguntur, in utrisque procedit ex simplicibus ad compositum. In aliis quidem rebus quae in usum hominis veniunt, sicut cum ex lignis constituit navem et ex lignis et lapidibus domum. In ipsis autem hominibus, sicut cum multos homines ordinat in unam quamdam communitatem. Quarum quidem communitatum cum diversi sint gradus et ordines, ultima est communitas civitatis ordinata ad per se sufficientia vitae humanae. Unde inter omnes communitates humanas ipsa est perfectissima. Et quia ea quae in usum hominis veniunt ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem, qui est principalior his quae sunt ad finem, ideo necesse est quod hoc totum quod est civitas sit principalius omnibus totis, quae ratione humana cognosci et constitui possunt.

Moreover, since human reason has to arrange not only those things that come into human use, but also human beings themselves, who are ruled by reason, in both cases it proceeds from simple things to something composed. It does this with those things that come into human use as when it builds a ship out of timber, and a house out of timber and stones; and with human beings themselves, as when it orders many human beings into one community. Of which communities, indeed—since there are various levels and orders—the last one is the community of the city, which is ordered toward the self-sufficiency of human life. So among all human communities it is the most perfected. And since what comes into human use is ordered to human beings as to an end—which end is more governing than those things which are toward the end—it is therefore necessary that this whole which is the city is more governing than all other wholes that can be known and constituted by human reason.

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Ex his igitur quae dicta sunt circa doctrinam politicae, quam Aristoteles in hoc libro tradit, quatuor accipere possumus.

From these things that have been said about political doctrine, which Aristotle hands down in this book, four things may be gathered.

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Primo quidem necessitatem huius scientiae. Omnium enim quae ratione cognosci possunt, necesse est aliquam doctrinam tradi ad perfectionem humanae sapientiae quae philosophia vocatur. Cum igitur hoc totum quod est civitas, sit cuidam rationis iudicio subiectum, necesse fuit ad complementum philosophiae de civitate doctrinam tradere quae politica nominatur, idest civilis scientia.

First, the necessity of this science. For to attain the perfection of human wisdom, which is called philosophy, it is necessary to hand down some doctrine about all things that can be known by reason. Since, therefore, this whole that is the city is subject to some judgment of reason, it was necessary, for the completion of philosophy, to hand down a doctrine about the city, which is named political science, that is, the science of civic affairs.

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Secundo possumus accipere genus huius scientiae. Cum enim scientiae practicae a speculativis distinguantur in hoc quod speculativae ordinantur solum ad scientiam veritatis, practicae vero ad opus; necesse est hanc scientiam sub practica philosophia contineri, cum civitas sit quiddam totum, cujus humana ratio non solum est cognoscitiva, sed etiam operativa. Rursumque cum ratio quaedam operetur per modum factionis operatione in exteriorem materiam transeunte, quod proprie ad artes pertinet, quae mechanicae vocantur, utpote fabrilis et navifactiva et similes: quaedam vero operetur per modum actionis operatione manente in eo qui operatur, sicut est consiliari, eligere, velle et hujusmodi quae ad moralem scientiam pertinent: manifestum est politicam scientiam, quae de hominum considerat ordinatione, non contineri sub factivis scientiis, quae sunt artes mechanicae, sed sub activis quae sunt scientiae morales.

Second, we can gather the genus of this science. For since a practical science is distinguished from a speculative science in that the speculative is ordered only toward the knowledge of truth, but practical toward a work, it is necessary that this science be contained under practical philosophy, since the city is some whole which human reason is not only able to know about, but also to do work upon. Furthermore, since reason does work upon some things in the mode of manufacturing—when the work has gone over into external material, which properly belongs to the arts that are called mechanical, such as the smith and the shipwright and the like—but works upon other things in the mode of acting—when the work remains in the one who is at work, as when he takes counsel, chooses, wills, and other things of this sort which belong to moral science—it is therefore clear that political science, which studies the ordering of human beings, is not contained under the manufacturing sciences, which are the mechanical arts, but under the acting ones, which are the moral sciences.

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Tertio possumus accipere dignitatem et ordinem politicae ad omnes alias scientias practicas. Est enim civitas principalissimum eorum quae humana ratione constitui possunt. Nam ad ipsam omnes communitates humanae referuntur. Rursumque omnia tota quae per artes mechanicas constituuntur ex rebus in usum hominum venientibus, ad homines ordinantur, sicut ad finem. Si igitur principalior scientia est quae est de nobiliori et perfectiori, necesse est politicam inter omnes scientias practicas esse principaliorem et architectonicam omnium aliarum, utpote considerans ultimum et perfectum bonum in rebus humanis. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit in fine decimi Ethicorum quod ad politicam perficitur philosophia, quae est circa res humanas.

Third, we are able to gather the dignity and order of political science with regard to all other practical sciences. For the city is most governing of those things that can be constituted by human reason, for all human communities exist in reference to it. Furthermore, every whole that is constituted through the mechanical arts from objects that have come into human use is ordered towards human beings as toward an end. Therefore, if a more governing science is that of the more noble and more perfected things, it is necessary that political science, among all the practical sciences, is a more governing science, and architectonic of all the others, inasmuch as it studies the last and perfect good in human affairs. And because of this, the philosopher says at the end of the Ethics X that the philosophy concerned with human affairs is perfected in political science.

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Quarto ex praedictis accipere possumus modum et ordinem huiusmodi scientiae. Sicut enim scientiae speculativae quae de aliquo toto considerant, ex consideratione partium et principiorum notitiam de toto perficiunt passiones et operationes totius manifestando; sic et haec scientia principia et partes civitatis considerans de ipsa notitiam tradit, partes et passiones et operationes eius manifestans: et quia practica est, manifestat insuper quomodo singula perfici possunt: quod est necessarium in omni practica scientia.

Fourth, from what has been said we can gather the method and order of this sort of science. For just as the speculative sciences—which consider some whole—perfect the knowledge of the whole by clarifying the experiences and works of the whole, through a consideration of its parts and its principles, so also does this science deliver knowledge about the city by considering its principles and parts, thereby clarifying its parts and experiences and works. And because it is practical, it additionally clarifies how each particular can be perfected, as is necessary in all the practical sciences.

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Book 1

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Lecture 1/a

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Quoniam omnem civitatem videmus communitatem quandam existentem, et omnem communitatem boni alicuius institutam, eius enim quod videtur boni gratia omnia operantur omnes, manifestum quod omnes quidem bonum aliquod coniecturant.

Since we see every city existing as a community of some kind, and every community is instituted for the sake of some good (for everyone always works for the sake of what seems good to them) it is clear that every city aims at some good.

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Maxime autem principalissimum omnium, omnium maxime principalis, et omnes alias circumplectens, haec autem est quae vocatur civitas et communicatio politica.

And the most governing community aims at the most governing good of all, and embraces all others. Now this is what is called the city, and the political union.

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Quicumque quidem igitur existimant politicum et regale et yconomicum et despoticum idem, non bene dicunt.

Anyone, therefore, who thinks that the political, the kingly, the economic and the despotic are the same does not speak well.

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Multitudine enim et paucitate putant differre, sed non specie horum unumquodque, puta si quidem paucorum patrem familias, si autem plurium yconomum, si autem adhuc plurium politicum aut regale; tanquam nihil differentem magnam domum et parvam civitatem, et politicum et regale; quando quidem ipse praeest regale, quando autem secundum sermones disciplinae talis secundum partem principans et subiectus, politicum.

For they believe them to differ by multitude or fewness, but not in kind. For example, if over a few, it is a paterfamilias; if over more, it is economic; over a still larger number, it is political or kingly, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small city. And [they think] the difference between the political and the kingly is, when the one himself is foremost, it is kingly; when, according to a discipline's discourses, such a one is partly governor and subject, it is political.

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Haec autem non sunt vera. Manifestum autem erit quod dicitur intendentibus secundum subiectam methodum. Sicut enim in aliis compositum usque ad incomposita necesse dividere, haec enim minimae partes totius, sic et civitatem ex quibus componitur considerantes videbimus et de his magis quidque differunt ab invicem, et si quid artificiale contingit accipere circa unumquodque dictorum. Si quis enim ex principio res nascentes viderit, quemadmodum et in aliis et in his optime utique sic contemplabitur.

Now these things are not true. And the things said will be clear to those inquiring according to the method of the subject. As in other areas, it is necessary to divide what is composite into what is not composite; for these are the smallest parts of the whole. So, also, considering those things from which the city is composed, we will see also about these things [i.e. the different kinds of rule] in what they differ from each other, and whether anything might be artfully grasped concerning each of the things that was said. For if anyone, from the beginning, will look to nascent things, then in the same way in other things and also in these, he will best contemplate both.

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Necesse itaque primum combinare sine invicem non possibiles esse, puta feminam et masculum generationis gratia; et hoc non ex electione, sed sicut in aliis animalibus et plantis naturale appetere quale ipsum tale derelinquere alterum.

So first, it is necessary to combine what cannot exist without each other, namely, female and male, for the sake of generation. And this is not by choice, but as with the other animals and with plants, from a natural appetite to leave behind another like oneself.

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Principans autem et subiectum natura propter salutem. Quod quidem enim potest mente praevidere principans natura et dominans natura. Quod autem potest haec corpore facere subiectum et natura servum; propter quod domino et servo idem expedit.

And the natural governor and subject are for the sake of preservation. For that which can foresee by the mind is by nature the governor and master, and that which can enact this with its body is a subject, and by nature a slave. Hence the same thing is advantageous for both master and slave.

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Natura quidem igitur distinguntur femina et servum. Nihil enim natura facit tale quale eris figuratores delficum gladium paupere sed unum ad unum. Sic enim utique perficiet optime organorum unumquodque non multis operibus, sed uni serviens.

Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For nature makes nothing as did the smith of the Delphian knife, from poverty, but for one thing; for every tool is best made when it is thus at the service of one, and not of many works.

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Inter barbaros autem femina et servum eundem habent ordinem.

But among barbarians, women and slaves are in the same order.

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Causa autem quia natura principans non habent, sed fit communicatio ipsorum servae et servi; propter quod dicunt poetae: barbaris quidem Grecos principari congrue, tanquam sit idem natura barbarum et servum.

The reason is because they do not have a natural governor among them, but they are a union of slaves, male and female. Because of this, the poets say, It is fitting that Greeks should govern barbarians¹; as though the nature of barbarian and slave were the same.

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Ex his quidem igitur duabus communitatibus domus prima; et recte Hesiodus dixit poetizans: domum quidem praeminentem mulieremque et bovem aratorem, bos enim pro ministro pauperibus est.

Out of these two communities comes the first home, and Hesiod is correct when he says poetically, First home and wife and an ox for the plough,¹ for the ox stands in as a servant for the poor.

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In omnem quidem igitur diem constituta communitas secundum naturam domus est, quos Charondas quidem vocat homosipyos, Epimenides autem okres homokapnos.

Therefore, the community constituted for every day, according to nature, is the home, which indeed Charondas called homosipyos [of one dish], but Epimenides of Ocres [sic] called homokapnos [of one smoke].

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Ex pluribus autem domibus communicatio prima usus non diurnalis gratia vicus.

From several homes, the first union for the sake of non-daily use is the village.

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Maxime autem videtur secundum naturam vicus vicinia domuum esse, quos vocant quidam collactaneos puerosque et puerorum pueros.

And the village that seems most according to nature seems to be a neighborhood of homes, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.'

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Propter quod et primum rege regebantur civitates et nunc adhuc gentes, ex subiectis enim regi, omnis enim domus regitur a senissimo. Quare et viciniae propter cognationem, et hoc est quod dicit Homerus: leges statuit unusquisque pueris et uxoribus, dispersim enim et sic antiquitus habitabant.

And because of this, cities were first ruled by kings, as tribes are still, from being subjected to a king; for every home is ruled by the eldest, which is why it happened in the neighborhoods on account of consanguinity. As Homer says: Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.¹ For they lived dispersedly, as was the habit in ancient times.

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Et deos autem propter hoc omnes dicunt regi, quia et ipsi hii quidem adhuc et nunc, hii autem antiquitus regebantur. Sicut autem et species sibi ipsis assimilant homines, sic et vitas deorum.

Wherefore men say that the gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For human beings project themselves not only upon the forms of the Gods, but also on their ways of life.

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His igitur praelibatis, sciendum est quod Aristotiles in hoc libro praemittit quoddam prohemium in quo manifestat intentionem huius scientiae;

After these preliminary remarks, it should be understood that Aristotle introduces this book with a prologue in which he first clarifies the intention of this science;

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et deinde accedit ad propositum manifestandum, ibi quoniam autem manifestum ex quibus partibus etc.

and then he proceeds to clarify what he has proposed, at: quoniam autem manifestum ex quibus partibus.

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Circa primum duo facit:

Concerning the first point he does two things.

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primo ostendit dignitatem civitatis de qua est politica ex eius fine;

First, he shows the dignity of the city, which political science is about, from its end;

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secundo ostendit comparationem civitatis ad alias communitates, ibi quicumque quidem igitur etc.

second, he compares the city to the other communities, at quicumque quidem igitur.

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Circa primum duo intendit probare:

Concerning the first point he intends to prove two things.

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quorum primum est quod civitas ordinetur ad aliquod bonum sicut ad finem;

The first is that the city is ordered to some good as to an end.

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secundo quod bonum ad quod ordinatur civitas sit principalissimum inter bona humana, ibi maxime autem principalissimum etc.

Second, that the good to which the city is ordered is the most governing of all human goods, at and the most governing community of all.

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Circa primum ponit talem rationem. Omnis communitas est instituta gratia alicuius boni; sed omnis civitas est communitas quaedam, ut manifeste videmus: ergo omnis civitas est instituta gratia alicuius boni. Quia igitur minor manifestatur, maiorem sic probat. Omnes homines omnia quae faciunt operantur gratia eius quod videtur bonum, sive sit vere bonum sive non; sed omnis communitas est instituta aliquo operante: ergo omnes communitates coniectant aliquod bonum, id est intendunt aliquod bonum sicut finem.

Concerning the first, he puts forward this kind of argument. Every community has been instituted for the sake of some good. But every city is some community, as we clearly see. Therefore every city has been instituted for the sake of some good. Since, then, the minor premise is evident, he proves the major like this: all men work on all things that they do for the sake of what seems good (it may either be truly good or not). But every community is instituted by someone working. Therefore all communities aim at some good, that is, they intend some good as an end.

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Deinde cum dicit maxime autem etc., ostendit quod illud bonum ad quod ordinatur civitas est principalissimum inter bona humana, tali ratione. Si omnis communitas ordinatur ad bonum, necesse est quod illa communitas quae est maxime principalis maxime sit coniectatrix boni quod est inter omnia humana bona principalissimum; oportet enim quod proportio eorum quae sunt ad finem sit secundum proportionem finium. Quae autem communitas sit maxime principalis, manifestat per hoc quod addit et omnes alias circumplectens. Est enim communitas quoddam totum. In omnibus autem totis talis ordo invenitur quod illud totum quod in se includit aliud totum principalius est; sicut paries est quoddam totum, et quia includitur in hoc toto quod est domus, manifestum est quod domus est principalius totum: et similiter communitas quae includit alias communitates est principalior. Manifestum est autem quod civitas includit omnes alias communitates, nam et domus et vici sub civitate comprehenduntur; et sic ipsa communitas politica est communitas principalissima: est ergo coniectatrix principalissimi boni inter omnia bona humana. Intendit enim bonum commune, quod est melius et divinius quam bonum unius, ut dicitur in principio Ethicorum.

Then, where he says and the most governing [community] of all, he shows that the good to which the city is ordered is the most governing among human goods, with the following reasoning. If every community is ordered to a good, it is necessary that the community that is the most governing would be the one that most intends the good that is the most governing good among all human goods. For the proportion between things that are each toward an end must follow the proportion between their ends. Moreover, he clarifies which community is the most governing by what he adds: and embraces all others. For a community is some whole, but in every whole is found an order such that the whole which contains another within itself is more governing—just as a wall is a certain whole, and because it is contained within the whole that is the house, it is clear that the house is the more governing whole. Likewise, the community which contains other communities is the more governing community. Moreover, it is clear that the city contains all other communities, because households and villages are bound together under the city, and in this way the political community itself is the most governing community. It is therefore the one that intends the most governing good among all human goods: for it intends the common good, which is better and more godlike than the good of one, as is said at the beginning of the Ethics.

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Deinde cum dicit quicumque quidem igitur etc., comparat civitatem ad alias communitates. Et circa hoc tria facit:

Then, where he says quicumque quidem igitur, he compares the city to the other communities. Concerning this he does three things.

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primo ponit quorundam falsam opinionem;

First, he puts forward the false opinion of some people.

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secundo ostendit quo modo positae opinionis falsitas innotescere possit, ibi haec autem non sunt vera etc.;

Second, he shows how the falsity of the opinion that he put forward can be discovered, at, haec autem non sunt vera, etc.

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tertio secundum assignatum modum ponit veram comparationem civitatis ad alias communitates, ibi necesse itaque primum combinare.

Third, in the way mentioned, he puts forward the true comparison of the city to the other communities, at: necesse itaque primum combinare.

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Circa primum duo facit:

Concerning this he does two things.

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primo ponit falsam opinionem;

First, he lays out a false opinion;

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secundo inducit eorum rationem, ibi multitudine enim et paucitate etc.

second, he introduces their reasoning, at: multitudine enim et paucitate, etc.

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Circa primum considerandum est quod duplex est communitas omnibus manifesta, scilicet civitatis et domus. Civitas autem duplici regimine regitur, scilicet politico et regali: regale quidem est regimen quando ille qui civitati praeest habet plenariam potestatem, politicum autem regimen est quando ille qui praeest habet potestatem coartatam secundum aliquas leges civitatis. Et similiter duplex est regimen domus, scilicet yconomicum et despoticum: despota quidem vocatur omnis habens servos, yconomus autem vocatur procurator et dispensator alicuius familiae; unde despoticum regimen est quo aliquis dominus suis servis praesidet, yconomicum autem regimen est quo aliquis dispensat ea quae pertinent ad totam familiam, in qua continentur non solum servi sed etiam liberi multi. Posuerunt ergo quidam, sed non bene, quod ista regimina non differunt sed sunt omnino idem.

Concerning the first of these, one should consider that the community is of two sorts, clear to everyone: that of the city and that of the household. The city, moreover, is ruled by two sorts of rule: the political and the kingly. There is a kingly rule when he who is foremost in the city has a fullness of power. There is political rule, however, when he who is foremost in the city has power that is confined by the laws of the city. And likewise, the rule of the household has two sorts, that is, the economic and the despotic. For all who have slaves are called despots, but the one who acquires and organizes [the goods] of a family is called a manager. So a despotic rule is one where a master commands his slaves; an economic rule is one where someone organizes those who belong to the whole family, which encompasses not only slaves, but also many who are free. Now some people have maintained, though not well, that such rules are not different from each other, but are entirely the same.

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Deinde cum dicit multitudine enim et paucitate etc., ponit rationem eorum, quae talis est. Quaecumque differunt solum multitudine et paucitate non differunt specie, quia differentia quae est secundum magis et minus non diversificat speciem; sed praedicta regimina differunt solum multitudine et paucitate: quod sic manifestabant. Si enim communitas quae regitur sit paucorum, sicut in aliqua parva domo, ille qui praeest dicitur paterfamilias ad quem pertinet despoticus principatus; si autem sit plurium ita quod non solum contineat servos sed etiam multitudinem liberorum, dicitur ille qui praeest yconomus; si autem sit adhuc plurium, puta non solum eorum qui sunt unius domus sed unius civitatis, tunc dicitur regimen politicum aut regale.

Then, where he says multitudinem enim et paucitate, he posits their reasoning, which is as follows. Whatever differs only by multitude and fewness is not different in kind, because difference according to more and less does not make things vary in kind. But the aforementioned regimes differ only by multitude and fewness, which they used to explain like this: if a community which is ruled is of few people, as in a small household, he who is foremost is called the paterfamilias, to whom belongs a despotic mode of government. If, however, the community is of many people, such that it encompasses not only slaves but also many of the free, it is said that he who is foremost is an economic [ruler]. But if it is of still more people, it is thought to be not only of those who are of one household, but of one city, and then it is called a political—or kingly—rule.

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Quod quidem dicebant tanquam nihil differret domus a civitate nisi magnitudine et parvitate, ita quod magna domus sit parva civitas et e converso: quod ex sequentibus patet esse falsum. Similiter etiam politicum et regale regimen ponebant differre solum multitudine et paucitate. Quando enim ipse homo praeest simpliciter et secundum omnia, dicitur regimen regale. Quando autem praeest secundum sermones disciplinales, id est secundum leges positas per disciplinam politicam, est regimen politicum: quasi secundum partem principetur, quantum ad ea scilicet quae eius potestati subsunt, et secundum partem sit subiectus quantum ad ea in quibus subicitur legi. Ex quibus omnibus concludebant quod omnia praedicta regimina, quorum quaedam pertinent ad civitatem quaedam ad domum, non differant specie.

Which, indeed, they used to say—as though a household differed from a city by nothing except greatness and smallness, so that a big household is a small city, and the converse. From what follows, it will be apparent that this is false. Likewise, they also used to posit that political and kingly rules differ only by multitude and fewness. For when a human being is foremost simply and according to all things, it is called a kingly rule. When, however, he is foremost according to the discipline's discourses, that is, according to the laws put in place through the discipline of politics, the rule is political, as though he were in part governor, namely, as regards those things that come under his power, and were in part subject, namely, in those things to which he is subjected by the laws. From all of this they concluded that none of the aforementioned rules—some of which belong to the city, some to the household—are different from each other in kind.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit haec autem non sunt vera etc., ostendit modum manifestandi falsitatem praedictae opinionis. Et dicit quod ea quae dicta sunt non sunt vera; et hoc erit manifestum si quis velit intendere secundum subiectam methodum, id est secundum artem considerandi talia quae infra ponetur. Modus autem huius artis est talis quod, sicut in aliis rebus, ad cognitionem totius necesse est dividere compositum usque ad incomposita, id est usque ad indivisibilia quae sunt minimae partes totius: puta ad cognoscendum orationem necesse est dividere usque ad litteras, et ad cognoscendum corpus naturale mixtum necesse est dividere usque ad elementa; sic si consideremus ex quibus civitas componatur, magis poterimus videre de praemissis regiminibus quid unumquodque sit secundum se, et quid differant ad invicem, et utrum aliquid circa unumquodque eorum possit artificialiter considerari. In omnibus enim ita videmus quod si quis inspiciat res secundum quod oriuntur ex suo principio, optime poterit in eis contemplari veritatem; et hoc sicut est verum in aliis rebus, ita etiam est verum in his de quibus intendimus. In his autem verbis philsophi considerandum est quod ad cognitionem compositorum primo opus est via resolutionis, ut scilicet dividamus compositum usque ad individua; postmodum vero necessaria est via compositionis, ut ex principiis indivisibilibus iam notis diiudicemus de rebus quae ex principiis causantur.

Then, where he says haec autem non sunt vera, he shows the method for displaying the falseness of the aforementioned opinions, and he says that those who spoke like this did not speak truly. And this will be clear if anyone wishes to inquire according to the proper method of the subject, that is, according to the art of considering such things, which will be put forth below. But the method of this art is the following: that just as with other objects, to have knowledge of a whole it is necessary to divide what is composite into to those things incomposite, that is, until we reach those things that cannot be divided, which are the smallest parts of the whole. For example, to know a sentence, it is necessary to divide the sentence into its letters, and to know a naturally mixed body, it is necessary to divide the body into its elements. In this way, if we were considering those things from which the city is composed, we would be able to see in the aforementioned regimes what each one is according to itself, and what makes each one differ from the others, and whether someone could consider each of these things artfully. For in all things we see it is thus: that if someone looks into affairs with respect to how they have arisen from their principle, he will best be able to contemplate the truth in them. And just as this is true in other affairs, so also is it true in these things about which we are inquiring. But with these words of the philosopher, we must consider that to have knowledge about composite things, the first work is to take the path of disentangling, namely, to divide what is composite into what cannot be divided. Afterward, indeed, it is necessary to take the path of composition, so that from principles now known that cannot be divided, we may discern the things that are caused by the principles.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit necesse itaque primum combinare etc., secundum praemissum modum ponit veram comparationem aliarum communitatum ad civitatem. Et circa hoc duo facit:

Then, where he says necesse itaque primum combinare, using the method that was introduced, he lays out the true relation between the other communities and the city, and he does two things in this regard.

Polit.L1

primo agit de aliis communitatibus quae ordinantur ad civitatem;

First, he deals with the other communities that are ordered toward the city;

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secundo de communitate civitatis, ibi quae autem ex pluribus vicis.

and second, of the community of the city, at: quae autem ex pluribus vicis.

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Circa primum tria facit:

Concerning the first he does three things.

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primo proponit communitatem personae ad personam;

First, he puts forward the community of person to person;

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secundo ponit communitatem domus, quae complectitur diversas personarum communicationes, ibi ex his quidem igitur duabus etc.;

second, he puts forward the community of the household, which entwines together several distinct unions of persons, at: ex his quidem igitur duabus.

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tertio ponit communitatem vici quae est ex pluribus multitudinibus, ibi ex pluribus autem domibus etc.

Third, he puts forward the community of the village, which is from several multitudes, at: ex pluribus autem domibus.

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Circa primum duo facit:

Concerning the first, he does two things.

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primo ponit duas communicationes personales;

First, he puts forward two personal unions;

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secundo comparat eas ad invicem, ibi natura quidem igitur etc.

second, he compares these to each other, at: natura quidem igitur, etc.

Polit.L1

Duarum autem communicationum personalium primo ponit eam quae est maris et feminae. Et dicit quod quia oportet nos dividere civitatem usque ad partes minimas, necesse est dicere quod prima combinatio est personarum quae sine invicem esse non possunt, scilicet maris et feminae; huiusmodi enim combinatio est propter generationem per quam producuntur et mares et feminae, et ex hoc patet quod sine invicem esse non possunt.

Moreover, of the two personal unions, he first puts forward that of the male and female: and he says that because we must divide the city into its smallest parts, it is necessary to say that the first combination is of persons who cannot exist without each other, namely, male and female. For combining in this way is for the sake of generation, through which both males and females are produced--and from this it is evident that they are not able to exist without each other.

Polit.L1

Sed quare ista combinatio sit prima, ostendit per hoc quod subdit quod non ex electione. Ubi considerandum est quod in homine est aliquid quod est proprium eius, scilicet ratio secundum quam ei competit quod et consilio et electione agat. Invenitur etiam aliquid in homine quod est commune ei et aliis, et huiusmodi est generare; hoc igitur non competit ei ex electione, id est secundum quod habet rationem eligentem, sed competit ei secundum rationem communem sibi et animalibus et etiam plantis. Omnibus enim his inest naturalis appetitus ut post se derelinquat alterum tale quale ipsum est, ut sic per generationem conservetur in specie quod idem numero conservari non potest. Est quidem igitur huiusmodi naturalis appetitus etiam in omnibus aliis rebus naturalibus corruptibilibus. Sed quia et viventia, scilicet plantae et animalia, habent specialem modum generandi ut scilicet generent ex se ipsis, ideo specialiter de plantis et animalibus mentionem facit; nam etiam in plantis invenitur vis masculina et feminina, sed coniuncta in eodem individuo, licet in uno habundet plus una, in alio altera: ita scilicet ut imaginemur plantam omni tempore esse talem qualia sunt mas et femina tempore coitus.

He shows why this combination is first by what he adds: and this is not by choice. Here one must consider that in the human being, there is something that is proper to him, namely, reason, whereby he is suited to act from counsel and by choice. One also finds in the human being something that is common both to him and to others, and generation is of this sort. Therefore, this is not suited for them by choice--that is, because he has rational choice--but it is suited for him for a reason common to both him and the animals and even the plants. For innate to all of these is the natural appetite to leave behind another thing such as themselves, so that in this way what cannot be preserved in the same individual may be preserved in species. Therefore, this sort of natural appetite is also in all other naturally corruptible things. But because living beings, namely plants and animals, have a specific method of generation, namely, that they generate from themselves, he therefore makes particular mention of plants and animals. For even in plants is found masculine and feminine force, but yoked together in the same individual, although in one there abounds more of one, in another of the other; such that we may thus imagine that a plant is at all times in the same state as the male and female at the time of intercourse.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit principans autem etc., ponit secundam communicationem personarum, scilicet principantis et subiecti; et haec etiam communicatio est a natura propter salutem: natura enim non solum intendit generationem, sed etiam quod generata salventur. Et quod hoc quidem contingat in hominibus per communicationem principantis et subiecti, ostendit per hoc quod ille est naturaliter principans et dominans qui suo intellectu potest praevidere ea quae congruunt saluti, puta consequendo proficua et repellendo nociva. Ille autem qui potest per fortitudinem corporis implere opere quod sapiens mente praeviderit, est naturaliter subiectus et servus. Ex quo patet quod idem expedit utrique ad salutem, scilicet quod iste principetur et ille subiciatur; ille enim qui propter sapientiam potest mente praevidere, interdum salvari non posset deficientibus viribus corporis nisi haberet servum qui exequeretur, nec ille qui habundat viribus corporis posset salvari nisi alterius prudentia regeretur.

Then, where he says and the natural governor, he sets out the second union of persons, namely of the governor and the subject: and even this union is from nature for the sake of preservation. For nature not only intends generation, but also that the thing generated be preserved. And that this happens, for men, through the union of the governor and the subject he shows through this: that the one is naturally governor and master who in his own understanding can foresee those things fitting for preservation--by pursuing what is beneficial, for instance, and shunning what is harmful. But he who by bodily fortitude can fulfill through work what the wise man foresaw through mind is naturally a subject and slave. From this it is clear that the same thing profits both for the sake of preservation, namely, that the former should govern and the latter be subject. For there are times when he who because of wisdom can foresee through mind would not be able to be preserved, since he lacks bodily fortitude, unless he had a slave who executed things; nor could he who abounds in bodily strength be preserved unless he were ruled by the prudence of another.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit natura quidem igitur etc., comparat praedictas communicationes ad invicem. Et primo secundum veritatem; secundo excludit errorem, ibi inter barbaros autem etc. Concludit ergo primo ex praedictis quod femina et servus naturaliter distinguntur. Femina enim naturaliter est disposita ad generandum ex alio; non autem est robusta corpore, quod requiritur in servo: et sic praedictae duae communicationes ab invicem differunt.

Then, where he says now nature has distinguished, he compares the aforementioned unions to each other: first, according to the truth; second, he excludes an error, at inter barbaros autem, etc. Therefore, he first concludes from what has been mentioned that a woman and a slave are naturally distinguished from each other. For the woman is naturally disposed for generating from another, but is not hard of body, which is required in a slave. And thus the two aforementioned unions differ from each other.

Polit.L1

Causas autem praemissae distinctionis assignat ex hoc quod natura non facit aliquid tale sicut illi qui fabricant ex aere, id est ex metallo, delphicum gladium pro aliquo paupere; apud Delphos enim fiebant quidam gladii quorum unus ad plura ministeria deputabatur, puta si unus gladius esset ad incidendum, ad limandum et ad aliqua alia huiusmodi: et hoc fiebat propter pauperes qui non poterant plura instrumenta habere. Natura autem sic non facit ut unum ordinet ad diversa officia, sed unum deputat ad unum officium; et propter hoc femina non deputatur a natura ad serviendum, sed ad generandum: sic enim optime fient omnia quando unum instrumentum non deservit multis operibus, sed uni tantum. Sed hoc est intelligendum quando accideret impedimentum in utroque vel altero duorum operum quibus idem instrumentum attribueretur, ut puta si oporteret utrumque opus frequenter simul exercere; si autem per vices diversa opera exerceantur, nullum impedimentum sequitur si unum instrumentum pluribus operibus accommodetur. Unde et lingua congruit in duo opera naturae, scilicet in gustum et locutionem, ut dicitur in III De anima; non enim haec duo opera secundum idem tempus sibi invicem coincidunt.

Moreover, he indicates the causes of these aforementioned distinctions from this: that nature does not make something in the way of those who manufactured from bronze (that is, from metal) the Delphic knife, from a sort of poverty. For among the Delphians there came to be some knives, of which one would be designed for several services--as if one knife should be for cutting, filing, and for other things of this sort. And this came to be because of the poor, who were not able to have several instruments. But nature does not make thus, so that one thing is ordered toward various offices; but it designs one thing for one office. And because of this, a woman is not designed by nature for slavery, but for generating; for all things best come to be when one instrument is at the service of only one work, and not many. But it should be understood that when this happens, an impediment occurs in one or both of two works for which the same instrument was dedicated--if, for instance, it were necessary for each work to be frequently exercised at the same time, though if the works are exercised in turns, no impediment follows--if one instrument were adapted [accommodo] for several works. Hence the tongue is fit for two works of nature, namely, for taste and speech, as is said in De Anima Bk. III. For these two works do not coincide with each other at the same time.

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Deinde cum dicit inter barbaros autem etc., excludit errorem contrarium.

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Et primo ponit errorem;

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secundo ostendit causam erroris, ibi causa autem quia natura etc.

Polit.L1

Dicit ergo primo quod apud barbaros femina et servus habentur quasi eiusdem ordinis; utuntur enim feminis quasi servis. Potest autem hic esse dubium qui dicantur barbari. Dicunt enim quidam omnem hominem barbarum esse ei qui linguam eius non intelligit; unde et apostolus dicit: si nesciero virtutem vocis, ero ei cui loquar barbarus, et qui loquitur mihi barbarus. Quibusdam autem videtur illos barbaros dici qui non habent litteralem locutionem suo vulgali ydiomati respondentem; unde et Beda dicitur in linguam anglicam liberales artes transtulisse ne anglici barbari reputarentur. Quibusdam autem videtur barbaros esse eos qui ab aliquibus civilibus legibus non reguntur.

Polit.L1

Et quidem omnia aliqualiter ad veritatem accedunt. In nomine enim barbari extraneum aliquid intelligitur. Potest enim aliquis homo extraneus dici vel simpliciter, vel quoad aliquem. Simpliciter quidem extraneus videtur ab humano genere, qui deficit ratione secundum quam homo dicitur: et ideo simpliciter barbari nominantur illi qui ratione deficiunt, vel propter plagam caeli quam intemperatam sortiuntur, ut ex ipsa dispositione regionis hebetes ut plurimum inveniantur; vel etiam propter aliquam malam consuetudinem in aliquibus terris existentem, ex qua provenit ut homines irrationales et quasi brutales reddantur. Manifestum est autem quod ex virtute rationis procedit quod homines rationabili iure regantur et quod in litteris exercitentur: unde barbaries convenienter hoc signo declaratur quod homines vel non utuntur legibus, vel irrationabilibus utuntur; et similiter quod apud aliquas gentes non sint exercitia litterarum. Sed quoad aliquem dicitur esse extraneus qui cum eo non communicat; maxime autem homines nati sunt sibi communicare per sermonem, et secundum hoc illi qui suum invicem sermonem non intelligunt barbari ad se ipsos dici possunt. Philosophus autem loquitur hic de his qui sunt simpliciter barbari.

And indeed, all of these things fall close to the truth in some way. For in the name of “barbarian” is understood something foreign--and a human being can be called foreign either simply or in relation to another. Simply, indeed, someone seems foreign to the human family [genus] who lacks reason, according to which someone is called human; and therefore, they are named barbarians simply who lack reason either from the blows of the heavens--those cast into intemperate regions, such that they are dulled by the very disposition of the region, as is found with many people--or also because of some evil custom existing in certain lands, by which it comes about that human beings return to irrational and almost brutish ways. But it is clear that from the virtue of reason it follows that men are ruled by what is rationally right [rationabili iure], and that they are exercised in writing. Hence barbarism is fittingly revealed by this sign: that men either do not use laws or they use them irrationally: and similarly, that among some peoples there is not the exercise of writing. But he is called a foreigner in relation to another who cannot communicate with him. But human beings are most of all born to communicate with each other through discourse: and according to this, those who cannot understand one another’s discourse can be called barbarians in relation to each other. But the philosopher is speaking here about those who are barbarians simply speaking.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit causa autem, assignat causam praedicti erroris; et dicit quod causa eius est quia apud barbaros non est principatus secundum naturam. Dictum est enim supra quod principans secundum naturam est qui potest mente praevidere, servus autem qui potest corpore exequi; barbari autem ut plurimum inveniuntur corpore robusti et mente deficientes: et ideo apud eos non potest esse naturalis ordo principatus et subiectionis, sed apud ipsos fit quaedam communicatio servae et servi, id est communiter utuntur serva, scilicet muliere, et servo. Et quia naturaliter non est principatus in barbaris sed in hiis qui mente habundant, propter hoc dicunt poetae quod congruum quod Greci, qui sapientia praediti erant, principentur barbaris: ac si idem sit naturaliter esse barbarum et esse servum. Cum autem e converso est, sequitur perversio et inordinatio in mundo, secundum illud Salomonis: vidi servos in equis, et principes ambulantes sicut servos super terram.

Then, where he says this is the cause, he indicates the cause of the aforementioned error, and says that the cause of it is because among the barbarians there is no natural government. For he said above that a natural governor is the one who is able to foresee with his mind, and the slave is the one who is able to execute with his body. But the barbarians are found for the most part to be hard of body and lacking in mind. And therefore among them there cannot be a natural order of government and subjection. But among them there comes to be a certain union of male and female slaves, that is, they generally make use of male and female slaves. And because there is no natural government among the barbarians, but only among those who abound in mind, because of this the poet says it is fitting that the Greeks who were gifted with wisdom should govern the barbarians: and thus it would be naturally the same to be barbarian and slave. But when the converse happens, what follows is perversion and a lack of order in the world, after the words of Solomon: I saw slaves on horses, and princes walking like slaves over the earth.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit ex hiis quidem igitur etc., determinat de communitate domus, quae constituitur ex pluribus communicationibus personalibus. Et circa hoc tria facit:

Then, where he says ex his quidem igitur etc., he determines the household community, which is constituted out of several personal unions. Concerning this he does three things.

Polit.L1

primo ostendit ex quibus consistat ista communitas;

First, he shows from what this community is constructed;

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secundo ostendit ad quid sit, ibi in omnem quidem igitur etc.;

second, he shows what it exists for, at: in omnem quidem igitur, etc.;

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tertio ostendit quo modo nominantur qui in hac communitate sunt, ibi quos Charondas quidem etc.

third, he shows how those in this community are named, at: quos Charondas quidem etc.

Polit.L1

Dicit ergo primo quod ex praedictis duabus communitatibus personalibus, quarum una est ad generationem, alia ad salutem, constituitur prima domus: oportet enim in domo esse virum et feminam, et dominum et servum. Ideo autem dicitur domus prima quia est et alia communicatio personalis quae invenitur in domo, scilicet patris et filii, quae ex prima causatur; unde primae duae sunt primordiales. Et ad hoc inducit verbum Hesiodi poetae, qui dixit quod domus habet haec tria: dominum qui praeeminet, et mulierem, et bovem ad arandum; in paupere enim domo bos est loco ministri, utitur enim homo bove ad exequendum aliquod opus sicut et ministro.

Therefore, he says first that from the two aforementioned personal communities, one of which is for generation, the other for safety, is constituted the first household. For in a household there must be man and woman, master, and slave. And it is thence called the first household, because there is also another communion of persons which is found in a household, namely, of father and son—which is caused by the first. Whence the first two are the primordial [primordiales] ones. And to show this, he references the word of the poet Hesiod, who said that the household has these three: the master who projects [praeeminet] forward, and a woman and an ox for plowing. For in a poor household, an ox takes the place of a servant. For man uses an ox for executing some work, like a servant.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit in omnem quidem igitur etc., ostendit ad quid ordinetur communitas domus. Ubi considerandum est quod omnis humana communicatio est secundum aliquos actus; actuum autem humanorum quidam sunt cotidiani sicut comedere, calefieri ad ignem et alia huiusmodi; quidam autem non sunt cotidiani, sicut mercari, pugnare et alia huiusmodi. Naturale est autem hominibus ut in utroque genere operum sibi communicent se invicem iuvantes; et ideo dicit quod nihil aliud est domus quam quaedam communitas secundum naturam constituta in omnem diem, id est ad actus qui occurrunt cotidie agendi. Et hoc manifestat consequenter per nomina: quidam enim Charondas nomine nominat eos qui communicant in domo homostitios, quasi unius pulmenti, quia communicant in cibo; quidam autem alius nomine Epimenides, natione ocres, vocat eos homocapnos, quasi unius fumi, quia sedent ad eundem ignem.

Then, where he says in omnem quidem igitur, etc., he shows what the community of the household is ordered toward. Here one must consider that every human union is for certain acts. Some human acts are daily, such as eating, warming by the fire, and others of this sort. Some, however, are not daily, such as selling, fighting, and others of this sort. Now it is natural for men to unite with each other in both kinds [genera] of work, helping each other. And therefore he says that the household is nothing other than some community according to nature constituted for everyday life, that is, for acts that have to be acted daily. And this is clear, consequently, through the name. For a certain man named Charondas named those who unite in the household homostitios, as if of one dish, because they unite through food. But a certain other named Epimenides, of the nation of Ocres, called them homocapnos, as if of one smoke, because they sit at the same fire.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit ex pluribus autem domibus etc., ponit tertiam communitatem, scilicet vici.

Then, where he says ex pluribus autem domibus, etc., he lays out the third community, namely the village.

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Et primo ostendit ex quibus sit ista communitas et propter quid;

And first he shows from what this community [is made] and because of what.

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secundo ostendit quod sit naturalis, ibi maxime autem videtur etc.

Second, he shows that it is natural, at maxime autem videtur, etc.

Polit.L1

Dicit ergo primo quod prima communicatio quae est ex pluribus domibus vocatur vicus; et dicitur prima ad differentiam secundae quae est civitas. Haec autem communitas non est constituta in diem sicut dicit de domo, sed est instituta gratia usus non diurnalis; illi enim qui sunt convicanei non communicant sibi in actibus cotidianis, in quibus communicant sibi illi qui sunt unius domus, sicut est comedere, sedere ad ignem et huiusmodi: sed communicant sibi in aliquibus exterioribus actibus non cotidianis.

Hence, he first says that the first union which is from several households is called a village: and it is said to be first to set it apart from the second, which is the city. But this community is not constituted for daily life as he said of the household, but is founded for the sake of employment that is not daily. For those who are neighbors do not unite with each other in the daily acts in which those who are of one household unite with each other, such as eating, sitting by the fire, and things of this sort: but they unite with each other in certain exterior acts that are not daily.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit maxime autem videtur etc., ostendit quod communitas vici sit naturalis.

Then where he says maxime autem videtur, etc., he shows that the community of the village is natural.

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Et primo ostendit propositum per rationem;

And first he shows the proposition through reason.

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secundo per quaedam signa, ibi propter quod et primum etc.

Second, through a certain sign, at propter quod et primum, etc.

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Dicit ergo primo quod vicinia domorum quae est vicus maxime videtur esse secundum naturam. Nihil enim est magis naturale quam propagatio multorum ex uno in animalibus: et hoc facit viciniam domorum. Hos enim qui habent domos vicinas quidam vocant collactaneos puerosque, id est filios, et puerorum pueros, id est nepotes: ut intelligamus quod huiusmodi vicinia domorum ex hoc primo processit quod filii et nepotes multiplicati instituerunt diversas domos iuxta se habitantes. Unde cum multiplicatio prolis sit naturalis, sequitur quod communitas vici sit naturalis.

Hence, he says first that neighboring households, which is the village, seem to be according to nature most of all. For nothing is more natural among animals than producing [propago] many out of one, and this makes neighboring households. Indeed, some people call those who have neighborly households foster-brothers and children, that is, sons, and children of children, that is, grandchildren, such that we understand that neighboring households of this sort proceed out of this first: that multiplied sons and grandchildren instituted separate households, dwelling close to each other. Whence, since the multiplication of offspring is natural, it follows that the community of the village is natural.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod et primum etc., manifestat idem per signa.

Then, where he says propter quod et primum, etc., he clarifies the same thing through a sign.

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Et primo secundum ea quae videmus in hominibus;

And first, according to those things which we see in men.

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secundo secundum ea quae dicebantur de diis, ibi et deos autem propter hoc etc.

Second, according to those things that were said about the gods, at et deos autem propter hoc, etc.

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Dicit ergo primo quod quia ex multiplicatione prolis constituta est vicinia, ex hoc processit quod a principio quaelibet civitas regebatur rege, et adhuc aliquae gentes habent regem, etsi singulae civitates singulos reges non habeant; et hoc ideo quia civitates et gentes instituuntur ex hiis qui sunt subiecti regi. Quo modo autem hoc signum respondeat praemissis, ostendit per hoc quod subditur, quia omnis domus regitur ab aliquo antiquissimo sicut a patrefamilias reguntur filii. Et exinde contingit quod etiam tota vicinia quae erat instituta ex consanguineis, regebatur propter cognationem ab aliquo qui erat principalis in cognatione, sicut civitas regitur a rege. Unde Homerus dixit quod unusquisque uxori et pueris suis instituit leges sicut rex in civitate. Ideo autem hoc regimen a domibus et vicis processit ad civitates, quia diversi vici sunt sicut civitas dispersa in diversas partes; et ita antiquitus habitabant homines dispersi per vicos, non autem congregati in unam civitatem. Sic ergo patet quod regimen regis super civitatem vel gentem processit a regimine antiquioris in domo vel vico.

Therefore, he says first that because the village is constituted out of the multiplication of offspring, from this it proceeds that from its beginning [a principio], any city is ruled by a king. And up to this time, some peoples have a king, although different cities do not always have different kings. And this is because cities and peoples were instituted by those who were subject to a king. And how this sign corresponds to the aforementioned things he shows by what he says below: because every household is ruled by the one who is oldest, as sons are ruled by the father of the family. And from this it happens that even the whole neighborhood, which is instituted from blood relation, is ruled on account of kinship by someone who governed in kinship, just as a city is ruled by a king. Whence Homer said that each one institutes laws for his wife and children, just as the king in the city. But therefore, this rule proceeds from the household and the village to cities, because different villages are scattered into separate parts, as in the city. And therefore, of old, men dwelt scattered through villages, not yet gathered together into one city. Thus it is evident that the rule of a king over a city or people proceeds from the rule of the oldest in the household or village.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit et deos autem etc., ponit aliud signum per ea quae de diis dicebantur. Et dicit quod propter praemissa omnes gentiles dicebant quod eorum dii regebantur ab aliquo rege, dicentes Iovem esse regem deorum. Et hoc ideo quia homines adhuc aliqui regibus reguntur; antiquitus autem fere omnes regebantur regibus: hoc autem fuit primum regimen, ut infra dicetur. Homines autem sicut assimilant sibi species deorum, id est formas eorum, aestimantes deos esse in figura quorundam hominum: ita et assimilant sibi vitas deorum, id est conversationes, aestimantes eos conversari secundum quod vident conversari homines. Hic Aristotiles (deos) nominat more Platonicorum substantias separatas a materia, ab uno tamen summo Deo creatas; quibus gentiles erronee et formas et conversationes hominum attribuebant, ut hic philosophus dicit.

Then, where he says et deos autem, etc., he lays out another sign through what was said about the gods. And he says that because of the aforementioned things, all peoples used to say that their gods were ruled by some king, saying that Jove was the king of the gods. And this, because some men are still ruled by kings, but of old, almost all men were ruled by kings. And this was the first rule, as will be said later. But men, just as they make the appearance of the gods like themselves--that is, their forms--appraising that the gods are in the shape of certain men, so also they make the lives of the gods like their own, that is, their associations, deeming that they are associated in the manner that they see men are associated. Here Aristotle names as gods the substances separated from matter, according to the custom [mos] of the Platonists, created by the one, highest, and only God, to which substances the peoples erroneously annexed both the forms and the associations of men, as the philosopher here says.

Polit.L1

Lecture 1/b

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Quae autem ex pluribus vicis communitas perfecta civitas, iam omnis habens terminum per se sufficientiae, ut consequens est dicere, facta quidem igitur vivendi gratia, existens autem gratia bene vivendi.

Now what comes to be out of several villages, all now having the end of self-sufficiency, is the complete community, the city; which is to say, consequently, that it is made for the sake of living, and exists for the sake of living well.

Polit.L1

Propter quod omnis civitas natura est siquidem et primae communitates, finis enim ipsa illarum, natura autem finis est. Quale enim unumquodque est generatione perfecta, hanc dicimus naturam esse uniuscuiusque, sicut hominis, equi, domus.

Because of this, every city is natural if, indeed, the first communities are; for it is their end, and nature is the end. For as each thing is in its completed generation, this we say to be the nature of each thing, whether human beings, horses, or the household.

Polit.L1

Adhuc quod cuius gratia et finis optimum, per se sufficientia autem finis et optimum.

Moreover, what something is for the sake of and is an end is the best, but self-sufficiency is an end and the best.

Polit.L1

Ex hiis igitur manifestum quod eorum quae natura civitas est, et quod homo natura civile animal est, et qui incivilis propter naturam et non propter fortunam, aut pravus est, aut melior quam homo; quaemadmodum et qui ab Homero maledictus: insocialis, illegalis, sceleratus. Simul enim natura talis et belli affectator veluti sine iugo existens, sicut in volatilibus.

From this it is clear that the city is one of the things that is natural, and that man is by nature a civic animal. And he who is without a city by nature and not by fortune is either , is either crooked, or better than a man. Such is he whom Homer denounces: unsociable, lawless, evil. One with such a nature is like this and is bent on war, wishing to exist without any yoke, as do the wild birds.

Polit.L1

Quod autem civile animal homo omni ape et omni gregali animali magis palam. Nihil enim ut aimus frustra natura facit; sermonem autem solus habet homo supra animalia; vox quidem igitur delectabilis et tristabilis est signum, propter quod et aliis existit animalibus; usque enim ad hoc natura eorum pervenit, ut habeant sensum tristabilis et delectabilis et haec significent invicem. Sermo autem est in ostendendo conferens et nocivum. Quare et iustum et iniustum; hoc enim ad alia animalia hominibus proprium est solum boni et mali, iusti et iniusti, et aliorum sensum habere. Horum autem communicatio facit domum et civitatem.

Now, that man is more of a civic animal than the bees and all herd animals is very plain. For nature, as we say, makes nothing in vain, and only man has speech, beyond the animals; for the voice is, indeed, a sign of pleasure and sorrow, and because of this it exists among other animals; for their nature has reached the point at which it has the sense of sorrows and pleasures and they signify them to each other. But speech [exists] in showing the constructive and the harmful, and therefore, the just and the unjust; for among all the animals it is proper only to man to have a sense of good and evil, the just and the unjust, and the like. And union in such things produces the household and the city.

Polit.L1

Et prius itaque civitas quam domus et unusquisque nostrum est; totum enim prius necessarium esse parte. Interempto enim toto non erit pes neque manus nisi equivoce, velut si quis dicat lapideam: corrupta enim erit talis. Omnia enim opere diffinita sunt et virtute. Quare non iam talia existentia non dicendum eadem esse sed equivoca. Quod quidem igitur civitas natura et prior quam unusquisque manifestum. Si enim non per se sufficiens unusquisque segregatus, similiter aliis partibus se habebit ad totum. Non potens autem communicare aut nullo indigens propter per se sufficientiam, nulla pars est civitatis. Quare aut bestia aut deus.

Accordingly, the city is before the household, and before each one of us; for it is necessary that the whole be before the part. For if the whole [body] is destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except equivocally, as we might speak of a stone hand; for it will be like this if decayed, since all things are defined by their work and their virtue. This is why it will no longer have the same existence and will not be called the same thing, but will be named equivocally. So therefore, that the city is natural and is prior to each individual is clear. For each individual is not self-sufficient separately, and likewise, the other parts maintain themselves with reference to the whole. But he who is unable to unite with others or requires nothing because he is self-sufficient is no part of the city because he is either a beast or a god.

Polit.L1

Natura quidem igitur impetus in omnibus ad talem communitatem. Qui autem primus instituit maximorum bonorum causa. Sicut enim perfectum optimum animalium homo est, sic et separatum a lege et iustitia pessimum omnium. Sevissima enim iniustitia habens arma, homo autem habens arma nascitur prudentia et virtute, quibus ad contraria est uti maxime; propter quod scelestissimum et silvestrissimum sine virtute et ad venerea et voracitatem pessimum. Iustitia autem civile. Diki enim civilis communitatis ordo est. Diki autem iusti iudicium.

Moreover, nature puts an impulse in everyone toward such a community. But he who first instituted it was the cause of the greatest of goods. For just as man, when perfected, is the best of the animals, so also when he is separated from law and justice, he is the worst of them all. For armed injustice is the cruellest, and man is born with weapons to be used by prudence and virtue, which he may use to great effect for contrary ends; because of this, without virtue, man is the most evil and savage of animals, bent on lust and the most rapacious greed. But justice is civic. For dike is the order of the civic community, and dike is the judgment of the just.

Polit.L1

Quae autem ex pluribus vicis etc. Postquam philosophus determinavit de communitatibus ordinatis ad civitatem, hic determinat de ipsa communitate civitatis. Et dividitur in partes tres:

Quae autem ex pluribus vicis, etc. After the philosopher determines the communities ordered toward the city, he determines the community of the city itself. And it is divided into three parts.

Polit.L1

in prima ostendit qualis sit civitatis communitas;

First, he shows what kind of community the city is.

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secundo ostendit quod est naturalis, ibi propter quod omnis civitas etc;

Second, he shows that it is natural, at propter quod omnis civitas, etc.

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tertio agit de institutione civitatis, ibi natura igitur quidem etc.

Third, he treats of the institution of the city at natura igitur quidem, etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum ostendit conditionem civitatis quantum ad tria.

Concerning the first, he shows the condition of the city with reference [quantum] to three things.

Polit.L1

Primo ostendit ex quibus sit civitas: quia sicut vicus constituitur ex pluribus domibus, ita et civitas ex pluribus vicis.

First he shows out of what the city [has been made]. Because just as the village is constituted out of several households, so also is the city out of several villages.

Polit.L1

Secundo dicit quod civitas est communitas perfecta. Quod ex hoc probat quia, cum omnis communicatio omnium hominum ordinetur ad aliquid necessarium vitae, illa erit perfecta communitas quae ordinatur ad hoc quod homo habeat sufficienter quicquid est necessarium ad vitam. Talis autem est communitas civitatis; est enim de ratione civitatis quod in ea inveniantur omnia quae sufficiunt ad vitam humanam sicut contingit esse: et propter hoc componitur ex pluribus vicis in quorum uno exercetur ars fabrilis, in alio ars textoria, et sic de aliis. Unde manifestum est quod civitas est communitas perfecta.

Second, he says that the city is the perfect community, which he proves from this: since every union among all men is ordered toward something necessary for life, that community will be perfected which is ordered toward this: that men sufficiently have whatever is necessary for life; but such is the community of the city. For it is from the rationale for the city that in it will be found everything that is sufficient for human life—as it also happens to be [in reality]. And because of this, it is put together out of several villages, in one of which is exercised the art of the smith, in another the art of the weaver, and thus for the others. Whence it is clear that the city is the perfect community.

Polit.L1

Tertio ostendit ad quid est civitas ordinata. Est enim primitus facta gratia vivendi, ut scilicet homines sufficienter invenirent unde vivere possent; sed ex eius esse provenit quod homines non solum vivant, sed quod bene vivant in quantum per leges civitatis ordinatur vita hominum ad virtutem.

Third, he shows what the city is ordered toward: for it is initially [primitus] made for the sake of living, namely, so that men might sufficiently find those things from which they are able to live: but from its existence, it emerges that men not only live, but that they live well, inasmuch as through the laws of the city, the life of men is ordered toward the virtues.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit propter quod omnis civitas etc., ostendit quod communitas civitatis est naturalis. Et circa hoc tria facit:

Then, where he says propter quod omnis civitas, etc., he shows that the community of the city is natural. Concerning this he does three things.

Polit.L1

primo ostendit quod civitas est naturalis;

First he shows that the city is natural.

Polit.L1

secundo quod homo est naturaliter animal civile, ibi ex hiis igitur manifestum etc.;

Second, that man is naturally a civic animal, at ex his igitur manifestum, etc.

Polit.L1

tertio ostendit quid sit prius secundum naturam, utrum unus homo aut domus vel civitas, ibi et prius itaque civitas etc.

Third, he shows what is prior [prius] according to nature, whether it is one man, or a household, or a city, at et prius itaque civitas, etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum ponit duas rationes,

Concerning the first he lays out two reasons.

Polit.L1

quarum prima talis est. Finis rerum naturalium est natura ipsarum; sed civitas est finis praedictarum communitatum, de quibus ostensum est quod sunt naturales: ergo et civitas est naturalis. Quod autem natura sit finis rerum naturalium probat, ibi quale enim etc., tali ratione. Illud dicimus esse naturam uniuscuiusque rei quod convenit ei quando est eius generatio perfecta: sicut natura hominis est quam habet post perfectionem generationis ipsius; et similiter est de equo et de domo, ut tamen natura domus intelligatur forma ipsius. Sed dispositio rei quam habet perfecta sua generatione est finis omnium eorum quae sunt ante generationem ipsius; ergo id quod est finis naturalium principiorum ex quibus aliquid generatur, est natura rei: et sic cum civitas generetur ex praemissis communitatibus, quae sunt naturales, ipsa erit naturalis.

The first reason is this: the end of natural things is the nature of the things themselves. But the city is the end of the aforementioned communities, which have been shown to be natural. Therefore, the city is natural. And he proves that nature is the end of natural objects through this reasoning: We call that the nature of each things which happens [convenit] to it when its generation is perfected: just as the nature of man is what he has after the perfection of his generation: and likewise also for both a horse and a household--insofar as the nature of the household is understood as its own form. But the organization that an object has when its generation is perfected is the end of what was before the generation: therefore, that which is the end of those natural beginnings out of which something is generated is the nature of the thing. And so, since the city is generated from the aforementioned communities, which are natural, it will itself be natural.

Polit.L1

Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc quod cuius gratia etc. Quae talis est. Illud quod est optimum in unoquoque est finis et cuius gratia aliquid fit; sed habere sufficientiam est optimum, ergo habet rationem finis: et sic cum civitas sit communitas habens per se sufficientiam vitae, ipsa est finis praemissarum communitatum. Unde patet quod haec secunda ratio inducitur ut probatio minoris praecedentis rationis.

He lays out the second reason, at adhuc quod cuius gratia, etc., which is this: That which is the best in each thing is its end, for the sake of which something comes to be. But to have sufficiency is the best thing: therefore it has the rationale of an end. And thus, since the city is the community that is self-sufficient for life, it is itself the end of the aforementioned communities. Whence it is evident that this second reason is introduced as a proof of the minor premise of the preceding line of reasoning.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit ex hiis igitur manifestum etc., ostendit quod homo sit naturaliter civile animal.

Then, where he says ex hiis igitur manifestum, etc., he shows that man is naturally a civic animal.

Polit.L1

Et primo concludit hoc ex naturalitate civitatis;

And first he concludes this from the naturalness of the city.

Polit.L1

secundo probat hoc per operationem propriam ipsius, ibi quod autem civile etc.

Second, he proves this from man’s proper work, at quod autem civile, etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum duo facit:

Concerning the first he makes two observations.

Polit.L1

primo ostendit propositum;

First, he shows what was proposed.

Polit.L1

secundo excludit dubitationem, ibi et qui incivilis etc.

Second, he excludes a doubt, at et qui incivilis, etc.

Polit.L1

Concludit ergo primo ex praemissis quod civitas est eorum quae sunt secundum naturam; et cum civitas non sit nisi congregatio hominum, sequitur quod homo sit animal naturaliter civile.

He concludes, therefore, from the aforementioned things, that the city is of those things which are according to nature. And since the city is nothing but a gathering of men, it follows that man is a naturally civic animal.

Polit.L1

Posset autem hoc alicui venire in dubium ex hoc quod ea quae sunt secundum naturam omnibus insunt; non autem omnes homines inveniuntur esse habitatores civitatum. Et ideo ad hanc dubitationem excludendam consequenter dicit quod aliqui sunt non civiles propter fortunam, utpote quia sunt expulsi de civitate; vel propter paupertatem necesse habent excolere agros aut animalia custodire. Et hoc patet quod non est contrarium ei quod dictum est, quod homo sit naturaliter civilis: quia et alia naturalia aliquando deficiunt propter fortunam, puta cum alicui amputatur manus, vel cum privatur cibo. Sed si aliquis homo habet quod non sit civilis propter naturam, necesse est quod vel sit pravus, utpote cum hoc contingit ex corruptione naturae humanae; aut est melior quam homo, in quantum scilicet habet naturam perfectiorem aliis hominibus communiter, ita quod per se sibi possit sufficere absque hominum societate: sicut fuit in Iohanne Baptista et beato Antonio heremita. Et inducit ad hoc verbum Homeri maledicentis quendam qui non erat civilis propter pravitatem; dicit enim de ipso quod erat insocialis quia non poterat contineri vinculo amicitiae, et illegalis quia non poterat contineri sub iugo legis, et sceleratus quia non poterat contineri sub regula rationis. Qui autem est talis secundum naturam simul cum hoc oportet quod habeat quod sit affectator belli, quasi litigiosus et sine iugo existens: sicut videmus quod volatilia quae non sunt socialia, sunt rapacia.

But it is possible that doubt could come to someone from this: that those things which are according to nature are innate to everyone, but not all men are found to be city-dwellers. And therefore, to rule out [excludendam] this doubt, he accordingly says that some people are not civic because of fortune, for instance, because they are driven out [expulsi] of the city; or, because they are poor, they necessarily have to till the fields or tend animals. And this clarifies that it is not contrary to what was said--that man is naturally civic--because other natural things sometimes lack something on account of fortune: for example, when someone’s hand is amputated, or when he loses an eye. But if some man holds that he is not civic because of nature, he is necessarily either crooked, as when this happens from a corruption of human nature; or he is better than a man, inasmuch as he has a nature more perfected than other men commonly are, such that through himself he is able to be self-sufficient without the society of men. Such a thing was seen in John the Baptist, and in Blessed Anthony the hermit. For he cites the words of Homer, cursing a certain man who was not civic on account of crookedness. For he says about the man that he was un-sociable, because he could not be contained by the bond of friendship, and lawless, because he could not be contained under the yoke of the law, and evil, because he could not be contained under the rules of reason. And along with this, he who is of this sort according to nature will necessarily have in himself that which is bent on war, as though quarrelsome and existing without yoke. Just as we see that wild birds, which are not social, are grasping.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quod autem civile animal etc., probat ex propria operatione hominis quod sit animal civile, magis etiam quam apis et quam quodcumque gregale animal, tali ratione. Dicimus enim quod natura nihil facit frustra, quia semper operatur ad finem determinatum; unde si natura attribuit alicui rei aliquid quod de se est ordinatum ad aliquem finem, sequitur quod ille finis detur illi rei a natura. Videmus autem quod, cum quaedam alia animalia habeant vocem, solus homo supra alia animalia habeat locutionem; nam etsi quaedam animalia locutionem humanam proferant, non tamen proprie loquntur, quia non intelligunt quid dicunt, sed ex usu quodam tales voces proferunt. Est autem differentia inter sermonem et simplicem vocem. Nam vox est signum tristitiae et delectationis, et per consequens aliarum passionum ut irae et timoris, quae omnes ordinantur ad delectationem et tristitiam, ut in II Ethicorum dicitur. Et ideo vox datur aliis animalibus quorum natura usque ad hoc pervenit, quod sentiant suas delectationes et tristitias et haec sibi invicem significent per aliquas naturales voces, sicut leo per rugitum et canis per latratum; loco quorum nos habemus interiectiones.

Then, where he says quod autem civile animal, etc., he proves from the proper work of man that he is a civic animal, moreso even than the bees, and than any herd animal, according to this reasoning: for we say that nature makes nothing in vain, because it always works toward a determinate end; hence, if nature bestows upon a sort of thing something that is ordered of itself toward some end, it follows that the end would be given to the thing by nature. For we see that although some other animals have a voice, only man, above the other animals, has speech. For although some animals utter human speech, they do not have the characteristic of speech, because they do not understand what they say, but utter such words from some use. Now there is a difference between speech and a simple voice. For voice is a sign of sadness and delight, and consequently, of the other feelings, such as anger and fear, which are all ordered toward delight and sadness, as is said in Ethics II. And therefore a voice is given to other animals, whose nature has reached this point: that they sense their pleasures and sorrows, and make signs of this to one another through certain natural voices, as the lion through his roar, the dog through his bark--in the place of which we have interjections.

Polit.L1

Sed locutio humana significat quid est utile et quid nocivum, ex quo sequitur quod significet iustum et iniustum: consistit enim iustitia et iniustitia ex hoc quod aliqui adaequentur vel non aequentur in rebus utilibus et nocivis. Et ideo locutio est propria hominibus, quia hoc est proprium eis in comparatione ad alia animalia, quod habeant cognitionem boni et mali, iusti et iniusti, et aliorum huiusmodi quae sermone significari possunt. Cum ergo homini datus sit sermo a natura, et sermo ordinetur ad hoc quod homines sibi invicem communicent in utili et nocivo, iusto et iniusto et alia huiusmodi: sequitur, ex quo natura nihil facit frustra, quod naturaliter homines in hiis sibi communicent. Sed communicatio in istis facit domum et civitatem; ergo homo est naturaliter animal domesticum et civile.

But human speech makes signs about what is useful and what is harmful, from which it follows that it makes signs about what is just and unjust [iustum et iniustum]. For justice and injustice consist in this, that some people are equalized or not equalized regarding useful or harmful things. And therefore speech is characteristic of men: because it is characteristic of them, relative to other animals, that they have knowledge of good and evil, and so also of the unjust, and of the other things of this sort, signs of which can be made through discourse. Since, therefore, discourse was given to men by nature, and discourse is ordered to this, that men unite with one another in the useful and the harmful, the just and the unjust, and other things of this sort, it follows, since nature makes nothing in vain, that men naturally unite with each other in these things. But uniting in such things is what makes the household and the city. Therefore, man is naturally a domestic and civic animal.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit et prius itaque civitas etc., ostendit ex praemissis quod civitas sit prior secundum naturam quam domus vel quam unus homo singularis, tali ratione. Necesse est totum esse prius parte, ordine scilicet naturae et perfectionis; sed hoc intelligendum est de parte materiae, non de parte speciei, ut ostenditur in VII Metaphysicae. Et hoc sic probat: quia destructo toto homine, non remanet pes neque manus nisi aequivoce, eo modo quo manus lapidea posset dici manus; et hoc ideo quia talis pars corrumpitur corrupto toto, illud autem quod est corruptum non retinet speciem a qua sumitur ratio diffinitiva: unde patet quod non remanet eadem ratio nominis, et sic nomen aequivoce praedicatur. Et quod pars corrumpatur corrupto toto, ostendit per hoc quod omnis pars diffinitur per suam operationem et per virtutem qua operatur: sicut diffinitio pedis est quod sit membrum organicum habens virtutem ad ambulandum; et ideo ex quo iam non habet talem virtutem et operationem, non est idem secundum speciem, sed aequivoce dicitur pes. Et eadem ratio est de aliis huiusmodi partibus quae dicuntur partes materiae, in quarum diffinitione ponitur totum sicut et in diffinitione semicirculi ponitur circulus: est semicirculus media pars circuli. Secus autem est de partibus speciei quae ponuntur in diffinitione totius, sicut lineae ponuntur in diffinitione trianguli.

Then, where he says et prius itaque civitas, etc., he shows from the aforementioned things that according to nature, the city is before the household, or even before one single man--and through this reasoning: it is necessary that the whole is before the part, in the order of nature and perfection. But this must be understood about a material part, not about a part of the species, as is shown in Metaphysics Bk. VII. And he proves this as follows: because when the whole man has been destroyed, there remains neither a foot nor a hand, except equivocally--in the way that a hand [made] of stones could be called a hand. And this is because such a part corrupts when the whole corrupts. Now what has been corrupted does not remain the same kind of thing, from which [kind] it takes up its defining rationale. Whence it is clear that the same rationale for its name does not remain, and so also the name is equivocally predicated. And that the part corrupts when the whole corrupts, he shows through this: that every part is defined by its work, and by the virtue through which it works--just as the definition of a foot is “an appended tool [membrum organicum] that has the virtue to walk.” And therefore, since [the part] no longer has such a virtue and work, it is not the same in kind, but is equivocally called a foot. And the same reasoning is given about other parts of this sort, which are called material parts, in whose definition is placed the whole, just as “circle” is placed within the definition of “semicircle” -- for a semicircle is the half-part of a circle. It is not so, however, with the parts of the kind that are placed in the definition of the whole, as the line is placed in the definition of the triangle.

Polit.L1

Sic igitur patet quod totum est prius naturaliter quam partes materiae, quamvis partes sint priores ordine generationis. Sed singuli homines comparantur ad totam civitatem sicut partes hominis ad hominem, quia sicut manus aut pes non potest esse sine homine, ita nec unus homo est per se sufficiens ad vivendum separatus a civitate. Si autem contingat quod aliquis non possit communicare societate civitatis propter suam pravitatem, est peior quam homo et quasi bestia; si vero nullo indigeat et (sit) quasi habens per se sufficientiam, et propter hoc non sit pars civitatis, est melior quam homo: est enim quasi quidam Deus. Relinquitur ergo ex praemissis quod civitas est prius secundum naturam quam unus homo.

So therefore, it is clear that the whole is naturally before the parts of matter, although parts are earlier in the order of generation. But individual men are related to the whole city as the parts of a man are to the man. Because just as the hand or the foot cannot exist without a man, neither can one man, through himself, be self-sufficient for living when separated from the city. Now if it happens that someone is not able to unite with the company of the city because of his crookedness, he is worse than a man, and is as if he were a beast. But if, indeed, he needs nothing, and it is as if he has self-sufficiency, and because of this he is not part of a city, he is better than a man. For he is like some God. It remains, therefore, from the aforementioned things, that the city is earlier according to nature than is a single man.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit natura igitur quidem etc., agit de institutione civitatis, concludens ex praemissis quod in omnibus hominibus inest quidam naturalis impetus ad communitatem civitatis, sicut et ad virtutes; sed tamen sicut virtutes acquiruntur per exercitium humanum, ut dicitur in II Ethicorum, ita civitates sunt institutae humana industria. Ille autem qui primo instituit civitatem fuit causa hominibus maximorum bonorum.

Then, where he says natura igitur quidem, etc., he deals with the institution of the city, concluding from the aforementioned things that there is within all men a certain natural innate impulse toward the community of the city, as there also is toward the virtues. But nevertheless, just as the virtues are acquired through human exercise, as is said in Ethics II, so also cities are instituted by human industry. Now he who first instituted the city was the cause, for men, of the greatest of goods.

Polit.L1

Homo enim est optimum animalium, si perficiatur in eo virtus ad quam habet inclinationem naturalem; sed si sit sine lege et iustitia, homo est pessimum omnium animalium. Quod sic probat quia iniustitia tanto est saevior quanto plura habet arma, id est adiumenta ad malefaciendum; homini autem secundum suam naturam convenit prudentia et virtus quae de se sunt ordinata ad bonum: sed quando homo est malus, utitur eis quasi quibusdam armis ad malefaciendum, sicut cum per astutiam excogitat diversas fraudes, et per abstinentiam potens fit ad tolerandum famem et sitim ut magis in malitia perseveret, et similiter de aliis. Et inde est quod homo sine virtute quantum ad corruptionem irascibilis est maxime scelestus et silvestris, utpote crudelis et sine affectione; et quantum ad corruptionem concupiscibilis est pessimus quantum ad venerea et quantum ad voracitatem ciborum. Sed homo reducitur ad iustitiam per ordinem civilem: quod patet ex hoc quod eodem nomine apud Grecos nominatur ordo civilis communitatis et iudicium iustitiae, scilicet diki. Unde manifestum est quod ille qui civitatem instituit, abstulit hominibus quod essent pessimi, et reduxit eos ad hoc quod essent optimi secundum iustitiam et virtutes.

For man is the best of animals if virtue is perfected in him, for which he has a natural inclination. But if he is without law and justice, man is the worst of all the animals--which is proved like this: because injustice is all the more cruel by however many weapons it has--that is, aids in evildoing. Now for man, according to his nature, are fit prudence and virtue, which are ordered of themselves toward good. But when man is wicked, he uses these things as if they were a sort of weapon for evildoing, just as when through his cleverness he thinks up various frauds, and through abstinence he becomes able to tolerate hunger and thirst, such that he can greatly persevere in wickedness--and similarly in other things. And hence it is that man without virtue, in the amount that his capacity for anger is corrupted, is most of all evil and wild, inasmuch as he is fierce and without affection. And in the amount that his capacity for desire is corrupted, he is the worst with regard to sexual matters, and regarding his greed for food. But man is led back to justice through civic order: which is clear from this, that with the same name, among the Greeks, were named the order of the civic community, and judgment of justice, that is, dike. Whence it is clear that he who instituted the city carried away from men that which was the worst, and led them back toward that which was the best according to justice and the virtues.

Polit.L1

Lecture 2

Polit.L2

Quoniam autem manifestum ex quibus partibus civitas constat, necessarium primum de yconomia dicere. Omnis enim componitur civitas ex domibus.

Now since it is clear from which parts the city is constituted, it is necessary to speak first about economy, for every city is composed of households.

Polit.L2

Domus autem partes ex quibus rursum domus instituta est, domus autem perfecta ex servis et liberis. Quoniam autem in minimis primum unumquodque quaerendum, prime autem et minime partes domus, dominus et servus, et maritus et uxor, et pater et filii, de tribus hiis considerandum utique erit, quid unumquodque et quale oportet esse; haec autem sunt despotica et nuptialis, innominata enim femine et viri coniugatio, et tertium teknofactiva, et enim haec non est nominata proprio nomine. Sint autem hae tres quas diximus.

Now the parts of the household are drawn from those out of which the household is instituted, and a completed household [is instituted] from slaves and the free. Now since we ought to seek what is first in each thing in what is smallest, and the smallest parts of the household are master and slave, husband and wife, and father and son, we will need to consider, regarding these three parts, both what each of them is and how each of them must be. And these three are the despotic, the nuptial (for the conjunction of man and woman itself is unnamed), and third, the teknofactive, for this also is not named with a proper name. So there will be these three for us to discuss.

Polit.L2

Est autem quaedam pars quae videtur hiis quidem esse yconomia, hiis autem maxima pars ipsius; quomodo autem se habet considerandum. Dico autem de vocata crimatistica.

And there is a another part which certainly seems to some to be economy itself, and to others, the greatest part of it, and we shall have to consider how it is disposed. And I am speaking about what is called the "crematistic" [art].

Polit.L2

Primum autem de despota et servo dicamus, ut et quae ad necessariam oportunitatem videamus, et ut utique si quid ad scire de ipsis poterimus accipere melius nunc opinatis.

Now first, let us speak of despot and slave, so that we may see what is opportune by necessity, and also so that we may know if we are able to grasp anything better about them than is now opined.

Polit.L2

Hiis quidem enim videtur scientia quaedam esse despotia, et eadem yconomia et despotia et politica et regnativa, sicut diximus incipientes; hiis autem praeter naturam despotizare, lege enim hunc quidem servum esse, hunc autem liberum. Natura autem nihil differre, propter quod neque iustum, violentum enim.

For it seems to some that despotism is some science, and that economy and despotism and politics and kingship are all the same, as we said when we began. But others think that despotism exceeds nature--for indeed, the law says that this one is a slave, but that this other one is free--and that by nature there is no difference. Because of this, [they think that] it is not just, for it is violent.

Polit.L2

Quoniam igitur possessio pars domus est, et possessiva pars yconomie. Sine enim necessariis impossibile etiam vivere. Quaemadmodum autem determinatis artibus necessarium utique erit existere convenientia organa si debeat perfici opus, sic et yconomico.

Since, therefore, property is a part of the household, the [art of] property is a part of economy. For without necessary things it is impossible even to live. Now just as, for each of the determinate arts it will assuredly be necessary that there exist fitting instruments if their works are to be perfected, so also with the economic art.

Polit.L2

Organorum autem haec quidem inanimata, haec autem animata, velut gubernatori, gubernaculum quidem inanimatum, prorarius autem animatum. Minister enim in organi specie artibus est. Sic et res possessa organum ad vitam est, et possessio multitudo organorum est, et servus res possessa animata; et sicut organum ante organa omnis minister. Si enim posset unumquodque organorum iussum et praesentiens perficere suum opus, quaemadmodum quae Dedali aiunt aut Vulcani tripodas quos ait poeta spontaneos divinum subinduere agonem, sic si pectines pectinarent per se et plectra cytharizarent, nihil utique opus esset architectonibus ministrorum neque dominis servorum.

Now among tools, some are soulless, and others are ensouled, as for the pilot of a ship, the rudder is a soulless tool, but the prowsman is ensouled; for a servant is a kind of tool for the arts. So also a piece of property is a tool for life, and property [as a whole] a multitude of tools, and a slave is an ensouled piece of property; and likewise, a servant is a tool before all other tools. For if it were possible for each tool, both when commanded and anticipating, to complete its own work, just as they say the things of Daedalus did, or the tripods of Vulcan, which the poet says spontaneously undertook the contest of the gods--if thus looms were to weave by themselves and the plectrum play the lyre--there would assuredly be no work from the architect for his servants nor from the master for his slaves.

Polit.L2

Quae quidem dicuntur organa, factiva organa sunt, res possessa autem activum; ex pectine quidem enim alterum aliquid fit praeter usum ipsius, ex vestitu autem et lecto usus solum.

Now among those things named tools, some are "making tools," but a piece of property is for action; for from the loom comes something other, beyond its own use, whereas from clothing or a bed, only the use.

Polit.L2

Adhuc quoniam differunt factio specie et actio, et indigent ambe organis, necesse est haec eandem habere differentiam. Vita autem actio non factio est, propter quod et servus minister eorum quae ad actionem.

Further, as making and acting differ in kind, and both require tools, it is necessary for these, likewise, to be different. Now life is acting and not making; because of this, the slave is a servant of those things which are for acting.

Polit.L2

Res possessa autem dicitur quaemadmodum et pars; quod quidem enim pars non solum alterius est pars, sed et simpliciter alterius. Similiter autem et res possessa; propter quod despotes quidem servi despotes solum. Illius autem non est. Servus autem non solum despotis servus est, sed et omnino illius.

Again, a piece of property is also spoken of as a part; for a part is not only a part of another, but is "of another" simply speaking. Likewise also for a piece of property; and because of this, the despot over a slave is only a despot and is not "of the slave," but the slave is not only "the slave of the master," but is "of him" wholly.

Polit.L2

Quae quidem igitur natura servi et quae virtus ex hiis manifestum. Qui enim non sui ipsius natura sed alterius homo est, iste natura servus est; alterius autem est homo quicumque res possessa aut servus est; res possessa autem organum activum et separatum.

So therefore, from these things it is clear what is the nature of a slave and what his virtue. For he who is by nature not his own, but "of another human being", such a one is by nature a slave; and whichever human being is "of another" is a piece of property, or a slave; and a piece of property is a tool, for action, and separate.

Polit.L2

Quoniam autem manifestum ex quibus partibus etc. Posito prohemio in quo ostendit conditionem civitatis et partium eius, hic accedit ad tradendum scientiam politicam.

Quoniam autem manifestum ex quibus partibus, etc. Having set out an introduction in which he describes the condition of the city and of its parts, he here starts to develop political science.

Polit.L2

Et primo secundum praeassignatum modum determinat ea quae pertinent ad primas partes civitatis;

And first, after the designated method, he determines what belongs to the first parts of the city.

Polit.L2

secundo determinat ea quae pertinent ad ipsam civitatem, in secundo libro qui incipit ibi quia considerare volumus de communione etc.

Second, he determines what belongs to the city itself, in the second book, which begins at quia considerare volumus de communione, etc.

Polit.L2

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L2

primo dicit de quo est intentio;

First, he says what his intention is.

Polit.L2

secundo exequitur propositum, ibi hiis quidem enim etc.

Second, he carries out what he proposed, at hiis quidem enim, etc.

Polit.L2

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first, he does two things.

Polit.L2

primo dicit de quibus determinare intendit;

First, he says what things he intends to determine.

Polit.L2

secundo quo ordine, ibi primum autem de despota etc.

Second, in what order, at primum autem de despota, etc.

Polit.L2

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L2

primo dicit quod est determinandum de hiis quae pertinent ad domum;

First, he says that the things that belong to the household need to be determined.

Polit.L2

secundo enumerat ea quae ad domum pertinent, ibi domus autem partes etc.

Second, he enumerates the things that belong to the household, at domus autem partes, etc.

Polit.L2

Dicit ergo primo quod manifestum est per praemissa ex quibus partibus civitas constat. Et (quia) oportet ad cognoscendum totum praecognoscere partes, ut supra habitum est, necesse est ut primum dicamus de yconomia, quae est dispensativa vel gubernativa domus, quia omnis civitas componitur ex domibus sicut ex partibus.

First, therefore, he says that it is clear, from the preceding, out of what parts the city is constituted: and because to know a whole, one must first know the parts, as was grasped above, it is necessary that we first speak about economy, which manages or governs the things of the household, because every city is composed from households as from parts.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit domus autem partes etc., enumerat ea quae pertinent ad domum.

Then, where he says domus autem partes, etc., he enumerates what belongs to the household.

Polit.L2

Et primo ea quae pertinent ad ipsam sicut partes;

And first, what belongs to it as parts.

Polit.L2

secundo ea quae pertinent sicut necessaria partibus, ibi est autem quaedam pars etc.

Second, what belongs as necessities for the parts, at est autem quaedam pars, etc.

Polit.L2

Dicit ergo primo quod partes domus sunt ex quibus domus constituitur; omnis autem domus, id est domestica familia, si sit perfecta constat ex servis et liberis. Dicit autem perfecta quia in domo pauperis est bos pro ministro, ut supra dictum est. Et quia unumquodque quod in multis considerari potest primo quaerendum est in paucioribus et simplicioribus, ut facilior sit doctrina, ideo dicendum est quod primae et minimae partes domus sunt hae tres combinationes, scilicet domini et servi, mariti et uxoris, patris et filii: quae quidem tertia ex secunda oritur et ideo supra eam praetermisit; et ideo de istis tribus est considerandum quid unumquodque sit.

He says first, therefore, that the parts of the household are the things from which the household is constituted. Now every household--that is, the domestic family—if it is complete, is constituted from slaves and the free. Now he says “complete” because in the household of the poor there is an ox for a servant, as was said above. And since each thing that can be observed in many things must first be sought in fewer and simpler things, so that doctrine may be easier, therefore it must be said that the first and smallest parts of the household are these three combinations: of master and slave, husband and wife, father and son--the third of which arises from the second, and so he omits it above. And so what each of these three are must be considered.

Polit.L2

Et consequenter ponit nomina harum combinationum. Et dicit quod combinatio domini et servi vocatur despotica, id est dominativa; combinatio autem viri et feminae non erat nominata suo tempore, sed ipse nominat eam nuptialem, quam nos matrimonium vocamus; similiter et tertia combinatio patris et filii non habebat proprium nomen, sed ipse vocat eam teknofactivam, id est factivam filiorum.

And consequently, he posits the names of these combinations; and he says that the combination of master and slave is called “despotic,” that is, “mastery.” Now the combination of man and woman was not named in his time, but he himself called “nuptial” what we call “matrimony.” Likewise also, the third combination of father and son did not have a proper name, but he himself calls it teknofactive, that is, factive of sons.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit est autem quaedam pars etc., ponit quartum quod pertinet ad necessaria domus. Et dicit quod est quaedam alia pars yconomicae quae vocatur crimatistica, id est pecunialis; quae quibusdam videtur esse tota yconomia, quibusdam vero maxima pars eius eo quod dispensatio domus maxime consistit in acquisitione et conservatione pecuniae. Et de hac etiam parte considerandum est quo modo se habeat.

Then, where he says est autem quaedam pars, etc., he posits a fourth thing that belongs to the necessities of the household: and he says that there is a certain other economic part, which is called “crematistic,” that is, pecuniary, which seems to some people to be the whole of economy, but to some people, the greatest part of it; for the management of the household most of all consists in the acquisition and conservation of money. And we must consider how this part, too, should be disposed.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit primum autem de despota etc., dicit quo ordine de hiis sit agendum. Et dicit quod primo dicendum est de domino et servo; et haec consideratio ad duo erit utilis:

Then, where he says primum autem de despota, etc., he says in what order he ought to do these things. And he says that first he ought to speak about master and slave: and this consideration will be useful for two things.

Polit.L2

primo quidem ut possimus cognoscere ea quae sunt oportuna in talibus, scilicet ad exercendum dominium in servos;

First, indeed, so that we may be able to know those things that are opportune in such affairs; namely, for the practice of mastery over slaves.

Polit.L2

secundo valet ad scientiam, ut per hoc possimus accipere aliquid melius hiis quae antiqui sunt opinati de dominio et servitute.

Second, it will be helpful for science, since through this [consideration] we can attain to something better than what the ancients opined about mastery and slavery.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit hiis quidem enim videtur etc., determinat ea quae proposuit. Et dividitur in partes duas:

Then, where he says hiis quidem enim videtur, etc., he determines what he proposed: and he divides it into two parts.

Polit.L2

in prima determinat de combinatione domini et servi;

In the first, he determines the combination of master and slave.

Polit.L2

in secunda de aliis duabus combinationibus, ibi quoniam autem tres partes yconomicae etc.

In the second, the other two combinations, at quoniam autem tres partes yconomicae, etc.

Polit.L2

Prima dividitur in duas:

The first is divided into two parts.

Polit.L2

in prima determinat de combinatione domini et servi;

In the first, he determines the combination of master and slave.

Polit.L2

et quia servus est quaedam possessio, ideo in secunda parte determinat de alia parte yconomiae quae est pecuniativa vel possessiva, ibi totaliter autem de omni possessione etc.

And because a slave is a sort of property, therefore in the second part he determines about the other part of economy, which is pecuniary, or about property, at totaliter autem de omni possessione, etc.

Polit.L2

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L2

primo narrat opiniones quorundam de dominio et servitute;

First, he reports the opinions of certain people about mastery and slavery.

Polit.L2

secundo determinat veritatem de eis, ibi quoniam igitur possessio etc.

Second, he determines the truth of them, at quoniam igitur possessio, etc.

Polit.L2

Circa primum ponit duas opiniones,

About the first he presents two opinions.

Polit.L2

quarum una est quod despotia, id est dominativa, est quaedam scientia qua aliquis scit dominari servis; et quod est idem cum yconomia qua aliquis scit gubernare domum, et cum politica et regnativa qua aliquis scit gubernare civitatem, sicut in prohemio dictum est.

The first is that despotism, that is, mastery, is a certain science by which someone has scientific knowledge about how to have mastery over a slave; and that this is the same as economy, by which someone has scientific knowledge about the government of a household, and as political and ruling [science], by which someone has scientific knowledge about the government of a city, as was said in the preface.

Polit.L2

Alia opinio est quod habere servum sit praeter naturam, et quod sola lege sit ordinatum quia quidam sunt servi et quidam liberi, et quod nulla differentia sit inter eos secundum naturam; unde ulterius inducunt quod est iniustum esse aliquos servos: ex quadam enim violentia provenit quod quidam alios sibi subiecerunt in servos.

The other opinion is that to have a slave exceeds nature, and that only by law is it ordered that some men are slaves and some are free, and that there is no difference between them according to nature. Whence, they further advanced that it is unjust that some are slaves, for it is out of violence that someone subjects others to himself as slaves.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit quoniam igitur possessio etc., determinat veritatem de dominio et servitute.

Then, where he says quoniam igitur possessio, etc., he determines the truth about mastery and slavery.

Polit.L2

Et primo determinat rationem servitutis;

And first he determines the meaning of slavery.

Polit.L2

secundo inquirit de opinionibus praemissis, ibi utrum autem est aliquis natura talis etc.

Second, he goes into the premising opinions, at utrum autem est aliquis natura talis, etc.

Polit.L2

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first, he does two things.

Polit.L2

primo praemittit quaedam necessaria ad cognoscendum rationem servitutis;

First, he premises certain things as necessary for knowing the meaning of slavery.

Polit.L2

secundo concludit ex praemissis diffinitionem servi, ibi quae quidem igitur natura servi etc.

Second, from the premises, he concludes with a definition of a slave, at quae quidem igitur natura servi, etc.

Polit.L2

Circa primum quatuor ponit,

About the first, he posits four things:

Polit.L2

quorum primum est quod possessio sit quaedam pars domus et quod ars possessiva sit quaedam pars yconomiae; et hoc ideo quia impossibile est vivere in domo sine necessariis ad vitam quae per possessiones habentur. Et hoc probat per similitudinem in artibus. Videmus enim quod unicuique arti necessarium est habere convenientia instrumenta si debeat perficere opus suum, sicut fabro necesse est habere martellum si debeat facere cultellum; et hoc modo gubernatori domus necesse est habere res possessas ad proprium opus sicut quaedam instrumenta.

the first is that property is some part of the household, and that the art of property is some part of economy. And this is because it is impossible to live in a household without things necessary for life, which are had through property: and he proves this through a likeness to the arts. For we see that it is necessary for each art to have fitting instruments if it is going to complete its own work; as it is necessary for a smith to have a hammer if he is going to make a knife. And in this manner, for the governor [gubernator] of a household it is necessary to have property as an instrument for his own work.

Polit.L2

Secundo ibi organorum autem quidem etc., ponit unam divisionem organorum, dicens quod instrumentorum quaedam sunt animata, quaedam inanimata; sicut gubernatoris inanimatum instrumentum est gubernaculum, instrumentum autem eius animatum est prorarius, id est ille qui custodit anteriorem partem navis, quae vocatur prora, et obedit gubernatori. Minister enim in artibus habet rationem instrumenti, quia sicut instrumentum movetur ab artifice, ita etiam minister movetur ad imperium praecipientis. Et sicut est in operibus artis duplex instrumentum, ita etiam in domo est instrumentum inanimatum ipsa res possessa, puta lectus vel vestis, quae est instrumentum quoddam deserviens vitae humanae: et multitudo talium instrumentorum est tota possessio domus; cum autem servus sit quaedam res possessa animata, sequitur quod sit organum animatum deserviens vitae domesticae. Est autem huiusmodi organum animatum, quod est minister in artibus et servus in domo, instrumentum super alia instrumenta, quia scilicet ipse utitur aliis instrumentis et movet ea; et ad hoc indigemus ministris et servis. Principales enim artifices qui architectores dicuntur non indigerent ministris, neque domini domorum indigerent servis, si unumquodque instrumentum inanimatum posset ad imperium domini agnoscens ipsum perficere opus suum: puta quod pectines per se pectinarent et plectra per se citharizarent, sicut dicitur de statua quam fecit Daedalus quod per ingenium argenti vivi movebat se ipsam. Et similiter quidam poeta dicit quod in quodam templo Vulcani, qui dicebatur deus ignis, tripodes quidam erant sic praeparati per artificium humanum vel per artem nigromanticam, quod per se ipsos quasi spontanei videbantur subinduere divinum agonem, quasi concertando ad serviendum in ministerio templi.

Second, at organorum autem quidem, etc., he posits a division of instruments, saying that some instruments are ensouled, and others are soulless. Just as a rudder [gubernaculum] is a soulless instrument of a pilot [gubernator], but the prowsman--that is, he who guards the front part of the ship, which is called the prow--is his ensouled instrument, and obeys the pilot. For a servant in the arts has the rationale of an instrument because just as an instrument is moved by the artisan, so also a servant moves at the command of one who governs him. And just as in the works of an art there are these two sorts of instruments, so also in the household there is a soulless instrument, the possession itself, such as a bed or a garment, which is a certain instrument in the service of human life. And the multitude of such instruments is the whole that is possessed by the household. But since a slave is a possessed, ensouled object, it follows that he is a certain ensouled tool in the service of household life. Now there is an ensouled tool of this sort in the arts; and in the household, the slave is an instrument above other instruments because he himself uses other instruments, and moves them; and for this we are in need of servants and slaves. For governing artisans, who are called "architects," would not be in need of servants, nor would a master of a household be in need of slaves if each soulless instrument, discerning the master, could complete its own work at his command--as if looms were to weave by themselves, or a plectrum [i.e. a pick] were to play the lyre by itself, as it is said of the statues that Daedalus made that through an inborn quality of the quicksilver, they used to move of themselves. And likewise, a certain poet says that in a certain temple of Vulcan, who was called the god of fire, certain tripods were so prepared, either through human artifice or black magic, that of themselves -- as if spontaneously -- they seemed to undertake a divine contest, as if fighting to serve in the service of the temple.

Polit.L2

Tertio, ibi quae quidem dicuntur organa etc., ponit secundam divisionem organorum: organa enim artium dicuntur organa factiva, sed res possessa quae est organum domus est organum activum. Et hanc divisionem probat duplici ratione.

Third, at quae quidem dicuntur organa, etc., he posits a second division of tools. Now tools of the arts are called “making tools”; but a piece of property, which is the tool of the household, is an “acting tool”. Now he proves this division through two reasonings.

Polit.L2

Primo quidem quia organa factiva dicuntur ex quibus fit aliquid praeter ipsum usum instrumenti: et hoc videmus in ipsis instrumentis artis, sicut ex pectine quo utuntur textores fit aliquid alterum praeter usum ipsius, scilicet pannus; sed ex rebus possessis quae sunt instrumenta domus non fit aliquid aliud praeter usum ipsius, sicut ex vestitu et lecto non fit nisi usus eorum: ergo ista non sunt factiva sicut organa artium.

First, indeed, because tools are called “making” when from the instruments, something comes to be beyond the use of the instrument itself. And we see this in the instruments of the arts; as from a loom, which weavers use, something comes to be beyond the use of the loom itself, namely, cloth. But from property, which is the instrument of the household, there is not something other that comes to be beyond the use of the thing itself; as from clothing and a bed, nothing comes to be except their use. Therefore, such things are not “making things” like the tools of the arts.

Polit.L2

Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc quoniam differunt etc., quae talis est. Diversorum diversa sunt instrumenta; sed actio et factio differunt specie, nam factio est operatio per quam aliquid fit in exteriori materia, sicut secare et urere, actio autem est operatio permanens in operante et pertinens ad vitam ipsius, ut dicitur in IX Metaphysicae: ambae autem hae operationes indigent instrumentis, ergo instrumenta eorum differunt specie. Sed vita, id est conversatio domestica, non est factio sed actio; ergo servus est minister et organum eorum quae pertinent ad actionem, non autem eorum quae pertinent ad factionem.

He posits a second reason, at adhuc quoniam differunt, etc., which goes like this. Diverse instruments are for diverse things. But acting and making [actio et factio] are different in kind: for making is a work through which something comes to be in external materials, as with cutting and burning: but acting is a work that stays in the worker, and belongs to the life of the worker himself, as is said in Metaphysics IX. But both these works need instruments. Therefore, their instruments are different in kind. But life, that is, household association, is not a making but an acting: therefore, the slave is a servant and a tool of those things that belong to acting, but not of those things that belong to making.

Polit.L2

Quarto, ibi res possessa autem etc., ostendit qualiter servus se habet ad dominum. Et dicit quod eadem est comparatio rei possessae ad possessorem et partis ad totum, quantum ad hoc quod pars non dicitur solum pars totius sed etiam dicitur simpliciter esse totius, sicut dicimus manum hominis et non solum dicimus quod sit pars hominis; et similiter res possessa, puta vestis, non solum dicitur quod sit possessio hominis sed quod simpliciter est huius hominis. Unde cum servus sit quaedam possessio, servus non solum est servus domini sed est simpliciter illius; ille autem qui est dominus non est simpliciter servi, sed solum est dominus eius.

Fourth, at res possessa autem, etc., he shows how the slave is disposed with regard to his master: and says that the comparison of the piece of property to the owner and of the part toward the whole is the same, inasmuch as a part is not said to be only a part of the whole, but is also said to belong to the whole simply speaking, as we say “man’s hand” and not only that it is a part of the man: and similarly, a piece of property, such as clothing, is not only said to be the property of the man, but that it is this man’s simply speaking. So since a slave is property, a slave is not only the slave of the master, but is his simply speaking. But he who is a master is not “of the slave,” simply speaking, but is only a master with regard to slave.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit quae quidem igitur natura etc., concludit ex praemissis diffinitionem servi. Et dicit quod manifestum est ex praedictis quae sit natura, id est servi, et quae sit virtus eius, quod est officium ipsius; nam virtus ad actionem refertur, officium autem est congruus actus alicuius. Cum enim servus sit hoc ipsum quod est alterius, ut dictum est, quicumque homo non est naturaliter sui ipsius sed alterius, ipse est naturaliter servus; ille autem homo non est naturaliter sui ipsius sed alterius, qui non potest regi nisi ab alio: hoc autem convertitur, scilicet quod quicumque est res possessa vel servus alterius, est homo alterius. De ratione autem rei possessae est quod sit organum activum et separatum. Unde potest talis diffinitio servi concludi: servus est organum animatum activum separatum alterius homo existens. In qua quidem diffinitione organum ponitur tanquam genus; et adduntur quinque differentiae. Per hoc enim quod dicitur animatum, distinguitur ab instrumentis inanimatis; per hoc autem quod dicitur activum distinguitur a ministro artificis, qui est organum animatum factivum; per hoc autem quod dicitur alterius existens distinguitur a libero, qui quandoque ministrat in domo non sicut res possessa sed sponte vel mercede conductus; per hoc autem quod dicitur separatum distinguitur a parte quae est alterius non separata, sicut manus; per hoc autem quod dicitur homo existens distinguitur a brutis animalibus quae sunt res possessae separatae.

Then, where he says quae quidem igitur natura, etc., he draws a conclusion from the premises with a definition of a slave: and he says that from what has been said, the nature of the slave is clear, and also his virtue—which is his duty. For virtue refers to acting, but a duty is the suitable act of someone. For since a slave is a thing that in itself belongs to another, as was said, any human being that is not naturally his own, but another's, is naturally a slave. But that human being is not naturally his own, but belongs to another, who is not able to be ruled except by another. Moreover, this is convertible, namely, that anyone that is the property or slave of another is the human being of another. For it is from the rationale [ratio] of property that he is an “active and separate tool.” Whence, it is possible to conclude with this definition of a slave: a slave is a tool; ensouled, active, separate, human, belonging to another’s existence. In this definition, “tool” is posited as the genus, and five differences are added. Through what is called “ensouled,” he is distinguished from soulless instruments; and through what which is called “active,” he is distinguished from an artisan's servant, who is an ensouled instrument that makes; and through what is called “belonging to another’s existence,” he is distinguished from the free, who always serves in the household not as property, but of his own accord, or hired for pay; and through what is called “separate,” he is distinguished from a part, which belongs to another but is not separate, like a hand. Through what is called “human existence” he is distinguished from the brute animals, which are separate pieces of property.

Polit.L2

Lecture 3

Polit.L3

Utrum autem est aliquis natura talis aut non, et utrum dignius et iustius alicui servire quam non, sed omnis servitus praeter naturam est, post haec considerandum.

But after this, we must consider whether anyone is of such a nature or not, and whether there is anyone for whom it is more worthy and just to serve than not, or if all slavery exceeds nature.

Polit.L3

Non difficile autem et ratione contemplari et ex hiis quae fiunt addiscere.

But it is not difficult either to contemplate this through reason or to discover this from the things that happen.

Polit.L3

Principari enim et subici non solum necessariorum, sed etiam expedientium est, et statim ex nativitate quaedam segregata sunt, haec quidem ad subici, haec autem ad principari; et species multe et subiectorum sunt et principantium; et semper melior principatus qui meliorum subiectorum, puta hominis quam bestiae. Quod enim efficitur a melioribus melius opus. Ubi autem hoc quidem principatur, hoc autem subicitur, est aliquod horum opus.

For to govern and to be subject is not only necessary, but also expedient, and immediately, from birth, some are separated, these to be subject, and these others to govern; but there are many ways both of being subject and of governing, and always, the better government is over the better subjects (for instance, over a human being rather than a beast). For what is effected by better things is a better work. And where one thing governs and another is subject, there is some work of theirs.

Polit.L3

Quaecumque enim ex pluribus constituta su-nt, et fit unum aliquod commune, sive ex coniunctis sive ex divisis, in omnibus videtur principans et subiectum.

For among things which are constituted out of many, and which come to be some single common thing, either through conjunction or division, in every case there seems to be a governor and a subject.

Polit.L3

Et hoc ex omni natura inest animatis, et enim in non participantibus vita est quidam principatus, puta harmonie. Sed haec quidem forte magis extrinsece sunt speculationis.

And this, from the whole of nature, is innate in ensouled things--and indeed, there is a certain government in things that do not participate in life, such as harmony. But certainly, this may be rather extrinsic to our inquiry.

Polit.L3

Animal autem primum constat ex anima et corpore, quorum hoc quidem principans est natura, hoc autem subiectum. Oportet autem intendere ex secundum naturam habentibus magis quod natura, et non in corruptis; propter quod et optime dispositum et secundum corpus et secundum animam hominem considerandum, in quo hoc palam; pestilentium enim et prave se habentium videbitur principari multotiens corpus animae, propter prave et praeter naturam habere. Est equidem sicut dicimus primum in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum et politicum; anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico principatu, intellectus autem appetitui politico et regali. In quibus manifestum est quod secundum naturam et expediens corpori regi ab anima et passibili parti ab intellectu et parte rationem habente. Ex equo autem aut e contrario nocivum omnibus.

Now an animal is built first from soul and body, of which the former is by nature the governor, the latter the subject. But we must intend [to derive] what is more natural from what a thing has according to nature than from what occurs among corrupted things; because of this, we must also consider the human being with the best disposition of both body and soul, in which this is evident; for the body very frequently seems to govern the soul among those who are diseased or wickedly disposed, because they are wicked and disposed to exceed nature. And it is absolutely the case, as we say, that among ensouled beings we first contemplate both despotic and political government: for indeed, the soul has mastery over the body with despotic government, and the intellect is over the appetite with political and kingly government. In these things it is clear that, according to nature, it is expedient both for the body to be ruled by the soul and for the passible parts by the intellect, and the part that has reason. From the contrary, or from evenness, would come harm to all.

Polit.L3

Iterum in homine et in aliis animalibus similiter. Mansueta quidem enim silvestribus digniora secundum naturam, hiis autem omnibus melius regi ab homine: adipiscuntur enim salutem sic.

It is like this, again, among human beings and among the other animals. For indeed, tame animals are more worthy than wild ones according to nature, and for all of the foermer ones, it is better to be ruled by a human being: for thus they obtain health.

Polit.L3

Adhuc autem masculinum ad femininum, natura hoc quidem melius, hoc autem deterius, et hoc quidem principans, hoc autem principatum.

Yet again for the masculine toward the feminine, for indeed, the nature of the one is better and of the other is inferior, and it is the case that the one governs and the other is governed.

Polit.L3

Eodem autem modo necessarium esse et in hominibus.

It is necessary that things also be the same way among human beings.

Polit.L3

Quicumque quidem igitur tantum distant quantum anima a corpore et homo a bestia, disponuntur autem hoc modo: quorumcumque est opus corporis usus, et hoc est ab ipsis optimum. Isti quidem sunt natura servi, quibus melius est regi hoc principatu, si quidem et dictis creditur; est enim natura servus qui potest alterius esse, propter quod et alterius est.

Therefore, whoever stands so far apart from another as the soul from the body and the human from the beast--things are disposed in this way for those whose work is the use of the body, when this is the best thing that can come from them. Such men, indeed, are by nature slaves, for whom it is better to be ruled by this government, if indeed what has been said is to be believed; for he is by nature a slave who is able to be of another because of which he also actually is of another.

Polit.L3

Et communicant ratione tantum quantum ad sensum recipere, sed non habere. Alia enim animalia non ratione sentientia sed passionibus serviunt, et oportunitas variatur modicum: ad necessaria enim corpori auxilium fit ab ambobus, et a servis et a domesticis animalibus.

And he shares in reason only so far as to receive it through sense, but not so far as to possess it. For the other animals serve, not through rational perception, but through the passions. But the advantage is only a little varied: for from both comes bodily help with necessities, whether from slaves or from domesticated animals.

Polit.L3

Vult quidem igitur natura et corpora differentia facere, quae liberorum et servorum, haec quidem fortia ad necessarium usum, haec autem recta et inutilia ad tales operationes, sed utilia ad civilem vitam. Iste autem et fit divisus ad bellicam oportunitatem et pacificam. Accidit autem multotiens et contrarium, hos quidem corpora habere liberorum, hos autem animas.

Indeed, nature also wants to make a difference in the bodies of the free and of slaves, the latter strong for necessary employment, but the former upright and unuseful for such works, but useful for civic life. Such men, moreover, would become separated off for what is beneficial for war and peace. However, the contrary also frequently happens, such that some have the bodies of the free, and the others the souls.

Polit.L3

Quoniam et hoc manifestum quod si tantum fiunt differentes corpore solum quantum deorum ymagines, subdeficientes omnes dicent utique dignos esse hiis servire.

Because of this, it is also clear that if some come to be different from the others in body only, like the images of the gods, then worse and worse will everyone declare that those who are worthy must serve the others.

Polit.L3

Si autem in corpore hoc verum, multo iustius hoc in anima diffiniri. Sed non similiter facile videre pulcritudinem animae et corporis. Quod quidem igitur sunt natura quidam, hii quidem liberi, hii autem servi, manifestum quibus et expedit servire et iustum est.

Now if this is true in the body, it is much more just to define it of the soul. But it is not likewise so easy to see the beauty of the soul as of the body. Certainly, therefore, it is clear what such a nature is, who are the free, and who the slaves, and for whom to serve is advantageous and just.

Polit.L3

Utrum autem est (aliquis) natura talis etc. Postquam philosophus ostendit rationem et virtutem servi, hic procedit ad investigandum de opinionibus supra positis.

Utrum autem est (aliquis) natura talis etc. After the philosopher shows the rationale for and the virtue of the slave, he here proceeds to investigate the opinions put forward above.

Et primo inquirit utrum servitus sit naturalis;

And first he inquires whether slavery is natural [I.3-4].

Polit.L3

secundo utrum dominativa sit idem quod politica, ibi manifestum autem et ex hiis etc.

Second, whether mastery is the same as politics, at manifestum autem et ex his etc [I.5].

Polit.L3

Circa primum tria facit:

About the first he does three things.

Polit.L3

primo movet dubitationem;

First, he raises a difficulty [I.3.a].

Polit.L3

secundo determinat eam approbando unam partem, ibi non difficile autem etc.;

Second, he determines it by approving one part, at non difficile autem etc [I.3.b].

Polit.L3

tertio ostendit quo modo etiam alia pars dubitationis habet aliqualiter veritatem, ibi quod autem et qui contraria dicunt etc.

Third, he shows how even the other part of the difficulty has a certain [aliqualiter] virtue, at quod autem et qui contraria dicunt, etc [I.4].

Polit.L3

Dicit ergo primo quod post praedicta considerandum est utrum aliquis sit naturaliter servus vel non; et iterum utrum alicui magis sit dignum et iustum quod serviat quam quod non serviat, aut non, sed omnis servitus praeter naturam est: quod quidem respondet ad duas praemissas quaestiones. Si enim omnis servitus est praeter naturam, tunc nullus est naturaliter servus; et iterum non erit iustum neque dignum quod aliquis serviat: quod enim est praeter naturam non est dignum neque iustum.

Therefore, he says first that after the aforementioned things, it must be considered whether anyone is naturally a slave or not: and therefore, whether for some it is more worthy and just that they serve than that they not serve, or alternatively not, but that all slavery exceeds nature. Which, indeed, goes back to two previous questions. For if all slavery exceeds nature, then a) nobody is naturally a slave, and therefore b) it will be neither just nor worthy that anyone serves: for what exceeds nature is neither worthy nor just.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit non difficile autem etc., determinat propositam quaestionem, ostendens duo: scilicet quod aliquis homo naturaliter est servus, et quod alicui dignum est et expediens servire. Et circa hoc duo facit:

Then, where he says non difficile autem etc. [I.3.b], he makes a determination about the proposed question, showing two things: namely, that some human being is naturally a slave, and that for some, it is worthy and expedient to serve. And about this he does two things.

Polit.L3

primo enim proponit modum quo haec ostendenda sunt, dicens quod non est difficile quod aliquis contempletur praedictarum quaestionum veritatem et rationem, et quod etiam veritatem addiscat ex hiis quae in rebus accidunt.

For he first proposes the method by which these things ought to be shown, saying that it is not difficult for anyone to contemplate the truth and reason of the aforementioned questions, and that he can even further discover the truth from those things that happen in human affairs [rebus].

Polit.L3

Secundo, ibi principari enim et subici etc., secundum duos praemissos modos ostendit propositum,

Second, at principari enim et subici etc., he shows the two methods that have been advanced for what has been proposed.

Polit.L3

et primo ex hiis quae fiunt;

And first, from those things that happen.

Polit.L3

secundo ex ratione, ibi quaecumque enim ex pluribus constituta sunt etc.

Second, from reason, at quaecumque enim ex pluribus constituta sunt, etc [I.3.c].

Polit.L3

Circa primum quatuor proponit.

About the first he puts forward four things,

Polit.L3

Quorum primum est quod principari et subici non solum est de numero eorum quae ex necessitate vel violentia proveniunt, sed etiam est de numero eorum quae expediunt ad salutem hominum. Et hoc pertinet ad secundam quaestionem: quod enim expediens est alicui, videtur esse dignum et iustum ei.

the first of which is that to govern and to be subject are not only counted among those things that come out of necessity or violence, but also among those that are expedient for the well-being of human beings: and this pertains to the second question. For what is expedient for someone seems to be worthy and just for him.

Polit.L3

Secundum est quod in hominibus ex ipsa nativitate videmus quod est quaedam distinctio, ita quod quidam sunt apti ad hoc quod subiciantur, quidam vero ad hoc quod principentur. Et hoc pertinet ad primam quaestionem: quod enim ex nativitate confestim inest alicui, videtur esse naturale.

The second is that in human beings, from their very birth, we see that there is a certain distinction: that some of them are apt to be subject, but some of them to govern--and this relates to the first question. For what is immediately innate to something from birth seems to exist naturally.

Polit.L3

Tertium est quod sunt multae species eorum qui subiciuntur et eorum qui principantur; aliter enim principatur vir feminae, aliter dominus servo, aliter rex regno. Et hoc etiam pertinet ad eandem quaestionem: nam ea quae naturaliter insunt rebus, secundum eorum diversitatem diversificantur.

The third is that there are many kinds of those things that are subject and of those that govern: for in one way, a man governs a woman, in another, a master governs a slave, and another, a king governs a kingdom. And this also pertains to the same question: for those things that are naturally innate to things are differentiated according to their difference.

Polit.L3

Et quartum est quod semper est melior principatus qui est meliorum subiectorum, sicut melior est principatus quo quis principatur homini quam quo quis principatur bestiae; et hoc probat tali ratione. Omnis principatus et subiectio ad aliquod opus ordinatur, obedit enim qui subicitur principanti in aliquo opere; sed opus quod fit a melioribus est melius: ergo et principatus melior. Et hoc etiam quartum pertinet ad primam quaestionem; nam quae naturaliter insunt tanto sunt meliora quanto sunt meliorum.

And the fourth is that the better government is always over the better subjects: just as that government is better by which someone governs a human being than by which someone governs a beast. And he proves this through the following line of reasoning. All government and subjection is ordered toward a certain work, for he obeys who is subjected to one who governs in a certain work. But a work which comes to be from something better is better: therefore also the government is better. And this fourth thing also pertains to the first question, for what is naturally innate, by however much it is better, by so much is it of a better thing.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit quaecumque enim ex pluribus etc., ostendit propositum ex ratione.

Then, where he says quaecumque enim ex pluribus, etc. [I.3.c], he shows what was proposed through reason.

Polit.L3

Et ponit rationem ad ostendendum quod aliqui sunt naturaliter servi, quibus expedit servire;

And he presents a reason showing that those people are naturally slaves for whom it is expedient to serve.

Polit.L3

secundo ostendit qui sint tales, ibi quicumque quidem igitur etc.

Second, he shows who these are, at quicumque quidem igitur, etc. [I.3.j].

Polit.L3

Circa primum ponit talem rationem. Quaecumque sunt ex pluribus constituta, in hiis est aliquid principans et aliquid subiectum naturaliter, et hoc expedit; sed hominum multitudo est ex pluribus constituta: ergo naturale est et expediens quod unus principetur et alius subiciatur. Huius autem rationis minor manifesta est ex praemissis in quibus ostensum est quod homo est naturaliter animal politicum, et ita naturale est quod ex multis hominibus constituatur una multitudo;

About the first, he presents this reasoning. In whatever things are constituted out of many things, there is naturally some governor and some subject, and this is expedient. But a multitude of human beings is constituted out of many things: therefore it is naturally expedient both that one govern and another be subject. The minor premise of this reasoning is clear from what was previously said, where it was shown that human beings are naturally political animals, and hence it is natural that from many human beings, one multitude should be constituted.

Polit.L3

unde ea praetermissa, probat maiorem. Et sic in hac ratione tria facit:

Hence, with those things previously advanced, he proves the major premise: and so in this [line of] reasoning he does three things.

Polit.L3

primo ponit maiorem;

First, he posits the major premise.

Polit.L3

secundo probat eam, ibi et hoc ex omni natura etc.;

Second, he proves it, at et hoc ex omni natura, etc.

Polit.L3

tertio infert conclusionem, ibi eodem autem modo etc.

Third, he infers the conclusion at eodem autem modo, etc.

Polit.L3

Dicit ergo primo quod quaecumque sunt constituta ex pluribus ita quod ex eis fiat unum commune, sive illa plura sint coniuncta sicut membra corporis coniunguntur ad constitutionem totius, sive sint divisa sicut ex multis militibus constituitur unus exercitus, in omnibus hiis invenitur esse principans et subiectum; et hoc est naturale et expediens, ut per singula patebit exempla.

Therefore, he says first that for whatever is constituted out of many things so that from them comes to be one common thing, whether those many things are conjoined, as the members of a body are joined together for the constitution of the whole, or whether they are divided as when from many soldiers a single army is constituted, nevertheless in all these there will be found a governor and a subject: and this is natural and expedient, as will be apparent through individual examples.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et hoc ex omni natura etc., Probat propositum quadrupliciter:

Then, where he says et hoc ex omni natura, etc., he proves the proposition in four ways.

Polit.L3

primo quidem in rebus inanimatis;

First, indeed, in unensouled objects.

Polit.L3

secundo in partibus hominis, ibi animal autem primum constat etc.;

Second, in the parts of the human being, at animal autem primum constat, etc.

Polit.L3

tertio in genere animalium, ibi iterum in homine etc.;

Third, in the genus of animals, at iterum in homine etc.

Polit.L3

quarto in differentia sexuum, ibi adhuc autem masculinum etc.

Fourth, in the differences of the sexes, at adhuc autem masculinum, etc.

Polit.L3

Dicit ergo primo quod veritas praemissae propositionis invenitur in rebus animatis non quasi sit eis proprium, sed ex eo quod est commune toti naturae: quia etiam in hiis quae non participant vita est aliquis principatus, puta harmoniae. Quod potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo de harmonia sonorum, quia semper in vocibus quae consonant aliqua vox praedominatur secundum quam tota harmonia diiudicatur; potest etiam intelligi de harmonia elementorum in corpore mixto, in quo semper unum elementorum est praedominans. Sed huiusmodi pertransit, quia sunt extrinseca ab hac consideratione.

He first says, therefore, that the truth of the previously advanced propositions will be found in ensouled objects, not as if it were proper to them, but from that which is common to the whole of nature. Because even in those things that do not participate in life there is a certain government, for instance, of harmony. This can be understood in two modes. In one mode, regarding the harmony of sounds; because in consonant voices, there is always a certain voice that has chief mastery [praedominatur], according to which the whole harmony is discerned. It can also be understood regarding the harmony of the elements in a mixed body, in which there is always one of the elements that has chief mastery. But he moves on from things of this sort, because they are extrinsic to this consideration.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit animal autem primum etc., ostendit propositum in partibus hominis. Et dicit quod prima compositio animalis est ex anima et corpore, quae quidem compositio dicitur prima non secundum ordinem generationis sed secundum principalitatem, quia est ex partibus principalissimis; harum autem partium una est naturaliter principans, scilicet anima, alia vero subiecta, scilicet corpus. Posset autem aliquis dicere quod hoc non est naturale, cum non inveniatur in omnibus. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum subdit quod ad iudicandum quid sit naturale, oportet considerare ea quae se habent secundum naturam, non autem ea quae sunt corrupta quia huiusmodi deficiunt a natura. Et ideo ad iudicandum quae pars in homine naturaliter principetur, oportet considerare aliquem hominem qui sit bene dispositus et secundum animam et secundum corpus: in quo est manifestum quod anima corpori dominatur. Sed in hominibus pestilentibus et qui male se habent multotiens corpus principatur animae, quia praeferunt commodum corporis commodo animae; et hoc ideo quia sunt male dispositi et praeter naturam.

Then, where he says animal autem primum, etc., he shows the proposition in the parts of the human being, and says that the composite of an animal is from the soul and body. And this composite is called first, not according to the order of generation, but according to government, because it is from the most governing parts. But of these parts, one is naturally governor, namely, the soul; and the other is subject, namely, the body. Now it would be possible for someone to say that this is not natural, since it is not found in all; and therefore, in order to exclude this [objection], he adds that in order to judge what is natural, it is necessary to consider those things which are disposed [se habent] according to nature, and not those things which have been corrupted, because things of this manner fall short from nature. And therefore, in order to judge what part in the human being naturally governs, one must consider a human being who is well-disposed both of soul and of body, in which it is clear that the soul has mastery over the body. But in diseased human beings and those who are evilly disposed [se habent], the body frequently governs the soul, because they prefer the advantage of the body before the advantage of the soul; and this happens because they are evilly disposed, and exceed nature.

Polit.L3

Ostendit autem consequenter quod principatus qui est in partibus animalis habet quandam similitudinem exterioris principatus. Possumus enim in animali quod est homo considerare duplicem principatum ad partes eius, scilicet despoticum quo dominus principatur servis, et politicum quo rector civitatis principatur liberis. Invenitur enim inter partes hominis quod anima dominatur corpori, sed hoc est despotico principatu in quo servus in nullo potest resistere domino, eo quod servus id quod est simpliciter est domini, ut supra dictum est: et hoc videmus in membris corporis, scilicet manibus et pedibus, quod statim sine contradictione ad imperium animae applicantur ad opus. Invenimus etiam quod intellectus seu ratio dominatur appetitui, sed principatu politico et regali qui est ad liberos, unde possunt in aliquibus contradicere: et similiter appetitus aliquando non sequitur rationem. Et huius diversitatis ratio est quia corpus non potest moveri nisi ab anima, et ideo totaliter subicitur ei; sed appetitus potest moveri non solum a ratione sed etiam a sensu, et ideo non totaliter subicitur rationi. In utroque autem regimine manifestum est quod subiectio est secundum naturam et expediens. Est enim naturale et expediens corpori quod regatur ab anima; et similiter est naturale et expediens parti passibili, id est appetitui qui subicitur passionibus, ut regatur ab intellectu vel ratione. Et utrobique esset nocivum, si id quod debet subici se haberet ex aequo vel e contrario ei quod debet principari; corpus enim corrumperetur nisi subiceretur animae, et appetitus esset inordinatus nisi subiceretur rationi.

And he consequently shows that the government that is in the parts of an animal has a certain likeness to external government. For we are able to consider, in the animal that is human, a twofold government regarding his parts: namely, the despotic, by which a master governs a slave, and the political, by which a ruler of a city governs the free. For it is found among the parts of the human being that the soul masters the body, but this is with a despotic government, in which the slave is in no way able to resist the master, because to be a slave, simply speaking, is to be “of a master” as was said above. And we see this in the members of the body, such as the hands and the feet: that they immediately apply themselves to a work at the command of the soul. We also find that the intellect, or reason, has mastery over the appetite, but with political and kingly [government], which is over the free; hence they are able to contradict in some things. And likewise, the appetite sometimes does not follow the reason. And the reason for this difference is, because the body is not able to be moved except by the soul, and therefore it is wholly subjected to it; but the appetite is able to be moved not only by reason, but also by the senses, and therefore it is not wholly subjected to reason. Under both regimes, however, it is clear that subjection is according to nature and expedient. For it is natural and expedient to the body that it be ruled by the soul: and similarly, it is natural and expedient for the feeling part, that is, for the appetite which is subjected to the passions, that it be ruled by the understanding, or reason. And for both it would be harmful if what ought to be subject were disposed toward equality, or on the contrary, what ought to govern: for the body would be corrupted if it weren’t subject to the soul, and the appetite would be inordinate if it weren’t subject to reason.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit iterum in homine etc., probat idem in genere animalium, dicens quod similiter se habet in homine et aliis animalibus quod naturale et expediens est ut homo aliis dominetur; videmus enim quod animalia mansueta quibus homo dominatur, digniora sunt secundum naturam silvestribus in quantum participant aliqualiter regimine rationis. Sed et omnibus animalibus (melius est) quod ab homine regantur, quia sic in multis casibus adipiscuntur salutem corporalem quam per se consequi non possent: sicut patet cum eis copiosa pabula et remedia sanitatis ab hominibus exhibentur.

Then, where he says iterum in homine, etc., he proves the same thing in the genus of animals, saying that it is similarly disposed [se habet] among human beings and among the other animals, that it is natural and expedient for the human being to be a master over the others. For we see that tame animals, over whom man is master, are more worthy according to nature than the wild ones inasmuch as they participate in some way in the regime of reason; but also for all animals (it is better) that they be ruled by human beings, because thus in many cases they obtain greater bodily health than they would have been able to achieve through themselves; as it is clear, since for them more abundant food and the remedies of health are furnished by human beings.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem masculinum etc., probat idem in differentia sexuum. Et dicit quod eodem modo etiam se habet masculinum ad femininum, quod naturaliter masculinum est melius et femininum deterius; et masculus principans, femina autem subiecta. Est autem attendendum quod prima duo exempla sunt de toto integrali, alia duo de toto universali quod est genus vel species; et sic patet quod praedicta propositio in utrisque locum habet.

Then, where he says adhuc autem masculinum, etc., he proves the same thing in the differences of the sexes. And he says that in the same way, also, the masculine is disposed toward the feminine, that naturally the masculine is better, and the feminine is inferior; and the male governs, but the female is subject. It ought to be noticed that the first two examples are about an integral whole, the other two are about a universal whole, which is a genus or species: and thus it is clear that the aforementioned proposition has a place in both.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit eodem autem modo etc., concludit propositum, scilicet quod eodem modo se habet in hominibus sicut in praemissis; scilicet quod naturale et expediens est quod quidam principentur et quidam subiciantur.

Then, where he says eodem autem modo, etc., he concludes what was proposed, namely, that things are arranged in the same way among human beings as with the things previously discussed: that it is natural and expedient that one governs, and another be subject.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit quicumque quidem igitur etc., ostendit qui sunt qui naturaliter principantur et subiciuntur:

Then, where he says quicumque quidem igitur, etc., he shows who those are who naturally govern and are subject.

Polit.L3

et primo quales sunt secundum animam;

And first, what kind they are according to the soul;

Polit.L3

secundo quales secundum corpus, ibi vult quidem igitur natura etc.

second, what kind according to the body, at vult quidem igitur natura, etc.

Polit.L3

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L3

primo ostendit quales sunt secundum animam qui naturaliter principantur vel subiciuntur;

First, he shows what kind they are, according to the soul, who naturally govern or are subject.

Polit.L3

secundo ponit comparationem inter homines qui naturaliter sunt servi et bruta animalia quae etiam naturaliter serviunt, ibi et communicant ratione etc.

Second, he draws a comparison between human beings who are naturally slaves, and brute animals, which also naturally serve, at communicant ratione, etc.

Polit.L3

Dicit ergo primo quod cum anima naturaliter dominetur corpori et homo bestiis, quicumque tantum distant ab aliis sicut anima a corpore et homo a bestia, propter eminentiam rationis in quibusdam et defectum in aliis, isti sunt naturaliter domini aliorum: secundum quod etiam Salomon dicit quod qui stultus est serviet sapienti. Disponuntur autem hoc modo, scilicet quod ad eos se habeant aliqui sicut homo ad bestias, vel anima ad corpus, illi quorum opus principale est usus corporis; et quod hoc est optimum quod ab eis haberi potest, sunt enim validi ad exequenda opera corporalia, impotentes autem ad opera rationis: et isti sunt naturaliter servi quibus melius est quod regantur a sapientibus, si conveniens est quod credatur rationibus supra dictis, quia in hoc sortiuntur regimen rationis. Et quod isti sint naturaliter servi, patet per hoc quia ille est naturaliter servus qui habet aptitudinem naturalem ut sit alterius, in quantum scilicet non potest regi propria ratione per quam homo est dominus sui, sed solum ratione alterius: propter quod naturaliter alterius est, quasi servus.

Therefore, he says first that, since the soul naturally is master over the body, and human beings over the beasts, then whoever stands so far apart from the others as the soul from the body and human beings from the beasts, because of the eminence of reason in some, and its deficiency in others, such human beings are naturally masters of the others, according to which Solomon also said that “the fool will serve the wise.” They are disposed in this manner: that some are disposed toward them as the human being is toward the beasts or the soul toward the body--those whose governing work is the use of the body; and that this is best, that they are able to be possessed by them. For they are robust for executing bodily works, but impotent for the works of reason: and such human beings are naturally slaves, for whom it would be better that they be ruled by the wise “if this may be believed from what was said,” because in this, they are alloted to the regime of reason. And that such human beings would naturally be slaves is clear through this, because he is naturally a slave who has a natural aptness to be another’s, inasmuch as he is not able to be ruled by his own reason, by which a human being is master of himself, but only by the reason of another, because of which he is naturally another’s, as if a slave.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et communicant ratione etc., comparat secundum convenientiam et differentiam hominem naturaliter servum et animal brutum. Et dicit quod ille qui est servus naturaliter communicat ratione solum quantum ad hoc quod recipit sensum rationis sicut edoctus ab alio, sed non quantum ad hoc quod habeat sensum rationis per se ipsum; sed alia animalia serviunt homini non quasi recipientia aliquem sensum rationis ab homine, in quantum scilicet, memoria eorum quae sunt bene vel male passa ab homine, timore vel amore incitantur ad serviendum. Et sic quantum ad modum serviendi est differentia in quantum naturaliter servus servit ratione, brutum autem animal passione; sed oportunitas, id est utilitas quae ex utriusque servitio provenit, modicum variatur. Ad eadem enim praebetur nobis auxilium et a servis et a domesticis animalibus, scilicet ad necessaria corpori; non enim naturaliter servus, cum deficiat ratione, potest auxiliari ad consilium vel ad aliquod opus rationis. In corporalibus tamen pluribus modis potest servire servus quam animal brutum propter rationem.

Then, where he says et communicant ratione, etc., he compares the human being who is naturally a slave to the brute animal, with regard to what is fitting and what is different. And he says that he who is naturally a slave shares in reason only to this degree: that he receives the perception of reason [sensum rationis] when he is taught by another, but not to the degree that he has the perception of reason of himself. But other animals serve human beings not as if receiving a certain perception of reason from man, but inasmuch as their memories, which receive impressions [passa] either well or badly from man, are incited to serving either through fear or through love. And in this degree, the mode of serving is different inasmuch as the natural slave serves by reason, but the dull animal by passion. But the advantage, that is, the usefulness that comes forth from the slavery of both, is only a little varied: for help is proffered to us from the same things, both from slaves and from domesticated animals: namely, for the necessities of the body. For the natural slave, since his reason is deficient, is not able to be helpful for counsel, or for some work of reason. However, the slave is able to serve in more bodily modes than the dull animal, because of reason.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit vult quidem igitur natura etc., ostendit quales sint servi secundum corpus.

Then, where he says vult quidem igitur natura, etc., he shows what sort would be slaves following the body.

Polit.L3

Et primo proponit quod intendit;

And he first proposes his intention.

Polit.L3

secundo probat propositum, ibi quoniam et hoc manifestum etc.

Second, he proves what was proposed, at quoniam et hoc manifestum, etc.

Polit.L3

Dicit ergo primo quod natura vult, id est habet quendam impetum sive inclinationem ad hoc ut faciat differentiam inter corpora liberorum et servorum, ita scilicet quod corpora servorum sint fortia ad exercendum usum necessarium qui eis competit, scilicet ad fodiendum in agro et alia similia ministeria exercenda; sed corpora liberorum debent esse recta, id est bene disposita secundum naturam, et inutilia ad tales operationes serviles, quod exigit complexio delicata: sed tamen debent esse utilia ad civilem vitam in qua liberi homines conversantur. Iste autem qui habet membra utilia ad civilem vitam, habet dispositionem divisam ad bellicam oportunitatem et pacificam: ut scilicet tempore belli habeat membra apta ad pugnandum et ad alia militaria opera, tempore vero pacis ad exercendum alia civilia opera. Et quamvis natura habeat inclinationem ad praedictam differentiam corporum causandam, tamen quandoque deficit in hoc, sicut etiam in omnibus aliis quae generantur et corrumpuntur consequitur natura effectum suum ut in pluribus, deficit vero in paucioribus. Quando ergo in hoc natura deficit, accidit multoties contrarium ei quod dictum est, ut scilicet illi qui habent animas liberorum habeant corpora servorum, vel e converso.

Therefore, he says first that nature desires, that is, has a certain impulse [impetus] or inclination [inclinationem] to this: in order to make a difference between the bodies of the free and of the slaves: namely, so that the bodies of slaves should be stronger, for exercising [exercendum] necessary employment, which is fit for them: namely, for digging in the fields, and other similar exercising services [ministeria exercenda]. But the bodies of the free ought to be upright, that is, well-disposed by nature, and unuseful for such servile works [operationes serviles], which drive out a delightful constitution; but nevertheless, they ought to be useful for the civic life, in which free men keep company [conversantur]. Such men who have limbs useful for the civic life have a disposition divided between a suitability for war and for peace, so that in times of war they have limbs knit for fighting, and for other military works; but in times of peace, for exercising other civic works. And however much nature may have an inclination toward causing the aforementioned difference of bodies, nevertheless, whenever it is deficient in this, just as in all other things which are generated and corrupted, nature achieves its effect as in most cases, but falls short in a few. When, therefore, nature is deficient in this, the contrary to this frequently happens, as was said, so that those who have the souls of the free have the bodies of slaves, and the converse.

Polit.L3

Est autem considerandum quod philosophus hic inducit concludens ex praemissis in quibus agebat de dispositione animae; quia cum corpus sit naturaliter propter animam, natura intendit formare tale corpus quale sit conveniens animae, et ideo intendit his qui habent animas liberorum dare corpora liberorum, et similiter de servis. Et hoc quidem quantum ad interiores dispositiones semper consonat, non enim potest esse quod aliquis habeat animam bene dispositam si organa imaginationis et aliarum virium sensitivarum sint male disposita; sed in figura et quantitate exteriori et aliis dispositionibus exterioribus potest inveniri dissonantia, ut hic dicitur.

Now we must consider that the philosopher here deduces a conclusion from premises, in which he dealt with the disposition of the soul; because, since the body exists naturally for the sake of the soul, nature intends to form the body such that it may be fitted for the soul; and therefore, it intends to give those who have the souls of the free the bodies of the free, and similarly regarding slaves. And this, indeed, so that the interior dispositions always harmonize [consonat]: for it cannot be that someone should have a soul well disposed if the tools of the imagination and of the other sensitive forces are badly disposed: but in shape, and exterior quantity, and the other exterior arrangements, dissonance can be found, as is said here.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit quoniam et hoc manifestum etc., probat quod dixerat.

Then, where he says quoniam et hoc manifestum, etc., he proves what he had said.

Polit.L3

Et primo quantum ad corpus;

And first, with reference to the body;

Polit.L3

secundo quantum ad animam, ibi si autem in corpore etc.

second, with reference to the soul, at si autem in corpore, etc.

Polit.L3

Dicit ergo primo quod naturam inclinari ad hoc quod faciat diversa corpora servorum et liberorum, ex hoc est manifestum quia si inter aliquos inveniatur tanta differentia solummodo ex parte corporis ut videatur tantum alios excellere ac si essent quaedam imagines deorum, sicut solemus communiter dicere quando videmus aliquos elegantis formae quod videntur esse sicut angeli, tunc omnes dicerent quod illi qui deficiunt a tanta elegantia formae corporalis sunt digni ut serviant eis qui superexcellunt, secundum illud species Priami digna est imperio. Et cum hoc sit manifestum in maxima differentia, idem etiam est sentiendum quantum ad intentionem naturae si non fuerit tanta differentia.

Therefore, he says first that it is clear that nature is inclined toward this--that it makes diverse bodies of slaves and of the free--from this: because if among some there is found such a great difference merely on the part of the body that they seem to surpass others as if they were images of the gods; just as we are commonly accustomed to say, when we see someone of elegant form, that they seem to be like the angels: then all say that those who are deficient in such elegance of bodily form are worthy [digni] to serve those who are abundantly surpassing, following this: “the appearance of Priam is worthy to command.” And since this is clear in the greatest difference, the same is also perceived to be the intention of nature, even if there were not such a great difference.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit si autem in corpore etc., probat idem ex parte animae. Et dicit quod si hoc est verum ex parte corporis quod illi qui deficiunt sunt digni servire excellentibus, multo iustius est hoc determinari ex parte animae quanto anima nobilior est corpore. Sed tamen excellentia pulchritudinis animae non ita de facili potest cognosci sicut pulchritudo corporis; et ideo magis vulgariter iudicatur quod aliqui sint digni ad dominandum ex parte corporis quam ex parte animae.

Then, where he says se autem in corpore, etc., he proves the same thing from on the part of the soul: and he says that if this is true on the part of the body, that those who are deficient are worthy to serve the more excellent, it is much more just to determine this from the part of the soul, inasmuch as the soul is more noble than the body. But however excellent the beauty of the soul, it cannot be so easily known as the beauty of the body: and therefore, it is more vulgarly judged that someone is worthy to have mastery on behalf of the body than on behalf of the soul.

Polit.L3

Ultimo autem concludit epilogando duas conclusiones intentas in hoc capitulo: scilicet quod quidam sunt naturaliter servi et quidam naturaliter liberi; et quod his qui sunt naturaliter servi expedit servire, et iustum est quod serviant.

And lastly, in an epilogue he concludes two serious conclusions in this chapter: namely, that some men are naturally slaves, and some are naturally free: and that for those who are naturally slaves it is advantageous to serve, and it is just that they should serve.

Polit.L3

Lecture 4

Polit.L4

Quod autem et qui contraria dicunt secundum modum aliquem dicunt recte, non difficile videre. Dupliciter enim dicitur servire et servus. Est enim aliquis secundum legem servus et serviens: lex enim promulgatio quaedam est, in qua in bello superata praevalentium esse dicunt.

But it is not difficult to see that those who assert the contrary also speak rightly, in a certain manner. For [the terms] "to serve" and "slave" are used in two different ways. For there is the one who is a slave and enslaved by law: for there is a certain promulgated law in which they say that those overcome in war belong to those who prevail.

Polit.L4

Hoc itaque iustum multi eorum qui in legibus quaemadmodum retora scribunt iniquorum tanquam durum si vim inferre potentis et secundum potentiam melioris erit servum et subiectum quod violentiam passum est; et hiis quidem sic videtur, hiis autem illo modo etiam sapientum.

But many of those who write about law, as did a certain rhetorician, declare it to be iniquitous and hard if, because someone suffered violence, he will become a slave and a subject of one with power to inflict force who is only better according to his power. And it seems thus to some, but to others the other way, even among the wise.

Polit.L4

Causa autem huius dubitationis et quod facit verba variari, quia modo aliquo virtus sortita successum et violentiam pati potest maxime et est semper superans in excessu boni alicuius, ut videatur non sine virtute esse violentiam.

The cause of this difficulty, and what makes explanations to vary, is that virtue, in a certain mode, things falling out successfully, is most of all able to endure violence; and it is always from an excess of some good that one overcomes another, so that it seems violence is not without virtue.

Polit.L4

Sed de iusto solum esse dubitationem: propter hoc enim hiis quidem benivolentia videtur iustum esse, hiis autem ipsum hoc iustum meliorem principari, quoniam sepositis seorsum hiis rationibus neque forte nihil habent neque probabile altere rationes, ut non oporteat melius secundum virtutem principari et dominari.

But the difficulty seems to be solely about justice: for to some, benevolence itself seems to be what is just, but to others, that it is just for those who are better to govern, since if these reasons are set out separately, the former reasons--that it would not be necessary for those who are better according to virtue to govern and have mastery--have neither strength nor probability.

Polit.L4

Totaliter autem attendentes quidam ut possibile est ad iustum quoddam, lex enim iustum quoddam, eam quae secundum bellum servitutem ponunt iustam, omnino autem non aiunt.

Now comprehensively, some attending, as is possible, to a certain just thing, for law is a certain just thing, posit the slavery according to war as just, though not in every way.

Polit.L4

Principium enim contingit non iustum esse bellorum, et indignum servire, nequaquam utique dicet aliquis servum esse. Si autem non, accidet eos qui videntur esse optimi generis servos esse, et ex servis si contingat vendi captos.

For it happens that the beginning of a war is unjust; and certainly one can by no means say that anyone ought to be a slave who is unworthy to serve. Moreover, if this were not the case, it would happen that those who appear to be the best family of men would be slaves, and [born] of slaves, if it happened that those captured were sold.

Polit.L4

Propter quod ipsos non volunt dicere servos sed barbaros.

Because of this, they do not wish to call themselves slaves, but only barbarians.

Polit.L4

Et quidem cum hoc dicunt, nihil aliud quaerunt quam quod natura servum; quod quidem a principio diximus. Necesse enim est dicere aliquos esse hos quidem a principio servos, hos autem nequaquam.

And indeed, when they speak this way, they are inquiring about nothing other than the natural slave, which, indeed, we spoke about at the beginning. For it is necessary to say that some, indeed, are slaves from the beginning, but others not at all.

Polit.L4

Eodem autem modo et de ingenuitate: ipsos quidem enim non solum apud ipsos ingenuos, sed etiam ubique putant; barbaros autem domi solum, tanquam sit aliquid hoc quidem simpliciter ingenuum et liberum, hoc autem non simpliciter, quaemadmodum Theodekti eleloga inquit: ex ambabus divinis progenitricibus radicibus quis utique dignificabit addicere servum.

In the same way, also, regarding nobility. For some, indeed, are not only like this among themselves, but are also deemed such everywhere; but the barbarians [are thought noble] only at home; as though something is noble and free simply speaking, but something else not simply, just as Theodectes quoted in his elegies: would anyone presume to call me a slave who am sprung from divine roots on both sides?

Polit.L4

Cum autem hoc dicant nihil aliud quam virtus et malitia determinant servum et liberum et nobiles et ignobiles. Dignificant enim quaemadmodum ex homine hominem et ex bestiis fieri bestiam, sic et ex bonis bonum. Natura autem vult quidem hoc facere multotiens, non tamen potest.

Now when they speak this way, they mean nothing other than that virtue and wickedness determine the slaves and the free, the nobles and the ignoble. For just as they judge the human comes from the human, and from beasts come to be beasts, so also the good from the good. And indeed, nature desires to make things usually this way, although it is not able [to accomplish it].

Polit.L4

Quod quidem igitur habet quandam rationem dubitatio, et non sunt hii quidem natura servi, hii autem liberi, palam; et quod in quibusdam determinatum est quod tale quorum huic quidem expedit servire, huic autem dominari, et iustum est; et oportet hoc quidem subici, hoc autem principari, quo nati sunt principatu principari. Quare et despotizare, male autem inutiliter est ambobus. Idem enim expedit parti et toti, et corpori et animae. Servus autem pars quaedam domini, velut animatum aliquid corporis. Separata autem pars corporis, propter quod et expediens aliquid est, et amicitia servo et domino ad invicem, hiis qui natura tales dignificantur; hiis autem qui non secundum hunc modum, sed secundum legem et violentiam passis contrarium.

It is evident, therefore, that the difficulty [above] has some reason to it, and that it is not that these are indeed by nature slaves, but those by nature free. And that in some situations, it is determinate who are such, and advantageous for some to serve, for some to have mastery--and also just. And it must be that the one obeys and the other governs by the government of those born to govern. This is why despotism is evil and disadvantageous to both parties. For the same thing is advantageous to the part and the whole, to the body and the soul. Now the slave is a certain part of the master, but as though a living thing of his body. But he is separated on the part of the body, and because of this there is something advantageous [for them], and master and slave have friendship for each other--for those whom nature has made of such dignity. But for those who are not [master and slave] in this way, but according to law, and who suffer violence, the contrary occurs.

Polit.L4

Quod autem et qui contraria dicunt etc. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod aliqui naturaliter sunt servi, quibus expedit servire et iustum est, hic ostendit quod etiam contraria opinio est secundum (modum) aliquem vera. Et circa hoc duo facit:

After the philosopher shows that natural slaves are those for whom it is expedient and just to slave, he here shows that the contrary opinion is also true in a certain mode. And about this he does two things.

Polit.L4

primo ponit modum servitutis secundum quem negatur a quibusdam servitus esse naturalis et iusta;

First, he presents the mode of slavery that makes some people deny that slavery is natural and just.

Polit.L4

secundo super hoc dubitationem movet et solvit, ibi hoc itaque iustum etc.

Second, he raises doubt about this, and resolves it.

Polit.L4

Dicit ergo primo quod non difficile est videre quod illi qui dicunt contrarium hiis quae determinata sunt, asserendo scilicet nullam servitutem esse naturalem et iustam, secundum modum aliquem recte dicunt. Dupliciter enim dicitur servire et servus: unus quidem modus est secundum aptitudinem naturalem, ut supra dictum est; sed etiam est aliquis servus vel serviens secundum legem inter homines positam. Est enim quaedam promulgatio legis ut illi qui sunt victi in bello dicantur esse servi eorum qui contra eos praevaluerunt; et hoc iure quasi omnes gentes utuntur, unde et ius gentium nominatur.

Therefore, he says first that it is not difficult to see that those who speak contrary to what has been determined, and who assert that no slavery is natural and just, speak correctly according to some mode. For there are two ways to speak of a slave or slavery. One way is according to a natural aptitude, as was said above, but someone is also a slave or in slavery after a law posited between men. For there is a certain promulgation of law that those who are conquered in war are said to be the slaves of those that have prevailed against them: and as though all nations [gentes] use this right [ius], it is named “the right of nations.”

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit hoc itaque iustum etc., movet dubitationem de ista servitute legali. Et circa hoc tria facit:

Then, he raises a doubt about such legal slavery. And he does three things in this regard.

Polit.L4

primo ponit diversas opiniones;

First, he lays out diverse opinions.

Polit.L4

secundo assignat rationes diversitatis, ibi causa autem huius dubitationis etc.;

Second, he indicates the reasons for this diversity.

Polit.L4

tertio solvit dubitationem, ibi totaliter autem attendentes etc.

Third, he resolves the doubt.

Polit.L4

Dicit ergo primo quod multi qui intromiserunt se de legibus scribendis scripserunt quod iustum praedictae legis est de numero iniquorum. Et introducit quendam qui vocabatur rethora, cui durum videbatur si ille qui est passus violentiam sit servus et subiectus ei qui potuit violentiam inferre, et non est melior nisi quia est potentior. Unde quibusdam sic videtur, quod scilicet sit iniqum, aliis autem videtur alio modo; et ista diversitas non solum est inter populares, sed etiam inter sapientes.

Therefore, he says first that those who have engaged in writing about these laws have written that the right of the aforementioned law is numbered among those that are iniquitous. And he introduces someone who was called “the Rhetorician” to whom it seemed hard if someone who suffered violence should be a slave and subject to him who had the power to inflict the violence and who is not better except because he is more powerful. So to some, it seemed that it is iniquitous. However, to others it seemed the other way: and this diversity [of opinion] is not only among the many, but also among the wise.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit causa autem huius etc., assignat causam praedictae diversitatis.

Then he indicated the cause of this diversity [of opinion].

Polit.L4

Et primo proponit quiddam quod est manifestum;

And first, he puts forward something that is clear.

Polit.L4

secundo de quo sit dubitatio, ibi sed de iusto solum etc.

Second, indicates the source of the doubt.

Polit.L4

Dicit ergo primo quod causa praemissae dubitationis unde variantur verba sapientum est ex hoc quod virtus quae est per aliquem modum, id est sive per sapientiam sive per constantiam sive per fortitudinem corporalem sive quocumque alio modo, si sortiatur successum, id est nisi contrarium eveniat per infortunium, potest maxime compati secum quod violentiam inferat. Et sic manifestum est quod ille qui superat semper est in excessu alicuius boni, nisi per infortunium aliter accidat; et ex hoc videtur quod violentia nunquam fit sine qualicumque virtute eius qui violentiam infert. Et hoc est per se manifestum.

Therefore, he says first that the cause of the previously advanced doubt, from which the explantions of the wise are at odds, is this: virtue, which exists in some [particular] mode—either as wisdom, or firmness, or as bodily fortitude, or in any other mode—if things should fall out successfully (that is, if the contrary should not come forth through misfortune) is most of all able to inflict violence. And so it is clear that he who overcomes always has an excess of some good, unless things happen otherwise through misfortune: from this it seems that force never occurs without any virtue whatsoever in him who inflicts the force. And this is clear through itself.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit sed de iusto solum etc., ostendit quid remaneat sub dubitatione. Et dicit quod de hoc solum remanet dubitatio, utrum sit iustum quod propter excellentiam qualiscumque virtutis aliqui debeant principari qui superant; et ideo circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones. Quidam enim dicunt quod hoc iustum praedictae legis est per benevolentiam, id est in favorem victorum introductum ut per hoc homines ad fortiter pugnandum incitarentur; quibusdam autem videtur quod hoc ipsum (habet) quandam rationem iustitiae, quod ille qui apparet melior in hoc quod vincit principetur, secundum quod Salomon dicit in Prov.: manus fortium dominabitur; quae autem remissa est tributis serviet. Et hoc quidem ideo dicunt quia, si huiusmodi rationes operationum removeantur de medio, in primo aspectu apparet quod illae rationes quae dicunt quod non oportet principari et dominari illum qui est melior secundum virtutem quae victorum extitit, non habent aliquid quod sit efficax ad movendum rationem, neque etiam habent aliquam probabilitatem secundum ea quae communiter hominibus videntur.

Then he shows what remains under doubt; and he says that this only remains in doubt: whether it is just that because of any excellence of virtue whatsoever, certain people who overcome ought to govern. And there are diverse opinions about this. For some say that this aforementioned justice of law is through benevolence—that is, introduced in favor of the victors—so that through this men would be incited to fight more bravely. To others, however, it seems that this law has a certain account of justice, insofar as he who appears better in that which he conquers should govern, as Solomon says in Proverbs: “Let the stronger hand have mastery; let him who is slack serve as tribute.” And they say this because if the reasons for such works were removed from the [middle term in the argument], from the perspective of what is first it would appear that those reasons indicating that he must not govern and have mastery who is better in that virtue that exists in the victors do not have anything that is effective for moving the reason, nor do they even have probability, according to those things that commonly appear [probable] to men.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit totaliter (autem) attendentes etc., solvit praedictam dubitationem.

Then he resolves the aforementioned doubt.

Polit.L4

Et primo ostendit quo modo sit iustum servire;

And first, he shows in what manner it is just to be a slave.

Polit.L4

et secundo quo modo sit expediens, ibi quod quidem igitur habet etc.

Second, how it is advantageous.

Polit.L4

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L4

primo ponit solutionem;

First, he lays out a solution.

Polit.L4

secundo manifestat eam, ibi principium enim contingit etc.

Second, he clarifies it.

Polit.L4

Dicit ergo primo quod ut totaliter et complete veritatem huius dubitationis determinemus, dicendum est quod quidam attendentes ad quoddam iustum, id est ad iustum secundum quid quale potest esse in rebus humanis, quod quidem iustum lex tradit, ponunt servitutem quae ex bello provenit esse iustum; non autem dicunt quod omnino, id est simpliciter, sit iusta. Approbat igitur secundam opinionem, sed exponit eam ostendens quod non loquebatur de iusto simpliciter sed de iusto secundum quid, quale est iustum legis humanae. Dicitur enim iustum simpliciter quod est iustum secundum suam naturam; iustum autem secundum quid, quod refertur ad commoditatem humanam quam lex intendit, quia propter utilitatem hominum omnes leges positae sunt. Quia igitur hoc non est iustum secundum naturam quod quicumque ab hostibus vincuntur sint servi, cum plerumque contingat sapientes ab insipientibus superari, dicit hoc non esse simpliciter iustum; est tamen ad commodum humanae vitae. Est enim hoc utile et illis qui vincuntur, quia propter hoc a victoribus conservantur ut saltem subiecti vivant, unde et servi a servando dicuntur; et etiam illis qui vincunt, quia per hoc homines incitantur ad fortius pugnandum: et quod sint aliqui fortes pugnatores expedit conversationi humanae ad prohibendum multorum malitias.

Therefore, he says first that in order to comprehensively and fully determine the truth of this doubt, it must be said that some people, attending to some just thing—that is, to something just that is able to be among human affairs in a certain respect [secundum quid]—that law hands down some just thing, posit that the slavery which comes forth from war is just: but they do not say that this is just in every way—that is, simply speaking. Therefore, he approves of a second opinion, but explains it, showing that he was not speaking about what is just, simply speaking [simpliciter], but about what is just in a certain respect [secundum quid], how it is just for human law. For that is called just simply speaking which is just according to its own nature: but just in a certain respect [secundum quid] which is brought back to human advantage--which law intends, because it is on account of what is useful for man that all laws are set up. So because it is not just by nature that simply anyone conquered by enemies should be a slave—since usually it happens that the wise are overcome by fools—he says that this is not simply just; it is, however, advantageous for human life. For this is useful for those who are conquered, because on account of this, they are preserved from the victors, such that they can at least live as subjects, and so they are called slaves from their slavery; and also for those who conquer, because through this, men are incited to fight more bravely—and it is advantageous for human associations that there should be some brave fighters to prevent the wickedness of many.

Polit.L4

Si autem potuisset lex humana determinare efficaciter qui essent meliores mente, illos procul dubio sequens naturam dominos ordinasset; sed quia hoc fieri non poterat, accepit lex aliud signum praeeminentiae, scilicet ipsam victoriam quae provenit ex aliqua excellentia virtutis, et ideo statuit victores esse dominos eorum qui vincuntur. Et ideo hoc iustum dicitur esse secundum quid, ut possibile fuit legem poni, non tamen est iustum simpliciter; et tamen servandum est etiam homini virtuoso secundum mentem, quia cum bonum commune sit melius quam bonum proprium unius, non est infringendum quod convenit bono publico quamvis non conveniat alicui privatae personae.

If, however, human law were able to effectively determine who were the better in mind, then following nature, it would without doubt set them in order as masters. But because this could not come to be, the law accepted another sign of preeminence, namely, the victory that comes forth from some excellence of virtue; and therefore, it established that victors are masters of those whom they conquer. And thus this is called just in a certain respect [secundum quid], as what was possible to be set up as law; but it is not simply just. And so slavery is also for men who are virtuous of mind, because since the common good is better than the private good [bonum proprium] of one, what is fitting for the public good should not be damaged, even if it is not fitting for some private person.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit principium enim etc., manifestat solutionem praemissam.

Then he clarifies the solution to what was previously advanced.

Polit.L4

Et primo per rationes;

And first through reasons.

Polit.L4

secundo per ea quae communiter dicuntur, ibi propter quod ipsos non volunt etc.

Second, through those things that are commonly said.

Polit.L4

Circa primum ponit duas rationes.

Regarding the first, he puts forward two reasons.

Polit.L4

Illud quod provenit ex principio iniusto non est simpliciter iustum; sed principium bellorum contingit esse iniustum, puta cum aliquis non habet iustam causam assumendi bellum: ergo servitus quae sequitur ex tali bello non est simpliciter iusta.

What comes forth from an unjust beginning is not just simply speaking: but the beginning of a war can happen to be wrong, such as when someone does not have a just cause for engaging in war. Therefore, the slavery that follows from such a war is not just simply speaking.

Polit.L4

Secundam rationem ponit ibi et indignum servire etc., quae talis est. Contingit per bellum aliquem superari cui indignum est servire; sed nullus potest dicere quod ille quem indignum est servire iuste sit servus: ergo non potest dici quod servitus quae est ex bello simpliciter sit iusta. Minorem autem probat: quia si aliquis diceret iuste servum esse eum quem indignum est servire, accideret quandoque eos qui sunt de nobilissimo genere esse servos, si caperentur in bello et si contingeret eos vendi; sequeretur ulterius quod filii eorum essent servi ex servis nati: quod videtur esse inconveniens.

He puts forward a second reason which is of this sort. It happens through war that someone is overcome for whom slavery is unworthy. But nobody can say that he for whom slavery is unworthy can justly be a slave: therefore, it cannot be said that the slavery that is from war is just simply speaking. He proves his minor premise: because if someone were to justly say that he is a slave for whom slavery is unworthy, it would happen that those who are from the noblest families would be slaves if they were captured in war; and if it happened that they were sold, it would further follow that their sons would be slaves that were born from slaves, which seems to be unfitting.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit propter quod ipsos etc., probat propositum per ea quae communiter dicuntur.

Then he proves what was proposed through those things that are commonly said.

Polit.L4

Et primo per ea quae communiter dicuntur de servitute;

And first, through those things that are commonly said about slavery.

Polit.L4

secundo per ea quae communiter dicuntur de libertate, ibi eodem autem modo etc.

Second, through those things that are commonly said about freedom.

Polit.L4

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first, he does two things.

Polit.L4

primo proponit dictum commune;

First, he puts forward common sayings.

Polit.L4

secundo ostendit qualiter intelligatur, ibi et quidem cum hoc dicunt etc.

Second, he shows in what way they can be understood [intelligatur].

Polit.L4

Dicit ergo primo quod propter praedictum inconveniens vitandum non volunt homines dicere quod nobiles homines quando capiuntur in bello fiant servi; sed solum barbari cum capiuntur fiunt servi.

Therefore, he says first that in order to shun the unfitting things mentioned, men do not want to say that noble men, when they are captured in war, become slaves; but only barbarians become slaves when they are captured.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit et quidem etc., ostendit quo modo intelligatur. Et dicit quod illi qui hoc dicunt videntur dicere solum de naturali servitute quae est in barbaris propter defectum mentis, non autem est in nobilibus viris captis in bello; quia, sicut supra dictum est, necesse est ab ipso principio nativitatis esse quosdam naturaliter servos, et quosdam non.

Then, he shows how this can be understood. And he says that those who say these things seem to speak only about the natural slavery that is among barbarians because of their incomplete [defectum] minds, but is not among noble men captured in war: because, as was said above, it is necessary from the very beginning [principio] of birth that there are some who are naturally slaves and some who are not.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit eodem autem modo etc., ponit ea quae dicunt homines de libertate.

Then he lays out what men say about freedom.

Polit.L4

Et primo ponit dictum;

And first he lays out what is said.

Polit.L4

secundo ostendit quo modo sit intelligendum, ibi cum autem hoc dicant etc.

Second, he shows how it may be understood.

Polit.L4

Dicit ergo primo quod secundum eundem modum loquntur homines de ingenuitate, id est de libertate, nam ingenuus est qui neque est servus neque libertus. Dicunt enim quod homines nobiles sunt ingenui non solum cum sunt apud se ipsos, id est cum sunt in propria domo et potestate, sed etiam ubique terrarum; sed barbari, qui sunt naturaliter servi propter defectum rationis, solum domi sunt liberi propter defectum dominantium; ac si aliqui sint simpliciter liberi vel ingenui, scilicet qui sunt bene dispositi secundum mentem, alii autem secundum quid, sicut barbari. Et inducit ad confirmationem praemissorum verba Theodecti poetae qui in sua elegia, id est tractatu de miseria, dixit: Quis dignum reputabit quod addicatur servituti ille qui ex utraque parte, scilicet patris et matris, processit ex nobilissima et divina progenie, secundum errorem gentilium qui magnos principes deos vocabant.

Therefore, he says first that men speak in the same manner about good birth [ingenuitate], that is, about freedom: for he is well born who is neither a slave nor a liberated man. For they say that noble men are well born not only when they are “among their own,” that is, when they are in their own household and place of power, but also wherever they are on earth: but barbarians who are naturally slaves because of incomplete reason are only free in their own households because of an incomplete mastering: and if some were simply free or well-born, namely, because they are well-organized in mind, others are [free] only in a certain respect, like barbarians. And to confirm these words, he invokes the poet Theodectes, who said in his elegies (that is, his writings on pity): “who will repute it worthy that he is surrendered into slavery who on both sides,” that is, the father's side and the mother's, “has came forth as offspring from the noblest and most divine [parents]?” (He was speaking after the error of the gentiles, who called great princes gods).

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit cum autem hoc dicant etc., ostendit qualiter id quod dictum est sit intelligendum. Et dicit quod illi qui hoc dicunt nihil aliud dicere videntur quam quod libertas et servitus, nobilitas et ignobilitas, determinantur virtute mentis: ita quod illi qui sunt virtuosi secundum mentem sint liberi et nobiles, qui autem sunt vitiosi sunt servi et ignobiles, secundum quod Dominus dicit in libro Regum qui contemnunt me erunt ignobiles. Et hoc ideo quia homines reputant dignum quod, sicut ex homine generatur homo et ex bestiis bestia, ita ex bonis viris generatur bonus vir; et inde processit honor nobilitatis, dum filii bonorum honorati sunt tanquam similes patribus in bonitate.

Then he shows how what was said may be understood. And he says that those who say these things seem to say nothing other than that freedom and slavery, nobility and ignobility, are determined by virtue of mind: and so those who are virtuous of mind are free and noble, while those who are vicious are slaves and ignoble, as the Lord says in Kings: “Those who disdain me will be ignoble.” And he says this because men repute it as worthy that as man is generated from man, and beasts from beasts, so also the good man is generated from a good man. And from this proceeds the honor of nobility, when sons of the good are honored as though alike to their fathers in goodness.

Polit.L4

Et verum est quod natura habet inclinationem ad hoc faciendum. Provenit enim ex bona corporis complexione et natura quod aliqui inclinantur magis vel minus ad opera virtutum vel vitiorum, sicut aliqui naturaliter sunt iracundi et aliqui mansueti. Et haec quidem natura corporalis a patre derivatur ad posteros ut in pluribus sicut et aliae dispositiones corporales, puta pulchritudo, fortitudo et alia huiusmodi, sed propter aliquod impedimentum quandoque deficit; et ideo ex bonis parentibus nascuntur multoties boni filii, sed propter aliquod impedimentum non potest natura semper hoc facere: et ideo quandoque ex parentibus bene dispositis ad virtutem oriuntur filii male dispositi, sicut ex parentibus pulchris turpes filii, et ex magnis parvi.

And it is true that nature has an inclination to make things this way: for it arises that from a body that is good in composition and nature that some are more or less inclined to the works of virtue or vice, just as some naturally are irascible, and some are mild-tempered: and this, that is, the nature of the body, is distributed from the father to his descendents—at least for the most part—just as other bodily dispositions, such as beauty, fortitude, and others of this sort. But because of some impediment, it sometimes fails. So from good parents, good children are often born. But because of some impediment, nature is not always able to make things this way, and so sometimes, from parents that are well-disposed toward virtue there will arise evilly-disposed sons, just as ugly children can come from beautiful parents, and small ones from large parents.

Polit.L4

Contingit etiam quod filii diversificantur a parentibus in bonitate vel malitia non solum propter dispositionem naturalem corporis, sed etiam propter rationem quae non ex necessitate sequitur naturalem inclinationem; unde contingit quod homines qui sunt similes parentibus in dispositione naturali, propter aliam instructionem et consuetudinem sunt etiam in moribus dissimiles. Si igitur bonorum parentum filii sint boni, erunt nobiles et secundum opinionem et secundum veritatem; si autem sint mali, erunt nobiles secundum opinionem, ignobiles autem secundum rei veritatem. E contrario autem est de filiis malorum.

It also happens that children are diversified from their parents in goodness and wickedness not only according to the natural organization of the body, but also on account of reason, which does not follow of necessity from natural inclination. So it happens that men who are like their parents in natural organization, because of different instruction and custom are also unlike their parents in morals. So if the children of good parents are good, they will be noble both after opinion and truth: but if they are evil, they will be noble after opinion, but ignoble after the truth of the thing [rei veritatem]. And the contrary is true about the sons of the wicked.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem igitur etc., ostendit quo modo servire aliquibus sit expediens vel non, concludens epilogando ex praemissis quod dubitatio quae supra mota est habet quandam rationem. Ita quod quaedam libertatis et servitutis distinctio non est secundum naturam sed secundum legem; sed in quibusdam distinguitur per naturam, et in talibus expedit huic quod serviat et illi quod dominetur, et hoc etiam iustum est. Et hoc probat quia oportunum est quod unusquisque subiciatur vel principetur secundum quod habet aptitudinem naturalem, unde et hiis qui habent aptitudinem naturalem ad hoc expedit quod dominentur servis; sed si male dominentur et contra aptitudinem naturalem, inutile est ambobus. Quod probat per hoc quia videmus quod idem expedit parti et toti, scilicet ut pars contineatur in toto; et similiter corpori et animae, ut scilicet corpus regatur ab anima. Quod autem servus comparetur ad dominum sicut corpus ad animam, supra dictum est; sed etiam comparatur ad ipsum sicut quaedam pars eius, ac si esset quoddam organum animatum quod esset quaedam pars corporis separata: hoc enim distinguit servum a parte, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo patet ex praemissis quod servo et domino qui sunt digni esse tales secundum naturam, expedit ad invicem quod unus sit dominus et alius sit servus; et ideo potest esse amicitia inter eos, quia communicatio duorum in eo quod expedit utrique est ratio amicitiae. Sed illi qui non sic se habent ad invicem secundum naturam, sed solum secundum legem et violentiam, contrario modo se habent, quia non habent amicitiam ad invicem, nec expedit eis quod unus sit dominus et alius servus.

Then he shows how to be a slave is advantageous for some, or not, and concludes with an epilogue from what has been put forward. For the doubt which was raised above has a certain reason to it, such that a certain distinction between freedom and slavery is not after nature, but after law, but in some, it is distinguished by nature, and among such people, slavery is advantageous for them and for those that have mastery, and this is also just. And he proves this: because it is opportune that each one should be subject or govern because he has a natural aptitude: and so also for those who have a natural aptitude for this, it is advantageous that they have mastery over slaves. But if they exercise mastery badly and against a natural aptitude, it is useless for both. He proves it through this: because we see that the same thing is advantageous for the part and for the whole, namely, that the part be contained within the whole, and likewise, for the body and the soul, that the body be ruled by the soul. Now the slave is compared to the master as the body to the soul, as was said above; but he is also compared to the master as a certain of his parts, as if it were a certain ensouled tool that is some part that is separated from the body: for this distinguishes a slave from a part, as was said above. And therefore it is clear from what has been advanced that for the slave and the master who are worthy to be such after nature, it is advantageous for each the one should be the master and the other a slave; and therefore there can be friendship among them, because a union of two in what is advantageous for both is the rationale of friendship. But for those who are not thus disposed toward each other after nature, but only after law and force, they are disposed in a contrary manner, because they do not have friendship toward each other, nor is it advantageous for them that one is master and the other is a slave.

Polit.L4

Lecture 5

Polit.L5

Manifestum autem et ex hiis quoniam non idem est despotia et politica, neque omnes ad invicem principatus, sicut quidam aiunt, hic quidem enim liberorum natura, hic autem servorum est.

So it is clear from all this that the despotic and the political are not the same, nor doe all have the same government toward each other, as some assert, for there are some who by nature are of the free, but others who are of the slaves.

Polit.L5

Et yconomica quidem monarchia; ab uno enim regitur omnis domus; politica autem liberorum et equalium principatus.

And indeed, economics is monarchic; for all in the household are led by one; but politics is government of those free and equal.

Polit.L5

Despotes quidem igitur non dicitur secundum scientiam, sed eo quod talis sit. Similiter autem et servus et liber.

Now indeed, a despot is not so named after some science, but because he is such. Likewise also the slave and the free.

Polit.L5

Scientia autem utique erit et despotica et servilis. Servilis quidem qualem quidem qui in Syracusis erudivit. Ibi enim accipiens quis pretium docuit ancillaria ministeria pueros; erit autem utique et ad plus horum disciplina velut pulmentaria et alia talia genera ministrationis. Sunt enim alia aliis, haec quidem honorabiliora opera, haec autem necessariora, et secundum proverbium: servus ante servum, dominus ante dominum. Tales quidem igitur omnes serviles scientiae sunt.

Now certainly, there will be both a despotic science and a servile science. The servile, indeed, will be of the sort that the man of Syracuse cultivated. For there, for a fee, he taught the boys the services of handmaids. Now certainly, there will be both more of these discplines, such as cooking, and also other such general services. And for others there are others, those more honorable works, but these are more necessary, and according to the proverb: slave before slave, master before master. Therefore, all such things are, indeed, servile sciences.

Polit.L5

Despotica autem scientia est quae est usiva servorum. Despotes enim non in possidendo servos, sed in utendo servis.

Now the despotic science is what is about the use of slaves. For [one is] a despot not in possessing slaves, but in using slaves.

Polit.L5

Est autem haec scientia nihil magnum habens, neque venerandum. Quae enim servum oportet scire facere, illum oportet haec scire precipere; propter quod quibuscumque potestas quod non ipsi malum patiantur, procurator accipit hunc honorem. Ipsi autem civiliter vivunt aut philosophantur.

But this science has nothing great about it, nor is it to be venerated. For what the slave must know to do, this the master must know to direct; because of this, for anyone who has the power that they do not themselves have to endure this evil, a manager takes up this honor. But they themselves live for civic life or philosophy.

Polit.L5

Acquisitiva autem altera ab utrisque hiis, velut quae iusta bellica quaedam existens, aut venativa. De servo quidem igitur et domino determinatum sic hoc modo.

But what is acquisitive of another is from both of these, such as when a certain just war exists, or through hunting. Therefore, what concerns the slave and the master has been thus determined in this way.

Polit.L5

Manifestum autem et ex hiis etc. Postquam philosophus inquisivit de veritate opinionis ponentis servitutem non esse naturalem, hic accedit ad inquirendum de alia opinione ponente quod despotia et est eadem politicae, et quod est scientia quaedam.

Manifestum autem et ex hiis etc. After the philosopher sought after the truth of the opinions of those who posit that slavery is not natural, he here proceeds to inquire about another posited opinion: that despotism is both the same as politics, and that it is a certain science.

Polit.L5

Et primo excludit primum modum;

And first he excludes the first mode;

Polit.L5

secundo secundum, ibi despotes quidem igitur etc.

second, the second, at despotes quidem igitur, etc.

Polit.L5

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L5

primo ostendit quod despotia, id est dominativa, non est idem quod politica;

First, he shows that despotic [government]—that is, mastery—is not the same as political [government].

Polit.L5

secundo quod yconomica non est idem quod politica, ibi et yconomica quidem etc.

Second, that economic [government] is not the same as political, at et oeconomica quidem, etc.

Polit.L5

Dicit ergo primo quod ex praedictis potest esse manifestum falsam esse opinionem quorundam qui dicebant quod despotia, id est dominativa, et politica et quilibet principatus sunt unum ad invicem. Politica enim est principatus eorum qui sunt liberi secundum naturam, despotia autem est principatus servorum; dictum est autem supra quod secundum diversitatem subiectorum et principantium est diversitas principativa, ita quod meliorum subiectorum est melior principatus: non est ergo idem principatus despotia et politica, sed politica est praeeminentior.

Therefore, he says first that from what has been said, it can be clear that they have a false opinion who say that despotic [government], that is, mastery, and political [government], and any kind of government are one and the same. For political is the government over those who are free after nature, but despotic is government over slaves. For it was said above that, with a diversity of subjects and governors there follows a diversity in government so that with better subjects, there is a better government. For despotic and political government are not the same, but the political is more preeminent.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit et yconomica quidem etc., ostendit differentiam politicae ad yconomicam, sub qua despotia continetur, cum despotia sit principatus servorum, yconomica vero omnium qui habitant in domo, quorum quidam sunt servi et quidam liberi. Differt ergo yconomica a politica in hoc quod yconomica est quaedam monachia, id est principatus unius, omnis enim domus regitur ab uno qui est paterfamilias; sed politica est principatus liberorum et equalium, unde commutantur personae principantes et subiectae propter equalitatem, et constituuntur etiam plures principantes vel in uno vel in diversis officiis. Videtur autem haec differentia non esse conveniens:

Then, where he says et oeconomica quidem, etc., he shows the difference of political [government] with regard to economic[government]—under which the despotic is contained, since the despotic is the government over slaves, but economic[government] is over all who inhabit the household, of which some are slaves, and some free. Therefore, economic [government] differs from political [government] in this, that economic government is a sort of monarchy, that is, the government of one; for every household is ruled by one who is the paterfamilias; but political is the government of those who are free and equal, and so persons exchange governing and being subjects because of equality, and many governments are constituted, either in one or in diverse offices. But it seems that these differences are not fitting.

Polit.L5

primo quidem quia non omnis yconomica videtur esse monarchia, sed solum cum pater domum regit; cum vero vir et uxor dominentur, est aristocratia; cum vero fratres in domo, est thimocratia vel politia, ut dicitur in VIII Ethicorum.

First, indeed, because not every economic [government] seems to be a monarchy, but only when the father of the household rules; but when both man and wife have mastery, it is an aristocracy; and when brothers rule, it is a timocracy, or political, as is said in Ethics VIII.

Polit.L5

Secundo etiam quia monarchia est una politiarum, ut in III dicetur.

Secondly, because monarchy is one of the regimes [politiarum], as will be said in Bk. III.

Polit.L5

Dicendum autem ad primum quod philosophus loquitur hic de domus principatu secundum optimum suum statum qui perseverare potest. Quod autem fratres principentur in domo, hoc non est ad semper sed quousque haereditatem dividant et unusquisque domum suam regat: principatus autem uxoris in domo non est simpliciter sed secundum quid, cum et ipsa sit subiecta viro: et si aliter accidat, est inordinatio et corruptio domus.

So regarding the first point, it should be said that the philosopher is speaking here about the government of the household after its best state, which is able to persevere: and that brothers should govern in the household—this is not permanent, but only for however long it takes them to divide their inheritance, and then each one rules his own household. And the government of the wife in the household is not government simply speaking [simpliciter], but in a certain respect [secundum quid], since she herself is subject to her husband, and if it happens otherwise, it is a corrupted household, and without order.

Polit.L5

Ad secundum dicendum quod hic loquitur de principatu politicae secundum quod politicum distinguitur a regali, ut supra habitum est.

Regarding the second point, it should be said that he is speaking here about the government of the political [community], according to which political government is distinguished from kingly, as was grasped above.

Polit.L5.ad1

Deinde cum dicit despotes quidem igitur etc., improbat praedictam opinionem quantum ad hoc quod ponebat despotiam esse scientiam.

Then, where he says despotes quidem igitur, etc., he disproves the aforementioned opinion with reference to its claim that despotism is a science.

Polit.L5

Et primo ostendit quod non est scientia;

And he shows first that it is not a science.

Polit.L5

secundo quod habet quandam scientiam adiunctam, ibi scientia autem utique erit.

Second, that it has a certain adjunct science, at scientia autem utique erit.

Polit.L5

Dicit ergo primo quod despotes non dicitur secundum scientiam, quia scilicet sciat dominari, sed ex eo quod est sic dispositus secundum naturam vel legem quod dominetur; et similiter dicendum est de servo et libero. Sed despotia est qua aliquis denominatur despotes: ergo despotia non est scientia.

Therefore, he first says that a despot is not so named after a science—because he has the science of mastery—but because things are so arranged [dispositus] either according to nature or law that he has mastery; and it ought to be said likewise about a slave or someone free. But despotism is that by which someone is denominated a despot: therefore despotism is not a science.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit scientia autem etc., ostendit quod despotia habet scientiam adiunctam. Et circa hoc duo facit:

Then, where he says scientia autem, etc., he shows that despotism has an adjunct science. And about this he does two things.

Polit.L5

primo proponit quod intendit, dicens quod est quaedam scientia despotica, id est dominativa, et quaedam servilis.

First, he lays out his intention, saying that there is a certain despotic science, that is, the masterful, and a certain servile one.

Polit.L5

Secundo, ibi servilis quidem etc., manifestat de utraque,

Second, at servilis quidem, etc., he clarifies both,

Polit.L5

et primo de servili,

and first the servile;

Polit.L5

secundo de despotica, ibi despotica autem etc.

second the despotic, at despotica autem, etc.

Polit.L5

Dicit ergo primo quod servilis scientia est qualem quidam in civitate Syracusanorum docuit, qui accepto pretio docuit pueros quaedam ancillaria ministeria, id est docuit eos facere quaedam ministeria quae ancillae facere consueverunt vel alii servi; et haec scientia ad plus se extendit, ad praeparanda pulmenta et alia huiusmodi ministeria facienda. Quorum tamen ministeriorum differentia attenditur secundum duo, scilicet secundum dignitatem et necessitatem: quaedam enim sunt honorabiliora, tamen minus necessaria, sicut ministerium de delicatis cibariis praeparandis; quaedam autem sunt ministeria magis necessaria sed minus honorabilia, sicut ministerium de pane faciendo. Unde et proverbium inolevit quod non omnes servi sunt equales, sed servus praefertur servo sicut dominus domino. Quia igitur talia ministeria sunt servorum manifestum est quod omnes tales scientiae sunt serviles; unde ad harum differentiam dicuntur aliquae artes liberales, quae deputantur ad actus liberorum.

Therefore, he first says that the servile science is the sort that someone in the city of the Syracusans taught, who received fees, and taught boys certain maid-services [ministeria], that is, taught them to do certain services that maids had been enjoined to do, or other slaves. And this science extends itself to more than just preparing appetizers, and other services of this sort that must be performed. For a difference attends these services in two regards: in worthiness and necessity. For some of them are more honorable, though less necessary, such the service of preparing fine food; but some are services more necessary but less honorable, such as the service of making bread. And so the proverb became ingrained that not all slaves are equal, but one slave is preferred to another, just as master is to master. Therefore, because such services are for slaves, it is clear that all such sciences are servile sciences: hence, to bring out the difference from these, some arts are called “liberal arts,” which designates them for the acts of the free.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit despotica autem etc., manifestat quae sit despotica scientia. Et circa hoc tria facit:

Then, where he says despotica autem, etc., he clarifies what is the despotic science. And about this he does three things.

Polit.L5

primo manifestat propositum;

First, he clarifies what was proposed.

Polit.L5

secundo ostendit conditionem despoticae scientiae, ibi est autem haec scientia etc.;

Second, he shows the construction of the despotic science, at est autem haec scientia, etc.

Polit.L5

tertio agit de quadam scientia affini, ibi acquisitiva autem etc.

Third, he treats of a certain adjacent science, at acquisitiva autem, etc.

Polit.L5

Dicit ergo primo quod despotica scientia dicitur per quam aliquis scit bene uti servis, non autem illa per quam aliquis acquirit servos. Et hoc probat per hoc quod aliquis dicitur despotes, id est dominus, non in possidendo, id est in acquirendo, servos sed magis in hoc quod utitur ipsis.

Therefore, he calls a “despotic science” that through which someone knows [scit] how to use slaves well, not that through which someone acquires slaves. And he proves this through this: that someone is called a “despot”, that is, a master, not in possessing, that is, in acquiring slaves, but moreso in using them.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit est autem haec scientia etc., ostendit conditionem huius scientiae, et dicit quod haec scientia non est magnae aestimationis aut venerationis.

Then, where he says est autem haec scientia, etc., he shows the condition of this science, and he says that this science is not of great valuation or veneration.

Polit.L5

Et hoc probat primo per rationem, quia scilicet dominativa scientia in hoc consistit ut homo sciat uti servis praecipiendo eis; et hoc non est magnum: eadem enim sunt quae scire oportet servum ad faciendum et dominum ad praecipiendum, unde patet quod non est magni momenti talis scientia.

And he proves this first through reason: because the masterful science consists in this: that man knows how to use slaves by directing [praecipendo] them. And this is not great, for the things that the slave must know for doing and that the master must know for directing are the same: whence it is clear that this science is of no great importance.

Polit.L5

Secundo manifestat idem per consuetudinem humanam: quia enim haec scientia non reputatur alicuius momenti, ideo quicumque possunt se expedire ut non patiantur hoc malum, id est ut non impediantur circa curam servorum, ipsi expediunt se et vacant vel vitae politicae vel vitae civili vel vitae philosophicae, curam autem servorum committunt alicui procuratori.

Second, he clarifies the same thing through human custom: for since this science is not reputed of any importance, anyone who can detach themselves so that they do not have to suffer this evil, that is, so that they are not weighed down by the care of slaves, do detach themselves and free themselves up so that they can attend to the political life, or the civil life, or to the philosophic life, and the care of slaves they entrust to some manager.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit acquisitiva autem etc., quia dixerat quod despotica scientia non consistit in acquirendo servos, subdit quod quaedam alia scientia est acquisitiva servorum, quae differt et a servili et a despotica; et haec est multiplex. Exemplificat autem de duabus, per quarum unam acquirit homo homines in servos: et haec est scientia peragendi iusta bella, in quibus qui capiuntur iure servi efficiuntur; si autem bellum esset iniustum, non esset iusta acquisitio servorum, unde non esset secundum scientiam. Alia autem scientia est per quam homo acquirit bestias in servos: et ista est scientia venandi.

Then, where he says acquisitiva autem, etc., because he had said that the despotic science does not consist in acquiring slaves, he adds that there is some other science for acquiring slaves which differs both from the servile and the despotic sciences: and this is of many kinds. He gives two examples: through one of them, a man acquires other men as slaves, and this is the science of accomplishing a just war in which those who are justly captured are made into slaves (though if the war is unjust, it would not be a just acquisition of slaves, and so it would not be done after a science); the other science, however, is that through which a man acquires beasts as slaves, and this is the science of hunting.

Polit.L5

Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod de domino et servo in tantum determinatum sit.

Lastly, he concludes in an epilogue that master and slave have been determined up to this point.

Polit.L5

Lecture 6

Polit.L6

Totaliter autem de omni possessione et pecuniativa contemplabimur secundum subinductum modum, quoniam quidem et servus possessionis pars quaedam erat.

Let us now contemplate all of property and moneymaking generally, according to the previously induced method, since indeed a slave was a certain part of property.

Polit.L6

Primum quidem igitur dubitabit aliquis utrum pecuniative eadem sit yconomice, aut pars quaedam, aut subministrativa; et si subministrativa utrum ut pectinifactiva textili, aut sicut eraria statuifice. Non enim similiter serviunt, sed haec quidem organa exhibet, haec autem materiam, dico autem materiam quod supponitur ex quo aliquod perficitur opus, puta textori quidem lana, statuifico autem es.

First, therefore, anyone will have difficulty about whether moneymaking is economics, or a certain part of it, or subservient; and if it is subservient, whether it is so as the art of making combs is for weaving, or as bronzing for statuary. For they do not serve [another art] in the same way, but the one, indeed, shows the tools, the other the material--and I call "material" what lies beneath, out of which any work is perfected, as with weaving, wool, or with statuary, bronze.

Polit.L6

Quod quidem igitur non eadem yconomica pecuniative palam: huius quidem est acquirere, huius autem uti. Quae enim erit quae utitur hiis quae secundum domum praeter yconomicam.

Now indeed, it is therefore obvious that economics is not the same as moneymaking: for it is for the one to acquire, but the other to use. For which art will it be which uses those things that are for the household other than economics?

Polit.L6

Utrum autem pars ipsius est quaedam altera species, habet dubitationem.

But there is a difficulty about whether some other kind of art is [also] a part of economics.

Polit.L6

Si enim est pecuniative videre unde pecuniae et acquisitio erit, possessio autem multas complectitur partes et divitiae. Itaque primum agricultura utrum pars quaedam pecuniative, aut alterum quoddam genus, et universaliter quae circa cibum cura et acquisitio.

For if it will be for moneymaking to see where money comes from and how it is acquired, but property contains many parts and kinds of wealth, then first we will have to consider whether agriculture is a certain part of moneymaking, or of another kind of art, and generally, whether all things concerned with the acquisition and care of food.

Polit.L6

Insuper species multae ciborum propter quod et vitae multae et animalium et hominum sunt. Non enim possibile est vivere sine cibo. Quare differentiae ciborum vitas fecerunt differentes animalium. Bestiarum et enim haec quidem gregalia, haec autem dispersa sunt; utro modo expedit ad cibum ipsis; propter haec quidem esse animalifaga, haec autem fructifaga, haec autem omnifaga ipsorum esse. Itaque ad desidias et electionem horum, natura vitas ipsorum determinavit. Quoniam autem non idem unicuique delectabile secundum naturam. Sed altera alteris, et ipsorum animalifagorum et fructifagorum vitae ad invicem differunt.

Again, there are many kinds of food, and because of this, there are many kinds of lives both of animals and human beings. For it is not possible to live without food. For this reason, differences in food has made different lives for animals. For of beasts, some are gregarious, others have been dispersed; in both ways it is advantageous for the food of each; this, indeed, is why some are carniverous but athers are herbiverous or omniverous. Therefore, nature has determined the lives of each according to their idleness and choice. Now since the same thing is not pleasurable for each according to nature, but another thing is for another animal, it is also the case that the lives of carnivores and herbivores differ from each other.

Polit.L6

Similiter autem et hominum: multis enim differunt horum vitae. Qui quidem enim otiosissimi, pascuales sunt. Qui enim a domesticis animalibus cibus, sine labore fit vacantibus. Cum autem fuerit necessarium transmigrare pecoribus propter pascua, et ipsi coguntur coassequi tanquam agriculturam viventem colentes. Alii autem ex praeda vivunt, et praedas alii alias, puta hii quidem a latrocinio, hii autem a piscatione, quicumque circa stagna et paludes et fluvios et mare tale habitant, hii autem ex avibus aut bestiis silvestribus. Plurimum autem genus hominum ex terra vivit et domesticis fructibus. Vitae quidem igitur tot fere sunt. Quicumque quidem sponte natam habent elaborationem et non per commutationem et negociationem ferunt alimentum: pascualis, furativa, piscativa, venativa. Alii autem et miscentes ex hiis delectabiliter vivunt consupplentes defectissimam vitam qua fuerit deficiens ad per se sufficientem esse, puta hii quidem pascualem simul et furativam, hii autem agricultivam et venativam. Similiter autem et circa alias, quomodocumque oportunitas compellat, hoc modo degunt.

Likewise also for human beings: for their lives differ in many ways. For indeed, the most leisurely are shepherds, for their food comes to be from domestic animals, without labor, from wandering about. Now since it will have been necessary for flocks to migrate, because of pasture, and the shepherds are compelled to follow them, as though cultivating a sort of living farm. But others live off plunder, and plunder is different for different people, as some, indeed, live from banditry, others from fishing--whoever dwells near ponds, marshes, rivers, and the sea; and others from the birds and the beasts of the woods. But more kinds of human beings live from the earth and cultivated fruits. Therefore, there are about as many ways of life. For some have what is spontaneously born for noursihment, without labor, or engaging in trade or business: the shepherd, the raider, the fisherman, the hunter. And for others, by mixing these live more delightfully, suplementing the deficiencies of one life with what it lacks in order to be self-sufficient, such as those who are shepherds and at the same time, raiders, or those who are farmers and hunters. Likewise also regarding the others, in whatever way opportunity compells them, in this way they spend their time.

Polit.L6

Talis quidem igitur acquisitio ab ipsa videtur natura data omnibus, sicut secundum primam generationem mox, sic et secundum perfectam. Et enim secundum eam quae a principio generationem, haec quidem animalium coekpariunt tantum alimentum ut sufficiens sit quousque utique possit ipsum sibi ipsi acquirere quod generatum est, velut quaecumque vermificant aut ouificant. Quaecumque autem animalificant pro genitis habent cibum in se ipsis ad tempus, vocatum lactis naturam. Quare similiter palam, quoniam et genitis existimandum plantas animalium gratia esse et alia animalia hominum gratia. Domestica quidem et propter usum et propter cibum. Silvestrium autem quamvis non alia omnia, tamen plurima cibi et alterius auxilii gratia, ut et vestis et alia organa fiant ex ipsis. Si igitur natura nihil neque imperfectum facit neque frustra, necessarium hominum gratia ipsa omnia fecisse naturam, propter quod et bellica natura acquisitiva aliqualiter erit: predativa enim pars ipsius, qua oportet uti et ad bestias et ad homines quicumque nati subici non volunt, tanquam natura iustum sit hoc praedativum bellum primum.

And indeed, therefore, this kind of aquisition seems to be given by nature to all, both immediately from their first generation, until they are perfected. For according to that kind of generation which is from the beginning, these animals supply enough nourishment along with their offspring as will be sufficient until they are able to acquire for themselves what was generated, as with vermiparous or oviparous animals. And those animals who reproduce through birth have food in themselves for a time by nature, called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the sake of other aids, as food and other tools come to be from them. Now if nature makes nothing imperfect, and nothing in vain, it is necessary that she has made all animals for the sake of man, for which reason also the art of war will be a natural art of acquisition, in a certain respect. For hunting is a part of it, an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to obey, do not wish to; for this first hunting-war is naturally just.

Polit.L6

Una quidem igitur species secundum naturam possessivae yconomicae pars est, quam oportet aut existere aut acquirere ipsam ut existat, quarum est thesaurizatio rerum ad vitam necessariarum et utilium in communionem civitatis aut domus.

Of the art of [acquiring] property then there is one kind which by nature is a part of economics, inasmuch as it must either exist, or be acquired in order to exist, and that is a treasury of things necessary for life or usefiul for the communion of the city or the household.

Polit.L6

Et videntur vere divitiae ex hiis esse, possessionis enim talis per se sufficientia ad bonam vitam non infinita est, sicut Solon inquit poetizans: divitiarum nullus terminus praefinitus viris ponitur. Ponitur enim quaemadmodum et aliis artibus. Nullum enim organum infinitum nullius est artis neque multitudine neque magnitudine. Divitiae autem organorum multitudo sunt yconomico et politico. Quod quidem igitur est quaedam possessiva secundum naturam yconomicis et politicis, et propter quam causam palam.

And true riches seem to be from these things; for the amount of property which is self sufficient for a good life is not infinite, although Solon in one of his poems says that no bound to riches has been fixed for man. But it is established, just as in the other arts. For no tool of any art is ever infinite, either in multitude or magnitude. And riches are a multitude of economic or political tools. And so it is evident that there is a natural art of property for economics and politics, and what is the cause of this.

Polit.L6

Totaliter autem de omni possessione etc. Postquam philosophus determinavit de domino et servo qui est possessio quaedam, hic determinat communiter de omni possessione. Et dividitur in partes duas:

Totaliter autem de omni possessione, [I.6.a] etc. After the philosopher determined about masters and slaves, which are a kind of property, he here determines what is common to all property. And it is divided into two parts.

Polit.L6

in prima determinat de ea quantum ad scientiam;

In the first he determines about property with regard to its science.

Polit.L6

in secunda quantum ad usum, ibi quoniam autem quae ad scientiam etc.

In the second, with regard to its use, at quoniam autem que ad scientiam, [I.9.a] etc.

Polit.L6

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L6

primo dicit de quo est intentio;

First, he states his intention.

Polit.L6

secundo movet dubitationes, ibi primum quidem igitur etc.

Second, he raises difficulties, at primum quidem igitur, [I.6.b] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo quod, quia dictum est de servo quod servus est quaedam possessio, oportet considerare, eo modo quo tractavimus de servo, universaliter de omni possessione et de arte quae est de pecuniis.

Therefore, he first says that because it has been said about a slave that a slave is a kind of property, we must consider, in the manner in which we treated of the slave, about all property universally speaking, and about the art that pertains to money.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit primum quidem igitur etc., movet quasdam dubitationes.

Then, where he says primum quidem igitur, [I.6.b] etc., he raises certain difficulties.

Polit.L6

Primo movet eas;

First he raises them.

Polit.L6

secundo incipit eas solvere, ibi quod quidem igitur etc.

Second, he begins to resolve them, at quod quidem igitur, [I.6.c] etc.

Polit.L6

Prima autem dubitatio dividitur in duas,

The first difficulty is divided into two parts.

Polit.L6

quarum prima est utrum ars pecuniativa, id est acquirendi pecunias, sit omnino eadem yconomiae, vel sit potius pars quaedam ipsius, aut non sit eadem neque pars sed potius subministrativa; manifestum est enim quod pecuniativa aliquo modo ad yconomicam pertinet, unde oportet quod aliquo istorum modorum se habeat ad eam. Non autem idem est quod aliqua ars sit pars alterius, et quod sit subministrativa ei: nam ars dicitur esse pars alterius artis, quae considerat partem eius quod considerat alia ars, sicut ars quae facit cultellum est ars fabrilis quia cultellus est quaedam species operum ex ferro factorum; ars autem subministrativa dicitur quae facit aliquid in ministerium alterius artis, sicut ars quae fodit ferrum subministrat arti fabrili. Et quia pecunia est in ministerium domus, ideo magis videtur esse subministrativa quam pars.

The first is: whether the moneymaking art, that is, the art of acquiring money, is utterly the same as that of economy, or rather, a certain of its parts, or if it is not the same, nor a part, but is rather subservient to it. For it is clear that moneymaking belongs in some way to economy: and so it must be that in one of these ways it belongs to it. But it is not the same thing for some art to be a part of another and for it to be subservient to it. For an art is said to be part of another art which studies a part of what the other art studies; just as the art which makes knives is the art of the blacksmith since a knife is a certain kind of those works that are made from iron. But an art is called subservient which makes something in the service of the other art, just as the art of mining iron is subservient to the art of the blacksmith. And because money is in the service of the household, it therefore seems to be more subservient than a part.

Polit.L6

Et ideo movet secundam dubitationem. Invenitur enim quod una ars ministrat alii dupliciter: uno modo praeparando ei organum quo operatur, sicut ars quae facit pectinem cum quo texitur ministrat arti textili proprium instrumentum; alio modo quia exhibet ei materiam qua operatur, sicut ars quae praeparat es deservit arti quae facit statuam ex ere, et illa qui praeparat lanam deservit textori. Est ergo dubitatio utrum ars acquirendi pecuniam deserviat yconomicae sicut praeparans materiam, vel sicut preparans instrumentum.

And then he raises a second difficulty. For it is found that one art serves another in two ways. In one, by preparing for it the tool with which it works, just as the art which makes the combs for weaving serves the art of weaving with its proper instruments. In another manner, [one art serves another] because it presents it with the material on which it works, just as the art which prepares bronze is at the service of the art that makes bronze statues, and that which prepares wool is at the service of the weaver. Therefore, there is a difficulty about whether the art of acquiring money is in the service of economy as one that prepares the material, or as one that prepares the instrument.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem igitur etc., incipit solvere praedictas dubitationes.

Then, where he says quod quidem igitur, [I.6.c] etc., he begins to resolve the aforementioned difficulty.

Polit.L6

Et primo ostendit quod pecuniativa non est eadem yconomicae;

And first he shows that moneymaking is not the same as economy.

Polit.L6

secundo inquirit utrum sit pars eius, aut subministrativa, vel potius sit aliquid extraneum ab ea, ibi utrum autem pars ipsius est etc.

Second, he inquires whether it is one of its parts, or subservient to it, or rather if it is something foreign to it, at utrum autem pars ipsius est, [I.6.d] etc.

Polit.L6

Primo ergo solvit primam dubitationem ostendens quod pecuniativa non sit omnino eadem yconomicae, quia ad pecuniativam pertinet acquirere pecunias; ad yconomicam autem pertinet uti eis: nulla enim alia ars est ad quam pertineat uti hiis quae sunt utilia domui nisi yconomicae. Manifestum est autem etiam in aliis quod ars quae utitur est alia ab ea quae facit vel acquirit, sicut ars gubernatoria est alia a navifactiva; ergo yconomica est alia a pecuniativa. Ex quo etiam manifestum est quod pecuniativa magis est ministrativa quam pars; semper enim ars factiva deservit arti utenti, sicut quae facit fraenum militari. Ex quo etiam manifestum fit quod pecuniativa magis subministrat per modum praeparantis instrumenta, quam per modum praeparantis materiam; pecunia enim et omnes divitiae sunt quaedam instrumenta yconomicae, ut infra dicetur.

First, therefore, he resolves the first doubt, showing that moneymaking is not utterly the same as economy, because it belongs to moneymaking to acquire money, but to economy belongs its use. For to no other art does the use of what is useful for the household belong than the art of economy. But it is also clear in other things that the art which uses is different than the art by which things are made or acquired, just as the art of piloting a ship is other than the art of shipmaking. Therefore, economy is other than moneymaking. From this it is also clear that moneymaking is much more subservient than it is a part, for the art of making is always at the service of the art of using, like him who makes bridles for the military. From this it also becomes clear that moneymaking is subservient more in the mode of preparing instruments than in the mode of preparing material. For money, and all wealth, is a certain instrument of economy, as will be said later.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit utrum autem pars (ipsius) est etc., inquirit utrum pecuniativa sit pars yconomicae, vel aliquid extraneum ab ipsa. Et dividitur in partes duas:

Then, where he says utrum autem pars (ipsius) est, [I.6.d] etc., he inquires whether moneymaking is a part of economy or is something foreign to it. And this is divided into two parts.

Polit.L6

in prima movet dubitationem;

In the first, he raises a difficulty.

Polit.L6

in secunda prosequitur eam, ibi si enim est pecuniativae etc.

In the second, he pursues it, at si enim est pecuniativae, [I.6.e] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo quod cum pecuniativa non sit eadem yconomicae quae universaliter utitur divitiis et possessionibus, dubitari potest utrum pecuniativa sit quaedam pars ipsius yconomicae, aut sit altera species ab yconomica.

Therefore, he first says that since moneymaking is not the same as economy, which universally uses wealth and property, it can be doubted whether moneymaking is a certain part of economy itself, or is a different kind [species] of thing than economy.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit si enim est pecuniativae etc., prosequitur praedictam dubitationem.

Then, where he says si enim est pecuniativae, [I.6.e] he pursues the aforementioned difficulty.

Polit.L6

Et primo ostendit differentiam pecuniativae ad aliam possessivam;

And first he shows what is different about moneymaking from other [arts of property].

Polit.L6

secundo determinat propositam quaestionem, ibi palam autem et quod dubitabant etc.

Second, he determines the proposed question, at palam autem et quod dubitabant, [I.8.9].

Polit.L6

Circa primum tria facit:

About the first he does three things.

Polit.L6

primo movet dubitationem de differentia pecuniativae ad alias possessivas;

First, he raises a difficulty about what is different about moneymaking with respect to other [arts of property] [I.6.e].

Polit.L6

secundo determinat de alia possessiva, ibi insuper species multae ciborum etc.;

Second, he determines about other [arts of property], at insuper species multae ciborum, [I.6.f].

Polit.L6

tertio determinat de pecuniativa, ibi est autem genus aliud etc.

Third, he determines about moneymaking, at est autem genus aliud, [I.7.a] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo quod, cum ad pecuniativam pertineat considerare unde pecuniae acquirantur, multa autem alia possidentur praeter pecuniam, sicut terrae nascentia et alia huiusmodi: quaestio est de agricultura per quam aliquae divitiae acquiruntur, utrum sit quaedam pars pecuniativae vel aliud genus artis. Et quia agricultura ordinatur ad acquirendum cibum, eadem quaestio potest moveri de arte quae curat ad acquirendum universaliter cibum.

Therefore, he first says that since it belongs to moneymaking to study how to acquire money; but many other things are [held as property] beyond money, such as everything grown from the earth, and other things of this sort: the question is about agriculture, through which some wealth is acquired, whether it is a certain part of moneymaking, or is another genus of art. And because agriculture is ordered toward acquiring food, the same question can be raised about the art that is ordered toward acquiring food, universally speaking.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit insuper species multae etc., solvit propositam quaestionem.

Then, where he says insuper species multae, [I.6.f] etc., he resolves the proposed question.

Polit.L6

Et primo dividit acquisitivam ciborum in multas partes;

And first he divides the acquisition of food into many parts [I.6.f-g].

Polit.L6

secundo ostendit qualis sit, ibi talis quidem igitur acquisitio etc.

Second, he shows of what sort it is, at talis quidem igitur acquisitio, [I.6.h] etc.

Polit.L6

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L6

primo ostendit diversitatem ciborum in animalibus;

First, he shows the diversity of food among animals [I.6.f].

Polit.L6

secundo in hominibus, ibi similiter autem et hominum etc.

Second, among men, at similiter autem et hominum, [I.6.g] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo quod multae sunt ciborum species, et ex hoc diversificantur modi vivendi tam in animalibus quam in hominibus; cum enim non sit possibile vivere sine cibo, necesse est quod secundum differentiam ciborum differat modus vivendi in animalibus. Videmus enim quod quaedam bestiae vivunt congregata in multitudine, et quaedam vivunt dispersa et separata secundum quod expedit ad cibum ipsorum: quaedam enim ipsorum sunt animalifaga, id est comedentia animalia, fagi enim in Graeco idem est quod comedere; quaedam vero comedunt fructus, quaedam vero comedunt indifferenter omnia. Unde natura distinxit vitas eorum secundum cibos quos eligunt naturaliter; et secundum quod vivunt in desidia vel in pugna, nam ea quae comedunt animalia alia oportet esse pugnativa et quod dispersa vivant, aliter enim non possent cibum invenire: sed animalia quae comedunt cibum qui de facili potest inveniri, vivunt simul. Et quia in quolibet dictorum generum diversa sunt delectabilia diversis animalibus, non enim omnia animalia comedentia carnes delectantur in eisdem carnibus, et similiter nec omnia animalia comedentia fructus delectantur in eisdem fructibus: inde contingit quod etiam animalium quae comedunt carnes sunt diversi modi vivendi, et similiter eorum quae comedunt fructus.

Therefore, he first says that there are many kinds of food, and from this, the modes of living are diversified, as among the animals, so also among men. For since it is not possible to live without food, it is necessary that according to the difference of foods, the mode of living differs among the animals: for we see that some of the animals live flocked together in a multitude, and some lived dispersed and separated according to what is expedient for the food of each. For some of them are animalifaga—that is, “animal-eaters,” for phagi in Greek is the same as “to eat”. But some of them eat fruit, and some eat everything indifferently. By this nature has distinguished their ways of life, after the foods that they naturally choose, and after whether they live in idleness or in fighting. For those that eat other animals must be quarrelsome, and live scattered, for otherwise they would not be able to find food; but animals that eat food that is easily able to be found live together. And because diverse animals take delight in any of the diverse genera [of food] mentioned—for not all meat-eating animals take delight in the same meats, and likewise, not all animals that eat fruit delight in the same fruits—it therefore happens that for animals that eat meat, there are diverse manners of living, and likewise for those that eat fruit.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit similiter autem et hominum etc., ostendit diversitatem ciborum in hominibus, et dicit quod etiam secundum diversitatem ciborum in multis differunt vitae hominum. Tripliciter enim acquirunt aliqui nutrimentum. Quidam enim acquirunt cibum, neque laborant, neque depraedant: et isti sunt otiosissimi, scilicet pastores, quia cibus qui fit a domesticis animalibus, puta ab ovibus, absque labore fit hominibus viventibus in otio; sed hunc solum laborem habent quod cum fuerit necessarium pecoribus propter pascua transire de loco ad locum, tunc et ipsi coguntur sequi tanquam si colerent quendam agrum qui viveret et moveretur. Alii vero sumunt nutrimentum ex praeda, vel quam acquirunt ab hominibus, sicut latrones; vel quam acquirunt ex aquis stagnorum, paludum, fluviorum et in aliis, sicut piscatores; vel ex agris et silvis, sicut venatores avium et bestiarum. Tertium genus vivendi est quod pluribus hominum convenit, quod vivunt ex hiis quae nascuntur in terra et ex domesticis fructibus: et isti habent cibum elaboratum. Hae igitur sunt plurimum vitae hominum. Praeter eos enim qui habent cibum elaboratum, et qui vivunt de negotiatione, de quo infra agetur, sunt quatuor vitae simplices: scilicet pascualis, furativa, piscativa et venativa, ut ex dictis patet. Sed cum vita hominum sit deficientissima eo quod multis indiget, quidam ad hoc quod per se sibi sufficiant in omnibus miscent praedictas vitas, et ita delectabiliter vivunt supplentes sibi ex una quod deest sibi ex altera: sicut quidam exercent simul vitam pascualem et furativam, quidam simul agricultivam et venativam, et similiter alias vitas secundum quod unicuique est oportunum.

Then, where he says similiter autem et hominum, [I.6.h] he shows the diversity of foods among men, and he says that it is also after the diversity of foods that the lives of men differ in many ways. For someone acquires nutrition in three ways. For some acquire food and neither labor nor plunder, and such men are the most leisurely—such as shepherds, because the food that comes to be from domestic animals, like sheep, comes without labor to men living in leisure; but they have only this labor, that when it becomes necessary because of pastureland to move the livestock from one place to another, then they are compelled to follow, as if they were cultivating a sort of field that lived and moved. Others, however, seize nutrition from plunder, which they either acquire from other men, like bandits; or which they acquire from the water of ponds, marshes, rivers, or other things of this sort, like fishermen; or from fields and woods, like the hunters of birds and beasts. The third genus of living is what is fit for most men that live off of those things that are grown from the earth, and off of domestic produce: and such men have the food brought forth through labor. These, therefore, are the lives of most men: for beyond those who have food through labor and who live by their business--who will be treated of later—there are four simple lives: the pastoral life, raiding, fishing, and hunting, as is clear from what has been said. But since the life of man is most deficient inasmuch as it lacks many things, some people, in order to be self-sufficient by themselves in all things, mix the aforementioned lives: and so they live delightfully, supplying for themselves what they lack from one with the other, just as some practice at once the pastoral and raiding lives, some the lives of agriculture and hunting, and likewise the other lives, after what is opportune for each one.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit talis quidem igitur etc., ostendit qualis sit praedicta possessiva quae est acquisitiva cibi.

Then, where he says talis quidem igitur, [I.6.i] etc., he shows of what sort is the aforementioned [mode of having property], which is for acquiring food.

Polit.L6

Et primo ostendit quod est naturalis;

And first he shows that it is natural [I.6.i].

Polit.L6

secundo quod est pars yconomicae, ibi una quidem igitur species etc.;

Second, that it is a part of economy, at una quidem igitur species, [I.6.j] etc.

Polit.L6

tertio quod non est infinita, ibi et videntur verae divitiae etc.

Third, that it is not without an end, at et videntur verae divitiae, [I.6.k] etc.

Polit.L6

Circa primum ponit talem rationem. Sicut natura providet animalibus statim in prima eorum generatione, ita et postquam eorum generatio fuerit perfecta; providet autem eis de nutrimento in prima eorum generatione: et hoc patet in diversis animalibus. Sunt enim quaedam animalia non generantia animal perfectum sed faciunt ova, sicut aves, vel vermes quosdam loco ovorum, sicut patet in formicis et in apibus et in aliis huiusmodi. Et huiusmodi animalia coekpariunt, id est simul pariunt cum propriis fetibus, tantum de nutrimento quantum sufficere possit quousque animal generatum perveniat ad perfectum: sicut patet in ovo cuius rubeum cedit in nutrimentum pulli qui generatur ex albo ovi, et hoc quandiu pullus est intra testam; simile est in vermibus. Quaedam autem animalia sunt quae generant animal perfectum, sicut equus et alia huiusmodi; et in talibus animalia quae pariunt habent usque ad aliquod tempus cibum in se ipsis ab nutrimentum genitorum, qui quidem cibus vocatur lac. Et sic patet quod in prima generatione natura providet animalibus de cibo. Unde manifestum est quod postquam iam animalia sunt perfecta, natura providet eis de cibo; ita quod plantae sunt propter alia animalia ut ex eis nutriantur, alia vero animalia sunt propter homines: domestica quidem et propter cibum et propter alias utilitates; sylvestria vero, etsi non omnia, tamen plurima eorum cedunt in cibum hominis, vel aliquo alio modo in auxilium eius, in quantum homo ex eis acquirit vestitum, scilicet de pellibus eorum, vel etiam alia instrumenta, ut puta de cornibus, ossibus aut dentibus. Et sic manifestum est quod homo indiget ad suam vitam aliis animalibus et plantis.

About the first he lays out this reason: just as nature provides for animals instantly at the beginning of their generation, so does it also after their generation becomes perfected. But it provides nutrition for them at the beginning of their generation: and this is evident in diverse animals, for there are some animals that are not generated as perfect animals, but they make eggs, like birds, or varieties of worms in the place of eggs, as is evident with ants and bees and others of this sort: and animals of this sort coekpariunt—that is, they at once produce [pariunt] along with their young only so much nutrition as is able to be sufficient until the generated animal arrives at perfection. Just as it is clear with eggs, whose yolk results in nutrition for the chicks that are generated from the egg white, which lasts as long as the chick is within the shell, so likewise is it with worms. But there are some animals that are generated as perfect animals, like the horse and others of this sort, and among animals that are produced in this way, for some time they have food for themselves from the nutrition of the generator, which food is called “milk”. And so it is clear that nature provides food for animals from the first moment of generation. And so it is clear that after animals are already perfected, nature provides food for them, such that plants are for the sake of animals, so that they may receive nutrition from them; but animals are for the sake of man: domestic animals both for food and for other uses; wild animals, though not all, yet most of them serve as [cedunt] food for man, or in some other mode for his help, inasmuch as man acquires clothing from them—that is, from their skins; or also other instruments, such as from their horns, their bones, or their teeth. And so it is clear that man requires for his life both animals and plants.

Polit.L6

Sed natura neque dimittit aliquid imperfectum, neque facit aliquid frustra; ergo manifestum est quod natura fecit animalia et plantas ad sustentationem hominum. Sed quando aliquis acquirit id quod natura propter ipsum fecit, est naturalis acquisitio; ergo possessiva, qua huiusmodi acquiruntur quae pertinent ad necessitatem vitae, est naturalis. Et pars eius est praedativa, qua oportet uti et ad bestias quae naturaliter sunt subiectae homini, et ad homines barbaros qui sunt naturaliter servi, ut supra dictum est, ac si hoc sit primum iustum bellum secundum naturam. Dixit autem praedativam esse partem huius possessivae, quia alia pars est agricultura quae acquirit nutrimentum ex plantis.

But nature neither leaves anything imperfect, nor makes anything in vain, and so it is clear that nature makes animals and plants for the sustenance of men. But when anyone acquires what nature made for him, it is a natural acquisition: and so [the art of property] by which things of this sort are acquired, which belong to the necessities of life, is natural, and part of this is plundering, which must be employed toward the beasts, who are naturally the subjects of man, and toward barbarian men who are naturally slaves, as was said above, as if this were the first just war according to nature. Moreover, he said that plundering is a part of this [art of property], because the other part is agriculture, which acquires nutrition from plants.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit una quidem igitur etc., concludit ex praemissis quod quaedam naturalis species possessivae, de qua iam dictum est, est pars quaedam yconomicae, secundum quod pars dicitur esse quae est subministrativa; subministrat enim non solum yconomicae sed etiam politicae, et hoc ideo quia oportet ad actum politici et yconomici (ut existant) aut acquirantur et illae res quae thesaurizantur ad necessitatem vitae et utilitatem communitatis, tam domus quam civitatis, quia neque domus neque civitas potest gubernari sine necessariis vitae.

Then he concludes from what has been advanced that a certain natural kind of property of which we have now spoken is a certain part of economy, in the sense that [secundum quod] the part is said to be subservient: for it subserves not only economy, but also the political community. And this follows because it is necessary for the acts of political and economic [governors] that both those things which are treasured up for the necessity of life and what is useful for the community, either exist or are acquired; as in the household so also in the city, because neither the household nor the city can be governed without what is necessary for life.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit et videntur verae divitiae etc., ostendit quod praedicta possessiva non est infinita. Et dicit quod verae divitiae sunt ex huiusmodi rebus quibus subvenitur necessitati naturae; ideo autem istae sunt verae divitiae quia possunt tollere indigentiam et facere sufficientiam habenti eas, ut scilicet homo sit sibi sufficiens ad bene vivendum. Sunt autem quaedam aliae divitiae quarum possessio est infinita, ut infra dicetur; de quibus Solon, qui fuit unus de septem sapientibus, dixit in suo poemate quod nullus terminus divitiarum potest praefiniri hominibus: unde tales non sunt verae divitiae, quia non replent hominis appetitum.

Then, where he says et videntur verae divitiae, [I.6.k] etc., he shows that the aforementioned [art of property] is not without an end. And he says that true wealth is of those sorts of things through which the necessity of nature is relieved. But therefore, such things are true wealth because they can take away need and make sufficient those who have them, so that man may be self-sufficient for living well. But there is other wealth the possession of which is without end, as will be discussed below, about which Solon—who was one of seven wise men—said in his poetry that no limit of wealth can set up an end for men: and so such things are not true wealth, because they do not fill up the appetite of man.

Polit.L6

Quod autem divitiae quae consistunt ex rebus necessariis ad vitam sint finitae, probat tali ratione. Nullius actus instrumentum est infinitum neque multitudine neque magnitudine: ars enim fabrilis non habet infinitos martellos, neque etiam unum martellum infinitum; sed praedictae divitiae sunt quaedam organa yconomici et politici, quia eis utuntur ad gubernationem domus vel civitatis, ut dictum est: ergo huiusmodi divitiae non sunt infinitae, sed est eis aliquis terminus.

But that the wealth which consists in things necessary for life has an end he proves through this reasoning: the act of no instrument is without an end, neither in multitude nor magnitude. For the art of the smithy does not have unending hammers, nor even one unending hammer. But the aforementioned wealth is a certain tool of economic and political [governors], because they use it for governing the household or the city, as was said. Therefore, wealth of this sort is not without end, but it has some limit.

Polit.L6

Et ultimo epilogando concludit quod est quaedam naturalis possessiva, quae est necessaria et yconomicis et politicis; et propter quam causam, manifestum est ex dictis.

And he finally concludes in an epilogue that there is a certain natural property that is necessary both for economic and political [governors]; and the cause of this is clear from what has been said.

Polit.L6

Lecture 7

Polit.L7

Est autem genus aliud possessivae quam maxime vocant et iustum ipsum vocari pecuniativam, propter quam nullus videtur terminus esse divitiarum et possessionis; quam ut unam et eandem dictae multi putant propter vicinitatem; est autem neque eadem dictae, neque longa posita. Est autem haec quidam natura, haec autem non natura ipsarum sed per experientiam quandam et artem fit magis.

There is another kind of the [art of] property than that which is mostly called this, and that is rightly called "moneymaking." Because of [this art], there appears to be no limit to wealth and property, and on account of their proximity, many impute that they should be called one and the same. But though they are not far distant from each other, neither should they be called the same. For indeed, one is by nature, but the other is not itself by nature but rather comes to be through some experience and through art.

Polit.L7

Sumamus autem de ipsa principium hinc: uniuscuiusque enim rei duplex usus est, ambo autem secundum se, sed non similiter secundum se; sed hic quidem proprius, hic autem non proprius rei, puta calciamenti calciato et commutatio; ambo enim calciamenti usus; et enim commutans cum eo qui indiget calciamento pro nummismate aut cibo utitur calciamento secundum quod calciamentum, sed non secundum proprium usum. Non enim commutationis gratia factum est. Eodem autem modo se habet et de aliis possessis rebus.

Let us begin regarding these things with this principle: for each thing there is a twofold use, both are according to the thing itself, but not similarly according to the thing; but one is proper to the thing, and the other is not proper to the thing. For example, a shoe is for shoeing [feet] and for trade. Both are uses of the shoe: for in trading with one who requires a shoe, in exchange for money or for food, the shoe is used insofar as it is a shoe, bu not according to its proper use. For it is not made for the sake of trade. The same may be said of all other things held as property.

Polit.L7

Est enim permutativa omnium quae incipit primo quidem ab eo quod secundum naturam, eo quod haec quidem plura, haec autem pauciora sufficientum habent homines. Qua et palam quod non est secundum naturam pecuniativae campsoria. Quantum enim sufficiens ipsis necessarium erat fieri commutationem.

For there is [an art of] exchange for all things which begins, first, from what is according to nature, because some have too much, others too less than what is sufficient. From this it is clear that profit-turning [campsoria] is not a moneymaking art according to nature. For trade came to be from what was necessary for them to be sufficient.

Polit.L7

In prima quidem igitur communitate, haec autem est domus, manifestum quod nullum est opus ipsius; sed iam ampliori communitate existente, hii quidem enim ipsorum communicabant omnibus, hii autem segregati, multis rursum et aliis quorum secundum indigentias necessarium fieri retributiones, quaemadmodum adhuc faciunt multae barbararum nationum secundum commutationem. Ipsa enim oportuna ad ipsa commutant, ad plus autem nihil, puta vinum ad triticum dantes et accipientes, et aliorum talium unumquodque.

In the first community, indeed, which is the household, it is clear that its work [needs nothing of the art], but when existing in a broader community, some share in all things, but others are divided, and exchange with each other many necessities required for life. This a kind of trade which is still practiced among barbarous nations. For each trades what is advantageous for each, but nothing more, as for example giving and receiving wine for wheat, and other such things.

Polit.L7

Talis quidem igitur commutativa neque praeter naturam, neque pecuniativae est species nulla. In suppletionem enim eius quae secundum naturam per se sufficientiae erat.

This sort of trade is not beyond nature, nor is it a kind of moneymaking. For it was for the satisfaction of what is self sufficient according to nature.

Polit.L7

Ex hac tamen facta est illa secundum rationem: magis peregrino enim facto auxilio per adduci quibus indigebant, et emittere quibus habundabant, ex necessitate nummismatis acquisitus est usus. Non enim facile portabile unumquodque secundum naturam necessariorum; propter quod ad commutationes tale aliquid composuerunt ad semet ipsos dare et accipere, quod utilium per se ens habebat utilitatem valde expeditam ad vivere, puta ferrum et argentum, et si quid tale alterum, primo quidem simpliciter determinatum magnitudine et pondere, postremo autem et caracterem imprimentibus ut absolvant a mensuratione ipsos. Caracter enim positus est quantitatis signum.

However, from this was made [the other kind of trade] according to reason: from greater travel, a help was developed for pursuing what was required and exchanging what was abundant, from which the necessity the acquisition of coin came into use. For the various things necessary according to nature are not easily carried about; because of this, for the sake of such trades, men agreed to give and receive to each other something intrinsically useful, a thing useful and very advantageous for life, such as iron and silver, and other such things. First, this was simply determined by size and weight, but later, a character was imprinted, to absolve people from measuring. For the character is posited as a sign of quantity.

Polit.L7

Facto igitur iam nummismate ex necessaria commutatione, altera species pecuniativae facta est, campsoria; primo quidem igitur simpliciter forte factum, deinde per experientiam iam artificialius, unde et quomodo transmutatum plurimum faciet lucrum.

When coin had been made for the trade of necessities, another kind of moneymaking was made, profit-turning [campsoria]. First, it was perhaps done simply, but then through experience it became artful from where and how to make profit through many exchanges.

Polit.L7

Propter quod videtur pecuniativa maxime circa nummisma esse, et opus ipsius posse considerare, unde erit multitudo pecuniarum; factiva enim divitiarum et pecuniarum.

Because of this, it seems that moneymaking is chiefly about coin, and that its work is to be able to study where much money will come from, and to be [the art] that makes wealth and money.

Polit.L7

Et enim divitias multotiens ponunt nummismatis multitudinem. Propter circa hoc esse pecuniativam et campsoriam.

Indeed, wealth is thought by many to be much coin, and because of this, that it is about moneymaking and profit-turning.

Polit.L7

Aliquando autem rursum deliramentum esse videtur nummisma et lex omnino, natura autem nihil; quoniam transpositis utentibus, nullo dignum neque utile ad aliquid necessariorum est. Et nummismatae dives, multotiens indigebit necessario cibo, quamvis inconveniens tales esse divitias quibus habundans fame perit, quaemadmodum et Medam illum fabulosae dicunt propter insatiabilitatem desiderii, omnibus sibi exhibetis aureis.

But then again, sometimes coin seems deranged and utterly [a thing of] the law, with nothing of nature; since if those using it replace it [i.e. with something else], it has no worth, nor is it useful for anything necessary. And those rich in coin can often lack necessary food. But it is unfitting that such people should be wealthy who perish from hunger, as they say of Midas, in the fable, whose insatiable desire turned everything set before him into gold.

Polit.L7

Propter quod quaerunt alterum aliquid divitias et pecuniativam recte quaerentes; est enim altera pecuniativa et divitiae quae secundum naturam, et haec quidem yconomica. Campsoria autem factiva pecuniarum non omnino, sed per pecuniarum permutationem. Et videtur circa nummisma haec esse. Nummisma enim elementum et finis commutationis est.

Because of this, those who seek a different kind of wealth and moneymaking seek rightly; for there is another kind of moneymaking and wealth that is according to nature, and this indeed is economics. But profit-turning makes money not in every way, but through the exchange of money. And this seems to be about coin, for coin is the element and end of such trade.

Polit.L7

Est autem genus aliud etc. Postquam philosophus determinavit de una parte possessivae quae est acquisitiva cibi et aliorum necessariorum vitae, hic determinat de alia possessiva quae appellatur pecuniativa. Et circa hoc duo facit:

Est autem genus aliud, etc. After the philosopher determined about one part of property, which is the acquisition of food and of other necessities of life, he here determines about the other part of property, namely, moneymaking. And about this he does two things.

Polit.L7

primo proponit conditionem ipsius;

First, he discusses its establishment [I.7.a].

Polit.L7

secundo determinat de ea, ibi sumamus autem de ipsa etc.

Second, he determines it, at sumamus autem de ipsa, [I.7.b] etc.

Polit.L7

Circa primum tria determinat de hac secunda parte possessivae:

Concerning the first he determines three things about this second part of property.

Polit.L7

primo enim determinat nomen eius, dicens quod vocatur pecuniativa quia scilicet insistit circa acquisitionem pecuniarum.

For he first determines its name, saying that it is called moneymaking because it pursues the acquisition of money.

Polit.L7

Secundo dicit de ea quod, quia acquisitio pecuniarum est in infinitum, propter istam partem possessivae videtur hominibus quod nullus sit terminus divitiarum et possessionis; multi enim reputant quod haec pars possessivae sit una et eadem cum praemissa propter vicinitatem quam habet cum ipsa.

Second, he says that the acquisition of money is without an end, since this part of property seems to men to have no limit of wealth and property: for many repute that this part of property is one and the same with the one previously advanced because of the proximity that it has with it.

Polit.L7

Tertio ponit comparationem huius possessivae ad praemissam, et dicit quod neque est eadem cum praedicta, neque tamen longe distat ab ea. Quod autem non sit eadem, manifestat per hoc quod praedicta pars possessivae quae est acquisitiva cibi et aliorum necessariorum vitae est naturalis, sed haec quae est acquisitiva pecuniae non est naturalis; denarii enim non sunt adinventi a natura, sed per quandam experientiam et artem sunt introducti. Ideo autem dixit quod non longe distant, quia pro denariis etiam necessaria vitae haberi possunt et e converso.

Third, he lays out a comparison of this property with the previously advanced one, and he says that it is neither the same with the one mentioned, nor is it far distant from it. That it is not the same he clarifies through this: that the aforementioned part of property, which is acquisitive of food and of other necessities of life, is natural, but the one that is acquisitive of money is not natural. For currency was not invented by nature, but it was introduced through a certain experience and art. But therefore, he said that [the two kinds of property] are not far apart, because the necessities of life can be owned for the sake of currency, and also the converse.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit sumamus autem etc., incipit determinare naturam pecuniativae. Et quia pecunia est inventa propter commutationes faciendas, ideo circa hoc tria facit:

Then, where he says sumamus autem, etc., he begins to determine the nature of moneymaking. And because money was invented for the sake of making trades, he therefore does three things about it.

Polit.L7

primo ostendit quo modo commutatio se habet ad res commutatas;

First he shows how trade is related to the things traded [I.7.b].

Polit.L7

secundo determinat de commutatione naturali, ibi est enim permutativa omnium etc.;

Second, he determines about natural trading, at est enim permutativa omnium, [I.7.c] etc.

Polit.L7

tertio determinat de commutatione pecuniaria, ibi ex hac tamen facta est illa etc.

Third, he determines about monetary trading, at ex hac tamen facta est illa, [I.7.f] etc.

Polit.L7

Dicit ergo primo quod ad considerandum de pecuniativa debemus hinc accipere principium. Est enim uniuscuiusque rei duplex usus, et conveniunt in hoc quod uterque est secundum se et non per accidens; differunt autem in hoc quod unus eorum est proprius usus rei, alius autem non est proprius sed communis. Sicut duplex est usus calciamenti: unus quidem proprius, scilicet calciatio, ad hunc enim usum factum est calciamentum; alius autem non est proprius, scilicet commutatio, non enim ad hoc est factum calciamentum ut homo commutet ipsum. Sed tamen homo sic potest uti calciamento ut commutet ipsum vel pro pane vel pro cibo; et quamvis commutatio non sit proprius usus calciamenti, est tamen usus eius per se et non secundum accidens, quia ille qui commutat ipsum utitur eo secundum valorem suum. Et sicut dictum est de calciamento, ita intelligendum est de omnibus aliis rebus quae ab homine possideri possunt.

Therefore, he says first that in order to study moneymaking, we ought to take up this beginning: there is a twofold use for each thing. And they are fit for this, since either [use] is according to the thing itself [secundum se] and not accidental to it [per accidens]. But they differ in this: that one of them is the proper use of the thing, and the other is not proper, but common. Just as there is a twofold use for shoes. One, indeed, is its proper use: to shoe feet, and for this use the shoe is made; but the other is not its proper use, namely, trade, for it was not for this purpose that a shoe was made—so that man could trade it—but certainly man can use shoes to trade them, whether for bread or for food. And although trading is not the proper use for shoes, it is a use of them according to themselves, and not accidentally, because he who trades it uses it according to its value. And what has been said about shoes can be understood about all other things that can be possessed by man.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit est enim permutativa etc., determinat de commutatione naturali. Et circa hoc tria facit:

Then, where he says est enim permutativa, etc., he determines about natural trading; and he does three things in this regard.

Polit.L7

primo ostendit quorum sit ista commutatio;

First, he shows what this trading is of [I.7.c].

Polit.L7

secundo quo modo est introducta, ibi in prima igitur communitate etc.;

Second, how it is introduced.

Polit.L7

tertio quo modo se habet ad naturam, ibi talis quidem igitur commutativa etc.

Third, how it relates [se habet] to nature.

Polit.L7

Dicit ergo primo quod permutatio potest fieri de omnibus rebus. Et prima quidem commutatio incepit a rebus quae natura ministrat ad necessitatem humanae vitae, eo quod de hiis quidam homines plura habebant, quidam pauciora; sicut quidam habebant plus de vino, alii autem plus de pane, unde oportuit quod commutarent; et in tantum fiebat commutatio quousque unusquisque habebat quod sibi sufficiebat. Unde manifestum est quod, cum denarii non sint a natura sicut dictum est, campsoria quae est permutatio denariorum non est a natura.

Therefore, he says first that exchange can happen with all things. And first, trading begins from things that nature serves for the necessities of human life, of which some men have more, and some less, just as some have more wine, but others more bread: whence they needed to trade. And trading came to be until each one had self-sufficiency. From this it is clear that since currency is not from nature, as was said, profit-turning, which is currency exchange, is not from nature.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit in prima quidem igitur etc., ostendit quo modo est introducta talis permutatio. Et dicit quod in prima communitate quae est communitas unius domus non erat opus aliqua tali commutatione, eo quod omnia necessaria vitae erant patrisfamilias qui omnia providebat. Sed quando iam facta est amplior communitas, scilicet vici et civitatis, propter hoc quod aliqui hominum communicabant cum omnibus, inter quos non poterat fieri commutatio, alii vero erant separati et in multis aliis rebus, ideo necessarium fuit illarum rerum quae divisae erant fieri commutationes, ut scilicet dum unus acciperet ab alio quod alter habebat, ipse retribueret ei quod ipse habebat; quod adhuc servatur apud multas barbaras nationes apud quas non est usus denariorum, quae nihil plus commutant nisi ea quae sunt eis oportuna ad vitam, sicut dando et accipiendo vinum et triticum, et alia huiusmodi.

Then, where he says in prima quidem igitur, etc., he shows how such exchange was introduced: and he says that in the first community, which is the community of one household, there was not any work such as trading, since all the necessities of life were those of the father of the family, who provided all things. But when the broader community had been made, namely, a village and a city, because of this—that some men held all things in common, among whom trade could not come to be, while others who were separated also [held many other things in common]—it therefore it was necessary for there to become trades of their things, which were divided, so that as one received from the other what the other had, the latter in turn gave what he had back to the former. And this practice still serves among many barbarian nations, among whom there is no use of currency, and who trade nothing more than those things which are opportune for life, by giving and receiving things like wine and wheat and other things of this sort.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit talis quidem igitur etc., concludit ex praemissis quod talis commutativa non est praeter naturam, quia est de rebus quas natura ministrat; neque est species pecuniativae, quia non fit per denarios. Et quod non sit praeter naturam, probat per hoc quod est in supplementum per se sufficientiae, id est ut homo per huiusmodi commutationem habeat ea quae sunt necessaria sufficienter ad sustentationem humanae vitae.

Then, where he says talis quidem igitur, etc., he concludes from what has been advanced that such trade is not beyond nature, because it concerns things that nature serves, nor is it a kind of moneymaking because it does not come to be through currency. And that it is not beyond nature he proves through this: that it is for supplying self-sufficiency, that is, so that man, through trade of this sort should have those things that are necessary for sufficiently supporting human life.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit ex hac tamen etc., determinat de commutatione pecuniaria. Et circa hoc duo facit:

Then, where he says ex hac tamen, etc., he determines about monetary [trading], and he does two things in this regard.

Polit.L7

primo ostendit quo modo haec commutatio est per rationem inventa, cum non sit a natura;

First, he shows how this trading was invented through reason, although it is not from nature.

Polit.L7

secundo ostendit quod sit infinita, ibi et infinitae utique divitiae etc.

Second, he shows that it is without an end, at et infinitae utique divitiae [I.8.a], etc.

Polit.L7

Circa primum tria facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L7

primo determinat de prima inventione pecuniariae commutationis;

First he determines about the first invention of monetary trading.

Polit.L7

secundo de quadam commutatione pecuniaria superveniente, ibi facto igitur iam nummismate etc.;

Second, about a certain monetary trading that overtook [the first], at facto igitur iam numismate [I.7.g], etc..

Polit.L7

tertio determinat de pecuniativa quae est circa huiusmodi commutationes, ibi propter quod videtur pecuniativa etc.

Third, he determines about the moneymaking that concerns trades of this sort, at propter quod videtur pecuniativa [I.7.h], etc.

Polit.L7

Dicit ergo primo quod ex prima commutatione, quae erat ipsarum rerum necessariarum ad invicem, processit quaedam alia commutatio secundum rationem inventa. Cum enim auxilium hominum ad invicem per commutationes esset factum magis peregrinum, quia scilicet homines non solum ad propinquos sed etiam ad remotos ceperunt uti commutatione, adducendo ad se ea quibus indigebant et mittendo illis ea in quibus ipsi habundabant. Propter istam necessitatem inventus est usus denariorum, eo quod non poterant de facili portari ea quae sunt necessaria secundum naturam ad remotas terras, puta vinum aut triticum aut aliquid huiusmodi; et ideo ad huiusmodi commutationes in remotis faciendas ordinaverunt quod aliquid sibi invicem darent et acciperent quod de facili et expedite portari posset, et tamen de se haberet aliquam utilitatem: et huiusmodi sunt metalla, puta es, ferrum et argentum et alia huiusmodi. Haec enim sunt secundum se utilia, inquantum ex eis fiunt vasa vel aliqua instrumenta; et tamen de facili portari poterant ad remotum, quia modicum de istis propter eorum raritatem valebat multum de aliis rebus, sicut etiam modo homines qui debent longum iter peragere pro suis expensis loco denariorum ereorum portant argenteos vel aureos. Propter praedictam autem necessitatem commutationis ad loca remota, primo fuit determinatum metallum solo pondere et magnitudine, sicut apud quasdam gentes habentur formae argenti non monetati; sed postea ut homines liberarentur a necessitate mensurandi vel ponderandi impresserunt aliquem characterem, quod imponitur in signum quod metallum sit tantae quantitatis, sicut etiam in aliquibus locis imponuntur quaedam signa publica ad mensuram vini vel frumenti. Sic ergo patet quod primo denarii sunt inventi pro commutatione rerum necessariarum.

Therefore, he first says that from the first trade, which was of the necessary things themselves for each other, there proceeded a certain other trade according to what reason had invented. For since mutual human help, through trade, had produced more traveling, because men began to make use of trade not only with their neighbors, but also with remote [peoples], by bringing to themselves what they lacked, and sending the things in which they themselves abounded to others; because of such necessity the use of currency was discovered, since those things that are necessary by nature cannot be easily carried to remote lands—like wine and wheat and other things of this sort. And therefore, in order to make trades of things of this sort in remote lands, they had so ordered it that they could give and receive something to each other that was able to be carried easily and expediently, and yet that had some usefulness about it: and metals are things of this sort, like bronze, iron, silver, and others: for these are useful in themselves, inasmuch as from them come vases, and other instruments, and nevertheless they can be easily carried to remote lands because a small amount of such things, because of their scarcity, is worth much with reference to other things; and so it is the way of men who are required to take a long journey to carry for their expenses, in place of the currency of the area, silver or gold. But because of the aforementioned necessity of trade with remote places, metal was at first determined only by weight and magnitude, just as among certain peoples they use forms of unminted silver; but afterward, so that men might be freed from the necessity of measuring and weighing, they impressed some character that was imposed as a symbol that the metal was of such a quantity. Just as in some places they impose a certain public symbol as a measure of wine or grain. So therefore it is evident that the first currency was discovered for the trade of necessary things.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit facto igitur etc., determinat de alia commutatione superveniente. Et dicit quod postquam iam facti sunt denarii ex praedicta commutatione, quae est ex necessitate facta propter res necessarias ex remotis locis habendas, subintroducta est species commutationis pecuniariae secundum quam denarii pro denariis commutantur: et haec vocatur campsoria, qua scilicet utuntur campsores denariorum. Et hoc quidem primo factum est simpliciter et quasi a casu, puta quod ex aliquibus terris in alias aliqui denarios transferentes carius eos expenderunt quam acceperint; unde postea per experientiam factum est artificiale, ut homo scilicet consideret de quo loco denarii transmutati et quo modo possint facere maximum lucrum: et hoc pertinet ad artem campsoriam.

Then, where he says facto igitur, etc., he determines the other trading that overtook [the original]; and he says that after currency had been made for the aforementioned trading, which was made by necessity of having necessary things from remote places, a kind of monetary trading was brought in underneath [subintroducta] in which currency was traded for currency. And this is called profit-turning, which is what those who turn profits from money do. And this was first done simply and as though by chance, for instance, as though some people, in transporting currency from one land into another, paid out less than they were going to receive. And so afterward, through experience, it was done through artifice, so that man would consider from what place the money was transferred, and how it would be possible to make the greatest gain; and this belongs to the art of turning a profit.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit propter quod videtur etc., determinat de pecuniativa. Et circa hoc duo facit:

Then, where he says propter quod videtur, etc., he determines about moneymaking, and he says two things about it.

Polit.L7

primo concludit ex praemissis quae sit materia et actus huius artis;

First, he concludes from what has been advanced what is the material and activity of this art [I.7.h].

Polit.L7

secundo determinat quandam dubitationem, ibi et enim divitias etc.

Second, he determines a certain doubt, at etenim divitias [I.7.i], etc.

Polit.L7

Concludit ergo ex praemissis quod ex quo inceperunt denarii ad denarios commutari propter lucrum quodam artificiali modo, ars quae est circa denarios vocatur pecuniativa; et actus eius est quod possit considerare unde possit provenire homini multitudo pecuniarum, ad hoc enim est ordinata sicut ad finem ut faciat multitudinem pecuniarum et divitiarum.

Therefore, he concludes from what has been advanced that the art which concerns currency is called moneymaking from that which initiated the trade of currency for currency for the sake of gain through a certain artificial manner. And its act is that it can consider from whence men can acquire much money. For it is ordered toward this as toward its end, so that it can make much money and wealth.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit et enim divitias etc., determinat quandam dubitationem circa praemissa: quia enim dixerat quod pecuniativa est factiva divitiarum et pecuniarum, posset aliquis dubitare utrum sint omnino idem pecuniae et divitiae. Circa hoc ergo tria facit:

Then, where he says etenim divitias, etc., he determines a certain doubt about what has been advanced. For because he had said that moneymaking is what makes wealth and money, someone could doubt whether it is utterly the same as money and wealth. About this he does three things.

Polit.L7

primo ponit quorundam opinionem;

First, he lays out the opinion of certain people [I.7.i].

Polit.L7

secundo inducit rationes in contrarium, ibi aliquando autem rursus etc.;

Second, he introduces reasons to the contrary, at aliquando autem rursus [I.7.j], etc.

Polit.L7

tertio concludit determinationem veritatis, ibi propter quod quaerunt etc.

Third, he concludes with a determination of the truth, at propter quod quaerunt [I.7.k], etc.

Polit.L7

Dicit ergo primo quod multotiens homines opinantur quod divitiae nihil aliud sint quam multitudo pecuniarum, eo quod pecuniativa et campsoria, cuius finis est multiplicare divitias, tota consistit circa pecunias sicut circa propriam materiam.

Therefore, he first says that most men have the opinion that wealth is nothing other than much money, and from this, that moneymaking and profit-turning, whose end is to multiply wealth, is wholly built around money, as though around its proper material.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit aliquando autem etc., ponit opinionem contrariam, dicens quod aliquando videtur fatuitas quaedam dicere quod nihil eorum quae sunt secundum naturam sint divitiae, puta triticum et vinum et alia huiusmodi; et quod totae divitiae sint denarii introducti per legem. Et ad hoc introducit duas rationes,

Then, where he says aliquando autem, etc., he lays out a contrary opinion, saying that it sometimes seems folly for some people to say that none of those things that are natural are wealth, such as grain, and wine, and other things of this sort, and that the whole of wealth is money, which was introduced by law. And for this he brings in two reasons.

Polit.L7

quarum prima est quia non sunt verae divitiae illae quae variata hominum dispositione nullam dignitatem neque utilitatem habent ad necessitatem vitae; sed transmutata dispositione hominum qui utuntur divitiis denarii nullius sunt pretii nec aliquid afferunt ad necessitatem vitae, puta si placeat regi vel communitati (quod) non valeant: ergo stultum est dicere quod divitiae totaliter nihil sint nisi multitudo pecuniarum.

The first is: because those things are not true wealth that, if the disposition of men is varied, have no worth or usefulness for the necessities of life. But were the disposition of men who use currency for wealth altered, [currency] would have no value, nor would it contribute anything to the necessities of life—for instance, if it pleased a king or a community that [currency] should have no worth. Therefore, it is stupid to say that wealth is absolutely nothing except a multitude of money.

Polit.L7

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi et nummismate dives etc. quae talis est. Inconveniens est dicere quod ille qui est dives indigeat cibo vel pereat fame; sed multoties potest contingere quod homo habundans in denariis egeat cibo et moriatur fame, sicut dicitur fabulose de quodam Meda nomine quod, propter hoc quod habebat insatiabile desiderium pecuniae, petiit a Deo et impetravit quod omnia quae sibi exhiberentur fierent aurea: et sic peribat fame habens multitudinem auri, omnibus cibis sibi appositis conversis in aurum. Ergo denarii non sunt verae divitiae.

He lays out a second reason, at et numismate dives [I.7.j], etc.,which is this. It is unfitting to say that he who is wealthy could lack food or perish through hunger: but it can often happen that a man abounding in currency goes without food and dies of hunger, as is said in the fable about the man named Midas, who, because he had an insatiable desire for money, asked God and obtained it so that everything offered to him would become gold; and so he died of hunger, having a multitude of gold, since all food set before him was turned into gold. Therefore, currency is not true wealth.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit propter quod quaerunt etc., concludit determinationem veritatis, et dicit quod illi qui recte sapiunt propter praedictas rationes dicunt aliud esse divitias et pecuniam, sive pecuniativam. Sunt enim quaedam divitiae secundum naturam, scilicet de rebus necessariis ad vitam sicut supra dictum est: et talis acquisitio divitiarum proprie pertinet ad yconomicam; sed illa pecuniativa quae est campsoria multiplicat pecunias non omnibus modis, sed solum per denariorum permutationem: unde tota consistit circa denarios, quia denarius est principium et finis talis commutationis, dum denarius pro denario datur. Patet igitur secundum hoc, quod ditiores sunt qui habundant in rebus necessariis ad vitam vere loquendo, quam illi qui abundant in denariis.

Then, where he says propter quod quaerunt, etc., he concludes by a determination of the truth. And he says that those who discern correctly, for the aforementioned reasons, say that wealth is other than either money or moneymaking: for there is a certain wealth according to nature, namely, of those things necessary for life, as was said above. And the acquisition of such wealth properly belongs to economy. But the moneymaking which is profit-turning multiplies money not in every manner, but only through currency exchange: whence it is constructed entirely around currency, because currency is the beginning and end of such trading, so long as currency is given for currency. Therefore, it is evident according to this that, to speak truly, they are wealthier who abound in those things necessary for life than are those who abound in currency.

Polit.L7

Lecture 8

Polit.L8

Et infinitae utique divitiae quae ab hac pecuniativa. Sicut enim medicinalis ad sanare in infinitum est, et quaelibet artium finis in infinitum, quam maxime enim illum volunt facere, eorum autem quae ad finem non in infinitum, terminus enim quod finis omnibus, sic et huic pecuniativae non est finis terminus; finis autem tales divitiae et pecuniarum possessio. Yconomicae autem non pecuniativae est terminus: non enim hoc yconomice opus.

And indeed, there is no end of the wealth that is from this moneymaking [art]. For as in the medical [art] the pursuit of health is endless, and as the end of any of the arts is endless, for that is what they most of all will to do (but those things that are for the sake of an end are not endless, since the end is a limit in all things), so also in this moneymaking [art], the end is not a limit. For property is the end of such kinds of wealth and money. But in economics, the limit is not the moneymaking art: for this is not the work of economy.

Polit.L8

Propter quod sic quidem videtur omnium divitiarum necessarium esse terminum. In hiis autem quae fiunt video accidens contrarium: omnes enim in infinitum augent pro rebus ad usum habentes nummisma.

Because of this, it seems indeed that there is necessarily a limit to all wealth. But in the things we see happen, the contrary occurs: for all those who have coin endlessly increase it for the sake of useful things.

Polit.L8

Causa autem propinquitas ipsorum: variat enim usus eiusdem existens uterque pecuniativae; eiusdem enim est usus acquisitio, sed non secundum idem; sed huius quidem alius finis, huius autem augmentatio. Quare videtur quibusdam hoc esse yconomice opus, et perseverant vel salvare oportere existimantes vel augere nummismatis substantiam in infinitum.

But the cause is that they are closely related: for both kinds of moneymaking vary in their use of the same existing thing. For both, the use is acquisition, but not according to the same thing; but for one, [the acquisition] is of another end, but for the other, it is mere increase. This is why it seems to some that the second one is the work of economics, and they persevere in judging that they must either preserve or increase the substance of their coin endlessly.

Polit.L8

Causa autem huius dispositionis studere circa vivere, sed non circa vivere. In infinitum igitur illa concupiscentia existente, et factiva infinita desiderant. Quicumque autem et ipsius bene vivere adiciunt quod ad fruitiones corporales quaerunt. Itaque quoniam et hoc in possessione videtur existere, omnis eorum cura circa acquisitionem pecuniarum est.

The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as their desires are unlimited they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without limit. Those who do aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, they are absorbed in getting wealth.

Polit.L8

Et altera species pecuniativae propter hoc venit. In excessu enim existente fruitione, fruitivi excessus factiva quaerunt.

And so there arises the second species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment.

Polit.L8

Et si non per pecuniativam possint acquirere, per aliam causam hoc attemptant, unaquaque potentiarum utentes non secundum naturam. Fortitudinis enim non pecunias facere est sed audaciam; neque militaris et medicinalis, sed huius quidem victoriam, huius autem sanitatem; hii autem omnes faciunt pecuniativas tanquam hoc finis existat, ad finem autem omnia oportunum occurrere. De non necessaria quidem igitur pecuniativa et quae et propter quam causam in indigentia sumus ipsius, dictum est; et de necessaria, quoniam altera quidem ab ipsa; yconomica autem secundum naturam, quae circa cibum, non sicut ipsa infinita, sed habens terminum.

And, if they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of getting wealth, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not intended to make wealth, but to inspire confidence; neither is this the aim of the general's or of the physician's art; but the one aims at victory and the other at health. Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things must contribute. Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth-getting which is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit.

Polit.L8

Palam autem et quod dubitabant a principio, utrum yconomici et politici est pecuniativa aut non, sed oportet hoc quidem existere. Sicut enim et homines non facit politica, sed sumens a natura utitur ipsis, sic et cibum naturam oportet tradere, terram aut mare aut aliud aliquid. Ex hiis autem quomodo oportet ista disponere convenit yconomo. Non enim est textilis lanas facere, sed uti ipsis, et cognoscere etiam quale utile et ydoneum vel pravum et ineptum.

But what we doubted at the beginning is now clear: whether moneymaking belongs to the economic or political [art] or not, or whether they [already] need it to exist. For just as politics does not make human beings, but takes them up from nature for its use, so also nature must give over food for them, from the earth or the sea, or some other thing. And from this, it belongs to the economic [art] to dispose of such things as is fitting. For it is not for the weaver to make wool, but to use it, and to know what sort is useful and apt, or is mishapen and unuseable.

Polit.L8

Et enim dubitabit utique aliquis propter quid pecuniativa quidem pars yconomiae, medicinalis autem non pars, quamvis oportet sanari eos qui in domo sicut vivere aut aliud aliquid necessariorum. Quoniam autem est quidem ut yconomici et principis et de sanitate videre, est autem ut non, sed medici, sic et de pecuniis est quidem ut yconomici, est autem ut non, sed subservientis.

For someone may indeed doubt why moneymaking is, indeed, part of economics, but the medical art is not a part, even though the one who lives in the household must be healthy; and so too with any other of the necessities. But it is, indeed, for the economist and governor to see to health, but not as the doctor does, and so also about money, it is indeed for the economist, but in a way it is not, but for a subservient art.

Polit.L8

Maxime autem quaemadmodum dictum est prius, oportet natura hoc existere. Naturae enim est opus cibum genito exhibere; omni enim ex quo fit cibus quod relinquitur est, propter quod secundum naturam est pecuniativa omnibus ex fructibus et animalibus.

But what was said previously is chiefly the case, that this must exist from nature. For it is the work of nature to bring forth food to what is born; and for all things that come to be, they have food from what is left-over; because of this, according to nature, there is a moneymaking art for all human beings from fruits and animals.

Polit.L8

Duplici autem existente ipsa quaemadmodum diximus, et hac quidem campsoria, hac autem yconomica, et hac quidem necessaria et laudata, hac autem translativa vituperata iuste; non enim secundum naturam, sed ab invicem est, rationabilissime odio habetur obolostatica, eo quod ab ipso nummismate sit acquisitio, et non super quo quidem acquisivimus; translationis enim gratia factum est. Tokos autem se ipsum facit amplius, unde et nomen istud accepit. Similia enim parta generantibus ipsa sunt. Tokos autem fit nummisma ex nummismate. Quare et maxime praeter naturam ista pecuniarum acquisitio est.

As we have said, two kinds [of moneymaking] exist: one is profit-turning, and the other is economics; and this latter is necessary and praiseworthy, but the former has justly carried blame with it. For it is not according to nature, but [a way for men to acquire] from each other. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is obolostatics, which is acquisition from coin itself, and not from that for the sake of which we have acquired it. For money was made for the sake of transferral. And tokos makes money itself greater, for which reason it has taken on such a name. For offspring are like what generated them, and tokos makes coin come from coin. For this reason, such acquisition of money is most of all contrary to nature.

Polit.L8

Et infinitae utique divitiae etc. Postquam ostendit Philosophus quo modo pecuniativa commutatio est introducta per legem, hic ostendit quo modo sit infinita talis acquisitiva pecuniae. Et circa hoc duo facit:

Et infinitae utique divitiae et cetera. After the philosopher shows how the moneymaking trade is brought in by law, he here shows how such an acquisition of money is without an end [infinitus]: and about this he does two things.

Polit.L8

primo ostendit propositum;

First, he shows what has been proposed.

Polit.L8

secundo assignat causam praemissorum, ibi causa autem huius dispositionis etc.

Second, he indicates the cause of what has been put forward, ibi, causa autem huius dispositionis et cetera.

Polit.L8

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L8

primo ostendit propositum;

First, he shows what has been proposed.

Polit.L8

secundo solvit ex hoc quandam dubitationem, ibi propter quod sic quidem etc.

Second, from this he resolves a certain doubt, ibi, propter quod sic quidem et cetera.

Polit.L8

Dicit ergo primo quod divitiae quae acquiruntur ab hac pecuniativa, scilicet campsoria quae tota est circa denarios, est infinita; et hoc probat tali ratione. Desiderium finis in unaquaque arte est in infinitum; desiderium autem eius quod est ad finem non est in infinitum, sed habet terminum secundum regulam et mensuram finis: sicut ars medicinalis intendit ad sanandum in infinitum cum inducit sanitatem quantamcumque potest, sed medicinam non dat quantamcumque potest sed secundum mensuram quae est utilis ad sanandum; et ita est in aliis artibus. Et ratio huius est quia finis est secundum se appetibilis; quod autem secundum se est tale, si magis fuerit erit magis tale: sicut si album disgregat visum, magis album magis disgregat. Sed pecuniae se habent ad pecuniativam campsoriam sicut finis, haec enim intendit acquirere pecunias; ad yconomicam autem non se habet sicut finis, sed sicut ordinatum ad finem qui est gubernatio domus. Ergo pecuniativa quaerit pecunias absque termino, yconomica autem cum aliquo termino.

Therefore, he first says that the wealth that is acquired “from this moneymaking [art],” namely, profit-turning, is without an end, and he proves it through this reason. In each art, the desire for the end [finis] is without an end [in infinitum]; but the desire of what is towards the end is not without an end, but has a limit following the rule and measure of the end: just as the art of medicine intends to heal without an end, since it brings about health to whatever degree it can; but it does not give medicine to whatever degree it can, but after the measure of what is useful for healing. And so it is in the other arts. And the reason for this is because the end is appetable in and of itself [secundum se]; but what is such in and of itself, if it were greater, would be more greatly such—just as if white dazzles vision, what is greatly white will greatly dazzle. But money is related to monetary profit-turning as an end: for this [art] intends to acquire money. But it is not related to economy as an end, but as something ordered toward an end, which is the governing of the household. Therefore, moneymaking seeks money without a limit, but economy [seeks money] with a limit.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit propter quod sic quidem etc., solvit dubitationem quandam ex praemissis. Et circa hoc duo facit:

Then, when he says propter quod sic quidem etc., from what has been advanced he resolves a certain doubt. And about this he does two things.

Polit.L8

primo movet eam;

First, he raises it.

Polit.L8

secundo solvit, ibi causa autem etc.

Second, he resolves it, ibi, causa autem etc.

Polit.L8

Dicit ergo primo quod propter praedictam rationem videtur quod necessarium sit esse aliquem terminum divitiarum in yconomica; sed si quis consideret in hiis quae accidunt, videtur esse contrarium: omnes enim yconomici augent denarios in infinitum, volentes habere denarios pro rebus quae sunt ad usum vitae.

Therefore, he first says that because of the aforementioned reasoning, it seems that it is necessary that there be a certain limit of wealth in economy: but if anyone studies those things that happen, the contrary seems to be. For every economy increases currency without an end, desiring to have currency for those things that are for the use of life.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit causa autem etc., solvit praemissam dubitationem. Et dicit quod causa praedictae diversitatis videtur esse propinquitas utriusque pecuniativae, illius scilicet quae deservit yconomicae, quae quaerit pecunias pro commutatione rerum necessariarum, et campsoriae quae quaerit denarios propter se ipsos. Utriusque enim pecuniativae est idem actus, scilicet acquisitio pecuniarum, sed non eodem modo: sed in pecuniativa yconomica hoc ordinatur ad alium finem, scilicet ad gubernationem domus; in pecuniativa autem scilicet campsoria ipsa augmentatio pecuniae est finis. Et ideo propter propinquitatem campsoriae ad yconomicam, videtur quibusdam yconomis quod sit eorum officium illud quod pertinet ad campsores, ut scilicet instent ad conservandum et multiplicandum denarios in infinitum.

Then, when he says causa autem etc., he resolves the previously advanced doubt; and he says that the cause of the aforementioned diversity seems to be the proximity of both [kinds] of moneymaking—of that which is at the service of economy, which seeks money for the trade of necessary things, and profit-turning, which pursues currency for its own sake: for the act of both [kinds] of moneymaking is the same, namely, the acquisition of money, but not in the same manner. But in economic moneymaking, this is ordered to another end: the governing of the household; but in moneymaking—profit-turning—the very increase of money is the end; and therefore, because of the proximity of profit-turning to economy, it seems to some economists that it is their office to do what belongs to profit-turners: that they delve into preserving and multiplying currency endlessly.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit causa autem etc., assignat causam eius quod dixerat, quod dispensatores domorum interdum perseverant ad augendum pecunias in infinitum.

Then, when he says causa autem etc. he indicates the cause of what had been said, that the managers of households sometimes persevere in increasing money endlessly.

Polit.L8

Et quia ex causa quam assignat sequntur quaedam abusiones, ideo haec pars dividitur in tres secundum tres abusiones quas ponit;

And because of this cause, which he indicates, there follow certain misuses. Therefore, this part is divided into three after the three abuses which he lays out.

Polit.L8

secunda pars incipit ibi et altera species etc.;

The second part initiates here: et altera species etc.

Polit.L8

tertia ibi et si pro non per pecuniativam etc.

The third here: et si pro non per pecuniativam etc.

Polit.L8

Dicit ergo primo quod causa huius dispositionis, quod scilicet dispensatores domorum quaerunt augere pecuniam in infinitum, est quia homines student ad vivendum qualitercumque, non autem ad vivendum bene, quod est vivere secundum virtutem. Si enim intenderent vivere secundum virtutem, essent contenti hiis quae sufficiunt ad sustentationem naturae; sed quia praetermisso hoc studio student ad vivendum unusquisque secundum suam voluntatem, ideo unusquisque intendit acquirere ea per quae possit suam voluntatem implere. Et quia concupiscentia hominum tendit in infinitum, ideo in infinitum desiderant ea per quae possint satisfacere suae concupiscentiae. Quidam etiam sunt qui habent studium ut bene vivant, sed ei quod est bene vivere addunt id quod pertinet ad delectationes corporales; dicunt enim non esse bonam vitam nisi cum talibus delectationibus homo vivat: et ideo quaerunt ea per quae possunt implere delectationes corporales. Et quia hoc videtur hominibus posse evenire per multitudinem divitiarum, ideo omnis cura eorum esse videtur ad acquirendum multas pecunias. Et est considerandum quod assignat causam eorum quae pertinent ad dispensatorem domus ex intentione humanae vitae, quia dispensator domus habet pro fine bonam vitam eorum qui sunt in domo. Sic igitur prima abusio est quod homines, propter hoc quod non habent rectum studium bonae vitae, intendunt ad acquirendum pecunias in infinitum.

Therefore, he first says that the cause of this organization—that managers of households seek to increase money without an end—is because men are zealous for living howsoever, but not for living well, which is to live after virtue. For if they were to intend to live after virtue, they would be content with those things that are sufficient for the sustenance of nature. But because this zeal is permitted, each one is zealous for living after his own will, and therefore each one intends to acquire those things through which he can fulfill his own will: and because the concupiscence of men intends what is without an end, they therefore desire without an end those things which can make their concupiscence content. There are also some who have a zeal for living well; but to that which constitutes “living well,” they add what belongs to bodily delight, for they say that there is no good life unless man lives with such delights, and therefore they seek those things through which they can fill up bodily delight: and because this seems to men to come forth from great wealth, therefore their every care seems to be for acquiring much money. And it must be considered that he indicates the cause of these things, which belong to the manager of the household, from the intention of human life, because the manager of the household has for his end the good life of those who are in the household. This, therefore, is the first misuse: that men, because they do not have a correct zeal for the good life intend to acquire money without an end.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit et altera species etc., ponit secundam abusionem. Quia enim dispensatores domorum student circa acquisitionem pecuniarum, propter hoc inducitur in curam domus altera species pecuniativae, scilicet campsoria, praeter eam quae est propria yconomicae, scilicet acquisitio rerum necessariarum ad vitam; sed quia in excessu intendunt frui delectationibus corporalibus, propter hoc quaerunt ea quae possunt facere huiusmodi excessum, scilicet multitudinem divitiarum. Et sic est secunda abusio, quod pecuniativa non naturalis neque necessaria assumitur ad yconomicam.

Then, when he says et altera species, etc., he lays out the second misuse. For because the managers of households are zealous for the acquisition of money, on account of this they bring into the care of the household another kind of moneymaking—profit-turning--beyond what is proper for economy, that is, the acquisition of things necessary for life. But because they intend to enjoy [frui] the delights of the body in excess, because of this they seek those things that can make an excess of this sort: a multitude of wealth. And this is the second misuse: that the moneymaking that is not natural or necessary is taken up into economy.

Polit.L8

Tertio ponit tertiam abusionem, ibi et si non per pecuniativam etc. Et dicit quod quia homines non possunt interdum per artem pecuniariam acquirere sufficienter ea per quae satisfaciant excessui delectationum corporalium, attemptant acquirere pecunias per alias causas; et abutuntur qualibet potentia, id est virtute vel arte vel officio, non secundum suam naturam. Sicut fortitudo est quaedam virtus, et eius opus proprium non est congregare pecunias sed facere hominem audacem ad aggrediendum et sustinendum; unde si aliquis fortitudine utatur ad congregandum divitias, utitur ea non secundum naturam. Similiter etiam militaris ars est propter victoriam, et medicinalis propter sanitatem, neutra tamen est propter pecuniam; sed quidam et militarem artem et medicinalem convertunt ad acquirendum pecuniam, et ita faciunt utramque esse pecuniativam, id est acquisitivam pecuniae, ordinantes huiusmodi artes ad pecuniam sicut ad finem ad quem oportet ordinari omnia alia. Et ideo dicitur in Ecclesiaste: et pecuniae obediunt omnia.

Third, he lays out a third misuse here: et si non per pecuniativam etc. And he says that because sometimes, through the art of moneymaking, men cannot acquire those things sufficiently through which they make the excess of bodily delights content, they attempt to acquire money by other causes; and they misuse any power—that is, virtue, or art, or office—not after its own nature. Just as fortitude is a certain virtue, and its proper work is not not to gather [congregare] money, but to make men bold [audacem] for undertaking or enduring; and so if someone uses fortitude for gathering wealth, he does not use it after its nature. Likewise also the military art is for victory, and the medicinal for health, but neither is for money: but some turn both the military art and the medicinal toward acquiring money, and so they make both to be moneymaking [arts], that is, acquisitive of money, ordering arts of this sort toward money as toward the end to which all other things must be ordered; and therefore it is said in Ecclesiastes: all things are obedient to money.

Polit.L8

Concludit ergo epilogando ex praemissis quod dictum est de non necessaria pecuniativa, quae scilicet acquirit pecuniam in infinitum sicut finem, quae sit et propter quam causam homines indigent ipsa, scilicet propter concupiscentiam infinitam. Dictum est etiam de necessaria pecuniativa, quae scilicet est altera a praemissa; acquirit enim pecunias usque ad aliquem terminum propter alium finem, scilicet propter habenda necessaria vitae. Sed proprie yconomica est circa ea quae sunt secundum naturam, sicut illa quae pertinent ad cibum; et haec non est infinita sicut prima pecuniativa, sed habet aliquem terminum. Vel potest intelligi quod ipsa pecuniativa quae est necessaria est altera a non necessaria, sed est yconomica; et alia non mutantur.

Therefore, from what has been advanced, he concludes in an epilogue that it has been said about the non-necessary moneymaking—that acquires money without an end as if this were the end—what it is in itself, and for what reason men need [indigent] it—because of unending concupiscence. Necessary moneymaking has also been discussed—the one that is other than the previous one. For it acquires money up to some limit because of some other end, namely, to have the necessities of life. But properly, economy is about those things that are according to nature, such as those that belong to acquiring food: and this not without an end, as was the first moneymaking, but it has some limit. Or it can be understood that the moneymaking itself that is necessary is other than the unnecessary, but is economic, and other things are not traded.

Polit.L8

Palam autem et quod dubitabant etc. Moverat superius quaestionem utrum pecuniativa sit pars vel subserviens yconomicae, et distinxit pecuniativam ab alia possessiva; nunc solvit motam superius quaestionem. Et circa hoc duo facit:

Palam autem et quod dubitabant etc. He had raised a question further up: whether moneymaking is a part or is subservient to the economic [art]: and he distinguished moneymaking from the other [forms of] possessing. Now he resolves the previously raised question. And about this he does two things.

Polit.L8

primo ostendit quod pecuniativa subservit yconomicae;

First, he shows that moneymaking is subservient to the economic [art].

Polit.L8

secundo ostendit quo modo pecuniativa quaedam est laudabilis et quaedam vituperabilis, ibi duplici autem existente etc.

Second, he shows how some moneymaking is praiseworthy, and some is blameworthy, at: duplici autem existente, etc.

Polit.L8

Circa primum tria facit:

About the first he does three things.

Polit.L8

primo solvit superius motam quaestionem;

First, he resolves the question that was raised earlier.

Polit.L8

secundo movet aliam dubitationem, ibi et enim dubitabit etc.;

Second, he raises another doubt here: etenim dubitabit etc.

Polit.L8

tertio manifestat quiddam quod dixerat, ibi maxime autem etc.

Third, he clarifies something that he had said here: maxime autem etc.

Polit.L8

Dicit ergo primo quod iam ex praemissis potest esse manifestum illud quod quaerebatur a principio, utrum pecuniativa pertineat ad yconomicum et politicum, aut non, sed sit omnino extranea. Et veritas est quod non est eadem pecuniativa yconomicae, ut supra dictum est; sed tamen ei subservit, quia pecunias oportet existere ad hoc quod domus gubernetur. Et hoc probat per hoc quod in domo et civitate oportet esse et homines et ea quae sunt necessaria hominibus; homines autem non facit politica, sed accipit eos a natura generatos et sic utitur ipsis: similiter ergo politica vel yconomica non facit cibum, sed natura tradit ipsum vel ex terra sicut fructus, vel ex mari sicut pisces, aut ex aliqua alia re. Facere igitur vel acquirere huiusmodi cibum non est proprium opus et immediatum politicae vel yconomicae, sed proprium opus eius est dispensare ista in domo sicut oportet; sicut videmus quod textoris non est facere lanam, sed uti ipsa et cognoscere qualis lana sit ydonea ad suum opus, qualis etiam sit prava et inepta. Sic igitur yconomicae deservit et natura, quae generat hominem et cibos, et iterum pecuniativa quae acquirit, sicut etiam arti textoriae deservit et natura quae producit lanam et mercativa quae acquirit eam.

Therefore, he first says that what was sought from the beginning can now be clarified from what has been advanced: whether moneymaking belongs to economics and politics, or does not, but is utterly foreign. And the truth is that moneymaking is not the same as economics, as was said above, but nevertheless is subservient to it: because money must exist for this, that the household may be governed. And he proves this through this: that in the household and the city there must be both men and those things that are necessary for men. But politics does not make men, but receives them, generated by nature, and so uses them. Likewise, therefore, politics or economics does not make food, but nature hands it down to them, either from the earth, as with produce, or from the sea, as with fish, or from some other thing. Therefore, to make or to acquire food of this sort is not the proper and unmediated work of politics or economics; but its proper work is to manage these things in the household, as it must. Just as we see that it is not for the weaver to make wool, but to use it, and to know [cognoscere] which wool is apt for his work, and which is misshapen or unusable. So thus, at the service of economics are both nature, which generates men and food, and consequently, moneymaking, which acquires things, just as at the service of the weaver's art are both nature, which produces wool, and the merchant's [art], which acquires it.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit et enim dubitabit etc., movet quandam quaestionem. Et est ista quaestio: cum illi qui sunt in domo indigeant sanitate sicut indigent hiis quae sunt necessaria ad vitam, ut cibo et vestitu, quare ars medicinalis non est pars yconomicae sicut pecuniativa? Et respondet quod ad dispensatorem domus et ad principem civitatis pertinet quodam modo considerare de sanitate, scilicet utendo consilio medicorum ad sanitatem subiectorum; alio autem modo non pertinet ad eos sed ad medicos, considerando scilicet ex quibus rebus sanitas conservetur vel restituatur. Similiter etiam ad dispensatorem domus quodam modo pertinet considerare de pecunia, scilicet utendo ea iam acquisita et utendo etiam ministerio eorum qui acquirunt; sed considerare ex quibus rebus pecunia possit acquiri et quo modo, hoc non pertinet ad yconomicum sed ad artem subservientem, scilicet ad pecuniativam.

Then, when he says etenim dubitabit, etc., he raises a certain question, and it is this question: since those who are in the household require health, just as they require those things that are necessary for life, like food and clothing, why is the medical art not a part of economy, just like moneymaking is? And he responds that it belongs to the manager of the household and to the governor of the city to consider health in some manner—through using the counsel of the doctor about the health of his subjects. But in another manner it does not belong to them, but to doctors—for considering from what things health will be preserved or restored. Likewise also, it belongs to the manager of the household to consider money—for using it once it has been acquired, and using also the service of those who acquire it: but to consider from what things money can be acquired and how—this does not belong to economics, but to a subservient art: moneymaking.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit maxime autem etc., manifestat quod supra dixerat, scilicet quod natura tradat ea quae sunt necessaria. Et dicit quod, sicut dictum est prius, ea quibus utitur yconomica vel politica maxime oportet praeexistere a natura, a qua etiam accipiunt subservientes artes; et hoc probat per hoc quod naturae opus est dare cibum ei quod generatur secundum naturam. Videmus enim quod illud ex quo fit aliquid quantum ad id quod est residuum generationi est cibus rei generatae: sicut patet quod animal generatur ex sanguine menstruo, et id quod est residuum ex hac materia natura convertit in lac et praeparat cibum generato. Et ideo quia homo constitutus est ex rebus quae sunt secundum naturam, aliae res quae sunt secundum naturam, sunt ei cibus; et ideo omnibus hominibus est naturalis pecuniativa, id est acquisitiva ciborum vel denariorum pro cibo ex rebus naturalibus, scilicet ex fructibus et animalibus. Quod autem aliquis acquirat pecuniam non ex rebus naturalibus sed ab ipsis denariis, hoc non est secundum naturam.

Then when he says maxime autem etc., he clarifies what he had said above—that nature hands down those things that are necessary: and he says that as was said earlier, those things that economics or politics use must most of all pre-exist from nature, from which also the subservient arts receive them. And he proves this through this: that the work of nature is to give food to what is generated following nature. For we see that the thing from which something comes to be, to the degree that it is the surplus of generation, is the food of the thing generated, just as it is evident that an animal is generated from menstrual blood, and what is the surplus from this material nature converts into milk and prepares food for the generated thing. And therefore, because man is constituted from things that are according to nature, other things that are according to nature are food for him. And so for all men there is a natural moneymaking, that is, the one acquisitive of food or of currency for food, from natural things—from produce and animals. But that someone acquires money from from natural things, but from currency itself, this is not following nature.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit duplici autem existente etc., positis duabus pecuniativis, ostendit quae earum sit laudabilis et quae vituperabilis. Et dicit quod duae sunt pecuniativae, quarum una vocatur campsoria, quae scilicet acquirit pecuniam ex pecuniis et propter ipsas pecunias; alia autem pecuniativa est yconomica, quae scilicet acquirit pecunias ex rebus naturalibus, puta ex fructibus et animalibus, ut dictum est. Ista quidem secunda est necessaria ad vitam hominum, unde et laudatur; alia vero, scilicet campsoria, transfertur ab eo quod est necessarium naturae ad id quod requirit concupiscentia, ut supra dictum est: et ideo iuste vituperatur. Non enim ista pecuniativa est secundum naturam, quia neque ex rebus naturalibus est, neque ad supplendam necessitatem naturae ordinatur, sed ex (translatione) denariorum ad invicem, inquantum scilicet homo denarios per denarios lucratur. Et cum ista pecuniativa quae est campsoria iuste vituperetur, quaedam alia acquisitiva pecuniae est quae rationabilissime vituperatur et odio habetur, quae dicitur obolostatica, id est statuitiva denariorum, sicut illi qui lucrantur in excessu denariis instituendis. Ista enim acquisitio fit ab ipsis denariis, et non secundum primum modum qui institutus est ad acquirendos denarios; facti sunt enim denarii gratia translationis, id est commutationis, ut supra dictum est. Est autem et quaedam alia acquisitiva pecuniae quae Graece vocatur tokos, id est usura, per quam denarius se ipsum adauget, et ideo sic vocatur apud Graecos. Tokos enim idem est quod partus; videmus autem quod ea quae pariuntur secundum naturam sunt similia generantibus: unde fit quidam partus cum denarius ex denario crescit. Et ideo etiam ista acquisitio pecuniarum est maxime praeter naturam; quia secundum naturam est ut denarii acquirantur ex rebus naturalibus, non autem ex denariis. Sic ergo una pecuniativa est laudabilis, et tres vituperabiles ut dictum est.

Then, when he says duplici autem existente, etc., when he had laid out the two kinds of moneymaking, he shows which of them is praiseworthy, and which is blameworthy. And he says that there are two [kinds] of moneymaking, the first of which is called profit-turning, which acquires money from money and because of money, but the other kind of moneymaking is economic, which acquires money from natural things—such as from produce and animals, as was said. And this second one is necessary for the life of men, and so it is praiseworthy: but the other—profit-turning—is transferred from what is necessary for nature to what is required by concupiscence, as was said above, and therefore it is justly blameworthy: for this moneymaking is not following nature, because it is neither from natural things, nor is it ordered toward fulfilling the necessity of nature, but it is from the transferal of currency for currency, inasmuch as men gain currency through currency. And since this moneymaking, which is profit-turning, is justly blamed, there is a certain other [art] acquisitive of money that is most rationally blamed, and held in hatred, which is called obolostatics—that is, money-lending [statuitiva denariorum], as with those who gain through deviantly [excessu] loaning money [excessu denariis instituendis]. For such acquisition comes to be from the currency itself, and not after the first manner that was fashioned for acquiring currency; for currency was made for the sake of transferal—that is, trading—as was said above. But there is a certain other [art] acquisitive of money that in Greek is called tokos, that is, usury, through which currency increases itself, and so it is called this among the Greeks. For tokos is the same as “born” and we see that the things generated following nature are the same as the generators; and so it comes to be that there is a certain birth where currency grows from currency. And so also such an acquisition of money is most of all beyond nature, because following nature, currency is acquired from natural things, and not from currency. So therefore, one moneymaking is praiseworthy, and three are blameworthy, as was said.

Polit.L8

Lecture 9

Polit.L9

Quoniam autem quae ad scientiam determinavimus sufficienter, quae ad usum oportet pertransire: omnia enim talia contemplationem liberam habent, experientiam autem necessariam.

Since, now, we have sufficiently determined what pertains to the science [of moneymaking], we must now pass through what pertains to its use. For all such things have their free contemplation, but experience is also necessary.

Polit.L9

Sunt autem pecuniativae partes utiles circa possessibilia expertum esse, qualia pretiosissima, et ubi, et quomodo, puta equorum possessio qualis quaedam, aut boum, aut ovium, similiter autem et ceterorum animalium; oportet enim expertum esse ad invicem horum quae pretiosissima, et qualia in quibus locis; alia enim in aliis habundant regionibus. Deinde de terrae cultura et huius iam nude et plantate, et de apum cultura, et aliorum animalium natatilium et volatilium, a quibuscumque contingit sortiri auxilium: propriissime quidem igitur pecuniativae hae partes et primae.

Now there are useful parts of moneymaking around the things in which it is possible to be experienced: what kinds of things are most valuable, and where, and how they can be acquired--for example, the ownership of certain kinds of horses, or cattle, or sheep, and likewise also with the rest of the animals. For one must be experienced about which of these, compared with the others, is the most valuable, and which kinds in which places, since some abound in some regions, and others in others. Then, about the cultivation of the land, both cleared and planted; and about the cultivation of bees, and of the other animals, swimming and winged, from which sorts of things it happens one can acquire help. These, therefore, are the first and most proper parts of moneymaking.

Polit.L9

Translativae autem maximum quidem mercativa, et huius partes tres: naucleria, fortigia, parastasis. Differunt autem horum altera ab alteris, eo quod haec quidem certiora sunt, haec autem ampliorem acquirunt excrescentiam. Secundum autem tokismos, tertium autem mystarina; huius autem haec quidem banausarum artium, haec autem inartificialium et corpori soli utilium. Quarta autem species pecuniativae, intermedia huius et primae; habet enim et eius quae secundum naturam aliquam partem, et translativae, quaecumque a terra et ex terra genitis infructuosis quidem, utilibus autem; puta silvae incisiva, et omnis metallica; haec autem multa iam complectitur genera. Multae enim species ex terra metallorum sunt.

Of the other, which consists in exchange, the first and most important division is commerce (of which there are three kinds- the provision of a ship, the conveyance of goods, exposure for sale- these again differing as they are safer or more profitable), the second is usury, the third, service for hire- of this, one kind is employed in the mechanical arts, the other in unskilled and bodily labor. There is still a third sort of wealth getting intermediate between this and the first or natural mode which is partly natural, but is also concerned with exchange, viz., the industries that make their profit from the earth, and from things growing from the earth which, although they bear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable; for example, the cutting of timber and all mining. The art of mining, by which minerals are obtained, itself has many branches, for there are various kinds of things dug out of the earth.

Polit.L9

De unaquaque autem horum universaliter quidem dictum est, et nunc; particulariter autem diligentius dicere, utile quidem ad operationes, grave autem immorari.

Of the several divisions of wealth-getting I now speak generally; a minute consideration of them might be useful in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell upon them at greater length now.

Polit.L9

Sunt autem maxime artificiales quidem operationum, ubi minimum fortune; maxime autem banausike in quibus corpora maculantur maxime. Maxime autem serviles, ubi corporis plurimi usus. Ignobilissime autem ubi minimum requiritur virtutis.

Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is the least element of chance; they are the meanest in which the body is most deteriorated, the most servile in which there is the greatest use of the body, and the most illiberal in which there is the least need of excellence.

Polit.L9

Quoniam autem a quibusdam scripta sunt de hiis, puta a Kharitide pario et Apollodoro limnio de terrae cultura et nude et plantate. Similiter autem et ab aliis de aliis, haec quidem ex hiis considerentur cuicumque est cura.

Works have been written upon these subjects by various persons; for example, by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage and Planting, while others have treated of other branches; any one who cares for such matters may refer to their writings.

Polit.L9

Adhuc autem et dicta sparsim per quae adepti sunt quidam pecuniis intendentes oportet colligere; omnia enim haec proficua sunt honorantibus pecuniativam. Puta et quod Thaleo milesii: haec enim est consideratio quaedam pecuniativa. Sed illi quidem propter sapientiam adaptant. Contingit autem universale aliquid existens. Exprobrantibus enim ipsi propter paupertatem tanquam inutili philosophia existente, considerasse dicunt ipsum olivarum ubertatem futuram ex astrologia, et adhuc hyeme existente habundantem pecuniis paucis arrabones dedisse olivarum cultoribus hiis qui in Mileto et Khio omnibus modico pro pretio dato tanquam nullo adiciente. Quando autem tempus venit multis quaerentibus simul et subito, pretium taxans quomodo voluit, cum multas pecunias collegisset, demonstravit quia facile est ditari philosophis si volunt. Sed non est hoc circa quod student. Thales quidem igitur dicitur hoc modo ostensionem fecisse sapientiae.

It would be well also to collect the scattered stories of the ways in which individuals have succeeded in amassing a fortune; for all this is useful to persons who value the art of getting wealth. There is the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which involves a principle of universal application, but is attributed to him on account of his reputation for wisdom. He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to show that philosophy was of no use. According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the harvest-time came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if they like, but that their ambition is of another sort. Thales is supposed to have given a striking proof of his wisdom.

Polit.L9

Est autem quaemadmodum diximus universaliter quod tale pecuniativum si quis potuerit monopoliam sibi praeparare, propter quod et civitatum quaedam hoc modo faciunt divitias cum egeant pecuniis; monopoliam enim venialium faciunt.

But, as I was saying, his device for getting wealth is of universal application, and is nothing but the creation of a monopoly. It is an art often practiced by cities when they are want of money; they make a monopoly of provisions.

Polit.L9

In Sicilia autem quidam reposito apud se nummismate simul emit omne ferrum de ferri mineris; post haec autem ut advenerunt de nundinis mercatores vendebat solus, non multum faciens excessum pretii. Sed tamen in quinquaginta talentis superassumpsit centum. Hunc igitur Dyonisius sentiens pecunias quidem iussit asportare, non tamen amplius manere in Syracusis, tanquam divitias invenientem sui ipsius rebus inconvenientes.

There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with him, bought up an the iron from the iron mines; afterwards, when the merchants from their various markets came to buy, he was the only seller, and without much increasing the price he gained 200 per cent. Which when Dionysius heard, he told him that he might take away his money, but that he must not remain at Syracuse, for he thought that the man had discovered a way of making money which was injurious to his own interests.

Polit.L9

Quod vero visum fuit Thali et huic idem est: utrique enim sibi ipsis studuerunt fieri monopoliam. Utile autem notificare haec politicis; multis enim civitatibus opus est pecuniae acquisitione et talibus divitiis, quaemadmodum domibus, magis autem; propter quod et quidam civiliter conversantium, civiliter conversantur per hoc solum.

He made the same discovery as Thales; they both contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. And statesmen as well ought to know these things; for a state is often as much in want of money and of such devices for obtaining it as a household, or even more so; hence some public men devote themselves entirely to finance.

Polit.L9

Quoniam autem quae ad scientiam etc. Postquam philosophus docuit cognoscere pecuniativae originem et eius proprietates et partes, hic consequenter determinat ea quae pertinent ad usum ipsius.

Quoniam autem quae ad scientiam etc. After the philosopher taught knowledge of the origin of moneymaking and its properties and parts, he here consequently determines what belongs to its use.

Polit.L9

Et primo dicit de quo est intentio;

And he first says what his intention is.

Polit.L9

secundo exequitur propositum, ibi sunt autem pecuniativae etc.

Second, he carries out what was proposed here: sunt autem pecuniativae, etc.

Polit.L9

Dicit ergo primo quod, quia sufficienter determinavimus de pecuniativa in ea quae pertinet ad cognoscendum naturam ipsius, oportet breviter et pertranseunter ponere ea quae pertinent ad usum eius, qualiter scilicet sit ea utendum. Omnia enim huiusmodi quae pertinent ad operationes humanas habent liberam, id est expeditam, contemplationem, quia facile est ea considerare in universali; sed tamen necesse est quod habeatur experientia circa ipsa ad hoc quod homo possit perfectum usum eorum habere.

Therefore, he first says that because we have sufficiently determined about moneymaking in what belongs to knowing its nature, what belongs to its use—how it ought to be used—must briefly and passingly be laid out. For all things of this sort that belong to human workings, have free, that is, expedient, contemplation; because it is easy to consider these things in the universal, but it is nevertheless necessary that experience be had about these things so that man can have their perfect use.

Polit.L9

Deinde cum dicit sunt autem pecuniativae etc., determinat ea quae pertinent ad usum pecuniativae. Et circa hoc duo facit:

Then, when he says sunt autem pecuniativae, etc., he determines what belongs to the use of moneymaking. And about this he does two things.

Polit.L9

primo distinguit partes ipsius;

First, he distinguishes its parts.

Polit.L9

secundo ponit quaedam documenta utilia pecuniativae, ibi quoniam autem a quibusdam etc.

Second, he lays out certain useful lessons for moneymaking, at: quoniam autem a quibusdam, etc.

Polit.L9

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L9

primo assignat partes pecuniativae, quae est necessaria ad vitam humanam;

First, he indicates the parts of the moneymaking that is necessary for human life.

Polit.L9

secundo partes pecuniativae non necessariae, ibi translativae autem etc.

Second, the parts of the moneymaking that is not necessary are here: translativae autem, etc.

Polit.L9

Dixit autem supra necessariam esse pecuniativam per quam homo acquirit pecuniam ex rebus quas natura ministrat ad necessitatem vitae; huius autem ponit duas partes,

But he said above that the moneymaking is necessary through which man acquires money from the things that nature serves for the necessities of life; and he lays out two parts of this.

Polit.L9

quarum prima est secundum quam homo ex emptione et venditione talium rerum potest pecuniam acquirere. Et circa hanc partem dicit quod pecuniativae sunt istae partes utiles, id est utilia quaedam documenta, ut homo sit expertus circa bona huiusmodi quae ab hominibus possidentur, quae eorum sint maximi pretii, et ubi maximo pretio vendantur, et quo modo, puta quo tempore, vel secundum alias conditiones. Et exponit de quibus possessibilibus bonis dicat: est enim quaedam possessio equorum, et boum, et ovium et aliorum animalium; oportet autem eum qui ex hiis vult lucrari pecuniam, esse expertum quae eorum sint maxime cara et in quibus locis, quia alia istorum in aliis regionibus habundant, ut scilicet emat in loco ubi habundant et vendat in loco ubi sunt cara.

Following the first of these, man is able to acquire money from the buying and selling of things. And he says about this part that such [kinds of] moneymaking are useful parts [of moneymaking]—that is, certain useful lessons—so that man may become experienced about goods of this sort which can be possessed by men—which of these is of the greatest value, and where they can be sold for the greatest price, and how—for instance, at what time, or following other conditions. And he explains what possessable goods he is talking about. For there is a certain possessing of horses, and cattle, and sheep, and of other animals. And he who desires to gain money from these must be an expert about which of these are most precious, and in what places—because other of these abound in other regions—so that he may buy in a place where they abound, and sell in a place where they are precious.

Polit.L9

Secunda autem pars huius possessivae est ut homo acquirat copiam harum rerum venalium. Quod quidem est per culturam terrae sive nudae, hoc est absque arboribus, sicut sunt campi in quibus seminatur triticum; sive plantatae, sicut sunt vineae et orti et oliveta: per huiusmodi enim culturam acquirit homo habundantiam tritici et vini et aliorum huiusmodi. Et oportet etiam esse hominem expertum de cultura apum et aliorum animalium tam natatilium, scilicet piscium, quam etiam volatilium, scilicet avium, a quibuscumque contingit acquirere auxilium ad vitam humanam; quia per horum habundantiam potest fieri acquisitio pecuniarum. Sic igitur patet quod istae sunt primae et propriissimae partes pecuniativae; et dicuntur primae et propriissimae quia sic acquiritur pecunia ex rebus naturalibus, propter quas inventa est primo pecunia.

However, the second part of this possessing is that a man should acquire a supply of these goods for sale: that is, through cultivating the earth, either cleared land that is without trees, as it is in fields that wheat may be sown; or planted land, like vineyards, and gardens, and olive orchards. For through cultivation of this sort, man acquires an abundance of wheat and of wine and of other things of this sort; and man must be experienced in cultivating bees, and other animals, both swimming creatures—like fish—and also winged creatures—like birds; and from whatever he happens to acquire help for human life. Because from an abundance of these things the acquisition of money can come to be. So thus it is clear that these are the first and most proper parts of moneymaking: and they are called the first and most proper because like this money is acquired from natural things, because of which money was first discovered.

Polit.L9

Deinde cum dicit translativae autem etc., distinguit partes pecuniativae translativae.

Then, when he says translativae autem, etc., he distinguishes the parts of transferred moneymaking.

Polit.L9

Dixit autem supra pecuniativam translativam esse per quam acquiritur pecunia non ex rebus necessariis ad vitam, sed ex quibusdam aliis rebus;

Now he said above that transferred moneymaking is that through which money is acquired not from things that are necessary for life, but from certain other things.

Polit.L9

et dicitur translativa quia pecuniativa translata est de rebus naturalibus ad huiusmodi.

And it is called “transferred” because money is transferred from natural things to things of this sort.

Polit.L9

Circa primum tria facit:

About the first he does three things.

Polit.L9

primo distinguit partes huius pecuniativae;

First, he distinguishes the parts of this moneymaking.

Polit.L9

secundo excusat se a diligentiori consideratione harum partium, ibi de unaquaque autem etc.;

Second, he excuses himself from a more diligent study of these parts here: de unaquaque autem, etc.

Polit.L9

tertio manifestat quaedam quae dixerat, ibi sunt autem maxime etc.

Third, he clarifies certain things that he had said here: sunt autem maxime, etc.

Polit.L9

Circa primum ponit quatuor partes huius pecuniativae,

About the first he lays out four parts of this moneymaking,

Polit.L9

quarum prima et maxima est mercativa: mercatores enim maxime pecunias acquirunt.

the first and greatest of which is mercantilism [mercativa]. For merchants most of all acquire money.

Polit.L9

Et hanc primam partem secundo distinguit in tres partes,

And he distinguishes this first part from the second in three parts:

Polit.L9

quarum prima est naucleria, quae scilicet mercationes exercet per mare;

the first is shipping [naucleria], which merchants practice at sea.

Polit.L9

alia autem dicitur phortigia, id est oneraria, nam fortion in Graeco dicitur pondus vel onus, quae scilicet exercet mercationes in terra per deportationem onerum in curribus vel iumentis;

Now the other is called phortigia—that is, freight, for phortion in Greek means “burdened” or “freighted”--which merchants practice on land through the transportation of freight in wagons or on beasts of burden.

Polit.L9

tertia autem vocatur parastasis, id est assistentia, puta cum aliquis non defert merces nec per mare nec per terram, sed assistit mercatoribus per communicationem pecuniae vel rerum. Et istae partes differunt ad invicem, quia quaedam eorum sunt certiores sicut mercationes terrae, quaedam autem faciunt magis excrescere lucrum sicut mercationes maris, quae tamen sunt magis periculosae.

And the third is called parastasis—that is, assistance—as when someone does not bear merchandise either by sea or by land, but assists merchants by communicating [communicationem] money or other goods to them. And such parts differ from each other, because some of them are more certain, as are ventures [mercationes] by land, but some make their gain increase greatly, as do ventures by sea, which are nevertheless more dangerous.

Polit.L9

Secunda autem pars principalis huius translativae pecuniativae est toquismos, id est usuraria, quae scilicet per usuras pecuniam acquirit.

The second governing part of this transferred moneymaking is toquismos—that is, usury—which acquires money through interest.

Polit.L9

Tertia autem pars est mystarina, id est mercennaria, sicut eorum qui labores suos locant pro mercede pecuniae. In hac est quaedam differentia: quia quaedam mercennaria fit per artes banausas, id est maculativas corporis, sicut est ars coquorum et huiusmodi ministeriorum; quaedam autem fit per labores non artificiales, et qui sunt utiles soli corpori et in quibus etiam solum corpus est utile, sicut illi qui mercede conducuntur ad fodiendum in agro vel ad aliquid aliud huiusmodi.

The third part is mistarina—that is, wage-earners, as with those who hire out their labor for a wage of money. In this there is a certain difference, because a certain wage-earning comes to be through the arts of banausas, that is, the blemishing of the body, as with the art of cooking, and other services of this sort. Another, however, comes to be through labors that are not artful, and that are useful only for the body, and in which only the body is useful, as those who for a wage are employed to dig in a field, or to do something else like this.

Polit.L9

Quarta autem pars est media inter translativam et primam quae est necessaria, habens aliquid de utraque, illa scilicet quae acquirit lucrum per incisionem lapidum vel metallorum de terra; habet enim hoc commune cum prima pecuniativa quia est a terra et ab hiis quae generantur ex terra, sicut agricultura circa ea est quae generantur ex terra. Cum translativa autem convenit in hoc quod huiusmodi metalla non faciunt aliquem fructum pertinentem ad necessitatem vitae sicut faciunt campi et animalia; sunt tamen huiusmodi utilia ad alia, puta ad aedificandas domos, vel ad aliqua instrumenta construenda. Et ista quarta pars complectitur sub se diversa genera secundum diversas species metallorum quae sunt aurum, argentum, ferrum et huiusmodi.

The fourth part is a middle between the transferred moneymaking and the first, necessary moneymaking, and it has something of both: that which acquires gain through mining stones or metals from the earth. For it has this in common with the first moneymaking: it is from the earth and concerns those things generated from the earth, as agriculture is about those things that are generated from the earth. With the transferred moneymaking, however, it fits in this: that metals of this sort do not make any produce that belongs to the necessities of life, like fields and animals make: but they are useful for other purposes, such as for framing houses or constructing other instruments. And this fourth part includes [complectitur] within itself diverse genera [of moneymaking] following the different kinds of metals: gold, silver, iron, and others like this.

Polit.L9

Deinde cum dicit de unaquaque autem etc., excusat se a perfecta horum determinatione. Et dicit quod dictum est nunc universaliter de istis partibus; esset autem utile ad operationes eorum qui volunt pecuniam acquirere quod diligentius determinaret particulariter de singulis, sed tamen grave est diu commorari circa talia tendentibus ad maiora.

Then, when he says de unaquaque autem, etc., he excuses himself from a perfect determination of these things, and he says that these parts have been usefully discussed. But it would be useful for the workings of those who wish to acquire money that the particulars of each be more diligently determined; but nevertheless, it is tedious for those reaching after greater things to linger too long over things of this sort.

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Deinde cum dicit sunt autem maxime, exponit quaedam quae dixerat de operationibus banausis et inartificialibus; et dicit quod illae operationes sunt maxime artificiales in quibus minimum operatur fortuna. Hoc enim a fortuna fieri dicimus quod fit praeter praevisionem rationis, in qua ars consistit: unde operationes illae quarum eventus multum subiacent fortunae parum sunt artificiales, sicut eorum qui piscantur cum hamo, et aliorum huiusmodi; et e contrario operationes quarum effectus parum subiacent fortunae sunt maxime artificiales, sicut fabrorum et aliorum artificum. Illae autem operationes sunt maxime banausicae, id est abiectae et viles, quibus corpora maxime maculantur, sicut tinctorum et eorum qui purgant plateas et aliorum huiusmodi. Illae autem operationes sunt maxime serviles ubi maior pars usus est ex parte corporis et parum ex parte rationis, sicut eorum qui deferunt onera, et cursorum et huiusmodi. Ille autem sunt ignobilissimae inter omnes ad quas requiritur minimum de virtute vel animi vel corporis, sicut in aliquibus praedictarum apparet.

Then, when he says sunt autem maxime, he explains certain things that he had said about the workings of the banausi, and the un-artful [laborers]. And he says that those workings are most of all artful in which fortune is least at work: for we say that something comes to be from fortune that comes to be beyond the foresight [praevisio] of reason, in which art consists. So those workings whose outcome is mostly subject to fortune are the least artful: and conversely, those workings whose effects are least subject to fortune are the most artful, as those of a builder, and other artisans. But those workings are are most of all banausic—that is, most base and cheap—for which the body is most blemished, as of dyers, and those who wash dishes, and others of this sort. But those workings are most of all slavish where there greater part of employment [usus] is on the part of the body, and the least is on the part of the reason—as of those who bear freight [onera: lit... burdens], and messengers, and this sort. But those are the most ignoble of all for which the least virtue is required—either of soul or of body—as is apparent in any of the aforementioned things.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem a quibusdam etc., proponit documenta utilia ad partes praemissas pecuniativae.

Then, when he says quoniam autem a quibusdam, etc., he proposes useful lessons for the previously advanced parts of moneymaking.

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Et primo docet huiusmodi documenta considerare ex scripturis;

And he first teaches lessons of this sort for consideration from writings [scripturis].

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secundo ex exemplis, ibi adhuc autem et dicta etc.

Second, from examples, here: adhuc autem et dicta etc.

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Dicit ergo primo quod quia quidam sapientes de praemissis scripserunt, sicut quidam Carittis nomine parilis origine, et Apollodorus Linius scripserunt de cultura terrae tam nudae quam plantatae, velut et apud Latinos Palladius, et ab aliis scriptum est de aliis praemissarum partium, quicumque habet curam plenius praemissa cognoscere consideret ex eorum libris.

Therefore, he first says that because certain wise men had written about what has been advanced, as a certain man named Chares of Paros, and Apollodorus of Lemnos had written about agriculture, both cleared land and plantations, as Palladius did among the Latins, and it has also been written by others about other of the parts that have been advanced. Each one who has care should more fully study to know from their books the things that have been advanced.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem et dicta etc., proponit documentum de exemplis considerandis.

Then, when he says adhuc autem et dicta etc., he proposes a lesson from examples that have been studied.

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Et primo proponit quod intendit;

And first he proposes his intention.

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secundo subiungit exempla, ibi puta quod et Thaleo etc.

Second, he adds an example, here: puta quod et Thaleo etc.

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Dicit ergo primo quod non solum oportet considerare libros eorum qui artes de praedictis partibus construxerunt, sed etiam si quae dicuntur exempla dispersa in diversis narrationibus per quae aliqui acquisiverunt magnam pecuniam, oportet huiusmodi considerare; haec enim erunt utilia hiis qui intendunt acquirere pecunias.

Therefore, he first says that one must not only study the books of those who constructed the arts concerning the aforementioned parts, but also if what was said is dispersed in diverse stories about people who acquired much money, one must consider things of this sort. For these will be useful to those who intend to acquire money.

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Deinde cum dicit puta quod et Thaleo etc., subiungit duo exempla,

Then, when he says puta quod et Thaleo, etc., he adds two examples,

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quorum secundum incipit ibi in Sicilia autem etc.

the second of which begins here: in Sicilia autem, etc.

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Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

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primo proponit exemplum;

First, he proposes the example.

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secundo ostendit ad quid est utile, ibi est autem quemadmodum diximus etc.

Second, he shows what it is useful for, here: est autem quemadmodum diximus, etc.

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Sciendum est ergo circa primum quod Thales Milesius fuit unus de septem sapientibus, qui primus incepit studere in philosophia naturali, aliis sex sapientibus circa res humanas occupatis. Cuius factum habet quandam considerationem utilem ad acquirendum pecunias, quamvis adscribatur non ad cupiditatem pecuniae sed ad sapientiam; potest tamen ex eius facto sumi quoddam universale documentum acquirendi pecunias. Cum enim exprobraretur sibi ab aliquibus quod pauper esset et quod sic sua philosophia esset sibi inutilis, consideravit per astrologiam cuius erat peritus, quod in futuro anno futura esset ubertas olivarum praeter consuetudinem, nam in praecedenti anno etiam fuerat olivarum ubertas; ut plurimum autem olivae deficiunt post ubertatem. Cum igitur adhuc in hyeme esset habundantia olivarum, dedit cultoribus olivarum in duabus civitatibus, scilicet Mileto et Quio, paucas pecunias pro arra fructus futuri anni qui parum credebatur excrescere. Quando ergo venit tempus olivarum, multis simul et subito quaerentibus emere olivas, taxavit pretium sicut voluit; et sic colligens multas pecunias ostendit quod philosophis facile est ditari si volunt, sed non est studium eorum ad hoc. Et per hunc modum Thales ostendit suam sapientiam.

It needs to be understood about the first that Thaeles of Miletus was the one of the seven wise men who first began to have zeal for natural philosophy—the other six wise men being occupied with human affairs. His deed [factum] has a certain useful study for acquiring money, although it is ascribed not to desire for money, but to wisdom: and from his deed, there can be taken up a certain universal lesson for acquiring money. For when he was reproached by some people because he was poor, and that thus his philosophy was not useful to him, he studied through astrology—of which he was an expert [experienced? Perior...]—that in a future the next year, there would be an abundance of olives beyond what was customary: for in the preceding year there also had been an abundance of olives, but usually there is a shortage of olives after an abundance. Since, therefore, there was still an abundance of olives in winter, he gave a little money to the cultivators of olives in two cities—Miletus and Chios—as a surety for the produce of the next year, which it was believed would grow very little. Therefore, when the time came for olives, when many people were suddenly and at once seeking to buy olives, he taxes the price however he wished; and thus collecting much money, he showed that for philosophers it is easy to become wealthy if they wish, but their zeal is not for this: in in this manner, Thales showed his wisdom.

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Deinde cum dicit est autem quemadmodum diximus etc., ostendit ad quid est utile pecuniativae huiusmodi exemplum. Et dicit quod hoc est valde utile ad acquirendum pecunias si quis possit preparare monopoliam, id est unicam et singularem venditionem, ut scilicet ipse solus vendat res aliquas in civitate. Polis enim in Graeco per o parvum scriptum et i breve significat civitatem, scriptum autem per o parvum et y Graecum significat multitudinem, scriptum vero per o magnum significat venditionem; unde dicitur versus est polis urbs, sed multa polis, est vendere polis: ex quo dicitur monopolia, id est singularis venditio. Et quia hoc multum facit ad pecunias acquirendas, ideo quaedam civitates cum indigeant pecuniis instituunt monopoliam, ut scilicet communitas singulariter vendat sal vel aliquid huiusmodi.

Then, when he says est autem quemadmodum diximus, etc., he shows what an example of this sort of moneymaking is useful for: and he says that it is extremely useful for acquiring money if someone were able to prepare for a monopoly—that is, an only and individual seller [rework]—so that he alone sells something in a city. For polis in Greek, written with a small o and short i signifies a city; written with a small o and a y, it signifies in Greek a multitude; but written with a large o it signifies sale. And so it is written in turn that a polis is a town, but a polis with reference to many is a polis as in “to sell”: from which is said monopolia, that is, a sale of one. And because this does much for acquiring money, therefore certain cities, when they lack money, institute a monopoly, so that the community alone will sell salt, or something of this sort.

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Deinde cum dicit in Sicilia autem etc., ponit secundum exemplum:

Then, when he says in Sicilia autem, etc., he lays out a second example.

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et primo narrat factum,

And first he narrates the deed,

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secundo ostendit quod redit in idem cum primo.

second he shows that it returns to the same thing as the first.

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Dicit ergo primo quod cum quidam in Sicilia haberet pecuniam apud se reconditam, emit simul omne ferrum de mineris in quibus fodiebatur; unde cum venissent mercatores ipse solus vendebat, non tamen faciebat magnum excessum pretii ut expeditius venderet: tamen lucratus est de L talentis C. Dyonisius autem tyrannus Syracusanorum sentiens hunc valde ditatum, mandavit ei quod ulterius non habitaret in Syracusis, permittens tamen ei portare suas secum pecunias; quod enim aliqui cives multum ditentur, reputant sibi tyranni esse inconveniens, ut infra dicetur.

Therefore, he first says that since a certain man in Sicily had laid up some money on himself, he bought at once all the iron from the mines in which smelted. And so, when merchants came, only he was selling, and without making an excessive price, so that he could quickly sell; nevertheless, he gained one hundred talents from fifty. But Dionysius, the tyrant of the Syracusans, perceiving this swift wealth, mandated that he could no longer dwell in Syracuse, permitting him, however, to carry his money with him. For that some citizen should gain much wealth is thought by tyrants to be unfitting for them, as will be said later.

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Deinde cum dicit quod vero visum fuit etc., ostendit quod illud in idem redit cum primo, quia et isti Siculo et Thali philosopho idem visum fuit, ut scilicet exerceret monopoliam. Et etiam utile est quod politici considerent, quia multis civitatibus necesse est acquirere pecunias sicut et domibus, et adhuc magis quanto civitas pluribus indiget; et ideo quidam qui student circa regimina civitatum, ad hoc principaliter videntur intendere ut multiplicent pecuniam in aerario publico.

Then, when he says quod vero visum fuit, etc., he shows that this returns to the same thing as the first: because both to this Sicilian and to Thales the philosopher it seemed the same: that they should set up a monopoly. And it is also useful for political [leaders] to consider, because for many cities it is necessary to acquire money, as also for households; and all the more to the degree that a city lacks many things. And therefore, for some who are zealous about the rules of the city, the governing intention seems to be toward this, so that they may multiply money in the public coffers.

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Lecture 10

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Quoniam autem tres partes yconomice erant, una quidem despotica de qua dictum est prius, una autem paterna, tertia autem nuptialis; et enim mulieri praeesse et natis tanquam liberis quidem ambobus, non eodem autem modo principatus, sed mulieri quidem politicae, natis autem regaliter. Masculus enim natura femella principalior, nisi aliqualiter constet praeter naturam, et senius et perfectum, iuniore et imperfecto.

Of household management we have seen that there are three parts—one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already, another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature.

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In politicis quidem igitur principatibus plurimis transmutatur principans et subiectum: ex aequali enim vult secundum naturam et differe nihil. At tamen cum hoc quidem dominetur, hoc autem subiciatur, quaerunt differentiam esse et figuris et sermonibus et honoribus, quaemadmodum Amasis dixit de pedum lotore sermonem. Masculus autem semper ad femellam hoc se habet modo.

But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan. The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent.

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Puerorum autem principatus regalis. Quod enim genuit, et secundum amorem principans et secundum senectutem est, quod quidem est regalis species principatus; propter quod bene Homerus Iovem appellavit dicens: pater virorumque deorumque, regem horum omnium patrem dicens. Natura enim regem quidem differre oportet, genere autem esse eundem; quod quidem passum est senius ad iuvenius, et qui genuit ad natum.

The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus father of gods and men,¹ because he is the king of them all. For a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.

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Manifestum igitur quoniam amplior sollicitudo yconomie circa homines quam circa inanimatorum possessionem, et circa virtutem horum, quam circa eam quae possessionis quam vocamus divitias, et liberorum magis quam servorum.

Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence of property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves.

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Primo quidem igitur de servis dubitabit utique aliquis utrum est virtus aliqua servi praeter organicas et ministrativas, alia honorabilior hiis: puta temperantia et fortitudo et iustitia et aliorum talium habituum, aut non est neque una prater corporalia servitia; habet enim dubitationem utrobique. Si enim est, quid different a liberis? Et si non est, existentibus hominibus et ratione communicantibus, inconveniens.

A question may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities—whether he can have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that they have no virtue.

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Fere autem idem est quod quaeritur et de muliere et puero, utrum et horum sunt virtutes, et oportet mulierem esse temperatam et fortem et iustam, et puer est intemperatus et temperatus, aut non. Universaliter itaque hoc est considerandum de subiecto natura et principante, utrum eadem virtus, aut altera. Si quidem enim oportet ambos participare kalokagatia, propter quid hunc quidem principari oportebit utique, hunc autem subici secundum semel. Neque enim per magis et minus possibile est differre. Subici quidem enim et principari specie differunt, magis et minus nihil. Si autem hunc quidem oportet, hunc autem non, mirabile. Si enim principans non erit sobrius et iustus, quomodo principabitur bene? Si vero subiectus, quomodo subicietur bene? Intemperatus enim existens et formidolosus, nihil faciet eorum quae oportet.

A similar question may be raised about women and children, whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or not. So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if a noble nature is equally required in both, why should one of them always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind, which the difference of more and less never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well? If the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty.

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Manifestum igitur quia necesse quidem participare utrosque virtute, huius autem esse differentiae, quaemadmodum et natura subiectorum; et hoc statim exemplificatur circa animam. In hac enim est natura hoc quidem principans, hoc autem principatum, quorum alteram dicimus esse virtutem, puta rationem habentis et irrationalis. Manifestum igitur quod eodem modo se habet et in aliis. Quare natura quae plura principantia et subiecta, alio anim modo liberum servo principatur, et masculus feminae, et vir puero; et omnibus insunt quidem partes animae, sed insunt differenter. Servus quidem enim omnino non habet quod consiliativum; femina autem habet quidem, sed invalidum, puer autem habet quidem, sed imperfectum. Similiter igitur necessarium habere et circa morales virtutes existimandum oportere quidem participare omnes, sed non eodem modo, sed quantum unicuique ad sui ipsius opus, propter quod principem quidem perfectam habere oportet moralem virtutem; opus enim est simpliciter architectonis, ratio autem architecton, aliorum autem unumquodque quantum immittit ipsis. Itaque manifestum quoniam est moralis virtus dictorum omnium, et non eadem temperantia mulieris et viri, neque fortitudo et iustitia, quaemadmodum putavit Socrates. Sed haec quidem principativa fortitudo, haec autem subministrativa. Similiter autem se habet et circa alias.

It is evident, therefore, that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural subjects also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of the soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to be different from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in an of them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without strength, and the child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and rational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, oil the other hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues.

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Palam autem hoc et particulariter magis considerantibus; universaliter enim dicentes decipiunt se ipsos, quia bene habere animam virtute aut recte operari, aut aliquid talium; multo enim melius dicunt enumerantes virtutes, sicut Gorgias, quam qui sic determinant; propter quod oportet, sicut poeta dixit de muliere, sic putare habere de omnibus: mulieri ornatum silentium praestat; sed viro non iam hoc. Quoniam autem puer imperfectus, palam quod huius quidem virtus non ipsius ad se ipsum est, sed ad finem et ductorem. Similiter autem et servi ad dominum; posuimus autem ad necessaria utilem esse servum; quare palam quod et virtute indiget parva et tanta ut neque propter intemperantiam neque propter timiditatem deficiat ab operibus.

This will be more clearly seen if we look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues. All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women, Silence is a woman's glory,¹ but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obviously require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack of self-control.

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Quoniam autem tres partes etc. Postquam philosophus determinavit de coniugatione domini et servi, addito etiam universali tractatu de possessione, hic determinat de aliis duabus coniugationibus domesticis quas supra posuerat, scilicet viri ad uxorem et patris ad filium. Et dividitur in partes duas:

After the philosopher had determined about the partnership of master and slave, having also added a universal treatise about ownership, he here determines the two other household partnerships which he had posited previously: namely, that of a man toward his wife, and a father toward his son; and it is divided into two parts.

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in prima determinat quaedam de huiusmodi coniugationibus;

In the first, he determines something about partnerships of this mode.

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in secunda excusat se a diligentiori horum consideratione, ibi de mulieris autem et viri etc.

In the second, he excuses himself from a more diligent study of these things, at de mulieris autem et viri, [I.11.5] etc.

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Circa primum duo facit:

About the first of these he does two things.

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primo determinat de praedictis coniugationibus comparans eas aliis principatibus;

First, he determines the aforementioned partnerships, comparing them to other governments.

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secundo movet quandam quaestionem communem de omnibus, ibi primo igitur quidem de servis etc.

Second, he raises a certain common question about them all, at primo igitur quidem de servis, [I.10.6] etc.

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Circa primum tria facit:

About the first he does three things.

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primo ponit comparationem praedictarum coniugationum ad alios principatus;

First, he posits the comparison of the aforementioned associations with other modes of government.

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secundo comparationem praedictam manifestat, ibi in politicis quidem etc.;

Second, he clarifies the comparison, at in politicis quidem, [I.10.3] etc.

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tertio ostendit quod sollicitudo yconomiae maxime circa huiusmodi coniugationes versatur, ibi manifestum igitur etc.

Third, he shows that the concern of the economy is most of all turned toward these sorts of associations, at manifestum igitur, [I.10.5] .

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Dicit ergo primo quod, cum prius dictum sit quod tres sint partes yconomicae, id est gubernativae domus, secundum tres coniugationes praedictas,

Therefore, he says first that there are three parts of economy, that is, of the government of the household, that follow the three aforementioned associations.

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de una earum iam dictum est, scilicet de despotica quae pertinet ad dominum et servum;

The first of them has already been spoken about, namely, the despotic, which belongs to master and slave;

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unde restat dicendum de secunda quae est paterna pertinens ad patrem et filium,

therefore, it remains to speak about the second, which is the fatherly, pertaining to father and son,

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et de tertia quae est nuptialis pertinens ad virum et uxorem.

and the third, which is the marital, pertaining to man and wife.

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De quibus tria dicit:

About these he says three things.

primo quidem quod in utraque harum coniugationum est quaedam praelatio sive quidam principatus; vir enim principatur mulieri et pater filiis, non quidem sicut servis sed sicut liberis, in quo differunt hii duo principatus a principatu despotico.

First, that in both of these associations there is a certain preferment, or government. For the man governs the woman, and the father the son, though not as slaves, but as the free--in which these two governments differ from a despotic government.

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Secundum est quod hii duo principatus non sunt unius modi, sed vir principatur mulieri politico principatu, id est sicut aliquis qui eligitur in rectorem civitatis praeest; sed pater praeest filiis regali principatu. Et hoc ideo quia pater habet plenariam potestatem super filios sicut et rex in regno; sed vir non habet plenariam potestatem super uxorem quantum ad omnia, sed secundum quod exigit lex matrimonii, sicut et rector civitatis habet potestatem super cives secundum statuta.

The second point is that these two governments are not of one kind; but a man governs a woman with a political government, that is, he is foremost like someone who is chosen by the city as a ruler. But a father governs his sons with a kingly government; and this is because a father has the fullness of power over his sons, as does a king in a kingdom: but a man does not have the fullness of power over his wife in all things, but according to what the law of matrimony demands, just as the ruler of a city has power over citizens following established rules [statuta].

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Tertio autem manifestat hos duos principatus esse secundum naturam, quia semper quod est principalius in natura principatur, ut supra habitum est; sed masculus est naturaliter principalior femina, nisi aliquid accidat praeter naturam sicut in hominibus effeminatis; et similiter pater est naturaliter principalior filio, sicut antiquius iuniore et sicut perfectum imperfecto; ergo naturaliter masculus principatur feminae et pater filio.

Third, however, he clarifies that these two governments exist according to nature. Because always, what is more governing in nature governs, as was grasped above. But the male is naturally more governing than the female, except when something happens beyond nature, as with effeminate men. And similarly, the father is naturally more governing than the son, as is the older than the younger, and the perfect than the imperfect. Therefore, the male is naturally governor over the female, and the father over the son.

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Deinde cum dicit in politicis quidem igitur etc., manifestat comparationes praedictas.

Then, where he says in politicis quidem igitur, etc., he clarifies the aforementioned comparisons:

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Et primo nuptialis principatus ad politicum;

first, the marital government to the political;

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secundo paterni ad regalem, ibi puerorum autem principatus etc.

second, the fatherly to the kingly, at puerorum autem principatus, [I.10.4] etc.

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Ostendit ergo primo comparationem quantum ad differentiam, quia in politicis principatibus transmutantur personae principantis et subiectae; qui enim sunt in officio principatus uno anno subditi sunt alio, et hoc ideo quia talem principatum competit esse inter eos qui sunt equales secundum naturam et in nullo differunt naturaliter. Sed tamen tempore quo unus principatur et alii subiciuntur, industria humana adinvenit quandam differentiam et quantum ad figuram, quae consistit in exterioribus insigniis, et quantum ad sermones, quia aliter nominantur quam prius et aliter eos homines alloquntur; et similiter quantum ad honores, quia scilicet cives quasdam reverentias exhibent ei qui est in principatu quas ante non exhibebant; sicut Amasis poeta dixit de lotore pedum: ille enim qui est lotor pedum, si circumponerentur sibi huiusmodi insignia et alia duo dona exhiberentur, non videretur a principe civitatis differre. Sic ergo patet quod politicus principatus permutatur de persona in personam; sed hoc non contingit in principatu maris ad feminam: non enim qui est mas postea fit femina aut e converso, sed semper manent eodem modo.

Therefore, he shows the first comparison with regard to their difference. Because in political governments, the persons of the governor and the subject are changed over: for those who are in the office of the governor for one year are subordinates in the others; and this happens because this sort of government is agreeable only among those who are equal following nature, and in no way differ naturally, but nevertheless, [differ] for a time in which one governs, and the others are subjects. Human industry invented a certain difference, both with regard to figure, which consists in external badges, and also in conversation, because they are named otherwise than before, and men address them differently; and likewise with respect to honors, because citizens display a certain reverence for those who are in a government which they did not display before. Just as the poet Amasis said about a foot washer. For he who is a foot washer, if badges of this kind were placed around him and the two other gifts were displayed, would not seem to differ from a governor of the city. Thus, therefore, it is clear that the political government is transferred from person to person. But this does not happen in the government of the husband toward the woman: for he who is a husband does not afterward become a woman, or the converse; but he always stays in the same mode.

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Deinde cum dicit puerorum autem principatus etc., comparat principatum paternum ad regalem secundum similitudinem, et dicit quod principatus patris respectu puerorum, id est filiorum, est regalis. In hoc enim principatu duo attenduntur, scilicet quod pater qui generat principatur secundum amorem, naturaliter enim amat filios; et iterum principatur secundum senectutem quasi habens quandam naturalem praerogativam etatis supra filios. Et quantum ad hoc est species, id est similitudo, principatus regalis; et inde est quod Homerus appellavit Iovem, id est summum deum, patrem virorum et deorum, id est regem omnium et hominum et superiorum substantiarum quas deos vocabant. Oportet enim quod rex qui perpetuo principatur et plenariam habet in omnibus potestatem, differat a subditis secundum naturam in quadam magnitudine bonitatis; et quod tamen sit genere idem eis ad minus secundum speciem humanam, melius autem erit et si etiam unitate gentis. Et haec etiam est comparatio senioris ad iuniorem et generantis ad genitum, quod scilicet habet naturalem praerogativam perfectionis. Ideo autem oportet regem naturaliter differre ab aliis: nisi enim esset naturali quadam bonitate melior, non esset iustum quod semper dominaretur plenaria potestate sibi equalibus, ut infra in tertio dicetur. Sic igitur naturalis differentia separat principatum regalem a politico qui est ad equale secundum naturam; amor autem separat principatum regalem a tyrannico, qui non principatur propter amorem quem habet ad subditos sed propter commodum proprium.

Then, where he says puerorum autem principatus, etc., he compares the paternal government with the kingly following a likeness; and he says that the government of the father with respect to children—that is, sons—is kingly. For in this government, two things are attended to: namely, that the father, who generates, governs according to love, for he naturally loves his sons; and moreover, he governs according to old age, as if he has a certain natural prerogative of age over his sons; and in this regard, it is a species, that is, a likeness, of a kingly government. And so it is that “Homer called Jove,” that is, the highest God, “the father of men and gods,” that is, the king of all, both of men, and of higher substances, which they used to call gods. For it must be that the king, who perpetually governs and has the fullness of power in all things, differs from subordinates according to nature in a certain magnitude of goodness; and that he is nevertheless the same genus as them, at least regarding the human species. But it will be better if he is also from the same union of people. And this is also the comparison of older toward the younger, and of generator to generated, namely, that they have a natural prerogative of perfection. Therefore, it is must be that the king naturally differs from the others: for if he were not naturally better in a certain goodness, it would not be just for him to always have mastery with a fullness of power over his equals, as will be said below in the third part. Thus, therefore, a difference of nature separates the kingly government from the political: but love separates the kingly government from the tyrannical, which does not rule on account of the love that it has for its subordinates, but for its own gain.

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Deinde cum dicit manifestum igitur etc., concludit quod principalis intentio yconomici est circa istas duas coniugationes, principalior quam circa alia. Magis enim intendit circa homines quam circa possessionem inanimatorum, sicut tritici et vini et aliorum huiusmodi; et magis debet intendere ad virtutem per quam homines bene vivunt, quam ad virtutem possessionis per quam possessio bene procuratur et multiplicatur, quod significatur nomine divitiarum; et similiter etiam magis studet ad virtutem liberorum quam servorum. Et huius ratio potest assignari quia principalis intentio cuiuslibet est de fine; res autem inanimatae quaeruntur propter homines sicut propter finem, et servi propter liberos ut eis ministrent.

Then, where he says manfiestum igitur, etc., he concludes that the governing intention of an economist is more chiefly about these latter two associations than about the others. For he more intends things that concern human beings than that concern the possession of unensouled things, like wheat, and wine, and other things like this. And he ought more to intend the virtue through which men live well than the virtue of ownership, through which a possession is acquired and multiplied, which is signified by the name “wealth”: and likewise, he ought more to have zeal for the virtue of free men than of slaves. And the reason for this can be assigned, because the governing intention of each thing concerns its end. But unensouled objects are pursued on account of men, as an end, and slaves on account of the free, so that they may assist them.

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Deinde cum dicit primo quidem igitur etc., quia fecerat mentionem de virtute liberorum et servorum, movet de hoc quaestionem. Et circa hoc tria facit:

Then, where he says primo quidem igitur, etc., because he had made mention about the virtue of the free and of slaves, he raises a question about this: and he does three things in this regard.

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primo movet;

First, he raises it.

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secundo solvit eam, ibi manifestum quia necesse etc.;

Second, he resolves it, at manifestum quia necesse, [I.10.8] etc.

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tertio ex solutione movet iterum aliam quaestionem, ibi dubitabit autem utique aliquis etc.

Third, out of this solution, he raises again another question, at dubitabit autem utique aliquis, [I.11.1] etc.

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Circa primum duo facit:

About the first, he does two things.

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primo movet quaestionem circa dominum et servum;

First, he raises a question about master and slave.

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secundo circa alios principatus, ibi fere autem idem est quod quaeritur etc.

Second, about the other governments, at fere autem idem est quod quaeritur, [I.10.7] etc.

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Dicit ergo primo quod de servis potest esse quaedam dubitatio. Manifestum est enim quod servus debet habere quandam virtutem organicam et ministrativam per quam scilicet sciat et possit exequi mandatum domini et ei servire, sicut supra dictum est quod sunt quaedam serviles scientiae; sed dubitatio est utrum praeter huiusmodi virtutes sit aliqua alia dignior virtus conveniens servo, sicut sunt virtutes morales ut temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia et alia huiusmodi, vel nulla virtus competat servo nisi quae pertinet ad corporalia servitia. Et dicit quod ex utraque parte videtur esse dubitatio: quia si competit servis habere huiusmodi virtutes sicut et liberis, in nullo videbuntur differre a liberis; ex alia parte inconveniens videtur si, cum sint homines ratione communicantes, non habeant virtutes quibus homines vivunt secundum rationem.

Therefore, he says first that there can be a certain doubt about slaves. For it is clear that a slave ought to have a certain instrumental [organicum] and assistant virtue, through which he may know scientifically [sciat] and may be able to carry out the mandates of the master and to serve him, just as it was said above that there are certain servile sciences. But the doubt is about whether beyond the virtues of this sort there is some other more worthy virtue fitting for a slave, such as the moral virtues, like temperance, fortitude, justice, and others of this sort; or if there are no virtues fitting for a slave except those that belong to bodily service. And he says that on either side there seems to be a difficulty: because if it is fitting for slaves to have virtues of this sort, just as the free do, they will not seem to differ from the free in anything; on the other hand, it seems unfitting if they do not have the virtues through which men live according to reason, since they are men who share in reason.

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Deinde cum dicit fere autem idem etc., movet eandem quaestionem in aliis principatibus. Et dicit quod idem quod quaeritur de servo potest etiam quaeri de muliere et puero: utrum scilicet oportet esse mulierem temperatam et fortem et iustam, et similiter puerum, vel non. Et haec etiam quaestio potest moveri universaliter in omni principatu, utrum scilicet sit eadem virtus principantis et subiecti, vel non. Et obicit ad utramque partem quia, si oportet et principantem et subiectum participare calocagatia, id est bonitate virtutis, nam calos dicitur bonum et similiter cagaton, nulla ratio erit quod unus debeat subici et alius principari secundum semel, id est per totam vitam suam; secus autem esset si successive subicerentur et principarentur, sicut accidit in politico principatu. Nec potest dici quod virtus principantis et subiecti differant secundum magis et minus; magis enim et minus non variant speciem, sed principari et subici differunt specie: unde non videtur sufficere ad differentiam principantis et subiecti quod unus habeat plus de virtute quam alius. Ex alia parte si dicatur quod oportet unum habere virtutem, non autem alium, sequitur etiam inconveniens; quia si ille qui principatur non erit sobrius et iustus, non poterit bene principari: si vero subiectus non habeat has virtutes, non poterit bene subici quia propter intemperantiam vel timorem frequenter omittet facere ea quae oportet, et sic non bene subicietur.

Then, where he says fere autem idem, etc., he raises a certain question about the other governments, and he says that the same thing that is asked about the slave can also be asked about women and children: whether it is necessary for the woman to be temperate, and brave, and just, and likewise the child, or not. And this question can also be raised universally about every government: whether there is the same virtue for governor and for subject, or not. And he objects to each side. Because if both the governor and the subject must participate in calocagatia, that is, the goodness of virtue—for calos means “good”, and likewise, cagaton—then there will be no reason that the one ought to be permanently subordinate, and the other to rule—that is, for his whole life. It would be different if they were successively subjects and then governed, as happens in the political government. Nor can it be said that the virtue of governing and being subject differ according to greater and less, for greater and less do not alter the kind. But to govern and to be subject differ in kind; so it does not seem to be sufficient for the difference between governing and being subject that one has more virtue than the other. And on the other side, if it were said that it is necessary for one to have virtue, but not the other, something unfitting would also follow. Because if he who governs will not be sober and just, he will not be able to govern well. But if the subject does not have these virtues, he will not be able to be subjected well, because he will frequently fail to do those things that he must do on account of intemperance or fear, and thus he will not be a good subject.

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Deinde cum dicit manifestum igitur quia necesse etc., solvit propositam dubitationem.

Then, where he says manifestum igitur quia necesse, etc., he resolves the proposed difficulty,

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Et primo proponit solutionem in generali;

and he first proposes a solution in general;

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secundo in speciali, ibi palam autem hoc etc.

second, specifically, at palam autem hoc, [I.10.11] etc.

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Concludit ergo primo ex rationibus inductis ad unam partem, quod necesse (est) quod tam principans quam subiectus participent virtute; aliter enim neque unus bene principaretur, neque alius bene subiceretur. Sed est quaedam differentia virtutis utriusque, et hoc manifestat per ea quae subiciuntur aliis naturaliter; et ponit exemplum in partibus animae cuius una pars naturaliter subicitur, scilicet pars irrationalis ut irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Ponimus autem utriusque partis esse aliquam virtutem, sed differentem; nam virtus rationalis partis est prudentia, sed virtus irrationalis partis est temperantia et fortitudo et aliae huiusmodi virtutes: unde manifestum est quod eodem modo se habet et in aliis quae principantur et subiciuntur secundum naturam. Et quia natura diversificatur in diversis, ideo secundum naturam sunt diversa quae principantur et subiciuntur; alio enim modo homo liber principatur suo servo, et masculus feminae, et vir puero, ut etiam supra habitum est. Omnibus autem hiis insunt partes animae quae dicta sunt; unde et virtutes earum omnibus praemissis insunt, sed differenter.

Therefore, he first concludes from the reasons brought forward [inductis] for one side that it is necessary for both the governor and the subject to participate in virtue; for otherwise, neither will the one govern well, nor will the other be subject well. But there is a certain difference of virtue for both, and this is clear from those who are naturally subject to others. He posits an example in the parts of the soul, one part of which is naturally subject, namely, the irrational part, such as the irascible and concupiscent [faculties]. Now we posit that there is a certain virtue for both parts, but different. For the virtue of the rational part is prudence, but the virtue of the irrational part is temperance and fortitude and other virtues of this sort. So it is clear that with the same mode, things are also so disposed [se habet] in other affairs which both govern and are subjected according to nature. And because nature is diverse in diverse things, therefore, following nature, there are diverse things that govern and that are subjected. For in a different manner, a free man governs his slave, and the male the female, and a man a child, as was also grasped previously. But the parts of the soul which were mentioned are innate in all of these, and so their virtues are innate in all the aforementioned, but differently.

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Et hoc primo manifestat quantum ad partem rationalem ad quam pertinet consiliari. Servus enim in quantum est servus non habet consilium de suis actibus; cuius ratio est quia consiliamur de hiis quae sunt in potestate nostra: servus autem non habet actus suos in potestate sua, sed sunt actus eius in potestate domini; unde servus non habet liberam potestatem consiliandi. Sed femina cum sit libera habet potestatem consiliandi, sed consilium eius est invalidum; cuius ratio est quia propter mollitiem naturae ratio eius non firmiter inheret consiliatis, sed cito ab eis removetur propter passiones aliquas, puta concupiscentiae vel ire vel timoris, aut alicuius huiusmodi. Pueri autem habent consilium, sed imperfectum; cuius ratio est quia non habet perfectum usum rationis ut possit singula discutere quae sunt in consiliis attendenda. Et sic diversimode se habent ad id quod est rationis.

And this is clear first of all with reference to the rational part, to which it belongs to take counsel. For a slave, insofar as he is a slave, does not have counsel in his actions. The reason for this is, because we take counsel about those things that are in our power, but a slave does not have his acts in his power, but his acts are in the power of the master. So the slave does not have a free power of taking counsel. However, a woman, since she is free, has a power of counsel, but her counsel is not forceful. The reason for this is because, on account of the pliability of her nature, her reason does not firmly adhere to counsels, but is swiftly distanced from them on account of certain feelings, such as that of concupiscence, or anger, or fear, or something of this sort. Children, moreover, have counsel, but imperfectly. The reason for this is, because they do not have the perfect use of reason, such that they are not able to discuss particular things that ought to be attended to in counsels. Thus they [are all] disposed in diverse manners toward that which is of reason.

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Similiter etiam considerandum est et circa morales virtutes. Omnes enim participant ipsas sed non eodem modo; sed unusquisque tantum eas participat quantum est necessarium ad proprium opus. Unde ille qui principatur sive civitati, sive servis, sive mulieri, sive filiis, oportet quod habeat perfectam virtutem moralem, quia opus eius est simpliciter opus architectoris, id est principalis artificis; sicut enim principalis artifex dirigit et imperat ministros artis qui manu operantur, ita princeps dirigit suos subiectos, et ideo habet officium rationis quae se habet similiter ut principalis artifex ad inferiores partes animae: et ita oportet quod ille qui principatur habeat rationem perfectam. Sed unusquisque aliorum qui subiciuntur tantum habent de ratione et de virtute quantum ille qui principatur immittit ipsis, id est tantum oportet quod habeant quod sufficiant sequi directionem principantis implendo mandata ipsius; et sic patet quod omnium praedictorum est aliqua moralis virtus, scilicet ut temperantia, fortitudo et iustitia. Non tamen eadem est viri et mulieris et aliorum subiectorum, sicut putavit Socrates, sed fortitudo viri est ad principandum, ut scilicet propter nullum timorem praetermittat ordinare quid faciendum sit; sed in muliere et in quolibet subdito oportet quod sit fortitudo ministrativa, ut scilicet propter timorem non praetermittat facere proprium ministerium: sic etiam differt fortitudo in duce exercitus et in milite. Et sicut dictum est de fortitudine ita dicendum est de omnibus aliis virtutibus, quae in principante quidem sunt principativae, in subditis autem ministrativae. Et per hoc patet quod non differunt solum secundum magis et minus horum virtutes, sed aliqualiter secundum rationem.

Likewise, the moral virtues must also be considered: for all participate in them, but not in the same manner. But each one participates in them insofar as it is necessary for his own work. Whence he who governs either the city, or slaves, or women, or children, must have perfect moral virtue, because his work is the work of the architect, simply speaking, that is, of the governing artisan. For just as the governing artisan guides and commands the assistants of his art who are at work by hand, so also the governor directs his subjects: and therefore, he holds the office of reason, which is disposed similarly to a governing artisan over the inferior parts of the soul. And so it must be that he who governs should have perfect reason: but each of the others who are subjected only have as much reason and virtue as he who governs puts into them—that is, they only must have what is sufficient to follow the guidance of the governor, for fulfilling his mandates. And so it is obvious that in all of the aforementioned things, there is some moral virtue, namely, temperance, fortitude, and justice. There is not, however, the same virtue for men and for women and for other subjects, as Socrates thought: but the fortitude of men is for governing, so that they will not hold back on account of fear from ordering what ought to be done. But in women, and in any subordinate, there must be an assisting fortitude, so that they will not hold back from giving their own assistance on account of fear. So also, fortitude differs in the leader of an army and in the soldiers. And just as was said about fortitude, so it ought to be said about all the other virtues: those that are in a governor, indeed, have governing qualities, but those in subordinates are assistive. And through this it is clear that the virtues of these do not differ only according to greater and less, but otherwise, according to their rationales.

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Deinde cum dicit palam autem hoc etc., manifestat quod dixerat magis in particulari. Et dicit quod hoc quod dictum est magis erit manifestum hiis qui volunt considerare magis in particulari; quia illi qui de actibus humanis volunt dicere in universali tantum decipiunt se ipsos, quia non possunt plene pervenire ad veritatem: sicut si aliquis esset contentus ut sciret quod virtus est per quam anima bene se habet, aut per quam homo iuste operatur, aut aliquid aliud talium, et nihil plus vellet scire de virtute, deciperet se ipsum imperfectam et inutilem habens scientiam de virtute. Multo enim melius dicunt illi qui enumerant virtutes in speciali sicut Gorgias fecit, quam illi qui dicunt solum in generali; cuius ratio est quia actus sunt circa singularia, unde ea quae ad actus pertinent in particulari sunt consideranda. Et ideo sicut quidam poeta dixit de muliere quiddam particulariter ad eius virtutem pertinens, ita etiam est estimandum in omnibus: ad mulieris enim ornatum vel honestatem pertinet quod sit taciturna, hoc enim ex verecundia provenit quae mulieribus debetur; sed hoc ad ornatum viri non pertinet, sed magis quod sicut decet loquatur. Unde et apostolus monet quod mulieres in ecclesiis taceant, et si quid discere volunt domi viros suos interrogent. Sed quia puer est imperfectus, virtus eius non est ad se ipsum, id est ut secundum suum sensum regatur, sed ut disponatur secundum quod est conveniens ad finem debitum et ad obediendum ductori, scilicet pedagogo; unde in Ecclesiastico sapiens dicit: non des filio tuo potestatem in iuventute, et ne despicias cogitatus illius. Similiter etiam virtus servi est in ordine ad dominum; dictum est enim supra quod servus est utilis ad necessaria vitae: unde indiget quidem virtute, sed parva, et tanta ut non deficiat ab hiis quae debet operari propter intemperantiam concupiscentiae vel propter timiditatem.

Then, where he says palam autem hoc, etc., he more fully clarifies what had been said in the particular: and he says that that which was said will be more fully clarified for those who wish to study more in the particular. Because those who wish to speak about human actions only universally deceive themselves, because they cannot fully arrive at the truth; just as if someone where content to understand what that virtue is through which the soul is well disposed, or through which man is at work justly, or something else like this, and desired to understand nothing more about virtue: he would deceive himself, and have an imperfect and non-advantageous understanding of virtue. For those who calculate the virtues specifically, as Gorgias did, speak much better than him who speaks only in general about what the reason for this thing is, because acts are about particulars. Whence, also, those things that belong to acts must be studied as particulars. And therefore, just as a certain poet said a certain particular thing about women, pertaining to their virtue, so also it must be evaluated in all things. For it belongs to the elegance and dignity of a woman that she be silent: and this comes forth from the modesty that is owed to women. But this does not belong to the elegance of a man, but moreso that he should speak as it is seemly. Whence also the apostle warns that women should be silent in churches, and if they want to say something, they should interrogate their husbands about it at home. And because a child is imperfect, his virtue is not toward himself, that is, so that he should be ruled following his own perception, but so that [his life] may be organized following that which is fitting for the end he ought [to pursue], and toward obeying his leader, that is, his educator. So also, in Ecclesiasticus, the wise man says: neither give power to your son in his youth, nor regard to his thoughts. Likewise, also, the virtue of a slave is in the ordering toward his master. For it was said above that the slave is useful for the necessities of life: whence he does require virtue, but little; and only so much that he not fail in those works he ought to do, on account of the intemperance of concupiscence, or because of timidity.

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Lecture 11

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Dubitabit autem utique aliquis de nunc dicto; si verum, ergo et artifices oportebit habere virtutem; multotiens enim propter intemperantiam deficiunt ab operibus.

Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work through the lack of self control?

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Aut differt ab hiis plurimum. Servus quidem enim particeps vitae, hic autem remotius, et tantum immittit virtutis, quantum et servitutis, banausus enim artifex determinatam quandam habet servitutem, et servus quidem eorum quae natura. Coriarius autem nullus, neque aliorum artificum.

But is there not a great difference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his master's life; the artisan is less closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan.

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Manifestum igitur quod talis virtutis causam esse oportet servo dominum, sed non doctrinativam habentem operum despoticam; propter quod dicunt non bene, ratione servos privantes, et dicentes precepto utendum solum. Monendum enim magis servos quam pueros. Sed de hiis quidem determinatum sit isto modo.

It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of mastership which trains the slave in his duties. Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of admonition than children.

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De mulieris autem et viri et natorum et patris ea quae circa unumquodque ipsorum virtute, et ea quae ad se ipsos omelia quid quod bene et non bene est, et quomodo oportet quod quidem bene persequi, quod autem male fugere, in hiis quae circa politias necessarium supervenire.

So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government.

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Quoniam enim domus quidem omnis pars civitatis, haec autem domus, eam autem quae partis ad eam quae totius oportet videre virtutem, necessarium ad politiam respicientes erudire et pueros et mulieres. Si quidem aliquid differt ad civitatem esse studiosam pueros esse studiosos et mulieres studiosas, necessarium autem differe; mulieres quidem enim dimidia pars liberorum, ex pueris autem dispensatores fiunt politiae.

For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution, if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women.

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Quare quoniam de hiis quidem determinatum est, de reliquis autem in aliis dicendum. Dimittentes tanquam finem habentes eos qui nunc sermones, aliud principium facientes dicamus, et primo consideremus de pronunciatis de optima politia.

Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.

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Dubitabit autem (utique) aliquis etc. Soluta praecedenti dubitatione, hic movet quandam aliam dubitationem quae ex praemissa solutione oritur. Et circa hoc tria facit:

Dubitabit autem (utique) aliquis, etc. After he solved the preceding difficulty, he here raises a certain other difficulty that arises from the previously advanced solution. And about this he does three things.

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primo movet dubitationem;

First, he raises the difficulty.

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secundo solvit eam, ibi aut differt ab hiis etc.;

Second, he solves it, at aut differt ab his, [I.11.2] etc.

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tertio inducit quoddam correlarium ex solutione posita, ibi manifestum igitur etc.

Third, he deduces a certain corollary from the posited solution, at manifestum igitur, [I.11.4] etc.

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Est ergo dubitatio de hoc quod supra dictum est. Si enim verum est quod oportet servum habere quandam virtutem ne propter intemperantiam aut timorem deficiat ab operibus, pari ratione videbitur quod artifices ad hoc quod sint boni artifices, oporteat habere aliquam virtutem; cum multoties contingat quod propter intemperantiam vel alia vitia defectum faciant in suis operibus, ut puta negligenter evagantes dum aliis intendunt.

There is, therefore, a difficulty about what was mentioned above. For if it is true that a slave must have a certain virtue so that he does not fail in his work out of intemperance or fear, through the same reasoning it will seem that artisans, in order to be good artisans, must have some virtue, since it frequently happens that because of intemperance, or some other vice, they make a defect in their works, as when they neglectfully wander away while attending to other things.

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Deinde cum dicit aut differt ab hiis plurimum etc., solvit propositam dubitationem. Et dicit quod multa differentia est inter servum et artificem; et hoc probat per duas rationes.

Then, where he says aut differt ab his plurimum, etc., he resolves the proposed difficulty. He says that there is a great difference between a slave and an artisan, and he proves this through two rationales.

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Quarum prima est quia servus in aliquo est particeps vitae, id est conversationis humanae, in quantum est servus; dictum est enim supra quod servus est instrumentum in hiis quae pertinent ad actionem, id est ad conversationem hominum: et ideo cum virtutes morales perficiant hominem in conversatione humana, oportet quod servus ad hoc quod sit bonus participet aliquid de virtute morali. Sed artifex remotius se habet a conversatione humana; non enim operatio artificis in quantum huiusmodi est circa agibilia conversationis humanae, sed circa aliqua artificiata quae dicuntur factibilia: unde aliquis dicitur bonus artifex, ut puta bonus faber, ex hoc quod sciat et potest facere bonos cultellos, etiam si male utatur vel negligenter sua arte. Sed tamen in tantum immittit de virtute in sua operatione, in quantum exhibet de servitute ad conversationem humanam: sicut videmus quod aliqui artifices ut banausi, id est mercennarii, ut puta coqui, habent quandam determinatam servitutem dum deputantur ad quaedam specialia ministeria et serviunt. Et secundum hoc indigent virtute morali ad hoc quod sint boni in ministerio.

The first is: because there is something in which a slave is a participant in life—that is, of human association—insofar as he is a slave. For it was said above that the slave is an instrument in those things which belong to action, that is, to the association of men. And therefore, since the moral virtues perfect man in human association, the slave must participate in something of moral virtue so that he may be good. But the artisan's disposition is further removed from human association: for the work of the artisan, insofar as he is of this sort, is not about the doings of human association, but about artifacts, which is what things that are made are called. So someone is called a good artisan, for instance, a good blacksmith, from this, that he understands and is able to make good knives, even if he employs his art evilly or negligently. Certainly, insofar as he displays service for human association, to that degree does he put virtue into his work, just as we see that certain artisans, like banausi—that is, wage-earners, such as cooks—have a certain determinate service when they are employed for a certain specific assistance, and they serve: and following on this, they require moral virtue so that they may be good in assisting.

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Secundam rationem ponit ibi et servus quidem etc., quia servus est de hiis quae sunt a natura; probatum est enim supra quod aliqui sunt naturaliter servi. Sed nullus est coriarius vel nullius artis artifex a natura, sed omnes artes sunt adinventae per rationem; virtus autem ad ea se habet quae sunt nobis a natura, habemus enim naturalem quandam inclinationem ad virtutem, ut dictum est in II Ethicorum: unde patet quod ad hoc quod aliquis sit bonus servus, indiget virtute morali, non autem ad hoc quod sit bonus artifex.

He posits a second rationale, at et servus quidem, etc., because a slave is one of those things that are from nature. For it was proved above that some are naturally slaves, but nobody is a tanner by nature, or an artisan of any other art, but all arts are invented by reason. But virtue pertains to those things that are in us by nature. For we have a certain natural inclination toward virtue, as was said in Ethics II, and so it is obvious that for someone to be a good slave, he requires moral virtue, but not in order to be a good artisan.

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Deinde cum dicit manifestum igitur etc., infert quoddam correlarium ex dictis. Dictum est enim quare servus indiget virtute; oportet autem quod homo qui habet inclinationem ad virtutem, consequatur virtutem per studium alicuius gubernantis; sicut cives debent fieri virtuosi per legislatorem, ut dicitur in II Ethicorum: unde manifestum est quod huius virtutis quam servus debet habere ad hoc quod sit bonus, dominus eius debet ei esse causa instruendo eum qualiter agere debeat, et puniendo si male facit, et remunerando si bene. Sed non est dicendum quod ad dominum pertineat quod habeat despoticam, id est dominalem quandam scientiam quae doceat opera servilia ipsum servum, puta quod doceat ipsum coquinare vel aliqua huiusmodi facere; sed debet eum docere quo modo sit temperatus et humilis et patiens et alia huiusmodi. Unde non dicunt bene, qui dicunt quod non est ratione utendum ad servos sed solo praecepto; magis enim debemus servos monere ad virtutem quam filios pueros, quia nondum sunt ita capaces monitionis. Et de hiis quidem sic determinatum sit.

Then, where he says manifestum igitur, etc., he deduces a certain corollary from what has been said. For it was said why a slave requires virtue: but man, who has an inclination toward virtue, must follow after virtue through the study of some governor; just as citizens ought to become virtuous through a legislator, as is said in Ethics II. So it is clear that the master ought to be the cause of the virtue that the slave ought to have in order to be good, instructing him how he ought to act, both by punishing him if he does badly, and rewarding him if he does well. But it should not be said that it belongs to a master to have despotic, that is, a certain mastering science that teaches slavish works to the slave himself, thinking that he ought to teach [the slave] to cook, or to do other things of this sort; but he ought to teach the slave how to be temperate, and humble, and patient, and other things of this sort. So they do not speak well who say that reason should not be used with slaves, but only precepts, for we more ought to admonish slaves toward virtue than sons, because children are not yet capable of admonition. And let these things now be determined.

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Deinde cum dicit de mulieris autem et viri etc., excusat se a diligentiori determinatione de duabus coniugationibus. Et circa hoc tria facit:

Then, where he says de mulieris autem et viri, etc., he excuses himself from a more diligent determination about the two associations. He does three things about this.

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primo ponit excusationem;

First, he lays out his excuse.

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secundo assignat rationem dictorum, ibi quoniam enim domus quidem, etc.;

Second, he indicates the reason for what was said, at quoniam enim domus quidem, [I.11.6] etc.

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tertio continuat praedicta dicendis, ibi quare quoniam de hiis etc.

Third, he extends what has already been said into what must be said, at quare, quoniam de his, [I.11.7] etc..

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Dicit ergo primo quod in hiis quae dicenda sunt de politiis, id est de civitatibus, necessarium est tractare de virtute mulieris et viri, et patris et filiorum; et de omelia, id est collocutione vel conversatione eorum ad invicem, quid in hoc fit bene et quid non bene, et quo modo illud quod est bonum sit procurandum, et illud quod sit malum sit vitandum. Et ita ad praesens antequam de politiis dicamus determinari hic non possunt.

Therefore, he says first that in the things that must be said about regimes—that is, about cities—it is necessary to draw out further the virtue of woman and man, father and sons, and about their homily—that is, about their conference or intercourse with each other—what is done well and not-well in this, and how that which is good may be cared for, and that which is evil may be shunned. And so at present, before we speak about regimes, we are not able to determine this.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam enim domus (quidem) omnis etc., assignat duas rationes quare praedicta oporteat determinari circa politias.

Then, where he says quoniam enim domus (quidem) omnis, etc., he indicates two reasons why it is necessary to determine the aforementioned things with reference to the regimes.

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Quarum prima est quia dispositionem partis oportet considerare in comparatione ad totum, sicut dispositionem fundamenti in comparatione ad domum; sed domus est pars civitatis, ad quam primo pertinent iste duae coniugationes patris et filii, viri et uxoris: unde secundum comparationem ad politiam oportet considerare qualiter sint erudiendi pueri et uxores.

The first reason is because the disposition of the part must be studied in comparison with the whole, like the disposition of a foundation in comparison with the house. But the household, to which the two associations of father and son, husband and wife first belong, is part of the city. So we must consider how children and wives are to be refined [erudiendi] following upon the comparison with the regime.

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Secundam rationem ponit ibi si quidem aliquid differt etc. Ea enim quorum dispositio facit differentiam circa bonitatem civitatis sunt consideranda in politiis; sed huiusmodi sunt instructiones puerorum et mulierum quo modo utrique sint boni, quia mulieres sunt media pars hominum liberorum qui sunt in civitate, ex pueris autem crescunt viri quos oportet esse dispensatores civitatis: ergo in politiis determinandum est de instructione filiorum et uxorum.

He posits a second rationale, at si quidem aliquid differt, etc.: for those things whose disposition makes a difference for the goodness of the city must be studied within regimes. But the instruction of women and children is something of this sort, and how they are both good, because women are a half part of the free human beings who are in the city; and from the children grow the men, who are the managers of the city. Therefore, it is in regimes that the instruction of wives and children must be determined.

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Deinde cum dicit quare quoniam etc., continuat dicta dicendis. Et dicit quod quia determinatum est de praemissis, de reliquis autem dicendum est in aliis, id est sequentibus, quae ad politias pertinent, debemus ad praesens dimittere istos sermones pertinentes ad dispensationem domus tanquam iam consummationem habentes; et faciemus aliud principium, considerando ea quae dicta sunt ab aliis de optima politia. Et sic terminatur primus liber.

Then, where he says quare, quoniam, etc., he extends the things that have been said into the things that must be said, and he says that because the previously advanced things have been determined, and what remains must be discussed in other places, that is, in what follows, which belongs to regimes, we ought at present to dismiss such conversations as belong to the management of the household, as though we now had a completion. And we will make another beginning, by considering those things that have been said about the best regime. And so the first book comes to an end.

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Book 2

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Lecture 1

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Quia considerare volumus de communione politica quae sit optima omnium hiis quae possunt vivere quam maxime ad votum, oportet et alias considerare politias, quibus utuntur quaedam civitatum earum quae bene regi legibus dicuntur, et si quae aliae existunt a quibusdam dictae et visae bene se habere, ut et recte habens appareat et utile.

Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life. We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and useful may be brought to light.

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Adhuc autem quaerere praeter ipsas alterum, non videatur esse omnino sophizare volentium. Sed propter non bene habere has nunc existentes, propter hoc hanc videamur inserere methodum.

And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost; we only undertake this inquiry because all the constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.

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Principium autem primo faciendum quod quidem natum est esse principium huius speculationis. Necesse enim aut omnes omnibus communicare cives, aut nullo, aut quibusdam quidem, quibusdam autem non.

We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. Three alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must either have all things or nothing in common, or some things in common and some not.

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Nullo quidem igitur communicare, manifestum quod impossibile. Civilitas enim communicatio quaedam est, et primum necesse loco communicare; locus quidem enim unus, qui unius civitatis. Cives autem socii unius civitatis.

That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the constitution is a community, and must at any rate have a common place—one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who share in that one city.

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Sed utrum quibuscumque contingit communicare, melius est communicare futuram habitari civitatem bene, aut quibusdam quidem, quibusdam autem non, melius. Contingit enim et pueris et mulieribus et possessionibus communicare cives ad invicem, quaemadmodum in politia Platonis. Ibi enim Socrates ait oportere communes pueros et mulieres esse et possessiones, hoc itaque utrum ut nunc sic melius habere, aut secundum in politia scriptam legem.

But should a well ordered state have all things, as far as may be, in common, or some only and not others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the Republic of Plato. Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new order of society?

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Habet itaque difficultates alias multas omnium esse mulieres communes; et causa propter quam inquit oportere lege statui hoc modo Socrates, non videtur accidens ex rationibus. Adhuc autem ad finem quem ait oportere existere civitati, ut quidem dictum est nunc, impossibile; quomodo autem dividere, nihil determinatum est.

There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution evidently is not established by his arguments. Further, as a means to the end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally is impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated.

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Dico autem unam esse civitatem tanquam optimum ens quam maxime omnem; accipit enim hanc suppositionem Socrates.

I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, that the greater the unity of the state the better.

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Quamvis manifestum sit quod procedens et facta una magis, neque civitas erit; multitudo enim quaedam secundum naturam est civitas, factaque una magis, domus quidem ex civitate, homo autem ex domo erit. Magis enim unam domum civitate dicemus utique et unum domo. Quare si potens quis esset hoc operari, non faciendum. Interimet enim civitatem. Non solum autem plurium hominum est civitas, sed et ex specie differentibus; non enim fit civitas ex similibus; alterum enim compugnatio et civitas: haec quidem enim quantitate utile, quamvis sit idem specie; auxilii enim gratia compugnatio apta nata est, quaemadmodum utique si pondus amplius trahet. Differet autem tali et civitas a gente, cum non per vicos fuerint segregati multitudine, sed velut Archades; ex quibus autem oportet unum fieri, specie differunt; propter quod equale contrapassum salvat civitates, quaemadmodum in Ethicis dictum est prius; quoniam et in liberis et equalibus necesse hoc esse.

Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state? Since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. It is not like a military alliance The usefulness of the latter depends upon its quantity even where there is no difference in quality (for mutual protection is the end aimed at), just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less (in like manner, a state differs from a nation, when the nation has not its population organized in villages, but lives an Arcadian sort of life); but the elements out of which a unity is to be formed differ in kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation, as I have already remarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among freemen and equals this is a principle which must be maintained.

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Simul autem non possibile est omnes principari, sed aut secundum annum, aut secundum aliquem alium ordinem, aut tempus; et accidit utique secundum hunc modum ut omnes principentur, quaemadmodum utique si transmutarentur coriarii et fabri et non semper iidem coriarii et fabri essent. Quoniam autem melius sic habere et quae circa communitatem politicam, palam quomodo eosdem semper melius principari si possibile. In quibus autem non possibile propter secundum naturam equales esse omnes, simul autem et iustum sive bonum sive pravum principari, omnes ipso participare; hoc autem imitatur scilicet in parte equales cedere, hoc tanquam similes sint a principio; hii quidem enim principantur, hii autem subiciuntur, tanquam utique alii facti; et eodem utique modo principantium, alii alios principantur principatus. Manifestum igitur ex hiis quod non aptum natum est unam sic esse civitatem ut dicunt quidam, et dictum ut maximum bonum in civitatibus quod civitates interimit, quamvis uniuscuiusque bonum salvet unumquodque.

For they cannot an rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succession. The result is that upon this plan they all govern; just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. And since it is better that this should be so in politics as well, it is clear that while there should be continuance of the same persons in power where this is possible, yet where this is not possible by reason of the natural equality of the citizens, and at the same time it is just that an should share in the government (whether to govern be a good thing or a bad), an approximation to this is that equals should in turn retire from office and should, apart from official position, be treated alike. Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn, as if they were no longer the same persons. In like manner when they hold office there is a variety in the offices held. Hence it is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some persons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their destruction; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves them.

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Est autem et per alium modum manifestum quoniam valde quaerere unire civitatem, non est melius. Domus quidem enim magis per se sufficiens uno, civitas autem domo; et vult iam tunc esse civitas cum per se sufficientem accidit esse communitatem multitudinis. Si quidem igitur magis eligibile quod magis per se sufficiens, et minus unum, eo quod magis eligibilius.

Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being when the community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.

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Quia considerare volumus de communione politica etc. Postquam philosophus determinavit in primo libro de hiis quae pertinent ad domum, quae sunt elementa quaedam civitatis, hic incipit determinare de ipsa civitate secundum modum quem in fine primi tetigit, et etiam in fine X Ethicorum.

Quia considerare volumus decommunione politica, etc. After the philosopher has determined, in the first book, about those things that belong to the household, which are certain elements of the city, he here begins to determine about the city itself, after the method which he touched upon at the end of the first book, and also at the end of the tenth book of the Ethics.

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Primo enim ponit ea quae ab aliis dicta sunt de politica communicatione;

For he first posits those things which have been said by others about the political union;

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secundo incipit determinare de ea secundum propriam sententiam in tertio libro, ibi ei qui de politia considerat etc.

second, he begins to determine about those things according to his own thoughts in the third book, at et qui de politia considerat, etc..

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Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

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primo dicit de quo est intentio;

First, he says what his intention is.

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secundo prosequitur suam intentionem, ibi principium autem primo faciendum etc.

Second, he carries out his intention, at principium autem primo faciendum, etc.

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Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

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primo proponit suam intentionem;

First, he puts forward his intention.

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secundo excusat eam, ibi adhuc autem quaerere etc.

Second, he offers an excuse for it, at adhhuc autem quaerere, etc.

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Dicit ergo primo quod intentio nostra principalis est considerare de communione politica, ut sciamus quis modus politicae conversationis sit optimus, quemadmodum (habeat) omnia ea secundum quae possunt homines vivere maxime ad votum. Ad hoc consequendum oportet considerare politias, id est ordinationes civitatis, quas alii tradiderunt, sive sint ille quibus quaedam civitatum utuntur quae laudantur de hoc quod bene reguntur legibus, sive etiam sint ab aliquibus philosophis et sapientibus traditae quae videntur bene se habere. Et hoc ideo oportet considerare ut appareat quid sit rectum et utile in conversatione et regimine civitatis; ex collatione enim multorum magis potest apparere quid sit melius et utilius.

He says first, therefore, that our governing intention is to consider the political communion, so that we may have scientific knowledge about what manner of political association is the best, and how to have all things so that men are able to live above of all as they would wish to. To pursue this, it is necessary to study the regimes, that is, the orderings of the city, that others have handed down; either those that some city uses which are praised because they are well ruled by laws; or also those that were handed down by philosophers and the wise, which seem well disposed. And it is necessary to study this so that it may be apparent what is correct and useful in the association and rule of the city. For by holding up many [regimes] next to each other, it can be more apparent what is better and more useful.

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Notandum est autem quod ad optimam politiam pertinere dicit ut homines vivant quam maxime ad votum, id est secundum hominum voluntatem, quia voluntas hominis principaliter est de fine humanae vitae ad quem ordinatur tota politica conversatio; unde secundum quod homines diversimode existimant de fine vitae humanae, secundum hoc diversimode homines existimant de conversatione civitatis. Qui enim finem humanae vitae ponunt delectationes, vel potentiam, aut honores, aestimant illam civitatem esse optime dispositam in qua homines possunt vivere deliciose, vel acquirere multas pecunias, aut consequi magnos honores, vel etiam multis dominari; qui vero finem praesentis vitae ponunt in bono quod est praemium virtutis, aestimant illam civitatem esse optime dispositam in qua homines maxime pacifice et secundum virtutem vivere (possunt). Unde simpliciter verum est quod optima dispositio civitatis est secundum quorumlibet opinionem, prout in civitate potest vivere homo ad votum. Item notandum est quod dicit se consideraturum de politiis civitatum quae bene dicuntur regi, et de ordinationibus civitatum a sapientibus traditis quae videntur bene se habere; quia ad inveniendum veritatem non multum prodest consideratio eorum quae sunt manifeste falsa, sed eorum quae probabiliter dicuntur.

It should be noted, however, that he says it belongs to the best regime that men live most of all as they would wish to, that is, following the will of human beings; because the will of the human being is chiefly about the end of human life, to which the whole political association is ordered. And so what human beings assess about the association of the city follows upon what they diversely assess about the end of human life. For those who posit the end of human life as delights, power or honors, esteem that city to be the best arranged in which men are able to live delightfully, or to acquire much money, or to pursue great honors, or even to be master over many. But those who posit the end of this present life in the good that is the reward of virtue esteem that city to be best arranged in which men are most of all peaceful, and (can) live according to virtue. Whence, simply speaking, it is true that the best arrangement of the city is, in anyone’s opinion, that in the city man can live as he would wish to. It should also be noted that he says he will consider the regimes of communities which are said to be well ruled, and the orderings of the cities handed down by the wise, which seem to be well-disposed; because for the discovery of truth, the consideration of those things that are clearly false is not very beneficial, but rather, of those things that are spoken with probability.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem quaerere etc., excusat propriam intentionem. Et dicit quod non oportet alicui videri quod hoc ipsum quod est quaerere aliquid aliud in ordinationibus civitatum praeter ea quae ab aliis dicta sunt, procedat ex hoc quod ipse (velit) sophizare, id est suam sapientiam ostentare; sed ideo interserit hanc artem, quia ea quae ab aliis dicta sunt in multis videntur non bene se habere.

Then he offers an excuse for his own intention; and he says that it is not necessary for someone to seem in this endeavor--which is, to seek after something else, in the orderings of the city, beyond those things that have been said by others--to proceed from this, that he (wants) to sophisize, that is, to show his own wisdom: but rather, he intersperses this art because those things which have been said by others seem, in many regards, not to be well disposed.

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Deinde cum dicit principium autem etc., prosequitur suam intentionem prosequendo ea quae ab aliis dicta sunt de ordinatione civitatis.

Then, where he says principium autem, etc., he pursues his intention by pursuing those things that have been said by others about the ordering of the city.

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Et primo ponit diversas ordinationes civitatum traditas a diversis;

And first, he posits diverse orderings of the city handed down by diverse people.

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secundo ostendit qui fuerunt et quales qui de huiusmodi se intromiserunt, ibi eorum autem qui pronuntiaverunt etc.

Second, he shows who they were and of what sort who entered into things of this sort, at eorum autem qui pronutiaverunt, etc.

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Prima autem pars dividitur in duas secundum diversitatem quam in praemissis tetigit:

Now the first part is divided in two, after the diversity which was touched upon previously.

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in prima enim ponit ordinationes civitatis quae sunt ab aliquibus sapientibus traditae;

For in the first he posits the orderings of the city which are handed down by certain of the wise.

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in secunda ponit eas quae in quibusdam civitatibus ordinate viventibus observantur, ibi de ea autem quae Lacedaemoniorum etc.

In the second, he posits those which were observed in certain cities that lived in an orderly way, at de ea autem quae Lacedaemoniorum, etc.

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Prima dividitur in tres:

The first is divided in three parts.

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primo ponit ordinationem civitatis quam tradidit Socrates, vel Plato discipulus eius, qui in suis libris Socratem loquentem introducit;

First, he posits the ordering of the city that was handed down by Socrates, or Plato, his student, who brought the conversations of Socrates into his books.

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in secunda ponit ordinationem civitatis traditam a quodam qui Felleas dicebatur, ibi sunt autem quaedam etc.;

In the second, he posits the ordering of the city handed down by a certain man called Felleas [Phaleas], at sunt autem quaedam, etc.

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in tertia ponit ordinationem Hyppodami, ibi Hyppodamus autem etc.

In the third, he posits the ordering of Hyppodamus, at Hyppodamus autem, etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

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primo pertractat quandam quaestionem de quadam ordinatione quam Plato dixit esse utilimam civitati;

First, he investigates [pertractat] a certain question about a certain ordering which Plato called the most useful for the city [II.1-5].

Polit.L1

secundo prosequitur de ordinatione ipsius quantum ad alia, ibi fere autem similiter et quae circa leges.

Second, he pursues [Plato’s] ordering with regard to other things, at fere autem similiter et quae circa leges [II.6-7].

Polit.L1

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L1

primo movet quaestionem;

First, he raises a question.

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secundo prosequitur eam, ibi habet itaque difficultates etc.

Second, he pursues it.

Polit.L1

Circa primum tria facit:

About the first he does three things.

Polit.L1

primo movet quandam quaestionem trimembrem;

First, he raises a certain three-part question.

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secundo excludit unum membrum ipsius, ibi nullo quidem igitur etc.;

Second, he rules out [excludit] one of the parts.

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tertio quaerit de aliis duobus, ibi sed utrum quibuscumque etc.

Third, he seeks after the other two.

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Dicit ergo primo quod principium huius considerationis faciendum est ab eo quod primo considerandum occurrit secundum naturam civitatis. Cum enim civitas sit communitas quaedam, necesse est primo considerare utrum omnes cives debeant communicare in omnibus, aut in nullo, aut in quibusdam et quibusdam non.

Therefore, he says first that the beginning of this study ought to be made from what occurs according to the nature of the city. For since the city is a community, it is necessary to consider certain things: whether all citizens ought to commune in all things, in nothing, or in certain things but not in others.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit nullo quidem igitur etc., excludit unum trium membrorum. Impossibile est enim dicere quod cives in nullo communicent; quod probat dupliciter.

Then, where he says nullo quidem igitur, etc., he rules out one of the three parts. For it is impossible to say that the citizens commune in nothing: which he proves in two ways.

Polit.L1

Primo quidem quia civitas est quaedam communicatio; unde contra rationem civitatis esset quod cives in nullo communicarent.

First, indeed, because the city is a certain union. Whence, it would be against the rationale [ratio] of the city if the citizens should commune in nothing.

Polit.L1

Secundo quia manifestum est quod omnes cives necesse est communicare saltem in loco, quia unus est locus unius civitatis; concives autem dicuntur qui sunt socii in una civitate: unde oportet quod communicent in loco.

Second, because it is clear that all citizens necessarily commune, at least in place, because the place of one city is one. And they are called “co-citizens” who are companions [socii] in one city: whence it is necessary that they commune in place.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit sed utrum quibuscumque etc., relinquit duo alia membra sub dubitatione, scilicet utrum melius sit quod civitas quae debet bene conversari communicet in quibuscumque contingit aliquos communicare, vel in quibusdam eorum communicet et in quibusdam non. Quaedam enim sunt in quibus nullo modo contingit communicare, sicut in omnibus personalibus, puta in membris corporis; sed in filiis et uxoribus et possessionibus contingit cives communicare ad invicem, sicut traditur in politica Platonis. Ibi enim dixit Socrates quod oportet ad optimam civitatem quod sint communes possessiones omnium civium et communes uxores, ita scilicet quod indifferenter omnes accedant ad omnes; et per consequens sequitur quod filii sint communes propter incertitudinem filiorum: et hoc tangitur in principio Thimei. Quaerendum est ergo utrum melius sit sic se habere conversationem politicam sicut nunc, aut secundum legem quam Socrates in sua politica scripsit.

Then, where he says sed utrum quibuscumque, he abandons the two other parts under a doubt: namely, whether it is better that the city, which ought to be well-associated [bene conversari], should commune in whatever it happens that some commune in, or should commune in some of them, and not in others. For there are some things in which it does not happen in any manner that men commune; such as in all personal things, like the limbs of the body. But in children and wives and possessions, it happens that citizens commune with each other, as was handed down in Plato’s Republic: for there, Socrates said that it is necessary, for the best city, that the possessions of all citizens should be common, and the wives common: and thus, that all would approach all without difference; and as a result, it would follow that the sons would be common because of the uncertainty of sons: and this is touched upon at the beginning of the Timaeus. We must pursue, therefore, whether it is better for the political association to be disposed as it is now, or following the law which Socrates wrote in his Republic.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit habet itaque difficultates etc., inquirit de praedicta quaestione.

Then, where he says habet itaque difficultates, etc, he inquires into the aforementioned question.

Polit.L1

Et primo ostendit inconvenientiam praedictae positionis de communitate uxorum et possessionum;

And first, he shows the unfitness of the aforementioned position about the community of wives and possessions.

Polit.L1

secundo ostendit eius insufficientiam, ibi causa autem deviationis etc.

Second, he shows their insufficiency, at causa autem deviationis, [II.5.1] etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum tria facit:

About the first he does three things.

Polit.L1

primo improbat legem Socratis quantum ad communitatem uxorum et filiorum;

First, he disproves the law of Socrates with reference to the community of wives and sons.

Polit.L1

secundo quantum ad communitatem possessionum, ibi habitum autem hiis est etc.;

Second, with reference to the community of possessions, at habitum autem his est, [II.4.1] etc.

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tertio communiter quantum ad utrumque, ibi et ad hec interimunt etc.

Third, commonly, with reference to both, at et ad hoc interimunt, [II.4.9] etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L1

primo proponit ea secundum quae potest apparere positio Socratis de communitate uxorum inconveniens;

First, he proposes those things following which it can be evident that the position of Socrates about the community of wives is unfitting.

Polit.L1

secundo prosequitur illa, ibi dico autem unam esse civitatem etc.

Second, he pursues it, at dico autem unam esse civitatem, etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum ponit quatuor

About the first he posits four things:

Polit.L1

quorum primum est quod ista ordinatio de communitate mulierum habet multas alias difficultates praeter eas inconvenientias quae statim tangentur;

of which the first is that this ordering, about the community of women, has many other difficulties beyond those unfitting things that should immediately be touched on.

Polit.L1

secundum est quod causa propter quam Socrates dixit hoc oportere lege ordinari non videtur esse rationabilis;

The second is that the cause on account of which Socrates said it was necessary for this law to be ordered does not seem to be reasonable.

Polit.L1

tertium est quod per istam legem non posset perveniri ad finem, (scilicet) utilitatem civitatis, quam Socrates existimabat;

The third is that through this law it would not be possible to arrive at the end, namely, what is useful for the city, which Socrates was assessing.

Polit.L1

quartum est quod insufficienter tradidit: cum enim communia non possint singulis applicari nisi secundum certum modum distribuendi, ipse cum faceret mulieres communes non docebat modum quomodo essent singulis dividendae ad usum.

The fourth is that it is insufficiently handed down: for since common things are not able to be applied to an individual except by a certain method of distribution, though he would make women common, he did not teach the method in which they should be divided individually for use.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit dico autem etc., prosequitur tria eorum quae dixerat, nam quartum de insufficientia est per se manifestum.

Then he pursues three of those things that he had said: for the fourth, about insufficiency, is clear through itself.

Polit.L1

Primo enim ostendit causam huius ordinationis a Socrate assignatam esse irrationabilem;

For he first shows the cause of this ordering assigned by Socrates to be irrational [II.1.11].

Polit.L1

secundo ostendit quod per hanc legem civitas non posset consequi finem quem Socrates intendebat, ibi at vero neque si hoc optimum etc.;

Second, he shows that through this law, the city could not pursue the end that Socrates was intending, at at vero neque si hoc optimum, [II.2.1] etc.

Polit.L1

tertio ostendit quod haec lex habet multas difficultates, ibi adhuc autem (et) tales difficultates etc.

Third, he shows that this law has many difficulties, at adhuc autem et tales difficultates, [II.3.1] etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum duo facit:

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L1

primo proponit causam legis quam Socrates assignabat;

First, he proposes the cause of the law that Socrates indicated.

Polit.L1

secundo improbat eam, ibi quamvis manifestum sit etc.

Second, he disproves it.

Polit.L1

Dicit ergo primo quod Socrates supponebat hoc quasi principium, quod optimum esset civitati quod esset una quantumcumque posset; propter hoc enim volebat omnia esse communia, etiam filios et uxores, ut cives essent maxime ad invicem uniti.

He says first, therefore, that Socrates supposed this as if it were a principle: that it would be best for the city that it should be one as much as possible. For because of this, he wanted all things to be common, even sons and wives, so that to the utmost extent, the citizens should be united with each other.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quamvis manifestum sit etc., improbat praedictam causam tribus rationibus:

Then, where he says quamvis manifestum sit, etc., he disproves the aforementioned cause with three rationales:

Polit.L1

Circa quarum primam dicit manifestum esse quod tantum posset procedere unitas civitatis magis quam deberet, quod non remaneret civitas. Dictum enim est supra quod civitas est naturaliter quaedam multitudo; multitudo autem opponitur unitati: unde si civitas fuerit magis una quam deberet, iam non esset civitas, sed ex civitate fieret domus. Et iterum si domus uniretur plus quam deberet, ex domo non remaneret nisi unus homo. Nullus enim dubitat quin una domus est magis unum quam civitas, et magis unus homo est unum quam domus; unde si etiam aliquis posset facere quod in tota civitate esset tanta unitas sicut in una domo, non deberet hoc facere, quia sic destrueretur civitas.

about the first of these he says that it is clear that the unity of the city could proceed to so much greater a degree than it ought that it would not remain a city. For it was said above that the city is naturally a certain multitude: but a multitude is opposed to unity. Hence, if the city were more one than it ought to be, it would not now be a city, but from a city, would have been made into a household: and then, if the household were united more than it ought to be, from the household nothing would remain except one man. For no one doubts that even one household is more one than a city, and a man is more one than a household. Hence, even if someone were able to make it that in the whole city there should be as much unity as in one household, they ought not to make this happen, because they would destroy the city.

Polit.L1

Sed quia posset aliquis dicere quod Socrates non intelligebat de unitate quae excludit multitudinem personarum, sed de unitate quae excludit dissimilitudinem, ideo subiungit quod civitas non solum debet esse ex pluribus hominibus, sed etiam oportet esse ex differentibus specie, id est ex hominibus diversarum conditionum: non enim fit civitas ex hominibus qui sunt totaliter similes secundum conditiones. Et hoc manifestat tripliciter.

But because someone might be able to say that Socrates did not mean to understand a unity that excludes a multitude of persons, but a unity that excludes dissimilarity; he therefore adds that the city not only ought to be [made] out of many men, but it is also necessary that it be from those different in kind [species], that is, from men of diverse conditions. For a city is not made out of men who are wholly similar following their condition. And this is clear in three ways.

Polit.L1

Primo quidem quia aliud est civitas, et aliud est multitudo congregata ad simul pugnandum: quia multitudo congregata ad simul pugnandum est utilis ex sola quantitate numerali, etiam si omnes sint eiusdem conditionis, quia talis multitudo est adunata propter adiutorium; sicut contingit in illis qui volunt trahere aliquod pondus, quod maior multitudo hominum trahit maius pondus, ita etiam maior multitudo militum similium magis auxiliatur ad victoriam.

First, indeed, because the city is something other than a multitude flocked together simultaneously for fighting. Because a multitude flocked together at the same time for fighting is useful from numerical quantity alone, even if they are all of the same condition; because such a multitude is united on account of aid, just as it happens among those who desire to drag some weight, that a greater multitude of men drags a greater weight; thus also, a greater multitude of similar soldiers are a greater help for victory.

Polit.L1

Secundo per hoc quod civitas in hoc quod ex dissimilibus constituitur, differt ab illa gente in qua multitudo non dividitur per habitationem diversarum civitatum aut vicorum, sed unusquisque separatim habitat per se ipsum, sicut accidit apud Archades. Est autem Archadia quaedam provincia in Graecia in qua unusquisque per se habitat, et sic sunt quodam modo omnes equales et similes.

It follows, through this, that the city insofar as it is constituted out of the dissimilar, differs from a tribe in which a multitude is not divided by the dwelling of diverse cities or villages, but each one dwells separately, on his own, as happened among the Arcadians. For Arcadia is a certain province in Greece in which each one dwells on his own: and thus, in a certain manner, all are equal and similar.

Polit.L1

Tertio ostendit idem per hoc quod ea ex quibus oportet unum aliquid perfectum fieri, differunt specie: unde omne totum perfectum in rebus naturalibus invenitur esse constitutum ex partibus diversis secundum speciem, ut homo ex carnibus, ossibus et nervis; totum vero quod componitur ex partibus eiusdem speciei est imperfectum in genere naturae, sicut aer et aqua et alia inanimata corpora. Unde manifestum est quod cum civitas sit quoddam totum perfectum, oportet quod consistat ex partibus dissimilibus secundum speciem.

Third, he shows the same thing through this: that those from which it is necessary that one perfect thing be made differ in kind: hence, every perfect whole in natural affairs is found to be constituted from parts that are diverse following their kind; as man [is made] from flesh, and bones, and nerves. But a whole that is put together from parts of the same kind is imperfect in the genus of nature, like air and water and the other unensouled bodies. Hence, it it clear that, since the city is a certain perfect whole, it is necessary that it be constituted from parts that are dissimilar in kind.

Polit.L1

Et ideo dictum est in V Ethicorum quod civitas conservatur per equale contrapassum, id est per hoc quod alicui proportionaliter retribuitur equale ei quod fecit, quia hoc necesse est quod sit in liberis et equalibus; si enim non retribueretur alicui secundum quod fecit, esset quaedam servitus, ut ibidem dictum est. Haec autem retributio, quae hic contrapassum dicitur, in hiis qui sunt equales secundum quantitatem fit secundum equalitatem quantitatis, ut quantum aliquis dedit tantum recipiat, quantum fecit tantum patiatur; in hiis autem qui non sunt equales secundum quantitatem sed secundum proportionem, servetur etiam equalitas proportionis, utpote quanto ille qui fecit iniuriam est minor, in eadem proportione plus puniatur: maioris enim culpae est quod aliquis percutiat digniorem personam quam inferiorem. Sic igitur patet quod cum de ratione civitatis sit quod civitas ex dissimilibus constituatur, non est verum quod Socrates putavit, quod oporteat civitatem esse maxime unam, quia si tollatur dissimilitudo civium iam non erit civitas; quae quidem dissimilitudo maxime videtur tolli, factis communibus possessionibus et mulieribus et filiis.

And therefore, it was said in Ethics V that the city is preserved through a reciprocal equality, that is, through that which retributes each one proportionally for what he has done, because this is necessarily what is among the free and equal. For if things are not retributed to someone according to what he has done, it would be a sort of slavery, as he said in the same place. Now this retribution, which is here called “reciprocal” is done according to equality of quantity among those who are equal in quantity, so that as much as someone gave, so much does he receive: as much as he does, so much does he undergo. But among those who are not equals following quantity, but following proportion, equality of proportion is also preserved: since by however much he who does the injury is lesser, in the same proportion is he more punished. For it is a greater crime that someone should strike a more worthy person than an inferior. Thus it is clear that, since it is in the city’s rationale that the city is constituted out of the dissimilar, what Socrates thought is not true--that it is necessary for the city to be most of all one; because if the dissimilarity of the citizens is taken away, there will no longer be a city. And this dissimilarity seems most of all taken away by making possessions and women and children common.

Polit.L1

Secundam rationem ponit ibi simul autem etc., quae etiam inducitur ad ostendendum quod oportet esse aliquam differentiam inter cives: oportet enim quod quidam eorum principentur et quidam subiciantur. Non enim est possibile quod omnes simul principentur; sed si hoc fiat oportet quod hoc sit vicissim, vel ita quod unusquisque in suo anno principetur aut quocumque alio tempore determinato, puta mense vel die; vel etiam secundum quemcumque alium ordinem, puta quod sorte principes eligantur. Et secundum hunc modum vicissitudinarii principatus accidit quod omnes diversis temporibus principentur; sicut si in civitate aliqua non semper idem homines essent coriarii vel fabri, sed vicissim, sequeretur quod omnes cives fierent coriarii et fabri.

He posits a second rationale, at simul autem, etc., which is introduced in order to show that it is necessary that there be some difference among the citizens. For it is necessary that some of them govern and that some be subject. For it is not possible that all at the same time govern: but if this came to be, it would be necessary that this should be by turn, thus that each one in his own year would govern, or at whatever other determined time, such as a month, or a day, or also following whatever other order, such as that governors be chosen by lot: and following this manner of taking the government in turn, it happens that all would govern at diverse times, as if in some city, the same men were not always tanners or builders, but that it followed by turn that all citizens would become tanners and builders.

Polit.L1

Subiungit autem quod melius est quod ita disponatur civitas politica, si possibile sit, quod idem semper principentur. Hoc enim dicit esse possibile quando in aliqua civitate inveniuntur aliqui viri multum aliis excellentiores, per quos optimum erit ut semper civitas regatur; sed quando hoc non est possibile eo quod omnes cives fere sunt equales secundum naturalem industriam et virtutem, tunc iustum est quod omnes participent principatu, sive principari sit quoddam bonum sive malum, quia et communibus bonis et communibus oneribus iustum est ut equaliter participent qui sunt equales in civitate. Iustum igitur esset, si esset possibile, quod omnes simul principarentur; sed quia hoc non est possibile, ad huius iusti imitationem observatur quod illi qui sunt equales in parte sibi invicem cedant, tanquam a principio sint similes, quia dum quidam eorum principantur et quidam subiciuntur quodam modo facti sunt dissimiles et diversi per gradum dignitatis: et ita etiam quaedam diversitas est inter eos qui simul principantur, dum diversi in civitate diversos principatus vel officia gerunt. Et sic patet quod ad civitatem requiritur principantium et subiectorum diversitas vel simpliciter, vel secundum aliquod tempus. Sic igitur manifestum est ex praedictis quod civitas non est sic nata esse una, sicut quidam dicunt, ut omnes sint similes; et illud quod dicitur esse maximum bonum in civitatibus, scilicet maxima unitas, destruit civitatem: unde non potest esse bonum civitatis, quia unaquaeque res salvatur per id quod est sibi bonum.

But he adds that it is better that the political city be disposed thus, if possible: that the same men always govern. For he says that this is possible when in a certain city are found certain men who are much more excellent than the others, through whom it will be best that the city always be ruled. But when this is not possible through this, that all the citizens are almost equal following natural industry and virtue, then it is just that all participate in the government, whether to govern is a certain good, or evil; because it is just that those who are equals in the city should equally participate in both common goods and common burdens. Therefore, it would be just, if it were possible, that all should govern at the same time: but because this is not possible, as an imitation of this justice, it is observed that those who are equals in part yield to each other the position, although from the principle [of their rule] they were similar: because while some of them govern, and some are subject, in a certain manner they are made dissimilar and diverse through the degree of dignity. And thus also a certain diversity is among them that govern at the same time, so long as diverse [men] hold diverse governments or offices. And thus it is clear that for a city, a diversity of governors and of subjects is required, either simply, or following a certain time. So, therefore, it is clear from what has been said that the city is not thus born [so as to be one] as some say, that all may be similar. And that which is said to be the greatest good in cities, namely, the greatest unity, destroys the city. Hence, it cannot be the good of the city, because each thing is preserved through that which, for it, is good.

Polit.L1

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi est autem et per alium modum etc. Et procedit ista ratio alio modo a praemissis: nam prima ratio sumebatur ex partibus dissimilibus ex quibus necesse est constitui civitatem; haec vero ratio sumitur ex fine civitatis qui est sufficientia vitae. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod per alium modum potest manifestari quod non est melius quod homo quaerat valde unire civitatem: per hoc enim tollitur sufficientia vitae. Manifestum est enim quod una domus vel familia tota magis est sufficiens ad vitam quam unus homo, et civitas est magis sufficiens quam domus; tunc enim iam debet esse civitas, cum communitas multitudinis est per se sufficiens ad vitam. Si igitur id quod est minus unum est magis per se sufficiens, ut domus homine et civitas domo, manifeste sequitur quod eligibilius est in civitate quod sit minus una quantum ad distinctionem civium, quam quod sit magis una; tanto enim erit sibi sufficientior, quanto plures diversitates hominum in ea inveniuntur. Unde patet falsum esse quod Socrates dixit, optimum esse in civitate quod sit maxime una.

He posits a third rationale, at est autem et per alium modum, etc., and this rationale proceeds in a different manner from the things previously advanced: for the first rationale was taken up from the dissimilar parts out of which it is necessary for the city to be constituted: but this rationale is taken up from the end of the city, which is the sufficiency of life. And this is what he says, that through another manner it can be clarified that it is not better that man strongly seek to unify the city; for through this is taken away the sufficiency of life. For it is clear that one household or whole family is more greatly sufficient for life than one man; and the city is more greatly sufficient than the household. For it ought to be a city when the community of the multitude is sufficient through itself for life. If, therefore, what is less one is more sufficient through itself, as the household is than a man, and the city than a household, it clearly follows that the more choiceworthy in the city is what is less one, regarding the distinction of the citizens, than what is more one. For by however much a greater diversity of men is found in it, by so much will it be more sufficient unto itself. Hence, what Socrates called the best thing for the city—to be maximally one—is obviously false.

Polit.L1

Lecture 2

Polit.L2

At vero neque si hoc optimum est scilicet unam quam maxime esse communitatem, neque hoc ostendi videtur per sermonem, si omnes simul dicant meum et non meum: hoc enim existimat Socrates signum esse eius quod est civitatem perfectae esse unam. Quod enim omnes duplex: si quidem igitur ut unusquisque, forsitan utique erit magis quod vult facere Socrates. Unusquisque enim filium sui ipsius dicit eundem, et mulierem utique eandem, et de substantia, et circa unumquodque utique contingentium similiter. Nunc autem non sic dicent communibus utentes uxoribus et pueris, sed omnes quidem, non ut unusquisque autem ipsorum; similiter autem et substantiam quidem, non ut unusquisque autem ipsorum. Quod quidem igitur paralogismus quidam est dicere omnes, manifestum. Quod enim omnes et utraque et imparia et paria propter duplicitatem et in orationibus litigiosos faciunt sillogismos; propter quod est omnes idem dicere, sic quidem bonum, sed non possibile; sic autem nihil consentaneum.

But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have the greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved to follow from the fact 'of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant of time,' which, according to Socrates, is the sign of perfect unity in a state. For the word 'all' is ambiguous. If the meaning be that every individual says 'mine' and 'not mine' at the same time, then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished; each man will call the same person his own son and the same person his wife, and so of his property and of all that falls to his lot. This, however, is not the way in which people would speak who had their had their wives and children in common; they would say 'all' but not 'each.' In like manner their property would be described as belonging to them, not severally but collectively. There is an obvious fallacy in the term 'all': like some other words, 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' it is ambiguous, and even in abstract argument becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all persons call the same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a fine thing, but it is impracticable; or if the words are taken in the other sense, such a unity in no way conduces to harmony.

Polit.L2

Ad haec autem alium habet nocumentum quod dicitur. Minime enim cura sortitur, quod plurimorum est commune. De propriis enim maxime curant, de communibus autem minus, quam quantum unicuique attinet: apud alios enim tanquam altero curante negliguntur magis, sicut in ministerialibus servitiis multi servientes quandoque deterius serviunt paucioribus; fiunt autem unicuique civium mille filii, et isti non ut uniuscuiusque, sed contingentis contingens similiter est filius. Quare omnes similiter negligent.

And there is another objection to the proposal. For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill; as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually but anybody will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike.

Polit.L2

Adhuc sic unusquisque meus dicet bene operantem civium aut male quodcumque contingat secundum naturam existens, puta meus aut huius filius, hoc modo dicens secundum unumquemque mille aut quodcumque civitas est, et hoc dubitans. Inmanifestum enim cui accidit genuisse filium, et salvatum esse genitum; equidem utrum sic melius meum dicere unumquemque, idem quidem appellantes duorum milium aut decem milium, aut magis ut nunc in civitatibus meum dicunt. Hii quidem enim filium suum, hic autem fratrem suum appellat eundem, hic autem nepotem, aut secundum aliam quandam cognationem, aut a sanguine, aut secundum familiaritatem et curam ipsius primum, aut eorum qui ipsius. Ad haec autem alterum fratruelem aut contribulem. Melius enim proprium nepotem esse, quam per modum istum filium.

Further, upon this principle, every one will use the word 'mine' of one who is prospering or the reverse, however small a fraction he may himself be of the whole number; the same boy will be 'so and so's son,' the son of each of the thousand, or whatever be the number of the citizens; and even about this he will not be positive; for it is impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. But which is better- for each to say 'mine' in this way, making a man the same relation to two thousand or ten thousand citizens, or to use the word 'mine' in the ordinary and more restricted sense? For usually the same person is called by one man his own son whom another calls his own brother or cousin or kinsman—blood relation or connection by marriage either of himself or of some relation of his, and yet another his clansman or tribesman; and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato's fashion!

Polit.L2

Quinimmo sed neque diffugere possibile, non quosdam suspicari sui ipsorum fratres et pueros et patres et matres; secundum similitudines enim quae fiunt pueris ad generantes, necessarium accipere de invicem credulitates; quod quidem aiunt quidam accidere terrae peryodus describentium: esse enim quibusdam de superiori Libia communes uxores, natos tamen pueros dividi per similitudines. Sunt autem quaedam etiam femelle etiam aliorum animalium, puta equae et bovas, quae valde natae sunt similes reddere natos parentibus, quaemadmodum quae in Farsalo vocata iusta equa.

Nor is there any way of preventing brothers and children and fathers and mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for children are born like their parents, and they will necessarily be finding indications of their relationship to one another. Geographers declare such to be the fact; they say that in part of Upper Libya, where the women are common, nevertheless the children who are born are assigned to their respective fathers on the ground of their likeness. And some women, like the females of other animals- for example, mares and cows- have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their parents, as was the case with the Pharsalian mare called Honest.

Polit.L2

At vero neque si hoc optimum etc. Postquam reprobavit causam quam Socrates assignabat legis ferendae de communitate mulierum et filiorum, ostendens non esse optimum in civitate quod sit maxime una, hic incipit ostendere quod civitas non consequitur maximam unitatem per legem praemissam; et ponit ad hoc quatuor rationes.

At vero neque si hoc optimum, etc. After he objected to the cause which Socrates assigned for passing a law about the community of women and children, showing that it is not the best thing for the city that it be maximally one, he here begins to show that the city does not attain maximal unity through the previously advanced law. And he posits this for four reasons.

Polit.L2

Circa quarum primam dicit quod, dato quod hoc esset optimum civitatis ut esset maxime una, non tamen hoc videtur ostendi quod civitas sit maxime una per hoc quod omnes simul dicant, hoc est meum et hoc non est meum. Si enim omnia sint communia, nullus posset dicere hoc est meum nisi de quo et alius diceret hoc est meum; et hoc putabat Socrates esse signum huius quod est civitatem esse perfecte unam. Videbat enim quod ex hoc oriuntur discidia in civitate, quod unus curat proprium bonum et alius bonum suum; et sic studia hominum ad diversa feruntur, quia non est idem de quo unusquisque dicit hoc est meum. Sed si omnes dicerent de una et eadem re hoc est meum, omnium studia ferrentur in unum; et sic, sicut putabat Socrates, civitas esset maxime una. Sed haec non est causa. Quia cum tu dicis omnes dicerent hoc est meum, haec propositio est duplex, eo quod li omnes possit teneri distributive vel collective: si distributive, esset sensus quod unusquisque per se ipsum posset dicere de tali re hoc est meum; et tunc forte esset verum quod Socrates dixit, quia unusquisque unum et eundem diligeret tanquam filium proprium, et similiter mulierem tanquam suam propriam; et ita est etiam de substantia, id est de possessione. Sed illi qui utuntur communibus uxoribus et pueris non dicent omnes in isto sensu hoc est meum, sed omnes quidem dicent collective tanquam possidentes unam rem communem, ita tamen quod nullus per se ipsum dicet hoc est meum; et idem est etiam si possessio sit communis, nullius enim secundum se ipsum erit propria. Sic igitur patet quod quidam sophisticus sillogismus est secundum quem procedebat Socrates dicens quod dicere omnes hoc est meum est signum perfectae unitatis; quia istae dictiones omnes et utrumque propter suam duplicitatem etiam in orationibus, id est in disputationibus, faciunt sillogismos litigiosos, id est sophisticos. Puta si aliquis dicat, propositis tribus ex una parte et tribus ex alia, utraque istorum sunt paria: hoc enim est verum si collective accipiatur, quia simul iuncta sunt paria; si vero distributive accipiatur, sunt imparia. Unde dicendum est quod in uno sensu dicere omnes de eodem quod sit suum, esset bonum, scilicet secundum quod li omnes tenetur distributive; sed non est possibile, implicat enim contradictionem: ex hoc enim ipso quod est proprium huius, non est alterius. Si autem non accipiatur sic sed collective, non erit consentaneum, id est congruum civitati.

About the first of these, he says that, even if we grant that it would be the best for the city that it be maximally one, it still does not seem to be shown that the city would be maximally one by everyone saying at the same time, “this is mine,” and “this is not mine.” For if all things were common, nobody would be able to say “this is mine” except about that of which another could also say “this is mine.” And Socrates thought that this would be a sign that the city is perfectly one. For he saw that factions arise in the city from this, that one has care for his own good, and another for his own good, and thus the zeal of men is carried toward diverse things because it is not the same thing about which each one says, “this is mine.” But if all men were to say about one and the same object, “this is mine,” the zeal of all men would be born into one; and thus, as Socrates supposed, the city would be maximally one. But this is not a cause [of unity]: because when you say “All say: ‘This is mine,’” this proposition has a twofold meaning: for the word “all” can be taken distributively or collectively. If distributively, its sense would be that each one, through himself, would be able to say of such a thing “this is mine;” and then what Socrates said would definitely be true, because each one would delight in one and the same [child] as though in his own son, and likewise, in the same woman as though his own wife. And thus also for substance, that is, possessions. But those who use wives and children in common do not all say in this sense, “this is mine,” but rather, all speak collectively, as though possessing one common thing: thus it is that nobody says through himself, “this is mine.” And the same thing is also true if a possession is common: for it will be the property of nobody in and of himself. Thus, therefore, it is clear that it was a certain sophistic syllogism along which Socrates was proceeding when he said that all saying “this is mine” is a sign of perfect unity: because such sayings as “all” and “each,” because of their twofold meaning, even in speeches, that is, in disputations, they make litigatious syllogisms, that is, sophistic ones: as if someone were to say, “since it is proposed ‘three from one party, and three from the other party,’ each of them is equal [par];” for this is true if it is taken collectively, because they are equal when joined together at the same time: but if taken distributively, they are unequal. Hence, it ought to be said that in one sense, it is good for all men to say of the same thing that it is theirs, namely, insofar as “all” is taken distributively. But this is not possible, because it implies a contradiction. For from this very thing, that it is the property of this one, it is not of another one. But if it is not taken like this, but collectively, it will not be consensual, that is, not agreeable for the city.

Polit.L2

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, ad haec autem etc., per quam ostendit quod dictum Socratis non solum non est utile civitati, sed etiam infert maximum nocumentum. Videmus enim quod de eo quod est commune multorum valde parum curatur: quia omnes maxime curant de propriis; sed de communibus minus etiam curant homines quam quantum pertinet ad unumquemque; ita quod ab omnibus simul minus curatur, quam curaretur si esset unius solius. Dum enim unus credit quod alius faciat, omnes negligunt: sicut accidit in servitiis ministrorum, quod multi servientes quandoque peius serviunt, dum unus expectat quod alius faciat. Secundum autem legem Socratis sequitur quod unusquisque civis haberet mille filios vel plures; et sic minus curabit de singulis quam si haberet unum solum. Et si addamus quod isti mille filii non sunt proprii uniuscuiusque civium, sed incertus est filius incerti patris, multo minus curabunt. Unde sequetur quod omnes cives similiter negligent curam puerorum, et hoc erit maximum damnum in civitate.

He sets out a second argument, at ad haec autem, etc., through which he shows that what was said by Socrates is not only not useful for the city, but even inflicts the greatest injury [upon the city]. For we see that exceedingly little care is taken of those things that are common to many: because all have the greatest care for what is their own; but about what is common, men care even less than for what belongs to each one; thus it is that something is cared for less by many at the same time than it would be cared for if it belonged to only one. For as long as one believes that another will do something, all neglect it: just as it happens in the services of assistants, that many servants often serve worse, so long as one expects that another will do something. Therefore, following the law of Socrates, it follows that each citizen would have a thousand sons, or many; and thus would care less for each than if he were to have only one. And if we add that these thousand sons are not property of each of the citizens, but is the uncertain son of an uncertain father, much less would they care. Whence, it follows that all citizens will likewise neglect the care of the sons, and this will be the greatest punishment [damnum] for the city.

Polit.L2

Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc sic unusquisque et cetera. Dicens quod sic, idest secundum positionem Socratis, unusquisque civium dicet de unoquoque civium bene operante, vel male, quotcumque contingat eos esse, dicet inquam, hic est meus, aliquod secundum naturam existens, puta, hic meus filius, vel illius. Et hoc modo dicet de unoquoque mille, vel quotcumque contingat esse in civitate: et hoc dicet non quasi pro certo sciat hunc esse suum filium, vel illius, sed cum dubitatione; quia si mulieres sint communes, multis accedentibus ad unam, non potest esse manifestum, ex quo patre contingat esse genitum filium; quia multi sunt qui non generant; et etiam immanifestum est, cuius filium contingat esse servatum in vita multis morientibus. Est ergo considerandum utrum melius sit, quod per modum istum aliquis appellet aliquid idem, id est suum filium vel nepotem quemlibet de numero duorum millium vel decem milium, aut magis, quod aliquis appellet aliquem iuvenem suum proprium, sicut modo in civitatibus faciunt. Videmus enim, quod unum et eundem iuvenem quidam civium vocant filium suum, quidam nepotem, vel secundum quamdam aliam propinquitatem, sive consideretur propinquitas propter consanguinitatem, sive propter aliquam familiaritatem, sive quia aliquis a principio habuit curam ipsius, puta, quia fuit tutor eius vel instructor, aut etiam eorum, quae ad ipsum pertinent, et cum unum dicat filium vel nepotem, alium dicet esse fratruelem, vel contribulem. Dicuntur autem fratrueles, qui sunt ex duobus fratribus nati. Contribules autem qui sunt ex una tribu, puta ex una societate in civitate. Sic igitur patet, quod non solum secundum legem Socratis multi cives dicunt de uno et eodem, hic est meus, sed etiam secundum consuetudinem quae nunc in civitatibus observatur. Sed in hoc videtur esse praeeminentia secundum legem Socratis, quod multi dicent hunc esse suum filium. Ex alia vero parte est praeeminentia ex hoc, quod diversi dicent unum et eundem esse suum, non tamquam communem, sed tamquam proprium, vel nepotem, vel filium, vel fratrem, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Multo autem melius et efficacius est ad amicitiam et curam impendendam, quod aliquis aestimet esse aliquem proprium nepotem, quam quod aestimet eum filium communem per modum quo Socrates posuit; quia sicut dictum est, propria magis homines amant et procurant quam communia. Unde patet, quod lex Socratis magis affert civitati detrimentum quam utilitatem.

He posits a third rationale, at adhuc sic unusquisque, etc. saying that thus, that is, according to the position the position of Socrates, each of the citizens would say about each of the citizens who worked well, or badly, however many they happened to be: “this is mine”—something that exists by nature, such as “this is my son,” or “this is his son.” And they would speak in this manner about each thousand—or however many there happened to be in the city. And they would say this, not as if they knew for certain that this was their son, or his son, but with doubt; since if the women were common, and many would join up with the same woman, it could not be clear from which father he happened to be the generated son, since there are many who did not generate him. And it would be even less clear whose son happened to be preserved in life, since many die. Therefore, it ought to be considered whether it is better that, in this manner, anyone should call anyone the same thing, that is, his son or his nephew, from any number of two thousand or ten thousand, or great, that anyone should call some youth his own, as in the manner they do in cities. For we see that a certain of the citizens calls one and the same youth his son, and another calls him his nephew, or following some other relationship; either considering a relationship because of consanguinity, or because of some familiarity, or because someone from the beginning had care of him—was his tutor, for instance, or instructor. This also is for those who belong to him: and although he would call one a son or nephew, he would call another a brother's son, or a tribesman. For they are called “brother's sons” who are born of two brothers, but they are called tribesmen who are from one tribe, such as those from one company [societas] in the city. It is clear, therefore, that it is not only following the law of Socrates that many citizens say of one and the same, “he is mine,” but also following the custom which is now observed in cities. But in this, it seems to be preeminent following the law of Socrates that many should say “this is my son.” From [custom], however, it is preeminent that diverse [citizens] should say that one and the same [youth] is theirs—not as if he were common, but as if he were their own nephew, or son, or brother, or other things of this manner. And it is much better and more effective for provoking [impendendam] friendship and care that someone should deem that someone is their own nephew than that he should evaluate him to be a common son in the manner that Socrates posited. Because as was said, men love and care for their own things more greatly than common things. Whence it is clear that the law of Socrates brings forth more damage than utility for the city.

Polit.L2

Quartam rationem ponit ibi, quinimo, sed neque diffugere et cetera. Et dicit, quod quamvis Socrates putaret per communitatem filiorum et mulierum hoc evitare, ut nullus dicat esse suum proprium filium vel fratrem, sed communiter hoc opinentur, tamen non potest hoc effugere, quin aliqui suspicentur de aliquibus, quod sint fratres eorum, vel filii, vel patres vel matres: et hoc propter similitudinem quae frequenter invenitur inter filios et patres vel matres. Unde quidam eorum, qui describunt peryodos terrae, id est quomodo circularitas mundi est habitata, narrant quod in superiori Lybia quidam habent communes uxores, sed dividunt filios secundum similitudines, ita quod unusquisque virorum accipit sibi pro filio illum qui sibi similatur. Et hoc etiam videmus contingere in feminis aliorum animalium, sicut equae, et vaccae, quae naturaliter habent, quod faciunt filios similes patribus. Sicut dicitur de quadam equa, quae in terra Pharsaliae ob hoc vocabatur iusta, quia filios reddebat similes patribus. Unde manifestum est, quod Socrates per legem quam dicit esse ferendam de communitate uxorum et filiorum, non potest hoc consequi, ut non sint privati affectus inter homines.

He posits a fourth rationale, at quinimo, sed neque diffugere, etc, and says that although Socrates had thought, through the community of women and sons, to avoid this—so that nobody would say that someone was their own son or brother, but would hold this opinion commonly, nevertheless, he could not escape that it should be expected about some by others that they are their brothers, or sons, or fathers, or mothers: and this is because of the likeness that is frequently found between sons and fathers or mothers. Whence, certain of them, who describe the peryodos of the earth, that is, how the circle of the world is inhabited, narrate that in upper Libya there are some who have common wives, but divide their sons following their likenesses: thus, that each of the men takes to himself as son he who is like to himself. And we also see that this happens among the females of other animals, such as mares and cows, which naturally have it that they make sons like to their fathers; just as was said about a certain mare, which in the land of Pharsalus was called “the just” on account of this, because she gave back sons that were like their fathers. Whence it is clear that Socrates, through the law that he says ought to be held about the community of wives and sons, cannot bring it about that there would not be private affections between men.

Polit.L2

Lecture 3

Polit.L3

Adhuc autem et tales difficultates non facile devitare hand construentibus communitatem, puta vulnerationes et homicidia involuntaria, haec autem voluntaria et pugnas et maledictiones, quorum nullum conveniens est fieri ad patres et matres et eos qui non longe secundum cognationem sunt, quaemadmodum et ad eos qui longe; quae plus accidere necessarium ignorantibus quam scientibus; et factorum scientibus quidem contingit putatas fieri solutiones, aliis autem neque unam.

Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of such a community to guard, will be assaults and homicides, voluntary as well as involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all which are most unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy when there is no relationship. Moreover, they are much more likely to occur if the relationship is unknown, and, when they have occurred, the customary expiations of them cannot be made.

Polit.L3

Inconveniens autem et communes facientes filios, coire solum auferre ab amantibus, amare autem non prohibere, neque usus aliios quos patri ad filium esse, omnium est indecentissimum, et fratri ad fratrem, quoniam et amare solum. Inconveniens autem et coitum auferre propter aliam causam quidem neque unam, ut valde vehementi delactatione facta, quia autem hic quidem pater aut filius, hi autem fratres ad invicem, nihil putare differre.

Again, how strange it is that Socrates, after having made the children common, should hinder lovers from carnal intercourse only, but should permit love and familiarities between father and son or between brother and brother, than which nothing can be more unseemly, since even without them love of this sort is improper. How strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son or of brothers with one another made no difference.

Polit.L3

Videtur autem magis terrae cultoribus esse utile communes esse uxores et pueros quam custodibus: minus enim erit amicitia, communibus existentibus pueris et uxoribus; oportet autem tales esse subiectos ad obedire et ad non insolescere.

This community of wives and children seems better suited to the husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they have wives and children in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel.

Polit.L3

Totaliter autem accidere necesse propter talem legem contrarium eorum quorum convenit recte positas leges causas fieri, et propter quam causam Socrates sic arbitratus est oportere ordinari quae circa pueros et uxores. Amicitiam quidem enim putamus maximum esse bonorum civitatibus. Sic enim utique minime seditiones facient, et unam esse civitatem collaudat maxime Socrates, quod et videtur et ille esse inquit amicitiae opus, quaemadmodum in amativis sermonibus scimus dicentem Aristophanem, quod amantibus propter nimis diligere desiderantibus natura unum factos esse, et fieri ambos ex duobus existentibus unum, hic quidem igitur necesse ambos corruptos esse aut unum. In civitate autem amicitiam necessarium remissam fieri propter communionem talem, et minime dicere meum, aut filium patrem, aut patrem filium. Sicut enim modicum dulce in multam aquam mixtum insensibilem facit mixtionem, sic accidit et familiaritatem ad invicem eam quae ex nominibus his curare minime necessarium existens in politia tali, aut patrem ut filii, aut filium ut patris, aut ut fratres invicem. Duo enim sunt quae maxime faciunt sollicite curare homines et diligere, proprium et dilectum; quorum neutrum possibile est existere his qui sic civiliter conversantur.

In a word, the result of such a law would be just the opposite of which good laws ought to have, and the intention of Socrates in making these regulations about women and children would defeat itself. For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of states and the preservative of them against revolutions; neither is there anything which Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of the state which he and all the world declare to be created by friendship. But the unity which he commends would be like that of the lovers in the Symposium, who, as Aristophanes says, desire to grow together in the excess of their affection, and from being two to become one, in which case one or both would certainly perish. Whereas in a state having women and children common, love will be watery; and the father will certainly not say 'my son,' or the son 'my father.' As a little sweet wine mingled with a great deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of community, the idea of relationship which is based upon these names will be lost; there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son, or the son about the father, or brothers about one another. Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection- that a thing is your own and that it is your only one-neither can exist in such a state as this.

Polit.L3

At vero et de eo quod est transferri natos pueros, hos quidem ex cultoribus et artificibus ad custodes, hos autem ex his ad illos, multam habet turbationem, quo erit modo; et cognoscere necessarium dantes et transferentes quibus quos dant.

Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank, will be very difficult to arrange; the givers or transferrers cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring, and to whom.

Polit.L3

Adhuc autem et antique dicta magis in his necessarium accidere, puta vulnerationes, amores, homicidia. Non enim adhuc appellant fratres et pueros et patres et matres qui in alios cives dati custodes, et rursum qui apud custodes alios cives, ut vereantur talium aliquid operari propter cognationem. De ea quidem igitur quae circa pueros et uxores communione, determinatum sit hoc modo.

And the previously mentioned evils, such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more often amongst those who are transferred to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned to them among the guardians; for they will no longer call the members of the class they have left brothers, and children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and children, let this be our conclusion.

Polit.L3

Adhuc autem et tales difficultates et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit, quod causa, quam Socrates assignabat, suae legis, non erat rationabilis, scilicet quod optimum esset civitati esse maxime unam, et iterum quod maxima unitas non provenit ex communitate mulierum et filiorum, hic tertio vult ostendere multas difficultates et inconvenientia, quae consequentur ex tali lege: et proponit sex rationes.

After the philosopher shows that the cause which Socrates indicated for his law was not reasonable—namely, that it would be best for the city to be as unified as possible, and then that the greatest unity does not arise from the community of women and children—he here wants to show a third thing: the many difficulties and unfitting things that would follow from such a law: and he puts forward six reasons.

Polit.L3

Circa quarum primam dicit, quod illis qui constituunt hanc communitatem mulierum et filiorum, non est facile, quod devitent has difficultates, et inconvenientia quae dicentur. Primo enim non potest contingere quin in civitate contingant vulnerationes et homicidia. Quandoque quidem involuntaria, puta cum casu fiunt. Quandoque autem voluntaria, puta cum fiunt ex odio vel ira. Et iterum rixae et maledictiones sive opprobria: quae omnia multo magis inconveniens est quod fiant parentibus, vel aliis propinquis secundum cognationem, quod extraneis et remotis; quanto enim naturaliter aliquis magis inclinatur ad amorem alterius, tanto magis inconveniens est, quod ei inferat nocumentum. Et huiusmodi nocumenta vel iniuriae multo magis fient ad illos de quibus nescietur pro certo quod sint filii eorum quibus inferunt tales iniurias, quam apud illos de quibus pro certo scitur. Potest etiam cum hoc reputari, quod sit facta aliqua dissolutio propinquitatis; sicut contingit quandoque, quod propinquitas tollitur, vel propter longinquam generationem, vel quandoque etiam consanguinei abdicantur propter aliquam offensam. Sed illi qui nesciunt propinquitatem, nullam possunt putare solutionem propinquitatis esse factam. Unde patet, quod huiusmodi mala, quae in civitatibus proveniunt, erunt magis inconvenientia si ponatur communitas mulierum et filiorum; quia scilicet continget, frequenter quod fiant ad propinquos.

About the first of these, he says that for those who constitute this community of women and children, it is not easy to avoid these difficulties and unfitting things which were mentioned. First, because it cannot happen that assaults and murders will not happen in the city. Sometimes, of course, these things are done unwillingly, as happens with accidents, but sometimes they are willing, as when they happen out of hatred or anger. And then—brawls and curses or taunts—all of which are much more unfitting when done against parents, or other kindred relations, than against foreigners and those who are remote; for by however much someone is naturally more inclined toward the love of another, by so much is it more unfitting that he should advance harm against them. And this manner of injury or harm happens far more to those about whom it is not known for certain whether they are the sons of those against whom they advance these sorts of injuries than it does among those about whom it is known for certain. With this, it can also be reckoned that a certain dissolution of the relationship has been made, just as it sometimes happens that relationship is taken away either because of a distant generating, or when blood-relatives are rejected because of some offense. But those who are ignorant of relation cannot think that a dissolution of the relationship has been made. Hence it is clear that this manner of evils, which arise in the city, will be more unfitting if a community of women and children is set up, because it would frequently happen that such things would be done to relatives.

Polit.L3

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, inconveniens autem, et cetera. Et sumitur haec ratio ex inconvenientibus, quae sequentur ex concupiscentia libidinum, sicut prima sumebatur ex inconvenientibus quae sequuntur ex ira vel odio, considerandum est ergo, quod apud omnes reputatum fuit inconveniens et inhonestum, quod filii coirent cum matribus, aut patres cum filiabus; et hoc oportebat accidere, si ponerentur communes filii: quia contingeret, quod filius cognosceret matrem suam sicut et aliquam aliam mulierem; et similiter contingeret, quod pater cognosceret carnaliter filiam suam, sicut et aliquam aliam. Socrates igitur praesentiens hoc inconveniens, voluit ipsum vitare tali statuto, ut per principes civitatis impediretur coitus filii cum matre, cum oportebat esse certum ad minus apud principes civitatis, qui filium susciperent nutriendum; et similiter, ut impediretur per eosdem principes coitus patris ad filiam, quando aliqua coniectura posset haberi, quod haec esset filia illius.

He posits a second rationale, at inconveniens autem, etc., and this rationale is taken up from the unfitting things that follow from lustful desire, just as the first was taken from the unfitting things that follow from anger and hatred. Therefore, it ought to be considered that among all men it was reputed unfitting and dishonorable for sons to have intercourse with their mothers, or fathers with their daughters; and this would have to occur if common sons were established, because it would happen that a son would know his mother just like any other woman; and likewise, it would happen that a father would know his daughter carnally, as he would anyone else. Socrates, therefore, anticipating this unfitting thing, wanted to shun such things with a statute, so that through the governors of the city, the intercourse of son with mother should be hindered, since it needed to be certain at least among the governors of the city, who took up the son for rearing; and likewise, to hinder through the same governors the intercourse of father and daughter when some conjecture could be had that this was his daughter.

Polit.L3

Sed hoc statutum Socratis philosophus impugnat dupliciter.

But the philosopher attacks this statute of Socrates for two reasons.

Polit.L3

Primo quidem, quia hoc statutum videtur esse insufficiens. Prohibebat enim filio solum coitum matris, non autem prohibebat ei amorem libidinosum, quia non indicabat ei quod haec esset mater eius, neque etiam prohibebat ei alios usus libidinosos, puta amplexus et oscula, quae indecentissimum est esse inter propinquos, quia etiam amorem libidinosum inter eos esse est inconveniens.

First, because this statute seems to be insufficient. For it prohibited the son only from having intercourse with his mother, but it did not prohibit him lustful love, because it did not indicate to him that this was his mother, nor did it prohibit it from other lustful acts, such as embraces and kisses, which is utterly indecent between relatives, because even lustful love between them is unfitting.

Polit.L3

Secundo improbat istud statutum propter causam quam assignat. Dicebat enim, quod interdicendus erat coitus matris cum filio, propter nullam aliam causam, nisi ad vitandum delectationem valde vehementem, quae ex amore naturali matris et filii proveniret, qui superadderetur libidinoso amori. Vehementiam autem delectationis in coitu, ideo vitari volebat, ne homines nimis allicerentur ad intemperantiam. Dicit ergo Aristoteles, quod inconveniens est dicere, quod propter istam solam causam debeat aliquis abstinere a coitu matris, et non ex solo, quod mater eius est. Et eadem ratio est de aliis propinquis: ex ipsa enim sanguinis propinquitate debent sibi cognati quamdam reverentiam honestatis, quae tollitur per lasciviam coitus.

Second, he blames this statute because of the cause that was indicated [for it]. For he said that the intercourse of mother with son ought to be prohibited because no other cause, except for shunning extremely vehement delight, which would have come forth from the natural love of mother and son, and which would have been added on top of the lustful love. The vehement delight in intercourse, however, he wanted to shun so that men would not be lured into intemperance. Therefore, Aristotle says that it is unfitting to say that because of this cause alone someone ought to abstain from intercourse with his mother, and not from this only: that she is his mother. And the reason is the same for other relatives: for from the very relationship of blood, they owe to their kinsmen a certain reverence of honor, which is taken away through wanton [licentious?] intercourse.

Polit.L3

Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, videtur autem magis et cetera. Et dicit quod ista lex Socratis de communitate uxorum et filiorum, magis erit utilis agricolis et aliis infimae conditionis hominibus, quam custodibus civitatis, idest principibus civitatis, et aliis magnis viris, qui agunt curam de rebus communibus civitatis; quia filii agricolarum exaltabuntur, et filii magnorum deiicientur, si omnes redigantur in commune. Et ex hoc sequitur, quod minus erit amicitia inter magnos et plebeios: conservatur enim amicitia inter eos, inquantum agricolae et alii huiusmodi sunt principibus subiecti: quia ut dicitur in nono Ethicorum, illud quod est proportionale unicuique, salvat amicitiam: subiectio autem conservatur in hoc, quod inferiores principibus obediant et non insolescant; quod quidem accidet si aequiparantur maioribus in filiis et mulieribus. Unde patet, quod haec lex Socratis impedit amicitiam civitatis, quae debet esse inter principes et subiectos.

He posits a third reason, at videtur autem magis, etc., and says that this law of Socrates about the community of wives and sons will be more useful for the farmers and for other men of the lowest condition, than for the guardians of the city, that is, the governors of the city, or for other great men who have care of the communal affairs of the city; because the sons of the farmers will be elevated and the sons of the great will be cast down if all are reduced in common. And out of this it will follow that there will be less friendship between the great and the plebeians: for friendship among them is preserved insofar as farmers and others like this are subject to governors: because, as was said in Ethics IX, that which is proportional to each one saves friendship. But subjecthood is preserved through this, that the inferiors are obedient to the governors, and do not become insolent; and this would occur if they were put on an equal level with the great in women and children. Whence it is clear that this law of Socrates hinders the friendship of the city that ought to exist between governors and subjects.

Polit.L3

Quartam rationem ponit, ibi, totaliter autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod ex tali lege omnino accidit contrarium eorum, ad quae intendunt illi qui ponunt rectas leges; et iterum contrarium ei, propter quod Socrates putavit, quod debeat ordinari lex de pueris et uxoribus. Omnes enim communiter putamus, quod amicitia sit maximum bonum in civitatibus; quia si sit amicitia inter cives, minime facient seditiones; et ad hoc intendunt omnes legislatores, ut civitas sit sine seditionibus. Unde omnes, qui ponunt rectas leges, ad hoc tendunt, ut sit amicitia inter omnes cives. Socrates etiam dixit, quod optimum in civitate erat, quod esset una: unitas autem hominum adinvicem est effectus amicitiae, et sicut communiter videtur omnibus, et etiam sicut Socrates dixit. Unde etiam Aristophanes dixit in sermonibus quos de amore fecit, quod seinvicem amantes desiderant, quod essent facti unum per naturam; et quia hoc non potest esse, desiderant, quod fiant unum quantumcumque possibile est. In hoc igitur casu in quo Aristophanes loquitur, sequeretur quod vel ambo se amantes corrumperentur, dum ex eis aliquid unum fieret, vel alter eorum corrumperetur quasi in alterum conversus. Sed in civitate propter talem communionem mulierum et filiorum, sequitur quod amicitia diminuatur et minimum habebit de pondere ad amorem quod vel pater dicat de aliquo, iste est meus filius, cum simul dicat hoc de multis aliis in civitate existentibus, aut filius dicat de patre, hic est meus pater, cum etiam ipse hoc de multis aliis dicat. Videmus enim quod si aliquis aliquod modicum dulce immittat in multam aquam fit insensibilis mixtio, sicut cum parum de melle imponitur in multa aqua, nihil sentitur de dulcedine mellis. Unde familiaritas, quae ex istis nominibus provenit in civitate, qua unus dicit, hic est meus pater, vel filius, aut frater, parum curabitur si quilibet antiquior de quolibet iuniore dicat eum esse suum filium, et e converso, quilibet iunior dicat quemlibet antiquiorem esse suum patrem, et omnes coetabiles dicant se esse fratres. Et huius ratio est, quia duo sunt quae maxime faciunt homines sollicite curare de aliis et maxime diligere eos: quorum unum est quod sit proprium et singulare eorum. Unde homines magis curant de rebus propriis, quam de communibus, sicut supra habitum est. Aliud est specialis amor, quem quis habet ad aliquem: qui quidem amor magis fit ad eum quem aliquis singulariter diligit quam ad eum quem simul cum multis aliis diligit: sicut videmus quod etiam parentes magis diligunt filios unigenitos, quam si multos habeant; quasi amor diminuatur per communicationem ad multos. Sic igitur patet quod si sit talis ordinatio civitatis qualem Socrates lege ordinavit, diminuetur amicitia civium adinvicem; quod est contra intentionem legislatorum.

He posits a fourth reason, at totaliter autem, etc., and he says that from such a law occurs the utter contrary of those things that they who set up correct laws intend; and again, something contrary to that on account of which Socrates thought that the law about wives and children ought to be ordered. For we all think in common that friendship is the greatest good in cities, because if there is friendship among citizens, they least make sedition: and this is what all legislators intend--that the city may be without sedition. Whence everyone who establishes correct laws intends this: that there may be friendship among the citizens. Socrates also said that the best thing in the city was that it should be one: but the unity of men toward each other is the effect of friendship, both as it seems to all in common, and also as Socrates said. Hence also Aristophanes said in the discourses he made about love, that lovers mutually desire that they should be made one through nature; and because this is not able to be, they desire that they should become one as much as possible. In this case of which Aristophanes spoke, it would follow that either both lovers would be corrupted, since from them, something would come to be that was one, or else one of them would be corrupted, as though turned into the other. But in the city, according to such a communion of women and sons, it follows that friendship would be diminished, and will have very little of the weight of love when a father says of someone, “this is my son,” since he would at the same time say it about many others existing in the city; or when a son says about his father, “he is my father,” since he would also say this of many others. For we see that if someone introduces a little bit of something sweet into much water, it will become imperceptible in the mixture, just as when too little honey is put into much water: none of the honey’s sweetness is perceived. Whence familiarity, which arises in the city from these names [when] one says “he is my father” or “son,” or “brother,” will be too little cared for if just anyone older could say about anyone younger, “this is my son,” and conversely, if anyone younger could say that anyone older is his father, and everyone of the same age said that they were brothers. And the reason for this is because there are two things that most of all make men utterly care about others, and most of all prize [diligere] them: the first of which is that they be their own, and uniquely theirs. Hence men care more about their own things than about common ones, as was previously stated. The other is the specific love that someone has toward another, which becomes a greater love toward him whom someone uniquely prizes than toward him whom he prizes along with many others [i.e. who many others also prize]. Just as we see that even parents more greatly prize only-begotten sons than they would if they had many, as if love were diminished by being common to many. Thus it is clear that if there were an ordering of the city like that which Socrates put in order by law, the friendship of citizens for one another would be diminished--which is contrary to the intention of legislators.

Polit.L3

Quintam rationem ponit, ibi, at vero et de eo quod est et cetera. Et dicit quod secundum ordinationem Socratis oportebat quod fieret transmutatio filiorum; ut illi scilicet qui essent nati a quibusdam matribus, aliis darentur ad nutriendum, ita quod nullus cognosceret proprium filium. Quomodo autem hoc fieri posset, ut scilicet transferrentur filii agricultorum et artificum ad nobiles qui custodiunt civitatem, aut e converso, non de facili apparet: (afferret) enim talis translatio magnam turbationem civibus afferret, et ex alia parte non posset omnino tolli opinio de propriis filiis; quia illi qui darent et transferrent pueros, oporteret quod scirent a quibus acciperent et quibus darent. Unde lex Socratis non consequeretur intentum, et cum hoc induceret magnam turbationem.

He posits a fifth rationale, and says that following the ordering of Socrates, there must have been a changeover of sons, such that those who were born from certain mothers would be given away to be reared, so that no one would know their own sons. But how this could come to be, such that the sons of farmers and artisans should be transferred to the nobles who were guardians of the city, or the converse, is not easily apparent: for such a transfer would bring a great disturbance to the citizens. And on the other hand, opinion about one’s own children could not be completely taken away, because for those who give and transfer the children, it would be necessary that they should know [scirent] from whom they received [the children], and to whom they gave them. Whence, the law of Socrates would not have followed through on his intention, and along with this, it would have brought about a great disturbance.

Polit.L3

Sextam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. Et dicit quod propter huiusmodi translationem puerorum maxime in talibus acciderent ea quae superius dicta sunt, scilicet vulnerationes, libidinosi amores, et homicidia inter propinquos. Videmus enim quod nunc pueri qui dantur ad custodiam et nutritionem aliorum, non tanta affectione nominant suos propinquos, sicut si apud eos nutriantur; et per consequens non multum verentur in suos propinquos aliquid praedictorum committere: multo igitur magis si non cognoscerent suos esse proprios propinquos, nihil talium vererentur facere. Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod hoc modo determinatum est de communione filiorum et uxorum, quam Socrates inducere volebat.

He posits a sixth rationale, and he says that because of this manner of transfer of sons, those sorts of things that were previously mentioned would most of all happen, namely, assaults, lustful loves, and murders among relations. For we see that even now, children who are given into the guard and rearing of others do not name their relatives with as great affection as they would if they were reared among them, and as a result, it is not as awful for them to commit one of the aforementioned things against their relatives. It will be even much more so if they do not know them to be their relatives: nothing like this will be awful for them to do. Lastly, he concludes in an epilogue that in this manner, it has been determined regarding the communion of sons and wives that Socrates wanted to introduce.

Polit.L3

Lecture 4

Polit.L4

Habitum autem his est considerare de possessione quomodo oportet constituere futuris conversari secundum optimam politiam, utrum communem aut non cummunem oporteat esse possessionem. Hoc autem utique quis considerabit et seorsum extra legis statuta de pueris et uxoribus. Dico autem quae circa possessionem, utrum et si sint illa seorsum secundum modum quem nunc se habent omnes communes esse possessiones melius et usus, puta: campos quidem seorsum, fructus autem in commune ferentes expendere, quod quidem quaedam faciunt nationum; aut contrario modo terram quidem communem esse et colere communiter, fructus autem dividi ad proprios usus, dicuntur autem quidam et hoc modo communicare barbarorum, aut et campos et fructus communes.

Next let us consider what should be our arrangements about property: should the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in common or not? This question may be discussed separately from the enactments about women and children. Even supposing that the women and children belong to individuals, according to the custom which is at present universal, may there not be an advantage in having and using possessions in common? Three cases are possible: the soil may be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the common stock; and this is the practice of some nations. Or, the soil may be common, and may be cultivated in common, but the produce divided among individuals for their private use; this is a form of common property which is said to exist among certain barbarians. Or, the soil and the produce may be alike common.

Polit.L4

Alteris quidem igitur existentibus cultoribus, alius utique erit modus et facilior; ipsis autem sibi laborantibus quae circa possessiones plures utique exhibebunt difficultates; etenim in fruitionibus et operibus non factis equalibus sed inequalibus, necessarium accusationes fieri ad fruentes quidem si accipientes quidem multa pauca autem laborantes, ab his qui minus quidem accipiunt plus autem laborant.

When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be different and easier to deal with; but when they till the ground for themselves the question of ownership will give a world of trouble. If they do not share equally enjoyments and toils, those who labor much and get little will necessarily complain of those who labor little and receive or consume much.

Polit.L4

Omnino autem convivere et communicare humanis omnibus difficile et maxime talibus. Ostendunt autem comperegrinantium cummunitates: fere enim plurimi dissidentes ex his quae in potibus et ex parvis propulsantes invicem.

But indeed there is always a difficulty in men living together and having all human relations in common, but especially in their having common property. The partnerships of fellow-travelers are an example to the point; for they generally fall out over everyday matters and quarrel about any trifle which turns up.

Polit.L4

Adhuc autem famulantium his maxime offendimur, quibus plurimum indigemus ad ministrationes ancillares. Communes quidem igitur esse possessiones, has et alias tales habet difficultates.

So with servants: we are most able to take offense at those with whom we most we most frequently come into contact in daily life. These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of property.

Polit.L4

Eo autem modo quo nunc se habet superornatum consuetudinibus et ordine legum rectarum non modicum utique differet; habebit enim quod ex ambobus bonum. Dico autem quod ex ambobus, quod ex communes esse possessiones, et quod ex proprias. Oportet enim aliquo modo quidem esse communes, omnino autem proprias. Curae quidem enim divisae litigia ad invicem non facient. Magis autem addent ut ad proprium unicuique insistentes, propter virtutem autem erit ad uti secundum proverbium: communia quae amicorum. Est autem et nunc hoc modo in quibusdam civitatibus sic subscriptum, tamquam non existens impossibile, et maxime in bene dispositis, haec quidem sunt, haec autem fient utique; propriam enim unusquisque possessionem habens, haec quidem utilia facit amicis, his autem utitur tamquam communibus, velut etiam in Lacedemonia servis utuntur his qui invicem ut est dicere propriis, adhuc autem equis et canibus si indigeant pro viaticis in agris per regionem. Manifestum igitur quod melius esse quidem proprias possessiones, usu autem facere communes; quomodo autem fiant tales, legislatoris hoc opus propium est.

The present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages of both systems. Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own business. And yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of use, 'Friends,' as the proverb says, 'will have all things common.' Even now there are traces of such a principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists already to a certain extent and may be carried further. For, although every man has his own property, some things he will place at the disposal of his friends, while of others he shares the use with them. The Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and horses, and dogs, as if they were their own; and when they lack provisions on a journey, they appropriate what they find in the fields throughout the country. It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition.

Polit.L4

Adhuc autem et ad delectationem inenarrabile quantum differt putare aliquid proprium; nequaquam enim vane eam quae ad se ipsum habet amicitiam unusquisque, sed est hoc naturale. Filauton autem esse vituperatur et iuste. Non est autem hoc amare se ipsum, sed magis quam oportet amare, quaemadmodum et amatorem pecuniarum quoniam amant quidem omnes ut dicatur unumquodque talium.

Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own; for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this, however, is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess, like the miser's love of money; for all, or almost all, men love money and other such objects in a measure.

Polit.L4

At vero et largiri et auxiliari amicis aut extraneis aut alteris delectabilissimum, quod fit possessione propria existente. Haec itaque accidunt nimis unum facientibus civitatem.

And further, there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered when a man has private property. These advantages are lost by excessive unification of the state.

Polit.L4

Et ad haec interimunt opera duarum virtutum manifestae: temperantiae quidem circa mulieres: opus enim bonum ab aliena existente abstinere propter temperantiam; liberalistatis autem circa possessiones: neque enim erit manifestus liberalis existens, neque operabitur actum liberalem neque unum. In usu enim possessionum liberalitatis opus est.

The exhibition of two virtues, besides, is visibly annihilated in such a state: first, temperance towards women (for it is an honorable action to abstain from another's wife for temperance' sake); secondly, liberality in the matter of property. No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an example of liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of property.

Polit.L4

Bonae faciei quidem igitur talis legislatio, et filantropos utique esse videbitur; audiens enim gaudens suscipit putans fore amicitiam quandam mirabilem omnibus ad omnes. Aliterque et cum accusat aliquis nunc existentia in politiis mala tamquam facta propter non communem esse substantiam, dico autem disceptationes ad invicem circa contractuum et falsorum testimoniorum iudicia, et divitum adulationes, quorum nihil fit propter incommunicationem, sed propter malitiam, quoniam et communia possidentes et communicantes multo magis dissidentes videmus quam separatim substantias habentes. Sed videmus paucos ex communicationibs dissidentes ad multos comparantes possidentes segregatim possessiones.

Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence; men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause- the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common, though there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private property.

Polit.L4

Adhuc autem iustum non solum dicere quantis privantur malis communicantes, sed etiam quantis bonis. Videtur autem esse omnino impossibilis vita.

Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the citizens will be saved, but also the advantages which they will lose. The life which they are to lead appears to be quite impracticable.

Polit.L4

Habitum autem his est et cetera. Postquam Philosophus improbavit legem Socratis quantum ad communitatem mulierum et puerorum, hic improbat eam quantum ad communitatem possessionum. Et circa hoc duo facit.

Habitum autem hiis est, etc. After the philosopher objected to the law of Socrates with regard to the community of women and children, he here objects to it with reference to the community of possessions. And concerning this, he does two things.

Polit.L4

Primo proponit quod intendit.

First, he proposes his intention.

Polit.L4

Secundo ostendit propositum, ibi, alteris quidem igitur et cetera.

Second, he shows what was proposed, at alteris quidem igitur, [II.4.2] etc.

Polit.L4

Circa primum tria facit.

Concerning the first he does three things.

Polit.L4

Primo continuat se ad praecedentia, dicens quod habitum, id est consequens ad praemissa est considerare de possessione, utrum oporteat ordinare quod illi qui debent conversari secundum optimam conversationem civilem, habeant possessiones communes vel non communes.

First, he links it with the preceding, saying that one has to consider about possessions—as a consequence of the preceding—whether it is necessary to order them such that those who ought to be associated after the best civil association should have possessions in common or not in common.

Polit.L4

Secundo, ibi, hoc autem utique et cetera. Ostendit quod ista quaestio seorsum est consideranda a praemissa, quae erat de communitate uxorum; et dicit quod considerandum est seorsum, etiam si nihil esset statutum de communitate filiorum et uxorum: utrum scilicet dato quod filii et uxores non sint communes, sed seorsum quilibet habeat propriam uxorem et filios secundum modum qui nunc observatur, melius sit quod possessiones et usus earum sint communes omnibus, quam quod unusquisque habeat propriam possessionem, sicut nunc est.

Second, at hoc autem utique, etc., he shows that this question should be considered separately from the previous, which was about the community of women; and he says that it would be considered separately even if there were no statute about the community of children and wives. Namely, if it were a given that children and wives were not common, but that each one separately had is own wife and children after the mode that is now observed, we should still consider whether it is better that possessions and their use should be common to all than that each one have his own possessions, as it is now.

Polit.L4

Tertio, ibi, puta campos seorsum et cetera. Distinguit modos quibus possibile est cives communicare in bonis possessis. Et ponit tres modos:

Third, at puta campos seorsum, etc., he distinguishes the modes in which it is possible for citizens to hold their possessed goods in common. And he lays out three modes:

Polit.L4

quorum primus est quod unusquisque habeat seorsum proprium campum, sed omnes fructus camporum deferantur ad commune et distribuantur in omnes: quod observabatur apud quasdam nationes.

the first of which is that each person separately has fields of his own, but that all the produce of the fields are carried away to a common place and distributed to everyone—which is observed among some nations.

Polit.L4

Secundus modus est quod e converso terra sit communis et communiter colatur, sed fructus agrorum dividantur inter cives ad proprium usum cuiuslibet. Et hic modus apud quosdam barbaros observabatur.

The second mode is that, conversely, the land is in common, and cultivated in common, but the produce of the farms is divided among the citizens for the private use of each. And this mode is observed among some barbarians.

Polit.L4

Tertius modus est, ut et campi et fructus sint communes: quod Socrates lege statuendum esse dicebat.

The third mode is that both the fields and their produce are common, which Socrates said should be established by law.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit alteris quidem igitur etc., ostendit quid sit verum circa propositam quaestionem.

Then, where he says alteris quidem igitur, etc., he shows what is true about the proposed question.

Polit.L4

Et primo improbat legem Socratis de communitate possessionum, ostendens quae mala ex ea sequerentur.

And first he objects to the law of Socrates about the community of possessions, showing what evils would follow from it.

Polit.L4

Secundo ostendit quae bona per eam tollentur, ibi, eo autem modo et cetera.

Second, he shows what goods would be taken away through it, at eo autem modo, [II.4.5] etc.

Polit.L4

Circa primum ponit tres rationes:

Concerning the first, he lays out three rationales.

Polit.L4

quarum prima est, quia si possessiones essent communes omnium civium, oporteret alterum duorum esse: scilicet quod vel agri colerentur per aliquos extraneos, vel per aliquos ex civibus. Et si quidem per alios colerentur, haberet aliquam difficultatem, quia difficile esset advocare tot extraneos agricolas: tamen hic modus esset facilior, quam si aliqui ex civibus laborent: hoc enim exhiberet multas difficultates. Non enim esset possibile quod omnes cives colerent agros: oporteret enim maiores maioribus negotiis intendere, minores autem agriculturae: et tamen oporteret quod maiores, qui minus laborarent circa agriculturam, plus acciperent de fructibus: et sic non aequaliter secundum proportionem corresponderet perceptio fructuum operibus, sive laboribus agriculturae: et propter hoc ex necessitate orirentur accusationes et litigia, dum minores qui plus laborarent, murmurarent de maioribus quod parum laborantes multum acciperent, ipsi autem e converso minus acciperent plus laborantes. Et sic patet quod ex hac lege non sequeretur unitas civitatis, ut Socrates volebat, sed potius discidium.

The first is: if possessions were common to all citizens, one of two things must happen [esse]: either the farms are cultivated by some who are foreigners, or by some of the citizens. And if, indeed, they are cultivated by others, there will be some difficulty, because it is difficult to summon so many foreign farmers: however, this mode would be easier than if some of the citizens were to labor, for this displays many difficulties. For it would not be possible for all the citizens to cultivate the farms, since it must be that the greater [citizens] would intend greater occupations, but the lesser ones at farming; nevertheless, it must also be that the greater citizens, who would labor less at farming, would also receive more of its produce, and so the partaking of the produce [of the farms] would not correspond to the work equally, according to proportion. And because of this, of necessity there would arise accusations and quarrels when the lesser citizens, who labor more, would complain about the greater that those laboring less received much, but conversely, those laboring more received less. And so it is evident that from this law, the unity of the city—which Socrates had wished—would not follow, but rather, discord.

Polit.L4

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, omnino autem convivere et cetera. Et dicit quod valde difficile est quod multi homines simul ducant vitam et quod communicent in quibuscumque humanis bonis et praecipue in divitiis. Videmus enim quod illi qui in aliquibus divitiis communicant, multas habent dissensiones adinvicem, ut patet in his qui simul peregrinantur: frequenter enim adinvicem dissentiunt ex his quae expendunt in cibis et potibus compotum faciendo, et aliquando pro modico seinvicem propulsant et offendunt verbo vel facto. Unde patet quod si omnes cives haberent communes omnes possessiones, plurima litigia inter eos existerent.

He lays out a second rationale, at omnino autem convivere, etc., and he says that it is extremely difficult for many men to live life together and that they commune in any human goods, and chiefly in wealth. For we see that those who commune in some wealth have many disagreements with each other, as is evident among those who travel together: for they frequently disagree with each other about what is advantageous when determining what is to be done about food and drink, and at times, for a trifle, they repel and offend each other in word and deed. So it is evident that if all citizens held all possessions in common, more quarrels would exist among them.

Polit.L4

Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc autem famulantium et cetera. Et dicit quod homines maxime offenduntur suis famulis quibus multum indigent ad aliqua servilia ministeria; et hoc propter communitatem conversationis vitae: qui enim non frequenter simul conversantur, non frequenter habent turbationes ad invicem. Ex quo patet quod communicatio inter homines existens est frequenter causa discordiae. Ultimo autem concludit quod praemissae difficultates et aliae similes sequerentur ex communitate possessionum in civitate.

He lays out a third reason, at adhuc autem famulantium, etc., and he says that men are most offended by those maids which they most [frequently] require for some servile service. And this is because of a community of associated life: for those who do not frequently associate do not frequently have disturbances with each other. From this it is evident that a union existing among men is frequently the cause of strife. And lastly, he concludes that the previous difficulties and other similar ones would follow from a community of possessions in the city.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit eo autem modo etc., ostendit quae bona per praedictam legem tollerentur. Et ponit tres rationes:

Then, where he says eo autem modo, etc., he shows what goods would be taken away through the aforementioned law. And he lays out three rationales.

Polit.L4

circa quarum primam dicit, quod si ita ordinetur in civitatibus, sicut nunc se habet, quod scilicet possessiones sint civibus divisae, et hoc ordinetur pulchris consuetudinibus et iustis legibus, habebit magnam differentiam in excessu bonitatis et utilitatis respectu eius quod Socrates dicebat. Utrobique enim invenitur aliquid boni: scilicet et in hoc quod ponuntur possessiones propriae, et in hoc quod ponuntur communes. Sed si possessiones sint propriae, et ordinetur per rectas leges et consuetudines quod cives sibi invicem communicent de suis bonis, habebit talis modus vivendi bonum, quod est ex utroque: scilicet et ex communitate possessionum et distinctione earum. Oportet enim possessiones simpliciter quidem esse proprias quantum ad proprietatem dominii, sed secundum aliquem modum communes. Ex hoc enim quod sunt propriae possessiones, sequitur quod procurationes possessionum sunt divisae, dum unusquisque curat de possessione sua. Et ex hoc sequuntur duo bona: quorum unum est quod dum unusquisque intromittit se de suo proprio et non de eo quod est alterius, non fiunt litigia inter homines quae solent fieri quando multi habent unam rem procurare, dum uni videtur sic et alii aliter faciendum. Aliud bonum est quod unusquisque magis multiplicabit possessionem suam insistens ei sollicitius tamquam propriae. Et hoc modo erunt possessiones divisae, sed propter virtutem civium, qui erunt in invicem liberales et benefici, erunt communes secundum usum, sicut dicitur in proverbio, quod ea quae sunt amicorum sunt communia.

Concerning the first, he says that if it were so ordered in the city—as now occurs—that possessions were divided among the citizens, and this were put in order through beautiful customs and just laws, there would be a great difference in the abundance of goodness and usefulness regarding those things that Socrates discussed. For on both sides there is found some good, both in the one that proposes private possessions and in the one that proposes common possessions. But if possessions were private, and it were put in order by correct laws and customs that citizens commune with each other in their goods, there will occur that sort of manner of living well that comes from both—both from the community of possessions and from their distinction. For indeed, simply speaking, possessions must be private to the degree that they are the property of a master, but they must be common in some manner. For from this—that there are private possessions—it follows that the managers of possessions are divided, while each one has care for his own possessions. From this two goods follow: the first is that, so long as each one limits [intermittit] himself at his own property, and not at what is another's, the quarrels among men will not happen that tend to happen when many have to manage one thing—where it seems to one that it should be done in this way, and to another in another way; the second good is that each one will multiply more his own possessions, since he is more devoted and studious for those things that are as though his own. And in this manner possessions will be divided, but because of the virtue of the citizens, who will be generous and beneficent to each other, they will be common in usage, as it says in the proverb that the things of friends are common.

Polit.L4

Et ne cui videatur impossibile, subiungit quod in quibusdam civitatibus bene dispositis est hoc statutum quod quaedam sint ipso facto communia quantum ad usum, quaedam autem fiant communia per voluntatem ab ipsis dominis, dum scilicet unusquisque habens propriam possessionem, quaedam de bonis suis facit provenire in utilitatem suorum amicorum, et quibusdam de bonis suis utuntur amici sui per seipsos, tamquam rebus communibus. Sicut erat in civitate Lacedaemonia in qua unus poterat uti servo alterius ad suum ministerium ac si esset proprius servus. Similiter poterant uti equis et canibus aliorum tamquam suis, si indigerent ire ad agros, in eadem tamen regione. Unde manifestum est quod multo melius est quod sint propriae possessiones secundum dominium, sed quod fiant communes aliquo modo quantum ad usum. Quomodo autem usus rerum propriarum possit fieri communis, hoc pertinet ad providentiam boni legislatoris.

And in case this seems impossible to someone, he adds on that in some well-organized cities there is a statute that some things are common regarding use in and of themselves [ipso facto], but some become common through the will of their masters: while each one still has private possession, he makes some of his goods come forth for the usefulness of his friends, and his friends use some of his goods as their own, as though they were things in common. So it was in Lacedaemon, in which one could use the slave of another for his own service, as if he were his own slave. Likewise, they were able to use the horses and dogs of others as though their own, if they needed to go to the fields—when in the same district. And so it is clear that it is much better that there be private possessions regarding mastery, but that they become common in some manner with reference to their use. But how the use of private things can become common—this belongs to the providence of a good legislator.

Polit.L4

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc et cetera. Et dicit quod non potest de facili enarrari quantum sit magis delectabile reputare aliquid esse sibi proprium. Venit enim haec delectatio ex hoc quod homo amat seipsum; propter hoc enim vult sibi bona. Nec hoc est vanum, quod aliquis habet amicitiam ad seipsum; sed naturale est. Quandoque tamen iuste vituperatur aliquis ex hoc quod est philauton, id est amator suiipsius. Sed quando hoc in vituperium dicitur, non est hoc simpliciter amare seipsum, sed magis quam oportet; sicut et amatores pecuniarum vituperantur, quas tamen omnes aliquo modo amant: quia amatores pecuniarum vituperantur inquantum amant eas magis quam oportet. Hanc autem delectationem, quae est de rebus propriis habendis aufert lex Socratis.

He lays out a second rationale at adhuc, etc. And he says that one cannot easily describe the degree to which it is more delightful to repute something as your own. For the delight comes from this: that man loves himself, and because of this he wants goods for himself. Nor is it vain that someone has friendship for himself, but it is natural. Certainly, sometimes someone is justly blamed for being a philauton—that is, a self-lover—but when this is said in blame, this is not for loving himself simply speaking, but more than he should; just as they are blamed who love money—which, indeed, everyone loves in some manner—because lovers of money are blamed inasmuch as they love it more than they should. This delight, however, which concerns having one's own things, the law of Socrates removes.

Polit.L4

Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, at vero et largiri et cetera. Et dicit quod valde delectabile est quod homo donet vel auxilium ferat vel amicis, vel extraneis vel quibuscumque aliis: quod quidem fit per hoc quod homo habet propriam possessionem: unde etiam hoc bonum tollit lex Socratis auferens proprietatem possessionum. Ultimo autem concludit, quod ista inconvenientia accidunt his qui volunt nimis unire civitatem introducendo communitatem possessionum, et uxorum, et filiorum.

He lays out a third reason at vero et largiri etc., and he says that it is very delightful for a man to give help, or to bear it either to friends or to foreigners, or to any others—which happens, moreover, through man having private possessions. And so also the law of Socrates takes away this good when it removes private possessions. Lastly, he concludes that such unfitting things happen to those who excessively wish to unite the city by introducing a community of possessions, and of wives and children.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit et ad haec interimunt etc., obiicit simul contra utramque positionem, scilicet de communitate uxorum et possessionum. Et inducit etiam ad hoc tres rationes:

Then, where he says et ad haec interimunt etc., he objects at once to each position—to the community of wives and to the community of possessions. And he also introduces three reasons for this.

Polit.L4

quarum prima est quod illi qui volunt sic nimis unire civitatem, manifeste interimunt opera duarum virtutum: scilicet temperantiae, inquantum est circa mulieres: opus enim temperantiae est abstinere a muliere aliena: quod non habebit locum si omnes mulieres sint communes. Similiter introducens communitatem possessionum, aufert actum liberalitatis. Non enim poterit esse manifestum de aliquo an sit liberalis, neque aliquis poterit actum liberalitatis exercere, ex quo non habet proprias possessiones, in quarum usu consistit opus liberalitatis. Providus homo propria expendit et dat. Quod autem aliquis det communia, non est multum liberalitatis.

The first is that those who excessively wish to unite the city like this clearly abolish [interimunt] the works of two virtues: temperance, inasmuch as it is about women—for the work of temperance is to abstain from other women—which will not have a place if all women are in common; likewise, introducing a community of possessions removes the act of generosity [liberalitas], for nobody will be able to exercise the act of generosity since he does not have private possessions—from the use of which is the work of generosity constructed. The provident man spends and gives the things that are his own; but that someone should give away things held in common is not very generous.

Polit.L4

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, bonae faciei quidem igitur et cetera. Et dicit quod lex Socratis praedicta videtur bona in superficie, et videtur quod sit philantropos, id est inducens amicitiam inter homines, vel philantropos, id est amabilis ab hominibus. Et hoc propter duo. Primo propter bonum quod aliquis suspicatur futurum ex tali lege. Quando enim aliquis audit, quod inter cives sint omnia communia, suscipit hoc cum gaudio, reputans amicitiam admirabilem futuram per hoc omnium ad omnes. Secundo propter mala, quae putat tolli per hanc legem. Accusat enim aliquis mala, quae nunc fiunt in civitatibus, sicut disceptationes hominum ad invicem circa contractus, et iudicia de testimoniis falsis, et hoc quod pauperes adulantur divitibus, tamquam omnia ista fiant propter hoc quod possessiones non sunt communes. Sed si aliquis recte consideret, nihil horum fit propter hoc quod possessiones non sunt communes, sed propter malitiam hominum. Videmus enim quod illi qui possident aliqua in communi, multo magis dissident adinvicem, quam illi qui habent separatas possessiones. Sed quia pauci sunt illi qui habent possessiones communes respectu illorum qui habent divisas, propter hoc pauciora litigia veniunt ex communitate possessionum: tamen si omnes haberent communes multo plura litigia essent.

He lays out the second reason at bonae faciei quidem igitur, etc., and he says that the aforementioned law of Socrates seems superficially good, and it seems that it is either philantropos, meaning “introducing friendship among men,” or that it is philantropos meaning “lovable by men.” And this is because of two things. First, because of the good that someone looks for as coming from such a law. For when someone hears that among citizens there are all things in common, he looks up to this with joy, reputing that a wondrous friendship of all with all will come from this. Second, because of the evils that he thinks will be taken away through this law. For some condemn the evils that now happen in cities, such as disputes of men over contracts, and judgments about false testimony, and that the poor flatter the wealthy, as though all such things came to be because possessions are not in common. But if someone would consider correctly, none of these come to be because possessions are not in common, but because of the wickedness of men. For we see that those who possess something in common are often more greatly divided among themselves than those who have separated possessions. But because those who have possessions in common are few with respect to those who have them divided, because of this, fewer quarrels come from a community of possessions: but if all held possessions in common, there would be many more quarrels.

Polit.L4

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc autem iustum et cetera. Et dicit quod homo non solum debet considerare quot malis priventur illi qui habent communes possessiones et uxores, sed etiam quot bonis priventur. Debet enim legislator sustinere aliqua mala, ne priventur maiora bona: tot autem bona privantur per hanc legem Socratis, quod videtur esse impossibilis talis conversatio vitae, ut patet per inconvenientia supra posita.

He lays out a third reason at adhuc autem iustum, etc., and he says that man ought to consider not only how much evil those who have possessions and wives in common are deprived of, but also how many goods they are deprived of. For the legislator ought to allow some evils lest he deprive people of greater goods. But people are deprived of so much good through this law of Socrates that such an association of life seems impossible, as is clear from the unfitting things laid out above.

Polit.L4

Lecture 5

Polit.L5

Causam autem deviationis Socrati oportet putare suppositionem non entem rectam. Oportet quidem enim esse modo aliquo unam et domum et civitatem, sed non omnino: est quidem enim ut non erit procedens civitas, est autem ut erit quidem, prope autem existens ut non sit civitas, erit deterior civitas, quaemadmodum utique si quis symphoniam faciat omofoniam, aut rithmon basem unam. Sed oportet multitudinem existentem quaemadmodum dictum est prius, propter disciplinam communem et unam facere; et futurum disciplinam inducere et putantem per hanc fore civitatem studiosam, inconveniens talibus existimare dirigere, sed non consuetudinibus et philosophia et legibus, quaemadmodum quae circa possessiones in Lacedemonia et Creta pro conviviis legislator communicavit.

The error of Socrates must be attributed to the false notion of unity from which he starts. Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in some respects only. For there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state, like harmony passing into unison, or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot. The state, as I was saying, is a plurality which should be united and made into a community by education; and it is strange that the author of a system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, whereby the legislator has made property common.

Polit.L5

Oportet autem non hoc ipsum ignorare, quia oportet attendere multo tempore et multis annis, in quibus non utique lateat si haec bene se habuerunt. Omnia enim fere inventa sunt quidem, sed haec quidem non conducta sunt, his autem non utuntur cognoscentes. Maxime autem fiet utique manifestum si quis operibus videat talem politiam constructam. Non enim poterit non partiens ipsa et segregans, facere civitatem, haec quidem in convivia, haec autem in confraternitates et tribus; itaque et nihil aliud accidet esse lege statutum, praeter non agros colere municipes, quod et nunc Lacedemonii facere conantur.

Let us remember that we should not disregard the experience of ages; in the multitude of years these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been unknown; for almost everything has been found out, although sometimes they are not put together; in other cases men do not use the knowledge which they have. Great light would be thrown on this subject if we could see such a form of government in the actual process of construction; for the legislator could not form a state at all without distributing and dividing its constituents into associations for common meals, and into phratries and tribes. But all this legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to the guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedaemonians try to enforce already.

Polit.L5

Quin immo sed neque modus totius politiae quis erit communicantibus, neque dixit Socrates, neque facile dicere; equidem fere multitudo civitatis diversorum civium fit multitudo, de quibus nihil determinatum est prius, et agricolis communes esse oportet possessiones, aut secundum unumquemque proprias. Adhuc autem uxores et pueros proprios aut communes. Si quidem enim eodem modo communia omnia omnibus, quid different isti ab illis municipibus, aut quid plus sustinentibus principatum ipsorum, aut quid passi sufferunt principatum, nisi aliquid sapiant tale quale Cretenses? Illi enim alia haec servis dimittentes, solum negant gymnasia et armorum possessionem. Si autem quaemadmodum in aliis civitatibus et apud ilos erunt talia, quis modus erit communitatis? In una enim civitate duas civitates esse necessarium, et has subcontrarias invicem; faciunt enim hos quidem municipes velut custodes, agricolas autem et artifices et alios cives.

But, indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, what in such a community will be the general form of the state. The citizens who are not guardians are the majority, and about them nothing has been determined: are the husbandmen, too, to have their property in common? Or is each individual to have his own? And are the wives and children to be individual or common. If, like the guardians, they are to have all things in common, what do they differ from them, or what will they gain by submitting to their government? Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give their slaves the same institutions as their own, but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriage and property, what will be the form of the community? Must it not contain two states in one, each hostile to the other? He makes the guardians into a mere occupying garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real citizens.

Polit.L5

Accusationes autem et disceptationes et quaecumque alia civitatibus existere inquid mala, omnia existent et his, quamvis dicat Socrates quod non multis indigebunt legalibus propter disciplinam; puta legibus circa municipium et circa forum et aliis talibus, attribuens solum disciplinam municipus.

But if so the suits and quarrels, and all the evils which Socrates affirms to exist in other states, will exist equally among them. He says indeed that, having so good an education, the citizens will not need many laws, for example laws about the city or about the markets; but then he confines his education to the guardians.

Polit.L5

Adhuc autem dominos facit rerum possessarum agricolas oblationem ferentes. Sed multo magis verisimile est graves esse et astutiis plenos quam a quibusdam obsequia et humiliationes et servitutes.

Again, he makes the husbandmen owners of the property upon condition of their paying a tribute. But in that case they are likely to be much more unmanageable and conceited than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general.

Polit.L5

Sed sive necessaria haec similiter sive non, nunc nihil determinatum est, et de habitis quae horum politia et disciplina et leges quales. Est autem neque invenire facile, neque differens modicum, quales quosdam esse hos ad salvandum municipum communitatem.

And whether community of wives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or not, and the questions akin to this, what will be the education, form of government, laws of the lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined: neither is it easy to discover this, nor is their character of small importance if the common life of the guardians is to be maintained.

Polit.L5

At vero si uxores quidem faciet communes, possessiones autem proprias, quis dispensabit? Quamvis si communes possessiones et agricolarum uxores, quaemadmodum quae in agris viri ipsarum. Inconveniens autem et ex bestiis fieri parabolam, quia oportet eadem tractare mulieres viris, quibus yconomie nihil attinet.

Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and retains private property, the men will see to the fields, but who will see to the house? And who will do so if the agricultural class have both their property and their wives in common? Once more: it is absurd to argue, from the analogy of the animals, that men and women should follow the same pursuits, for animals have not to manage a household.

Polit.L5

Insecurum autem et principes quomodo instituit Socrates; semper enim facit eosdem principes; hoc autem seditionis causa fit, et apud nullam dignitatem possidentes si alicunde utique apud animosos et bellicosos viros. Quod autem necessarium ipsi facere eosdem principes manifestum: non enim quandoque quidem aliis, quandoque autem aliis mixtum est animabus a deo aurum, sed semper eisdem; ait autem his quidem mox genitis misceri aurum, his autem argentum, es autem et ferrum artificibus futuris et agricolis.

The government, too, as constituted by Socrates, contains elements of danger; for he makes the same persons always rule. And if this is often a cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, how much more among high-spirited warriors? But that the persons whom he makes rulers must be the same is evident; for the gold which the God mingles in the souls of men is not at one time given to one, at another time to another, but always to the same: as he says, 'God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth; but brass and iron in those who are meant to be artisans and husbandmen.'

Polit.L5

Adhuc autem et felicitatem auferens a municipibus totam inquit oportere felicem facere civitatem legislatorem. Impossibile autem felicitare totam, non pluribus aut non omnibus partibus aut quibusdam habentibus felicitatem. Non enim eorundem felicitare quorum et par: hoc quidem enim contingit toti inesse, partium autem neutri; felicitare autem impossibile. At vero si municipes non felices, qui alteri? Non enim utique artifices et multitudo banausorum. Politia quidem igitur de qua Socrates dixit has dubitationes habet, et his non minores alteras.

Again, he deprives the guardians even of happiness, and says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect happiness is not like the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in neither of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people. The Republic of which Socrates discourses has all these difficulties, and others quite as great.

Polit.L5

Causam autem deviationis et cetera. Postquam Philosophus impugnavit legem Socratis ostendens eam esse inconvenientem, hic impugnat eam ostendens esse insufficientem. Et circa hoc duo facit.

Causam autem deviationis, etc. After the philosopher objected to the law of Socrates by showing that it is unfitting, he here objects to it by showing that it is insufficient. Concerning this he does two things.

Polit.L5

Primo ostendit quod non habuit sufficiens motivum.

First, he shows that [Socrates] did not have a sufficient motive.

Polit.L5

Secundo ostendit quod id quod ponebatur, insufficiens erat, ibi, quinimmo sed neque modus et cetera.

Second, he shows that what [Socrates] laid out was insufficient, at quinimmo sed neque modus, [II.5.5] etc.

Polit.L5

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L5

Primo ostendit motivum esse insufficiens propter falsam suppositionem.

First, he shows that the motive is insufficient because of a false supposition [II.5.2].

Polit.L5

Secundo propter defectum experientiae quae requiritur in legibus condendis, ibi, oportet autem non hoc ipsum ignorare et cetera.

Second, because of a shortage of the experience that is required in crafting laws, at oportet autem non hoc ipsum ignorare, [II.5.4] etc.

Polit.L5

Dicit ergo primo, quod causa quare Socrates deviavit a veritate circa legem de communitate possessionum, filiorum et uxorum, oportet putare hanc esse, quia supponebat quamdam suppositionem non rectam: scilicet quod summum bonum civitatum esset quod ipsa esset maxime una. Haec autem suppositio ideo non est recta, quia ad civitatem et domum, sicut supra dictum est, requiritur aliqua unitas, sed non omnimoda. Unde intantum potest procedere unitas civitatis, quod iam non erit civitas; puta si omnes sint unius artis et cohabitantes in una domo. Intantum autem potest procedere unitas quod erit in propinquo ad hoc quod non sit civitas. Unde sequitur quod sit peior: quia unumquodque tanto deterius est, quanto magis appropinquat ad suum non esse; sicut si tollatur aliqua distinctio officiorum, quae sunt necessaria ad bene esse civitatis. Et ponit exemplum, sicut si aliquis faciat homofoniam, idest omnes cantantes in una voce, iam non erit symphonia id est consonantia vocum, cui similatur civitas ex diversis consistens. Et similiter tolleretur rismon, id est ordinatio figurae puta trianguli, si quis vellet facere unam solam basim. Et ita potest in tantum procedere unitas quod tollatur civitas.

Therefore, he first says that the cause why Socrates deviated from the truth concerning the law about the community of possessions, of wives, and of children, must be deemed to be because he supposed some supposition that was not correct: that the highest good of the city is that it be maximally one. But this supposition is not correct because for the city and the household, as has been said above, a sort of unity is required, but not in every way. For the unity of the city can proceed to such a degree that it will no longer be a city; for instance, if all practice one art, and dwell together in one household. Moreover, unity can proceed to such a degree that it will approach being what is not a city. So it follows that it is worse, because by how much each thing approaches its own non-being, by so much more is it inferior—as [would happen] if someone were to destroy the distinction of offices that is necessary for the well-being of the city. And he lays out an example: just as if someone were to make homophonia—that is, everyone singing in one voice—there will no longer be symphonia—that is, a harmony of voices; to this, he likens the city, constructed out of diverse things. And likewise, rismon—that is, the order of a figure, like a triangle—would be destroyed if someone wished to make only one base. And so unity can proceed to such a degree that the city would be destroyed.

Polit.L5

Sed, sicut supra dictum est, oportet in civitate esse quidem diversorum multitudinem, sed quod civitas fiat una et communis propter quamdam disciplinam legum recte positarum. Sed si aliquis qui erat inducturus disciplinam ad uniendum civitatem putet per hanc legem de communitate filiorum et uxorum fieri civitatem bonam, inconveniens est si aestimet quod per tales communitates possit rectificare civitatem, et non magis per bonas consuetudines et leges, et per philosophiam, id est sapientiam circa talia: sicut dictum est supra, quod Lacedaemones possessiones proprias faciebant communes quantum ad usum; et in Creta etiam fecit legislator esse aliqua communia, ut fierent quaedam convivia publica civibus, secundum aliqua tempora ad hoc ut inter eos maior familiaritas esset.

But as was said above, in the city there must certainly be a multitude of diverse people, but the city becomes one and common because of some discipline of laws that are set up correctly. But if someone who was about to introduce discipline for uniting the city were to deem that through this law about the community of wives and children, a good city would come to be, it is unfitting if he were to deem that through such communities he could make the city correct, and not more through good customs and laws, and through philosophy—that is, wisdom about such things. Just as it was said above that the Lacedaemonians made private possessions common with regard to use, and in Crete also, the legislator made some things common, so that there would be public feasts for the citizens, at certain times, so that there would be greater intimacy among them.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit oportet non hoc ipsum etc., ostendit insufficientiam motivi propter defectum experientiae: et dicit quod ad hoc quod leges bene ponantur, oportet hoc non ignorare, quia debet aliquis multo tempore considerare et multis annis, ut manifestum sit per experientiam, si tales leges vel statuta bene se habeant. Aestimandum est enim quod in longitudine praecedentium temporum fere omnia inventa sunt circa conversationem humanam, quae excogitari possunt: sed quaedam eorum non sunt conducta, idest non est usque ad hoc in eis processum quod lege statuerentur, quia statim eorum inconvenientia apparebat: quaedam vero sunt quidem statuta, sed recesserunt ab usu dum cognoverunt homines quod non erant utilia. Et hoc maxime manifestum fit, si quis per experientiam operis inspiciat talem ordinem civitatis institutum, qualem Socrates dixit. Impossibile enim est, quod fiat civitas nisi per aliquam partitionem et segregationem; puta quod de bonis communibus fiat distributio per diversa convivia, vel per diversas confraternitates, aut per diversas tribus, idest societates civitatis aut regionis. Quia igitur necesse est omnino, quod fiat distributio bonorum communium quantum ad rem, nihil aliud affertur per statutum talis legis de communitate possessionum, nisi quod municipes, idest qui continue morantur in civitate, non habeant curam de agris colendis, quasi non habentes agros proprios. Sed etiam si non sint agri communes, hoc ipsum fieri potest, sicut Lacedaemonii facere conantur, ut scilicet per alios agri colantur, quamvis sunt proprii.

Then, where he says oportet non hoc ipsum, etc., he shows the insufficiency of motive [power] because of a shortage of experience: and he says that for the laws to be well set up, one must not be ignorant, because someone ought to consider for much time and for many years, so that it will be clear through experience if such laws or statutes are well arranged [se habeant]. For one must deem that in the length of preceding time, almost all things have been discovered about human associations that can be thought up. But some of these have not been employed—that is, to this point, it has not proceeded for them that they should be established as law, because it was immediately apparent that they were unfitting. Some, truly, have indeed been established, but they fell out of use when men learned that they were not useful. And this becomes maximally clear if someone, through experience of the work, looks into an order of the city instituted such as Socrates discussed. For it is impossible that a city come to be except through some partition and separation; consider that with common goods, there comes to be a distribution through diverse feasts, or diverse societies, or through diverse tribes—that is, companies of the city or the region. Therefore, because it is utterly necessary that there comes to be a distribution of common goods—with reference to things—nothing other is brought forth through the establishment of such a law about the community of possessions, except that the townsmen [municipes]--that is, those who continually dwell in the city—will not have care for cultivating the farms, as though they do not have their own farms. But this can come to be even if the farms are not in common, just as the Lacedaemonians attempted to make it—so that the farms were cultivated by others as though they were their own.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit quinimmo, etc., ostendit inconvenientiam legis Platonicae quantum ad id quod ponebatur. Et circa hoc duo facit.

Then, where he says quinimmo, etc., he shows that the Platonic law is unfitting with reference to what has been laid out. Concerning this he does two things.

Polit.L5

Primo ostendit insufficientiam praedictae legis quantum ad ea de quibus est.

First, he shows the insufficiency of the aforementioned law with reference to those things that it is about.

Polit.L5

Secundo quantum ad quaedam consequentia, ibi, sed sive necessaria et cetera.

Second, with reference to some of its consequences, at sed sive necessaria, [II.5.10] etc.

Polit.L5

Circa primum inducit tres rationes:

Concerning the first, he introduces three reasons.

Polit.L5

quarum prima ostendit insufficientiam praedictae legis quantum ad hoc, quod non poterat secundum eam sufficienter distingui multitudo civitatis. Et dicit, quod non solum lex Socratis (nichil aliud) facere videbatur, nisi quod municipes agros non colerent tamquam non proprios existentes, sed neque etiam Socrates dixit quis modus esset totius conversationis politicae instituendae secundum suam legem communicantibus, idest habentibus omnia communia, neque etiam possibile est a quovis alio dici hac lege servata.

The first shows the insufficiency of the aforementioned law with reference to this: that it could not sufficiently distinguish the multitude of the city according to the thing [secundum id]. And he says that not only did the law of Socrates seem to accomplish nothing else than that the townsmen did not cultivate the farms—as though the fields were not their own—but Socrates did not even say what the method would be of instituting a whole political association, following his law, for communing—that is, for having all things in common; nor is it even possible for it to be explained by someone else anywhere at all, from the law having been kept.

Polit.L5

Necesse enim est, quod multitudo civitatis sit multitudo hominum diversorum secundum diversos status. De quorum diversitate qualiter esse possit, nihil est determinatum a Socrate: necesse enim est dicere, quod agricolis sint possessiones communes simul cum aliis civibus, et filii et uxores, aut quod habeant seorsum proprios filios et possessiones et uxores praeter alios cives. Hoc autem secundo modo contingit assignare diversitatem eorum ab aliis civibus, tum propter differentiam eorum in possessionibus, tum etiam propter parentum originem: sed si eodem modo sint communia omnia praedicta omnibus aliis, nulla differentia invenitur, secundum quam possunt diversificari agricolae a municipibus; id est ab illis qui communiter incolunt civitatem. Neque etiam poterit assignari, quid plus consequantur illi qui portant pondus principatus in regendo civitatem, et sic inutiliter laborabunt: nunc autem habent hoc emolumentum, quod attribuuntur eis plures possessiones, et filii eorum nobilitantur. Similiter etiam non poterit assignari, quid passi sufferunt principatum, idest propter quam eorum conditionem praecedentem ad principatum assumantur nunc enim consueverunt ad principatus assumi, qui sunt nobiliores origine vel excellentiores divites: excellentia autem secundum virtutem non semper est ita manifesta, quod secundum eam solam sufficienter possint inveniri homines, qui assumantur ad principatus.

For it is necessary that the multitude of the city be a multitude of diverse men of diverse states [of life]. Nothing was determined by Socrates about how their diversity would be able to be: for it is necessary to say that there are common possessions for farmers, just as with the other citizens, and sons and wives, or that they separately have their own sons and possessions and wives, beyond what the other citizens have. But with this second manner, he happens to indicate their diversity from the other citizens, both because of their difference in possessions, and also because of the origin of their parentage: but if, in the same manner, all the aforementioned things are common to all the others, no difference will be found according to which they can diversify the farmers from the townsmen [municipibus]—that is, from those who cultivate the city in common. Nor can it even be indicated what further consequence will follow for those who carry the weight of government in ruling the city, and so they will labor uselessly: but now they have this comfort—that they are allotted more possessions, and their sons are ennobled. Likewise, also, they will not be able to indicate what steps will permit government—that is, because of which of their preceding conditions will they be assumed to government; for now it is customary for those to assume government who are more noble in origin, or more excellent in wealth—for excellence in virtue is not always so clear that men can be found according to it alone who will be assumed to government.

Polit.L5

Posset autem aliquis dicere, quod illi qui servarent legem Socratis, susciperent tale aliquid observandum, quale observant Cretenses, qui agriculturam et alia huiusmodi artificia dimittunt exercenda per servos, quibus solum interdicunt gymnasia, idest exercitia corporalia, et usum armorum, ut secundum hoc non oporteat distinguere inter agricolas et alios municipes, quia exercentes agriculturam et artifices secundum hoc non erunt cives, sed servi. Sed si in civitate, quam Socrates intendit instituere, erunt huiusmodi ordinata sicut in aliis civitatibus, ut scilicet quidam civium sint agricolae et artifices, non videbitur esse una communitas, quia in una civitate necessarium erit esse quasi duas civitates sibi contrarias: ex una enim parte erunt municipes, qui custodiunt civitatem, nihil aliud operantes; et ex alia parte erunt agricolae et artifices operantes, quos oportet esse contrarios adinvicem, ex hoc ipso quod quibusdam laborantibus, alii non laborant, et tamen plura de fructibus recipiunt, sicut etiam supra dictum est. Si vero possessiones non sint communes, non erit ex hoc litigium, quia quilibet procurabit, quod colantur agri sui, vel per alium, vel per seipsum: et dum minores servient maioribus, ab eis aliquod lucrum recipientes, erit una communicatio inter eos.

But someone could say that those who keep the law of Socrates would undertake to observe in some way something like what the Cretans observe, who dismiss agriculture and other artful things of this sort for the slaves to exercise, to whom they forbid only gymnasia—that is, bodily exercise, and the use of arms, so that according to this, one does not need to distinguish between farmers and other townsmen, because those exercising agriculture and artisans, according to this, will not be citizens, but slaves. But if in the city that Socrates intended to fashion, something of this sort were set in order, as in other cities—so that some of the citizens were farmers and artisans—there will not seem to be one community, because in one city it will be necessary for it to be as if there were two cities opposed [contrarias] to each other. For in one part there will be the townsmen, who guard the city, working at nothing else; and in the other part there will be those working as farmers and artisans, and these two parts much be opposed to each other from this very thing: that while some are laboring, others do not labor, and nevertheless they receive more of the produce, as was also said above. But if possessions are not common, there will not be quarrels from this, because everyone will direct the cultivation of his own field, either through someone else, or through himself, and when the lesser serve the greater, they will receive gain from this, and there will be one union among them.

Polit.L5

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, accusationes autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod in civitate habente omnia communia, sicut Socrates dixit, invenientur mutuae accusationes et disceptationes, et omnia alia mala, quae Socrates dicit nunc esse in civitatibus. Disceptabunt enim cives adinvicem de hoc quod non aequaliter laborant, nec aequaliter fructum recipiunt, et de multis etiam aliis; quamvis Socrates putaverat, quod ista mala in civitate, in qua essent omnia communia, non essent. Et propter hoc dicebat, quod propter huiusmodi disciplinam non indigeret civitas multis legibus, sed solum quibusdam paucis, scilicet circa habitationem municipii, et circa forum iudiciorum, vel etiam circa forum rerum venalium, et circa alia huiusmodi, sine quorum ordinatione civitas esse non potest: ita tamen quod huiusmodi disciplinam legum attribuebat solum municipibus, id est custodibus civitatis, non autem agricolis, qui extra civitatem municipum morabantur. Et sic patet, quod lex Socratis erat insufficiens, quia non poterat a civitate extirpare mala quae tollere conabatur.

He lays out a second reason at accusationes autem, etc., and he says that in a city having all things in common, as Socrates discussed, will be found mutual accusations and disputes, and all the other evils that Socrates says are now in cities. For citizens dispute with each other about this: that they do not labor equally, nor do they equally receive the produce of their labor, and about many other things also; although Socrates had deemed that there would not be such evils in a city in which all things were in common. And because of this he said that because of this sort of discipline, the city would not require many laws, but only a few—concerning the dwelling place of the townsmen, and about a place of judgment, and a place for selling things, and other things of this sort, without the ordering of which the city is not able to be: thus, nevertheless, that this sort of discipline of the laws should be allotted only to the townsmen—that is, to the guardians of the city—but not the farmers, who dwell beyond the city of the townsmen. And so it is evident that the law of Socrates was insufficient, because it could not root out the evils that he attempted to destroy.

Polit.L5

Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc autem dominos facit et cetera. Et dicit quod Socrates committebat secundum suam legem totam dispositionem possessionum agricolis, quibus dicebat esse committendum, quod fructus agrorum offerrent quibuscumque circa alia vacantibus: et ex hoc putabat, quod agricolae propter hanc potestatem efficerentur obsequiosi et humiliter servientes aliis civibus. Sed totum contrarium accideret: multo enim magis est verisimile, quod ex quo haberent omnia in sua potestate, quod essent graves aliis civibus, et adinvenirent astutias ad defraudandum eos, quam quod humiliter eis servirent. Et sic patet, quod lex Socratis de communitate mulierum et possessionum insufficiens erat, quia non poterat implere quod conabatur.

He lays out a third reason at adhuc autem dominos facit, etc., and says that Socrates entrusted, following his law, the whole organization of possessions to the farmers, to whom he said that it should be entrusted, so that the produce of the farms would be offered to whoever was freed up for other things: and from this he deemed that the farmers, because this power, would be effected compliant and would humbly serve the other citizens. But the complete contrary would happen: for it is more more likely that from this, since they held all things in their power, they would be a burden to the other citizens, and would discover the cunning to defraud them, rather than that they would humbly serve them. And so it is clear that the law of Socrates about the community of women and possessions was insufficient, because it could not fulfill what it attempted.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit sed sive necessaria etc., ostendit insufficientiam legis Socraticae quantum ad alia consequentia.

Then, where he says sed sive necessaria, etc., he shows the insufficiency of the Socratic law regarding its other consequences.

Polit.L5

Et primo in generali.

And first in general.

Polit.L5

Secundo in speciali, ibi, at vero si uxores et cetera.

Second, particularly, at at vero si uxores, [II.5.11] etc.

Polit.L5

Dicit ergo primo, quod sive ista quae Socrates posuit de communitatem mulierum et possessionum, sint necessaria civitati, sive non, tamen de habitis, id est de consequentibus nihil determinavit, scilicet qualis debeat esse ordinatio politicae conversationis, et qualis disciplina, et quales leges propriae eorum, qui sic habent omnia communia: non enim est de facili invenire aliquas tales: nec etiam oportet eos parum differre ab aliis, qui praedictam civitatem servare possint: unde quibusdam specialibus legibus et speciali disciplina essent imbuendi.

Therefore, he first says that either such things as Socrates laid out about the community of women and possessions are necessary for the city, or they are not; however, about its habits—that is, about its consequences—he determined nothing: of what should be the order of the political associations, what should the discipline be, and which laws are proper to those who have all things in common like this? For it is not easy to discover anyone like this, and those who would be able to serve the aforementioned city must differ from others by no small amount. And so they would need to be saturated by some particular laws and a particular discipline.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit at vero si uxores etc., ostendit insufficientiam in speciali.

Then, where he says at vero si uxores, etc., he shows the insufficiency in particular.

Polit.L5

Et primo quantum ad mulieres.

And first with reference to women.

Polit.L5

Secundo quantum ad principes, ibi, insecurum autem et cetera.

Second, with reference to governors, at insecurum autem, [II.5.13] etc.

Polit.L5

Tertio quantum ad communem civitatis felicitatem, ibi, adhuc autem et felicitatem auferens et cetera.

Third, with reference to the common happiness of the city, at adhuc autem et felicitatem auferens, [II.5.15] etc.

Polit.L5

Quantum ad mulieres autem duo tangit.

With reference to women he touches on two things.

Polit.L5

Primo, quod non potest sufficienter ordinari de mulieribus si sint communes municipibus et agricolis, sive possessiones sint propriae et distinctae utrisque, sive sint communes; quia si sint communes, oportet quod (per) agricolas dispensentur; et etiam si sint propriae municipum, quis alius dispensabit eas nisi agricolae? Quo modo autem poterunt dispensare ea quae sunt in agris viri mulierum quae habitant in civitate? Non enim simul poterunt uti mulieribus in civitate existentibus et agros colere.

First, that women cannot be sufficiently put in order if they are in common for both the townsmen and the farmers; either possessions are private and distinguished for both, or they are common, because if they are common, they must be managed by the farmers, and even if they belong to the townsmen, who else will manage them except the farmers? But how could the men who are in the farms manage the women who dwell in the city? For they could not, at the same time, employ the women existing in the city and also cultivate the farms.

Polit.L5

Secundo circa mulieres dicit, quod Socrates dicebat, quod mulieres debebant eadem tractare cum viris, ut scilicet colerent agros et pugnarent, et alia huiusmodi facerent sicut viri: et accipiebat parabolam, id est similitudinem a bestiis, in quibus feminae similia operantur masculis. Sed Aristoteles istud dicit esse inconveniens, nec esse simile: quia bestiae nihil participant de vita oeconomica, in qua quidem vita mulieres habent quaedam propria opera, quibus oportet eas intendere, et abstinere semper ab operibus civilibus.

Second, concerning women, he says that Socrates said that the women ought to deal with the same things as the men, so that they would cultivate the farms and go to war, and do other things of this sort as do the men. And he accepted a parable—that is, a likeness drawn from the beasts—in which the female was at work like the male. But Aristotle said that this is unfitting, and that there is not a likeness because the beasts participate in nothing of the oeconomic life, in which, indeed, women have their own work which they must intend, and for which they must always abstain from civil works.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit insecurum autem etc., ostendit insufficientiam quantum ad principes: et dicit, quod non est securum civitati, quod hoc modo instituantur principes civitatis sicut Socrates instituebat: ordinavit enim, quod semper manerent iidem principes: quod quidem fit causa seditionis, etiam apud homines non magni valoris, et multo magis apud homines animosos et bellicosos, qui non possunt de facili pati, quod ipsi semper subiiciantur, et alii principentur.

Then, where he says insecurum autem, etc., he shows the insufficiency with reference to governors, and he says that it is not secure for the city that the governors of the city be instituted in this manner, as Socrates instituted them: for he had so ordered it that the governors would always remain the same, which indeed becomes a cause of sedition even among men that are not of great might, and much more among spirited and warlike men who cannot easily suffer that they should always be subjects and never govern others.

Polit.L5

Et subiungit causam quare Socrates instituebat, quod semper essent iidem principes: dicebat enim, quod sicut in quibusdam mineris terrarum invenitur aurum, in quibusdam argentum, in quibusdam vero ferrum, aut aes, ita in animabus quorumdam hominum, qui abundant in sapientia et virtute, est a Deo quasi inditum aurum, quos iustum est principari; in quibusdam vero argentum, qui sunt secundi gradus; in quibusdam vero qui sunt imperfecti ad sapientiam et virtutem, invenitur quasi aes aut ferrum: et tales secundum ipsum debent fieri agricolae et artifices. Manifestum est autem, quod istud non commutatur, ita quod quandoque istis hominibus sit inditum aurum, et quandoque aliis; sed semper eisdem: unde sequitur, quod semper iidem principentur.

And he adds on the cause for why Socrates instituted it that there should always be the same governors: for he said that just as in some mines of the earth is found gold, and in some silver, and in some iron or bronze, so also in the souls of some men, who abound in wisdom and virtue, it is as though God had instilled gold—and for them it is just to govern; but in some, who are of the second level, there is silver; and in some who are imperfect in wisdom and virtue, it is as though there is found bronze or iron, and such men of themselves ought to become farmers and artisans. But it is clear that this is not easily changed, such that sometimes one man would be instilled with gold, and sometimes another, but it is always the same ones, and so it would follow that the same men would always govern.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem et felicitatem etc., ostendit insufficientiam quantum ad communem civitatis felicitatem; dicebat enim Socrates, quod legislator debet ad hoc attendere, quod faciat totam civitatem felicem, et quantum ad opera virtutis, et quantum ad exteriora bona: cum tamen Socrates per suam legem auferret a singulis civibus felicitatem: quia volebat, quod non haberent aliquid proprium, nec in possessionibus, nec in mulieribus, nec in filiis, quae quidem pertinent ad felicitatem tamquam organice deservientia, ut dicitur in primo Ethicorum. Hoc autem est impossibile, quod tota civitas sit felix, nisi vel omnes, vel plures partes civitatis felicitatem habeant: non enim est felicitas civitatis, sicut numerus par, et alia similia. Partes enim numeri paris quandoque sunt impares, sicut partes senarii sunt duo trinarii. Et praeterea si municipes civitatis non sunt felices, qui alii erunt felices ad hoc quod in eis felicitas civitatis fundari possit? Non enim potest dici quod agricolae et banausi, id est mercenarii sint felices, qui sunt infimi in civitate: non enim felicitas quae est optimum civitatis potest salvari in infima eius parte.

Then, where he says adhuc autem et felicitatem, etc., he shows the insufficiency with reference to the common happiness of the city. For Socrates said that the legislator ought to attend to this, so that he would make the whole city happy, both regarding the works of virtue, and regarding external goods. Yet Socrates, through his law, stole happiness from the particular citizens, because he wanted them not to have anything of their own, neither possessions, nor women, nor children, which things certainly belong to happiness as though instrumentally [organice] at its service, as it says in Ethics Bk. I. But it is impossible that the whole city should be happy when neither all nor most parts of the city have happiness: for the happiness of the city is not like an even number, and other similar things, for the parts of an even number are sometimes uneven, as the parts of a group of six are two groups of three. And moreover, if the townsmen of the city are not happy, who else will be happy so that the happiness of the city can be founded upon them? For it cannot be said that the farmers and the banausi—that is, the wage-earners—are happy, who are the basest in the city, for happiness, which is the best thing in the city, cannot be preserved in its basest part.

Polit.L5

Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod conversatio politica civitatis de qua Socrates dixit, habet praedictas dubitationes et quasdam alias non minores praedictis.

Lastly, he concludes in an epilogue that the political association of the city that Socrates spoke about has the aforementioned difficulties, and some others not less than what has been mentioned.

Polit.L5

Lecture 6

Polit.L6

Fere autem similiter et quae circa leges se habent posterius scriptas; propter quod et de ea quae hic politia considerare modica melius; etenim in politia de paucis omnino determinavit Socrates, de uxorum et puerorum communione quomodo habere oportet, et de possessione, et politiae ordinem.

The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later work, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in all a few questions only; such as the community of women and children, the community of property, and the constitution of the state.

Polit.L6

Dividitur autem in duas partes multitudo habitantium, haec quidem in agricolas, haec autem in partem quae ad bellum, tertium autem ex his consilians et principale civitatis. De agricolis autem et artificibus utrum nullo aut aliquo participant principatu, et utrum arma oportet possidere etiam hos et compugnare aut non, de his nihil determinavit Socrates. Sed uxores quidem existimat oportere simul bellare, et disciplina participare eadem municipibus; alia autem exterioribus replevit sermonibus.

The population is divided into two classes—one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors; from this latter is taken a third class of counselors and rulers of the state. But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artisans are to have a share in the government, and whether they, too, are to carry arms and share in military service, or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject.

Polit.L6

Et de disciplina qualem quandam oportet fieri municipibus.

And with discussions about the education of the guardians.

Polit.L6

Legum autem plurima quidem pars leges existunt entes, pauca autem de politia dixit; et hanc volens communiorem facere civitatibus, secundum modicum circumducit iterum ad alteram politiam; praeter mulierum enim communionem et possessionis, alia eadem tradit ambabus politiis: et enim disciplinam eandem, et quod ab operibus necessariis abstinentes vivere, et de conviviis similiter.

In the Laws there is hardly anything but laws; not much is said about the constitution. This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. For with the exception of the community of women and property, he supposes everything to be the same in both states; there is to be the same education; the citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations, and there are to be common meals in both.

Polit.L6

Verumtamen in hac inquid oportere esse convivia mulierum, et hanc mille arma possidentium, hanc autem quinque milium.

The only difference is that in the Laws, the common meals are extended to women, and the warriors number 5,000, but in the Republic only 1,000.

Polit.L6

Superfluum quidem igitur habent omnes Socratis sermones et leve et novum et questionibus plenum, bene autem omnia forte difficile.

The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in everything can hardly be expected.

Polit.L6

Quoniam et nunc dictam multitudinem oportet non latere, quia regione babylonica vel alia aliqua infinita opus erit tot multitudine ex qua otiosi quinque milia nutriantur, et praeter hos mulierum et famulorum alia turba multo maior; oportet quidem igitur supponi ad votum nihil tamen impossibile. Dicitur autem quod oportet legislatorem ad duo respicientem ponere leges, ad regionem et homines. Adhuc autem bene se habet apponere et ad vicinorum loca. Primum quidem si oportet civitatem vivere vitam politicam, non monoticam. Non enim solum necessarium est ipsam talibus uti ad bellum armis quae utilia secundum propriam regionem sunt, sed et ad exteriora loca. Si quis autem non talem acceptat vitam, neque propriam neque communem civitatis, tamen nihil minus oportet terribiles esse inimicis non solum venientibus in regionem, sed et discedentibus.

We must not overlook the fact that the number of 5,000 citizens, just now mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylon, or some other huge site, if so many persons are to be supported in idleness, together with their women and attendants, who will be a multitude many times as great. In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities. It is said that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two points- the people and the country. But neighboring countries also must not be forgotten by him, firstly because the state for which he legislates is to have a political and not an isolated life. For a state must have such a military force as will be serviceable against her neighbors, and not merely useful at home. Even if the life of action is not admitted to be the best, either for individuals or states, still a city should be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating.

Polit.L6

Et multitudinem autem possessionis videre oportet ne forte melius altero modo determinetur plane magis. Tantam enim esse inquid oportere ut vivatur temperate, quaemadmodum si quis dicat ut vivatur bene: hoc enim est utile magis.

There is another point: should not the amount of property be defined in some way which differs from this by being clearer? For Socrates says that a man should have so much property as will enable him to live temperately, which is only a way of saying 'to live well'; this is too general a conception.

Polit.L6

Adhuc autem est temperate quidem misere autem vivere. Sed melior determinatio temperate et liberaliter. Separatim enim utrumque huic quidem deliciari assequetur, huic autem laboriosae vivere, quoniam soli hi habitus sunt virtutes circa habitudinem substantiae, puta substantia mansuete aut fortiter uti non est, temperate autem et liberaliter est, quare et usus hos necessarium esse circa ipsam.

Further, a man may live temperately and yet miserably. A better definition would be that a man must have so much property as will enable him to live not only temperately but liberally; if the two are parted, liberally will combine with luxury; temperance will be associated with toil. For liberality and temperance are the only eligible qualities which have to do with the use of property. A man cannot use property with mildness or courage, but temperately and liberally he may; and therefore the practice of these virtues is inseparable from property.

Polit.L6

Inconveniens autem et possessionem adequantem circa multitudinem civium non constituere, sed sinere puerorum procreationem infinitam, tanquam sufficienter utique respondentem ad eandem multitudinem propter sterilitates quantiscumque generatis, quia videtur hoc etiam nunc accidere circa civitates. Oportet autem hoc non similiter certe habere circa civitates tunc et nunc.

There is an inconsistency, too, in too, in equalizing the property and not regulating the number of the citizens; the population is to remain unlimited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to be the case in existing states. But greater care will be required than now.

Polit.L6

Nunc quidem enim nullus dubitat eo quod partitae sunt substantiae ad quantamcumque multitudinem, tunc autem indivisis existentibus necesse deiectos nihil habere sive pauciores sint secundum multitudinem sive plures.

For among ourselves, whatever may be the number of citizens, the property is always distributed among them, and therefore no one is in want; but, if the property were incapable of division as in the Laws, the supernumeraries, whether few or many, would get nothing.

Polit.L6

Magis autem suspicabitur quis utique oportere determinatum esse puerorum procreationem quam substantiam, ut non numero quodam plures generentur, hanc autem multitudinem ponere aspicientem ad fortunas, si accidat mori quosdam generatorum et ad aliorum sterilitatem. Sinere autem quaemadmodum in aliis civitatibus paupertatis necessariam causam fieri civibus; penuria autem seditionem efficit et malignitatem.

One would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit should be fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children, and of sterility in married persons. The neglect of this subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent of revolution and crime.

Polit.L6

Fidon quidem igitur corinthius existens legislator antiquorum domus equales opinatus est oportere permanere et multitudinem civium, et si primo inequales habuissent sortes omnes secundum magnitudinem. In legibus autem his contrarium est. Sed de his quidem quomodo utique estimamus melius habere dicendum posterius.

Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of the most ardent legislators, thought that the families and the number of citizens ought to remain the same, although originally all the lots may have been of different sizes: but in the Laws the opposite principle is maintained. What in our opinion is the right arrangement will have to be explained hereafter.

Polit.L6

Derelictum autem est legibus his et que circa principes quomodo erunt differentes a subiectis; ait enim oportere quaemadmodum ex altero lanae filatum fit quam lini, sic et principes habeter oportet ad subiectos.

There is another omission in the Laws: Socrates does not tell us how the rulers differ from their subjects; he only says that they should be related as the warp and the woof, which are made out of different wools.

Polit.L6

Quoniam autem omnem substantiam sinit fieri maiorem usque quincuplum, propter quid hoc non utique erit in terra usque aliquid. Et domiciliorum autem divisionem oportet considerare, ne forte non expediat ad yconomiam: duo enim domicilia cuilibet distribuebat dividens seorsum. Difficile autem domos duas habitare.

He allows that a man's whole property may be increased fivefold, but why should not his land also increase to a certain extent? Again, will the good management of a household be promoted by his arrangement of homesteads? For he assigns to each individual two homesteads in separate places, and it is difficult to live in two houses.

Polit.L6

Fere autem similiter et quae circa leges et cetera. Postquam Philosophus improbavit positionem Socratis de communitate mulierum et puerorum et possessionum, quod ponebat quasi principale in sua politia, hic inquirit de aliis consequentibus legibus.

Fere autem similiter et quae circa leges, etc. After the philosopher objected to the position of Socrates about the community of women and children and possessions, which he had laid out as if it were the governing thing in his regime, he here inquires about the other subsequent Laws.

Polit.L6

Et primo narrat eas.

And first he explains them.

Polit.L6

Secundo disputat contra eas, ibi, superfluum quidem igitur et cetera.

Second, he argues against them, at superfluum quidem igitur, [II.6.6] etc.

Polit.L6

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L6

Primo dicit de quo est intentio.

First, he says what he intends.

Polit.L6

Secundo prosequitur intentum, ibi, dividitur autem in duas partes et cetera.

Second, he carries out his intention, at dividitur autem in duas partes, [II.6.2] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut habet multas dubitationes lex de communitate mulierum et possessionum, ita etiam et aliae eius consequentes leges; et ideo melius est quod de tota eius politia aliqua pauca hic dicantur; quia de paucis in sua politia determinavit Socrates, scilicet de communitate uxorum et filiorum et possessionis, quomodo debeat se habere; et super hoc determinavit ordinem politicae conversationis.

Therefore, he first says that just as the law about the community of women and possessions has many difficulties, so also do his other subsequent Laws. And therefore it is better to say a few words here about his whole regime, because Socrates determined few things in his regime: about the community of wives and sons and possessions, and how they ought to be arranged; and over this he determined the order of political association.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit dividitur autem in duas etc., recitat ea quae Socrates dixit de ordine politiae nam de communitate satis supra dictum est.

Then, where he says dividitur autem in duas, etc., he relates what Socrates had said about the order of the regime—for enough has been said above about the community.

Polit.L6

Et primo quantum ad partes civitatis.

And first, with reference to the parts of the city.

Polit.L6

Secundo quantum ad disciplinam civium, ibi, et de disciplina qualem quamdam et cetera.

Second, with reference to the discipline of the citizens, at et de disciplina qualem quamdam, [II.6.3] etc.

Polit.L6

Circa primum quatuor dicit.

Concerning the first he says four things.

Polit.L6

Quorum primum est quod Socrates totam multitudinem habitantium civitatem dividebat in duas partes: quarum una erat agricolarum et aliorum artificum; alia vero erat vivorum bellatorum: addebat autem et tertiam partem, scilicet consilium et principes civitatis.

The first is that Socrates divided the whole multitude inhabiting the city into two parts: the first was of the farmers and the other artisans; the second was of those living for war; and he added a third part: the council and the governors of the city.

Polit.L6

Secundo dicit quod Socrates omisit dicere de agricolis et artificibus, utrum debeant aliquem principatum habere, et utrum etiam debeant aliquo modo pugnare vel non.

Second, he says that Socrates omitted to speak about whether the farmers and artisans ought to have some government, and whether they also ought to fight in some manner, or not.

Polit.L6

Tertio dicit, quod Socrates existimavit quod oportebat mulieres bellare et alia similia facere viris.

Third, he says that Socrates deemed that the women must go to war, and do other things like the men.

Polit.L6

Quarto dicit quod alias quidem partes suae politicae implevit multis sermonibus extraneis qui non pertinebant ad materiam politicae, interponens multa de naturalibus et de aliis scientiis.

Fourth, he says that Socrates filled up other parts of his political [community] with many foreign discourses that did not belong to the material of the political community, interspersing many things about the natural sciences and the other sciences.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit et de disciplina etc., narrat quid Socrates dixit de disciplina civitatis, et circa hoc tria facit.

Then, where he says et de disciplina, etc., he describes what Socrates said about the discipline of the city, and he does three things in this regard.

Polit.L6

Primo dicit in communi quod Socrates dixit de disciplina civitatis quod oportet aliquam disciplinam habere municipes, id est habitatores civitatis.

First, he says that in general, Socrates said about the discipline of the city that the townsmen—that is, the inhabitants of the city—must have some discipline.

Polit.L6

Secundo, ibi, legum autem et cetera. Ponit ea in quibus conveniebat cum aliis politiis: et dicit quod magna pars legum, quas Socrates ponebat, sunt leges quae modo in civitatibus observantur. Cum enim ipse dixerit de politia, idest conversatione civitatis, et induxerit quamdam maiorem communitatem in civitate quam sit consuetum, paulatim instituendo leges deveniebat ad alteram politiam, quae nunc observatur; quia praeter communionem mulierum et possessionis quae erat propria suae politiae, omnia alia tradidit quae possint esse communia ambabus politiis, scilicet et illi quae observat hanc communitatem, et illi quae non observat: eamdem enim disciplinam dixit esse utrorumque: puta quod homines viverent de necessariis operibus cum quadam moderantia et abstinentia, et quod facerent quaedam convivia in civitate ad maiorem civium familiaritatem, quae etiam apud alias civitates observabantur, quamvis oportuisset quod instituerent multo differentem disciplinam, ut supra dictum est.

Second, at legum autem, etc., he lays out those things in which [the Laws of Socrates] fit with other regimes, and he says that a great part of the Laws that Socrates laid out are laws that are observed in some manner in cities. For since he was going to speak about a regime—that is, about the association of the city—and he was going to introduce a greater community into the city than is customary, by gradually instituting laws he arrived at another regime that is now observed. Because beyond the communion of women and possessions that was proper to his regime, he handed down all other things that are able to be common to both regimes—namely, both to the one that observes this community, and to the one that does not observe it. For he said that the same discipline was for both of them: consider that men were to live from necessary works with moderation and abstinence, and that they were to make feasts in the city for greater intimacy among the citizens, which things are also observed among other cities—although they would need to have instituted a very different discipline [in Socrates's city], as was said above.

Polit.L6

Tertio cum dicit, verum tamen in hac inquit etc., narrat quaedam propria quae Socrates ponebat: quorum unum erat quod fierent etiam convivia mulierum et non solum virorum: aliud autem erat quod determinabat numerum bellatorum; scilicet quod in civitate essent ad minus mille arma portantes et ad plus quinque milia.

Third, where he says verum tamen in hac inquit, etc., he describes some things proper to what Socrates laid out. The first was that there would also come to be feasts for women and not only for men. Another was that he determined the number of warriors—so that in the city there would be at least a thousand bearing arms, and at most five thousand.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit superfluum quidem igitur etc., obiicit contra praedicta alia quae Socrates inducebat.

Then, where he says superfluum quidem igitur, etc., he objects to the other things mentioned that Socrates introduced.

Polit.L6

Et primo obiicit contra disciplinam legum.

And first he objects to the discipline of the laws.

Polit.L6

Secundo contra ordinem partium civitatis, ibi, coordinatio autem tota vult et cetera.

Second, to the order of a part of the city, at coordinatio autem tota vult, [II.7.1] etc.

Polit.L6

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L6

Primo proponit quod intendit.

First, he proposes his intention.

Polit.L6

Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, quoniam et nunc dictam et cetera.

Second, he clarifies what was proposed, at quoniam et nunc dictam, [II.6.7] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo, quod sermones Socratis habent aliquid superfluum, inquantum replet suam politiam extraneis sermonibus; et leve, inquantum erant insufficientes rationes, et sine experientia prolatae; et novum, inquantum erat contra communem consuetudinem. Et erat quaestionibus plenum per multas difficultates consequentes; et quod in omnibus bene diceret difficile est asserere.

Therefore, he first says that the discourses of Socrates have something superfluous, inasmuch as he fills up his Republic with extraneous discourses; and trivial, inasmuch as there were insufficient reasons, and they were put forward without experience; and new, inasmuch as it was going against common custom. And it is filled with questions because of the many consequent difficulties. And that it is difficult to assert that Socrates spoke well in all things.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit quoniam et nunc dictam manifestat quod dixerat.

Then, where he says quoniam et nunc dictam he clarifies what he had said.

Polit.L6

Et primo improbat dicta Socratis quantum ad mensuram quam civitati imponebat.

And first, he objects to the words of Socrates with reference to the measure he placed upon the city.

Polit.L6

Secundo quantum ad distinctionem, ibi, Fidon quidem igitur et cetera.

Second, with reference to its distinction, at Fidon quidem igitur, [II.6.16] etc.

Polit.L6

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L6

Primo improbat dictum eius quantum ad numerum bellatorum.

First, he objects to his words with reference to the number of warriors.

Polit.L6

Secundo quantum ad quantitatem possessionis quam taxabat, ibi, et multitudinem autem possessionis et cetera.

Second, with reference to the quantity of possessions that he assessed, at et multitudinem autem possessionis, [II.6.8] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo, quod si quis consideret praedictam multitudinem bellatorum, quam Socrates instituebat in civitate, manifeste apparet quod civitas talis indigebit maxima latitudine camporum, sicut est circa Babyloniam, ad hoc quod nutriantur exinde quinque millia bellatorum, qui nihil aliud operentur, et praeter eos multo maior alia turba, et mulierum et famulorum.

Therefore, he first says that if someone were to consider the aforementioned multitude of warriors that Socrates instituted in the city, it clearly appears that a city of this sort will require the greatest breadth of fields, as around Babylon, for feeding five thousand warriors from them who work at nothing else, and further, the other far greater host of women and servants [famulorum].

Polit.L6

Et secundum hoc oportet quod ille qui talem civitatem instituit, habeat multitudinem camporum ad votum; quod tamen non est impossibile: sed tamen hoc considerandum quod ille qui vult legem in civitate statuere, non debet statuere legem secundum illud quod cogitat quod sit possibile, sed respiciendo ad ea quae ei existunt; et praecipue quidem ad duo: scilicet ad regionem, ut non constituat maiorem civitatem quam regio illa pascere possit, et iterum ad homines ut conveniant leges hominibus secundum eorum conditiones.

And according to this, he who would institute such a city must have a multitude of fields at his whim—which, indeed, is not impossible, but nevertheless, it ought to be considered that he who wants to establish [statuere] a law in a city ought not to establish the law according to what he thinks to be possible, but by looking to those things that are in existence for it; and chiefly to two things: to the region, so that he will not constitute a greater city than that region can feed; and also to the men, so that the laws may be fitting for the human beings according to their conditions.

Polit.L6

Tertio autem est apponendum, ut ponat leges respiciendo ad loca vicina: et hoc quidem primo est necessarium si civitas debet habere vitam non solitariam, sed politicam, idest communem cum multis aliis civitatibus, cum quibus societatem habeat non solum in pace, sed etiam in bello: quia talem civitatem non solum necessarium est uti talibus armis ad bellum et in tanto numero secundum quod utile est ad propriam regionem; sed etiam in exterioribus locis, in quibus conversantur vel hostes vel amici. Secundo autem si quis non approbet vitam bellicosam, neque ut propriam alicuius hominis, neque ut communem totius civitatis, nihilominus tamen quantum ad hoc oportet cives esse armatos et bellicosos, ut sint terribiles inimicis, non solum cum veniunt in regionem, sed etiam quando discedunt.

The third thing for one who would put things in place is that he put forward laws by looking toward the neighboring places. This is necessary, first of all, if the city would have a life that is not solitary but political—that is, in common with many other cities, with whom it has society not only in peace, but also in war. Because it is not only necessary that such a city have the use of such weapons for war and in so great a number insofar as it is useful for its own region, but also in foreign places, in which are associated both enemies and friends. Second, however, if someone does not approve of a warlike life, either as what is proper to some men, or as something common to the whole city, nevertheless, citizens must still be armed and warlike in this regard, as there are terrible foes—not only when they come into the region, but also when they depart.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit multitudinem autem etc., improbat positionem Socratis, quantum ad mensuram possessionum quam in civitate statuebat. Et circa hoc duo facit.

Then, where he says multitudinem autem, etc., he objects to the position of Socrates with reference to the measure of possessions that he established in the city. Concerning this he does two things.

Polit.L6

Primo improbat mensuram possessionum a Socrate positam secundum se.

First, he objects to the measure of possessions posited by Socrates in and of itself.

Polit.L6

Secundo quantum ad hoc quod praetermisit mensurare generationem, ibi, inconveniens autem et possessiones et cetera.

Second, because he neglected a measure for generation, at inconveniens autem et possessiones, etc.

Polit.L6

Circa primum ponit duas rationes.

Concerning the first, he lays out two reasons.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo, quod oportet considerare ne forte alio modo possit planius determinari quantitas possessionum quas civitas debet communiter habere, quam Socrates determinaverat. Dicit enim Socrates quod tanta debet esse possessio civitatis, ut ex ea possint cives vivere temperate: sed planius diceretur si quis diceret, quod tanta debet esse possessio civitatis, ut ex ea vivatur bene: haec enim determinatio est magis utilis, eo quod plura in se comprehendit bene vivere quam temperate vivere.

Therefore, he first says that one must consider whether we could more strongly, in another manner, determine a more even quantity of possessions which the city ought to have in common than what Socrates had determined. For Socrates says that the possessions of the city ought to be enough that the citizens are able to live temperately from them: but it would be more evenly spoken if someone were to say that the possessions of the city ought to be enough that it may live well from them. For this determination is more useful, for “to live well” comprehends more things within itself than “to live temperately.”

Polit.L6

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc autem est temperate quidem et cetera. Et dicit quod contingit aliquem temperate vivere, qui tamen misere vivit, idest cum magna penuria. Et sic patet quod praedicta determinatio Socratis non sufficit; sed melior determinatio est ut dicatur quod tanta debet esse possessio, ut vivatur temperate et liberaliter. Si enim alterum eorum separatim dicatur, sequetur inconveniens. Ex una enim parte si dicatur quod debeat vivere liberaliter, sequetur quod homo in superfluis delitiis vivat. Ex alia vero parte, si dicatur quod debet vivere temperate, sequetur quod possit homo vivere cum penuria et labore: ideo ad excludendum utrumque inconveniens oportet dicere, temperate et liberaliter; et ista determinatio sufficit; quia solae hae duae virtutes faciunt hominem bene se habere circa usum substantiae, idest possessionis: et hoc patet in aliis virtutibus: non enim potest dici quod aliquis utatur sua possessione mansuete aut fortiter. Mansuetudo enim est circa iras, et fortitudo circa timores et audacias; et sic in nullo respiciunt usum possessionum: sed temperantia quae est circa concupiscentias ciborum et venereorum propter quas multi consumunt suam substantiam, et liberalitas quae est circa donationes et acceptiones manifeste respiciunt usum possessionis: unde potest dici quod aliquis utatur sua possessione temperate et liberaliter: unde cum per utrumque istorum videtur esse inconveniens circa usum possessionum, necessarium est circa ipsas esse usus hos, scilicet temperantiae et liberalitatis.

He lays out a second reason at adhuc autem est temperate quidem, etc., and he says that it can happen for someone to live temperately who nevertheless lives in poverty—that is, in great need. And thus it is evident that the aforementioned determination of Socrates is not sufficient, but a better determination is to say that possessions ought to be so great that one may live temperately and generously. For if either of these is spoken of separately, something unfitting would follow. On the one hand, if it is said that one ought to live generously, it would follow that man would live in superfluous luxury. On the other hand, if it is said that he ought to live temperately, it would follow that man could live with neediness and labor. Therefore, to exclude both of these unfitting things, one must say “temperately and generously.” And such a determination is sufficient, because these two virtues alone make man well disposed for the use of his substance—that is, his possessions. And this is evident in the other virtues, for it could not be said that someone uses his possessions meekly or bravely. For meekness concerns anger, and bravery concerns fear and daring; and thus in no way do they look toward the use of possessions; but temperance, which is about the concupiscence for food and sex—on account of which many devour their substance—and generosity, which is about giving and receiving, clearly look toward the use of possessions. And so it can be said that someone uses his possessions temperately and generously: and so, since through both of these things there seems to be something unfitting concerning the use of possessions, the latter things—temperance and generosity—are necessary for the use of possessions.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit inconveniens autem etc., improbat positionem Socratis ex hoc quod determinans quantitatem possessionum non determinabat quantitatem generationis. Et circa hoc sex facit.

Then, where he says inconveniens autem, etc., he objects to the position of Socrates because of this: that while he determined the amount of possessions, he did not determine the amount of generation. Concerning this he does six things.

Polit.L6

Primo quidem proponit esse inconveniens id quod Socrates dicebat: et dicit quod inconveniens est quod aliquis velit possessiones civitatis adaequare idest ad certam quantitatem reducere, et cum hoc non instituat aliquid ad determinandum multitudinem civium, sed permittat generationem civium in infinitum fieri, sicut Socrates faciebat.

First, he proposes that what Socrates said is unfitting: and he says that it is unfitting that someone should wish for the possessions of a city to be equalized—that is, to be brought down to a certain quantity—and along with this should not institute something for determining the multitude of the citizens, but permit the generation of citizens to come to be without a limit, as Socrates did.

Polit.L6

Secundo, ibi, tamquam sufficienter etc. ponit rationem quae movebat Socratem: contingit enim in civitate multas mulieres esse steriles: et ita licet aliis mulieribus generantibus multos filios, tamen semper conservabitur eadem multitudo civitatis, sicut nunc videmus in civitatibus evenire. Et propter hoc Socrati non videbatur necessarium quod circa generationem filiorum aliquid taxaretur.

Second, at tamquam sufficienter, etc., he lays out the reason that moved Socrates. For it happens in the city that many women are infertile, and so it is permitted to other women to generate many sons, and yet to always preserve the same multitude of the city, as we now see come to pass in cities. And because of this, it did not seem necessary to Socrates that anything should be assessed about the generation of sons.

Polit.L6

Tertio quidem, ibi, nunc quidem enim etc., ostendit Aristoteles hanc rationem esse insufficientem: quia nunc in civitatibus, propter hoc quod possessiones sunt divisae, unoquoque habente propriam possessionem, nulla dubitatio potest provenire ad quantamcumque multitudinem proveniat generatio filiorum, quia unusquisque filiis suis studet aliquo modo providere; sed tunc cum possessiones non essent divisae inter cives secundum ordinationem Socratis, sequeretur quod illi qui essent abiectiores nihil perciperent de fructibus possessionum, sive multiplicarentur, sive diminuerentur, dum modo illi qui essent potentes multiplicarentur; dum enim potentes civitatis primo sibi et suis necessaria sumerent, sic eorum multitudo excresceret.

Third, indeed, at nunc quidem enim, etc., Aristotle shows that this reasoning is insufficient because now in cities, because possessions are divided, and each one has his own possessions, no difficulty can come forth regarding the generation of sons bringing forth any multitude whatsoever, because each person, having zeal for his own sons, provides for them in some manner. But then, since possessions were not divided among citizens in the ordering of Socrates, it would have followed that those who were abject would partake in none of the fruit of possessions, whether they were multiplied or diminished, so long as those who were powerful were multiplied; and so long as the powerful of the city take up the necessary things first for themselves and their own, their multitude will increase.

Polit.L6

Quarto ibi, magis autem suspicabitur et cetera. Proponit quod oportet determinare multitudinem circa generationem filiorum; et dicit quod aliquis potest aestimare quod magis oportet determinari generationem filiorum quam etiam multitudinem substantiae; ita scilicet quod non generentur plures cives ab aliquo numero determinato, cui sufficiant civitatis possessiones.

Fourth, at magis autem suspicabitur, etc., he proposes that one must determine multitude concerning the generation of sons. And he says that someone could estimate that one must further determine the generation of sons than even the multitude of [their] substance—so that more citizens are not generated than some determinate number for which the possessions of the city are sufficient.

Polit.L6

Quinto ibi, hanc autem multitudinem etc., ostendit quid debeat observari in tali determinatione; et dicit quod oportet determinare multitudinem filiorum generandorum respiciendo ad casus fortuitos, puta ad mortes eorum qui nascuntur, et ad sterilitatem mulierum quae non concipiunt, ut scilicet tantum permittatur ex alia parte superexcrescere generatorum numerus, ut huiusmodi defectus fortuiti suppleantur.

Fifth, at hanc autem multitudinem, etc., he shows what ought to be observed in such a determination, and he says that one must determine the multitude of sons that should be generated by looking toward chance occurrences: for instance, toward the deaths of those who are born, and toward the sterility of the women who do not conceive, so that only so much of the rest would be permitted to exceed the number of the generated as would fill up what is lacking by some sort of chance.

Polit.L6

Sexto, ibi, sinere autem etc. ostendit quomodo oportet determinari multitudinem generatorum; et dicit quod hoc ideo necessarium est, quia si permittatur quod in infinitum homines generentur absque aliquo determinato numero, sicut communiter fit in civitatibus, ex necessitate sequitur quod ex hoc proveniat causa paupertatis civibus: multi enim filii pauperes erunt habentes id solum quod eorum pater dives habebat; ex paupertate autem civium, sequitur quod sint seditiosi et maligni; quia dum non habent necessaria vitae, student ea conquirere fraudibus et rapinis.

Sixth, at sinere autem, etc., he shows how one must determine the multitude of the generated; and he says that this is necessary because if it were permitted that men should generate without an end, apart from some determinate number, as commonly comes to be in cities, it would follow, of necessity, that from this comes forth a cause of poverty for the citizens. For many sons will be poor when they have only what their wealthy father had. But from the poverty of the citizens, it follows that there will be sedition and wickedness; because so long as they do not have the necessities of life, they will be zealous to seek them out with robbery and fraud.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit Phaedon quidem igitur etc., improbat disciplinam legum Socratis quantum ad distinctionem quam in civitate faciebat. Et circa hoc quatuor facit.

Then, where he says Phaedon quidem igitur, etc., he objects to Socrates's discipline in the Laws with reference to the distinction that he made in the city. And concerning this he does four things.

Polit.L6

Primo ostendit quomodo circa distinctionem discordabat ab aliis legislatoribus. Et dicit quod quidam legislator Corinthius, Phaedon nomine, duo dixit esse observanda in civitate: quorum unum est, ut domus antiquorum civium permanerent aequales adinvicem in divitiis et dignitate, etiam si a principio inaequales sortes habuissent: (quomodo autem reduci possint ad aequalitatem infra dicetur): aliud est ut multitudo civium semper aequalis remaneret. Sed in legibus Socratis contrarium invenitur: quia neque ordinat quomodo aequalitas multitudinis civium conservetur, neque etiam statuit quod sint aequales divitiae civium; sed permittit quod quidam habeant maiores divitias aliis, ut postea dicetur: sed de hoc quid melius sit, utrum scilicet quod omnes cives habeant divitias aequales, vel non, postea determinabitur.

First, he shows how Socrates disagreed with other legislators about this distinction. And he says that some legislator of Corinth named Phaedon said two things need to be observed in the city. The first is that the households of the ancient citizens remain equal to each other in wealth and worthiness, even if from the beginning they were to have had unequal lots. (How they can be brought back to equality he will say later.) The other is that the multitude of the citizens should remain always equal. In the laws of Socrates, the contrary is found, because he neither puts in order how the equality of the multitude of the citizens would be preserved, nor also does he establish that the wealth of the citizens be equal; but he permits that some should have greater wealth than others, as will be said afterward. But about what is better—whether that all the citizens should have equal wealth or not—will be determined afterward.

Polit.L6

Secundo, ibi derelictum autem est etc., improbat legem Socratis quantum ad distinctionem principum. Et dicit quod per leges Socratis non fuit determinatum quomodo deberent distingui principes a subditis, cum tamen ipse diceret quod oporteret aliquam distinctionem esse inter eos, ut sicut ex alia materia fit filatum lanae quam filatum lini, ita ex alia conditione oporteret aliquos assumi in principatum et remanere aliquos in subiectione: non enim poterat eos distinguere per originem generis ex quo ponebat pueros et uxores communes.

Second, at derelictum autem est, etc., he objects to the law of Socrates with reference to the distinction of the governors. And he says that through the laws of Socrates, it was not determined how the governors ought to be distinguished from the subordinates—although, indeed, he had himself said that there would have to be some distinction between them, since just as a thread of fleece and a thread of flax come to be from different materials, so those who are to be assumed into government and those who are to remain in subjection must come from different conditions, for he could not distinguish them through the origin of their family [genus], since he had set up wives and children in common.

Polit.L6

Tertio, ibi, quoniam autem omnem substantiam etc. improbat positionem Socratis quantum ad distinctionem possessionum; et dicit quod Socrates permittebat quod in rebus mobilibus divitiae unius multiplicarentur supra divitias alterius in quincuplum; et pari ratione poterat permittere idem in possessione terrae, ut non faceret omnes agros communes.

Third, at quoniam autem omnem substantiam, etc., he objects to the position of Socrates with reference to the distinction of possessions. And he says that Socrates permitted that with moveable things [res mobilis], the wealth of one could be multiplied beyond the wealth of another by five times; and by equal reasoning, he was able to permit the same thing for possessing the land, so that he would not make all farms communal.

Polit.L6

Quarto, ibi, et domiciliorum autem etc., improbat distinctionem Socratis quantum ad domos. Et dicit quod oportet considerare ne forte distinctio domorum, quam introducebat Socrates, non sit utilis oeconomicae. Dicebat enim quod quilibet civis debebat habere duo domicilia, forte propter separationem filiorum: sed hoc est difficile quod aliquis habeat tantam familiam quod possit inhabitare duas domos; et etiam damnosum oeconomicae, ut unus homo faciat duas expensas in duabus familiis.

Fourth, at et domiciliorum autem, etc., he objects to the distinction of Socrates with reference to households. And he says that one must consider whether perhaps distinction of households that Socrates introduced is not useful for the economic [governor]. For he said that any citizen ought to have two homes, perhaps because of the separation of sons. But it is difficult for someone to have so great a family that he could inhabit two households; and it is ruinous for an economic governor that one man should pay the expenses for two families.

Polit.L6

Lecture 7

Polit.L7

Coordinatio autem tota vult quidem esse neque democratia neque oligarchia, media autem harum quam vocant politiam: ex utentibus enim armis est.

The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usually called a polity, and is composed of the heavy-armed soldiers.

Polit.L7

Si quidem igitur ut communissimam hanc construit civitatibus aliarum politeiarum, bene dixit forte. Si autem ut optimam post primam politeiam, non benem forsitan enim eam que Laconorum aliquis utique laudabit magis, vel etiam aliam aliquam magis aristocraticam.

Now, if he intended to frame a constitution which would suit the greatest number of states, he was very likely right, but not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came nearest to his first or ideal state; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aristocratic government.

Polit.L7

Quidam quidem igitur dicunt quod oportet optimam politeiam ex omnibsu esse civibus mixtam, propter quod et Lacedemoniorum laudant: esse enim ipsam hi quidem ex oligarchia et monarchia et democratia aiunt dicentes regnum quidem monarchaim seniorum autem principatum oligarchaim, democraticae autem principari secundum principatum, propter ex populo esse eforos. Alii autem eforiam quidem esse tyrannidem, democraticae autem principari secundum convivia et aliam vitam cotidianam.

Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing forms, and they praise the Lacedaemonian because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in the habits of daily life.

Polit.L7

In legibus autem his dictum est quod oportunum componi optimam politeiam ex democratia et tyrannide.

In the Laws it is maintained that the best constitution is made up of democracy and tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or are the worst of all.

Polit.L7

Quas aut omnino non utique aliquis ponet politeias aut pessimas omnibus. Melius igitur dicunt qui plures commiscent: ex pluribus enim composita politeia melior.

But they are nearer the truth who combine many forms; for the constitution is better which is made up of more numerous elements.

Polit.L7

Deinde neque habens videtur monarchicum nihil, sed oligarchica et democratica. Magis autem declinare vult ad oligarchiam.

The constitution proposed in the Laws has no element of monarchy at all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy.

Polit.L7

Palam autem ex principantium institutione. Quod quidem enim ex electis sortiales commune est ambarum. Quod autem habundantioribus necessarium sit convocare et ferre principes, aut facere aliquid aliud politicorum, hos autem dimittere, hoc oligarchicum, et temptare plures ex habundantibus esse principes et maximos ex maximis honorabilitatibus.

This is seen in the mode of appointing magistrates; for although the appointment of them by lot from among those who have been already selected combines both elements, the way in which the rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties, while the rest may do as they like, and the endeavor to have the greater number of the magistrates appointed out of the richer classes and the highest officers selected from those who have the greatest incomes, both these are oligarchical features.

Polit.L7

Oligarchicam autem facit et concilii electionem. Eligunt quidem enim omnes necessario, sed ex prima honorabilitate. Deinde rursum equales ex secunda. Deinde ex tertiis; verumtamen non omnibus erat necessarium his qui ex tertiis aut quartis. Ex quarto autem quartorum necessarium solis primis et secundis. Deinde ex his ex qualibet honorabilitate ait oportere ostendere equalem numerum; erunt autem plures qui ex maximis honorabilitatibus et meliores propter quosdam popularium non eligere, quia non necessarium.

The oligarchical principle prevails also in the choice of the council, for all are compelled to choose, but the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class, and of an equal number out of the second class and out of the third class, but not in this latter case to all the voters but to those of the first three classes; and the selection of candidates out of the fourth class is only compulsory on the first and second. Then, from the persons so chosen, he says that there ought to be an equal number of each class selected. Thus a preponderance will be given to the better sort of people, who have the larger incomes, because many of the lower classes, not being compelled will not vote.

Polit.L7

Quomodo quidem igitur ex democratia et monarchia oportet constare talem politiam ex his manifestum et ex posterius dicendis cum inciderit de tali politia consideratio.

These considerations, and others which will be adduced when the time comes for examining similar polities, tend to show that states like Plato's should not be composed of democracy and monarchy.

Polit.L7

Habet autem et circa electionem principum scilicet quod ex electis eligibiles periculosum. Si enim aliqui institui velint et mediocres multitudine, semper ad horum eligentur voluntatem. Quae quidem igitur circa politeiam quae in legibus hunc habet modum.

There is also a danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who are themselves elected; for, if but a small number choose to combine, the elections will always go as they desire. Such is the constitution which is described in the Laws.

Polit.L7

Coordinatio autem tota et cetera. Postquam Aristoteles improbavit positionem Socratis quantum ad disciplinas legum, hic improbat eam quantum ad ordinem civitatis.

Coordinatio autem tota, etc. After Aristotle objected to the position of Socrates with reference to the discipline of the Laws, he here objects to it with reference to the order of the city.

Polit.L7

Et primo quantum ad populum.

And first, with reference to the people.

Polit.L7

Secundo quantum ad principes, ibi, quidam quidem igitur dicunt et cetera.

Second, with reference to the governors, at quidam quidem igitur dicunt, [II.7.4] etc.

Polit.L7

Ad evidentiam autem eorum quae hic dicuntur, considerandum est, quod sex sunt species ordinationis civitatum, ut in tertio dicetur. Omnis enim civitas, aut regitur ab uno, aut a paucis, aut a multis. Si ab uno; aut ille unus est rex, aut tyrannus. Rex quidem, si sit virtuosus tenens communem utilitatem subditorum. Tyrannus autem, si sit malus omnia retorquens ad suum commodum, utilitate subditorum contempta. Si vero regatur civitas a paucis; aut illi eligentur propter virtutem qui bonum multitudinis procurent; et tale regimen dicitur aristocratia id est potestas virtuosorum vel optimorum. Aut eligentur aliqui pauci propter potentiam, aut divitias, et non propter virtutem, qui omnia quae sunt multitudinis ad suam propriam utilitatem retorquebunt; et tale regimen dicitur oligarchia, id est principatus paucorum. Si vero civitas regitur a multis, similiter, siquidem regatur a multis virtuosis, tale regimen vocabitur communi nomine politia. Non autem contingit multos inveniri virtuosos in civitate, nisi forte secundum bellicam virtutem: et ideo hoc regimen est quando viri bellatores in civitate dominantur. Si vero tota multitudo populi dominari velit, vocatur democratia id est potestas populi.

For evidence of what he says here, it should be considered that there are six kinds of orders for the city, as will be said in Bk. III. For every city is either ruled by one, or by the few, or by the many. If by one, either the one is a king or a tyrant. He is a king if he is virtuous, and upholds what is useful in common for his subordinates; but he is a tyrant if he is evil, and twists all things back toward his own ease, despising what is useful for his subordinates. However, if the city is ruled by the few, either those are chosen because of virtue who administer the good of the multitude—and such a rule is called aristocracy—that is, the power of the virtuous or the best, or some few are chosen because of their power, or their wealth, and not because of virtue—who will twist all the things of the multitude back to what is useful for themselves. And such a rule is called an oligarchy—that is, the government of the few. But if a city is ruled by the many, likewise if it is ruled by many who are virtuous, such a rule will be called by the common name of polity. However, it does not happen that the many are found virtuous in a city, except by chance, with regard to warlike virtue: and therefore this rule is when warlike men have mastery in the city. But if the whole multitude of the people wish to have mastery, it is called democracy—that is, the power of the people.

Polit.L7

Dicit ergo primo, quod secundum legem Socratis tota coordinatio multitudinis, scilicet civitatis, neque est democratia, neque oligarchia, sed est media horum, quam communi nomine nominant aliqui politiam; et consistit ex his qui utuntur armis. Cum enim Socrates multitudinem civitatis divideret in duas partes, quarum una erat pugnatorum, alia artificum et agricolarum (agricolas autem oportet in agris manere) relinquitur quod quasi multitudo habitantium civitatem esset virorum bellatorum.

Therefore, he first says that according to the law of Socrates, that the whole established order of the multitude—namely, of the city—is neither a democracy, nor an oligarchy, but is a mean between these, which some name by the common name polity: and it is constructed from those who use arms. For when Socrates divided the multitude of the city into two parts, the first of which was the warriors, he abandons the other—the artisans and the farmers (though the farmers must remain in the farms)—as if the multitude dwelling in the city were a multitude of warlike men.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit siquidem igitur ut communissimam etc., ostendit quantum ad quid bene dixit, et quantum ad quid male. Et dicit quod si ipse instituit talem ordinationem tamquam communissimam inter alias politias, forte bene dixit. Nam oligarchia est solum magnorum: democratia vero est solum infirmorum: haec vero politia est ex his qui sunt medii inter utrosque: unde communior est, utpote cum utriusque participans. Sed si ipse instituit talem ordinationem quasi optimam post primam, non bene dixit. Primam autem ordinationem dicit regnum, vel quia est prima tempore (a principio enim omnes civitates regibus regebantur), vel quia est optima dummodo rex sit bonus. Post hanc autem primam politiam non potest dici quod politia virorum bellantium sit optima; multo enim melior est aristocratia, quae est principatus virtuosorum, per quem modum regebantur Lachoni vel si qui alii cives adhuc magis aristocratice reguntur.

Then, where he says siquidem igitur ut communissimam, etc., he shows the degree to which Socrates spoke well, and the degree to which he spoke badly. And he says that if he instituted such an order as the most common among the other regimes, perhaps he spoke well. For oligarchy is only of the great; democracy is only of the weak; but this regime is one of those that are the mean between both, and whence it is more common, namely, since those of both parts participate in it. But if he instituted such an order as if it were the best after the first one, he did not speak well. For he calls the first order a kingdom, either because it is the first in time (for at the beginning, all cities were ruled by kings), or because it is the best—so long as the king is good. But after this first regime, it cannot be said that the regime of warlike men is the best; for aristocracy—the government of the virtuous—is much better, in which manner the Laconians were ruled, even if those who are citizens of other [cities] are still ruled more aristocratically.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit quidam quidem igitur dicunt etc., improbat ordinem quem Socrates in civitate statuebat quantum ad principes. Et circa hoc duo facit.

Then, where he says quidam quidem igitur dicunt, etc., he objects to the order that Socrates established in the city with reference to governors. Concerning this he does two things.

Polit.L7

Primo ponit positionem eius.

First, he lays out Socrates's position.

Polit.L7

Secundo improbat eam, ibi, quas aut omnino et cetera.

Second, he objects to it, at quas aut omnino, [II.7.6] etc.

Polit.L7

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L7

Primo proponit quod expedit in civitatibus commisceri praedicta regimina.

First, he proposes that it is advantageous in cities that the aforementioned regimes be mixed.

Polit.L7

Secundo ostendit qualiter Socrates commiscebat, ibi, in legibus autem iis dictum est et cetera.

Second, he shows how Socrates mixed them, at in legibus autem iis dictum est, [II.7.5] etc.

Polit.L7

Dicit ergo primo, quod quidam dicunt quod optimum regimen civitatis est quod est quasi commixtum ex omnibus praedictis regiminibus. Et huius ratio est, quia unum regimen temperatur ex admixtione alterius, et minus datur seditionis materia, si omnes habeant partem in principatu civitatis; puta si in aliquo dominetur populus, in aliquo potentes, in aliquo rex: et secundum hoc maxime laudabitur ordinatio civitatis Lacedaemoniorum: de qua tamen erant duae opiniones. Quidam enim dicebant eam componi ex tribus civilitatibus, scilicet ex oligarchia, id est principatus divitum, et monarchia, id est potestate unius, et democratia, id est potentia populi: habebant enim in civitate regem, quod pertinebat ad monarchiam: habebant etiam seniores quosdam ex maioribus civitatis assumptos, quod pertinebat ad oligarchiam: habebant etiam quosdam principes qui eligebantur ex populo, et vocabantur ephori, idest provisores, et hoc pertinebat ad democratiam. Aliorum autem opinio fuit quod principatus ephororum pertineret ad tyrannidem, quia pro voluntate dominabantur; sed erant in civitate alii principatus qui disponebant de conviviis communibus et de aliis pertinentibus ad quotidianam vitam civitatis, puta de victualibus et aliis rebus venalibus; et id dicebant pertinere ad democratiam.

Therefore, he first says that some say that the best regime of the city is that it is as though it were a mixture of all the aforementioned regimes. And the reason for this is because one regime is restrained by the admixture of another, and it is given less material for sedition if all have a share in the government of the city—as though in some part, the people have mastery, in another the powerful, and in another the king. And following this, the ordering of the city of the Lacedaemonians will be most praised. There are two opinions about this. For some say that it is put together from three cities: from oligarchy—the government of the wealthy—and monarchy—the power of one—and democracy—the power of the people. For they had a king in the city, which belongs to monarchy; they also had some elders, assumed from the greater men of the city, which belongs to oligarchy; they also had some leaders who were chosen from the people, and were called ephors—that is, providers—which belongs to democracy. But the opinion of others was that the government of the ephors belonged to tyranny, because they exercised mastery at will; but there were other governments in the city that organized common feasts, and other things that belonged to the daily life of the city—to nutrition and to sexual matters—and they said that this belonged to democracy.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit in legibus autem etc., ostendit quomodo Socrates commiscebat suam politiam: et dicit, quod in legibus Socratis dictum est, quod optima politia debet componi ex tyrannide et democratia; forte propter hoc, ut potentia populi refrenaretur per potentiam tyranni, et iterum quod potentia tyranni refrenaretur per potentiam populi.

Then, where he says in legibus autem, etc., he shows how Socrates mixed his regime. And he says that in the laws of Socrates it was said that the best regime ought to be put together from tyranny and democracy; perhaps so that the power of the people might be bridled by the power of a tyrant, and moreover that the power of a tyrant might be bridled by the power of the people.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit quas aut omnino etc., improbat quantum ad hoc Socratis dictum.

Then, where he says quas aut omnino, etc., he objects to what Socrates said.

Polit.L7

Et primo ostendit hanc ordinationem secundum se inconvenientem esse.

And first, he shows that this ordering, in itself, is unfitting.

Polit.L7

Secundo ostendit, quod ea, quae statuebat, non erant convenientia huic commixtioni, ibi, deinde neque habens videtur et cetera.

Second, he shows that the things Socrates established were not fitting for this mixture, at deinde neque habens videtur, [II.7.7] etc.

Polit.L7

Dicit ergo primo, quod praedictae duae politiae, scilicet tyrannis et democratia, vel non sunt dicendae politiae, quia non sequuntur ordinem rationis, sed impetum voluntatis: vel sunt dicendae pessimae inter omnes: unde inconveniens est, quod ex pessimis politiis componatur optima politia. Multo igitur melius faciunt illi, qui ex pluribus politiis commiscent ordinationem civitatis: quanto enim est ex pluribus commixta, tanto melior est, quia plures habent partem in dominio civitatis.

Therefore, he first says that the two aforementioned regimes—tyranny and democracy—either should not be called regimes, because they do not follow the order of reason, but the impulse of the will, or they should be called the worst of all. And so it is unfitting that from the worst regimes the best regime should be put together. He does much better, therefore, who mixes the ordering of the city from many regimes: for by however much it is mixed from many, by so much is it better, because many have a share in the mastery of the city.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit deinde, neque habens etc., improbat dictum Socratis quantum ad ea quae instituebat, (quae) non conveniebant commixtioni praedictae. Et circa hoc duo facit.

Then, where he says deinde, neque habens, etc., he objects to what Socrates had said with reference to the things that he instituted, which are not fitting for the aforementioned mixture. Concerning this he does two things.

Polit.L7

Primo ostendit, quod ea quae statuebat Socrates, non conveniebant praedictae commixtioni.

First, he shows that those things that Socrates established are not fitting for the aforementioned mixture.

Polit.L7

Secundo, quod erant secundum se periculosa, ibi, habet autem, et circa electionem et cetera.

Second, that in themselves, they were dangerous, at habet autem, et circa electionem, [II.7.11] etc.

Polit.L7

Circa primum tria facit.

Concerning the first he does three things.

Polit.L7

Primo proponit quod intendit.

First, he proposes his intention.

Polit.L7

Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, palam autem ex principantium et cetera.

Second, he clarifies what was proposed, at palam autem ex principantium, [II.7.8] etc.

Polit.L7

Tertio ostendit quomodo praedicta commixtio fieri posset, ibi, quomodo quidem igitur et cetera.

Third, he shows how the aforementioned mixture could come to be, at quomodo quidem igitur, [II.7.10] etc.

Polit.L7

Dicit ergo primo, quod cum Socrates vellet commiscere politiam ex democratia et tyrannide, quae est monarchia quaedam, siquis consideret ea, quae ipse statuit, nihil est ibi monarchicum, id est pertinens ad principatum unius: sed omnia sunt oligarchica et democratica, id est pertinentia ad potentes, vel populum; sed magis declinat sua ordinatio ad oligarchiam.

Therefore, he first says that although Socrates wished to mix the regime from democracy and tyranny, which is a sort of monarchy, if anyone were to consider the things that he established, nothing here is monarchic—that is, belonging to the government of one; but all things are oligarchic and democratic, that is, belonging to the powerful or to the people. And his ordering leans more toward oligarchy.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit palam autem etc., ostendit propositum.

Then, where he says palam autem, etc., he shows what was proposed.

Polit.L7

Et primo circa electionem principum.

And first, concerning the choice of governors;

Polit.L7

Secundo circa electionem consiliorum, ibi, oligarchicam autem et cetera.

second, concerning the choice of counselors, at oligarchicam autem, [II.7.9] etc.

Polit.L7

Dicit ergo primo, quod hoc quod dictum est, manifestum est ex institutione principum, quam Socrates determinat: dicit enim quod debebant aliqui eligi ex quibus per sortem assumerentur principes: et hoc commune erat et democratiae et oligarchiae, quia isti electi erant et de populo et de maioribus. Sed quaedam alia instituebat pertinentia ad oligarchiam: scilicet quod ad divites civitatis pertineret convocare multitudinem, et quod ipsi deferrent principes electos ad populum; et omnia huiusmodi, quae pertinebant ad communitatem civitatis volebat fieri per divitiores, et in his alios dimittebat: similiter etiam oligarchicum erat, quod volebat plures principes fieri ex divitibus, et in maioribus officiis constitutos.

Therefore, he first says that what was said is clear from the institution of governors that Socrates determined. For he says that they should have been chosen from those who were taken up as governors by lot: and this was common both to democracy and to oligarchy, because such men were chosen both from the people and from the greater men. But some other things he instituted belong to oligarchy: that it belongs to the wealthy of the city to call together the multitude, and that they announce the chosen governors to the people; and all things of this sort that belonged to the community of the city he wished to happen through the wealthy, and he dismissed the others from these affairs; likewise, also, it was oligarchic that he wanted more governors to be from the wealthy, and for them to be constituted in the greater offices.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit oligarchicam autem etc., dicit quomodo in electione consiliariorum declinabat ad oligarchiam: et dicit, quod secundum Socratem cives distinguebantur per quatuor gradus, et ex omnibus gradibus aliqui erant, qui eligebant consiliarios: sed omnes, qui erant de prima honorabilitate, ex necessitate cogebantur ad eligendum: illi vero qui erant in secunda honorabilitate, non omnes eligebant, sed aliqui aequales numero primis; et tamen isti etiam ex necessitate cogebantur eligere. Deinde ex tertio gradu eligebantur aliqui aequales, et similiter ex quartis: sed tamen non erat necessarium, quod omnes qui eligebantur ex tertiis vel quartis eligerent; sed ex quarto gradu qui erat quartorum, nullus poterat eligere consiliarios, nisi illi qui erant de primo vel de secundo gradu: et ita dicebat Socrates, quod aequalis numerus consiliariorum proveniebat de quolibet gradu civitatis. Sed hoc non est necessarium: quinimo semper erunt plures et meliores ex maximis honorabilitatibus, eo quod populares non omnes eligent, cum non habeant necessitatem eligendi.

Then, where he says oligarchicam autem, etc., he says how it leans toward oligarchy in the choice of the counselors. And he says that, following Socrates, citizens were distinguished into four ranks, and from all the ranks there were some who chose counselors. But all who were of the first honorability of necessity were forced to choose; but those who were in the second honorability did not all choose, but some equal in number to the first ones; and yet these also of necessity were forced to choose. Then, from the third rank there were chosen some equal in number, and likewise from the fourth: however, there was not necessity that all those who were chosen from the third or the fourth ranks should choose; and nobody was able to choose counselors from the fourth for its counselors except those who were of the first or second rank: and thus Socrates said that an equal number of counselors would come from each rank of the city; but this is not necessary: in fact, there always will be more and better men from the greatest honorability, because the people will not all choose, since they are not under the necessity of choosing.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit quomodo quidem igitur etc., dicit, quod ex his quae dicta sunt, potest esse manifestum qualiter oporteat institui politiam ex democratia et monarchia: et iterum ex his, quae dicentur posterius, quando inciderit consideratio de politia sic commixta.

Then, where he says quomodo quidem igitur, etc., he says that from what has been said, it can be clarified how a regime must be instituted from democracy and monarchy: and again, from those things that will be said afterward, when he will delve into a consideration about regimes thus mixed.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit habet autem et circa electionem etc., ostendit, quod electio principum quam Socrates instituebat, est periculosa. Et dicit, quod periculosum est civitati, quod Socrates instituebat circa electionem principum, ut scilicet ex aliquibus electis, alii electi eligerentur. Illi enim primi electi ex quibus eliguntur principes, sunt pauci respectu totius multitudinis civitatis, et ideo facilius erit eos pervertere quam totam multitudinem: unde si sint aliqui qui velint semper institui in principatu, etiam si sint mediocres multitudine, semper ad horum voluntatem eligentur principes, quia mutuo se eligent, et mutuo sibi succedent in principatibus.

Then, where he says habet autem et circa electionem, etc., he shows that the choice of governors that Socrates instituted is dangerous. And he says that it is dangerous for the city that Socrates instituted--concerning the choice of governors--that those chosen to choose would be taken from others who had [already] been chosen. For those chosen first—from whom the governors were chosen—are few with respect to the whole multitude of the city, and therefore it will be easier to corrupt them than the whole multitude. And so if there were some who wished to always be instituted in government, even if they should be few in multitude, they would always be chosen as governors according to their will, because they would choose each other, and in exchange, succeed each other in government.

Polit.L7

Ultimo epilogando concludit, quod ea quae sunt in legibus, circa politiam Socratis habent hunc praedictum modum.

Lastly, in an epilogue, he concludes that the things that are in the laws about the regime of Socrates are in the aforementioned mode.

Polit.L7

Lecture 8

Polit.L8

Sunt autem quaedam politeiae et aliae, hae quidem ydiotarum, hae autem philosophorum et civilium; omnes autem consitutarum et secundum quas politicae vivunt nunc, propinquius sunt his ambabus. Nullus enim neque eam quae circa pueros communitatem et uxores alius adinvenit, neque circa convivia mulierum, sed a necessariis inchoant magis.

Other constitutions have been proposed; some by private persons, others by philosophers and statesmen, which all come nearer to established or existing ones than either of Plato's. No one else has introduced such novelties as the community of women and children, or public tables for women: other legislators begin with what is necessary.

Polit.L8

Videtur enim quibusdam quod circa substantias esse necessarium maximum ordinari bene. De his enim fieri aiunt seditiones omnes. Propter quod Felleas calcedonius hoc intulit primus: ait enim oportere equales esse possessiones civium. Hoc autem eas quae habitari incipiebant civitates quidem confestim non difficile existimabat facere, eas autem quae iam habitabantur laboriosius quidem, tamen celerrime utique regulari per dotes: divites dare quidem, accipere autem non; pauperes autem non dare quidem, accipere autem.

In the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn. This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions. He thought that in a new colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily when a state was already established; and that then the shortest way of compassing the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to receive marriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receive them.

Polit.L8

Plato autem leges scribens usque ad aliquid quidem putabat oportere, plus autem quam quincuplum esse minime possessionis nulli civium potestatem esse possidere, quaemadmodum dictum est et prius. Oportet autem neque hoc latere sic leges ferentes, quod latet nunc, quoniam substantiae statuentes multitudinem convenit et filiorum multitudinem ordinare. Si enim excedat substantiae multitudinem puerorum numerus, necesse legem solui; et sine solutione pravum multos ex divitibus fieri pauperes: opus enim non insolescentes esse tales.

Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already observed, any citizen to possess more than five times the minimum qualification But those who make such laws should remember what they are apt to forget- that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the number of children; for, if the children are too many for the property, the law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, it is a bad thing that many from being rich should become poor; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions.

Polit.L8

Quia quidem igitur habet quandam potentiam ad politicam communitatem substantiae regularitas, etiam antiquorum quidam videntur cognovisse, velut etiam Solon lege statuit; et apud alios est lex, quae prohibet possidere terram quandamcumque voluerit quis. Similiter autem et substantiam vendere leges prohibent, sicut in Locris lex est non vendere, nisi manifestum infortunium ostendatur accidisse. Adhuc autem antiquas sortes conservare. Hoc autem solutum et circa Leucadam demoticam valde fecit politeiam ipsorum. Non enim adhuc contingebat a determinatis dignitatibus ad principatus procedere.

That the equalization of property exercises an influence on political society was clearly understood even by some of the old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and others prohibiting an individual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and there are other laws in states which forbid the sale of property: among the Locrians, for example, there is a law that a man is not to sell his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some misfortune has befallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preservation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the island of Leucas, and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification.

Polit.L8

Sed est equalitatem quidem esse substantiae, hanc autem vel valde multam esse ut deliciose vivatur, aut valde modicam ut vivatur tenaciter Palam igitur quod non sufficiens substantias equales facere erit legislator, sed medium coniecturandum.

Again, where there is equality of property, the amount may be either too large or too small, and the possessor may be living either in luxury or penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount.

Polit.L8

Adhuc autem si quis mediocrem ordinaverit substantias omnibus nihil prodest. Magis enim oportet concupiscentias regulare quam substantias; hoc autem non est non eruditis sufficienter a legibus.

Further, if he prescribe this moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws.

Polit.L8

Sed forte utique dicet Felleas quod haec dicit ipse: putat enim duorum horum equalitatem oportere existere civitatibus, possessionis et disciplinae. Sed disciplinam quidem quae erit oportet dicere, et unam esse et eandem nihil utile; est enim eandem quidem esse et unam, sed hanc esse talem ex qua erunt electivi supergrediendi aut pecuniis aut honore aut simul utrisque.

But Phaleas will probably reply that this is precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in states, not only equal property, but equal education. Still he should tell precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in be in having one and the same for all, if it is of a sort that predisposes men to avarice, or ambition, or both.

Polit.L8

Adhuc dissident non solum propter inequalitatem possessionis, sed etiam propter honorum inequalitatem, e contrario autem circa utrumque. Multi quidem enim propter inequale circa possessiones, gratiosi autem de honoribus si equales. Unde et indigent honore, hoc quidem malus, hoc autem bonus.

Moreover, civil troubles arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but out of the inequality of honor, though in opposite ways. For the common people quarrel about the inequality of property, the higher class about the equality of honor; as the poet says, the bad and good alike in honor share.¹

Polit.L8

Non solum autem homines propter necessaria iniuriantur, quorum remedium esse putat equalitatem substantiae, ut non spolient protper rigere aut esurire, sed et ut gaudeant et non concupiscant. Se enim maiorem habeant concupiscentiam necessariorum, propter huius medicinam iniuriabuntur; non igitur propter hanc solum, sed et se desiderent ut gaudeant sine tristitiis delectationibus. Quod igitur remedium horum trium? His quidem substantia modica et operatio, his autem temperantia, tertium autem se aliqui possint per ipsa gaudere, non utique quaerent nisi a philosophia remedium; aliae enim hominibus indigent.

There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take away from a man the temptation to be a highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. But want is not the sole incentive to crime; men also wish to enjoy themselves and not to be in a state of desire- they wish to cure some desire, going beyond the necessities of life, which preys upon them; nay, this is not the only reason- they may desire superfluities in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with pain, and therefore they commit crimes. Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, moderate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits of temperance; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for all other pleasures we are dependent on others.

Polit.L8

Iniuriantur autem maxime propter excellentiam, sed non propter necessaria, puta tyrannides exercent non ut non rigeant, propter quod et honores magni si interficiat quis non furem sed tyrannum. Itaque ade modicas iniurias auxiliatius solum modus Fellei politeiae.

The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence great is the honor bestowed, not on him who kills a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas avail only against petty crimes.

Polit.L8

Adhuc multa opus est constitui, ex quibus ad se ipsos conversentur bene. Oportet autem et ad vicinos et ad extraneos omnes. Necessarium igitur politeiam constitui ad bellicum robur, de qua ille nihil dixit.

There is another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator should consider also its relation to neighboring nations, and to all who are outside of it. The government must be organized with a view to military strength; and of this he has said not a word.

Polit.L8

Sunt autem quaedam et cetera. Postquam philosophus disputavit de politia Socratis sive Platonis, hic prosequitur de politia cuiusdam qui Phaleas dicebatur. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Sunt autem quaedam, etc. After the philosopher argued about the regime of Socrates (or Plato), he here discusses the regime of someone who was called Phaleas. Concerning this he does three things.

Polit.L8

Primo narrat eius ordinationem.

First, he describes its order.

Polit.L8

Secundo approbat eam quantum ad id quod bene dicebat, ibi, quia quidem igitur habet et cetera.

Second, he approves of it with reference to what Phaleas said well, at quia quidem igitur habet, [II.8.6] etc.

Polit.L8

Tertio improbat eam quantum ad id in quo deficiebat, ibi, sed est aequalitatem et cetera.

Third, he objects to it with reference to what it lacked, at sed est aequalitatem, [II.8.8] etc.

Polit.L8

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L8

Primo comparat istam politiam et sequentes ad praecedentem ordinationem Socratis vel Platonis.

First, he compares this regime and the following to the preceding order of Socrates/Plato.

Polit.L8

Secundo enarrat huius politiae ordinationem, ibi, videtur enim quibusdam et cetera.

Second, he describes the order of this regime, at videtur enim quibusdam, [II.8.2] etc.

Polit.L8

Dicit ergo primo, quod praeter praedictas politias Socratis vel Platonis sunt etiam quaedam aliae politiae, idest ordinationes civitatum, quarum quaedam sunt ab idiotis et illiteratis inventae, quaedam vero sunt adinventae a philosophis et a quibusdam hominibus, qui fuerunt prudentes et experti in civili conversatione; et earum quaedam sunt constitutae tantum a suis auctoribus, ita tamen, quod in nulla civitate observantur; quaedam vero sunt secundum quas aliqui civiliter conversantur. Omnes autem huiusmodi politiae propinquius se habent ad invicem, et ad id quod est conveniens civitati, quam ambae praedictae politiae Socratis vel Platonis, quarum prima supra posita est de communitate mulierum, et filiorum et possessionum: alia vero posterius de legibus ab eo scriptis. Nullus enim alius legislator adinvenit, neque communitatem filiorum et uxorum, quod pertinet ad primam politiam Socratis, neque ordinavit aliquid circa convivia mulierum, quod pertinet ad secundam, ut ex praedictis patet; sed incipiunt ordinare civitatem ab his quae sunt magis necessaria.

Therefore, he first says that beyond the aforementioned regimes of Socrates/Plato, there are also some other regimes—that is, orders of cities—some of which were found by the ignorant and illiterate, but some of which were discovered by philosophers and by the sort of men who were prudent and experienced in citizenly association. And some of these were constituted only by their authors, such that they were not observed in any city; but there are some that some people follow in civil association. All, however, of these sorts of regimes have a greater relation to each other and to what is fitting for the city than both of the aforementioned regimes of Socrates/Plato, the first of which was posited above, regarding the community of women and sons and possessions; the second, afterward, about the laws written by him. For no other legislator discovered either the community of sons and wives, that belonged to the first regime of Socrates, or ordered the feasts for the women that belonged to the second, as has been obviously stated; but they [i.e. other lawmakers] start to order the city from things that are more necessary.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit videtur enim quibusdam etc., narrat politiam quam Phaleas ordinavit. Et circa hoc quatuor facit.

Then, where he says videtur enim quibusdam, etc., he describes the regime that Phaleas ordered. Concerning this he does four things.

Polit.L8

Primo ostendit ad quid plurimi legislatorum intenderunt. Et dicit, quod quibusdam legislatoribus visum est maxime necessarium esse, quod bene ordinetur de substantiis, idest de possessionibus civium; quia ex his praecipue oriuntur omnes seditiones civitatum, quas principaliter legislatores removere intendunt.

First, he shows what most legislators intend. And he says that to some legislators, it seemed most necessary that things be well ordered regarding the substance, that is, the possessions of the citizens, because from this chiefly arises all the sedition of the city—which it is the leading intention of legislators to remove.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit propter quod Felleas etc., ostendit quid circa hoc Phaleas ordinaverit. Et dicit, quod ipse primus circa hoc aliquid statuit. Voluit enim quod omnes possessiones civium essent aequales: quod quidem dicebat non esse difficile fieri in civitatibus, quando a principio inhabitari incipiebant, quia poterant possessiones ex aequo dividi inter cives; sed in civitatibus inhabitatis quarum cives habent inaequales possessiones, hoc difficilius erat: tamen cito posset reduci ad hanc regulam per dotes, ita scilicet quod divites contrahentes cum pauperibus darent dotes et non acciperent, pauperes autem acciperent et non darent, quousque omnium possessiones adaequarentur.

Then, where he says propter quod Felleas, etc., he shows what this Phaleas ordered. And he says that he first established something about this: he desired that all the possessions of the citizens should be equal. And he said that it is not difficult for this to come to be in a city at the beginning, when it started to be inhabited, because possessions could be equally divided among the citizens. But in an inhabited city, the citizens of which have unequal possessions, this was more difficult: yet it could swiftly be led back to this rule through dowries, such that when the wealthy contracted with the poor, they would give dowries but not receive them, but the poor would receive them and not give them, until the possessions of all were equalized.

Polit.L8

Tertio ibi, Plato autem leges etc., ostendit quomodo diversimode circa hoc Plato ordinavit: dixit enim, quod nulli civium debebat dari potestas, ut haberet divitias plusquam in quincuplum supra eum qui minimum haberet: sed hoc est intelligendum quantum ad divitias rerum mobilium, quia res immobiles faciebat communes.

Third, at Plato autem leges, etc., he shows how Plato ordered things differently about this. For he said that none of the citizens should have been given power so that he would have more than quintuple the wealth then was possessed by whoever had the least. But this should be understood with reference to the wealth of movable things [rerum mobilium], because he made immovable things common.

Polit.L8

Quarto ibi, oportet autem neque hoc latere etc., ostendit in quo omnes huiusmodi deficiebant: latebat enim eos, quoniam ex quo statuebant aliquid circa multitudinem divitiarum, oportebat etiam, quod aliquid ordinarent circa multitudinem filiorum: puta, quod aliquis post certum numerum, generationi operam non daret, vel quod postquam pueri essent nati in aliquo numero, quod superexcrescentes viri mitterentur ad alias civitates construendas, vel quocumque alio modo. Quia si numerus filiorum qui nascuntur excedat multitudinem divitiarum, quae alicui homini taxantur, necesse est, quod lex de aequalitate possessionum dissolvatur; puta si duorum civium habentium aequales possessiones, unus generat quatuor filios, alius vero unum tantum, ex necessitate sequetur, quod filii eorum non habeant aequales possessiones. Et propter hoc, quod solvitur lex, sequitur etiam aliud malum; scilicet, quod multi qui nascuntur ex divitibus fiant pauperes, dum substantia unius divitis in multos filios dividitur: et hoc est malum, quia opus est ad pacem civitatis, ut filii divitum qui insolescere possunt, non sint pauperes, quia efficerentur latrones. Sed si non taxetur alicui quantitas possessionis, hoc non sequetur; quia secundum quod augetur ei numerus filiorum, studebit aliquis in divitiis crescere: sic igitur, vel nihil statuendum est circa mensuram possessionum, vel simul cum hoc ordinandum est aliquid circa numerum filiorum.

Fourth, at oportet autem neque hoc latere, etc., he shows what all things of this sort lack. For it escaped them that since they established something about the multitude of wealth, they must also put something in order about the multitude of sons: for example, that someone should not supply the work of generation after a certain number [of children], or that after some number of children were born, that the overgrowth of men should be sent to construct other cities, or in whatever other manner. Because if the number of the sons who are born exceeds the multitude of wealth allotted to each man, it is necessary that the law about the equality of possessions will be dismantled. For example, if one of two citizens who have equal possessions generates four sons, but the other only one, from necessity it would follow that their sons would not have equal possessions. And because of this—that the law would be undone—another evil would also follow: that many who were born of the wealthy would become poor when the substance of one wealthy man was divided among many sons. And this is evil because the task [opus], for the peace of the city, is that the sons of the wealthy—who can be extravagant—do not become poor, because it could make them into thieves. But if the quantity of possessions were not allotted to anyone, this would not follow, because insofar as the number of someone's sons expanded, he would be zealous to increase his wealth. So therefore, either nothing should be established about a measure for possessions, or at the same time as this, something should be put in order about a number of sons.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit quia quidem igitur etc., approbat praedictam ordinationem quantum ad hoc, quod ordinabat aliquid circa mensuram substantiarum, ne videatur propter praedicta inconvenientia ea reprobasse. Approbat autem hoc duplici ratione.

Then, where he says quia quidem igitur, etc., he approves of the aforementioned order of things in this regard: that Phaleas put something in order about the measure of substance—lest it should seem that he condemned him because of the aforementioned unfitting things. Moreover, he approves him for two reasons.

Polit.L8

Primo quidem per auctoritatem antiquorum legislatorum; et dicit, quod quidam antiquorum legislatorum videntur cognovisse, quod regulare substantias civium, habet magnam virtutem ad civilem communitatem bene conservandam: unde Solon, qui fuit unus de septem sapientibus, et statuit leges Atheniensium posuit pro lege, quod etiam apud alios observatur, ut non possit quis acquirere de terra ad possidendum quantumcumque voluerit, sed usque ad aliquem certum terminum: similiter etiam leges quaedam sunt in aliquibus civitatibus, quae prohibent, ne homines vendant suas possessiones: sicut in civitate Locrorum, quae est in Calabria, lex fuit antiquitus, ut nullus venderet possessionem, nisi monstraretur quod accidisset ei aliquod grave infortunium, puta quod esset captus ab hostibus, vel aliud aliquid huiusmodi passus. Similiter etiam leges aliquae sunt ordinantes, quod antiquae sortes civium conserventur illesae: et haec omnia pertinent ad hoc, quod substantiae civium regulentur.

First, indeed, because of the authority of ancient legislators; and he says that some of the ancient legislators seem to have known that regulating the substance of the citizens has a great virtue for preserving well the civic community. And so Solon, who was one of the seven wise men, and established the laws of the Athenians, set it up as a law (that is observed even among others) that someone could not acquire land to possess as much as he might wish, but only up to a certain limit: likewise also, there are laws in other cities that prohibit men from selling their possessions, as in the city of the Locrians—which is in Calabria—there was an ancient law that nobody could sell their possessions unless they could demonstrate that some heavy misfortune had happened to them—for instance, that they had been captured by enemies, or had suffered something else of this sort. Likewise, also, some places have ordered laws that the ancient lots of citizens be preserved inviolate. And these all belong to regulating the substance of citizens.

Polit.L8

Secundo ibi, hoc autem solutum etc., ostendit idem per inconvenientia quae sequuntur: et dicit, quod quia hoc fuit permissum in quadam civitate, consecutum est quod eorum politia esset multum democratica, id est popularis; quia cum indifferenter cuilibet liceret possessiones emere, factum est quod multi popularium sunt exaltati, et maiores depressi: et ita sequebatur, quod non eligerentur homines ad principatus ex aliquibus determinatis dignitatibus civium, propter confusionem supervenientem in conditionibus civium.

Second, at hoc autem solutum, etc., he shows the same thing through the unfitting things that would follow [if substance remained unregulated]. And he says that because this was permitted in a specific city, it followed that their regime was greatly democratic—that is, of the people—because when it was permitted to anyone to purchase possessions indifferently, it made it that many of the people were elevated, and the greater ones were pressed down: and so it followed that the men chosen for government were not from any of the citizens of determined worth, because of the overwhelming confusion in the conditions of the citizens.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit sed est aequalitatem quidem etc., improbat praedictam ordinationem.

Then, where he says sed est aequalitatem quidem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned order.

Polit.L8

Et primo quantum ad hoc, quod aliqua praetermisit.

And first, because it neglected some things.

Polit.L8

Secundo quantum ad hoc, quod substantias non convenienter regulavit, ibi, similiter autem et de possessione et cetera.

Second, because substance was not fittingly regulated, at similiter autem et de possessione, [II.9.1] etc.

Polit.L8

Tertio, quantum ad hoc, quod de artificibus inconvenienter assignavit, ibi, videtur autem ex legislatione et cetera.

Third, because things were unfittingly indicated concerning artisans, at videtur autem ex legislatione, [II.9.7] etc.

Polit.L8

Circa primum tria facit.

Concerning the first he does three things.

Polit.L8

Primo ostendit, quod praetermisit ea quae pertinent ad disciplinam civium.

First, he shows that Phaleas neglected the things that belong to the discipline of the citizens [II.8.9].

Polit.L8

Secundo, quod praetermisit ea quae pertinent ad pacem civitatis, ibi, adhuc dissident et cetera.

Second, that he overlooked the things that belong to the peace of the city, at adhuc dissident, [II.8.12] etc.

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Tertio ex hoc, quod praetermisit ea, quae pertinent ad civilem conversationem, ibi, adhuc multa opus est et cetera.

Third, because he neglected things that belong to the civic association, at adhuc multa opus est, [II.8.15] etc.

Polit.L8

Circa primum ponit duas rationes:

Concerning the first, he lays out two reasons.

Polit.L8

quarum, prima est, quod contingit esse aequalitatem substantiae inter cives: et tamen potest esse vel valde multa, ita quod cives ex ea delitiose vivant, et sic civium mores corrumpantur: vel valde modica, ut vivant cives valde tenaciter, ita quod unus alteri subvenire non possit: et utrumque eorum est nocivum ad bonam disciplinam civium; unde manifestum est, quod non est sufficiens legislator ex hoc, quod solum facit substantias civium aequales; sed oportet quod ipse determinet aliquod medium, ita scilicet quod sit tanta quantitas possessionum, ut neque superflue possint delitiis intendere, neque etiam nimis parce vivere compellantur.

The first is that it can happen that there is equality of substance among the citizens, and yet that there is either too much, so that citizens live luxuriously from it, and thus the morals [mores] of the citizens are corrupted; or that it is too little [modicum], so that the citizens live too strictly, such that one is not able to support another; and both of these are harmful for the good discipline of the citizens. So it is clear that Phaleas was not a sufficient legislator, because he only made the substance of the citizens to be equal, but he needed to determine some mean, so that there would be so great a quantity of possessions that they could neither intend superfluous luxury, nor also be compelled to live too frugally.

Polit.L8

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc autem si quis et cetera.

He lays out a second reason at adhuc autem si quis, etc.

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Et circa hoc duo facit.

Concerning this he does two things.

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Primo ponit rationem; et dicit, quod etiam si aliquis omnibus civibus ordinet moderatam possessionem, adhuc istud non sufficit ad bonam vitam civium: magis enim oportet regulare interiores concupiscentias animae, ut scilicet non immoderata concupiscant, quam exteriores substantias, ut scilicet non immoderata habeant. Sed quod concupiscentiae hominum regulentur, hoc non contingit nisi per hoc, quod homines sunt sufficienter instructi per debitas leges, quas Phaleas non posuit: unde insufficienter tradidit ea, quae pertinent ad disciplinam civium.

First, he lays out the reason, and he says that even if someone ordered moderate possessions for all citizens, this still would not suffice for the good life of the citizens. For one must more rule the interior desires of the soul—so that they do not desire immoderately—than the exterior substance—so that they do not have things immoderately. But it does not happen that the desires of man are ruled except when men are sufficiently instructed through the due laws—which Phaleas did not set up. And so he insufficiently handed down what belongs to the discipline of the citizens.

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Secundo ibi, sed forte utique dicet etc., excludit responsionem Phaleae: qui forte ad hanc rationem responderet, quod utrumque oportet esse in civitate; scilicet et aequalitatem possessionis, et aequalitatem disciplinae, ut scilicet omnes cives aequali disciplina informentur. Sed contra hoc Aristoteles dicit, quod oportuisset eum dicere quid est ista disciplina, qua oportet omnes cives informare. Non enim sufficit dicere, quod sit una et eadem omnium; sed oportet eam esse talem, per quam cives informentur, ut quidam eorum non velint excedere alios vel in divitiis, vel in honoribus, vel simul in utrisque: unde, cum talem disciplinam Phaleas praetermiserit, insufficiens legislator fuit.

Second, at sed forte utique dicet, etc., he rules out the response of Phaleas, who would perhaps have responded to this that both must be in the city—that is, both equality of possessions and equality of discipline, such that all the citizens are given equal formation by discipline. But Aristotle speaks against this that one would have needed to say what such a discipline is that must give formation to all the citizens. For it does not suffice to say that it should be one and the same for all, but it must be the sort of thing through which the citizens may be given a formation such that some of them do not wish to exceed the others either in wealth or in honors, or in both at once. And so, since Phaleas neglected this sort of discipline, he was insufficient as a legislator.

Polit.L8

Deinde cum dicit adhuc dissident etc., ostendit, quod praetermisit ea quae pertinent ad pacem civitatis. Et circa hoc ponit tres rationes:

Then, where he says adhuc dissident, etc., he shows that Phaleas neglected the things that belong to the peace of the city. Concerning this, he lays out three reasons.

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quarum prima est, quod cives dissident non solum propter inaequalitatem possessionis, sed etiam propter inaequalitatem honorum; sed diversimode tamen. Nam multitudo popularium de honoribus non curat, sed solum de divitiis, et ideo dissident propter inaequalitates divitiarum; sed homines gratiosi qui alios excellunt in operibus virtutum, dissident de honoribus, si aequales eis reddantur, et non maiores quam aliis. Et ideo indiget legislator ordinare aliquid circa honores: ut scilicet aliquis honor determinetur, qui non detur nisi bonis, et alius honor sit, quo etiam malus, idest deficiens a virtute, uti possit: et sic servabitur pax in civitate. Cum igitur hoc Phaleas praetermiserit, insufficienter tradidit ea quae pertinent ad pacem civitatis.

The first is that citizens are factious not only because of inequality of possessions, but also because of inequality of honors—but in different ways. Now the multitude of the people do not care about honors, but only about wealth, and so they are factious because of inequality of wealth. But favored [gratiosi] men, who excel others in the works of virtue, are factious because of honors if equal honors are rendered to them, and their honor is not greater than others. And therefore, the legislator needs to put something in order about honors: for instance, that some honor be determined that is not given to any except the good, and another honor that even someone wicked—that is, lacking in virtue—could use. And thus will peace be preserved in the city. However, since Phaleas neglected this, he insufficiently handed down what belongs to the peace of the city.

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Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, non solum autem homines etc., quae talis est. Homines quidem non solum iniuriantur aliis propter necessaria conquirenda, quod est primum, cuius remedium esse putabat Phaleas, quod substantiae civium essent aequales, et sic omnes necessaria habent, et sic unus homo non spoliat alium propter vitandum frigus aut famem: sed etiam quidam proximo iniuriantur, ut fruantur suis delectationibus, et ut non concupiscant aliquid, quod statim non habeant: quia si sint aliqui qui habeant maiorem concupiscentiam rerum temporalium necessariorum, id est necessariis more Graeco, idest qui plura concupiscant quam sint eis necessaria, propter huius medicinam, idest ut satisfaciant suae concupiscentiae, iniuriabuntur auferentes bona aliorum vi vel dolo. Nec solum propter hanc causam homines iniuriantur; sed etiam propter hoc, quod aliqui volunt ita gaudere delectabilibus, quod nullas tristitias patiantur; et ideo iniuriantur hominibus, per quos timent sibi posse inferri tristitias, opprimendo eos. Oportet igitur, ad pacem civitatis, quod legislator excogitet remedia contra istas tres causas iniuriandi. Illis enim qui iniuriantur propter necessaria acquirenda, pro remedio sufficit modica possessio, et operatio propria, per quam sibi victus aliquis acquirit. Paucis enim natura contenta est. Sed illis qui iniuriantur propter concupiscentias delectationum, remedium est temperantia, quae moderatur in homine delectationum concupiscentias. Sed contra tertium, scilicet contra eos qui iniuriantur ut non tristentur, remedium adhibet philosophia, quantum ad eos, qui possunt eius delectationibus frui, quae sunt sine tristitia: quae etiam facit hominem non tristari in infortuniis. Sed in aliis duobus potest homini auxilium ferri per homines: unde cum ista duo secunda remedia Phaleas praetermiserit, solum contra primum remedium ferens, videtur insufficienter ordinasse.

He lays out a second reason at non solum autem homines, etc., which is like this. Men certainly not only do wrong to others because they are seeking out necessities—which is first, and the remedy for which Phaleas thought was that the substance of the citizens should be equal, and so all would have the necessities, and thus one man would not despoil another in order to avoid hunger or cold—but also, some men do wrong to those nearest them so that they may enjoy what delights them, and so that they will not desire anything that they do not immediately have. Because if there are some who have too great a desire of temporal necessities (for necessities in Greek), that is, who desire more than would be necessary for them, then as a medicine for this—so that they can make their desires content—they will do injury, stealing away the goods of others by force or deception. Nor is this the only cause of men doing wrong, but also because some want to so rejoice in delights that they do not suffer any sorrow; and therefore, they do wrong to men by whom they fear they could have sorrow inflicted upon them, by oppressing them. Therefore, for the peace of the city, the legislator must think up some remedies for these three causes of wrong-doing. For those who would do wrong because of seeking out necessities, it suffices as a remedy to have modest [modica] possessions, and their own work, through which they can acquire some food for themselves. For with a few things, nature is contented. But for those who do wrong because of a desire for delights, the remedy is temperance, which moderates in men the desire for delights. But against the third—namely, against those who do wrong so that they may not have sorrow, the remedy is to apply philosophy, so that they can enjoy its delights, which are without sorrow—which even make men not to sorrow in misfortune. But in the other two, help can be given to a man through other men; and so, since Phaleas neglected the second of these two remedies, only giving a remedy for the first, he seems to have ordered things insufficiently.

Polit.L8

Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, iniuriantur et cetera. Et dicit, quod homines maxime iniuriantur propter excellentias divitiarum et honorum acquirendas: non autem propter necessaria conquirenda; sicut patet de illis qui exercent tyrannidem, non quidem propter hoc ut non patiantur frigus aut famem, sed propter praedictas excellentias. Et ideo quia isti maxime iniuriantur in civitate, propter hoc, praemium datur magnorum honorum in civitatibus his qui interficiunt tyrannos, non autem his qui interficiunt alios fures. Et tamen contra iniurias tyrannorum nullum remedium apposuit Phaleas: unde patet, quod modus ordinationis eius praebet auxilium solum contra modicas iniurias, non autem contra magnas.

He lays out a third reason at iniuriantur, etc., and says that men do wrong most of all in order to acquire excellence in wealth and honors, but not in order to seek out necessities—as it is evident about those who exercise tyranny: not, indeed, so they will not suffer from hunger or cold, but on account of the aforementioned excellences. And therefore, because such men most of all do wrong in the city, a reward of great honor is given in cities to those who kill tyrants, but not to those who kill thieves. And yet, Phaleas did not set up any remedy against the wrong-doing of tyrants: and so it is evident that his manner of ordering things offered help only against the little wrongs, but not against the great ones.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc multa opus est etc., ostendit, quod ordinatio Phaleae insufficiens erat quantum ad civium conversationem; quia oportet in civitate multa constitui, ex quibus cives bene conversantur adinvicem. Oportet etiam aliqua constitui, per quae bene conversentur ad vicinos, et ad quoscumque extraneos. Et quia inter vicinos et extraneos quidam etiam sunt hostes, cum quibus est bellandum; ideo necesse est etiam ponere in civitate aliquam ordinationem in comparatione ad bellicam fortitudinem. Quae omnia praedictus legislator praetermisit: unde manifestum est, quod insufficienter civitatem ordinavit.

Then, where he says adhuc multa opus est, etc., he shows that the order of Phaleas was insufficient with reference to the association of citizens; because many things must be constituted in the city, from which the citizens may associate well with each other. Something must also be constituted through which they will associate well with their neighbors, and with any foreigners. And because among neighbors and foreigners there are also some who are enemies, with whom there will be warring, it is therefore necessary to set up in the city some order in relation to warlike fortitude. All of these things the aforementioned legislator neglected: so it is clear that he insufficiently ordered the city.

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Lecture 9

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Similiter autem et de possessione: oportet enim non solum ad politicos usus sufficientem existere, sed et ad extrinseca pericula; propter quod quidem neque tantam oportet multitudinem existere, quam proximi et meliores concupiscant, habentes autem sufferre non possint molestantes; neque sic modicam ut non possint bellum sufferre neque equalium et similium. Ille quidem igitur nihil determinavit; oportet autem hoc non latere quod confert multitudo substantiae. Forte igitur optimus terminus, ut non pro levi habeat melioribus propter abundantiam bellum inferre, sed sic utique et non habentibus tantam substantiam; veluti Euboylus Autofradati volenti Atarneam obsidere precepit ipsum considerantem in quando tempore capiet locum, ratiocinari temporis huius expensam: debere enim minus hoc sumentem derelinquere iam Atarneam; haec autem cum dixisset fecit Autofradatem consentientem factum cessare ab obsidione.

And so with respect to property: there should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from without. The property of the state should not be so large that more powerful neighbors may be tempted by it, while the owners are unable to repel the invaders; nor yet so small that the state is unable to maintain a war even against states of equal power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not laid down any rule; but we should bear in mind that abundance of wealth is an advantage. The best limit will probably be, that a more powerful neighbor must have no inducement to go to war with you by reason of the excess of your wealth, but only such as he would have had if you had possessed less. There is a story that Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to besiege Atarneus, told him to consider how long the operation would take, and then reckon up the cost which would be incurred in the time. 'For,' said he, 'I am willing for a smaller sum than that to leave Atarneus at once.' These words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates, and he desisted from the siege.

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Est quidem igitur aliquid expedientium substantias esse equales civibus ad non seditione fieri ad invicem; at tamen magnum nihil ut est dicere. Et enim gratiosi utique indignabuntur, ut non equalium existentes digni; propter quod et videntur frequenter molesti et seditiones moventes.

The equalization of property is one of the things that tend to prevent the citizens from quarrelling. Not that the gain in this direction is very great. For the nobles will be dissatisfied because they think themselves worthy of more than an equal share of honors; and this is often found to be a cause of sedition and revolution.

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Adhuc autem malitia homninum erreplebilis; et primum quidem sufficiens duo obolo solum. Cum autem iam hoc fuerit patrium semper indigent pluribus quousque in infinitum veniant. Infinita enim concupiscentiae natura, ad cuius utique repletionem multi vivunt. Talium igitur principium magis quam substantias regulari epieikeis quidem natura tales constituere ut non velint avare agere, pravos autem ut non possint; hoc autem est si minores sint et non iniusta patiantur.

And the avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time two obols was pay enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want more and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live only for the gratification of it. The beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not ill-treated.

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Non bene autem neque equalitatem substantiae dixit. Circa terrae enim possessionem adequat solum. Sunt autem et servorum et pecorum divitae et nummismatis, et preparatio multa eorum quae superlectilia vocantur; aut igitur omnium horum equalitatem quaerendum, aut ordinem quendam moderatum, aut omnia dimittendum.

Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas is imperfect; for he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be rich also in slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abundance of what are called his movables. Now either all these things must be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on them, or they must be let alone.

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Videtur autem ex legislatione construens covitatem modicam, si quidem artifices omnes publici erunt et non supplementum aliquod exhibebunt civitatis. Sed si quidem oportet publicos esse communia operantes, oportet sicut in Epidamno et sicut Dyofantus aliquando constituit in Athenis, hunc habere modum. De Fellei quidem igitur politeia fere ex his utique quis speculabitur se quid bene dixit aut non bene.

It would appear that Phaleas is legislating for a small city only, if, as he supposes, all the artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a supplementary part of the body of citizens. But if there is a law that artisans are to be public slaves, it should only apply to those engaged on public works, as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on the plan which Diophantus once introduced. From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas was wrong or right in his ideas.

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Similiter autem et de possessione et cetera. Postquam philosophus improbavit politiam Phaleae quantum ad ea quae praetermisit, quantum ad disciplinam civium, pacem civitatis, et communem conversationem; hic improbat eam quantum ad hoc, quod insufficienter de substantiis ordinavit. Et circa hoc ponit quatuor rationes:

Similiter autem et de possessione, etc. After the philosopher objected to the regime of Phaleas because of the things he neglected—namely, the discipline of citizens, the peace of the city, and common association—he here objects to it in this regard: that he insufficiently ordered it concerning substance. Concerning this he lays out four reasons.

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circa quarum primam dicit, quod etiam de possessione non sufficienter determinavit. Quamvis enim posuerit quamdam possessionis regulam inter cives adinvicem, ut scilicet omnium possessiones essent aequales, non tamen determinavit quanta deberet esse possessio totius civitatis: cuius mensuram oportet accipere, non solum in comparatione ad sufficientiam civilium usuum qui pertinent ad victum et vestitum civium et alia huiusmodi, sed etiam per comparationem ad pericula quae possunt ab exterioribus imminere. Et ideo duo sunt consideranda circa quantitatem possessionis civitatis: quorum unum est quod non sit tam magna quod vicini potentiores alliciantur ad eam concupiscendam, ita quod cives non possunt sustinere eorum molestias; aliud est quod non sit tam parva, ut non sufficiat ad praeparationem belli per quod cives resistant sibi aequalibus et similibus. Oportet ergo scire, quod multitudo possessionis prodest civitati: quia per hoc erunt cives sufficientes non solum ad expensas vitae civilis, sed etiam ad exercitia bellica: sed tamen optimus terminus esse videtur multitudinis substantiae, ut non sit tanta, ut propter abundantiam cives de levi praesumant inferre bellum suis potentioribus; sed ita ut possint secure inferre bellum his qui non habent tantam substantiam, per quam eis possint resistere. Vel potest aliter intelligi, ut talis terminus possessioni civium statuatur, ut potentiores non de facili moveantur bellum civitati inferre allecti ex abundantia possessionis eorum; sed ita se habeant ad eos sicut ad illos qui non habent tot divitias propter quas diripiendas debeant potentiores discrimen belli subire.

About the first, he says that Phaleas also did not sufficiently determine about possessions. For although he laid out some rules for possessions among the citizens, toward each other—namely, that the possessions of all should be equal—he did not, however, determine how much ought to be possessed by the whole city. The measure [of the city’s possessions] must be taken up, not only in relation to what is sufficient for the use of the citizens—which pertains to the food and clothing of the citizens, and other things of this sort—but also in relation to the dangers that can threaten from outside. And so two things should be considered concerning the quantity of the possession of the city: the first is that it should not be so great that neighboring powers are lured into desiring it, such that the citizens cannot endure their disturbances; the other is that it not be so small that it does not suffice to prepare for a war through which the citizens resist those equal to them, and similar. Therefore, one must be certain [scire] that the multitude of possessions profits the city, because through this, the citizens will be sufficient not only for the expenses of civic life, but also for warlike exercises. However, the best limit for the multitude of substance seems to be that it not be so much that, on account of abundance, citizens lightly presume to wage war against their more powerful [neighbors]; but such that they are able to securely wage war against those who do not have as great a substance, through which they would be able to resist them. Or it can be understood otherwise: that such a limit of the possessions of the citizens should be established that the more powerful will not easily be raised to wage war against the city, allured by their abundant possessions; but they should be disposed toward them as toward those who do not have much wealth on account of which the more powerful would have to undergo the hazards of war in order to loot it.

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Et huic consonat exemplum, quod subdit. Cum enim quidam princeps Autophradates nomine, vellet obsidere quamdam civitatem quae Abtharnia dicebatur, quidam sapiens Eubolus nomine vel Eubulus, id est aliquis bonus consiliarius induxit eum, ut consideraret in quanto tempore posset capere civitatem, et cum hoc etiam computaret tanti temporis expensas: et si inveniret quod minus lucraretur capiendo civitatem quam expenderet obsidendo, derelinqueret ipsam. Cui consilio princeps ille consentiens cessavit ab obsidione: non autem cessasset si maiores divitias habuissent. Unde praedictus possessionis terminus videtur esse utilis civitati: quem cum Phaleas praetermiserit, videtur insufficienter de possessione civitatis ordinasse.

And this fits with the example that follows. For when some prince named Autophradates wished to besiege a city called Atarneus, a wise man named Eubolus—or “Eubulus,” that is, “someone of good counsel”—led him to consider how long it would take to capture the city, and along with this, also, to calculate the expenses of so great a time: and if he found that there was less to be gained in capturing the city than would be spent in the siege, to abandon it. The prince, agreeing with this counsel, stopped the siege. But he would not have stopped if they had had greater wealth. And so the aforementioned limit of possessions seems to be what is useful for the city. And since Phaleas neglected this, he seems to have insufficiently ordered the possessions of the city.

Polit.L9

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, est quidem igitur aliquid et cetera. Et dicit quod in aliquo expedit civitati quod substantiae civium sint aequales ad hoc quod non fiant seditiones adinvicem inter cives: sed, ut ita liceat dicere, hoc non est aliquid magnum: quod per hoc cessant seditiones inter parvos cives, remanet autem materia seditionis maioribus civitatis. Illi enim qui sunt in civitate gratiosi, utpote nobiles et virtuosi existentes indignabuntur si aequalia recipiant cum sint digni maioribus. Sicut enim contra iustitiam esse videtur, ut aequales inaequalia habeant, ita iniustitia est, ut inaequales aequalia habeant. Et ex hac causa frequenter maiores sunt aliis molesti et seditiones movent. Per iustitiam enim conservatur pax civitatis, transgressio vero iustitiae est seditionis causa. Sic insufficienter de possessionibus statuit Phaleas.

He lays out a second reason at est quidem igitur aliquid, etc., and he says that in some places, it is expedient for the city that the substance of the citizens be equal so that sedition will not come to be among the citizens. But, if one may speak thus, it is nothing great: for through this, sedition may cease among the small citizens, but the material for sedition among the greater of the city remains. For those who are favored in the city—namely, the nobles, and those existing virtuously—will be indignant if they receive equally, since they are greater in worth. For just as it seems to be against justice that for equals to have unequal things, so also is it unjust for unequals to have equal things. And from this cause, frequently the greater citizens are disturbed by the others and raise sedition. For it is through justice that the peace of the city is preserved, but the transgression of justice is the cause of sedition. So Phaleas insufficiently established things about possessions.

Polit.L9

Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc autem malitia hominum et cetera. Et dicit quod etsi voluntas hominum quantum ad necessitatem repleri possit tamen quantum ad malitiam repleri non potest. Primo enim homini qui nihil habet videtur sufficiens quod habeat duos obolos; quos cum acquisiverit vel ex haereditate paterna acceperit, semper videtur quod indigeat pluribus, et hoc usque in infinitum. Et hoc ideo est, quia natura concupiscentiae est infinita: non enim quaerit sola necessaria vitae, sed omnia quae possunt homini esse delectabilia, quae sunt infinita. Unde, cum plurimi hominum ad hoc tendunt ut suam concupiscentiam repleant, sequitur quod eorum desiderium repleri non possit usque in infinitum. Ex hoc autem quod aliqui desiderant ea quae sunt aliorum, oriuntur in civitatibus seditiones. Oportet igitur quod legislator magis regulet principium horum, scilicet concupiscentiam, quam etiam possessiones.

He lays out a third reason at adhuc autem malitia hominum, etc., and he says that even if the will of men were able to be satisfied regarding necessities, yet it is not able to be satisfied regarding wickedness. For at first, for men who have nothing, it seems sufficient that they have two obols; but when they will have acquired this, or have received it from paternal inheritance, it always seems that they need more, and those goes on without an end [in infinitum]. And this is because the nature of desire is without an end, for it does not seek only the necessities of life, but all things that are able to be delightful to man—which are without end. And so, since most men intend to satisfy their desire, it follows that their desire to be satisfied cannot go on without an end. From this—that some desire the things of others—arises sedition in cities. Therefore, a legislator must regulate the beginning of these things—that is, desire—even more than possessions.

Polit.L9

Sed hoc aliter fit quantum ad bonos et aliter quantum ad malos. Oportet enim quod legislator illos qui sunt epyikes natura, id est naturaliter virtuosi, ita instituat, quod non velint agere avare, idest tollere aliena: quod quidem facere potest assuefaciendo eos ad amorem iustitiae. Sed homines pravos sic debet tractare, ut non possint aliena tollere etiam si velint. Et ad hoc duo sunt necessaria: quorum unum est, ut pravi in civitate sint minores, idest quod dimittantur in infimo statu, ut aliis nocere non possint. Aliud autem est ut eis iniuriae non irrogentur, ex quibus homines provocantur, ut aliis noceant. Cum igitur huiusmodi disciplinam Phaleas praetermiserit, insufficiens in sua legislatione fuisse videtur.

But this comes to be in one way with reference to the good, and in another way with reference to the wicked. For the legislator must institute those who are natural epyikes—that is, the naturally virtuous—in such a way that they do not wish to act covetously [avare]—that is, to take the things of others: which, indeed, is able to be done by making them accustomed to the love of justice. But crooked men ought to be handled in such a way that they are not able to take the things of others even if they wish to. And for this, two things are necessary: the first is that the crooked in the city should be lesser—that is, that they should be dismissed into the lowest state, so that they will not be able to harm others. The other, however, is that wrongs not be inflicted upon them, by which men are provoked to harm others. Therefore, since Phaleas neglected discipline of this sort, he seems to have been insufficient in his legislation.

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Quartam rationem ponit, ibi, non bene autem et cetera. Et dicit quod Phaleas non sufficienter dixit de aequalitate substantiae; quia adaequavit substantias civium solum quantum ad bona immobilia, scilicet quantum ad possessionem terrae. Sunt autem quaedam aliae divitiae, puta servorum, animalium, denariorum et aliorum quae praeparantur ad usum vitae, quae supellectilia dicuntur: de quorum aequalitate nihil dixit. Oportet autem quod omnium tam mobilium quam immobilium aequalitas statuatur, aut secundum aliquem alium modum ordinetur de eis, aut quod omnia praetermittantur: eadem enim ratio est de mobilibus et immobilibus, quia ex utrisque seditiones oriuntur.

He lays out a fourth reason at non bene autem, etc., and says that Phaleas did not speak sufficiently about equality of substance, because he equalized the substance of citizens only with reference to unmovable goods, namely, with reference to the possession of the land. But there are other sorts of wealth, such as slaves, animals, currency, and other things that are prepared for the use of life, which are called equipment—and about the equality of these he said nothing. For the equality of everything—both the movable and immovable things—must be established; either these things should be ordered after some other manner, or everything should be neglected: for there is the same rationale for the movable and the immovable wealth, because sedition can arise from both of them.

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Deinde cum dicit videtur autem ex legislatione etc., improbat ordinationem Phaleae quantum ad artifices: et dicit quod propter legem quam Phaleas circa artifices tulit sequebatur quod civitas modica construeretur; volebat enim quod omnes artifices in communi operarentur et eorum opera distribuerentur civibus secundum eorum necessitates; et secundum hoc artifices essent quasi servi communitatis et non facerent aliquod supplementum ad multitudinem civitatis: unde relinquebatur quod civitas esset parva; cum videamus nunc non modicam partem civitatis ex artificibus esse. Oportet tamen esse in civitate aliquos publicos operarios qui operentur opera communia civitatis, sicut servatur in civitate Epidamni et sicut quidam legislator nomine Diophantus aliquando statuit in Athenis. Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod ex praemissis, potest aliquis considerare circa politiam Phaleae quid bene vel non bene dixerit.

Then, where he says videtur autem ex legislatione, etc., he objects to the order of Phaleas with reference to artisans, and he says that on account of the law that Phaleas held up about artisans, it followed that a little city would have been constructed. For he wanted all the artisans to be at work in common, and their works to be distributed to the citizens according to their necessities; and following this, the artisans would be like the slaves of the community, and would not have filled up the multitude of the city. Therefore, the city must have remained small, since we see now that the artisans make up no small part of the city. Yet in the city, there must be some public workers who work upon the common works of the city, as it served for the city of Epidamnus, and as some legislator named Diophantus established at one time in Athens. And lastly, in an epilogue, he conludes that from what has been advanced, one is able to consider what about the regime of Phaleas was said well, and what was not said well.

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Lecture 10

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Ippodamus autem Eurifontis milisios, qui et civitatum divisionem invenit et suburbia incidit, factus circa aliam vitam magis superfluus propter honoris amorem, sic ut videatur quibusdam vivere curiosius capillorum multitudine et comae, adhuc autem vestitus vilis quidem sed calidi non in hieme solum, sed etiam circa estiva tempora, ratiocinatus autem et circa totam naturam esse volens, primus non politicae viventium conatus est aliquid de politeia dicere optima.

Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, the same who invented the art of planning cities, and who also laid out the Piraeus- a strange man, whose fondness for distinction led him into a general eccentricity of life, which made some think him affected (for he would wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments; but these were worn on a cheap but warm garment both in winter and summer); he, besides aspiring to be an adept in the knowledge of nature, was the first person not a statesman who made inquiries about the best form of government.

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Construxit autem civitatem multitudine quidem decem milium virorum, in tres autem partes divisam; fecit enim unam quidem partem artifices, unam autem agricolas, tertiam autem propugnans et arma habens. Dividebat autem in tres partes regionem, hanc quidem sacram, hanc autem publicam, hanc autem propriam. Unde quidem reputata faciant ad deos, sacram; a quibus autem propugnantes vivant, communem; agricolarum autem propriam.

The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens divided into three parts—one of artisans, one of husbandmen, and a third of armed defenders of the state. He also divided the land into three parts, one sacred, one public, the third private: the first was set apart to maintain the customary worship of the Gods, the second was to support the warriors, the third was the property of the husbandmen.

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Putavit autem et species legum esse tres solum: de quibus enim disceptationes fiunt tria haec esse numero, iniuriam, nocumentum, mortem.

He also divided laws into three classes, and no more, for he maintained that there are three subjects of lawsuits—insult, injury, and homicide.

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Lege autem statuit et praetorium unum principale, ad quod omnes reduci oportet causas quae non bene iudicate esse videntur; hoc autem construxit ex quibusdam senibus electis.

He likewise instituted a single final court of appeal, to which all causes seeming to have been improperly decided might be referred; this court he formed of elders chosen for the purpose.

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Iudicia autem in praetoriis non per sententiae collationem putabat fieri oportere, sed ferre unumquemque pugillarem in quo scribatur si condemnetur simpliciter. Si autem absolvatur simpliciter vacuus. Si autem hoc quidem hoc autem non, hoc determinare. Nunc enim non putabat lege statutum esse bene, cogere enim deierare haec vel haec disceptantes.

He was further of opinion that the decisions of the courts ought not to be given by the use of a voting pebble, but that every one should have a tablet on which he might not only write a simple condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal; but, if he partly acquitted and partly condemned, he was to distinguish accordingly. To the existing law he objected that it obliged the judges to be guilty of perjury, whichever way they voted.

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Adhuc autem legem posuit de invenientibus aliquid civitati expediens, quatinus adipiscantur honorem. Et pueris eorum qui in bello moriuntur, de publico fieri cibum, tanquam nondum hoc apud alios lege statutum; est autem et in Athenis ista lex nunc et in alteris civitatum. Principes autem a populo eligi omnes; populum autem faciebat tres partes civitatis; electos autem curare de communibus et peregrinis et orphanis. Plurima quidem igitur et quae maxime verbo digna Ippodami ordinationis, haec sunt.

He also enacted that those who discovered anything for the good of the state should be honored; and he provided that the children of citizens who died in battle should be maintained at the public expense, as if such an enactment had never been heard of before, yet it actually exists at Athens and in other places. As to the magistrates, he would have them all elected by the people, that is, by the three classes already mentioned, and those who were elected were to watch over the interests of the public, of strangers, and of orphans. These are the most striking points in the constitution of Hippodamus. There is not much else.

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Ypodamus autem Eurifontis et cetera. Postquam Philosophus prosecutus est de politia Phaleae, hic incipit agere de politia Hippodami. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Ypodamus autem Eurifontis, etc. After the philosopher went after the regime of Phaleas, he here starts to deal with the regime of Hippodamus. Concerning this he does three things.

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Primo exponit conditionem legislatoris.

First, he sets out the condition of the legislator.

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Secundo narrat politiam ipsius, quam ipse instituit, ibi, construxit autem civitatem et cetera.

Second, he describes his regime, which he instituted, at construxit autem civitatem, [II.10.2] etc.

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Tertio improbat eam quantum ad aliqua, ibi, dubitabit autem utique aliquis et cetera.

Third, he objects to it in a certain respect, at dubitabit autem utique aliquis, [II.11.1] etc.

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Circa primum tria facit.

Concerning the first he does three things.

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Primo dicit quid in arte politica Hippodamus adinvenit; et dicit quod adinvenit distinctionem civitatis quantum ad diversos ordines civium: et iterum incidit, hoc est divisit suburbia; adinvenit enim quomodo territorium civitatis per diversa suburbia distingui deberet. Fuit autem Euriphontis filius, Milesius autem natione.

First, he says what Hippodamus discovered in the political art, and he says that he discovered the distinction of the city with reference to the diverse orders of citizens. And moreover, he carved out—that is, divided—the suburbs. For he discovered how the territories of the city ought to be distinguished through diverse suburbs. Now he was the son of Euriphons, but of Miletus by birth.

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Secundo exponit conversationem ipsius; et dicit quod quia erat honoris cupidus, quaedam superflua observabat in propria vita privata quae est alia a civili: videbatur enim esse curiosus in multitudine capillorum et comae, et iterum in utilitate vestitus; volebat tamen habere calida vestimenta non solum in hieme, sed etiam in aestate.

Second, he sets out his conduct [conversatio], and he says that because he desired [cupidus] honor, he observed some extravagant things in his own private life that is different from his civic life: for he seems to have been a curiosity in the length of his hair and beard, and also in the usefulness of his clothes, as he wished to have warm clothes not only in the winter, but also in the summer.

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Tertio exponit studium ipsius: voluit enim ratiocinari de tota natura rerum, et primus inter philosophos, qui non agunt civilem vitam, sed contemplativam, conatus est determinare quae sit optima politia.

Third, he sets out his study: for he wished to reason out the whole nature of things, and was the first among the philosophers who did not lead a civic life, but a contemplative, and attempted to determine what is the best regime.

Polit.L10

Deinde cum dicit construxit autem civitatem etc., enarrat ordinem politiae ipsius.

Then, where he says construxit autem civitatem, etc., he describes the order of his regime.

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Et primo quantum ad divisiones quas adinvenit.

First, with reference to the divisions which he discovered.

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Secundo quantum ad iudicia, ibi, putavit autem et species legum et cetera.

Second, with reference to judgments, at putavit autem et species legum, [II.10.4] etc.

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Tertio quantum ad civium disciplinam, ibi, adhuc autem legem et cetera.

Third, with reference to the discipline of citizens, at adhuc autem legem, [II.10.5] etc.

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Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

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Primo ostendit quomodo divisit civium multitudinem.

First, he shows how he divided the multitude of citizens.

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Secundo quomodo divisit civitatis possessiones, ibi, dividebat autem in tres partes et cetera.

Second, how he divided the possessions of the city, at dividebat autem in tres partes, [II.10.3] etc.

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Dicit ergo primo, quod Hippodamus determinabat optimam quantitatem multitudinis in civitate, ut sit decem millium virorum: et hanc multitudinem dividebat in tres partes: quarum una erat artificum, alia agricolarum, tertia pugnatorum.

Therefore, he first says that Hippodamus determined the best quantity for the multitude in the city—that it is ten thousand men. And this multitude he divided into three parts: the first was the artisans; the second the farmers; the third, the warriors.

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Deinde cum dicit dividebat autem etc., ostendit quomodo dividebat possessionem civitatis; et dicit quod totam regionem, idest territorium civitatis dividebat in tres partes: quarum unam volebat esse sacram, de qua scilicet fierent ea quae homines reputant fieri propter cultum divinum; aliam volebat esse publicam vel communem de qua viverent bellatores: tertiam volebat esse propriam quae distribueretur inter agricolas.

Then, where he says dividebat autem, etc., he shows how he divided the possessions of the city. And he says that the whole region—that is, the territory of the city—he divided into three parts. The first he wished to be holy, where things were done that men reputed should be done for divine worship; the other he wished to be public or common, where the warriors would live; the third he wished to be private, which would be distributed among the farmers.

Polit.L10

Deinde cum dicit putavit autem et species etc., narrat ordinem politiae ipsius quantum ad iudicia.

Then, where he says putavit autem et species, etc., he describes the order of the regime itself, with reference to judgments.

Polit.L10

Et circa hoc tria facit.

And concerning this he does three things.

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Primo dicit quod putavit leges iudiciorum esse solummodo tres, secundum tria de quibus homines in iudiciis disceptant: quae sunt iniuria, nocumentum, et mors: ut iniuria referatur ad ea quae fiunt in vituperium hominis, nocumentum autem ad ea quae fiunt in damnum rerum, sub morte autem comprehenduntur omnia quae fiunt in nocumentum personae.

First, he says that Hippodamus deemed that there should be only three laws of judgment, according to the three things about which men dispute in judgment: these things are wrong-doing, injury, and death. As wrongdoing, he referred to those things that come to be from censuring a man; as injury, however he referred to what comes to be from damaging things; under death, he included all things that come to be in injuring a person.

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Secundo ibi, lege autem statuit etc., dicit quod Hippodamus instituit quamdam principalem curiam ad quam reducerentur, quasi per appellationem, omnes causae quae non viderentur esse bene iudicatae: et volebat quod hoc iudicium committeretur quibusdam senibus ad hoc electis qui et discretione et virtute essent probati.

Second, at lege autem statuit, etc., he says that Hippodamus instituted a governing court to which all causes were brought back—as if through an appeal—that did not seem to have been judged well. And he wanted this judgment to be committed to some old men chosen for this, who were proven in both discernment and virtue.

Polit.L10

Tertio ibi, iudicia autem et cetera. Ponit modum quem in iudicando volebat observari. Cum enim esset aliqua sententia ferenda a multis iudicibus, putabat non oportere, quod iudices conferrent adinvicem de sententia ferenda; sed quod unusquisque solitarius cogitaret de sententia ferenda, et illud quod cogitaret deferret scriptum in pugillari; ita scilicet quod si sibi videretur quod aliquis accusatus esset condemnandus, simpliciter condemnationem ibi describeret: si vero sibi videretur quod esset simpliciter absolvendus, deferret pugillare vacuum. Si autem sibi videretur quod quantum ad aliquid esset condemnandus, et quantum ad aliquid absolvendus, hoc etiam determinaret per Scripturam: et sic ex omnibus Scripturis eliceretur quod pluribus videretur. Non autem putabat bonum esse hoc, quod nunc est lege statutum, ut iudices adinvicem conferant antequam unusquisque sententiam proferat: cum enim sint iurati dicere quod eis videtur, per huiusmodi disceptationes quae in tali loco, et circa talia fiunt, coguntur quodammodo degerare, dum aliquis non audet dicere quod sibi videtur multis contradicentibus.

Third, at iudicia autem, etc., he lays out the mode that he wished to be observed in judgment. For when a sentence was to be given by many judges, he thought that the judges must not confer with each other about the sentence to be given; but that each one should think in solitude about the sentence to be given, and that he should carry what he thought written on a tablet, so that if it seemed to him that the accused should be condemned, he would simply “condemnation”; but if it seemed to him that he should be absolved, he would carry an empty tablet. If, however, it seemed to him that with reference to one thing he should be condemned, and with reference to another he should be absolved, he would determine this through writing. And so, from everything written, what seemed correct to most would be chosen. However, he did not deem that what is now established as law is good—that judges confer with each other before each one offers his sentence: for since they have vowed to say how things seem to them, through the sort of disagreements that happen in this such a place and about such matters, they are in a certain manner compelled to swear when someone does not dare to speak what it seems to him, because many contract him.

Polit.L10

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem legem posuit etc., narrat ordinationem eius circa disciplinam civium. Et ponit eius quatuor leges:

Then, where he says adhuc autem legem posuit, etc., he describes the ordering of Hippodamus concerning the discipline of the citizens. And he lays out the four laws of Hippodamus.

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quarum prima est quod illi qui invenerunt aliquid ordinandum in civitate quod esset civitati expediens, obtinerent aliquem honorem.

The first is that those who discover some order for the city that would be advantageous to the city would obtain some honor.

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Secundam legem ponit, ibi, et pueris eorum et cetera. Ut scilicet filii eorum qui moriuntur in bello pro civitate nutrirentur de aerario publico; quod quidem nondum erat statutum in civitatibus; nunc autem ista lex observatur in Athenis et in quibusdam aliis civitatibus.

The second law he lays out at et pueris eorum, etc. Namely, that the sons of those who are killed in war for the city should be fed out of the public treasury—which indeed was not yet established in cities; now, however, such a law is observed in Athens and in some other cities.

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Tertiam legem ponit, ibi, principes autem et cetera. Et haec est de electione principum, ut scilicet totus populus principes eligat. Dicebat autem esse populum tres praedictas partes civitatis; scilicet agricolas, artifices et bellatores.

He lays out the third law at principes autem, etc., and this is about the choosing of leaders—namely, that the whole of the people chooses the governors . But he said that the people were the three aforementioned parts of the city: the farmers, the artisans, and the warriors.

Polit.L10

Quartam legem ponit de officio principum, ibi, electos autem et cetera. Ut scilicet illi qui eliguntur in principes, habeant curam de rebus communibus civitatis et de peregrinis et de orphanis et aliis impotentibus personis.

He lays out a fourth law about the office of the governors at electos autem, etc. Namely, that those who are chosen as governors have care for the common affairs of the city, and of travelers, and of orphans, and other persons without power.

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Et ultimo concludit, quod plurima et maxime recitanda de his quae Hippodamus ordinavit, sunt ea quae dicta sunt.

And lastly, he concludes that most of the things that Hippodamus put in order—and the greatest—are what has been discussed.

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Lecture 11

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Dubitabit autem utique aliquis primum quidem circa divisionem multitudinis civium; artifices enim et agricolae et arma habentes communicant politeia omnes, agricolae quidem non habentes arma, artifices autem neque terram neque arma, quare fiunt fere serui arma possidentium; participare quidem igitur omnibus honoribus impossibile. Necesse enim ex arma habentibus constitui et duces exercitus et civium rectores et principalissimos principatus ut est dicere; non participantes autem politeia quomodo possibile est amicabiliter se habere ad politeiam?

The first of these proposals to which objection may be taken is the threefold division of the citizens. The artisans, and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a share in the government. But the husbandmen have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, and therefore they become all but slaves of the warrior class. That they should share in all the offices is an impossibility; for generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the governing magistrates, must be taken from the class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the two other classes have no share in the government, how can they be loyal citizens?

Polit.L11

Sed oportet et meliores esse arma possidentes ambabus partibus; hoc autem non facile non multos existentes. Si autem hoc erit, quid oportet alios participare politeia et dominos esse constitutionis principum.

It may be said that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the other classes, but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous; and if they are, why should the other classes share in the government at all, or have power to appoint magistrates?

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Adhuc agricolae quid utiles civitati? Artifices quidem enim necessarium esse; omnes enim indiget civitas artificibus, et possunt procedere quaemadmodum in aliis civitatibus ab arte. Agricolae autem acquirentes quidem arma possidentibus cibum rationabiliter utique essent aliqua pars civitatis, nunc autem propriam habent et hanc propriam colent.

Further, what use are farmers to the city? Artisans there must be, for these are wanted in every city, and they can live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen too, if they really provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share in the government. But in the republic of Hippodamus they are supposed to have land of their own, which they cultivate for their private benefit.

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Adhuc autem communem a qua propugnantes habebunt cibum, si quidem ipsi colent, non utique erit pugnans alterum et agros colens. Vult autem legislator alterum esse. Si autem alteri quidam erunt ab his qui propria colunt et bellantibus, quarta iterum pars erit haec civitatis nullo participans, sed aliena a politeia. At very si quis eosdem ponat eos qui propriam et qui communem colant, tunc multitudo deficiens erit fructuum ex quibus unusquisque ministrabit duas domos, et cuius gratia non statim ex terra et eisdem sortibus sibi ipsis cibum sument et viris praelii exhibebunt? Haec itaque omnia multam habent turbationem.

Again, as to this common land out of which the soldiers are maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen, although the legislator intended to make a distinction between them. If, again, there are to be other cultivators distinct both from the husbandmen, who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will make a fourth class, which has no place in the state and no share in anything. Or, if the same persons are to cultivate their own lands, and those of the public as well, they will have difficulty in supplying the quantity of produce which will maintain two households: and why, in this case, should there be any division, for they might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the same land and the same lots? There is surely a great confusion in all this.

Polit.L11

Non bene autem neque de iudicio habt lex iudicare dignificans dividentes, causa simpliciter scripta, et fieri iudicem disquisitorem; hoc autem in disquisitione quidem et pluribus contingit. Colloquuntur enim ad invicem de iudicio. In pretoriis autem non est. Sed contrarium huius legislatorum multi statuunt ut iudices non colloquantur ad invicem.

Neither is the law to be commended which says that the judges, when a simple issue is laid before them, should distinguish in their judgement; for the judge is thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitration, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with one another about the decision, and therefore they can distinguish; but in courts of law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators take pains to prevent the judges from holding any communication with one another.

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Deine quomodo non erit plenum turbatione iudicium cum debere iudex quidem existimaverit non tantum quantum litigans? Hic quidem viginti mnas, iudex autem iudicat decem mnas; aut hic quidem plus, hic autem minus, alius autem quinque, hic autem quatuor; et hoc itaque modo palam quia patientur; hi quidem omnia condemnabunt, hi autem non. Quis igitur modus erit disputationis sententiarum?

Again, will there not be confusion if the judge thinks that damages should be given, but not so much as the suitor demands? He asks, say, for twenty minae, and the judge allows him ten minae (or in general the suitor asks for more and the judge allows less), while another judge allows five, another four minae. In this way they will go on splitting up the damages, and some will grant the whole and others nothing: how is the final reckoning to be taken?

Polit.L11

Adhuc nullus deierare cogit simpliciter abiudicantem aut condemnantem siquidem simpliciter accusatio scripta est iuste. Non enim nihil debere abiudicans iudicat, sed viginti mnas; sed illud deirat condemnatus non putans debere viginti mnas.

Again, no one contends that he who votes for a simple acquittal or condemnation perjures himself, if the indictment has been laid in an unqualified form; and this is just, for the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and yet condemns him.

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Dubitabit autem utique aliquis et cetera. Posita politia Hippodami, hic improbat ipsam.

Dubitabit autem utique aliquis, etc. Having put forward the regime of Hippodamus, Aristotle here objects to it.

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Et primo quantum ad divisionem quam instituit.

And first, with reference to the division that he instituted.

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Secundo quantum ad ea quae de iudicio dixit, ibi, non bene autem neque de iudicio et cetera.

Second, with reference to what he said about judgment, at non bene autem neque de iudicio, [II.11.6] etc.

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Tertio quantum ad ea quae instituit de disciplina civium, ibi, de eo autem quod invenientibus et cetera.

Third, with reference to what he instituted about the discipline of citizens, at de eo autem quod invenientibus, [II.12.1] etc.

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Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first, he does two things.

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Primo improbat divisionem institutam ab Hippodamo quantum ad partes civitatis.

First, he objects to the division instituted by Hippodamus with reference to the parts of the city.

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Secundo quantum ad possessiones, ibi, adhuc autem communem et cetera.

Second, with reference to possessions, at adhuc autem communem, [II.11.5] etc.

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Circa primum tria facit.

Concerning the first he does three things.

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Primo improbat divisionem partium civitatis quantum ad artifices.

First, he objects to the division of the parts of the city with reference to artisans.

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Secundo quantum ad bellatores, ibi, sed oportet et cetera.

Second, with reference to warriors, at sed oportet, [II.11.3] etc.

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Tertio quantum ad agricolas, ibi, adhuc agricolae et cetera.

Third, with reference to farmers, at adhuc agricolae, [II.11.4] etc.

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Dicit ergo primo, quod prima dubitatio in politia Hippodami, accidit circa divisionem multitudinis civium. Voluit enim quod tam artifices quam agricolae et quam viri armati, omnes communicarent in ordine civitatis: ita tamen quod agricolae non haberent arma, sed haberent terram: artifices autem neque haberent terram, neque arma. Ex qua ordinatione sequitur, quod artifices fere sunt servi eorum qui possident arma, quia nullam propriam possessionem habentes. Quod videtur ad eorum utilitatem pertinere. Insistunt enim operibus in ministerium civitatis, et praecipue bellatorum, quos oportet maiorem partem in honoribus civitatis obtinere. Non enim est possibile quod artifices habeant partem in omnibus honoribus, quia duces exercitus et rectores civium et alii maiores principatus non erit decens quod instituantur ex artificibus, sed solum ex viris bellatoribus, qui sunt ad hoc magis idonei. Non est autem possibile quod, ex quo non habent partem in regimine civitatis, quod ipsi ament talem ordinationem civitatis: unde relinquitur seditionis materia: non igitur convenienter ordinavit de artificibus.

Therefore, he first says that the first doubt about the regime of Hippodamus comes from the division of the multitude of the citizens. For Hippodamus wanted the artisans, the farmers, and the armed men to all commune in the order of the city; yet so that the farmers would not have arms, but would have land; the artisans, moreover, would have neither land nor arms. From this order, it would follow that the artisans were almost the slaves of those who possessed arms, because they have none of their own possessions—which seems to belong to their usefulness. For they are devoted to [insistunt] works in the service of the city, and chiefly of the warriors, who must obtain the greater part of the honors of the city. For it is not possible that the artisans should have a part in all honors, because it will not be appropriate for artisans to be instituted as the commanders of the army and the rulers of the citizens, or put into other great governments; but these will only come from warlike men, who are more apt for this. For it is not possible, since they do not have a part in the regime of the city, that they should love such an ordering of the city: whence, the material for sedition remains, and therefore, he did not sufficiently give order to the artisans.

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Deinde cum dicit sed oportet etc., improbat praedictam ordinationem quantum ad viros bellatores. Oportet enim eos esse meliores, idest potentiores ambabus aliis partibus, scilicet et agricolis et artificibus. Et hoc ideo quia ad viros bellatores pertinet, ut potestatem civitatis defendant non solum contra impugnationem hostium, sed et contra seditiones civium, quos non possent reprimere nisi potentiores essent: quod quidem non est facile, nisi sint multi. Si autem viri bellatores excedant et multitudine et virtute et dignitate, nulla necessitas fuit, quod artifices et agricolae partem haberent in regimine civitatis, et quod ad eos pertineret institutio principum, quia semper hoc fiet ad arbitrium virorum bellatorum. Superflue igitur aliis committitur: unde patet quod non convenienter divisit viros bellatores ab aliis.

Then, where he says sed oportet, etc., he objects to the aforementioned ordering with reference to men of war. For they must be better—that is, more powerful than both the other parts, namely, the farmers and the artisans. And this is because it belongs to the men of war to defend the power of the city not only against the attacks of enemies, but also against the sedition of the citizens, whom they are not able to repress unless they are more powerful than them—which, indeed, is not easy unless there are many of them. But if the men of war exceeded the others in multitude, and in virtue, and in worth, there was no necessity that the artisans and the farmers should have had any part in the rule of the city, and that the institution of the governors should belong to them, because this would happen at the decision of the men of war. Therefore, it is superfluously committed to others, and so it is evident that he did not fittingly divide the men of war from the others.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc agricolae etc., improbat praedictam distinctionem quantum ad agricolas: de quibus non est manifestum secundum praedictam ordinationem, quomodo sint utiles civitati. De artificibus enim manifestum est quod sunt in civitate necessarii propter variam supellectilem praeparandam: et vita civium poterit bene procedere per ea quae praeparantur ab arte, sicut accidit in aliis civitatibus. Vel potest intelligi quod ipsi artifices possunt procedere, idest nutriri de sua arte, unde non indigent agricolis ut ab eis sustententur; sed viri bellatores, quasi ab aliis distinguantur, non possunt de suo officio sustentari: unde indigent ut ab aliis sustententur. Si igitur agricolae instituerentur ad hoc quod acquirerent cibum viris bellatoribus, rationabiliter ponerentur esse pars civitatis. Oportet enim quod pars totius coadiuvet ad bonum aliarum partium. Sed secundum praedictam operationem habebunt proprias possessiones et eas colent et ita aliis in nullo utiles erunt, sed sibiipsis tantum. Non ergo ponuntur agricolae convenienter pars civitatis.

Then, where he says adhuc agricolae, etc., he objects to the aforementioned distinction with reference to the farmers. For it is not clear, concerning them, how they would be useful to the city. Concerning artisans, it is clear that they are necessary in the city so that they can prepare various equipment, and the life of the citizens will be able to proceed well through the things that are prepared by their art—as also occurs in other cities. For it can be understood that the artisans can proceed—that is, be nourished by their art—so that they do not require the farmers to support them. But the men of war, as though distinct from the others, are not able to be supported by their office, and so they require that they be supported by others. Therefore, if the farmers were instituted for acquiring food for the men of war, they would reasonably be placed as a part of the city. For the part of the whole must assist the good of the other parts. But following the aforementioned workings, they will have their own possessions and cultivate them, and so they will not be useful to others, but only to themselves. Therefore, he did not fittingly set up the farmers as a part of the city.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem communem etc., improbat divisionem possessionum. Ponebat enim Hippodamus unam partem possessionum civitatis communem ex qua viri bellatores nutrirentur. Est ergo considerandum quis colet istam terram communem. Oportet autem quod altero aliquo trium modorum colatur: quorum primus est ut ipsimet bellatores colant terram communem, et sic quidem erunt pugnantes et agricolae: sed legislator voluit eos distinguere, inutilis ergo fuit distinctio. Secundus modus, ut quidam alii inter pugnatores et agricolas colentes possessiones proprias, colant terram communem: ex quo sequitur quod erit quaedam quarta pars civitatis in nullo participans regimine civitatis, sed omnino ab hoc aliena: non enim admittebat ad electionem principum, nisi tres partes praedictas. Tertius modus esse potest, ut ipsi agricolae qui colunt possessiones proprias colant et communes: sed tunc sequetur quod non sit copia fructuum terrae in civitate, non enim erit facile quod unus agricola sufficienter excolat tot terras, unde fructus necessarios duabus familiis administret. Si etiam iste tertius modus ponatur, videtur fuisse superflua possessionum divisio in tres partes: potuisset enim fieri, ut a principio tota terra daretur agricolis: ut scilicet unusquisque agricola ex terra, quae ei veniret in sortem, sumeret cibum suae familiae et aliquibus viris bellatoribus. Ea igitur quae Hippodamus dixit circa huiusmodi divisiones, inducunt magnam turbationem.

Then, where he says adhuc autem communem, etc., he objects to the division of possessions. For Hippodamus set up one part of the possessions of the city in common, from which the men of war were fed. Therefore, it should be considered who will cultivate this common land. Now it must be cultivated in one of three manners. The first is that the warriors themselves cultivate the common land, and so they will be fighters and farmers. But the legislator wished to distinguish these things, therefore it was a useless distinction. The second manner is that some others between the fighters and the farmers—who cultivate their own possessions—cultivate the common land. From this it follows that there will be some fourth part of the city that in no way participates in the rule of the city, but is utterly alien to it. For no one is allowed to choose the governors except the three aforementioned parts. The third manner can be that the farmers themselves who cultivate their own possessions also cultivate the common ones. But then it would follow that there would not be an abundance of the produce of the land in the city, for it will not be easy for one farmer to sufficiently cultivate so many lands as would administer the produce necessary for two families. Even if such a third manner were set up, it seems that it would have been superfluous to divide possessions into three parts. For it could have happened that from the beginning the whole land was given to the farmers, so that each farmer, from the land that came to him by lot, would acquire food for his family and for some other men of war. Therefore, what Hippodamus said about these sorts of divisions introduces great disturbance.

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Deinde cum dicit non bene autem neque de iudicio etc., improbat praedictam politiam quantum ad iudicium; scilicet quantum ad hoc quod statuit iudicia in praetoriis fieri, non per sententiae collationem. Et circa hoc duo facit.

Then, where he says non bene autem neque de iudicio, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to judgment—namely, insofar as he established that judgments in court do not occur by collecting the sentences [of the judges]. Concerning this he does two things.

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Primo improbat statutum.

First, he objects to this establishment.

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Secundo rationem statuti, ibi, adhuc nullus degerare cogit et cetera.

Second, the reason for the establishment, at adhuc nullus degerare cogit, [II.11.8] etc.

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Circa primum ponit duas rationes:

Concerning the first, he lays out two reasons.

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circa quarum primam dicit quod lex quam ipse posuit de iudicio, non bene se habet, per quam dignum reputavit quod aliqui iudicarent dividentes se abinvicem, ita quod quilibet per seipsum conscriberet id quod sibi de causa videretur. Et secundum hoc volebat quod iudex per seipsum disquireret quid esset sententiandum. Sed in tali disquisitione singulari contingebat etiam a pluribus simul disquiri, quia iudices poterant sibiinvicem colloqui de iudicio ferendo in domibus propriis, ita tamen quod in praetoriis, idest in loco publico iudiciorum non colloquerentur adinvicem ad conferendum de sententia; et hoc erat magis periculosum, quia facilius poterat contingere quod unus iudex perverteret alium ad ferendum sententiam aliter quam sibi videretur privatim cum eo conferens, quam in praetorio publico omnibus audientibus: unde etiam contrarium huius multi legislatores statuerunt, ut scilicet iudices non colloquantur adinvicem, in privato videlicet, sed solum in praetoriis adinvicem conferrent. Videtur igitur quod praedicta lex periculosa fuerit et aliorum legibus contraria.

About the first, he first says that the law which he set up about judgment is not well arranged [se habet]. Through the law, Hippodamus deemed it worthy that people should make judgments when divided from each other, so that any of them, by himself, could write out what seemed to him to be the cause [of the problem]. And according to this, Hippodamus wanted a judge to investigate by himself what his sentence should be. But in such an individual investigation also happened to be investigated by many at once, because the judges could speak together in their own households about the judgment they were carrying on, even though they did not speak together in court—that is, in a public place of judgment—to confer about their judgments. And this was most dangerous, because by conferring privately, rather than in a public court with everyone listening, it could more easily happen that one judge could have twisted another into bearing a sentence other than it seemed to him. This is why many legislators have established the contrary of this, so that judges cannot speak together—that is to say, in private—but they only confer with each other in court. Therefore, it seems that the aforementioned law would have been dangers, and contrary to the laws of others.

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Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, deinde quomodo non erit plenum turbatione et cetera. Et dicit quod non poterit iudicium absque turbatione fieri per modum praedictum. Potest enim contingere quod iudici non videbitur seorsum considerandum, ut reus tantum condemnetur quantum actor qui litigat petit, sed forte actor petit quod reus condemnetur ad viginti minas, iudex autem iudicabit quod condemnetur ad decem minas; aut forte unus iudicum condemnabit eum ad plus, alius autem ad minus; puta unus ad quinque, alius ad quatuor; et per hunc modum oportet quod iudices idem patiantur, idest ut conferant adinvicem post sententias scriptas, sicut si sententias singulariter non conscripsissent quia forte quidam iudicum condemnabunt reum quantum ad omnia quae petit actor, quidam autem non. Quis ergo modus erit disputandi de sententiis diversis iudicum, nisi scilicet conferendo? Quod sic praedicta lex non poterit vitare quod intendebat, scilicet collationem iudicum: unde patet quod superflua fuit.

He lays out a second reason at deinde quomodo non erit plenum turbatione, etc., and he says that judgment will not be able to happen in the aforementioned manner without disturbance. For it can happen that it will not seem to a judge, considering things himself, that the defendant is so much to be condemned as the plaintiff deems who is suing, but perhaps the plaintiff deems that the defendant should be prosecuted for twenty minas, but the judge judges that he should be prosecuted for ten minas; or perhaps one judge condemns him to more, but another to less—for instance, one to five minas, and the other to four. And in this manner, the judges must suffer the same thing to happen—that is, that they confer with each other after the sentences have been written, just as if the sentences had not been written individually, because perhaps one judge will condemn the defendant to all that the plaintiff petitions, but another one will not. So in what manner will the diverse sentences of the judges be debated, except by conferring? So the aforementioned law will not be able to avoid what it intended to avoid—the conference of the judges. So it is evident that it was superfluous.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc nullus etc., improbat causam statuti, quae erat vitatio periurii; et dicit quod si fiat collatio iudicum de condemnatione alicuius, nullus cogit propter hoc, quod periurium committatur ab eo qui iudicare debet, etiam si accusatio actoris sit iuste scripta et iudex eam non admittat: non enim iudicabit iudex quod reus nihil debeat, sed forte iudicabit quod viginti minas debeat, cum actor plus petat; sed magis reus, qui condemnatur, degerare videtur, qui non putat etiam se debere viginti minas. Et ita propter talem causam non oportebat hanc legem poni.

Then, where he says adhuc nullus, etc., he objects to the cause of the established law, which was the avoidance of perjury, and he says that if a conference of the judges about the condemnation of someone were to happen, no one would be coerced because of this, so that perjury would be committed by the one who ought to judge, even if the accusation of the plaintiff is justly written and the judge does not accept it. For the judge will not judge that the defendant owes nothing, but perhaps he will judge that he owes twenty minas, although the plaintiff is petitioning for more. But the defendant who is condemned seems to swear that he does not deem that he even owes twenty minas. And so, for this reason [causam], this law need not have been set up.

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Lecture 12

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De eo autem quod invenientibus aliquid civitati utile oporteat fieri quendam honorem, non est securum legem ferre, sed boni aspectus audire solum: habet enim calumnias et motus si eveniat politeiae. Incidit autem in aliud problema et considerationem alteram. Dubitant enim quidam utrum nocivum aut expediens civitatibus amovere patrias leges, si sit aliqua alia melior; propter quod quidem non facile dicto velociter consentire, siquidem non expedit amovere; contingit autem inducere quosdam legum solutionem aut politeiae ut commune bonum.

To honor those who discover anything which is useful to the state is a proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot safely be enacted by law, for it may encourage informers, and perhaps even lead to political commotions. This question involves another. It has been doubted whether it is or is not expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country, even if another law be better. Now, if an changes are inexpedient, we can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus; for, under pretense of doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the constitution.

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Quoniam autem fecimus memoriam modicum amoplius de ipso dilatare melius: habet enim quaemadmodum diximus dubitationem, et videbitur utique melius esse amovere. In aliis enim scientiis hoc contulit, puta medicinali mota extra paterna et gymnastica, et totaliter artes omnes et virtutes. Quare quoniam unam harum ponendum etiam politicam, palam quia et circa hanc necessarium similter habere.

But, since we have touched upon this subject, perhaps we had better go a little into detail, for, as I was saying, there is a difference of opinion, and it may sometimes seem desirable to make changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences have certainly been beneficial; medicine, for example, and gymnastic, and every other art and craft have departed from traditional usage.

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Signum autem utique fieri dicet aliquis in ipsis operibus: antiquas enim leges valde simplices esse et barbaricas; ferrum enim portabant Graeci et uxores emebant ad invicem. Quaecumque autem reliqua antiquorum sunt alicubi legalium, stulta omnino sunt, puta in Komi circa homicidia lex est, si multitudo quaedam testium astiterit persequens homicidam qui suorum cognatorum, reum esse homicidii fugientem. Quaerunt autem totaliter non quod patrium, sed quod bonum omnes.

And, if politics be an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art. That improvement has occurred is shown by the fact that old customs are exceedingly simple and barbarous. For the ancient Hellenes went about armed and bought their brides of each other. The remains of ancient laws which have come down to us are quite absurd; for example, at Cumae there is a law about murder, to the effect that if the accuser produce a certain number of witnesses from among his own kinsmen, the accused shall be held guilty. Again, men in general desire the good, and not merely what their fathers had.

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Verisimilequae primos sive terrigenae erant sive ex corruptione quadam salvati sunt, similiter esse et contingentes et insensatos, quaemadmodum et dicitur de terrigenis. Quare inconveniens manere in horum dogmatibus.

But the primeval inhabitants, whether they were born of the earth or were the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary or even foolish people among ourselves (such is certainly the tradition concerning the earth-born men); and it would be ridiculous to rest contented with their notions.

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Ad haec autem neque scriptas si immobiles melius. Sicut enim et circa alias artes, et circa politicum ordinem impossibile diligenter omnia scripta esse. Universaliter enim necessarium scribere; actus autem de particularibus sunt; ex his quidem igitur videtur quia amovendae et quaedam et quandoque legum sunt.

Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. As in other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars. Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed.

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Alio autem modo considerantibus reverentiae utique videbitur esse multae. Cum enim fuerit quod quidem melius modicum, assuescere autem facile solvere leges pravum. Manifestum quod sinendum quaedam peccata et legislatoribus et principibus; non enim tantum proderit qui mutaverit quantum nocebit principibus rebellare assuescens.

But when we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution would seem to be required. For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage is small, some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not gain so much by making the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedience.

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Mendax quoque exemplum quod ab artibus; non enim simile movere artem et legem; lex enim robur nullum habet ad persuaderi praeter consuetudinem, hoc autem non fit nisi per temporis multitudinem. Itaque facile mutare ex existentibus legibus ad alteras leges novas, facere est debilem legis virtutem.

The analogy of the arts is false; a change in a law is a very different thing from a change in an art. For the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the law.

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Adhuc autem si mutandae, utrum omnes et in omni politeia aut non? et utrum quocumque aut quibus? Haec enim habent magnam differentiam; propter quod nunc quidem dimittamus hanc considerationem; aliorum enim est temporum.

Even if we admit that the laws are to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in every state? And are they to be changed by anybody who likes, or only by certain persons? These are very important questions; and therefore we had better reserve the discussion of them to a more suitable occasion.

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De eo autem quod invenientibus et cetera. Postquam improbavit politiam Hippodami quantum ad divisionem et iudicia, hic improbat eam quantum ad disciplinam quam ordinavit, quantum ad hoc, scilicet, quod statuit quod hi qui invenirent aliquid utile civitati, honorem consequerentur. Et circa hoc duo facit.

De eo autem quod invenientibus, etc. After he objected to the regime of Hippodamus with reference to its division and its judgments, he here objects to it with reference to the discipline that he put in order, with reference to this: he established that honor would follow after those who discovered something useful for the city. Concerning this he does two things.

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Primo improbat statutum.

First, he objects to what was established.

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Secundo movet quasdam quaestiones, ibi, quoniam autem fecimus et cetera.

Second, he raises some questions at quoniam autem fecimus, [II.12.2] etc.

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Dicit ergo primo, quod non est securum civitati quod praedicta lex statuatur; sed solum in primo aspectu, quando auditur, apparet bona. Si enim eveniat quod talis lex statuatur, habebit multas calumnias, dum aliqui arbitrabuntur esse utile illud adinventum et aliqui quod non. Habebit etiam transmutationes politiarum. Una enim lege transmutata, quandoque totus status civitatis mutatur. Sed istud statutum facit nos incidere in aliud problema, id est in aliam quaestionem et in aliam considerationem: est enim dubium apud quosdam utrum sit expediens vel nocivum civitati, ut removeat patrias leges, si aliqua melior adinveniatur; et ideo huic dicto non facile est quod homo velociter consentiat, ut scilicet adinventores novorum honorentur, et hoc si non expedit civitatibus quod leges patriae amoveantur. Continget autem per hoc statutum, quod quidam dum provocantur ad novorum adinventionem, ut adipiscantur honorem, inducant dissolutionem legum et totius politiae sub specie communis boni: quod quidem est valde periculosum: non ergo illud statutum est conveniens.

Therefore, he first says that it is not secure for the city that the aforementioned law be established, but only at first glance, when it is heard, does it appear good. For if it came about that such a law was established, it will have many calumnies, where some will decide that some discovery is useful, and others that it is not. It will also have many transformations of the regime. For when one law is transformed, sometimes the whole state of the city is changed. But such an establishment brings us to another problem—that is, into another question and another consideration. For there is a doubt among some whether it is advantageous or harmful for the city to get rid of ancestral laws if something better is discovered. And therefore, regarding what has been said, it is not easy for man to quickly agree that those who discover new things be honored, or whether or not it is advantageous for cities that ancestral laws be cast off. For it may happen through this establishment that some, when provoked to invent something new to achieve honor, may introduce the destruction [dissolutio] of the whole regime under the appearance [specie] of the common good—which, indeed, is exceedingly dangerous: therefore, this establishment is not fitting.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem fecimus etc., movet quasdam dubitationes.

Then, where he says quoniam autem fecimus, etc., he raises some doubts.

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Et primo, utrum oportet leges mutare.

First, whether the laws must change.

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Secundo si sunt mutandae, a quibus et quomodo, ibi, adhuc autem si mutandae et cetera.

Second, if they are to be changed, by whom, and how, at adhuc autem si mutandae, etc.

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Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

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Primo inducit rationes ad ostendendum quod oportet leges mutare.

First, he introduces reasons for showing that the laws must change.

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Secundo inducit ad contrarium, ibi, alio autem modo considerantibus etc.

Second, he introduces [reasons] to the contrary, at alio autem modo considerantibus, [II.12.6] etc.

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Circa primum ponit quatuor rationes.

Concerning the first he lays out four reasons.

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Circa quarum primam dicit quod quia fecimus modicam mentionem de mutatione legum, melius est quod parum amplius super hoc nos dilatemus; quia, ut dictum est, hoc habet dubitationem: et quibusdam videtur, quod melius sit leges antiquas amovere, si aliqua melior inveniatur. Videmus enim quod hoc multum profuit in aliis scientiis, quod scilicet aliqua sunt mutata de his quae a patribus observabantur scilicet in medicina. Nam posteriores medici multa adinvenerunt mutantes ea quae primi observabant. Et idem etiam est in gymnastica, idest in exercitativa. Dicebantur enim gymnasia, quaedam exercitia in quibus homines nudi se exercebant, a gymnos, quod est nudum. Et ita etiam videmus in omnibus aliis artibus et operativis potentiis, de quarum numero est politica, quae est regitiva civitatis. Ergo etiam in regimine civitatis oportet mutare ea quae a patribus sunt observata, dummodo meliora occurrant.

Concerning the first of these, he says that, because we made small mention about the change of the laws, it is better that we extend things a little more broadly about this because, as was said, there are some doubts about this. And it seems to some that it is better for ancient laws to be cast off is something better is found. For we see that it helped greatly in the other sciences that some things were changed from those that were observed by our ancestors—such as in medicine. For later doctors discovered many things, and changed what they used to observe at first. And the same thing also is in gymnastics—that is, in exercise. For some places of exercise where men exercised naked were called gymnasia, from gymnos, that is, “naked.” And we see this in all the other arts and works of power, of whose number is the political, which is the ruling of the city. Therefore also in the rule of the city, those things must change which were observed by our ancestors, so long as better things may occur.

Polit.L12

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, signum autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod signum huius quod leges sint mutandae, potest aliquis accipere ab ipsis operibus, idest ab his quae contingunt: videmus enim quod antiquae leges fuerunt valde simplices et barbaricae, idest irrationabiles et extraneae, sicut hoc quod ab antiquo erat lex apud Graecos quod emebant uxores adinvicem portantes ad talem emptionem ferrum, quia forte alia metalla non erant in usu. Et similiter videmus quod si quae leges adhuc remanent de antiquis, sunt omnia stulta, sicut in quadam terra erat talis lex circa homicidia quod si aliquis de cognatis occisi persequeretur homicidam et ille fugeret praesente multitudine testium, quod ille reputaretur reus homicidii (et ab hinc videtur introducta consuetudo duellorum): et hoc est omnino irrationabile. Homines autem in legibus ponendis non debent quaerere, quid fuerit a patribus observatum, sed quid sit bonum observandum; et ita conveniens est antiquas leges mutare, si occurrant meliores.

He lays out a second reason at signum autem, etc., and he says someone can receive a sign that the laws should be changed from their works—that is, from what happens: for we see that ancient laws were exceedingly simple and barbaric—that is, irrational and foreign, just as there was an ancient law among the Greeks that they could purchase wives in turn, bearing iron for this purchase, perhaps because other metals were not in use. And likewise, we see that if any laws still remain from ancient times, they are all foolish, as was a law of this sort in some land concerning homicide, that if anyone was prosecuted as a murderer on account of kin-slaying, and he fled when presented with a multitude of witnesses, that he would be deemed guilty of homicide (and this seems to have introduced the custom of dueling). And this is utterly unreasonable. Men, therefore, in setting up laws, should not seek what would have been observed by their ancestors, but what would be good to be observed; and so it is fitting for old laws to change if better ones may occur.

Polit.L12

Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, verisimileque et cetera. Ad cuius intellectum considerandum est, quod Aristoteles opinatus fuit mundum ab aeterno fuisse, ut patet in octavo physicorum et in primo de caelo: et tamen manifestum est per antiquas historias, quod ab aliquo certo tempore incoeperunt regiones habitari: quod videtur contrariari aeternitati mundi. Sed ad hoc solvendum inducebat Aristoteles quod multoties factae sunt desolationes generales terrarum per aliqua diluvia vel per quascumque corruptiones; quibus cessantibus incoeperunt de novo regiones habitari. Quod quidem potuit contingere dupliciter. Uno modo ita quod homines generarentur ex terra. Posuerunt enim quidam quod ex terra aliquo modo proportionata naturaliter generaretur homo, sicut et murem certum est generari ex terra. Sed hoc non videtur conveniens: quia natura ex determinatis principiis et per determinata media procedit ad suos effectus: unde animalia perfecta nunquam possunt generari nisi ex semine: unde non credimus quod ex terra possit homo fieri naturaliter, sed solum virtute divina. Alio modo potuit contingere quod in generali corruptione aliqui homines conservarentur vel in montibus vel per aliquem alium modum; sicut nos ponimus quod Noe fuit conservatus in arca, tempore diluvii generalis, et Deucalion fuit conservatus in montibus in diluvio, quod accidit tempore Ogygis regis in terra Graecorum. Sed quocumque horum modorum contigerit, videtur quod primi homines fuerint contingentes id est qualescumque non viri excellentes, et quod fuerint insensati, sicut fabulose dicitur de illis qui dicuntur fuisse producti de terra, tempore Deucalionis: unde inconveniens videtur quod aliquis permaneat in legibus et statutis ipsorum.

He lays out a third reason at verisimileque, etc. In order to understand it, it must be considered that Aristotle was of the opinion that the world existed from eternity, as is evident in Physics VIII, and in On the Heavens I. And yet it is clear through ancient histories that from some certain time, regions started to be inhabited, which seems contrary to the eternity of the world. But to untangle this, Aristotle deduced that frequently, general desolation of the lands was made by some flood or through whatever other corruptions happened. When these had ceased, the regions started to be inhabited anew. Which, indeed, could happen in two ways. In one manner, such that men were generated from the land. For some posited that, just as a certain rodent is generated from the land, so also man was naturally generated from the land in some proportionate manner. But this does not seem fitting, because nature proceeds to its effects from determinate beginnings and through determinate means; and so a perfected animal can never be generated except from semen: whence we do not believe that man could naturally come to be from the land, but only by divine force. In another manner, it could have happened that in a general corruption, some men were preserved either in the mountains or in some other manner, just as we posit that Noah was preserved in the arc at the time of the general flood, and Deucalion was preserved in the mountains in a flood that happened in the time of King Ogygus, in the land of the Greeks. But in whichever of these ways it may have happened, it seems that the first men were “contingents”—that is, that they were not men excellent in any way—and nonsensical, as is told in the story about those who were said to have been produced from the earth in the time of Deucalion; and so it seems unfitting that anyone should persevere in their laws and statutes.

Polit.L12

Quartam rationem ponit, ibi, ad haec autem et cetera. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod consuetudines antiquorum insensatorum opportunum fuit mutare; sed leges quae sunt scriptae a viris sapientibus non debent mutari. Sed ad hoc excludendum ipse obiiciendo dicit quod non est melius, si etiam leges scriptae permaneant immobiles. Videmus enim quod impossibile est omnia diligenter et perfecte esse conscripta circa ordinationem civitatis, etiam a quantumcumque sapientibus viris; sicut etiam est hoc impossibile circa alias artes: quia sapientes scribunt leges in universali, et non possunt considerari omnia particularia: actus vero sunt circa particularia: unde non potuerunt omnia perfecte conscribere quae pertinent ad directionem actuum; et sic melius est quod immutentur quando aliquid melius invenitur. Sic ergo per huiusmodi rationes videtur quod quaedam leges aliquando sint mutandae.

He lays out a fourth reason at ad haec autem, etc. For someone could say that it was opportune to change the customs of the nonsensical ancients, but that the laws that were written by wise men should not be changed. But in order to exclude this, he himself objects by saying that it is not better if even the written laws persevere unmovable. For we see that it is impossible for all things to be diligently and perfectly written out about the ordering of the city, even by any number of wise men; just as this is also impossible concerning the other arts: because wise men write laws universally, and every particular cannot be considered; but acts concern particulars, and so they were not able to perfectly write out all things that belong to the directing of acts; and thus it is better that they be altered when something better is discovered. Thus, therefore, through reasons of this sort, it seems that sometimes, some laws should be changed.

Polit.L12

Deinde cum dicit alio autem modo etc., procedit ad contrarium.

Then, where he says alio modo, etc., he proceeds toward the contrary position.

Polit.L12

Et primo ostendit veritatem quaestionis.

And first he shows the truth of the question.

Polit.L12

Secundo solvit quamdam inductarum rationum, ibi, mendax quoque et cetera.

Second, he untangles some reasons that have been introduced at mendax quoque, [II.12.17] etc.

Polit.L12

Dicit ergo primo, quod si quis secundum alium modum consideret, videbitur esse multum verendum, mutare antiquas leges etiam pro verioribus: potest enim contingere quod sit modicum melius illud, quod adinvenitur: consuescere autem ad dissolvendum leges est valde pravum. Unde manifestum est quod sustinendi sunt quidam modici defectus et errores qui contingunt principibus et sapientibus in legibus ferendis; quia ille qui vult mutare propter aliquid melius, non tantum proficiet mutando, quantum nocebit, dum consuescunt cives ad non observandum statuta et praecepta principum.

Therefore, he first says that if anyone were to consider it in another way, it will seem that it is extremely dreadful to change ancient laws, even for truer ones: for it can happen that what is discovered is a little better; but accustoming oneself to destroying laws is exceedingly crooked. And so it is clear that small defects and errors that happen to the governors and wise men in carrying out the laws ought to be upheld, because he who wishes to change to something better will not so much make progress through changing as he will do harm, so long as the citizens become accustomed to not observing the statutes and prescriptions of the governors.

Polit.L12

Deinde cum dicit mendax quoque etc., solvit unam inductarum rationum in contrarium. Et dicit quod illud exemplum, quod sumebatur de artibus in quibus profuit multa mutasse, inducit nos ad mendacium, quod non est simile de mutatione artis et legis: quia ea quae sunt habent efficaciam ex ratione; sed lex nullum habet robur ad hoc quod persuadeatur subditis, quia sit bona, nisi consuetudinem; quae quidem non fit nisi per multum tempus. Unde qui facile mutat leges, quantum est de se, debilitat legis virtutem. Ad alias autem rationes patet solutio; quia non concludunt quod leges sint de facili mutandae; sed quod aliquae leges, scilicet malae, sint aliquando mutandae, quod verum est.

Then, where he says mendax quoque, etc., he resolves one of the reasons introduced to the contrary. And he says that this example that was taken up concerning art, in which it greatly helped to make a change, introduced us to something deceitful, since a change in art is not like a change in law: because the things that are of art have their efficacy from reason, but law has nothing firm to persuade subordinates that it is good except custom—which, indeed, does not come to be except after a great time. And so, whoever easily changes the laws as such cripples the virtue of the law. The solution to the other reasons is evident, because they did not conclude that laws are to be changed with ease, but that some laws, namely, bad ones, should sometimes be changed—which is true.

Polit.L12

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem si mutandae etc., movet aliam quaestionem; et dicit, quod si leges sint aliquando mutandae, quaerendum est, utrum omnes sint mutandae, et in qualibet politia vel non; et utrum sint mutandae a quocumque, vel ab aliquibus determinatis. Multum enim differt quid circa hoc verius sit. Et ideo haec consideratio dimittatur ad praesens et reservetur in posterum.

Then, where he says adhuc autem si mutandae, etc., he raises another question, and he says that if the laws should sometimes be changed, one should seek out whether all laws may be changed, and in any regime, or not; and whether they may be changed by anyone, or by some determinate people. For what is more true about this differs greatly. And therefore, this consideration is dismissed for the present and saved for later.

Polit.L12

Lecture 13

Polit.L13

De ea autem quae Lacedemoniorum politeia, fere autem et de aliis politeiis, duae sunt considerationes. Una quidem si quid bene aut non bene ad virtutis ordinem lege statutum est, altera autem si quid ad suppositionem et modum contrariae propositae ipsis politeiae.

In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in all governments, two points have to be considered: first, whether any particular law is good or bad, when compared with the perfect state; secondly, whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set before his citizens.

Polit.L13

Quod quidem igitur oportet future bene politicae vivere necessariorum existere scolam, confessum est. Quo autem modo existere, non facile accipere. Tessalorum enim inopes molesti fuerunt multotiens Tessalis. Similiter autem Lakosibus servi quasi enim insidiantes infortuniis perseverant. Circa Cretenses autem nihil unquam tale accidit. Causa autem forte vicinas civitates quamvis pugnantes ad invicem neque unam esse compugnantes distantibus propter non expedire etiam ipsis possidentibus praedia circa domos; Lakosensibus autem vicini inimici omnes erant Argii et Messenii et Arkades; quoniam et a Tessalois et a principio discedebant propter bellare, adhuc cum Achaicis vicinis et Perebiis et Magnesibus. Videtur autem et si nihil alterum, sed quod curae quidem operosum esse quo oporteat ad ipsos colloqui modo. Remissi quidem enim iniuriantur et equalibus dignificant se ipsos dominis, et mala ferendo viventes insidiantur et odiunt. Palam igitur quod non exinvenientibus optimum modum, quibus hoc accidit circa servitutem.

That in a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and not have to provide for their daily wants is generally acknowledged, but there is a difficulty in seeing how this leisure is to be attained. The Thessalian Penestae have often risen against their masters, and the Helots in like manner against the Lacedaemonians, for whose misfortunes they are always lying in wait. Nothing, however, of this kind has as yet happened to the Cretans; the reason probably is that the neighboring cities, even when at war with one another, never form an alliance with rebellious serfs, rebellions not being for their interest, since they themselves have a dependent population. Whereas all the neighbors of the Lacedaemonians, whether Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, were their enemies. In Thessaly, again, the original revolt of the slaves occurred because the Thessalians were still at war with the neighboring Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. Besides, if there were no other difficulty, the treatment or management of slaves is a troublesome affair; for, if not kept in hand, they are insolent, and think that they are as good as their masters, and, if harshly treated, they hate and conspire against them. Now it is clear that when these are the results the citizens of a state have not found out the secret of managing their subject population.

Polit.L13

Adhuc autem ad mulieres remissio, et ad electionem politeiae nociva et ad felicitatem civitatis. Quaemadmodum enim domus pars vir et mulier, palam quia et civitatem prope ei quod est in duo dividi oportet putare, ut ad virorum multitudinem et mulierum. Itaque in quibuscumque politeiis prave habet quod circa mulieres, medium covitatis oportet putare esse inordinatum lege.

Again, the license of the Lacedaemonian women defeats the intention of the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the happiness of the state. For, a husband and wife being each a part of every family, the state may be considered as about equally divided into men and women; and, therefore, in those states in which the condition of the women is bad, half the city may be regarded as having no laws.

Polit.L13

Quod quidem ibi accidit: toam enim civitatem legislator esse volens perseverativam, secundum viros quidem talis est, in mulieribus autem neglexit. Vivunt enim voluptuose ad omnem intemperantiam et deliciose.

And this is what has actually happened at Sparta; the legislator wanted to make the whole state hardy and temperate, and he has carried out his intention in the case of the men, but he has neglected the women, who live in every sort of intemperance and luxury.

Polit.L13

Itaque necessarium in tali politeia honorari divitias. Aliterque et si existant a mulieribus continentes quaemadmodum multa militarium et bellicorum generum, vel etiam si quidam alteri honoraverunt eum qui ad masculos coitum. Videtur enim qui fabulose locutus est primus non irrationabiliter coniunxisse Martem ad Venerem; aut enim ad eam quae masculorum collocutionem, aut ad eam quae mulierem, videntur inhiantes omnes tales, propter quod apud Lakosenses hoc extitit. Et multa dispensabantur a mulieribus in principatu ipsorum; quamvis quid differt mulieres principari, aut principes sub mulieribus regi? Idem enim accidit.

The consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly valued, especially if the citizen fall under the dominion of their wives, after the manner of most warlike races, except the Celts and a few others who openly approve of male loves. The old mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting Ares and Aphrodite, for all warlike races are prone to the love either of men or of women. This was exemplified among the Spartans in the days of their greatness; many things were managed by their women. But what difference does it make whether women rule, or the rulers are ruled by women? The result is the same.

Polit.L13

Utili autem existente audacia ad nihil circularium nisi ad bellum, maxime nocivae etiam ad hoc quae Lakosensium erant; ostenderunt autem in eo qui Thebeorum congressu. Utiles quidem enim nihil erant quaemadmodum in aliis civitatibus. Tumultum autem exhibebant plus quam inimici.

Even in regard to courage, which is of no use in daily life, and is needed only in war, the influence of the Lacedaemonian women has been most mischievous. The evil showed itself in the Theban invasion, when, unlike the women other cities, they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy.

Polit.L13

A principio quidem igitur videtur accidisse Lakosensibus rationabiliter mulierum remissio: extra domum enim propter militias peregrinabantur multo tempore pugnantes ad Argos bellum, et rursum ad Archades et Messenios. Vacantes autem ses exhibebant legislatori preparatos factos propter militarem vitam; mults enim habet partes virtutis. Mulieres autem aiunt quidem conatum fuisse Likurgum ducere ad leges; ut autem risistebant discedere rursum. Causae quidem igitur sunt hae factorum, quare palam quia et huius peccati; sed nos non hoc consideramus cui oporteat veniam habere, aut non habere, sed de eo quod recte aut non recte. Quae autem circa mulieres habentia non bene sicut dictum est prius, non solum indecentiam quandam facere politeiae ipsius secundum se, sed addere aliquid ad amorem pecuniae.

This license of the Lacedaemonian women existed from the earliest times, and was only what might be expected. For, during the wars of the Lacedaemonians, first against the Argives, and afterwards against the Arcadians and Messenians, the men were long away from home, and, on the return of peace, they gave themselves into the legislator's hand, already prepared by the discipline of a soldier's life (in which there are many elements of virtue), to receive his enactments. But, when Lycurgus, as tradition says, wanted to bring the women under his laws, they resisted, and he gave up the attempt. These then are the causes of what then happened, and this defect in the constitution is clearly to be attributed to them. We are not, however, considering what is or is not to be excused, but what is right or wrong, and the disorder of the women, as I have already said, not only gives an air of indecorum to the constitution considered in itself, but tends in a measure to foster avarice.

Polit.L13

Post ea enim quae nunc dicta sunt, eos qui circa irregularitatem possessionis increpabit utique aliquis: his quidem enim ipsorum accidit possidere multam valde substantiam, his autem omnino modicam, propter quod quidem ad paucos venit regio.

The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the inequality of property. While some of the Spartan citizen have quite small properties, others have very large ones; hence the land has passed into the hands of a few.

Polit.L13

Hoc autem et per leges ordinatum est prave: emere quidem enim aut vendere existentem non facit non bonum recte faciens, dare autem et derelinquere potestatem dedit volentibus, quamvis idem accidere necessarium illo modo et isto. Sunt autem mulierum fere omnis regionis quinque partium duae heredibus multis factis, et propter dotes dare magnas, quamvis melius nullam aut modicam aut mensuratam institutam esse. Nunc autem licet dare hereditariam cuicumque voluerit, et si moritur non disponens quem utique derelinquat heredem, iste cuicumque voluerit dat.

And this is due also to faulty laws; for, although the legislator rightly holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, he allows anybody who likes to give or bequeath it. Yet both practices lead to the same result. And nearly two-fifths of the whole country are held by women; this is owing to the number of heiresses and to the large dowries which are customary. It would surely have been better to have given no dowries at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones. As the law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege of giving her away descends to his heir.

Polit.L13

Igitur cum possit regio mille equites nutrire et quingentos, et viros ad arma triginta milia, neque mille multitudine erant; factum est autem per opera ipsorum. Manifestum quia pravae ipsis habebant quae circa institutionem hanc: nullam enim plagam pertulit civitas, sed periit propter hominum paucitatem. Dicunt autem quod sub prioribus regibus traiciebant politiam ut non fieret tunc hominum paucitas bellantibus multo tempore, et aiunt fuisse aliquando Spartiatis et decem milia; at tamen sive sint vera ista sive non, melius per possessionem regulatam replere viris civitatem.

Hence, although the country is able to maintain 1,500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the whole number of Spartan citizens fell below 1,000. The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property; for the city sank under a single defeat; the want of men was their ruin. There is a tradition that, in the days of their ancient kings, they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of population was experienced by them; indeed, at one time Sparta is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens. Whether this statement is true or not, it would certainly have been better to have maintained their numbers by the equalization of property.

Polit.L13

Contraria autem et quae circa filiorum procreationem lex ad hanc directionem. Volens enim legislator ut plures sint Spartiatae, provocat cives quod plures faciant pueros. Est autem ipsis lex eum qui genuerit tres filios afruron esse, eum autem qui quatuor sine vectigali omnium; quamvis manifestum, quia multis factis, regione autem sic divisa, necessarium multos fieri pauperes.

Again, the law which relates to the procreation of children is adverse to the correction of this inequality. For the legislator, wanting to have as many Spartans as he could, encouraged the citizens to have large families; and there is a law at Sparta that the father of three sons shall be exempt from military service, and he who has four from all the burdens of the state. Yet it is obvious that, if there were many children, the land being distributed as it is, many of them must necessarily fall into poverty.

Polit.L13

De ea autem quae Lacedaemoniorum et cetera. Postquam Philosophus posuit politias institutas a sapientibus, nunc agit de politiis, quae in civitatibus observabantur.

De ea autem quae Lacedaemoniorum, etc. After the philosopher laid out the regimes instituted by the wise, he now treats of the regimes that are observed in cities,

Polit.L13

Et primo de politia Lacedaemoniorum sive Lachosensium.

and first, about the regime of the Laconians—or the Lacedaemonians.

Polit.L13

Secundo de politia Cretensium, ibi, Cretensium autem politia et cetera.

Second, about the regime of the Cretans, at Cretensium autem politeia, [II.15.1] etc.

Polit.L13

Tertio de politia Calchedoniorum, ibi, politizare autem videntes et cetera.

Third, about the regime of the Carthaginians, at politizare autem videntes, [II.16.1] etc.

Polit.L13

Horum enim civitatum politiae commendabantur. Circa primum duo facit.

For the regimes of these cities are commended. Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L13

Primo ponit modum considerationis necessariae circa has politias.

First, he lays out the mode of consideration that is necessary concerning these regimes.

Polit.L13

Secundo agit de politia Lacedaemoniorum, ibi, quod quidem igitur oportet et cetera.

Second, he deals with the regime of the Lacedaemonians at quod quidem igitur oportet, [II.13.2] etc.

Polit.L13

Dicit ergo primo, quod duae considerationes incidunt circa politias Lacedaemoniorum et alias politias: quarum una est ut consideretur, utrum illud quod in eis lege est statutum, sit conveniens ordini virtutis. Hoc enim est finis omnis legis. Unde si lex non sit proportionata ad virtutem, non erit lex. Alia consideratio est, utrum in politia sit aliquid ordinatum, quod sit conveniens secundum suppositionem et modum, contrariae politiae ei quae proponitur: puta si aliquis intendat instituere politiam democraticam, et ponat leges convenientes politiae oligarchicae, quae est contraria. Sic enim et in scientiis aliquid reprobatur, aut quia non convenit veritati, aut quia non convenit positioni.

Therefore, he first says that two considerations are encountered concerning the regimes of the Lacedaemonians and the other regimes. One of these is that it ought to be considered whether what is established by law in them is fitting for the order of virtue. For this is the end of every law. Whence, if the law is not proportionate to virtue, it will not be law. The other consideration is whether in the regime something is ordered that is fitting to the suppositions and mode of a regime that is contrary to the one proposed. Consider, for instance, if someone intended to institute a democratic regime, and he set up laws that are fitting for an oligarchic regime, which is contrary. Thus, also, is something objected to in the sciences, either because it does not fit the truth, or because it does not fit a proposition [positio].

Polit.L13

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem igitur etc., agit de politia Lacedaemoniorum.

Then, where he says quod quidem igitur, etc., he deals with the regime of the Lacedaemonians.

Polit.L13

Et primo quantum ad ea quae habentur a civibus.

And first, with reference to what was held [i.e. owned] by the citizens.

Polit.L13

Secundo quantum ad ordinem ipsorum civium, ibi, at vero et quae circa efforiam et cetera.

Second, with reference to the order of the citizens themselves, at at vero et quae circa efforiam, [II.14.1] etc.

Polit.L13

Circa primum tria facit.

Concerning the first, he does three things.

Polit.L13

Primo prosequitur ea quae pertinent ad servos.

First, he pursues the things that belong to slaves.

Polit.L13

Secundo ea quae pertinent ad mulieres, ibi, adhuc autem ad mulieres et cetera.

Second, the things that belong to women, at adhuc autem ad mulieres, [II.13.5] etc.

Polit.L13

Tertio ea quae pertinent ad possessiones, ibi, post ea enim quae nunc dicta sunt et cetera.

Third, what belongs to possessions, at post ea enim quae nunc dicta sunt, [II.13.9] etc.

Polit.L13

Haec enim tria a civibus habentur.

For these three things are held [i.e. owned] by the citizens.

Polit.L13

Dicit ergo primo, quod omnes confitentur hoc: quod opportunum est civitati, quae debet bene vivere politice, quod in ea existat scola necessariorum, idest servorum, vel quorumcumque qui sunt necessarii ad ministrandum, ut scilicet ipsi recta disciplina potiantur. Sed quomodo fiat non potest de facili accipi.

Therefore, he first says that everyone confesses this: that it is opportune for a city that is due to live well politically, that there exists in it a school for those who are necessary—that is, for the slaves, or for anyone who is necessary for serving—so that they may, with the correct discipline, be capable [of serving]. But how this comes to be cannot be easily received.

Polit.L13

Quod autem hoc sit necessarium, manifestat consequenter per inconvenientia, quae ex eis sequuntur, quando non sunt bene disciplinati. Multoties enim contingit, quod pauperes in Thessalonica molesti fuerunt divitibus: et similiter etiam Lachosibus, id est Lacedaemoniis servi eorum frequenter fuerunt infesti: insidiabantur enim eis quando aliqua infortunia eis contingebant, ita ut non possent eos reprimere, et in talibus infortuniis eos molestabant. Sed Cretensibus nihil tale accidit: et forte huius causa est, quia quamvis civitates, quae sunt vicinae, pugnent adinvicem, nulla tamen civitas (est) quae pugnet contra aliquos cives distantes, eo quod non expediat eis, propter hoc quod praedia possident prope civitatem et domos suas; et sic si longinquum bellum susciperent, non possent suorum praediorum curam habere. Et quia Cretenses non habebant vicinos, qui contra eos pugnarent, puta in insula maris existentes, non frequenter imminebant eis infortunia, in quibus servi vel inopes possent eis insidiari. Sed Lachosensibus, id est Lacedaemoniis omnes vicini inimicabantur. Erant enim totaliter dediti rebus militaribus, ut Vegetius dicit in libro de re militari, sicut et Athenienses philosophiae. Inimicabantur enim Argi et Messenii et etiam Arcades, et a principio etiam discordabant a Thessalonicensibus. Habuerunt etiam bella cum Achaicis vicinis eorum, et Perrebiis et Magnesibus. Et ideo multoties infortunia eis imminebant, quibus eorum servi insidiabantur.

Moreover, that this is necessary he consequently clarifies through the unfitting things that would follow from them were they not well-disciplined. For it happened many times that the poor in Thessaly caused trouble for the wealthy, and likewise also in Sparta—that is, among the Lacedaemonians—their slaves were frequently hostile, for they plotted against them when some misfortune happened to them, when they could not repress them, and troubled them in such misfortunes. But among the Cretans, nothing of this sort happened, and perhaps the cause of this is because however much neighboring cities fight with each other, yet there is no city that fights against distant citizens, since it is not advantageous for them—because they possess estates near the city and their own households; and so, if they were to undertake a war from afar, they could not care for their own estates. And because the Cretans did not have neighbors who would fight against them—existing, for example, in islands at sea—misfortunes did not frequently threaten them, in which their slaves or indigents could plot against them. But for the Laconians—that is, the Lacedaemonians—all neighbors were made enemies. For they were wholly given over to military affairs, as Vegetius says in his book, De Re Militari, as do the Athenian philosophers. For they made enemies of the Argives, the Messenians, and also the Arcadians, and from the beginning they also quarreled with the Thessalians. They also waged war with the Achaeans, their neighbors, and the Perrhaebians, and the Magnesians. And therefore, misfortune threatened them many times—at which times their slaves plotted against them.

Polit.L13

Sic igitur patet, quod necessarium est, ut servi et alii necessarii disciplinentur. Sed quod non sit facile, ostendit consequenter. Et dicit, quod si nihil alterum esset, istud videtur operosum esse quantum ad curam, quae oportet haberi de servis, quomodo oporteat ad eos colloqui, vel qualitercumque conversari. Quia ex una parte, si homo benigne se habeat ad eos, insolescunt et efficiuntur iniuriosi, et reputant se aequales dominis suis. Ex alia vero parte si ipsi vivant, semper mala sustinendo a dominis suis, odiunt eos et insidiantur eis: unde difficile est videre qualiter sint tractandi. Oportet enim medio modo se ad eos habere, ut non iniuste affligantur, nec tamen eis nimia familiaritas ostendatur. Ex istis ergo concludit, quod Lacedaemonii, quibus hoc accidit, ut a servis suis molestarentur, non sunt ex illis, qui optimum modum invenerunt circa gubernationem servorum.

Thus, therefore, it is evident that it is necessary for the slaves and the other necessary people to have discipline. But that this is not easy he shows in what follows. And he says that, if it were nothing else, it seems that this would be laborious with regard to the care that must be had about the slaves, how one would have to converse with them, or in what way to associate with them. Because on the one hand, if a man relates to them kindly, they will grow haughty and it will have an effect upon them that is wrong, and they will deem themselves equals to their master. But on the other hand, if they live always enduring evils from their masters, they will hate them and plot against them; and so it is difficult to see how they should be treated. For one must adopt a middling manner toward them, neither punishing them unjustly, nor yet showing too much familiarity to them. From this, therefore, he concludes that the Lacedaemonians, to whom this happened so that they were troubled by their slaves, are not among those who discovered the best method for the government of slaves.

Polit.L13

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ad mulieres etc., agit de politia Lacedaemoniorum quantum ad mulieres. Et circa hoc quatuor facit.

Then, where he says adhuc autem ad mulieres, etc., he deals with the regime of the Lacedaemonians with reference to women. And concerning this, he does four things.

Polit.L13

Primo ostendit, necessarium esse, quod mulieres in civitate bene disciplinentur.

First, he shows that it is necessary for the women in the city to be well-disciplined.

Polit.L13

Secundo ostendit quid circa hoc Lacedaemonii observarent, ibi, quod quidem ibi accidit et cetera.

Second, he shows what the Lacedaemonians observed about this, at quod quidem ibi accidit, [II.13.6] etc.

Polit.L13

Tertio ostendit, quae inconvenientia ex hac observantia sequerentur, ibi, itaque necessarium.

Third, he shows what unfitting things would follow from this observance, at itaque necessarium [II.13.7].

Polit.L13

Quarto ostendit, quae fuerit causa huius observantiae, ibi, a principio quidem igitur et cetera.

Fourth, he shows what the cause of this observance was, at a principio quidem igitur, [II.13.8] etc.

Polit.L13

Dicit ergo primo, quod remissio legum circa mulieres, ut scilicet absque convenienti disciplina in civitate vivant, ad duo est nociva.

Therefore, he first says that loosening the laws about women—such that they live in the city without a fitting discipline—is harmful for two reasons.

Polit.L13

Primo quidem ad electionem politiae; quia per earum inordinationem totam politiam contingit immutari, ut dicetur.

The first, indeed, regarding the choice of the regime, because through their disorder, the whole regime can happen to be changed, as will be said.

Polit.L13

Secundo ad felicitatem civitatis; quia propter earum inordinationem multa inconvenientia possunt in civitate sequi.

Second, regarding the happiness of the city; for because of their disorder, many unfitting things can follow in the city.

Polit.L13

Et hoc manifestat per hoc, quod sicut partes domus sunt vir et mulier, ut in primo dictum est, ita oportet quasi totam civitatem quae ex domibus constituitur, in duo dividi, considerata multitudine virorum et mulierum. Unde sequitur, quod in quibuscumque civitatibus male se habeat ordinatio mulierum, reputandum est, quod medietas civitatis non sit bene ordinata secundum leges.

And this is clear, because just as the parts of the household are the man and the woman, as was said in Bk. I, so also it must be as though the whole city, which is constituted from households, is divided in two, if the multitude of men and women is considered. So it would follow that in any city where the order of women is badly arranged, it should be deemed that the mean for the city has not been well ordered according to the laws.

Polit.L13

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem ibi etc., ostendit quid circa hoc observaretur apud Lacedaemoniam. Ibi enim accidebat praedicta inordinatio mulierum. Cum enim de intentione legislatoris esset, quod tota civitas esset perseverativa, id est potens sustinere et abstinere a delitiis, hoc bene observabatur quantum ad viros; sed mulieribus hoc instituere legislator neglexit. Vivunt enim ibi mulieres voluptuose secundum omne genus intemperantiae, et etiam delitiose.

Then, where he says quod quidem ibi, etc., he shows what was observed in this regard among the Lecedaemonians. For there, the aforementioned disorder of the women occurred. For since the intention of the legislator was that the whole city should have perseverance, that is, able to endure and to abstain from delights, this was well observed with reference to the men; but the legislator neglected to institute this for the women. For there, the women live voluptuously, following every kind of intemperance, and also luxuriously.

Polit.L13

Deinde cum dicit itaque necessarium etc., ostendit quae inconvenientia sequebantur. Et ponit quatuor:

Then, where he says itaque neessarium, etc., he shows what unfitting thing followed. And he lays out four things.

Polit.L13

quorum primum est, quod necessarium est in tali politia, in qua mulieres sic delitiose vivunt, quod viri multum appretientur divitias, et concupiscant eas, ut ex his satisfacere possint delitiis mulierum, quae sine magnis sumptibus esse non possunt. Hoc autem multum facit ad hoc, quod mores corrumpantur in civitate quod multum curent de divitiis. Ex hoc enim sequitur, quod omnia in civitate sint venalia; quod corrumpit statum civitatis.

The first is that it is necessary in such a regime, in which the women live so luxuriously, that the men will appraise wealth highly, and desire it so that from it they can satisfy the delights of the women—which cannot be done without great expense. This, however, does much, for morals are corrupted in a city that greatly cares for wealth. For from this it follows that everything in the city is for sale, which corrupts the establishment of the city.

Polit.L13

Secundum inconveniens ponit, ibi, aliterque si existant et cetera. Et dicit, quod si cogatur multitudo civium, ut nimis contineat a mulieribus, sequitur quod labantur ad turpe vitium, scilicet ad coitum masculorum; sicut accidit multis militantibus et bellicosis viris, et quibuscumque similibus. Qui enim primo fabulose induxit, quod Mars fuit maritus Veneris, non irrationabiliter est locutus; quia viri bellicosi, qui sunt Martiales, luxuriosi sunt, et inhiant vel ad coitum masculorum vel mulierum. Dicitur enim in libro de problematibus, quod equitantes continue, luxuriosi magis fiunt, quia propter caliditatem et motum, hoc patiuntur, quod accidit in coitu. Hoc etiam quod frequenter vacant a negotiis, eos luxuriosos facit. Et hoc etiam accidit Lacedaemoniis, propter hoc quod ad nimiam continentiam mulierum legislator eos induxit.

He lays out a second unfitting thing at aliterque si existant, etc., and he says that if the multitude of citizens were compelled to abstain too much from women, it would follow that they would slip into the foulest of vices—namely, the intercourse of males—as happens to many soldiers and warriors, and to anyone like them. For whoever introduced the tale that Mars was the husband of Venus did not speak irrationally, because warriors, who are called Martial, are debaucherous, and are agape with desire for intercourse with men or women. For it says in the Problems that those continually riding become more debaucherous because, on account of the heat and motion, they experience what happens in intercourse. This also made them debaucherous: they were frequently unoccupied with business. And this also befell the Lacedaemonians because the legislator led them to abstain too much from women.

Polit.L13

Tertio inconveniens ponit, ibi, et multa dispensabantur et cetera. Et dicit, quod mulieres in Lacedaemonia, propter hoc quod delitiose vivebant, praesumptuosae reddebantur, et volebant se de omnibus intromittere; ita quod etiam in principatibus civitatis, multa dispensabantur per mulieres: et tamen nihil differt, utrum ipsae mulieres principentur, vel ipsi principes sub mulieribus regantur, quod eis subiecti propter insolentiam mulierum. Idem enim accidit utroque modo, ut scilicet civitas male regatur, quia mulieres deficiunt ratione.

He lays out a third unfitting thing at et multa dispensabantur, etc, and he says that the women in Lacedaemon, because they lived luxuriously, were given back to presumption, and wished to insinuate themselves into everything, so that even in the government of the city, many things were managed by the women. And yet it makes no difference whether the women govern or if the governors themselves are ruled by women, being subject to them because of the extravagance of the women. For the same thing happens in both modes: the city is badly ruled because the women lack reason.

Polit.L13

Quartum inconveniens ponit, ibi, utili autem existente et cetera. Mulieres enim Lacedaemoniorum propter delitias insolentes et audaces reddebantur. Audacia autem in civitate ad nihil circularium, id est circumadiacentium negotiorum utilis esse potest, nisi ad bellum: et tamen ad hoc etiam audacia illarum mulierum erat nociva. Quod quidem manifestatum fuit in bello quod habuerunt cum Thebanis; in quo mulieres ad nihil utiles erant, nolentes facere ministeria, quae in aliis civitatibus mulieres faciunt. Sed viris pugnantibus, maiorem tumultum inferebant, quam etiam inimici, volentes forte de omnibus se intromittere. Unde ex his patet remissionem mulierum nocivam fuisse.

He lays out a fourth unfitting thing at utili autem existente, etc. For the women of the Lacedaemonians, because of luxury, returned to extravagance and boldness. But boldness, in regular affairs—that is, local affairs—cannot be useful except for war: and yet even here was the boldness of their women harmful. This, indeed, was clear in the war that they had with the Thebans, in which the women were useful for nothing, since they didn't want to do the services that the women do in other cities. But while the men were fighting, the women carried out a greater uproar even than the enemies—wishing, perhaps, to insinuate themselves into everything. So it is clear from this that the loosening of the women was harmful.

Polit.L13

Deinde cum dicit a principio quidem igitur etc., ostendit causam praedictae observantiae. Et dicit quod rationabiliter Lacedaemoniis accidit a principio remissio disciplinae circa mulieres; quia propter militiam, cui totaliter dedita erat civitas, multo tempore peregrinabantur extra domum, pugnantes contra Argos et Arcades et Messenos. Et ideo mulieres remanebant domi absque viris, ad libitum viventes nullam disciplinam a viris habentes. Et ex hac etiam causa contingit quod viri facti sunt virtuosi in multis. Vacantes enim rebus bellicis se exhibebant promptos ad obediendum legislatori propter consuetudinem militaris vitae, quae multas in se continet partes virtutis. Requirit enim talis vita maximam obedientiam et abstinentiam a delitiis, et perseverantiam in laboribus et rebus dolorosis. Postmodum Lycurgus legislator Lacedaemoniorum conatus fuit mulieres reducere ad rectam disciplinam legum. Sed mulieres omnino restiterunt propter pravam consuetudinem; et ideo oportuit quod legislator desisteret ab incepto. Hae sunt igitur causae eorum quae fiebant apud Lacedaemones, et potestatis mulierum, quae apud eos erat: et quamvis ex rationabili causa hoc acciderit absque eorum culpa, et sic sint excusandi, tamen eos non consideramus modo, quibus oporteat dare veniam vel non dare. Non enim intendimus eos laudare vel vituperare, sed ostendere quid recte se habeat vel non recte. Manifestum est enim quod ea quae non bene se habebant circa mulieres, apud eos non solum erant indecens secundum se politiae eorum, sed etiam in animis civium aliquid addebant ad amorem pecuniae, ut dictum est.

Then, where he says a principio quidem igitur, etc., he shows the cause of the aforementioned observance. And he says that a loosening of the discipline of women quite rationally happened to the Lacedaemonians from the beginning: because, on account of the army, to which the whole city was given over, at many times they traveled away from home, fighting against the Argives, and the Arcadians, and the Messenians. And therefore, the women remained at home without the men, living at their pleasure, and having no discipline from the men. And from this cause, it happened that the men were made virtuous in many things. For when idle from the affairs of war, they showed themselves ready for obedience to the legislator because of the custom of military life, which contains in itself many parts of virtue. For such a life requires the greatest obedience and abstinence from luxury, and perseverance in labors, and in sorrowful affairs. Afterward, Lycurgus, the legislator of the Lacedaemonians, attempted to lead the women back to the correct discipline of the laws. But the women were utterly resistant because of crooked custom; and therefore, the legislator must have ceased from the start. These, therefore, are the causes of what came to be among the Lacedaemonians, and of the power of the women that was among them. And although this came to pass from a rational cause, apart from their fault, and thus should be excused, yet we are not considering them in the mode of asking to whom we should or should not give pardon; for we do not intend to praise or blame them, but to show how they were correctly arranged, or not correctly. For it is clear that what was not well disposed concerning the women was not only indecent in a certain respect, regarding their polity, but also in the souls of the citizens, something was given over to the love of money, as was said.

Polit.L13

Deinde cum dicit post ea enim quae nunc dicta sunt etc., agit de politia Lacedaemoniorum quantum ad possessiones.

Then, where he says post ea enim quae nunc dicta sunt, etc., he deals with the regime of the Lacedaemonians with reference to possessions.

Polit.L13

Et primo improbat politiam ipsorum circa possessiones, ostendens eam esse nocivam civitati.

And first, he objects to their regime concerning possessions, showing that it is harmful to the city.

Polit.L13

Secundo ostendens eam esse contrariam legislatoris intentioni, ibi, contraria autem et cetera.

Second, showing that it is contrary to the intention of the legislator, at contraria autem, [II.13.12] etc.

Polit.L13

Circa primum tria facit.

Concerning the first he does three things.

Polit.L13

Primo proponit quod apud eos erat irregularitas possessionum.

First, he proposes that among them there was an unevenness of possessions.

Polit.L13

Secundo ostendit unde provenerat, ibi, hoc autem et per leges et cetera.

Second, he shows from whence it came forth, at hoc autem et per leges, etc.

Polit.L13

Tertio ostendit nocumentum quod ex hoc est secutum, ibi, igitur cum possit regio et cetera.

Third, he shows the harm that followed from this, at igitur cum possit regio, etc.

Polit.L13

Dicit ergo primo, quod post praedicta quae reprobanda sunt in hac politia circa servos et mulieres, potest etiam eos aliquis increpare, quod circa irregularitatem possessionis delinquebant. Accidebat enim apud ipsos quod aliqui habebant valde magnas possessiones, alii vero habebant valde modicas, ita quod quasi tota regio ad dominium paucorum pervenerat.

Therefore, he first says that after the aforementioned things about slaves and women, which should be objected to, someone can also complain to them that they failed, concerning the unevenness of possessions. For it happened among them that some had exceedingly great possessions, but others had exceedingly few, such that it was as if the whole region had arrived at the mastery of a few.

Polit.L13

Deinde cum dicit hoc autem et per leges etc., ostendit, unde haec irregularitas processerat. Et dicit quod hoc processit ex prava ordinatione legis. Statuit enim legislator apud eos quod civis non esset dominus vendendi et emendi, ut scilicet posset possessionem suam vendere aut emere alienam quacumque ex causa. Et hoc quidem bonum fecit ad regulandas possessiones; non tamen recte, quia non sufficienter. Dedit enim potestatem civibus, ut quibuscumque vellent darent inter vivos vel etiam derelinquerent in testamento bona sua; ex quo etiam accidebat irregularitas possessionum, sicut ex emptione et venditione: ita quod si totum eorum territorium divideretur in quinque partes, duae illarum partium iam pervenerant ad mulieres. Tum quia multae earum erant institutae haeredes a viris morientibus; tum etiam quia quando nubebant accipiebant magnas dotes, cum tamen multo melius sit, quod vel nulla dos detur, vel modica vel moderata. Sed apud Lacedaemonios licebat cuilibet in testamento dimittere haeredem bonorum suorum quemcumque voluerit; et si in sua morte non velit dimittere haeredem, potest distribuere bona sua cuicumque voluerit.

Then, where he says hoc autem et per leges, etc., he shows from what this unevenness proceeded. And he says that this proceeded from a crooked ordering of law. For the legislator established among them that a citizen would not be [his own] master of buying and selling, such that he could have sold his possessions or bought those of another for any cause. And certainly, he did this good thing to regulate possessions; but not yet correctly, because not sufficiently. For he gave power to the citizens that they could give their goods to anyone they wished while living, or even when departed in a will. From this happened an unnevenness of possessions, as from buying and selling: such that if the whole of their territory were divided into five parts, two of the parts came to rest with the women. This, both because many of them were instituted as heiresses by their dead husbands, and also because when they were married, they received great dowries—though indeed, it is much better either to give no dowry, or few, or moderate ones. But among the Lacedaemonians, it was permitted to anyone to leave in a will to an heir whichever of his goods he wished; and if, in his death, he did not wish to leave an heir, he could distribute his goods to whomever he wished.

Polit.L13

Deinde cum dicit igitur cum possit etc., ostendit quod nocumentum sit inde secutum. Et dicit quod cum tanta sit eorum regio, idest territorium, quod posset nutrire mille quingentos equites, et super hoc triginta millia bellatorum peditum, ad tantam paucitatem devenerant, possessionibus devenientibus ad paucos, quod non erant nisi mille bellatores in civitate. Et sic per opera eorum manifestatum est quod praedicta institutio mala erat; quia civitas illa ex hoc deperiit cum nullam gravem hostilem plagam sustinuerit. Dicitur autem quod in antiquis temporibus extendebant politiam suam quantum poterant, ut haberent multitudinem bellatorum; ita quod aliquando (ut dicitur) Spartiatae, id est Lacedaemones habuerunt in exercitu suo decem millia armatorum. Sed sive ista sint vera, sive non, tamen opportunum est quod per regulatas possessiones civitas viris repleatur, quod aliter fieri non potest. Quia si possessiones ad paucos devolvantur, alii propter paupertatem desererent civitatem.

Then, where he says igitur cum possit, etc., he shows that harm followed from this. And he says that although their region—that is, their territory—was so great that a thousand five hundred knights could be fed from it, and above this, thirty thousand foot-soldiers, yet it was left to so few—the possessions having been left to few—that there were not even a thousand warriors in the city. And so, through their works it is clear that the aforementioned institution was bad, because the city, through this, perished when it did not survive the heavy assault of an enemy. For it is said that in ancient times, they extended their regime as much as they could, so that they could have a multitude of wars; thus sometimes the Spartans (as they are called)–that is, the Lacedaemonians—had in their army ten thousand armed men. But whether this is true or not, nevertheless it is opportune that, by regulating possessions, the city should be filled with men—which can not otherwise come to be. Because if possessions should fall to a few, the others will desert the city because of poverty.

Polit.L13

Deinde cum dicit contraria autem etc., ostendit quod praedicta irregularitas possessionum erat contraria intentioni legislatoris, qui proposuerat quamdam legem circa filiorum generationem contrariam praedictae institutioni, ex qua procedebat irregularitas possessionum. Intendens enim legislator ad hoc quod essent plures cives in civitate, provocavit eos ad hoc quod generarent multos filios, quibusdam immunitatibus: erat enim statutum lege apud eos, quod ille qui genuisset tres filios, esset affruron, id est sine custodia, quia scilicet non tenebatur ire ad custodiam civitatis: qui autem genuerat quatuor filios erat immunis ab omnibus vectigalibus et tributis. Et tamen manifestum est quod si observetur praedicta regularitas in divisione possessionum, necesse erit, si generarentur plures filii, quod sint multi pauperes in civitate, quod est nocivum civitati, ut supra dictum est.

Then, where he says contraria autem, etc., he shows that the aforementioned unevenness of possessions was contrary to the intention of the legislator, who proposed a particular law about the generation of sons that is contrary to the aforementioned institution, from which proceeded the unevenness of possessions. For the legislator, intending that there should be many citizens in the city, invited those who generated many sons to certain exemptions: for it was established by law among them that he who generated three sons would be an affruron—that is, not a guardian, because he was not required to go to guard the city; moreover, he who generated four sons was exempt from all taxes and tributes. And yet it is clear that if the aforementioned unevenness in the division of possessions was observed, it will be necessary, if many sons are generated, that there will be many who are poor in the city, which is harmful to the city, as was said above.

Polit.L13

Lecture 14

Polit.L14

At vero et quae circa eforiam pravae se habent; principatus enim dominus quidem maximorum ipsius est; fiunt autem ex populo omnes, ut et multotiens incidant homines valde pauperes in locum principum, qui propter penuriam venales erant. Ostenderunt autem multotiens et prius, et nunc autem in Andriis. Corrupti enim argento quidam quantum in ipsis totam civitatem perdiderunt.

The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point; I mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest matters, but the Ephors are chosen from the whole people, and so the office is apt to fall into the hands of very poor men, who, being badly off, are open to bribes. There have been many examples at Sparta of this evil in former times; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin the state.

Polit.L14

Et propter principatum esse valde magnum et equitirannum regere populum se ipsos cogebant reges, ut et sic simul laedatur politeia. Democratia enim ex aristocratia accidebat. Continet quidem igitur politeiam principatus hic. Quiescit enim populus eo quod participet maximo principatu. Itaque sive propter legislatorem sive propter fortunam hoc evenit, utiliter habet rebus, oportet enim politeiam salvandum omnes velle partes civitatis esse permanere has. Reges quidem igitur propter ipsorum honorem sic habent; kalikagathi autem propter gerusiam, praemium enim principatus iste virtutis est; populus autem propter eforiam, constituitur enim ex omnibus.

And so great and tyrannical is their power, that even the kings have been compelled to court them, so that, in this way as well together with the royal office, the whole constitution has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has turned into a democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for the people are contented when they have a share in the highest office, and the result, whether due to the legislator or to chance, has been advantageous. For if a constitution is to be permanent, all the parts of the state must wish that it should exist and the same arrangements be maintained. This is the case at Sparta, where the kings desire its permanence because they have due honor in their own persons; the nobles because they are represented in the council of elders (for the office of elder is a reward of virtue); and the people, because all are eligible to the Ephoralty.

Polit.L14

Sed eligibilem oportebat principatum esse hunc, ex omnibus quidem, non autem modo isto quo nunc: puerilis enim est valde.

The election of Ephors out of the whole people is perfectly right, but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which is too childish.

Polit.L14

Adhuc autem et iudiciorum magnorum sunt domini existentes quicumque; propter quod quidem non propria sententia melius iudicare, sed secundum litteras et leges. Est autem et dieta efororum non consona voluntati civitatis, haec quidem enim remissa valde est. In aliis autem magis excedit ad durum ut non possint perseverare, sed latenter legem trasgredientes fruantur corporalibus delectationibus.

Again, they have the decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore they should not determine them merely on their own judgment, but according to written rules, and to the laws. Their way of life, too, is not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution- they have a deal too much license; whereas, in the case of the other citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable that they run away from the law into the secret indulgence of sensual pleasures.

Polit.L14

Habent autem et quae circa seniorum principatum non bene ipsis. Epeiekesi enim existentibus et eruditis sufficienter ad andragathiam, fortisan utique dicet aliquis expedire civitati, quamvis per vitam dominos esse iudiciorum magnorum formidablie sit. Est enim quaemadmodum et corporis et mentis senectus; modo autem isto eruditis, ut et legislator ipse discredat ut non bonis viris non securum. Videntur autem et velle videri dativi et inutiliter tribuentes multa communium qui participes fuerunt principatus istius; propter quod melius est ipsos non sine correctione esse, nunc autem sunt. Videbitur autem utique efororum principatus omnes corrigere principatus, hoc autem eforiae magnum valde donum, et modo non hoc dicimus oportere dare correctiones.

Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It may be said that the elders are good men and well trained in manly virtue; and that, therefore, there is an advantage to the state in having them. But that judges of important causes should hold office for life is a disputable thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body. And when men have been educated in such a manner that even the legislator himself cannot trust them, there is real danger. Many of the elders are well known to have taken bribes and to have been guilty of partiality in public affairs. And therefore they ought not to be irresponsible; yet at Sparta they are so. But (it may be replied), 'All magistracies are accountable to the Ephors.' Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, and we maintain that the control should be exercised in some other manner.

Polit.L14

Adhuc autem et electionem quam faciunt seniorum secundum iudicium est puerilis, et ipsum petere qui principatu dignificabitur non recte habet: oportet enim et volentem et non volentem principari, qui dignus est principatu. Nunc autem quod et circa aliam politeiam legislator videtur faciens, amatores enim honoris constituens cives, hoc usus est ad elecionem senum. Nullus enim utique principari quaeret non amator honoris existens, quamvis iniustitiarum voluntariarum plurima accidant fere propter amorem honorum et amorem pecuniarum hominibus.

Further, the mode in which the Spartans elect their elders is childish; and it is improper that the person to be elected should canvass for the office; the worthiest should be appointed, whether he chooses or not. And here the legislator clearly indicates the same intention which appears in other parts of his constitution; he would have his citizens ambitious, and he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the elders; for no one would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and avarice, almost more than any other passions, are the motives of crime.

Polit.L14

De regno autem se quidem emlius est existere civitatibus aut non melius, alius sit sermo; sed et se melius non sicut nunc, sed per ipsius vitam unumquemque iudicare regum. Quod autem legislator neque ipse putat posse facere kaluskagathus, manifestum: diffidit enim ut non existentibus sufficienter bonis viris, propter quod quidem emittebant simul legatos inimicos et salutem putabant civitati esse dissidere reges.

Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, I will consider at another time; they should at any rate be chosen, not as they are now, but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The legislator himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them really good men; at least he shows a great distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spartans used to join enemies with them in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state.

Polit.L14

Non bene autem neque circa convivia vocata amicabilia lege statutum est ab eo qui instituit primum. Oportebat enim de communi magis esse synodum quaemadmodum in Creta; apud Lacedemonas autem oportet ferre etiam valde pauperibus quibusdam existentibus , et haec consumptio non potentium expendere. Quare accidit contrarium legislatoris voluntati: vult quidem enim democraticum esse preparationem conviviorum, fit autem minimae democraticum sic lege statutum: participare quidem enim non facile valde pauperibus. Determinatio autem politeiae ista est ipsis patria non ponentem hoc tributum ferre, non participare ipsa.

Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called 'phiditia,' regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have been provided at the public cost, as in Crete; but among the Lacedaemonians every one is expected to contribute, and some of them are too poor to afford the expense; thus the intention of the legislator is frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular. For the very poor can scarcely take part in them; and, according to ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain their rights of citizenship.

Polit.L14

Eam autem quae circa navigii principes legem, et alteri quidam increpuerunt, recte increpantes. Seditionis enim fit causa. Sub regibus enim existentibus militaribus sempiternis, nauarchia fere alterum regnum.

The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and with justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are perpetual generals, and this office of admiral is but the setting up of another king.

Polit.L14

Et hoc autem suppositionem legislatoris increpabit utique aliquis, quod quidem et Plato in legibus increpuit. Ad partem enim virtutis omnios ordinatio legum est, scilicet bellicam, haec enim utilis ad dominari. Igitur salvabantur quidem bellantes, peribant autem principantes propter nescire vacare neque ad virtutem exercitari nulla exercitatione altera principaliori quam bellica; hoc autem peccatum non modicum; putant enim fieri bona quae circa res bellicas per virtutem magis quam per militiam, et hoc quidem bene. Quod tamen haec meliora virtute suspicantur non bene. Pravae autem habet et circa communes pecunias Spartiatis. Neque enim in communi civitatis est nihil, bella magna coactis preliari. Inferuntque male, eo enim quod Spartiatarum est plurima terra, non requirunt ab invicem illationes; accidit autem contrarium legislatori quam expediebat. Civitatem quidem enim fecit sine pecuniis, idiotas autem amatores pecuniarum. De Lacedemoniorum quidem igitur politeia in tantum dictum sit: haec enim sunt quae maxime utique quis increpabit.

The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws, against the intention of the legislator, is likewise justified; the whole constitution has regard to one part of virtue only—the virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war. So long as they were at war, therefore, their power was preserved, but when they had attained empire they fell for of the arts of peace they knew nothing, and had never engaged in any employment higher than war. There is another error, equally great, into which they have fallen. Although they truly think that the goods for which men contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed; there is no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one another's contributions. The result which the legislator has produced is the reverse of beneficial; for he has made his city poor, and his citizens greedy. Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are the principal defects.

Polit.L14

At vero et quae circa efforiam et cetera. Postquam Philosophus prosecutus est de politia Lacedaemoniorum, quantum ad ea quae habentur a civibus, scilicet servos, mulieres et possessiones, hic prosequitur de eadem politia quantum ad ipsos cives.

At vero et quae circa efforiam, etc. After the philosopher pursued the regime of the Lacedaemonians with reference to what the citizens have—namely, slaves, women, and possessions—he here pursues the same regime with reference to the citizens themselves.

Polit.L14

Et primo quantum ad principes.

And first, with reference to the governors.

Polit.L14

Secundo quantum ad populum, ibi, non bene autem neque circa convivia et cetera.

Second, with reference to the people, at non bene autem neque circa convivia, [II.14.9] etc.

Polit.L14

Tertio quantum ad bellatores viros, ibi, eam autem quae circa navigii et cetera.

Third, with reference to the warriors, at eam autem quae circa navigii, [II.14.10] etc.

Polit.L14

Erant autem tres principatus apud Lacedaemones, ut etiam supra tactum est: scilicet ephori, idest provisores, et de his primo tractat.

Now there were three governments among the Lacedaemonians, as has already been touched upon: namely, the ephors, that is, those who were providers, and he treats of these first.

Polit.L14

Et iterum seniores quidam, et de his tractat secundo, ibi, habent autem et quae circa seniorum et cetera.

And also some elders, and he treats of these second, at habent autem et quae circa seniorum, [II.14.6] etc.

Polit.L14

Erat etiam rex in civitate, et de hoc tractat tertio, ibi, de regno autem siquidem melius est et cetera.

There was also a king in the city, and he treats of him third, at de regno autem siquidem melius est, [II.14.8] etc.

Polit.L14

Circa primum improbat principatum ephororum quantum ad quinque.

Concerning the first, he objects to the government of the ephors with reference to five things.

Polit.L14

Primo quidem quantum ad conditionem personarum quae in hoc principatu constituebantur. Et dicit quod ea quae erant circa hunc principatum prave se habebant: hic enim principatus habebat dominium et potestatem super ea quae erant maxima in civitate: puta circa indicenda bella vel faciendam pacem, et circa electiones militum et alia similia. Et tamen ad istum principatum omnes eligebantur ex populo; ita quod quandoque accidebat quod homines valde pauperes assumebantur ad talem principatum, qui propter penuriam venales erant, et facile poterant corrumpi muneribus. Quod quidem prius multoties ostenderant, sed nuper ostenderunt in quodam negotio quod habebant cum Andriis: corrupti enim fuerunt ab eis argento, ita quod quantum in ipsis fuit, totam civitatem periculo exposuerunt.

First, indeed, with reference to the condition of persons that were constituted in this government. And he says that those who were concerned with this government were crookedly disposed: for this government had mastery and power over the things that were greatest in the city: for instance, over declaring war or making peace, and concerning the choices of soldiers, and other similar things. And yet, for this government, anyone from the people could be chosen, so that it sometimes happened that men who were exceedingly poor were taken up to this government—men who could be purchased because of their poverty, and were easily corrupted with gifts. They had shown this earlier many times, but they recently showed it in a certain business that they had with the Andrians: for they were corrupted by their silver, so that they exposed the whole city to danger inasmuch as it was for them to do so.

Polit.L14

Secundo ibi, et propter principatum esse etc., improbat praedictum principatum quantum ad magnam potestatem quam habebat. Et dicit quod quia iste principatus erat valde magnus et quasi aequalis tyrannidi, ita attenuabat potestatem regum quod cogebant, ut permitterent quod populus seipsum regeret parum obediens legi. Et sic corrumpebatur tota politia ipsorum, quia ex aristocratia degenerabat in democratiam. Et tamen iste principatus quantum ad aliquid erat utilis, quia continebat civitatem in pace: quiescebat enim populus a seditione propter hoc quod habebat partem in magno principatu. Et haec utilitas sequebatur per experimentum in ipsis rebus; sive hoc fuerit ex intentione legislatoris, sive fortuito acciderit. Oportet enim, ad hoc quod politia conservetur, quod omnes partes civitatis velint eam esse, et quod cuilibet parti civitatis sufficiat quod permaneat in suo statu: et hoc ibi contingebat. Nam reges acceptabant propter honorem quem ibi habebant; calicagathi autem, idest virtuosi, acceptabant propter iherusiam, idest propter honorabilitatem seniorum: iste enim principatus erat virtutis praemium, ita quod nullus ad eum assumebatur nisi virtuosus. Populus autem acceptabat propter principatum ephororum, qui communicabatur omnibus.

Second, at et propter principatum esse, etc., he objects to the aforementioned government with reference to the great power that it had. And he says that because this government was exceedingly great, as if equal to tyranny, it so weakened the power of the king that they compelled him to permit it that the people themselves should rule with little obedience to the law. And thus their whole regime was corrupted, because it degenerated from an aristocracy into a democracy. And yet, such government was useful with reference to something, because it contained the city in peace: for it quieted the people from sedition because it had a part in a great government. And this usefulness followed from experience in these affairs; either this came to be from the intention of the legislator, or happened by chance. For in order to preserve the regime, it must be that all parts of the city wish it to exist, and that for any part of the city, it suffices that they remain in their establishment: and this happened here. For the kings accepted it because of the honor that they had there; moreover, the calicagathoi—that is, the virtuous—accepted it because of the iherusia—that is, because of the honor given to the elders. For such government was the reward for virtue, such that nobody was assumed to it except the virtuous. The people, moreover, accepted it because of the government of the ephors, which was common to all.

Polit.L14

Tertio ibi, sed eligibilem etc., improbat hunc principatum quantum ad electionem. Erat enim commendabile quod ad illum principatum assumerentur ex omnibus per electionem: sed modus eligendi erat valde puerilis: quia forte per sortes vel alio inconvenienti modo eligebant, ita quod iste deveniebat quandoque ad inopes, sicut dictum est.

Third, at sed eligibilem, etc., he objects to this government with reference to the choice [of its governors]. For it was commendable that they were assumed into government from everyone through choice, but the mode of choosing was exceedingly childish: because they were chosen perhaps through lots or through another unfitting manner, such that government sometimes fell to the powerless [inopes], as was said.

Polit.L14

Quarto, ibi, adhuc autem et iudiciorum etc., improbat praedictum principatum quantum ad arbitrium quod habebat. Et dicit, quod hoc erat improbabile, quod quicumque essent ephori, habebant in sua potestate arbitrium iudicandi de rebus magnis. Melius enim erat, quod non iudicarent secundum proprium arbitrium, sed secundum aliquas Scripturas et leges.

Fourth, at adhuc autem et iudiciorum, etc., he objects to the aforementioned government with reference to the decisions that it [could make]. And he says that it was inappropriate that whoever the ephors were had in their power the decision to judge about great affairs. For it was better that they not judge according to their own decision, but according to some Scriptures and laws.

Polit.L14

Quinto ibi, est autem et dieta etc., improbat praedictum principatum quantum ad eorum conversationem. Et dicit, quod eorum dieta id est disciplina in cibis et vestibus et potibus, et aliis huiusmodi, non consonabat voluntati civitatis; quia in quibusdam erat valde remissa, puta forte in vestibus vel in otio; in aliis autem, puta forte in cibis et venereis, imponebatur eis dura lex, forte propter hoc, ut non emollescerent, ita quod non poterant eam sustinere; sed occulte transgrediebantur legem sibi positam fruentes corporalibus delectationibus. Et sic eorum conversatio erat contra intentionem civitatis.

Fifth, at est autem et dieta, etc., he objects to the aforementioned government with reference to their associations. And he says that their diet—that is, their discipline in food and clothing and drink, and other things of this sort--is not consonant with the will of the city; because in some things it was exceedingly remiss, for instance, with clothing or leisure; in other things, however—perhaps, for example, with food and sex—the law placed hard things upon them, perhaps so that they would not grow soft; thus it was that they were not able to uphold it, but secretly transgressed the law set up for them, enjoying bodily delights. And so their association was against the intention of the city.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit habent autem et quae circa seniorum etc., improbat politiam praedictam quantum ad principatum seniorum.

Then, where he says habent autem et quae circa seniorum, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to the government of the elders.

Polit.L14

Et primo quantum ad potestatem ipsorum.

And first, with reference to their power.

Polit.L14

Secundo quantum ad electionem eorum, ibi, adhuc autem et electionem et cetera.

Second, with reference to the choosing of them, at adhuc autem et electionem, [II.14.7] etc.

Polit.L14

Dicit ergo primo, quod apud Lacedaemones non bene se habent ea quae pertinent ad principatum seniorum: manebant enim perpetuo in principatu. Si enim huiusmodi seniores possent inveniri, qui essent epyikes, id est virtuosi, et sufficienter instructi ad andragathiam, id est ad virilem bonitatem, sive ad strenuitatem, posset forte aliquis dicere, quod expediens esset civitati, quod perpetuo manerent in principatu. Quamvis etiam si essent perfecte virtuosi, formidabile esset civitati, quod aliqui essent habentes dominium et potestatem super magna iudicia civitatis, et hoc per totam vitam suam. Quia sicut virtus corporis senectute debilitatur, ita etiam plerumque virtus mentis: quia postquam senescunt homines, non habent nec illud robur animi, nec illam vivacitatem ingenii, quam habebant in iuventute, propter debilitatem virtutum sensitivarum deservientium parti intellectivae. Multo plus igitur formidandum est aliquos principari per vitam, si sunt isto modo instructi ad bonum, sicut erant apud Lacedaemones, ita quod etiam legislator non considerat de eis omnino, sicut de bonis viris, quia non omnia committit eis. Frequenter autem tales volunt videri liberales in plebem, ut captent sibi favorem populi, et sic absque utilitate civitatis dispergunt bona communia. Unde melius est, quod habeant quamdam correctionem, talem scilicet, ut si deficientes inveniantur, possint amoveri: nunc autem sunt absque tali correctione. Habebant tamen aliquam correctionem, quia principatus ephororum poterat corrigere omnes principatus, impediendo scilicet ne sententiae eorum procederent, si viderentur male facere, et haec erat maxima dignitas ephororum. Sed nos intelligimus de alia correctione, ut scilicet possint amoveri; quod ephori facere non poterant.

Therefore, he first says that among the Lacedaemonians, the things that belong to the government of the elders were not well arranged [se habent]: for they remained perpetually in government. For if elders of this sort could be found who were epyikes, that is, virtuous, and sufficiently instructed in andragathia—that is, in manly goodness, or nimbleness, someone could perhaps say that it was advantageous for the city that they remain perpetually in government. Even granting that they were perfectly virtuous, it is frightening for the city that some should always have mastery and power over the great judgments of the city, and this through the whole of their life. Because just as the virtue of the body is weakened in old age, thus also, usually, the virtue of the mind: because after men grow old, they have neither that robust soul, nor that liveliness of genius, which they had in their youth, on account of the weakened virtue of the sensitive powers that are at the service of the part that understands. Therefore, it is much more frightening for some to govern throughout life if they are, in such a manner, instructed for the good, as they were among the Lacedaemonians, and thus it was that even the legislator did not consider them completely as if they were good men, because he did not commit all things to them. Frequently, however, such men wish to seem liberal among the commoners, to seize for themselves the favor of the people, and so apart from what is useful for the city, they dispense the common goods. And so it is better that they have some correction, such that if they are found to be lacking, they can be removed: but now, however, they are without such a correction. Yet they have a certain correction, because the government of the ephors was able to correct all other governments, by hindering them, so that their sentences would not proceed if they seemed badly made, and this was the greatest dignity of the ephors. But we understand about another correction: that they can be removed—which the ephors could not do.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem etc., improbat praedictum principatum quantum ad electionem ipsorum: et hoc duplici ratione.

Then, where he says adhuc autem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned government with reference to the choosing of the governors: and he does this for two reasons.

Polit.L14

Circa quarum primam dicit, quod electio seniorum, quae fiebat apud eos, erat valde puerilis. Erat enim apud eos ordinatum, ut illi qui digni viderentur tali principatu, peterent ipsum: quod non recte se habet: quia secundum hoc nullus assumeretur ad principatum nisi volens. Oportet autem aliquem, qui dignus est principatu, assumi ad principatum, sive velit sive non velit; quia utilitas communis est praeferenda propriae voluntati ipsius.

Concerning the first, he says that the choice of the elders, which came to be among them, was exceedingly childish. For the order among them was such that those who seemed worthy for such government were to seek it—which is not correctly arranged, because according to this, nobody would be assumed into government unless they wished it. However, someone who is worthy of government should be assumed to government whether he wishes it or not, because the common utility should be preferred to his private will.

Polit.L14

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, nunc autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod per hanc ordinationem circa electionem senum, legislator videtur facere cives amatores honoris, sicut et circa aliam partem politiae, idest circa electionem ephororum, vel etiam circa quaecumque alia, (per) quae faciebant cives honoris amatores. Et quod hoc facerent in electione senum, patet. Nullus enim peteret principatum, nisi principari volens, quod est amare honorem. Si ergo nullus haberet principatum nisi petens, sequeretur quod soli amantes honorem principarentur; et ita omnes provocarentur ad amandum honorem: et hoc est valde periculosum civitati: quia maior pars iniustitiarum, quae in civitate accidunt ex voluntate hominum, sicut sunt violentiae, rapinae et huiusmodi, fiunt propter amorem honoris et pecuniae. Unde patet, quod talis ordinatio est periculosa civitati.

He lays out a second reason at nunc autem, etc., and he says that through this ordering about the choosing of elders, the legislator seems to make the citizens lovers of honor, as he did with the other part of the regime—that is, concerning the choosing of the ephors—or also concerning any other parts that make the citizens lovers of honor. And that they make this happen in the choosing of the elders is evident. For nobody would seek government unless he wished to be a governor—which is to love honor. If, therefore, nobody were to have government except the seeker, it would follow that only the lovers of honor would be governors, and so all would be encouraged toward loving honor: and this is exceedingly dangerous for the city, because the greater part of the injustices that happen in the city from the will of men—such as violence and robbery and the like—come to be on account of the love of honor and of money. So it is evident that such an order is dangerous to the city.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit de regno autem etc., improbat praedictam politiam quantum ad principatum regium. Et dicit, quod utrum expediat civitati habere regem vel non, tractabitur inferius, scilicet in tertio: sed supposito quod melius sit habere regem, non est hoc melius, sicut erat apud Lacedaemones, quod non per totam vitam regnabant; sed melius est quod unusquisque habeat iudicium regium per totam vitam suam, quia rex est utilis civitati, ut sua potestate efficaciter conservet statum civitatis. Quod fieri non potest nisi per vitam regnaverit; quia et ipse timebit alios offendere, et alii minus eum timebunt. Secus autem est de senioribus, qui ad consilia vel ad iudicia quaedam eligebantur. Causa autem quare legislator apud Lacedaemones instituit non esse reges perpetuos, est ista: quia reputavit quod non posset facere cives aliquos caluscagathus, id est perfecte bonos. Unde diffidit de civibus quasi de non perfecte bonis existentibus. Et propter hoc quando mittebant aliquos legatos seu nuncios, eligebant aliquos inimicos vel dissentientes, ut unus alium impediret, si vellet facere contra bonum civitatis. Et similiter putabant esse salutem civitatis, si reges dissentirent, qui sibi invicem succederent; qui unus emendabat, quod alius male fecisset.

Then, where he says de regno autem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to the government of the kings. And he says that whether to have a king is advantageous to the city or not will be treated of later—namely, in Bk. III—but that if we suppose it is better to have a king, it still is not better as it was among the Lacedaemonians, that they did not rule throughout their whole life, but it is better that each one have the judgment of kings through the whole of their lives, because a king is useful to the city so that his power will effectively preserve the establishment of the city. And this cannot come to be unless he reigns throughout his life, because he will both fear to offend others, and others will will fear him less. It is otherwise with the elders who were chosen for some counsel or judgment. The cause, moreover, why the legislator did not institute that there should be perpetual kings among the Lacedaemonians, is this: because he deemed that he was not able to make the citizens into caluscagathoi—that is, perfectly good. And so he had no faith about the citizens, as if about those who were not perfectly good. And because of this, when they sent some legates or envoys, they chose those who were enemies or in opposition to each other, so that one would obstruct the other if he wished to do something contrary to the good of the city. And likewise, they deemed that it was healthy for the city if kings were in opposition, who succeeded each other in turn, so that one amended what the other did badly.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit non bene autem etc., improbat praedictam politiam quantum ad ea quae pertinent ad populum, scilicet quantum ad convivia publica quae erant in civitate: et dicit, quod lex non bene ordinaverat de huiusmodi conviviis; quia melius esset, quod huiusmodi congregatio convivii fieret de expensis communibus civitatis, sicut fiebat apud Cretenses, quam quod fieret de his quae a singulis afferrentur, sicut fiebat apud Lacedaemones, apud quos etiam et valde pauperes oportebat aliquid ferre ad huiusmodi sumptus; et hoc erat destructio pauperum, qui non poterant expendere. Unde circa hoc accidebat contrarium intentioni legislatoris qui instituit huiusmodi convivia quasi aliquid democraticum, id est in favorem populi, ut scilicet populus aliquam recreationem haberet in huiusmodi conviviis; sed secundum hanc legem conviviorum sequebatur quod essent huiusmodi convivia in magnum detrimentum populi, quia secundum hoc populares non de facili poterant principari; erat enim lex apud eos, quod qui non ponerent aliquid ad huiusmodi sumptus, non haberent partem in politia ipsorum; quia nec poterant fieri principes, nec habebant vocem in electione principum.

Then, where he says non bene autem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to what belongs to the people—namely, with reference to the public feasts that were in the city. And he says that the law was not well ordered about these sorts of feasts, because it would be better that gathering for feasts of this sort should come to be at the common expense of the city, as happens among the Cretans, than that they come to be such that they are produced by an individual, as happened among the Lacedaemonians, among whom even those who were exceedingly poor had to bear the expense of such things, and this was the destruction of the poor, who were not able to pay. Whence, what happened in this regard was contrary to the intention of the legislator, who instituted feasts of this sort as though they were something democratic—that is, in favor of the people—so that the people would have some recreation in feasts of this sort; but according to this law of feasts, it followed that there were some feasts of this sort at great loss to the people, because according to this, the people were not easily able to rule. For there was a law among them that those who did not contribute something to the expense [of the feasts] should not have a part in their regime; because they could neither become governors, nor have a voice in the choice of governors.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit eam autem quae circa navigii etc., improbat praedictam politiam quantum ad viros bellatores.

Then, where he says eam autem quae circa navigii, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to warriors.

Polit.L14

Et primo quantum ad bellatores belli navalis.

And first, with reference to the warriors of naval wars.

Polit.L14

Secundo communiter quantum ad omnes, ibi, et hoc autem suppositionem et cetera.

Second, more commonly, with reference to them all, at et hoc autem suppositionem, [II.14.11] etc.

Polit.L14

Tertio quantum ad ipsorum stipendia, ibi, prave autem habet et cetera.

Third, with reference to their pay, at prave autem habet, [II.14.12] etc.

Polit.L14

Dicit ergo primo, quod quidam alii recte increpaverunt legem Lacedaemoniorum, quae erat circa principes navigii, eo quod erat causa seditionis. Cum enim haberent reges quasi sempiternos, qui praeerant terrestri militiae, navarchia, id est principatus navigiorum fiebat quasi alterum regnum: et ita habebant quasi duos reges, quod poterat esse materia dissensionis.

Therefore, he first says that others have correctly criticized the law of the Lacedaemonians about the governors of ships, in that it was a cause of sedition. For although they had, as it were, everlasting kings, who were at the head of the land-based military, the navarchia—that is, the government of the ships—became as though it were another king: and so it was as though they had two kings, which was able to be the material for discord.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit et hoc autem suppositionem etc., improbat praedictam politiam communiter quantum ad omnes viros bellatores: et dicit, quod aliquis recte potest increpare suppositionem legislatoris, idest illud quod supponebat tamquam finem, ad quem totam politiam ordinabat: et hoc etiam Plato in suis legibus increpabat, quod omnes leges eorum ordinabantur ad unam partem virtutis, scilicet ad bellicam, propter hoc, quod erat utilis ad dominandum aliis. Et ideo, quia bene se habebant in his, quae pertinent ad bellum, male autem in his quae pertinent ad status politici gubernationem: sequebatur, quod in bellis conservabantur: sed quando iam adepti erant principatum, imminebant eis multa pericula, quia nesciebant vacare, id est nesciebant vivere in pace, neque erant exercitati aliqua alia meliori exercitatione quam bellica: quod non erat parvum peccatum. In hoc enim bene opinabantur quod putabant res bellicas melius tractari per virtutem hominum, quam etiam per malitiam, quia ut dicitur in tertio Ethicorum, homines virtuosi non parcunt vitae, ubi bonum est persistere: milites vero quando superexcrescunt pericula, deficiunt, non enim confidunt ulterius posse liberari per experientiam et industriam armorum. Sed non bene opinabantur quantum ad hoc quod putabant virtutem, qua homo bene se habet in bellis, esse optimam: cum aliae virtutes, scilicet prudentia et iustitia, sint digniores fortitudine; et ipsum etiam bellum est propter pacem, non autem e converso.

Then, where he says et hoc autem suppositionem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime more commonly with reference to all the warriors: and he says that someone could correctly criticize the supposition of the legislator, that is, the one that was supposed as an end to which the whole regime was ordered: and Plato also, in his laws, criticized that all their laws were ordered toward one part of virtue—to military virtue—because of this: it was useful for mastering others. And therefore, because they were well-arranged in those things that belong to war, but badly in those things that belong to the governing of the political establishment, it followed that they were preserved in war, but when they had acquired government, they encountered many dangers, because they did not know how to be unoccupied—that is, they did not know how to live in peace, nor were they exercised in any exercise better than war: which was no small sin. For they opined well in this regard: that they deemed the affairs of war to be better treated through the virtue of men than through wickedness, because as it says in Ethics III, virtuous men are not sparing of life where it is good to persist: but soldiers, when they have overcome dangers, are lacking, for they are not confident beyond being able to be free through the trial and industry of weapons. But they did not opine well in this regard: that they deemed the virtue through which man is well-disposed for war to be the best virtue, although the other virtues—namely, prudence and justice—are more worthy than fortitude; and even war itself is on account of peace, and not the converse.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit prave autem habet etc., improbat praedictam politiam quantum ad stipendia militum vel circa aerarium publicum: et dicit quod apud Spartiatas, id est Lacedaemones non erat bene ordinatum de communibus pecuniis. Nihil enim habebat civitas in communi, cum tamen frequenter cogeretur magna bella agere; et iterum singuli cives male ministrabant necessaria ad tales sumptus; non enim requirebantur a singulis auctoritate alicuius potestatis publicae, sed committebatur voluntati cuiuslibet, ut daret quod vellet. Quod ideo statuit legislator, quia cives habebant multas possessiones, et poterant sine aliquo gravamine multa dare: sed accidit contra utilitatem, quam legislator intendebat; quia ipse reddidit civitatem sine pecuniis publicis; et ydiotas, id est privatas personas et viles fecit amatores pecuniarum, dum conabantur tantum lucrari quod possent et sibi et communitati providere. Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod ea quae dicta sunt, videntur improbabilia in politia Lacedaemoniorum.

Then, where he says prave autem habet, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to the pay of the soldiers, or concerning public gold. And he says that among the Spartans—that is, the Lacedaemonians—things were not well-ordered about common money. For the city had nothing in common, although it was nevertheless frequently compelled to wage great wars; and therefore, the individual citizens badly administered the things necessary for such expenses, for they were not required by an individual authority of any public power, but it was left to the will of each to give what he wished—which, indeed, the legislator established because the citizens had many possessions, and were able to give much without any burden: but what happened was against the utility that the legislator had intended, because he himself left the city without any public money; and the ydiotas—that is, the private and base persons—he made into lovers of money, so long as they endeavored to gain so much that they were able to provide both for themselves and for the community. And lastly, he concludes in an epilogue that the things that have been discussed seem improper in the Lacedaemonian regime.

Polit.L14

Lecture 15

Polit.L15

Cretensium autem politeia proxima quidem est huic; habet autem modica quidem non deterius, plurimum autem minus planae.

The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan, and in some few points is quite as good; but for the most part less perfect in form.

Polit.L15

Etenim videtur et dicitur quidem in plurimis imitari creticam politeiam quae Lacedemoniorum; plurima autem antiquorum minus dearticulata sunt iunioribus. Aiunt enim Likurgum quando procurationem Kharilli regis derelinquens peregrinatus est, plurimo tempore conversatum esse circa Cretam propter cognationem. Domestici enim Cretenses Lacedemonibus erant. Susceperunt autem qui ad familiaritatem venerant institutionem legum existentem in tunc habitantibus, propter quod et nunc incole eodem modo utuntur ipsis ut instituit Minus primus ordinem legum.

The older constitutions are generally less elaborate than the later, and the Lacedaemonian is said to be, and probably is, in a very great measure, a copy of the Cretan. According to tradition, Lycurgus, when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charillus, went abroad and spent most of his time in Crete. For the two countries are nearly connected; the Lyctians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which they found existing among the inhabitants. Even to this day the Perioeci, or subject population of Crete, are governed by the original laws which Minos is supposed to have enacted.

Polit.L15

Videtur autem insula et ad principatum Graecorum apta esse et poni bene: toti enim superponitur mari fere Graecis collactis circa mare omnibus; distat quidem enim a Polopo insula modicum; versus Asiam autem ab eo loco qui circa Triopium et a Rodo; propter quod et maris principatum optinuit Minus et insulas has quidem vi subegit, has autem habitari fecit; finaliter autem appositus Siciliae vitam consummavit ibi circa Caminum.

The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in Hellas, and to be well situated; it extends right across the sea, around which nearly all the Hellenes are settled; and while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to the region of Asia about Triopium and Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the empire of the sea, subduing some of the islands and colonizing others; at last he invaded Sicily, where he died near Camicus.

Polit.L15

Habet autem proportionaliter Cretensium institutio ad Lacedemonicam. Agriculturae enim opus faciunt, his quidem servi, Cretensibus autem incolae; et convivia apud ambos sunt, et antiquitus vocabant Lacedemones non filitia, sed andreia quaemadmodum Cretenses; ex quo manifestum quia inde venit. Adhuc autem politeiae ordo: efore quidem enim eandem habent potentiam his qui in Crate vocantur kosmoi. Verumtamen efori quidem quinque numero, kosmoi autem decem sunt. Seniores autem senioribus quos vocant Cretenses boulin equales. Regnum autem primo quidem fuit, deinde dissolverunt Cretenses et ducatum kosmoi eum qui ad bellum habent. Ecclesia autem participant omnes, domina autem nullius est nisi consententiandi ea quae videntur senioribus et kosmois.

The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the other, and both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common meals, which were anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not 'phiditia' but 'andria'; and the Cretans have the same word, the use of which proves that the common meals originally came from Crete. Further, the two constitutions are similar; for the office of the Ephors is the same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only difference being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are ten in number. The elders, too, answer to the elders in Crete, who are termed by the Cretans the council. And the kingly office once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war. All classes share in the ecclesia, but it can only ratify the decrees of the elders and the Cosmi.

Polit.L15

Quae quidem igitur conviviorum habent melius Cretensibus quam Lacedemonibus. In Lacedemonia quidem enim secundum caput unusquisque infert constitutum. Si autem non, participare lex prohibet politeia quaemadmodum dictum est prius. In Creta autem communius: ab omnibus enim natis fructibus et pecoribus ex publicis et oblationibus quas ferunt incolae constituta est pars, haec quidem ad deos et communia sacrificia, haec autem ad convivia, ut et de communi nutriantur omnes et mulieres et pueri et viri. Ad modicum autem cibum ut proficuum, multa philosophatus est legislator, et ad divisigationem mulierum ut non multos pueros faciant, eam quae ad masculos facit collucutionem; de qua si pravae aut non pravae aliud erit considerandi tempus. Quod autem quae circa convivia melius ordinata sunt Cretensibus quam Lacedemonibus manifestum.

The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the Lacedaemonian; for in Lacedaemon every one pays so much per head, or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, forbids him to exercise the rights of citizenship. But in Crete they are of a more popular character. There, of all the fruits of the earth and cattle raised on the public lands, and of the tribute which is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is assigned to the Gods and to the service of the state, and another to the common meals, so that men, women, and children are all supported out of a common stock. The legislator has many ingenious ways of securing moderation in eating, which he conceives to be a gain; he likewise encourages the separation of men from women, lest they should have too many children, and the companionship of men with one another—whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of considering at another time. But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered than the Lacedaemonian there can be no doubt.

Polit.L15

Quae autem circa kosmos adhuc deterius quam quae efororum. Quod quidem enim habet malum efororum principatus, existit et his; fiunt enim quicumque. Quod autem ibi expedit ad politeiam, hic non est. Ibi quidem enim propter electionem ex omnibus esse participans populus maximi principatus, vult manere politeiam; hic autem non ex omnibus eligunt kosmos, sed ex quibusdam senibus, et senes ex quibusdam qui fuerunt kosmi.

On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the good. Like the Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political advantage. At Sparta every one is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in the highest office, want the constitution to be permanent. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain families, and not out of the whole people, and the elders out of those who have been Cosmi.

Polit.L15

De quibus eosdem utique dicet aliquis sermones et de his quae in Lacedemonia fiunt. Quod enim sine correctione et quod per vitam, maior est senectus dignitate ipsis, et non secundum litteras principari, sed autognomonas insecurum.

The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which has been already made about the Lacedaemonian elders. Their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their arbitrary power of acting upon their own judgment, and dispensing with written law, is dangerous.

Polit.L15

Quiescere autem non participantem populum nullum signum eius quod est ordinatam esse bene: neque enim sumptionis aliquid kosmois sicut eforis; longe enim peregrinantur in insula differentium.

It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people are not discontented at being excluded from it. For there is no profit to be made out of the office as out of the Ephoralty, since, unlike the Ephors, the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed from temptation.

Polit.L15

Quam autem faciunt peccati huius medicinam, inconveniens et non politica, sed oppressiva: multotiens enim ejiciunt convenientes quidam kosmos aut conprincipantium ipsorum aut idiotarum; licet autem et indermedium kosmis abnegare principatum; haec utique omnia melius fieri secundum legem quam secundum hominum voluntatem; non enim securus canon.

The remedy by which they correct the evil of this institution is an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy than to a constitutional state. For the Cosmi are often expelled by a conspiracy of their own colleagues, or of private individuals; and they are allowed also to resign before their term of office has expired. Surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is a very unsafe rule.

Polit.L15

Omnium autem pessimum id quod akosmiae quam constituunt frequenter cum non sententias velint dare potentum.

Worst of all is the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles often have recourse when they will not submit to justice.

Polit.L15

Aut et palam quod habet aliquid politeiae insitutio, sed non politeia est, sed potentatus magis. Consueverunt autem assumentes populum et amicos monarchiam facere seditiones movere et pugnare ad invicem; equidem quid differt quod tale, aut post quoddam tempus non iam civitatem esse talem, sed solui politicam communionem. Est autem valde periculosa sic habens civitas volentibus invadere et potentibus, sed quaemadmodum dictum est salvatur propter locum; ab expulsione enim quod longe fecit; propter quod et quod incolarum manet Cretensibus; ministri autem recedunt frequenter. Neque enim extrinseco principatu participant Cretenses. Nuperque bellum peregrinum transivit ad insulam quod fecit manifestam infirmitatem earum quae ibi legum. De hac quidem igitur politeia tantum nobis dictum sit.

This shows that the Cretan government, although possessing some of the characteristics of a constitutional state, is really a close oligarchy. The nobles have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they get together a party among the common people and their own friends and then quarrel and fight with one another. What is this but the temporary destruction of the state and dissolution of society? A city is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her. But, as I have already said, the island of Crete is saved by her situation; distance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian prohibition of strangers; and the Cretans have no foreign dominions. This is the reason why the Perioeci are contented in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. But when lately foreign invaders found their way into the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough of the government of Crete.

Polit.L15

Cretensium autem politia et cetera. Postquam superius auctor prosecutus est de politia Lacedaemonica, hic prosequitur de politia Cretensi.

Cretensium autem politia, etc. After the author pursued the Lacedaemonian regime above, he here pursues the regime of the Cretans.

Polit.L15

Et primo comparat hanc politiam ad praecedentem.

And first, he relates this regime to the preceding.

Polit.L15

Secundo improbat eam, ibi, de quibus eosdem utique dicet et cetera.

Second, he objects to it, at de quibus eosdem utique dicet, [II.15.7] etc.

Polit.L15

Circa primum tria facit.

Concerning the first, he does two things.

Polit.L15

Primo ponit in communi comparationem istarum politiarum.

First, he lays out the relation of these regimes in common.

Polit.L15

Secundo assignat rationem positae comparationis, ibi, et enim videtur et cetera.

Second, he indicates the reason for the relation he laid out, at et enim videtur, [II.15.2] etc.

Polit.L15

Tertio explicat praedictam comparationem in speciali, ibi, habet autem proportionaliter et cetera.

Third, he explicates the aforementioned relation specifically, at habet autem proportionaliter, [II.15.4] etc.

Polit.L15

Dicit ergo primo, quod politia Cretensium est propinqua politiae Lacedaemonicae in quibusdam; tamen differt in aliquibus, in quorum paucis non se habet deterius quam politia Lacedaemonica, sed melius; sed in pluribus se habet minus plane, idest minus expedite et convenienter ad bonum statum civitatis.

Therefore, he first says that the regime of the Cretans is a relative of the Lacedaemonian regime in some things, yet it differs in others, in a few of which it is not more poorly arranged than the Lacedaemonian regime, but better; but in most things, it is arranged less smoothly, that is, less advantageously and fittingly for the good establishment of the city.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit et enim videtur, assignat causam praemissae comparationis.

Then, where he says et enim videtur, he indicates the cause of the previously noted relation.

Polit.L15

Et primo ostendit huius causam esse ex hoc quod Lacedaemonica sumpta est a Cretensi.

And first he shows that the cause of this is because the Lacedaemonian is taken up from the Cretan.

Polit.L15

Secundo assignat causam quare Cretensis fuit prior, ibi, videtur autem insula et cetera.

Second, he indicates the cause why the Cretan was prior, at videtur autem insula, [II.15.3] etc.

Polit.L15

Dicit ergo primo quod causa praedictorum est, quia politia Lacedaemonica in pluribus imitatur politiam Cretensium tamquam antiquiorem; et ideo politia Cretensis in pluribus peius se habet; quia videmus quod plurima de his quae sunt ab antiquis inventa, sunt minus dearticulata, idest diligenter distincta quam ea quae sunt inventa a iunioribus. Dicunt enim quod Lycurgus qui instituit politiam Lacedaemonicam dimittens regnum Charylli regis Lacedaemoniorum, multo tempore conversatus est apud Cretam propter amicitiam et affinitatem quam habebant Lacedaemones ad Cretenses. Et ideo Lacedaemones, qui venerant Cretam causa familiaritatis, susceperunt institutiones legum, quae tunc erant apud habitantes in Creta. Unde videmus quod incolae Cretenses eodem modo utuntur legibus sicut et Lacedaemones; et hoc est secundum institutionem Minois regis Cretensium.

Therefore, he first says that the cause of the aforementioned things is because the Lacedaemonian regime imitates the regime of the Cretans in many things, insofar as it is older; and therefore, the regime of the Cretans is more poorly arranged in many things: because we see that most of those things that were discovered by the ancients are less articulated—that is, carefully distinguished—than what are discovered by the younger ones. For they say that Lycurgus, who instituted the Lacedaemonian regime, when he left the kingdom of Charillus, king of the Lacedaemonians, for a long time he was associated with Crete because of the friendship and affinity which the Lacedaemonians had for the Cretans. And therefore, the Lacedaemonians, who had come to Crete for the sake of familiarity, took up the institutions of the laws that then were among those dwelling in Crete. Whence we see that the Cretan residents employed laws in the same manner as did the Lacedaemonians; and this is following the institution of Minos, king of the Cretans.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit videtur autem insula etc., assignat causam quare leges inter Graecos primo inventae sunt apud Cretam. Dicit enim quod insula Cretensis videtur secundum situm terrae optime esse disposita ad principandum Graecis, qui fere omnes habitant circa mare. Insula autem illa quasi adiacet toti litori Graeciae; et distat modicum a quadam insula quae vocatur Pelopus, quae nunc dicitur Achaia: et similiter versus Asiam propinqua est loco qui dicitur Tropium et insulae quae dicitur Rhodus; et ideo Minos qui fuit rex Cretensis obtinuit principatum in toto mari Graeciae, et insulas quasdam prius habitatas per violentiam subegit, quasdam autem de novo habitari fecit singulis suas leges imponens. Ultimo autem transivit in insulam Siciliae, et ibi mortuus est circa caminum, idest circa montem Vulcani vel Ethnae ex quibus ignis eructuat.

Then, where he says videtur autem insula, etc., he indicates the cause why the laws among the Greeks were first discovered at Crete. For he says that the island of the Cretans seems, according to the setting of the land, to be the best-organized for being the governor of the Greeks, who almost all dwelt around the sea. It is as if that island is adjacent to the whole Greek shore, and slightly set apart from the island called the Peloponnese, which is now called Achaeia: and likewise, turning toward Asia, it is close to the place that is called Tropium, and the island that is called Rhodes; and therefore Minos, who was the king of the Cretans, obtained the government of the whole Greek sea, and he overcame some islands through violence that were previously inhabited; but some he made to be newly inhabited; into both, he pressed his laws. Lastly, however, he went over to the island of Sicily, and there he died near the Forge—that is, near the mountain of Vulcano, or near Etna, from both of which erupts fire.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit habet autem proportionaliter etc., explicat in speciali comparationem supra positam.

Then, where he says habet autem proportionaliter, etc., he explicates the relation laid out above specifically.

Polit.L15

Et primo ostendit in quibus conveniunt ambae politiae.

And first, he shows what things both regimes agree.

Polit.L15

Secundo in quibus politia Cretensis habet melius, ibi, quod quidem igitur conviviorum et cetera.

Second, in which things the regime of the Cretans has something better, at quod quidem igitur conviviorum, etc.

Polit.L15

Tertio in quibus habet peius, ibi, quae autem circa cosmos et cetera.

Third, in which things it has something worse, at quae autem circa cosmos, etc.

Polit.L15

Ostendit autem primo, quod hae duae politiae proportionaliter se habent adinvicem in tribus convenientes.

Therefore, he first hows that these two regimes are proportionally related to each other, agreeing in three regards.

Polit.L15

Primo quidem in agricultura, quam apud Lacedaemones exercent servi, apud Cretenses autem incolae, idest rustici habitantes in insula.

First, indeed, in agriculture, which the slaves exercised among the Lacedaemonians, but among the Cretans, the residents—that is, the rural inhabitants in the island.

Polit.L15

Secundo quantum ad convivia publica quae apud utrosque fiunt: quae quidem nunc apud Lacedaemones vocabantur Philitia, a philos quod est amor, quia erant instituta ad amorem mutuum inter cives conservandum; sed antiquitus apud eos vocabantur Andria; ab anir quod est vir, quia soli viri ibi conveniebant absque mulieribus et sic etiam vocantur nunc apud Cretenses. Unde manifestum est quod Lacedaemones assumpserunt a Cretensibus.

Second, with reference to public feasts, which occur among both: which, indeed, are now called Philitia among the Lacedaemonians, from philos, which is “love,” because the were instituted for preserving mutual love among the citizens; but in antiquity, they were called Andria among them, from anir, which is “man,” because only the men came together there, apart from the women; and so are they now called among the Cretans. Whence it is clear that the Lacedaemonians took up [the practice] from the Cretans.

Polit.L15

Tertio quantum ad ordinem politiae, quia ephori apud Lacedaemones habebant eamdem potestatem, quam apud Cretenses quidam qui dicebantur cosmi, idest ornatores, solo numero differentes: nam ephori apud Lacedaemones erant quinque, cosmi vero Cretensium erant decem. Similiter et seniores apud Lacedaemones erant aequales et numero et potestate senioribus Cretensium, quos vocabant boulin, id est consilium. Regnum autem primo fuit apud Cretenses, sicut et apud Lacedaemones: sed postmodum dissolverunt regnum, et commiserunt cosmis ducatum bellorum: utrique etiam habent Ecclesiam, idest adunationem populi, quae nullius rei habet potestatem, nisi approbandi sententias seniorum et cosmorum.

Third, with reference to the order of the regime, because the ephors, among the Lacedaemonians, have the same power as do those among the Cretans who are called cosmoi—that is, “adorners,” who were different only in number: for there were five ephors among the Lacedaemonians, but there were ten cosmoi of the Cretans. Likewise, also, the elders among the Lacedaemonians were equal both in number and in power to the elders of the Cretans, who they called the boulin—that is, the counsel. The king, however, among the Cretans, was at first just as he was among the Lacedaemonians: but afterward, they dismantled the kingship, and committed to the cosmoi the command of wars: both also have an Ecclesia—that is, a meeting of the people—which has power over nothing except confirming the sentences of the elders and the cosmoi.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit quae quidem igitur conviviorum etc., ostendit in quibus melior erat politia Cretensis. Et dicit quod ordinatio conviviorum melior erat apud Cretenses quam etiam apud Lacedaemones; quia in Lacedaemonia unusquisque qui accedebat ad convivium, oportebat, quod aliquid exhiberet secundum caput suum, alioquin non poterat participare politia, sicut prius dictum est: sed apud Cretenses erat observatio magis pertinens ad commune, quia de rebus publicis, tam de fructibus terrae, quam de pecoribus et de redditibus, quos reddebant incolae qui colebant terras, erat instituta quaedam pars quae expendebatur in sacrificia, et quaedam pars quae expendebatur in convivia, ut in talibus conviviis homines et mulieres et pueri et viri nutrirentur de communi. Hoc erat autem et aliud proprium politiae Cretensium, quod legislator eorum multa philosophice induxit ad hoc, quod modicum comederent; quasi hoc sit valde proficuum et singulis et communitati. Volens etiam quod non procrearent multos pueros, ne multitudo hominum excederet quantitatem possessionis, voluit, quod homines non multum commiscerentur mulieribus, et ad hoc concessit turpem masculorum coitum: sed utrum in hoc bene fecerit vel male, posterius considerabitur: tamen hoc manifestum est, quod ordinatio conviviorum melior erat apud Cretenses quam apud Lacedaemones.

Then, where he says quae quidem igitur conviviorum, etc., he shows in what things the regime of the Cretans was better. And he says that the ordering of feasts was better among the Cretans than even among the Lacedaemonians, because in Lacedaemon, each one who approached the feast needed to supply something per capita, otherwise he would not be able to participate in the regime, as was said previously: but among the Cretans there was an observance that belonged more to the common things, because in public affairs, both regarding the produce of the land and the cattle and the yields that the residents who cultivated the lands yielded up, it was the institution that there be some part that was spent on sacrifices, and some part that was spent on feasts, so that in such feasts, the men—the husbands and wives and children—should receive sustenance from the common things. Moreover, their legislator also very philosophically introduced another thing proper to the regime of the Cretans: that they should eat moderately; as if this were exceedingly beneficial both for the individual and the community. Wishing also that they not procreate many children, lest the multitude of men should exceed the quantity of possessions, he wished that the men not mingle much with the women, and to this end, he permitted the foul intercourse of males: but whether in this he crafted things well or badly will be considered later—yet this is clear: that the ordering of feasts was better among the Cretans than among the Lacedaemonians.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit quae autem circa cosmos etc., ostendit in quo peior erat Cretensis politia. Et dicit, quod peior erat ordinatio apud Cretenses de cosmis quam apud Lacedaemones de ephoris. Unum enim malum est commune utrisque, quia scilicet apud utrosque assumuntur ad huiusmodi principatum quicumque, idest homines non probati nec virtuosi. Sed tamen apud Lacedaemones erat unum bonum, quia poterant eligi de qualibet conditione hominum: et ideo populus, quasi habens partem in maximo principatu, bene volebat, quod conservaretur talis politia. Sed apud Cretenses non eligebantur cosmi ex qualibet hominum conditione, sed solum ex aliquibus qui erant vel fuerant de numero seniorum; et similiter seniores eligebantur ex quibusdam qui fuerant cosmi quibus licebat dimittere suum principatum, ut infra dicetur. Et sic populus in principatu cosmorum non habebat partem.

Then, where he says quae autem circa cosmos, etc., he shows in what regard the Cretan regime was worse. And he says that the ordering among the Cretans about the cosmoi was worse than among the Lacedaemonians about the ephors. For there is one evil common to both, because in both, anyone could be taken up into this government—that is, men who were neither proven nor virtuous. But yet, among the Lacedaemonians there was one good, because they could be chosen from any condition of man: and therefore the people, as though they had a part in the greatest government, beneficially wished that the regime be preserved. But among the Cretans, the cosmoi were not chosen from men of any condition, but only from those who were or had been among the number of the elders; and likewise, the elders the chosen from those who had been cosmoi—to whom it was permitted to leave their government, as will be said below. And thus, the people did not have a part of the government of the cosmoi.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit de quibus eosdem etc., improbat praedictam politiam.

Then, where he says de quibus eosdem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime.

Polit.L15

Et primo quantum ad statuta quae ponebant.

And first, with reference to the establishments they set up.

Polit.L15

Secundo quantum ad remedia quae adhibebant, ibi, quam autem faciunt et cetera.

Second, with reference to the remedies they applied, at quam autem faciunt, [II.15.9] etc.

Polit.L15

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L15

Primo improbat eorum statuta.

First, he objects to their establishments.

Polit.L15

Secundo excludit quamdam responsionem, ibi, quiescere et cetera.

Second, he excludes some responses, at quiescere, [II.15.8] etc.

Polit.L15

Improbat autem politiam istam quantum ad duo, quae etiam improbavit in politia Lacedaemonica: quorum unum est, quod cosmi et seniores principabantur per totam vitam suam sine correctione, idest sine hoc quod possent amoveri propter aliquam culpam; et sic principatus erant maiores quam dignum esset. Secundum autem est, quia non principabantur secundum litteras, id est secundum aliquas leges scriptas, sed auctognomonas, id est per se sententiantes vel arbitrantes; et hoc non erat securum civitati; quia eorum iudicium poterat perverti amore vel odio.

Moreover, he objects to such a regime with reference to two things that he also objected to in the Lacedaemonian regime. One of these is that the cosmoi and the elders have government for the whole of their lives, without correction—that is, without being able to be removed because of a fault; and so their government was greater than was worthy. The second, however, is that, because they did not govern according to writing—that is, according to any written laws—but according to auctognomonas—that is, through decisions and opinions; and this was not safe for the city, because their judgment was able to be twisted by love or hatred.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit quiescere autem etc., excludit quamdam responsionem qua possent se defendere, inducentes pro signo bonae ordinationis, quod semper absque seditione vixerint. Sed ipse dicit, quod hoc, quod populus quieverit apud eos a seditionibus non participans principatu, non est signum demonstrans quod eorum politia sit bene ordinata: hoc enim contingebat quia Cretenses longe peregrinabantur ab aliis hominibus (in) insula quadam habitantes, et distantes ab aliis: et sic non habebant bella cum finitimis, sicut supra dictum est, et sic cosmi apud Cretenses non habebant aliqua recipere vel expendere propter bella, sicut ephori apud Lacedaemones: unde populus non multum curabat tali principatu participare.

Then, where he says quiescere autem, etc., he excludes a certain response through which they could defend themselves, invoking as a sign of the good ordering that they always lived without sedition. But he himself says that among them, the people's restraint from sedition, not participating in government, is not a sign demonstrating that their regime is well-ordered: for this happened because the Cretans traveled far from other men, dwelling in an island, and distant from others; and so they did not have war with bordering peoples, as was said above, and thus the cosmoi, among the Cretans, did not have to take or spend anything on account of the wars, as did the ephors among the Lacedaemonians. Hence, the people did not greatly care to participate in this sort of government.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit quam autem faciunt etc., improbat remedia, quae apud Cretenses contra pericula erant.

Then, where he says quam autem faciunt, etc., he objects to the remedies that were among the Cretans against the dangers.

Polit.L15

Et primo ponit ea.

And first he lays them out.

Polit.L15

Secundo improbat, ibi, aut et palam et cetera.

Second, he objects to them, at aut palam, etc.

Polit.L15

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L15

Primo ponit remedia, quae erant contra personas male principantium.

First, he lays out the remedies that were against persons that held government badly.

Polit.L15

Secundo remedium, quod erat contra ipsum principatum, ibi, omnium autem pessimum et cetera.

Second, the remedy that was against the government itself, at omnium autem pessimum, [II.15.10] etc.

Polit.L15

Dicit ergo primo, quod illa medicina, quam faciunt Cretenses contra praedictum peccatum de incorrigibilitate principum, non est conveniens, nec est politica quasi sapiens communem ordinem civitatis, sed magis est oppressiva et tyrannica; quod non est secundum rationem, sed per violentiam. Multoties enim apud eos conveniebant aliqui vel de principibus vel de privatis personis, et eiiciebant cosmos per violentiam. Erat autem et aliud remedium: quia cosmi poterant abrenunciare principatui in vita sua. Sed melius erat, quod ista duo ordinarentur per legem: ut scilicet aliqua lex esset certa secundum quam cosmi deberent expelli, vel cedere principatui, quam quod hoc fieret secundum voluntatem hominum, quae non est securus canon, id est secura regula, cum frequenter voluntas humana sit irrationabilis et iniusta.

Therefore, he first says that the medicine that the Cretans made against the aforementioned sins concerning uncorrectable governors is not fitting, nor is it political—as if the wise were the common order of the city—but rather is oppressive and tyrannical, which is not according to reason, but through violence. For many times, some among them assembled, either from the governors or from private persons, and cast out the cosmoi through violence. There was also another remedy, because the cosmoi were able to renounce their government within their own lifetime. But it was better that these two things should be put in order through law—so that there would be some certain [certa] law, according to which the cosmoi ought to be expelled, or to depart from their government—than that this should come to be following the will of men, which is not a safe canon—that is, a safe rule—since frequently, the human will is irrational and unjust.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit omnium autem pessimum etc., ponit remedium quod habebant contra ipsum officium; et dicit, quod illud erat pessimum inter omnia remedia, quod quando cosmi volebant dare sententias contra aliquos potentes, frequenter inter eos instituebatur acosme, id est cessatio principatus cosmorum: interdicebant enim ad tempus omnino talem principatum: hoc autem dicit esse pessimum, quia non solum erat contra personas, sed contra totum officium vel principatum, ex quo proveniebat multa utilitas civitati.

Then, where he says omnium autem pessimum, etc., he lays out the remedy that they had for the office itself; and he says that it was the worse among all the remedies that when the cosmoi wished to give sentence against some of the powerful, they frequently instituted among them an acosmoi—that is, a break from the government of the cosmoi: for they utterly forbid, for a time, such government. And he says that this is the worst thing, because it was not only against the persons, but was against the whole office, or government, from which came forth many useful things for the city.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit aut et palam etc., improbat praedicta remedia. Et dicit quod ista institutio ultima de vacatione cosmorum habet aliquid politiae inquantum fit de communi consensu populi, sed tamen non est vera politia, sed magis oppressio quaedam per potentiam populi, et via quaedam ad tyrannidem. Consueverunt enim aliqui habentes odio cosmos, colligantes sibi populum et alios amicos suos facere monarchiam, ut scilicet aliquis eorum dominetur in civitate loco omnium; et quando hoc non possunt statim facere, movent seditiones et pugnant cives adinvicem. Nihil autem hoc differt, quam quod post aliquod tempus iam non sit civitas, sed solvatur tota communio politica.

Then, where he says aut et palam, etc., he objects to the aforementioned remedy. And he says that this last institution, about the emptying of the cosmoi, has something of regime inasmuch as it comes to be from the common consent of the people—but yet it is not a true regime, but it is rather an oppression through the power of the people, and a path to tyranny. For some who had hatred for the cosmoi were accustomed to gather to themselves the people and their other friends to make a monarchy, so that one of them could have mastery in the city in the place of all; and when they could not do this immediately, they raised sedition and the citizens fought with each other. But this is not at all different from a situation where, after some time, there will no longer be a city, but the whole political communion will be unbound.

Polit.L15

Non enim potest esse civitas, soluta concordia civium; et sic per seipsam dissolvitur. Sed etiam antequam per seipsam dissolvatur imminet ei periculum ab hostibus, qui volunt et valent invadere civitatem; quia dum cives adinvicem pugnant, non possunt unanimiter resistere hostibus; et quandoque una pars introducit hostes in sui auxilium. Sed, sicut dictum est, ab huiusmodi periculis hostium liberata fuit politia Cretensium propter locum, quia habitabant in insula longe ab aliis civitatibus; et sic ipsa longinquitas fecit eos securos ab expulsione, idest quod non expellerentur de proprio loco ab hostibus. Et huius ponit duo signa: quorum unum est, quod status incolarum perseverat apud Cretenses propter consuetudinem conversationis. Sed illi qui adveniunt aliunde ad ministrandum, non possunt cum eis diu commorari, quia nullum principatum possunt apud eos habere. Non enim volebant Cretenses habere principes extraneos. Secundum signum est, quia nuper transierat ad insulam Cretensium bellum ab extraneis invadentibus insulam: ex quo manifestum est, quod leges eorum non erant sufficienter virtuosae ad conservandum eorum politiam; sed conservabantur, quia non habebant inimicos contra se bellantes. Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod intantum dictum est de politia Cretensium.

For there cannot be a city when the concord of the citizens is unbound; and thus [the city] as such is dismantled. But even before it would be dismantled as such, danger will threaten it, from enemies who wish and are strong enough to invade the city; because so long as the citizens fight each other, they are not able to resist their enemies with one spirit; and sometimes, one part introduces enemies in aid of themselves. But, as it has been said, the regime of the Cretans was freed from the dangers of enemies because of its place, because they dwelt in an island far from other cities; and the distance itself made them safe from being driven out—that is, that they would not be driven out from their own place by enemies. And he lays out two signs of this: one is that the establishment [status] of the residents endured among the Cretans because of their custom of association. But those who immigrated from elsewhere for serving were not able to linger with them for long, because they were not able to have any government among them. For the Cretans did not wish to have government who were foreigners. The second sign is that war had recently come over to the island of the Cretans from foreign invaders of the island: from this it is clear that their laws were not sufficiently virtuous to preserve their regime; but they were preserved because they did not have any enemies warring against them. Lastly, in an epilogue, he concludes that enough has been said about the regime of the Cretans.

Polit.L15

Lecture 16

Polit.L16

Politizare autem videntur et Calcedonii bene, et in multis abundantius ad alios. Maxime autem quaedam propinquae Lacedemonibus: hae enim politeiae tres ad invicem propinquae aliqualiter sunt et ab aliis multum differunt, quae Cretensium et lacedemonica et tertia ab his quae Calcedoniorum; et multa institutorum se habent apud ipsos bene. Signum autem politieiae coordinatae populum habentem permanere in institutione politeiae, et neque seditionem quod et dignum dici fieri, neque tyrannum.

The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form of government, which differs from that of any other state in several respects, though it is in some very like the Lacedaemonian. Indeed, all three states- the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian- nearly resemble one another, and are very different from any others. Many of the Carthaginian institutions are excellent. The superiority of their constitution is proved by the fact that the common people remain loyal to the constitution the Carthaginians have never had any rebellion worth speaking of, and have never been under the rule of a tyrant.

Polit.L16

Habet autem similia Lacedemonum politeiae convivia quidem societatum filitiois. Eum autem qui centum et quatuor principatum eforis. Verumtamen non deterius: hi quidem enim ex contingentibus sunt, hunc autem eligunt principatum virtuosum. Reges autem et gerusiam proportianata his quae ibi regibus et senibus.

Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following: the common tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia, and their magistracy of the 104 to the Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit—this is an improvement. They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta.

Polit.L16

Et melius autem reges neque per se esse genus, neque hoc quod contingens. Sique differens, ex his eligibiles magis quam secundum aetatem; magnorum enim domini constituti si viles fuerint multum laedunt et laeserunt iam civitatem Calcedoniorum; plurima quidem igitur increpatorum utique propter transgressiones communia existunt entia omnibus dictis politeiis.

Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same family, nor that an ordinary one, but if there is some distinguished family they are selected out of it and not appointed by senority—this is far better. Such officers have great power, and therefore, if they are persons of little worth, do a great deal of harm, and they have already done harm at Lacedaemon.

Polit.L16

Eorum quae ad suppositionem aristocratiae et politeiae, haec quidem ad demum declinant magis, haec autem ad oligarchiam; eius quidem enim quod est haec quidem adducere, haec autem non adducere ad populum reges domini cum senibus si consenserint omnes. Si autem non, et horum populus. Quaecumque autem intulerint non audire solum attribuunt populo qui statuit principibus, sed domini de iudicando sunt, et volenti illatis contradicere licet, quod quidem in aliis politeiis non est; pentarchias autem dominas existentes multorum et magnorum ab ipsis eligibiles esse, et eum qui centum hos eligere maximum principatum. Adhuc autem hos ampliori principari tempore aliis, et enim praeteriti principantur et futuri, oligarchicum. Quod autem sine pretio et non sortiales, aristocraticum ponendum, et si quid tale alterum, et sententias a principibus iudicari omnes, et non alias ab aliis quaemadmodum in Lacedemonia.

Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally to all the forms of government which we have mentioned. But of the deflections from aristocracy and constitutional government, some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people, but when they are not unanimous, the people decide on such matters as well. And whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not only heard but also determined by them, and any one who likes may oppose it; now this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistrates of five who have under them many important matters should be co-opted, that they should choose the supreme council of 100, and should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and after they hold office)—these are oligarchical features; their being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points, such as the practice of having all suits tried by the magistrates, and not some by one class of judges or jurors and some by another, as at Lacedaemon, are characteristic of aristocracy.

Polit.L16

Transgreditur autem aristocratiae institutio Calcedoniorum maxime ad oligarchiam secundum quendam intellectum ut videtur multis. Non enim solum virtuosum sed et divitem putant oportere eligi principem. Impossibile enim egentem bene principari et vacare. Si quidem igitur eligere divitem oligarchicum, secundum virtutem autem aristocraticum, iste quidem utique erit ordo tertius, secundum quem quidem ordinata sunt et apud Calcedonas quae circa politeiam: eligunt enim ad duo haec respicientes et maxime maximos reges et duces exercitus.

The Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men in general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth: a man, they say, who is poor cannot rule well- he has not the leisure. If, then, election of magistrates for their wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the Carthaginians choose their magistrates, and particularly the highest of them—their kings and generals—with an eye both to merit and to wealth.

Polit.L16

Oportet autem putare peccatum legislatoris esse transgressionem hanc aristocratiae; a principio enim hoc videre est necessariissimorum, qualiter optimi possint vacare et nihil dehonestari, non solum principes, sed neque singulariter viventes.

But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but when out of office, should have leisure and not disgrace themselves in any way; and to this his attention should be first directed.

Polit.L16

Si autem oportet aspicere et ad abundantiam gratia vacationis, pravum maximos principatuum venales esse, regnum scilicet et ducatum exercitus; lex enim ista divitias facit pretiosas magis virtute, et civitatem totam amativam pecuniarum. Quodcumque autem existimat pretiosum esse quod principale, necesse et aliarum politiarum opinionem assequi his. Ubi autem non maxime virtus honoratur, hanc politiam non est possibile firmiter secundum virtutem principari. Rationabile autem assuescere lucrari hoc ementes quando cum expenderint principentur. Inconveniens quidem enim si pauper quidem existens, epieikes autem volet lucrari; deterior autem utique non volet cum expenderit, propter quod oportet eos qui possunt aristarchizare, hos principari.

Even if you must have regard to wealth, in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever the chiefs of the state deem anything honorable, the other citizens are sure to follow their example; and, where virtue has not the first place, their aristocracy cannot be firmly established. Those who have been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has incurred a great expense will not. Wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best.

Polit.L16

Dignius autem si et praeferret penuriam epieikorum legislator, sed et principantium curaret de vacatione.

And even if the legislator does not care to protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for them when in office.

Polit.L16

Pravum autem utique videbitur esse, et plures principatus eundem principari, quod quidem acceptatur aput Calcedonios. Unum enim opus ab uno optime perficitur. Oportet autem qualiter fiat hoc, videre legislatorum, et non praecipere eundem fistulare et coria incidere. Quare ubi non parva civitas, magis politicum est plures participare principatibus et magis demoticum. Communius enim sicut diximus et pulchrius unumquodque perficitur ab eisdem, et velocius; palam autem hoc in bellicis et nauticis. In his enim ambobus per omnes ut est dicere extenditur principari et subici.

It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person should hold many offices, which is a favorite practice among the Carthaginians, for one business is better done by one man. The legislator should see to this and should not appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker. Hence, where the state is large, it is more in accordance both with constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many persons. For, as I said, this arrangement is fairer to all, and any action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner performed. We have a proof in military and naval matters; the duties of command and of obedience in both these services extend to all.

Polit.L16

Oligarchia autem existente politia, optime effugiunt in ditando semper aliquam populi partem emittentes super civitates; hoc enim sanant et faciunt mansivam politiam. Sed hoc est fortune opus; oportet autem inseditionales esse propter legislatorem. Nunc autem si infortunium alquod eveniat et multitudo abcesserit subiectorum, nullum est remedium quietis per leges. De Lacedemoniorum quidem igitur politia et Cretensium et Calcedoniorum quae merito acceptantur, hoc habet modo.

The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of the people after another by sending them to their colonies. This is their panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state. Accident favors them, but the legislator should be able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the bulk of the subjects revolted, there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods. Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated.

Polit.L16

Politizare autem videntur et cetera. Postquam Philosophus prosecutus est de politia Lacedaemoniorum et Cretensium, prosequitur de politia Calchedonensium. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Politizare autem videntur, etc. After the philosopher has pursued the regime of the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans, and pursues the regime of the Carthaginians. And concerning this he does three things.

Polit.L16

Primo commendat huiusmodi politiam simul cum praemissis.

First, he he commends a regime of this sort, along with the others.

Polit.L16

Secundo ostendit convenientiam huius politiae ad praemissas, ibi, habet autem similia et cetera.

Second, he shows the agreement of this regime with the aforementioned, at habet autem similia, [II.16.2] etc.

Polit.L16

Tertio improbat quaedam circa ipsam, ibi, et melius autem reges et cetera.

Third, he objects to some things about it, at melius autem reges, [II.16.3] etc.

Polit.L16

Dicit ergo primo, quod Calchedonenses bene videbantur vivere politice, et quantum ad multa melius aliis, et maxime in illis in quibus appropinquabant ad politiam Lacedaemonicam. Istae enim tres politiae erant adinvicem propinquae, multum ab aliis differentes, scilicet Cretensis, Lacedaemonica et Calchedonensis; et multa erant bene statuta, apud eos. Signum autem quod politia eorum esset bene ordinata, est quod populus permanebat quietus in tali ordinatione, et non fiebat ibi seditio populi quae esset alicuius ponderis, neque etiam degeneravit eorum politia ad tyrannidem.

Therefore, he first says that the Carthaginians seemed to live well politically, and better than the others with reference to many things, and most of all in those in which it approaches the Lacedaemonian regime. For these three regimes—namely, that of the Cretans, the Lacedaemonian, and that of the Carthaginians—were related to each other, and greatly different from the others; and they had many good establishments among them. Moreoever, a sign that their regimes were well-ordered is that the people remained quieted in such an order, and no sedition of the people of any weight came to be there, nor did their regime even degenerate into tyranny.

Polit.L16

Deinde cum dicit habet autem similia etc., ostendit convenientiam huius politiae ad Lacedaemonicam.

Then, where he says habet autem similia, etc., he shows the agreement of this regime with the Lacedaemonian.

Polit.L16

Et primo quidem quantum ad hoc, quod apud ipsos fiebant convivia societatum quae Lacedaemones vocabant Philitia.

And first, with reference to this: that among them there were the feasts of society that the Lacedaemonians called Philitia.

Polit.L16

Secundo quantum ad regimen civitatis; quia apud Calchedonenses erat principatus centum et quatuor virorum similis principatui ephororum qui erat apud Lacedaemones: tamen quantum ad hoc non deterius sed melius se habebant Calchedonenses; quia Lacedaemonii instituebant ephoros ex contingentibus, idest ex quibuscumque personis, et etiam non approbatis in virtute. Sed Calchedonenses eligebant ad hunc principatum solum homines virtuosos. Similiter etiam Calchedonenses habebant reges sicut Lacedaemones, et habebant iherusiam, id est dignitatem quamdam vel honorabilitatem correspondentem senioribus qui erant apud Lacedaemones.

Second, with reference to the rule of the city; because among the Carthaginians there was the government of the hundred and four men, like the government of the ephors who were among the Lacedaemonians: yet, with reference to this, they were not worse, but the Carthaginians were better-arranged; because the Lacedaemonians instituted the ephors from an undetermined group—that is, from any persons whatsoever—who also were not proven in virtue. But the Carthaginians chose for this government only virtuous men. Likewise, also, the Carthaginians had kings like the Lacedaemonians, and had iherusia—that is, a certain place of worth or honor that corresponded with the elders who were among the Lacedaemonians.

Polit.L16

Deinde cum dicit melius autem etc., improbat praedictam politiam secundum duos modos supra positos.

Then, where he says melius autem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime according to the two modes posited above.

Polit.L16

Et primo quidem quantum ad hoc, quod non erat apud eos bene statutum.

And first, with reference to this: that it was not well-established.

Polit.L16

Secundo quantum ad hoc, quod non concordabat intentioni legislatoris, ibi, eorum autem quae ad suppositionem et cetera.

Second, with reference to this: that it did not accord [concordia] with the intention of the legislator, at eorum autem quae ad suppositionem, [II.16.4] etc.

Polit.L16

Dicit ergo primo, quod melius esset, quod reges non acciperentur ex uno solo genere, sed ex quibuscumque virtuosis: et si deberent ex uno genere accipi, non deberet esse illud genus qualecumque, sed tale, ex quo ut in pluribus boni prodirent. Et iterum si eligatur aliquod genus differens bonitate ab aliis, ex quo assumantur reges, melius esset, quod ex illo genere aliqui eligerentur ad regnum per electionem quam per aetatem; puta, quod primogeniti dominentur: quod dum aliter fit, frequenter contingit quod homines viles perveniunt ad regnum: et hoc est valde periculosum, si homines viles constituantur ad habendum potestatem de rebus magnis. Multum enim hoc laedit civitates: et tales viles reges in multis laeserant civitatem Calchedonensium. Concludit etiam ex praedictis, quod cum tres istae politiae sint similes, communia sunt omnibus ea quae sunt in eis increpatione digna. Et ideo quae dicta sunt in aliis, sunt etiam hic intelligenda.

Therefore, he first says that it would be better that the kings were not received from only one family, but from any of the virtuous: and if they ought to have been received from one family, the family ought not to be of just any kind, but of the sort from which the good usually come forth. And again, if some family were chosen that differed in goodness from the others, from which the kings were assumed, it would be better that from that family, those be chosen as king through choice rather than by age—when, for example, the first-born has mastery: in which, when it occurs otherwise, it frequently happens that worthless men come into rule: and it is exceedingly dangerous if worthless men are constituted as having power over great affairs. For this greatly wounds cities: and such worthless kings wounded the city of the Carthaginians in many things. He also concludes from what has been said that since these three regimes are similar, there are things common to all of them that are worthy of rebuke. And therefore, what has been said regarding the others should also be understood here.

Polit.L16

Deinde cum dicit eorum autem quae etc., improbat hanc politiam quantum ad hoc, quod recedebat a proposita intentione. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Then, where he says eorum autem quae, etc., he objects to this regime with reference to this: that it fell away from its proposed intention. Concerning this he does three things.

Polit.L16

Primo ostendit, quod in quibusdam divertebat ad democratiam, in quibusdam ad oligarchiam.

First, he shows that in some things, it veered toward democracy, and in others, toward oligarchy.

Polit.L16

Secundo ostendit, quod magis divertebat ad oligarchiam, ibi, transgreditur autem aristocratiae et cetera.

Second, he shows that it veered more toward oligarchy, at transgreditur autem aristocratiae, [II.16.5] etc.

Polit.L16

Tertio improbat remedium, quod contra hoc apponebant, ibi oligarchia autem et cetera.

Third, he objects to the remedy that they applied to this, at oligarchia autem, [II.16.9] etc.

Polit.L16

Dicit ergo primo, quod cum ista esset supposita intentio legislatoris apud Calchedones ut institueret politiam vel aristocratiam, quaedam statutorum eius declinabant ad demum, id est ad populum, quaedam ad oligarchiam. Erat enim apud eos statutum, quod reges cum senioribus haberent in sua potestate aliqua deferre ad populum, vel non deferre quando omnes consentirent: si autem non omnes consentirent, populus habebat de illis in hoc iudicium quid fieri deberet. Similiter autem quando de communi consensu aliqua referebant ad populum, non solum populus habebat audire quae dicebantur et approbare, sed habebat potestatem diiudicandi an esset bonum vel non: et si volebat populus, poterat contradicere: quod non fiebat in aliis praemissis politiis: et sic populus statuebat principibus quid esset faciendum: et hoc erat democraticum. Ex alia parte erat apud eos quaedam pentharchiae, id est principatus quinque virorum, qui habebant se intromittere de multis et magnis negociis civitatis: et isti eligebantur per solos principes. Similiter etiam et per eos solos eligebantur illi centum quatuor, de quibus supra dictum est. Similiter etiam maiores civitatis pluri tempore principabantur quam alii: quia illi qui praecesserant in principatu, erant socii in principatu eorum qui succedebant, et sic duplicabatur eis tempus principatus, quod non fiebat aliis minoribus: et hoc erat oligarchicum. Erat etiam apud eos aliquid aristocraticum, scilicet quod principes eligebantur absque pretio dato ab eis. Et iterum non eligebantur per sortem, sed propter virtutem, et quaedam alia huiusmodi. Et sic non in omnibus recedebant ab aristocratia. Habebant etiam aliud oligarchicum: scilicet, quod maximi principes iudicabant de omnibus sententiis. Non autem erant diversi, qui ex diversis iudicarent, sicut fiebat in Lacedaemonia.

Therefore, he first says that, although it was the presupposed intention of the legislator among the Carthaginians to institute a polity or aristocracy, some of his establishments bent down toward the demos—that is, toward the people—and some toward oligarchy. For it was established among them that the kings, along with the elders, would have it in their power to defer something to the people, or not to defer when all were in accord: but if not all were in accord, the people had the judgment of what ought to occur in this matter. Likewise, moreover, when from common accord, they referred something to the people, the people not only had the power to hear what was said, and to approve it, but it had the power to make the judgment of whether it was good or not: and if the people wished, they could contradict it—which did not occur in the other previous regimes: and so the people established for the governors what should be done: and this was democratic. On the other hand, there was among them a sort of pentharchia—that is, a government of five men—who had the power to interject themselves into many and great occupations of the city: and these men were chosen only by the governors. Likewise, also, by them alone were chosen the one hundred and four, about whom it was spoken above. Likewise, also, the greater men of the city were governors for a greater time than the others, because those who preceded in government were companions in government of those who succeeded them, and so the time of government was doubled for them, which did not occur for the others who were lesser: and this was oligarchic. There was also something aristocratic among them: that the governors were chosen giving bribes. And again, they were not chosen by lot, but on account of virtue, and some other things of this sort. And so they did not fall away from aristocracy in all things. They also had something else that was oligarchic: that the greatest governors judged all sentences. However, there were not diverse [governors] who judged diverse affairs, as happened in Lacedaemon.

Polit.L16

Deinde cum dicit transgreditur autem etc., ostendit, quod ista politia magis declinabat ad oligarchiam.

Then, where he says transgreditur autem, etc., he shows that this regime bent down more toward oligarchy.

Polit.L16

Et hoc quantum ad duo, quorum secundum ponit ibi, pravum autem utique et cetera.

And this is with reference to two things: he lays out the second at pravum autem utique, [II.16.8] etc.

Polit.L16

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L16

Primo ostendit in quo declinabat ad oligarchiam.

First, he shows where it bent down toward oligarchy.

Polit.L16

Secundo improbat, ibi, oportet autem putare et cetera.

Second, he objects to it, at oportet autem putare, [II.16.6] etc.

Polit.L16

Dicit ergo primo, quod institutio politiae Calchedonensis quam volebant esse aristocraticam, maxime declinabat ad oligarchiam, sicut multis videtur. Putabant enim, quod oportet eligi principes non solum virtuosos, sed etiam divites: et movebantur hac ratione: quia impossibile erat, quod aliquis pauper bene principaretur et vacaret negotiis civitatis. Non enim habebant eorum principes salarium de communi. Unde oportebat, si pauperes virtuosi eligerentur in principes, quod praetermissis negotiis civitatis intenderent ad quaerendum sibi victum. Quia autem eligere principem divitem est oligarchicum, eligere autem virtuosum est aristocraticum, manifestum est, quod eligere divitem virtuosum erit iam tertius ordo, qui observabatur apud Calchedonenses. Eligebant enim maximos principes reges et duces exercitus, respicientes simul ad divitias et virtutes.

Therefore, he first says that the institution of the regime of the Carthaginians, which they wished to be aristocratic, bent down most of all toward oligarchy, as it seems to in many [regimes]. For they deemed that not only virtuous governors must be chosen, but also wealthy ones: and they were moved by this reason: because it was impossible that someone poor could rule well and also be freed up for the occupations of the city. For their governors did not have a salary from the common treasury. Hence, if those virtuous and poor were chosen as governors, they would need to intend acquiring provisions for themselves, while neglecting the occupations of the city. However, because it is oligarchic to choose the wealthy as leaders, but aristocratic to choose the virtuous, it is clear that to choose those wealthy and virtuous will be some third order, which was observed among the Carthaginians. For above all, they chose as governors kings and military generals, respecting at the same time wealth and the virtues.

Polit.L16

Deinde cum dicit oportet autem putare etc., improbat praedictam ordinationem.

Then, where he says oportet autem putare, etc., he objects to the aforementioned ordering.

Polit.L16

Et primo rationem qua movebantur.

And first, he objects to the reason by which they were moved.

Polit.L16

Secundo ipsam ordinationem, ibi, si autem oportet et cetera.

Second, the ordering itself, at si autem oportet, etc.

Polit.L16

Dicit ergo primo, quod iste recessus ab aristocratia est imputandus legislatori: hoc enim fuit maxime necessarium videre a principio, qualiter homines optimi in virtute, possent vacare operibus virtutum, absque hoc quod dehonestarentur vacando rusticanis operibus: et hoc non solum quando principarentur, seu etiam quando agerent privatam vitam; instituendo scilicet aliqua praemia virtutum, ex quibus nutrirentur virtuosi.

Therefore, he first says that such a falling away from aristocracy should be credited to the legislator: for it was of the greatest necessity to see from the beginning in what way the best men in virtue would be able to be freed-up for the works of virtue, without being dishonored, by being freed-up from course work: and this is not only when they are governors, but even when they were acting in private life—namely, by instituting some reward for virtue, by which the virtuous would be supported.

Polit.L16

Deinde cum dicit si autem oportet etc., improbat ipsam ordinationem dupliciter.

Then, where he says si autem oportet, etc., he objects to this ordering in two ways.

Polit.L16

Primo quidem ostendens eam esse periculosam. Si enim oportet in eligendis principibus aspicere ad divitias, ad hoc quod possint vacare absque operibus, quibus lucrentur victum, valde malum erit quod maximi principatus, scilicet regnum et ducatus exercitus, sint venales, ita scilicet, quod pro abundantia pecuniarum dentur. Ita etiam dicit esse pravum, quia ex hac lege sequitur, quod tota civitas sit amativa pecuniae, etiam magis quam virtutis. Quia cives quicquid viderint esse pretiosum in principatibus, consequenter opinantur pretiosum esse. Et in quacumque civitate virtus non maxime honoratur, ut scilicet soli virtuti honor principatus deferatur, impossibile quod in tali civitate homines secundum virtutem infallibiliter principentur. Et ex quo propter divitias principatus datur, quodammodo divitiis emptus, probabile est, quod cives consuescant inhiare ad lucra pecuniae; quando cum expenderint, poterunt principari. Valde enim inconveniens est, si dicatur, quod ille qui est pauper et virtuosus, volet lucrari in officio constitutus, ille autem qui est deterior, non volet lucrari, postquam multa expenderit ad principatum acquirendum. Hoc enim est omnino improbabile. Et ideo non oportet requirere, an sint divites illi qui sunt instituendi ad principatum: sed sive sint divites, sive pauperes, illi debent institui qui possunt aristarchizare, id est principari secundum virtutem. Secundo, ibi, dignius et cetera. Improbat praedictam legem ex hoc, quod praetermittit convenientius remedium quod possit adhiberi. Dignius enim esset si legislator praeeligeret ad principatum paupertatem virtuosorum, non respiciens ad divitias; et cum hoc curam aliquam apponeret, ut saltem in principatu existentes possent vacare.

First, he shows that it is dangerous. For if one must look toward wealth when choosing governors, so that they can be freed-up, without the works through which they make gain for their own provision, it will be exceedingly evil that the greatest governments—the king, and the commanders of the army—will be for sale, so that they will be for whomever may be given an abundance of money. Thus, he says that it is crooked, because from this law it would follow that the whole city would be lovers of money—even more than of virtue. Because whatever citizens see to be valuable for government, they consequently opine to be valuable. And in whatever city virtue does not receive the greatest honor—so that the honor of government is deferred only to virtue—it is impossible that in such a city men will infallibly govern according to virtue. And because government is given on account of wealth, in a sense, purchased by wealth, it is probable that the citizens will become accustomed to gape after the gain of money, when [it is the case that] they would be able to govern by spending it. For it is exceedingly unfitting, if it should be said that he who is poor and virtuous will wish for gain when constituted in an office, but that he who is worse will not wish for gain after he has spent much money to acquire government. For this is utterly improbable. And therefore, one should not seek whether they are wealthy who are to be instituted to government, but [rather], whether they are wealthy or poor, those ought to be instituted who are able to aristarchizare—that is, to govern according to virtue. Second, at dignius, etc., he objects to the aforementioned law for this: that it neglected a more fitting remedy that could have been applied. For it would be more worthy if a legislator gave preference to the choice of those poor and virtuous for government, not looking to wealth; and along with this, that he set up some cure, so that at any event, they could exist unoccupied while in government.

Polit.L16

Deinde cum dicit pravum autem utique etc., ponit secundo, in quo declinabat ista politia ad oligarchiam, et dicit hoc esse pravum id quod observabatur apud Calchedones, ut idem obtineret plures principatus sive plura officia: quia unum opus optime perficitur ab uno homine. Si autem unus homo debeat plura opera exercere, necesse est, quod impediatur in altero, vel in utroque. Unde legislatorem oportet attendere, ut non imponat plura opera uni homini: puta, quod non praecipiat eidem fistulare et incidere coria. Et ideo, nisi parvitas civitatis impediat, magis videtur esse politicum et demoticum id est populare, ut plures participent principatibus diversis, non autem unus habeat plures principatus: quia hoc est oligarchicum. Ideo autem illud est melius, quia unumquodque, sicut praedictum est, et pulchrius et velocius perficitur ab uno: ita quod unus non cogatur multa facere. Et hoc videmus in exercitu et in navi. Utrobique enim propter distinctionem officiorum quodammodo ad omnes extenditur principari et subiici; dum scilicet quidam subiecti quibusdam aliis praeferuntur usque ad infimos.

Then, where he says pravum autem utique, etc., he lays out his second way in which this regime bends down toward oligarchy, and he says that what was observed among the Carthaginians is crooked—that the same person would obtain several seats of government or several offices: because one work is perfected best by one man. However, if one man should have to exercise several works, it is necessary that he should be hindered in the other, or in both. Hence, the legislator must attend, lest he impose several works on one man: for example, that he not require the same man to pipe and to cut leather. And therefore, lest the smallness of the city should be a hindrance, it seems to be more political and demotic—that is, popular—that several people should participate in diverse seats of government, but not that one should have several seats of government: because this is oligarchic. And therefore, this is better, because each thing, as was said, is more beautifully and swiftly perfected by one [person], so that one person should not be compelled to do many things. And we see this in the army and on ships. For with both, because of the distinction of officers, to govern and to be subject is in some way extended to all—where some subjects are preferred to others, all the way to the lowest ranks.

Polit.L16

Deinde cum dicit oligarchia autem existente etc., improbat remedium quod contra praedictam declinationem habebant. Et dicit, quod cum politia eorum esset oligarchica, optimum modum adinvenerunt ad effugiendum seditionem populi, quia semper aliquos de populo mittebant ad regimina civitatum sibi subiectarum ut sic ditarentur, et per hoc quodammodo sanabant et faciebant permanere suam politiam; sed hoc erat a fortuna; quia scilicet civitates eis subiectae non rebellaverant. Oportet autem, ut cives sint absque seditione, non propter fortunam, sed propter providentiam legislatoris. Nunc autem si aliquod infortunium Calchedonibus eveniat, ut magna pars subiectorum discedat ab eorum dominio, nullum erit remedium contra seditiones propter leges ab eis latas. Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod ea quae praedicta sunt, merito possunt acceptari circa politiam Lacedaemonum, et Cretensium, et Calchedonensium.

Then, where he says oligarchia autem existente, etc., he objects to the remedy that they had against the aforementioned bending down. And he says that, although their regime was oligarchic, they discovered the best manner of escaping the sedition of the people, because they always sent some of the people for the rule of the cities that were subject to them, so that they were thus made wealthy, and through this, in some way they healed their regime, and made it endure; but this was by fortune, because the cities subject to them did not rebel. However, it must not be by fortune that citizens are without sedition, but by the providence of the legislator. Now, however, if some misfortune were to happen to the Carthaginians, such that a great part of their subjects left their mastery, there will be no remedy against sedition because of the laws they upheld. Lastly, in an epilogue, he concludes that what has been said about the regimes of the Lacedaemonians, the Cretans, and the Carthaginians, merits acceptance.

Polit.L16

Lecture 17

Polit.L17

Eorum autem qui pronuntiaverunt de politia quidam quidem non communicaverunt actionibus politicis nullis, sed perseveraverunt singulari vita viventes. De quibus si quid sermone dignum, dictum est fere de omnibus. Quidam autem legislatores fuerunt, hi quidem propriis civitatibus, hi autem et quibusdam extraneorum politicae conversati ipsi, et horum hi quidem fuerunt conditores legum, hi autem et politiae, puta Likurgus et Solon. Isti enim et leges et politias instituerunt.

Of those who have treated of governments, some have never taken any part at all in public affairs, but have passed their lives in a private station; about most of them, what was worth telling has been already told. Others have been lawgivers, either in their own or in foreign cities, whose affairs they have administered; and of these some have only made laws, others have framed constitutions; for example, Lycurgus and Solon did both.

Polit.L17

De ea quidem igitur quae Lacedemoniorum dictum est. Solonem autem aliqui quidem putant fuisse legislatorem sudiosum. Oligarchiam enim dissolvisse valde intemperatam existentem, et servientem populum liberasse, et democratiam patriam instituisse, miscuisseque bene politiam; fuisse enim quod quidem in Ariopago consilium oligarchicum, quod autem principatus eligibiles aristocraticum, pretorium autem demoticum. Videtur autem Solon illa quidem existentia prius non dissolvisse, consilium scilicet et principatuum electionem, populum autem instituisse pretoria faciens ex omnibus.

Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I have already spoken. As to Solon, he is thought by some to have been a good legislator, who put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different elements of the state. According to their view, the council of Areopagus was an oligarchical element, the elected magistracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical. The truth seems to be that the council and the elected magistracy existed before the time of Solon, and were retained by him, but that he formed the courts of law out of an the citizens, thus creating the democracy.

Polit.L17

Propter quod et quidam accusant ipsum; solvere enim alteram cum fecerit pretorium dominum omnium, cum sit sortiale. Cum enim hoc invalvit sicut tyranno populo largientes politiam in eam quae nunc democratiam instituti sunt, et id quidem quod in Ariopago consilium, Efialtes prohibuit et Periclees, et hoc itaque modo unusquisque rectorum populi augens produxit in eam quae nunc democratiam.

This is why he is sometimes blamed; for in giving the supreme power to the law courts, which are elected by lot, he is thought to have destroyed the non-democratic element. When the law courts grew powerful, to please the people who were now playing the tyrant the old constitution was changed into the existing democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of the Areopagus; Pericles also instituted the payment of the juries, and thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy until it became what we now see.

Polit.L17

Videtur autem hoc non secundum Solonis voluntatem factum fuisse, sed magis ab accidente. Navarchiae enim in Medis populus factus causa astute concepit, et rectores populi accepit pravos pro politicae conversantibus epieikis; quoniam et Solon videtur necessarium maxime potentiam attribuere populo scilicet principatus eligere et corrigere. Neque enim huius populus existens dominus servus utique esset et abundantibus instituit omnes, ex quingentis medimnis et iugariis, et tertio fine vocato equestri. Quartum autem quod mercennarium, quibus nullus principatus attinebat.

All this is true; it seems, however, to be the result of circumstances, and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people, having been instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian War, began to get a notion of itself, and followed worthless demagogues, whom the better class opposed. Solon, himself, appears to have given the Athenians only that power of electing to offices and calling to account the magistrates which was absolutely necessary; for without it they would have been in a state of slavery and enmity to the government. All the magistrates he appointed from the notables and the men of wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni, or from the class called zeugitae, or from a third class of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth class were laborers who had no share in any magistracy.

Polit.L17

Legislatores autem fuerunt Zaleucus Locris occidentalibus et Charondas cataneus suis civibus, et aliis Calcidiae civitatibus circa Italiam et Siciliam. Volunt autem quidam colligere qualiter Onomacritus fuit primus industrius circa legislationem, exercitatum autem fuisse in Creta cum esset locrus et prefectum populo secundum artem; huius autem fuisse socium Theletam, Theletae autem auditorem Likurgum et Zaleucum, Zaleuci autem Charondam. Sed haec quidem dicunt inconsideratius tempori dicentes.

Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his own city of Catana, and for the other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily. Some people attempt to make out that Onomacritus was the first person who had any special skill in legislation, and that he, although a Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived in the exercise of his prophetic art; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But their account is quite inconsistent with chronology.

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Fuit autem et Filolaus corinthius legislator Thebeis, erat autem Filolaus de genere quidem Bachidorum; amator autem factus Dyocleis qui vicit olimpiadem, ut ille civitatem reliquit recordatus amorem matris Ankyones abiit Thebas, et ibi vitam finierunt ambo. Et nunc adhuc ostendunt sepulchra ipsorum invicem quidem facile conspectibilia existentia, ad regionem autem Corinthiorum hoc quidem conspectibili, hoc autem non conspectibili; fabulantur enim ipsos sic ordinasse sepulturam, Dyoclea quidem propter abstinentiam passionis quatinus non visibilis sit Corinthia a pulvere, Filolaum autem quatinus visibilis; habitaverunt quidem igitur propter talem causam apud Thebeos.

There was also Philolaus, the Corinthian, who gave laws to the Thebans. This Philolaus was one of the family of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor, who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his mother Halcyone had conceived for him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days. The inhabitants still point out their tombs, which are in full view of one another, but one is visible from the Corinthian territory, the other not. Tradition says the two friends arranged them thus, Diocles out of horror at his misfortunes, so that the land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb; Philolaus that it might. This is the reason why they settled at Thebes.

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Legislator autem fuit ipsis Filolaus de aliis quibusdam et de puerorum procreatione quas vocant illi leges positivas, et hoc est singulariter ab illo lege statutum, quatinus numerus salvetur sortium. Charondi autem nihil est proprium nisi vindictae falsorum testium; primus enim fecit considerationem. Diligentia autem est placentior et his qui nunc legislatoribus. Filolai autem proprium est substantiarum irregularitas, Platonis autem mulierum et puerorum et substantiae communitas et convivia mulierum, adhuc autem lex circa ebrietatem scilicet sobrios symposiarchizare, et exercitium in bellicis quatinus ambidextri fiant per studium ut oportunum est, non hac quidem manuum utile esse, hac autem inutile. Dracontis autem leges sunt; politiae autem existenti leges posuit, proprium autem in legibus nihil est quod sit memoria dignum, nisi sevitia propter dampni magnitudinem. Fuit autem et Pittacus legum conditor, sed non politiae; lex autem propria ipsius, ebrios si percusserint amplius dampnum ferre quam sobrios, quia plures iniuriantur ebrii quam sobrii; non ad veniam respexit quia oportet ebris habere magis, sed ad conferens. Fuit autem et Androdamas reginus legislator Calcidibus qui in Tracia, cuius circa homicidialia et heredationes est; attamen proprium ipsius nihil utique habebit dicere aliquis. Quae quidem igitur circa politias principales et circa dictas ab aliquibus sint considerata hoc modo.

And so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, and, besides some other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of children, which they call the Laws of Adoption. These laws were peculiar to him, and were intended to preserve the number of the lots. In the legislation of Charondas there is nothing remarkable, except the suits against false witnesses. He is the first who instituted denunciation for perjury. His laws are more exact and more precisely expressed than even those of our modern legislators.(Characteristic of Phaleas is the equalization of property; of Plato, the community of women, children and property, the common meals and women, and the law about drinking, that the sober shall be masters of the feast; also the training of soldiers to acquire by practice equal skill with both hands, so that one should be as useful as the other.) Draco has left laws, but he adapted them to a constitution whcih already existed, and there is no peculiarity in them which is worth mentioning except the greatness and severity of the punishments. Pittacus, too, was only a lawgiver, and not the author of a constitution; he has a law which is peculiar to him, that, if a drunken man do something wrong, he shall be more heavily punished than if he were sober; he looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunkard, but only to expediency, for drunken more often than sober people commit acts of violence. Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the Chalcidians of Thrace. Some of them relate to homicide, and to heiresses; but there is nothing remarkable in them. And here let us conclude our inquiry into the various constitutions which either actually exist, or have been devised by theorists.

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Eorum autem qui pronuntiaverunt de politia et cetera. Postquam philosophus prosecutus est de diversis politiis, hic prosequitur de institutoribus politiarum et legum. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Eorum autem qui pronuntiaverunt de politia, etc. After the philosopher pursued diverse regimes, he here pursues the institutors of regimes and of laws. Concerning this he does three things.

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Primo determinat eorum differentiam adinvicem.

First, he determines their difference toward each other.

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Secundo determinat de quibusdam qui instituerunt politias, ibi, de ea quidem igitur et cetera.

Second, he determines about those who instituted regimes, at de ea quidem igitur, [II.17.2] etc.

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In tertia determinat de quibusdam, qui fuerunt legislatores, ibi, legislatores autem et cetera.

In the third, he determines about those who were legislators, at legislatores autem, [II.17.5] etc.

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Ponit ergo primo, duas differentias eorum, qui de politiis vel legibus tractaverunt; quarum prima est secundum diversitatem vitae. Quidam enim eorum vixerunt vita privata, in nullo communicantes politicis actionibus, quia non fuerunt gubernatores aliquarum civitatum, sicut Plato, Phaleas et Hippodamus, de quibus supra dictum est, si quid fuit dignum circa eos dicendum. Alii autem vixerunt vita politica, instituentes leges aliquibus civitatibus, vel propriis vel extraneis. Secunda differentia est secundum ea quae tradiderunt. Quidam enim fuerunt conditores aliquarum legum, sine hoc, quod ordinarent aliquam politiam. Quidam vero etiam instituerunt politiam, quae est ordinatio regiminis civitatis, et posuerunt quasdam leges, sicut Lycurgus, qui instituit Lacedaemonicam politiam, et Solon qui instituit Atheniensem.

Therefore, he first lays out two differences in those who have developed regimes or laws: the first is according to their diversity of life. For some of them lived a private life, in no way sharing in political actions, because they were not governors of any city, such as Plato, Phaleas, and Hippodamus, about whom he has already spoken, if there was anything worthy to be said about them. Others, however, lived the political life, instituting laws for some cities, either their own, or foreign ones. The second difference is according to what they treated of. For some were fashioners of some laws, but without putting any regime in order. But some also instituted a regime, which is the order of the rules of the city, and set up certain laws, as did Lycurgus, who instituted the Lacedaemonian regime, and Solon, who instituted the Athenian regime.

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Deinde cum dicit de ea quidem igitur etc., prosequitur de instituentibus politias. Et quia de politia Lacedaemonica, quam Lycurgus instituit, supra dictum est; restat dicendum de politia Atheniensi, quam instituit Solon. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Then, where he says de ea quidem igitur, etc., he pursues those who instituted regimes. And because he has already spoken above about the Lacedaemonian regime, which Lycurgus instituted, it remains to speak about the Athenian regime, which Solon instituted. And concerning this he does three things.

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Primo ostendit quid Solon instituit.

First, he shows what Solon instituted.

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Secundo quomodo a quibusdam reprehendebatur, ibi, propter quod et quidam et cetera.

Second, how he was censured by some, at propter quod et quidam, [II.17.3] etc.

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Tertio excusat ipsum, ibi, videtur autem hoc et cetera.

Third, he excuses him, at videtur autem hoc, [II.17.4] etc.

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Dicit ergo primo, quod aliqui reputant Solonem fuisse bonum legislatorem, quia dissolvit oligarchiam, quae erat valde intemperata et immoderata apud Athenas, et liberavit populum qui servitute opprimebatur ex immoderato regimine divitum, et instituit democratiam in patria sua, et miscuit bene politiam id est regimen civitatis, dans aliquam partem populo in ea.

Therefore, he first says that some deem that Solon was a good legislator, because he dismantled the oligarchy, which was exceedingly intemperate and immoderate at Athens, and he freed the people who were oppressed in slavery by the immoderate rules of the wealthy, and he instituted a democracy in his fatherland, and mixed well the regime—that is, the rule of the city, giving some part to the people in it.

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Erat enim in Ariopago, idest in vico Martis, qui erat locus solemnis apud Athenas, institutum Concilium civitatis, quod erat oligarchicum, quia consiliarii civitatis erant ex divitibus et potentibus. Sed quod principes eligerentur, hoc erat aristocraticum.

For it was in the Areopagus, that is, in the village of Mars, which was a solemn place at Athens, that he instituted the council of the city, which was oligarchic, because the councils of the city were drawn from the wealthy and the powerful. But when the governors were chosen, it was aristocratic.

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Praetorium autem, idest potestatem iudiciariam instituit ex popularibus, quod erat democraticum, id est populare. Et sic Solon videtur non dissolvisse illa, quae prius erant, scilicet Concilium oligarchicum et electionem populi, quae erat aristocratica. Sed de novo instituit popularem quemdam principatum, dum fecit praetoria, idest iudices ex omnibus civibus.

The courts, however—that is, the power of judging—he established from the popular element, which was democratic, that is, popular. And so Solon does not seem to have dismantled what was before—that is, the oligarchic council, and the choice of the people, which was aristocratic. But as a new thing, he instituted a certain popular government when he made the courts—that is, the judges—from all the citizens.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod et quidam etc., ostendit quomodo Solon a quibusdam reprehendebatur. Accusabant enim quidam ipsum, quod ipse dissolverat alteram politiam, quae prius erat, quando instituit praetorium quod postea habuit potestatem super omnia, cum tamen istud officium esset sortiale, quia scilicet sorte eligebantur aliqui ex populo ad hoc officium. Ideo autem dicunt eum per hoc dissolvisse priorem politiam, quia cum invaluit istud officium in civitate, praetores illi instituti ex populo, transtulerunt totum regimen civitatis in populum qui (per) tyrannidem opprimebat maiores; et ita deventum est ad inordinatam democratiam, quae erat apud Athenas. Primo enim Ephialtes et Pericles qui fuerunt praetores populares, destruxerunt consilium quod ex antiquo erat in Ariopago, et continenter unusquisque de rectoribus populi auxit potestatem populi, quousque perducta est politia ad democratiam quae tunc erat.

Then, where he says propter quod et quidam, etc., he shows how Solon has been censured by some. For some accuse him of dismantling another regime that was before when he instituted the courts that afterward had power over all, although this office was yet [chosen] by lot, because someone from the people was chosen by lot for this office. And therefore, they say that through this, he dismantled the earlier regime, because when he strengthened this office in the city, instituting the courts from the people, they transferred the whole rule of the city to the people, who through tyranny oppressed the greater [citizens]; and so it arrived at the disordered democracy which was at Athens. For first, Ephialtes and Pericles, who were of the popular courts, destroyed the council that from antiquity was in the Areopagus, and continuously, each of the rulers of the people enlarged the power of the people: how long was it before the regime was brought to the democracy that then existed?

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Deinde cum dicit videtur autem etc., excusat Solonem; et dicit, quod iste defectus videtur accidisse non ex intentione Solonis, sed ex quodam accidente. Cum enim rex Medorum invaderet Athenienses, illi cogitantes, quod neque fines suos tueri poterant neque obsidionem civitatis sustinere, collocatis pueris et mulieribus et rebus quas habebant, in aliis Graeciae civitatibus, dimissa civitate, transtulerunt bellum de terra ad mare. Et ita congregatus est populus tempore Medorum causa huiusmodi navarchiae, id est principatus navalis, et astute concepit ut totam sibi potestatem usurparet: et accidit, quod loco virtuosorum rectorum, populus habuit pravos rectores, qui intentionem populi sunt prosecuti. Quod autem Solon hoc non intenderit, patet per hoc, quia Solon non dedit potestatem populo, nisi illam quae est maxime necessaria, ut scilicet eligeret principes et corrigeret eorum errores. Hanc autem potentiam populi dicit esse necessariam, quia sine hoc populus esset servus, si sine sua voluntate principes acciperentur, et non posset emendare mala quae principes facerent; et cum servitutem ferre non posset fieret adversarius principibus.

Then, where he says videtur autem, etc., he excuses Solon, and he says that the defect seems to have happened not from the intention of Solon, but from some accident. For when the king of the Medes invaded the Athenians, because they thought that they could neither uphold their borders, nor endure a siege of the city, when the women and children and the things they had were settled in other Greek cities, having been sent away from the city, they transferred the war from the land to the sea. And so the people were gathered at the time of the Medes for the sake of this navarchia—that is, the government of the navy—and they cunningly conceived to usurp the whole power for themselves: and it happened that in place of virtuous rulers, the people had crooked rulers who pursued the intention of the people. And that Solon did not intend this is evident, because Solon did not give power to the people, except what was greatly necessary—to choose governors and to correct their errors. Moreover, he says that this power of the people is necessary because without this, the people would be slaves, if without their will the governors were received, and they were not able to mend the evils that their governors did; and since they could not bear slavery, they would become the adversaries of the governors.

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Sed omnes principatus instituit primo ex insignibus, idest nobilibus et divitibus.

But he instituted all government first from the distinguished—that is, from the noble and the wealthy.

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Et secundario instituit ex quibusdam quingentis qui erant quasi medii in civitate, quos medignos vocat, quasi moderatores, et iugarios eos vocat, quia erant capita societatum vel artium quasi coniungentes multitudinem;

And secondarily, he instituted it from some fifty men who were as though the middle in the city, who he called medimnoi—as if moderators—and he called them “yokers,” [iugarios] because they were the heads of companies or arts, as if “yoking together” [coniugentes] the multitude; and

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et tertio instituebat principes ex equitibus, qui erat tertius ordo.

third, he instituted the governors from the knights, which was a third order.

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Quartus autem ordo erat mercenariorum, qui erant infima pars populi: ad quos nullus principatus pertinebat. Et sic patet, quod in principatibus maiorem partem addidit maioribus quam populo. Unde non fuit eius intentio instituere democratiam; sed consecuta est praeter eius intentionem.

The fourth order was of wage-earners, who were the basest part of the people, to whom no part of government belonged. And so it is evident that in government, a greater part was given to the greater than to the people. Hence, it was not his intention to institute a democracy, but it was a consequence beyond his intention.

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Deinde cum dicit legislatores autem etc., determinat de institutoribus legum.

Then, where he says legislatores autem, etc., he determines about the instituters of laws.

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Et primo ostendit qui fuerint, et quibus leges imposuerint.

And first, he shows who they were, and upon whom they imposed the laws.

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Secundo, quas leges tulerint, ibi, legislator autem fuit et cetera.

Second, what laws they carried out, at legislator autem fuit, [II.17.7] etc.

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Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

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Primo agit de quibusdam legislatoribus in Italia: quae quondam magna Graecia vocabatur.

First, he deals with some legislators in Italy—which was once called Magna Graecia.

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Secundo de quibusdam legislatoribus Graeciae, ibi, fuit autem et Philolaus et cetera.

Second, about some legislators of Greece, at fuit autem et Philolaus, [II.17.6] etc.

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Dicit ergo primo, quod legislatores fuerunt quidam Zaleucus nomine, qui imposuit leges Locris Occidentalibus et est quaedam civitas Calabriae, quae est ad occidentem Graeciae. Fuit etiam quidam legislator Charondas Catinensis qui tulit leges suis civibus et quibusdam aliis civitatibus Chalcidiae, circa Italiam et Siciliam. Ostendit autem, unde isti fuerint eruditi in legislatione; et dicit quod quidam volunt colligere quod in terris illis primus instructus industrius in legislatione fuit quidam Onomacritus nomine, qui cum esset civis Locrensis, exercitatus fuit circa legislationem in Creta, et postea praefectus fuit populo artificialiter regens ipsum: et huius socium dicunt fuisse quaedam Thaletem, cuius auditores dicunt fuisse Lycurgum Lacedaemonium et Zaleucum Locrium. Zaleuci autem auditorem dicunt fuisse Charondam Cataniensem. Sed ista dicunt non considerantes bene tempus ipsorum, quod non erat conveniens huic narrationi.

Therefore, he first says that there was a certain legislator by the name of Zaleucus who set up the laws for the Western Locrians—which is a city in Calabria that is to the west of Greece. There was also a legislator, Charondas of Catania, who delivered laws to his own citizens and also to the other Chalcidian cities around Italy and Sicily. Moreoever, he shows where they became learned [eruditi] in legislation; and he says that some wish to gather that in those lands, the first one diligently instructed in legislation was someone by the name of Onomacritus, who, although he was a citizen of Locri, received exercise in legislation at Crete, and afterward, was put in charge of the people himself, ruling them artfully: and they say that his companion was a certain Thales, whose pupils, they say, were Lycurgus of Lacedaemon and Zaleucus of Locri. Moreover, they say that the pupil of Zaleucus was Charondas the Catanian. But those who say this do not consider well the time of these men, which does not fit with this narrative.

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Deinde cum dicit fuit autem et Philolaus etc., narrat de legislatoribus Graeciae. Et dicit, quod quidam Philolaus civis Corinthiensis tulit leges Thebanis. Et assignat causam quare de Corintho transivit Thebas. Et dicit, quod cum esset de genere Bachidorum, idest eorum qui trahebant originem a Baccho, factus est amicus cuiusdam Dioclis, qui habuerat quamdam victoriam in Olimpiade. Postquam igitur Diocles reliquit civitatem, forte expulsus inde per aliquam iniuriam, Philolaus habens in memoriam amorem matris Dioclis, quae vocabatur Anchiones, quae forte nutriverat eum, simul cum eo abiit Thebas, et ibi ambo finiverunt vitam, quod usque nunc eorum sepulcra ostendunt, quae mutuo se respiciebant, et ex uno poterat conspici aliud. Sed ita erant disposita versus regionem Corinthiorum, ut unum posset inde videri, aliud non. Narrant autem, quod ideo fuit sic ordinata eorum sepultura, ut Diocles non videretur a Corinthiis, quasi volens ab eis abstinere propter ea quae ab eis passus fuerat: Philolaus autem videri poterat, qui nihil ab eis fuerat passus. Ista igitur fuit causa, quare apud Thebanos habitaverunt, et eis leges tulerunt.

Then, where he says fuit autem et Philolaus, etc., he tells about the legislators of Greece. And he says that a certain Philolaus, a citizen of the Corinthians, passed the laws of the Thebans. And he indicates the cause why he went over from Corinth to Thebes. And he says that, since he was of the family of the Bacchiads—that is, of those who trace their origin to Bacchus—he was made a friend of one Diocles, who had had a victory in the Olympics. Therefore, after Diocles left the city—perhaps cast out from them because of some wrong—Philolaus, holding in his memory the love of Diocles's mother, who was called Alcyone, who perhaps had nursed him, he went with him to Thebes, where both of them ended life, and until now, they still show their tombs, which faced each other, and from one, the other could be seen. But they were so organized, toward the region of the Corinthians, that one could be seen from there, but not the other. And they tell that their tombs were so organized so that Diocles would not be seen from Corinth, as though they wished to avoid this because of what he had suffered from them: but Philolaus was able to be seen, who had suffered nothing from them. Such things were the cause of their dwelling among the Thebans, and the laws that they passed for them.

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Deinde cum dicit legislator autem etc., ostendit, quid proprium unusquisque legislator instituit. Et dicit, quod Philolaus tulit leges Thebanis de quibusdam aliis, sed specialiter de puerorum procreatione, ut scilicet non insisterent operi generationis, postquam certum numerum filiorum haberent. Et has leges Philolai, Thebani vocant leges positivas. Hoc autem de procreatione filiorum solus ipse constituit ad hoc, quod conservetur numerus sortium, idest, quod non oporteat unam partem possessionis unius hominis dividi in plures; sed tot pueri generentur, quod semper idem numerus civium conservetur. Charondas autem nihil statuit ipse solus, nisi vindictas de falsis testimoniis, quod ipse primus consideravit: sed magis placuit propter hoc, quod cum diligentia explicavit ea quae necessaria erant in legibus prae aliis legislatoribus, quam de hoc quod aliquid singulariter statueret. Sed Philolaus instituit aliquid proprium, scilicet, ut tolleretur irregularitas possessionum. Plato autem quatuor propria instituit in suis legibus: quorum unum est, quod mulieres et pueri et possessiones sint communes. Secundum est, quod fierent convivia mulierum sicut in aliis civitatibus fiunt convivia virorum. Tertium est, quod instituit legem contra ebrietatem, ut scilicet soli sobrii possint esse principes symposiorum id est. Conviviorum. Quartum autem statuit in re militari, ut scilicet homines per exercitium et studium fierent ambidexteri, ut scilicet utraque manus fieret eis utilis ad bellandum. Consequenter dicit, quod inveniuntur quaedam leges draconis, qui politiae praeexistenti imposuit quasdam leges, sed in legibus suis nihil fuit proprium quod sit memoria dignum, nisi quod severior poena daretur quando maius damnum sequebatur ex culpa. Fuit etiam quidam Pittacus legislator, qui non instituit politiam: cuius lex quaedam propria fuit, ut ebrii si percuterent, plus punirentur quam sobrii, quia plures ebrii faciunt iniurias quam sobrii: unde magis respexit ad utilitatem, ut scilicet cohiberentur iniuriae ebriorum, quam ad veniam, quam oportet habere de ebriis, qui non sunt sui compotes. Fuit etiam alius legislator Androdamas civis Rheginus, qui instituit quasdam leges circa poenas homicidiorum, et circa successiones haereditatum, sed tamen quasi nihil proprium ipsius dici potest. Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod hoc modo sunt considerata eadem, quae oportuit considerari circa optimas politias, puta Lacedaemonensium, Cretensium, et Chalcedonensium, et circa politias a quibusdam aliis ordinatas. Et sic terminatur secundus liber.

Then, where he says legislator autem, etc., he shows what each legislator himself instituted. And he says that Philolaus passed laws for the Thebans about some other things, but specifically about the procreation of children: namely, that they should not continue in the work of generation after they had a determinate number of sons. And these laws of Philolaus the Thebans called settled laws. Moreover, only he constituted this about the procreation of children: that the number of allotments should be preserved—that is, that one part of the possessions of one man must not be divided among several; but that as many children be generated as would always preserve the same number of citizens. However, Charondas was not the only one to establish anything, except the punishment of false testimonies, which he was the first to consider: he is more pleasing because he diligently explicated what was necessary in the laws which other legislators, before all other legislators, than because he individually established anything. But Philolaus instituted something himself: he eliminated the unevenness of possessions. Now Plato instituted four things of his own in his Laws. One of them is that women and children and possessions should be common. The second is that there should be feasts among the women, just as in other cities there were feasts among the men. The third is that he instituted a law against drunkenness, so that only the sober would be able to be governors of symposia—that is, of feasts. Fourth, he established in military affairs that the men, through exercise and study, would become ambidextrous—so that both hands would become useful for fighting. After this, he says that certain laws of Draco have been found, which laws he imposed upon a preexisting regime; but in his laws was found nothing of his own that is worthy of memory, except that a harsher penalty was given when the harm that followed from a fault was greater. There was also one Pittacus, a legislator who did not institute a regime. The law proper to him was that drunks, if they were prosecuted, would be punished more than the sober, because more drunks committed wrongs than did the sober: hence he looked more toward utility, to contain the wrongs of drunks, than toward the pardon that one must have toward drunks, who are not competent for themselves. There was also a legislator, Androdamas, a citizen of Reggio, who instituted some laws about the penalties for homicide, and hereditary successions, but yet nothing can be spoken of as if it were his own. And lastly, he concludes in a epilogue that in this manner, we have considered the things that must be considered about the best regimes: of the Lacedaemonians, the Cretans, and the Carthaginians, and about the regimes put in order by certain others. And so the second book is ended.

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Book 3

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Lecture 1

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Ei qui de politia considerat quae sit unaquaeque, et qualis quae, prima consideratio est de civitate videre quid quidem sit civitas. Nunc enim dubitant hi quidem dicentes civitatem egisse actionem, hi autem non civitatem, sed oligarchiam vel tyrannum; politici autem et legislatoris videmus omne negotium existens circa civitatem; politia autem est ordo quidam habitantium civitatem. Quoniam autem civitas est compositorum, sicut aliud aliquod totorum quidem et constantium ex multis partibus, palam quod prius civis est inquirendus; civitas enim civium quaedam multitudo est. Quare quem oporteat vocare civem, et quis sit civis considerandum. Et enim civis dubitatur saepe. Non enim eundem confitentur omnes esse civem: est enim aliquis qui in democratia civis existens, in oligarchia saepe non est civis.

He who would inquire into the essence and attributes of various kinds of governments must first of all determine 'What is a state?' At present this is a disputed question. Some say that the state has done a certain act; others, no, not the state, but the oligarchy or the tyrant. And the legislator or statesman is concerned entirely with the state; a constitution or government being an arrangement of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is composite, like any other whole made up of many parts; these are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a difference of opinion. He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy.

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Eos quidem igitur qui aliter qualiter sortiuntur hanc appellationem velut poetales cives dimittendum. Civis autem non per habitare alicubi civis est, et enim adventicii et servi communicant habitatione; neque iustorum participes ita ut et sententiam optineant et iudicentur: hoc enim inest et his qui a contractibus communicant. In multis quidem igitur locis neque his perfectae adventicii participant, sed necesse tribuere astitorem. Quare imperfecte aliqualiter participant tali communione. Sed sicut et pueros qui nondum propter aetatem inscripti sunt, et senes dimissos, dicentum esse aliqualiter quidem cives, non simpliciter autem valde, sed apponentes, hos quidem imperfectos, hos autem ultra provectos, vel aliquid tale alterum; nihil enim differt; palam enim quod dicitur; quaerimus enim simpliciter civem et nullam talem habentem adiectionem oportunam directioni, quoniam et de vilibus et profugis est talia et dubitare et solvere.

Leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who have obtained the name of citizen any other accidental manner, we may say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing and being sued; for this right may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. Nay, resident aliens in many places do not possess even such rights completely, for they are obliged to have a patron, so that they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the register, or to old men who have been relieved from state duties. Of these we do not say quite simply that they are citizens, but add in the one case that they are not of age, and in the other, that they are past the age, or something of that sort; the precise expression is immaterial, for our meaning is clear. Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned may be raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles.

Polit.L1

Civis autem simpliciter nullo aliorum determinatur magis quam per participare iudicio et principatu. Principatuum autem hi quidem sunt divisi per tempus, ut et quibusdam omnino non liceat eundem bis principarim vel per aliqua determinata tempora; alius autem indeterminatus velut praetor et contionator. Forte quidem igitur dicet utique quis neque principes esse tales, neque participare propter haec principatu. Sed differat nihil. De nomine enim ratio. Innominatum enim quod commune in praetore et contionatore, quid oporteat haec ambo vocare. Sit itaque determinationis gratia indeterminatus principatus. Ponimus itaque cives eos qui sic participant. Qui quidem igitur maxime congruit utique civis, ad opmnes qui dicuntur cives, fere talis est.

But the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices. Now of offices some are discontinuous, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval; others have no limit of time- for example, the office of a dicast or ecclesiast. It may, indeed, be argued that these are not magistrates at all, and that their functions give them no share in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the power do not govern. Let us not dwell further upon this, which is a purely verbal question; what we want is a common term including both dicast and ecclesiast. Let us, for the sake of distinction, call it 'indefinite office,' and we will assume that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the most comprehensive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who are generally so called.

Polit.L1

Oportet autem non latere quod rerum in quibus supposita differunt specie, et hoc quidem ipsorum est primum, hoc autem secundum, aliud autem habitum, aut omnino nihil est secundum quod talia quod commune, aut vix; politias autem videmus specie differentes ab invicem, et hac quidem posteriores, has autem priores existentes; vitiatas enim et transgressas necessarium posteriores esse non vitiatis; transgressas autem quomodo dicimus, posterius erit manifestum. Quare et civem necessarium alterum esse eum qui secundum unamquamque politiam; propter quod quidem dictus in democratia quidem maxime est civis. In aliis contingit quidem, non tamen necessarium. Quibusdam enim non est populus, neque ecclesiam putant, sed convocatos; et sententias iudicant secundum partem, velut in Lacedemonia eas quae contractuum iudicat efororum alius alias; senes autem homicidiales, forte autem alius principatus alias. Eodem autem modo et circa Calcedonem: omnes enim sententias, principatus aliqui iudicant.

But we must not forget that things of which the underlying principles differ in kind, one of them being first, another second, another third, have, when regarded in this relation, nothing, or hardly anything, worth mentioning in common. Now we see that governments differ in kind, and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior; those which are faulty or perverted are necessarily posterior to those which are perfect. (What we mean by perversion will be hereafter explained.) The citizen then of necessity differs under each form of government; and our definition is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy; but not necessarily to other states. For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones; and suits are distributed by sections among the magistrates. At Lacedaemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which they distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes are decided by other magistrates. A similar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all causes.

Polit.L1

Sed habet directionem civis diffinitio. In aliis enim politiis non qui indeterminatus princeps est contionator et praetor, sed qui secundum principatum determinatus, horum enim aut omnibus aut quibusdam attribuitur consiliari et iudicare vel de omnibus vel de aliquibus. Quis quidem igitur sit civis, ex his manifestum. Cui enim potestas communicandi principatur consiliativo vel iudicativo, civem iam dicimus esse huius civitatis. Civitatem autem talium multitudinem sufficientem ad autarkiam vitae ut simpliciter est dicere.

We may, indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as to include these states. In them it is the holder of a definite, not of an indefinite office, who legislates and judges, and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging about some things or about all things. The conception of the citizen now begins to clear up.He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizens of that state; and, speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.

Polit.L1

Determinant etiam secundum usum civem, eum qui ex ambobus civibus et non ex altero solum, puta patre vel matre; alii autem et hoc ad plus requirunt, puta ad avos duos vel tres vel plures. Sic autem determinatis politicae et celeriter dubitant quidam tertium hunc vel quartum, quomodo erit civis. Gorgias quidem igitur leontinus, haec quidem forte dubitans, haec autem ironice loquens ait: sicut mortariola esse ea quae a mortariolificis facta sunt, sec et Larisseos eos qui a condentibus facti sunt; esse enim quosdam larissofactivos. Est autem simplex. Si enim participabant secundum dictam diffinitionem politia erant cives. Neque enim possibile est adaptare quod ex cive mare aut femina ad primos qui habitaverunt vel aedificaverunt.

But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents are citizens; others insist on going further back; say to two or three or more ancestors. This is a short and practical definition but there are some who raise the further question: How this third or fourth ancestor came to be a citizen? Gorgias of Leontini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony, said- 'Mortars are what is made by the mortar-makers, and the citizens of Larissa are those who are made by the magistrates; for it is their trade to make Larissaeans.' Yet the question is really simple, for, if according to the definition just given they shared in the government, they were citizens. This is a better definition than the other. For the words, 'born of a father or mother who is a citizen,' cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.

Polit.L1

Ei qui de politia considerat et cetera. Postquam Philosophus in secundo libro inquisivit de politiis secundum traditionem aliorum, hic incipit prosequi de eis secundum propriam opinionem. Et dividitur in partes duas.

Ei qui de politia considerat, etc. After the philosopher investigated regimes following the tradition of others, he here begins to pursue the same things following his own opinion. And it is divided into two parts.

Polit.L1

In prima manifestat diversitatem politiarum,

In the first part, he clarifies the diversity of regimes;

Polit.L1

in secunda docet qualiter optima politia sit instituenda, in principio septimi libri, ibi, de politia optima facturum et cetera.

in the second, he teaches how the best regime may be instituted, at the beginning of Bk. VII, at de politia optima facturum, etc.

Polit.L1

Prima autem pars dividitur in duas.

The first part, moreover, is divided in two.

Polit.L1

In prima distinguit politias.

First, he distinguishes the regimes;

Polit.L1

In secunda determinat de singulis earum, in quarto libro, ibi, in omnibus artibus et scientiis et cetera.

second, he determines each of them, in Bk. IV, at in omnibus artibus et scientiis, etc.

Polit.L1

Prima autem pars dividitur in duas.

And this first part is divided in two.

Polit.L1

In prima parte determinat id, quod pertinet ad politiam in communi.

In its first part he determines what belongs [pertinet] to regime commonly;

Polit.L1

In secunda dividit politias, ibi, quoniam autem haec determinata sunt, et cetera.

second, he divides regimes from each other, at quoniam autem haec determinata sunt, [III.5.1] etc.

Polit.L1

Prima pars dividitur in duas.

The first part is divided in two parts:

Polit.L1

In prima dicit de quo est intentio.

in the first, he states his intention;

Polit.L1

In secunda prosequitur propositum, ibi, eos quidem igitur qui aliter qualiter et cetera.

in the second, he he pursues what was put forward, at eos quidem igitur qui aliter qualiter, [III.1.4] etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things:

Polit.L1

Primo ostendit, quod ad tractandum de politiis, necesse est primo considerare de civitate.

first he shows that in order to treat of regimes, it is necessary first to consider the city;

Polit.L1

Secundo ostendit, quod ad tractandum de civitate, necesse est considerare quid sit civis, ibi, quoniam autem civitas, et cetera.

second, he shows that in order to treat of the city, it is necessary to consider what the citizen is, at quoniam autem civitas, [III.1.3] etc.

Polit.L1

Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui vult considerare de politia, quae unaquaeque sit secundum propriam rationem et qualis sit, utrum scilicet bona vel mala, iusta vel iniusta, necesse est, quod primo consideret quid sit civitas. Et hoc probat duplici ratione:

Therefore, he says first that for he who desires to consider regimes, what each one is according to its proper rationale and what kind it is, whether it is good or bad, just or unjust, it is necessary to first consider what a city is. And he proves this with a twofold reasoning:

Polit.L1

quarum prima est, quia de hoc potest esse dubitatio. Dubitant enim aliqui circa aliqua negotia, utrum sint facta a civitate, puta cum sint facta a tyranno, vel a divitibus civitatis. In quo casu aliqui dicunt, quod civitas haec fecit; aliqui autem dicunt, quod non fecit haec civitas, sed oligarchia, id est divites principantes, vel etiam tyrannus: et sic videtur in dubium verti, utrum soli divites principantes sint civitas. Et quia dubium est; oportet quod determinetur.

first, because it is possible to have a doubt about this. For some people had doubts about whether certain occupations were done by the city--whether, for instance, they were done by a tyrant, or by the city’s wealthy. In which case, some say that the city did these things, but others say that the city did not do these things, but that it was the oligarchs, that is, the wealthy governors, or even a tyrant. And thus the doubt seems to turn upon whether it is only the wealthy governors who are the city. And because [the question] is in doubt, it is necessary that it be determined.

Polit.L1

Secunda ratio est, quia tota intentio eorum, qui tractant de politiis et legislatione, negotiatur circa civitatem, quia politia nihil aliud est quam ordo inhabitantium civitatem.

The second reason is because the whole intention of those who treat of regimes and legislation is to be occupied with the city, because the regime is nothing other than the order of those who inhabit the city.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem civitas etc., ostendit, quod necessarium est determinare de cive, duplici ratione:

Then, where he says quoniam autem civitas, etc., he shows that it is necessary to determine the citizen for two reasons,

Polit.L1

quarum prima talis est. In omnibus illis quae sunt composita ex multis partibus, necesse est prius considerare partes. Civitas autem est quoddam totum constitutum ex civibus sicut ex partibus, cum civitas nihil aliud sit, quam quaedam civium multitudo. Ergo ad cognoscendum civitatem, oportet considerare quid sit civis.

of which the first is this: in all those things that are composed from many parts, it is first necessary to consider the parts. The city, however, is a certain whole constituted out of citizens as [its] parts, since the city is nothing other than a certain multitude of citizens. Therefore, in order to know about the city, one must consider what a citizen is.

Polit.L1

Secunda ratio est, quod de hoc etiam contingit dubitationem esse: non enim omnes concorditer confitentur, quod idem sit civis. Aliquis enim popularis, qui est civis in democratia secundum quam populus principatur, non reputatur quandoque civis in oligarchia, secundum quam divites principantur: quia frequenter talis est oligarchia, quod populus nullam habet ibi partem.

The second reason is because there happens to be a doubt even about this—for not all like-mindedly confess that the same person is a citizen. For someone from the popular [element], who is a citizen in a democracy according to which the people govern is not counted as a citizen at any time in an oligarchy, according to which the wealthy govern: because frequently an oligarchy is such that the people have no part in it.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit eos quidem igitur etc., prosequitur propositum. Et dividitur in partes duas.

Then, where he says eos quidem igitur, etc., he pursues what was proposed. And he divides it into two parts.

Polit.L1

In prima ostendit quid sit civis.

In the first, he shows what a citizen is.

Polit.L1

In secunda ostendit quae sit virtus, quae facit bonum civem, ibi, his autem quae dicta sunt et cetera.

In the second he shows which virtue it is that makes a good citizen, at his autem quae dicta sunt, [III.3.1] etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L1

Primo determinat quid sit civis.

First, he determines what a citizen is.

Polit.L1

Secundo movet circa hoc quasdam dubitationes, ibi, sed forte illi magis et cetera.

Second, he raises certain doubts, at sed forte illi magis, [III.2.1] etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things.

Polit.L1

Primo ostendit, quid sit civis secundum rei veritatem.

First, he shows what a citizen is according to the truth of the thing.

Polit.L1

Secundo excludit quandam falsam determinationem, ibi, determinant etiam secundum usum et cetera.

Second, he rules out a certain false determination, at determinant etiam secundum usum, [III.1.9] etc.

Polit.L1

Circa primum duo facit.

Concerning the first he does two things:

Polit.L1

Primo ponit quosdam modos secundum quos aliqui sunt cives secundum quid et non simpliciter.

first he puts forth certain modes, according to which some people are citizens in a certain respect [secundum quid], and not simply speaking [III.1.5].

Polit.L1

Secundo ostendit quid sit civis simpliciter, ibi, civis autem simpliciter et cetera.

Second, he shows what a citizen is simply, at civis autem simpliciter, [III.1.6] etc.

Polit.L1

Dicit ergo primo, quod debemus ad praesens dimittere illos qui dicuntur cives secundum aliquem modum poeticum, idest secundum metaphoram vel similitudinem; quia isti non sunt vere cives. Et primus quidem modus est secundum habitationem. Non autem dicuntur vere cives aliqui ex hoc quod civitatem inhabitant: quia advenae et servi habitant in civitate, nec tamen sunt simpliciter cives. Secundus modus est, quod aliqui possunt dici cives, quia subduntur iurisdictioni civitatis, ut scilicet participent iustitiam civitatis in hoc, quod quandoque obtineant sententiam pro se, et quandoque iudicentur, idest condemnentur: quia hoc etiam convenit illis qui habent aliquos contractus inter se, qui tamen non sunt unius civitatis cives. Et tamen in quibusdam civitatibus extranei non participant perfecte huiusmodi iustitia sicut cives: sed necesse est, quod si volunt iudicio contendere, quod dent astitorem, idest fideiussorem de parendo iuri. Unde patet, quod adventitii imperfecte participant communionem iustitiae: et ita secundum hoc non sunt simpliciter cives, sed possunt dici cives secundum quid. Sicut etiam tertio modo dicimus pueros cives, qui nondum conscripti sunt in numero civium. Et sicut dicimus senes cives, qui iam emissi sunt a numero civium, ut non possunt exequi opera civium: utrosque enim non dicimus simpliciter cives, sed cum aliqua adiectione. Pueros quidem tamquam imperfectos. Senes autem tanquam ultra provectos, quam requirat conditio civium. Vel si etiam aliud aliquid tale apponatur, nihil differt. Manifestum est enim illud quod intendimus dicere: inquirimus enim nunc quid sit simpliciter civis absque aliqua additione, quae sit necessaria ad dirigendum vel exponendum nomen civis. Est autem et quartus modus, in quo est eadem dubitatio et solutio: scilicet circa profugos et viles, id est infames personas; quia scilicet tales sunt cives secundum quid, et non simpliciter.

Therefore, he says first that we ought, for the present, send away those who are called citizens in a certain poetic mode, that is, after metaphor or likeness: because such are not truly citizens. And indeed, the first mode is according to habitation. For they are not truly called citizens from this—that they inhabit the city—because immigrants and slaves inhabit in the city, and they, indeed, are not citizens, simply speaking. The second mode is that some can be called citizens because they are placed under the jurisdiction of the city such that they participate in the justice of the city in this: that sometimes they may obtain a sentence in their favor, and sometimes they are judged, that is, condemned: because this also happens to those who have contracted certain things between themselves, and who yet are not citizens of one city. And yet, in some cities, foreigners do not participate perfectly in justice of this sort, as do the citizens: but it is necessary, if they want to contend in judgment, that they present one who stands up for them, that is, who gives right faith for their obedience to what is right [ius]. Whence it is clear that immigrants imperfectly participate in the communion of justice: and thus, following this, they are not citizens simply, but are able to be called citizens in a certain respect. Likewise, in a third way, we call children citizens who have not yet been written into the number of the citizens. And likewise, we call the elderly citizens, who have already been sent out from the number of citizens, since they are not able to execute the works of the city: for we do not call either of them citizens simply, but with some addition: the children insofar as they are imperfect; but the elderly insofar as they are carried on beyond what the condition of the citizen requires. Or, if another such thing is also added on, there will be no difference, for it is clear what we intend to say: for we are now inquiring after what the citizen is simply, without any addition—which is necessary for correcting or explaining the name of citizen. But there is a fourth way, in which there is the same doubt and solution: namely, about fugitives and the worthless--that is, ill-reputed persons; because such people are citizens in a certain respect and not simply speaking.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit civis autem simpliciter etc., ostendit quid sit civis simpliciter. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Then, where he says dicit civis autem simpliciter, etc., he shows what a citizen is simply, and about this he does three things.

Polit.L1

Primo ponit quamdam determinationem civis.

First, he lays out a determination of the citizen.

Polit.L1

Secundo ostendit quod illa determinatio non est communis in qualibet politia, ibi, oportet autem non latere et cetera.

Second, he shows that the determination is not common to just any regime, at oportet autem non latere, [III.1.7] etc.

Polit.L1

Tertio ostendit quomodo possit corrigi ut sit communis, ibi, sed habet directionem et cetera.

Third, he shows in what way it may be corrected so that it will be common, at sed habet directionem, [III.1.8] etc.

Polit.L1

Dicit ergo primo, quod per nihil aliud melius potest determinari civis simpliciter, quam per hoc, quod participet in civitate iudicio, ut scilicet possit de aliquo iudicare et principatu, ut scilicet aliquam habeat potestatem in negotiis civitatis. Sed sciendum, quod principatuum sunt duo genera. Quidam enim sunt determinati ad certum tempus, ita quod apud quasdam civitates non liceat, quod idem homo bis obtineat eumdem principatum, vel quod obtineat per determinata tempora, puta quod exerceat aliquod officium ad annum, et postea non possit institui in eodem officio usque ad tres vel quatuor annos. Alius autem principatus est qui non determinatur secundum aliquod tempus, sed quocumque tempore potest homo illud officium exercere: sicut praetor, qui scilicet habet potestatem iudicandi de aliquibus causis, et concionator qui habet potestatem dicendi suam sententiam in concione civitatis. Potest autem contingere quod aliquis huiusmodi iudices vel concionatores non nominet principes, et quod dicatur quod non habent propter hoc aliquem principatum quod possint concionari vel iudicare. Sed hoc nihil ad propositum differat, quia ista dubitatio non est nisi in nomine: non enim invenimus aliquod nomen commune iudici et concionatori: et ideo imponatur eis hoc nomen, ut dicatur indeterminatus. Sic igitur ponimus eos qui participant huiusmodi principatu, esse cives: et ista videtur esse melior determinatio civis simpliciter.

He first says, therefore, that through nothing else can the citizen be better determined, simply speaking, than through this: that he participates in the city through judgment—namely, that he is able to judge about things—and through government—namely, that he has some power in the city’s business. But it should be known that there are two kinds of government. For some are determined to a certain time, and thus among certain cities it is not permitted that the same man should twice obtain the same government, or that he should obtain it for a determinate time; for example, that he should exercise a certain office for a year, and afterward he should not be able to be instituted into the same office until around three or four years had passed. But the other government is one that is not determinate following a certain time, but a man is able to exercise the office for any length of time whatsoever: just as the praetor, who holds the power of judging about any causes, and the councilman, who holds the power of speaking his own sentences in the assembly of the city. But it can happen that someone does not name judges or is on the council as governors, and because it is said on account of this that they do not have any government, that they will not be able to [serve as] council or to judge. But this makes no difference to what was put forth, because such a doubt does not exist except in name: for we do not find any common name for the judge, and the proclaimer: and therefore let this name be placed upon them: “indeterminate government.” Thus, therefore, we put forth that those who participate in this sort of government are citizens: and this seems a better determination of the citizen, simply speaking.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit oportet non latere etc., ostendit quod huiusmodi determinatio civis non est communis in omnibus politiis. Et dicit quod oportet hoc manifestum esse quod in omnibus rebus in quibus supposita differunt specie, et unum eorum est primum, aliud secundum, aliud habitum, id est consequenter se habens, vel nihil est commune in eis, sicut in aequivocis, vel vix est aliquid commune, idest secundum aliquid modicum. Politiae autem, ut infra dicetur, differunt secundum speciem, et quaedam earum sunt priores et quaedam posteriores; quia illae quae sunt vitiatae et transgrediuntur rectum ordinem politiae, sunt posteriores naturaliter politiis non vitiatis, sicut in quolibet genere perfectum est naturaliter prius corrupto. Quomodo autem aliquae politiae transgrediuntur rectum ordinem, infra erit manifestum. Unde oportet quod altera sit ratio civis in diversis politiis. Unde praedicta determinatio civis maxime convenit in democratia in qua quilibet de populo habet potestatem iudicandi de aliquo et concionandi. In aliis autem politiis quandoque contingit, quod quilibet civis habet hanc potestatem; non tamen est hoc necessarium, quia in quibusdam non est populus habens aliquam civilitatem, neque aliquid reputant Ecclesiam, id est congregationem populi, sed solum aliquos specialiter convocatos, et isti soli per partes iudicant aliquas sententias, sicut in Lacedaemonia ephori iudicant sententias contractuum, alii tamen alias, diversi diversas. Senes autem iudicant causas homicidiales, et alii principatus alias. Et ita etiam est apud Calchedonem, quia omnes sententiae iudicantur per aliquos principes, et sic populares cives non participant iudicio: unde praedicta determinatio civis in talibus politiis non convenit.

Then, where he says oportet non latere, etc., he shows that this determination of the citizen is not common to all regimes. And he says that it must be clear that in every affair [rebus] in which the things supposed differ in kind, and one of them is first, another is second, then it is taken differently—that is, it is consequently arranged such that either nothing is common to these, as with equivocal terms, or there is scarcely anything common, that is, according to a certain modicum. Regimes, however, as will be said, differ in kind, and some of them are before, some of them after; because those that are damaged and transgress the correct order of the regime are naturally after undamaged regimes, just as in any genus, the perfect is naturally before the corrupt. But how certain regimes transgress the correct order will be clear below. Whence there must be another rationale of citizenship in diverse regimes. Hence the aforementioned determination of the citizen is most fit for a democracy, in which any of the people has the power of judging about something and of proclaiming. And in other regimes, it sometimes happens that any of the citizens has this power, but yet, this is not necessary, because in these regimes, it is not the people that have some citizenship, nor something that they deem the Ecclesia—that is, a gathering of the people—but only some who are specially called together, and these only judge of some sentence in part, as in Lacedaemon, the ephors judged sentences for contracts, but others judged others, and diverse people judged diverse things. Moreover, the elders judged cases of murder, and other seats of government others. And so also, among the Carthaginians, because all the sentences were judged by some of the governors, and so the popular citizens did not participate in judgment: whence, the aforementioned determination of the citizen does not fit with such regimes.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit sed habet directionem etc., corrigit praedictam definitionem civis; et dicit quod praedicta definitio potest dirigi ad hoc quod sit communis, quia in aliis politiis quam democratia concionator et praetor non habet indeterminatum principatum, sed haec duo pertinent solum ad eos qui habent determinatos principatus, quia quibusdam horum, aut etiam omnibus, convenit iudicare et consiliari, vel de quibusdam, vel de omnibus. Et ex hoc potest esse manifestum quid sit civis: non enim ille qui participat iudicio et concione, sed ille qui potest constitui in principatu consiliativo vel iudicativo. Illi enim qui non possunt assumi ad talia officia, in nullo videntur participare politia, unde non videntur esse cives. Ultimo autem ex hoc concludit quod civitas nihil est aliud, quam multitudo talium, qui sic dicuntur cives sufficiens ad autarkiam, id est per se sufficientiam vitae ut potest absolute dici. Est enim civitas communitas per se sufficiens, ut in primo dictum est.

Then, where he says sed habet directionem, etc., he corrects the aforementioned definition of the citizen; and he says that the aforementioned definition can be straightened out into something that is common because in regimes other than democracy, the council and the chief do not have indeterminate government, but these two belong only to those who have determinate government, because for some of these, or even all, it is fitting to judge and to counsel, either about some matters, or about all. And from this it can be clear what a citizen is: for it is not he who participates in judging and the council, but he who is able to be constituted in some government of counsel or judging. For those who are not able to be taken up to such offices do not seem to participate in the regime, and hence do not seem to be citizens. But finally, he concludes from this that the city is nothing other than a multitude of such people, who are thus called citizens sufficient for autarkia, that is, the self-sufficiency of life such that it can be called this absolutely. For the city is the self-sufficient community, as was said in Book I.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit determinant etiam secundum usum etc., excludit quamdam determinationem qua quidam definiunt civem. Et dicit, quod quidam secundum consuetudinem determinant eum esse civem, qui natus est ex ambobus parentibus civibus, et non ex altero solum, scilicet patre vel matre. Quidam autem amplius requirunt ad hoc quod aliquis sit civis, scilicet quod deducatur eius generatio ad cives avos usque ad secundum gradum, vel tertium, vel ultra. Et si sic determinetur civis politice, idest secundum consuetudinem quarumdam civitatum et celeriter, id est ante debitam disquisitionem, consurgit dubitatio, quomodo iste tertius vel quartus avus fuit civis. Secundum enim praedictam determinationem non poterit dici fuisse civis, nisi et eius generatio reducatur ad tertium vel quartum avum civem: et ita erit procedere in infinitum. Circa hoc autem ponit dictum Gorgiae Siculi Leontini qui quaedam verba sapientia (circa) praedictas determinationes dixit, sive quia non erat certus de veritate, sive quia ironice loquebatur. Dixit enim quod sicut mortariola sunt illa quae fiunt ab artificibus mortariorum, ita et cives Larissaei sunt qui sunt facti, idest geniti ab aliis civibus Larissaeis, qui sunt factivi civium Larissaeorum. Hoc autem dictum est simpliciter et sine ratione: quia si aliqui participant politia secundum definitionem praedictam a nobis, oportet dicere, quod sint cives etiam si non sint progeniti ex civibus: alioqui ista determinatio quam isti dant non potest adaptari primis, qui aedificaverunt, aut inhabitaverunt civitatem; de quibus constat quod non fuerunt nati ex civibus illius civitatis: unde sequeretur, quod non fuerunt cives; et per consequens nec alii, qui ab eis derivantur; quod est inconveniens.

Then, where he says determinant etiam secundum usum, etc., he excludes a determination by which some define the citizen. And he says that some, following custom, determine that a citizen is he who was born from two citizen parents, and not from only one, either the father or the mother. But some further require for this--that anyone be a citizen--that they trace their generation to citizen ancestors even to the second generation, or the third, or beyond. And if the citizen is thus determined politically, that is, following a custom of certain cities, and swiftly, that is, before the due investigation, a doubt will arise about how this third or fourth generation ancestor was a citizen. For following the aforementioned determination, he will not be able to be called a citizen unless also his generation could reach back to a third or fourth citizen ancestor: and thus it will proceed without an end. But about this he puts forth the saying of Gorgias, a Sicilian of Leontini, who spoke certain wise words about the aforementioned determinations, either because he was not certain of the truth, or because he was talking ironically. For he said that just as mortars are things that come into being from the artisans of mortars, so also the Larissan citizens are those who were made--that is, generated--by other citizens of Larissa, who are makers of Larissan citizens. But this was said simply, and without a reason: because if anyone participates in the regime following the definition aforementioned by us, it is necessary to say that they are citizens, even if they were not also generated [progeniti] by citizens: alternatively, the determination that they give cannot be adapted for those who first built or inhabited the city--who, it is agreed, were not born from citizens of that city. Whence it would follow that they were not citizens, and consequently, neither would the others be citizens who flowed forth from them--which is unfitting.

Polit.L1

Lecture 2

Polit.L2

Sed forte illi magis habent dubitationem quicumque participant transmutatione facta politiae velut Athenis fecit Klistenes post tyrannorum eiectionem. Multos enim ad tribus applicuit extraneos et servos adventicios. Dubitatio autem ad hos est non quis civis, sed utrum iniuste vel iuste.

There is a greater difficulty in the case of those who have been made citizens after a revolution, as by Cleisthenes at Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants, for he enrolled in tribes many metics, both strangers and slaves. The doubt in these cases is, not who is, but whether he who is ought to be a citizen.

Polit.L2

Equidem et cum hoc adhuc aliquis dubitabit utrum si non iuste civis, non civis, tanquam idem potente iniusto et falso. Quoniam autem videmus et principantes quosdam iniuste, quos principari quidem dicemus sed non iuste, civis autem principatu quodam determinatus est; qui enim communicat tali principatu civis est ut dicimus; palam quia cives quidem esse fatendum et hos.

And there will still be a furthering the state, whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state; for what ought not to be is what is false. Now, there are some who hold office, and yet ought not to hold office, whom we describe as ruling, but ruling unjustly. And the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind of rule or office—he who holds a judicial or legislative office fulfills our definition of a citizen. It is evident, therefore, that the citizens about whom the doubt has arisen must be called citizens.

Polit.L2

De eo autem quod est iuste vel non iuste, copulatur ad dictam prius dubitationem. Dubitant enim quidam quando civitas egit, et quando non civitas, puta quando ex oligarchia vel tyrannide fiat democratia; tunc enim neque conventiones volunt quidam dissolvere tanquam non civitas sed tyrannus acceperit, neque alia multa talium, tanquam quaedam politiarum sint in optinendo sed non propter communiter expediens. Si quidem igitur in democratiam versae fuerint quaedam, secundum hunc modum similiter dicendum civitatis huius esse eas quae huius politiae actiones et eas quae ex oligarchia et tyrannide.

Whether they ought to be so or not is a question which is bound up with the previous inquiry. For a parallel question is raised respecting the state, whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state; for example, in the transition from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy. In such cases persons refuse to fulfill their contracts or any other obligations, on the ground that the tyrant, and not the state, contracted them; they argue that some constitutions are established by force, and not for the sake of the common good. But this would apply equally to democracies, for they too may be founded on violence, and then the acts of the democracy will be neither more nor less acts of the state in question than those of an oligarchy or of a tyranny.

Polit.L2

Videtur autem sermo proprius esse dubitationis huius, qualiter quidem oporteat dicere civitatem esse eandem, aut non eandem, sed alteram. Superficialis quidem igitur inquisitio dubitationis circa locum et homines est; contingit enim disiungi locum et homines et hos quidem alterum, hos autem alterum habitare locum; hanc quidem igitur mitiorem ponendum dubitationem. Multipliciter enim civitate dicta, est aliqualiter alleviatio talis inquisitionis. Similiter autem et hominum eundem locum habitantium, quando oportet putare unam esse civitatem. Non enim utique muris: erit enim utique Peloponiso circumponere unum murum; talis autem forte est et Babylon, et omnis quae habet circumscriptionem magis gentis quam civitatis, qua quidem capta aiunt tertio die non sensisse quandam partem civitatis. Sed de hac quidem dubitatione in aliud tempus oportuna speculatio. De magnitudine enim civitatis, quod quandum et utrum gens una vel plures expediant, oportet non latere politicum.

This question runs up into another: on what principle shall we ever say that the state is the same, or different? It would be a very superficial view which considered only the place and the inhabitants (for the soil and the population may be separated, and some of the inhabitants may live in one place and some in another). This, however, is not a very serious difficulty; we need only remark that the word 'state' is ambiguous.It is further asked: When are men, living in the same place, to be regarded as a single city- what is the limit? Certainly not the wall of the city, for you might surround all Peloponnesus with a wall. Like this, we may say, is Babylon, and every city that has the compass of a nation rather than a city; Babylon, they say, had been taken for three days before some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact. This difficulty may, however, with advantage be deferred to another occasion; the statesman has to consider the size of the state, and whether it should consist of more than one nation or not.

Polit.L2

Sed et eisdem habitantibus eundem locum. Utrum donec utique sit genus idem habitantium, dicendum eandem esse civitatem, quamvis semper his quidem corruptis, his autem generatis, sicut et fluvios consuevimus dicere eosdem, et fontes eosdem, quamvis semper hoc quidem superveniente fluxu, hoc autem recedente.

Again, shall we say that while the race of inhabitants, as well as their place of abode, remain the same, the city is also the same, although the citizens are always dying and being born, as we call rivers and fountains the same, although the water is always flowing away and coming again.

Polit.L2

Aut homines quidem dicendum esse eosdem propter talem causam, civitatem autem alteram. Siquidem enim est communicatio quaedam civitas, est autem communicatio civium, politia facta altera specie, et differente politia necessarium esse videbitur et civitatem esse non eandem. Sicut et chorum quandoque quidem komicum, quandoque autem tragicum, alterum esse dicimus eisdem saepe hominibus existentibus. Similiter autem et omnem aliam communionem et compositionem alteram si species altera compositionis sit, velut armoniam eorundem sonorum alteram esse dicemus, si quandoque quidem sit doria, quandoque autem frigia. Si itaque hunc habet modum, manifestum quod maxime dicendum eandem civitatem ad politiam respicientes. Nomine autem vocare altero vel eodem licet. Et eisdem habitantibus ipsam, et omnino alteris hominibus. Se autem iustum dissolvere vel non dissolvere, quando ad alteram politiam transmutatur civitas, ratio altera.

Or shall we say that the generations of men, like the rivers, are the same, but that the state changes? For, since the state is a partnership, and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution, when the form of government changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same, just as a tragic differs from a comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical. And in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements as different when the form of their composition alters; for example, a scale containing the same sounds is said to be different, accordingly as the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution, and it may be called or not called by the same name, whether the inhabitants are the same or entirely different. It is quite another question, whether a state ought or ought not to fulfill engagements when the form of government changes.

Polit.L2

Sed forte illi magis et cetera. Postquam determinavit quid sit civis, hic manifestat quasdam dubitationes circa praedicta, et determinat eas. Et ponit quatuor dubitationes se invicem consequentes.

Sed forte illi magis, etc. After he determined what a citizen is, he here clarifies certain difficulties about the aforementioned things, and determines them. And he puts forward four difficulties that follow upon each other.

Polit.L2

Est autem prima dubitatio de his qui facta mutatione politiae assumuntur ad communicationem politiae, sicut quidam sapiens Clisthenes nomine fecit apud Athenas tyrannis eiectis. Adiunxit enim societatibus civitatis multos extraneos, et etiam quosdam servos adventitios, ut multiplicato populo, divites non possent tyrannice opprimere ipsum. Ad hanc autem dubitationem solvendam dicit quod circa hos dubitatio est non an sint cives; quia ex quo sunt facti cives, cives sunt: sed est dubitatio, utrum sint iuste vel iniuste.

Now there is a first difficulty regarding those who, when a change has been made in the regime, are taken up into the union of the regime, as with [the changes] a certain wiseman named Cleisthenes made within Athens, when they threw out the tyrant. For he joined to the society of the city many foreigners and even certain immigrant-slaves, so that, by multiplying the people, the wealthy would not be able to tyrannically oppress them. In order to untangle this difficulty, he says that the difficulty is not about whether these people are citizens; since they were made citizens, they are citizens. But the difficulty is about whether they are justly or unjustly so.

Polit.L2

Secundam dubitationem movet, ibi, equidem cum hoc et cetera. Potest enim aliquis dubitare, utrum ille qui non est iuste civis, sit civis; ac si tantum valeat circa hoc iniustum quantum falsum: manifestum enim est quod falsus civis non est civis. Et ad hoc solvit quod cum aliqui qui principantur iniuste, principes tamen habeantur, eadem ratione et illi qui sunt iniuste cives, dicendi sunt cives, quia civis dicitur ex hoc quod participat aliquo principatu, ut supra dictum est.

He raises a second difficulty, at equidem cum hoc, etc. For it is possible for someone to doubt whether he who is not justly a citizen is a citizen; as if it were valid in this matter to treat “unjust” as “false”. For it is clear that a false citizen is not a citizen. And he untangles the problem thus: since there are some who govern unjustly, and who nevertheless are held as governors, by the same reasoning also those who are not justly citizens are still citizens, because one is called a citizen from this: that he participates in some government, as was said above.

Polit.L2

Tertiam dubitationem ponit, ibi, de eo autem quod est iuste et cetera. Et dicit quod an aliquis sit iuste civis vel iniuste videtur esse coniunctum praecedenti dubitationi, quae in principio huius libri tertii mota est. In transmutationibus enim politiarum circa aliquam civitatem dubitari solet, quando id quod fit, sit factum civitatis, et quando non, sicut contingit quandoque quod politia civitatis mutatur de tyrannide vel oligarchia in democratiam, et tunc populus potestatem politiae accipiens, non vult adimplere conventiones quae sunt factae vel per tyrannum vel per divites prius dominantes: dicunt enim quod si qua sunt data tyranno vel divitibus civitatis, non accepit ea civitas: et ita est in multis talibus, quia in quibusdam politiis, illi qui praesident, obtinent aliqua ab aliis, non propter communem utilitatem civitatis, sed propter proprium commodum. Solvit autem hanc dubitationem: quod si haec civitas maneat eadem facta transmutatione politiae, sicut est factum huius civitatis, illud quod fit ex democratia, ita illud quod fit ex oligarchia vel tyrannide: quia sicut tunc habebat in civitate potestatem tyrannus vel divites, ita etiam in democratia populus.

He puts forward a third difficulty, at de eo autem quod est iuste, etc. And says that whether someone is a citizen justly or unjustly seems to be joined with the preceding doubt, which was raised at the beginning of the third book. For in changing over the regime, a difficulty remains about any city: when were the deeds done by the city, and when were they not--as happens whenever the regime of the city is changed from tyranny or oligarchy into democracy, and then the people, taking the power of the regime, do not want to fulfill the agreements which were made by the tyrant or the wealthy, the previous masters: for they say that if anything was given by the tyrant or the wealthy of the city, the city will not accept it: and thus in many such affairs, because in certain regimes, those who command take hold of something from others not because of its common utility, because of their private convenience. But he untangles this difficulty: because if this city remains the same when the regime has been made to change over, so too does the deed of this city [remain]; that which was done from democracy, and that which was done from oligarchy or tyranny: because just as the tyrant or the rich then held power in the city, so also do the people in the democracy.

Polit.L2

Quartam dubitationem ponit, ibi, videtur autem sermo et cetera.

He puts forward a fourth difficulty, at videtur autem sermo, etc.

Polit.L2

Et primo ponit hanc dubitationem in generali: et dicit quod proprius sermo ad solvendum tertiam dubitationem est, quomodo oporteat civitatem dicere eamdem vel non eamdem.

He first puts forward this difficulty in general: and he says that the proper discussion for untangling the third difficulty is about how one must say that the city is the same or not the same.

Polit.L2

Secundo ibi, superficialis quidem igitur etc., dividit praedictam dubitationem in duas partes: et dicit quod huiusmodi quaestio in ipsa superficie apparet, quod est circa duo: scilicet circa locum civitatis, et circa homines inhabitantes civitatem. Contingit enim quandoque aliter separari homines a loco: puta cum omnes cives expelluntur de civitate, et quidam ducuntur ad unum locum, et quidam ad alium. Potest igitur esse dubitatio si superinducantur alii habitatores, utrum sit eadem civitas vel non: et haec quidem dubitatio mitior est, idest facilior. Civitas enim multipliciter dicitur. Uno modo ipse locus civitatis: et sic civitas est eadem; alio modo populus civitatis, et sic civitas non est eadem.

Second, he divides the aforementioned doubt into two parts: and he says that a question of this sort in itself appears, superficially, to be about two things: namely, about the place of the city, and about the men inhabiting the city. For it happens whenever men are separated from a place in different ways, as when all citizens are expelled from the city, and some are led to one place, and some to another. There can then be a doubt, if other inhabitants are led in upon the place, whether the same city exists or not: and indeed, this doubt is milder, that is, easier [to untangle]. For the city is spoken of in manifold ways. In one way, it is the place itself, and in this way the same city exists; in another way, it is the people of the city, and in this way the same city does not exist.

Polit.L2

Sed tunc remanet alia dubitatio, quam tangit ibi, similiter autem et hominum et cetera. Si enim semper iidem homines habitent eumdem locum, potest esse dubium quando sit una civitas, et quando non. Et primo excludit unam rationem unitatis, cum dicit, non enim utique muris et cetera. Et dicit quod non potest dici, quod homines inhabitantes civitatem conservent identitatem civitatis propter muros eosdem. Posset enim contingere quod toti uni regioni, puta Peloponneso, id est Achayae, circumduceretur unus murus, et tamen non esset eadem civitas, et ita fuit de Babylone vel de quacumque alia maxima civitate, in qua magis comprehenditur una gens, quam una civitas. Dicitur enim de Babylone quod quando fuit capta, usque ad tertium diem non sensit quaedam pars civitatis propter murorum amplitudinem.

But then there remains another doubt, which he touches on at similiter autem et hominum, etc. For if the same men always inhabit the same place, there can be a doubt when it is one city, and when it is not. And first he excludes one rationale for oneness: and he says that it cannot be said that men inhabiting the city preserve the identity of the city because of the same walls. For it could happen that one wall circumscribes the whole of one region, such as the Peloponnesus--that is, Achaia--and yet it not be the same city; and thus was Babylon, or any other very great city whatever, in which it is more that one tribe is comprehended than one city. For it is said of Babylon that when it was seized, a certain part of the city did not perceive it until the third day because of the length of the walls.

Polit.L2

Et interponit quod de hac dubitatione, scilicet utrum expediat esse ita magnam civitatem, considerandum erit alibi, idest in septimo. Pertinet enim ad politicum cognoscere quanta debeat esse magnitudo civitatis, et utrum debeat continere homines unius gentis vel plurium.

And he interjects that this doubt -- namely, whether it is advantageous to be a great city thus -- will have to be considered elsewhere, that is, in Bk. VII. For it belongs to politics to know how large a city ought to be, and whether it ought to contain men of one tribe or many.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit sed et eisdem etc., inquirit de alia ratione unitatis: utrum scilicet hominibus remanentibus in eodem loco, sit dicenda civitas eadem propter idem genus inhabitantium, quia scilicet quidam succedunt quibusdam, quamvis non sint iidem homines numero: sed sicut dicimus fontes vel fluvios esse eosdem propter successionem aquarum, quamvis quaedam effluat, et quaedam adveniat.

Then, where he says sed et eisdem, etc., he asks about another rationale of unity: namely, whether for men remaining in the same place, the city ought to be called the same on account of the same tribe of inhabitants, since certain men succeed others, although they are not the same men in number; just as we say that springs or rivers are the same because of the succession of waters, although some [of the waters] flow out, and others come in.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit aut homines quidem etc., solvens hanc dubitationem ostendit veram rationem unitatis civitatis. Et dicit quod propter praedictam successionem hominum unius generis potest aliqualiter dici eadem multitudo hominum; non tamen potest dici eadem civitas, si mutetur ordo politiae. Cum enim communicatio civium, quae politia dicitur, sit de ratione civitatis, manifestum est quod mutata politia non remanet eadem civitas, sicut videmus in illis qui dicunt cantiones in choreis quod non est idem chorus, si quandoque sit comicus, idest dicens cantiones comediales de factis infimarum personarum, quandoque autem tragicus, idest dicens tragicas cantiones de bellis principum: et ita etiam videmus in omnibus aliis quae consistunt in quadam compositione vel communione, quod quandocumque fit alia species compositionis non remanet identitas: sicut non est eadem harmonia, si quandoque sit Dorica, idest septimi vel octavi toni, quandoque autem Phrygia idest tertii vel quarti. Cum igitur omnia talia habeant hunc modum, manifestum est quod civitas est dicenda eadem respiciendo ad ordinem politiae; ita quod mutato ordine politiae, licet remaneat idem locus et iidem homines, non est eadem civitas, quamvis materialiter sit eadem. Potest autem civitas sic mutata vocari, vel eodem vel altero nomine, sive sint iidem, sive alii: sed si est idem nomen, erit aequivoce dictum. Utrum autem propter hoc quod non remanet eadem civitas facta transmutatione politiae, sit iustum, quod conventiones prioris politiae adimpleantur, vel non, pertinet ad aliam considerationem, quod quidem in sequentibus determinabitur.

Then, where he says aut homines quidem, etc., untangling [solvens] this doubt, he shows the true reason for the city’s unity. And he says that because of the aforementioned succession of men of one genus, the multitude of men can be called the same in a sense; but it cannot be called the same city if the order of the regime has changed. For since the union of the citizens—which is called the regime—is the rationale of the city, it is clear that a changed regime does not remain the same city, just as we see with those who sing songs in a chorus that it is not the same chorus if at one time it sings comedic songs about the deeds of lowly persons, and at another it is tragic, singing tragic songs about the wars of the governors. And so, also, we see in all other things that consist in some composition or communion, that whenever another species of composition comes to be, the same identity does not remain: just as it is not the same harmony if it is at one time Dorian, on the seventh or the eighth tone, but at another time Phrygian, on the third or the fourth. Since, therefore, all such things have this mode, it is clear that the city is said to be the same with respect to the order of the regime; so that when the order of the regime is changed, the same place and the same men may remain, but it is not the same city, although it may be materially the same. Now a city thus changed can be called either by the same or a different name whether they are the same or different: but if the name is the same, it will be used equivocally. But on account of this--that it does not remain the same city when the regime has made a change-over --whether or not it is just that the conventions of a previous regime should be fulfilled belongs to another consideration--which, indeed, will be determined in what follows.

Polit.L2

Lecture 3

Polit.L3

His autem quae dicta sunt habitum est considerare utrum eandem virtutem ponendum boni viri et civis studiosi, vel non eandem. At vero si quidem hoc oportet sortiri inquisitione eam quae civis, typo quodam primo sumendum.

There is a point nearly allied to the preceding: Whether the virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same or not. But, before entering on this discussion, we must certainly first obtain some general notion of the virtue of the citizen.

Polit.L3

Sicut igitur nauta unus aliquis communionum est, ita et civem dicimus. Nautarum autem quamvis dissimilium existentium potentia, hic quidem enim est remigator, hic autem gubernator, hic autem prorarius, hic autem aliam quandam talem habens denominationem, palam quod diligentissima uniuscuiusque ratio propria virtutis erit. Similiter autem et communis quaedam congruet omnibus. Salus enim navigationis opus est ipsorum omnium; hoc enim desiderat uniusquisque nautarum. Similiter igitur civium quamvis dissimilium existentium, opus est salus communitatis; communicatio autem est politia, propter quod quidem necessarium est esse civis virtutem ad politiam. Siquidem igitur sunt plures politiae species, palam quod non contingit studiosi civis unam esse virtutem perfectam. Bonum autem virum dicimus esse secundum unam virtutem perfectam. Quod quidem igitur contingit civem existentem studiosum non possidere virtutem secundum quam est studiosus vir, manifestum.

Like the sailor, the citizen is a member of a community. Now, sailors have different functions, for one of them is a rower, another a pilot, and a third a look-out man, a fourth is described by some similar term; and while the precise definition of each individual's virtue applies exclusively to him, there is, at the same time, a common definition applicable to them all. For they have all of them a common object, which is safety in navigation. Similarly, one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all. This community is the constitution; the virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member. If, then, there are many forms of government, it is evident that there is not one single virtue of the good citizen which is perfect virtue. But we say that the good man is he who has one single virtue which is perfect virtue. Hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man.

Polit.L3

Quin immo et secundum alium modum est dubitantes venire ad eandem rationem de optima politia. Si enim impossibile est ex omnibus studiosis existentibus esse civitatem, oportet autem unumquemque quod secundum ipsum opus bene facere, hoc autem a virtute, quoniam impossibile similes esse omnes cives, non utique erit virtus una civis et viri boni; eam quidem enim quae studiosi civis oportet omnibus inesse. Sic enim optimam necessarium esse civitatem, eam autem quae viri boni impossibile, si non omnes necessarium bonos esse eos qui in studiosa civitate cives.

The same question may also be approached by another road, from a consideration of the best constitution. If the state cannot be entirely composed of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to do his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, still inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the good citizen- thus, and thus only, can the state be perfect; but they will not have the virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the good state all the citizens must be good.

Polit.L3

Adhuc quoniam ex dissimilibus est civitas, sicut animal mox ex anima et corpore, et anima ex ratione et appetitu, et domus ex viro et muliere, et possessio ex domino et servo, eodem modo et civitas ex omnibus his et ad haec ex aliis dissimilibus speciebus consistit, necesse non unam esse civium omnium virtutem, sicut neque chorizantium summi et astantis. Quod quidem igitur non eadem manifestum ex his.

Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be compared to the living being: as the first elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and body, as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite, the family of husband and wife, property of master and slave, so of all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the state is composed; and, therefore, the virtue of all the citizens cannot possibly be the same, any more than the excellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands by his side. I have said enough to show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and always the same.

Polit.L3

Sed forte erit alicuius eadem virtus civis studiosi et viri studiosi. Dicimus itaque principem studiosum esse bonum et prudentem, politicum autem necessarium esse prudentem.

But will there then be no case in which the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man coincide? To this we answer that the good ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be a statesman must be a wise man.

Polit.L3

Et disciplinam autem mox alteram esse dicunt quidam principis, sicut et videntur regum filii equestrem et bellicam erudiri; et Euripides ait. Non mihi quae varia et alta sed quorum civitati opus est; tanquam sit quaedam principis disciplina. Si itaque eadem principis boni et viri boni, civis autem est et qui subditus, non eadem utique erit simpliciter civis et viri, alicuius tamen scilicet potentis principari solius civis. Non enim eadem principis et civis, et propter hoc Iason ait esurire quando tyrannizat, tanquam nesciens idiota esse.

And some persons say that even the education of the ruler should be of a special kind; for are not the children of kings instructed in riding and military exercises? As Euripides says: no subtle arts for me, but what the state requires.¹ As though there were a special education needed by a ruler. If then the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, and we assume further that the subject is a citizen as well as the ruler, the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be absolutely the same, although in some cases they may; for the virtue of a ruler differs from that of a citizen. It was the sense of this difference which made Jason say that he felt hungry when he was not a tyrant, meaning that he could not endure to live in a private station.

Polit.L3

At vero laudatur posse principari et subici, et propati civis virtus esse posse principari et subici bene. Si igitur eam quidem quae boni viri ponimus principativam, eam autem quae civis ambo, non utique erunt ambo laudabilia similiter.

But, on the other hand, it may be argued that men are praised for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a citizen of approved virtue who is able to do both. Now if we suppose the virtue of a good man to be that which rules, and the virtue of the citizen to include ruling and obeying, it cannot be said that they are equally worthy of praise.

Polit.L3

Quoniam igitur aliquando videtur utraque et non eadem oportere principem discere et subditum, civem autem ambo scire et participare ambobus, et hinc utique considerabit aliquis.

Since, then, it is sometimes thought that the ruler and the ruled must learn different things and not the same, but that the citizen must know and share in them both, the inference is obvious.

Polit.L3

Est enim principatus despoticus, hunc autem qui circa necessaria dicta scire facere principem non necessarium, sed uti magis, alterum autem servile. Dico autem alterum posse et servire ministerialibus actionibus. Servi autem species plures dicimus, operationes enim plures, quarum unam partem tenent manuales, isti autem sunt sicut et nomen significat ipsos qui vivunt de manibus in quibus banausus artifex est, propter quod apud quosdam non participabant principatibus antiquitus artifices, antequam fuisset demus extremus; opera quidem igitur subditorum sic non oportet bonum neque politicum, neque civem bonum addiscere, nisi quandoque gratia oportunitatis sibi ad se ipsum. Non enim adhuc accidit fieri hunc quidem despotam, hunc autem servum.

There is, indeed, the rule of a master, which is concerned with menial offices—the master need not know how to perform these, but may employ others in the execution of them: the other would be degrading; and by the other I mean the power actually to do menial duties, which vary much in character and are executed by various classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen, who, as their name signifies, live by the labor of their hands: under these the mechanic is included. Hence in ancient times, and among some nations, the working classes had no share in the government—a privilege which they only acquired under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good man and the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of inferiors except for their own occasional use; if they habitually practice them, there will cease to be a distinction between master and slave.

Polit.L3

Sed est quidam principatus secundum quem principatur similibus genere et liberis, hunc enim dicimus esse civilem principatum, quem oportet principem subditum addiscere, velut equestribus principari eum qui inter illos subditus fuit, et exercitum ducere in exercitu ductum, et qui ordini praefuit et insidias disposuit; propter quod dicitur et hoc bene, quod non est bene principari eum qui non sub principe fuit.

This is not the rule of which we are speaking; but there is a rule of another kind, which is exercised over freemen and equals by birth—a constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by obeying, as he would learn the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the orders of a general of cavalry, or the duties of a general of infantry by being under the orders of a general of infantry, and by having had the command of a regiment and of a company. It has been well said that 'he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander.'

Polit.L3

Horum autem virtus quidem altera, oportet autem civem bonum scire et posse principari et subici, et haec virtus civis scire principatum liberorum ad utraque, et boni etiam viri ambo, et si altera species temperantiae et iustitiae principativae; et enim subiecti quidem liberi autem boni, palam quia non una utique erit virtus, puta iustitia, sed habens species secundum quas principabitur et subicietur. Sicut enim viri et mulieris alia temperantia et fortitudo. Videbitur enim utique vir timidus esse, si sic fortis fuerit sicut mulier fortis, et mulier loquax, si sic ornata fuerit sicut vir bonus, quoniam et yconomia altera viri et mulieris: huius quidem enim acquirere, huius autem servare opus est; prudentia autem principis propria virtus sola; alias enim videtur necessarium esse communes subditorum eet principum. Subditi autem non est virtus prudentia, sed opinio vera. Sicut enim fistularum factor subiectus, princeps autem fistulator qui utitur. Utrum quidem igitur eadem virtus viri boni et civis studiosi, vel altera, et quomodo eadem, et quomodo altera, manifestum ex his.

The two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman—these are the virtues of a citizen. And, although the temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the virtue of a good man will include both; for the virtue of the good man who is free and also a subject, e.g., his justice, will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds, the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and differing as the temperance and courage of men and women differ. For a man would be thought a coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation than the good man; and indeed their part in the management of the household is different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the other to preserve. Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler: it would seem that all other virtues must equally belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion; he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user of the flute.From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the question, whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, or different, and how far the same, and how far different.

Polit.L3

His autem quae dicta sunt et cetera. Postquam Philosophus ostendit quid sit civis, hic inquirit de virtute civis. Et dividitur in partes duas.

Hiis autem quae dicta sunt, etc. After the philosopher shows what a citizen is, he inquires after the virtue of the citizen. This is divided into two parts.

Polit.L3

In prima ostendit, quod non est simpliciter eadem virtus civis, et virtus boni viri.

In the first part, he shows that the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man are not the same simply.

Polit.L3

In secunda parte movet circa hoc quasdam dubitationes, ibi, circa civem autem et cetera.

In the second part, he raises certain difficulties about this, at circa civem autem, [III.4.1] etc.

Polit.L3

Circa primum duo facit.

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L3

Primo ostendit, quod non est eadem simpliciter virtus civis, et boni viri.

First, he shows that the virtue of the citizen and of the good man are not the same simply.

Polit.L3

In secunda ostendit, quod alicuius civis est eadem virtus, quae et boni viri, ibi, sed forte erit alicuius et cetera.

In the second, he shows that for a certain citizen, there is the same virtue as for a good man, at sed forte erit alicuius, [III.3.5] etc.

Polit.L3

Circa primum duo facit.

About the first of these he does two things.

Polit.L3

Primo dicit de quo est intentio: quia post praedicta habitum est, id est consequens considerare, utrum debeamus ponere eamdem virtutem boni civis et boni viri, vel non: quod est quaerere, utrum ab eodem dicatur aliquis bonus vir, et bonus civis: nam virtus est, quae bonum facit habentem. Ad hoc autem, quod ista quaestio debitam inquisitionem accipiat, oportet primo ostendere, quae sit virtus civis, quodam typo, id est sub quadam figura et similitudine.

First, he says what his intention is: because after the aforementioned things have been grasped, it is necessary to consider, as a consequence, whether we ought to posit as the same virtue that of the good citizen and of the good man, or not--which is to seek whether it is from the same thing that someone is called a good man and a good citizen: for virtue is what makes good the one who has it. For this, therefore, so that such a question may receive a worthy inquiry, it is necessary to show first what the virtue of the citizen is, but as a certain type—that is, under a certain figure and likeness.

Polit.L3

Secundo, ibi, sicut igitur nauta etc., ostendit, quod non sit eadem virtus civis et boni viri, tribus rationibus.

Second, at sicut igitur nauta, etc., he shows that the virtue of the citizen and of the good man are not the same—for three reasons.

Polit.L3

In quarum prima praemittit similitudinem, ad ostendendum, quae sit virtus boni civis: et dicit, quod sicut nauta significat aliquid commune multis, ita et civis. Quod autem nauta sit communis multis, manifestat, quia cum multi dissimiles in potentia, idest arte et officio, dicantur nautae, quidam eorum est remigator, qui movet navem remis, quidam gubernator, qui dirigit motum navis gubernaculo, quidam autem est prorarius, idest custos prorae, quae est anterior pars navis, et alii habent alia nomina et alia officia. Manifestum est autem, quod unicuique horum convenit aliquid secundum propriam virtutem, et aliquid secundum communem. Ad propriam enim virtutem uniuscuiusque pertinet, quod habeat diligentem rationem et curam de proprio officio, sicut gubernator de gubernatione, et sic de aliis. Communis autem virtus est quaedam, quae convenit omnibus: omnium enim eorum opus ad hoc tendit, ut navigatio sit salva: ad hoc enim tendit desiderium et intentio cuiuslibet nautarum: et ad hoc ordinatur virtus communis nautarum, quae est virtus nautae inquantum est nauta. Ita etiam cum sint diversi cives habentes dissimilia officia, et status dissimiles in civitate, opus commune omnium est salus communitatis: quae quidem communitas consistit in ordine politiae. Unde patet, quod virtus civis inquantum est civis, consideretur in ordine ad politiam; ut scilicet ille sit bonus civis, qui bene operatur ad conservationem politiae. Sunt autem plures species politiae, ut infra dicetur, et ex superioribus aliqualiter est manifestum: ad diversas autem politias ordinantur homines bene, secundum diversas virtutes. Alio enim modo conservatur democratia, et alio modo oligarchia, aut tyrannis. Unde manifestum est quod non est una virtus perfecta secundum quam civis possit simpliciter dici bonus; sed aliquis dicitur bonus vir secundum unam virtutem perfectam, scilicet secundum prudentiam, ex qua omnes virtutes morales dependent. Contingit igitur aliquem esse bonum civem, qui tamen non habet virtutem secundum quam aliquis est bonus vir; et hoc in politiis, quae sunt praeter optimam politiam.

In the first, he presents a likeness in order to show what the virtue of the good citizen is: and he says that just as “sailor” signifies something common to many things, even so does “citizen.” And he clarifies that “sailor” is common to many because, although many people unlike each other in powers—that is, in art and office—are called “sailor,” yet a certain one of them is an “oarsman” who moves the ship with an oar, another is a “helmsman” [gubernator], who directs [dirigit] the movement of the ship from the helm [gubernaculo], and another is “prowsman,” that is, the guard of the prow, which is the forward part of the ship, and others have other names and other offices. It is clear, therefore, that for each of these [people], something [i.e. some name] is fitting for them according to their proper virtue, and something according to what is common. For it belongs to the proper virtue of each to have diligent reason, and care for his proper office, just as the helmsman for the helm, and so also the others. However, the virtue of what is common is a certain thing that is fitting for everyone: for the work of all of them intends this—that the voyage be healthy [salva]: for toward this tends the desire and intention of any of the sailors: and toward this is ordered the common virtue of the sailors, which is the virtue of the sailor inasmuch as he is a sailor. Thus, also, although there are diverse citizens holding dissimilar offices, and dissimilar states in the city, the common work of all is the health [salus] of the community: which community, indeed, consists in the order of the regime. Whence it is clear that the virtue of the citizen, inasmuch as he is a citizen, should be considered in the order toward the regime; so that, evidently, he is a good citizen who works well for the preservation of the regime. Now there are several kinds of regime, as will be said later, and from the above it is also somewhat clear: therefore, men are well-ordered to diverse regimes following diverse virtues. For in one way, democracy will be preserved, and in another mode oligarchy—or tyranny. Whence it is clear that there is not one perfect virtue following which a citizen can be called simply good; but someone is called a good man according to one perfect virtue, namely, according to prudence, from which all the moral virtues hang. It happens, therefore, that someone may be a good citizen who nevertheless does not have the virtue according to which someone is a good man; and this happens in regimes which are other than the best regime.

Polit.L3

Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, quinimmo et secundum alium modum et cetera. Et dicit, quod per alium modum possumus inquirendo sive obiiciendo pervenire ad eamdem rationem, et circa optimam politiam, scilicet quod non sit eadem virtus boni civis et boni viri: quia impossibile est, quantumcumque sit bona politia, quod omnes cives sint virtuosi: sed tamen oportet, quod unusquisque faciat opus suum quod ad civitatem pertinet, bene: quod quidem fit secundum virtutem civis, inquantum est civis. Et ideo dico, opus quod secundum ipsum, quia non possunt esse omnes cives similes, ut idem opus ad omnes pertineat. Et ex hoc sequitur, quod non sit una virtus civis et boni viri. Quam quidem consequentiam sic manifestat. Quia in optima politia, oportet quod quilibet civis habeat virtutem boni civis. Per hunc enim modum civitas erit optima: sed virtutem boni viri, impossibile est quod omnes habeant, quia non omnes sunt virtuosi in una civitate, ut dictum est.

He puts forward a second reason, at quinimmo et secundum alium modum, etc., and he says that, through another way, by inquiring or arguing, we can arrive at the same reason, and about the best regime—namely, that there is not the same virtue of a good citizen and a good man: because it is impossible, however good the regime may be, that all the citizens should be virtuous: but it is nevertheless necessary that each one should do his own work well that pertains to the city; which, indeed, occurs according to the virtue of the citizen inasmuch as he is a citizen. And therefore I say: “the work which is his own” because not all citizens can be the same, such that the same work belongs to all of them. And from this it follows that there is not one virtue of the citizen and of the good man, which consequence is clear thus: because in the best regime, it is necessary that any citizen have the virtue of a good citizen. For in this way, the city will be the best: but as for the virtue of the good man, it is impossible that everyone have it, since not everyone is virtuous in one city, as was said.

Polit.L3

Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc quoniam et ex dissimilibus et cetera. Et dicit, quod omnis civitas constat ex dissimilibus partibus, sicut animal constat statim quidem ex dissimilibus, scilicet ex anima et corpore, et similiter anima humana constat dissimilibus, scilicet ex vi rationabili et appetitiva, et iterum domestica societas consistit ex dissimilibus, scilicet ex viro et muliere, et possessio etiam constat ex domino et servo. Civitas autem constat ex omnibus istis diversitatibus, et ex multis aliis. Dictum est autem in primo, quod non est eadem virtus principantis et subiecti, neque in anima, neque etiam in aliis: unde etiam relinquitur, quod non sit una et eadem virtus omnium civium: sicut videmus, quod in choreis non est eadem virtus summi, idest illius qui ducit choream, et astantis, idest illius qui assistit. Manifestum est autem, quod una et eadem est virtus boni viri: relinquitur ergo, quod non sit eadem virtus boni civis et boni viri.

He puts forward a third reason, at adhuc quoniam et ex dissimilibus, etc., and he says that every city is built out of dissimilar parts, just as an animal is built—usually, at least—out of dissimilar parts, namely, out of soul and body, and likewise, the human soul is built out of the dissimilar, namely, from the rational power and appetitive, and again, household society is built from the dissimilar, namely, from man and wife, and an estate is also built out of master and slave. Now the city is built out of all these differences, and out of many others. But it was said in Bk. I that the virtues of governing and of being subject are not the same, nor is the soul the same, nor are various other things: whence it remains that there is not one and the same virtue for all citizens: just as we see that in the chorus there is not the same virtue for the summi, that is, for he who leads the chorus, and for the astantis, that is, for he who assists. But it is clear that the virtue of the good man is one and the same: it remains, therefore, that the virtue of the good citizen and of the good man are not the same.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit sed forte erit alicuius eadem etc., ostendit, quod alicuius civis est eadem virtus, quae et boni viri. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Then, where he says sed forte erit alicuius eadem, etc., he shows that the virtue of a certain citizen is the same virtue as that of the good man. And about this he does three things.

Polit.L3

Primo ostendit propositum.

First, he shows what was proposed.

Polit.L3

Secundo ex hoc concludit conclusionem probatam in praemissis, ibi, et disciplinam autem et cetera.

Second, from this he concludes that the conclusion is proved in the aforementioned things, at et disciplinam autem, [II.3.6] etc.

Polit.L3

Tertio movet quamdam dubitationem circa praemissa, et solvit, ibi, at vero laudatur et cetera.

Third, he raises a certain difficulty about the aforementioned, and resolves it, at at vero laudatur, [II.3.7] etc.

Polit.L3

Dicit ergo primo, quod forte poterit dici, quod alicuius civis, ad hoc quod sit bonus, requiritur eadem virtus, quae est boni viri. Non enim dicitur aliquis esse bonus princeps, nisi sit bonus per virtutes morales et prudens. Dictum est enim in sexto Ethicorum quod politica est quaedam pars prudentiae: unde oportet politicum, idest rectorem politiae, esse prudentem, et per consequens bonum virum.

He says first, therefore, that by chance it will be able to be said that, for that which is the good of a certain citizen, the same virtue is required which is that of the good man. For it is not said that someone is a good prince unless he is good through the moral virtues and prudence. For it was said in Bk. VI of the Ethics that politics is a certain part of prudence: whence it is necessary that someone political, that is, the ruler of a regime, is prudent, and consequently, a good man.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et disciplinam autem etc., concludit ex hoc, quod non sit eadem virtus boni civis simpliciter, et boni viri. Et ad hoc probandum primo inducit, quod quidam dicunt aliam esse disciplinam principis, qua est instruendus ad virtutem, et disciplinam civis, ut apparet ex hoc quod filii regum erudiuntur in equestri et bellica disciplina. Unde, et Euripides dixit loquens ex persona principis: non ad me pertinet scire quae sunt varia, et alta, quae scilicet philosophi considerant, sed ea quorum opus est ad regimen civitatis. Et hoc dixit ad significandum, quod est quaedam propria disciplina principis. Et quo concludit, quod si eadem sit disciplina et virtus boni principis et boni viri, non autem omnis civis est princeps, sed etiam subditi sunt cives; sequitur, quod non sit simpliciter eadem virtus civis, et viri, nisi forte alicuius civis, illius scilicet, qui potest esse princeps. Et hoc ideo, quia non est eadem virtus principis et civis. Propter quod Iason dixit, quod esuriebat quando non tyrannizabat, ac si nesciret vivere sicut ydiota, id est sicut privata persona.

Then, where he says et disciplinam autem, etc., he concludes from this that the virtue of the good citizen and of the good man are not simply the same. And to prove this, he first introduces what some say, that the discipline of a prince, who should be instructed for virtue, is other than the discipline of the citizen--as will appear from this, that the sons of a king are developed in riding and military discipline. Whence Euripides also said, speaking in the person of a prince: “It does not belong to me to know things various and high, which philosophers consider, but those things whose work is for the regime of the city.” And he said this in order to signify what is a certain proper discipline for a prince. And from this he concludes that if the discipline and virtue of a good prince and a good man are the same, and not every citizen is a prince, but even subjects are citizens, then it follows that the virtue of a citizen and of a man are not simply the same, unless by chance of a certain citizen, of him, namely, who is able to be a prince. And this is so because the virtue of a prince and of a citizen are not the same. Because of this Jason said that he used to hunger when he was not tyrannizing, as if he did not know how to live as an ydiota, that is, as a private person.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit at vero laudatur etc., movet dubitationem circa praemissa. Et circa hoc duo facit.

Then, where he says at vero laudatur, etc., he raises a difficulty about the aforementioned things, and he does two things concerning this.

Polit.L3

Primo obiicit contra praemissa.

First, he argues against the aforementioned things.

Polit.L3

Secundo solvit, ibi, quoniam igitur aliquando videtur et cetera.

Second, he resolves the difficulty, at quoniam igitur aliquando videtur, [III.3.8] etc.

Polit.L3

Dicit ergo primo, quod quandoque laudatur civis ex hoc, quod potest bene principari et subiici. Si ergo virtus boni viri est, quae est virtus boni principis; virtus autem boni civis est, quae se habet ad utrumque, scilicet ad principandum et subiiciendum: sequitur, quod non sunt ambo similiter laudabilia, scilicet esse bonum civem et bonum virum; sed esse bonum civem sit multo melius.

Therefore, he says first that sometimes a citizen is praised because of this--that he is well able to govern and to be subject. If, therefore, the virtue of a good man is the virtue of a good prince, but the virtue of a good citizen is inclined toward both, namely, toward governing and being subject, it follows that they are not both similarly praiseworthy—to be a good citizen and a good man—but to be a good citizen is much better.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit quoniam igitur etc., solvit praedictam dubitationem.

Then, where he says quoniam igitur, etc., he resolves the aforementioned doubt.

Polit.L3

Et primo ponit, quomodo est eadem disciplina principis et subiecti, et quomodo non.

And he first posits in what way the discipline of prince and subject are the same, and in what way they are not.

Polit.L3

Secundo ostendit, quomodo sit eadem virtus utriusque, ibi horum autem virtus et cetera.

Second, he shows in what way the virtue of both is the same, at horum autem virtus, [III.3.11] etc.

Polit.L3

Circa primum tria facit.

About the first he does three things.

Polit.L3

Primo proponit quod intendit: et dicit, quod quia, sicut praedictum est, aliquando utrumque horum videtur, scilicet quod non oporteat eadem discere principem et subditum; et iterum, quod bonus civis debet scire utrumque, scilicet principari et subiici: quomodo utrumque sit verum, oportet considerare ex sequentibus.

First, he proposes his intention: and he says that because, as was said before, sometimes both of these [seem correct]—namely, that it is not necessary for the prince and the subject to learn the same things; and again, that the good citizen ought to know both, namely, to govern and to be subject—it is therefore necessary to consider from the following things in what way both are true.

Polit.L3

Secundo, ibi, est enim principatus et cetera. Ponit unum modum principatus, in quo verificatur unum eorum, quae dicta sunt: scilicet quod alia est disciplina principis et subditi. Et dicit, quod est quidam principatus despoticus, id est dominativus, in quo princeps est dominus subditorum; et talem principem non oportet quod sciat facere ea quae pertinent ad ministeria necessaria vitae, sed magis quod sciat uti eis: alterum autem, scilicet posse servire in his quae pertinent ad actiones ministrorum, non videtur esse principativum vel dominativum, sed magis servile. Sunt autem diversae species servorum secundum diversas operationes ministrantium: inter quos unam partem tenent illi qui manibus operantur, sicut calcifices, coquinarii, et similes. Isti autem vivunt de operibus manuum, sicut ex nomine ipsorum significatur: et inter tales computatur banausus artifex, idest qui opere suae artis maculat corpus, ut in primo dictum est. Et quia operationes horum artificum non sunt principativae, sed magis serviles, ideo antiquitus apud quosdam artifices non habebant aliquam partem in principatu civitatis; et hoc dico antequam fuisset demus, id est populus extremus, idest antequam infimi de populo acciperent potestatem in civitatibus. Sic igitur patet, quod huiusmodi opera subditorum non oportet addiscere neque bonum politicum, idest gubernatorem civitatis, neque etiam bonum civem, nisi quandoque propter aliquam utilitatem ad seipsum; non quod in hoc serviat aliis, quia iam non esset distinctio inter dominum et servum, si huiusmodi servilia opera domini exercerent.

Second, at est enim principatus, etc., he posits one mode of government, in which one of the things that has been said is verified: namely, that the discipline of a prince is other than that of a subject. And he says that there is a certain despotic government—that is, mastery—in which the prince is the master of the subjects; and it is not necessary that such a prince should know how to do those things that belong to the services necessary for life, but rather, that he should know how to use them: but the others—that are able to serve in those things that belong to the actions of servants—do not seem to be governing or masterful, but rather, servile. But there are diverse kinds of slaves according to the diverse works of servants—among whom, those hold one part who work with their hands, like shoe-makers and cooks. Such men live by the work of their hands, as their names signify: and among such men is counted the artisan banausoi, that is, he who stains his body by the work of his art. And because the works of these artisans are not governing, but rather, slavish, therefore among some in antiquity, artisans did not have any part in the government of the city; and I say that this was before the demos, which is the extreme of the people—that is, before the lowest of the people—took power in the city. Thus, therefore, it is clear that it is not necessary for either the good statesman—that is, the governor of the city—or even the good citizen to learn the works of this sort of subject, unless at times because of some utility to themselves; not so that in this they could serve others, because there would no longer be a distinction between master and slave if masters were to exercise these sorts of slavish works.

Polit.L3

Tertio ibi, sed est quidam principatus et cetera. Ponit alium principatum in quo alia pars verificatur: scilicet quod eadem debet addiscere et princeps et subditus. Et dicit, quod est quidam principatus secundum quem aliquis principatur, non sicut dominus servis, sed sicut liberis, et sibi aequalibus. Et hic est civilis principatus, secundum quem in civitatibus nunc hi, nunc alii assumuntur ad principandum. Et huiusmodi principem oportet subiectum addiscere qualiter debet principari; sicut principari equestribus addiscit aliquis per hoc quod inter equites subiectus fuit, et esse dux exercitus addiscit aliquis per hoc quod fuit sub duce exercitus, et qui alicui particulari ordini praefuit, puta uni centuriae vel uni cohorti, et qui insidias disposuit ad mandatum ducis. Magnum enim principatum exercere addiscit homo, et per subiectionem et per exercitium in minoribus officiis. Et quantum ad hoc bene dicitur in proverbio, quod non potest bene principari, qui non fuit sub principe.

Third, at sed est quidam principatus, etc., he puts forth another government in which the other part is verified: namely, that the prince and the subject ought to learn the same thing. And he says that there is a certain government according to which someone governs, not as the master over slaves, but as over those free and equal to himself. And this is a civic government, according to which—in cities—now some, and then others are taken up for government. And it is necessary for a prince of this sort to learn, subjected, how he ought to govern; just as someone learns to govern cavalry through this: that he was a subject among knights; and someone learns to be a commander of an army through this: that he was under the commander of an army, and has been at the head of some particular order, such as one company or one cohort, and has organized plots at the mandate of a commander. For man learns to exercise a great government both through subjection and through exercise in lesser offices. And concerning this, it was well-said in the proverb that he cannot govern well who has not been under a prince.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit horum autem virtus quidem etc., ostendit, quomodo sit eadem virtus, vel diversa principis et aliorum. Et dicit, quod etiam in hoc principatu est altera virtus principis et subiecti: sed tamen oportet, quod ille qui est simpliciter bonus civis, sciat et principari, et subiici, principatu scilicet non dominativo, qui est servorum, sed politico, qui est liberorum. Et haec est virtus civis, ut ad utrumque bene se habeat: et similiter boni viri sunt ambo, scilicet, et bene principari, et bene subiici. Et sic boni civis, inquantum est potens principari, est eadem virtus quae et boni viri; sed inquantum est subiectus, est alia virtus principis et boni viri, a virtute boni civis: puta altera species est temperantiae et iustitiae principis, et temperantiae et iustitiae subditorum. Subiectus enim qui est liber et bonus, non habet unam tantum virtutem, puta iustitiam; sed iustitia eius habet duas species; secundum unam quarum potest bene principari, et secundum aliam bene subiici: et ita etiam de aliis virtutibus.

Then, where he says horum autem virtus quidem, etc., he shows in what way there may be either the same virtue, or diverse ones for a prince and the others. And he says that even in this government there is another virtue for prince and subject: but it is nevertheless necessary that he who is simply a good citizen knows both how to govern and to be subject when the government is not mastery, which is of slaves, but political, which is of the free. And this is the virtue of the citizen: that he is well-prepared for both. And likewise, it is of the good man to do both—namely, to govern well and to be subject well. And so the virtue of the good citizen—inasmuch as it is an ability to govern—is the same virtue as that of the good man; but inasmuch as the citizen is a subject, the virtue of a governor and of a good man is other than the virtue of a good citizen: just as the temperance and justice of a prince is a different kind than the temperance and justice of subordinates. For a subject who is free and good does not have only one virtue, such as justice; but his justice has two kinds; according to one of them he is able to govern well, and according to the other of them he is able to be subject well: and thus also concerning the other virtues.

Polit.L3

Et manifestat hoc per exemplum: quia alia est temperantia et fortitudo viri et mulieris: quia vir reputabitur timidus, si non sit magis fortis quam fortis mulier; et mulier quam decet taciturnitas, reputabitur loquax, si sit ornata, id est facunda sicut bonus vir. Et hoc ideo, quia etiam in dispensatione domus, aliud pertinet ad virum, aliud ad mulierem. Ad virum enim pertinet acquirere divitias, ad mulierem autem conservare. Et sic etiam se habet in civitate circa principem et subiectum. Nam proprie virtus principis est prudentia, quae est regitiva et gubernativa. Aliae vero virtutes morales, quarum ratio consistit in gubernari et subiici, sunt communes et subditorum et principum: sed tamen aliquid prudentiae participant subditi, ut scilicet habeant opinionem veram de agendis, per quam possint seipsos gubernare in propriis actibus secundum gubernationem principis. Et ponit exemplum de illo qui facit fistulas, qui se habet ad fistulatorem, qui utitur fistulis, sicut subiectus ad principem: operatur enim recte faciendo fistulas, si habeat opinionem regulatam secundum mandatum fistulatoris: et ita est in civitate de subiecto et principe. Loquitur autem hic de virtute subditi, non inquantum est bonus vir, quia sic indiget habere prudentiam, sed loquitur de eo inquantum est bonus subditus: ad hoc enim non requiritur nisi quod habeat opinionem veram de his quae ei mandantur.

And he clarifies this through an example: because the temperance and fortitude of a man is other than that of a woman, since a man will be deemed fearful if he is not of greater strength than a strong woman; and a woman, whom silence adorns, will be deemed talkative if she is ornate—that is, eloquent—like a good man. And this results because even in the management of the household, one thing belongs to a man, and another to a woman. For it belongs to the man to acquire wealth, but to the woman to protect it. And things also have themselves like this in the city, concerning the prince and the subject. For properly, the virtue of the prince is prudence—which rules and govers. Certainly, the other moral virtues whose account consists in governing and being subordinate are common to both subordinates and princes: but nevertheless, subordinates participate in something of prudence, namely, when they have a true opinion about acting through which they can govern themselves in their proper acts—following the government of the prince. And he puts forward the example of the one who makes flutes, who is related to the flute player—who uses flutes—just as a subject toward a prince: for he works correctly in making flutes if he has an opinion that is ruled by what the flute player mandated: and so it is in the city, with the subject and the prince. For this is said about the virtue of the subordinate not inasmuch as he is a good man—since he would be in need of prudence—but it is said about him inasmuch as he is a good subordinate: and for this, nothing is required except that he have a true opinion about those things that are mandated to him.

Polit.L3

Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, manifestum esse ex praemissis, an sit eadem vel altera virtus boni viri et boni civis; et iterum, quomodo sit eadem et quomodo altera, quia est eadem inquantum potest bene principari, alia autem inquantum potest bene subiici.

Now in the final epilogue, he concludes that it is clear from what has been set forth whether there is the same virtue or another one for good man and a good citizen; and again, in what way it is the same and in what way it is another—since it is the same inasmuch as it can govern well, but another inasmuch as it can be subject well.

Polit.L3

Lecture 4

Polit.L4

Circa civem autem adhuc restat quaedam dubitationum, ut vere enim utrum civis est cui licet communicare principatu, aut et banausos cives ponendum. Si quidem igitur et hos ponendum quibus non interest principatuum, non est possibile omnis civis esse talem virtutem. Iste enim civis. Si autem nullus talium civis, in qua parte ponendus unusquisque; neque enim advena neque peregrinus.

There still remains one more question about the citizen: Is he only a true citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic to be included? If they who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this virtue of ruling and obeying; for this man is a citizen And if none of the lower class are citizens, in which part of the state are they to be placed? For they are not resident aliens, and they are not foreigners.

Polit.L4

Aut propter hanc quidem rationem nullum dicemus accidere inconveniens; neque enim servi dictorum nullum, neque libertini; hoc enim verum quod non omnes ponendum cives, sine quibus non utique erit civitas, quoniam neque similiter cives pueri et viri. Sed hi quidem simpliciter, hi autem ex suppositione; cives quidem enim suntm sed imperfecti. In antiquis quidem igitur temporibus apud quosdam erat servum quod banausum vel peregrinum, propter quod multi tales et nunc; optima autem civitas non faciet banausum civem. Si autem et hic civis, sed civis virtutem quam diximus dicendum, non omnis neque liberi solum, sed quicumque operibus necessariis sunt dimissi. Necessariorum autem qui quidem uni ministrantes talia servi. Qui autem communiter banausi et mercennarii.

May we not reply, that as far as this objection goes there is no more absurdity in excluding them than in excluding slaves and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes? It must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of the state; for example, children are not citizen equally with grown-up men, who are citizens absolutely, but children, not being grown up, are only citizens on a certain assumption. Nay, in ancient times, and among some nations the artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the majority of them are so now. The best form of state will not admit them to citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the virtue of a citizen will not apply to every citizen nor to every free man as such, but only to those who are freed from necessary services. The necessary people are either slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or mechanics and laborers who are the servants of the community.

Polit.L4

Manifestum autem hinc parum considerantibus. Quomodo habet de ipsis; ipsum enim apparens quod dictum est facit evidens. Quoniam enim plures sunt politiae, et species civis necessarium esse plures, et maxime subditi civis. Quare in aliqua quidem politia, necessarium esse banausum et mercennarium cives; in aliquibus autem impossibile, puta si qua est, quam vocant aristocraticam, et in qua secubndum virtutem dantur honores, et secundum dignitatem; neque enim possibile est exhibere quae virtutis viventem vita banausa vel mercennaria. In oligarchiis autem mercennarium quidem non contingit esse civem; ab honorabilitatibus enim longis participationes principatuum; banausum autem contingit. Ditantur enim et multi artificum. In Thebis autem lex erat eum qui decem annorum non abstinuisset a foro, non participare virtute. In multis autem politiis contrahitur et peregrinorum lex. Qui enim ex patre cive in quibusdam democratiis civis est. Eodem autem modo habent et quae circa spurios apud multos. Attamen quoniam propter indigentiam legitimorum civium faciunt cives tales, propter paucitatem enim hominum sic utuntur legibus, defectum habentes turbae, paulatim eligunt eos qui ex servo primum vel serva; deinde eos qui ex mulieribus; tandem autem solum eos qui ex ambobus ipsis cives faciunt. Quod quidem igitur species plures civis, manifestum ex his.

These reflections carried a little further will explain their position; and indeed what has been said already is of itself, when understood, explanation enough. Since there are many forms of government there must be many varieties of citizen and especially of citizens who are subjects; so that under some governments the mechanic and the laborer will be citizens, but not in others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-called government of the best (if there be such an one), in which honors are given according to virtue and merit; for no man can practice virtue who is living the life of a mechanic or laborer. In oligarchies the qualification for office is high, and therefore no laborer can ever be a citizen; but a mechanic may, for an actual majority of them are rich. At Thebes there was a law that no man could hold office who had not retired from business for ten years. But in many states the law goes to the length of admitting aliens; for in some democracies a man is a citizen though his mother only be a citizen; and a similar principle is applied to illegitimate children; the law is relaxed when there is a dearth of population. But when the number of citizens increases, first the children of a male or a female slave are excluded; then those whose mothers only are citizens; and at last the right of citizenship is confined to those whose fathers and mothers are both citizens.

Polit.L4

Et quod dicitur maxime civis qui participat honoribus sicut et Homerus poetizavit: ac si quendam inhonoratum post exurgentem. Sed ubi quod tale occultum est, gratia deceptionis cohabitantium est. Sicut advena enim est qui honoribus non participat.

Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens; and he is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honors of the state. Compare Homer's words, like some dishonored stranger¹; he who is excluded from the honors of the state is no better than an alien. But when his exclusion is concealed, then the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow inhabitants.

Polit.L4

Utrum quidem igitur alteram vel eandem ponendum secundum quam vir bonus est et civis studiosus, palam quia alicuius quidem civitatis idem, alicuius autem alius; et ille autem non omnis, sed qui civilis eet dominus, vel potens esse dominus, vel secundum se vel cum aliis curae communium.

As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only the statesman and those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs.

Polit.L4

Circa civem autem adhuc restat et cetera. Postquam Philosophus ostendit, quae sit virtus civis, et utrum sit eadem cum virtute boni viri, hic movet quamdam dubitationem circa praedeterminata. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Circa civem autem adhuc restat, etc. After the philosopher shows what the virtue of the citizen is, and whether it is the same as the virtue of the good man, he here raises a certain difficulty about what has been determined. And about this he does three things.

Polit.L4

Primo movet dubitationem.

First, he arouses the difficulty.

Polit.L4

Secundo solvit eam, ibi, aut propter hanc quidem rationem et cetera.

Second, he resolves it, at aut propter hanc quidem rationem, [III.4.2] etc.

Polit.L4

Tertio solutionem manifestat, ibi, manifestum autem hinc parum et cetera.

Third, he clarifies the solution, at manifestum autem hinc parum, [III.4.4] etc.

Polit.L4

Dicit ergo primo, quod circa civem adhuc remanet quaedam dubitatio: utrum scilicet ille solus sit civis, qui potest communicare in principatu civitatis; an etiam banausi, id est viles artifices sint ponendi cives, quos non contingit communicare in principatu. Et obiicit ad utramque partem: quia si banausi dicantur cives, ad quos nihil pertinet de civitatibus, sequetur, quod virtus quam diximus esse boni civis, ut scilicet possit bene principari et subiici, non pertineat ad omnem civem, quia iste civis ponitur, qui tamen non potest principari: si autem dicatur, quod nullus talium sit civis: remanebit dubium, in quo genere sint ponendi banausi. Non enim potest dici quod sint advenae, quasi aliunde venientes ad habitandum in civitate; neque quod sint peregrini, sicut viatores, qui propter aliquod negotium ad civitatem veniunt, non causa manendi. Huiusmodi enim artifices, et mansionem in civitate habent, et in civitate sunt nati, non advenientes aliunde.

First, therefore, he says that a certain difficulty yet remains about the citizen: namely, whether he only is a citizen who is able to share in the government of the city; or whether even the banausoi—that is, the base artisanswho do not happen to share in government—ought to be placed among the citizens. And he argues for each part: because if the banausoi were called citizens—to whom belong nothing about cities—it would follow that the virtue which we called that of the good citizen—that he be able to govern and to be subject well—would not belong to every citizen, because such a citizen was posited as to be unable to govern: but if it would be said that nobody of this kind may be a citizen, a doubt will remain: in what genus the banausoi may be placed? For it could not be said that they are immigrants, as if they came from elsewhere in order to inhabit the city; nor that they are travelers, like wayfarers, who come to the city because of some business, and not in order to dwell. For artisans of this sort have dwellings in the city, and were born in the city, and are not immigrants from elsewhere.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit aut propter hanc quidem etc.; solvit praedictam dubitationem, et dicit, quod propter hanc ultimam rationem (quae) dubitat in qua parte ponendi sunt artifices, si non cives sunt, non sequitur aliquod inconveniens. Multi enim sunt, qui non sunt cives, et tamen neque sunt advenae neque peregrini; sicut patet de servis et libertinis, qui sunt ex servitute libertati restituti. Verum est enim quod non omnes sunt cives, qui sunt necessarii ad complementum civitatis, sine quibus civitas esse non potest; quia non solum de servis, sed etiam de pueris videmus, quod non sunt ita perfecte cives sicut et viri. Viri enim sunt simpliciter cives, quasi potentes operari ea quae sunt civium: sed pueri sunt cives ex suppositione, idest cum aliqua determinatione diminuente. Sunt enim cives imperfecti: et sicut servi et pueri sunt quidem aliqualiter cives, sed non perfecte, ita etiam est et de artificibus. Unde in antiquis temporibus banausi, id est viles artifices opere suae artis maculantes corpus, et etiam peregrini apud quasdam civitates erant servi, sicut etiam et modo multi sunt tales.

Then, where he says aut propter hanc quidem, etc., he resolves the aforementioned doubt, and he says that on account of this last reason, which doubts in what part artisans should be placed if they are not citizens, nothing follows that is unfitting. For there are many who are not citizens and yet are neither immigrants nor travelers, as is clear concerning slaves, and freedmen who, out of slavery, are re-established in freedom. For it is true that not all are citizens who are necessary for the completion of the city, and without whom the city is not able to be; because we see not only about slaves, but even about children, that they are not so perfectly citizens as are men. For men are citizens simply, as having the power to work those things which are of the city; but children are citizens through the place of another, that is, with a certain lessened determination. For they are imperfect citizens: and just as slaves and children are indeed citizens in a way, but not perfectly, even so is it also for artisans. So just as in ancient times that the banausoi, that is the base artisans, stained their bodies with the work of the hands, and also travelers among certain cities were slaves, so also are many of them today.

Polit.L4

Sed modo etiam in civitate optime disposita non possunt esse banausi cives. Et si dicatur, quod banausus est civis aliquo modo; tunc dicendum est, quod virtus civis, quam determinavimus, ut scilicet possit bene principari et subiici, non est cuiuslibet civis quomodocumque dicti: sed oportet, ad hoc quod ad eos pertineat huiusmodi virtus, quod non solum sint liberi, sed etiam sint dimissi, idest absoluti ab operibus necessariis vitae. Illi enim qui sunt deputati talibus necessariis operibus, siquidem in his ministrent uni tantum, hoc est proprie servorum: consueverunt enim servi huiusmodi ministeria exhibere dominis suis. Si autem haec ministeria exhibeant communiter quibuscumque, hoc pertinet ad banausos et mercenarios, nam calcifices et pistores serviunt quibuscumque pro pecunia.

But in a way, even in the best-organized city, the banausoi are not able to be citizens. And if it is said that a banausus is a citizen in a certain manner, then it needs to be said that the virtue of the citizen, which we determined—namely, that he be able to govern and to be subject well—is not of just any citizen, after whatever manner he may be called: but it is necessary, in order that virtue of this sort should belong to anyone, that they not only are free, but also are released, that is, detached from the works necessary for life. Indeed, those who are groomed for such necessary works, if they serve in these things for only one person, this is properly of slaves: for it was customary for slaves to deliver services of this manner to their masters. But if these services were delivered commonly to anyone whosoever, this belonged to banausoi and wage-earners, for cobblers and bakers will serve anyone for money.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem etc., manifestat propositam solutionem. Et circa hoc facit tria.

Then, where he says manifestum autem, etc., he clarifies the proposed solution. And about this he does three things.

Polit.L4

Primo ostendit, quomodo aliquis diversimode in diversis politiis est civis.

First, he shows in what manner the citizen is diversified in diverse regimes.

Polit.L4

Secundo ostendit, quod maxime civis est in qualibet politia, qui potest participare principatu, ibi, quod dicitur maxime civis et cetera.

Second, he shows that the greatest citizen in any given regime is he who is able to participate in government, at quod dicitur maxime civis, [III.4.6] etc.

Polit.L4

Tertio epilogando colligit ea quae dicta sunt de virtute civis.

Third, in an epilogue [III.4.7], he ties together those things that have been said about the virtue of the citizen.

Polit.L4

Dicit ergo primo, quod manifestum erit, quomodo se habeat veritas circa praemissa, ex parva consideratione eorum quae sequuntur. Si enim aliquis perfecte videat id quod dicetur, fiet ei evidens quod dictum est: cum enim sint plures politiae specie differentes, et civis dicatur in ordine ad politiam, ut dictum est; necesse est etiam, quod civis habeat plures species. Et maxime ista differentia attenditur quantum ad cives subditos, qui in diversis politiis diversimode se habent ad principatum. Illi autem qui praesident in qualibet politia principantur. Unde propter diversitatem politiarum, et per consequens civium, necesse est, quod in aliqua politia, scilicet in democratia, in qua quaeritur solum libertas, banausi et mercenarii sint cives: poterunt enim ad principatum promoveri, cum sint liberi. Sed in aliquibus politiis est hoc impossibile, sicut maxime contingit in aristocratia, in qua dantur honores dignis secundum eorum virtutem, illi autem qui vivunt vita banausa vel mercenaria non possunt civitati exhibere in suo regimine ea quae pertinent ad virtutem, quia non sunt in talibus exercitati. Sed in oligarchiis mercenarii quidem non possunt esse cives, quia in huiusmodi politiis assumuntur aliqui ad principatus propter diuturnos honores praecedentes. Unde non de facili potest contingere, quod mercenarii ad honores assumantur, qui vix per totam vitam suam possunt congregare, unde divites fiant. Sed banausi, id est artifices in talibus politiis possunt esse cives et principes, quia multi artifices cito ditantur, et ita possunt propter divitias in oligarchiis assumi ad principatus, cum per aliquod tempus ab artificiis se abstinentes, postquam fuerint ditati, honorabilem duxerunt vitam: unde apud Thebas erat statutum, quod ille qui non abstinuisset a foro venalium rerum decem annis, non posset participare virtute, scilicet principativa.

He first says, therefore, that it will be clear in what manner truth holds itself toward what has been set down from a small consideration of those things that will follow. For if someone could see perfectly what will be said, what was said would become evident to him: for since there are several regimes differing in kind, and the citizen is so called within the order toward the regime, as was said, it is also necessary that the citizen have several kinds. And most of all, this difference is approached in the amount that citizens are subordinates, who hold themselves in diverse manner toward government in diverse regimes. Those who command govern in any regime. Whence, on account of the diversity of regimes, and consequently, of citizens, it is necessary a certain regime, such as in a democracy—in which only freedom is sought—the banausoi and wage-earners are citizens: for they will be able to be promoted toward government, since they are free. But in other regimes this is impossible, as most of all happens in aristocracy, in which honors are given to the worthy according to their virtue; now those who live the life of the banausoi or wage-earners cannot exhibit to the city those things that belong to virtue in their regime, because they are not exercised in such things. But in oligarchies, wage-earners, certainly, are not able to be citizens, because in regimes of this sort, people are taken up to government because of long-preceding honors. Whence it does not easily happen that wage-earners are taken up to honors, who are scarcely able, through the whole of their lives to gather what would make them wealthy. But banausoi, that is, artisans, are able to be citizens and governors in such regimes because many artisans gain wealth quickly, and so because of wealth, can be taken up to government in oligarchies, although for a certain time they will have abstained from making art after becoming wealthy, and led an honorable life. Whence, at Thebes, there was a statute that he who had not abstained from the affairs of selling for ten years could not participate in virtue—namely, governing virtue.

Polit.L4

Sed quamvis peregrini et advenae, et abiectae personae non possint esse cives, quasi potentes principari in civitatibus bene institutis, tamen in multis politiis, scilicet democraticis, restringitur lex de peregrinis et advenis ut non sint cives; quia in quibusdam democratiis, ille qui est natus ex matre cive, reputatur civis, licet pater sit advena vel peregrinus. Et ita etiam restringitur lex de spuriis apud multos, ut scilicet sint cives: sed hoc faciunt propter indigentiam bonorum civium, et propter paucitatem hominum habentes defectum turbae, in qua consistit potestas democratiae, utuntur talibus legibus, ut primo eligant eos in cives, qui sunt nati ex servo vel ex serva, dummodo alter parentum sit liber; deinde crescente multitudine, excludunt omnes filios servorum, sed reputant cives eos, qui sunt nati ex mulieribus civibus, quamvis patres sint advenae; tandem autem diriguntur ad hoc, quod iudicant cives solum illos, qui sunt nati ex ambobus liberis et civibus. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod sunt diversae species civium, secundum diversitatem politiarum.

But although travelers and immigrants and abject persons are not able to be citizens, since the powerful govern in well-instituted cities, nevertheless, in many regimes, namely, democratic ones, the law about travelers and immigrants—that they may not be citizens—is loosened; because in certain democracies, although he who is born from a citizen mother is deemed a citizen, it is permitted that the father be an immigrant or traveler. And so also the law about illegitimacy is loosened among many cities—namely, that they may be citizens. But they do this because of the lack of good citizens, and because of the scarcity of men, having the defect of a mob, in which the power of democracy consists, they use such laws so that they may first elect those as citizens who are born from slaves or slave-women, as long as the other parent is free; then, when the multitude has grown, they exclude all the children of slaves, but esteem as citizens those who are born from citizen mothers, though their fathers may be immigrants; but finally the laws are straightened out toward this, that they judge as citizens only those who were born from parents both of whom were free and citizens. Thus, therefore, it is clear that there are diverse kinds of citizens, following the diversity of regimes.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit et quod dicitur maxime etc., ostendit, quid sit maxime civis. Et dicit quod maxime ille dicitur civis in qualibet politia, qui participat honoribus civitatis. Unde Homerus dixit poetice de quodam quod post alios exsurrexit, puta ad loquendum, sicut quidam inhonoratus idest sicut quidam advena, qui non erat civis. Sed ubi ista ratio civis occultatur propter deceptionem, cohabitantium (est) esse civem, ut scilicet omnes inhabitantes civitatem cives dicantur; sed hoc non est conveniens quia ille qui non participat honoribus civitatis, est sicut advena in civitate.

Then, where he says et quod dicitur maxime, etc., he shows what is most of all a citizen. And he says that most of all, he is called a citizen in any given regime who participates in the honors of the city. Whence, Homer said poetically of a certain man that he arose after others—in order to speak, for instance—as someone dishonored, that is, as some immigrant who was not a citizen. But where such an account of the citizen is hidden because of deception, then those dwelling together are called “citizens”, as, for instance, all those inhabiting the city are called citizens. But this is not fitting, because he who does not participate in the honors of the city is like an immigrant in the city.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit utrum quidem igitur etc., colligit epilogando quae dixerat: et dicit quod circa hanc quaestionem qua quaerebatur, utrum sit eadem virtus boni viri et studiosi civis, ostensum est quod in aliqua civitate, scilicet aristocratica, idem est bonus vir et bonus civis, quia scilicet principatus dantur secundum virtutem quae est boni viri. In aliquibus autem alius est bonus vir et alius bonus civis, scilicet in corruptis politiis in quibus principatus dantur non secundum virtutem. Et ille cives qui est idem cum bono viro, non est quicumque civis, sed ille qui est civilis, id est rector civitatis et dominus vel potens esse dominus eorum quae pertinent ad curam communitatis, vel solus vel etiam cum aliis. Dictum enim est supra quod eadem est virtus principis et boni viri. Unde si civis accipiatur, qui est princeps vel qui potest esse, eadem est virtus eius et boni viri. Si autem accipiatur civis imperfectus qui non potest esse princeps, non erit eadem virtus boni civis et boni viri, ut ex praedictis patet.

Then, where he says utrum quidem igitur, etc., he ties together what he had said in an epilogue: and he says that concerning this question which he was pursuing, whether the virtue of the good man and the zealous citizen are the same, it has been shown that in a certain city, namely, the aristocratic, the same one is a good man and a good citizen, because government is given according to the virtue which is of the good man. In others, however, one will be a good man, and another a good citizen, namely, in corrupted regimes in which government is not given according to virtue. And the citizen who is the same as the good man is not just any citizen, but he who is civic, that is, the ruler of the city and the master, or the one able to be master of those who belong to the care of the community, either alone or also with others. For it was said above that the virtue of a prince and of a good man is the same. Whence, if one who is a prince or who is able to be is taken up as a citizen, his virtue is the same as that of a good man. If, however, someone imperfect is taken up as a citizen, who is not able to be a prince, the virtue of the good citizen and of the good man will not be the same, as is clear from what has already been said.

Polit.L4

Lecture 5

Polit.L5

Quoniam autem haec determinata sunt, quod post haec considerandum, utrum unam ponendum politiam, vel plures, et si plures, quae et quot, et differentiae quae sint ipsarum.

Having determined these questions, we have next to consider whether there is only one form of government or many, and if many, what they are, and how many, and what are the differences between them.

Polit.L5

Est autem politia ordo civitatis aliorum principatuum et maxime dominantis omnium. Dominans quidem enim ubique est politeuma civitatis; politeuma autem est politia. Dico autem puta in democraticis quidem dominans populus, pauci autem e contrario in oligarchiis. Dicimus autem et politiam alteram esse horum, eundem autem hunc sermonem dicemus et de aliis.

A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state, especially of the highest of all. The government is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the constitution is in fact the government. For example, in democracies the people are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say that these two forms of government also are different: and so in other cases.

Polit.L5

Supponendum itaque primo cuius gratia constituta est civitas, et principatus species quod eius qui circa hominem et circa communionem vitae.

First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, and how many forms of government there are by which human society is regulated.

Polit.L5

Dictum est autem in primis sermonibus in quibus de yconomia determinatum est et de despotia, quod natura quidem est homo animal civile; propter quod et nullo indigens eius quae ab invicem politiae appetunt convivere. Quin immo et communiter conferens colligit in quantum adiacet unicuique pars ut vivatur bene. Maxime quidem igitur hoc est finis et communiter omnibus sigillatim. Conveniunt autem et ad vivere gratia ipsius et continent politicam communionem; forte enim inest aliqua boni particula. Et secundum ipsum vivere solum; si non diris secundum vitam excedatur valde; palam autem quod perseverant multa mala sustinentes multi hominum inviscati ad vivere, tanquam existente quodam solatio in ipso et dulcedine naturali.

We have already said, in the first part of this treatise, when discussing household management and the rule of a master, that man is by nature a political animal. And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together; not but that they are also brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life (in which there is possibly some noble element so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good) mankind meet together and maintain the political community. And we all see that men cling to life even at the cost of enduring great misfortune, seeming to find in life a natural sweetness and happiness.

Polit.L5

At vero et principatus dictos modos facile dividere. Et enim in extrinsecis sermonibus determinamus de ipsis saepe Despotia quidem enim quamvis sit idem conferens secundum veritatem ei qui natura servus, et ei qui natura despotes, tamen principatur ad conferens despitis nihil minus; ad id autem quod servi secundum accidens. Non enim contingit corrupto servo salvari despotiam. Principatus autem puerorum et mulieris et totius domus quem utique vocamus yconomicum, vel subiectorum gratia est, vel alicuius communis amborum, secundum se quidem subiectorum ut videmus et alias artes, puta medicinalem et exercitativam. Secundum accidens autem et utique ipsorum erunt; nihil enim prohibet exercitia docentem pueros aliquando esse et ipsum eorum qui exercitantur, sicut gubernator est semper unus nautarum; puerorum quidem igitur exercitator vel gubernator considerat subiectorum bonum. Quando autem unus horum fuerit et ipso, secundum accidens participat utilitate; hic quidem enim nauta, hic autem fit unus eorum qui exercitantur cum sit puerorum exercitator.

There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of authority; they have been often defined already in discussions outside the school. The rule of a master, although the slave by nature and the master by nature have in reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him. On the other hand, the government of a wife and children and of a household, which we have called household management, is exercised in the first instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties, but essentially for the good of the governed, as we see to be the case in medicine, gymnastic, and the arts in general, which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the artists themselves. For there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practice gymnastics, and the helmsman is always one of the crew. The trainer or the helmsman considers the good of those committed to his care. But, when he is one of the persons taken care of, he accidentally participates in the advantage, for the helmsman is also a sailor, and the trainer becomes one of those in training.

Polit.L5

Propter quod et politicos principatus quando fuerit secundum equalitatem civium constituta et secundum similitudinem, secundum partem dignificant principari, prius quidem qua aptum natum erat dignificantes in parte ministrare, et considerare aliquem rursum quod ipsius bonum, sicut prius ipse principans considerabat quod illius conferens. Nunc autem propter utilitates quae a communibus et eas quae ex principatu, volunt continue principari, veluti si accideret sanos esse semper principantes, cum essent egrotativi; et enim sic forte utique persequerentur principatus.

And so in politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and likeness, the citizens think that they ought to hold office by turns. Formerly, as is natural, every one would take his turn of service; and then again, somebody else would look after his interest, just as he, while in office, had looked after theirs. But nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained from the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in office. One might imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were only kept in health while they continued in office; in that case we may be sure that they would be hunting after places.

Polit.L5

Manifestum igitur quod quaecumque quidem politiae intendunt quod communiter conferens, ipse quidem recte existunt entes secundum id quod simpliciter iustum. Quaecumque autem conferens principum solum, vitiatae; et omnes sunt transgressiones rectarum politiarum. Despotice enim, civitas autem communitas liiberorum est.

The conclusion is evident: that governments which have a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms, for they are despotic, whereas a state is a community of freemen.

Polit.L5

Quoniam autem haec determinata sunt et cetera. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de cive, ex cuius notitia cognosci potest quid sit civitas, hic consequenter intendit distinguere politiam in suas species. Et dividitur in partes tres.

Quoniam autem haec determinata sunt, etc. After the philosopher determined about the citizen—from the knowledge of which it can be learned what a city is—he here intends, consequently, to distinguish “regime” according to its kind; and this is divided into three parts.

Polit.L5

In prima distinguit politias.

In the first, he separates out regimes.

Polit.L5

In secunda ostendit quid sit iustum in unaquaque politia, ibi, sumendum autem et cetera.

In the second he shows what is just in any given regime, at sumendum autem, [III.7.1] etc.

Polit.L5

Tertio ostendit quae politiarum sit potior, ibi, habet autem dubitationem et cetera.

Third, he shows which of the regimes is more powerful, at habet autem dubitationem, [III.8.1] etc.

Polit.L5

Circa primum tria facit.

About the first he does three things.

Polit.L5

Primo dicit de quo est intentio.

First, he states his intention.

Polit.L5

Secundo ostendit quid sit politia, ibi, est autem politia et cetera.

Second, he shows what a regime is, at est autem politia, [III.5.2] etc.

Polit.L5

Tertio dividit politias, ibi, supponendum itaque primo et cetera.

Third, he divides regimes, at supponendum itaque primo, [III.5.3] etc.

Polit.L5

Dicit ergo primo, quod determinatis praedictis restat considerare, utrum sit una politia tantum vel plures; et si sunt plures, quot et quae sint, et quomodo adinvicem differant.

He says, therefore, since the aforementioned things have been determined, it still stands to consider whether there is only one regime, or several; and if several, how many and which ones they are, and in what manner they differ from one another.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit est autem politia etc., ostendit quid sit politia. Et dicit quod politia nihil est aliud quam ordinatio civitatis quantum ad omnes principatus qui sunt in civitate, sed praecipue quantum ad maximum principatum, qui dominatur omnibus aliis principatibus. Et hoc ideo, quia politeuma civitatis id est positio ordinis in civitate, tota consistit in eo qui dominatur civitati; et talis impositio ordinis est ipsa politia. Unde praecipue politia consistit in ordine summi principatus secundum cuius diversitatem politiae diversificantur: sicut in democratiis dominatur populus, in oligarchiis quidem pauci divites: et ex hoc est diversitas harum politiarum. Et eodem modo dicendum est de aliis politiis.

Then, where he says est autem politia, etc., he shows what a regime is. And he says that a regime is nothing other than the order of the city with reference to all government that is in the city, but chiefly with reference to the greatest government, which has mastery over all the others. And this, indeed, is because the politeuma of the city—that is, the placement of order in the city—is wholly established in him who has mastery over the city; and such an placement of order is the regime itself. Whence, the regime chiefly consists in the order of the highest government according to whose diversity the regimes are also made diverse: just as in democracies the people are masters, and in oligarchies, indeed, the wealthy few: and from this comes the diversity of these regimes. And in the same manner, this must be said for the other regimes.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit supponendum itaque primo etc., distinguit politias.

Then, where he says supponendum itaque primo, etc., he distinguishes the regimes.

Polit.L5

Et primo ostendit quomodo distinguantur rectae politiae ab iniustis.

And he first shows in what manner correct regimes are distinguished from unjust ones.

Polit.L5

Secundo quomodo distinguantur utraeque politiae in seipsis, ibi, determinatis autem his et cetera.

Second, in what manner both regimes are distinguished in themselves, at determinatis autem his, [III.6.1] etc.

Polit.L5

Circa primum tria facit.

About the first he does three things.

Polit.L5

Primo ostendit ad quid sit civitas ordinata.

First, he shows what the city is ordered toward.

Polit.L5

Secundo ostendit quomodo distinguantur principatus adinvicem, ibi at vero et principatus etc.

Second, he shows in what manner governments are distinguished from each other, at at vero et principatus, [III.5.5] etc.

Polit.L5

Tertio concludit differentiam rectarum politiarum et iniquarum, ibi, manifestum igitur et cetera.

Third, he infers the difference between correct regimes and uneven ones, at manifestum igitur, [III.5.7] etc.

Polit.L5

Circa primum duo facit.

About the first he does two things.

Polit.L5

Primo dicit de quo est intentio.

First, he states his intention.

Polit.L5

Secundo incipit exequi propositum, ibi, dictum est autem et cetera.

Second, he begins to execute what was proposed, at dictum est autem, [III.5.4] etc.

Polit.L5

Dicit ergo primo, quod cum oporteat distinguere politias abinvicem, oportet primo duo praemittere;

He says first, therefore, that since it is necessary to distinguish regimes from each other, it is necessary first to set forth two things.

Polit.L5

quorum primum est propter quid civitas sit instituta.

The first of which is: the account of why the city was instituted.

Polit.L5

Secundum est, quod sint differentiae principatuum, qui sunt circa homines et circa omnia quae veniunt in communionem vitae.

The second is: the differences between governments, with regard to men, and with regard to all who enter into a communion of life.

Polit.L5

Ex his enim duobus poterit accipi differentia iustae et iniustae politiae.

For from these two things, it will be possible to grasp the difference between a just and an unjust regime.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit dictum est autem in primis etc., ostendit quid sit finis civitatis vel politiae. Et dicit quod dictum est in primo libro, in quo determinatum est de oeconomia et despotia, quod homo naturaliter est animal civile; et ideo homines appetunt adinvicem convivere et non esse solitarii, etiam si in nullo unus alio indigeret ad hoc quod ducerent vitam politicam: sed tamen magna utilitas est communis in communione vitae socialis. Et hoc quantum ad duo.

Then, where he says dictum est autem in primis, etc., he shows what the end of the city or regime is. And he says that it was said in the first book--in which economics and despotism were determined--that man is naturally a civic animal; and so it is that men have an appetite for living together with each other and for not being alone; [and this would be the case] even if one man were in no way in need of another in order to lead the political life: but for all that, there is a great common utility in the communion of a social life. And this with reference to two things.

Polit.L5

Primo quidem quantum ad bene vivere: ad quod unusquisque affert suam partem, sicut videmus in qualibet communitate, quod unus servit communitati de uno officio, alius de alio, et sic omnes communiter bene vivunt. Hoc igitur, scilicet bene vivere, maxime est finis civitatis vel politiae et communiter quantum ad omnes et sigillatim quantum ad unumquemque.

First, certainly, with reference to living well, toward which each one carries on his part, just as we see in any given community that one serves the community from one office, another from another, and thus all live well commonly. This, therefore—namely, living well—is most of all the end of the city or regime, both commonly, with regard to all, and singly, with regard to each one.

Polit.L5

Secundo utilis est vita communis etiam propter ipsum vivere, dum unus in communitate vitae existentium alii subvenit ad sustentationem vitae et contra pericula mortis. Et propter hoc homines ad invicem conveniunt et conservant politicam communionem, quia etiam ipsum vivere secundum se consideratum absque aliis quae faciunt ad bene vivendum est quiddam bonum et diligibile, nisi forte homo in vita sua patiatur aliqua valde gravia et crudelia. Et hoc patet ex hoc quod homines etiam si multa mala sustineant, tamen perseverant in affectu vivendi quodam modo inviscati id est fortiter coniuncti ad desiderium vitae, ac si ipsa vita habeat in se quoddam solatium et dulcedinem naturalem.

Second, the common life is also useful on account of living itself, as one in a community of life supports the existence of another, to the point of sustaining his life, even against the danger of death. And because of this, men assemble together and conserve the political communion, because even living itself, considered in itself, without the other things that make for living well, is a certain good and choiceworthy, unless perchance a man suffers things in his life exceedingly heavy and cruel. And this is clear from this: that men, even if they bear many evils, nevertheless persevere in an affection for living that is, in a certain manner, in their guts—that is to say, strongly wed to the desire for life, as if life itself has in itself a certain natural solace and sweetness.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit at vero et principatus etc., distinguit species principatus.

Then, where he says at vero et principatus, etc., he distinguishes the kinds of government.

Polit.L5

Et primo in oeconomicis.

And first in economics;

Polit.L5

Secundo in politicis, ibi, propter quod et politicos et cetera.

second, in politics, at propter quod et politicos, [III.5.6] etc.

Polit.L5

Dicit ergo, quod facile est distinguere modos principatus qui dicuntur, quia saepe etiam facta est mentio in extraneis sermonibus praeter principalem intentionem de ipsis, sicut in octavo Ethicorum, et supra etiam in secundo. Est autem in domesticis duplex principatus. Unus quidem est domini ad servos, qui vocatur despotia: et quamvis idem sit secundum rei veritatem utile ei qui est naturaliter servus, et ei qui est naturaliter dominus, ut scilicet iste ab illo regatur, tamen dominus principatur servo ad utilitatem domini, non autem ad utilitatem servi, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum scilicet corrupto servo cessat dominium. Alius autem est principatus ad liberos, sicut ad filios et uxorem et totam familiam, qui vocatur principatus oeconomicus. In quo quidem principatu intenditur utilitas subditorum, vel etiam communis utrorumque. Per se quidem et principaliter, utilitas subditorum, sicut videmus in aliis artibus, sicut ars medicinae intendit principaliter utilitatem eorum qui medicantur, et ars exercitativa intendit principaliter utilitatem eorum qui exercitantur: sed per accidens contingit, quod etiam utilitas redundat in ipsos qui habent artem. Ille enim qui exercitat pueros etiam ipse simul exercitatur; aliquando etiam est de numero eorum qui exercitantur, sicut gubernator unus est nautarum. Sic igitur exercitator puerorum et gubernator navis considerat per se subiectorum utilitatem: sed quia ipse est unus de numero eorum, ideo uterque per accidens participat utilitate communi quam procurat. Et similiter pater participat utilitate domus quam procurat.

He says, therefore, that it is easy to distinguish the modes of government which are spoken of, because he has also frequently made mention of them in other discourses, apart from their governing intention, such as in Ethics Bk. VIII, and also above in Bk. II. There is, moreover, in household affairs a twofold government. One, indeed, is of a master toward slaves, which is called despotic: and although the same thing is, according to the truth of the matter, useful for him who is naturally a slave and for him who is naturally a master—namely, that the former be ruled by the latter—nevertheless, the master governs the slave for the utility of the master, and not for the utility of the slave, except perhaps accidentally—inasmuch as a corrupted slave delays the feast. But there is another government for free men—such as sons and a wife and the whole family—which is called economic government. Indeed, this government intends what is useful for the subordinates—or even what is common to both. Indeed, in and of itself, and chiefly, [it intends] what is useful for the subordinate, just as we see in other arts, as the art of medicine intends chiefly the utility of those who are medicated, and the art of training intends chiefly the utility of those who are exercised: but it accidentally happens that the utility also overflows into those who have the art. For he who exercises boys also, at the same time, is exercised; sometimes, he is even from the number of those who are exercised, as the captain [gubernator] is one of the sailors. Thus, therefore, the exerciser of boys or the captain of a ship considers, of himself, the utility of the subject: but because he is himself one of their number, both therefore take part—accidentally—in the utility of the community which they care for. And similarly, the father participates in the utility of the house that he cares for.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit propter quod et politicos etc., distinguit secundum praemissa principatus politicos. Et dicit quod quia principatus qui est supra liberos ordinatur principaliter ad utilitatem subditorum; ideo dignum reputatur quod particulariter principentur cives secundum principatus politicos, quando fuerint instituti secundum aequalitatem et similitudinem civium. Tunc enim dignum videtur quod in una parte temporis quidam principentur, in alia vero alii. Secus autem esset, si quidam civium multum excederent alios in bonitate: tunc enim dignum esset, ut illi semper principarentur; sicut infra dicetur. Sed circa istud dignum variatur aestimatio hominum secundum temporum diversitatem. A principio enim ipsi qui principabantur quasi aliis servientes reputabant dignum, sicut et erat, ut ipsi in parte ministrarent aliis intendentes utilitati aliorum, et iterum alio tempore aliquis alius principaretur qui intenderet ad bonum eius, sicut ipse prius intenderat ad bonum aliorum: sed postea homines, propter utilitates quae veniunt ex bonis communibus quae sibi principantes usurpant et quae veniunt etiam ex ipso iure principatus, volunt semper principari, ac si principari esset sanum esse, et non principari, esset infirmum esse. Sic enim videntur homines appetere principatum, sicut infirmi appetunt sanitatem.

Then, where he says propter quod et politicos, etc., he distinguishes political government according to what has been set out. And he says that, because government that is over freemen is ordered chiefly to what is useful for the subordinates, therefore, it is deemed worthy that citizens should particularly govern according to political [modes of] government, when they have been instituted [in them] according to the equality and likeness of citizens. For then it seems worthy that at one time this one should govern, and at another, another. However, it would be otherwise if a certain multitude of citizens were to exceed the others in goodness: for then it would be worthy that those ones always govern, as was said above. But the assessment of men about [what determines] this worth is varied at diverse times. For in the beginning, the men who would govern as though they were serving the others were thought worthy, as also it was, such that they for their part would serve others, intending what is useful for them, and then at another time, someone else would govern who would intend their good, just as they had previously intended the good of the others. But later, because of the utility that came from the common goods that princes usurped for themselves, and also that came from the very right of government, men willed to govern always, as if to govern were to be healthy and not to govern were to be sick. For men thus seem to have an appetite government as the sick have an appetite for health.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit manifestum igitur etc., concludit ex dictis distinctionem rectarum politiarum ab iniustis. Cum enim ita sit quod principatus liberorum sit ordinatus ad utilitatem subditorum, manifestum est quod in quibuscumque politiis principes intendunt communem utilitatem, illae sunt rectae politiae secundum iustitiam absolutam: in quibuscumque vero politiis intenditur sola utilitas principantium, illae sunt vitiatae et corruptiones quaedam rectarum politiarum: non enim in eis est iustum simpliciter, sed iustum secundum quid, ut infra dicetur. Principantur enim despotice civitati utentes civibus sicut servis, scilicet ad suam utilitatem: et hoc est contra iustitiam, quia civitas est communitas liberorum; servus enim non est civis, ut supra dictum est.

Then, where he says manifestum igitur, from what has been said he concludes with the distinction between correct regimes and unjust ones. For since it is thus, that government over freemen is ordered toward what is useful for the subordinates, it is clear that in whatsoever regime the princes intend the common utility, those regimes are correct according to absolute justice: but in any regime whatsoever which intends only the utility of those who govern, those are damaged and certain corruptions of correct regimes: for they do not have the just in them simply, but in a certain respect, as will be said below. For they govern the city despotically, using citizens like slaves, for their own utility: and this is against justice, because the city is the community of freemen; for a slave is not a citizen, as was said above.

Polit.L5

Lecture 6

Polit.L6

Determinatis autem his, habitum est politias considerare, quot numero, et quae sint; et primo rectas ipsarum; et enim transgressiones erunt manifestae, his determinatis.

Having determined these points, we have next to consider how many forms of government there are, and what they are; and in the first place what are the true forms, for when they are determined the perversions of them will at once be apparent.

Polit.L6

Quoniam autem politia quidem et politeuma significant idem, politeuma autem est quod dominans civitatum, necesse autem esse dominans aut unum, aut paucum, aut multos; quando quidem unus vel pauci vel multi ad commune conferens principantur, has quidem rectas necessarium esse politias; eas autem quae ad proprium vel unius vel paucorum vel multitudinis, transgressiones; aut enim non cives dicendum esse participantes, aut oportet communicare conferente.

The words constitution and government have the same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many. The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one or of the few, or of the many, are perversions. For the members of a state, if they are truly citizens, ought to participate in its advantages.

Polit.L6

Vocare autem consueviumus monarchiarum quidem eam quae ad commune conferens respicit, regnum; eam autem quae paucorum quidem, plurimum autem uno, aristocratiam, aut propter optimos principari, aut propterea quod ad optimum civitati, et communicantibus ipsa. Quando autem multitudo ad commune conferens vivit, vocatur communi nomine omnium politiarum politia; accidit autem rationabiliter: unum quidem enim differre secundum virtutem vel paucos contingit, plures autem iam ad summum omnis virtutis pervenisse, difficile, et maxime ad bellicam; haec enim in multitudine fit. Propter quod quidem secundum hanc politiam, principalissimum quod propugnantivum; et participant ipsa qui possident arma.

Of forms of government in which one rules, we call that which regards the common interests, kingship or royalty; that in which more than one, but not many, rule, aristocracy; and it is so called, either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But when the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name- a constitution. And there is a reason for this use of language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but as the number increases it becomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in every kind of virtue, though they may in military virtue, for this is found in the masses. Hence in a constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens.

Polit.L6

Transgressiones autem dictarum, tyrannis quidem regni, oligarchia autem aristocratiae, democratia autem politiae. Tyrannis quidem igitur est monarchia ad conferens monarchizantis. Oligarchia autem ad id quod abundantium. Democratia autem ad conferens egenorum; ad id autem quod expedit communi, nulla ipsarum.

Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as follows: of royalty, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of all.

Polit.L6

Oportet autem paulo per longiora dicere quae sit unaquaeque harum politiarum. Et enim habet quasdam dubitationes; ei autem qui circa unamquamque methodum philosophatur et non solum aspicit ad agere, conveniens est non despicere neque praetermittere, sed declarare circa unumquodque veritatem. Est autem tyrannis quidem monarchia sicut dictum est despotica politicae cummunitatis; oligarchia autem quando fuerint domini politiae qui substantias habent; democratia autem e contrario quando qui non possident multitudinem substantiae sed egeni.

But there are difficulties about these forms of government, and it will therefore be necessary to state a little more at length the nature of each of them. For he who would make a philosophical study of the various sciences, and does not regard practice only, ought not to overlook or omit anything, but to set forth the truth in every particular. Tyranny, as I was saying, is monarchy exercising the rule of a master over the political society; oligarchy is when men of property have the government in their hands; democracy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers.

Polit.L6

Prima autem dubitatio ad diffinitionem est. Si enim fuerint qui plures existentes divites domini civitatis, democratia autem est quando fuerit domina multitudo; similiter autem rursum utique si alicubi accidat egenos pauciores quidem esse divitibus, meliores autem existentes dominos esse politiae, ubi autem pauca multitudo domina oligarchiam esse aiunt, non videbitur utique bene diffinitum esse de politiis.

And here arises the first of our difficulties, and it relates to the distinction drawn. For democracy is said to be the government of the many. But what if the many are men of property and have the power in their hands? In like manner oligarchy is said to be the government of the few; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power in their hands because they are stronger? In these cases the distinction which we have drawn between these different forms of government would no longer hold good.

Polit.L6

At vero si quis connectens habundantiae quidem paucitatem, penuriae autem multitudinem, sic appelet politias; oligarchiam quidem in qua principatus habent qui divites pauci multitudinae existentes, democratiam autem in qua egeni multi existentes multitudinae, aliam habet dubitationem. Quas enim dicemus modo dictas politias eam in qua plures opulenti et in qua pauciores egeni, domini autem utrique politiarum, si quidem nulla alia politia est praeter dictas.

Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty to the many, and name the governments accordingly—an oligarchy is said to be that in which the few and the wealthy, and a democracy that in which the many and the poor are the rulers—there will still be a difficulty. For, if the only forms of government are the ones already mentioned, how shall we describe those other governments also just mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer, and both govern in their respective states?

Polit.L6

Videtur igitur ratio facere palam quod paucos quidem vel multos esse dominos, accidens est, hoc quidem oligarchiis, hoc autem democratiis, propterea quod opulenti quidem pauci, egeni autem multi sint ubique; propter quod et non accidit dictas causas fieri differentiae. Quo autem differunt democratia et oligarchia ab invicem, penuria et divitiae sunt; et necessarium quidem ubicumque principantur propter divitias, sive pauciores, sive plures, hanc esse oligarchiam. Ubi autem egeni democratiam. Sed accidit sicut diximus, hos quidem paucos esse, hos autem multos; habundant quidem enim pauci, libertatae autem participant omnes; propter quas causas altercantur utrique de politia.

The argument seems to show that, whether in oligarchies or in democracies, the number of the governing body, whether the greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous. But if so, there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference between them. For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy. But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many; for few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim power in the state.

Polit.L6

Determinatis autem his et cetera. Postquam Philosophus distinxit politias rectas ab iniustis, hic intendit distinguere utrasque abinvicem. Et circa hoc duo facit.

Determinatis autem hiis, etc. After the philosopher distinguished correct regimes from unjust ones, he here intends to distinguish both from each other. And he does two things about this.

Polit.L6

Primo dicit de quo est intentio.

First, he says what his intention is.

Polit.L6

Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, quoniam autem politia et cetera.

Second, he follows through on what was put forward, at quoniam autem politia, [III.6.2] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo, quod postquam praedicta determinata sunt, consequens est determinare de politiis quot sint numero et quae sint; et hoc ordine, ut primo consideremus de politiis rectis, secundo de iniustis.

He says first, therefore, that after the aforesaid things have been determined, what follows is to determine about regimes: how many they are in number, and which ones there are; and in this order: that we may first consider correct regimes, second, unjust ones.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem politia etc., distinguit politias. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Then, where he says quoniam autem politia, etc., he distinguishes regimes. And he does three things about this.

Polit.L6

Primo ostendit secundum quid accipienda sit politiarum distinctio.

First, he shows in what respect the distinction between regimes must be taken.

Polit.L6

Secundo distinguit politias, ibi, vocare autem consuevimus et cetera.

Second, he distinguishes regimes, at vocare autem consuevimus, [III.6.3] etc.

Polit.L6

Tertio obiicit contra praedicta, ibi, oportet autem paulo et cetera.

Third, he objects to the aforesaid things, at oportet autem paulo, [III.6.5] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo, quod (quia) politia nihil est aliud quam politeuma, quod significat ordinem dominantium in civitate. Necesse est quod distinguantur politiae secundum diversitatem dominantium. Aut enim in civitate dominatur unus, aut pauci, aut multi. Et quodlibet horum trium fuerit, potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo quando principantur ad utilitatem communem, et tunc erunt rectae politiae. Alio modo quando principantur ad propriam utilitatem eorum qui dominantur, sive sit unus, sive pauci, sive plures; et tunc sunt transgressiones politiarum; quia oportet dicere quod vel subditi non sint cives, vel quod in aliquo communicent utilitate civitatis.

He says first, therefore, that (because) a regime is nothing other than the politeuma, that it signifies the order of mastery in the city. It is necessary that regimes be distinguished following the diversity of mastery. For in the city, either one is master, or a few, or many. And should any of these three exist, it can happen in two modes. In one mode, when they govern for the common utility, and then they are correct regimes; in another mode, when they govern for the private utility of those who are masters, either one, or a few, or many; and then they are transgressions of regimes, because it is necessary either to say that the subordinates are not citizens, or that they share in the city’s utility in some way.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit vocare autem consuevimus etc., distinguit utrasque politias per propria nomina.

Then, where he says vocare autem consuevimus, etc., he distinguishes both regimes by their proper names.

Polit.L6

Et primo rectas.

And first the correct ones,

Polit.L6

Secundo vitiosas, ibi, transgressiones autem et cetera.

second the damaged ones, at transgressiones autem, [III.6.4] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo, quod si sit monarchia, id est principatus unius, vocatur regnum consueto nomine si intendat utilitatem communem. Illa vero politia in qua pauci principantur propter bonum commune, plures tamen uno, vocatur aristocratia, id est potestas optimorum vel optima, vel quia optimi principantur, scilicet virtuosi; vel quia ordinatur talis politia ad id quod est optimum civitati et omnium civium. Sed quando multitudo principatur intendens ad utilitatem communem, vocatur politia, quod est nomen commune omnibus politiis. Et hoc quod ista politia vocetur tali nomine, rationabiliter accidit: de facili enim contingit quod in civitate inveniatur unus vel pauci qui multum excedant alios in virtute: sed valde difficile quod multi inveniantur qui perveniant ad perfectum virtutis; sed maxime hoc contingit circa bellicam virtutem, ut scilicet multi in ea sint perfecti. Et ideo in hac politia principantur viri bellatores et illi qui habent arma.

Therefore, he says first that if it is a monarchy, that is, the government of one, it is called by the customary name “kingship” if it intends the common utility. And that regime in which a few govern for the common good—more, indeed, than one—is called “aristocracy” (that is, the power of the best men); either the best one, or because the best men govern—the virtuous—or because such a regime is ordered toward that which is the best for the city and for all the citizens. But when many govern, intending the common utility, it is called a polity [politia], which is the name common to all regimes [politiis]. And it happens rationally that such a regime should be called by a name of this sort: for it easily happens that one or a few may be found in a city who greatly exceed the others in virtue: but it is with exceeding difficulty that many may be found who can attain to the perfection of virtue; but this happens most of all with reference to warlike virtue—that many may be perfect in it. And therefore, in this regime, warlike men govern, and those who have weapons.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit transgressiones autem etc., distinguit corruptiones dictarum politiarum per nomina. Et dicit quod dictarum politiarum sunt istae transgressiones: tyrannis quidem regni; oligarchia autem, id est principatus paucorum, aristocratiae transgressio est; democratia autem, id est potestas populi, id est vulgalis multitudinis, est transgressio politiae in qua multi principantur saltem propter virtutem bellicam. Ex quo concludit quod tyrannis est monarchia, id est principatus unius intendens utilitatem principantis. Oligarchia vero est tendens ad utilitatem divitum. Democratia vero ad utilitatem pauperum: nulla vero earum intendit ad utilitatem communem.

Then, where he says transgressiones autem, etc., he distinguishes the corruptions of the aforementioned regimes by name. And he says that of the mentioned regimes there are these transgressions: tyranny, indeed, of kingship; but oligarchy—that is, the government of the few—is the transgression of aristocracy; and democracy—that is, the power of the people, of the vulgar multitude, is the transgression of the polity in which the many govern because of their warlike virtue, at the very least. From this he concludes that tyranny is a monarchy—that is, the government of one—intending the utility of the governor; oligarchy tends toward the utility of the wealthy; democracy toward the utility of the poor: none of these intend the common utility.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit oportet autem paulo etc., obiicit contra praedicta. Et circa hoc tria facit.

Then, where he says oportet autem paulo, etc., he raises an objection against the aforesaid things. And he does three things in this regard.

Polit.L6

Primo dicit de quo est intentio: et repetit quae praedicta sunt.

First, he says what his intention is: and he repeats what he said before.

Polit.L6

Secundo movet dubitationem, ibi, prima autem dubitatio est et cetera.

Second, he raises a difficulty, at prima autem dubitatio est, [III.6.6] etc.

Polit.L6

Tertio ponit solutionem, ibi, videtur igitur ratio et cetera.

Third, he puts forth a solution, at videtur igitur ratio, [III.6.8] etc..

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo, quod oportet aliquantulum a remotiori discutere quae sit unaquaeque politiarum praedictarum cum habeat quasdam dubitationes. Ille qui philosophatur in unaquaque arte, quasi considerans veritatem et non solum respicit ad id quod est utile ad agendum, nihil debet despicere vel praetermittere, sed in singulis declarare veritatem. Dictum est autem quod tyrannis est quaedam monarchia despotica id est dominativa politicae communitatis, quia scilicet utitur civibus ut servis. Oligarchia vero est quando dominantur politiae illi qui abundant in divitiis. Democratia vero est quando dominantur politiae non illi qui possident multitudinem divitiarum, sed magis pauperes.

Therefore, he says first that it is necessary to discuss a little more from a distance what is of each of the aforementioned regimes, since he has certain difficulties. He who philosophizes in each art, as considering the truth and not only only reflecting on what is useful for acting, ought to look down upon nothing nor to neglect anything, but in each particular, to clarify the truth. Now it has been said that a tyrant is a certain despotic monarch, that is, having mastery over the political community--since he uses citizens as slaves; an oligarchy is when those who have mastery over the regime abound in wealth; a democracy is when those who have mastery over the regime do not possess a multitude of wealth, but rather, are poor.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit prima autem dubitatio etc., movet dubitationem.

Then, where he says prima autem dubitatio, etc., he raises a difficulty.

Polit.L6

Et primo ponit dubitationem,

And first he puts forward the difficulty;

Polit.L6

secundo excludit quamdam responsionem, ibi, at vero siquis et cetera.

second, he excludes a certain response, at at vero siquis, [III.6.7] etc.

Polit.L6

Dicit ergo primo, quod prima dubitatio est contra definitionem, scilicet democratiae et oligarchiae. Dictum est enim quod democratia est quando dominantur in civitate egeni oligarchia autem quando dominantur divites; ipsum autem nomen oligarchiae designat principatum paucorum, nomen autem democratiae designat principatum populi sive multitudinis. Ponatur ergo quod in aliqua civitate sint plures divites quam pauperes, et divites sint domini civitatis: videtur, secundum hoc, quod sit ibi democratia, quae est quando multitudo dominatur; similiter autem si alicubi contingat quod pauperes sint pauciores, sed sint meliores et fortiores et dominentur civitati, sequetur, secundum hoc, quod sit ibi oligarchia quia pauci dominantur. Non ergo videtur quod sit bene definitum de politiis cum dictum est quod democratia est dominium pauperum, oligarchia dominium divitum.

Therefore, he says first that the first difficulty is against the definition, specifically, of democracy and oligarchy. For it was said that a democracy is when the poor are masters in the city, but oligarchy when the wealthy are masters; but the name of oligarchy itself designates the government of the few, whereas the name of democracy designates the government of the people, or the many. Let it be put forward, therefore, that in some city there are more wealthy than poor, and the wealthy are masters of the city: it seems, following this, that it would be a democracy, which is when the many are masters; and similarly, if somewhere it were to happen that the poor were fewer, but they were better and stronger and were masters of the city, it would follow, according to this, that there would be an oligarchy because the few were masters. Therefore, it does not seem that regimes have been well defined, since it was said that democracy is [the government of] poor masters, oligarchy of rich masters.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit at vero si quis connectens etc., excludit quamdam responsionem. Posset enim aliquis dicere, quod in definitione oligarchiae est coniungenda paucitas divitiis; et in definitione democratiae est coniungenda multitudo paupertati; ita scilicet quod oligarchia sit in qua pauci divites principantur, democratia autem in qua multi pauperes. Sed hoc iterum habet aliam dubitationem: si enim sufficienter divisae sunt politiae, ita scilicet quod nulla sit alia politia praeter praedictas, non erit dare sub qua politia comprehendantur duae praedictae politiae: scilicet quando principantur vel multi divites, vel pauci pauperes.

Then, where he says at vero si quis connectens, etc., he excludes a certain response. For it would be possible for someone to say that in the definition of oligarchy, the fewness is yoked to the wealthy; and in the definition of democracy, the many are yoked to poverty; and thus, namely, that oligarchy would be in which a few wealthy would govern, but democracy in which many poor do so. But this consequently has another doubt: for if the regimes are sufficiently divided, so that, namely, there are no other regimes besides the aforementioned ones, it will not give what regime the two aforementioned regimes may be comprehended under--namely, when either many wealthy or a few poor govern.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit videtur igitur etc., concludit ex praemissis solutionem dubitationis. Et dicit quod ratio praemissae dubitationis videtur manifestare, quod principes esse multos, per accidens se habeat ad democratias: et eos esse paucos per accidens se habeat ad oligarchias, eo quod ubique inveniuntur plures pauperes quam divites; et secundum hoc nomina sunt posita prout in pluribus invenitur. Sed quia id quod per accidens est, non est differentia specifica; ideo oligarchiae non distinguuntur a democratiis per se loquendo secundum multitudinem et paucitatem: sed id quo per se differunt sunt paupertas et divitia: alia enim est ratio regiminis quod ordinatur ad opulentiam et eius quod ordinatur ad libertatem quae est finis democratiae. Et ideo necesse est quod ubicumque aliqui dominantur propter divitias, sive sint plures, sive pauciores, quod ibi sit oligarchia; et ubicumque dominantur pauperes, ibi sit democratia: sed per accidens est, quod hi sint multi, et illi pauci. Pauci enim sunt, qui abundant divitiis, sed omnes participant libertate; et propter haec duo altercantur sibi invicem; dum pauci volunt praeesse propter excessum divitiarum, et multi volunt praevalere paucis, quasi aequivalentes eis propter libertatem.

Then, where he says videtur igitur, etc., he infers the solution of the difficulty from what has been set out. And he says that the reason for the difficulty that has been set out seems to clarify that, the princes being many are accidentally disposed toward democracies: and that they being few are accidentally disposed toward oligarchies, because everywhere, we find more poor than wealthy; and according to this, the names are posited as is found in most cases. But because what accidentally is, is not a specific difference, therefore oligarchies are not distinguished from democracies in themselves by speaking according to multitude and scarcity: but that by which they differ through themselves is poverty and wealth: for the rationale of the rule that is ordered toward opulence is other than that of the one that is ordered toward freedom--which is the end of democracy. And therefore it is necessary that wherever people are masters according to wealth, whether they are more in number or fewer, that there it will be an oligarchy; and wherever the poor are masters, there it will be a democracy: but it is only accidentally that the latter are the many, and the former are the few. For those are few who abound in wealth, but all participate in freedom; and because of this, these two quarrel among themselves, since the few desire to go first because they exceed in wealth, and the many desire to prevail over the few, as if they were equal to them in strength because of freedom.

Polit.L6

Petri de Alvernia continuatio S. Thomae in Politicam

Continuation of Peter of Auvergne

Polit.L6

Hinc deinceps expositio a Petro de Alvernia perfecitur

Polit.L6

Lecture 7

Non iniuriae cautio, non mercium commutatio, non propinqua habitatio, non bellorum propulsatio, non magistratuum participatio, sed bene beateque vivendi ratio, homines in urbibus congregavit.

Polit.L7

260. Sumendum autem prius quos terminos dicunt oligarchiae et democratiae: et quidem quod iustum est oligarchicum existens, et democraticum.

Polit.L7

261. Omnes enim tangunt iustum quoddam; sed usque ad aliquid procedunt, et dicunt non omne quod proprie iustum est, et est, sed non omnibus, sed aequalibus. Et videtur inaequale esse quod iustum est, et est, sed non omnibus, sed inaequalibus. Ii autem hoc auferunt, scilicet quibus, et judicant male.

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262. Causa autem, quia de se ipsis iudicium: fere autem plurimi sunt iudices pravi de propriis. Quare, quoniam quod iustum aliquibus, et iustum est eodem modo in rebus et quibus, sicut dictum est prius in Ethicis; rei quidem inaequalitatem confitentur, eam autem quae quibus dubitant, maxime quidem propter dictum modum, quia iudicant de se ipsis male.

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263. Deinde autem, et quia dicere usquequo utrosque iustum aliquid, putant iustum dicere simpliciter. Hi quidem enim si secundum aliquid inaequales sint, puta secundum pecunias, totaliter putant inequales esse: ii autem si secundum aliquid aequales, puta secundum libtertatem, totaliter aequales.

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264. Quod autem principalissimum non dicunt. Si quidem enim possessionum gratia communicassent et convenissent, tantum participant civitate, quantum et possessione. Quare oligarchicorum sermo videbitur utique invalescere: non enim esse iustum, aequum participare centum minas unum qui intulit minam unam, cum eo qui dedit residuum totum.

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265. Neque iis, qui a principio, neque post acquisitis. Si autem neque ipsius vivere gratia solum, sed magis ipsius bene vivere, etenim servorum utique et aliorum animalium esset civitas, nunc autem non quia non participant felicitatem, neque ipso vivere secundum electionem.

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266. Neque compugnationis gratia quatenus a nullo iniustitiam patiantur, neque propter commutationes, ut eum usum qui ad invicem.

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267. Etenim utique Tyrrheni, et Carchedonii, et omnes quibus sunt contractus ad invicem, et unius utique civitatis cives essent: sunt enim ipsis pacta de introductibilibus, et conventiones de non iniustitia facienda, et scripturae de compugnatione.

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268. Sed neque principatus omnibus communes in iis constituti sunt, sed alii aput utrosque.

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269. Neque quales quosdam esse oporteat alteros alteri curant neque quando nullus erit iniustus eorum qui sub pactis, neque quando malitiam nullam habeant, sed solum qundo nihil iniuste agant invicem. De virtute autem et malitia ministrant, quicumque curant bonam legislationem. Quare manifestum, quod oportet de virtute sollicitam esse ei, quae tamquam vere nominatur civitas non sermonis gratia. Fit enim communicatio et compugnatio de aliis loco differens solum ab iis, qui de longe compugnant. Et lex pactum, sicut ait Lycophron sophista, fideiussor invicem iustorum, sed non qualis faciat bonos et iustos cives.

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270. Quod autem hoc modo se habeat, manifestum. Si enim aliquis, et copulet loca in unum, ut se tangant Megareorum civitas et Corinthiorum muris, tamen non una civitas, neque si ad invicem connubia fecerint, quamvis hoc propriarum communicationum civitatibus sit. Similiter autem, neque si qui habitarent separatim quidem, non tamen tantum de longe ut non communicarent, sed si essent ipsis leges, ut non se ipsos iniuste molestarent circa mutuas dationes, puta si hic quidem esset faber, hic autem agricola, alius autem coriarius, alius vero aliud aliquid tale, et multitudine essent decem millia, non tamen communicarent in alio nullo, quam in talibus, puta communicatione et compugnatione, neque sic quidem civitas: propter quam itaque causam? non enim utique propter non propinquum communitatis. Si enim sic, et convenirent sic communicantes, unusquisque tamen uteretur propria domo tamquam civitate, et sibi ipsis auxiliantes sicut pugna existente ad iniuriantes solum, neque sic utique videbitur esse civitas diligenter considerantibus. Siquidem similiter diligenter considerantibus. Siquidem similiter colloquerentur congregati, et sigillatim.

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271. Manifestum igitur, quod non est civitas communio loci, et eius quod non est iniusta agere ad se ipsos, et mutuae dationis gratia; sed hoc quidem necessarium existere si erit civitas. Attamen neque existentibus omnibus iis, est iam civitas.

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272. Sed ipsius bene vivere communicatio et domibus et generibus gratia vitae perfectae et per se sufficientis. Non erit tamen hoc non unum et eundem locum habitantium, et utentium connubiis: propter quod affectiones factae sunt in civitatibus et fraternitates, et immolationes, et deductiones ipsius convivere. Quod autem tale, amicitiae opus; convivendi enim electio amicitia est.

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273. Finis quidem igitur civitatis bene vivere, haec autem finis gratia. Civitas autem generum et vicorum communitas vitae perfectae et per se sufficientis. Hoc autem est, ut dicimus, vivere feliciter et bene: bonarum ergo actionum gratia ponendum esse politicam communionem, sed non ipsius convivere.

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274. Propter quod quidem quicumque adiiciunt plurimum ad talem communionem, iis civitatis attinet plusquam aequalibus secundum libertatem et genus, vel maioribus secundum politicam autem virtutem inaequalibus; vel excedentibus secundum divitias, secundum virtutem autem excessis. Quod quidem igitur omnes qui de politiis altercantur partem quamdam iusti dicant, manifestum est ex dictis.

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399. Postquam Philosophus declaravit per quid distinguuntur popularis status et paucorum, in parte ista ostendit per quid antiqui istas politias determinaverunt. Et quia determinaverunt huiusmodi politias per iustum quoddam, ideo determinat in parte ista de iusto paucorum potentia, et multorum, et quomodo verum dixerunt, et quomodo non: et dividitur in partes duas.

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In prima praemittit intentum suum.

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Secundo prosequitur, ibi, omnes enim tangunt, et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod postquam determinatum est, quid est paucorum status, et multorum, et quod distinguuntur per divitias et penuriam, primo accipiendum definitiones, quas antiqui assignaverunt de ipsis. Definiunt autem ista per iustum, quia politia est ordo inhabitantium in civitate, et iste ordo attenditur secundum aliquam iustitiam; ideo huiusmodi politias definiverunt per iustum: propter quod videndum est, quid sit iustum multorum.

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Deinde cum dicit omnes enim prosequitur intentum suum. Et quia antiqui, ut dictum est, istas politias distinxerunt per iustum, vult determinare, quod huiusmodi iustum sit iustum secundum quid, non simpliciter.

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Et primo ostendit, quod sit iustum secundum quid.

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Secundo specialiter, quod non sit iustum simpliciter, ibi, quod autem principalissimum, et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas:

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quoniam primo declarat, quod isti tetigerunt iustum secundum quid, non simpliciter.

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Secundo assignat causam cuiusdam dicti, ibi, causa autem, quia et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod omnes antiqui determinantes de paucorum statu, et de multorum, tangunt iustum secundum quid, non simpliciter, procedentes usque ad aliquid: et dicunt non omne illud quod est proprie iustum et simpliciter iustum, sed illud quod est improprie et secundum quid iustum. Et hoc apparet, quia iustum attenditur secundum aliquam proportionem, et secundum aliquam dignitatem, saltem in iustitia distributiva. Et ideo ubi est iustum secundum proportionem, quae est secundum dignitatem, respectu boni simpliciter, ibi est bonum simpliciter: ubi autem non est respectu boni simpliciter, sed secundum quid, ibi iustum non est simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Hoc autem est in statu multorum, et paucorum. In statu enim paucorum attenditur iustum penes divitias, in statu vero multorum penes libertatem. Et manifestum est, quod ista non sunt bona simpliciter: bona enim simpliciter sunt bona virtutis: quare manifestum est, quod isti tetigerunt iustum secundum quid, non simpliciter. Iterum hoc apparet. Iustum enim aequale videtur esse vel consistere in quadam aequalitate secundum proportionem; quae non solum attenditur ex parte rerum, quae distribui debent, sed ex parte suppositorum, quibus debet fieri distributio. In iustitia enim facienda etiam attenditur aequalitas proportionis ex parte personarum, quibus debet fieri iustitia secundum aliquam dignitatem: et eamdem oportet esse proportionem rerum quae distribuuntur; ut si sint aequales secundum virtutes, aequaliter distribuatur eis de bonis. Si autem inaequales secundum virtutem, distribuatur eis aequaliter secundum proportionem, ut quanto excedit unus alium in virtute, tanto plus distribuatur ei de bonis communibus. Similiter etiam si quantum ad aliquid attendatur dignitas. Et antiqui decertantes de iusto paucorum potentiae et multorum, concesserunt bene aequalitatem ex parte rerum et tetigerunt; aequalitatem autem suppositorum praetermiserunt, et male quantum ad hoc iudicaverunt. Quare manifestum est, quod non tetigerunt iustum simpliciter; quare, male ipsum iudicaverunt.

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Deinde cum dicit causam autem assignat causam cuiusdam dicti. Dixit enim, quod male iudicaverunt de iusto, et assignat causam huiusmodi: et dividitur in duas, secundum quod dupliciter assignat. Secunda, ibi, deinde autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod causa quare male iudicaverunt de iusto, non considerantes aequalitatem personarum sed rerum, haec fuit, quia de seipsis iudicaverunt: fere autem plures pravum iudicium dant de seipsis; et ratio huius est, quia ad iudicium requiritur prudentia. Prudentia autem praesupponit appetitum rectum per virtutem moralem: quod ergo pervertit appetitum, pervertit iudicium rationis. Iudicium autem de seipso pervertit appetitus malus et perversus. Homo autem habet ut in pluribus perversum appetitum respectu suiipsius, quia unusquisque nimis afficitur ad seipsum. Et ideo propter nimiam dilectionem et affectionem quam habet ad seipsum, voluntas pervertitur a fine recto: et ideo iudicantes de seipsis prave iudicant. Et dicit fere autem etc. quia sapientes non male iudicant de seipsis: habent enim prudentiam et appetitum rectum, et cognoscunt se sicut sunt, et ideo non inordinate afficiuntur ad seipsos; propter quod recte iudicant de seipsis sicut de aliis. Cum ergo iustum sit aequale eodem modo et ex parte rerum, et ex parte personarum, sicut dictum est in Ethicis, ipsi vero antiqui erant personae, quibus fiebat distributio, et iudicabant de seipsis: concesserunt aequalitatem ex parte rerum, non personarum: quare manifestum est, quod male iudicaverunt de iusto.

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Deinde cum dicit deinde autem hoc idem probat secunda ratione: et dicit, quod iterum manifestum est, quod hi qui favent statui paucorum et multorum, male iudicaverunt de iusto, et propter causam dictam, et quia tangentes iustum secundum quid, putaverunt tetigisse iustum simpliciter: sed non tetigerunt, quia dixerunt fautores status paucorum, quod si aliqui sunt inaequales secundum quid, sunt inaequales simpliciter: videlicet si sunt inaequales secundum divitias, ut unus sit ditior alio, sint inaequales simpliciter. Et ideo non tantum debet distribui de bonis communibus uni quantum alteri. Fautores status multorum dixerunt, quod si aliqui essent aequales in libertate, essent aequales simpliciter, et aequaliter debebant recipere de bonis communibus. Si autem inaequales in libertate, inaequales simpliciter et inaequaliter deberent recipere. Et sic manifestum est, quod non tangunt iustum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Arguunt enim a secundum quid ad simpliciter: est aequalis secundum divitias, ergo aequalis: et: est aequalis in libertate, ergo aequalis simpliciter.

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Deinde cum dicit quod autem probat specialiter, quod isti non intenderunt iustum simpliciter.

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Et primo quantum ad statum paucorum.

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Secundo quantum ad omnes, ibi, neque iis, qui a principio et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod isti dimittunt principalissimum iustum. Si enim ita esset, quod civitas esset instituta finaliter propter divitias et possessiones, et homines communicassent et convenissent propter eas, tantum participarent civitate quantum divitiis. Et tunc veritatem haberet sermo eorum, qui de statu paucorum scribunt, ut qui aequales essent in divitiis, aequaliter reciperent de communi: si vero non, non. Non enim videtur eis esse iustum, si communitas habeat in bonis centum talenta, quod tantum recipiat de centum talentis, qui ad commune non apposuit nisi unam minam, idest aliquam parvam mensuram, sicut ille qui totum residuum dedit. Iterum non videtur esse iustum, quod ille qui minus apposuit ad commune, tantum recipiat de illis quae habuit communitas a principio, nec de illis quae postmodum acquisita sunt. Nunc autem civitas non est instituta propter divitias finaliter, cum divitiae ad aliquid ordinentur: quare manifestum est, quod isti qui statui paucorum favent, non tetigerunt iustum simpliciter.

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Deinde cum dicit neque compugnationis ostendit universaliter, quod nec isti nec alii tetigerunt iustum simpliciter. Et quia iustum attenditur in ordine ad finem civitatis, in operationibus quae sunt ad alterum, ideo philosophus declarat finem civitatis, ut ex hoc appareat quid sit iustum simpliciter, et quid iustum secundum quid. Et dividitur in partes duas.

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Primo ostendit, gratia cuius finis civitas sit instituta. S

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ecundo infert corollarium, ex quo apparet illud quod intendit principaliter, ibi, quapropter et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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Primo ostendit, quod civitas non est instituta gratia alicuius boni particularis, et secundum quid.

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Secundo ostendit gratia cuius est instituta, ibi, sed ipsius bene vivere et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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Primo ostendit, quod non est instituta gratia ipsius vivere absolute.

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Secundo, quod nec gratia commutationis, aut compugnationis, ibi, neque compugnationis gratia et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod si civitas non sit instituta finaliter propter divitias, nec instituta est gratia ipsius vivere solum, ita quod ipsum vivere secundum se sit finis ultimus civitatis, sed magis ipsum vivere bene: si enim vivere absolute esset finis civitatis, quicquid attingeret ad vivere, attingeret ad finem civitatis: sed servi et bruta animalia attingunt ad vivere absolute, quare attingerent ad finem civitatis: sed non attingunt, quia felicitas, finis est civitatis: ipsa autem non participant felicitatem nec attingunt ad ipsum vivere secundum electionem: quare manifestum est, quod civitas non est instituta gratia ipsius vivere absolute.

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Deinde cum dicit neque compugnationis ostendit, quod nec gratia compugnationis, et commutationis eorum adinvicem.

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Et dividitur in duas, secundum quod hoc dupliciter probat.

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Secunda, ibi, quod autem hoc modo et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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In prima ponit conclusionem rationis quam intendit.

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In secunda probat eam, ibi, etenim utique Tyrrheni et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod civitas non est instituta gratia compugnationis ad inimicos, ut a nullo possint pati iniustitiam; nec gratia commutationis faciendae; nec propter aliquos contractus, vel usus, qui possunt fieri inter homines adinvicem.

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Deinde cum dicit etenim utique probat; et dicit quod si civitas esset instituta propter ista, quae dicta sunt, tunc Tusci et Carthaginenses, qui habent aliquos contractus adinvicem, essent sub una civitate: sed hoc est falsum: quare civitas non est instituta gratia alicuius commutationis, nec compugnationis. Circa istam rationem sic procedit. Primo probat consequentiam. Secundo destruit consequens, ibi, sed neque magistratus. In prima dicit, quod si civitas esset instituta, gratia compugnationis et commutationis et contractuum, qui possunt fieri adinvicem, tunc Tusci et Carthaginenses, et omnes inter quos sunt et fiunt aliqui contractus, essent sub una civitate: sunt enim istis pacta de introductibilibus, sive de rebus apportabilibus adinvicem, ut res unius civitatis possint apportari ad aliam civitatem, et commutari. Iterum conventiones habent, quod non faciant sibi adinvicem iniustitiam de compugnatione: quare isti essent sub una civitate contra inimicos iuvando se adinvicem.

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Deinde cum dicit sed neque destruit consequens, probando ipsum esse falsum.

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Et dividitur in duas, secundum quod dupliciter probat.

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Secunda ibi, neque quales quosdam et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod manifestum est, quod non sit una civitas, quia civitas una unum principatum habet: sed cives Tusci, et Carthaginenses, et alii quibus sunt contractus adinvicem, non sunt sub uno principatu, sed sub diversis principatibus. Alius est enim principatus Tuscorum, et Carthaginensium: quare, manifestum est, quod isti non sunt sub una civitate.

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Deinde cum dicit neque quales ponit secundam rationem ad destruendum consequens. Et dicit quod manifestum est quod isti non sunt sub una civitate, quia isti Tusci non curant quales debent esse secundum virtutem Carthaginenses, nec e converso; nec curant quomodo nullus eorum iniustus sit, nec qualiter nullus habeat malitiam, nec ad hoc laborant, nec ad hoc cooperantur; sed solum intendunt quod non faciant sibi adinvicem iniustitiam. Sed quicumque curant de bona legislatione considerant de virtute et malitia, ut malitiam repellant a civibus et faciant eos virtuosos: hoc enim intendit bonus legislator: quare manifestum est quod bona et vera civitas et non secundum sermonem tantum, debet esse sollicita de virtute, ut faciat cives virtuosos. Quamvis tamen isti non curent adinvicem quales sint secundum virtutem, nec ad hoc laborent, habent tamen aliquam communicationem; nam iuvant se in pugnando contra inimicos, et communicant in commutationibus et in contractibus, et sic de aliis. Similiter dicendum est ita, quod si sint duae civitates remotae secundum situm, quandoque tamen in commutationibus et aliis contractibus communicant et iuvant se adinvicem in compugnando contra inimicos, differentes tantum in hoc a propinquis secundum locum, quia istae propinquae, illae remotae. Et pactum est eis lex, quod non faciant sibi adinvicem iniustitiam non quod faciant se bonos cives: sicut proverbialiter dixit Lycophron sophista quod pactum inter aliquos habitum fideiussor est, quod non faciant sibi adinvicem iniustitiam; non quod bonos seinvicem faciant, nec et quales sint secundum virtutem, scilicet boni vel iusti.

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Deinde cum dicit quod autem ponit secundam rationem ad probandum quod civitas non est instituta gratia compugnationis et commutationis et aliorum contractuum. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod si Tusci et Carthaginenses essent propinqui et commorarentur simul in uno loco et communicarent in communicationibus et contractibus aliis, essent una civitas. Hoc removet per istam rationem. Et dividitur in duas. In prima ponit rationem quasi procedens narrative. Secundo concludit conclusionem principaliter intentam, ibi, ex quo patet et cetera. In prima dicit, palam esse ex dictis, quod hoc modo se habeat, sicut dictum est, quod civitas non instituta sit gratia compugnationis, nec commutationis, nec aliorum contractuum. Si enim duae civitates distinctae, sicut Megarensium et Corinthiorum, essent propinquae secundum situm, ita quod se tangerent et circumvolverentur uno muro, adhuc non esset una civitas, quia posset contingere quod haberent diversos principatus et diversas politias, et manifestum est quod tunc non esset una civitas, etiam dato quod communicarent sibi adinvicem secundum connubia, ut aliqui civium Megarensium contraherent cum aliquibus Corinthiorum; quamvis ista communicatio sit una de propriis communicationibus quae fiunt in civitatibus. Homines enim unius civitatis frequenter contrahunt cum aliis eiusdem civitatis. Adhuc tamen non esset una civitas, quia istud possent facere diversae civitates. Eodem modo si aliqui separati essent secundum locum et haberent diversas habitationes, non tamen tantum distarent quod non possent adinvicem communicare, sed haberent leges quod in commutationibus faciendis adinvicem non inferrent iniuste sibi molestias, ut si aliquis esset faber, alius coriarius, alius agricola, alius haberet aliquam artem aliam, et essent in aliqua magna multitudine, sicut si essent decem millia, et in nullo alio communicarent adinvicem, quam in commutatione rerum et in compugnando contra inimicos, adhuc non esset una civitas; quia ista possunt contingere habitantibus in diversis civitatibus. Quae igitur est causa propter quam non est civitas una? Non est dicendum quod propter hoc non sunt propinquae secundum situm cum non sint sub una civitate, ita quod non esse propinquos secundum situm faciat civitatem non esse unam et esse propinquum faciat civitatem esse unam: quia si aliqui sic convenirent quod essent propinqui secundum situm et communicarent adinvicem, si tamen quilibet haberet domum suam et uteretur ea sicut civitate, quae communis est pluribus, et iuvarent se adinvicem contra inimicos iniuriantes eis, sed in nullo alio communicarent, non esset civitas una. Et hoc manifestum est diligenter consideranti; quia possibile est quod sint sub diversis principatibus et politiis, et tunc manifestum est quod non sunt sub una civitate. Iterum dato quod sic essent congregati, ut adinvicem colloquerentur et divisim de contractibus faciendis, adhuc non esset civitas una, quia possibile esset quod haberent diversas politias et principatus.

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Deinde cum dicit manifestum igitur concludit conclusionem principalem. Et dicit quod manifestum est quod civitas non est communicatio loci, nec civitas finaliter instituta est ut adinvicem non faciant iniusta, nec gratia commutationis: tamen si debeat esse civitas: oportet ista existere, aliter enim non esset civitas: tamen istis solum existentibus non est primo.

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Deinde cum dicit sed ipsius ostendit gratia cuius instituta est. Et dividitur in duas.

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In prima ostendit quid est civitas simpliciter.

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In secunda ostendit quis est finis civitatis gratia cuius instituta est, ibi, finis est et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod bene dictum est quod communicatio loci non est civitas, sed communicatio bene vivendi composita ex domibus et diversis generibus gratia vitae perfectae, et per se sufficientis, est civitas. Et per hoc quod dicit, communicatio bene vivendi, innuit causam formalem: per hoc quod dicit composita ex domibus, tangit causam materialem propinquam: per hoc quod dicit ex diversis generibus, tangit causas materiales remotas: per hoc quod dicit gratia vitae perfectae etc. tangit causam finalem. Sed haec non contingunt esse nisi habitantibus eumdem locum et nisi coniungantur secundum connubia. Et propter hoc in civitate fiunt affectiones amicitiae factivae et conservativae, et confraternitates, quae sunt communicationes adinvicem in comestionibus et potibus vel in aliis. Similiter fiunt sacra et conversationes et solatia propter ipsum convivere: et ratio huius est, quia amicitia multum necessaria est in civitate. Amicitia enim eligitur propter convivere, sine autem convivere non est civitas: quare amicitia necessaria est ad civitatem: sed ista quae dicta sunt, necessaria sunt ad amicitiam; et ideo ista ordinata sunt in civitate.

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Deinde cum dicit finis quidem ostendit gratia cuius finis instituta est civitas. Et dicit quod finis civitatis propter quod civitas instituta est, est ipsum bene vivere. Civitas autem et illa quae ordinantur ad civitatem, sunt propter finem. Civitas enim est communicatio bene vivendi composita ex generibus diversis et gratia vitae perfectae et per se sufficientis. Hoc autem est vivere feliciter: bene autem vel feliciter vivere in politicis, est operari secundum optimam virtutem practice. Et propter hoc manifestum est quod communicatio politica consistit in communicatione bonarum actionum, et consistit in ipso vivere absolute. Apparet igitur quod finis propter quem instituta est civitas bene ordinata, est secundum virtutem perfectam vivere vel operari, et non ipsum convivere.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod infert corollarium ex quo apparet principale intentum. Et dicit quod, cum finis civitatis sit feliciter vivere practice, feliciter autem vivere sit operari secundum optimam virtutem practicam, quae est prudentia, et communicatio politica consistit in huiusmodi actionibus; manifestum est quod illi qui plus addunt ad talem communionem plus addunt ad civilitatem, et plus civitatis pertinet ad istos quam ad illos qui sunt aequales in libertate vel genere, et quam ad illos qui sunt maiores in genere, tamen minores et inaequales secundum virtutem politicam. Iterum plus attinet illis de eis quae pertinent ad civitatem, quam illis qui excedunt alios in divitiis, sed exceduntur ab aliis in virtutibus. Ex quo apparet, quod si iustum est aequale aliquarum rerum aliquibus personis secundum dignitatem in ordine ad finem, quod in politia illa in qua ponitur rectus finis, est iustum simpliciter. Iustum enim, ut dictum est, attenditur secundum dignitatem in ordine ad finem, sicut in regno et politiis rectis universaliter. In politia autem in qua ponitur finis non rectus, non est iustum simpliciter. Tales autem sunt status popularis et paucorum; et ideo in talibus non est iustum simpliciter. Quod erat principale intentum, gratia cuius induxit totam inquisitionem de fine civitatis. Nunc recapitulat, et dicit quod manifestum est ex determinatis, quod omnes illi qui adversantur de iusto non tetigerunt iustum simpliciter, sed iustum secundum quid tantum.

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L. 8 (Γ.10–11, 1281a10–1281b21)Utrum unum an plures dominari conveniat; et si plures, num optimates, an divites, an multitudo.Utrum unum an plures dominari conveniat; et si plures, num optimates, an divites, an multitudo.

275. Habet autem dubitationem quid oportet esse dominativum civitatis: aut enim multitudinem, aut divites, aut epiiches, aut optimum virum omnium, aut tyrannum.

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276. Sed haec omnia videntur habere difficultatem. Quid enim si pauperes quia plures sunt, diripient ea quae divitum, hoc non iniustum est? Videbatur enim utique per Iovem dominatio iuste. Iniustitiam igitur quid oportet dicere extremam?

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277. Rursumque omnibus acceptis, qui plures ea quae paucorum si diripiant, manifestum quod corrumpunt civitatem. At vero non quidem virtus corrumpet, quod ipsam habet, neque iustum civitatis corruptivum. Quare palam quod et legem hanc non est possibile esse iustam.

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278. Adhuc et actiones quascumque tyrannus egit, necessarium esse ones iustas. Vim enim infert potentior existens, sicut et multitudo divitibus.

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279. Ergo ne pauciores principari iustum et divites? si igitur et illi hoc faciant, et diripiant, et possessiones auferant multitudinis, hoc est iustum? Alterum ergo. Hoc quidem igitur quod sint prava omnia et non studiosa, manifestum.

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280. Sed epiiches principari oportet et dominos esse omnium: igitur necesse alios omnes inhonoratos esse, qui non honorantur politicis principatibus: principantibus autem semper eisdem, necessarium esse alios inhonoratos.

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281. Sed unum studiosissimum principari melius. Sed adhuc hoc magis oligarchicum. Qui enim inhonorati plures.

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282. Sed forte dicet utique aliquis dominativum totaliter hominem esse habentem accidentes passiones circa animam, sed non legem pravum.

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283. Si igitur sit lex quidem, oligarchia autem vel democratia, quid differret de dubitatis? accident enim similiter dicta prius.

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284. De aliis quidemigitur altera sit aliqua ratio. Quod autem oportet dominans esse magis multitudinem, quam optimos quidem, paucos autem, videbitur utique solvie et alicuius habere dubitationem, forte autem utique veritatem.

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285. Multos enim quorum unusquisque est non studiosus vir tamen contingit, cum convenerint, esse meliores illis, non ut singulum, sed ut simul omnes; veluti comportare caenam, iis quae ex una expensa elargitae sunt. Multis enim existentibus, unumquodque partem habere virtutis et prudentiae, et fieri congregatorum quasi unum hominem multitudinem multorum pedum et multarum manuum et multos sensus habentem sic et quae circa mores et circa intellectum: propter quod et melius qui multi, et quae musicae opera et quae poetarum. ALii enim aliam particulam aliquam, omnia autem omnes.

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286. Sed hoc differunt studiosi virorum ab unoquoque multorum sicut a non bonis bonos aiunt, et picta per artem a veris, eo quod collecta sint dispersa seorsum in unum, quoniam separatum quidem pulchrius habere picto, hoc quidem oculum, aliquo autem altero alteram particulam.

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287. Siquidem igitur circa totum populum et circa totam multitudinem, contingit hanc esse differentiam ultorum ad paucos studiosos, immanifestum. Forte autem per Iovem, palam quod de quibusdam impossibile, eadem enim utique ratio et in bestiis congruet: equidem quid differunt quidam a bestiis? ut consequens est dicere. Sed circa aliquam multitudinem nihil prohibet quod dictum est, esse verum.

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Postquam Philosophus distinxit politias secundum distinctionem principatuum, et declaravit cuius gratia civitas est instituta, in parte ista inquirit quem oportet esse principantem in civitate. Et quia principatus debet distribui secundum excessum alicuius boni, inquirit secundum cuius excessum debeant distribui. Et secundum hoc dividitur ista pars in duas partes.

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In prima inquirit quem oportet esse principantem in civitate.

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Secundo inquirit secundum cuius excessum debeat distribui, ibi, quoniam autem et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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In prima movet dubitationem, tangens quasi solutionem.

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Secundo arguit contra solutionem, ibi, sed haec et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod postquam determinatum est ad quod politiae debent distingui secundum distinctionem principatuum, sequitur dubitatio, scilicet quem oportet dominantem esse in civitate. Cum autem oporteat aliquem esse dominantem: aut dominabitur multitudo, sicut in politia quae est status popularis; aut divites ut in statu paucorum; aut virtuosi, sicut in statu optimatum; aut unus optimus, sicut in regno; aut unus pessimus, sicut in tyrannide.

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Deinde cum dicit sed haec omnia arguit contra ista singula, et ad minus contra plura. Et dividitur in duas.

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In prima facit quod dictum est.

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Secundo specialiter inquirit, utrum magis expediat multitudinem dominari aut paucos virtuosos, ibi, de his et cetera.

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Prima adhuc in duas.

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Primo arguit quod non expedit dominari multitudinem, aut divites.

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Secundo quod nec unum studiosum, ibi, sed unum et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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Primo ostendit quod non expedit multitudinem dominari.

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Secundo, quod nec paucos divites, ibi, ergo ne pauciores et cetera.

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Prima in tres, secundum quod probat per tres rationes quod non expedit multitudinem dominari.

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Secunda, ibi, rursumque et cetera.

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Tertia, ibi, adhuc et actiones et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod omnia ista videntur habere difficultatem. Si enim dicatur quod expedit multitudinem pauperum dominari, cum huiusmodi multitudo potentiam habeat et sine virtute, sic sequetur quod diripient propter indigentiam et potentiam bona divitum. Sed est ne hoc iniustum? Quasi diceret, sic. Secundum enim virtutem civitas debet habere dominium iustum. Quare manifestum est quod iniustitia extrema est haec, idest pessima.

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Deinde cum dicit rursumque omnibus ponit secundam rationem. Et dicit quod, si dicatur quod expedit multitudinem dominari, sequetur sicut prius, quod diripient bona divitum et paucorum, sicut virtuosorum. Sed hoc est destruere civitatem. Sed virtus non destruit illud cuius est, quod habet eam, nec quod iustum est corrumpit civitatem: quare manifestum est quod illa lex quae praecipit multitudinem dominari, non est iusta: non igitur expedit multitudinem dominari.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc et ponit tertiam rationem. Et dicit quod omnes operationes, quas facit tyrannus, ut tyrannus est, iniustae sunt, quia tyrannus per potentiam suam violentiam facit et accipit bona subditorum: talis autem operatio iniusta est. Sed ubi multitudo dominatur, facit violentiam divitibus ad modum tyranni diripiendo bona eorum; et ideo manifestum est quod multitudo est sicut tyrannus: quare operationes multitudinis sunt iniustae, ergo non expedit multitudinem dominari.

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Deinde cum dicit ergo ne ostendit quod non est iustum dominari paucos divites. Et dividitur in duas.

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In prima ostendit quod non expedit paucos divites dominari.

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Secundo quod nec virtuosos, sive paucos sive plures, ibi, sed epiiches et cetera.

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In prima dicit quasi interrogando: est ne iustum pauciores divites dominari in civitate? Quasi dicat: non est iustum pauciores dominari, quia per potentiam suam diripient bona pauperum et possessiones; sicut e contrario multitudo si dominaretur; et sic iustum esset divites diripere bona multitudinis et e contrario iustum esset multitudinem diripere bona divitum. Sed hoc est iniustum, ut visum est: quare manifestum est quod pravum et iniustum est et non studiosum divites paucos dominari.

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Deinde cum dicit sed epiiches ostendit quod non est iustum dominari virtuosos, sive plures, sive paucos. Aliquis enim diceret quod verum est quod non expedit dominari nec paucos divites, nec multitudinem; sed bene expedit et iustum est virtuosos dominari et esse dominos inter omnes. Sed istud videtur esse falsum: quia si soli virtuosi principentur, omnes alii erunt inhonorati, quia non attingunt ad honorem principatus, quia principatus honores sunt. Sunt enim praemium virtutis, et hoc est honor, sicut dicitur primo et quarto Ethicorum. Ergo qui non attingit ad principatum, non attingit ad honorem. Principantibus igitur virtuosis alii remanent inhonorati: sed hoc est inconveniens. Est enim hoc causa dissensionis: omnes enim appetunt honorem naturaliter, propter quod appetunt honorari a bonis et sapientibus qui melius et rectius possent iudicare. Si ergo auferatur eis honor, sequitur dissensio et multa mala in civitate: quare non est iustum virtuosos dominari.

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Deinde cum dicit sed unum ostendit quod non est iustum dominari unum virtuosum. Et dividitur in partes duas.

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In prima facit quod dictum est.

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In secunda, quia posset aliquis dicere quod non expedit hominem principari, sed hominem per legem ostendit contrarium, ibi, sed forte dicet et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod non expedit unum virtuosum valde principari; quia si unus valde virtuosus dominetur, plures erunt inhonorati honore principatus: sed hoc est inconveniens. Ex hoc enim sequuntur dissensiones in civitate et perturbationes, sicut dictum est. Iterum videbitur politia peior esse quam status paucorum, quia in principatu paucorum pluribus impenduntur, in ista autem uni. Hoc autem peius videtur esse, quia malum quanto magis divisum est, tanto minus existit et tolerabilius est: quare manifestum est quod non expedit unum virtuosum dominari.

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Deinde cum dicit sed forte quia diceret aliquis, quod lex debet dominari non homo, arguit contra hoc.

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Et primo ponit rationem per quam videtur quod lex debet dominari.

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Secundo arguit in contrarium, ibi, si igitur et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod pravum et iniustum est hominem principari et non legem, quia homo habet passiones sibi coniunctas. Passiones autem distrahunt voluntatem et faciunt deviare a recto fine, et per consequens pervertunt iudicium rationis. Lex autem nullas habet passiones: quare per legem non contingit deviare e recto iudicio rationis. Cum igitur melius et iustius sit illum principari qui non potest deviare a recto fine, quam illum qui potest, et homo potest deviare a recto fine, lex vero non; manifestum est quod iustum est legem dominari, non hominem.

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Deinde cum dicit si igitur arguit in contrarium; et dicit quod non videtur esse verum quod legem sit iustum dominari universaliter; quia contingit leges esse pertinentes ad potentiam paucorum vel multorum; et tales leges datae et ordinatae sunt in ordine ad finem illarum. In illis autem non supponitur rectus finis simpliciter, sicut praedictum est: ergo nec leges istae sunt iustae simpliciter. Quare manifestum est quod non differt quid dicatur, sive legem, sive aliud aliquid aliorum principari; quia semper idem accidit inconveniens, sicut prius ostensum est de omnibus.

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Deinde cum dicit de aliis omissis aliis, specialiter descendit ad inquirendum utrum magis expediat multitudinem, aut paucos virtuosos dominari. Et dividitur in duas. In prima praemittit quod omissis aliis, de quibus non est argutum, quia altera ratio est (manifestum est enim quod unum pessimum non expedit dominari, quia hoc est per se manifestum), altera ratio de hoc et de aliis, quia de aliis est dubium, sed de hoc non; ideo philosophus non arguit ad istud. Sed inquirendum est, utrum multitudinem magis expediat dominari, quam virtuosos, paucos tamen. Hoc enim videtur habere dubium et solutionem qua dissolvitur ratio, quae in oppositum adducebatur prius; et magis videtur esse verum et expediens multitudinem principari debere quam paucos virtuosos.

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Deinde cum dicit multos enim prosequitur;

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et primo ostendit quod magis expediat multitudinem dominari quam paucos virtuosos.

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Secundo solvit dubitationem, et quamdam aliam annexam illi, ibi, quapropter et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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Primo declarat unam propositionem.

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Secundo arguit ex illa, ibi, si igitur et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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Primo manifestat illam propositionem.

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Secundo ponit differentiam inter aliqua de quibus erat mentio facta, ibi, multos enim et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod si sint multi non virtuosi simpliciter, cum convenient in aliquod unum, facient unum aliquod studiosum, non sic quidem, ut quilibet faciat aliquid studiosum per se, et aliquid melius, sed omnes simul faciant unum aliquid studiosum, et sunt aliquid melius quam quilibet divisim acceptus. Et hoc declaravit per simile; et dicit, quod sicut illi qui faciunt coenam ad communes expensas et quilibet modicum apportat, quod autem collectum est ex omnibus apportatis magnae quantitatis est, sic est in proposito, si sint multi et quilibet aliquid habeat virtutis et prudentiae, cum convenerint in unum facient unum aliquid magnum et virtuosum. In quo enim unus deficit, contingit alterum abundare; ut si unus non inclinetur ad fortitudinem alter inclinabitur; et si alius non inclinetur ad temperantiam, alter inclinabitur: et ubi unus non poterit praevidere bene, alter poterit: et sic cum convenerit, facient quasi unum hominem virtuosum et perfectum: hominem dico habentem multitudinem sensuum, per quos discernere possit, et multitudinem manuum et pedum per quae possit moveri ad operationem et operari. Similiter etiam quantum ad mores et quantum ad intellectum se habet. Ex omnibus enim, cum convenerint, efficietur quasi unus homo perfectus secundum intellectum, quantum ad virtutes intellectuales, et secundum appetitum quantum ad morales. Et adducit aliud simile: dicens, quod propter hoc quod multi sunt aliquid melius simul iuncti, quam quilibet illorum, contingit quod opera musicalia, et opera poetarum melius facta sunt et ducta ad perfectionem per plures quam per unum. Sic enim inventae fuerunt artes et scientiae; quia primo unus invenit aliquid et illud tradidit et forte inordinate: alius post hoc accepit illud et addidit et totum tradidit et magis ordinate; et sic consequenter donec perfecte artes et scientiae inventae sunt: et manifestum est quod aliqui aliqua invenerunt, sed omnes simul omnia: et manifestum est quod plus est et perfectius illud quod omnes invenerunt quam illud quod quilibet per se.

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Deinde cum dicit sed hoc differunt ponit differentiam inter unum virum studiosum simpliciter, et quemlibet illorum, ex quibus cum convenerint in unum, factum est aliquid studiosum. Et dicit quod viri studiosi, sive virtuosi, differunt a quolibet illorum multorum ex quibus cum convenerint in aliquod unum, fit aliquid virtuosum, sicut bonus differt a non bono; quoniam viri virtuosi boni simpliciter sunt; sed quilibet istorum secundum se acceptus non est bonus, quia non est virtuosus perfecte. Iterum differunt viri studiosi ab istis divisim acceptis, sicut picta per artem differunt a veris. Circa quod intelligo quod pictor volens aliquid pingere per artem, sicut imaginem hominis, considerat bonam dispositionem oculorum in isto dimittens malas dispositiones aliorum membrorum; similiter considerat bonam dispositionem manus in alio dimittens malas dispositiones aliorum membrorum; et sic considerat meliores dispositiones aliorum membrorum in diversis et dimittit turpes: tunc ex omnibus istis collectis facit imaginem pulchriorem quam sit quilibet illorum ex quibus aliquid accepit. Et manifestum est quod quilibet illorum ex quibus aliquid accepit aliquid pulchritudinis habet, sed non simpliciter; illud autem quod acceptum est ex istis, simpliciter pulchrum est. Sic similiter in proposito, quilibet istorum multorum aliquid habet virtutis, sed non est simpliciter virtuosus: id autem quod simpliciter collectum est ex ipsis, simpliciter virtuosum est. Et hoc est quod intendit, cum dicit artificiose, eo quod illa vera simpliciter accepta sunt collecta in unum, et imago illa quae componitur simul ex partibus bene dispositis in diversis existentibus, pulchrior est quam unumquodque illorum, in quorum uno invenitur pulcher oculus, in alio autem pulchra manus: convenit enim bene invenire seorsum unum habentem oculum pulchriorem quam sit pictus quamvis in aliis deficiat; similiter aliquem habentem pulchram manum, quam sit picta, quamvis in aliis deficiat; similiter in aliis particulis. Similiter in proposito, differt vir studiosus ab unoquoque illorum qui dicti sunt; quia omnes bonas dispositiones secundum animam habent coniunctim, et in uno supposito unusquisque illorum unam aut in qua forte poterit excedere virtuosum, simpliciter tamen excedetur ab eo.

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Deinde cum dicit siquidem igitur ex ista propositione declarata arguit dicens, quod immanifestum est utrum huiusmodi differentiam contingat esse circa multitudinem, et circa populum totum ad paucos virtuosos, quod scilicet tota multitudo melior sit quam illi pauci virtuosi. Tamen secundum virtutem in quibusdam est impossibile: hoc est enim quaedam multitudo bestialis, cuius homines inclinantur ad actus bestiales, et parum rationis habent. Et in tali multitudine non est verum, quod ex illis hominibus possit fieri aliquid virtuosum, si conveniant in unum. Alia est multitudo in qua quisque habet aliquid virtutis et prudentiae, et inclinantur ad actum virtutis: et in tali verum est, quod illud quod fit ex istis, cum conveniunt in unum, est aliquid virtuosum. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus quod in aliqua multitudine non est verum, quod illa multitudo faciat aliquid virtuosum, sed in aliqua multitudine potest habere veritatem. Ex quo potest formari ratio sic. Melius est principari quod melius et studiosius est; sed contingit aliquam multitudinem esse meliorem et magis studiosam paucis virtuosis, ut probatum est, ergo et cetera.

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L. 9 (Γ.11, 1281b21–1282b13)Multitudini committendam esse electionem magistratuum et administratarum rerum examen; magistratus autem legibus obtemperare debere, et solum in his quae lex cavere non valuit arbitrium habere.

Multitudini committendam esse electionem magistratuum et administratarum rerum examen; magistratus autem legibus obtemperare debere, et solum in his quae lex cavere non valuit arbitrium habere.

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288. Propter quod et prius dictam dubitationem solvet utique quis per hoc et habitam ipsi, quorum oportet dominos esse liberos et multitudinem civium; tales autem sunt quicumque neque dignitatem habent virtutis nullam.

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289. Participare quidem enim ipsos principatibus maximis, non securum; propter iniustitiam enim et propter imprudentiam, hoc quidem iniuste agere utique, hoc autem peccare ipsos.

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290. Non tradere autem neque participare, terribile. Cum enim inhonorati multi et pauperes extiterint, necessarium civitatem hanc esse plenam seditionibus.

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291.Restat utique eo quod est consiliari et iudicare participare ipsos.

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292. Propter quod quidem et Solon et aliorum legislatorum aliqui, statuunt fieri electiones principatuum et correctiones principum; principari autem singulariter, non permittunt. Omnes quidem enim habent congregati sufficientem sensum, et admixti, melioribus civitatibus prosunt, sicut non purum alimentum cum puro totum facit utilius pauco, sigillatim autem unusquisque circa iudicare imperfectus est.

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293. Habet autem ordinatio haec politiae, dubitationem: primum quidem, quia videbitur utique eiusdem esse iudicare quis recte medicatus est, cuius quidem et medicari et facere sanum laborantem ab aegritudine praesente. Iste autem est medicus. Similiter autem et hoc et circa alias experientias et artes; sicut enim medicum oportet dare correctiones in medicinis, ita et alios in similibus: medicus autem et qui operator et qui architectonicus et tertius qui eruditus circa artem. Sunt enim aliqui tales circa omnes, ut est dicere, artes: attribuimus autem iudicare nihil minus eruditis quam scientibus.

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294. Deinde circa electionem eodem utique modo videbitur habere: etenim eligere recte scientium opus est, veluti geometram geometricorum, et gubernatorem gubernativorum: etenim si de quibusdam operibus, et artibus participant etiam idiotarum aliqui, sed non quidem scientibus magis.

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295. Quare secundum hanc quidem rationem non utique erit faciendum multitudinem dominorum, neque electionum principatuum, neque correctionum.

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296. Sed forte non omnia haec dicuntur bene, propter eam quae olim rationem, si sit multitudo non nimis vilis: erit enim unusquisque quidem deterior iudex scientibus, omnes autem congregati meliores, aut non deteriores.

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297. Et quia de quibusdam neque solus qui fecit, neque optime utique iudicabit, quorumcumque opera cognoscunt: et qui non habent artem, puta domum, non solum est cognoscere eius qui fecit, immo melius qui utitur ipsa, iudicat: utitur autem oeconomus. Et gubernaculum gubernator carpentario, et cibum epulans sed non coquus. Hanc quidem igitur dubitationem forte videbitur utique aliquis sic solvere sufficienter.

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298. Alia autem est habita huic: videtur enim inconveniens esse maiorum esse dominos pravos quam epiiches. Correctiones autem et principatuum electiones sunt maxime quas in quibusdam politiis, sicut dictum, et populus attribuunt: ecclesia enim talium omnium domina est: equidem ecclesiae quidem participant et consiliantur et iudicant a parvis honorabilitatibus et cuiuscumque aetatis: praesunt autem operibus et exercitus ducunt, et maximis principantibus principantur a maioribus.

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299. Similiter itaque solvet utique aliquis, et hanc dubitationem: forte enim habet et hoc recte: neque enim iudex, neque consiliator, neque concionator, princeps est; sed praetorium, et consilium, et populus. Dictorum autem unusquisque pars est horum: dico autem partem, consiliarium, et concionatorem et iudicem. Quare iuste dominans maior multitudo: ex multis enim populus et consilium, et praetorium. Honorabilitas autem amplior horum omnium quam eorum quae secundum unum, et secundum paucos principantium magnis principatibus. Haec quidem igitur determinata sint hoc modo.

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300. Prima autem dicta dubitatio facit manifestum nihil sic alterum, quomodo quia oportet leges recte positas esse dominans; principem autem, sive unus, sive plures sint, et de iis esse dominos de quibuscumque, non possunt leges dicere certitudinaliter, propterea quod non facile sit universaliter determinare de omnibus.

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301. Quales tamen quasdam oportet esse recte positas leges nondum palam, sed adhuc manet olim dubitatum: sed si simul politiis necesse, et leges pravas vel studiosas esse, et iustas vel iniustas. Verumtamen, hoc manifestum quod oportet ad politiam poni leges. At vero si hoc, palam quod eas quidem quae secundum leges rectas politias, necessarium esse iustas: eas aut quae secundum transgressas non iustas.

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Postquam Philosophus movit dubitationem, utrum magis expediat multitudinem dominari quam virtuosos, in parte ista solvit eam, et quamdam annexam illi: et habet duo.

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Primo infert solutionem quaestionis ex determinatis, et ponit quaestionem annexam.

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Secundo solvit illam, ibi, participare et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod propter ea quae dicta sunt, potest solvi dubitatio, qua quaeritur: utrum magis expediat dominari multitudinem, quam paucos virtuosos: apparet enim ex dictis, quod duplex est multitudo. Una quidem bestialis, in qua nullus habet rationem vel modicam, sed inclinatur ad bestiales actus; et manifestum est, quod istam non expediat dominari aliquo modo, quia sine ratione est et coniunctim et divisim. Alia est multitudo ubi omnes aliquid habent rationis et inclinantur ad prudentiam, et bene suasibiles sunt a ratione: et talem expedit magis dominari, quam paucos virtuosos: quamvis enim quilibet non sit virtuosus, tamen quod fit ex omnibus cum conveniunt, est virtuosum. Et sic apparet solutio quaestionis; quia ubi est talis multitudo, expedit eam magis dominari quam virtuosos: ubi non est talis, sed bestialis, nullo modo expedit. Poterit etiam per hoc solvi quaestio alia consequenter se habens ad illam; scilicet utrum oporteat multitudinem et liberos dominos eligere, et eos corrigere, et quorum expedit eos esse dominos, si expediat. Et qui sunt illi, de quibus movet quaestionem, exponit: huiusmodi enim sunt qui non habent aliquam dignitatem sive bonum virtutis.

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Deinde cum dicit participare quidem solvit quaestionem.

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Et primo solvit eam.

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Secundo solutionem confirmat per leges antiquorum, ibi, quapropter et cetera.

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Prima in tres.

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In primo ostendit quod inconveniens et non securum est multitudinem principari.

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Secundo, quod terribile est eos nullo modo participare principatum, ibi, non tradere.

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Tertio, quod expedit aliquo modo, ibi, restat utique et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod liberos et multitudinem attingere ad principatum, maximum et primum periculum est: isti enim iniustitiam et imprudentiam habent, et propter imprudentiam deficerent a recte iudicando, et propter iniustitiam inclinabuntur ad opera iniusta: et ideo sequetur quod multa mala facient quantum ad seipsos, et multa iniusta quantum ad alios, eis iniuriando et molestando: hoc autem est periculosum; ergo tales participare principatu inconveniens est maximum.

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Deinde cum dicit non tradere ostendit, quod terribile videtur esse, eos nullo modo participare honoribus: et quod si nullo modo concedatur eis principatus, nec attingant ad ipsum, inconveniens et terribile videtur, quia reputabunt se inhonoratos; et cum sint multi et pauperes, sequetur seditio et turbatio in civitate: sed istud est terribile.

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Deinde cum dicit restat utique concludit tertium. Et dicit quod ex quo sequuntur multa mala in civitate, si nullo modo attingant ad principatum, relinquitur, quod participare debent principatu aliquo modo, saltem quantum ad consiliativum et iudicativum.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod confirmat solutionem per leges et ordinationes antiquorum; et dividitur in partes duas.

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In prima facit quod dictum est.

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In secunda arguit contra ordinationes illorum, ibi habet autem ordinatio et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod quia dictum est, si multitudo nullo modo participet principatu, sequentur multa mala, sicut seditio et turbatio in civitate. Solon legislator Atheniensium, et quidam alii legislatores statuerunt multitudinem in eligendo et corrigendo principes; tamen noluerunt quod quilibet sigillatim haberet potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo; et hoc rationabiliter; quia quilibet secundum se virtutem non habet: et ideo deficeret in eligendo et corrigendo. Et dicimus, quod isti noluerunt quod quilibet haberet potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo principantem propter causam dictam, sed omnes insimul. Et ratio huius est, quia quamvis quilibet non habeat virtutem perfectam, unde recte se possit habere in principatu, tamen tota multitudo sufficienter virtutem habet, et discretionem in eligendo et corrigendo: in ista enim multitudine sunt sapientes et virtuosi aliqui, et aliqui non; et plus valet quod sumantur isti omnes simul, quam si sumerentur virtuosi et sapientes solum: sic enim est hic, sicut est de alimento: alimentum enim impurum sumptum cum puro, plus proficit quam alimentum impurum, si per se assumatur: impuri enim alimenti malitia et improbitas per purum sibi permixtum corrigitur, et ex eis commixtis fit bonum alimentum, et impurum ad aequalitatem redigitur: sic in republica insipientes in consulendo et decernendo quodammodo rectificantur a sapientibus, ut possint aliquo modo reipublicae prodesse.

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Deinde cum dicit habet autem obiicit contra istam ordinationem antiquorum: et dividitur in duas secundum quod dupliciter obiicit.

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Secunda, ibi, alia autem est habita et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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In prima tangit obiectionem.

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Secundo solvit, ibi, sed forte et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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Primo praemittit duas propositiones.

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Secundo arguit ex illis, ibi, quare secundum et cetera.

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Prima in duas, secundum quod duas propositiones proponit.

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Secunda, ibi, deinde circa electionem et cetera.

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In prima dicit: ita dictum est quod Solon et quidam alii legislatores ordinaverunt, quod multitudo haberet potestatem in eligendo, et corrigendo principatum. Videtur quod haec ordinatio habet dubitationem. Et ad declarationem praemittit istam propositionem. Cuius est aliquem medicari et sanare ab aegritudine praesente, eius est iudicare quis recte sanatus est: hoc autem facit medicus. Et ratio propositionis est, quia cuius est aliquid facere per deductionem ex causis et principiis, eius est resolvere ipsum usque ad primas causas, considerando ex quibus et qualibus causis est et habet esse: hoc autem est iudicare; ergo eiusdem est aliquid constituere, et iudicare de ipso: similiter est in aliis artibus: sicut enim medicus in medicinalibus iudicat et corrigit, similiter et alii in suis artibus. Ulterius dicit quod medicus triplex est: unus quidem est qui non novit artem, sed ordinata ab aliis aliqualiter scit applicare ad opus. Alius est artifex principalis, qui novit simpliciter omnes causas et principia medicinae; et tertius est expertus qui aliqua novit, sed non simpliciter. Cum igitur dicimus medicum iudicare de eo quem sanat, intelligimus de medico secundo et tertio modo. Et sicut circa medicinam est considerare triplicem medicum, scilicet practicum, scientem et expertum, sic circa omnes alias artes fere: in omnibus autem ipsis iudicium rectum, de his quae sub ipsis sunt, attribuimus non minus, idest parum minus expertis quam ipsis scientibus. Dicit autem non minus, quia scientes simpliciter in omnibus melius iudicant.

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Deinde cum dicit deinde circa proponit secundam propositionem; et dicit, quod sicut est circa iudicium, sic est circa electionem, quod scientis est recte eligere, et hoc est opus eius, sicut geometra iudicat recte de geometricis, et gubernator de gubernativis, et sic de aliis. Et ratio huius est. Electio enim est appetitus praeconsiliantis, consilium autem est ratiocinatio de eis quae sunt ad finem, ratiocinari autem recte de his quae sunt ad finem scientis est. Quare manifestum est, quod opus scientis est iudicare, et recte eligere. Et si idiotae aliqua recte eligant, non tamen sicut scientes, nec magis ipsis; quia si recte eligant, vel iudicent, hoc est a casu; non sic autem sapientes.

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Deinde cum dicit quare secundum ex istis duobus arguit, quod non expedit populum habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo principatum; dicens, quod manifestum est ex dictis, quod non expedit multitudinem habere dominium in electione et correctione principum, quia sicut dictum est, scientis est eligere, et corrigere prudentis; sed multitudo et ignorans et imprudens est; quare non expedit multitudinem dominari in eligendo et corrigendo.

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Deinde cum dicit sed forte solvit istam dubitationem: et dividitur in duas, secundum quod dupliciter removet ipsam.

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Secunda ibi, et quia de quibusdam et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod forte omnia ista non habent veritatem, nec bene dicta sunt; et hoc propter rationem superius dictam. Si enim sit multitudo non vilis, sive bestialis, sed aliquid habens rationis et virtutis, bene etiam suasibilis, habens sapientes a quibus recte suadeatur, talem multitudinem simul sumptam bene expedit habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo principem, et si unusquisque illorum non habeat sufficienter rationem et virtutem, per quam possit recte eligere et corrigere, tamen omnes simul habent, et constitutum ex omnibus cum conveniunt, virtuosum est simpliciter. Ex quo apparet, quod philosophus respondet per interemptionem minoris cum dicebatur quod multitudo est imprudens et ignorans: verum est si fuerit talis, sicut dictum est. Et dicit forsan quia in aliqua politia non expedit multitudinem habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo, sicut in regno. In regno enim si unus sit simpliciter prudens et alii regantur quasi dominativo principatu, ut inferiores obediunt superiori, non expedit multitudinem habere potestatem; sed in politia, ubi multitudo est aequalis expedit.

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Deinde cum dicit et quia de secundo removet obiectionem quasi interimendo maiorem; et dicit quod istud quod accipiebatur quod scientis solum secundum unamquamque artem est iudicare de opere suo, non habet veritatem, puta si sint aliqui qui fecerunt aliqua opera, et tamen non utantur illis, non est verum quod illi bene iudicent; sed illi qui utuntur recte iudicant; sicut non solum aedificator iudicat domum, immo melius iudicat ille qui ea facta utitur, sicut paterfamilias: similiter nauta gubernaculum accipit a carpentario, et melius iudicat de ipso quam carpentarius; sic et conviva de epulis melius iudicat quam coquus. Haec ergo dubitatio isto modo videtur esse dissoluta sufficienter. Similiter etiam est in proposito quod melius iudicat qui utitur principatu; hoc autem est multitudo. Et est intelligendum quod tres sunt artes se habentes per ordinem. Una quidem est quae versatur circa materiam, sicut est illa quae praeparat materiam, sicut est lignorum dolativa et praeparativa. Alia est quae in materia dispositiva introducit formam, sicut navifactiva. Tertia est usualis quae utitur nave facta. Et istae sic se habent: quod prima rationem operandi habet a secunda, et est propter ipsam: disponit enim sic ligna, quia talis forma quam considerat debet introduci in materiam talem; et tamen ipsa secundum se, formam illam non novit. Similiter secunda rationem operandi habet ex tertia et est propter ipsam; talem enim formam inducit in lignis, cui competit talis finis qui consideratur a tertia quae dicitur usualis; et ideo etiam considerat causam omnium aliarum primam. Per resolutionem autem ad primam causam iudicatur de re certius; et ideo usualis rectius iudicat quam ille qui formam inducit in materia. Si autem sit aliqua scientia quae aliquid constituat in esse et eo utatur, ista melius iudicat et certius omnibus.

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Deinde cum dicit alia autem ponit secundam obiectionem contra illam ordinationem; et dividitur in duas.

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In prima ponit obiectionem.

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In secunda solvit, ibi, similiter itaque et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod alia est dubitatio contra illam ordinationem se habens ad primam: inconveniens enim est pravis et imprudentibus committere maxima; sed electio et correctio principum maxima sunt in civitate; ergo committere ista pravis inconveniens est: sed multitudo prava et imprudens est; ergo inconveniens est multitudinem habere potestatem in corrigendo et eligendo super principes et virtuosos. Sed sicut dictum est, in quibusdam politiis ista commissa sunt populo; multitudo enim in illis dominium habet et in eligendo et corrigendo, quia in aliqua civitate populares et inferiores attingunt ad principatum et ad iudicativum et consiliativum, etiam de parvis honoribus iudicant et praesunt divitibus et ducunt exercitus et principantur maximis principatibus et magis quam maiores: quare manifestum est quod ordinationes istorum inconvenientes sunt.

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Deinde cum dicit similiter itaque solvit dubitationem.

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Et primo facit hoc.

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Secundo ostendit quid ex dictis potest esse manifestum et quid immanifestum, ibi, prima autem dicta dubitatio et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod eodem modo ista dubitatio potest solvi, sicut prima. Forte veritatem habet quod expedit aliquam multitudinem habere potestatem in electione et correctione principum: in aliqua enim multitudine, nec iudex, nec consiliator, nec praetor, neque concionator unus per se est iudex de principatu et dominus in electione, sed totum aggregatum ex praetorio consilio et populo; et unusquisque illorum pars est aggregata, scilicet consiliarius et concionator et iudex. Et manifestum est quod expedit magis dominari totam multitudinem quam aliquos, quia tota multitudo studiosa magis est quam aliqui pauci. Est enim multitudo ex sapientibus mediocribus et inferioribus: est enim ibi populus et consilium et praetor. Et manifestum est quod honorabilior est tota multitudo quam aliquis unus secundum se acceptus vel aliqui pauci. Et ex his manifestum est, quod obiectio praedicta non valet. Quod enim dicebatur quod multitudo prava est et imprudens, dicendum quod non est verum: quamvis enim aliqui sint tales, non omnes tamen. Sed si esset talis multitudo vilis in qua nullus esset sapiens nec prudens, non expediret talem habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo principes. Et ex his apparet quod philosophus intendit quod magis expedit totam multitudinem habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo quam paucos: et vocat hic multitudinem aggregatam ex sapientibus maioribus et prudentibus et mediocribus et populo: istam totam multitudinem talem magis expedit dominari quam paucos, vilem tamen multitudinem non expedit. Et dicit forsan, quia in politia, in qua est unus excellens in virtute, et alii nati sibi obedire, non expedit multitudinem attingere ad ista; quia duo exiguntur in regimine politiae. Unum est ratio recta; hoc autem habet ista multitudo per illos sapientes. Aliud est potentia, ut possit coercere et punire malos: hoc autem habet per populum.

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Deinde cum dicit prima autem ostendit quid est manifestum et quid immanifestum ex praedicta dubitatione.

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Et primo ostendit quid est manifestum.

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Secundo quid est immanifestum, ibi, quales tamen quasdam et cetera.

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Ista litera dupliciter potest exponi.

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Primo, ut referamus istam literam ad dubitationem, qua quaerebatur prius, utrum magis expediret multitudinem dominari quam paucos virtuosos, ut dicamus sic. Dubitatio prima, scilicet ista quae iam dicta est, nihil aliud manifestat, nisi qualiter lex dominetur in civitate et qualiter princeps, sive sit unus, sive plures: legem enim oportet esse dominam et principativam omnium eorum de quibus leges determinare possunt: principem autem oportet esse dominum de omnibus illis quae per leges non possunt cum certitudine determinari. Lex enim fertur in universali; et ideo in aliquo particulari quandoque habet instantiam: non enim potest legislator praevidere omnia particularia in quibus lex potest deficere: et ideo quandoque deficit. In isto autem casu princeps dominatur. Istud vero manifestum est ex praedicta dubitatione et solutione. Oportet enim in civitate principem habere regulam per quam dirigatur in operationibus suis et dirigat alios et per quam iudicet: hoc autem potest facere per legem. Quare oportet legem principari: et quia quandoque non potest per legem iudicare, quia lex deficit in aliquo casu, non apparet quid in illo casu oportet principem corrigere; et ideo expedit quod in isto casu princeps dominetur. Aliter potest exponi, ut referatur litera ad illud quod dictum est prius: dicebatur enim quod non oportet hominem principari secundum legem, quia passiones habet coniunctas quae pervertunt iudicium rationis. In contrarium arguebatur, quia contingit legem esse pravam et talem non expedit principari. Ex hoc oritur dubitatio, quem expedit magis principari: vel legem vel hominem: et tunc legatur sic. Dubitatio prima, hoc est prius dicta, aliud non quaerit, nisi quando oportet legem principari et quando principem sive sit unus, sive plures. Et sicut prius dictum est, quod legem expedit principari in illis, in quibus potest cum certitudine terminare, in aliis in quibus non potest, expedit principem dominari.

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Deinde cum dicit quales tamen ostendit quid est manifestum ex dictis: quia dictum est superius quod leges quaedam sunt rectae, hoc autem quae sint leges rectae et quae non, adhuc non est manifestum, sed adhuc est dubitatio de hoc, de quo similiter prius dubitatum est. Sed de legibus dicendum est sicut de politiis: sicut enim quaedam politiae sunt pravae et iniustae, et quaedam studiosae et iustae; sic sunt leges quaedam iustae et studiosae, quaedam pravae et iniustae, quia leges dantur de conferentibus ad finem politiae: ergo si finis politiae rectus simpliciter, et politia recta et lex data de his quae fiunt ad talem finem recta est: si finis politiae non sit rectus, nec politia recta, nec lex data de conferentibus ad finem talis politiae recta erit: et si hoc, manifestum est quod leges dantur in habitudine ad politiam et ad finem eius, et manifestum est quod leges quae dantur secundum politias rectas sunt rectae: quae secundum transgressiones non rectae sunt.

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L. 10 (Γ.12, 1282b14–1283a14)Magistratus non esse distribuendos secundum excessum cuiuslibet boni.

Magistratus non esse distribuendos secundum excessum cuiuslibet boni.

Polit.L10

302. Quoniam autem in omnibus quidem scientiis et artibus bonum, finis: maximum itaque et maxime in principalissima omnium: haec autem est politica potentia: est autem politicum bonum quod iustum, hoc autem est quod communiter conferens.

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303. Videtur autem omnibus aequale aliquid esse quod iustum et usque ad aliquid quidem consentiunt iis qui secundum philosophiam sermonibus, in quibus determinatum est de moralibus, quod enim et quibus; nam quod iustum, et oportet aequalibus aequales esse, aiunt. Qualium autem aequalitas est, et qualium inaequalitas est, oportet non latere: habet enim hoc dubitationem, et philosophiam politicam.

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304. Forte enim utique dicet aliquis secundum omnis boni excessum oportet inaequaliter distribui principatus, si omnia reliqua nihil differant, sed similes acciderit esse. Diffeerentibus enim alterum esse quod iustum, et secundum quod dignitatem.

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305. At vero si hoc verum erit, et secundum colorem et secundum magnitudinem et secundum quodcumque bonorum, superabundantia quaedam politicorum iustorum excedentibus. Aut hoc superficiale falsum, manifestum autem in aliis scientiis et potentiis. Similiter enim fistulatoribus secundum artem non dandam superabundantiam fistularum nobilioribus; neque enim fistulabunt melius; oportet autem ei qui secundum opus excedit dare et organorum excessum.

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306. Si autem nondum palam quod dicitur, adhuc magis ipsum procedentibus erit manifestum. Si enim sit aliquis excedens quidem secundum fistulativam, multum autem deficiens secundum nobilitatem vel pulchritudinem, et si unumquodque bonorum illorum sit magis fistulativa (dico autem nobilitatem et pulchritudinem), et secundum analogiam excedant plus fistulativam quam ille secundum fistulativam; tamen huic dancum differentes fistularum. Oportet enim ad opus comparari excessum, et divitiis et nobilitati comparantur nihil.

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307. Adhuc secundum hanc rationem omne bonum ad omne utique erit comparabile. Si enim magis aliqua magnitudo et totaliter magnitudo utique adaequabilis erit, et ad divitias et ad libertatem. Quare, se plus hic differat secundum magnitudinem quam hic secundum virtutem, et ampliorem virtutis magnitudo totaliter excedit, erunt utique comparabilia omnia; tanta enim magnitudo si melior, valentior tanta, palam quod aequalis.

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308. Quoniam autem hoc impossibile, palam quod in politiis rationabiliter non secundum omnem aequalitatem altercantur de principatibus. Si enim ii quidam tardi, ii autem veloces, nihil propter hoc oportet hos quidem plus, hos autem minus habere; sed in exercitativis agonibus horum differentia accipit honorem.

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Postquam Philosophus declaravit quis debet esse dominans et principans in civitate, ostendit in parte ista secundum cuius boni excessum debeant distribui principatus; et dividitur in duas.

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In prima praemittit intentum suum et causam intenti.

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Secundo prosequitur, ibi forte enim et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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In prima ostendit quod finis politiae recte ordinatae est bonum communiter conferens.

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Secundo dat intentum suum et causam intenti, ibi, videtur autem omnibus et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod in omnibus artibus et scientiis, scilicet operativis, finis est aliquid bonum, quia omnis doctrina et ars, similiter autem actus et operatio bonum quoddam appetere videtur, sicut primo Ethicorum dicitur. Si autem cuiuslibet artis et scientiae finis est aliquod bonum, principalissimae est finis optimum et principalissimum; quia in his quae sunt per se, sicut simpliciter ad simpliciter, ita magis ad magis, et maxime ad maxime. Sed inter omnes scientias practicas activas politica est principalissima, ut ostensum est in primo huius: quare finis eius debet esse principalissimum quid et optimum. Sed bonum intentum in politica est illud quod iustum est simpliciter, idest in ordine ad quod attenditur iustum simpliciter, et tale est bonum conferens communiter: ergo bonum communiter conferens est finis in politia.

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Deinde cum dicit videtur autem dat intentionem suam cum causa; et dicit quod omnibus apparet quod iustum est aequale; quod consonat ei quod dictum est, ubi determinatum est de sermonibus moralibus, scilicet in Ethicis: ibi enim dictum est quod iustum est aequale in rebus, quae debent distribui secundum dignitatem et aliquibus et aequalibus personis quibus debet fieri distributio. In huiusmodi vero distributione oportet esse aliquam mensuram secundum quam dirigantur in distributione: huiusmodi autem mensurae finis est, ita quod secundum quod aliquis plus accedit vel minus ad finem, secundum hoc plus vel minus debet ei distribui de communibus bonis; ita et qui aequaliter attingunt ad huiusmodi dignitatem in ordine ad finem, aequaliter debent recipere. Quid autem est illud bonum respectu cuius vel quorum est aequalitas vel inaequalitas, non debet esse immanifestum; hoc enim habet dubitationem, quam determinare pertinet ad politicum.

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Deinde cum dicit forte enim prosequitur.

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Et primo improbat opinionem quorumdam circa hoc.

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Secundo inquirit veritatem secundum intentionem suam, ibi sed ex quibus et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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Primo ponit opinionem illorum.

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Secundo reprobat, ibi, at non si hoc et cetera.

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In prima ponit opinionem; et dicit quod cum aliquis posset dicere, quod principatus debet distribui secundum dignitatem vel excessum cuiuslibet boni, sive sit bonum secundum animam, sive sit secundum corpus. Si enim aliqui duo in aliquo bono differant secundum excessum, ita quod unus excedat alium in illo, et in omnibus aliis sint similes et non differant, principatus debet distribui secundum excessum illius boni, ita quod ille qui excedit plus debet habere principatum: qui enim differunt in aliquo bono quocumque, differunt secundum dignitatem, ad quam inspiciendum est in distribuendo honores communes: differentibus enim in aliquo bono non est idem iustum, nec est idem secundum dignitatem, sed diversum et alterum; ita quod quae est proportio dignitatis alicuius, sive boni, ad dignitatem alterius, sive ad bonum, eadem est proportio eius quod debet distribui uni ad illud quod debet distribui alteri; ita quod quantum bonum unius excedit bonum alterius, et principatus unius principatum alterius.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero reprobat istam opinionem: et dividitur in partes tres, secundum quod reprobat eam per tres rationes.

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Secunda ibi, si autem non et cetera.

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Tertia ibi, adhuc secundum hanc et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod si istud verum est, quod principatus debet inaequaliter distribui secundum excessum cuiuslibet boni; manifestum est, quod secundum excessum coloris et magnitudinis, et secundum excessum cuiuslibet alterius boni, plus debet distribui de principatu politico. Sed istud statim apparet esse falsum, et hoc manifestum est in aliis scientiis et potentiis. Si enim sint duo habentes aequaliter artem fistulandi, si unus excedat alium in nobilitate, manifestum quod non propter hoc debent dari plures fistulae vel meliores ei qui excedit in nobilitate: et ratio huius est, quia fistulae non dantur nisi propter opus fistulandi: ergo non debent dari nisi ei qui aptus natus est ad fistulandum: quare plures et meliores debent dari ei qui magis est aptus, et melius scit fistulare: ergo propter excessum illius non debent plures distribui, per quod homo non est magis aptus ad fistulandum, nec melius scit fistulare: quare manifestum est, quod per excessum in nobilitate non debent plures fistulae distribui. Similiter si sint duo aequales in virtute, unus tamen excedat alium in pulchritudine, vel in aliquo alio bono, cum hoc sit accidens in ordine ad principatum, manifestum est quod propter istum excessum non debet plus attribui de principatu uni quam alteri.

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Deinde cum dicit si autem ponit secundam rationem: et dicit, quod si ex ista ratione non sit manifestum, quod secundum excessum cuiuslibet boni non debet fieri distributio principatus, volentibus ulterius producere rationem praedictam, magis erit manifestum. Si enim sit aliquis qui multum excedit alium in arte fistulandi, excedatur tamen ab alio in nobilitate et pulchritudine, supposito quod quodlibet illorum sit melius quam ars fistulativa, sicut pulchritudo et nobilitas, et secundum aliquam proportionem, excedant plus illa bona artem fistulandi quam alius secundum artem fistulandi illa bona, nihilominus plures fistulae et differentes in bonitate debent dari ei qui excedit in arte fistulandi, quam aliis. Et ratio huius est, quia distributio fistularum secundum excessum debet fieri in ordine ad opus, quia fistulae non dantur nisi propter opus: ergo ei qui melius scit artem fistulandi, plures et meliores fistulae debent distribui: sed per divitias et voluptates non est magis aptus ad fistulandum. Similiter si sit aliquis melius dispositus secundum virtutem, et magis aptus ad principandum quam alius, exceditur tamen ab alio in nobilitate et pulchritudine, distributio principatus magis debet fieri virtuoso, quam alii; et ratio huius est, quia distributio principatus secundum excessum, non debet fieri nisi ei qui magis est aptus ad principandum; hic autem est ille qui excedit in virtute. Quare manifestum est, quod distributio principatus non debet fieri secundum excessum cuiuslibet boni.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc secundum ponit tertiam rationem, et est ducens ad impossibile: et dividitur in duas.

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In prima ponit rationem.

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Secundo destruit consequens quod sequitur, ibi, quoniam autem et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod si distributio principatus fiat secundum excessum cuiuslibet boni, tunc omne bonum erit ad omne bonum comparabile, et secundum magis et minus, et secundum aequale: sed hoc est falsum, quare et primum. Quod autem ita sit, declarat philosophus, quod omne bonum sit ad omne comparabile secundum magis et minus; et si distributio principatus fiat secundum excessum cuiuslibet boni, hoc manifestum est; et ideo philosophus hoc non declarat: sed quod sit comparabile secundum aequale, sic probari potest. Si enim sint duo, et unus excedat alium in nobilitate et pulchritudine, manifestum est, quod sunt comparabilia secundum magis et minus: similiter secundum aequale: quia si ab eo quod excedit alium, auferatur illud in quo excedit, manifestum est, quod residuum erit aequale: si enim aliqua magnitudo sit maior altera, si auferatur ab ea in quo excedit alteram, totaliter erit aequalis ei.

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Eodem modo est consideratio ad divitias et ad libertatem: si enim aliquis excedat alium in nobilitate et divitiis et libertate, si amoveatur illud in quo excedit, manifestum est, quod erit aequalis. Et ex hoc manifestum est, quod si isti duo sic se habeant, quod magnitudo boni unius plus excedat virtutem alterius, quam alius secundum virtutem, si addamus virtutem ampliorem, manifestum est, quod iste excedet in virtute: quare manifestum est, quod omnia bona ad omnia sunt comparabilia, et secundum magis, et secundum minus et secundum aequale: si enim tanta magnitudo sit maior altera, amoto illo in quo excedit, residuum erit aequale.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem destruit consequens: et dicit, quod hoc est impossibile; scilicet, quod omnia bona sint comparabilia secundum aequale, et magis et minus. Et ratio huius est quia comparabilia oportet esse unius speciei, sicut dicitur septimo physicorum; sed omnia bona non sunt unius speciei, nec etiam unius generis: quare omnia bona adinvicem non sunt comparabilia: et si hoc est impossibile, manifestum est, quod hypothesis est impossibilis; scilicet, quod secundum excessum cuiuslibet boni vel qualitatis, distribuatur principatus. Et adiungit ad declarationem huiusmodi; dicens, quod si isti sunt tardi, et alii sunt veloces, isti veloces non plus debent participare principatu; quia secundum aliquod istorum non magis attingit ad finem principatus per se, quia propter aliud istorum non est magis virtuosus: tamen in agonibus exercitatis, huiusmodi diversitas consideranda est: in tali enim exercitio secundum excessum velocitatis est distributio honoris; ita quod ille qui velocior et agilior est, plus recipit de honore. In principatu vero politico secundum excessum istorum non debet fieri distributio principatus.

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L. 11 (Γ.12–13, 1283a14–1283b35)Utrum nobilibus, an opulentis, an virtute praeditis, an potentioribus, attribuendi sint magistratus.Utrum nobilibus, an opulentis, an virtute praeditis, an potentioribus, attribuendi sint magistratus.

309. Sed ex quibus civitas consistit, in iis necessarium fieri altercationem; propter quod quidem rationabiliter praeparantur honori nobiles et divites et liberi. Oportet enim liberos esse et honorabilitatem ferentes: non enim utique erit ex egenis omnibus civitas, sicut neque ex servis. At vero si opus est horum, alam quia et iustitiae, et bellicae virtutis: neque enim sine iis habitari civitatem possibile est. Sed sine prioribus quidem impossibile esse civitatem; sine iis autem habitari bene.

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310. Ad civitatem quidem igitur esse videbuntur utique vel omnia vel quaedam horum recte dubitari, ad vitam vero bonam disciplina et virtus maxime iuste utique dubtarentur, quaemadmodum dictum est prius.

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311. Quoniam autem neque omnium aequale oportet habere aequales secundum unum aliquid solum existentes, neque inaequale inaequales secundum unum, necesse omnes tales politias esse transgressiones. Dictum est quidem igitur et prius, quod altercantur modo quodam iuste omnes; simpliciter autem non omnes iuste. Divites quidem quia plus regionis attinet ipsis, regio autem commune. Adhuc ad conventiones, fideles magis ut in pluribus.

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312. Liberi autem et ingenui tamquam prope invicem. Cives enim magis qui generosi iis qui non generosi. Ingenuitas autem apud quoscumque habetur honorabilis. Adhuc quia meliores verisimile eos qui ex melioribus, ingenuitas autem est virtus generis.

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313. Similiter autem dicemus iuste, et virtutem altercari. Communicativam enim virtutem dicimus esse iustitiam, cui necessarium omnes alias assequi.

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314. At vero et plures ad pauciores. Etenim valentiores et ditiores et meliores sunt, ut acceptis pluribus ad pauciores.

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315. Ergo, si omnes sunt in una civitate, dico autem puta boni et divites et ingenui, adhuc autem multitudo alia politica, utrum altercatio erit, quos oporteat principari, aut non erit? secundum unamquamque quidem igitur politicam dictarum intubitatum iudicium quos oporteat principari. Dominantibus enim differunt ab invicem: puta haec quidem eo quod per studiosos viros sit, et aliarum unaquaeque eodem modo. Attamen consideramus, quando circa idem tempus haec existunt, quomodo determinantum. Si itaque sint numero pauco valde qui virtutem habent, quo oportet dividere modo? vel hoc quod pauci, ad opus oportet cinsiderare, si possit habitari civitas? vel quod tanti multitudine ut sit civitas ex ipsis?

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316. Est autem dubitatio quaedam ad omnes altercantes de politicis honoribus. Videbuntur enem nihil dicere iustum qui propter divitias volunt principari, similiter autem et qui secundum genus. Palam enim rursus quod siquis unus ditior omnibus est, palam quod secundum idem iustum oportebit hunct unum principari omnibus. Similiter autem et differentem ingenuitate altercantibus propter libertatem.

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317. Idem autem iis accidet et circa aristocratias de virtute. Si enim aliquis unus sit melior vir aliis, qui sunt in politeumate, studiosis existentibus, hunc oportet esse dominum secundum idem iustum.

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318. Igitur si et multitudo oportet esse dominans quia valentiores sunt paucis, et si unus vel plures quidem uno, pauciores autem multis, valentiores sunt aliis, hos utique oportebit dominos esse magis quam multitudinem.

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319. Omnia itaque haec videntur facere manifestum quod horum terminorum nullus rectus sit secundum quem volunt ipsi quidem principari, alios autem omnes sub se subici. Etenim utique ad eos qui secundum virtutem volunt domini esse politeumatis, similiter autem et ad eos qui secundum divitias, habebunt utique dicere multitudines rationem qumdam iustam: nihil enim prohibet aliquando multitudinem esse meliorem paucis, et ditiorem, non ut secundum singulum, sed ut simul omnes.

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Postquam Philosophus reprobavit opinionem antiquorum volentium, quod secundum excessum cuiuslibet boni debeant distribui principatus, inquirit secundum intentionem suam, secundum cuius boni excessum debeat fieri: sunt enim quaedam bona quae ordinantur ad civitatem propter finem ipsius; et de talibus inquirit, utrum secundum excessum alicuius istorum quae ordinantur ad civitatem debeat fieri: rationabile enim videtur, quod secundum excessum alicuius illorum quae ordinantur ad civitatem debeat fieri; et dividitur in duas.

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In prima ostendit quae sunt illa, ex quibus est civitas; proponens quod non irrationabiliter dubitabit aliquis de istis.

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In secunda inquirit, utrum secundum excessum illorum debeat fieri, ibi, quoniam autem et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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Primo proponit quod de bonis illis, quae ordinantur ad civitatem, rationabiliter aliquis dubitabit.

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Secundo concludit intentum suum, ibi, ad civitatem quidem et cetera.

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In prima dicit, ita dictum est, quod inconveniens est, ut secundum excessum cuiuslibet boni fiat distributio principatus: sed de illis quae ordinantur ad civitatem non dubitabit aliquis irrationabiliter: sunt autem ista quae ordinantur ad civitatem: divitiae, nobilitas et libertas: et propter hoc divites honorantur in civitate, et nobiles, et liberi: liberos enim oportet in civitate honorari. Quod autem ista requirantur ad civitatem, hinc apparet: nam civitas non debet esse ex egenis, quia si esset ex omnibus egenis, nihil posset tribuere ad commune, quod tamen est necessarium: aliter non possent repelli inimici: nec debet esse ex servis, quia non esset civitas: servus enim non potest habere principatum, quia non potest praevidere de agibilibus; ergo oportet civitatem esse ex divitibus et liberis. Si autem ista sunt necessaria ad civitatem, multo magis iustitia et virtus bellica; nam sine istis non contingit inhabitari bene civitatem; sed differenter sunt necessaria ad civitatem ista: et primo, quia prima sic sunt necessaria, quod sine ipsis non potest esse civitas; sed sine iustitia et bellica virtute potest quidem esse, sed non bene.

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Deinde cum dicit ad civitatem concludit intentum suum. Et dicit, quod manifestum est, quod omnia ista vel quaedam horum conferunt et ordinantur ad civitatem; sed ad bonam vitam disciplina, et maxime virtus; propter quod manifestum est, quod rationabiliter dubitabit aliquis, utrum secundum excessum istorum vel alicuius eorum debeat fieri distributio principatus.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem inquirit utrum secundum excessum alicuius istorum debeat distribui principatus: et dividitur in duas.

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In prima ponit rationes ad utramque partem.

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Secundo solvit dubitationem, ibi, omnia itaque haec et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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In prima ostendit quod secundum dignitatem alicuius istorum debeat distribui principatus.

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Secundo arguit in contrarium, ibi, est autem dubitatio et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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In prima facit quod dictum est.

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Secundo inducit quamdam quaestionem, ibi, ergo si omnes sunt et cetera.

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Prima in quatuor.

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Primo ostendit quod secundum excessum divitiarum debeat fieri distributio principatus.

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Secundo, quod secundum dignitatem libertatis, ibi, liberi autem et ingenui et cetera.

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Tertio, quod secundum dignitatem virtutis, ibi, similiter autem dicemus et cetera.

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Quarto, quod secundum dignitatem multitudinis, ibi, at qui et cetera.

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In prima igitur vult ponere rationes, per quas videtur quod secundum divitias magis debeat distribui; et primo dicit quod manifestum est quod non oportet quod si aliqui sint secundum aliquid aequales, quod aequaliter debeant recipere; quia possibile est quod sint aequales in parvo bono et inaequales in maiori. Non autem expedit quod isti aequaliter recipiant, immo iniustum est. Similiter si aliqui sint secundum aliquid inaequales, non oportet quod inaequaliter recipiant, quia possibile est quod sint inaequales in minori bono et quod sint aequales in maiori bono: tales autem recipere inaequaliter iniustum est. Quare manifestum est quod illae politiae, in quibus ita sit quod aequales secundum aliquid aequaliter recipiant et inaequales secundum aliquid inaequaliter, transgressiones sunt, secundum quod dictum est. Omnes etiam tales altercantur considerantes secundum quid iustum et aliquo modo, sed non simpliciter iustum; sicut divites dicunt se plus debere recipere de principatu, quia ille qui plus habet in regione plus debet participare principatu, quia regio communis est. Divites vero plus participant regione: habent enim magnas possessiones, pauperes vero aut parvas aut nullas. Iterum illi qui fideliores sunt civitati et magis conservant politiam et conventiones politiae plus debent participare principatu: sed divites sunt fideliores pauperibus et melius servant politiam et conventiones, quia pauperes propter penuriam coguntur infringere pacta, et sic infideles sunt, divites vero non, quia divitias habent, et iterum propter defectum divitiarum non tradent regionem in manu alterius; et ideo fideliores sunt quam pauperes in pluribus, ad minus ut videtur.

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Deinde cum dicit liberi autem ostendit quod secundum dignitatem libertatis et ingenuitatis debeat distribui: et dicit quod liberi et ingenui tamquam sint propinqui adinvicem, invicem altercantur de principatu: liber autem dicitur qui mente potest praevidere quae agenda sunt et inclinatur ad virtutem: similiter ingenuus: sed differunt, quia ingenuus dicitur qui habet huiusmodi inclinationem secundum virtutem profectam a parentibus et illi ab aliis, et sic secundum quamdam antiquitatem: liber autem qui habet undecumque. Isti igitur altercantur dicentes se debere participare principatu, alios non: et hoc dupliciter.

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Primo, quia illis magis debetur principatus qui magis attingunt ad civitatem; sed liberi et ingenui tales sunt, quia generosi magis sunt cives quam alii non generosi, quia magis videntur virtuosi. Et huiusmodi signum est, quia apud quoscumque nobiles sive generosi honorabiliores sunt, quare liberis et generosis magis debetur principatus quam aliis.

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Secundo, quia illis magis debetur principatus qui meliores sunt: sed liberi et generosi meliores sunt. Generosi quidem, quia verisimile est quod qui generati sunt ex melioribus meliores sint; generosi autem sunt ex melioribus; est enim generositas virtus generis, haec est inclinatio ad virtutem.

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Sed intelligendum circa hoc quod dicit, quod meliores ex melioribus generantur, quod bonus dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum actum perfectum: et sic bonus non generat bonum, quia bonus est secundum intellectum et secundum electionem et exercitationem: non ergo fit bonus aliquis secundum actum perfectum a parentibus. Alio modo dicitur bonus secundum inclinationem ad virtutem perfectam, et sic bonus vult bonum generare, quia virtus in semine existens intendit per se generare simile ei a quo est ipsum semen secundum omnes dispositiones ad quas potest attingere virtus generativa. Attingit autem ad omnes dispositiones materiales quae inclinant ad dispositiones voluntatis et intellectus; et ideo intendit generare sibi simile secundum omnes dispositiones inclinantes sive in bonum sive in malum: propter quod inclinatio ad virtutem aliqualiter est ex parentibus. Bonus igitur isto modo generat, ut in pluribus, bonum: si autem quandoque accidit contrarium, hoc est per accidens. De hoc autem quod dicit quod ingenuitas est virtus, intelligendum quod virtus dupliciter dicitur: uno modo secundum actum perfectum: et sic nobilitas non est virtus, sed in ordine ad ipsam dicitur: alio modo dicitur virtus inchoatio quaedam et dispositio sive inclinatio ad virtutem perfectam. Isto modo dicitur virtus nobilitas, si proveniat ex parentibus et illi ex aliis, et sic secundum quamdam antiquitatem; si autem proveniat ex quacumque causa, facit liberum.

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Deinde cum dicit similiter autem ostendit quod secundum dignitatem virtutis debeat distribui principatus; et dicit quod eodem modo rationabiliter altercantur virtuosi de principatu, dicentes se debere principari et non alios, quoniam secundum dignitatem illius debet distribui principatus quod est magis salvativum civitatis: sed hoc est virtus: quod apparet, quia iustitia est maxime salvativa civitatis. Est enim iustitia habitus, per quem sumus operativi iustorum et volumus operari iusta: hoc autem contingit in agere et contra pati aequale. Hoc autem maxime salvativum est civitatis, ut dicitur quinto Ethicorum: ipsam enim consequitur omnis alia virtus. Quod potest dupliciter exponi. Uno modo sic quod omnes aliae sibi consequuntur pro tanto, quia qui habet unam virtutem perfecte habet omnes: iustitia est virtus perfecta: ergo qui habet iustitiam habet omnes. Aliter sic: quia duplex est iustitia: una particularis, per quam aliquis bene se habet in operatione quae est ad alterum vel in his quae ordinantur in bonum alterius: alia vero iustitia est universalis, per quam aliquis bene se habet in opere quod est ad alterum in ordine ad bonum commune. Unde per iustitiam universalem aliquis recte utitur omni virtute et actu cuiusque virtutis in ordine ad bonum commune, et sic includit omnem virtutem: tale vero quod includit omnem virtutem maxime salvativum est civitatis; et sic videtur quod secundum dignitatem virtutis debeat distribui principatus.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero et arguit quod secundum dignitatem multitudinis debeat distribui: et dicit quod plures sive multitudo altercantur cum paucioribus rationabiliter de distributione principatus; dicentes se debere principari, quia secundum dignitatem istorum debet distribui principatus qui meliores et ditiores et valentiores sunt: nunc autem multitudo valentior, melior et ditior est quam aliqui particulares quicumque, quia multitudo includit istos et alios, et pauci non. Quare manifestum est quod secundum dignitatem multitudinis debet distribui principatus.

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Deinde cum dicit ergo si omnes inducit quamdam dubitationem; et dicit quod si isti omnes, divites scilicet, liberi, ingenui et virtuosi, sint in civitate, iterum multitudo civilis, dubitabit aliquis utrum inter istos sit altercatio de principatu aut non. Et solvit quod sic: quoniam in unaquaque politia determinatum est quis debet esse dominans; sicut in statu populari populus, in statu paucorum divites, in statu optimatum virtuosi, et sic de aliis: politiae enim differunt secundum diversitatem principatuum; et ideo erit altercatio de principatu. Dicent enim divites se debere principari, similiter virtuosi: quare altercatio erit quis debet esse principans: sed si sint omnes in civitate et eodem tempore, considerandum est in universali secundum cuius dignitatem magis et simpliciter debet distribui principatus; utrum secundum divitias vel ingenuitatem, et sic de aliis. Adhuc etiam magis considerandum est in speciali, si in civitate sint valde pauci viri virtuosi, dato quod principatus debeat distribui secundum dignitatem virtutis, considerandum est quomodo illi pauci determinari debent. Et solvit dicens quod in determinatione ista oportet considerare ad opus. Manifestum est enim quod ratio principatus ex fine sumitur. Finis vero politiae rectae est feliciter vivere; ideo ex hoc debet sumi ratio principatus; ideo tot sunt necessarii virtuosi in civitate, quot sunt necessarii ad dirigendum et regulandum civitatem ut possit feliciter vivere: iterum tot virtuosi debent principari, ut possint per prudentiam suam constituere civitatem. Sed quantam oportet esse multitudinem omnium habitantium in civitate? Dicendum quod tanta debet esse quanta potest vivere per se sufficienter, et quanta potest repellere inimicos, sicut inferius ostendetur in septimo huius.

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Deinde cum dicit est autem arguit in contrarium: et dividitur in tres.

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In prima arguit, quod secundum dignitatem divitiarum et ingenuitatis non debet fieri distributio principatus.

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Secundo, quod nec secundum dignitatem virtutis, ibi, idem autem iis accidet et cetera.

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Tertio, quod nec secundum dignitatem multitudinis, ibi, igitur si et multitudo et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod ad omnes altercantes de distributione principatus est dubitatio alia in contrarium. Primo enim illi qui dicunt quod secundum dignitatem divitiarum debent principatus distribui, similiter et illi qui dicunt quod debet fieri secundum generositatem, non verum dicunt nec iustum: si enim secundum dignitatem divitiarum distribuantur, si contingat unum ditiorem esse omnibus aliis, manifestum est, quod secundum hoc iustum quod ipsi dicunt oportebit istum principari; hoc autem est inconveniens, quia ille propter divitias, cum non habeat virtutem, iniuriabitur aliis. Erit enim elatus et superbus. Quare manifestum est quod secundum dignitatem divitiarum non debet distribui principatus: similiter accidet illis, qui altercantur propter libertatem et ingenuitatem: quia si sit unus generosior omnibus aliis, secundum istud iustum oportebit istum dominari: hoc autem est inconveniens; quia cum non habeat virtutem, sed solum inclinationem ad ipsam, potest esse quod habeat malitiam, et tunc faciet iniurias aliis: quare manifestum est quod secundum dignitatem ingenuitatis non debet fieri distributio principatus. Eodem modo potest argui de libertate.

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Deinde cum dicit idem autem ostendit quod non debeat fieri distributio secundum dignitatem virtutis: et dicit quod istud idem accidit circa politiam optimatum in qua distribuitur principatus propter dignitatem virtutis; quia si contingat unum esse meliorem secundum virtutem omnibus aliis studiosis qui sunt in civitate, ipse principabitur et dominabitur: hoc autem est inconveniens, quia sequitur quod alii erunt inhonorati; et tunc sequuntur seditiones et turbationes in civitate. Quare manifestum est quod non debet fieri distributio principatus secundum dignitatem virtutis.

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Deinde cum dicit igitur si et arguit contra altercantes de multitudine, quod secundum dignitatem multitudinis non debeat fieri distributio principatus: quia si propter causam istam multitudo debet dominari, quia ditior et melior, tunc si unus sit ditior omnibus aliis, vel plures vel pauciores, tunc manifestum est quod istum vel istos paucos magis expediret dominari quam totam multitudinem. Sed tunc sequitur, sicut prius, quod omnes alii erunt inhonorati; et ex hoc sequuntur seditiones et turbationes in civitate. Ista autem corrumpunt eam. Quare manifestum est, quod secundum dignitatem multitudinis non debet distribui principatus.

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Deinde cum dicit omnia itaque solvit dubitationem.

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Et primo ponit solutionem.

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Secundo inducit quaedam ad declarationem eius, ibi, ex quo ad quaestionem illam quam afferunt per hunc modum et cetera.

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In prima philosophus videtur colligere solutionem suam ex tactis rationibus ad utramque partem; haec enim est consuetudo philosophi, cum arguit ad aliquam dubitationem ad utramque partem; quod rationes utraeque aliquid veri concludunt; et sic ex omnibus rationibus colligit solutionem. Dicit ergo, quod omnia ista quae arguta sunt, faciunt manifestum, quod nullum istorum per se determinate sit illud, secundum cuius dignitatem debet distribui principatus nec divitiae, nec libertas, nec virtus, et sic de aliis; quia contra illos qui volunt principari propter divitias et virtutes arguet multitudo volens principari; et hoc iuste et rationabiliter; quia meliorem et ditiorem oportet principari in civitate: sed multitudinem contingit esse meliorem et ditiorem quam paucos; non quod quilibet de multitudine sit melior et ditior divisim, sed omnes insimul contingit esse meliores et ditiores. Possibile enim est in multitudine esse aliquos viros sapientes et prudentes, et aliquos valde divites; ipsos autem et alios populares bene suasibiles a ratione et obedibiles. Talem autem multitudinem melius est principari quam paucos; quia ad principandum duo requiruntur; scilicet recte regere, et potentia: sed in multitudine tali ista duo reperiuntur, quia sapientes habet et prudentes; scit et regere, quia multitudo est; et habet potentiam coercendi et repellendi inimicos; quare rationabiliter arguit multitudo contra illos, quod melius est eam principari; aggregat enim multitudo et divites et nobiles et virtuosos et populi potentiam; et ideo videtur rationabilius totam multitudinem quae aggregat omnia ista debere principari, ubi possibile erit invenire talem multitudinem: sed non multitudinem vilem et non persuasibilem; et propter hoc in electione principatus oportet ad multa inspicere non ad unum, et hoc dixit philosophus prius.

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L. 12 (Γ.13, 1283b35–1284b34)Post longam discussionem concludit excellentem probitate virum ceteris praeferendum, cum natura talis sit cui debeant omnes subesse.

Post longam discussionem concludit excellentem probitate virum ceteris praeferendum, cum natura talis sit cui debeant omnes subesse.

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320. Propter quod et ad dubitationem, qua quaerunt et praemittunt quidam, contingit hoc modo obviare. Dubitant enim quidam, utrum legislatori volenti ponere rectissimas leges sit ponendum leges ad conferens meliorum, vel ad id quod plurium: cum acciderit quod dictum est. Quod autem rectum sumendum forte.

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321. Rectum autem forte ad conferens totius civitatis et ad commune civium; civis autem communiter quidem est qui participat eo quod est principari et subici, secundum unamquamque politiam, alter. Ad optimam autem qui potest et elegit subici et principari ad vitam quae secundum virtutem.

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322. Si autem est aliquis intantum differens secundum excessum virtutis, vel plures quidem uno, non tamen possibile complementum exhiberi civitatis, ut non sit comparabilis aliorum omnium virtus, neque potentia ipsorum politica, ad eam quae illorum, sive plures sive unus, eam quae illis solam, non adhuc ponendum partem huius civitatis.

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323. Iniuriabuntur enim dignificati aequalibus, inaequales tamen existentes secundum virtutem, et secundum politicam potentiam; sicut enim Deum inter homines verisimile esse talem.

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324. Unde palam, quia et legislationem necessariam esse circa aequales et genere et potentia. De talibus autem non est lex' etenim deridendus utique erit aliquis leges statuere tentans de ipsis.

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325. Dicentur enim utique forte quae quidem Antisthenes ait, leones contendentibus lepusculis, et aequale volentibus omnes habere.

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326. Propter quod et ponunt relegationem democratizatae civitates propter talem causam. Hae enim utique persequuntur aequalitatem maxime omnium. Quare eos qui videntur excedere potentia, propter divitias, vel multos amicos, vel propter aliquam aliam politicam potentiam, relegabant, et transtulerunt extra civitatem temporibus determinatis.

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327. Fabulantur autem et Argonautas Herculem dereliquisse propter talem causam; non enim voluisse ipsum ducere Argo, id est navem cum aliis, tamquam excedentem multum nautas.

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328. Propter quod et vituperantes tyrannidem, et Periandri Thrasybulo consilium, non simpliciter existimandum recte increpare: aiunt enim Periandrum dixisse quidem nihil ad missum praeconem de consilio, sed auferentem excedentes spicarum planasse aream. Unde ignorante quidem praecone, eius quod fiebat causam, proferente autem quod contigit, intellexisse Thrasybulum, quod oportet excellentes viros perimere. Hoc enim non solum expedit tyrannis, neque solum tyranni faciunt, sed similiter habet et circa oligarchias et circa democratias. Relegatio enim eandem habet potentiam, modo quodam, scilicet prohibere excellentes et fugare.

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329. Idem autem circa civittates et gentes faciunt qui domini potentiae; velut Athenienses quidem circa Samios, et Chios, et Lesbios. Cum enim magis imperialiter haberent principatum, humiliaverunt ipsos praeter pacta. Persarum autem rex Medos, et Babylonios, et aliorum sagaces factos, quia fuerant aliquando in principatu, dispersit saepe. Problema autem universaliter est circa omnes politias etiam rectas transgressae quidem enim ad id, quod proprium, respicientes, hoc agunt non solum, sed cura commune bonum intendentes eodem habent modo.

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330. Palam autem hoc et in aliis artibus et scientiis. Neque enim pictor sinet utique aliter habere pedem excedentem commensurationem neque si differat pulchritudine: neque proram navis factor, vel aliarum partium navis, neque utique magister chri eum, qui altius et pulchrius toto choro cantat, sinet simul chorum agere. Quare propter hoc quidem nihil prohibet monarchias concordare civitatibus, si proprio principatu proficuo civitatibus existente, hoc agunt.

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331. Propter quod secundum excessus excellentias habet aliquod civile iuistum, sero qui circa regulationem.

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332. Melius quidem igitur legislatorem a principio sic instruere politiam, ut non indigeat tali medicina; secundo autem inordinatio si evenerit tentare dirigere tali aliqua directione, quod quidem non faciebant circa civitates: non enim respiciebant ad conferens propriae politiae, sed seditiose utebantur relegationibus.

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333. In transgressis quidem igitur, quid quidem singulariter expediat et iustum sit, manifestum. Forte autem et quod non simpliciter iustum, et hoc manifestum. Sed in optima politia habet multam dubitationem, non secundum aliorum bonorum excessum, puta roboris et divitiarum et multitudinis amicorum, sed siquis fuerit differens secundum virtutem, quid oporteat facere. Non enim dicet utique oportere eicere et transferre talem, at vero neque principari talem. Simile enim, et utique si Iovem principari velimus partientes principatus. Relinquitur igitur, quod etiam videtur aptum natum esse tali obedire omnes laetanter, ut reges sint tales perpetui in civitatibus.

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Postquam Philosophus declaravit, quod in distributione principatus non est inspiciendum ad unum, sed multa; inducit quaedam ad declarationem dictorum; et dividitur in duas.

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In prima praemittit dubitationem quamdam.

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Secundo declarat quiddam, cuius contrarium videtur opponi cuidam dictorum, ibi, si autem est aliquis intantum et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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In prima praemittit dubitationem.

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Secundo solvit eam, ibi, rectum autem forte ad conferens et cetera.

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In prima dicit: dictum est, quod expedit multitudinem aliquam magis principari quam paucos aliquos vel unum; et quod in distributione principatus non debet considerari ad unum solum, sed plura. Propter hoc ad dubitationem quam quaesierunt aliqui et dimiserunt insolutam, isto modo potest solvi, vel obviari ad ipsam. Dubitaverunt enim utrum legislator volens ponere rectas leges, debeat eas ponere ad conferens vel bonum totius multitudinis, vel meliorem aliquorum, vel secundum divitias, vel secundum virtutem, supposito quod sit multitudo habens sapientes et divites, et alios suasibiles et obedibiles rationi.

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Deinde cum dicit rectum autem solvit istam dubitationem. Et dicit, quod illud quod rectum est et melius, hoc est accipiendum: melius autem et magis rectum est, quod leges ferantur ad bonum totius civitatis et communitatis et civium: nam leges feruntur de conferentibus ad finem civitatis: finis vero civitatis est bonum communiter conferens; ergo leges debent ferri in ordine ad commune bonum totius civitatis et civium. Civis autem dicitur ille qui virtutem habet, per quam recte potest subiici et principari in diversis temporibus: sed alius et alius est secundum suppositum et rationem, et in diversis politiis: nam in statu multitudinis populus eligit dominari propter libertatem, in statu paucorum propter divitias: sed in optima politia ille dicitur civis qui eligit, et potest subiici et principari propter vitam virtuosam.

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Deinde cum dicit si autem declarat quiddam cuius contrarium videtur opponi cuidam dictorum prius: dictum est enim, quod magis expedit multitudinem dominari quam unum vel plures: et ideo intendit inquirere si inveniretur unus vel plures in civitate, qui excederent omnes alios in virtute, utrum expediret istum vel istos dominari: si enim expediat, non est verum quod determinatum est iam. Et circa hoc duo facit.

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Primo enim declarat, quod iste non sit civis.

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Secundo declarat qualiter se debeat habere ad civitatem et civitas ad ipsum, ibi, in transgressis quidem igitur et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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In prima proponit conclusionem suam.

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Secundo arguit ad eam, ibi, iniuriabuntur enim dignificati et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod si in aliqua civitate unus inveniatur qui excedat omnes alios in virtute, vel plures virtuosi excedentes alios, non tamen tot quot ex ipsis civitas possit compleri vel fieri, et intantum iste vel isti excedant alios, quod virtus omnium aliorum et potentia ipsa civilis non possit aequari secundum aequalitatem virtuti et potentiae illorum plurium, nec virtuti et potentiae illius unius si non sit nisi unus solus, talis iste non erit pars civitatis, nec illi plures si sint plures virtuosi.

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Deinde cum dicit iniuriabuntur enim probat quod dictum est.

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Et primo arguit quod iste vel isti non sint pars civitatis.

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Secundo respondet ad obiectionem, quam posset fieri, ibi propter quod secundum et cetera.

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Tertio corrigit quoddam dictum, ibi, melius quidem igitur et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in tres;

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quia primo probat, quod iste non sit pars civitatis per rationes politicas.

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Secundo per facta et dicta aliorum, ibi, dicentur autem utique et cetera.

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Tertio per simile, ibi, patet hoc autem in aliis et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas, secundum quod probat per duas rationes.

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Secunda, ibi, unde palam, quia et cetera.

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Prima ratio consistit in hoc: iustum simpliciter est, ut qui sunt aequales in virtute, recipiant et attingant ad principatum aequaliter: qui vero inaequales sunt, inaequaliter recipiant: sed iste vel isti excedit vel excedunt omnes alios in virtute; ergo plus debet recipere ille unus vel isti plures, quam omnes alii: sed omnes alii propter multitudinem credunt se plus debere recipere quam ille vel isti pauci: quare, si excedentes secundum virtutem et potentiam plus recipiant quam omnes alii, videbuntur iniuriari aliis; et tunc sequitur dissensio et turbatio in civitate et corrumpetur proportio civitatis: hoc autem est inconveniens: quare nec iste nec illi, si sint plures excedentes in civitate, erunt cives; et propter talem unum excedentem omnes alios in virtute, verisimile est esse quasi Deum. Circa quod intelligendum est, quod aliquis potest attingere ad virtutem perfectam et actum ipsius dupliciter: uno modo secundum statum communem humanum: alio modo ultra communem modum vel statum humanum: hoc autem fit per virtutem heroicam. Est autem virtus heroica secundum quam aliquis per virtutem moralem et intellectualem attingit ad operationem cuiuslibet virtutis supra communem modum hominum: hoc autem est aliquod esse divinum, quod fit per aliquod divinum in homine existens, quod est intellectus: sic loquitur hic philosophus; talem enim hominem, et sic excedentem omnes alios, dicit esse sicut Deum.

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Deinde cum dicit unde palam ponit secundam rationem, quae est haec: lex quae datur in civitate est necessaria omnibus aequalibus potentia et genere: et hoc patet, quia lex est de conferentibus ad finem politiae. In his autem non omnes sunt sufficientes se dirigere ex se, et ideo indigent lege dirigente eos in agibilibus; unde datur lex eis qui sunt aequales genere et potentia isto modo: quia non sunt sufficientes dirigere se in actionibus, et isti dicuntur cives: sed talibus, qui sic excedunt alios in virtute, non datur lex; ipsi enim sunt sibi lex: et hoc patet, quia lex est ordinatio quaedam secundum rationem de conferentibus ad finem politiae: isti enim ordinationem habent in seipsis, ideo sunt sibi leges. Deridendus igitur esset ille, qui vellet dare legem istis virtuosis, cum in eis non sit causa, propter quam lex fertur. Igitur isti sic excellentes, cives non erunt.

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Deinde cum dicit dicentur enim probat quod iste qui sic excedit omnes alios, non sit civis respectu aliorum; et dividitur in quinque, secundum quod probat per quinque.

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Secunda, ibi, propter quod ponunt et cetera.

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Tertia, ibi, tradunt etiam et cetera.

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Quarta, ibi, propter quod et vituperantes et cetera.

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Quinta, ibi, idem autem circa civitates et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod de isto virtuoso vel de talibus fortassis recte poterit dici quod dixit Antisthenes de leonibus: dixit enim quod lepusculis volentibus habere aequale, sive volentibus esse aequales, non est bonum habere leones cum dentibus in socios: quia leones propter potentiam eorum devorarent eos: sic in civitate non est bonum civibus volentibus esse aequales habere istum virtuosum vel plures concives, quia propter potentiam suam et virtutem opprimerent eos.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod declarat secundum. Et dicit quod manifestum est, quod isti vel iste sic excedentes alios non debent esse cives; propter hoc enim civitates populares statuerunt ostracismum, idest relegationem contra tales: huiusmodi enim civitates volunt habere aequalitatem: dominatur enim in tali republica populus propter libertatem: omnes autem aequaliter attingunt ad libertatem: et propter hoc illos, qui excedebant communiter cives vel in divitiis, vel in amicis, vel in potentia aliqua civili, relegabant a civitate, et transtulerunt aliquos extra civitatem aliquibus temporibus determinatis. Quare manifestum est secundum istos, quod non expedit sic excedentes cives esse et remanere in civitate.

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Deinde cum dicit fabulantur autem declarat hoc idem per tertium. Et dicit quod narratur, quod quidam nautae dicti Argonautae ab Argo navi, noluerunt recipere Herculem propter consimilem causam. Hercules enim multum excedebat eos virtute et potentia: timentes, ergo, quod quia excedebat eos multum, vellet dominari, dereliquerunt eum, et noluerunt quod conduceret cum eis navem suam. Quare videtur, quod iste excedens alios in virtute et potentia, non debeat remanere in civitate, ne alios opprimat.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod ponit quartum ad declarationem illius eiusdem. Et dicit, quod propter hoc, quod non expedit tales excedentes alios, remanere in civitate, sed vel relegare, vel interimere omnino, quidam volentes increpare tyrannidem, non secundum rationem vituperaverunt consilium Periandri ad Thrasybulum: misso enim nuncio a Thrasybulo ad Periandrum, quid faciendum sibi esset contra potentes et divites et universaliter excellentes turbantes civitatis dominium; dicunt enim, quod nolens manifestare intentum suum Periander expresse nuncio misso, sub parabola dixit ei quid faciendum erat, dicens quod auferens excedentes spicas aequabat segetes: cum autem nuncius ignoraret causam eius quod fiebat, et nunciaret quod ei dictum erat Thrasybulo, statim intellexit Thrasybulus, quod oportebat viros excellentes in virtute et potentia politica interficere. Et dico quod non rationabiliter increpuerunt consilium huiusmodi, quia istud non solum expedit tyrannis, nec solum hoc ipsi faciunt, immo consimiliter fiebat in politia paucorum et populari; in illis enim ordinata fuit relegatio ad prohibendum ne aliquis fieret ita excellens; et si contingeret esse aliquem talem, quod relegaretur a civitate. Sic igitur manifestum est ex hoc, quod tales viri non debent remanere in civitate.

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Deinde cum dicit idem autem ponit quintum ad declarationem illius eiusdem. Et dicit quod idem in quibusdam civitatibus fecerunt aliqui habentes dominium et potentiam super illas, sicut Athenienses subiugantes sibi Samios et Chios et Lesbios quibusdam pactis intervenientibus, cum illos Athenienses excederent, et principarentur, magis quantum ad aliqua humiliaverunt eos, opprimendo eos praetermissis pactis praehabitis: eodem modo fecit rex Persarum cum subiugasset sibi Medos et Babylonicos, prudentiores et magis sagaces inter ipsos dispersit saepe: videns enim quod isti prudentes et sagaces erant, quia fuerant in principatu, et civiliter vixerant, timens quod si simul manerent, per sapientiam possent invenire vias per quas discuterent se a iugo illius, dispersit eos, et sic isti excellentes propter eorum sapientiam translati sunt ad alias regiones. Sic igitur huiusmodi problema universaliter est circa omnes politias; quod scilicet illi qui excedunt alios in potentia et virtute, cives non sunt. Istud autem in transgressis politiis observatur, nam principantes in illis intendentes bonum proprium, illos qui excedunt alios in potentia vel virtute, relegant a civitate; et non solum intendentes bonum proprium, sed commune hoc faciunt.

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Deinde cum dicit palam autem declarat idem per simile in artibus. Et dicit, talem qui excedit alios, non debere esse civem nec manere in civitate, manifestum est per simile in aliis artibus: videmus enim quod pictor si pingat imaginem, non pinget pedem excedentem alias partes secundum proportionem, dato etiam quod sit pulchrior aliis; quinimmo si pinxerit, delet et pinget pedem minorem magis proportionatum; similiter ille qui facit navem non facit proram, partem scilicet anteriorem navis, maiorem aliis praeter proportionem, dato quod illa pars sit optime facta; et si fecerit abiicit et facit minorem: similiter magister chori, si unus cantat altius omnibus aliis praeter proportionem, dato quod pulchrius et delectabilius cantet, non permittet eum cantare cum aliis: quare similiter legislator si sit aliquis in civitate excellentior omnibus aliis in virtute et potentia, quamvis secundum se sit bonus, quia tamen improportionalis est aliis, ipsum debet relegare a civitate.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod respondet cuidam obiectioni, quae posset fieri. Aliquis enim posset dicere, quod si ille qui excedit alios omnes in civitate, deberet expelli propter excessum, cum monarcha in aliqua monarchia excellat omnes alios, talis deberet expelli et non principari. Solvit dicens, quod quamvis monarcha excellat alios in potestate, tamen nihil prohibet ipsum concordare cum aliis si principetur propter bonum commune: tunc enim concordabit cum aliis: si autem monarcha non principaretur propter bonum commune, tunc ibi laborandum esset ad expulsionem eius.

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Deinde cum dicit melius quidem docet corrigere quoddam dictum prius: dictum est enim et declaratum, quod excellentes omnes alios debeant a civitate relegari, et hoc durum valde: ideo volens hoc corrigere dicit philosophus, quod sermo de relegatione facienda eius qui excedit omnes alios in potentia vel virtute aliquod iustum habet, sed non simpliciter iustum: ideo melius fuit a principio sic ordinare politiam, quod non esset necessarium uti ipsa relegatione, quia relegatio ista periculosa est, quia non relegantur nisi potentes, isti autem nocere possunt civitati. Et ideo melius fuisset sic ordinasse civitatem, ut non oporteret uti ea; ita, quod a principio fuisset ordinatum, quod non liceret alicui excedere determinatum gradum divitiarum, nec excedere alios secundum quemcumque gradum, nec recipere excedentes sed aequales; et si contingeret aliquem excedere, corrigeretur et dirigeretur aliqualiter; secundo loco, idest si secundario defecerit, corrigeretur tali relegatione; tunc enim esset utendum relegatione. Sic autem non fiebat in quibusdam civitatibus; quia relegantes huiusmodi excedentes non respiciebant ad bonum commune politiae, sed propter commodum proprium, et malitiose et seditiose, et propter malam affectionem, quam habebant ad illos.

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Deinde cum dicit in transgressis declarat qualiter iste, qui excedit omnes alios in civitate, se debeat habere in civitate, et civitas ad ipsum: et dicit, quod in politiis non recte ordinatis sed transgressis tantum expedit talem sic excedentem relegare a civitate, et iustum sit non simpliciter, sed secundum quid est iustum, sicut in populari statu: in ipso enim intenditur aequalitas civium; et ideo contra finem illius politiae est talis excessus, propter quod iustum est in ea taliter relegari. Iterum in statu paucorum non expedit talem esse civem, quia per suam potentiam converteret politiam illam ad voluntatem suam; nec in tyrannide expedit talem esse; quia talis nimis tyrannizare vellet: quare manifestum est, quod in transgressis iustum est talem relegare; non simpliciter iustum, sed secundum quid, quia in istis politiis non est iustum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, ut dictum est prius. Sed in optima politia magna dubitatio est, qualiter se habendum sit circa talem. Non est autem dubitatio de illo qui excedit omnes alios vel in fortitudine corporali, vel in divitiis, vel in multitudine amicorum: sed de illo, qui excellat omnes alios in virtute sive in bonis secundum animam, quid oportet facere de isto: non enim dicendum est, quod debeat expelli a civitate, et transferri ad alium locum: hoc enim est contra rationem, ex quo est optimus; quare nullo modo est repellendus. Iterum non est assumendus ad principatum sicut alii, ut quandoque principetur, quandoque non. Simile enim esset ac si vellemus principari Iovem aliquando et aliquando non, hoc enim derisorium est. Et ideo relinquitur, quod cum talis sit optimus, quod dignum et iustum est quod omnes sibi laetanter obediant, et ut sit rex; vel si sint tales plures, quod sint reges, et principantes, non aliquando sic aliquando non, sed semper. Sed est considerandum, quod philosophus videtur sibi contrariari: dixit enim prius, quod melius est multitudinem aliquam principari quam paucos: dixit etiam, quod si unus principaretur, alii essent inhonorati, quod est inconveniens: in ista parte dicit, quod iste qui sic excedit omnes alios non est civis; sed ille qui non est civis non debet principari: quare iste non debet principari: cuius contrarium dicit hic. Ad hoc dicendum, quod si unus inveniatur, qui excedat omnes alios in virtute, iste debet principari. Et ratio huius est, quia illum oportet magis principari qui accedit magis ad principatum naturalem, et ad principatum universi: sed iste qui sic excedit omnes alios in virtute est huiusmodi: ergo expedit ipsum solum principari. Maior propositio apparet in animali: pars enim quae principatur cor est, cor autem unum est et principale, a quo derivatur virtus ad singulas partes corporis. Iterum in universo est unus princeps: principatus autem universi unus et optimus est: quare ille in civitate qui magis unus et melior est accedit magis ad similitudinem principatus universi et naturalis: ergo ille principatus erit melior, in quo erit unus princeps; et illum magis expedit principari, qui unus existens optimus est: talis est ille, qui excedit omnes alios in virtute: ergo manifestum est, quod istum expedit magis principari quam alium. Nec valet, quod primo obiicitur, quod superius dixit, quod magis expedit multitudinem dominari: quia illud intelligendum est ubi est politia aequalium et similium, et virtus unius non excedat virtutem omnium aliorum, quod in proposito non contingit. Nec valet quod secundo obiiciebatur, si unus vel plures principarentur, quod omnes alii essent inhonorati; quia in politia recte ordinata quilibet diligit statum et gradum proprium et gradum alterius, et ideo vult honorem sibi secundum gradum suum, et vult alii honorem secundum gradum illius, nec vult sibi honorem alterius. Et ideo si sit unus excellens omnes in virtute, omnes volunt sibi honorem qui debetur ei; et ideo non sunt inhonorati, quia quilibet habet honorem qui debetur ei. Nec valet quod obiiciebatur tertio de hoc quod dicit, quod iste non est civis: verum enim est, quia sicut ille, qui principatur propter excellentiam virtutis, non est civis, sed supra civem, eodem enim modo est aliquis civis, sicut se habet ad legem: sed cum assumitur, quod non debet dominari nisi civis, non habet veritatem in politia regali et optima simpliciter, qualis est illa, in qua dominatur qui dictus est.

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L. 13 (Γ.14–15, 1284b35–1286a7)Quinque regum species proponit et de qua disputaturus sit eligit.

Quinque regum species proponit et de qua disputaturus sit eligit.

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334. Forte autem bene habet post determinatas rationes transire, et considerare de regno hoc. dicimus enim rectarum politiarum unam esse hanc. Considerandum autem, utrum expediat bene habente habitari civitati et regioni, rege regi, aut non: sed alia aliqua politia magis: vel aliquibus quidem expedit, aliquibus autem non expedit. Oportet itaque primo dividere, utrum unum aliquod genus est ipsius, vel plures habet differentias.

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335. Facile itaque hoc addiscere, quod plura genera continet et principatus modus est non unus omnium. Qui enim in Laconica politia, videtur quidem esse regnum maxime eorum quae secundum legem: non est autem dominans omnium, sed quando exierit regionem, dux est eorum, quae ad bellum. Adhuc autem, quae ad Deos, attributa sunt regibus. Hoc quidem igitur regnum velut ducatus quidam exercitus imperialis et perpetuus est. Occidendi enim non dominus, nisi in aliquo regno, quaemadmodum sub antiquis; in bellicis exercitibus promptus potens lege.

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336. Significat autem Homerus. Agamemnon enim male quidem audiens deprimebatur in congregationibus: egressis autem et interficiendi dominus erat: dicit enim: quem ego videro fugientem e praelio, non sufficiens erit sibi fugere canes vel vultures, apud me enim est mors. Una quidem igitur species huius regni ducatus exercitus per vitam. Horum autem ii quidem secundum genus sunt, ii autem eligibiles.

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337. Praeter hanc autem alia monarchiae species, qualia erant regna apud quosdam Barbarorum.

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338. Habent autem haec omnia potentiam similem tyrannis, sunt tamen secundum legem et paterna. Quia enim magis serviles moribus sunt natura barbari quidem graecis. Qui autem circa Asiam iis qui circa Europam sufferunt despoticum principatum nihil contristati: tyranni quidem igitur propter tale sunt.

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339. Secura autem, quia patria, et secundum legem sunt. Et custodia autem regalis et noon tyrannica propter talem causam. Cives enim custodiunt armis reges, tyrannos autem extranei: ii quidem enim secundum legem et voluntariis, ii autem invountariis principantur. Quare ii quidem et civibus ii autem super cives habent custodiam. Duae quidem igitur species hae monarchiae.

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340. Altera autem, quae quidem erat in antiquis Graecis quos vocant Esymnetas. Est autem haec, ut simpliciter est dicere, electa tyrannis. Differens autem a barbarica, non eo quod non secundum legem, sed eo quod non patria sit solum: principabantur autem ii quidem per vitam principatu hoc, ii autem utique ad quaedam determinata tempora vel actiones.

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341. Qualem elegerunt quandoque Mytilenaei Pittacum adversus profugas, quibus praeerant Antimenides et Alcaeus poeta. Significat autem Alcaeus quod elegerunt Pittacum tyrannum in quodam scoliorum versuum: increpat enim, quis malum patriae Pittacum praefecerunt civitati sine felle et gravis felicitatis tyrannum quidem laudantes simul collecti. Hae quidem sunt et erant; quia enim tyrannicae erant, despoticae, quia autem electae et voluntariorum, regales.

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342. Quarta autem species monarchiae regalis, quae secundum Heroica tempora, voluntariae et patriae factae secundum legem, quia primi fuerunt benefactores multitudinis secundum artes aut bellum, aut quia collegerunt aut emerunt regionem, facti fuerunt reges voluntariorum, et successive sumentibus patrii.

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343. Domini autem erant praesulatus secundum bellum et substantiarum quaecumque non sacerdotales, et cum iis sententias iudicabant. Hoc autem faciebant ii quidem non iurantes, ii autem iurantes. Iuramentum autem erat sceptri elevatio.

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344. Qui quidem igitur in antiquis temporibus et super ea quae penes civitatem, et quae popularia, et quae circa confinia, continue principabantur. Posterius autem hoc quidem permittentibus ipsis regibus, hoc autem turbis occupantibus, in aliis quidem civitatibus patriae substantiae remanserunt regibus solum; ubi autem dignum est dicere regnum in confiniis bellicorum, ducatum solum habebant.

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345. Regni quidem species hae quatuor numero; una quidem quae circa Heroica tempora; haec autem erat voluntariorum quidem, in quibusdam autem determinatis; dux enim exercitus et iudex, erat rex, et eorum quae ad deos dominus. Secunda autem quae barbarica; haec autem ex genere principatus despoticus secundum legem. Tertia autem quam Aesymneticam appellant; haec autem est electa tyrannis. Quarta autem quae Laconica horum: haec autem est (ut simpliciter est dicere) ducatus exercitus secundum genus perpetuus. Hae quidem igitur hoc modo differunt ab invicem.

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346. Quinta autem species regni quando fuerit omnium dominus existens, sicut unaquaeque gens et civitas unaquaeque communium, ordinata secundum oeconomiam: sicut enim oeconomia regnum quoddam domus est, ita regnum civitatis et gentis unius vel plurium oeconomia.

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347. Fere itaque duae sunt (ut est dicere), species regni, de quibus considerandum; haec, et quod est Laconica. Aliarum enim multae intermediae harum sunt; pauciorum quidem enim domini quam regnum, plurium autem sunt quam Laconicus. Quare consideratio fere de duobus est: unum quidem, utrum expediat civitatibus ducem exercitus perpetuum esse, et hunc, vel secundum genus, vel secundum partem; aut non expedit. Unum autem, utrum quidem unum non expedit dominum esse omnium, vel non expedit.

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348. De tali quidem igitur ducatu exercitus considerare, habet magis legum speciem, quam politiae. In omnibus enim politiis contingit hoc fieri. Quare dimittatur primum. Reliquus autem modus regni politiae species est: quare de hac oportet considerare, et dubitationes quae insunt transcurrere.

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Postquam distinxit Philosophus politias secundum distinctiones principatuum, hic prosequitur de unaquaque ipsarum: et habet partes duas.

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Primo enim determinat de unaquaque ipsarum.

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Secundo ostendit ex quibus corrumpuntur et salvantur, in principio quinti libri, ibi, de aliis quidem et cetera.

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Prima dividitur in duas.

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In prima determinat de optima politia, scilicet de regno.

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In secunda determinat de aliis, in principio quarti libri, ibi, in omnibus artibus et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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In prima praemittit intentum suum.

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Secundo prosequitur, ibi, facile itaque et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod post praedictas inquisitiones de politiis forte bene se habet transire ad considerationem de regno: et ratio huius est, quia inter politias rectas regnum est optima et rectissima politiarum; et ideo regula et mensura aliarum: optimum enim perfectissimum est in unoquoque genere, et mensura est omnium aliorum: propter quod primo dicendum est de regno. Est autem considerandum de regno, utrum civitati et regioni quae debet in viris. Primo autem videndum est, utrum sunt monarchiae regalis plures modi et differentiae, aut unus modus solum.

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Deinde cum dicit facile itaque prosequitur intentum suum; et habet partes duas.

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Primo distinguit modos monarchiae regalis.

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Secundo prosequitur de principali modo, ibi, principium autem et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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Primo ponit diversos modos huius monarchiae.

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Secundo reducit istos ad duos modos, ibi, fere itaque duae et cetera.

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Prima adhuc in duas.

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Primo, ponit quatuor modos.

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Secundo recolligendo illos addit quintum qui est principalis, ibi, regni quidem et cetera.

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Prima in quatuor, secundum quod ponit quatuor modos.

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Secunda ibi, praeter hanc autem et cetera.

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Tertia ibi, altera autem et cetera.

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Quarta ibi, quarta autem species et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas:

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in prima ponit primum modum,

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in secunda declarat quoddam dictum per dictum Homeri, ibi, significat autem Homerus et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod parum considerantibus in politia regali, facile potest apparere quod principatus regalis plura et diversa genera continet; et istiusmodi principatus non est unus modus, sed plures. Est autem unus modus ipsius qui fuit in Laconica regione: in isto enim regno et rex principabatur secundum legem, et non erat dominus omnium, quia non ferebat sententias, nec puniebat secundum suam voluntatem; tamen quando exibat regionem ad praeliandum, tunc principabatur quantum ad omnia, quae pertinebant ad praelium: iterum dominus erat omnium eorum quae pertinebant ad cultum divinum. Istud autem regnum erat sicut quidam ducatus exercitus imperialis; quia iste rex universale imperium habebat quantum ad ea quae sunt exercitus. Iterum istud regnum perpetuum erat, ita quod rex non quandoque regnabat, quandoque non, sed non erat dominus omnium in civitate, quia non iudicabat homicidam; non enim erat dominus ad puniendum homicidium, nisi quando exibat ad praelia: poterat enim tunc dare leges et punire universaliter.

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Deinde cum dicit significat autem declarat quod dictum est per dictum Homeri. Dixit enim quod in isto regno princeps est dominus omnium: et dicit quod hoc significavit Homerus dicens quod Agamemnon cum esset in civitate et veniret ad congregationem civium, multoties opprimebatur quod non esset dominus omnium; cum autem regrederetur ad praelium, dominus erat in omnibus et interficiendi et dandi legem, quantum ad ea quae erant exercitus: dicebat enim: quem videro fugientem ex praelio, taliter tractabo ipsum quod non poterit fugere canes nec aves: apud me enim est mors, idest in potestate mea est interficere. Est ergo una species monarchiae regalis quae ducatus exercitus est, qui principatus durat per totam vitam hominis. Istorum autem qui principantur in isto regno, quidam regnant per successionem generis, quidam autem ex electione quia ad hoc eliguntur.

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Deinde cum dicit praeter hanc ponit secundam speciem huius monarchiae; et dividitur in duas.

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In prima ponit speciem illam.

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In secunda declarat qualis est.

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Secunda ibi, habent autem haec et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod praeter speciem monarchiae, de qua dictum est, est alia species secundum quam aliqui regnant apud barbaros. Dicuntur autem barbari qui deficiunt a ratione: barbari enim quasi extranei dicuntur. Et quia homo utitur ratione, quicumque deficiunt a ratione barbari dicuntur, sicut apparuit in primo.

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Deinde cum dicit habent autem ostendit qualis est:

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et primo quod est voluntaria.

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Secundo quod est secura, ibi, secura autem, quia et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod huiusmodi regna secundum quae principantur aliqui barbari, sunt sicut tyrannides monarchiae; et qui principantur in istis, principantur secundum legem et secundum leges patrias. Dicuntur autem leges patriae consuetudines, quae descendunt a parentibus in filios: isti autem secundum tales leges principantur. Et quia barbari naturaliter sunt magis serviles quam Graeci, et hi qui sunt circa Asiam sunt magis serviles quam qui circa Europam, quia Europa est media inter Africam et Asiam, et sicut media est secundum locum, sic homines medio modo se habent in aliis dispositionibus; et ideo isti barbari sustinent principatum dominativum sine tristitia, quia inclinationem habent ad sustinendum ipsum. Quod autem est secundum inclinationem, naturale est et voluntarium. Quare manifestum est, quod tales voluntarie sustinent talem principatum dominantium qui est domini ad servum. Quare manifestum est quod principantes in tali regno, propter hoc assimilantur tyrannidi.

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Deinde cum dicit secura autem ostendit quod est secura; et dicit quod huiusmodi monarchiae species secura est. Et ratio huius est, quia principatus in tali regno principatur et secundum genus, et secundum leges patrias, idest consuetudines quae descendunt a parentibus. Et quia secundum genus dominatur voluntate; regnante enim patre aliquo modo assuescunt subditi filio; et ideo postmodum regnante filio voluntarie subiiciuntur, quia consueti sunt. Iterum principatur secundum consuetudinem et secundum leges; quae autem insunt secundum consuetudinem delectabilia sunt; et ideo minus odiunt eos. Et quod sit secura, signum est, quia isti barbari custodiunt regem suum, quia diligunt eum et libenter subiiciuntur ei. Tyrannum autem custodiunt alieni et cives reges suos custodiunt cum armis, quia secundum legem, et voluntarie subiiciuntur eis: tyranni autem principantur subditis involuntariis, et propter hoc tyranni super cives habent custodiam, diffidunt enim de subditis. Sic igitur apparet quod hae sunt duae species monarchiae regalis.

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Deinde cum dicit altera autem ponit tertiam speciem;

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et primo ponit eam.

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Secundo declarat quoddam dictum per exemplum, ibi, qualem elegerunt quandoque et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod alia est species monarchiae regalis, quae erat apud antiquos Graecos qui dicebantur aesymnetae. Est autem huiusmodi monarchia, ut simpliciter est dicere, tyrannis secundum electionem: et dicit ut simpliciter dicamus quia tyrannis quae eligitur, simpliciter non est tyrannis. Differt autem ista a barbarica tyrannide de qua dictum est, non eo quod in ista, quae est secundum electionem, non principetur princeps secundum legem, in illa autem principetur: sed in hoc solum differunt quod ista non est patria, idest princeps non principatur secundum successionem generis; vel non est sic assueta, sicut sunt ea quae sunt patria, sed per electionem. In isto vero principatu quidam principantur per totam vitam suam, et eliguntur ad vitam suam, alii principantur usque ad aliqua tempora determinata, quia sic eliguntur; alii principantur quantum ad aliquas actiones.

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Deinde cum dicit qualem elegerunt declarat quod dictum est, per exemplum. Dictum est enim quod in isto principatu, principatur tyrannus per electionem, qualis fuit ille quem elegerunt quidam dicti Mytilenaei: cum enim quidam essent profugi a civitate illorum, elegerunt quemdam Pittacum nomine contra profugos illos, ut fugaret illos atque extirparet; tunc autem principabantur istis Mytilenaeis duo, quorum unus erat Antimenides, alius Alcaeus poeta. Dixit autem iste Alcaeus hoc in quodam loco suorum carminum; dixit inquam quod isti elegerunt sibi Pittacum tyrannum; et increpabat eos quod malum patriae praefecerunt. Iterum praefecerunt civitati hominem sine felle. Fel autem dicitur commovere ad iram, ira autem valet ad fortitudinem virtutis: unde dicitur tertio Ethicorum: virtutem immitte furori et virtutem erige furore. Volebat igitur dicere quod cum deberet esse fortis contra inimicos civitatis non movebatur; erat enim timidus nec potens eos opprimere. Iterum, quia elegerunt hominem gravis felicitatis, quia felicitatem suam ponit in voluptatibus, et gravabat subditos, ut posset exercere voluptates suas. Iterum increpabat eos, qui cum convenissent et fuissent congregati, approbaverunt eum eligentes. Istae autem monarchiae erant regales et tyrannicae. Tyrannicae quidem, quia principantes in eis principabantur principatu dominativo. Et quia principabantur voluntarie et per electionem, erant regales.

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Deinde cum dicit quarta autem ponit quartam speciem: et dividitur in tres.

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In prima ponit illam speciem.

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Secundo ostendit quorum erant domini principantes in isto regno, ibi, domini autem et cetera.

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Tertio ostendit quomodo huiusmodi monarchia augmentata fuit, ibi, qui quidem igitur in antiquis et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod quarta species monarchiae regalis, est secundum quod aliqui principantur aliquibus secundum virtutem heroicam. Et principantes dicebantur heroes, idest attingentes ad virtutem perfectam et actum eius ultra communem statum hominum; et fuit ista temporibus eiusmodi heroum. Isti autem voluntarie principabantur secundum legem. Primi autem principantes isto principatu assumpti fuerunt ad istum principatum, propter beneficium quod contulerant multitudini, aut quia invenerunt artem aliquam utilem regioni, sicut Saturnus in Italia primus docuit artem seminandi triticum, propter quod reputatus fuit Deus apud ipsos; aut quia primo praeliati fuerunt contra inimicos multitudinis; aut quia primo congregaverunt homines regionis inducentes eos ad vitam civilem; aut quia emerunt regionem: et ideo facti fuerunt reges propter huiusmodi beneficia, et hoc volentibus subditis voluntarie eos assuescentibus, principantes secundum successionem generis: et erant quasi principantes patrie, idest principantes secundum leges descendentes a parentibus in ipsos.

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Deinde cum dicit domini autem ostendit quorum erant domini: et dicit quod isti domini erant omnium quae pertinebant ad bellum: iterum omnium possessionum et substantiarum quae non erant sacerdotales, sive pertinentes ad cultum divinum, sicut erant possessiones sacerdotum; et cum hoc ferebant sententias et iudicabant. Ista autem faciebant ita quod quidam eorum non iurabant quod fideliter huiusmodi exercerent, quidam autem iurabant. Iuramentum autem ipsorum erat elevatio sceptri, scilicet baculi regalis.

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Deinde cum dicit qui quidem declarat quomodo huiusmodi monarchia augmentata fuit; et dicit quod in temporibus antiquis primo principati fuerunt in aliqua civitate, et in eis quae circa civitatem, sicut sunt castra; deinde gentibus; deinde principati fuerunt civitatibus circumvicinis: post haec autem regibus permittentibus et indulgentibus, vel multitudine civili cogente vel usurpante, substantiae paternae regum remanserunt in civitatibus principantibus, ipsis regibus habentibus ducatum vel dominium circa exteriora et in remotis a civitate, ubi exempta civitate principali et immuni facta a tributo regali, rex quasi in exterioribus principabatur.

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Deinde cum dicit regni quidem recolligit istos modos et addit quintum;

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et primo recolligit istos quatuor.

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Secundo addit etiam quintum, ibi, quinta autem species et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod monarchiae regalis sunt quatuor species numero.

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Una species in qua principabantur aliqui secundum virtutem heroicam, secundum aliqua tempora. In ista vero monarchia principabatur princeps volentibus subditis. Erat autem dominus in quibusdam determinatis, non in omnibus. Rex enim erat dux exercitus et ferebat sententias et eorum quae pertinebant ad cultum divinum dominus erat, sicut electionis sacerdotis, punitionis et talium, sed non possessionum.

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Secunda species est, secundum quam aliqui principabantur barbaris; et in isto principatu principabatur rex secundum successionem generis et secundum legem, et est principatus dominativus.

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Tertia species est quae dicitur aesymnetica et dicitur ista monarchia tyrannis secundum electionem.

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Quarta species est Laconica, in qua princeps dominabatur secundum legem. Huiusmodi monarchia dicebatur ducatus exercitus ad praelium, ut simpliciter est dicere: quod dicit, quia non omnium dominus erat, sed eorum quae pertinebant ad praelium: iste autem ducatus erat secundum successionem generis et perpetuus. Istae igitur species isto modo ad invicem differunt.

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Deinde cum dicit quinta autem addit quintam speciem; et dicit quod quinta species monarchiae regalis est, in qua dominus est omnium principans: sic namque gens et civitas ordinata sunt secundum quod gubernatio domus ordinatur. In gubernatione enim domus, unus principatur ad utilitatem subditorum et dominus est omnium qui sunt in domo: ita etiam est in regno unus qui principatur ad utilitatem subditorum: et ideo sicut gubernatio patris familias est quaedam regia potestas, ita regia potestas est quaedam domestica gubernatio civitatis et gentis; sive sit una civitas et una gens, sive plures civitates et gentes.

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Deinde cum dicit fere itaque reducit istos modos ad pauciores; scilicet ad duos.

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Et primo facit hoc.

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Secundo ostendit de quo istorum dicendum est nunc, ibi, de tali quidem igitur et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod fere duae sunt considerandae species monarchiae regalis ad quas aliae aliquo modo reducantur. Et dicit fere, quia distinguendo eas per proprias rationes plures sunt; sed considerando eas inquantum reducuntur ad duas, duae sunt. Una est Laconica, in qua principatur aliquis secundum legem. Alia est regnum. Laconica autem differt a regno, quia in Laconica rex principatur secundum legem, iterum non est dominus omnium. Sed in regno principatur secundum virtutem et est dominus omnium. Aliae autem sunt mediae inter istas vel privationes ipsarum: quia in aliquibus principantes plurium sunt domini quam in Laconica monarchia, sed pauciorum quam in regno; sicut monarchia in qua principatur aliquis secundum virtutem heroicam; et etiam illa est quae dicitur electa tyrannis. Manifestum igitur ex istis quod de duobus restat considerare. Primo quidem de ducatu exercitus, utrum magis expediat esse ducem exercitus et perpetuum vel non; et utrum magis expediat quod iste assumatur, vel per generis successionem. De regno etiam restat considerare, utrum expediat unum esse principem omnium; vel non expediat esse unum, sed plures magis.

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Deinde cum dicit de tali quidem ostendit de quo istorum est dicendum. Et dicit quod de ducatu exercitus considerare pertinet ad legislatorem magis quam ad politicum. In omnibus enim politiis fit ducatus exercitus; et ideo considerare de ipso dimittatur ad praesens. Sed monarchia regalis species est politiae, propter hoc de ista considerandum et transcurrendae sunt dubitationes quae possunt circa ipsam accidere.

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L. 14 (Γ.15, 1286a7–1286b40)Utrum a legibus an ab optimo rege melius sit civitatem gubernari; et de eius successione et custodia.Utrum a legibus an ab optimo rege melius sit civitatem gubernari; et de eius successione et custodia.

349. Principium autem inquisitionis est hoc, utrum expedit magis ab optimo viro regi, vel ab optimis legibus.

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350. Videtur itaque putantibus expedire a rege regi, universale solum leges dicere, sed non ordinare ad ea quae eveniunt: quare in quacumque arte principari secundum litteras miserum. Et quidem in Aegypto, post tertium diem movere licet medicis; si autem prius in suo periculo. Manifestum igitur, quod non est, quae secundum litteras et leges, optima politia propter eandem causam.

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351. At vero, et illum sermonem universalem oportet existere principibus, valentius autem cui non adest quod passionale omnino, quam cui connaturale. Lege quidem igitur hoc non inest, humanam autem animam necesse hoc habere omnem.

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352. Sed forte dicet utique aliquis, ut contra hoc consiliabitur de singularibus elius.

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353. Quod quidem igitur necesse ipsum esse legislatorem, palam, et ponere leges, sed non dominos qua transgrediuntur, quoniam de aliis oportet esse dominos: quaecumque vero non possibile legem iudicare, vel omnino, vel bene, utrum unum oportet optimum principari, vel omnes.

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354. Etenim nunc convenientes disceptant et consiliantur, et iudicant: haec autem sunt iudicia omnia de singularibus. Secundum unum quidem igitur comparatus quicumque forte deterior; sed est civitas ex multis, sicut convivatio comportata pulchrior una et simplici: propter hoc et iudicat melius turba multa quam unus quicumque.

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355. Adhuc magis indifferens quod multum; quaemadmodum aqua amplior, sic et multitudo paucis magis indifferens. Uno autem ab ira obtento, vel ab alia aliqua passione tali, necessarium corrumpi iudicium. Ibi autem habent difficile simul omnes impetu ferri et peccare. Sit autem multitudo qui liberi nihil praeter legem agentes, nisi de quibus necessarium deficere ipsam.

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356. Si autem non hoc facile in multis, sed si plures sint boni viri, et cives, utrum unus magis incorruptibilis princeps, vel magis plures quidem numero, boni autem viri?

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357. An palam quod plures? sed ii quidem divisiones facient, unus autem sine seditione. Sed ad hoc contraponendum forte quod studiosi secundum animam sicut et ille unus.

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358. Si itaque plurium principatum, bonorum autem virorum omnium, aristocratiam ponendum, eum autem qui unius, regnum, eligibilior utique erit civitatibus aristocratia, quam regnum, et cum potentia, et sine potentia existente principatus, si sit accipere plures similiter.

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359. Et propter hoc forte rege regebantur prius, qua rarum erat invenire viros multos differentes secundum virtutem. Alterum et tunc parvas habitabant civitates. Adhuc autem a beneficio instituebant reges, quod quidem est opus bonorum virorum.

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360. Quando autem evenit fieri multos similes ad virtutem, non adhuc sufferebant, sed quaerebant commune aliiquid, et politiam instituerunt.

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361. Quando autem deteriores facti, opulenti facti sunt, a communibus hinc rationabile factas esse oligarchias, honorabiles enim fecerunt divitias.

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362. Ex iis autem primo in tyrannides transmutabantur.

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363. Ex tyrannidibus autem in democratiam: semper enim ad pauciores ducentes propter turpe lucrum fortiorem ipsam multitudinem fecerunt, ut insurgerent, et fierent democratiae quoniam autem, et maiores accidit esse civitates, forte neque facile iam fieri politiam aliam praeter democratiam.

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364. Si vero aliquis ponat optimum civitatibus a rege regi, quomodo se habebunt quae de natis? utrum et genus oportet regnare? sed genitorum quales quidem contingunt, nocivum. Sed non tradet dominus existens natis. Sed non facile adhuc hoc credere. Difficile enim, et maioris virtutis, quam secundum humanam naturam.

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365. Habet autem dubitationem et de potentia, utrum oportet habere regnaturum robur aliquod circa ipsum quo possit cogere non volentes obedire, aut qualiter contingit principatum dispensare. Si enim secundum legem sit dominus nihil agens secundum suam voluntatem praeter legem, tamen necessarium existere ipsi potentiam quae custodiat leges.

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366. Forte quidem igitur quae circa regem talem non difficile determinare. Oportet enim ipsum quidem habere potentiam: esse autem tantam potentiam, ut sit ea quae singulorum, et unius, et simul plurium maior; ea autem quae multitudinis minor. Quemadmodum antiqui custodias dederunt, quando praefecerunt civitati quendam, quem vocabant aesymnetem vel tyrannum; et Dionysio, quando petebat custodias, consuluit quidam Syracusanis dare tot custodias.

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Postquam Philosophus distinxit monarchiam regalem et posuit quinque modos ipsius, prosequitur de primo modo et principaliter dicto, scilicet de regno.

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Et primo prosequitur quasdam dubitationes ex quibus apparet natura regni.

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Secundo ostendit quod eadem est virtus regis optimi et optimi viri, in fine huius tertii, ibi, de rege et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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Primo inquirit, utrum magis expediat civitatem regi ab optimis legibus vel ab optimis hominibus.

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Secundo utrum ab uno optimo viro vel pluribus, ibi, quoniam autem tres et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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Primo inquirit an melius sit civitatem regi ab optimis legibus an ab optimis viris.

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Secundo movet alias dubitationes, ibi, si vero aliquis et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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Primo praemittit dubitationem.

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Secundo prosequitur, ibi, videtur itaque putantibus et cetera.

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In prima igitur dicit quod primo inquirendum est de regno, utrum magis expediat civitatem regi ab optimo viro, an ab optimis legibus.

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Deinde cum dicit videtur itaque prosequitur.

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Et primo arguit quod melius est regnum regi ab optimo viro.

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Secundo arguit in contrarium, ibi, at qui et cetera.

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Quod melius sit regnum regi ab optimo viro quam ab optimis legibus, ostendit ratione et exemplo: et dicit quod quidam opinantur quod civitati expedit magis regi ab optimo viro; quia ab eo melius est civitatem regi, qui potest terminare casus omnes emergentes: sed hoc non potest lex, quia lex non dicit nisi universale, nihil autem de particulari. Particularia autem infinita sunt et non possunt apprehendi. Iterum lex non ordinat quod dicit ad ea quae de novo emergunt; sed hoc potest facere optimus vir per prudentiam suam: habet enim rectum iudicium de agibilibus et appetitum rectum per virtutem moralem. Et tunc interponit exemplum antequam concludat conclusionem: et dicit quod sic videmus in artibus aliis, quod non est semper bonum agere secundum artem scriptam; quia aliqua sunt scripta secundum quae si ageretur esset nocumentum alicui, sicut apparet in medicina. Non enim medicus in omnibus considerat ea quae scripta sunt in medicina, quia multa sunt dimissa prudentiae medici: sicut apud Aegyptios scriptum fuit, quod medicis post tertium diem liceret movere, hoc est agere per medicinam ad expulsionem morbi, quia ante tertium diem non poterat bene videri natura morbi, et si moveret ante tertium diem in periculo suo erat: hoc autem observare in omnibus non erat bonum: in aliquibus enim citius, in aliquibus tardius, hoc expedit secundum diversitatem medicinae et morbi facere. Similiter est in politia quod non expedit semper per scriptum vel per legem regi, quia lex quandoque deficit in aliquo particulari, et tunc indiget aliquo dirigente. Quare manifestum est quod melius est regnum regi ab optimo viro quam ab optimis legibus.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero arguit quod melius est civitatem regi ab optimis legibus.

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Et primo facit hoc.

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Secundo obiicit in contrarium, ibi, sed forte et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod principantibus oportet inesse universalem rationem; ideo melius est civitatem regi ab eo, qui non habet passiones coniunctas, quam ab eo qui naturaliter habet eas; quia passiones pervertunt iudicium rationis. Est enim passio motus appetitus sub phantasia boni vel mali: sed lex non habet passiones coniunctas, homo autem habet; quare melius est civitatem regi ab optimis legibus, quam ab optimo viro.

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Deinde cum dicit sed forte obiicit in contrarium, et ponit obiectionem.

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Secundo removet eam, ibi, quod quidem igitur et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod dicet aliquis quasi in contrarium, quod quamvis homo habeat passiones sibi naturaliter coniunctas, tamen bonus homo consiliabitur de singularibus, et secundum deliberationem habitam ipse recte iudicabit; quare adhuc melius est civitatem regi ab optimo viro, quam ab optima lege.

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Deinde cum dicit quod quidem removet istam obiectionem, inducendo quamdam aliam dubitationem, ex cuius dissolutione apparet solutio istius obiectionis. Et dividitur in duas.

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In prima facit quod dictum est.

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Secundo infert quaedam corollaria, ibi, si itaque et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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Primo ponit dubitationem.

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Secundo solvit probando alteram partem, ibi, etenim nunc et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod manifestum est, quod principantem in civitate oportet scire leges et ponere eas; non oportet tamen, quod sit dominus omnium: ex quo enim dominatur secundum legem, non oportet quod in omnibus dominetur; sed oportet quod dominetur in illis quae non possunt per legem terminari, vel simpliciter, vel non bene. Et tunc est dubitatio, utrum in isto casu magis oporteat unum principari in iudicando de particularibus, de quibus non potest lex bene determinare, vel multos.

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Deinde cum dicit etenim nunc solvit probando alteram partem: et dividitur in tres, secundum quod probat, quod melius sit in isto casu iudicare per plures, per tres rationes.

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Secunda, ibi, adhuc magis et cetera.

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Tertia, ibi, si autem et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod quando emergit casus particularis, qui non potest terminari per legem, tunc conveniunt plures et disceptant de illo adinvicem, et inquirunt per consilium de illo, et post consilium iudicant: et talia sunt omnia iudicia de particularibus, de quibus lex non potest terminare. Sic autem possunt facere plures et non unus; quia plures consiliantes super aliquo plura possunt videre quam unus. Ergo manifestum est, quod unus comparatus ad plures, deterior est in iudicando, et iudicium eius comparatum ad iudicium plurium deterius est: sicut enim civitas ex multis pulchrior est quam ex paucis, et iudicium multorum melius est quam unius, sicut coena comparata ex multis ferculis, idest sicut coena, in qua sunt plura fercula, pulchrior est quam coena simplex, ubi non est nisi unum ferculum. Manifestum igitur propter hoc, quod melius et certius iudicabit multa turba, sive plures quam unusquisque de turba. Et breviter ratio philosophi in hoc consistit. Per illum debet fieri iudicium in casu non determinato per legem, qui certius potest iudicare: sed in tali casu melius et certius possunt iudicare plures; ergo in tali casu debet fieri iudicium per plures. Minorem huius rationis declarat.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc magis ponit secundam rationem ad idem. Et dicit, quod manifestum est, quod plures magis sunt indifferentes respectu passionum turbantium, et pervertentium iudicium rectum, quam unus sive pauci; sicut aqua maior et amplior magis est indifferens ut fluat ad multa loca quam parva. Parva enim aqua cito fluit ad unam partem; et ideo unus potest magis occupari passionibus quam plures. Cum autem unus fuerit occupatus ab aliqua alia passione, corrumpitur iudicium. Ubi autem sunt plures, difficile est corrumpi iudicium propter impetus passionum: quia si aliqui sunt passionati, tunc reprimentur passiones eorum per rationem aliorum; et ideo difficile erit eos peccare: et maxime si sit multitudo non vilis, sed sit eorum, qui liberi sunt secundum virtutem: tales enim nihil agent praeter legem, nisi ubi lex deficit. Consistit autem ratio philosophi in hoc. Per illum debet fieri iudicium in tali casu qui non terminatur per legem, qui magis indifferens est respectu passionum: sed plures sunt magis indifferentes respectu passionum quam unus: quare melius debet fieri iudicium per plures quam per unum.

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Deinde cum dicit si autem ponit tertiam rationem.

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Et primo ponit eam.

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Secundo obiicit in contrarium, ibi, an palam, quod et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod si dicatur, quod non est facile quod plures bene iudicent in tali casu, si fuerint quicumque indifferenter; si tamen fuerint boni viri, et cives, adhuc quaerendum est, si sic dicatur, utrum unus princeps difficilius possit perverti et corrumpi quam plures numero boni viri. Et manifestum est, quod plures boni viri difficilius pervertentur et corrumpentur, quam unus bonus: et per illum melius est fieri iudicium, qui difficilius potest corrumpi et perverti: sed plures difficilius possunt corrumpi et perverti quam unus: quare melius est, quod fiat iudicium per plures, quam per unum.

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Deinde cum dicit an palam obiicit in contrarium. Et dicit, quod aliquis dicet, quod melius est quod fiat iudicium per unum, quam per plures; quia plures facient dissensiones adinvicem secundum seditiones; unus autem sibi non potest dissentire; quare melius est fieri iudicium per unum, quam per plures. Et solvit hoc dicens, quod contra hoc dicendum est, quod isti plures studiosi sunt sicut ille unus. Et manifestum est, quod studiosos non est possibile adinvicem dissentire, secundum quod huiusmodi.

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Deinde cum dicit si itaque infert duo corollaria: et habet duas partes secundum quod duo infert.

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Secunda, ibi, et propter hoc forte et cetera.

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In prima concludit praeeminentiam status optimatum ad regnum. Et dicit, quod si ita sit, ut declaratum est, quod melius sit plures bonos iudicare quam unum, et illa politia in qua principantur plures sapientes, sit status optimatum, illa in qua unus solus sapiens sit regnum; manifestum est, quod status optimatum melior est, quam regnum.

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Deinde cum dicit et propter ponit secundum corollarium; et est de ordine introductionis politiarum. Et dividitur in partes quinque.

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Primo enim concludit qualiter monarchia regalis primo fuit introducta.

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Secundo qualiter status optimatum, ibi, quoniam autem evenit et cetera.

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Tertio qualiter paucorum potentia, ibi, quoniam autem deteriores et cetera.

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Quarto qualiter tyrannis, ibi, ex his et cetera.

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Quinto qualiter status popularis, ibi, ex tyrannidibus et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod propter hoc, quod melius est civitatem regi et iudicia dari per plures quam per unum, civitates primo regebantur uno rege, quia in principatu facilius fuit invenire unum sapientem quam plures: et ideo primo principatus regalis fuit concessus uni. Iterum in principio, civitates parvae fuerunt, et ideo sufficiebat unus ad regendum. Iterum praefecerunt sibi aliquem in regem propter beneficium eis ab illo collatum; vel quia pugnavit contra inimicos pro illis, vel invenit artem aliquam eis necessariam: hoc autem est opus boni viri; et ideo talem tamquam bonum et virtuosum fecerunt sibi regem.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem evenit declarat qualiter postmodum introductus fuit status optimatum. Et dicit, quod postmodum accidit, quod plures exercitabant se in operibus virtutum, quia plures facti sunt virtuosi; similiter et tunc quaerebant principatum plurium similium in virtute, nec sustinuerunt principatum regalem, instituentes principatum aequalium in virtute: iste autem est status optimatum: post igitur regnum venit status optimatum.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem deteriores declarat qualiter post venit status paucorum. Et dicit, quod postmodum contigit, quod isti principantes facti sunt divites de bonis communibus, et inclinabantur ad voluptates deficientes a ratione, et principabantur propter divitias; et sic conversus fuit status optimatum in statum paucorum. Fecerunt enim divitias honorabiles, et debere principari propter ipsas.

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Deinde cum dicit ex iis autem declarat de tyrannide. Et dicit, quod postmodum contigit quod unus factus fuit ditior aliis, et potentior in amicis, et subiugavit alios; et sic convertit statum paucorum in tyrannidem, principans propter commodum suum.

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Deinde cum dicit ex tyrannidibus declarat qualiter introductus fuit status multorum. Et dicit, quod post tyrannidem factus fuit status multorum. Cum enim tyrannus opprimeret divites propter turpe lucrum, cives ducentes politiam ad pauciores extorsiones, fugientes turpe lucrum tyranni, induxerunt multitudinem fortiorem, et fecerunt eam ut insurgeret contra tyrannum; et contigit quod populus insurrexit et expulsus est tyrannus et remansit potestas penes populum, et tunc fuit politia popularis. Et haec est causa, quare in pluribus civitatibus dominatur populus, quia populus multus est; et ideo potestatem habet: verumtamen ubi populus dominatur, aliquid accipitur ab aliis politiis. Faciunt enim aliquos capitaneos et unum supra illos. Ulterius dicit, quod quia contingit fieri maiores civitates, fortassis non contingit de facili fieri aliam politiam praeter popularem. Ex dictis autem apparet solutio obiectionis prius factae ad probandum, quod unus debeat iudicare, quamvis habeat passiones sibi naturaliter coniunctas, quia consiliabitur de singularibus et sic recte iudicabit. Est enim dicendum, quod melius poterant consiliari plures quam unus, et sic melius iudicare; quare adhuc melius est civitatem regi per plures quam per unum.

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Deinde cum dicit si vero aliquis inducit alias dubitationes; et dividitur in duas, secundum quod ponit duas.

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Secunda, ibi, habet autem dubitationem et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod si quis dicat, quod optimum est civitatem regi ab uno, dubitatio erit de illo qualiter sit assumendus, utrum per electionem, vel per generis successionem. Et quod non debeat assumi per generis successionem, ostendit, quia dubium est de filiis succedentibus quales futuri sint: et potest contingere, quod malus sit filius: si ergo assumatur ille unus per generis successionem, continget assumi malum ad principatum: hoc autem est inconveniens; ergo non est assumendus per successionem. Sed quia forte aliquis diceret, quod pater bonus existens videns malum filium non tradet filio regnum, sed alii, ipse istud removet; et dicit, quod istud difficile est credere, patrem scilicet dimittere filium et tradere alii principatum. Hoc enim est supra communem facultatem hominum. Oportet enim quod dimittat principatum magis dilecto; et magis dilectum secundum naturam est propinquius secundum naturam: filius autem est sicut alter pater; et ideo sicut pater plus diligit se quam quemcumque alium, sic post se naturaliter plus diligit naturalem filium quam quemlibet alium; quare citius dimittet sibi regnum quam alicui alii. Et est intelligendum quod per se semper melius est assumi regem per electionem quam per successionem: sed per successionem melius per accidens. Primum patet sic. Melius est assumi principantem illo modo, quo per se contingit ipsum accipi meliorem; sed per electionem contingit assumi meliorem quam per successionem generis, quia melior ut in pluribus invenitur in tota multitudine quam sit unus. Et electio per se est appetitus ratione determinatus. Tamen per accidens est melius assumere principantem per generis successionem, quia in electione contingit esse dissensionem inter eligentes. Iterum quandoque eligentes mali sunt; et ideo contingit quod eligant malum. Utrumque autem istorum malum est in civitate. Iterum consuetudo dominandi multum facit ad hoc quod aliquis subiiciatur alteri; et ideo regnante patre assuescunt filii subiici, quia patri ideo inclinantur ad hoc ut subiiciantur ei. Iterum valde durum et extraneum est, quod ille qui est hodie aequalis alicui cras dominetur et sit princeps illi; et ideo per accidens melius est principantem assumi per successionem generis quam per electionem.

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Deinde cum dicit habet autem movet secundam dubitationem; et dividitur in duas partes.

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In prima movet dubitationem.

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In secunda solvit, ibi, forte quidem et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod de potentia principantis in monarchia regali est dubitatio, utrum oportet ipsum habere potentiam per quam possit cogere et punire rebelles nolentes obedire sibi; vel qualiter oportet principatum agere et dispensare. Et quod oporteat ipsum habere potentiam ad puniendum rebelles, apparet; quia videmus quod principans secundum legem nihil agens secundum voluntatem ultra legem, oportet quod habeat potentiam, per quam puniat nolentes obedire legi vel committentes contra legem: quare similiter oportet principantem secundum suam voluntatem, qualis est in monarchia regali, habere potentiam ad puniendum nolentes obedire sibi.

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Deinde cum dicit forte quidem solvit istam dubitationem; et dicit quod forte solvere dubitationem circa regem non est difficile. Manifestum est enim quod oportet ipsum habere potentiam et maiorem potentiam quam sit potentia unius; quia si non haberet maiorem non posset illum vel illos punire, si nollent ei obedire. Iterum et maiorem oportet ipsum habere potentiam, quam plurium simul; aliter non posset illos punire: minorem tamen quam sit potentia totius civitatis respectu multitudinis; quia si haberet maiorem potentiam quam civitas, opprimeret eam et converteret principatum in tyrannidem. Sicut fecerunt quidam antiqui quando praefecerunt quemdam in regem, quem dicebant aesymnetem, dederunt sibi custodias maioris potentiae quam unius vel plurium insimul, minores tamen quam civitatis totius. Similiter cum quidam alius, Dionysius nomine, peteret custodias a Syracusanis, consuluit quidam illis quod darent tot custodias quae non excederent potentiam civitatis vel multitudinis, ne opprimeret eam; maiorem tamen custodiam quam unius vel plurium insimul. Sic igitur manifestum est quod principantem secundum legem oportet habere potentiam ad puniendum rebelles.

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L. 15 (Γ.16, 1287a1–1287b36)Obiectiones continet quae adversus regiam potestatem adduci possunt.

Obiectiones continet quae adversus regiam potestatem adduci possunt.

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367. De rege autem qui secundum suam voluntatem omnia agat sermo instat nunc, et faciendum considerationem: qui quidem enim secundum legem rex, non est species regni, sicut dicimus. In omnibus enim contingit esse ducatum exercitus perpetuum, puta in democratia et aristocratia, et multi faciunt unum dominum dispensationis: talis enim quidam principatus est et circa Epidamnum et circa Opunta. Opunta autem circa aliquam partem minor est.

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368. De vocato autem omnimode rege, hoc autem est in quo rex principatur omnibus secundum suam voluntatem, dicendum. Videtur autem quibusdam, neque secundum naturam esse quod dominus sit communium civium unus, ubi consistit ex similibus civitas.

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369. Similibus enim natura idem iustum, necessarium, et eandem dignitatem secundum naturam esse. Quare siquidem inaequales aequale alimentum habere vel vestimentum nocivum corporibus, sic habent et quae circa honores. Similiter et inaequale aequales. Propter quod quidem nihil magis principari, quam subici, iustum est: et vicissim igitur eodem modo. Hoc autem iam lex, ordo enim lex. Legem ergo principari eligibilius magis, quam civium unum aliquem.

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370. Secundum eandem autem rationem hanc, utique, si aliquos principari melius, hos instituendum servatores legis, et ministros legum. Necessarium enim esse quosdam principatus: sed non hunc unum esse aiunt iustum, similibus existentibus omnibus.

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371. At ver quaecumque non videtur posse determinare lex, neque homo utique poterit nota facere. Sed universale lex instituit; reliqua iustissima sententia iudicare, et disponere principes. Adhuc autem omnia dirigere dant quodcumque videbitur tentantibus melius esse positis.

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372. Qui quidem intellectum iubet principari, videtur iubere principari Deum et leges: qui autem hominem iubet, apponit et bestiam: quando enim concupiscentia tale, et furor principatum habuerit, tandem et optimos viros interimet. Propter quod quidem sine appetitu intellectus, lex.

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373. Exemplum autem artium videtur esse falsum, quod secundum litteras medicari sit pravum, sed et eligibilius uti habentes artes. Ii quidem enim propter amicitias nihil praeter rationem faciunt, sed accipiunt mercedem aegrotos curantes: ii autem in politicis principatibus multa ad affectum et gratiam consueverunt agere: quoniam et medicos quando suspicantur persuasos ab inimicis perimere propter lucrum, tunc eam quae ex litteris curam quaerent utique magis.

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374. At vero medici aegrotantes inducunt ad se ipsos alios medicos. Et exercitatores puerorum cum sint in exercitio inducunt exercitatiores disciplinae; tamquam non potentes iudicare quod verum, quia iudicarent de propriis et in passione existentes. Quare palam quod iustum quaerentes, medium quaerunt; lex enim ipsum medium.

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375. Adhuc principaliores et de principalioribus quam hae secundum litteras leges sunt quae secundum consuetudines. Quare si iis quae secundum litteras homo princeps est securior, sed non iis quae secundum consuetudinem.

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376. At vero neque facile prospicere multa unum. Oportebit igitur multos esse sub ipso constituto principe. Quare quid distet hoc a principio mox existere, vel unum consistere hoc modo?

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377. Adhuc, quod et prius dictum est, si quidem vir studiosus quia melior principari dignius, uno autem duo boni meliores, hoc autem est, quod dicitur: simul duobus venientibus: et oratio Agamemnonis: tales mihi sodales: ut non iam principari iustum.

¹²

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378. Sunt autem et nunc de quibusdam principatus dominantes iudicio, sicut iudex, de quibus lex non potest determinare: quoniam de quibus potuit, nullus dubitat de iis, tamquam non utique optime lex praeceperit, iudicabit: sed quoniam haec quidem contingit comprehendi legibus, haec autem impossibilia. Haec sunt quae faciunt dubitare, et quaerere, utrum optimam legem principari eligibilius, quam optimum virum. De quibus enim consiliantur sunt impossibilium lege constituta esse. Non igitur hoc contradicunt, tamquam non necessarium esse hominem iudicantem de talibus; sed quod non unum solum, sed multos. Iudicat enim unusquisque princeps eruditus a lege bene.

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379. Inconveniensque forte utique esse videbitur, si melius percipiat quis, duobus oculis, et duabus auribus iudicans, et agens duobus pedibus et manibus, quam multi multis. Quoniam et nunc oculos multos monarchae faciunt sibi, et aures et manus et pedes. Eos enim qui principatui, et ipsius sunt amici, faciunt comprincipes. Non amici quidem igitur existentes non faciunt secundum monarchae voluntatem: si autem amici, et illius principatus quoque amicos forte et similes. Quare si hos existimat oportere principari aequales, et similes principari existimat oportere similiter. Quod quidem igitur dicunt dubitantes adversus regnum, fere haec sunt.

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Postquam Philosophus inquisivit utrum magis expediat civitatem regi optimis legibus an optimo viro, in parte ista inquirit utrum magis expediat ipsam regi uno viro optimo an pluribus. Et dividitur in partes duas.

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In prima dat intentionem suam et causam intentionis.

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In secunda prosequitur, ibi, de vocato autem et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod post praedicta restat dicendum de rege simpliciter, qui in omnibus secundum suam voluntatem non secundum legem agit et regit, et non secundum quod movetur ab alio: et de isto facienda est consideratio. Et causa huius est, quia ille qui principatur secundum legem non est rex simpliciter; nec principatus suus est species regni, sicut dictum fuit superius. Et quod non sit species regni, apparet: quia ille principatus qui est ducatus exercitus, reperitur in omnibus politiis, sicut in statu multorum et optimatum. In istis enim faciunt unum dominum ad regendum et dispensandum, et multi alii unum faciunt ducem. Non ergo iste ducatus est species regni. Talis autem fuit principatus qui fuit circa Dyrrachium et Sipontum, licet apud Sipontinos sit paulo constrictior minore existente quam primo.

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Deinde cum dicit de vocato prosequitur: et dividitur in partes tres.

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In prima proponit dubitationem.

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Secundo arguit ad ipsam, ibi, similibus enim et cetera.

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Tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, sed forte haec et cetera.

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In prima resumens intentionem suam, dicit quod de regno simpliciter in quo aliquis dominatur omnibus secundum suam voluntatem, et non secundum legem, est nunc dicendum. Quod quibusdam apparet quod non est secundum naturam, nec ex inclinatione naturali, nec consonum rationi quod unus sit dominus omnium secundum voluntatem, ubi civitas constet ex similibus secundum virtutem, id est secundum dispositionem naturalem.

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Deinde cum dicit similibus enim arguit ad quaestionem: et ostendit quod non est naturale unum dominari pluribus similibus illi secundum virtutem et dispositionem naturalem. Et dividitur in partes quatuor, secundum quod adducit quatuor rationes ad probationem huius.

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Secunda ibi, at vero et cetera.

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Tertia ibi, adhuc melior et cetera.

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Quarta ibi, inconveniensque forte et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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Primo ponit rationem illam.

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Secundo infert ex dictis quod melius est civitatem regi lege quam viro, ibi, propter quod et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod similibus secundum dispositionem naturalem et secundum virtutem idem est iustum et eadem virtus. Dicimus enim quod iustum est aequale: ergo quorum est eadem virtus et dispositio naturalis, idem est iustum et dignitas; quia dignitas attenditur secundum virtutem; et quorum non est eadem virtus, nec dignitas eadem, nec iustum idem. Si igitur ponamus quod aliqui sint similes in virtute eorum erit eadem dignitas et iustum: quare non expedit aliquem unum dominari secundum voluntatem istis, quia non inesset eis eadem dignitas. Et sicut videmus in naturalibus quod non expedit inaequales habere par alimentum, aut eamdem vestem; quia quod proficuum est uni nocivum est alii. Sunt enim aliqui calidi, aliqui frigidi. Et manifestum est quod isti indigent diversis alimentis. Eodem modo est circa honores. Si enim inaequales secundum virtutem aequale recipiant, iniustum est: et si aequales inaequales, similiter iniustum est. Si autem aliqui sint similes in virtute et dispositione naturali, et unus principetur secundum suam voluntatem aliis, manifestum est quod aequales inaequale recipiunt: hoc ergo est inaequale et iniustum: quare manifestum est quod non expedit unum dominari secundum virtutem aequalibus et dispositione naturali.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod infert ex dictis, quod melius est optimam legem principari, quam optimum virum.

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Et primo facit hoc.

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Secundo adducit rationem ad probationem huius, ibi, at vero quaecumque et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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In prima facit quod dictum est.

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In secunda ex eodem infert quod melius est legem principari quam plures optimos, ibi, secundum eamdem et cetera.

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In prima dicit, sicut dictum est: iustum est aequales secundum virtutem et dispositionem naturalem habere aequale: propter quod manifestum est quod si sint plures aequales vel similes secundum virtutem et dispositionem naturalem, quod unus non est magis natus principari vel subiici quam alius; et ideo unus non debet magis principari quam alius. Et quia necesse est aliquem principari, iustum est quod vicissim et secundum quemdam ordinem principentur omnes et eodem modo. Principari autem eos secundum ordinem et vicissim, lex quaedam est. Est enim lex ordo quidam. Quare manifestum est quod melius est et eligibilius legem principari quam unum aliquem civem.

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Deinde cum dicit secundum eamdem ex eodem infert quod melius est legem principari quam plures, paucos tamen. Et dicit quod secundum eamdem rationem, si melius est plures principari quam unum, illos tamen melius est principari secundum legem quam secundum voluntates proprias et institui ad servandum legem et ministros esse legis: sicut enim dictum est prius quod aequalibus secundum virtutem debetur aequalis honor et dignitas; ergo si civitas sit ex aequalibus secundum virtutem, aequalis honor debetur illis: ergo non expedit aliquos ex illis semper principari, sed necessarium est esse diversos principatus, ita ut isti modo principentur, alii alias secundum quemdam ordinem: quare oportet eos principari secundum quemdam ordinem: sed hoc est lex quaedam: quare manifestum est quod melius est plures secundum legem principari quam secundum proprias voluntates, si plures sit melius principari quam unum.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero adducit rationem ad probandum quod melius sit legem principari, vel hominem secundum legem, quam virum bonum secundum propriam voluntatem. Et dividitur in duas.

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In prima facit quod dictum est.

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In secunda solvit rationem adductam prius per simile, ad probandum quod melius sit hominem principari quam legem, ibi, exemplum autem et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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Primo ostendit de quibus fertur lex, et quae oportet dimittere principi.

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Secundo ponit rationem ad probandum quod melius est legem principari quam hominem, ibi, qui quidem et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod illa quaecumque non possint terminari per legem, nec homo secundum se potest facere nota et manifesta, nisi per prudentiam multam et longam experientiam: lex vero de particularibus nihil ordinat secundum se, sed tantum in universali. Est enim enunciatio universalis; et ideo dictum est ipsam deficere in aliquo particulari, et talia dimitti principi, qua oportet ipsum disponere et iudicare secundum rectam sententiam. Iterum si aliquid inveniatur secundum rationem melius quam lex posita determinet, istud dimittendum est principi ut ipse ordinet pro lege. Ita quod duo dimittuntur principi: unum est iudicare et disponere recte particularia per legem, ubi possibile est hoc fieri per legem: secundum est quod ubi lex scripta deficit in aliquo casu particulari, dirigat, et hoc est per virtutem ipsius propriam: vel si lex posita non sit bene ordinata secundum rationem, dimittitur principi, ut illa dimissa inveniat meliorem, vel per se, vel de consensu multitudinis; et ordinet per legem.

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Deinde cum dicit qui quidem adducit rationem ad probandum quod melius est legem principari quam optimum virum secundum propriam voluntatem. Et est intelligendum quod unumquodque maxime dicitur illud vel secundum illud quod est principale in eo, sicut dicitur in decimo Ethicorum. Principale vero in homine est intellectus. Et ideo maxime homo dicitur intellectus vel secundum intellectum: et tunc dicitur homo maxime operari cum operatur secundum intellectum. Contingit autem quod homo aliquando operatur secundum intellectum, ita quod non impeditur a sensu omnino, nec sensu utitur nisi quantum sibi necessarius est: et tunc dicitur homo simpliciter operari, quia operatur secundum id quod simplicius est in eo. Sed quia indiget sensu, contingit aliquando operationi intellectus coniungi appetitum sensitivum, et tunc dicitur homo compositus. Et cum homo operatur secundum intellectum, nec impeditur a sensu, tunc operatur maxime secundum intellectum et rationem, et secundum divinum aliquid inexistens: tum quia intellectus divinum aliquid in eo est, tum quia operatur supra communem modum hominum. Dicit igitur quod ille qui praecipit intellectui principari vel hominem secundum intellectum, ita quod non coniungatur appetitus sensitivus aliqualiter retrahens, praecipit velut Deum, hoc est hominem secundum aliquid divinum principari et legem: qui autem vult hominem principari eum comitante appetitu sensitivo, apponit bestiam, idest apponit aliquid per quod assimilatur homo bestiis, scilicet appetitum sensitivum. Sed melius est principari aliquid divinum quam coniunctum bestiae. Quia si principetur homo secundum intellectum cum appetitu sensitivo, cum in appetitu sint passiones pervertentes ipsum, et per consequens iudicium rationis, continget tandem quod principans existens in passione concupiscentiae et furoris, quod bonos viros et virtuosos interficiet. Hoc autem est inconveniens: quare melius est hominem per intellectum absolute principari, quam per intellectum coniunctum appetitui sensitivo. Cum igitur lex sit sine passione et sit secundum rationem, relinquitur ipsam esse intellectum sine appetitu sensitivo: quare melius est legem principari quam hominem.

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Deinde cum dicit exemplum autem dissolvit rationem quae prius adducebatur ex simili in artibus operativis ad probandum quod melius sit hominem principari quam legem.

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Et primo per interemptionem assumpti.

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Secundo interimendo similitudinem, ibi, adhuc principaliores et cetera.

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Prima in duas; secundum quod dupliciter probat quod non est verum quod assumebatur.

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Secunda ibi, at vero medici et cetera.

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In prima dicit: quod assumebatur prius ex simili in artibus non videtur esse verum sed falsum. Assumebatur enim quod non est bonum operari per artem, immo pravum sit: nec in politicis est bonum principari per legem. Istud autem non est verum: immo melius est, quod habentes artem operentur per eam quam alio aliquo modo. Et ratio huius est, quia operantes per artem secundum quod huiusmodi, non habent passiones nec affectiones sibi coniunctas; et ideo propter amicitiam nihil operantur praeter rationem ex quo operantur per artem. Operantes enim per artem curant aegrotos mercedem recusantes per gratiam solum; sed qui operantur per prudentiam propriam possunt habere passiones coniunctas pervertentes appetitum sensitivum, et per consequens iudicium rationis; multa faciunt sequentes passiones dimittentes rationem; sicut principantes in politicis per passiones et affectiones multa faciunt per gratiam dimittentes rationem rectam. Et propter hoc quandoque amici aegroti alicuius suspicantur quod medici volunt illum interficere propter lucrum quod recipiunt ab aliquo, tunc nolunt quod operentur circa aegrotum, nec curent eum secundum industriam, sed volunt quod operentur per artem: quare manifestum est, quod melius est operari per artem, quam per industriam propriam: non igitur pravum est operari per artem quemadmodum accipiebatur prius.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero declarat secundo assumptum esse falsum; et dicit quod melius est operari per illud per quod certius operari potest et rectius: sed per artem certius et rectius potest operari, quam per rationem: quia operantem per rationem contingit habere passiones pervertentes iudicium. Et propter hoc medici aegrotantes ad seipsos vocant sanandos alios medicos, propter hoc scilicet, quod sunt in passione, quamvis habeant habitum artis, et turbati a passione non possunt recte iudicare. Similiter illi qui sunt magistri palaestrae cum se exercent vocant alios magistros, ut videant si bene operentur, tamquam non potentes recte iudicare de propriis: qui ut in pluribus non bene iudicant nec vere de seipsis: quare manifestum est quod per passiones turbatur iudicium rationis. Operans autem per artem passiones non habet secundum quod huiusmodi: quare certius et melius potest iudicare quam per rationem. Et tunc infert quamdam conclusionem, quae sequitur non ex immediate dictis, sed ex prius dictis: et sequitur sic. Dictum est quod non est iustum unum principari aliquibus similibus et aequalibus secundum virtutem et naturalem dispositionem, sed iustum est eos vicissim et secundum ordinem principari, et hoc est principari secundum legem; ergo iustum est principari secundum legem et operam ergo cum lex sit mediam, palam quod quaerentes iustum quaerunt medium.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc principaliores solvit rationem per interemptionem similitudinis; et dicit, quod ratio adhuc in alio deficit, non enim est simile in artibus et in politiis: et hoc apparet, quia leges politiarum quae confirmatae sunt per consuetudinem, quia homines secundum illam vivere assueti sunt, sunt principaliores et de principalioribus quam leges operativarum artium: quia leges politiarum sunt de agibilibus in ordine ad finem politiae, et de his per quae perficitur anima: sed leges artis, sive ea quae sunt secundum artem, sunt de his per quae corpus perficitur, sicut medicina. Sicut ergo anima est melior quam corpus et principalior, sic leges quae sunt de his per quae perficitur anima principaliores et meliores sunt quam illae quae sunt de dispositionibus et de conferentibus ad corpus: quare manifestum est, quod quamvis homo secundum artem iudicet secure et cum certitudine, tamen non certius per leges quae sunt secundum consuetudinem, non secundum artem, cum istae sint principaliores.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero ponit secundam rationem ad principale, scilicet ad probandum quod non est naturale unum dominari pluribus similibus secundum virtutem: et dicit, quod adhuc manifestum est, quod non expedit unum principari similibus secundum virtutem, sed magis plures: quia principantem oportet ad multa inspicere, sed unus non potest bene inspicere: quare manifestum est quod oportet quod sint alii multi principantes, sub ipso: ergo si a principio fuissent multi principantes, non viderentur in aliquo differre, sed melius fuisset ordinatum quam sint multi sub ipso. Si ergo unus non potest principari, nisi habeat sub se aliquos principantes: ubi autem omnes sunt similes et aequales secundum virtutem nullus naturaliter sub alio est: manifestum est quod non est naturale unum principari similibus, et aequalibus secundum virtutem.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc quod ponit tertiam rationem.

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Et primo ponit eam.

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Secundo regreditur ad solvendum rationem prius adductam ad probandum, quod melius sit bonum virum principari quam bonam legem, ibi, sunt autem et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod ex hoc quod prius dictum est manifestum est, quod non est naturale unum dominari pluribus, sed plures, quia secundum quod dictum est, virtuosis principari debet qui melior est. Cum ergo duo sint meliores uno in similibus, manifestum quod melius est plures dominari, quam unum; et hoc est, quod dicit Homerus: duo simul euntes. Non plus ponit, sed supplendum est quod societas erit melior, quia unus iuvabit alium. Et hoc est quod Agamemnon petiit in oratione sua, quod haberet tales consultores quod non esset iustum ipsum eis principari, sed quod illi essent comprincipantes cum illo. Manifestum igitur est, quod melius est plures principari, quam unum: non est ergo secundum naturam, quod unus principetur pluribus similibus secundum virtutem.

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Deinde cum dicit sunt autem regreditur ad dissolvendum rationem prius adductam ad probandum quod melius est principari bonum virum quam legem; et dicit quod in actionibus politicis sunt quaedam quae oportet dimitti iudicio principantis, sicut sunt illa de quibus lex non potest determinare. In illis autem de quibus potest lex determinare, manifestum est quod nullus dubitat, utrum bene ordinata sit; nec intromittet se aliquis ad iudicandum de ipsis tamquam lex non bene ordinaverit, propter quod in istis melius est legem principari (cum lex sit sine passionibus, per quas pervertitur appetitus, per consequens iudicium rationis), quam principem: sed quia lex datur in universali, aliqua possunt comprehendi per legem, alia vero comprehendi est impossibile. Ex istis oritur dubitatio: utrum melius est principari optimam legem vel optimum virum. Illa vero de quibus principes consiliantur non possunt esse ordinata per legem; quoniam si essent, non inquirerent de istis per consilium; et ideo in talibus iudicabit princeps; in aliis vero de quibus determinavit lex, non iudicabit. Et sic manifestum est, quod ista non contradicunt legem principari in universali, et principem in particulari. Non enim recte potest dici quod non sit expediens hominem bonum iudicare de talibus per legem non determinatis: sed dici potest quod non expedit unum solum, sed magis plures; tunc enim plures iudicabunt optime, maxime si sint instructi secundum legem.

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Deinde cum dicit inconveniensque forte ponit quartam rationem; et dicit quod inconveniens est dicere, quod unus duobus oculis et duabus auribus melius percipiat quam multi multis auribus et multis oculis. Et inconveniens est dicere, quod unus melius operetur duabus manibus et duobus pedibus quam multi multis pedibus et multis manibus. Similiter inconveniens est quod unus melius iudicet per suam prudentiam quam multi; et ideo videmus quod principes faciunt sibi multos oculos et multas manus et pedes, quia faciunt sibi multos comprincipantes: hos enim vocat pedes et manus et oculos, quia per hos discernunt et operantur. Faciunt autem comprincipes illos, qui sunt amici sui et principatus; quia si non essent amici utriusque, sed alterius, sicut principatus, non curarent de bono principis, sed principatus. Iterum si non diligerent principatum, sed principem, non curarent de bono principatus. Oportet autem comprincipantes curare de bono principis et principatus. Et ideo faciunt comprincipantes amicos sui et principatus, quia amici non faciunt nisi quod rectum est et honestum: et si sunt amici principis et principatus, procurant bonum utriusque. Modo ita est quod amicos oportet esse similes. Quare si istos oportet esse comprincipantes illi, manifestum est, quod similes et aequales secundum virtutem oportet similiter principari. Non igitur naturale est unum secundum suam voluntatem principari aliquibus similibus et aequalibus ei secundum virtutem. Et adiungit recapitulando, dicens, quod ista sunt quae faciunt dubitare de regno. Et est intelligendum circa id quod dictum est, quod assumit princeps sibi comprincipantes amicos sui et principatus, quod ratio principis sumitur a ratione principatus; et ideo bonum principis est in ordine ad principatus bonum: et ideo qui diligit principem secundum quod princeps est, diligit principatum. Sed ille qui principatur, duobus modis potest considerari: vel secundum quod princeps, vel secundum quod homo talis; et ideo potest aliquis diligere ipsum, vel secundum quod princeps, vel secundum quod talis homo. Si diligat ipsum secundum quod princeps, diligit principatum; et procurando bona unius, procurat bona alterius. Si diligat ipsum secundum quod talis vel talis, non oportet quod diligat principatum: et tunc procurat secundum quod talis vel talis, non procurando de bono principatus.

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L. 16 (Γ.17–18, 1287b36–1288b6)Declarat quibus civitatibus regem creare conveniat, et quibus optimatum administrationem.

Declarat quibus civitatibus regem creare conveniat, et quibus optimatum administrationem.

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380. Sed forte haec in aliquibus quidem habent hoc modo, in aliquibus autem non sic: est enim aliquid natura despoticum, et aliud politicum, et iustum, et conferens: tyrannicum autem non est secundum naturam, neque aliarum politiarum quaecumque transgressiones sunt; haec enim fiunt, quia praeter naturam.

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381. Sed ex dictis manifestum, quod in similibus quidem et aequalibus, neque expediens est, neque iustum, unum dominum esse omnium, neque non existentibus legibus, sed ipsum tamquam sit lex; neque legibus existentibus; neque bonum bonis, neque non bonis non bonum, neque si secundum virtutem melior sit, nisi modo quodam.

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382. Quis autem modus, dicendum. Dictum est autem aliqualiter et prius. Primo autem determinandum quid sit regnabile, et quid sit aristocraticum, et quid politicum.

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383. Regnabile quidem igitur talis est multitudo quae nata est ferre genus superexcellens secundum virtutem ad praesulatum politicum. Aristocratia autem multitudo, quae nata est ferre multitudinem potentem regi principatu liberorum ab iis, qui secundum virtutem praesidibus ad politicum principatum. Politica autem multitudo in quo nata est fieri multitudo politica, potens principari et subici secundum legem distribuentem principatus secundum dignitatem opulentis.

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384. Cum igitur vel genus totum, vel aliorum unum acciderit esse differentes secundum virtutem tantum, ut excedat quae illius, eam quae aliorum omnium, tunc iustum est genus hoc esse regale et dominans omnium, et regem unum hunc. Sicut enim dictum prius, non solum sic habet secundum iustum quod proferre consueverunt qui politias instituerint, et qui aristocratias et qui oligarchias, et iterum qui democratias: penitus enim secundum excessum volunt, sed excessum non eundem, immo secundum quod prius dictum est. Neque enim occidere, vel fugare, neque relegare utique talem decens est, neque ullo subici secundum partem; non enim nata est pars excellere ipsum omne. Ei autem qui tantam excellentiam habet, hoc accidit. Qure relinquitur solum obedire tali et dominum esse, non secundum partem sed simpliciter.

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385. De regno quidem igitur quas habet differentias, et utrum non expediat civitatibus, aut expediat, et quibus, et quomodo, determinatum sic hoc modo.

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386. Quoniam autem tres dicimus esse rectas politias, horum autem necessarium optimam esse eam quae ab optimis dispensatur, talis autem est in qua accidit vel unum aliquem simul omnium, vel genus totum, vel multitudinem excedentem esse secundum virtutem, iis quidem subici potentibus, iis autem principari ad delectissimam vitam. In primis autem sermonibus ostensum est, quod eadem necessarium viri virtutem esse et civis optimae civitatis: manifestumque eodem modo, et per eadem fit vir studiosus, et civitatem instituet utique quis aristocratizatam et regno gubernatam.

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387. Quare erunt et disciplina et assuetudines eaedem fere quae faciunt studiosum virum, et quae faciunt politicum et regale.

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388. Determinatis autem iis, de politica optima, iam tentandum dicere quo nata sit fieri modo, et institui quomodo, necesse utique facturum de ipsa convenientem speculationem.

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Postquam Philosophus posuit rationes ad ostendendum, quod non est naturale unum principari pluribus secundum virtutem, in parte ista determinat veritatem: et dividitur in duas.

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In prima proponit intentionem suam cum quadam distinctione.

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In secunda manifestat eam, ibi, sed ex dictis et cetera.

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In prima dicit: ita dictum est quod non expedit unum dominari multis similibus: sed forte in aliquibus expedit, in aliquibus autem non expedit. Unde est intelligendum quod aliquid est iustum et conferens secundum naturam in ordine ad dominativam, aliud est iustum et conferens in ordine ad politiam: et manifestum est quod ista non sunt unum et idem. Et hoc apparet, quia principatus dominativus est, in quo aliquis principatur alteri qui natus est subiici, sicut est servus; et principatur primo et principaliter ad bonum proprium. Principatus autem politicus in quo principatur aliquis liberis et aequalibus secundum virtutem et ad bonum subditorum. Sicut ergo principatus isti sunt diversi, sic iustum quod est in ordine ad unum, non est idem quod iustum in ordine ad alium principatum; et ideo manifestum est quod non sunt idem iustum dominativum et iustum politicum. In tyrannide autem et in aliis transgressis non est iustum simpliciter: quia in illis politiis in quibus est finis praeter naturam non est iustum simpliciter: sed in transgressis politiis est finis praeter naturam. Sunt enim huiusmodi politiae praeter naturam. Ergo in ipsis non est iustum simpliciter vel secundum naturam.

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Deinde cum dicit sed ex dictis declarat solutionem in speciali.

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Et primo declarat quod in similibus secundum naturam et aequaliter se habentibus ad virtutem non est iustum esse unum dominum nisi aliquo modo.

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Secundo declarat quis est ille modus, ibi, quis autem et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod patet ex dictis, quod non est secundum naturam, nec expedit, nec iustum est, unum principari similibus et aequalibus secundum virtutem, sive non principetur secundum legem, sed secundum voluntatem suam, tamquam sit ipse lex; sive non principetur secundum suam propriam voluntatem, sed secundum legem; sive etiam princeps sit bonus et subditi boni; sive ipse sit malus et ipsi mali; sive sit melior et excellentior omnibus aliis in virtute, nisi aliquo modo. Apparet autem hoc ex dictis. Sicut enim dictum est, iustum est quod similibus secundum virtutem, sit eadem dignitas: si autem similibus secundum virtutem unus principaretur, non esset eis eadem dignitas. Iterum dictum est prius quod plures plura possunt videre et rectius iudicant quam unus: ex istis manifestum est, quod non est iustum similibus existentibus secundum virtutem, unum ex illis principari.

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Deinde cum dicit quis autem declarat quis est modus ille quo expedit unum principari pluribus.

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Et primo praemittit intentum suum.

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Secundo prosequitur, ibi, regnabile quidem et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod dicendum est quis est modus ille quo expedit unum principari pluribus, et qualiter. Aliqualiter autem dictum est prius quis est modus ille; scilicet ubi quaesivit, utrum excedens omnes alios virtute esset civis. Sed antequam dicamus quis est modus ille, dicendum est quid sit regius status et optimatum et politicus. Et ratio huius est, quia ista sunt obiecta politiarum, et ex ratione istorum aliqualiter apparebit propositum.

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Deinde cum dicit regnabile quidem prosequitur;

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et primo declarat quid est unumquodque istorum.

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Secundo declarat modum illum, ibi, cum igitur et cetera.

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In prima dicit quod regius status est cui subiicitur multitudo quae nata est subiici secundum inclinationem naturalem alicui superexcellenti in virtute ad principatum politicum vel regalem. Status optimatum vero est cui subiicitur multitudo quae nata est sustinere dominium multitudinis studiosorum; quae scilicet multitudo studiosorum nata est regi principatu optimatum et liberorum ab his qui principantur secundum virtutem in ordine ad politicum principatum: politicus autem est multitudo quae nata est subiici et principari quandoque secundum legem, secundum quam distribuitur principatus vel dignitates tenuioribus. Aliqui textus legunt opulentis; et ideo intelligendum est opulentis vel egenis, utrisque tamen virtuosis.

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Deinde cum dicit cum igitur declarat quis est ille modus, secundum quem expedit unum principari pluribus, et qualiter.

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Et primo facit hoc.

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Secundo recapitulat, ibi, de regno quidem et cetera.

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In prima dicit, quod si contingat unum totum genus vel unum inter alios sic differre in genere ab aliis secundum virtutem, ut virtus eius excedat virtutem omnium aliorum, iustum est hoc genus esse regale, vel illum si sit unus, et regnum et dominium esse unum omnium: hoc enim est secundum naturam, quod ille qui excedit secundum virtutem sit dominus aliorum. Ergo si virtus alicuius excedat virtutem aliorum, naturale est quod iste sit rex et dominus. Nec solum propter hoc iustum est illum esse regem, quia excedit absolute, sicut est prius dictum quod omnes illi qui instituerunt politias dixerunt quod iustum est principari illum qui excedit, sicut et qui optimatum et qui paucorum potentum et qui popularem statum instituerunt. Omnes enim considerantes ad excessum, dixerunt illum qui excedit debere principari: quamvis non eumdem excessum ponerent: sed quidam secundum virtutem, quidam secundum divitias, alii secundum libertatem: sed expedit istum principari qui excedit alios secundum virtutem: nec expedit interimere, vel relegare, vel fugare: hoc enim esset tollere regulam vivendi a civitate vel regione. Iterum non expedit istum principari secundum partem, sed omnibus; nec secundum aliquod tempus, sed semper; quia pars non est nata excedere suum totum: sed iste in virtute excedit omnes alios: ergo alii sunt pars respectu istius: ergo non sunt nati excedere ipsum, sed semper excedens magis secundum virtutem debet principari. Quare relinquitur istum debere principari omnibus et semper, et dominum esse, et omnes illi tali obedire quasi ex inclinatione naturali. Sed est intelligendum quod quamvis multi conveniant in virtute et disciplina, oportet tamen quandoque unum principari principatu regali. Est enim aliqua multitudo virtuosorum, et haec dignitatem habet, et dicitur multitudo politica. Alia est quae deficit a ratione multum, et haec dicitur dominativa. Utramque expedit regi principatu regali: primam, inquantum est unus qui excedit omnes alios in virtute; aliam autem expedit regi uno, inquantum est aliquis qui excedit omnes alios in virtute. Sed differt: quia in prima principatus politicus multum distat a dominativo principatu: in secunda autem multum appropinquat, quia multitudo ista a ratione deficit, prima autem non. Item differt, quia secundum regnum diuturnius est quam primum, quia ad secundum minus de virtute sufficit quam ad primum; et ideo facilius potest inveniri unus qui excedat alios, in primo non. In prima enim multitudine, quia omnes attingunt ad rationem, contingit esse aliquos qui possunt invenire diversas vias et modos ad expellendum principem. Non sic est in secunda, quia in secunda deficiunt a ratione; et ideo non possunt invenire vias et cautelas contra principantem; et ideo secundus principatus plus durat quam primus.

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Deinde cum dicit de regno recapitulat; et dicit quod de monarchia regali quas habet differentias et modos, et quae sunt, et utrum non expediat unum principari, et quibus expediat, et quomodo, dictum est.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem declarat quod eadem est virtus optimi regis et viri studiosi; et adiungit etiam statum optimatum.

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Et primo hoc declarat.

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Secundo continuat se ad dicenda, ibi, determinatis autem iis et cetera.

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Prima in duas.

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Primo ostendit quod eadem est virtus, per quam aliquis instituit rempublicam optimatum et regnum optimum, et viri studiosi.

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Secundo ex dictis infert unam esse disciplinam, et per consequens unam virtutem regis optimi et politici, et optimi viri, ibi, quare erunt et cetera. In prima dicit, quod cum sint tres politiae recte ordinatae, secundum quod dictum est prius, illa inter alia optima est, quae regitur et dispensatur ab optimo viro vel ab optimis viris, quia ad optimum finem ordinatur: semper enim quod fit ab optimo agente, ad optimum finem ordinatur per se. Illa igitur quae ab optimo viro vel optimis viris dispensatur optima est. Talis autem est politia illa in qua principatur unus vel totum unum genus, vel in qua multitudo excellens secundum virtutem principatur, in qua quidam possunt subiici et principari ad electissimam et perfectissimam vitam, scilicet quae est secundum virtutem perfectissimam. Ostensum autem fuit quod aliquo modo eadem est virtus optimi viri et optimi civis, quare manifestum est quod eodem modo et per eamdem virtutem per quam aliquis est vir studiosus, instituit has politias, scilicet regnum et optimatum statum.

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Deinde cum dicit quare erunt ex dictis infert unam esse disciplinam, et per consequens virtutem unam regis optimi, et politici, et optimi viri. Et dicit, quod si eadem est virtus per quam instituitur politia optimi viri, et viri studiosi, manifestum est, quod eadem erit disciplina, et eaedem consuetudines, quae faciunt virum studiosum, et quae faciunt civem politicum, et regales viros. Ratio autem huius consequentiae est, quia per illam virtutem per quam aliqua causa per se et primo instituit aliquem effectum, per eamdem est et determinatur; per idem enim est aliquid et operatur. Sed per virtutem boni et studiosi viri instituit rex politiam regalem, et institutor status optimatum, statum optimatum, ut probatum est prius. Ergo per eamdem sunt, hic autem est rex, hic autem est institutor status optimatum.

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Deinde cum dicit determinatis autem continuat se ad dicenda. Et dicit quod his determinatis, considerandum est qualiter et quomodo sit instituenda optima respublica, et quomodo necesse est eum, qui debet de ea facere speculationem convenientem, prius in universali de ea considerare.

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Bk. 4Cum regum, optimatum, et populi rectam administrationem et earum vitia in tertio proposuisset, in hoc quarto singulas in sua membra digerit ut optimam omnium rempublicam doceat; tria deinde civitatibus omnibus necessaria perpendit, consilia, magistratus et iudicia.

Cum regum, optimatum, et populi rectam administrationem et earum vitia in tertio proposuisset, in hoc quarto singulas in sua membra digerit ut optimam omnium rempublicam doceat; tria deinde civitatibus omnibus necessaria perpendit, consilia, magistratus et iudicia.

Polit.lib4

L. 1 (Δ.1–2, 1288b10–1289b26)Quod ad virum politicum pertineat scire quae sit respublica prorsus optima, quae ut secunda ab ea; et cum multae sint species rerumpublicarum, omnes omnibus non convenire; deinde commemorat quid dixerit, quidve dicendum sit, proponit.

Quod ad virum politicum pertineat scire quae sit respublica prorsus optima, quae ut secunda ab ea; et cum multae sint species rerumpublicarum, omnes omnibus non convenire; deinde commemorat quid dixerit, quidve dicendum sit, proponit.

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389. In omnibus artibus, et scientiis iis, quae non secundum particulam fiunt, sed circa genus unum aliquod, perfectis existentibus, unius est considerare quod congruit circa unumquodque genus, puta exercitatio corpori qualis quali expediat, et quae optima; ei enim qui optime aptus natus et proportionatus, optimam necessarium congruere. Et quae plurimis una omnibus. Etenim haec exercitativae opus est. Adhuc autem si quis non attinentem desideret, nec habitum, nec scientiam eorum, quae circa agoniam, nihil minus exercitatoris disciplinae et gymnastici est praeparare et hanc adhuc potentiam. Similiter autem, hoc et circa medicativam, et navificam, et circa vestitum, et circa omne aliam artem, videmus accidens.

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390. Quare palam, quia eiusdem scientiae est politiam optimam considereare, quae est, et qualis quaedam utique existens, maxime erit secundum votum, nullo impediente extrinsecorum, et quae quibus congruens. Multis enim valde forte impossibile sortiri optiam.

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391. Quare optimam simpliciter, et eam quae ex suppositis optimam, non oportet latuisse bonum legislatorem, et eum qui est, ut vere politicus. Adhuc autem tertiam eamm, quae ex suppositione: oportet enim et datam posse considerare, et a principio quomodo utique fiet, et facta quo utique modo salvabitur plurimo tempore. Dico autem, puta si alicui civitati accidit neque optima politia disponi, non abundantemque esse etiam necessariis, neque ea quae contingent ex existentibus, sed quadam peiori. Praeter omnia autem haec, eam quae maxime in omnibus civitatibus congruit, oportet cognoscere.

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392. Quo plurimi pronuntiantium de politia, et si alia dicant bene, tamen in optimis peccant; non enim solum optimam oportet considerare, sed etiam possibilem. Similiter autem et faciliorem, et communiorem omnibus. Nunc autem ii quidem summam et indigentem multis copiis quaerunt solum, ii autem magis communem quamdam dicentes, eas quae sunt interimentes politias, scilicet Laconicam, vel quam aliam laudamus.

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393. Oportet autem talem induci ordinem ad quem facile existentibus persuadeantur, et possint prosequi; tamquam non sit minus opus corrigere politiam, quam instruere a principio, sicut e post addiscere a principio.

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394. Propter quod cum dictis oportet et existentibus politiis posse auxiliari politicum, sicut dictum est prius. Hoc autem impossibile, ignorantem quot sunt species politiae. Nunc enim unam democratiam putant quidam esse, et unam oligarchiam. Non est autem hoc verum. Quare oportet, differentias politiarum non latere quot, et quot modis componantur.

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395. Cum eadem autem hac prudentia, et leges optimas videre, et eas quae unicuique politiarum congruunt. Ad politias enim leges oportet poni, et ponuntur omnes: sed non politias ad leges. Politia quidem enim est civitatis ordo, qui circa principatus quo modo distribuantur, et quid dominans politiae, et quid quod finis est communionis singulis. Leges autem separatae significantium politiam secundum quas oportet principes principari, et observare transgredientes ipsas. Quare palam quod differentias, et numerum necessarium habere politiae uniuscuiusque et ad legum positiones. Non enim possibile est easdem leges conferre oligarchiis neque democratiis omnibus: siquidem plures, et non una democratia, neque oligarchia solum est.

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396. Quoniam autem in prima methodo, politiarum divisimus tres quidem rectas politias, regnum, aristocratiam, politicam: Tres autem harum transgressiones, tyrannidem quidem regni: oligarchiam autem aristocratiae, democratiam autem politiae: et de aristocratia autem quidem et regno dictum est (de optima enim politia considerare idem, et de iis est dicere hominibus: vult enim utrumque consistere secundum virtutem diffusam); adhuc autem quid differant invicem aristocratia et regnum, et quando oportet regnum putare, determinatum est prius:

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397. Reliquum de politia percurrere ea, quae communi nomine appellatur; et de aliis politiis, oligarchia et democratia, et tyrannide.

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398. Manifestum quidem igitur et harum transgressionum quae pessima, et secunda quae: necesse enim eam quidem quae primae et divinissimae transgressionem, esse pessimam. Regnum autem, necessarium, aut nomen solum habere non existens, aut propter multam excellentiam regis esse: et tyrannidem, pessimam existentem, plurimum distare a politia: secundo autem, oligarchiam; aristocratia enim distat multum ab hac politia. Mensuratissimam autem, democratiam.

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399. Iam quidem igitur pronuntiavit et quidam priorum sic non tamen in idem nobis aspiciens. Ille quidem iudicavit omnibus quidem existentibus Epiicheis, puta oligarchia bona et aliis pessimam democratiam, pravarum autem optimam. Nos autem totaliter has vitiatas esse dicimus; et meliorem quidem oligarchiam, aliam alia, non bene habet dicere; minus autem pravam. Sed de tali quidem iudicio dimittatur nunc.

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400. Nobis autem primo dividendum est, quod sunt differentiae politiarum; siquidem sunt species plures democratiae et oligarchiae.

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401. Deinde, quae communissima et quae eligibilissima post optimam politiam, et utique si qua alia contigerit aristocratia, et consistens bene, sed pluribus congruens covitatibus quae sit.

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402. Deinde et aliarum, quae quibus eligibilis. Forte enim iis quidem necessaria democratia magis quam oligarchia; iis autem haec, magis quam illa. Post, hoc autem quomodo oportet instituere volentem has politias: dico autem democratias secundum unamquamque speciem, et iterum oligarchias. Tandem autem post haec omnia quando fecerimus breviter, contingentem memoriam tentandum supervenire quae corruptiones et quae salvationes politiarum, et communiter et sigillatim uniuscuiusque, et propter quas causas haec maxime fieri nata sunt.

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Postquam Philosophus determinavit de politia optima, puta de regno, et distinxit eius modos, et dissolvit quasdam dubitationes ex quibus apparet natura ipsius, scilicet monarchiae, idest potestatis regalis, prosequitur de aliis politiis. Et dividitur in duas.

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In prima ostendit de quibus et quo ordine considerandum est in hac scientia, et quae sunt considerata, et quae restant consideranda.

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Secundo prosequitur de illis, ibi, ut igitur et cetera.

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Prima in tres.

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In prima ostendit, quae sunt consideranda in hac scientia.

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Secundo ostendit, quae sunt considerata, et qui restant consideranda, ibi, quoniam autem in prima et cetera.

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In tertia ostendit quo ordine considerandum est, ibi, nobis autem et cetera.

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Adhuc prima in duas.

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In prima ostendit, quod istius scientiae est considerare de politia optima, quae et qualis sit, et quibus et qualibus congruit.

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Secundo ostendit quae sunt illa universaliter quae pertinent ad considerationem huius scientiae, ibi, quam optima simpliciter et cetera.

Polit.L1

In prima intendit istam rationem, in omnibus artibus factivis, et in omnibus scientiis activis, quae non versantur circa aliquam naturam particularem, sed circa aliquod unum commune, et quae perfecte considerant aliquod unum commune, unius est considerare qualis dispositio convenit unicuique illorum, quae sunt sub communi, et qualis est optima, quae competit illi communi et primo: sed politica est scientia activa considerativa alicuius unius communis, non particularis, et perfecte considerat illud: quare ipsius est considerare quae politia est optima, et quae politia quibus convenit. Circa istam rationem sic procedit. Supposita minore.

Polit.L1

Primo probat minorem, et eam ponit.

Polit.L1

Secundo concludit conclusionem, ibi, quare manifestum et cetera.

Polit.L1

Circa primum intelligendum est, quod scientiae omnes aliquod subiectum considerant, sed in quibusdam contingit esse illud univocum, in aliis autem non univocum, sed analogum, dictum de pluribus per attributionem ad aliquod prius inter illa. Et sicut est in speculativis, sic etiam est in activis et factivis, quae sunt quaedam scientiae activae et factivae considerantes aliquod unum dictum de pluribus per attributionem ad aliquod primum. Et in talibus proponit propositionem suam maiorem. Et dicit quod in omnibus artibus factivis et scientiis activis, quae non considerant particulare aliquod, sed considerant aliquod unum commune pluribus secundum analogiam perfecte considerantibus, illud commune unius est considerare quae et qualis est dispositio uniuscuiusque illorum habentium attributionem ad primum, et qualis est optima dispositio, quae competit illi primo, ad quod alia habent attributionem. Et declarat istam proportionem, quia ars exercitativa considerat quae et qualis exercitatio, cui et quali corpori conveniat. Considerat etiam quae est exercitatio optima, quae optime disposito corpori convenit. Optima enim exercitatio convenit ei qui est optime dispositus et proportionatus secundum naturam, et illa exercitatio, quae competit pluribus habentibus attributionem ad aliquid unum, illa una omnibus competit secundum attributionem. Ista enim est consideratio exercitativae artis. Et si aliquis obiiciat quod exercitativa non debet considerare dispositionem illam optimam, quia nullus attingit ad eam. Hoc removens dicit, quod si aliquis non desideret dispositionem optimam, vel quae sibi possibilis est, nec scientiam, vel habitum eorum, quae circa exercitationem illam sunt, tamen ars exercitativa de istis debet considerare. Iterum ars exercitativa debet disponere potentiam exercitati ad hanc, similiter medicina considerat sanitatem, et quae et qualis, cui et quali corpori conveniat. Considerat etiam dispositionem corporum, puta complexiones, et quae complexio optima, et quae sanitas optime complexionato congruit. Similiter est circa artem faciendi vestes, et circa omnes alias artes, et ratio huius est, quoniam si aliqua scientia considerat aliquam naturam, considerat passiones illius, considerat etiam omnia, quae attributionem habent ad illam naturam. Iterum passiones illorum attributorum, sed passio primi in scientia est dispositio eius optima. Passiones eorum quae attribuuntur sunt quales illis congruunt, et ideo eiusdem scientiae est considerare, et optimam dispositionem, et quae quali congruit.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quare palam concludit conclusionem. Et dicit, quod ex istis manifestum est, quod scientiae eiusdem, scilicet politicae, est considerare quae est optima politia. Haec autem est quae maxime desideratur, et est secundum voluntatem, si non sit impedimentum per aliquod extrinsecum. Contingit enim per aliquod impediens quod aliquis non appetit optimam politiam. Iterum politica scientia considerat, quae politia quibus convenit. Sunt enim multi qui non possunt attingere ad optimam, quae illis competat, sed ad illam quae illis congruit.

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Deinde cum dicit quare optimam ostendit quae pertinent ad considerationem universaliter huius scientiae.

Polit.L1

Et primo ostendit de quibus considerat per se et primo.

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Secundo ostendit de quibus ex consequenti; puta de differentiis legum et politiarum, ibi, propter quod et cetera.

Polit.L1

Prima in duas.

Polit.L1

In prima facit quod dictum est.

Polit.L1

In secunda tangit defectus quorumdam circa praedicta, ibi, quo plurimi et cetera.

Polit.L1

In prima dicit, quod manifestum est ex dictis, quod politicus considerat politiam simpliciter. Sicut enim dictum est, considerans aliquam naturam, considerat quae est optima dispositio eius; et ideo considerans politiam considerat eam quae est optima. Sed politicus de politia considerat: quare manifestum est, quod politicus et legislator considerant de optima politia. Iterum ad ipsum pertinet considerare quae est politia optima ex suppositione. Si enim in civitate aliqua sint plures virtuosi excedentes alios in virtute, et populus inclinetur ad virtutem, his suppositis optima politia reguntur isti. Iterum ad politicum pertinet considerare politiam quae ex suppositione, non ex suppositione simpliciter, sed ex suppositione alicuius quod non est bonum simpliciter. Si enim ista sit politia, oportet considerare in principio qualiter poterit fieri, et qualiter poterit conservari in multo tempore. Si enim aliqua civitas non regeretur optima politia simpliciter, nec etiam sufficienti in per se necessariis, nec etiam optima ex suppositione, quae ei contingere potest, sed quadam alia politia peiori ista ex suppositione non simpliciter, sed alicuius, quod non est simpliciter bonum. Item praeter omnia ista considerat politicus, quae politia cui civitati congruit.

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Deinde cum dicit quo plurimi tangit defectum quorumdam circa praedicta. Et dividitur in duas, secundum quod dupliciter eos reprobat.

Polit.L1

Secunda, ibi, oportet autem et cetera.

Polit.L1

In prima dicit: dictum est, quod politicus debet considerare politiam optimam simpliciter, et ex suppositione, quae pluribus civitatibus congruit. Sicut medicus non solum considerat sanitatem simpliciter, sed sanitatem quae competit isti. In hoc autem multi loquentium de politia defecerunt. Et si in aliquibus dicant bene, tamen in politiis, quae non sunt optimae, opportunae tamen aliquibus civitatibus, defecerunt, quia politicus non solum habet considerare politiam simpliciter optimam, sed ex suppositione, et quae cuique congruit, et quae possibilis. Similiter debet politicus considerare politiam faciliorem et communiorem omnibus. Isti autem solum de optima politia determinaverunt, quae multis indiget, ad quam pauci pertingere possunt. Et ideo solum de illa quae vix aut nunquam esse potest, consideraverunt. Alii consideraverunt politiam magis communem, et nihil de optima dixerunt: unde reprobabant quasdam politias, sicut politias Laconicorum, et si qua alia est, quae approbanda est, et quam laudamus. Et ideo manifestum est, quod erraverunt.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit oportet autem secundo improbat illos. Reprobat autem eos in hoc, quod voluerunt alias politias corrigere, in quo erraverunt. Et dicit, quod volentem corrigere aliquam politiam, oportet talem modum et ordinem invenire, ad quem possunt cives suaderi, et prosequi faciliter. Non enim minus difficile videtur corrigere politiam aliquam quam instituere eam a principio; sicut non videtur minus esse difficile addiscere, postquam aliquis oblitus est, et a principio. Sic autem isti non fecerunt; oportebat autem. Oportet enim qui vult corrigere aliquam politiam, prius amovere inordinationes, quae sunt in illa politia, et deinde inducere novum ordinem. Sicut si aliquis vult calefacere frigidum, oportet, quod prius natura abiiciat formam frigiditatis, et postmodum inducat formam caliditatis: sic in proposito. Non sic autem fecerunt isti; et ideo erraverunt in corrigendo.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit propter quod declarat, quod oportet politicum considerare, quae sunt differentiae politiarum.

Polit.L1

Et primo facit hoc.

Polit.L1

Secundo dicit, quod ad ipsum pertinet considerare differentias legum, ibi, cum eadem autem et cetera.

Polit.L1

In prima dicit, quod praeter ea quae dicta sunt, oportet politicum considerare per quae et quomodo contingit auxiliari politiis existentibus, cum fuerit error in illis, sicut praetactum fuit in praecedentibus. Hoc autem non potest fieri, nisi manifestum sit, quae sint differentiae et species politiarum; quia non est possibile aliquem auxiliari per se in eo quod non novit. Aliqui enim dicunt popularem esse unum tantum, similiter etiam et paucorum; nunc autem istud non est verum: sunt enim plures species utriusque istarum. Oportet igitur politicum, si debeat auxiliari politiis existentibus et dirigere differentias ipsarum, non latere quot sunt, et qualiter etiam componantur ex principiis suis.

Polit.L1

Consequenter cum dicit cum eadem declarat, quod oportet ipsum considerare de differentiis legum; dicens, quod cum consideratione praedictorum oportet considerare de legibus; puta quae sint optimae simpliciter, idest quae sint optimae secundum unamquamque politiam, et quae et quales unicuique illarum conveniunt. Cuius ratio est, quoniam leges omnes feruntur vel ferri debent secundum quod competit politiae per se, et non e converso politias ordinare secundum quod competit legibus. Politia enim est ordo principatuum in civitate, secundum quem distribuuntur ipsi principatus secundum rationem; et secundum quem attenditur, quem oportet esse dominantem in civitate, et quis etiam sit finis communicationis civium. Ista autem determinantur per leges. Leges enim separatae, scilicet seorsum acceptae, sunt enunciationes de agibilibus significantes praedictum ordinem, scilicet quot oportet esse differentias, et quis finis civitatis, et qualiter et quomodo oportet dominari, et qualiter oportet observare transgredientes ipsas. Igitur manifestum, quod necesse est politicum considerare leges, et differentias et numerum ipsarum, et differentias, quae sunt secundum differentias et numerum politiarum, quia non est possibile easdem leges conferre statui populari et paucorum: leges enim differunt secundum diversitatem finium: status autem popularis et paucorum non est idem finis. Nec etiam eaedem leges competunt omnibus modis statui populari; similiter nec omnibus modis statui paucorum; si non supponamus quod non sit popularis una tantum, nec paucorum una tantum, sed multae. Si enim sunt multae, aliqualiter diversos fines habent; leges vero diversificantur secundum diversitatem finium.

Polit.L1

Consequenter cum dicit quoniam autem declarat, quae de praedictis considerata sunt, et quae restant consideranda. Et dividitur in duas.

Polit.L1

Quoniam primo declarat quae sunt considerata.

Polit.L1

Secundo cum dicit, reliquum de politia etc. declarat quae restant consideranda.

Polit.L1

Primo igitur dicit, quod in praecedenti methodo distinximus politias in rectas et transgressas. Rectas quidem, ut sunt regnum, quod est optimum, et optimatum, et ea quae dicitur communi nomine politia. Transgressae autem sunt tyrannis quae a regno transgreditur, et propter hoc est pessima; et paucorum quae transgreditur ab optimatum; et popularis, quae a politia. Adhuc autem consideratum est in praecedentibus de regno et de statu optimatum. Idem enim est considerare de his quae significantur per ista nomina, et de optima politia: utraque enim istarum duarum intendit principaliter in finem, qui est secundum virtutem, et ad ipsam virtutem multam et perfectam existentem. Iterum consideratum est in quo differunt regnum et respublica optimatum, et quando etiam oportet regnum esse, et quibus oportet vivere sub regno.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit reliquum de politia declarat quae restant considerare. Et circa hoc duo facit.

Polit.L1

Primo tangit hoc quod dictum est.

Polit.L1

Secundo, quia fecerat mentionem de transgressis politiis, declarat, quae illarum est magis, et quae minus mala, ibi, manifestum quidem igitur et cetera.

Polit.L1

Circa primum dicit, quod post ea quae determinata sunt, relinquitur nobis considerandum de ea quae appellatur communi nomine politia recta existente, et de his quae transgrediuntur rectis, sicut de populari et paucorum et tyrannide.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit manifestum quidem declarat, quae istorum est magis et minus mala.

Polit.L1

Et primo facit hoc.

Polit.L1

Secundo tangit defectum cuiusdam, ibi, iam quidem igitur et cetera.

Polit.L1

Primo igitur dicit, quod ex dicendis poterit esse manifestum, quae politiarum transgressarum est pessima et quae minus mala post illam, et quae minime. Illa enim quae transgreditur ab optima et divinissima politia quae est maxime secundum rationem rectam, necessarium est esse pessimam, sicut ex se manifestum. Regnum autem est optima politia, et maxime secundum rationem. Regem enim, aut solum nomen regis oportet habere, et aequivoce, aut talem esse propter excellentiam virtutis et boni universaliter. Dicitur enim in octavo Ethicorum quod non est rex, qui non est per se sufficiens et omnibus bonis superexcellens. Quare tyrannis erit pessima omnium, et propter hoc, plurimum distat ab optima. Deinde autem post ipsam mala est gubernatio paucorum; transgreditur enim ab optimatum, quae optima est post regnum. Ergo ipsa pessima est post tyrannidem. Minus autem mala, et magis commensurata inter transgressas est popularis, quia transgreditur a politia, quae minus recta est inter rectas: ergo ista est minime mala inter transgressas: quod enim a minus bono transgreditur, necesse est esse minus malum.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit iam quidem tangit defectum Platonis circa praedicta; dicens, quod quidam priorum philosophantium, scilicet Plato, de istis pronunciavit, non tamen in idem ferens intentionem nobiscum. Ipse enim iudicavit omnes politias bonas esse, sicut regnum et paucorum et alias: sed popularem dixit esse pessimam respectu rectarum simpliciter. Dixit tamen esse optimam respectu earum quae inordinatae sunt. Nos autem e contrario dicimus, has tres politias totaliter transgressas esse, popularem scilicet et paucorum et tyrannidem; et quod non convenienter dicitur gubernationem paucorum unam meliorem alia: quae enim rationem boni non habent omnino, non sunt comparabilia secundum bonitatem: sed verius potest dici unam esse minus pravam alia: quae enim prava sunt contingunt comparari unum alii secundum pravitatem. Sed quia iudicium de talibus non multum facit ad propositum, dimittatur ad praesens.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit nobis autem dat ordinem considerandi de istis. Et primo quantum ad ea, quae consideranda sunt in quarto.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit deinde quae quantum ad quaedam quae consideranda sunt consequenter. Dicit igitur primo, quod post praedicta primo est considerandum a nobis quot sunt differentiae politiarum dictarum prius, puta popularis, et paucorum, et optimatum, si ita sit, quod sint plures species ipsarum. Postea considerabimus, quae politia sit communissima quantum ad omnes conditiones multitudinis, et quae maxime eligibilis in ordine ad finem post optimas politias, quae sunt regnum, et optimatum simpliciter. Et iterum si contingit esse aliquam speciem optimatum praeter simplicem, quae sit bene mansiva, et conveniens multis civitatibus, quae sit illa. Post haec vero considerandum erit, quae vel qualis, quibus vel qualibus sit magis eligibilis, et magis congruens. Possibile enim est, quod quibusdam magis congruat popularis quam paucorum, quibusdam autem magis ista quam illa.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit deinde et aliarum dat ordinem considerandi quantum ad consideranda consequenter; dicens, quod deinde post determinationem dictorum considerandum erit, quomodo instituendae sint a principio huiusmodi politiae, et ex quibus: puta quomodo instituendae sunt et ex quibus respublica popularis et paucorum secundum omnes species earum, et quomodo optima sit instituenda. Deinde autem posterius secundum intentionem, quamvis prius secundum executionem, puta in libro sequenti, considerandum est quae sunt principia corruptiva et salvativa huiusmodi politiarum, et in universali, et secundum unamquamque aliarum, et quae sunt causae propter quas maxime natae sunt corrumpi et salvari. Est autem intelligendum, quod prius considerat de corrumpentibus et salvantibus eas, puta in quinto istius; posterius et deinceps de institutione earum; quamvis prius esset in intentione de institutione, quam de salvatione et corruptione.

Polit.L1

L. 2 (Δ.3–4, 1289b27–1290b22)Causa investigatur ut plures sint species rerumpublicarum; reiciturque illa divisio quae per multos et paucos fiebat a quibusdam.

Causa investigatur ut plures sint species rerumpublicarum; reiciturque illa divisio quae per multos et paucos fiebat a quibusdam.

Polit.L2

403. Eius quidem igitur, quod esse plures politias, causa, quia omnis civitatis sunt partes plures numero.

Polit.L2

404. Primo quidem enim ex domibus compositas videmus omnes civitates: deinde rursus huius multitudinis, hos quidem opulentos necessarium esse, hos autem egenos, alios autem medios: et oplulentorum autem et egenorum hic quidem arma exercens, hic autem sine armis.

Polit.L2

405. Et hunc quidem populum videmus, agricultores esse; hunc autem circa forum occupatos, hunc autem banausium.

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406. Et insignium sunt differentiae, et secundum divitias, et magnitudines substantiae: puta secundum nutritiones equorum: hoc enim non facile non divites facere. Propter quod quidem abutii quis temporibus, quibuscumque civitatibus, in equis potentia erat, oligarchiae apud istos erant: utebantur autem ad bella equis ad vicinos: velut Eretrii, et Chalcidii, et Magnetes, qui sub Meandro, et aliorum multi circa Asiam.

Polit.L2

407. Adhuc cum iis, quae penes divites, differentiis sunt, haec quidem secundum genus, haec autem secundum virtutem, et si quid utique tale alterum dictum est esse civitatis pars, in iis quae circa aristocratiam. Ibi enim divisimus ex quot partibus necessariis est omnis civitas.

Polit.L2

408. Harum enim partium aliquando quidem omnes participant politia, aliquando autem pauciores aliquando autem plures.

Polit.L2

409. Manifestum igitur quod plures necessarium est esse politias specie differentes ab invicem; etenim hae partes differunt specie a se ipsis. Politia quidem enim principatuum ordo est: hunc autem distribuunt omnes vel secundum potentiam principantium, vel secundum quandam ipsorum communem aequalitatem: dico autem, puta egenorum vel opulentorum, vel communem quandam ambarum. Necessarium ergo politias esse tot, quot quidem ordines secundum excellentiam sunt, et secundum differentias partium.

Polit.L2

410. Maxime autem videntur esse duae, quemadmodum de ventis dicitur, ii quidem Australes, ii quidem Boreales, reliqui autem horum praetergressiones sic et politiarum duae, populus et oligarchia; aristocratiam enim ponunt speciem oligarchiae tamquam existentem quandam oligarchiam, et eam quae vocatur politia, democratiae; sicut in ventis Zephyrum quidem Boreae, Austrium autem Eurum. Similiter autem habet et circa harmonias, ut aiunt quidam; etenim ibi ponunt duas species, Doricam et Phrygiam; alias autem coordinationes has quidem doricas, has autem phrygias vocant.

Polit.L2

411. Maxime quidem igitur consueverunt ita existimare de politiis. Verius autem et melius, ut non divisimus, duarum, aut unius existentis bene institutae, alias esse transgressiones, has quidem bene contemperatae harmoniae, has autem optimae politiae; oligarchias quidem eas quam duriores et magis dispoticae, remissas autem eet molles demoticas.

Polit.L2

412. Non oportet autem poni democratiam, sicut consueverunt quidam nunc simpliciter ita, ubi dominans multitudo: etenim in oligarchiis et ubique amplior pars dominans: neque oligarchiam ubi domini politiae pauci. Si enim essent qui omnes mille et trecenti,et horum ipsi mille divites, et non traderent de principatu ipsis trecentis et pauperibus liberis existentibus, et quantum ad alia similibus, nullus utique diceret democratizare istos. Similiter autem et si pauperes quidem pauci essent, valentiores autem divitibus pluribus existentibus, nullus utique oligarchiam appellaret; neque talem, si aliis existentibus divitibus non attribuet honorem.

Polit.L2

413. Magis igitur dicendum quod demos quidem est quando liberi fuerint domini, oligarchia autem quando divites: sed accidit hos quidem plures esse, hos autem paucos: liberi quidem enim multi, divites autem pauci.

Polit.L2

414. Etenim utique si secundum magnitudinem distribuetur principatus, sicut in Aethiopia aiunt quidam, vel secundum pulchritudinem, oligarchia utique esset: pauca enim multitudo et pulchrorum et magnorum.

Polit.L2

415. Sed neque iis solum sufficienter habet determinare politias has. Sed quoniam partes plures et populi, et oligarchiae sunt, adhuc distinguendum, tamquam neque si liberi pauci existentes pluribus et non liberis principentur, demos, velut in Apollonia quae in Ionio, et in Thera. In utraque enim harum civitatum in honoribus erant qui differebant secundum ingenuitatem et primi obtinentes vicinias pauci existentes multorum. Neque utique divites propter excedere secundum multitudinem demos, velut in Colophone, antiquitus ibi non possidebant magnam substantiam qui plures antequam fieret bellum adversus Lydos. Sed est democratia quidem, quando liberi et egeni plures existentes domini fuerint, principantur. Oligarchia autem quando divites et nobiliores, pauci existentes. Quod quidem igitur politiae sunt plures, et propter quam causam, dictum est.

Polit.L2

Postquam philosophus declaravit de quibus considerat scientia ista et quae dicenda, et secundum quem ordinem, in parte ista prosequitur. Et dividitur in partes duas: quia primo facit quod dictum est; secundo determinat de quibusdam partibus principalibus politiae, ibi, quae autem sit et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima distinguit politias. In secunda prosequitur de illis, de quibus non est dictum prius, ibi, reliquum autem est et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima ostendit esse plures politias. In secunda distinguit species ipsarum magis in speciali, ibi, quod autem et cetera. Prima in duas, secundum quod primo probat politias esse plures, et quot sunt aliquo modo; secundo quod sunt plures dictis, cum dicit, quod autem et plures et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima dicit quod sunt plures: in secunda quot sunt, ibi, maxime autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. Primo praemittit causam propter quam sunt plures. Secundo manifestat, ibi, primo quidem enim et cetera. In prima dicit quod causa quare politiae sunt plures est, quia cuiuslibet civitatis plures sunt partes differentes secundum rationem. Et quamvis distinctio formae non sit propter distinctionem materiae, tamen ad distinctionem materiae sequitur distinctio formae.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit primo quidem propositam causam manifestat. Et primo ostendit quae sunt partes civitatis, et quam habent similitudinem ad politiam. In secunda ex hoc concludit quod sunt plures politiae, subinducens causam ex dictis propter quam sunt plures politiae, ibi, manifestum igitur et cetera. Prima in duas. Primo distinguit partes civitatis. Secundo ostendit quam habitudinem habent ad politiam, ibi, harum enim et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. Primo distinguit partes civitatis. Secundo subdividit, ibi, et hunc quidem et cetera. In prima dicit quod manifestum est quod primo civitas componatur ex domibus; et ideo quaecumque sunt partes domus, sunt partes civitatis radicaliter. Item in multitudine civitatis quidam sunt divites et opulenti, quidam pauperes, paucam aut nullam habentes substantiam; quidam medii. Iterum divitum et egenorum quidam habent exercitum armorum, quidam non habent.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit et hunc quidem subdividit partes civitatis. Et primo subdividit egenos. Secundo divites, ibi, et insignium et cetera. Tertio subdividit medios, ibi, adhuc cum et cetera. In prima dicit quod egenorum multi sunt modi: quidam enim sunt agricultores qui versantur circa culturam agrorum, alii sunt qui vacant circa commutationes venalium rerum, alii sunt dediti sordidis ministeriis qui faciendo opera sua maculant corpus, sicut sunt mercenarii. Istorum sunt multi modi; quidam coriarii, quidam pellium curatores et huiusmodi.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit et insignium subdividit opulentos; et dicit quod modi opulentorum sunt secundum diversitatem divitiarum et excessum earum. Quidam enim sunt divites eo quod vacant circa nutritionem equorum et aliorum animalium: tales enim non est difficile fieri divites: illud enim munus non possunt ferre nisi divites; et ideo antiquitus in illis civitatibus quarum potentia erat in equis et animalibus, erat politia paucorum: isti enim utebantur equis quos nutriebant contra adversarios, sicut contra vicinos; sicut quidam dicti Eretrienses et Chalcidenses et Magnesii, qui sunt super Meandro, et aliae plures civitates Asiae.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit adhuc cum subdividit medios; et dicit quod praeter differentias istorum divitum sunt aliae differentiae mediorum: quorum quidam excedunt secundum genus et nobilitatem, alii excedunt secundum virtutem. Similiter si aliud aliquid sit tale quod sit necessarium et utile civitati, et dicitur pars civitatis. Et hoc dictum fuit, ubi dicebatur de statu optimatum. Ibi enim dictum fuit, ex quot partibus necessariis est quaelibet civitas: puta in secundo huius, ubi posuit politiam Platonis quam forte dixit esse optimatum. Ibi enim numeravit partes civitatis. Vel forte in tractatu separato, ubi de republica optimatum dixit.

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Deinde cum dicit harum enim declarat quam habitudinem habent istae partes ad politiam; et dicit quod istarum partium aliquando omnes attingunt ad politiam, sicut in populari in qua populus dominatur, omnes attingunt ad eam, etiam infimi. Aliquando pauci, sicut in paucorum statu in qua divites principantur. Aliquando plures, sicut in statu optimatum, in qua principantur plures virtuosi.

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Deinde cum dicit manifestum igitur concludit causam propter quam sunt plures politiae. Et videtur concludere duas causas; et dicit quod manifestum est quod necesse est esse plures politias differentes adinvicem secundum speciem; quia distinctio politiarum secundum speciem est secundum distinctionem partium principalium. Quamvis enim diversitas secundum speciem non sit propter diversitatem partium materialium, tamen ad diversitatem partium materialium sequitur diversitas formae. Sed partium civitatis quaedam differunt specie adinvicem etiam pertinentium ad speciem: plures igitur erunt politiae. Et est intelligendum ad evidentiam dicti, quod sicut partium animalis quaedam sunt quae non pertinent ad speciem, sicut haec caro, haec ossa, quaedam quae pertinent ad ipsam, sicut caro et ossa absolute: et sicut sunt quaedam quae non attingunt ad formam rei, sicut pili et ungues, quaedam quae attingunt, sicut cor et hepar: et secundum distinctionem istorum secundum speciem diversificantur animalia secundum speciem, non autem secundum primarum distinctionem quae non attingunt ad formam, nec pertinent ad speciem: sic civitatis sunt quaedam partes quae non attingunt ad civilitatem, nec pertinent ad formam eius; aliae sunt partes principales ipsius; et secundum distinctionem istarum distinguuntur politiae; cuiusmodi sunt illae secundum quas distinguuntur principatus. Aliam causam tangit; et dicit, quod politia est ordo principatuum: ergo secundum distinctionem principatuum est distinctio politiarum. Sed distinctio principatuum est secundum distinctionem huiusmodi partium. In quibusdam enim politiis principatus distribuuntur secundum potentiam eorum qui possunt attingere ad principatum; in aliis secundum aequalitatem quamdam; sicut divites propter excessum divitiarum, et egeni principantur propter libertatem, in aliis plures propter virtutem; et isti sunt medii inter istos. Quare manifestum est, cum istae partes sint plures differentes species, quod erunt plures politiae differentes secundum speciem; et tot erunt politiae, quot sunt gradus secundum excessum aliquem.

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Deinde cum dicit maxime autem ostendit quot sunt politiae. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo removet errorem quorumdam, ibi, non oportet autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima dicit quot sunt secundum opinionem aliorum. In secunda quot secundum opinionem suam, ibi maxime quidem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod secundum intentionem aliorum, duae videntur maxime esse politiae, sicut duo sunt venti principales, scilicet Australis et borealis, et quod alii omnes sunt praetergressiones istorum duorum et quod ab eis deficientes reducuntur ad ipsos. Una est paucorum, alia popularis. Optimatum autem dicunt esse sub paucorum et reduci ad eam et politiam dicunt esse popularem quamdam, sicut accidit in ventis: ad illos enim duos omnes alios reducunt; sicut Zephyrum ad Boream, Eurum autem ad Austrum. Eodem modo accidit in proportionibus musicalibus. Sunt enim duae harmoniae principales, quibus omnes aliae coordinantur; scilicet Dorica et Phrygia. Dorica dicitur harmonia primi toni. Phrygia vero tertii. Et istis alias coordinant; quasdam reducentes ad Doricam, quasdam ad Phrygiam. Similiter in proposito duas posuerunt principales; scilicet politias popularem et paucorum; et istis duabus alias coordinaverunt.

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Deinde cum dicit maxime quidem declarat quot sunt secundum suam opinionem; et dicit, quod antiqui sic consueverunt dividere politias. Melius tamen est quod dividamus eas secundum quod superius dictum fuit: scilicet quod quaedam sunt politiae rectae, quaedam quae sunt transgressiones; ita quod unius politiae bene ordinatae vel duarum, aliae sunt transgressiones: puta quaedam transgressiones sunt bene commensuratae, sicut est illa quae communi nomine nominatur respublica; aliae vero sunt transgressiones.

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Deinde cum dicit non oportet removet errorem quemdam circa distinctionem status paucorum et popularium. Et primo probat quod non distinguuntur, sicut ipsi posuerunt eas distingui, proponendo intentum suum. Secundo ostendit qualiter distinguuntur, ibi, magis igitur. In prima dicit quod non oportet quod determinetur status popularis, sicut quidam consueverunt ponere et determinare ipsum simpliciter, ita quod status popularis sit politia in qua multitudo principatur: quia contingit quod in statu paucorum multi divites dominentur, et tamen tunc non erit status popularis. Non ergo debet status popularis determinari per hoc quod pauci dominentur. Quoniam si essent in aliqua civitate mille trecenti, et mille essent divites et principarentur aliis trecentis pauperibus et liberis existentibus et non concederent eis aliquid de principatu, sed tantum subiicerentur eis, nullus diceret eos principari principatu populari; et tamen multitudo dominaretur. Non ergo per hoc determinatur popularis status, quia multi principantur. Similiter si illi trecenti pauperes et pauci respectu aliorum existentes essent meliores divitibus et principarentur, divites autem non principarentur, sed subiicerentur illis, talem politiam nullus diceret statum paucorum; et tamen pauci sunt principantes. Quare manifestum est quod status paucorum non debet determinari per hoc quod pauci dominentur.

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Deinde cum dicit magis igitur declarat quomodo determinandae sunt respublica paucorum et popularis; et habet partes duas. In prima proponit quod per se determinantur libertate et divitiis, et per accidens multitudine et paucitate. In secunda probat, ibi, etenim utique et cetera. In prima dicit quod magis dicendum quod status popularis sit, quando liberi existentes principantur; paucorum quando divites. Sed accidit liberos esse plures, divites vero paucos; et ideo per accidens determinantur paucitate et multitudine.

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Deinde cum dicit etenim utique probat illud quod dictum est. Et primo probat quod multitudine et paucitate per se non distinguuntur nec determinantur. Secundo, quod solum determinantur per se per divitias et paupertatem; sed oportet adiungere multum et paucum, licet per accidens, ibi, sed neque iis. In prima dicit: ita dictum est quod paupertate et divitiis per se determinantur popularis et paucorum, sed per accidens multitudine et paucitate. Quia si per se distribuerentur principatus secundum magnitudinem, sicut dicunt quidam fieri in Aethiopia, vel secundum pulchritudinem, ita quod ille qui esset maior et pulchrior principaretur, cum pauci sint pulchri et magni, esset tunc paucorum; hoc autem falsum est. Status enim paucorum tantum est cum divites principantur. Quare manifestum est quod per se non determinantur paucitate et multitudine.

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Deinde cum dicit sed neque declarat quod paucitate et multitudine distinguuntur, sed per accidens; et quod oportet ista adiungere; et dicit, quod status paucorum et status popularis non sufficienter habent terminari his differentiis solum, scilicet paupertate et divitiis: sed cum sint plures partes popularis et paucorum, oportet adiungere aliqua ad determinationem eorum, saltem per accidens; quoniam si pauci liberi existentes principentur pluribus non liberis, non dicemus quod sit principatus popularis; sicut accidit in Apollonia quae est in Ionio et in Thera. In istis enim urbibus principabantur excellentes secundum ingenuitatem et pauci existentes erant ad alios collati, et iam non erat status popularis. Similiter si multi secundum divitias excedentes principarentur, non diceremus popularem, sicut accidit antiquitus in quadam civitate quae dicitur Colophon. In illa enim civitate erant plures divites antequam fieret bellum inter ipsos et Lydos, et principabantur: attamen non erat popularis. Sed sic debet determinari popularis, ut dicatur quod status popularis est, in quo plures existentes liberi et pauperes principantur: et status paucorum est, quando divites pauci existentes vel nobiles dominantur. Et tunc concludit, quod sunt plures politiae; dicens quod manifestum est quod politici sunt plures, et propter quam causam sunt plures.

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L. 3 (Δ.4, 1290b22–1291b15)Ex quibus partibus hoc est personis respublicae constent: et quae partes necessariae sint, quaeve adiunctae: quaeque sibi cohaerere possint, et quae non.

Ex quibus partibus hoc est personis respublicae constent: et quae partes necessariae sint, quaeve adiunctae: quaeque sibi cohaerere possint, et quae non.

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416. Quod autem et plures dictis et quae, et propter quid, dicamus, principium sumentes dictum prius. Confitemur enim non unam partem, sed plures habere omnem civitatem.

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417. Sicut igitur si animalis vellemus accipere species, primo quidem utique segregaremus, quod quidem necessarium habere omne animal, velut quiddam sensitivorum, et quod alimenti elaborativum et susceptivum: puta os et ventrem. Adhuc autem quibus movetur partibus, unumquodque ipsorum. Si itaque, tot species, solum autem horum essent differentiae, dico autem puta oris, quaedam plura genera, et ventris, et sensitivorum, adhuc autem et motivarum partium; numerus coniugationis horum, ex necessitate faciet plura genera animalium. Non enim possibile est idem animal habere plures oris differentias, similiter autem neque aurium. Quare quando acceptae fuerint horum omnes contingentes combinationes, faciet species animalis; et tot species animalis quot quidem coniugationes necessariarum partium sunt.

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418. Eodem autem modo et dictarum politiarum: etenim civitates non ex una, sed ex multis partibus componuntur, sicut dictum est saepe.

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419. Una quidem igitur est quae circa alimentum multitudo, quae vocatur agricolae; secunda autem quae vocatur banausa; est autem haec quae circa has artes sine quibus civitatem impossibile est habitari. Harum autem artium has quidem ex necessitate oportet existere, has autem ad delitias, vel bene vivere. Tertia autem quae circa forum; dico autem foralem quae circa venditiones et emptiones et negotiationes et campsorias demoratur. Quarta autem quod mercenarium.

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420. Quintum autem genus quod propugnans; quod iis nihil minus necessarium est existere, si debeant non servire invadentibus. Nihil enim minus impossibilium quam dignum esse vocare civitatem natura servam; per se sufficiens enim est civitas: quod autem servum, non per se sufficiens.

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421. Propter quod quidem in politia leviter haec, non sufficienter autem dictum est. Ait enim Socrates e quatuor necessariissimis componi civitatem: dicit autem hos textorem, agricolam, coriarium, aedificatorem. Rursum autem apponit tamquam non necessariis iis, aerarium et eos qui supra necessaria pecora adhuc autem negotiatorem, et campsorem. Et haec omnia sunt complementum primae civitatis, tamquam gratia necessariorum omnis civitas sit constituta, sed non boni qui magis, aequalibusque indigeat aerariis et agricolis.

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422. Partem autem propugnantem non prius attribuit antequam regione crescente, ac tangente vicinos, ad bellum instituantur.

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423. At vero et inter quatuor et quotcumque communicantes necessarium esse aliquid reddentem et iudicantem quod iustum. Siquidem igitur et animam ponat utique quis magis partem animalis quam corpus, et civitatum magis talia ponendum quam ea quae ad necessarium usum tendunt; scilicet bellicum et quod participant iustitia disceptativa.

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424. Adhuc autem quod consiliatur, quod quidem est intellectus politici opus; et haec sive separatim existant aliquibus sive eisdem; nihil enim differt ad rationem: ditari et agros colere accidit eisdem saepe. Quare siquidem et haec et illa sunt ponenda partes civitatis, manifestum quod et qui ad arma necessaria civitatis pars est.

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425. Septima autem quae substantiis ministrat, quam vocmus opulentos.

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426. Octava autem demiurgica si populi institutiva et quae circa principatus, administrativa: si quidem, sine principatibus impossibile esse civitatem. Necessarium igitur esse aliquos potentes principari et administrantes vel continue, vel secundum partem civitati, hac administratione.

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427. Reliqua autem, de quibus determinavimus perfecte, quod consiliabitur, et convincat altercantibus de iustis. Siquidem igitur haec oportet fieri in civitatibus, et bene fieri et iuste, necessarium et aliquos politicorum esse principantes virtute.

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428. Alias quidem igitur potentias videtur multis contingere existere eisdem; puta eosdem esse propugnantes et agricolas, et artifices; adhuc autem consiliantes et iudicantes. Informantur autem et virtute omnes, et plurimis principatibus principari putant posse: sed pauperes esse et divites eosdem impossibile est. Propter quod hae partes maxime esse videntur civitatis divites et egeni.

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429. Adhuc autem propterea quod ut in pluribus ii quidem pauci sunt, ii autem multi, hae videntur contrariae partes, partium civitatis, ut et politiae videntur esse democratia et oligarchia. Quod quidem igitur sint politiae plures et propter quas causas, dictum est prius.

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Postquam philosophus declaravit, quod plures sunt politiae et propter quam causam et quot sunt aliquo modo, in parte ista declarat quod sunt plures politiae quam quae dictae sunt: et ostendit hoc quasi ex virtute cuiusdam medii per quod ostendebat prius quod sint plures; et dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit quod sunt plures quam quae dictae sunt. In secunda ostendit quae sunt principales inter illas secundum alios, ibi, alias quidem. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima praemittit intentum suum proponendo principium ad probandum hoc. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, sicut igitur. In prima dicit: sic dictum est, quod sunt plures politiae: quaedam enim sunt rectae; et istae sunt tres: regnum, optimatum status, et respublica. Et sunt tres non rectae: tyrannis, paucorum, et popularis. Modo dicendum est, quod sunt plures politiae quam quae dictae sunt et quae sunt illae et propter quam causam sunt plures; accipiendo principium ad hoc probandum quod prius assumptum fuit ad probandum quod essent plures; scilicet quod omnis civitas plures partes habet et non unam solum: ex isto enim eodem probabitur quod sint plures quam quae dictae sunt.

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Deinde cum dicit sicut igitur probat accipiendo simile in his quae sunt secundum naturam; quia politia assimilatur eis. Est enim politia secundum rationem: ea autem quae secundum rationem sunt, sunt posteriora his quae sunt secundum naturam et ortum habent ex illis; et ideo assumit simile in his ad probandum intentum suum: et habet partes duas. Primo assumit simile. Secundo adaptat ad propositum, ibi, eodem autem modo. Circa primum intelligendum est, quod sicut dictum est prius, partium materialium quaedam sunt quae pertinent ad speciem, quaedam autem non. Partes pertinentes ad ipsam sunt sine quibus species non potest esse; sicut caro et os pertinent ad speciem hominis, quia sine his non potest esse homo. Partes materiales non pertinentes ad speciem sunt, sine quibus species potest reperiri; sicut ista ossa et istae carnes non pertinent ad speciem humanam, quia sine istis potest esse homo. Secundum igitur distinctionem partium pertinentium ad speciem distinguitur forma; quamvis distinctio formae non sit propter distinctionem materiae. De talibus vero partibus secundum quarum distinctionem distinguuntur formae et species, loquitur hic philosophus; et dicit quod si aliquis velit accipere species animalis, oportet quod distinguantur partes materiales animalis, sine quibus non potest esse forma animalis, non autem sine quibus animal potest esse: ut dicatur quod partium animalis materialium, aliud est sensitivum, aliud nutritivum, aliud digestivum: animal enim determinatur sensu; et ideo oportet esse unam partem sensitivam organicam: et cum animal nutriatur, oportet quod recipiat alimentum et quod digerat: ista autem fiunt per diversas partes: quare animalis est quaedam pars receptiva alimenti sicut os, alia digestiva sicut venter. Tertiam non adiungit hic quae necessaria est, per quam scilicet emittit impurum et superfluum; sed in libro de morte et vita adiungit illam. Iterum cum animal moveatur vel de loco ad locum, sicut animalia quae moventur motu progressionis vel motu dilatationis et constrictionis, sicut quaedam imperfecta, oportet quod habeat partes aliquas opportunas ad motum. Si ergo sint tot partes animalis, et istarum partium sint plura genera differentia secundum speciem, sicut sunt plura genera oris et ventris quae differunt secundum speciem; similiter et plura sensitiva differentia secundum speciem et plures partes opportunae ad motum: manifestum est quod secundum distinctionem istarum partium est distinctio specierum animalium: quia non est possibile quod idem animal secundum speciem habeat plures ventres differentes secundum speciem et plures aures et plures differentias oris: quia si animal sit unius speciei, oportet quod partes sint unius speciei, quia per formam ipsius partes eius determinantur. Ergo illae quae terminantur per formam unam, sunt unius speciei. Non ergo possibile est unius animalis esse plures differentias specificas oris, et sic de aliis. Quare manifestum est quod si accipiantur omnes combinationes quae possibiles sunt istarum partium animalium quae differunt secundum species, quod erunt diversae species animalis, et tot quot sunt tales combinationes.

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Deinde cum dicit eodem autem applicat ad propositum; et intendit istam rationem. Secundum distinctionem partium pertinentium ad speciem distinguitur species: sed plures sunt partes pertinentes ad rationem politiae, et plures quam quae dictae sunt: ergo plures erunt politiae et plures quam quae dictae sunt. Circa istam rationem duo facit. Primo applicando simile ad propositum, ponit minorem. Secundo probat, ibi, una quidem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod sicut secundum distinctionem partium animalis pertinentium ad speciem est distinctio specierum animalis, et plures sint species animalis cum sint plures tales partes, eodem modo sunt plures politiae, quia diversae sunt partes civitatis differentes secundum speciem: non enim civitas ex una parte componitur, sed ex multis, sicut frequenter dictum est superius.

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Deinde cum dicit una quidem probat quod sunt plures partes civitatis. Sunt autem tres gradus in ea; infimus, medius et supremus; et secundum hoc dividitur in tres partes. In prima enumerat partes populi qui est in gradu infimo. Secundo enumerat partes medias, ibi, quintum autem. Tertio partes supremas, ibi, reliqua. In prima dicit: bene dictum est quod sunt plures partes civitatis. Una enim est multitudo quae administrativa est alimenti, sicut sunt agricolae et ista est prima pars et necessaria; alimentum enim necessarium est in civitate, et ideo necessarii sunt illi qui administrant ipsum. Secunda pars civitatis quantum ad gradum inferiorem, sunt viles mercenarii: et dicuntur viles mercenarii qui in operibus suis maculant corpus, sicut sunt fullones, et coriarii, et alii huiusmodi artifices, sine quibus non potest civitas inhabitari. Et istarum artium multa sunt genera. Quaedam enim est, quae est ad necessitatem civitatis, sicut textiva et coriaria; sine enim istis non est civitas. Alia est propter delectationem et bene vivere, sicut musica. Et quaedam quae ordinantur ad superfluas delectationes, sicut musica quaedam. Et quaedam quae nocuae sunt civitati, sicut taxillaria et aleativa. Tertia pars civitatis est forensis, quae est circa venditiones et emptiones et negotiationes et nummularios. Quarta pars civitatis est mercenaria: et dicuntur mercenarii qui locant opera sua. Sic igitur sunt quatuor partes civitatis quantum ad inferiorem gradum ipsius.

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Deinde cum dicit quintum autem enumerat partes medias civitatis. Et dicuntur mediae, quia medio modo se habent inter primum principans, et populum qui tenet inferiorem gradum. Et dividitur in partes quinque. In prima probat quod propugnativum sit pars civitatis. In secunda, quod iudicativum, ibi, at vero et cetera. Et in tertia, quod consiliativum, ibi, adhuc autem quod consiliatur et cetera. In quarta, quod divites, ibi, septima et cetera. In quinta, quod directivum populi, ibi, octava et cetera. Prima istarum dividitur in duas. In prima probat, quod propugnativum sit pars civitatis. Secundo removet errorem quorumdam, ibi, quapropter et cetera. In prima dicit, quod quinta pars civitatis computando quatuor primas partes, et prima inter medias, est quod propugnativum est: quae pars non est minus necessaria quam aliqua praedictarum, si non debeat civitas esse serva; manifestum enim est, et inconveniens, et contra rationem civitatis ipsam esse naturaliter servam. Et ratio huius est, quia civitas est per se sufficiens: sed illud quod servum est, non est per se sufficiens; quia omnes operationes eius ad alterum ordinantur. Illud autem cuius operationes ad alterum sunt, non est per se sufficiens. Quare manifestum est, quod civitas non debet esse serva. Sed si civitas non haberet pugnantes contra adversarios, subiugaretur aliis et esset serva. Quare manifestum est, quod necessarium est in civitate esse propugnativum.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod removet errorem Platonis: et dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit, quod insufficienter dixit de partibus civitatis. Secundo tangit quod dixit Plato de propugnativo, ibi, partem autem propugnantem et cetera. In prima dicit: ita dictum est, quod quatuor sunt partes civitatis necessariae circa gradum infimum civitatis, et est alia pars non minus necessaria quae dicitur propugnativum: propter quod manifestum est, quod quidam, sicut Plato, leviter, hoc est, sine inquisitione et non sufficienter dixit de partibus civitatis. Dixit enim Socrates (et vocat Platonem Socratem, quia Plato intitulavit politiam nomine Socratis magistri sui), quod quatuor sunt partes valde necessariae, et sine quibus non potest esse civitas. Dixit autem illas partes esse, agricolam curantem de alimento: et manifestum est, quod ista est necessaria, quia sine alimento non potest esse civitas: aliam dixit textorem et coriarium: sine istis enim non potest esse similiter civitas: aliam dixit aedificatorem, civitas enim ex domibus est: ideo oportet, quod sint aedificatores in civitate. Istas quatuor posuit necessarias civitati. Iterum posuit alias, quas dixit non necessarias; scilicet fabrum ferrarium; et dicitur ferrarius qui operatur ferro. Iterum pastores, qui curam habent de animalibus. Iterum negotiatorem et nummularium. Et istas dixit esse complementum primae civitatis. Vocabat autem primam civitatem ut est ex primis partibus composita. Sic autem posuit, ac si civitas esset gratia ipsius vivere absolute, et non propter bene vivere, ac si civitas tantum primo et per se sit ex aequalibus, sicut sunt coriarii et agricolae. Non autem est ita: non enim civitas est gratia ipsius vivere absolute, sed gratia ipsius bene vivere: et propter hoc multae aliae partes sunt necessariae in ipsa quas ille non posuit. Iterum civitas non tantum indiget aequalibus, immo inaequalibus: et ideo dicendum est, quod erravit.

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Deinde cum dicit partem autem tangit quod dixit de propugnatione: et dicit, quod de propugnantibus similiter non bene dixit, quod in principio cum civitas aedificaretur, non fuerunt necessarii; sed postea cum civitas augmentatur et extenditur ad fines, vel ad terminos alterius civitatis, ex quibus saepe causatur dissensio ad reprimendum violentiam adversariorum.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero ostendit, quod iudicativum sit pars civitatis. Et dicit, quod iterum inter quatuor partes, vel quotquot ponantur, necessarium est esse in civitate partem, quae determinet et definiat accusationes et disceptationes quae sunt in ea, et faciat iustum: et hoc probat, quia sicut anima se habet ad corpus, sic iudex se habet ad civitatem. Nam sicut anima vel intellectus inquirit et consiliatur et iudicat de inventis, sic iudex inquirit et consiliatur de conferentibus ad finem politiae et iudicat. Sed anima necessaria pars est animalis et hominis magis quam corpus: ergo similiter iudex est pars necessaria in civitate magis quam propugnativum et magis quam illa quae ordinatur ad usum corporis. Probat autem philosophus de istis, quod sint partes, magis quam de aliis, quia de istis minus videbatur quod essent necessariae; et praecipue minus videretur si civitas esset instituta, gratia ipsius vivere absolute.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ostendit, quod consiliativum sit pars civitatis. Et dicit quod consiliativum est pars civitatis. Et ratio huius est, quia consiliari est opus politici: habet enim politicus consiliari de conferentibus ad finem civitatis: quare manifestum est, quod ad politicum pertinet consiliari. Sed quae pertinent ad politicum, secundum quod huiusmodi, sunt de necessitate civitatis: quare consiliativum est pars civitatis. Ista autem, scilicet consiliativum et iudicativum, utrum separatim existant, ut alius sit ille qui iudicat, alius sit qui consiliatur, alius qui in armis est, alius qui colit agros, sive non separatim existant, sed unus et idem sit qui iudicat et consiliatur, nihil differt ad propositum: hoc enim possibile est: videmus enim quod idem potest esse miles et agricola: similiter idem potest esse iudicans et consilians. Si igitur miles et agricola sint partes civitatis, manifestum, quod et ista et illa quae ordinatur ad bella, pars erit ipsius.

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Deinde cum dicit septima autem ostendit quod divites sunt partes civitatis. Et dicit, quod septima pars civitatis computando omnes praecedentes, est illa quae ministrat divitias, quam partem dicimus opulentos. Cum enim civitas debeat esse per se sufficiens, oportet quod habeat divitias, aliter non esset; et ideo illi sunt necessarii in civitate, qui habent huiusmodi divitias.

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Deinde cum dicit octava autem ostendit, quod directivum populi sit pars civitatis. Et dicit, quod octava pars civitatis est illa quae magistratus gerat, idest directiva sit populi. Ista autem est necessaria, quia populus est sine ratione; et ideo indiget aliquo directivo, ne praeter rationem moveatur.

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Deinde cum dicit reliqua autem ostendit, quod suprema pars civitatis est necessaria. Et dicit quod pars quae administrativa est in civitate circa principatus, necessaria est in civitate, quia civitas non potest esse sine principibus. Cuius probatio est, quia politia est ordo principatuum et maxime primi: ergo manifestum est, quod necesse est aliquos esse in civitate potentes principari, vel semper, vel aliquando, ita quod aliquando unus principetur, aliquando alius. Similiter alia, de quibus dictum est, scilicet de consiliatione et de illo qui determinat disceptationem inter aliquos altercantes de iusto, oportet esse in civitate. Si igitur haec in civitate fieri possunt bene et iuste, et iniuste et male: oportet autem hoc fieri bene, hoc autem non potest esse sine virtute dirigente, manifestum quod necesse est aliquos viros politicos principari in civitate secundum virtutem. Sic igitur apparet, quod sunt plures partes civitatis differentes secundum speciem et rationem: quare erunt plures politiae. Si autem aliquis dicat quod superius dictum est, quod sunt sex, tres rectae, et tres transgressae, et non plures; dicendum quod superius dixit, quod sunt sex genera politiae et non plures: quaedam tamen ipsarum habent species sub se contentas, et sic hic loquitur: unde vult probare quod sunt plures politiae secundum species.

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Deinde cum dicit alias quidem ostendit quae sunt principales inter istas secundum intentionem aliorum. Et dividitur in duas, secundum quod per duas rationes ostendit, quod iidem possunt esse consiliantes et iudicantes, quae sunt principales. Secunda ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod cum sint multae partes civitatis; duae tamen videntur esse principales, et maxime oppositae; scilicet divites et egeni. Alias enim partes contingit multis eisdem existere simul: verbi gratia, iidem possunt esse propugnantes et agricolae et artifices. Iterum iidem possunt esse consiliantes et iudicantes. Iterum cum his possunt esse virtuosi. Sed impossibile est unum et eumdem simul esse divitem et pauperem. Propter quod manifestum est quod divites et egeni videntur esse maxime principales partes civitatis, et maxime differentes. Propter quod duae maxime videntur partes civitatis esse, in quibus divites vel pauperes principantur.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundam rationem. Et dicit, quod iterum divites et egeni videntur duae partes esse civitatis maxime contrariae, quia ut in pluribus divites sunt pauci et pauperes multi. Quare manifestum est quod politiae quae determinantur secundum excessus istarum partium erunt duae politiae maxime contrariae et diversae. Ex quo manifestum est quod popularis et paucorum sunt duae politiae diversae et distinctae, quamvis autem dives secundum quod dives et pauper secundum quod huiusmodi, maxime differant, ne unus et idem simul possit esse dives et pauper, tamen non maxime differunt secundum rationem bonitatis et malitiae. Et ideo considerando secundum rationem boni et mali non maxime differunt, sed sunt aliae quae plus differunt. Ulterius concludit quod dictum est prius quod sunt plures politiae quam quae dictae sunt et propter quam causam.

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L. 4 (Δ.4–5, 1291b15–1292b11)Popularis administrationis quinque modi enumerantur, et paucorum status quatuor: quorum ultimi non legibus sed decretis regnant, persimiles sunt tyranno.

Popularis administrationis quinque modi enumerantur, et paucorum status quatuor: quorum ultimi non legibus sed decretis regnant, persimiles sunt tyranno.

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430. Quod autem sint et democratiae species plures et oligarchiae, dicamus; manifestum autem hoc et ex dictis.

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431. Species enim plures populi et dictorum insignium sunt: puta populi quidem species, una quidem agricolae, altera autem quae circa artes. Alia autem foralis, quae circa emptionem et venditionem versatur. Alia autem quae circa mare: et haec quidem bellica, haec autem piscativa. In multis enim locis singula, horum multae turbae; puta piscatores quidem in Tarento et Byzantio. Trierale autem Athenis, negotiativum autem in Aegina et Chio, transvectivum autem in Tenedo. Adhuc autem quod manuale, et quod modicam habet substantiam, ut non possit vacare. Adhuc quod quidem ex ambobus civibus liberum; et utique si qua talis alterius multitudinis species.

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432. Insignium autem, divitiae, nobilitas, virtus, disciplina, et iis similia, dicta secundum eandem differentiam.

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433. Democratia igitur est prima quidem quae dicitur maxime secundum aequale: aequale enim ait lex talis democratiae nihil magis existere egenis vel divitibus, neque dominos esse utroscumque sed similes ambos. Siquidem enim libertas maxime est in democratia, sicut existimant quidem, et aequalitas; sic utique erit maxime communicantibus omnibus maxime politia similiter. Quoniam autem amplior populus, dominans autem quod visum fuerit pluribus; necesse democratiam esse hanc. Una quidem igitur species democratiae haec. Alia autem quod principatus sint ab honorabilitatibus et brevibus existentibus iis. Oportet autem ei qui possidet potestatem esse participandi, et carentem non participare.

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434. Altera species democratiae, omnes quidem esse principantium, si solum sit civis, principari autem legem.

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435. Altera autem species democratiae, alia quidem esse eadem, dominans autem esse multitudinem et non legem.

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436. Haec autem fit quando sententiae fuerint dominae, sed non lex.

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437. Accidit autem hoc propter demagogos. In quibus quidem enim quae secundum legem democratizzant, non fit demagogus, sed optimi civium sunt in praeeminentia. Ubi autem leges non dominantur, hic fiunt demagogi. Monarchus enim fit populus compositus unus ex multis. Ipsi enim multi sunt domini, non ut unusuisque sed omnis. Quale autem dicat Homerus non bona esse multi-dominationem, utrum hanc vel quando plures sunt qui principantur ut uniuscuiusque, incertum. Talis igitur populus veluti monarchus existens, quaerit monarchizare, quia non subicitur sub lege, et fit despoticus. Quare et adulatores honorati; et est populus iste proportionaliter tyrannidi monarchiarum. Propter quod et mos idem et ambo despotica meliorum; et sententiae sicut ibi praecepta.

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438. Et demagogus et adulator idem et proportionaliter: et maxime autem utrique apud utrosque valent. Adulatores quidem apud tyrannos. Demagogi autem apud populos tales.

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439. Sunt autem iis causa, ut sententiae sint dominae, sed non leges, omnia reducentes ad populum. Accidit eni ipsis fieri magnos propter populum quidem esse dominum omnium, opinionis autem populi hos; suadetur enim multitudo iis.

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440. Adhuc autem qui principatus accusant, aiunt oportere populum iudicare, hic autem gaudenter recipit advocationem. Quare dissolvuntur omnes principatus.

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441. Rationabiliter autem utique videbitur increpare qui dicit talem esse democratiam, non politiam; ubi enim non principantur leges, non est politia. Oportet enim legem quidem principari omnium. De singularibus autem principatus et politiam iudicare.

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442. Quare siquidem est democratia una politiarum, manifestum, quod talis institutio in qua sententiae omnia dispensant, neque democratia proprie; nullam enim sententiam contingit esse universalem. Species quidem igitur democratiae determinatae sint in hoc modo.

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443. Oligarchiae autem species, una quidem esse principatus ab honorabilitatibus tantis, ut egeni non participent cum sint plures, licere autem possidenti participare politia.

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444. Alia autem quando ab honorabilitatibus immensis sunt principatus, et eligunt ipsi eos qui deficiunt. Siquidem igitur ex omnibus iis hoc faciant, videtur hoc esse magis aristocraticum. Si autem ex aliquibus determinatis, oligarchicum.

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445. Altera species oligarchiae est quando puer pro patre unus fit.

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446. Quarta autem quando exstiterit quod nunc dictum est, et principetur non lex, sed princeps: et est convertibilis hoc in oligarchiis sicut tyrannus in monarchiis, et de qua diximus ultima democratia in democratiis. Et vocant et valem oligarchiam potentatum. Oligarchiae quidem igitur species tot et democratiae.

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Postquam philosophus ostendit plures esse politias in generali, ostendit in speciali esse plures, distinguendo quaedam genera ipsarum, sicut popularem et paucorum. Et dividitur in duas. In prima praemittit intentum suum. Secundo prosequitur, ibi, species enim et cetera. In prima dicit, quod postquam dictum est quod sint plures species politiae in generali, dicendum est quod plures sunt species popularis et paucorum; et hoc manifestum erit ex eodem principio ex quo probatum fuit in generali quod sunt plures species politiae.

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Deinde cum dicit species enim prosequitur; et primo ostendit quod sunt plures politiae populares et plures paucorum. Et primo in generali. Secundo in speciali et divisim, ibi, democratia igitur. In prima intendit istam rationem. Secundum distinctionem partium pertinentium ad speciem, distinguitur species. Sed partes materiales populi pertinentes ad rationem status popularis, et partes divitum pertinentes ad rationem potentiae paucorum sunt plures: quare sunt plures species popularis et paucorum. Huius rationis declarat minorem. Et primo, quod sunt plures parte populi. Secundo quod sunt plures partes divitum, ibi, insignium autem et cetera. In prima dicit quod plures sunt partes populi, differentes secundum speciem; et divitum similiter. Una quidem species vel pars populi est agricultura: alia circa artes, sicut operatores; alia quae versatur circa emptionem et venditionem; alia quae circa mare; et ista multas habet sub se species. Quaedam enim est quae ordinatur ad bellicas operationes: alia quae ad pecunias acquirendas; alia est nautica solum quae merces vehit; alia ad piscandum. In diversis autem locis multi sunt operantes secundum singula istorum, sicut in Tarento et Byzantio multi sunt piscatores: Athenis sunt multi nautae. In Aegina vero et Chio sunt multi negotiantes in mari. Et in Tenedo multi sunt transportantes per mare. Ulterius est alia pars populi quae dicitur manualis, quae laborat manibus. Hoc autem est, quia modicam habent substantiam tales, unde possunt vivere; et ideo non possunt vacare speculationi vel actibus bellicis. Ulterius est alia species populi: scilicet si aliquis homo natus sit ex duobus civibus liber, pars populi est. Iterum si sit aliqua alia species multitudinis, pars populi est.

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Deinde cum dicit insignium autem ostendit quod sunt plures partes divitum. Et dicit, quod insignium plures sunt partes. Quidam enim sunt divites, quia divitias habent. Alii nobiles, alii virtuosi et disciplinati; et quicumque alii similes istis, secundum eumdem modum partes sunt insignium.

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Deinde cum dicit democratia igitur prosequitur modos popularis et paucorum in speciali et divisim. Et dividitur in duas: quoniam in prima parte ponit modos popularis et paucorum. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem etc. ponit modos status optimatum. Adhuc prima dividitur in duas. Quoniam in prima ponit modos istarum politiarum. Secundo assignat rationem istorum. Secunda ibi, non oportet autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima enumerat modos popularis. In secunda modos paucorum, ibi, quare siquidem et cetera. Prima in quinque, secundum quod enumerat quinque modos popularis: quorum tamen primus et ultimus in unum incidunt, ut videbitur. Secunda ibi, alia autem et cetera. Tertia ibi, altera species. Quarta ibi, alia species. Quinta ibi, altera species et cetera. In prima dicit, quod prima species popularis, quae maxime dicitur popularis, est in qua principantur secundum omnimodam aequalitatem. Et hoc apparet; quia lex fuit in tali politia, quod de honoribus non plus distribueretur divitibus quam egenis vel virtuosis quam non virtuosis; sed aequaliter istis et illis. Iterum dicebat lex, quod isti non magis deberent dominari quam illi nec e converso, sed isti et illi indifferenter, quia sunt similes vel aequales. Et ideo quia aequalitatem habent in libertate, aequaliter debent dominari et recipere de honoribus, non plus unus quam alter. Si enim libertas maxime sit in populari, ut dicunt plures, in ista autem sunt omnes aequales, manifestum est, quod maxime erit politia et aequalitas secundum ipsam, si omnes communicent in omnibus aequaliter. Et quod ista species sit popularis, probat sic. In ista enim specie politiae dominatur populus sive multitudo; quia omnes sunt aequales secundum libertatem et principatus distribuitur secundum ipsam. Et ideo multitudo tota dominatur: sed ubi multitudo dominatur popularis est: haec igitur est una species popularis.

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Deinde cum dicit alia autem ponit secundam speciem. Et dicit quod secunda species popularis est in qua assumitur aliquis ad principatum propter aliquem terminum divitiarum parvum quidem. Et adiungit parvum, ad hoc, ut plures possint regere. Si enim non assumerentur nisi qui magnum possiderent censum, esset admodum paucorum, et sic non esset popularis.

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Deinde cum dicit altera species ponit tertiam speciem. Et dicit, quod tertia species popularis est, in qua omnes habiles sunt ad magistratus gerendos, dummodo non sint obnoxii ex aliqua causa; puta quia ex aliquo crimine civilitatem amiserint, ut contingit capite diminutis, aut quia servi sint vel aliquo alio modo civilitate careant. Et in isto principatu principans principatur secundum legem. Cum enim quilibet assumatur et quilibet ex se non potest esse sufficiens dirigere, oportet quod sit dirigibilis et a lege dirigatur. Iterum non etiam possunt vacare; ideo oportet quod secundum legem principentur.

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Deinde cum dicit altera autem ponit quartam speciem. Et dicit quod quarta species popularis est, in qua aliqui assumuntur ad principatum, sive sint servi, sive liberi, dum tamen sint in civilitate. Et quia non omnes tales possunt vacare ad principatum, oportet quod principentur secundum legem, sicut prius.

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Deinde cum dicit haec autem ponit quintam speciem: et videtur eadem esse cum prima, nisi quod in ista repetit magis determinate quod dixit in prima. Et dividitur in duas. In prima ponit speciem istam. In secunda ostendit, quod non est vere politia nec status popularis, ibi, rationabiliter autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima ponit speciem istam. In secunda ostendit propter quam causam accidit, ibi, accidit autem et cetera. In prima dicit quod quinta species quae videtur esse eadem cum prima, est quando multitudo principatur non secundum legem, sed secundum decretum. Et est intelligendum quod decretum intelligitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur enunciatio quaedam universalis de particularibus operabilibus, sicut dicit philosophus secundo rhetoricae suae. Alio modo dicitur iudicium aliquod de aliquo operabili; et sic sumitur hic decretum. Et differt a lege; quia lex est de universali et obligat ad futurum, decretum vero isto modo sumptum est de particulari operabili et obligat ad praesens tantum.

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Deinde cum dicit accidit autem declarat propter quam causam iste modus accidit. Et dividitur in duas. In prima proponit quod accidit propter doctores populi et suasores. Et assignat causam quare isti introducti sunt. In secunda assignat causam popularis reipublicae praedictae ex dictis, ibi, sunt autem iis. Prima in duas. In prima ostendit quare doctores sunt introducti. Secundo comparat eos ad adulatores, ibi, demagogus. Dicit igitur quod accidit populum dominari non secundum legem, sed secundum sententiam populi propter praepotentes. Et hoc apparet; quia in his popularibus in quibus principatus est secundum legem, non oportet quod sit ductor, sed sunt viri optimi in praeeminentia. Tunc enim populus non ducitur secundum solam voluntatem alicuius, sed secundum legem. Praepotens autem ducit populum secundum suam voluntatem, non secundum legem. Sed ubi non est principatus secundum legem, ibi est ductor et suasor, quia populus deficit a ratione. Et ideo indiget aliquo ductore; et cum non ducatur secundum legem, oportet quod secundum rationem vel voluntatem alicuius. Talis vero est praepotens et suasor; et cum totus populus compositus ex multis dominatur, est sicut monarcha et princeps unus. Omnes enim principantur non divisim, sed coniunctim. De quo dixit Homerus quod non est bonus principatus ubi multitudo principatur. Sed incertum est, utrum intellexit Homerus quod quando tota multitudo dominatur, sicut unus monarcha coniunctim, non sit per se bonus principatus, vel quando populus dominatur, ita quod unusquisque dominetur. Sed quando huiusmodi populus qui est sicut monarcha quidam vult regere civitatem monarchice, et quia hoc non facit ad utilitatem omnium, sed sui et contra voluntatem insignium, oportet quod dominative principetur, idest principatu domini ad servum, propter quod accidit quod adulatores acceptantur et honorantur a talibus, quia acceptantur et honorantur a tyrannis. Cuius ratio est, quia adulator est qui dicit et operatur ea quae opinatur placere, in nullo volens contristari. Unusquisque autem diligit suam excellentiam et vult esse certus de ipsa: et ideo libenter audit ipsam et illum qui testatur de ea. Sed adulator dicit excellentiam alterius affirmando, ut sibi placeat, et ideo honoratur. Et quia in ista politia sunt aliqui qui dicunt excellentiam populi, cum dicunt quod omnia debent referri in populum, et quod unus non debet magis dominari quam alius, et quod sunt omnes aequales, ideo in tali politia adulatores, sive ductores, honorantur vel acceptantur. Populus etiam iste qui sic principatur, proportionabiliter se habet tyrannis in monarchiis in quibus unus principatur. Et ideo eadem consuetudo et idem mos in utroque: in utroque enim opprimuntur meliores: est enim principatus eorum dominativus respectu meliorum, quia opprimunt ipsos, et non intendunt bonum eorum per se. Iterum in principatu istorum sunt decreta, sicut in tyrannide sunt praecepta ad opprimendum meliores.

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Deinde cum dicit et demagogus comparat ductorem ad adulatorem; dicens quod ductor et adulator sunt idem, et proportionantur. Uterque enim vult dicere vel facere quod placeat aliis. Sed differunt, quia ductor dicit ea quae placent populo: sed adulator dicit ea quae placent tyranno, quia tyrannus et populus habent magnam potestatem. Manifestum est, quod uterque habet magnam potestatem: sed ductor apud populum, adulator apud tyrannum.

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Deinde cum dicit sunt autem declarat propter quid accidit talis politia. Et dividitur in duas. Primo assignat causam propter quam sit principatus in ista politia secundum decretum non secundum legem. Secundo assignat causam quare totus populus dominatur, ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. In prima dicit quod ductores sunt causa quare populus dominatur secundum sententiam suam, non secundum leges. Dicunt enim ductores et praepotentes omnia debere referri in populum; et quod unus non debet magis dominari quam alius, et quod omnes sunt aequales. Haec autem placent populo; ideo dominatur secundum sententiam; et quia populus principatur omnibus, contingit quod isti sunt magni et magnam potentiam habent. Isti enim tenent opinionem populi: sunt enim tria quae faciunt ad bene persuadendum secundum Aristotelem secundo rhetoricae: scilicet prudentia, virtus et benevolentia. Et propter istud tertium doctores de facili suadent populo; sunt enim eis benivoli.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem declarat quare totus populus principatur. Et dicit quod isti ductores accusantes principatus, in quibus unus vel pauci principantur, dicunt quod tota multitudo debet dominari et iudicare quae fiunt per alios magistratus. Omnia enim debent referri ad populum; et melius est totum principari quam partem. Populus autem gratanter recipit hanc allegationem; omnes enim faciliter exaudiunt proponentes pro eis ad quae inclinantur; sicut intemperatus pro actu intemperantiae. Propter quod cum potestatem habeant principantur, destruentes alios principatus.

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Deinde cum dicit rationabiliter autem declarat, quod huiusmodi politia in qua principatur populus non secundum legem, sed secundum sententiam, non est proprie politia, nec status popularis. Et primo declarat, quod non est proprie politia. Secundo, quod proprie non est popularis, ibi, quarum quidem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod rationabiliter videtur dicere ille qui dicit, quod huiusmodi popularis non est proprie politia. Et ratio huius est, quia ubi non principantur leges, non est politia, quia oportet in politia legem principari in omnibus. Oportet enim principatum et politiam iudicare de singularibus. Iudicant autem secundum leges, ubi leges provident; ubi vero non, tunc magistratus supplent et decernunt. Et ideo ubi est politia, leges principantur. Sed in tali populari statu non principantur leges, sed sententia populi: ergo talis popularis status non est politia proprie. Sed aliquis argueret contra illud quod dicit, quod ubi leges non praevalent, non est respublica: quia monarchia regalis politia est, tamen non est principatus secundum legem, sed secundum voluntatem et rationem principantis. Ad hoc posset aliquis dicere breviter, quod quaedam est politia monarchica in qua unus dominatur. Alia est politia poliarchica in qua plures principantur. In politia poliarchica non corrupta, principatus est secundum leges, et de tali loquitur hic Aristoteles; in alia non. Aliter dicendum est et melius, quod in omni politia recta principans dominatur secundum leges, quia in omni politia principatur aliquis secundum aliquam regulam, quam dicimus legem. Sed in quibusdam illa regula est interior existens in voluntate et ratione, in quibusdam est extra in scripto. In monarchia regali, monarcha habet istam regulam quae est in voluntate et ratione eius; in politia poliarchica est extra in scripto. Quod ergo dicebatur, quod ubi est politia ibi est principatus secundum legem, verum est: vel intrinsecam, vel scriptam. Hic autem intelligit de scripta; et ideo non multum differt a prima, sed eam declarat.

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Deinde cum dicit quare siquidem ostendit quod non est proprie popularis. Et dicit quod popularis est politia quaedam: sed talis popularis in qua sententiae principantur non leges, non est politia: quia politia est secundum leges, quae sunt de universalibus: sed sententiae sunt de particularibus non universalibus: nulla enim sententia est universalis secundum quod hic intendimus de ipsa, ut dictum est prius; quare manifestum est, quod talis popularis non est proprie popularis. Ulterius concludit quod species popularis determinantur hoc modo.

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Deinde cum dicit oligarchiae autem enumerat modos paucorum: et dividitur in quatuor secundum quod ponit quatuor. Secunda ibi, altera species et cetera. Tertia ibi, alia autem quando et cetera. Quarta ibi, quarta species et cetera. In prima dicit, quod una species paucorum est, in qua distribuuntur principatus secundum quamdam honorabilitatem, puta divitiarum vel generis, ita quod egeni non attingant ad ipsos quamvis sint plures. In paucorum autem ista licitum est principanti attingere ad eamdem rempublicam, scilicet quantum ad consilium et deliberationes communes et tractatus.

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Deinde cum dicit alia autem ponit secundam speciem. Et dicit quod alia est species paucorum in qua distribuuntur principatus secundum minores census, et principantes possunt eligere alios consocios suos si aliqui deficiant. Et si eligant illos qui deficiunt ex quibuscumque, dum tamen virtuosi sint, optimatum est; si autem ex aliquibus ex divitibus vel nobilibus, tantum paucorum.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit altera species ponit tertiam speciem. Et dicit, quod tertia species est, quando principatus distribuitur secundum honorabilitatem maiorem, ad haec divitiarum aut generis, et filius in principatu succedit patri, et fit princeps pro patre.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit quarta autem ponit quartam speciem. Et dicit quod quarta species est quando aliqui principantur propter honorabilitatem maximam, et filius succedit patri. Et in isto principatu non principatur lex, sed princeps secundum voluntatem propriam: et sic se habet ista inter paucos, sicut tyrannus inter monarchias. Sicut enim in tyrannide tyrannus principatur primo et per se propter bonum suum, et bonos opprimit, sic in isto principatu princeps principatur propter bonum suum. Et ideo, sicut inter monarchias tyrannis est pessima, sic inter paucorum potentias ista est pessima. Et sicut popularis ultima de qua dictum est, inter omnes species popularis pessima est, assimilatur enim tyrannidi, sicut dictum est prius; sic inter potentias paucorum ista est pessima: et talem paucorum potentiam vocant paucorum potentiam, quia potentes valde principantur. In fine concludit quod tot sunt species popularis et paucorum, ut dictum est.

Polit.L4

L. 5 (Δ.5–6, 12922b11–1293a34)Comprobat singulas quasque species popularis administrationis, et paucorum, superius enumeratas.

Comprobat singulas quasque species popularis administrationis, et paucorum, superius enumeratas.

Polit.L5

447. Non oportet autem latere, quod in multis locis accidit, ut politia quidem quae secundum leges non sit democratia, propter assuetudinem autem et modum politizet et democratizet. Similiter autem rursum apud alios enim quaedam quae secundum leges politiam esse magis democraticam, assuetudinibus autem et modo oligarchizare magis.

Polit.L5

448. Accidit autem hoc maxime post transmutationes politiarum: non enim statim transmutantur, sed amant in primis paulatim rapientes ex invicem, ut leges quidem permaneant quae prius extiterunt, obtineant autem quae transmutant politiam.

Polit.L5

449. Quod autem sint tot species democratiae et oligarchiae, ex ipsis, quae dicta sunt, manifestum. Necesse enim aut omnes dictas partes populi communicare politia, aut has quidem, has autem non. Quandoquidem igitur quod agricultivum, et quod possidet mediocrem substantiam, fuerint dominantes politiae, politizant secundum leges; habent enim vivere laborantes, non possunt autem vacare. Quare legem scientes convocant necessariissimas congregationes: aliis aute participare licet, cum possideant honorabilitatem determinatam a legibus, propter quod omnibus possidentibus licet participare. Universaliter quidem enim non licere omnibus, oligarchicum; licere autem vacare impossibile non existentibus proventibus. Haec quidem igitur una species democratiae propter causas has.

Polit.L5

450. Altera autem species propter consequentem electionem; est enim et omnibus licere non refutatis secundum genus, participare tamen potentibus vacare. Propter quod quidem in tali democratia leges principantur propter non esse proventum.

Polit.L5

451. Tertia autem species omnibus licere quicumque liberi fuerint participare politia; non taen participare propter praedictam causam. Quare necessarium, et in hac principari legem.

Polit.L5

452. Quarta autem species democratiae temporibus ultimo in civitatibus facta. Quia enim factae sunt civitates maiores multo quam a principio, ut proventes existunt et opulentiae, participant quidem omnes politiae propter excessum multitudinis communicant autem et politizant quia possunt vacare etiam egeni accipientes mercedem. Et maxime autem vacat talis multitudo: neque enim impedit ipsos, neque propriorum cura: divites impedit autem, ut saepe non communicent congregationi, neque ei quod est iudicare. Propter quod fit multitudo egenorum dominans politiae, sed non leges. Species quidem igitur democratiae, tot et tales propter has necessitates sunt.

Polit.L5

453. Oligarchiae autem quando quidem plures habent substantiam, minorem autem et non multam valde, primae oligarchiae species est; faciunt enim potestatem principandi possidenti, et propter multitudinem esse principantium politeumate necesse non homines, sed legem esse dominans. Quanto enim utique plus distant a monarchia, et neque tantam habeant substantiam, ut vacent negligentes, neque tam modicam, ut nutriantur a civitate; necesse legem velle ipsi principari, sed non ipsos.

Polit.L5

454. Si autem utique pauciores sunt qui substantias habent quam qui prius ampliorem autem, secundae oligarchiae fit species: magis enim potentes supergredi volunt; propter quod ipsi quidem eligunt ex multis eos, qui ad politeuma admittuntur. Quia autem nondum sic fortes sunt ut sine lege principenture, legem ponunt talem.

Polit.L5

455. Si autem invaluerint pauciores existentes habere maiores substantias, tertius gradus fit oligarchiae; scilicet per se ipsos principatus habere; secundum legem autem praecipientem morientium filios succedere.

Polit.L5

456. Quando autem iam plures invaluerint substantiis et multis amicis, prope talis potentatus, monarchia est, et domini fiunt homines, sed non lex, et quarta species oligarchiae haec est, convertibilis ultimae democratiae.

Polit.L5

Postquam philosophus posuit modos popularis paucorum, ponit incidens unum. Et dividitur in duas. In prima ponit incidens. In secunda, ostendit propter quam causam illud contingit, ibi, accidit autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod istud non debet nos latere, quod accidit in multis locis, quod aliqua politia non sit secundum leges popularis, sed propter consuetudinem et modum ipsam contingit esse popularem: similiter e contrario apud alios contingit, ut sit popularis respublica secundum leges, sed per assuefactionem contingit cives vivere secundum rempublicam paucorum. Sed illud non videtur esse verum; quia leges sunt de conferentibus ad finem reipublicae: ergo si aliqui vivant secundum unam rempublicam, et regantur per leges alterius reipublicae, simul et semel intendunt diversos fines, vel eadem respublica intendit in diversos fines: sed hoc est impossibile: quare non videtur esse possibile, quod aliqui vivant secundum unam rempublicam et leges sint alterius reipublicae. Dicendum, quod non est possibile quod aliqui simpliciter vivant secundum unam rempublicam et simpliciter leges in illa sint secundum aliam, quia simul tenderent in diversos fines simpliciter, quod non est possibile: sed possibile est, quod aliqui secundum quid vivant secundum unam rempublicam, et secundum quid regantur legibus alterius reipublicae; vel simpliciter quidem vivant secundum unam rempublicam, regantur autem in aliquibus legibus alterius, vel e contrario. Et id est causa dissensionis in aliquibus civitatibus, quod aliqui vivant secundum unam rempublicam et leges sint secundum aliam; quia ille qui cognoscit leges et amat eas, odit volentes vivere secundum eas leges; et hoc est causa dissensionis.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit accidit autem ostendit quando et propter quam causam accidit aliquos vivere secundum unam rempublicam et leges secundum aliam. Et dicit, quod hoc, quod dictum est, maxime contingit post transmutationes rerumpublicarum. Cum enim una civitas transmutatur de republica in aliam, non statim transmutatur. Sicut enim in medicinalibus subitae transmutationes nocivae sunt, sic in rebuspublicis; et ideo cum transmutatur de una republica in aliam, aliquid retinet de prima. Amant enim cives ea quae sub prima republica continebantur: et ideo aliquid retinentes de prima, transmutantur ad aliam, quasi paulatim aliquid accipientes de posteriori, et secundum aliud dimittentes primam; ita quod accidit, quod leges primae reipublicae remaneant secundum aliud, et vivant secundum rempublicam ad quam transmutantur.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit quod autem assignat rationem modorum popularis et paucorum. Et primo assignat rationem modorum popularis. Secundo paucorum, ibi, oligarchiae autem et cetera. Prima in quatuor, secundum quod assignat rationem quatuor modorum popularis. Secunda ibi, altera autem species et cetera. Tertia ibi, tertia autem species et cetera. Quarta ibi, quarta et cetera. In prima dicit quod ex his quae dicta sunt, apparet quod sunt tot modi popularis et paucorum: quia in populari, aut principantur omnes, aut plures. Et si plures, aut isti, aut illi: contingit enim considerare agricolas et alios artifices. Et si agricolae et illi qui habent divitias mediocres, ita quod non sunt excellenter divites, nec nimis pauperes, sed mediocriter se habent, principentur secundum leges, non secundum voluntates eorum, est primum modus. Et ratio huius est, quia agricolae habent vivere de agricultura circa quam oportet eos laborare; et ideo non possunt vacare congregationibus civitatis: unde principantes talibus scientes leges non faciunt congregationes, nisi pro magnis et valde necessariis casibus; et quia multitudo non vult aliter subiici, et oportet aliquos quandoque assumi ad principatum, ordinatur quod principentur secundum leges. Alii etiam qui habent aliquam dignitatem divitiarum aut generis moderatam secundum legem, possunt assumi ad principatum. Et ideo omnes qui habent possessiones possunt assumi, ut melius possint vacare. Si enim non possunt assumi omnes qui habent aliquam dignitatem possessionis, erit paucorum in qua non omnes assumuntur, sed excellentes valde. Illi autem qui non habent aliquas divitias non possunt assumi, quia tales debent assumi ad principatum qui possunt vacare. Sed eum qui non habet aliquos proventus vel aliquas possessiones impossibile est posse vacare: quare manifestum est, quod in tali principatu non assumuntur omnes, sed qui mediocres habent divitias. Et tunc concludit quod haec est una species popularis et propter praedictas causas.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit altera autem assignat rationem secundae speciei; et dicit quod alia species popularis est, in qua aliqui assumuntur ad principatum per electionem consequentem, ad quam licet omnes attingere qui non sunt refutati secundum genus; puta viles valde; sed liberi simpliciter ex utroque cive libero, si tamen possint non refutati propter penuriam. Propter quod in illo principatu principantur secundum legem. Et ratio est, quia tota multitudo non habet sufficientes divitias; et ideo oportet committere principatum aliis: et quia subiici non vult omnino, ordinat multitudo quod principentur secundum legem.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit tertia autem assignat rationem tertiae speciei. Et dicit quod tertia species quando quicumque fuerint, dum tamen liberi fuerint, quocumque modo assumantur ad principatum, non tamen principantur propter dignitatem aliquam divitiarum, sicut in aliis, sed assumuntur propter libertatem. In isto autem principatu ille qui dominatur principatur secundum legem. Et ratio huius est, quia multitudo non habet divitias sufficientes; et ideo oportet quod principatum committat omnibus, exceptis his de quibus non vult, aut subiici omnino voluntati alicuius; et ideo ordinat quod principatus sit secundum legem.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit quarta autem assignat rationem quartae speciei; et dicit, quod quarta species popularis quae ultimo secundum tempus facta est in civitatibus, est, quando tota multitudo dominatur secundum sententias non secundum legem. Et ratio huius est, quia civitates multo maiores sunt, quam essent a principio; et proventus et divitiae multo maiores. Et ideo quia multitudo magna est, multum habet et magnam potentiam. Et ideo omnes de multitudine attingunt ad principatum, quia possunt vacare etiam egeni qui non habent sufficientes divitias; nec propter defectum divitiarum impeditur aliquis a principatu; quia si contingat egenum principari accipit de communi aliquid. Maxime etiam ista multitudo potest vacare, quia non impeditur propter curam de propriis; aliquas enim substantias habent; sed divites impediuntur, ut frequenter non vadant ad congregationes civitatis, nec participent iudicativo: divites enim volunt honorari, in congregationibus vero non honorantur, aut non tantum quantum credunt debere honorari; et ideo non curant ire: iterum multas habent divitias; et ideo nihil curant habere de communi. Item virtuosi nolunt ire, quia non honorantur vel non secundum quod deberent; et ideo relinquitur quod sit multitudo pauperum et egenorum dominans et principans in tali republica secundum sententias, non secundum leges. Et tunc concludit dicens, quod species popularis, et tot, et tales sunt, et propter praedictas causas.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit oligarchiae autem assignat rationem modorum potentiae paucorum et dividitur in quatuor, secundum quod assignat rationem quatuor modorum ipsius. Secunda ibi, quanto enim et cetera. Tertia ibi, si autem invaluerit et cetera. Quarta ibi, quoniam autem iam et cetera. In prima dicit quod quando sunt plures divites in civitate, non habentes tamen divitias excellentes, sed mediocres, tunc est prima species gubernationis paucorum. Huiusmodi enim dant potestatem principandi alicui habenti vel possidenti substantias sive divitias. Quia enim plures sunt qui potestatem habent, ideo eligunt alios; quia divites sunt, eligunt sibi similes. Unusquisque enim libentius eligit sibi similem, quam dissimilem. Et quoniam multi sunt in ista specie qui attingunt ad rempublicam et possunt attingere ad principatum, principes dominantur in ea non secundum ipsorum hominum voluntatem, sed secundum leges. Quanto enim magis distant a monarchia, quia scilicet multi sunt potentes attingere ad principatum voluntates habentes diversas non unam sicut monarchia, et quanto mediocriores substantias habent, non tantas ut possint multum vacare negligentes propria negotia, nec tam parvas, ut necessarie habeant vivere de communi, tantum plus volunt non seipsos principari, aut quia non possunt omnino vitare, aut quia timent gravari ab aliis; sed leges magis.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit si autem assignat rationem secundae speciei; et dicit, quod si sint pauciores divites quam prius principes, sed tamen ditiores quam qui prius, secunda species potentiae paucorum est; quia ditiores sunt ideo volunt excedere alios et supergredi; et ideo potestatem habent eligendi ex multis illos qui deficiunt in principatu. Et quia non sunt adhuc ita potentes quod excedant multitudinem, permittunt quod principentur secundum legem.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit si autem assignat rationem tertiae speciei; et dicit, quod si adhuc fuerint pauciores divites quam prius et habentes maiores divitias; tertia species est gubernationis paucorum. Et videntur principes per se habere quasi ex haereditate principatus; et quia isti potentes sunt valde, ordinant et statuunt quod filii succedant eis in principatu.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit quando autem assignat rationem quartae speciei; et dicit, quod quoniam adhuc sunt pauciores divites quam prius, et multo ditiores et potentiores in amicis, est quarta species potentiae paucorum: et tunc est huiusmodi principatus quasi monarchicus; quia illi qui principantur, principantur secundum suas voluntates, non secundum legem, sicut fit in monarchia regali, et propter potentiam ipsorum filii succedunt. Et ista quarta species potentiae paucorum proportionatur quartae speciei popularis; quia sicut illa pessima est inter populares, sic ista pessima est inter potentias paucorum, et tyrannidi assimilatur: principantes enim in ista propter bonum proprium principaliter dominantur; sic autem est in tyrannide.

Polit.L5

L. 6 (Δ.7, 1293a35–1293b21)De optimatum administratione, et eius variis speciebus, quae ex commixtione virtutis ad divitias et multitudinem insurgunt.De optimatum administratione, et eius variis speciebus, quae ex commixtione virtutis ad divitias et multitudinem insurgu

457. Adhuc autem sunt duae politiae praeter democratiam et oligarchiam; quarum alteram quidem dicunt omnes, et dicta est quatuor: monarchiam, oligarchiam, democratiam, quartum vero vocatum aristocratiam: quinta autem est, quae appellatur communi nomine omnium; politiam enim vocant: sed quia non saepe fit, latet tentantes enumerare species politiarum, et utuntur quatuor solum, sicut Plato in politiis.

Polit.L6

458. Aristocratiam quidem igitur bene habet vocare, de qua pertractavimus quidem in primis sermonibus, eam enim quae ex optimis simpliciter politicam secundum virtutem, et non ad hypothesim aliquam bonorum virorum, solam iustum appellare aristocratiam. In sola enim simpliciter idem vir et civis bonus, bonus est. Qui autem in aliis boni, ad politiam ipsorum sunt.

Polit.L6

459. Sed sane sunt aliquae quae ad oligarchizatas habent differentias, et vocantur aristocratiae, et ad vocatam politiam: ubi vero non solum respectu divitiarum, sed et respectu virtutis eligunt principatus, haec politia differt ab ambabus, et aristocratica vocatur: etenim in non facientibus communem causam virtutis, sunt tamen quidam approbati, et qui videntur esse epiiches.

Polit.L6

460. Ubi igitur politia respicit ad divitias et virtutes et populum velut in Carchedonia, haec aristocratica est.

Polit.L6

461. In quibus ad duo solum, ut quae Lacedaemoniorum ad virtutem et populum, et est mixtio horum duorum, democratiae et virtutis. Aristocratiae quidem igitur praeter primam optimam politiam, hae duae species, et tertia, quaecumque eius quae vocatur politia inclinantur ad oligarchiam magis.

Polit.L6

Postquam philosophus determinavit de speciebus popularis et paucorum, determinat species optimatum; et dividitur in duas. In prima dicit, quod praeter istas respublicas, scilicet popularem et paucorum, sunt aliae duae respublicae. In secunda tangit modos optimatum status, ibi, aristocratiam quidem igitur et cetera. In prima dicit, quod praeter duas praedictas politias, idest popularem et paucorum, sunt aliae duae, quarum alteram omnes loquentes de rebuspublicis ponunt et est una species inter quatuor respublicas quae dictae sunt prius ab aliis. Posuerunt enim antiqui quatuor respublicas; scilicet monarchiam, paucorum, popularem et quartam optimatum dicunt. Sed tamen his quinta subest quae communi nomine nominatur, scilicet respublica. Et quia ista respublica communi nomine dicta raro accidit, latet homines volentes distinguere species reipublicae; et ideo non habet nomen proprium; et ideo utuntur tantum quatuor, sicut fecit Plato in suis rebuspublicis. Non enim posuit nisi quatuor species subdividendo monarchiam in regalem rectam et tyrannidem, cum republica communi nomine dicta apparet quod sunt sex.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit aristocratiam quidem ponit modos optimatum. Et dividitur in quatuor, secundum quod ponit quatuor modos eius. Secunda ibi, sed sane sunt et cetera. Tertia ibi, ubi vero et cetera. Quarta ibi, et ubi ad et cetera. In prima dicit quod respublica illa de qua dictum est prius cum determinabatur de regno, recte dicitur optimatum. Respublica enim in qua optimi viri simpliciter principantur et non aliquis vir optimus ex suppositione, sola dicitur optimatum. Item in sola ista republica, idem est optimus vir et civis optimus simpliciter; in aliis autem non; sed optimus civis in aliqua alia republica est optimus vir, in illa non simpliciter.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit sed sane ponit secundum modum; et dicit quod non solum ista respublica est species optimatum, immo sunt aliquae respublicae, quae differunt a paucorum potentiis, et ab ea quae respublica dicitur et in aliquo conveniunt cum eis: quarum una est in qua eligunt principantes habendo respectum ad divitias et ad virtutes, ita quod aliqui divites et virtuosi assumuntur. Differt autem a paucorum et republica in hoc quod eliguntur in ipsa virtuosi, et quia non solum habetur respectus ad divites. Paucorum autem et respublica non faciunt causam communem, propter quam scilicet assumantur ad principatum virtutis, idest a virtute; hoc est, non habent respectum ad virtutem in eligendo secundum quod huiusmodi, quamvis sint aliqui approbati, et qui videntur esse excellentes viri, quibus attribuunt principatus, non quidem secundum quod huiusmodi, sed secundum quod divites vel apti ad regendum.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit ubi igitur ponit tertiam speciem; et dicit, quod tertia species est in qua eligentes principes respiciunt ad divites virtuosos et populum, sicut accidit in Carthagine, ubi respiciunt ad ista tria: et talis respublica optimatum status dicitur, sed mixta ex statu paucorum, populari et optimatum.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit in quibus ponit quartam speciem; et dicit quod quarta species status optimatum est in qua in eligendo principatu, habetur respectus ad duo, scilicet ad virtutem et popularem, ut est respublica Lacedaemoniorum; et propter hoc mixta est ex optimatum et populari primo modo dicta. Et tunc recapitulat istos modos; et dicit, quod manifestum est quod praeter primam speciem status optimatum quae est optima, sunt istae duae ultimae de quibus iam dictum est, et tertia quae fuit secunda in ponendo species; et quacumque istius speciei quae respublica dicitur, magis inclinatur ad statum paucorum, inquantum fit respectus ad divites et non ad pauperes.

Polit.L6

L. 7 (Δ.8, 1293b22–1294a29)De eo civitatis statu qui communi nomine respublica dicitur, a ceteris tamen discreto, in quo et virtus et libertas et divitiae suum locum habent.De eo civitatis statu qui communi nomine respublica dicitur, a ceteris tamen discreto, in quo et virtus et libertas et d

462. Reliquum autem est nobis de nominata politia disserere et de tyrannide. Ordinavimus autem sic non existentem, neque hanc transgressionem, neque assignatas aristocratias, quia secundum veritatem quidem omnes sunt vitiatae a rectissima politia, deinde dinumerantur cum iis. Suntque ipsarum hae transgressiones, sicut in iis quae a principio diximus. Ultimo autem de tyrannide rationabile est facere mentionem, quia omnium minime politia haec est, nobis autem est methodus de politia. Propter quam quidem igitur causam et ordinatum est hoc modo, dictum est.

Polit.L7

463. Nunc autem ostendendum est nobis de politia. Manifestissima enim potentia ipsius determinatis iis quae de oligarchia et democratia; est enim politia, ut simpliciter est dicere, mixtio oligarchiae et democratiae.

Polit.L7

464. Consueverunt autem vocare declinantes quidem ut ad democratiam, politias. Declinantes autem ad oligarchiam, magis aristocratias, quia magis assequitur disciplina et nobilitas opulentioribus. Adhuc autem videntur habere opulenti quorum gratia iniusta agunt iniusti; unde et calusagathos, et insignes hos appellant. Quoniam igitur aristocratia vult excellentiam attribuere optimis civium, et oligarchias esse aiunt ex calusagathis magis.

Polit.L7

465. Videntur autem esse impossibilium civitatem aristocratizantem non bee legibus disponi, sed male gubernatam; similiter autem et aristocratizari eam quae non bene legibus disponuntur.

Polit.L7

466. Non est autem bona legum dispositio, bene poni leges, non obedire autem. Propter quod unam quidem bonam legum dispositionem existimandum esse, obedire positis legibus, alteram autem bene poni leges quibus immaneant. Est enim obedire et bene positis. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: aut enim optimis contingentium ipsis, aut simpliciter optimis.

Polit.L7

467. Videtur autem aristocratiam quidem esse maxime honorem distribui secundum virtutem; aristocratiae quidem enim terminus, virtus; oligarchiae autem divitiae, democratiae autem libertas.

Polit.L7

468. Haec autem, quodcumque videatur pluribus, in omnibus existit. Etenim in oligarchia et in aristocratia, et in democratia, quodcumque videatur maiori parti participantium politia, hoc est dominans.

Polit.L7

469. In plurimis quidem igitur civitatibus politiae species vocatur: solum enim mixtio coniecturat divitum et pauperum divitias et libertatem. Fere enim apud plurimos qui opulenti calusagathon videntur tenere regionem.

Polit.L7

470. Quoniam autem tria sunt, quae altercantur de aequalitate politiae, libertas, divitiae, virtus (quartum enim quod vocant ingenuitatem assequitur duobus: ingenuitas enim est virtus et divitiae antiquae): manifestum, quod mixtionem quidem duorum, scilicet opulentorum et egenorum, politiam dicendum: trium autem aristocratiam maxime aliarum praeter veram et primam.

Polit.L7

471. Quod quidem igitur sint et aliae species politiae praeter monarchiam et democratiam et oligarchiam dictum est, et quales hae, et quid differunt invicem aristocratiae, et politiae ab aristocratia: et quod non ab invicem longe, manifestum.

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Postquam philosophus distinxit respublicas et modos popularis, paucorum et optimatum in universali, in particulari prosequitur de ea quae communi nomine appellata est respublica, et de tyrannide. Et dividitur in duas. In prima praemittit intentionem suam et ordinem procedendi et causam ordinis. In secunda prosequitur intentum suum, ibi, nunc autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod postquam determinatum est de monarchia regali et de modis eius, et de populari, paucorum et optimatum, et modis earum, relinquitur considerandum nobis de illa quae communi nomine appellatur respublica et tyrannis. Causa autem quare primo de aliis rebuspublicis prius determinatum est quam de ea quae communi nomine nominata est, est quia respublica, et quaedam species reipublicae optimatum prius assignatae, aliquo modo transgressiones sunt primarum rerumpublicarum, aliquo modo non. Simpliciter quidem non sunt transgressiones: secundum quid autem sunt; quia omnes respublicae aliae ab optima et rectissima deficiunt ab ipsa. Et ideo respublica quae communi nomine nominata est, et species quaedam optimatum, transgressiones sunt; et continuatur aliis quae sunt transgressiones, sicut prius dictum est. Illud autem quod est transgressio alicuius cognoscitur ex illo: quare cognoscitur per alias rectas politias de quibus dictum est. Illud autem quod cognoscitur per aliud, sequitur illud et posterius est eo, quo ad nos. Quare, post determinationem de aliis politiis rectis, debuit determinare de politia communi nomine nominata; cum et ipsa aliquo modo transgressio sit, scilicet optimae et perfectissimae reipublicae. Ultimo vero de tyrannide: et hoc rationabiliter, quia tyrannis inter omnes politias minime politia est; et ideo prius debuit determinari de illis quae simpliciter vel magis politiae sunt, quia consideratio philosophi in isto libro est determinare de politia. Propter quam ergo causam prius determinatum est de aliis quam de politia, et ultimo de tyrannide dicetur, dictum est.

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Deinde cum dicit nunc autem prosequitur intentum suum; et dividitur in duas. In prima determinat de politia. Secundo de tyrannide, ibi, de tyrannide autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima ostendit, quod est composita ex populari et paucorum; et quam habet differentiam ad aliquas species status optimatum. In secunda ostendit, qualiter instituatur, ibi, non est autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima probat quod est composita ex populari et paucorum. Secundo, quia aliquam habet convenientiam cum aliquibus speciebus status optimatum ponit differentiam inter politiam et statum optimatum quantum ad illas species, ibi, videtur autem et cetera. Adhuc primo proponit intentum suum. Secundo probat, ibi, consueverunt autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod nunc dicendum est de politia. Ratio autem et natura eius manifesta erit visis rationibus status popularis et paucorum; quia politia simpliciter, ut est dicere, mixta est ex paucorum statu et populari; quia in politia actu et simpliciter non maneret ratio potentiae paucorum et popularis, sed tantum virtute, sicut miscibilia manent in eo quod componitur ex eis. Hoc autem habet rationem medii. Ratio autem medii cognoscitur ex rationibus extremorum. Quare manifestum est quod politia cognoscitur per rationes potentiae paucorum et popularis.

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Deinde cum dicit consueverunt autem probat quod sit mixta ex illis. Probat autem hoc ex communi dicto quorumdam; et dicit, quod quidam antiquorum politiam cum declinat ad popularem dicunt eam rempublicam: cum autem ad paucorum, dicunt eam statum optimatum: et ratio huius est, quia paucorum attenditur secundum dignitatem divitiarum: divitiis autem assequuntur disciplina et nobilitas. Disciplina quidem, quia organa necessaria ad disciplinam sunt divitiae; ideo pro tanto dicitur disciplina assequi divitibus, quia habent ea quae sunt necessaria ad disciplinam: nobilitas etiam assequitur, quia nobilitas est virtus, idest inclinatio ad virtutem, et divitiae antiquae. Ergo manifestum est, quod nobilitas et disciplina assequuntur divitibus. Adhuc, quia divites habent illa penes se, propter quorum defectum aliqui faciunt iniuriam. Aliqui enim propter penuriam, quandoque faciunt iniuriam; divites autem substantiam habent. Habent igitur penes se illa propter quorum defectum aliqui faciunt iniuriam. Propter quod dominantes in statu paucorum, viros divites et insignes vocant per se bonos, quia in politia optimatum principatus et excellentia attribuitur optimis viris et virtuosis; et faventes statui paucorum dicunt statum paucorum esse ex viris per se bonis. Dicunt etiam quod cum politia declinat ad paucorum potentiam eam esse optimatum: hoc autem non esset, nisi aliquid haberet de potentia paucorum. Similiter dicunt alii, cum declinat ad popularem, quod est politia popularis. Quare manifestum est quod politia componitur ex statu populari et paucorum.

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Deinde cum dicit videntur autem ponit differentiam inter politiam et alias species optimatum status; et dividitur in duas. In prima praemittit quaedam necessaria ad hoc declarandum. In secunda concludit differentiam, ibi, quoniam autem et cetera. Prima in duas. Primo praemittit illa. Secundo ostendit, quod politia conservatur in multis civitatibus, ibi, in plurimis quidem et cetera. Prima in quatuor, secundum quod praemittit quatuor. Secunda ibi, non est autem bona et cetera. Tertia ibi, videtur autem et cetera. Quarta ibi, haec autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod non videtur esse possibile civitatem aliquam quae regitur principatu optimatum, non bene disponi legibus, sed male gubernari secundum eas. Similiter non est possibile aliquam bene disponi, et non esse bene optimatum; quoniam civitas quae bene regitur secundum statum optimatum, bonum finem habet simpliciter, quia finem virtutis; et bene disponit quae ad finem et ad illud gratia cuius est. Bona autem ordinatio secundum rationem eorum quae ad finem ad ipsum est bona legis ordinatio: civitas ergo quae bene regitur secundum optimatum statum bene regitur legibus. Et eadem ratio est de conversa.

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Deinde cum dicit non est autem praemittit secundum; quia aliquis posset dicere, quod leges bene sunt dispositae et regitur civitas statu optimatum, sed tamen nolunt obedire legibus; ideo philosophus dicit quod ista non est bona dispositio et ordinatio legum quod leges bene ponantur, et quod non obediatur legibus. Et hoc apparet. Leges enim sunt organa quaedam ad finem civitatis: sicut igitur esset inconveniens, quod aliqua organa, sicut fistulae essent bene posita vel facta, et tamen non bene ordinarentur ad finem, sic inconveniens est, quod leges bene ponantur, et tamen non bene ordinentur ad finem: hoc autem contingit, si non obediatur legibus. Ergo manifestum est quod non est bona legis dispositio, quod lex bene ponatur, et quod non obediatur ei. Et ideo duae videntur esse bonae dispositiones legum. Una, quod legibus obediatur; alia ut ponantur leges rectae et iustae; quia sic legibus bene contingit obedire, et ideo sic debent poni ut eis obediatur et possint manere. Leges autem bene disponi ut eis obediatur, contingit dupliciter: aut quia sunt optimae ex suppositione et secundum quod contingit in tali civilitate; aut quia sunt optimae simpliciter et sine suppositione. Est enim intelligendum quod leges rationem sumunt ex fine: et ideo si finis civitatis est optimus simpliciter, sicut in regno et in statu optimatum, leges sunt optimae simpliciter: si autem finis non est bonus simpliciter, sed ex suppositione, sicut est in potentia paucorum, leges non sunt optimae simpliciter, sed ex suppositione; quia optimae sunt in illa civitate.

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Deinde cum dicit videtur autem ponit tertium. Et dicit quod in statu optimatum fit distributio principatus secundum dignitatem virtutis. Et ratio huius est, quia ratio, et terminus status optimatum, est virtus: et ideo secundum dignitatem virtutis fit distributio principatus in ea. In paucorum autem fit distributio principatus secundum dignitatem divitiarum; quia ratio et terminus eius sunt divitiae: sed ratio et terminus popularis est libertas; et ideo secundum dignitatem libertatis distribuitur principatus in ea.

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Deinde cum dicit haec autem ponit quartum. Et dicit, quod quidquid videtur pluribus in quacumque politia vigorem habet, et existit apud omnes in illa politia; sicut in paucorum illud quod videtur pluribus principantibus in politia, hoc vigorem habet. Et ratio huius est: melius enim iudicant plures quam pauci vel unus: item plures sunt potentiores quam pauci vel unus: et ideo quod videtur pluribus melius videtur, propter potentiam ipsorum observatur et habet vigorem. Propter quod illud quod videbitur maiori parti eorum qui participant politia, erit principatus in ea.

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Deinde cum dicit in plurimis ostendit, quod politia observatur in pluribus civitatibus. Et dicit quod in pluribus civitatibus respublica communi nomine vocata vocatur et observatur. Et ratio huius est, quia plurimae civitates mixtae sunt ex pauperibus et divitibus. Haec autem commixtio nihil aliud coniecturat nisi libertatem et divitias secundum quas determinantur gubernatio paucorum et popularis. Apud autem plurimos divites existentes boni et honesti videntur; et ideo principantur in tota regione, et apud aliquos populus propter libertatem. Cum igitur politia sit mixta ex populari et paucorum, manifestum est, quod plures civitates servant politiam.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem concludit differentiam inter politiam et optimatum potentiam quantum ad aliquas species. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo recapitulat, ibi, quod quidem igitur. In prima dicit, quod tria sunt, ad quae principaliter attendentes in politia altercantur de principatus aequalitate: scilicet libertas, virtus, divitiae. Quidam enim dicunt, quod principatus debet distribui secundum dignitatem libertatis; ut qui aequales sunt in libertate, aequaliter participent principatu. Alii dicunt, quod non debet fieri distributio principatus secundum dignitatem libertatis, sed secundum dignitatem divitiarum; ut qui abundantes sunt in divitiis. Alii dicunt, quod secundum nullum istorum debet fieri distributio principatus, sed secundum dignitatem virtutis; ut qui aequaliter attingunt ad virtutem, aequaliter attingant ad principatum: et sic altercantur aliqui secundum cuius istorum aequalitatem debeat distribui aequaliter principatus. Quartum autem de quo aliqui altercantur, quod vocatur nobilitas, annexum est vel assequitur duobus, scilicet virtuti et divitiis. Nobilitas enim est virtus generis, hoc est inclinatio ad virtutem descendens a parentibus in filios, et in parentes ab aliis prioribus, et sic secundum quamdam antiquitatem. Similiter nobilitas est divitiae antiquae: non quod divitiae sint de ratione nobilitatis: possibile enim est quod in pauperibus sit inclinatio ad virtutem orta ex parentibus, et secundum quamdam antiquitatem: sed pro tanto dicitur nobilitas divitiae antiquae, quia sunt necessariae ad virtutem. Cum igitur ita sit, manifestum est, quod politia mixta ex divitibus et egenis, dicenda est politia communi nomine: sed illa, quae mixta est ex tribus, scilicet divitibus et egenis, et virtuosis, optimatum status est una de tribus optimatum potentiis aliis a prima, quae est vera respublica optimatum non mixta.

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Deinde cum dicit quod quidem recapitulat; et dicit, quod dictum est iam, quod praeter monarchiam regalem et paucorum potentiam et popularem sunt aliae species politiae; et quales sunt et quae, quoniam optimatum et politia. Iterum dictum est, qualiter species optimatum adinvicem differunt, et qualiter politia differt ab optimatum statu; et manifestum est ex dictis, quod non multum distant adinvicem politia et optimatum status, qui respicit divites et pauperes virtuosos, quia solum in hoc quod respicit virtuosos, alia non; et ita divites et pauperes sicut politia: propter quod manifestum est, quod non multum distant.

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L. 8 (Δ.9, 1294a30–1294b41)Quo pacto supradicta reipublicae species contemperari debeat, ita ut et multitudinis et paucorum statum participet, neutrum tamen exquisite habeat.

Quo pacto supradicta reipublicae species contemperari debeat, ita ut et multitudinis et paucorum statum participet, neutrum tamen exquisite habeat.

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472. Quo autem modo sit praeter democratiam et oligarchiam, quae vocatur politia, et qualiter ipsam oportet institui, dicemus consequenter dictis: simul autem palam erit et quibus determinant democratiam et oligarchiam. Sumendum enim horum divisionem: deinde ex iis ex utraque, velut symbolum accipientes, componendum.

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473. Sunt autem termini tres compositionis et mixtionis. Aut enim utrumque sumendum quae utrique lege statuunt; puta de eo, quod est iudicare. In oligarchiis quidem enim opulentis damnum ordinant si non disceptent; egenis autem nullam mercedem. In democratiis autem, egenis quidem mercedem, opulentis autem nullum damnum. Commune autem et medium horum ambo haec: propter quod et politicum: mixtum est enim ex ambobus. Unus quidem igitur iste combinationis modus.

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474. Alterum autem accipere medium eorum quae utrique statuunt; puta congregationis fieri, ii quidem ab honorabilitate nulla, vel parva omnino; ii autem ab immensa honorabilitate. Commune autem neutrum; sed media honorabilitas utriusque horum.

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475. Tertium autem ex duabus institutionibus: haec quidem ex oligarchia lege, haec autem ex democratica. Dico autem puta videtur democraticum quidem esse sortiales esse principatus, eligibiles autem oligarchicum. Et democraticum quidem qui non ab honorabilitate, oligarchicum autem qui ab honorabilitate. Aristocraticum igitur et politicum ex utraque utrumque accipere: ex oligarchia quidem eligibiles facere principatus, ex democratia autem quod non ab honorabilitate.

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476. Modus quidem igitur mixtionis iste. Eius autem quod est bene misceri democratiam et oligarchiam terminus, quando contingit dicere eandem politiam et democratiam et oligarchiam.

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477. Palam enim quod hoc patiuntur dicentes propter mixtas esse bene. Patitur autem hoc et medium: apparet enim utrumque extremorum in ipso; quod quidem accidit circa Lacedaemoniorum politiam. Multi enim conantur dicere tamquam democratia existente, quia democratica multa ordo habet: puta primo quod circa alimentum puerorum: similiter enim qui divitum nutriuntur iis qui pauperum et erudiuntur hoc modo utique quo possent et pauperum pueri. Similiter autem et in habita aetate, et cum viri fuerint, eodem modo. Nullo enim distinctus dives et pauper; sic quae circa alimentum eadem omnibus in conviviis, et vestimentum tale divites, quale utique praeparare posset et pauperum aliquis quicumque. Adhuc, eo quod duos maximos principatus, hunc quidem eligat populus, hoc autem participet. Senes quidem enim eligunt, ephoria autem participant. Alii autem oligarchiam: quia multa habet oligarchica: puta quod omnes sunt eligibiles, et nullus sortialis, et quod pauci sunt domini mortis et fugae, et alia talia multa.

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478. Oportet autem in politia mixta bene videri utraque esse, et neutrum, et salvari per se ipsam: non eo quod plures extrinsecus sint, qui volunt: erit enim utique et pravae politiae hoc existens: sed eo quod neque utique velit politiam alteram nulla partium politiae totaliter. Quo quidem igitur modo videtur consistere politia, similiter autem et putatae aristocratiae, nunc dictum est.

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Postquam philosophus declaravit, quod politia communi nomine nominata, est composita ex populari statu, et paucorum; et qualiter differat ab optimatum statu quantum ad aliquam speciem, ostendit qualiter instituatur: et habet duas partes. In prima praemittit intentum suum. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, sunt autem termini et cetera. In prima dicit, quod postquam declaratum est, quod politia est composita ex populari statu et paucorum, consequenter dicendum est qualiter respublica communi nomine nominata sit quaedam politia alia a statu populari et paucorum, cum tamen ex illis componatur. Dicendum etiam est, qualiter instituatur. Visis autem rationibus, quibus determinantur gubernatio paucorum et popularis, simul apparebit ratio politiae. Et ideo sumenda est distinctio istarum duarum politiarum; deinde qualiter ex istis duabus accipiendo ab utraque et aliquid dimittendo, fit unum mixtum, vel totum aliquod continens aliquid utriusque.

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Deinde cum dicit sunt autem prosequitur: et dividitur in duas. In primo ostendit qualiter ex illis instituatur politia. Secundo, ostendit quis sit terminus et ratio bonae commixtionis, ibi, modus quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primam partem intelligendum est, quod circa principatum tria est considerare. Primum est personas principantes. Secundum est actus principantium. Tertium est modus institutionis principantium: secundum hoc ista pars dividitur in tres partes. In prima declarat terminum et rationem mixtionis politiae ex ipsis quantum ad actus principantium. Secundo quantum ad personas quae debent assumi ad principatum, ibi, alterum autem et cetera. Tertio quantum ad institutionem ipsorum, ibi, tertium autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod termini sive rationes compositionis, sive mixtionis politiae ex gubernatione paucorum et popularium, tres sunt: et una ratio est quantum ad actum principantium qui est iudicare. Ut autem appareat haec ratio mixtionis, aut sumenda sunt ea quae utraque ordinant, saltem secundum partem, quamvis non secundum totum et simpliciter: verbi gratia, de iudicio lex fuit, in paucorum statu, quod si divites non venirent ad iudicandum et disceptandum, quod haberent damnum: puta quod punirentur in aliquo: et si pauperes venirent nullam mercedem reportarent. Manifestum est autem quod ista lex introducta fuit in favorem divitum et in odium egenorum: quia lex ista data fuit, ut pauperes excluderentur a principatu: ex quo enim nullam mercedem reportant secundum legem, non veniunt, et sic excludantur. Data etiam fuit ut divites participarent principatu: quia ex quo damnum reportarent, si non venirent, compelluntur venire. In contrarium autem in populari statu fuit alia lex, quod egeni venientes ad disceptandum et iudicandum habeant mercedem, divites vero nullum damnum. Et manifestum est, quod ista lex data fuit in odium divitum et in favorem egenorum; quia per istam legem videntur excludi divites, et solum pauperes participare principatu. Illud vero, quod est commune istis duabus legibus, est medium, in quo consistit ratio compositionis politiae. Si enim accipiatur ex paucorum potentia divites reportare damnum, ex populari pauperes reportare mercedem, hoc est medium et commune illis, et hoc est politicum. Quare manifestum est, quomodo politia componitur ex istis. Et tunc concludit, quod unus modus mixtionis politiae ex statu populari et paucorum est iste qui dictus est.

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Deinde cum dicit alterum autem determinat rationem mixtionis, quantum ad personas quae debent assumi ad principatum. Et dicit quod alia est ratio mixtionis, scilicet quantum ad personas quas faventes paucorum potentiae et populari dicunt debere vocari ad congregationes, sive ad principatum: quia fuit lex in populari, quod nullus assumeretur ad principatum secundum dignitatem divitiarum, vel honorabilitatem: sed si deberent assumi secundum aliquam honorabilitatem, quod assumerentur secundum parvam in paucorum. E contrario fuit lex, quod assumerentur secundum honorabilitatem maximam. Manifestum est autem, quod neutrum istorum est commune, sed sunt diversa et separata. Si vero accipiatur medium, in hoc consistit ratio politiae, quod scilicet accipiatur princeps secundum mediam honorabilitatem. Quare manifestum est, quomodo politia miscenda est ex populari statu et paucorum, quantum ad personas, quae debent assumi ad principatum.

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Deinde cum dicit tertium autem declarat rationem mixtionis politiae quantum ad institutionem personarum quae debent assumi ad principatum. Et dicit, quod tertia ratio mixtionis est quantum ad modum eligendi, sive instituendi personas principantes: diversus enim est modus eligendi in statu populari et paucorum. In populari enim lex fuit, quod per sortem acciperentur principantes, et non secundum honorabilitatem magnam divitiarum. In paucorum vero fuit lex, quod acciperentur secundum leges et secundum dignitates divitiarum. Accipere autem aliquid ab utraque politicum, et optimatum statui convenit: malum enim est, quod omnes accipiantur per sortem: et etiam malum est, quod omnes accipiantur secundum honorabilitatem divitiarum; et ideo utrumque istorum dimittendum est. Sed accipiantur a potentia paucorum, quod accipiendi sunt per electionem, et quod non secundum aliquam honorabilitatem divitiarum, sed per sortem ex populari statu: et tunc erit politicum. Quare manifestum est quomodo politia componitur ex populari et paucorum quantum ad modum instituendi personas principantes.

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Deinde cum dicit modus quidem declarat quis est terminus et ratio bonae mixtionis: et dividitur in tres. In prima tangit quis est terminus bonae mixtionis: secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi, palam enim et cetera. Tertio declarat quid oportet observari in politia bene mixta, ibi, oportet autem et cetera. In prima dicit et quod ratio et terminus bonae mixtionis paucorum status et popularis, in politia aliqualiter est quando contingit dicere, quod respublica quae mixta est, ex statu paucorum et populari: et tunc bene mixta est respublica ex illis quando in republica apparent illae duae. Hoc enim contingit quia mixta est ex illis. In mixto enim manent miscibilia aliqualiter, et in medio extrema. Medium enim comparatum ad utrumque extremorum apparet esse utrumque. Tunc igitur bene mixta est respublica ex paucorum et multorum statu, quando in republica apparet paucorum et multorum respublica.

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Deinde cum dicit palam enim declarat per exemplum. Et dicit, quod in republica Lacedaemoniorum manifestum est, quod in republica apparet popularis et paucorum, quia multi dicunt quod illa respublica est popularis, quia habet multa de statu illo; verbi gratia, primo similiter se habet circa nutritionem, sicut popularis. Pueri enim in Lacedaemonia divitum et egenorum eodem modo et ex eisdem alimentis nutriuntur: similiter eodem modo erudiuntur, et illo modo quo possunt erudiri pauperum filii. Similiter in consequenti aetate cum facti sunt viri, eodem modo se habent sicut divites; in alimentis enim et vestimentis non est diversitas inter pauperem et divitem; talibus enim induuntur divites quibus pauperes possunt indui si volunt. Iterum habebant duos magnos principatus populares: populus enim eligebat principem in uno principatu. Eligebantur enim senes a populo. Ad principatum autem quemdam attingebat populus, scilicet ad principatum ephororum. Et dicitur principatus iste eorum qui potestatem habent convocandi multitudinem et exequendi per eam quae ad ipsum pertinent. Sic igitur apparet quod respublica Lacedaemoniorum videbatur esse quibusdam popularis, aliis videbatur esse paucorum, scilicet quod omnes principantes assumuntur per electionem et nullus per sortem. Item pauci erant principantes quantum ad condemnationem mortis, et relegationem, et similiter quantum ad alia talia. Sic igitur apparet quod in republica communi nomine nominata debent apparere popularis et paucorum status.

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Deinde cum dicit oportet autem ostendit quid oportet observari in republica. Et dicit, quod in republica bene mixta ex populari et paucorum statu oportet quod utrumque extremorum esse videatur et neutrum. Oportet quidem quod utrumque videatur; quia in mixto manent aliquo modo miscibilia. Quare si bene fuerit mixta respublica ex illis, oportet quod in republica aliquo modo appareat paucorum status et popularis. Item oportet quod neutrum videatur, scilicet secundum actum; nam in mixto non salvantur miscibilia secundum actus proprios. Et ideo in republica non debet apparere status paucorum simpliciter, et secundum actum suum simpliciter, nec popularis. Item oportet hic observari quod respublica sit talis quod per seipsam possit salvari, non per aliud extrinsecum, sed per se. Non ex eo quod sint aliqui plures extrinseci qui velint salvationem eius, quia hoc potest inesse tyrannidi vel alicui alii prave vel male ordinatae. Sed oportet quod salvetur propter hoc quod nulla pars huius reipublicae velit aliam rempublicam, sed tantum istam. Et tunc recapitulat; et dicit, quod patet qualiter se habet respublica; similiter qualiter se habent status optimatum mixti dictum est.

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L. 9 (Δ.10, 1295a1–1295a24)De tyrannide et eius speciebus tribus; quaeve tyrannis maxime opponatur regiae gubernationi.De tyrannide et eius speciebus tribus; quaeve tyrannis maxime opponatur regiae gubernationi.

479. De tyrannide autem erat reliquum nobis dicere; non quasi sit multa sermocinatio circa ipsam, sed ut accipiat quis methodi partem, quoniam eet hanc ponimus politiarum quandam partem.

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480. De regno quidem igitur determinavimus in primis sermonibus, in quibus de eo quod maxime dicitur regnum, fecimus considerationem, utrum inexpediens, vel expediat civitatibus et quam et unde oportet consistere et qualiter.

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481. Tyrannidis autem species duas quidem divisimus, in quibus de regno consideravimus propter potentiam ipsarum vergere aliqualiter et ad regnum, propter secundum legem esse ambos hos principatus. In quibusdam enim Barbarorum eligunt imperatores, monarchas, et olim apud antiquos Graecos fiebant quidem monarchae isto modo quos vocabant Aesym netas. Habent autem hae quasdam ad invicem differentias. Erant autem, propterea quod secundum legem, regales et quia monarchizabant voluntariis; tyrannicae autem propter despotice principari, et secundum suam sententiam.

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482. Tertia autem species tyrannidis, quae quidem maxime videtur esse tyrannis, convertibilis existens ei qui omnimode regnum. Talem autem necessarium tyrannidem esse monarchiam quae est incorrigibilis principatus similium et meliorum omnium ad proprium sive conferens, sed non ad id quod subiectorum: propter quod involuntarius. Nullus enim voluntarius liberorum sustinet tale principatum. Tyrannidis quidem species hac et tot propter dictas causas.

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Postquam philosophus determinavit de republica qualiter mixta est ex statu paucorum et multorum, et qualiter habet institui, determinat de tyrannide, et dividitur in duas. In prima praemittit intentum suum. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, de regno quidem et cetera. In prima dicit quod postquam determinatum est de republica communi nomine nominata; dicendum est de tyrannide: non quod debeat fieri sermo prolixus de ea, est enim respublica pessima; et ideo breviter dicendum est de ipsa ut habeatur pars quaedam praesentis tractatus. Intentio enim philosophi in isto libro est determinare de republica: sed tyrannis est respublica quaedam; ideo dicendum est de ipsa.

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Deinde cum dicit de regno prosequitur; et quia tyrannis est transgressio a regno, recolligit primo quaedam determinata de regno. Secundo prosequitur de ipsa, ibi, tyrannidis autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod in praecedentibus dictum est de monarchia regali: ubi tum consideratum est de ipsa monarchia, utrum civitatibus expediat unum principari, aut non expediat. Et dato quod expediat, consideratum fuit qualem unum, quoniam optimum; et unde assumendum est, quoniam ex optimis viris et qualiter.

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Deinde cum dicit tyrannidis autem prosequitur de tyrannide. Et primo ponit duos modos eius quos posuit prius, capitulo de regno. Secundo ponit modum unum qui proprie dicitur tyrannis, ibi, tertia autem species et cetera. In prima dicit quod duae sunt species tyrannidis, de quibus dictum est superius, cum de regno determinaretur; quae valde sunt propinquae monarchiae regali, propter potentiam quam habent principantes secundum illas supra subditos: et principantes secundum istas species principantur secundum leges, quod pertinet ad monarchiam regalem. Est enim una istarum specierum secundum quam in quibusdam civitatibus barbarorum assumitur monarcha qui regit eos secundum leges et consuetudinem. Est autem consuetudo eorum quod assumant sibi monarcham, vel per electionem, vel per successionem, qui regat eos secundum leges. Secunda species est secundum quam aliqui eligunt sibi principem ad fugandum inimicos, secundum quod apud Graecos olim eligebantur quidam qui vocabantur aesymnetae. Isti enim eligebant quosdam in principes ad fugandum adversarios. Istae autem duae species habebant in se quaedam opposita et differentia; quia videlicet, cum regerent huiusmodi reges secundum leges et volentibus imperarent, erant eorum monarchiae regales: cum vero praetermissis legibus secundum quas regere debebant plena potestate secundum arbitrium suum dominarentur, tyrannice regnabant et monarchiae illae tyrannides erant.

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Deinde cum dicit tertia autem ponit modum qui proprie dicitur tyrannis. Et dicit quod tertia species quae proprie et maxime videtur esse tyrannis, videtur esse convertibilis cum monarchia regali primo et principaliter dicta; non quod sit eadem illi; sed per oppositum; quia sicut in regno principatur unus secundum voluntatem suam et ratione ordinata ad utilitatem subditorum: sic in ista principatur unus secundum voluntatem suam. Est autem huiusmodi tyrannis, nullis subiacens legibus, incorrigibilis principatus similium et meliorum propter bonum suum, non propter bonum subditorum. In ista autem definitione principatus est loco generis, incorrigibilis loco differentiae. Et dicitur incorrigibilis, quia non est natus corrigi. Illud enim dicitur corrigibile quod a dispositione prava ad bonam potest mutari salvata natura eius: nunc autem iste principatus ita pessimus est quod a dispositione sua prava ad bonam non potest mutari, salvata eius natura, immo corrumperetur. Per similium et meliorum tangitur materia principatus. Sunt enim in isto principatu aequales et liberi et virtuosi. Causam finalem tangit cum dicit propter bonum proprium, non subditorum. Ex quo sequitur, quod iste principatus non est voluntarius, quia nullus liber voluntarie subiicitur tali principatui. Et ratio huius est, quia nullus qui est bene dispositus secundum naturam et inclinatur ad virtutem, vult subiici ei qui principatur non secundum virtutem, sed propter bonum proprium; immo magis inclinatur ad principandum simpliciter quam subiiciendum. Nunc autem liber bene dispositus est secundum naturam et inclinatur ad virtutem. Ergo manifestum est quod non vult subiici ei qui non principatur secundum virtutem, sed inclinatur magis ad principandum. Sed tyrannis principatur non secundum virtutem: quare manifestum est quod principatus iste involuntarius est. Dixit autem liberorum propter principatum servilem. In illo enim principatu subditi subiiciuntur tyranno voluntarie, quia inclinantur ad subiiciendum tali principatui; sicut in principatu barbarorum. Ulterius concludit quod hae et tot sunt species tyrannidis, et propter causas dictas.

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L. 10 (Δ.11, 1295a25–1296b12)Civitatem quae mediocres cives habet, id est neque nimium divites, neque nimium pauperes, optimam esse, securiorem, diuturniorem, minimeque seditiosam.

Civitatem quae mediocres cives habet, id est neque nimium divites, neque nimium pauperes, optimam esse, securiorem, diuturniorem, minimeque seditiosam.

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483. Quae autem sit optima politia, et quae optima vita plurimis civitatibus, et plurimis hominum neque ad virtutem comparandum esse super idiotas, neque ad disciplinam quae natura indiget, et successu fortunali, neque ad politiam secundum votum factam, sed ad vitam possibilem communicari plurimis, et ad politiam qua plurimas civitates contingit participare. Etenim quas vocant aristocratias de quibus nunc diximus, hae quidem magis extra cadunt plurimis civitatum, hae autem appropinquant ei quae vocatur politia: propter quod de ambabus et de una dicendum. Iudicium enim de omnibus iis et eisdem elementis est.

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484. Si enim bene in ethecis dictum est, felicem vitam esse eam quae secundum virtutem non impeditam, medietatem autem virtutem, necessarium mediam esse vitam optimam. Medietatis autem contingentis sortiri a singulis.

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485. Eosdem autem terminos, hos necessarium esse, et civitatis virtutis et malitiae: politia enim vita quaedam est civitas.

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486. In omnibus itaque civitatibus sunt tres partes civitatis; ii quidem opulenti valde, ii autem egeni valde, ii autem tertii qui medii horum. Quoniam igitur conceditur quod mediocre, optimum, et quuod medium manifestum quod bene fortuitorum possessio quae media, optima omnium.

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487. Facillima enim rationi obedire: superpulchrum, aut superfortem, aut superingenuum, aut superdivitem, aut contraria iis superegenum, aut superdebilem, aut valde vile, difficile rationem sequi. Fiunt enim, ii quidem iniuriosi, et in magnis iniqui magis: ii autem astuti, et in parvis inique valde. Iniuriarum autem hae quidem fiunt propter iniuriam, hae autem propter astutiam.

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488. Adhuc autem isti minime amant principes, et volunt esse principes: haec autem ambo nociva civitatibus.

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489. Adhuc autem qui quidem sunt in excessibus exfortuniorum potentiae, et divitiarum, et amicorum, et aliorum talium, subici neque volunt neque sciunt. Et hoc statim a primordio existit pueris existentibus: propter delitias enim neque doctoribus subici consuetum ipsis.

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490. Qui autem secundum excessum in indigentia horum, humiles valde: ut ii quidem principari nesciant, sed subici servili principatu. Ii autem subici quidem neque uno principatu, subici autem secundum despoticum principatum: fit igitur servorum et despotorum civitas, sed non liberorum. Et horum quidem invidentium, horum autem contemnentium: quae plurimum distant ab aicitia, et communione politica. Communio enim amicabile: neque enim in via volunt communicare cum inimicis.

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491. Vult autem civitas ex aequalibus esse, et similibus quam maxime: hoc autem existit maxime mediis. Quare necessarium optime politizare hanc civitatem, ex quibus dicimus esse natura constitutionem civitatis.

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492. Et salvantur autem in civitatibus isti maxime civium: neque enim ipsi aliena desiderant sicut pauperes ea quae divitum concupiscunt. Et propterea quod neque insidias patiuntur, neque fraudes moliuntur, sine periculo degunt.

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493. Propter hoc bene optavit Phocylides: multa mediis optima, medius volo in civitate esse.

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494. Palam ergo quod et communio politica optima per medios. Et tales contingit bene politizare civitates in quibus utique multum quod medium. Et valentius maxime quidem amborum: si autem non, alterius partis. Appositum enim facit inclinationem, et prohibet fieri contrarios excessus.

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495. Propter quod quidem eufortunium maximum, politizantes substantiam habere mediam et sufficientem. Namque ubi ii quidem multa valde possiderunt, ii autem nihil, aut populus exeremus fit, aut oligarchia intemperata, aut tyrannis, propter ambos excessus. Etenim ex democratia maxime iuvenili et ex oligarchia fit tyrannis: ex mediis autem et iis qui prope, multo minus. Causam autem posterius in iis, quae circa transmutationes politiarum, dicemus.

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496. Quod autem quae media, optima, manifestum: sola enim sine seditione: ubi enim multum quod intermedium, minime fiunt conturbationes et dissensiones politiarum. Et magnae civitates sunt magis sine seditionibus, propter eandem causam: quia multi quod medium. In parvis autem facile dividere omnes in duo ut nullum relinquatur medium, et omnes fere egeni vel opulenti sunt. Et democratiae autem securiores sunt oligarchiis, et durabiliores sunt propter medios: plures enim sunt et magis participant honoribus in democratiis, quam in oligarchiis: quoniam quando sine iis multitudine invaluerint homines, mala operatio fit, et pereunt cito.

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497. Signum autem oportet putare, et quod optimi legislatores fuerunt de mediis civibus. Solon enim fuit de iis significat autem ex poesi, et Lycurgus (non enim fuit rex) et Charondas, et fere plurimi aliorum.

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498. Manifestum autem ex iis, et quod plurimae politiae, hae quidem democratiae sunt, hae autem oligarchiae: quia enim saepe in iis paucum est quod medium, semper quicumque excesserint, sive qui substantias habent, sive populus, qui medium egrediuntur, secundum se ducunt politiam. Quare autem democratia fit, aut oligarchia.

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499. Adhuc autem propter seditiones fieri, et pugnas ad invicem populo et divitibus, quibuscumque evenerit obtinere magis contrariis, non instituunt communem politiam, neque aequalem; sed victoriae praemium excessum politiae accipiunt; et ii quidem democratiam, ii autem oligarchiam faciunt.

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500. Adhuc autem, et eorum, qui in praeeminentia fuerunt Graeciae, ad eam quae apud ipsos politiam utique respicientes, ii quidem democratiam in civitatibus instituerunt, ii autem oligarchiam; non ad conferens civitatis intendentes, sed ad id, quod sui ipsorum: ut et propter has causas, aut nunquam media sit politia, aut raro, et apud paucos: unus enim vir, solus eorum, qui prius in praesidatu fuerunt, persuasus fuit hunc ordinem assignare. Iam autem, et in iis qui in civitatibus, extat consuetudo, neque velle quod aeuale: sed aut principari quaerere, aut obtentos sufferre. Quae quidem igitur sit optima politia, et propter quam causam, ex iis manifestum.

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501. Aliarum autem politiarum, quoniam plures democratias, et plures oligarchias diximus esse, qualem ponendum primam et secundam, et hoc modo consequentem, per esse hanc quidem meliorem, hanc autem deteriorem, determinata optima, non difficile videre. Oportet autem necessario esse meliorem quae propinquissima huic, deteriorem autem plus distantem a medio, si non ad hypothesim iudicet aliquis. Dico autem ad hypothesim, quia saepe existente alia politia magis eligibili, quibusdam nihil prohibet expedire magis esse alteram politiam.

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Postquam philosophus determinavit de republica communi nomine nominata: et de tyrannide, declarat quae sit optima respublica pluribus civitatibus et pluribus hominibus simpliciter. Et dividitur in duas. In prima dicit intentum suum. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, si enim bene et cetera. In prima dicit, quod postquam determinatum est de republica et tyrannide, dicendum est quae est optima respublica et quae est optima vita pluribus civitatibus, et pluribus hominibus. Et non dicendum est nobis, quae est optima vita simpliciter secundum veritatem in comparatione ad simplices et idiotas, idest secundum quas simpliciter vivunt. Nec dicendum est quae est optima vita in comparatione ad disciplinam, qualis est speculativa. Istae enim indigent bona inclinatione naturali, et bono successu fortunae: ista autem habere difficile est. Iterum non dicendum est de republica optima, quae est secundum voluntatem et electionem simpliciter. Sed dicendum est de vita optima quae possibilis est pluribus hominibus et civitatibus, et de rebuspublicis ad quam possunt pertingere plurimae civitates. Status autem optimatum de quibus dictum est prius, scilicet illae quae sunt simplices et mixtae, quae magis accedunt ad ipsam, non sunt possibiles multis civitatibus: sed magis cadunt extra optimum pluribus civitatibus. Quidam autem magis appropinquant ei quam dicimus rempublicam. Et ideo de illis optimatibus et de hac republica dicendum est, sicut de una republica; quia ex eisdem principiis fit iudicium de ipsis. Et istae duae sunt optimae et possibiles pluribus civitatibus et hominibus, de quibus nunc dicendum est.

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Deinde cum dicit si enim prosequitur. Et primo ostendit quae sit optima vita et respublica possibilis pluribus civitatibus. Secundo qualiter aliae respublicae se habent ad vitam, ibi, aliarum autem politiarum et cetera. Prima in tres. In prima ostendit quae sit optima vita hominis. Secundo, quod ista eadem est ratio et terminus reipublicae possibilis pluribus civitatibus, ibi, eosdem autem et cetera. In tertia, quae sit optima respublica possibilis pluribus civitatibus, ibi, in omnibus itaque et cetera. In prima dicit, quod sicut dictum est in libro Ethicorum, optima vita hominis est operatio secundum virtutem non impedita. Non enim consistit in actu primo: quia existens in actu primo in potentia est ad secundum actum: ergo non est perfectus simpliciter. Sed felix perfectus est simpliciter. Nec in habitu; quia in potentia est ad actum secundum. Quare consistit in operatione ultima: quia illa non est amplius in potentia ad aliam. Sed virtus est medietas quaedam. Est enim habitus electivus in mediocritate existens determinata ratione, et ut sapiens determinabit. Quare optima vita hominis est vita media: et loquimur de tali medietate, quae possibilis est hominibus.

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Deinde cum dicit eosdem autem declarat, quod idem est terminus et eadem ratio civitatis et reipublicae, et virtutis vel malitiae. Et dicit, quod eadem est ratio civitatis bonae et reipublicae bonae, et civitatis malae et reipublicae malae. Et ratio est, quia respublica comparatur ad civitatem sicut vita. Est enim respublica ordo civitatis. Ordo autem vita est quaedam eius, cuius est. Ideo respublica vita est civitatis. Et sicut cessante vita cessat illud cuius est, sic cessante republica cessat civitas. Sicut ergo eadem est ratio vitae, et illius cuius est, et perfectionis, et illa cuius est; sic eadem est ratio reipublicae bonae et civitatis bonae. De mala republica et civitate mala non probat, quia apparet ex eo quod dictum est de bona republica.

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Deinde cum dicit in omnibus probat quae sit optima respublica pluribus civitatibus. Et primo probat quae sit optima civitas. Secundo, concludit quae sit optima respublica, ibi, palam ergo et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. Primo, ostendit quod civitas est optima, quae est ex mediis. Secundo, quod talis civitas bene salvatur, ibi, et salvantur et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. Primo, ostendit qui sint optimi cives, quoniam medii. Secundo, quae optima civitas, ibi, vult autem civitas et cetera. Ad haec primo concludit ex praecedentibus, quod medii sunt optimi cives. Secundo probat per rationem, ibi, facillima enim et cetera. In prima dicit: dictum est, quod eadem est ratio bonae reipublicae et bonae civitatis. Sunt autem civitatis tres partes. Quidam enim sunt opulenti valde, quidam egeni valde, alii sunt medii, qui nec nimis divites nec nimis pauperes sunt, sed medio modo se habent. Cum igitur omnes concedant, quod medium est optimum, quoniam vita secundum virtutem est optima, virtus etiam est in medio; manifestum est, quod medii in civitate sunt optimi, et possessio ipsorum media existens, optima est inter omnes.

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Deinde cum dicit facillima enim probat hoc per rationes. Et dividitur in quatuor, secundum quod probat per quatuor rationes. Secunda, ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. Tertia, ibi, adhuc autem qui et cetera. Quarta, ibi, qui autem et cetera. In prima intendit istam rationem. Illi sunt optimi cives, qui facillime obediunt rationi: sed medii in civitate facillime obediunt rationi, non autem extremi: ergo medii sunt optimi cives. Huius rationis minorem ponit in litera, et declarat eam. Ponit autem minorem, dicens, quod media pars civitatis facillima est ad obediendum rationi, non extremus, et ille qui excellit aliis in pulchritudine, vel in fortitudine, vel in nobilitate, vel in divitiis, non de facili obedit rationi. Iterum ille qui nimis egenus est, aut valde debilis, vel multum vilis, non de facili obedit rationi. Et ratio huius est, quia ille qui excedit, vel in pulchritudine, vel in fortitudine, vel in nobilitate, vel divitiis alios contemnit, et fit iniuriosus, et inclinatur etiam propter excessum alicuius istorum ad inordinatas delectationes, et sunt nequam magis, quia ista eos faciunt declinare ab eo quod est secundum rationem rectam. Egeni autem, valde debiles vel viles, deficiunt a ratione et fiunt avari, et in parvis nequam valde. Circa quod intelligendum est, quod astutia est inclinatio ad inveniendum diversos modos et vias ad finem non rectum. Actus autem qui procedit ex hoc, dicitur dolus vel fraus ad nocendum aliis. Et secundum quod est ad nocendum aliis in rebus, fraus dicitur: secundum quod in persona vel fama, dolus. Isti autem superegeni diversos modos et diversas vias inveniunt, quibus possint habere divitias, vel potentiam, vel aliud tale, praeter rationem. Propter quod manifestum est, quod sunt astuti et nequam in parvis valde. Sed iniuriarum quaedam fiunt propter astutiam, vel propter contemptum, vel contumeliam: quaedam autem propter iniuriam. Quare manifestum est, quod extremi de difficili obediunt rationi.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundam rationem, et est. Illi sunt optimi in civitate, qui amant principes et magistratus curant, ac bene consulunt bono reipublicae: sed medii amant principes, non autem extremi. Illi enim, qui sunt excellenter divites, non amant ipsos, nec consequenter bene consulunt: haec autem reipublicae damnosa sunt. Isti pauperes etiam principes non amant, quia opprimi reputant se ab eis. Quare manifestum est, quod extremi non sunt optimi cives.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit tertiam rationem. Et dicit, quod adhuc manifestum est, quod extremi in civitate non sunt optimi cives, sed medii; quia illi qui excedunt alios in bonis fortunae, sicut in divitiis, potentiis, et in amicis et in consimilibus, nec subiici volunt aliis nec sciunt. Et hoc inest statim eis a pueritia. Nam a pueritia in delitiis nutriti sunt. Et ideo doctoribus non sunt assueti subiici: propter hoc non subiici eis volunt, quia non possunt inclinari ad oppositum eius ad quod inclinantur ex assuetudine; sed statim ex nativitate inclinantur ad oppositum eius quod est subiici. Et ideo etiam addiscere nolunt. Isti etiam qui excellenter egeni sunt, intantum sunt humiles, quod nesciunt principari, sed subiici etiam servili principatu; nam subiiciuntur principatu despotico qui est domini ad servum. Si igitur civitas sit ex istis, erit ex servis et dominis: sed ista inconvenientia sunt. Quare manifestum est, quod extremi non sunt optimi cives: relinquitur igitur, quod medii.

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Deinde cum dicit qui autem ponit quartam rationem. Et dicit, quod illi qui invident aliis et contemnunt alios, nec magistratus gerere sciunt, non sunt optimi cives. Sed egeni valde invident aliis, nec magistratus gerere sciunt. Divites etiam valde contemnunt eos, quae sunt etiam contra rationem reipublicae; medii non; quare extremi non sunt optimi cives, sed medii. Huiusmodi rationis ponit minorem primo; dicens, quod illi qui sunt de numero egenorum invidentes sunt. Illi autem qui sunt de numero excedentium in bonis fortunae, contemnentes sunt alios, et hoc apparet. Divites enim et potentes videntes se habere ea quae non habent alii, illos despiciunt et contemnunt. Egeni et deficientes videntes quod non habent ea quae alii habent, invident illis, sed medii non. Quia enim ad sufficientiam habent, non invident: non contemnunt autem, quia non sunt valde excedentes. Invidere vero et contemnere sunt contra rationem reipublicae: quod declarat. Quia amicitia necessaria est in civitate. Nam communicatio amicitia quaedam est; quia inimici cum inimicis participare nolunt nec etiam in via. Sed invidia et contemptus sunt contra rationem amicitiae; quare sunt contra rationem reipublicae. Manifestum igitur, quod extremi non sunt optimi cives, sed medii inter extremos.

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Deinde cum dicit vult autem postquam philosophus determinavit qui sunt optimi cives, quoniam medii; declarat quae est optima civitas, quoniam illa quae est ex mediis. Et dicit, quod civitas debet et vult esse ex aequalibus maxime. Sed tales sunt medii, sicut probatum est; ergo civitas optima est quae est ex mediis. Et propter hoc manifestum est, quod talis civitas optime gubernatur. Illam enim necessarium est optime gubernari quae est constituta ex his, ex quibus civitas optima naturaliter constituitur: talis autem est quae dicta est: ergo et cetera.

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Deinde cum dicit et salvantur declarat quod talis civitas bene salvatur et sine periculo vivunt tales. Et primo ostendit, quod bene salvatur. Secundo quod vivunt sine periculo, ibi, propter hoc bene et cetera. In prima dicit, quod isti medii ex quibus componitur civitas optima, maxime salvantur in civitate: et hoc apparet, quia ipsi non concupiscunt aliena, sicut pauperes. Habent enim ad sufficientiam; et ideo non desiderant aliena; propter quod non insidiantur divitibus. Pauperes vero, quia deficientes sunt, desiderant aliena: et ideo insidiantur divitibus. Medii vero non, quia non habent superabundantiam divitiarum; ideo medii nec insidiantur aliis nec alii ipsis: tales autem maxime conservantur: quare manifestum est quod civitas quae est ex mediis maxime conservatur.

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Deinde cum dicit propter hoc ostendit quod vivunt sine periculo; et dicit, quod medii quia nullus insidiatur ipsis nec ipsi aliis insidiantur, sine periculo vivunt. Et propter hoc Phocylides rationabiliter desideravit medius esse in civitate, videns quod medii sunt in civitate optimi: unde dixit: medius in civitate volo esse.

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Deinde cum dicit palam ergo ostendit quod respublica quae est ex mediis est optima. Et dividitur in duas. In prima infert ex dictis quod respublica media est optima. Secundo probat hoc per signa et effectus, ibi, quod autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda infert corollarium, ibi, propter quod. In prima dicit, quod quia civitas optima est quae est ex mediis: manifestum quod respublica optima est ex mediis; et illae civitates quae multos habent medios, habent rempublicam optimam. Et ratio huius est, quia pars media civitatis valentior et melior est quam aliae duae partes divisim; quia si una pars praeter rationem velit opprimere aliam partem, sicut si divites pauperes velint opprimere, pars media adiungit se pauperibus, et cum illis reprimit malitiam divitum. Si autem pauperes velint insurgere contra divites praeter rationem, medii iungunt divitibus se, et reprimunt pauperes. Et ideo medii prohibent fieri excessus in civitate. Talis autem respublica optima est.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod infert unum corollarium. Et dicit, quod manifestum est ex dictis, quod ex quo civitas est optima quae est ex mediis, quod maximum bonum est quod in civitate gubernantes habeant substantiam mediam et possessiones medias. Quia ubi sunt qui valde excedunt in divitiis, aut indigentes valde, erit ibi aut status popularis aut paucorum intemperatus, in quo pauci divites valde dominantur secundum voluntatem suam; aut erit tyrannis propter ambos excessus, scilicet divitiarum et egestatis: ex populari enim statu nimis superbo insurgit tyrannis. Similiter ex paucorum potentia: ex mediis autem non. Multo autem minus oritur tyrannis ex his qui sunt propinqui mediis quam ex statu populari. Causa autem istorum apparebit inferius cum determinabitur de transmutatione reipublicae.

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Deinde cum dicit quod autem probat per signa, quod respublica quae est ex mediis optima est. Et dividitur in partes tres, secundum quod declarat per tria. Secunda ibi, signum autem et cetera. Tertia ibi, manifestum autem et cetera. In prima intendit istam rationem. Illa respublica est optima quae est sine seditione magis et turbatione: sed talis est illa quae est ex mediis; ergo respublica quae est ex mediis optima est. Huius rationis ponit conclusionem et minorem cum sua probatione. Dicit igitur: quod respublica quae est ex mediis sit optima, manifestum est. Ista enim sola et sine seditione et turbatione est. Hoc autem probat dupliciter. Primo, quia ubi sunt plures medii, non sunt seditiones nec turbationes. Et propter hoc magnae civitates sunt magis sine seditionibus quam parvae: quia in magnis civitatibus sunt multi medii: sed in parvis civitatibus statim omnes sunt divisi in divites et pauperes; et ideo in illis saepe fiunt perturbationes et seditiones. Quare manifestum est quod illa respublica quae est ex mediis, magis est sine seditione et turbatione. Hoc idem probat secundo ex alio, quia status populares sunt durabiliores quam paucorum, quia plures habent medios et magis attingunt medii ad principatum quam in paucorum potentia. Ex quo manifestum est quod illa respublica quae est ex mediis est magis sine seditione et turbatione. Si autem accidet quod inter egenos et divites non fuerint plures medii, aut non sufficientes, si multitudo invaluerit, multos excessus facient; et ideo male se habet et cito peribit respublica.

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Deinde cum dicit signum autem ponit secundum signum. Et dicit: quod respublica quae est ex mediis sit optima, signum est quod optimi legislatores fuerunt de mediis, sicut Solon. Iste enim Solon non fuit de divitibus excellenter, nec de pauperibus. Et hoc significavit in quadam poesi sua, quam non ponit philosophus: similiter Lycurgus non fuit de magnis: non enim fuit rex. Similiter Charondas, nec de divitibus, nec de pauperibus excellenter fuit, sed de mediis; similiter plures alii. Isti vero fuerunt optimi legislatores et fuerunt de mediis: quare manifestum est quod medio modo se habere disponit ad optimam rempublicam. Quod igitur optima respublica sit ex mediis, signum est quod optimi legislatores fuerunt de mediis.

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Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem ponit tertium signum. Et ponit primo signum. Secundo rationem assignat cuiusdam quod in signo est dictum, ibi, adhuc autem propter. In prima dicit, quod manifestum est ex his quae dicentur iam, quod optima respublica est ex mediis: qui propter hoc sunt plures respublicae aut populares aut paucorum: quia frequenter in civitatibus medium paucorum est; statim enim sunt omnes vel divites vel egeni: et quicumque excellunt alios, convertunt rempublicam secundum voluntatem suam ad utilitatem suam; ita quod si divites superaverint pauperes, convertunt rempublicam ad voluntatem suam et regunt eam, et tunc fit paucorum potentia. Si autem pauperes excesserint, regunt rempublicam secundum voluntatem suam et fit status popularis: quare manifestum est, quod aut erit popularis, aut paucorum. Cum ergo ista accidant, quae non sunt recta, propter defectum mediorum, signum est quod respublica quae est ex mediis, sit optima.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem propter assignat causam quare sunt plures populares et paucorum; et dividitur in duas, secundum quod probat hoc per duas rationes. Secunda ibi, adhuc autem et eorum et cetera. In prima dicit quod seditiones et pugnae quae fiunt in civitate inter divites et pauperes ad invicem, sunt causa quare sunt tot populares et paucorum. Illi enim qui obtinent contra adversarios, non instituunt rempublicam communem nec aequalem: sed instituunt rempublicam ad utilitatem suam et honorem et praemium victoriae suae instituunt rempublicam in qua excedunt adversarios: ita quod si pauperes obtineant faciunt popularem statum: si divites, paucorum potentiam.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem eorum ponit secundam rationem; et dicit quod aliqui praeeminentes in Graecia in potentia amicorum vel in divitiis, vel in nobilitate, vel in aliquo alio, nutriti in aliqua republica, cum vellent instituere rempublicam aliquam, non instituerunt quamcumque; sed considerantes ad rempublicam in qua nutriti sunt, instituerunt illam. Et quia nutriti erant in populari vel in paucorum, instituerunt hanc vel illam, non considerantes bonum commune, sed bonum proprium: et istae utiliores erant eis; ideo ista instituerunt. Et propterea nunquam aut raro et apud paucos invenitur respublica media. Unus autem optimus fuit vir, qui cum esset in principatu suasit civibus rempublicam hanc mediam: sed illi noluerunt acceptare ipsam: similiter nec isti qui modo sunt in civitatibus, volunt eam recipere, quia consuetudinem non habent per quam inclinentur ad volendum aequalitatem; sed vel quaerunt principari, aut magis volunt sustinere rempublicam quam habent non recte ordinatam, sicut paucorum potentiam in qua dominantur, aut aliquam aliam. Et tunc concludit dicens, quod quae sit optima respublica et propter quam causam, manifestum est ex determinatis.

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Deinde cum dicit aliarum autem declarat qualiter aliae respublicae se habent ad istam; et dicit, quod rerumpublicarum aliarum a media posuimus plures species, sicut popularis et paucorum. Unaquaeque enim istarum plures species habet, sicut apparuit prius: quae autem istarum sit melior, et quae peior, visa ratione mediae reipublicae, non est difficile videre. Cum enim respublica quae est ex mediis, sit optima; illa quae est propinquior huic, melior est; et quae remotior, peior. Nam universaliter hoc verum est, quod in unoquoque genere illud quod est propinquius primo, perfectius est et melius in illo genere: quare illa respublica quae propinquior est reipublicae optimae in pluribus melior est: sicut prima species popularis melior est quam secunda, et secunda quam tertia, et tertia quam quarta. Quarta vero pessima est inter illas: similiter de paucorum potentia prima melior quam secunda, secunda quam tertia, et sic deinceps. Et dico, quod illa quae est propinquior optimae, est melior simpliciter loquendo sine suppositione: quia si loquamur de meliori et optima ex suppositione, nihil prohibet aliquam, quae non est melior simpliciter, esse meliorem aliquibus: sicut si in civitate aliqua cives sint aequales in libertate, melius est eis regi populari, quam republica media. Sic igitur apparet qualiter aliae se habent ad istam.

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L. 11 (Δ.12–13, 1296b13–1297b34)De conservatione optimae reipublicae; deque cautione ne labatur aut ad multitudinis gubernationem, aut ad paucorum potentiam.De conservatione optimae reipublicae; deque cautione ne labatur aut ad multitudinis gubernationem, aut ad paucorum poten

502. Quae autem politia quibus, et qualis qualibus expediat, habitum est dictis pertransire.

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503. Sumendum itaque primo de omnibus universaliter idem. Oportet enim valentiorem esse partem civitatis volentem, non volente manere politiam. Est autem omnis civitas ex qualii et quanto. Dico autem quale quidem libertatem, divitias, disciplinam, ingenuitatem; quandum autem multitudinis excessum. Contingit autem quale quidem existere alteri parti civitatis, ex quibus partibus consistit civitas, alii autem parti quod quantum; ut plures esse in numero nobilibus ignobiles et divitibus pauperes, non tamen tantum excedere quanto, quantum deficere quali: propter quod haec et alia comparandum.

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504. Ubi quidem igitur excedit egenorum multitudo, secundum dictam analogiam, hic nata est esse democratia. Siquidem enim agricolae excedunt, fit agricolarum democratia: et unaquaeque species democratiae secundum excessum populi uniuscuiusque: puta siquidem agricolarum invaluerit multitudo, primam democratiam. Si autem multitudo banausarum et mercede agentium, ultimam. Similiter autem et alias intermedias harum.

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505. Ubi autem multitudo divitum et insignium supertendat quali, quantum deficit quanto, hic oligarchiam: et oligarchiae eodem modo unaquaeque species secundum excessum oligarchiae multitudinis.

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506. Oportet autem semper legislatorem in politia coassumere medios. Sive enim oligarchicas leges ponat, oportet coniecturare medios; sive democraticas, adducere legibus hoc. Ubi autem mediorum supergreditur multitudo quae simul amborum extremorum, aut etiam alterius solum, hic contingit politiam esse legalem.

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507. Nihil enim timendum, ne forte consentiant divites pauperibus super hoc. Nunquam enim alteri volunt servi esse. Communiorem autem si quaerant, nullam invenient aliam ab hac. In parte enim principari, non utique sustinebunt propter discredentiam ad invicem. Ubique autem dietetes fidelissimus: dietetes autem qui medius. Quanto enim utique melius politia misceatur, tanto magis mansiva.

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508. Peccant autem multi, et eorum qui aristocratias volunt facere politias, non solum in plus attribuere divitibus, sed in praeteraudiendo populum: necesse enim tempore aliquando ex falsis bonis verum evenire malum. Superegressiones enim divitum destruunt magis politiam, quam quae populi.

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509. Adhuc autem quaecumque pro locutionis gratia in politiis sapienter loquuntur ad populum, sunt quinque numero: circa congregationem, circa principatus, circa praetoria, circa armationem, circa exercitia.

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510. Circa congregationem quidem licere omnibus congregationi interesse: damnum autem imponi divitibus, si non intersint congregationi, vel solum vel multo maius.

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511. Circa principatus autem, habentibus quidem honorabilitatem, non licere abiurare, egenis autem licere.

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512. Circa praetoria divitibus quidem esse damnum si non discutiant, egenis autem licentiam; vel iis quidem magnum, iis autem parvum, sicut in legibus Charondae. Alicubi autem licet quidem omnibus scriptis, congregationi adesse et discutere. Si autem scripti neque convenerint neque discusserint, imponuntur iis magna damna; ut propter damnum quidem fugiant scribi; propter non scribi autem, neque discutiant neque conveniant.

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513. Eodem autem modo et de possidendo arma et de exercitari, leges ferunt. Egenis quidem enim licet non possidere, divitibus autem damnosum. Non possidentibus, et si non exercitantur, iis quidem nullum damnum, divitibus autem damnosum: quatenus ii quidem propter damnum participent, ii autem propter non timere, non participent. Haec uidem igitur sunt oligarchica sophismata legislationis.

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514. In democratis autem adversus haec sapienter obsistunt: egenis quidem enim mercedem acquirunt congregationi praesentibus et discutientibus, divitibus autem nullum statuunt damnum.

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515. Quare manifestum quod si quis vult miscere iuste, oportet quae apud utrosque colligere: et iis quidem mercedem acquirere, iis autem damnum: sic enim communicabunt omnes. Illo autem modo politia fit solorum alterorum.

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516. Oportet autem politiam esse quidem ex habentibus arma solis: honorabilitate autem secundum multitudinem, simpliciter quidem determinata; non est dicere tantum existere; sed considerantes, quod quale adicit longissimum, ut participantes politia sint plures non participantibus, hoc ordinare.

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517. Volunt enim pauperes etiam non participantes honoribus quietem habere, si neque aliquis molestet ipsos, neque auferatur aliquid substantiae. Sed hoc non facile: non enim accidit semper gratiosos esse eos qui participant politeumate et consueverunt autem quando bellum fuerit manere, si non accipiant alimentum pauperes autem sunt. Si autem acquirat aliquis alimentum, volunt bellare.

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518. Est enim politia apud aliquos non solum ex iis, qui sunt ad arma, sed etiam ex iis, qui fuerunt ad arma. Maliensium autem politia quidem erat ex eis, principatus autem eligebant ex militantibus. Et prima autem politia in graecis fuit, post regna, ex praeliantibus. Quae quidem a principio ex equestribus praelium habebat, sine coordinatione autem enim inutile, quod ad arma. Experientiae autem de talibus et ordinationes inter antiquos non erant quomodo in equestribus esset robur.

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519. Crescentibus autem civitatibus, et iis, qui in armis invalescentibus magis, plures participabant politia: propter quod quidem quas nunc vocamus politias, priores vocabant deocratias.

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520. Erant autem et antiquae politiae rationabiliter oligarchiae, et regales; propter paucitatem enim hominum non habebant multum, quod medium. Quare pauci existentes multitudine, et secundum coordinationem, magis sufferebant subici.

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521. Propter quam quidem igitur causam sunt politiae plures et propter quid praeter eas, quae dicuntur aliae: (democratia autem non una numero est, et aliarum similiter:) adhuc autem, quae differentiae, e propter quam causam accidit; adhuc autem, quae sit optima politiarum, dictum est.

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Postquam philosophus declaravit, quae et qualis respublica est optima pluribus civitatibus, declarat quae et qualis, quibus et qualibus expediat: et dividitur in duas. In prima praemittit intentum suum. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, sumendum. In prima dicit, quod post illa quae determinata sunt, dicendum est pertranseundo, quae respublica quibus et qualis qualibus expediat.

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Deinde cum dicit sumendum itaque prosequitur: et dividitur in duas. Primo praemittit quaedam universalia quae valent ad sequentia in isto capitulo. In secunda ostendit, quod propositum fuit, ibi, quidem igitur. In prima dicit, quod antequam determinetur de republica quae cui, et qualis quali competat, accipiendum est primo, quod universaliter verum est in omnibus rebuspublicis: scilicet, quod illa pars reipublicae melior est, et valentior quae vult salvationem reipublicae quam illa quae non vult. Et ratio huius est, quia bonum rei attenditur in ordine ad finem: sed partes reipublicae ordinantur in finem reipublicae, finis autem reipublicae est salus et permanentia eius; et ergo bonum partium reipublicae intenditur in ordine ad finem istum. Sed unumquodque vult bonum proprium, et quanto magis vult, tanto melius est; ergo illa pars reipublicae melior est, quae intendit istum finem, quam illa quae non intendit. Secundum est, quod proponit, quod omnis civitas componitur ex quali et quanto. Et exponit quid vocat quale et quantum. Quale quidem vocat dignitatem, ad quam considerat volens instituere rempublicam vel volens distribuere principatum; sicut sunt divitiae, disciplina, ingenuitas. Quantum vocat multitudinem. Modo ita est quandoque, quod alteri parti civitatis inest quale, ita quod excedit aliam in qualitate: alteri parti inest quantum, ita quod excedit aliam in multitudine: sicut verbi gratia plures sunt in civitate ignobiles quam nobiles, pauperes quam divites: tamen pars illa quae abundat in quanto, non abundat in illo quantum deficit in quali. Ista autem consideranda sunt in determinando, quae vel qualis, cui vel quali conveniat, comparando ista ad invicem; puta defectum secundum unum ad superabundantiam respectu alterius.

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Deinde cum dicit ubi quidem ostendit, quae et qualis, quibus et qualibus conveniat. Et primo quibus et qualibus popularis status. Secundo quibus et qualibus paucorum potentia, ibi, ubi autem multitudo, et cetera. Tertio quibus et qualibus respublica, ibi, oportet autem semper et cetera. In prima dicit, quod quamlibet civitatem, ubi abundat multitudo egenorum secundum dictam proportionem, scilicet, quod non excedat, puta in virtute, quantum deficit in multitudine divitum vel egenorum, oportet regi statu populari: ut si agricolae excedunt, tunc est popularis status agricolarum. Et secundum quod diversus est populus, secundum hoc oportet ipsum regi diversis speciebus popularis status: ut si multitudo agricolarum excedat, oportet regi prima specie popularis status. Si autem multitudo tenuiorum et mercenariorum, tunc oportet eam regi ultima specie popularis status. Isti enim minus sunt persuasibiles ratione, et magis inclinantur ad avaritiam; et ideo expedit eis magis regi illa specie popularis status, per quam possunt satisfacere magis avaritiae suae. Haec autem est ultima species, in qua principatur populus non secundum legem, sed secundum suam sententiam et voluntatem. Ubi autem multitudo est intermedia, competit regi eam aliqua specie intermedia: ut si excedat multitudo liberorum, secunda species debet esse; si multitudo aliorum quorumcumque, tertia species.

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Deinde cum dicit ubi autem ostendit quibus competit paucorum status. Et dicit, quod ubi multitudo divitum, quae plus abundat in quali, scilicet in divitiis et nobilitate, quam deficiat in quanto, idest in multitudine, ibi oportet esse paucorum status. Et secundum diversitatem huiusmodi multitudinis oportet diversificare species paucorum status; ita quod ubi est multitudo divitum habentium possessiones mediocres, oportet regi prima specie popularis status, in qua dominantur plures divites non nimis excedentes in divitiis, sed habentes possessiones mediocres. Ubi autem est minor multitudo, sed habent plures divitias, oportet regi secunda specie paucorum status. Ubi autem sunt adhuc pauciores divites, ditiores quam primi, expedit illos regi tertia specie. Ubi autem pauciores sunt, et magis divites, oportet regi illam civitatem quarta specie; ita quod sicut se habent species status popularis quantum ad multitudinem, sic species paucorum potentiae quantum ad divitias: ita quod sicut, ubi sunt pauciores egeni (sicut ubi sunt plures agricolae), oportet esse primam speciem status popularis; ubi adhuc plures, secundam; ubi adhuc plures quam prius, tertiam; ubi tota multitudo, quartam et pessimam; sic ex parte potentiae paucorum, ubi sunt plures divites habentes mediocres divitias, prima species: ubi pauciores ditiores, ibi secunda; sed ubi adhuc pauciores et ditiores, tertia: sed ubi sunt pauciores quam prius, et valde divites, quarta species et pessima.

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Deinde cum dicit oportet ostendit quibus competit respublica: et dividitur in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda regreditur ad declarandum qualiter miscetur ex populari statu et paucorum, ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima ostendit quibus competit respublica. Secundo removet errorem quorumdam, ibi, pereant autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. Secundo, removet obiectionem quae posset fieri, ibi, nihil enim timendum et cetera. In prima dicit, quod legislator, si bene debeat ordinare rempublicam, debet assumere ad rempublicam medios. Et hoc, quascumque leges ponat; sive convenientes potentiae paucorum, sive populari statui; semper oportet coassumere medios; quia sic debet ferre leges, et ordinare rempublicam, ut per leges possit respublica salvari. Ubi vero multitudo huiusmodi mediorum abundat secundum quale, aut secundum quantitatem, vel in uno comparatione ad aliud, convenit esse rempublicam quae bene nata est regi rectis legibus: ex talibus enim dicta est esse ipsa: igitur expedit coassumere medios.

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Deinde cum dicit nihil enim removet obiectionem quae posset fieri. Aliquis enim diceret, quod legislator non debet assumere medios, quia pauperes et divites non consentirent, et sic erit turbatio in civitatibus. Removet hoc: et dicit, quod non est timendum quin divites consentiant pauperibus. Et ratio huius est, quia nunquam volunt esse servi dominorum, nec divites nec pauperes, et ideo quaerunt communem rempublicam magis. Hoc autem est respublica et non alia. Si autem quaerunt rempublicam communem, non invenirent aliam magis communem: quia pauperes nolunt quod divites dominentur ne opprimantur ab illis, nec divites volunt quod pauperes timeant opprimi ab eis, et ideo quaerunt fideliorem principantem. Sed ubique fidelissimus est et communis magis medius et arbiter. Ex quo manifestum est, quod respublica quanto magis mixta est, accedens ad aequalitatem et indifferentiam, tanto magis mansiva est.

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Deinde cum dicit peccant autem removet errorem quorumdam. Aliqui enim fuerunt qui voluerunt facere respublicas optimatum, qui plus attribuebant divitibus quam deberent, et quam pauperibus. Philosophus dicit quod isti peccaverunt non solum in hoc quod plus attribuebant divitiis quam deberent; sed in hoc quod pauperes non audiebantur in his in quibus debebant audiri secundum rectam rationem, et minus attribuebant eis quam oporteret, quoniam aliquando ex unius malo venit magnum malum; et ideo quamvis hoc sit modicum malum, scilicet plus attribuere divitibus quam pauperibus, tamen ex hoc sequitur excessus divitum; sed excessus divitum magis corrumpit civitatem quam excessus pauperum. Et ratio huius est, quia excessus qui plus facit distare bonum commune a communitate magis corrumpit civitatem quam qui minus. Sed excessus divitum magis facit distare a communitate, quia bonum commune trahit ad paucos, quia pauperes sunt plures quam divites: quare manifestum est, quod excessus divitum magis corrumpit civitatem quam excessus pauperum: quare hoc est malum et peccatum in republica plus dare divitibus.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem postquam declaravit quae et qualis respublica quibus et qualibus conveniat, regreditur ad declarandum qualiter respublica misceatur ex paucorum et populari statu; et dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit ex quibus est maxime. In secunda recapitulat, ibi, praeter quam quidem et cetera. Prima in tres. Primo ostendit qualiter misceatur. Secundo ostendit ex quibus est, quia ex habentibus arma, ibi, oportet autem et cetera. In tertia assignat rationem propter quam antiqui vocaverunt rempublicam popularem statum, ibi, crescentibus autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. Quia enim respublica miscetur ex paucorum et populari statu, primo tangit leges popularis et paucorum, secundo infert ex dictis quomodo miscetur ex illis, ibi, quare manifestum et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima tangit leges paucorum status. Secundo popularis, ibi, in democratiis autem et cetera. In prima tangit leges paucorum status, per quas intendunt sophistice excludere multitudinem a republica; et primo tangit ea de quibus feruntur leges. Secundo tangit leges ipsas, ibi, circa congregationem. In prima dicit, quod illa de quibus dominantes paucorum statui ferunt leges fallaciter et dolose, proponentes populo, quinque sunt numero: scilicet concio, magistratus, iudicium, armatura, exercitatio.

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Deinde cum dicit circa congregationem tangit leges circa ista: et primo tangit legem circa concionem. Secundo circa magistratum, ibi, circa principatus. Tertio circa iudicium, ibi, circa praetoria. Quarto circa arma et exercitia, ibi, eodem modo. In prima dicit, quod circa concionem ordinaverunt faventes paucorum statui, quod omnes venire liceret ad concionem: sed ulterius ordinaverunt quod divites si non venirent, haberent damnum, pauperes vero non. Vel quod divites multo magis damnum reportarent quam pauperes. Et manifestum est quod per istam legem pauperes excludebantur: quia divites ex hoc quod damnum magnum reportabant compellebantur venire: pauperes, quia nullum damnum reportabant non curabant venire, et ita non participabant civitate libenter.

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Deinde cum dicit circa principatus tangit legem circa magistratum. Ordinaverunt enim quod omnes possent attingere magistratum, sed ulterius statuerunt quod pauperibus liceret renunciare magistratui, divitibus vero non: et manifestum est quod per istam legem excludebantur pauperes; quia pauperes cum sint occupati circa alia, facile est quod cum liceat eis renunciare, dimittant magistratum; divites vero semper remanebant, cum eis non liceat renunciare.

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Deinde cum dicit circa praetoria tangit legem circa iudicium; et dicit, quod circa iudicium ordinaverunt, supposito quod omnes possint attingere ad iudicia. Ulterius ordinaverunt divitibus damnum si non iudicarent et discuterent. Pauperibus vero dederunt licentiam de non discutiendo; vel si ordinaverunt damnum utrisque, tamen divitibus magnum damnum, pauperibus modicum, sicut ordinatum fuit in legibus Charondae. In aliquibus vero paucorum gubernationibus, licebat quidem omnibus discutere in iudicio et interesse congregationi, praescriptis tamen prius. Si vero contingeret quod scripti non interessent vel non discuterent, imponebantur magna damna; ita ut propter fugere damna non appeterent scribi; et sic si non scriberentur, nec interessent iudicio.

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Deinde cum dicit eodem autem tangit legem circa arma et exercitia simul: et dicit, quod eodem modo tulerunt legem de possessione armorum et circa exercitia ipsorum: et ordinaverunt quod liceret egenis non habere arma; divitibus, si non haberent, ordinaverunt magnum damnum. Similiter circa exercitium ordinaverunt quod pauperes si se non exercitarent in armis, nullum damnum haberent. Sed divitibus ordinaverunt magnum damnum. Sic autem ordinaverunt, ut divites propter damnum haberent arma et usum armorum, et sic haberent soli potestatem et tenerent principatum: pauperes vero, quia non timerent damnum, non haberent arma et usum armorum, et per consequens non participarent principatu. Et tunc concludit quod haec sunt sophismata de legislatione per quae volunt faventes paucorum potentiae excludere multitudinem a civilitate.

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Deinde cum dicit in democratiis ostendit qualiter faventes populo sapienter adversantur istis; et dicit, quod faventes populo in politia sua sapienter adversantur istis. Contra enim omnia ista ordinaverunt quod pauperes, qui convenirent ad congregationem et discuterent, haberent mercedem: divites vero si non venirent, nullum damnum reportarent. Et per istam legem monstratur quod excludebantur divites. Pauperes enim scientes, quod haberent mercedem, libenter veniebant. Divites autem scientes quod nullum haberent damnum, si non irent, non curabant ire, maxime quia non honorabantur: et sic tota potestas dimittebatur penes multitudinem.

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Deinde cum dicit quare manifestum concludit qualiter respublica sit miscenda ex paucorum et populari statu; et dicit, quod manifestum est ex dictis qualiter respublica miscenda est ex illis: mixtum enim debet aliqualiter habere miscibilia et aliqualiter non; et ideo si recte fiat mixtio ex istis, oportet accipere ea quae pertinent utrisque secundum partem et ordinari pauperibus mercedem si veniant, divitibus vero damnum si non veniant: et isto modo omnes communicabunt civilitate; sed praedictis modis altera solum, ut respublica tantum sit paucorum vel populo faventium.

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Deinde cum dicit oportet autem ostendit ex quibus est respublica. Et primo ostendit quod est ex utentibus armis maxime. Secundo quod est ex illis qui usi fuerunt armis, ibi, est enim politia. Prima in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. Secundo assignat causam cuiusdam dicti, ibi, volunt enim pauperes. In prima dicit quod respublica debet esse ex habentibus arma et utentibus iam in actu ipsis. Et ratio huius est, quia respublica debet esse ex mediis; et ideo debet esse ex illis in quibus sunt plures medii: tales sunt utentes armis. Quanta autem debet esse multitudo civitatis et census, non est determinatum nunc: oportet enim censum in civitate determinare secundum regionem et secundum potentiam adversariorum. Oportet enim tantam esse multitudinem quantam regio possit nutrire, et tantam quod possit repellere adversarios. Sed advertendum quod qualitas et bona dispositio secundum disciplinam vel mores multum addit ad bonitatem reipublicae; et ideo faciendum est quod participantes politiae sint plures, saltem secundum qualitatem, quamvis deficiant quantitate.

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Deinde cum dicit volunt enim assignat causam cuiusdam dicti; scilicet, quod oportet esse plures participantes reipublicae quam non participantes; et dicit, quod pauperes in civitate existentes absque principatu volunt vivere quiete et sine turbatione, dato quod nullus molestet eos, et dato quod nihil auferatur ab eis de bonis suis: sed istud non est facile, quia frequenter contingit, quod principantes non sint mites et humani; et ideo difficile est quod non suscipiant pauperes molestiam. Iterum illi qui utuntur armis, quando bellum debet fieri, volunt recipere alimentum a pauperibus si sint aliqui pauperes: et si non recipiant, movent bellum contra illos; et si accipiant, pauperes volunt insurgere. Ut igitur non possint insurgere contra principantes, expedit esse plures habentes arma quam non habentes.

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Deinde cum dicit est enim ostendit quod respublica non tantum est ex illis qui possident, sed ex illis qui possederunt arma et habuerunt usum eorum. Et dicit, quod apud aliquos est respublica non solum ex illis qui vadunt ad arma, et utuntur eis iam actu, sed ex eis qui fuerunt et usi sunt. Et rationabiliter hoc est: quia illi sunt magis exercitati in actibus virtutum et in armis. Rationabile autem est quod respublica sit ex illis: quod declarat per quamdam rempublicam, dicens quod apud Malienses erat respublica ex his qui fuerant in armis et usi fuerant. Verumtamen principantem eligebant ex militibus, sive ex illis qui iam utebantur armis. Primae etiam respublicae fuerunt magis ex praeliantibus et utentibus armis praeter principatus regales. Principem autem eligebant de equestribus; et respublica quae fuit a principio fuit ex equestribus, quia robur belli tunc in equestribus habebatur. Peditatus autem est omnino inutilis nisi adsit ordo et disciplina; sed qualis sit huiusmodi ordo et disciplina, non fuit cognitum antiquis: et propterea totum robur et excellentia exercitus habebatur ex equestribus.

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Deinde cum dicit crescentibus autem assignat causam cuiusdam dicti. Aliqui enim istam rempublicam vocaverunt popularem, alii paucorum. Ideo causam huius assignat; et primo quare dixerunt eandem popularem statum. Secundo quare paucorum, ibi, fuerat enim et cetera. In prima dicit, quod crescentibus civitatibus contigit, quod erat magna multitudo habentium arma qui dominabantur. Ubi autem multitudo dominatur, status popularis est: propter quod quidam dixerunt illam quam vocamus rempublicam, popularem.

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Deinde cum dicit erant autem ostendit quare vocaverunt eam paucorum statum; et dicit, quod antiquae respublicae rationabiliter erant status paucorum et regalis. Antiquitus enim pauci erant homines inhabitantes civitates; et ideo pauci erant medii: et quia pauci erant secundum multitudinem, paucorum status erat: sed quia bene erant ordinati, bene sustinebant principatum et subiiciebantur.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quam recapitulat dicta a principio quarti; et dicit quod dictum est in praecedentibus propter quam causam sunt plures respublicae, et propter quam causam sunt aliae respublicae praeter sex respublicas acceptas secundum genus; ut sunt plures populares et paucorum status et optimatum, et non una numero solum. Iterum dictum est qualiter differunt adinvicem, et quae sit optima respublica, et propter quam causam accidit, et quibus expediat.

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L. 12 (Δ.14, 1297b35–1299a1)De quibus consulationes in civitatibus fieri soleant; deque ipsarum varietate pro cuiusque civitatis administratione.De quibus consulationes in civitatibus fieri soleant; deque ipsarum varietate pro cuiusque civitatis administratione.

522. Rursum autem cum dixerimus et communiter et sigillatim de unaquaque, dicamus de iis quae deinceps, accipientes ipsorum principium conveniens. Sunt itaque tres partes omnium politiarum, de quibus oportet considerare studiosum legislatorem conferens unicuique; quibus se habentibus bene, necesse politiam habere bene, et politias ab invicem differre in differendo unumquodque horum. Est autem tertium horum unum quidem aliquid quod consiliatur de communibus: secundum autem, quod circa principatus hoc autem est, quos oportet esse, et quorum dominos, et qualem quadam oportet fieri electionem ipsorum. Tertium autem aliquid quod iudicat.

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523. Dominans autem est, quod consiliatur de bello et pace, et compugnatione et dissolutione, et de legibus et de morte, et fuga, et populatione, et de electione principatuum, et correctionum.

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524. Necessarium autem, aut omnibus dare omnia haec iudicia, aut quibusdam omnia, velut principatum alicui uni aut pluribus, aut aliis alia; aut quaedam quidem ipsorum omnibus, quaedam autem quibusdam.

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525. Omnes quidem igitur, et de omnibus, demotice: talem enim aequalitatem quaerit populus.

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526. Sunt autem modi eius, quod est omnes, plures: unus quidem secundum partem, sed non omnes simul, sicut est in politia Teleclei Milesii, et in aliis autem politiis consiliantur comprincipatus convenientes. Ad principatus autem vadunt omnes particulariter ex tribus et minimis partibus omnino, donec utique pertranseat per omnes. Conveire autem solum de legum positione, et de iis, quae de politia, et responsa audientes a principibus.

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527. Alius autem modus, quod omnes simul. Convenire autem solum ad electiones principatuum electuros, et ad legislationes, et de bello, et de pace,et ad correctiones: alia autem consiliari principatus in singulis instituens eligibiles existentes ex omnibus, vel sortiales.

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528. Alius autem modus circa principatus et correctiones, occurrere cives et de bello consiliaturos, et compugnatione, alia autem principatus disponere eligibiles existentes quoscumque contingit; tales autem sunt quoscumque principari necessarium scientes.

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529. Quartus autem modus omnis de omnibus consiliari, convenientes autem de nullo iudicare, sed solum referre: quo quidem modo nunc democratia ultima dispensatur, quam proportionalem dicimus esse oligarchiae potestative et monarchiae tyrannicae. Isti quidem igitur modi, sunt democratici omnes.

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530. Quidam autem de omnibus, oligarchicum: habet autem et hoc differentias plures.

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531. Quando quidem enim ab honorabilitatibus mediocribus eligibiles sunt, et plures propter mediocritates honorabilitatis et de quibus lex vetat ne moveant, sed sequantur, et liceat possidenti honorabilitatem participare, oligarchia quidem, politia autem est talis propter moderare.

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532. Quando autem non omnes eo, quod es consiliari, participant, sed electi, secundum legem autem participant sicut et prius, oligarchicum. Quando autem ipsos eligunt ipsi, qui domini eius, quod est consiliari, et quando puer pro patre ingreditur, et domini legum sunt, oligarchicum necessarium esse ordinem hunc. Quando autem quorundam, puta belli quidem sicut et pacis et correctionum omnes, aliorum autem principes, et isti eligibiles, vel sortiales, aristocratia est, vel politia.

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533. Si autem quorundam quidem eligibiles, quorundam autem sortiales, et sortiales, vel simpliciter, vel ex praeiudicatis, vel communiter eligibiles, et sortiales; hae quidem horum sunt politiae aristocraticae, hae autem ipsius politiae. Divisum est quidem igitur quod consiliatur ad politias hoc modo. Et disponitur quaelibet politia secundum dictum modum.

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534. Expedit autem democratiae quae maxime esse videtur democratia, quae nunc (dico autem talem in qua dominus populus et legum est), ad consiliari meliusque ipsum facere, quod quidem in praetoriis in oligarchiis. Statuunt enim damnum iis quos volunt iudicare, ut iudicent, demotici autem mercedem egenis; haec autem, et circa congregationes facere: consiliantur enim melius communiter consiliantes: omnis populus quidem cum insignibus, isti autem cum multitudine.

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535. Expedit autem, et eligibiles esse consilarios, vel sortiales aequales ex partibus.

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536. Expedit autem, si excedant multum secundum multitudinem demotici super politicos, aut non omnibus dare mercedem, sed quot commensurati ad multitudinem insignium, aut ex sorte facere plures.

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537. In oligarchiis autem aut praeeligi quosdam ex multitudine aut praeparantes principatum, velut in quibusdam politiis est, quos vocant praemissos vel legis servatores, de iis negotiari de quibus utique isti praeconsiliaverint: sic enim participabit populus eo quod est consiliari, et solvere nihil poterit eorum quae circa politiam.

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538. Adhuc eadem sententiare populum, aut nihil contrarium iis, qui inferuntur; aut consiliariis quidem tradere omnibus, consiliari quidem principes.

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539. Et oppositum autem eius quod fit in politiis, oportet facere. Absolventem quidem enim per sententiam, dominam oportet facere multitudinem: condemnantem autem per sententiam, non dominans, sed referatur rursum ad principes. In politiis enim contra faciunt. Pauci enim absolventes quidem domini; condemnantes autem non domini, sed reducetur ad plures semper.

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Postquam philosophus determinavit quae respublica est optima, et quae et qualis, quibus et qualibus conveniat, determinat de quibusdam partibus reipublicae, scilicet de consiliativo et dominativo et iudicativo. Et primo dat intentionem suam. Secundo prosequitur, ibi, dominans est et cetera. In prima dicit, quod postquam determinatum est de unaquaque republica et in communi et divisim, consequenter dicendum est de quibusdam ex quibus pendet consideratio determinatorum. Et dicit rursus, quia in tertio fecit mentionem de ipsis, et accipiendum est principium conveniens illis, scilicet quod sunt tres partes rerumpublicarum de quibus studiosus legislator debet considerare et conferre secundum rationem de illis. Illis enim bene se habentibus, necessarium est rempublicam bene esse ordinatam et male; et secundum differentiam istorum adinvicem necesse est respublicas differre, quia per ista distribuitur respublica quae est ordo principantium. Istorum autem una pars est, quae consiliatur de communibus civitatis. Alia est quae versatur circa principatus: et hoc est quos oportet esse principes, et quorum debent esse domini; et qualiter assumuntur, utrum per sortem vel per electionem. Tertia pars est quae versatur circa iudicia.

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Deinde cum dicit dominans autem prosequitur; et primo de consiliativo. Secundo de principatu, ibi, de consiliante et cetera. Tertio de iudicativo, ibi, reliquum autem et cetera. Prima in duas. Primo tangit de quibus consiliantur in communi. Secundo prosequitur de ipso consiliativo, ibi, necessarium autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod dominans in civitate consiliatur de bello, utrum bellandum sit vel non; et de pace, utrum pax debeat fieri cum adversariis vel non. Consiliatur etiam de propugnatione et de dissolutione, utrum simul vel separatim debeat pugnare. Iterum consiliatur de legibus qualiter sint ferendae. Consiliatur etiam de morte alicuius, utrum expediat aliquem qui fuit contra civitatem, interfici vel relegari. Iterum de populatione qualiter debeat fieri si indigeat civitas populari, et ex quibus. Iterum qualiter principantes debent eligi et corrigi.

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Deinde cum dicit necessarium autem prosequitur de ipso consiliativo declarando eius consiliativum cui competat reipublicae. Et primo ponit divisionem unam. Secundo ostendit quibus rebuspublicis competant membra ipsius, ibi, omnes igitur et cetera. In prima dicit, quod necessarium est, aut omnia iudicia dare omnibus civibus, ita quod omnes cives de omnibus iudicent; aut quibusdam omnia, sicut principanti uni, aut pluribus si sint plures principantes; aut alia aliis, ita quod quidam iudicent de quibusdam, alii de aliis; aut de quibusdam omnes, aut quidam de quibusdam.

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Deinde cum dicit omnes quidem ostendit primo quibus competant membra. Secundo determinat quaedam convenientia quibusdam rebuspublicis, ibi, expedit autem et cetera. Prima adhuc dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit quibus rebuspublicis competant membra praedicta. Et dividitur in tres. Primo enim ostendit quis modus competit populari statui. Secundo cum dicit, quidam autem etc. quis paucorum statui. Tertio quis optimatum, cum dicit, quando autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima tangit quis modus competat populari statui. In secunda cum dicit, sunt autem modi etc. subdividit ipsum declarando quis quibus modis eius conveniat. In prima dicit, quod ad popularem statum pertinet, quod omnes iudicent et deliberent de omnibus. Et ratio huius est, quia favens populo intendit aequalitatem: hoc autem videtur esse aequalitas quod omnes attingant ad iudicium de omnibus: quare iste modus pertinet ad popularem.

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Deinde cum dicit sunt autem subdit modum istum; et dividitur in quatuor, secundum quod ponit quatuor modos, declarans quibus modis populari statui competunt illi modi. Secunda ibi, alius autem modus et cetera. Tertia ibi, alius autem modus est ut. Quarta ibi, quartus autem modus et cetera. In prima dicit, quod eius, quod est omnes iudicare de omnibus, plures sunt modi. Unus est, quod omnes attingant ad iudicia omnia; sed quod non omnes simul conveniant, sed secundum partem, sicut accidit in republica Milesii et in aliis. De quibusdam enim rebuspublicis consiliantur principantes. Conveniunt autem omnes secundum partem, ut secundum tribus et partes minimas, ita quod modo vadit una pars cras alia, ita quod non sit aliqua pars quae non attingat ad civilitatem. Iste autem modus competit primo modo populari statui secundum quem principantur agricolae, habentes divitias mediocres, et secundum leges non secundum voluntatem. Tales enim non semper possunt venire, quia habent vivere de agricultura, circa quam oportet eos laborare. Et ideo necessarium est eos venire secundum partem: aliquando tamen oportet omnes venire simul, ut quando debet ferri lex aliqua: similiter quando debet tractari de his, quae pertinent ad rempublicam etiam quando debent audire responsiones a principibus.

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Deinde cum dicit alius autem ponit secundum modum. Et dicit, quod secundus modus est, quod omnes conveniant simul, et hoc in magnis solum, sicut in electione principis vel principantium, et quando debet lex aliqua dari, similiter quando debet tractari de bello vel de pace, similiter quando debent fieri correctiones principantium. Alia vero dimittuntur principantibus qui assumendi sunt vel per electionem vel per sortem. Et competit secundo modo populari statui in quo multitudo non habet sufficientes divitias; ideo oportet principatum committere aliquibus.

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Deinde cum dicit alius autem ponit tertium modum; et dicit, quod tertius modus est quando omnes conveniunt in magnis, sicut in correctionibus principum, et tamen debet tractari de bello et de pugnatione. Alia autem dimittuntur principibus qui eliguntur a quibuscumque qui sciunt principari. Et differt iste modus a primo; quia in primo non eliguntur principantes ex quibuscumque, sed in isto eliguntur. Iste autem modus competit tertio modo populari statui, in quo assumuntur principes ex quibuscumque.

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Deinde cum dicit quartus autem ponit quartum modum; et dicit, quod quartus modus est quando omnes de omnibus consiliantur et iudicant, ita quod nihil omnino dimittitur principantibus, sed solum referre: sic autem est in ultimo modo popularis status, in quo multitudo principatur. Et ideo iste modus quartus competit quarto modo populari statui, qui, ut dictum est superius, proportionabilis est quarto modo paucorum statui, qui quidem est potentatus proportionabilis monarchiae tyrannicae. Sicut enim ista monarchia tyrannica pessima est, et etiam haec paucorum potentia pessima inter alias species eius, ita iste quartus modus popularis status pessimus est inter omnes modos popularis status. Et ulterius concludit quod omnes isti modi sunt de statu populari, quia conveniunt popularis status modis.

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Deinde cum dicit quidam autem ostendit quis modus est paucorum potentiae; et dividitur in duas. In prima ponit modum mixtum. Secundo ponit modos pure paucorum dominantium, ibi, quando quidem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod quando aliqui consiliantur de omnibus, est modus paucorum. Et iste modus dividitur in plures: quando enim de omnibus consiliantur aliqui divites non habentes divitias excellentes, sed mediocres, et sunt plures secundum multitudinem plures habentes huiusmodi divitias et principantur secundum legem, ita quod legem non possunt mutare, nec facere quae prohibet, sed exequi ea quae praecipit, et possunt attingere ad principatum, tunc est unus modus paucorum dominantium, sed civilis est propter moderatas habere divitias. Tales enim medii sunt in civitate: respublica autem ex mediis est: quare iste modus mixtus est ex paucorum statu et republica.

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Deinde cum dicit quando quidem tangit alios modos paucorum status pure. Et dicit, quod quando non omnes divites consiliantur de omnibus, sed quidam electi ditiores prioribus et principantur secundum legem, paucorum potentiae est; et quando adhuc ditiores principantur omnibus, et consiliantur, et pauciores, et habent potestatem eligendi illos qui deficiunt in principatu, et filii eorum succedunt in principatu, sed adhuc principantur secundum legem; vel quando principantur pauciores quam prius et ditiores, et principantur non secundum legem, sed secundum suas sententias, ita quod domini sunt legis, quia possunt ferre legem vel mutare, tunc est paucorum potentia secundum diversos modos eius.

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Deinde cum dicit quando autem ostendit, quis est modus optimatum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim tangit, quis modus est optimatum pure. Secundo cum dicit quod si de quibusdam electi etc., ostendit, quis est mixtus ex paucorum et optimatum statu. In prima dicit, quod quando omnes consiliantur de quibusdam magnis, sicut de pace, utrum debeat fieri cum adversariis, et de bello, et de correctione, et alia permittuntur principantibus, qui sunt accipiendi, vel per sortem, vel per electionem, modus est optimatum, vel civilis: quia enim magna sunt, et periculosa, magnam inimicitiam habent. Maiorem vero inimicitiam habet aliquis ad paucos, vel ad aliquos, quam ad totam multitudinem, quia dividitur in plures, propter hoc minor est ad singulos. Et ideo in talibus omnes debent iudicare. In aliis iudicare possunt principes, in quibus non sunt magna pericula.

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Deinde cum dicit si autem ostendit, quis modus mixtus est ex praecedenti, et civili; intendens dicere, quod si de quibusdam omnes consilientur, sicut de magnis, de aliis autem principantes, qui assumuntur per electionem: aut si contingat, quod de quibusdam eligantur aliqui principantes per sortem, et hoc vel communiter ex quibuscumque, scilicet indifferenter, vel assumantur ex aliquibus, prius inquisito et facto iudicio vel scrutinio de illis ex quibus assumendi sunt per sortem, vel si assumantur de omnibus per electionem, hoc pertinet ad optimatum, vel rempublicam: quod enim per electionem, et ex quibusdam, optimatum est: quod autem per sortem, magis civile est. Ulterius concludit, quasi recapitulando, quod consiliativum de eis, quae ordinantur ad rempublicam, habet dividi, sicut dictum est, et quaelibet respublica disponitur et regitur consiliativo secundum modum dictum.

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Deinde cum dicit expedit autem determinat quaedam expedientia rebuspublicis quibusdam, scilicet populari, et paucorum statui. Et primo tangit expedientia popularis status. Secundo paucorum, ibi, in oligarchiis autem et cetera. Prima in tres, secundum quod ponit tria expedientia. Secunda, ibi, expedit autem et cetera. Tertia, ibi, expedit autem si excedant et cetera. In prima dicit, quod populari, quae maxime apparet esse popularis, sicut est quarta species, in qua populus totus dominatur non secundum legem, sed secundum sententiam, expedit et melius est facere illud quod observatur in iudiciis, et in paucorum statu: scilicet quod divitibus, si non conveniant ad iudicium et congregationem, ordinetur damnum magnum: pauperibus, si venirent ad congregationem, merces. Et ratio huius est, quia si venerint et divites et pauperes, melius deliberabunt et sanius omnis populus, scilicet divitibus, et e converso. Quod enim non videbunt divites, videbunt pauperes, et e converso. Et tunc quoniam communiter deliberabunt, communiter exequentur. Propter quod expedit huic speciei populari ordinare divitibus damnum, si non venerint ad congregationem: pauperibus mercedem, si venerint.

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Deinde cum dicit expedit autem ponit secundum expediens, quod competit aliis ab ultimo modo populari. Et dicit quod expedit populari statui, quod ad considerandum vel iudicandum eligantur aliqui de omnibus, ut tot de divitibus, tot de pauperibus, tot de ista turba, tot de alia; vel tot de isto vico, tot de alio; ita quod semper conservetur aequalitas; ut quot assumentur de quibusdam, tot assumantur de aliis secundum aequalem proportionem. Et ratio est, quia melius exequuntur deliberationes et magis concordes erunt.

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Deinde cum dicit expedit autem ponit tertium expediens: et videtur esse cautela contra aliquid, quod posset dici contra primum expediens. Dicebatur enim, quod merces erat danda pauperibus, si venirent ad congregationem. Potest autem dici, quod non est hoc expediens; quia tunc multi venient; et tunc, cum sint plures quam divites, deliberabunt secundum quod placebit eis, et nolent illud observari, et sic erit dissensio. Contra hoc ponit expediens; et dicit, quod si pauperes secundum multitudinem excedant viros civiles, sicut medios et insignes, aut quoscumque alios, tunc non est danda merces omnibus, nisi secundum proportionem ad multitudinem divitum, aut multos oportet privare congregatione.

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Deinde cum dicit in oligarchiis tangit cautelas convenientes paucis. Et dividitur in tres, secundum quod tangit tria. Secunda, ibi, adhuc eadem et cetera. Tertia, ibi, et oppositum autem eius quod et cetera. In prima dicit, quod ad hoc, quod bene consilientur faventes paucis, et consilium eorum sit firmum, oportet quod vocent aliquos faventes populo, sive aliquos de populo, sicut illos qui praeeminent aliqualiter populo, sicut est in quibusdam rebuspublicis, qui vocantur praemissi, vel servatores legis; et tractare cum istis de illis, de quibus faventes paucis consiliati fuerunt. Et ratio huius est, quia populus isto modo participabit consiliativo; et quod deliberatum fuerit isto modo, multitudo non poterit dissolvere, sed potius exequentur una cum paucorum potentia.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc eadem ponit secundam cautelam. Et dicit, quod ad hoc, quod consilium paucorum sit firmum, oportet paucos inquirere sententiam populi, vel opinionem quae est, et tunc sententiare secundum sententiam eius, ita quod populus eamdem sententiam dicat, quam pauci; aut si non, nihil sententient contrarium populo; vel quod principes consilientur de his, quae ad rempublicam ordinantur; et tunc quod inventum est per consilium, tradat omnibus consiliariis populi; sic enim sententia paucorum firmior erit.

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Deinde cum dicit et oppositum ponit tertiam cautelam. Et dicit, quod ad hoc quod consilium paucorum firmum sit, oportet eos facere oppositum eius quod fit in republica, scilicet cum pauci per sententiam debeant absolvere aliquem, quod convocent multitudinem et faciant eam dominam in dando sententiam propter benevolentiam habendam. Cum autem condemnabunt aliquem ad mortem, vel relegabunt, non dent potestatem multitudini, sed potestas solum dimittitur principibus. Et ratio huius est, quia condemnatio alicuius ad mortem, vel relegatio, fit, quia commisit contra principantes paucos; populus autem contrarius est eis. Si igitur darent potestatem populo in condemnatione, vel relegatione, contingeret quod populus absolveret, aut non tantum puniet, quantum deberet: quod est inconveniens, et ideo non debent dare potestatem populo supra mortem alicuius. Sed in rebuspublicis fit e contrario; quia absolventes sunt pauci, scilicet principantes; condemnantes vero sunt non principantes, sed plures, sicut populus. Et tunc concludit intentum suum, quod de principante consiliativo in rebuspublicis determinatum sit hoc modo.

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L. 13 (Δ.14–15, 1299a1–1300a8)De magistratuum numero, auctoritate, et diuturnitate consideratio habetur; et quando uni an pluribus demandandi sit.De magistratuum numero, auctoritate, et diuturnitate consideratio habetur; et quando uni an pluribus demandandi sit.

540. De consiliante quidem igitur et dominante utique politiae determinatum sit hoc modo. Habitum iis est, quae circa principatus divisio: habet enim et haec pars politiae multas differentias, quot principatus, et quorum domini, et de tempore quantum uniuscuiusque principatus: ii quidem enim sex mensium, ii autem per minus, ii autem annuales, ii autem diuturniores faciunt principatus perpetuum vel multi temporis, vel neutrum, sed saepe eosdem, vel non eundem bis, sed semel solum. Adhuc autem circa institutionem principatuum ex quibus oportet fieri et a quibus, et qualiter: de omnibus eni iis oportet posse dividere secundum quot contingit fieri modos. Deinde coaptare qualibus, quales politiae expediant.

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541. Est autem neque facile hoc determinare, quales oportet vocare principatus: multis enim praeceptoribus politica communitas indiget: propter quod quidem omnes, neque electos neque sortiales ponendum principes: puta sacerdotes primo. Hoc enim alterum aliquid praeter politicos principatus ponendum. Adhuc et distributores, et praecones; eliguntur autem et legati. Sunt autem hae quidem politicae curarum, vel omnium civium ad quandam operationem velut dux exercitus militantium, vel secundum partem gynoeconomus, vel pueronomus: ii autem oeconomicae: saepe enim eligunt frumenti mensuratores: hae autem ministeriales, et aad quas qui utique abundaverint, ordinant servos.

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542. Maxime autem, ut simpliciter est dicere, principatus dicendum hos, quibus cum attribuitur consiliari de aliquibus, et iudicare, et praecipere, et maxime haec: praecipere enim mais principatuum est.

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543. Sed hae differunt ad opportunitates quidem nihil, ut est dicere: non enim unquam iudicium fuit altercantium de nomine: habent autem quoddam aliud intellectuale negotium. Quales autem principatus, et quot necessarii, si erit civitas, et quales necessarii quidem, non opportuni autem ad studiosam politiam, magis utique quis dubitat ad omnem politiam et etiam ad parvas civitates.

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544. In magnis enim utique contingit et oportet unum ordinari ad unum opus; multosque enim contingit ire ad principatum propter multos esse cives, ut sit hos quidem intermittere multo tempore, hos autem seme principari. Et melius unumquodque opus sortitur cura circa unum intenta, quam circa multa.

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545. In parvis autem necesse congregare in paucos multos principatus: propter paucitatem enim hominum non facile est in principatibus multos esse. Qui enim erunt qui hos successive suscipiunt iterum?

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546. Indigent autem aliquando eisdem principatibus et legibus parvae cum magnis. Verumtamen quidem indigent saepe eisdem, aliis autem in multo tempore hoc accidit. Propter quod quidem nihil prohibet multas curas simul praecipere: non enim impediunt, et ad paucitatem hominum necessarium principatus velut obelischolychnia facere.

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547. Si igitur habeamus dicere quot necessarium existere omni civitati, et quot non, necessarium quidem oportet autem existere, facile autem quis sciens hoc colligit quales principatus congruit congregare in unum principatum.

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548. Congruit autem et hoc, non latere quales oportet secundum locum principatus de multis curare, et qualium ubique unum principatum esse dominum: puta boni ornatus esse, unum in foro quidem fori praefectum, alium autem in alio loco; vel ubique eundem: et utrum secundum rem oportet differe vel secundum homines. Dico autem puta unum boni ornatus, vel puerorum alium et mulierum. Et secundum politias autem, utrum differt secundum unamquamque etiam genus principatuum, vel nihil. Puta in democratia et oligarchia et aristocratia, et monarchia utrum iidem sint principatus quidem domini, non ex aequalibus, neque ex similibus, sed alii in aliis: puta in aristocratiis quidam ex eruditis. In oligarchiis autem ex divitibus. In democratiis vero ex liberis.

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549. Aut existunt quidem quidam existentes, et secundum has differentias principatuum. Est autem ubi conferunt idem, et ubi differunt propter hoc: hic quidem enim congruit magnos, hic esse parvos eosdem.

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550. Non solum, sed et singulares quidem sunt, velut qi praeconsulum; hic enim non democratiis; consilium autem democraticum. Oportet enim quidem esse aliquid tale, cui cura erit populi praeconsiliari, quatenus non vacans erit: ii autem cum pauci numero sint, praeconsules autem paucos necessarium esse multitudine. Quare oligarchicum. Sed ubi ambo idem principatus, praeconsulens instituuntur superconsiliarios. Consiliarius quidem enim demoticum, praeconsul autem oligarchicum.

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551. Dissolvitur autem et consilii potentia in talibus democratiis, in quibus ipse propter coveniens tractat de omnibus: hoc autem accidere consuevit quando penuria aliqua fuerit, vel merces convocatis. Vacantes enim colligntur saepe, et omnia ipsi iudicant.

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552. Pueronomus autem, et mulieronomus, et si quis alius principans dominus est talis curae, aristocraticum, democraticum autem non. Quomodo enim possibile prohibere exire eas quae egenorum? neque oligarchicum, delitiantur enim quae oligarchizantium. Sed de iis quidem in tantum dictum sit nunc.

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Postquam philosophus determinavit de consiliativo, et modis eius, et qui quibus rebuspublicis expediunt, determinat de principatu. Et dividitur in duas. In prima praemittit intentum suum. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, est autem neque facile. In prima dicit, quod postquam determinatum est de consiliativo, dicendum est de principatu. Divisio enim principatus conveniens est dictis de consiliativo. Sunt autem multae partes et differentiae principatus secundum quod sunt principatus, et quorum debent esse domini principantes. Item de tempore per quantum tempus debent esse domini secundum unumquemque principatum. Sunt enim quidam principatus durantes per sex menses, quidam qui durant per annum, alii qui durant plus. Quidam autem sunt non perpetui, sed multum durant: etiam quidam sunt, qui non sunt perpetui, nec multum durant, sed contingit eumdem frequenter principari: aliquoties etiam contingit principari non eumdem bis, sed solum semel. Iterum dicendum est de institutione principatuum, ex quibus, et qui debent instituere, et qualiter. De omnibus enim istis oportet diligenter videre quibus modis possunt fieri, et postmodum videre, qui modi et quales, quibus et qualibus rebuspublicis conveniant.

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Deinde cum dicit est autem prosequitur. Et dividitur in duas. In prima determinat de divisione principatuum, et de modo institutionis ipsorum. Secundo recolligit determinata, remittens nos de consideratione aliquorum ad sequentia, scilicet ad sextum librum, ibi, quod igitur sunt et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima determinat distinctionem principatuum in ordine ad respublicas. Secundo determinat de modo institutionis ipsarum, ibi, circa institutiones et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima determinat distinctionem principatus in generali. Secundo tangit distinctionem principatus in ordine ad respublicas, ibi, sed haec differunt et cetera. Prima in duas. Primo tangit modos principatus minus principales. Secundo tangit modos principaliter dictos, ibi, maxime autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod non est facile determinare, qui debent esse principatus, et quot; quoniam respublica conveniens, multis indiget principatibus, et praecipientibus: et quia plures oportet esse, manifestum est, quod non omnes sunt assumendi, vel per electionem, vel per sortem, sicut sacerdotes. Et dicuntur sacerdotes, qui curam habent de cultu divino. Tales autem non debent assumi per sortem, sed per electionem: principatus autem iste est alter a civilibus principatibus. Sunt etiam alii principatus, qui distribuunt bona communia, quibus debent distribui: sunt etiam praecones qui nunciant dicta communia, quae debent nunciari. Eliguntur etiam alii, qui dicuntur legati, qui mittuntur ad extrinsecas civitates et principatus. Sunt etiam alii principes civiles, qui curam habent de omnibus civitatibus quantum ad aliquam operationem, sicut est dux exercitus bellantium. Iste enim habet dirigere cives in exercitu. Alii sunt principes, qui non habent curam de omnibus quantum ad aliquam operationem, sed curam habent de aliqua parte civitatis, sicut sunt mulierum puerorumque curatores. Alii sunt principatus oeconomici quos frequenter eligunt, scilicet mensuratores frumenti, et ministeriales, qui habent ministeria diversa in civitate. Cum autem in talibus aliqui abundant, ordinant servos ad huiusmodi officia.

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Deinde cum dicit maxime autem tangit modos principatus principaliter dictos. Et est intelligendum, quod unumquodque naturalium aliqua operatione determinatur, in quam cum potest, dicitur illud; cum autem non potest, non dicitur, nisi aequivoce. Quare principatus est aliqua operatio in quam cum poterit, maxime dicetur principatus: cum autem non poterit, non dicetur, nisi aequivoce. Operationes autem principatus sunt consiliari de aliquibus, iudicare, et praecipere: maxime autem operatio principatus est praecipere, praecipere enim maxime pertinet ad principatum. Dicit igitur: maxime, et simpliciter, ut est dicere, illi debent dici principatus, quibus competunt isti actus, consiliari, iudicare et praecipere. Et ille principatus maxime dicitur principatus, cui competit praecipere, quia iste est actus praecipuus ipsius principatus.

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Deinde cum dicit sed hae tangit distinctionem principatus in ordine ad rempublicam. Et primo tangit quae circa principatus faciunt difficultatem, et quae non. Secundo prosequitur de illis quae faciunt difficultatem, ibi, in magnis et cetera. In prima dicit, quod utrum principatus dicatur secundum unum modum vel plures, et secundum diversas rationes, non multum facit ad propositum; quia iudicium non fit de altercatione quae sit de nominibus, sed pertinet ad aliud negotium, scilicet ad metaphysicum: consideratio enim de distinctione vocabulorum est negotium intellectuale: sed qui principatus et quales sunt necessarii, et quare, et quot in civitate si debeat esse civitas, et qui et quales non sunt necessarii, tamen expediunt ad bonam rempublicam, hoc magis facit ad propositum, et magis dubitabit aliquis de istis et circa omnem rempublicam et parvas civitates.

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Deinde cum dicit in magnis prosequitur de illis quae faciunt difficultatem: et dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit, in quibus civitatibus expedit unum principatum in plures dividi, et in quibus non. Secundo movet circa hoc dubitationes, ibi, contingit autem. Prima in duas. In prima ostendit, quod in magnis civitatibus non expedit unum principatum in plures dividi. In secunda, quod in parvis non expedit, ibi, in parvis autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod in magnis civitatibus congruit et expediens est unum principatum ordinari ad unum opus et non ad plures. Sed contingit esse multos principantes in talibus civitatibus: et ratio huius est duplex. Prima est, quia in magnis civitatibus multi sunt cives digni principari; et expediens est, quod quidam multo tempore dimittantur in principatu, alios semel expedit principari: hoc autem non contingeret, si unus teneret multos principatus. Quare in magnis civitatibus non expedit unum plures principatus tenere. Alia ratio est, quia unum opus melius perficitur ab uno adhibente curam circa illud, quam si circa multa intendens distraheretur: quare melius est unum principatum committere uni, quam plures.

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Deinde cum dicit in parvis ostendit, quod in parvis civitatibus expedit unum plures principatus tenere: et dividitur in tres. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda respondet obiectioni quae posset fieri, ibi, indigent autem aliquando. In tertia ostendit ex quo potest dignosci quos principatus congruat coniungere in unum, et quos non, ibi, si igitur habemus. In prima dicit quod in parvis civitatibus oportet unum plures principatus tenere. Et ratio huius est, quia in parvis civitatibus sunt pauci cives; et ideo propter paucitatem ipsorum, non possunt esse plures principantes: quare oportet unum principatus plures tenere. Et contingit in talibus civitatibus, quod successive iterum principantur.

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Deinde cum dicit indigent autem respondet obiectioni, quae posset fieri: aliquis enim posset dicere: si in magnis civitatibus oportet unum principantem unum principatum tenere, in parvis unum plures, non erit idem principatus secundum rationem in magnis civitatibus et in parvis. Iterum posset dici, quod non expedit in parvis civitatibus unum principatus plures tenere, quia regimen unius impediret curam alterius; minus enim potest esse intentus circa plures, quam circa unum. Ista duo removet; et dicit quod parvae civitates aliquando indigent eisdem principantibus secundum speciem, quibus indigent magnae. Sed in hoc est differentia: quod in magnis civitatibus frequenter sunt iidem principatus et principantes propter multos esse cives in civitate, in parvis autem non nisi in multo tempore. In parvis enim propter paucos esse cives non possunt multi esse principantes: et propter hoc oportet unum multo tempore principari, et tenere principatus multos: non enim omnes principatus impediunt seinvicem, ita quod propter curam unius impeditur alterius; sicut plura luminaria uni obelisco imposita, non se impediunt: non secus ergo plures principatus uni iniuncti non impediunt. Tales autem sunt principatus propinqui existentes natura, qui vel ordinantur ad unum finem vel ad propinquos; sicut est principatus qui habet curam honestatis puerorum et mulierum.

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Deinde cum dicit si igitur declarat ex quo potest dignosci quos principatus congruit demandare in unum, et quos non; dicens, quod si sciamus quos principatus necessarium est esse in civitate, et quos non est necessarium, et tamen expedit esse, de facili sciemus quos principatus et quales expedit congregare in unum principatum, et quos et quales non.

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Deinde cum dicit congruit autem inquirit quos principatus oportet uniri in unum, et quos oportet dividi in plures, per comparationem ad loca, et homines et respublicas. Et primo movet dubitationes circa hoc. Secundo solvit eas, ibi, aut existunt quidem. In prima dicit, quod non debet civem latere qui principes possunt habere curam de diversis secundum diversitatem locorum, et quorum et qualium oportet ubique esse unum principem. Verbi gratia, contingit aliquam curam habere honestatis in foro, et in alia parte civitatis, et extra. Modo est dubitatio, utrum curans honestatem in foro sit praefectus fori, et alius sit princeps honestatis in alia parte civitatis, ita quod secundum diversitatem locorum diversificentur principes, quamvis principatus honestatis sit unius rationis: aut sit unus princeps honestatis, et in foro, et in omni alio loco. Secunda quaestio est, utrum principatus debeant distingui secundum rem, vel secundum hominem: idest secundum illud ad quod per se inspicitur in dirigendo, vel secundum multitudinem hominum, qui debent dirigi per illum; verbi gratia, utrum sit idem principatus ornatus puerorum, et mulierum non. Tertia quaestio est, utrum principatus distinguantur secundum distinctionem rerumpublicarum: sicut verbi gratia: utrum in statu populari paucorum, et optimatum, et monarchia regali sint idem principatus, vel alii genere vel specie non existentes ex aequalibus nec ex similibus, vel sint diversi in diversis rebuspublicis, ut in statu optimatum virtuosi, in statu populari liberi, in statu paucorum divites.

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Deinde cum dicit aut existunt solvit dubitationes istas. Et primo solvit eas. Secundo addit ad solutionem quiddam, ibi, non solum. Circa primum intelligendum est, quod principatus distinguitur, sicut alia naturalia; scilicet et secundum formam, et secundum materiam. Forma vero principatus virtus aliqua vel potentia est: est enim principatus potentia quaedam, vel virtus: virtus autem attenditur in ordine ad finem: ergo secundum distinctionem finis distinguuntur principatus. Finis autem principatus duplex est: quidam scilicet est remotus, quidam vero propinquus: remotus, sicut finis reipublicae ad quem ordinantur ultimo omnes principatus, et maxime et immediate principalis. Principatus propinquus est sicut finis ducatus exercitus victoria, iudicii iudicare de subortis. Distinguitur igitur principatus primo secundum distinctionem finis remoti. Cum igitur fines rerumpublicarum erunt diversi, principatus diversarum rerumpublicarum erunt diversi: et sicut respublicae omnes attributionem habent ad unam primam, sic principatus rerumpublicarum posteriorum ad principatum in republica prima et simpliciter dicta, attributionem habent. Et per hoc solvitur tertia quaestio cum quaerebatur, utrum principatus distingueretur secundum distinctionem rerumpublicarum. Apparet enim quod sic, secundum distinctionem finis ultimi. Finis autem propinquus civitatis diversus est in qualibet republica, sicut ducatus exercitus victoria, iudicii iudicare. Secundum vero distinctionem huius finis distinguitur principatus. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo secundum distinctionem ipsius finis secundum se: et sic diversi sunt principatus ducatus exercitus et iudicii. Alio modo distinguitur principatus per hoc quod homines diversimode se habent ad finem illum: ita quod finis potest esse unus secundum rem: sed quia homines aliter se habent ad illum finem, principatus distinguitur: sicut est principatus ornatus mulierum, puerorum e virorum. Quamvis enim finis istorum sit unus; tamen quia aliter se habet puer ad istum finem quam mulier, et quam vir adultus; ideo alius est principatus ornatus mulierum, alius puerorum et adultorum. Et per hoc solvitur secunda quaestio cum quaerebatur, utrum distinctio principatus esset secundum homines vel rem: quia et est secundum rem, ut quando distinguitur secundum distinctionem finis propinqui secundum se: et secundum homines, quando homines diversimode se habent ad finem principatus. Secundo vero distinguitur principatus secundum materiam, ut secundum diversitatem locorum et hominum: possunt enim loca esse ita distantia quod unus homo non posset regere; et tunc unus principatus dividitur in plures. Iterum si sit magna multitudo civium quae non possit dirigi per unum, oportet principatum unum secundum speciem distingui in plures: si autem loca sint propinqua et pauci sint homines, tunc plures principatus uniuntur in unum. Similiter contingit aliquando diversos principatus secundum rem, maxime eos quorum est unus finis secundum rem, diversos tamen secundum diversum modum se habendi ad ipsum, propter paucitatem hominum et propinquitatem locorum, coniungi: sicut contingit eumdem habere curam boni ornatus virorum et puerorum et mulierum: aliquando contingit contrarium propter causas contrarias. Et per hoc solvitur prima quaestio cum quaerebatur, utrum principatus distingueretur secundum diversitatem locorum: quoniam aliquando sic, aliquando non. Et haec omnia innuit philosophus breviter dicens, quod secundum diversitatem istorum, scilicet locorum, hominum et rei et rerumpublicarum est diversitas principatuum. Contingit enim aliquando, quod diversi principatus congregantur in unum, aliquando unus dividitur in plures, quia contingit in aliquibus civitatibus multos esse cives, et loca distantia, ita quod unus non posset regere, et unus principatus dividitur in plures, sicut principatus boni ornatus, et propter multitudinem civium et distantiam locorum distinguitur in plures: in aliquibus vero contingit paucos esse cives et loca non esse distantia, sed propinqua; et tunc plures principatus uniuntur in unum, quia idem sufficiens est regere diversos principatus.

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Deinde cum dicit non solum adiungit praedictis quaedam. Et primo adiungit, quod sunt quidam principatus singulares quibusdam rebuspublicis. Secundo adiungit de principatu puerorum, ibi, puerorum et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda ostendit quod consilium in populari statu quoddam est, ibi, dissolvitur autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod non solum distinguitur vel unitur principatus secundum loca, ut unus dividatur in duo, et duo in unum congregentur; sed quidam sunt principatus singulares, qui reperiuntur in quibusdam rebuspublicis et non in aliis, sicut principatus praeconsulentium est in paucorum statu non in populari, sed consilium invenitur in populari statu, quia oportet in populari statu esse aliquos qui consilientur de eis quae sunt populi. Populus enim deficit a ratione, ut in pluribus. Universaliter in civitate oportet esse aliquid consiliativum quod dirigat et curet ut populus non vacet et insolescat: et si sint multi, populare est: si autem pauci, est paucorum potentia. Non sunt autem in populari statu, sed in paucorum praeconsules; quia praeconsules sunt pauci et divites; et ideo in paucorum statu sunt. Ubi autem sunt ambo principatus, scilicet praeconsulum et consiliantium, consules sunt supra consiliarios. Consiliarius autem est, ut dictum est, status popularis; sed praeconsul est paucorum.

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Deinde cum dicit dissolvitur autem declarat quod in quadam potentia populari non est consilium; et dicit, quod principatus consiliativus in quibusdam a popularibus statibus amovetur seu destruitur, sicut in illis in quibus totus populus, cum convenit, tractat de omnibus: hoc autem sit quando convenit totus populus et omnes tractant de omnibus; maxime quando ordinatur damnum vocatis si non veniunt et merces si veniunt: cum enim sic vocantur, conveniunt et de omnibus iudicant.

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Deinde cum dicit pueronomus autem adiungit de principatu puerorum et mulierum, quod est optimatum potentiae vel civilis; et dicit, quod principatus puerorum et mulierum, et si sit alius talis principatus optimatum potentiae, est non popularis: quia popularis status non prohibet mulieres pauperum exire ad negotiationes, sed praecipit: optimatum autem status prohibet. Nec talis principatus est paucorum: quia mulieres paucorum delitiose vivunt; et ideo nolunt sequi rationis motum. Et consequenter recapitulat dicens, quod de his intantum determinatum sit.

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L. 14 (Δ.15, 1300a8–1300b12)Tria esse in magistratibus creandis animadvertenda: qui constituantur; a quibus eligantur, et quo creentur, sorte an electione, ab omnibus aut a paucis.

Tria esse in magistratibus creandis animadvertenda: qui constituantur; a quibus eligantur, et quo creentur, sorte an electione, ab omnibus aut a paucis.

Polit.L14

N553. Circa institutiones autem principatuum, tentandum a principio pertransire.

Polit.L14

554. Sunt autem differentiae in tribus terminis, quibus compositis necessarium omnes acceptos esse modos. Est autem trium horum unum quidem qui sunt instituentes principatus; secundum autem ex quibus; reliquum autem quomodo.

Polit.L14

555. Uniuscuiusque autem horum trium sunt tres differentiae. Aut enim omnes cives instituunt, aut quidam, aut ex omnibus, aut ex aliquibus determinatis; puta vel honorabilitate, vel genere, vel virtute, vel tali aliquo alio, sicut in Megaris ex condescendentibus et compugnantibus ad populum; et hoc aut electione aut sorte.

Polit.L14

556. Rursum haec combinata. Dico autem hos quidem quidam, hos autem omnes: et hos quidem ex omnibus, hos autem ex aliquibus; et hos quidem electione, hos autem sorte. Horum autem uniuscuiusque differentiae erunt modi quatuor: aut enim omnes ex omnibus electione, aut omnes ex omnibus sorte; et aut ex omnibus simul, aut divisim: puta secundum tribus et populus et societates, donec utique pertranseat per omnes civiles, aut semper ex simul omnibus; et aut hoc quidem sic, hoc autem illo modo. Rursum si quidam instituentes, aut ex omnibus electione, aut ex omnibus forte, aut ex quibusdam electione, aut ex quibusdam sorte: aut hoc quidem sic, hoc autem illo modo. Dico autem hoc quidem ex omnibus electione, hoc autem sorte. Quare duodecim modi fiunt exceptis duabus combinationibus.

Polit.L14

557. Harum autem duae quidem institutiones demoticae secundum omnia ex omnibus electione vel sorte fieri: aut ambarum, hos quidem sorte, hos autem electione principatuum.

Polit.L14

558. Non omnes autem simul quidem instituere ex simul omnibus, vel ex quibusdam, aut sorte, aut electione, aut ambarum: aut hos quidem ex omnibus, hos autem ex quibusdam amborum (dico autem amborum, hos quidem sorte, hos autem electione), politicum.

Polit.L14

559. Et quosdam ex omnibus, hos quidem electione instituere hos sorte; aut amborum, hos quidem sorte, hos autem electione, oligarchicum: magis oligarchicum autem quod ex ambobus.

Polit.L14

560. Sed hos quidem ex omnibus, hos autem ex quibusdam, politicum aristocratice; aut hos quidem electione, hos autem sorte.

Polit.L14

561. Quosdam autem ex quibusdam, oligarchicum: et quosdam ex quibusdam sorte, non factum autem similiter, et quuosdam ex quibusdam amborum, quosdam autem ex similibus omnibus non oligarchicum: ex quibusdam autem electione omnes, aristocraticum.

Polit.L14

562. Modi quidem igitur eorum, quae circa principatus, tot numero sunt, et divisi sunt secundum politias sic: quae autem quibus expediant, et quomodo oportet fieri institutiones simul cum potentiis principatuum quae sunt, erit manifestum. Dico autem potentiam principatus velut eam quae domina proventuum, et dominam custodiae. Alia enim species potentiae, velut ducatus exercitus, et dominae eorum qui circa forum contractuum.

Polit.L14

Postquam philosophus de distinctione principatuum determinavit, declarat de modo institutionis ipsorum; et dividitur in duas. In prima praemittit intentionem suam. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, sunt autem. In prima dicit, quod postquam determinatum est de distinctione principatuum, conandum est pertransire de modo institutionis ipsorum: et hoc a principio.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit sunt autem prosequitur; et primo declarat qualiter convenit principatus institui, ponendo quasdam divisiones. Secundo ostendit qui modi cui reipublicae conveniunt, ibi, horum autem duae. Prima in duas. In prima ponit distinctionem unam. Secundo subdividit membra, ibi, uniuscuiusque autem. In prima dicit, quod tria sunt differentia secundum rationem, quibus divisis et combinatis, possint omnes modi institutionis principatuum accipi. Istorum autem trium unum est qui sunt instituentes principatum. Secundum est ex quibus instituitur princeps. Tertium est modus secundum quem instituitur.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit uniuscuiusque autem subdividit quodlibet istorum. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo tangit diversas combinationes dividentium, ut habeatur numerus modorum, ibi, rursus autem. In prima dicit, quod istorum sunt tres differentiae vel tres divisiones, ita quod uniuscuiusque sit una: aut enim instituentes sunt omnes cives aut quidam; et haec est prima differentia. Secunda est quod aut instituunt ex omnibus, aut ex aliquibus determinatis secundum aliquam dignitatem: vel secundum virtutem, vel secundum aliquem alium modum; sicut accidit in civitate Megarae in qua instituuntur principantes ex condescendentibus ad populum, hoc est ex illis qui condescendebant populo in civitate et ex illis qui simul pugnabant cum populo contra impugnantes et gravantes eos. Tertia differentia est, quod instituentes aut instituunt sorte aut electione.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit rursum haec ponit combinationes diversas, ut habeatur numerus modorum; et dicit iterum quod ista tria combinari possunt adinvicem. Unde per alia dividendum. Et exponit quae sint illa tria, dicens: dico autem, idest expono, quia aut omnes instituunt, aut quidam; et aut ex omnibus, aut ex aliquibus, aut ex electione, aut ex sorte. Et quodlibet istorum quatuor habet differentias quibus dividitur. Quia si omnes instituunt, aut ex omnibus, aut ex quibusdam: si ex omnibus, aut sorte, et sic est unum membrum; aut electione, et sic secundum; aut divisim, et sic tertium; aut coniunctim, et sic quartum. Dico autem divisim: sicut si secundum tribus instituantur et populos diversos et societates, ita quod modo instituantur ex una tribu, deinde ex alia; et similiter discurrendo per omnes partes civitatis. Coniunctim vero, ita quod semper ex omnibus simul sumptis instituant. Aut alios quidem sic, alios autem alio modo: puta quosdam ex omnibus coniunctis, quosdam autem ex omnibus divisis, et sic sunt sex membra. Si autem quidam sunt instituentes, habemus alia sex membra: quia aut instituunt ex omnibus, aut quibusdam: et si ex omnibus, aut sorte, aut electione: et sic duo membra habemus: si ex quibusdam, aut ex quibusdam, vel sorte, aut electione, et sunt alia duo: aut quosdam instituunt ex omnibus sorte, quosdam autem alios electione; et sic habemus alia duo membra. Et sic in universo habemus duodecim membra, ducendo membra primae divisionis in membra aliarum duarum, praemittendo duas combinationes, hoc est non ducendo membra tertiae in membra secundae.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit harum autem ostendit qui modi cui reipublicae conveniunt; et dividitur in partes quinque. In prima ostendit qui modi conveniunt populi statui. In secunda qui reipublicae, ibi, non omnes autem et cetera. In tertia qui paucorum statui, ibi, et quosdam ex omnibus. In quarta qui optimatum potentiae, ibi, sed hos quidem. In quinta adhuc quis paucorum potentiae, ibi, quosdam autem ex quibusdam. In prima dicit, quod istarum combinationum quae dictae sunt, duae pertinent ad popularem statum, scilicet omnes principatus instituere ex omnibus sorte, vel etiam electione: vel etiam si assumuntur omnes ex omnibus coniunctim vel divisim, vel per sortem, vel per electionem: hoc enim maxime pertinet, ubi multitudo dominatur: hoc autem est popularis status.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit non omnes ostendit qui modi sunt reipublicae; et dicit, quod non omnes instituere ex omnibus simul vel quibusdam, sed omnes simul et divisim per tribus et officia ex omnibus et divisim, et hoc vel per sortem, vel per electionem; aut secundum istos modos aliquos ex omnibus vel quibusdam, ut aliquos per sortem ex omnibus, alios per electionem, civile est, quia respublica est mixta ex paucorum et populari statu: instituere autem ex quibusdam paucorum est, instituere vero ex omnibus populare est; et ideo instituere ex omnibus vel quibusdam civile est. Et exponit quod dixerat, utroque modo, dicens: dico autem, et expono utroque modo, idest quosdam accipi ex omnibus divisim vel quibusdam per sortem, vel per electionem.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit et quosdam ostendit qui modi sunt paucorum potentiae. Et dicit quod quosdam instituere ex omnibus, vel per sortem, vel per electionem, vel instituere aliquos ex omnibus secundum utrumque modum, ut scilicet aliqui instituantur per electionem, aliqui per sortem, paucorum potentiae est magis; nam paucorum potentiae est aliquos paucos principari; et hoc est isto modo.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit sed hos quidem ostendit qui modi sunt civiles optimatum, idest reipublicae mixtae cum optimatum statu. Et dicit quod aliquos instituere ex omnibus, aliquos ex quibusdam, sed istos eligere per electionem, illos per sortem, est reipublicae mixtae cum statu optimatum.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit quosdam autem ostendit adhuc qui modus est paucorum potentiae. Et dicit, quod instituere quosdam ex quibusdam, paucorum potentiae est, quia paucorum potentia est paucos principari et eligere quosdam ex quibusdam per sortem facta electione, non eo modo quo fit in aliis, quia hic ad paucos divites inspicitur, et institui quosdam ex quibusdam secundum ambos modos eligendi, ut quidam instituuntur sorte, quidam electione, est paucorum potentiae; sed instituere quosdam ex omnibus simul, non est paucorum potentiae; sed instituere ex quibusdam, sicut virtuosis, per electionem, optimatum est.

Polit.L14

Deinde cum dicit modi quidem recolligit determinata, remittens de consideratione aliorum propositorum prius ad sequentia. Et dicit quod modi eorum qui circa principatus, idest modi assumendi principatus tot sunt, quot dicti sunt: et sic dividuntur principatus secundum distinctionem rerumpublicarum. Qui autem quibus principantibus expediant et qualiter oportet eos institui, posterius simul erit manifestum, cum erit manifestum de potentiis ipsorum. Et exponit quid vocat potentiam principatus, dicens, quod potentia principatus dicitur, ut quae est domina proventuum et regionis. Istae enim duae potentiae specie differunt, sicut potentia ducatus exercitus, et potentia quae est domina contractuum, qui circa forum sunt.

Polit.L14

L. 15 (1300b13–1301a15)Quod iudiciorum species sint, et quomodo purgandi, et a quibus.

Quod iudiciorum species sint, et quomodo purgandi, et a quibus.

Polit.L15

563. Reliquum autem trium dicere quod iudicativum de praetoriis; sumendum autem et horum modos secundum eandem hypothesim. Est autem differentia praetoriorum in tribus terminis, ex quibus, et de quibus, et quo modo. Dico autem ex quibus quidem, utrum ex quibus omnibus, aut ex quibusdam; de quibus autem quot species praetoriorum: quomodo autem utrum sorte, aut electione. Prius igitur dividatur, quot species praetoriorum.

Polit.L15

564. Sunt autem numero octo: una quidem correctiva, alia autem siquis iniuste laeserit aliquid communium; alia quaecumque in politia ferunt: quarta et principibus et idiotis quicumque de damnificationibus altercantur: quinta de propriis commutationibus et habentibus magnitudinem, et praeter hoc quid homicidiale, et quod peregrinum. Homicidialis quidem igitur speces, sive inter eosdem iudices, sive inter alios, sed de iis quae ex praemeditatione, et de involuntariis, et quaecumque confitentur quidem, altercantur autem de iusto. Quartum autem quaecumque fugientibus in descensu ferunt homicidia, velut Athenis dicitur, et quod in Pheati compulit iudex. Accidit autem talia in praesenti tempore pauca, et in magnis civitatibus. Peregrinalis autem, unum quidem extraneis ad extraneos, aliud extraneis ad ipsos. Adhuc autem praeter omnia haec de parvis cummutationibus quaecumque punctalia et quinque drachmarum, et paulo amplioris. Oportet enim et de iis fieri iudicium; non incidunt autem in iudicium multitudinem.

Polit.L15

565. Sed de iis quidem dimittetur, et de homicidialibus et de peregrinalibus. De politiis autem dicamus, de quibus non factis bene, seditiones fiunt et politiarum motus.

Polit.L15

566. Necesse itaque aut omnes de omnibus iudicare, divisis electione aut sorte. Aut omnes de omnibus, ii quidem sorte, ii autem electione. Aut de quibusdam eisdem, hos quidem sorte, hos autem electione. Isti quidem igitur modi quatuor numero; tot autem, et alteri qui secundum partem. Rursum enim ex quibusdam et iudicantes de omnibus electione, aut ex quibusdam de omnibus sorte, aut hoc quidem sorte, hoc autem electione, aut quidam praetoria de eisdem ex sortiatibus et electis. Isti quidem igitur sicut dicti fuerunt modi dictis. Adhuc autem eadem combinata: dico autem puta, ii quidem ex omnibus, ii autem ex quibusdam, ii autem ex ambobus, velut si praetorii essent, ii quidem ex omnibus, hic autem ex quibusdam, et aut sorte, aut electione, aut ambobus. Quot quidem igitur contingit esse modis praetoria, dictum est.

Polit.L15

567. Horum autem, prima quidem democratica quaecumque ex omnibus, aut de omnibus; secunda autem oligarchica quaecumque ex quibusdam de omnibus; tertia autem aristocratica et politica, quaecumque ii quidem ex omnibus ii autem ex quibusdam.

Polit.L15

Postquam philosophus determinavit de consiliativo et principatu, determinat de iudicativo: et dividitur in duas.

Polit.L15

In prima praemittit intentum suum.

Polit.L15

In secunda prosequitur, ibi, sunt autem et cetera.

Polit.L15

In prima dicit, quod postquam determinatum est de consiliativo et principatu, dicendum est de tertio prius propositorum, scilicet de iudicativo et iudicio: et accipiendi sunt modi iudicii et iudicativi, secundum quod prius accepti sunt modi aliorum, scilicet principatus et consiliativi. Circa iudicium autem tria sunt consideranda, in quibus consistit diversitas iudicii: scilicet ex quibus sumendi sunt, secundum est a quibus, tertium est qualiter assumendi sunt. Et exponit ex quibus sunt assumendi, utrum ex omnibus, aut quibusdam: de quibus, quot scilicet sunt species iudicii: qualiter autem, utrum institui debeant electione vel sorte. Et primo videndum est quot sunt species iudiciorum.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit sunt autem prosequitur: et dividitur in duas.

Polit.L15

In prima tangit species iudiciorum.

Polit.L15

In secunda ostendit quibus modis instituuntur, ibi, necesse itaque et cetera.

Polit.L15

Prima in duas.

Polit.L15

In prima facit quod dictum est.

Polit.L15

In secunda excludit quaedam a consideratione sua, ibi, sed de his quidem et cetera.

Polit.L15

In prima dicit, quod species iudiciorum in universali octo sunt. Una est correctiva secundum quam transgredientes legem puniuntur. Alia est punitiva eius qui peccat contra aliquod communium, puta contra aliquam personam publicam. Alia est, secundum quam puniuntur qui deliquerunt contra totam rempublicam. Quarta est, quae est communis et principibus, et idiotis, et quibuscumque; quae est damnorum et iniuriarum illatarum iudicativa, de quibus est altercatio. Quinta species est, de contractibus parvis et magnis. Alia vero est praeter haec iudicativa homicidiorum, de peregrinis, idest de eis quae ad peregrinos pertinent. Illa vero species quae est iudicativa homicidiorum, sive sint iidem iudices iudicantes et exequentes, sive sint alii (vel sic), sive sint iidem iudices secundum unam rempublicam, sive sint diversi secundum aliam et aliam rempublicam, species aliquas habet. Una est quae est iudicativa homicidii facti ex praemeditatione et deliberatione, et voluntarie ponendo insidias. Secunda est iudicativa homicidii perpetrati et confessi, allegatur tamen quod iuste factum est; et super hoc est altercatio, utrum iuste vel iniuste factum est. Quarta species est, quae est iudicativa eorum quae feruntur, idest ponuntur in descensu homicidii, idest in reatu, hoc est, quae est iudicativa eorum quibus imponuntur homicidia ab aliquibus, sed hoc ipsis fugientibus, hoc est negantibus: talibus enim solet aliquando indici duellum vel purgatio per iudicium ignis vel aquae, ut quod accusatus accipiat ignitum ferrum manu nuda, et si uratur iudicetur reus, si non, absolvatur; vel quod ligatis manibus et pedibus ponatur in aqua magna; et siquidem evadat, absolvatur; si non, reputetur reus fuisse; sicut dicitur Athenis, quod iudex compulit descendere in puteo quemdam ad purgandum forte se super homicidio. Istud autem est irrationabile; quia hoc est committere se fortunae et iudicio divino, et ideo raro fit nunc hominibus magis utentibus ratione, minus autem in magnis civitatibus ubi plures sunt sapientes. Septima species iudicii est, quae est iudicativa de disceptatione peregrinorum; et ista est duplex. Quaedam quae est iudicativa controversiae quae est inter peregrinos adinvicem. Alia est iudicativa de disceptatione quae est inter peregrinos extraneos et cives. Adhuc praeter istas species iudicii est una alia quae est octava: et est illa, quae est iudicativa de parvis commutationibus, quae sunt circa minima, et quasi punctualia, ut de his, quae sunt quinque drachmarum, et de his quae parum plus valent: de omnibus enim talibus oportet fieri iudicium; nec debent reduci in multitudinem iudicum propter parvitatem earum, sed in aliquem unum determinatum.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit sed de iis excludit quaedam a consideratione sua. Et dicit quod de istis, et de speciebus iudicativis homicidiorum, et de illis qui iudicant de disceptatione peregrinorum dimittatur ad praesens; sed de speciebus iudicii pertinentibus ad rempublicam dicendum est: quia si ista non bene fiunt, accidunt seditiones rerumpublicarum: de talibus autem per quae possunt contingere seditiones et transmutationes rerumpublicarum pertinet ad civem determinare.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit necesse itaque tangit modos instituendi iudicium: et dividitur in duas.

Polit.L15

In prima tangit modos instituendi iudicium.

Polit.L15

In secunda ostendit qui modi cui reipublicae conveniunt, ibi, horum autem.

Polit.L15

In prima dicit, quod necesse est omnes iudicare, aut quosdam: si omnes, aut de omnibus, aut de quibusdam: si de omnibus, aut de omnibus per electionem, aut de omnibus per sortem, aut de omnibus haec quidem sorte, alia vero electione: si omnes iudicent de quibusdam, aut iudicabunt de quibusdam sorte, aut electione, aut de quibusdam, haec quidem per sortem, alia per electionem: et sic sunt quatuor modi si omnes iudicent: similiter erunt quatuor modi subdividendo aliud membrum. Adhuc si quidam iudicant de omnibus, aut iudicant sorte de omnibus, aut de omnibus per electionem, aut de omnibus haec iudicant sorte, alia autem electione. Si autem iudicent de quibusdam, aut sorte iudicant de quibusdam, aut electione; aut de quibusdam quidam sorte, quidam electione: et sic sunt alii quatuor modi subdividendo aliud membrum, scilicet ut quidam iudicant. Et hoc breviter innuit, cum dicit, vel quaedam iudicia, scilicet omnibus, vel quibusdam ex sortitis et electis. Ulterius concludit, quod isti modi consimiles sunt modis dictis prius de institutione principatus. Iterum si ista fuerint combinata, erunt alii modi. Ut si dicamus, quod iudicantes sunt, aut ex omnibus, aut ex quibusdam, et hoc secundum alterum modum eligendi, scilicet sorte et electione, ut si dicamus, quod iudicia aut sunt ex omnibus, aut quibusdam: et si ex omnibus, aut sorte, aut electione; aut ex omnibus, hi quidem electione, alii vero sorte; et si ex quibusdam, aut sorte, aut electione, aut ex quibusdam quidem sorte, ex quibusdam vero electione. Et tunc concludit, quod tot contingit esse modos iudiciorum.

Polit.L15

Deinde cum dicit horum autem ostendit qui modi reipublicae conveniunt. Et dicit, quod primi quatuor, scilicet omnes de omnibus conveniunt statui populari. Secundi quatuor paucorum potentiae sunt; scilicet quaecumque ex quibusdam de omnibus. Tertii quatuor optimatibus conveniunt et rebuspublicis; scilicet quod iudicia partim sunt ex omnibus, partim ex quibusdam.

Polit.L15

Bk. 5Quid est quod omnes civitatum administrationes immutet quodque remedium singulis adhibendum ut in eodem permaneant.

Quid est quod omnes civitatum administrationes immutet quodque remedium singulis adhibendum ut in eodem permaneant.

Polit.lib5

L. 1 (Ε.1, 1301a19–1302a15)Quod ad virum politicum pertineat scire quae sit respublica prorsus optima, quae ut secunda ab ea; et cum multae sint species rerumpublicarum, omnes omnibus non convenire; deinde commemorat quid dixerit, quidve dicendum sit, proponit.

Polit.L1

568. De aliis quidem igitur quae praeeligimus, fere dictum est de omnibus: ex quibus autem transmutantur politiae, et ex quot, et ex qualibus, et quae sunt uniuscuiusque politiae correctiones, et ex qualibus ad quales maxime referuntur, adhuc autem salvationes quae sint uniuscuiusque et communiter et sigillatim, adhuc autem per quae utique maxime salvabitur politiarum unaquaeque, considerandum consequenter dictis.

Polit.L1

569. Oportet autem primo suscipere principium, quia multae factae sunt politiae, omnibus quidem confitentibus quod iustum, et quod secundum proportionem aequale, adhuc autem peccantibus, sicut dictum est et prius. Demos quidem enim factus est ex eo quod est aequales, id est quoscumque existentes, putare simpliciter aequales esse. Quia enim liberi similiter omnes, simpliciter aequales esse putant. Oligarchia autem ex eo quod est inaequales quacumque existentes, existimare totaliter esse inaequales; secundum substantiam enim inaequales, simpliciter inaequales existimant esse. Deinde quidem ii tamquam aequales existentes, omnibus aequalibus volunt participare; ii autem tamquam inaequales existentes superegredi quaerunt; quod enim plus, inaequale. Habent quidem igitur politiae omnes aliquid iustum, vitiatae autem sunt simpliciter.

Polit.L1

570. Et propter hanc causam, quando non secundum existimationem suam forte utrique participent politia, seditiones faciunt.

Polit.L1

571. Omnium autem iustissime quidem utique seditiones facerent, minime autem hoc agunt qui secundum virtutem differunt. Maxime enim rationabile inaequales simpliciter esse hos solum.

Polit.L1

572. Sunt autem quidam qui secundum genus excellentes, non dignificant aequalibus se ipsos propter inaequalitatem hanc. Nobiles enim esse videntur quibus existunt progenitorum virtus et divitiae. Principia quidem igitur, ut est dicere, haec, et fontes seditionum sunt, unde seditiones movent.

Polit.L1

573. Propter quod et transmutationes fiunt dupliciter. Quandoque quidem enim ad politiam, ut ex instituta aliam constituant, velut ex democratia, oligarchiam, aut democratiam ex oligarchia, aut politiam et aristocratiam ex iis, aut has ex illis.

Polit.L1

574. Quoniam autem, neque ad constitutam politiam, sed institutionem quidem eligunt eandem, per ipsos autem esse volunt hanc, velut oligarchiam et monarchiam.

Polit.L1

575. Adhuc de eo quod est magis et minus, velut oligarchiam existentem ad magis oligarchizari, vel ad minus; ad deocratiam existentem ad magis democratizari, vel ad minus; similiter etiam et in reliquis politiiis, ut aut intendantur aut remittantur.

Polit.L1

576. Adhuc ad partem aliquam politiae movere, puta principatum aliquem instituere,, vel destruere; sicut in Lacedaemonia aiunt quidem Lysandrum conatum fuisse dissolvere regnum, et Pausaniam regem Ephoriam, et in Epidamno autem transmutata fuit politia secundum partem, pro Philarchis enim consilium fecerunt. Apud Aelienses autem in praetorio eorum necesse est, adhuc quis politeumate ire principatus, cum eligitur aliquis principatus. Oligarchicum autem et princeps unus in hac politia.

Polit.L1

577. Ubique enim propter inaequale seditio, non solum inaequalibus existit proportionale. Perpetuum enim regnum inaequale, si sit in aequalibus. Totaliter enim aequale quaerentes seditiones faciunt.

Polit.L1

578. Est enim duplex quod aequale: hoc quidem enim numero, hoc autem secundum dignitatem est. Dico autem numero quidem multitudine aut magnitudine idem et aequale: secundum dignitatem autem quod ratione: ut puta excedunt secundum numerum quidem aequalem, tria duo, et hoc unum: ratione autem quatuor duo, et hoc unum: aequalis enim pars duo ipsorum quatuor, et unum duorum: ambo enim dimidium.

Polit.L1

579. Confitentes autem simpliciter esse iustum quod secundum dignitatem, differunt, sicut dictum est prius, ii quidem quia si secundum aliquid aequales sint, aequales totaliter esse putant; ii autem, quia secundum aliquid inaequales omnibus inaequalibus dignificant se ipsos.

Polit.L1

580. Propter quod, et maxime duae fiunt politiae, demos, et oligarchia; nobilitas enim et virtus in paucis, haec autem in pluribus. Nobiles enim et boni nusquam centum, egeni autem in multis locis.

Polit.L1

581. Simpliciter autem omnino secundum utramlibet aequalitatem ordinatum esse, pravum: manifestum autem ex eo quod accidit. Nulla enim ex talibus politiis mansiva. Manifesta est huius autem causa; quia impossibile a primo, et eo quod in principio vitiato, non occurrere in fine malum aliquod. Propter quod oportet hoc quidem arithmetica aequalitate uti, hoc autem ea quae secundum dignitatem.

Polit.L1

582. Attamen securior magis et minus seditiosa democratia quam oligarchia. In oligarchiis quidem enim sunt duae, quae ad invicem seditio, et adhuc quae ad populum. In democratiis autem quae ad oligarchiam solum: ipsi autem populo ad se ipsum, quod et dignum dicere, non fit seditio.

Polit.L1

583. Adhuc autem quae ex mediis politia propinquor populo, quam quae paucorum: quae quidem est securissima talium politiarum.

Polit.L1

Postquam philosophus determinavit de rebus publicis ostendendo quid est et de differentiis earum et in universali et in particulari, in isto quinto libro determinat de principiis salvantibus et corrumpentibus rempublicam; et dividitur in partes duas. In prima dat intentionem suam continuando dicta dicendis. In secunda prosequitur, cum dicit, oportet autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod post illa quae determinata sunt prius, consequenter dicendum est ex quibus corrumpuntur respublicae, et ex quot, et ex qualibus, et quae sint corruptiones et correctiones cuiusque reipublicae, et ex qualibus et quibus rebuspublicis ad quales sit transmutatio. Aliquando enim una respublica transmutatur in aliam; et ideo videndum est a quali ad qualem contingit fieri transmutationem. Item dicendum est de salvatione cuiusque reipublicae, qualiter scilicet salvatur unaquaeque et in universali et in particulari. Item dicendum est per quae maxime habet salvari quaelibet: de omnibus enim aliis quae proposuimus dicere in principio, fere dictum est. Et dicit fere, quia superius fecit mentionem de institutione principatus; sed non determinavit de ipsa ad plenum, sed determinabit in sequenti libro, scilicet in sexto.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit oportet autem prosequitur; et dividitur in duas. In prima prosequitur de salvatione et corruptione rerumpublicarum secundum intentionem suam. In secunda circa hoc reprobat opinionem Platonis in fine huius quinti cum dicit, in republica et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima determinat causas corruptionis et salvationis, rerumpublicarum proprie dictarum, scilicet in quibus plures principantur. In secunda determinat causas corruptionis et salvationis monarchiarum, sicut tyrannicae et regalis, ibi, restat autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima determinat causas corruptionis rerumpublicarum in quibus principantur plures. Secundo determinat de causis salvationis, ibi, de salvatione et cetera. Prima in duas. Primo dat radicale principium corruptionis rerumpublicarum. Secundo determinat causas et principia corruptionis proxima magis, ibi, sunt autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima declarat quae est radix corruptionis rerumpublicarum, et quomodo transmutantur. In secunda resumit causam illam ut addat, ibi, ubique enim et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima ostendit quod est radicale principium corruptionis. In secunda ostendit quot modis transmutantur, ibi, propter quod et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima praemittit quoddam. Secundo ex illo concludit causam primam corruptionis rerumpublicarum, ibi, et propter hanc causam et cetera. In prima dicit, quod ad videndum causam corruptionis rerumpublicarum, oportet primo accipere quo principio, quod rerumpublicarum quaedam sunt rectae, quaedam autem non; et quod omnes intendunt aliquod iustum et aequale secundum proportionem. Et ratio huius est, quia omnes intendunt salvationem. Respublica autem salvari non potest sine coniunctione, nec coniunctio fieri potest nisi reddatur aequale; hoc autem iustum est, ergo omnes intendunt iustum et aequale. Peccant tamen multi in determinando illud iustum.

Polit.L1

Quidam enim male determinant ipsum: populus enim putat quod si sint aliqui aequales in quocumque, quod sint aequales simpliciter, et quod aequaliter debent recipere; et quia omnes cives sunt liberi, et aequales simpliciter dicit eos esse. Paucorum vero potentia putat, quod si sint inaequales in aliquo quod sint inaequales simpliciter et inaequaliter debeant recipere illos; scilicet qui sunt inaequales in divitiis, putant inaequales esse simpliciter et inaequaliter debere recipere de bonis communibus. Sed non oportet quod inaequales in divitiis sint inaequales simpliciter, nec aequales in libertate sint aequales simpliciter; quia divitiae et libertas non sunt bona hominis secundum quod homo. Manifestum igitur est quod omnes intendunt aequale. Et dicit, quod ulterius accipiunt, quod si sint aequales aliqui, quod debent recipere aequaliter de communibus bonis: et cum omnes sint liberi aequaliter secundum populares status, debent omnes recipere de bonis communibus aequaliter: quasi paralogizantes; aequales aequaliter debent recipere de bonis communibus: sed liberi sunt aequales: ergo aequaliter debent recipere. Sed manifestum est quod hic est defectus secundum quid et simpliciter. Non enim sequitur: sunt aequales in aliquo, scilicet libertate: ergo sunt simpliciter aequales. Paucorum vero potentia dicit, quod cum ipsi sint aliis inaequales, quia excellentes eos, debent recipere plus et praeponendi sunt in plus accipiendo. Quod enim plus est, inaequale est. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod omnes istae respublicae aliquid iustum intendunt, sed vitiatae sunt simpliciter.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit et propter concludit ex dictis primam radicem et primum principium corruptionis reipublicae et seditionis. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo adiungit aliud principium, ibi, sunt autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda ostendit qui sunt in civitate qui iuste possunt movere dissensionem, et tamen non faciunt, ibi, omnium autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod cum unusquisque secundum unam dignitatem debeat recipere de bonis communibus, quando non recipiunt secundum quod existimant se dignos, faciunt seditionem in civitate et mutant rempublicam: ex hoc enim quod non recipiunt secundum existimationem quam habent de se, videtur eis, quod fiat eis iniustum, et quod contemnantur. Ista autem causa sunt dissensionis.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit omnium autem ostendit qui iuste possunt movere dissensionem in civitate, et tamen non movent. Et dicit, quod inter omnes iustissime possunt movere seditionem in civitate, quamvis non faciunt, virtuosi excellentes alios secundum virtutem. Et ratio huius est, quia illi qui sunt simpliciter inaequales, si non recipiant secundum illam inaequalitatem, iniustum fit simpliciter eis: sed virtuosi sunt simpliciter inaequales respectu aliorum, ipsos excedentes secundum virtutem: ergo si non recipiant secundum illam inaequalitatem, iniustum fit eis. Et cum excedant in eo quod est bonum simpliciter, iustissime possunt movere dissensionem, sed non faciunt propter duas causas. Prima est, quia frequenter contingit propter dissensionem detrimentum boni communis. Sapiens autem ut plurimum plus diligit bonum commune quam proprium; et ideo non facit dissensionem. Secunda ratio est, quia ad hoc quod aliquis debeat movere seditionem in civitate, oportet quod habeat iustam causam et potentiam: sed virtuosi ut frequenter non habent potentiam, nec putant se habere iustam causam; ideo non movent. Sed si ista concurrerent quod haberent causam iustam et potentiam, et non esset detrimentum boni communis, moverent seditionem rationabiliter, et peccarent si non moverent.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit sunt autem adiungit aliud principium corruptionis reipublicae; et dicit, quod sunt alii qui excellentes alios in nobilitate credunt excedere illos simpliciter; et ideo reputant se dignos maioribus. Tales autem videntur esse illi qui habent divitias et virtutem a progenitoribus; et ideo si non recipiant de bonis communibus secundum existimationem quam habent de seipsis, movent dissensionem; et tunc contingit quod principia et fontes seditionum per quae moventur civitates sunt ista; sed istud principium reducitur ad primum. Est enim radix seditionis excellentia in nobilitate per hoc quod tales non recipiunt secundum existimationem suam.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit propter quod declarat quot modis fit transmutatio reipublicae; et dividitur in quatuor, secundum quod ponit quatuor modos. Secunda ibi, quoniam autem et cetera. Tertia ibi, adhuc de eo et cetera. Quarta ibi, adhuc ad partem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod propter hoc quod contingit fieri seditionem in republica, contingit rempublicam mutari. Primo quidem quando fit transmutatio a republica una ad aliam diversam, ut quando ex republica instituta sit transmutatio ad aliam: ut ex populari gubernatione administratio paucorum constituatur, aut e converso; vel ex illis ad rempublicam et optimatum statum vel e contra.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem ponit secundum modum; et dicit, quod aliquando transmutatur respublica in aliam rempublicam, sed manet eadem et eligunt eamdem habere institutionem et ordinationem reipublicae, sed principantes mutant et volunt eamdem rempublicam regere et observare per seipsos vel per amicos suos, sicut in paucorum potentia et monarchia regali, manente eadem republica volunt eam servari et regi per alios; et ideo mutant eos. Similiter etiam in monarchia, ipsa remanente, aliam constituunt quandoque.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit adhuc de eo ponit tertium modum; et dicit, quod iterum fit transmutatio reipublicae non quod respublica transmutetur in aliam, nec etiam quantum ad principatus per se; sed fit quia eadem respublica mutatur in eamdem magis intensam vel remissam: sicut paucorum status transmutatur in paucorum statum magis intensum vel remissum, vel popularis status in popularem statum magis vel minus intensum. Similiter etiam in aliis rebuspublicis ut fiat transmutatio reipublicae eiusdem in eamdem secundum intensionem et remissionem.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit adhuc ad ponit quartum modum; et dicit, quod quarto fit transmutatio reipublicae secundum partem, ut quando unus principatus destruitur et alius instituitur, sicut dicitur factum fuisse in Lacedaemonia quod Lysander conatus fuit dissolvere regnum. Et similiter alius nomine Pausanias, qui rex fuit, conatus fuit destruere principatum ephororum secundum quem populus habet potestatem convocandi multitudinem. Consimiliter fuit in civitate quae dicitur Epidamnum fuit transmutata respublica secundum partem. In illa enim civitate erat alius principatus: illi vero amoverunt eum et fecerunt principatum senatorum. Videntes enim quod multi erant amatores illius principatus, mutaverunt ipsum in senatores. Propter quod statuerunt etiam apud Elienses quod principatus omnes eligerentur in communi. Unde necesse erat omnes principatus qui potestatem habebant et dignitatem in republica concurrere quando magistratus creabatur, et ibi eligere ut minor fraus fieret. Ille autem principatus qui fuit amotus paucorum potentiae erat, et erat unus princeps in illa republica, non plures.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit ubique enim resumit causam seditionis, ut addat. Et primo tangit causam seditionis. Secundo exponit quoddam dictum, ibi, est enim duplex et cetera. In prima dicit quod ubique fit seditio propter inaequalitatem: et non solum in aequalibus secundum aliquid est aequale proportione: puta dives et pauper inaequales sunt secundum substantiam, tamen contingit eis fieri aequales secundum proportionem: similiter magis et minus virtuosos: sed etiam eis qui sunt inaequales contingit fieri inaequales secundum proportionem: puta si quis sit dignior aliis secundum virtutem, dignum est eum regem esse, sed non perpetuum, quia forte non tantum excedit dignitas eius in virtute dignitatem aliorum, quantum honor perpetuo regnandi excedit honorem aliorum; et ideo etiam inaequales contingit fieri inaequales secundum proportionem. Universaliter igitur existimantes se debere habere aequale et non habentes, seditiones movent in republica. Et est intelligendum; quod immediatum principium ipsorum agibilium est electio. Electio autem est habitus praeconsiliativus. Ad consilium autem requiritur intellectus practicus: quare intellectus practicus est principium agibilium. Principium autem intellectus practici est voluntas recti finis; et ideo adhuc principium agibilium est appetitus recti finis. Voluntas vero recti finis praesupponit intellectum speculativum; et ideo intellectus speculativus causa est et principium agibilium. Et quantum ad hoc dixit prius quod existimare principium est seditionis. Principium vero intellectus est intelligibile, et hoc est inaequalitas. Secundum hoc dicit hic, quod inaequalitas est causa seditionis.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit est enim exponit quod dixit, scilicet aequale; et primo facit hoc. Secundo assignat diversitatem inter quaedam dicta, ibi, confitentes autem et cetera. Circa primum intelligendum est, quod proportio est habitudo duorum quantitatum adinvicem. Proportionalitas vero est habitudo proportionum quae consistit in quatuor terminis, vel secundum rem, vel secundum rationem: huiusmodi autem proportionis aequalis vel similitudo attenditur, vel secundum aequalitatem quantitatis, vel secundum aequalitatem dignitatis, vel similitudinis. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod aequale dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo aequale dicitur numero. Alio modo secundum dignitatem. Et exponit quod aequale numero dicitur aequale secundum magnitudinem vel secundum multitudinem. Secundum dignitatem aequale dicitur aequale secundum proportionem similitudinis. Et declarat per exempla aequale secundum quantitatem; ut sicut se habent duo ad unum sic tria ad duo. Excessus enim utrobique aequalis est. Aequalitas vero secundum dignitatem, ut si dicamus, sicut quatuor ad duo, sic duo ad unum. Sicut enim duo sunt medietas de quatuor, sic unum est medietas duorum.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit confitentes autem ponit diversitatem inter quaedam dicta. Dixit enim quod omnes volunt aequale secundum dignitatem: popularis status et paucorum. Dicit quod differenter. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo infert corollarium, ibi, propter quod et cetera. In prima dicit, quod omnes confitentur, quod iustum est secundum dignitatem: sed differunt: quia popularis status fautores dicunt quod si sint aliqui aequales secundum aliquid, puta secundum libertatem, quod simpliciter sunt aequales et quod aequaliter debent recipere: paucorum status fautores etiam dicunt quod si aliqui sunt inaequales secundum aliquid, puta secundum divitias, quod sunt simpliciter inaequales et digniores, et secundum hoc inaequaliter recipere.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit propter quod infert corollarium. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo probat quod status popularis et paucorum sunt male ordinati, ibi simpliciter autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod propter hoc quod fautores status popularis volunt aequale, fautores vero paucorum inaequale; unde status popularis et paucorum sunt duae respublicae maxime distinctae. Nobilitas enim, idest inclinatio ad virtutem, et virtus in paucis reperiuntur, sed paupertas in pluribus. Nobiles enim virtuosi vix alicubi centum inveniuntur. Pauperes autem in pluribus locis: et ideo respublicae ut frequenter vel sunt paucorum vel sunt populares.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit simpliciter autem ostendit quod ambae sunt malae ordinatae. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo ostendit, quod status popularis sit securior, ibi, attamen securior et cetera. In prima dicit, quod utraque respublica male ordinata est: scilicet status popularis in quo attenditur aequalitas secundum libertatem, et status paucorum in quo est aequalitas secundum divitias, ex eo quod accidit quod nulla istarum mansiva est. Et ratio huius est. Impossibile est enim, ex eo quod in principio corruptum et inordinatum est, in fine non accidere malum: istae autem inordinatae sunt, quamvis igitur in principio videatur modica inordinatio, tamen in fine magna, et malum apparet. Tale autem non potest esse mansivum; et ideo utraque respublica non potest esse mansiva. Et quia utraque vitiata et inordinata est, ad hoc quod sint magis mansivae, oportet quod utraque quandoque utatur aequalitate secundum proportionem arithmeticam, in qua intenditur aequalitas excessus, ut sicut tria ad duo, ita duo ad unum; et quandoque aequalitate secundum proportionem geometricam in qua attenditur aequalitas dignitatis, ut sicut se habent quatuor ad duo, sic duo ad unum.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit attamen securior ostendit quod status popularis sit magis securus et minus seditiosus; et dividitur in duas, secundum quod ostendit hoc per duas rationes. Secunda ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod quamvis status paucorum et multorum sint male ordinati, tamen status popularis est securior et minus seditiosus quam paucorum. Et ratio huius est, quia illa respublica magis est secura in qua fiunt pauciores seditiones: sed in statu populari sunt pauciores quam in statu paucorum. Quia in statu paucorum sunt duae seditiones: una divitum inter se, alia pauperum ad divites. In statu populari vero una seditio est, scilicet divitum ad pauperes. Pauperum autem inter se non est seditio quae sit digna reputatione, quia inter se magis conveniunt quam cum divitibus.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundam rationem; et dicit, quod iterum manifestum est quod status popularis est securior, quia respublica quae est ex mediis propinquior est populari statui, quam paucorum statui in quo pauci dominantur: sed respublica media securissima est inter tales respublicas, quae declinant ab optima: sed illa quae propinquior est securissimae securior est quam paucorum potentia.

Polit.L1

L. 2 (Ε.2–3, 1302a16–1303b17)Causa investigatur ut plures sint species rerumpublicarum; reiciturque illa divisio quae per multos et paucos fiebat a quibusdam.

Causa investigatur ut plures sint species rerumpublicarum; reiciturque illa divisio quae per multos et paucos fiebat a quibusdam.

Polit.L2

584. Quoniam autem consideramus ex quibus seditiones fiunt et transmutationes circa politias, sumendum universaliter prima principia et causas ipsorum. Sunt autem fere (ut est dicere) tres numero, quas determinandum secundum se typo primum: oportet enim accipere qualiter se habentem seditiones movent, et quorum gratia; et tertio quae principia fuerint civilium turbationum et seditionum ad invicem.

Polit.L2

585. Eius quidem igitur quod est ipsos se habere aliqualiter ad transmutationem, causam universaliter maxime ponendum de qua iam extitimus dicentes. Ii quidem enim aequalitatem appetentes, seditiones movent, si putant minus habere, aequales existentes superegredientibus, ii autem inaequalitatem et excessum, si existimant inaequales existentes non plus habere, sed aequale vel minus. Haec autem est quidem appetere iuste; est autem et iniuste: minores enim existentes: ut aequales sint, seditiones faciunt; et aequales existentes, ut maiores. Qualiter quidem igitur se habentes seditiones faciunt, dictum est.

Polit.L2

586. De quibus autem dissident, sunt lucrum et honor et contraria iis: etenim de honorationem fugientes et damnum, vel pro se ipsis, vel pro amicis seditiones faciunt in civitatibus.

Polit.L2

587. Causae autem et principia motuum, unde ipsi disponuntur dicto modo, et de dictis, sunt quidem et numero septem existentes, sunt autem ut plures. Quorum quidem duo sunt eadem dictis, sed non eodem modo. Propter lucrum enim et propter honorem exacerbantur ad invicem, ut non obtineant sibi ipsis, sicut dictum est prius; sed alios videntes, hos quidem iuste, hos autem iniuste plus habentes in his. Adhuc propter iniuriam, propter timorem, propter excessum, propter despectionem, propter excrescentiam praeter proportionem. Adhuc autem alio modo propter veracundiam, propter parvipensionem, propter parvitatem, propter dissimilitudinem.

Polit.L2

588. Horum autem iniuria quidem et lucrum quam habeant potentiam et qualiter causa, fere sunt manifestum. Iniuriantibus enim iis qui in principatibus et supergredientibus, seditiones movent et ad invicem, et ad politias dantes potestatem. Superacceptio autem fit quandoque quidem a propriis quandoque autem a communibus.

Polit.L2

589. Palam autem et honor, et qui potest, et quomodo causa seditionis. Etenim ipsi inhonorati, et alios videntes honoratos, seditiones faciunt. Haec autem iniuste quidem fiunt, quando praeter dignitatem, aut honorantur aliqui, aut inhonorantur. Iuste autem, quando secundum dignitatem.

Polit.L2

590. Propter excessum autem, quando aliquis potentia maior aut unus, aut plures, aut penes civitatem et potentiam politeumatis. Ex talibus enim fieri consuevit monarchia vel potentatus. Propter quod alicubi consueverunt relegare, velut in Argo et Athenis. Quamvis melius a principio, qualiter non viderunt tantum excedentes, quam postquam permiserunt fieri, sanare posterius.

Polit.L2

591. Propter timorem autem seditiones movent, et qui iniusta fecerunt, timentes ne dent vindictam, et qui iniusta passuri, volentes praevenire antequam iniusta patiantur; sicut in Rhodo convenerunt insignes contra populum propter sent quae superferebantur.

Polit.L2

592. Propter despectionem et seditiones movent et insurgunt, velut in oligarchiis, quando plures fuerint qui non participant politia; valentiores enim putant esse; et in democratiis opulenti contemnentes eos qui sine ordine et sine principatu; velut in Thebis post eam quae in Oenophytis pugnam male politizantibus democratia corrupta est et quae Megareorum propter victorum inordinationem et defectum principatus. Et in Syracusis ante tyrannidem Gelonis, et in Rhodo populus ante insurrectionem.

Polit.L2

593. Fiunt autem et propter excrescentiam quae praeter proportionem, transmutationes politiarum. Sicut enim corpus ex partibus componitur, et oportet augeri proportionaliter, ut maneat commensuratio: si autem non, corrumpitur, quando pes quidem quatuor cubitorum, aliud autem corpus duorum palmorum, aliquando autem utique et in alterius animalis formam transmutabitur, si non solum secundum quantitatem sed et secundum quale crescat praeter proportionem: sic et civitas componitur ex partibus, quarum saepe latet aliqua excrescens, velut egenorum multitudo in democratiis et politiis.

Polit.L2

594. Accidit autem aliquando hoc et propter fortunas, velut in Tarento victis et pereuntibus multis insignibus ab Iapygis paulo posterius a Medis, democratia facta est ex politia; et in Aro iis qui in septima pereuntibus a Cleomene Lacedaemone, compulsi admittere vernaculorum aliquos. Et in Athenis infortunatis in campo insignes pauciores facti sunt, quia militabat supputati sub Laconico bello. Accidit autem hoc et in democratiis, minus autem; pluribus enim egenis factis, vel substantiis augmentatis transmutantur in oligarchias et potentatus.

Polit.L2

595. Transmutantur autem et politiae, et sine seditione propter verecundiam, sicut in Herea. Ex eliigibilibus enim propter hoc fecerunt sortiales, quia eligebant verecundiam passos.

Polit.L2

596. Et propter parvipensionem, quando permittunt principatus intrare non amicos politiae, sicut Horeo dissoluta fuit oligarchia principum facto Heracleodoro, qui ex oligarchia politiam et democratiam instituit.

Polit.L2

597. Adhuc propter id quod penes parvum, dico autem penes parvum, quia saepe latet magna facta transgressio legitimorum quando negligunt quod parvum; sicut in Ambracia, parvum erat honorabilitas, tamdem autem nullius principabantur; tamquam propinquum sit vel nihil differens ab eo quod nihil id quod parvum.

Polit.L2

598. Seditionale autem, et quod non eiusdem tribus, donec utique simul spiraverunt. Sicut enim neque ex quacumque multitudine civitas fit, ita neque in quocumque tempore.

Polit.L2

599. Propter quod quicumque iam cohabitatores susceperint, vel supervenientes, plurimi seditione divisi sunt; velut cum Troezeniis Achaei cohabitaverunt Sybarim, deinde Achaici plures facti eiecerunt Troezeniis Achaei cohabitaverunt Sybarim, deinde Achaeici plures facti eiecerunt Troezenios. Unde odium accidit Sybaritis. Et in Thuriis Sybaritae iis, qui ibi cohabitaverunt: exigentes enim plus habere tamquam sua regione, exciderunt. Et Byzantinis advenae insidiantes depraedati exciderunt per pugnam. Et Antisaei, profugos de Chio proiicientes per pugnam eiecerunt. Zanclaei autem Samios suscipientes exciderunt ipsi. Et Apolloniatae qui in Euxino Ponto advenas superinducentes, seditiones passi sunt. Et Syracusani post tyrannica extraneos et merces portantes cives cum fecissent, seditiones passi sunt, et ad pugnam devenerunt. Et Amphipolitae suscipientes Chalcideorum expulsos, exciderunt ab iis plurimi ipsorum.

Polit.L2

600. Seditiones autem movent in oligarchiis quidem qui multi, tamquam iniusta sustinentes, quia non participant aequalibus, sicut dictum est prius, aequales existentes; in democratiis autem qui insignes quia participant aequalibus non aequales existentes.

Polit.L2

601. Seditiones autem sustinent aliquando civitates, et propter loca, quando non bene apte habet regio ad hoc quod sit una civitas, velut in Clazomeniis qui in Chytro ad eos qui in insula; et Colophonii et Notii. Et Athenis non similiter sunt, sed magis demotici sunt qui inhabitant suburbium quam qui municipium. Sicut enim in bellis penetrationes aperturarum etiam valde parvarum distrahunt acies, ita videtur omnis diversitatis facere dissidionem. Maximum quidem igitur forte dissidentia virtus et malitia. Deinde divitiae et paupertas: et sic utique altera magis qua altera: quarum una est, quae dicta est.

Polit.L2

Postquam philosophus posuit primam radicem et primum principium corruptionis rerumpublicarum, et modos quibus transmutantur, determinat causas universaliter huius corruptionis et transmutationis; et dividitur in duas. In prima determinat causas corruptionis rerumpublicarum in universali, non descendendo ad aliquam rempublicam. In secunda determinat causas corruptionis secundum unamquamque rempublicam, ibi, secundum unamquamque et cetera. Prima dividitur in tres. In prima determinat causas transmutationis rerumpublicarum. Secundo declarat terminum huius transmutationis, declarando quae respublica in quam transmutatur, ibi, sunt enim et cetera. In tertia declarat qualiter maxime fiat huiusmodi transmutatio, ibi, movetur quoque et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima praemittit intentum suum. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, eius quidem et cetera. In prima dicit: quoniam intentio nostra est considerare ex quibus fiunt seditiones et transmutationes rerumpublicarum, accipienda sunt primo in universali principia et causae transmutationis et corruptionis rerumpublicarum sunt autem tres causae et tria principia fere, ut est dicere, transmutationis ipsarum, de quibus considerare oportet succincte. Primo ergo oportet considerare qualiter homines se habentes movent seditiones et transmutant respublicas. Secundo propter quem finem hoc faciant. Tertio quae sint principia per quae disponuntur ad movendum dissensiones et seditiones in republica.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit eius quidem prosequitur; et dividitur in tres. In prima ostendit qualiter se habentes movent seditiones et turbationes. Secundo propter quem finem hoc faciunt, ibi, de quibus autem et cetera. Tertio quae sunt causae et principia, et quot, et per quae disponuntur ad faciendum seditiones, ibi, causae autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod causa eius quod est homines aliqualiter se habere ad faciendum seditionem et turbationem, est illa, de qua dictum est prius: quod aliqui homines, ex hoc quod appetunt aequale, si non credant se habere aequale sed minus, cum tamen sint aequales, vel existiment se aequales esse illis qui plus receperunt, movent seditionem. Alii autem volunt habere inaequale et plus, existimantes se inaequales aliis esse et excedere alios. Si autem existiment se habere non plus, sed aequale vel minus, movent seditionem. Qualiter igitur se habentes movent seditiones existimantes se minus habere quam credant se debere habere. Sed contingit ista, scilicet plus et aequale, appetere iuste et iniuste. Si enim dignus est habere aequale habens in se bonum virtutis et simpliciter aequale aliis, iuste potest appetere. Si autem non est dignus, iniuste appetit. Similiter potest aliquis appetere plus et inaequale, iuste et iniuste. Iuste, siquidem excellat alios in his, quae sunt bona simpliciter. Si autem non excellat, iniuste appetit: quia illi qui minus recipiunt, ut sint aliis aequales in recipiendo seditiones faciunt; et illi qui sunt aequales in accipiendo, ut plus accipiant, dissensiones faciunt. Hoc autem est iniustum. Et tunc concludit dicens, quod qualiter se habentes faciunt seditiones dictum est. Et est intelligendum, quod illa aequalitas attenditur secundum dignitatem eius quod est bonum hominis secundum quod homo. Bonum autem hominis duplex est. Quoddam enim est bonum hominis intrinsecum: et istud dividitur, quia quoddam bonum secundum partem inferiorem, sicut sanitas, robur. Aliud secundum partem superiorem, sicut scientia, virtus, et huiusmodi. Et ista sunt bona simpliciter. Alia sunt bona hominis exteriora, sicut divitiae et honor; ista vero sunt bona secundum quid. Et ideo dignitas hominis simpliciter non debet attendi secundum dignitatem istorum bonorum, sed secundum dignitatem bonorum simpliciter. Et ideo, quia in paucorum statu attenditur aequalitas secundum ista bona secundum quid, non consideratur iustum simpliciter, sed secundum quid; et ideo propter ista non movetur iuste seditio, si non recipiat plus qui excedit in istis. Sed ille qui non recipit aequale secundum dignitatem boni simpliciter, si sit bonus, iuste potest movere. In populari vero statu consideratur libertas; ut scilicet non serviat aliquis aliis secundum corpus, vel in rebus. Ista autem non est bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid; et ideo quia in ista republica attenditur aequalitas secundum libertatem istam per quam non consideratur iniustum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Qualiter igitur se habentes homines, idest qualiter dispositi movent seditiones, dictum est.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit de quibus autem declarat propter quem finem faciunt dissensionem. Et est intelligendum, quod quidam est finis secundum veritatem, sicut est bonum animae. Alius finis est secundum apparentiam, sicut est bonum corporis. Decet igitur hominem in operatione sua intendere finem simpliciter vel secundum apparentiam. Et bonum corporis est lucrum; bonum autem animae est honor. Dicit igitur, quod illa pro quibus, hoc est propter quae faciunt dissensionem, sunt duo: scilicet lucrum: ut sub lucro omnia bona secundum quid, sive corporis, contineantur. Aliud est honor, ut sub honore omnia bona simpliciter, quae sunt bona animae, comprehendantur. Faciunt similiter seditionem propter contraria istorum, ut propter damnum et inhonorationem. Propter damnum, quia eiusdem rationis est appetere lucrum et fugere damnum. Propter inhonorationem, quia eiusdem rationis est appetere honorem et fugere suum oppositum. Sed quia amicus est velut alter, ideo adiungit quod faciunt seditionem propter honorem proprium et damnum proprium vel amicorum suorum.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit causae autem declarat, quae sunt principia, per quae disponuntur ad faciendum dissensionem et seditionem: et dividitur in duas. Primo declarat causas per quas disponuntur ad seditionem. In secunda declarat qualiter inchoatae exinde de facili invalescunt, ibi, fiunt quidem igitur et cetera. Prima in duas. Primo enumerat causas illas. Secundo prosequitur, ibi, horum autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod principia et causae transmutationum rerumpublicarum per quas disponuntur ad faciendam seditionem, et de dictis, idest propter dicta, scilicet lucrum et honorem, sunt septem numero, uno modo: alio modo plures. Si enim enumerentur causae, quae disponunt ad occultam dissensionem, cuiusmodi est seditio (est enim seditio occulta dissensio), sic sunt septem numero. Si autem istae enumerentur, et illae quae disponunt ad manifestam dissensionem, sic sunt plures. Prima vero principia dispositiva ad seditionem sunt duo praedicta, honor et lucrum; sed non sicut dictum est prius. Honor enim et lucrum possunt considerari dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod intenduntur ab aliquo, et sic habent rationem finis: et sic dicebat prius, quod ea propter quae finaliter faciunt seditionem, sunt honor et lucrum et opposita istorum. Alio modo possunt considerari secundum quod aliquis videt ista in alio: et tunc, quia videt lucrum et honorem, et unum habere iuste, alium non, tristatur: non quia velint habere, sed quia iniuste de eis habet aliquis plus quam deberet. Sunt igitur duo principia per quae movent seditionem; scilicet honor et lucrum. Sunt alia etiam, scilicet iniuria, timor, excessus, contemptus, excellentia praeter proportionem. Propter ista disponuntur ad manifestam dissensionem: scilicet verecundiam, parvipensionem, pusillanimitatem, imparitatem, vel negligentiam. Propter enim ista movent seditiones.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit horum autem prosequitur de istis, declarans qualiter ista disponunt ad seditionem. Et primo prosequitur de illis quae disponunt indifferenter ad occultam et manifestam dissensionem. Secundo de illis quae disponunt ad manifestam principaliter, ibi, transmutantur autem et cetera. Prima in duas. Primo declarat qualiter iniuria et lucrum disponunt ad seditionem. Secundo declarat de aliis, ibi, palam autem et honor et cetera. In prima dicit: quam potentiam habeant, et qualiter sunt causa seditionis honor et lucrum, fere manifestum est. Contingit enim principantes iniuriari civibus, et excellere eosdem honoribus vel lucro: propter quod cives movent seditionem et contra principem, et contra rempublicam. Contra principem, quia iniuriam fecit et excellit iniuste. Contra rempublicam, quia per rempublicam potestatem habet. Et quod sic dominativa moveant seditionem, manifestum est; quia cum princeps accipit bona subditorum, voluntatem habet ad accipiendum. Alii habent contrarias voluntates, ergo dissident voluntate: sed dissensio voluntatum radix est seditionis. Propter iniuriam igitur et lucra movent seditiones. Et dicit ulterius, quod principes possunt plus accipere quam oportet, vel de bonis communibus, vel de bonis propriis subditorum; et utroque modo faciunt iniuriam subditis. Et est intelligendum, quod lucrum et iniuria, quandoque idem sunt subiecto et differunt ratione: nam illud idem quod est lucrum respectu unius qui plus accepit, iniuria est respectu alterius, scilicet a quo accepit.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit palam autem declarat de aliis: et dividitur in quinque. Primo declarat de honore qualiter disponit ad seditionem. Secundo de excessu, ibi, propter excessum autem et cetera. Tertio de timore, ibi, propter timorem autem et cetera. Quarto de contemptu, ibi, propter despectionem enim ad seditiones et cetera. Quinto de excrescentia praeter proportionem, ibi, fiunt autem et propter excrescentiam et cetera. In prima dicit quod manifestum est quam potentiam habeat, et qualiter est causa seditionis honor. Cum enim aliqui non honorantur videntes alios honoratos, faciunt seditiones; tunc enim dissident voluntates. Hoc autem est radix seditionis. Potest autem honorari aliquis et iuste et iniuste, et appetere honorem similiter iuste et iniuste. Si enim aliqui honorentur praeter dignitatem vel inhonorentur, iniustum est: et si appetit honorem praeter dignitatem, iniuste appetit: si autem hoc fiat secundum dignitatem, iustum est.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit propter excessum declarat, qualiter propter excessum faciunt seditionem. Et dicit, quod aliquando propter excessum faciunt seditionem: quando enim aliquis maior est in potentia, sive unus, sive plures potentiam habeant in civitate vel in republica, faciunt seditionem. Ex talibus enim contingit quandoque fieri monarchiam: quod patet, quia unusquisque inclinatur ad sui excellentiam. Cum ergo est aliquis talis, qui excellit alios in potentia, vel in amicis vel divitiis, conatur rempublicam mutare in monarchiam; aut si non fiat monarchia, fit quandoque potentatus, in quo dominantur divites valde et potentes, non secundum legem, sed secundum suas voluntates. Et propter hoc in quibusdam civitatibus relegabant tales excellentes, sicut fiebat in Argis et Athenis. Et tamen melius fuisset a principio ordinasse, quod nullus esset in civitate qui tantum excederet, et usque ad quem terminum posset excedere, quam postquam dimiserunt, relegare: sicut in medicinalibus, melius est a principio praevidere, ne morbus aliquis excrescat, quam postquam excesserit vel excreverit, ipsum expellere et curare.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit propter timorem declarat qualiter propter timorem fit seditio in civitate. Et dicit, quod propter timorem faciunt seditiones. Quando enim aliqui fecerunt iniurias timentes quod puniantur et vindicta fiat de eis, movent seditionem, ut per seditionem motam possint evadere, ut non puniantur. Similiter si aliqui sint passuri iniusta, vel timeant se passuros propter aliquam causam, antequam patiantur volentes praevenire, movent seditionem et turbant rempublicam, antequam sustineant iniurias; sicut contigit fieri in Rhodo insula. Divites enim convenerunt contra populum, timentes sententias, quae debebant dari contra eos, et turbaverunt rempublicam.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit propter despectionem declarat, qualiter propter contemptum disponuntur ad seditionem: et dicit, quod propter contemptum faciunt seditionem et insurgunt. Manifestum est enim, quod quilibet vult aliquid reputari: et ideo si contemnatur movet seditionem, sicut fit in paucorum et populari potentia. Quia in paucorum, in qua plures sunt, qui non participant principatu, illi qui sunt divites et tenent principatum contemnunt alios qui non principantur, et ideo incitant alios ad dissensiones; propter quod faciunt seditiones contra divites et permutant rempublicam. Similiter est in populari statu, illi qui sunt ditiores contemnunt minores qui sunt vel videntur esse sine ratione et ordine, sicut indignos principatu, propter quod ipsi incitantur ad dissolvendum; sicut accidit in Thebis post praelium quod habuerunt in Oenophytis, cum dominaretur populus, excessit et male gubernabat, fecerunt divites seditionem et mutaverunt popularem illum statum. Similiter in civitate Megarensium cum exissent ad praelium, contigit, quod populus principabatur inordinate; et ideo fecerunt divites seditionem. Similiter accidit in Syracusis antequam tyrannizaret Gelo, et in Rhodo insula populus dominabatur antequam insurgerent divites, et quia divites contemnebant eos, insurrexerunt et fecerunt seditionem, et mutaverunt rempublicam.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit fiunt autem declarat qualiter propter excrescentiam praeter proportionem faciunt seditionem; et dividitur in duas partes. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda declarat, quod haec excrescentia sit a fortuna quandoque, ibi, accidit autem aliquando et cetera. In prima dicit, quod propter excrescentiam quae praeter proportionem fit, fiunt quandoque seditiones et corruptiones rerumpublicarum, ut si divites superexcrescant, vel virtuosi, vel pauperes, contingit fieri transmutationem ipsarum. Et hoc apparet: quia sicut corpus componitur ex partibus pluribus, sic civitas composita ex partibus. Nunc ita est, quod oportet corpus animalis compositum augeri secundum proportionem, ut maneat recta proportio membrorum et commensuratio. Si autem non augeantur partes proportionaliter, corrumpitur animal. Si enim pes tantum augeatur quod sit quatuor cubitorum, et residuum sit duorum palmorum, corrumpitur proportio debita. Si autem animal crescat improportionabiliter et secundum quantitatem et secundum virtutem vel qualitatem, transmutabitur in formam alterius animalis. Similiter accidit in civitate: componitur enim ex partibus; et ideo si debeat salvari, oportet eam componi ex partibus commensuratis adinvicem. Aliquando autem excedit multitudo, sicut in populari statu et in republica; et tunc corrumpitur paucorum status et fit popularis vel respublica. Aliquando est excrescentia non secundum quantitatem, sed secundum qualitatem, sicut quando sunt aliqui divites valde excellentes in potentia; et tunc corrumpitur popularis status et fit paucorum.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit accidit autem declarat, quod haec excrescentia fit aliquando a fortuna; et dicit, quod huiusmodi excrescentia accidit quandoque a fortuna, sicut in Tarento. Cum enim illi exissent ad praelium et multi nobiles et divites fuissent interfecti ab Iapygensibus, facta est ex populari statu paucorum potentia, et sic a fortuna propter intentionem excrevit populus et mutavit rempublicam. Idem etiam accidit Argivis: cum enim fuissent interfecti illi qui erant in civitate Eudoma a Cleomene Spartiata, compulsi sunt propter paucitatem inhabitantium in civitatem recipere aliquos inquilinos ad rempublicam suam; qui postmodum excreverunt et facta fuit respublica popularis. Similiter accidit Athenis, cum divites fuissent infortunati et occubuissent multi in praelio, pauci fuerunt divites, quia mortui fuerunt. Similiter accidit in popularibus, sed minus quam in gubernatione paucorum. Cum enim sint plures egeni, contingit, quod plures ditentur; et tunc augmentatis divitiis transmutant popularem statum in paucorum gubernationem, et potentatus in quibus plures divites principantur non secundum legem.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit transmutantur autem declarat quae sunt causae transmutationis reipublicae sine seditione occulta. Et dividitur in partes quatuor. In prima declarat qualiter propter verecundiam fit seditio et transmutatio reipublicae. Secundo qualiter propter parvipensionem, ibi, et propter parvipensionem et cetera. Tertio qualiter propter contemptum eius quod est parvum, ibi, adhuc propter et cetera. Quarto, qualiter propter dissensionem, ibi, seditionale autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod respublicae aliquando transmutantur sine seditione, hoc est sine occulta dissensione; et hoc propter verecundiam, sicut accidit in Herea civitate. Contigit enim in illa civitate quod aliqui qui commiserant aliqua turpia, unde passi fuerant verecundiam, eligebantur ad principatum ab aliquibus. Alii vero nolentes sustinere quod isti infames principarentur, seditionem fecerunt et instituerunt quod principatus qui prius fiebant per sortem fierent per electionem: et sic propter verecundiam, quam aliqui passi fuerant, fuit facta seditio et transmutatio reipublicae.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit et propter. Ostendit quomodo propter parvipensionem fit seditio et transmutatio reipublicae. Et dicit, quod propter parvipensionem, quandoque fit mutatio reipublicae et seditio, ut quando assumitur aliquis ad principatum principalem, qui non diligit ipsum, sed parvipendit. Tunc enim accidit, quod iste qui parvipendit principatum mutat rempublicam. Sicut in Horeo civitate contingit quod elegerunt Heracleodorum in principem. Iste autem non diligebat rempublicam eorum; et ideo mutavit statum paucorum qui erat in illa civitate, et instituit rempublicam et popularem statum.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit adhuc propter declarat, quod propter contemptum eius quod est penes pusillitatem mutatur respublica. Et exponit quid vocat pusillitatem; et dicit, quod penes pusillitatem est quando aliqua parva transgressio negligitur, similiter et alia. Contingit enim ex omnibus istis fieri magnam transgressionem quae a principio non erat manifesta; et propter talem magnam transgressionem quae ex multis parvis neglectis causata est, contingit mutari rempublicam, sicut dicit accidisse apud Ambraciotas. Apud eos enim una honorabilitas parum reputabatur, et multae parvae negligebantur quasi parum vel nihil differrent, aut essent propinqua; et ideo accidit tandem in illa civitate quod nulli principabantur secundum honorabilitatem aliquam; et tunc paucorum status, in quo principabantur insignes et honorabiles, mutatus est in statum popularem.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit seditionale autem declarat qualiter propter dissimilitudinem mutatur respublica. Et dividitur in tres. In prima ostendit qualiter propter dissimilitudinem disponuntur ad seditionem. Secundo accidentaliter declarat qui movent seditiones in populari statu et paucorum maxime ex dicta causa, ibi, seditionem autem movent et cetera. Tertio ponit causam accidentalem magis seditionis, ibi, seditiones autem sustinent et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima ponit qualiter disponuntur ad seditionem, per similitudinem. Secundo manifestat per exempla, ibi, propter quod et cetera. In prima dicit, quod alia causa seditionis est dissimilitudo: cum enim inhabitaverint civitatem illi qui non habent eosdem mores nec consuetudines, movent seditiones, nisi multo tempore conspiraverint vel vixerint simul. Primo apparet; quia illi qui habent diversos mores inclinantur ad diversos fines. Ex hoc autem sequitur divisio voluntatis: hoc autem est causa dissensionis: quare manifestum est, quod dissimilitudo causa est seditionis. Secundum apparet, quia si illi qui habent diversos mores simul vixerint, contingit quod unus trahit alium et in fine habent eosdem mores et inclinantur ad eumdem finem, et tunc non mutant rempublicam. Est igitur manifestum quod donec simul vixerint multo tempore, movebunt seditiones illi qui habent diversos mores. Sicut enim civitas non fit ex quibuscumque, sed ex similibus, ita non fit in quocumque tempore, sed quando vixerint cives simul et iam inclinantur ad eosdem mores.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit propter quod manifestat quod dictum est per septem exempla; et dicit, quod quia dissimilitudo causa est seditionis, accidit, quod illae civitates quae extraneos indifferenter receperunt, plures passae sunt seditiones et divisiones; sicut accidit in quadam civitate quam vocant Sybarim. In illa enim civitate habitabant Troezenii: isti vero receperunt Achaeos: cum autem essent augmentati eiecerunt Troezenios, et ex hoc tunc fuit odium inter Sybaritas qui eiecti fuerant et Thurios qui eos receperant: cum enim plus exigerent eo quod regio esset sua, eiecti fuerunt a Sybaritis. Ponit secundum exemplum; et dicit, quod similiter accidit Byzantiis. Cum enim isti recepissent extraneos, isti insidiati sunt Byzantiis et depraedaverunt eos: qui Byzantii, re cognita, eos praelio et armis expulerunt. Ponit tertium exemplum; et dicit, quod similiter accidit in alia civitate quod Antissaei profugos et extraneos ex Chio receperunt in sua civitate, et tandem facta fuit seditio inter ipsos et eiecti sunt extranei. Tunc ponit quartum exemplum; et dicit, quod Zanclaei receperunt Samios in civitate, et postmodum facta seditione inter ipsos, ipsi expulsi fuerunt a civitate. Tunc ponit quintum exemplum; et dicit, quod Apolloniatae civitatem inhabitantes iuxta pontum, cum recepissent extraneos, passi sunt seditionem. Tunc ponit sextum exemplum; et dicit, quod Syracusani cum expulissent tyrannos a civitate, receperunt extraneos, et eos qui portant merces, et fecerunt eos cives, seditio facta fuit eis et venerunt ad pugnam. Tunc ponit ultimum exemplum; et dicit, quod Amphipolitae cum recepissent Chalcidensium colonos, seditione facta inter eos plurimi Amphipolitarum mortui sunt, et expulsi ab aliis. Ex omnibus istis non plus vult habere, nisi quod dissimilitudo causa est seditionis et destructionis reipublicae.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit seditiones autem declarat, qui movent seditiones in populari statu et paucorum ex dicta causa. Et dicit quod in paucorum potentia facit seditiones populus. Populus enim credit se debere recipere aequale, quia omnes sunt aequales in libertate. Divites autem totum habent vel plus: et ideo populus existimans se iniusta sustinere, movet seditiones. In statu autem populari seditiones movent divites, quia in statu populari recipiunt aequale. Existimant autem plus se debere recipere, cum sint excellentiores, et ideo movent seditiones contra populum.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit seditiones autem tangit causam seditionis accidentalem magis. Et dicit quod in aliquibus civitatibus fiunt seditiones propter dispositionem loci. Contingit enim quod regio non est bene disposita, ad hoc quod civitas sit una, sed magis et alia. Unitas autem ordinis in finem facit civitatem unam; et ideo illud quod disponit ad hoc requiritur ad unitatem civitatis. Facit autem ad hoc bona dispositio loci. Si igitur locus non est bene dispositus, ad hoc quod sit civitas una, fit seditio, sicut accidit Clazomeniis. Illi enim qui inhabitabant in Chytro, quae est una pars civitatis, erant contra illos qui habitabant in insula, scilicet in alia parte civitatis; et volebant facere diversas respublicas, et civitatem principalem in sua parte. Similiter Colophonii, et Notii ad invicem passi sunt seditiones propter malam dispositionem loci. Similiter Athenis non sunt bene dispositi ad unam rempublicam; quia illi qui sunt in suburbio, videlicet in Pyraeo extra muros civitatis populares sunt magis quam illi, qui habitant in urbe, quae est locus magis munitus ubi sunt fortilitia. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod diversitas facit ad divisionem et seditionem in civitate. Sicut enim in bello parvus fossarum transitus, et quaecumque modica apertura distrahit exercitum vel aciem, et ordinem eius interrumpit, ita omnis diversitas et dissimilitudo in civitate facit seditiones. Sed considerandum est, quod dissimilitudo quae maxime causat seditionem, est dissimilitudo virtutis et malitiae, quia inclinant statim in diversos fines. Post haec autem divitiae et paupertas; et sic ulterius alia dissimilitudo secundum alia aliqua, quae potest attendi inter multa. Sed haec est differentia, quod quaedam magis, quaedam minus faciunt seditiones. Sub ipso vero membro continetur causa, quae iam dicta est.

Polit.L2

L. 3 (Ε.4, 1303b17–1304b18)Ex quibus partibus hoc est personis respubicae constent: et quae partes necessariae sint, quaeve adiunctae: quaeque sibi cohaerere possint, et quae non.

Ex quibus partibus hoc est personis respubicae constent: et quae partes necessariae sint, quaeve adiunctae: quaeque sibi cohaerere possint, et quae non.

Polit.L3

602. Fiunt quidem igitur seditiones non de parvis, sed ex parvis; seditiones autem faciunt de magnis. Maxime autem et parvae invalescunt, quando inter dominos fiunt, velut accidit in Syracusis in antiquis temporibus: transmutata enim fuit politia ex duobus iuvenibus dissidentibus in principatibus qui erant circa amorosam causam: altero enim absente, leno quidam existens amicum ipsius finxit. Rursum autem ille huic indignatus est uxorem ipsius persuasit tamquam ipsum venire. Unde coassumentes eos qui in politeumate, diviserunt omnes.

Polit.L3

603. Propter quod quidem subditos vereri oportet talia, et dissolvere praesidium et potentum dissensiones in principio enim fit peccatum, principium autem dicitur esse dimidium totius. Quare et quod in principio parvum peccatum, proportionale est ad ea quae in aliis partibus.

Polit.L3

604. Totaliter autem insignium dissensiones coassumere faciunt et totam civitatem.

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605. Velut in Hestiaea accidit post Medica, duobus fratribus de paterna haereditate dissidentibus, pauperior quidem enim tamquam non proferente alio substantiam neque thesaurum, quem invenit pater, adduxit populares. Alius autem habens substantiam multam, opulentos.

Polit.L3

606. Et in Delphis, differentia quae facta est ex cura, fuit principium omnium seditionum posteriorum. Hic quidem enim auguratus quoddam symptoma, ut venit ad sponsam, non accipiens, abscessit: hi autem tamquam iniuriam passi iniecerunt sacrarum rerum sacrificatorem, et deinde tamquam sacrorum violatorem interfecerunt.

Polit.L3

607. Circa Mytilenem autem ex haereditatibus dissensione facta, multorum fuit principium malorum, et belli quod adversus Athenienses, in quo Pachus cepit civitatem ipsorum. Tymophane enim egenorum quodam relinquente duas filias, Doxander coartatus, et non accipiens, filiis suis incoepit seditionem, et Athenienses exacerbavit advena existens civitatis.

Polit.L3

608. Et Phoceis ex haereditatione facta seditione circa Mnaseam patrem Mnesonis et circa Euthycratem Onomarchi, seditio haec principium fuit sacri belli Phoceis.

Polit.L3

609. Fuit autem transmutata et in Epidamno politia ex nuptialibus. Cum desponsasset enim quidam filiam, et laesisset ipsum, desponsati pater factus principantium, alter comprehendit eos qui extra politiam, tamquam delusus.

Polit.L3

610. Transmutantur autem et in oligarchiam, et in demum, et in politiam, ex eo quod est approbari aliquid vel augeri, vel principatum, vel partem civitatis.

Polit.L3

611. Velut in Ariopago consilium bene complacens in Medicis videbatur fortiorem facere politiam.

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612. Et rursus navalis turba facta causa victoriae circa Salaminam, et per hanc praesulatus propter eam quae in mari potentiam, democratiam fortiorem fecit.

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613. Et in Argo insignes acceptati circa eam quae in Mantinea pugnam ad Lacedaemonios, conati sunt dissolvere demum.

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614. Et in Syracusis populum cum esset causa victoriae belli, quod ad Athenienses, ex politia in democratiam transmutatio facta est.

Polit.L3

615. Et in Chalcide populus cum insignibus Foxum tyrannum perimens, statim habebat politiam.

Polit.L3

616. Et in Ambracia rursum similiter, populus coniciens Periandrum tyrannum iis infesti erant, in se ipso constituit politiam.

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617. Et universaliter etiam oportet hoc non latere, quod qui potentiae causa facti, et idiotae et principatus et tribus, et totaliter pars, et qualiscumque multitudo seditionem movent. Aut enim qui iis honoratis invident inchoant seditionem, aut isti propter excessum non volunt manere in aequalibus.

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618. Moventur autem politiae, et quando quae videntur esse contrariae partes civitatis aequantur invicem, velut divites et populus, medium autem sit nullum, aut valde parvum: si enim multum excedat alterutra partium ad manifeste valentius, reliqua non vult periclitari: propter quod, et qui secundum virtutem differunt, non faciunt seditionem, ut est dicere, pauci enim fiunt ad multos. Universaliter quidem igitur circa omnes politias principia et causae seditionum et transmutationum hunc modum habent.

Polit.L3

619. Movent politias quandoque quidem per violentiam, quandoque autem per fallaciam. Per violentiam quidem aut mox a principio, aut posterius cogentes. Etenim fallacia duplex. Qui quidem enim sum acceperint primo voluntariorum transmutant politiam. Deinde posterius violentia detinent involuntariorum: velut in trecentis qui populum deceperunt dicentes regem daturum pecunias ad bellum adversum Lacedaemonios, et cum mentiti fuisset, conabantur retinere politiam. Aliquando autem a principio cum persuaserint, et posterius iterum persuasis ipsis voluntariis principantur. Similiter quidem igitur circa omnes politias ex dictis accidit fieri transmutationes.

Polit.L3

Postquam philosophus declaravit qualiter se habentes faciunt seditiones, et quae sunt disponentia, declarat qualiter seditiones inchoatae a parvis invalescunt multum. Et dividitur in duas secundum quod tangit duas causas huius. Secunda, ibi, totaliter autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima tangit causam illam. In secunda dat remedium contra illam, ibi, propter quod et cetera. In prima dicit, quod seditiones non fiunt de parvis, sed de magnis; fiunt autem ex parvis, quia incipiunt ex parvis. Parvae autem seditiones et dissensiones invalescunt citius, quando fiunt inter dominos habentes potestatem in civitate, sicut accidit antiquitus in civitate Syracusanorum. Contigit enim, quod respublica illorum fuit mutata propter dissensionem duorum iuvenum, qui principantes dissiderunt propter amoris causam. Accidit enim, cum unus esset extra civitatem, quod alter puerum quem amabat sibi conciliavit. Cum autem alter venisset, indignatus est, et studuit habere uxorem alterius. Cum autem ille istud sciret, mota est dissensio inter illos, et coassociantes sibi cives, diviserunt omnes in duas partes. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod parva dissensio multum invalescit, quando fit inter divites habentes potestatem in civitate.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit propter quod tangit remedium contra hoc. Et dicit, quod propter hoc quod parva dissensio inter dominos multum invalescit, oportet quod subditi talia timeant multum, et quod dissensiones inter divites dissolvant et trahant ad concordiam, quia dissensio quae accidit inter maiores et principantes est peccatum in principio. Principium autem est dimidium totius; quia principium continet se et principatum virtute; et ideo resistendum est peccato in principio. Nam peccatum in principio proportionaliter se habet ad ea peccata, quae fiunt in partibus principalibus animalium. Videmus autem quod modica facta diversitate in parte principali in animali, scilicet in corde, magna fit diversitas in aliis partibus. Similiter modica existente diversitate in semine, fit magna diversitas in eo quod fit ex semine; quia ex modica differentia calidi et frigidi causatur differentia maris et feminae. Similiter facta modica transpositione in gubernaculo navis, tota navis transmutatur. Quare sic erat in republica quod parvum peccatum in principio et parva dissensio multum invalescit.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit totaliter autem tangit secundam causam; et declarat, quod dissensiones insignium multum invalescunt. Et primo proponit. Secundo manifestat per exempla, ibi, velut in Hestiaea et cetera. In prima dicit, quod non solum dissensiones principantium multum et cito invalescunt, immo universaliter dissensiones divitum; ex quo enim divites sunt, potentiam habent. Et manifestum est, quod indignantur si non fiat eis secundum quod existimant se excellere alios, et faciunt dissensiones et totam civitatem ponunt in dissensione.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit velut in declarat per exempla. Et dividitur in quinque, secundum quod declarat per quinque exempla. Secunda ibi, et in Delphis et cetera. Tertia ibi, circa Mytilenem autem et cetera. Quarta ibi, et Phoceis et cetera. Quinta ibi, fuit autem transmutata et cetera. In prima dicit; ita dictum est, quod dissensiones divitum multum invalescunt: sicut accidit in Hestiaea civitate. Contigit enim quod duo fratres dissiderent de paterna haereditate, cum unus non haberet de divitiis et de thesauro, quem acquisivit pater, coassumpsit sibi populares, alius divites. Et fuit divisa civitas in duas partes, et facta fuit magna dissensio.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et in Delphis ponit secundum exemplum: et dicit: similiter accidit in Delphis, quod quidam habuit quamdam puellam in cura sua, quae cura fuit principium omnium dissensionum, quae postmodum contigerunt. Unus enim desponsavit illam, postmodum consuluit quemdam sacerdotem augurem, utrum expediret ei accipere eam in uxorem: qui consuluit quod non acciperet: tunc iste timens propter dictum auguris, scilicet infortunium aliquod, cum veniret ad sponsam, non accepit, sed recessit. Amici vero videntes hoc, sicut illi quibus facta fuerat iniuria, eo sacrificante, sacrum aliquid clam iniecerunt. Deinde accusaverunt eum quod male sacra tractasset: unde tamquam sacrilegum capite damnari fecerunt.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit circa Mytilenem ponit tertium exemplum: et dicit, quod circa Mytilenem civitatem facta fuit dissensio inter aliquos propter divisionem haereditatum, quae fuit principium multorum malorum quae postmodum contigerunt. Et fuit principium belli quod fuit inter ipsos et Athenienses, in quo praelio quidam dux, nomine Pachetes, accepit civitatem ipsorum Atheniensium. Accidit enim, quod Timophanes opulentus vita functus, reliquit duas filias superstites. Quidam autem Doxandrus eas dari concupivit filiis suis in uxores: quod cum assequi non potuisset, persuasit Atheniensibus, apud quos hospes publice erat, ut bellum susciperent contra Mytilenas.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et Phoceis ponit quartum exemplum: et dicit, quod apud Phocenses quidam fuerunt exhaereditati, ex quo facta fuit seditio inter Mnaseam patrem Mnesonis, et Euthycratem patrem Onomarchi. Haec autem dissensio fuit principium belli Phocensibus, illius inquam belli, quod sacrum appellaverunt.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit fuit autem ponit quintum exemplum: et dicit, quod in Epidamno civitate transmutata fuit respublica propter dissensionem, quae fuit facta propter nuptias quasdam. Cum enim quidam desponsasset quamdam, quidam fecerunt sibi iniuriam, et facta fuit dissensio. Postmodum contingit, quod pater desponsati factus fuit unus de principibus, et tunc accepit alios qui erant extra rempublicam et infensi statui, et coniungens eos sibi, transmutavit rempublicam.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit transmutatur autem cum declaravit, quod respublicae transmutentur, declarat in quid transmutantur. Et primo proponit. Secundo manifestat, ibi, ut apud et cetera. In prima dicit, quod respublicae transmutantur in paucorum statum et popularem ex eo quod aliquod collegium vel aliqua pars civitatis famam vel augmentum maiorem in modum consecuta est. Ob hanc enim causam contingit quod si regebat quod intendatur magis et fortior fiat eius status, et sic mutatur a debiliori ad fortiorem. Si vero non regebat, contingit, quod iusta fama et potentia regere incipiat, et ab una republica ad aliam fit transmutatio.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit velut in Ariopago manifestat per exempla; et ponit sex, in quibus declaratur qualiter respublica mutata est in rempublicam aliam, vel in eamdem magis vel minus intensam; et dicit, quod bene dictum est quod sit mutatio reipublicae in rempublicam, sicut accidit Athenis. Cum enim consilium Atheniensium quod erat in Ariopago quae est pars excellentior civitatis illius, tempore belli Persarum, famam consecutum fuisset, formam reipublicae auxit et fuit facta respublica eorum fortior.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et rursus ponit secundum exemplum; dicens quod multitudo navalis Athenis cum fuisset causa cuiusdam victoriae circa Salaminam fortiter pugnando, et fuisset causa salvationis principatus et ob eam victoriam acquisivisset potentiam maris civitati, fecit statum populi magis fortem.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et in Argo ponit tertium exemplum, in quo declaratur quod respublica mutatur in rempublicam: et dicit, quod in Argo contigit quod insignes et potentes cum eligerentur ad praelium contra Lacedaemonios, commisso praelio apud Mantineam urbem, magnam famam consecuti sunt, et ob hanc causam conati fuerunt destruere popularem statum et convertere in paucorum potentiam, et sic respublica mutabatur in aliam rempublicam.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et in Syracusis ponit quartum exemplum in quo idem probatur; et dicit, quod in civitate Syracusanorum cum factum fuisset praelium inter eos et Athenienses et obtinuissent, cuius victoriae causa populus fuit, rempublicam mutavit in statum popularem.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et in Chalcide ponit quintum exemplum; et dicit, quod cum in Chalcide civitate populus una cum divitibus quemdam tyrannum interfecisset, statim adhaesit reipublicae dimittens priorem rempublicam.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et in Ambracia ponit sextum exemplum; et dicit, quod in Ambracia cum populus eiecisset Periandrum qui tyrannizabat apud eos simul cum aliis divitibus qui contrarii erant ipsi in populo, instituit rempublicam sibi convenientem, scilicet statum popularem, dimittens priorem.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit et universaliter concludit unam regulam universalem; dicens quod universaliter hoc debet esse manifestum et non debet latere, quod quicumque propter potentiam aliquid praeclarum fecerunt, sive sint idiotae, sive principes, sive sint tribus aliquae, sive tota una pars, sive qualiscumque multitudo, movet seditionem. Aut enim qui invident eis qui honorantur in civitate movent et faciunt seditionem; aut illi qui excellunt et magnum aliquid fecerunt, propter potentiam, nolunt manere cum aequalibus et eis conformari. Ex hoc enim quod magnum fecerunt, inclinantur ad magna, quibus reputant se dignos. Ideo nolunt remanere cum aequalibus. Unde si potentiam habeant, seditionem faciunt.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit moventur autem declarat quando maxime moventur respublicae; et dicit, quod tunc maxime transmutantur respublicae quando duae partes quae videntur esse contrariae, sicut divites et populus, aequantur in potentia vel fere, medii autem nulli sunt, aut valde pauci: quia tunc quaelibet pars reputat se fortiorem alia et nititur repellere aliam. Et si contingit unam partem superare aliam, instituit rempublicam quae sibi videtur. Si autem una pars, quaecumque sit illa, excedat aliam in multo, manifeste illa pars quae exceditur, nolens perire, subiicitur parti quae valentior est, nec movet seditionem contra illam. Et propter hoc manifestum est, quod illi qui excedunt alios in virtute, non movent seditionem, quia pauci sunt respectu multitudinis. Et tunc concludit, quod universaliter principia et causae seditionum rerumpublicarum secundum hunc modum fiunt.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit movent autem declarat, quomodo et qualiter dissidentes movent respublicas; et dicit, quod quandoque movent respublicas et transmutant per violentiam, quandoque per fallaciam et astutiam. Per violentiam dupliciter. Uno modo in principio, scilicet inferendo violentiam quod rempublicam quam instituunt teneant. Alio modo cogendo posterius non in principio: quandoque enim in principio suadent per astutiam talem vel talem rempublicam, et decipientes cives transmutant rempublicam illis nolentibus. Et item in fine si nolunt resilire, faciunt eis violentiam et cogunt eos tenere rempublicam iam institutam, sicut accidit in quadringentis qui deceperunt populum dicentes ei quod rex daret pecuniam ad praeliandum contra Lacedaemonios, et populus hoc audito noluit, et instituit rempublicam quam isti instituerunt. Postmodum videns quod mentiti fuerunt, volens contradicere illi, conati fuerunt tenere eamdem et observare facientes violentiam populo. Aliquando autem contingit, quod in principio suadent et recipiunt rempublicam, et postmodum quod eam observant et suadent, illis persuasis principantur illis volentibus. Et tunc recapitulat quod simpliciter, hoc est universaliter, secundum dicta contingit fieri mutationes omnium rerumpublicarum.

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L. 4 (Ε.5, 1304b19–1305a36)Quomodo status popularis labatur ad tyrannidem, et cur minus nunc quam prius.

Quomodo status popularis labatur ad tyrannidem, et cur minus nunc quam prius.

Polit.L4

620. Secundum unamquamque autem speciem politiae ex iis partientes, accidentia considerare oportet.

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621. Democratiae quidem igitur maxime transmutantur propter demagogorum impudentiam: ii quidem enim seorsum calumniantes habentes substantias, coadunant ipsos: congregat enim et separatissimos communis timor. Hi autem communiter multitudinem inducentes.

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622. Et hoc in multis videbit utique aliquis factum. Etenim in Coo democratia transmutata fuit demagogis factis malis. Insignes enim coadunati sunt.

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623. Et in Rhodo demagogi tractantes stipendia, acquisierunt, et prohibebant reddere quae debebantur trierarchis. Ii autem propter illatas iniurias coacti sunt coadunati dissolvere demum.

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624. Dissolutus est autem et in Heraclea demus post migrationem mox, propter demagogos. Insignes enim iniuste pasi ad ipsis secesserunt. Deinde coadunati qui secesserant, et supervenientes, dissolverunt demum.

Polit.L4

625. Consimiliter autem et in Megaris dissoluta est democratia. Demagogi enim ut pecunias haberent de populari, eiecerunt multos insignium, donec multos facerent fugientes. Ii autem descendentes oppugnantes populum vicerunt, et instituerunt oligarchiam.

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626. Evenit autem idem et circa Cumam in domocratia quam dissolvit Thrasimachus.

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627. Fere autem et in aliis videbit utique aliquis considerans transmutationes hoc modo se habentes. Quandoque quidem enim, ut dona habeant, iniusta facientes, insignes coadunant, vel substantias aeque partiales facientes, vel redditus sacrificiis. Quandoque autem criminantes, ut habeant de populari possessiones divitum.

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628. In antiquis autem quando erat idem demagogus, erat et dux exercitus, in tyrannidem fiebat transmutatio: fere enim plurimi antiquorum tyrannorum ex demagogis facti sunt.

Polit.L4

629. Causa autem quare tunc quidem fiebat, nunc autem non, quia quidem demagogi erant ex militantibus. Nondum enim erant diserti loqui. Nunc autem, rhetorica augmentata, qui possunt loqui fiunt demagogi; propter inexperientiam autem bellicorum non superponuntur, nisi alicubi aliquid breve fiat tale.

Polit.L4

630. Fiebant autem tyrannides prius magis quam nunc, et quia magni principatus committebantur aliquibus, sicut in Mileto ex Prytanea; multorum enim et magnorum erat dominus prytanus.

Polit.L4

631. Adhuc autem, quia non magnae erant tunc civitates, sed in agris habitabat populus, occupatus existentes operibus, optimates populi, quando bellicosi erant, tyrannide praeficiebantur. Omnes autem hoc faciebant crediti a vulgo. Persuasio autem erat inimicitia ad divites; velut Athenis Pisistratus seditionem movit adversus Pediacos, et Theagenes in Megaris divitum pecora occidens, capiens iuxta fluvium pascentes; et Dionysius accusans Daphnaeum et divites dignificatus est tyrannide propter inimicitiam creditus tamquam popularis existens.

Polit.L4

632. Transmutantur autem et ex prima democratia in maxime novam: ubi enim eligibiles quidem principatus, non autem ab honorabilitatibus, eligit autem populus, demagogi qui student principari, ad hoc insistunt, ut populus, sit dominus legum.

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633. Remedium autem, ut non fiat vel ut minus fiat, tribus ferre principes, sed non omnem populum. Democratiarum quidem igitur transmutationes omnes fere fiunt propter has causas.

Polit.L4

Postquam philosophus declaravit causas et principia seditionis et transmutationis rerumpublicarum in universali, in quibus plures principantur, in parte ista incipit determinare in speciali causas et principia seditionis et transmutationis ipsarum. Et dividitur in partes tres. In prima determinat causas seditionis et transmutationis status popularis. Secundo paucorum, ibi, oligarchiae autem et cetera. Tertio status optimatum, ibi, in aristocratiis autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima proponit intentum suum. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, democratiae quidem igitur et cetera. In prima dicit, quod postquam determinatum est de causis et principiis seditionis et transmutationis rerumpublicarum in universali, considerandum est in speciali quae sunt accidentia secundum quae fit transmutatio et seditio secundum unamquamque speciem reipublicae pertinentes, et considerantes secundum unamquamque in speciali.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit democratiae quidem prosequitur; et dividitur in duas. In prima tangit causam propter quam popularis status transmutatur absolute. In secunda tangit causam vel modum transmutationis, ibi, transmutantur ex prima et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda ostendit in quam rempublicam antiquitus magis fiebat transmutatio, ibi, in antiquis autem et cetera. Prima in tres. In prima ponit causam transmutationis popularis status. In secunda manifestat per exempla, ibi, et hoc in multis et cetera. In tertia reddit causam cuiusdam, ibi, et in Rhodo et cetera. In prima dicit, quod populares status maxime transmutantur et patiuntur seditiones propter malitiam eorum qui duces sunt in populo. Isti enim propter malitiam vel impotentiam coadunant divites. Hoc autem potest fieri dupliciter. Uno modo calumniando eos. Est autem calumnia falsi criminis impositio. Et quandoque dicitur alienae rei usurpatio propter falsi criminis impositionem. Quando igitur isti duces imponunt falsa crimina divitibus, divites coadunantur inter se; et quamvis divites essent separati et fortassis inimici, propter tamen calumniam coadunantur, quia timor communis congregat et adunat eos qui valde sunt separati. Et ratio huius est, quia timor est tristitia vel turbatio propter phantasiam futuri mali; et ideo ille qui timet inquirit vias per quas possit vitare malum opinatum futurum: si ergo aestimet quod hoc faciet si coniungat se cum inimico, coniungit se cum illo. Est tamen intelligendum quod si motus timoris minor fuerit quam motus inimicitiae, non coniungetur cum inimico: si autem maior, coniungetur cum eo ad repellendum: semper enim sequitur motum maiorem. Quare manifestum est quod divites coniungunt seinvicem, et adunati et coniuncti insurgunt contra multitudinem et opprimunt eam et transmutant rempublicam. Alio modo coadunant duces populi divites, procurando quod multitudo gravetur a divitibus, ut multitudo gravata ab ipsis inducta ducibus, insurgat contra divites; et tunc divites timentes opprimi a multitudine coadunantur et insurgunt contra multitudinem et transmutant rempublicam.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit et hoc in manifestat per exempla. Et dividitur in quinque, secundum quod manifestat per quinque exempla. Secunda ibi, et in Rhodo et cetera. Tertia ibi, dissolutus est autem et in Heraclea et cetera. Quarta ibi, nec multo dissimiliter et cetera. Quinta ibi, evenit autem idem et circa Cumam et cetera. In prima dicit, quod si aliquis consideret, videbit in multis quod popularis status transmutatur propter malitiam ducum populi: nam in civitate quae dicitur Cous popularis status fuit transmutatus propter malitiam ipsorum: divites enim coadunati fuerunt et insurrexerunt contra multitudinem, et transmutaverunt rempublicam.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit et in Rhodo ponit secundum exemplum. Et dicit quod in Rhodo insula duces populi qui ordinati erant ad tractandum de stipendiis exsolvendis, quibus debebantur, prohibuerant ne redderentur huiusmodi stipendia militibus classis, cum eis deberentur: ipsi autem coniuncti insimul propter metum iudicii, et iniurias praedictas, compulsi sunt dissolvere popularem statum eorum.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit dissolutus est ponit tertium exemplum. Et dicit quod in civitate quae dicitur Heraclea, status popularis fuit corruptus post recessum ipsorum divitum propter ipsos duces populi, quia divites propter iniurias illatas recesserunt a civitate, deinde coadunaverunt se, et coadunati supervenientes, destruxerunt statum popularem et instituerunt aliam rempublicam.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit consimiliter autem ponit quartum exemplum. Et dicit quod in civitate Megareorum, popularis status fuit corruptus propter malitiam ducum populi: quia duces volentes habere pecunias a divitibus, per bonorum publicationem, eiecerunt multos divites, et hoc donec fuerunt multi exules facti. Divites autem postmodum coadunati fuerunt, et venientes contra civitatem impugnaverunt eam et devicerunt, et tunc corrumpentes popularem, instituerunt paucorum statum.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit evenit autem ponit quintum exemplum. Et dicit, quod istud idem accidit apud Cumas. Ab illa enim civitate fuit expulsus quidam nomine Thrasymachus a ducibus populi; postmodum iste insurrexit contra multitudinem, et devicit et mutavit rempublicam.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit fere autem assignat causam cuiusdam dicti. Dixit enim quod duces populi movent multitudinem contra divites: declarat propter quam causam hoc faciunt. Et dicit quod fere in omnibus aliis apparebit, si aliquis consideret, quod transmutatur popularis status, hoc modo, scilicet propter malitiam ducum populi: illi enim movent multitudinem contra divites, vel ut dona habeant a divitibus propter iniustitiam, ut scilicet divites propter iniuriam moveantur ad redimendum vexationem suam, vel a multitudine odiente ipsos divites; et tunc contingit, quod divites propter istam iniuriam coadunentur. Quandoque autem hoc faciunt, ut possessiones sint aequales, ut per hoc de possessionibus divitum possint aliquid habere, vel ut eorum redditus muneribus publicis subiiciantur. Quandoque autem imponunt crimina divitibus, ut per hoc relegentur a civitate, et a populo confiscentur possessiones ipsorum. Sicut enim dictum fuit superius, isti duces populi adulatores sunt, et ideo faciunt ea quae placent multitudini, propter quod multum lucrum afferunt.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit in antiquis declarat in quam rempublicam magis antiquitus fiebat transmutatio popularis status, quam in tyrannidem. Et primo proponit. Secundo probat cum dicit, causa autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod in antiquis temporibus quando dux populi erat dux exercitus, popularis status transmutabatur in tyrannidem, ut frequentius; quia fere plurimi antiquorum qui fuerant tyranni, ex ducibus populi facti sunt.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit causa autem assignat tres rationes eius quod propositum est. Et secundum hoc dividitur in tres. Secunda ibi, fiebant autem tyrannides et cetera. Tertia ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod causa quare antiquitus transmutabantur in tyrannidem et modo non, est, quia antiquitus duces populi assumebantur ex militantibus; isti enim erant magis diserti et facundi quam alii, quia exercitati, et quia rhetoricam habebant. Homines autem non erant communiter potentes loqui, quia nec communiter habebatur rhetorica. Et ideo illum qui magis erat facundus et disertus, et exercitatus in bello eligebant in principem. Ille autem solus principans postmodum tyrannizabat; et sic mutabatur popularis status in tyrannidem. Sed modo non sic est; quia rhetorica augmentata est, et multi noverunt eam, et ideo quicumque possunt loqui et diserti sunt, fiunt duces populi; sed quia non exercitati sunt in bellicis, non audent invadere principatum, ita ut aliquis solus principetur; nisi accidat, quod sit aliquis disertus et facundus prae aliis et exercitatus in bellicis.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit fiebant autem ponit secundam rationem. Et dicit, quod antiquitus plures erant tyrannides quam modo. Et ratio erat, quia magni principatus committebantur uni; ille autem trahebat dominium ad se, et principabatur solus tyrannizans; sicut accidit in Mileto civitate, quod cuidam fuit commissus principatus qui multorum et magnorum dominium habebat, postmodum solus principans tyrannizavit. Quia igitur plures erant antiquitus tyrannides quam modo, et respublica transmutabatur in illam, quae et pluries accidebat, ideo et popularis status transmutabatur in tyrannidem.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit tertiam rationem. Et dicit, quod iterum manifestum est, quod antiquitus transmutabatur popularis status in tyrannidem, quia civitates non erant multum magnae, immo populus habitabat in agris occupatus circa agriculturam; et ideo parum curabat de bono communi. Unde illos qui erant magis sagaces et meliores in populo, quoniam bellicosi existebant, populus praeficiebat, et principabantur tyrannice. Tyrannizabant autem, quia credebatur eis a vulgo; et causa huius erat, quia persuadebant pauperibus contra divites. Efficax autem persuasio erat inimicitia, quam praetendebant contra ipsos divites. Odio enim habere inimicum alicuius, facit ipsum bene credibilem illi; sicut accidit Athenis, quod quidam nomine Pisistratus fecit seditiones contra Pediacos. Et Megaris Theagenes sic nominatus a genere, qui occidit iuxta quemdam fluvium pecora divitum Megareorum, et cepit illos qui pascebant pecora illa, et ex hoc benivolus fuit populo. Similiter Dionysius accusavit quemdam nomine Daphnaeum, et similiter divites; et ex hoc reputatus est dignus principari principatu tyrannico, factus credibilis populo et reputatus fidelis, tum quia popularis erat, tum quia videbatur inimicitiam habere ad divites.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit transmutantur autem declarat, quomodo ex una specie popularis status fiat transmutatio in aliam. Et primo tangit modum. Secundo remedium, ibi, remedium autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod ex populari statu primo in quo principantur antiqui liberi, transmutatio fit in popularem statum novum, in quo tota multitudo dominatur secundum sententiam, non secundum leges, et non principatur aliquis secundum aliquam honorabilitatem. Fit autem transmutatio isto modo. Cum enim populus in tali republica potestatem habeat in electione, duces populi qui principari intendunt, sua decreta proponunt, quod multitudo debeat principari, quia melior est quam aliqui de multitudine; et ideo melius est principari totam multitudinem, quam aliquos. Populus autem libenter audit istam allegationem; et ideo instituit, quod tota multitudo principetur secundum legem; et dicitur iste popularis status novus.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit remedium autem tangit remedium contra istum modum transmutandi popularem statum; quia ista species in quam fit talis transmutatio, pessima est. Et dicit quod remedium ne fiat huiusmodi popularis status vel ut minus fiat, est sustinere et procurare, quod una tribus eligat, ita quod una tribus modo eligat, deinde alia, et sic deinceps, et non tota multitudo. Minor enim est una tribus quam tota multitudo; et ideo melius est eligere tribus quam totam multitudinem. Dicebat enim superius philosophus quod totam multitudinem eligere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo divisim, ut modo una tribus, deinde alia, ita quod omnes partes obtineant electionem divisim. Alio modo coniunctim: et quia primum potest haberi, accipiendum est magis. Et concludit quod propter istas causas fere fiunt omnes transmutationes status popularis.

Polit.L4

L. 5 (Ε.6, 1305a37–1306b21)De immutatione status paucorum vel in se ipsum, vel ad statum multitudinis vel in tyrannidem.De immutatione status paucorum vel in se ipsum, vel ad statum multitudinis vel in tyrannidem.

634. Oligarchiae autem transmutantur, maxime propter duos modos manifestissimos.

Polit.L5

635. Unum quidem si iniusta agant in multitudinem. Omnis enim fit praeses sufficiens. Maxime autem quando ex ipsa oligarchia accidit fieri praesidem, sicut in Naxo Lygdamus, qui et posterius tyrannizavit super Naxios.

Polit.L5

636. Habet autem et qui ex aliis principatus seditionis differentias. Quandoque quidem enim ex ipsis divitibus non existentibus autem in principatibus fit dissolutio, quando pauci valde fiunt qui in honoribus, velut in Massalia et in Istro, et in Heraclea, et in aliis civitatibus accidit. Qui enim non participabant principatibus, evacuabant, donec transmutarent seniores prius fratrum, posterius autem minores iterum. Non enim principantur alicubi quidem simul pater et filius. Alicubi autem senior et iunior frater. Et in eo quidem magis politica facta fuit oligarchia: in Istro autem ad demum remissa fuit. In Heraclea autem ex paucioribus ad sexcentos venit.

Polit.L5

637. Transmutata autem fuit et in Gnido oligarchia ipsis insignibus seditionem facientibus ad se ipsos propter paucos participare, et sicut dictum est, si pate filium non participaret, neque si plures fratres sed aut senissimum. Insurgens enim populus seditionem agentibus, et accipiens praesidem ex insignibus, invalescens obtinuit. Debile enim quod seditione divisum. Et in Erythres autem in oligarchia regiarum in antiquis temporibus, quamvis bene curam habentibus iis qui in politia, tamen propter a paucis regi, indignatus populus, transmutavit politiam.

Polit.L5

638. Moventur autem oligarchiae ex ipsis et propter contentionem demagogizantium.

Polit.L5

639. Est enim demagogia dupliciter. Haec quidem inter ipsos paucos. Insit enim demagogus et si omnino pauci sunt: velut in triginta Athenis qui circa Chariclea habuerunt triginta demagogizantes, et in trecentis qui circa Phrynicum eodem modo. Aut quando turbam demagogizant, qui in oligarchia sunt: velut in Larissa civium custodes propter eligere ipsos vulgus demagogizabant: et in quibuscumque oligarchiis non isti eligunt principatus ex quibus principes sunt, sed principatus quidem ex honorabilitatibus magnis sunt ac in societatibus, eligunt autem qui ad arma, vel populus: quod quidem in Abydo accidit. Et ubi praetoria non ex politeumate sint, demagogizantes autem adversus iudicia transmutant politiam: quod quidem, et in Heraclea, quae in Ponto, factum fuit.

Polit.L5

640. Adhuc autem, quando aliqui ad pauciores trahunt oligarchiam. Qui enim quaerunt quod aequale, coguntur inducere populum adiutorem.

Polit.L5

641. Fiunt autem transmutationes oligarchiae, et cum consumpserit propria viventes impudice. Etenim qui tales innovare quaerunt, et aut tyrannide praeferuntur ipsi, aut disponunt alium, sicut Hipparinus Dionysium in Syracusis, et in Amphipoli cui nomen erat Cleotinus advenas Chalcideorum induxit, et cum venissent, seditiose movit ipsos adversus divites: et in Aegina, qui actionem ad Charetem egit conatus est transmutare politiam propter talem causam. Quandoque quidem igitur mox conantur movere aliquid, quandoque autem furantur communia: unde ad ipsos seditiones agunt, qui isti, aut qui pugnant adversus istos fures: quod quidem accidit in Apollonia, ea quae in Ponto.

Polit.L5

642. Concors autem oligarchia non facile corruptibilis ex se ipsa: signum autem, quae in Pharsalo politia. Illi enim pauci existentes multorum domini sunt, quia utuntur se ipsis bene.

Polit.L5

643. Dissolvuntur autem, et quando in oligarchia alteram oligarchiam inducent: haec autem est quando toto politeumate pauco existente, maximis principantibus non participant qui pauci omnes: quod quidem in Elide accidit aliquando: politia enim per paucos existente senum, pauci omnino fiebant, propter perpetuos esse nonaginta existentes et propter electionem potestativam esse et similem ei quae in Lacedaemonia senum.

Polit.L5

644. Fit autem transmutatio oligarchiarum et in bello et in pace. In bello quidem propter discredentiam ad populum, militibus coactis uti: cuicumque enim manus iniecerunt, iste saepe fit tyrannus, sicut in Corintho Tymophanes: si autem plures, isti amplius acquirunt potentatum: qui autem hoc formidant tradunt multitudini politiam, quia compelluntur populo uti.

Polit.L5

645. In pace autem propter discredentiam ad invicem immittunt custodiam militibus et principanta medio qui aliquando fit dominus amborum: quod quidem accidit in Larissa in principatu Aloadorum circa Samum et in Abydo in sodalitatibus quarum una erat quae Iphiadae.

Polit.L5

646. Fiunt autem et seditiones et ex circumveniri alios ab aliis ipsorum qui in oligarchia, et ex dissidere penes nuptias vel sententias: puta ex nuptiali quidem causa, quae prius dictae. Et oligarchiam quae in Eretria equestrium Diagoras dissolvit iniusta passus circa nuptiaas. Ex iudicio autem praetorii quae in Heraclea seditio facta fuit, et in Thebis ex causa adulterii, iuste quidem, seditionaliter autem facientibus punitionem, iis quidem in Heraclea contra Eurytionem, iis autem qui in Thebis contra Archiam: vicerunt enim ipsos inimici, quare exceperunt in foro cyphone.

Polit.L5

647. Multae autem et propter valde despoticas esse oligarchias ab iis qui in politia contristatis dissolutae sunt; sicut quae in Gnido, et quae in Chio oligarchia.

Polit.L5

648. Fiunt autem et ab eventu transmutationes, et vocatae politiae, et oligarchiarum, in quibuscumque ab honorabilitate consiliantur, et iudicant, et principatibus principantur. Saepe enim primo statuta honorabilitas ad praesentia tempora, ut participent in oligarchia quidem pauci, in politia autem medii facilitate facta propter pacem vel propter aliam aliquam bonam fortunam accidit easdem possessiones fieri dignas multiplicata honorabilitate, ut omnes omnibus participent, quandoque quidem paulatim, et secundum modicum facta transmutatione, et latenter; quandoque autem et celerius.

Polit.L5

649. Oligarchiae quidem igitur transmutantur, et seditiones sustinent propter tales causas. Totaliter autem, et democratiae et oligarchiae transeunt, aliquando non in contrarias politias sed in eas quae in eodem genere: puta ex legibus democraticis et oligarchicis in eas quae dominae, et ex iis in illas.

Polit.L5

Postquam determinavit philosophus causas seditionis et transmutationis status popularis; in parte ista determinat causas transmutationis et seditionis status paucorum in particulari. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima tangit modos, quibus transmutatur status paucorum. In secunda recapitulat, ibi, oligarchiae quidem igitur et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima ponit modos per se, quibus transmutatur status paucorum. In secunda ponit unum modum accidentalem, ibi, fiunt autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima proponit, quod duo sunt modi quibus transmutatur. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, unum quidem si iniusta et cetera. In prima dicit quod status paucorum transmutantur secundum duos modos qui sunt valde manifesti: transmutantur enim propter dissensiones divitum inter se, et propter dissensionem pauperum ad divites.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit unum quidem prosequitur: et primo primum. Secundo secundum, ibi, habet autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod propter unum transmutatur status paucorum; scilicet si divites principantes opprimant multitudinem iniusta faciendo. Cum enim gravatur multitudo, insurgit contra divites et expellit eos, et sic corrumpit statum paucorum. Quaecumque enim sit multitudo, si praesens et unanimis sit, sufficiens est ad expulsionem divitum et corruptionem status paucorum: et maxime si populus unum ex paucorum numero eligat et ducem faciat, sicut factum fuit in Naxo; ubi Lygdamus assumptus fuit in praesidem ex paucorum statu qui postmodum tyrannizavit super illos Naxios.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit habet autem prosequitur alium modum qui est propter solutionem divitum inter se; et dividitur in septem secundum quod sunt septem modi. Secunda ibi, transmutata autem fuit et cetera. Tertia, ibi, moventur autem oligarchiae et cetera. Quarta, ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. Quinta, ibi, dissolvuntur autem et cetera. Sexta, ibi, fiunt etiam et cetera. Septima, ibi, multae autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod principatus paucorum potentiae patitur seditionem ab aliis divitibus. Contingit enim quandoque quod illi divites qui non sunt in principatu corrumpant rempublicam. Et hoc accidit quando illi quod principantur sunt pauci; sicut accidit in Massalia, et in Istro, et in Heraclea et in quibusdam aliis civitatibus. Contingit enim in illis quod illi divites qui non principabantur exiverunt civitatem, vel propter iniuriam illatam eis vel propter invidiam, et erant extra civitatem donec possent transmutare antiquiores fratrum principantes et postmodum iuniores. Similiter enim pater et filius non principabantur, sed pater tantum vel filius tantum; nec duo fratres simul, sed unus tantum, videlicet antiquior: et maxime accidebat in illis civitatibus, in quibus paucorum patritia illustrior erat; et sic accidit in Istro, ubi propter dissensionem divitum ex praedictis causis exortam mutatus est status paucorum in popularem; et similiter in Heraclea a paucioribus ad sexcentos propter eamdem causam transmutatus est.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit transmutata autem ponit secundum modum: et dicit, quod in Gnido civitate transmutata fuit paucorum potentia, propter hoc, quod divites inter se fecerunt dissensionem. Cum enim pauci essent principantes et plures divites, non principantes fecerunt seditionem. Cum enim pater principaretur et filius non posset, movebat seditionem filius contra patrem: iterum cum plures fratres non possint principari, sed senior, minor movit seditionem adversus fratrem seniorem. Ipsis autem dissentientibus, multitudo gravata propter eorum seditionem insurrexit contra illos et obtinuit et assumpsit sibi in principem unum ex illis: cum enim divites sint divisi, non possunt obtinere contra multitudinem; nam quod divisum est propter seditionem debile est: omnis enim virtus divisa minor est seipsa unita. Similiter et apud Erithrienses cum esset status paucorum regiarum urbium antiquitus, quamvis principantes bene regerent illos qui erant in republica, tamen quia pauci erant, populus indignatus insurrexit et transmutavit rempublicam paucorum.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit moventur autem ponit tertium modum. Et primo ponit ipsum. Secundo manifestat ipsum, ibi, est enim demagogia dupliciter et cetera. In prima dicit, quod iterum transmutantur paucorum status quasi ex seipsis a principio intrinseco, scilicet propter dissensionem et contentionem ipsorum, qui et plus posse volunt.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit est enim distinguit duos modos, quibus praepotentes mutant suum regimen, idest paucorum potentiam. In prima dicit, quod hoc quod dictum est, quod scilicet potentes propter factiones mutent gubernationem paucorum, duobus modis fit. Uno modo quando praedicti potentes adiungunt sibi alios ex ipso numero paucorum, quia sic per huiusmodi divisionem mutant rempublicam, sicut Charicles Athenis fecit, cum essent triginta potentes, et Phrynicus cum essent quadringenti: sic enim eos dividens mutavit eorum statum. Alio modo quando pauci praepotentes conciliant sibi plebem, sicut contigit in Larissa civitate. In illa enim principabantur habentes custodiam civium, quia eligebantur a populo et colendo plebem regebant ipsam. Similiter in aliis gubernationibus paucorum in quibus ipsi potentes qui possunt gerere magistratum non eligunt seipsos ad magistratus; sed permittitur civibus electio vel plebi: ita tamen quod secundum magnos census vel ex determinato alio genere fiat electio, ut Abydis: et similiter ipsi qui rempublicam gubernant, non iudicant: sed hoc permittunt plebi eam colendo. Ut igitur eorum suffragia promereri possent, cum et electio et iudicia ad plebem spectent, nimium faventes populo rempublicam mutabant: videlicet ex paucorum potentia in popularem, ut apud Heracleam contigit quae est in Ponto.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit quartum modum; et dividitur in tres in prima ponit modum illum. In secunda ostendit quando maxime corrumpitur paucorum status, ibi, fiunt etiam et cetera. Tertio quae paucorum potentia non de facili corrumpitur, ibi, concors autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod paucorum status contingit corrumpi ex se, quando sunt aliqui divites principantes et principatus reducitur ad pauciores, ita quod pauciores principentur quam prius: tunc enim divites qui expelluntur a principatu, videntes se contemni, volentes magis aequale et proportionale quam quod aliis sint subiecti, convocant populum in auxilium, et tunc transmutant rempublicam.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit fiunt autem ostendit quando maxime corrumpitur status; et dicit, quod contingit statum paucorum transmutari maxime, scilicet quando divites consumpserunt bona sua vivendo impudice et inhoneste. Cum enim assueverunt vivere delitiose consumentes propria, non habentes divitias, appetunt undecumque habere eas, ut possint continuare delitias assuetas. Credunt autem se posse habere divitias, si turbent rempublicam; et ideo quaerunt et procurant innovare rempublicam, et tunc contingit quod isti praeferantur et principentur tyrannizantes: quia enim consumpserunt bona sua vivendo voluptuose cum aliis, contingit quod habeant amicos: amantur enim maxime liberales vivendo et expendendo. Et ideo contingit cum turbant rempublicam quod habeant amicos fautores et praeficiuntur: si autem non possint praefici in tyrannum, procurant et disponunt quod alius sit princeps, ut per hoc acquirentes amicitiam illius possint habere quid expendant: sicut accidit in civitate Syracusanorum. Hipparinus enim cum consumpsisset bona sua et non posset praefici in principem, procuravit quod Dionysius tyrannizaret. Et in civitate quae dicitur Amphipolis quidam cui nomen erat Cleotinus, Chalcidenses advenas induxit et movit seditionem contra divites: similiter in Aegina civitate cum quidam movisset causam contra Charetem, cum consumpsisset bona sua, conatus est transmutare rempublicam propter eamdem causam, ut scilicet posset habere divitias ex quibus delitiose viveret. Conantur ergo isti transmutare rempublicam, secundum hunc modum, ut mox possint: et si non possunt praefici in tyrannos, nec procurare aliquem alium, furantur et rapiunt bona communia; et ideo faciunt seditiones, vel isti, vel illi qui pugnant contra illos fures et raptores: ex quo contingit mutare rempublicam; sicut accidit in Apollonia, quae est in Ponto: ibi enim cum quidam consumpsisset bona sua et non posset praefici in tyrannum, nec procurare quod alius esset, incepit rapere et furari bona communia, et tunc mota fuit seditio in civitate.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit concors autem ostendit qui paucorum status non de facili corrumpitur; et dicit, quod ille status paucorum non de facili corrumpitur, in quo divites sunt concordes ex se et bene utuntur omnibus quae sunt reipublicae unoquoque secundum gradum suum. Signum autem dicit esse rempublicam quae erat in civitate quae dicebatur Pharsalum: illi enim qui ibi dominabantur, pauci erant et multorum erant domini: unde bene utentes seipsis, unicuique attribuebant quod proportionabile erat, quia tales uniuntur in voluntate finis, et in voluntate eorum quae sunt ad finem, et unum finem intendunt, et ea quae sunt ad illum finem. Rempublicam autem talium non est facile corrumpere. Et dicit ex seipsa, quia ab exteriori agente potest corrumpi.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit dissolvuntur autem ponit quintum modum; et dividitur in duas. In prima ponit modum illum. In secunda declarat quando fit transmutatio paucorum potentiae secundum hunc modum et alios magis, ibi, fit autem transmutatio. In prima dicit, quod contingit aliquando paucorum statum transmutari quando fit transmutatio a statu paucorum assueto ad alium magis communem et paucorum. Hoc autem contingit quando sunt pauci principantes et sint alii viri divites et insignes qui non participant principatibus. Videntes enim quod non attingunt ad principatum; reputant se contemptos; et ideo movent seditionem et reducunt illum paucorum statum ad communionem magis in quo plures divites quam prius principantur; sicut accidit in Elide civitate: respublica enim ipsorum regebatur per paucos. Cuius ratio poterat esse, quia illi qui erant principaliores in reipublicae regimine erant tantum nonaginta et principatus eorum perpetuus erat. Et iterum aliquo decedente alii habebant potestatem alium eligendi. Unde frequentius eligebant amicos et notos; sicut fiebat in republica Lacedaemoniorum, de qua dictum est in secundo huius, propter quod alii videntes se contemptos moverunt seditionem et mutaverunt rempublicam in magis communem statum paucorum.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit fit autem declarat quando fit magis transmutatio. Et primo declarat quod fit tempore belli. Secundo quod fit tempore pacis, ibi, in pace autem. In prima dicit, quod transmutatur paucorum status tempore belli et tempore pacis: et tempore belli propter hoc quod divites diffidunt de multitudine. Multitudo enim invidet divitibus, et reputat se contemni propter hoc quod non reputatur ab eis. Ipsi autem contempti odiunt eos. Unde rationabiliter hoc praesentientes diffidunt de eis: et tamen oportet quod ipsi militantes contra adversarios utantur multitudine habente potentiam. Cogitant etiam quod quemcumque multitudo elevaverit in principem sibi, dans potestatem eidem, ille principabitur: sicut accidit in Corintho quod multitudo insurrexit et assumpsit sibi unum tyrannum cui nomen erat Timophanes, et iste fuit princeps illorum. Si autem plures assumpserit, isti magis erunt domini et facilius maiorem habentes potestatem. Et quia divites timent ista, tradunt dominium reipublicae multitudini, ne totum amittant; propter enim bellum oportet eos uti multitudine: posset enim contingere quod adversarii praevalerent et quod amitterent possessiones suas.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit in pace declarat qualiter corrumpitur tempore pacis; et dicit, quod tempore pacis corrumpitur paucorum status propter diffidentiam divitum adinvicem: quia enim divites diffidunt de se invicem, muniunt se ponendo custodiam multam in munitionibus contra invicem; et tunc contingit quod populus gravatus propter dissensionem ipsorum insurgit contra ipsos; et contingit quod assumit unum et ille fit princeps et dominus divitum et populi, sicut in Larissa civitate accidit in principatu Alevadensium: et circa Abydum societatem in civitatibus, quarum una fuit eorum qui dicuntur Iphiadi dicti a loco illo vel regione, dissentientibus divitibus, insurrexit populus et fecit unum praesidem.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit fiunt autem ponit sextum modum. Et dicit, quod fiunt seditiones et transmutationes paucorum potentiae propter hoc quod illi qui principantur circumveniunt alios: cum enim populus videt se deceptum a divitibus, indignatur et movetur contra ipsos faciens seditionem; et contingit quod transmutet rempublicam illam. Similiter fit transmutatio propter dissensiones quae fiunt propter nuptias vel iudicia: propter dissensiones quidem quae in nuptiis fiunt, de quibus dictum est prius, quod cum quidam desponsasset quamdam nolens eam accipere ductus consilio cuiusdam, contingit quod seditio facta fuit. Similiter paucorum potentiam quae erat in Eretria civitate. Diagoras princeps equestrium dissolvit propter iniuriam sibi illatam circa nuptias. Similiter in civitate Heraclea facta fuit seditio propter sententiam datam a iudice contra quemdam. Similiter Thebis fuit seditio propter quoddam iudicium adulterii. Et quamvis isti iuste moverentur, tamen movebantur seditionaliter per seditionem faciendo violentiam, sicut et in Heraclea civitate quidam moti fuerunt contra quemdam cui nomen erat evectio. Et quamvis iuste moverentur, tamen seditionaliter movebantur. Similiter in Thebis civitate quidam moti fuerunt circa Archiam quemdam: contendebant enim cum inimicis, et volebant inimici ipsorum quod ligaretur in foro; et quamvis isti moverentur iuste, tamen movebantur seditionaliter.

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Deinde cum dicit multae autem ponit septimum modum. Et dicit, quod aliquando corrumpitur status paucorum, quia valde dominativus est, et principantes domini: quia enim volunt uti subditis sicut servis, contingit eos contristari et insurgunt contra eos et assumentes sibi unum ex illis expellunt alios et corrumpunt paucorum potentiam, sicut corrupta fuit paucorum potentia quae fuit in Gnido et illa quae erat in Chio, quia principantes volebant uti eis sicut servis, propter quod insurrexerunt et mutaverunt rempublicam.

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Deinde cum dicit fiunt autem declarat qualiter corrumpitur status paucorum per accidens. Et dicit, quod status paucorum et respublica transmutantur quandoque ab eventu, et secundum accidens. Et hoc contingit quando illi qui principantur principatu consiliativo vel iudicativo, secundum aliquam honorabilitatem determinatam principantur; puta cum determinatur quantitas divitiarum quam habentes licitum est attingere ad principatum. Contingit enim aliquando ubi determinata est et statuta honorabilitas secundum quam principantur et in statu paucorum pauci et in republica medii, postmodum multos vel omnes venire ad illam honorabilitatem, et hoc existente felicitate, vel propter pacem, vel propter aliam bonam fortunam, ita ut omnes digni sint omnibus principatibus. Omnibus autem principantibus fit status popularis; quare transmutatur status paucorum in popularem ab eventu. Similiter est de republica. Haec autem transmutatio quandoque fit paulatim et latenter, quandoque autem celeriter.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit oligarchiae quidem recapitulat; et dicit, quod propter istas causas quae dictae sunt, paucorum status transmutantur et sustinent seditiones. Ulterius dicit, quod status popularis transmutatur in statum paucorum, quandoque vero e contrario. Aliquando vero non est transmutatio reipublicae in aliam rempublicam secundum genus, sed secundum speciem aliam vel modum illius: velut quando status popularis in quo dominatur aliquis secundum leges transmutatur in illum in quo dominatur tota multitudo vel aliqui secundum sententias et voluntates, non secundum leges. Similiter se habet de paucorum potentia.

Polit.L5

L. 6 (Ε.7, 1306b22–1307b25)De lapsu status optimatum in popularem, et reipublicae ad statum paucorum.De lapsu status optimatum in popularem, et reipublicae ad statum paucorum.

650. In aristocratiis autem fiunt seditiones hae quidem propter paucos participare honoribus, quod quidem dictum est movere et oligarchias, propter aristocratiam esse aliqualiter oligarchiam. In ambabus enim pauci qui principantur, non tamen propter idem pauci: quoniam videtur propter hoc et aristocratia oligarchia esse. Maxime autem hoc accidere necessarium quando fuerit multitudo astutorum tamquam similis secundum virtutem; velut in Lacedaemonia, qui dicebantur Partheniae, ex similibus erant; quos depraedantes cum insidiati fuissent, emiserunt Tarentum inhabitare.

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651. Aut quando aliqui inhonorantur magni existentes et nullo minores secundum virtutem ad aliquibus honoratioribus, velut Lysander a regibus.

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652. Aut quando virilis aliquis existens non participat honoribus, velut Cynadon qui sub Agesilao statuit insurrectionem in Spartiatas.

Polit.L6

653. Adhuc quando ii quidem egent valde, ii autem abundant; et maxime hoc fit in bellis. Accidit autem hoc et in Lacedaemonia sub Messenico bello. Palam autem hoc ex Tyrtaei poesi vocata Eunomia. Tribulati enim quidem propter bellum voluerunt aequae partialem facere regionem.

Polit.L6

654. Adhuc si quis magnus fuerit, et potens adhuc maior esse ut monarchizet, sicut in Lacedaemonia videtur Pausanias qui fuerat dux exercitus in medio bello, et in Carchedone Annon.

Polit.L6

655. Solvuntur autem maxime politiae et aristocratiae propter eam quae in ipsa politia iusti transgressionem.

Polit.L6

656. Principium enim id quod est, non esse mixta bene, in politia quidem democratiam et oligarchiam, in aristocratia autem haec et virtutem, maxime autem ipsa duo. Dico autem duo demum et oligarchiam, haec autem politiae tentant misceri, et multae vocatarum aristocratiarum: differunt enim a nominatis politiis aristocratiae hoc; et propter hoc sunt hae quidem minus, hae autem magis mansivae ipsarum. Declinantes enim magis ad oligarchiam aristocratias vocant; eas autem quae ad multitudinem, politias. Propter quod quidem securiores tales aliis sunt. Valentius enim quod plus; et magis amant aequale habentes. Qui autem in abundantiis, si politia det excessum, iniuriari quaerunt, et supergredi.

Polit.L6

657. Totaliter autem ad quodcumque utique declinaverit politia ad haec transit, utrisque quod suum augentibus: velut politia quidem ad demum, aristocratia autem ad oligarchiam: vel ad contraria, velut aristocratia quidem ad demum: tamquam enim iniusta patientes trahunt in contrarium, qui magis egent, politiae autem ad oligarchiam. Solum enim mansivum, quod secundum dignitatem aequale, et id quod est habere quae ipsorum.

Polit.L6

658. Accidit autem, quod dictum est, in Thuriis. Quia quidem enim ad ampliori honorabilitate erant principatus, ad minus transivit, et ad principativa plura. Quia quidem enim regionem totam insignes possidebant praeter legem, politia enim magis oligarchia erat, quare poterant supergredi, populus autem exercitatus in bello, factus fuit valentior donec dimitterent regionem quicumque plus erant habentes.

Polit.L6

659. Adhuc, quia omnes aristocraticae politiae sunt oligarchicae, magis plus occupant qui insignes, velut in Lacedaemonia ad paucos substantiae deveniunt, et licet facere quodcumque voluerint insignibus magis, et curare de quocumque volunt.

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660. Propter quod, et Locrorum civitas periit ex ea, quae ad Dionysium cura singulari, quod in democratia non utique fieret, neque utique in aristocratia bene mixta.

Polit.L6

661. Maxime autem latent aristocratiae transmutantes eo quod solvantur paulatim: quod quidem dictum est in prioribus universaliter de omnibus politiis, quod causa transmutationum est et quod modicum. Quando enim secundum aliquid eorum quae ad politiam prolabuntur, post haec et aliud paulo maius facilius movent, donec utique moveant totum mundum.

Polit.L6

662. Accidit autem hoc et in politia Thuriorum: lege enim existente per quinque annos ducatum exercitus obtinere, quidam virorum bellicosi facti et apud multitudinem custodiarum accepti, despicientes ea quae in rebus, et putantes facile obtinere, hanc legem solvere conati sunt, primo ut liceret continue eosdem ducatum exercitus obtinere, videntes populum ordinantem ipsos prompte. Qui autem super hoc instituti erant principium vocati consiliarii, cum impetum fecissent primo ad contrariandum, persuasi sunt, existimantes, cum hanc movissent legem, sinere aliam politiam. Posterius autem volentes prohibere, aliis motis, non adhuc plus faciebant aliquid, sed transmutatus est ordo totus politiae ad potentatum eorum qui conati fuerant insolescere.

Polit.L6

663. Omnes autem solvuntur quandoque quidem ex se ipsis, quandoque autem ab extrinseco, quando contraria politia fuerit vel prope vel longe quidem, habens autem potentiam. Quod quidem accidit in Atheniensibus et Lacedaemoniis: Athenienses quidem enim ubique oligarchias, Lacedaemonii autem demos dissipabant. Unde quidem igitur transmutationes fiunt politiarum et seditiones, dictum est fere.

Polit.L6

Postquam philosophus determinavit causas seditionis et transmutationis status popularis et paucorum, nunc determinat causas seditionis et transmutationis optimatum et reipublicae distinctae contra alias. Et dividitur in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda concludit quiddam commune omnibus, ibi, solvuntur et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima assignat causas huiusmodi transmutationis. In secunda declarat propter quam causam quandoque latent huiusmodi transmutationes, ibi, maxime autem latent et cetera. Prima in duas: quia duo erant modi optimatum: unus simplex, alter mixtus. Primo declarat causas et principia seditionis et transmutationis simplicis status optimatum. Secundo mixti, et cum hoc reipublicae, ibi, solvitur autem maxime et cetera. Prima in quinque, secundum quod ponit quinque modos quibus fit seditio et transmutatio simplicis status optimatum. Secunda ibi, aut quandoque aliqui et cetera. Tertia ibi, aut quandoque virilis et cetera. Quarta ibi, adhuc autem quandoque. Quinta ibi, adhuc si quis magnus et cetera. In prima dicit, quod in statu optimatum fiunt seditiones, quandoque quia pauci sunt honorati et principantes principatu: quod quidem movebat seditionem, ut dictum est, in statu paucorum, quia status optimatum aliqualiter est status paucorum. Est autem status paucorum, quia in utraque pauci principantur: non tamen propter eamdem dignitatem pauci sunt principantes in utraque. Quia in paucorum statu propter hoc pauci sunt principantes: quia principantur propter divitias, pauci autem sunt divites. In statu optimatum autem principantur propter virtutem: pauci autem virtuosi sunt; ideo utrobique pauci sunt principantes. Contingit autem maxime huiusmodi fieri seditiones quando sunt multi astuti et quasi similes virtuosis: quia enim astuti sunt, possunt invenire diversas vias ad malum finem, propter quod sciunt et possunt movere seditiones; sicut accidit in Lacedaemonia. Quidam enim dicti Partheniae, idest honesti, similes existentes virtuosis propter apparentiam temperantiae, quia non participabant principatu, procuraverunt seditionem: quod alii advertentes, eos comprehendentes relegaverunt a civitate, mittentes eos in coloniam Tarentum, et ibi inhabitarunt.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit aut quando ponit secundum modum; dicens, quod aliquando contingit fieri seditionem, quando aliqui magni et non minus virtuosi quam principantes inhonorantur a principantibus aliis inhonorationibus non decentibus eos. Indignati enim movent seditionem: sicut Lysander cum esset magnus et non minor quam alii principantes, cum inhonoraretur a regnantibus, movit seditionem.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc quando ponit tertium modum. Et dicit, quod iterum fit seditio in statu optimatum et transmutatio quando est aliquis virilis et prudens, qui secundum suam aestimationem non participat principatu. Talis enim reputans se contemptum, movet seditionem; sicut Cynadon, qui cum esset subditus Agesilao, virilis existens, ordinavit quod insurrectio fieret contra Spartiatas, et hoc modo eos opprimere tentavit.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit adhuc quando ponit quartum modum; dicens, quod aliquando fit seditio in statu optimatum quando aliqui sunt valde pauperes, alii valde divites. Tunc enim contingit quod pauperes invidentes divitibus movent seditionem contra illos; et hoc maxime fit tempore belli; propter quod contingit fieri ut frequentius seditionem; sicut accidit in Lacedaemonia sub bello contra Messenienses. Pauperes enim tribulati, propter paupertatem ex bello contingentem moverunt seditionem contra divites, et voluerunt regionem facere aequalem. Hoc autem dicit esse manifestum ex dicto Tyrtaei poetae, qui hoc dixit in poesi dicta bona divisio.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit adhuc si quis ponit quintum modum. Et dicit quod si sit aliquis magnus, vel secundum genus, vel secundum divitias, vel virtutem, et possit, et adhuc aptus sit fieri maior, et non habeat monarchiam, movet seditionem. Cum enim iste sit magnus et potens et reputet se maiorem aliis, si non principetur, reputat se contemptum, et tunc movet seditionem, sicut accidit in Lacedaemonia. Pausanias enim qui fuerat dux belli adversus Medos, et Hanno apud Carthaginenses cum essent magni, et non principarentur, moverunt seditionem.

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Deinde cum dicit solvuntur autem determinat causas et principia seditionis et transmutationis optimatum, reipublicae mixtae et cum hoc reipublicae. Et dividitur in duas, secundum quod assignat duos modos. Secunda ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima tangit modum illum. In secunda ostendit in quam rempublicam maxime fit huiusmodi transmutatio, ibi, totaliter autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima tangit causam secundum quam habet fieri seditio secundum istum modum. Secundo manifestat illam, ibi, principium enim et cetera. In prima dicit, quod corrumpuntur respublica et etiam optimatum status propter transgressionem iustitiae, quae est in republica. Et ratio huius est, quia respublica salvatur propter mutuam communicationem, secundum aliquam proportionem. Huiusmodi autem communicatio secundum proportionem iustitia est: quare respublica salvatur iustitia existente. Si ergo fiat transgressio, corrumpitur.

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Deinde cum dicit principium enim manifestat causam istam. Et dicit, quod causa et principium quare fit transgressio iusti in optimatum statum, et in rempublicam, est quia non bene mixtae sunt ex illis, ex quibus natae sunt misceri; puta respublica non est bene mixta ex potentia paucorum et populari ex quibus componitur. Optimatum vero non est bene mixta ex praedictis, scilicet paucorum statu et populari, et cum hoc ex virtute. Maxime autem declinant a iusto quando non bene mixtae et proportionatae sunt quantum ad duo istorum. Dico autem ista duo, paucorum et popularem: respublicae enim sunt maxime ex istis duabus mixtae, similiter et multae optimatum. In hoc enim differunt respublicae ab optimatum statu, quia respublicae sunt mixtae tantum ex duobus praedictis, optimatum status autem ex eisdem, et ex virtute, quamvis quaedam magis ex illis duobus. Et propter hoc, quod respublica et optimatum gubernationes sunt mixtae ex istis, et magis inclinantur ad unum quam ad aliud, manifestum quod quaedam sunt mansivae magis quaedam minus. Illae enim quae melius mixtae sunt, magis continuari possunt quam quae minus. Sicut enim in naturalibus mixtum ex aliquibus, quanto melius mixtum est, tanto plus conservatur in esse, et quanto peius mixtum est, et magis inclinatur ad alterum miscibilium, tanto minus, sic est in rebuspublicis. Illae enim quae bene mixtae sunt, mansivae sunt magis, et quae male, minus. Illas autem respublicas quae declinant ad statum paucorum, vocant aliqui optimatum statum, quia in utraque fit distributio principatus secundum excellentiam et dignitatem aliquam virtutis et nobilitatis, et quia in utrisque pauci principantur. Et ideo illae, quae inclinant ad statum paucorum, dicuntur status optimatum, illae respublicae quae declinant ad multitudinem, respublicae communi nomine dicuntur. Ex quo manifestum est, quod respublica communi nomine nominata securior est quam status paucorum, et quam status optimatum. Et assignat duplicem rationem, una est, quia in republica multitudo dominatur, sed in statu paucorum et optimatum, pauci: plus autem potest multitudo quam pauci, et fortior est: et ideo magis possunt conservari quam aliae. Alia ratio est, quia in republica magis fit distributio bonorum et principatuum secundum aequalitatem quam in aliis. In aliis enim fit distributio secundum excellentiam quamdam. Homines autem communiter plus appetunt aequale; et ideo amant plus homines communiter rempublicam quam alias: ex quo sequitur, quod plus conservatur, et securior est quam aliae. Si autem aliqui abundent, vel in divitiis, vel in aliis, si respublica ad excessum inclinet, sicut status paucorum ad excessum divitiarum, et status optimatum aliqui ad excessum generositatis, tunc sequentes motum istius excessus faciliter iniuriabuntur, volentes superare alios; et tunc fit transgressio iusti; quod erat probandum.

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Deinde cum dicit totaliter autem ostendit, in quas respublicas fit transmutatio earumdem magis. Et dividitur in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda manifestat dictum per exemplum, ibi, accidit autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod respublica totaliter aliquando transmutatur in illam ad quam declinat magis, utrisque augentibus quod suum est; hoc est, impetu volentium transmutare rempublicam augente inclinationem reipublicae et inclinatione reipublicae augente impetum volentium transmutare. Sicut respublica declinat ad statum popularem, et quandoque in illum transmutatur. Similiter status optimatum ad paucorum statum declinat, et in illum transmutatur. Si enim in statu optimatum mixto divites excedant, et fiat distributio secundum excellentiam divitiarum, fit status paucorum. Quandoque vero transmutatur in contrarium; sicut status optimatum ad popularem, et respublica ad statum paucorum. Cum enim status optimatum declinet ad statum paucorum, si divites excedant, tunc pauperes videntes se gravatos, et iniusta sustinentes, insurgunt contra eosdem, et transmutant statum optimatum in popularem trahentes ad se. Similiter respublica transmutatur in statum paucorum, quandoque vero in statum popularem. Sola enim illa bene mansiva est, in qua observatur aequale secundum dignitatem, et traditur unicuique quod suum est. Si igitur in republica communi nomine dicta, plus attribuatur pauperibus quam divitibus, et divitibus non attribuatur secundum suam dignitatem, insurgunt divites contra rempublicam, et transmutant eam in statum paucorum.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit accidit autem manifestat quoddam dictum per exemplum, quod scilicet respublica transeat ad rempublicam ad quam declinat. Et dicit, quod illud quod dictum est accidit in Thuriis civitate. In illa enim fiebat distributio principatus secundum quamdam honorabilitatem generis vel divitiarum magnam, ita quod pauci attingebant ad ipsum, et postmodum contigit quod mutata fuit, et plures erant principantes, et quod non fiebat distributio principatus secundum tantum honorabilitatem, et secundum minorem. Cum insignes et divites principarentur, respublica erat magis paucorum, et ideo poterat facere excessum. Postmodum cum populus esset exercitatus in bello, factus fuit potentior et valentior, et insurrexit contra illos insignes et principantes, et maiores habens divitias, et compellens eos dimittere regionem, mutavit rempublicam in statum popularem.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc quia ponit secundum modum seditionis et transmutationis status optimatum. Et primo ponit illum modum. Secundo manifestat per quoddam exemplum, ibi, propter quod et Locrorum et cetera. In prima dicit, quod iterum fit seditio et transmutatio in statu optimatum, quia omnis status optimatum mixtus, magis est status paucorum; et ideo divites plus habent de bonis communibus quam pauperes. Causa autem quare in statu optimatum plus attribuatur divitibus, est, quia in statu optimatum distributio bonorum, secundum dignitatem virtutis fit; ita quod qui plus participant virtute plus recipiunt de bonis communibus. Sed divites plus attingunt ad virtutem, vel videntur attingere, quam pauperes. Habent enim illud per cuius defectum egeni iniuriantur, scilicet divitias. Et ideo in statu optimatum plus recipiunt divites quam pauperes. Sicut accidit in Lacedaemonia. In illa enim civitate pauci fuerunt divites et habentes substantias et attingentes ad principatum. In republica etiam illa licet facere insignibus quicquid volunt, et curare de quocumque voluerunt. Ex hoc enim quod egeni vident divites plus recipere de bonis communibus quam ipsi recipiunt, invident, et contristantur, et insurgunt contra eos; et contingit quod mutent rempublicam, et sic status optimatum mixtus mutatur in statum popularem.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit propter quod manifestat per quoddam exemplum. Et dicit quod propter hoc contigit quod civitas Locrorum destructa fuit. In civitate enim ipsorum divites plus recipiebant quam pauperes, et ex hoc mota fuit seditio in civitate, et insurrexit multitudo contra divites, et assumens sibi in principem Dionysium transmutavit statum optimatum. Postmodum ille tyrannizavit, ex quo civitas illa destructa fuit. Hoc autem non contingeret in statu populari et optimatum bene mixto. Quare manifestum est quod status optimatum mixtus ex hoc corrumpitur quod divites plus recipiunt quam pauperes.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit maxime autem declarat propter quam causam latent transmutationes status optimatum et reipublicae. Et primo ponit rationes. Secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi, accidit autem hoc. In prima dicit, quod transmutationes status optimatum, vel ipsi status optimatum cum transmutantur maxime latent, quia paulatim et secundum modica corrumpitur; quod fuit dictum prius, ubi dictum fuit de causa transmutationis cuiuslibet reipublicae universaliter. Transgressio enim eius quod est modicum causa est transmutationis; quia quando fit transgressio secundum modicum ad eo quod exigitur ad rempublicam, quia modicum est, non curatur. Item cum transgressio secundum aliud modicum fit, negligitur. Sic autem procedendo paulatim permittitur maiores motus negligendo quousque moveant totam rempublicam. Sicut enim videmus in actibus moralibus quod unus actus inclinat ad consimilem actum, et exercitium inducit inclinationem ad consimiles actus, sic est in rebuspublicis quod quando praetermittitur illud quod est necessarium ad rempublicam, iste defectus inclinat ad consimilem actum. Et sic tamdem per processum continuum inducitur tanta inclinatio ad contrarium reipublicae, quod corrumpitur. Quia igitur secundum modica fit ista corruptio et paulatim, non apparet.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit accidit autem manifestat quod dictum est per exemplum. Et dicit, quod respublica Thuriorum per hunc modum destructa fuit, paulatim scilicet et secundum modica. Nam cum ibi esset lex quod nullus posset tenere praeturam nisi per quinque annos, contigit quod quidam facti fuerunt bellicosi et fortes et benivoli multitudini deputatae ad custodiam: contemnentes autem utilitates civitatis et credentes quod possent cum multitudine obtinere quod volebant, conati sunt destruere istam legem et suaserunt multitudini quod iidem possent tenere ducatum exercitus per totam vitam. Consiliarii autem principantes habentes potestatem super institutione legum et destructione cum moverentur ad contradicendum, finaliter tamen persuasi sunt istud concedere, et consideraverunt quod circa alias partes reipublicae de cetero nihil immutarent. Postmodum conati isti fuerunt destruere aliam legem, et persuaserunt multitudini cui erant benevoli. Cum autem principantes vellent resistere, non potuerunt, immo totus ordo reipublicae paulatim et secundum modica corruptus est et transmutatus in potentatum paucorum et dominium eorum qui conati fuerunt insolescere a republica inexistente prius et destruere ipsam.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit omnes autem concludit quiddam universale quantum ad omnes respublicas. Et dicit, quod omnes respublicae corrumpuntur vel ex seipsis propter dissensionem civium, vel ab aliqua causa extrinseca. Quando enim est respublica contraria extra vel prope civitatem vel longe, quae potentiam habet supra civitatem illam, corrumpit istam propter contrarietatem. Unum enim contrarium natum est dissolvere aliud. Sicut accidit apud Athenienses et Lacedaemonios. Cum enim Athenienses haberent rempublicam popularem, ubique destruebant statum paucorum, et mutabant in statum popularem. Et Lacedaemonii cum statum paucorum haberent, ubique corrumpebant statum popularem, et mutabant in statum paucorum. Et tunc recapitulat dicens, quod unde fiunt transmutationes et corruptiones rerumpublicarum fere dictum est.

Polit.L6

L. 7 (Ε.8–9, 1307b26–1310a38)De conversatione status popularis, paucorum, optimatum et reipublicae.De conversatione status popularis, paucorum, optimatum et reipublicae.

664. De salvatione autem communiter et singillatim uniuscuiusque politiae, habitum est dicere.

Polit.L7

665. Primo quidem igitur palam, quod siquidem habemus per quae corrumpuntur politiae, habemus et per quae salvantur contrariorum enim contraria sunt factiva. Corruptio autem, salvationi contrarium.

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666. In bene autem temperatis quidem igitur politiis, sicut aliud aliquid oportet observare, ut nihil praevaricentur, et maxime quod parvum serpere, latet enim subintrans praevaricatio, sicut substantias parvae expensae consumunt saepe factae. Latet autem seditio quia non simul tota fit: paralogizatur enim omnes ab ipsis, sicut sophistica oratio: si unumquodque parvum, et omnia. Hoc autem est quidem ut sic, est autem, ut non: totum enim et omnia, non parvum, sed componitur ex parvis. Unam quidem igitur custodiam, ad hoc principium oportet facere.

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667. Deinde non credere iis, qui sophismatis gratia ad multitudinem applicantur: arguuntur enim ab operibus. Qualia autem dicimus politiarum sophismata, prius dictum est.

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668. Adhuc autem videre quia quaedam manent non solum aristocratiae, sed oligarchiae; non propterea, quod firmae sunt politiae; sed quia bene utuntur ii, qui in principatibus fiunt, et iis quae extra politiam, et iis quae in politeumate, non iniusta facientes in eos quidem qui non participant, et introducendo principales eorum ipsorum in politiam, et amatores quidem honoris non iniuriando in inhonoratione, et multos in lucro; ad se ipsos autem, et ad principantes in utendo invicem demotice. Quod enim in multitudine quaerunt aequale qui demotici, hoc in similibus, non solum iustum, sed expediens est.

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669. Propter quod si plures sint in politeumate, multa expediunt demoticorum lege statutorum; velut sex mensium principatus esse; ut omnes, qui similes, participent. Est enim sicut demus iam qui similes. Propter quod, et in iis fiunt demagogi saepe, sicut dictum est prius. Deinde minus in potentatus incidunt oligarchiae et aristocratiae: non enim similiter facile malignari pauco tempore principantes, et multo. Quoniam propter hoc in oligarchiis et democratiis fiunt tyrannides. Aut enim qui maximi in utraque praeferuntur tyrannide, ii quidem demagogi, ii autem potentes; aut qui quando maximos habent principatus, multo tempore principantur.

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670. Salvantur autem politiae non solum propter longe esse a corrumpentibus, sed aliquando, et quia prope: timentes enim per manus habent magis politiam. Quare oportet eos, qui de politia sollicitantur, timores praeparare, ut conservent, et non dissolvant: quemadmodum nocturnam custodiam politiae observationem, et quod longe, propter facere.

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671. Adhuc insignium contentiones et seditiones, et per leges oportet tentare cavere, et eos, qui extra contentionem sunt antequam comprehendantur et ipsi; tamquam quod in principio sit malum cognoscere, sit in cuiuscumque, sed politici viri.

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672. Ad eam autem, quae per honorabilitatem fit transmutationem ex oligarchia et politia, cum acciderit hoc, menentibus quidem eisdem honorabilitatibus, abundantia autem honorabilitatis facta excedit honorabilitatis communis multitudinem, considerare ad praeteriens. In quibuscumque quidem civitatibus honorantur secundum annum, secundum hoc tempus: in maioribus autem per triennium aut quinquennium: et si sit multiplex vel submultiplex prioris in quo honorationes institutae fuerunt politiae, legem et honorabilitates intendere vel remittere: siquidem excedant, intendentes secundum multiplicationem; si autem deficiant, remittentes, et minorem facientes honorationem.

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673. Oligarchiis enim et politiis non facientibus quidem sic, hic quidem oligarchiam, hic autem potentatum fieri accidit. Illo autem modo ex politia quidem democratiam, ex oligarchia autem politiam vel demum.

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674. Commune autem et in democratia et in oligarchia, et in monarchia, et in omni politia, neque crescere valde multum praeter commensurationem, sed magis tentare parvos et multi temporis dare honores quam breviter magnos. Corrumpuntur enim; et non omnis viri ferre bonam fortunam: si autem non, neque cum simul multos totos dederint, auferre rursus simul totos, sed gradatim.

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675. Et maxime quidem tentare legibus sic ordinare, ut nullum fiat multum excedens potentia, neque amicorum neque pecuniarum: si autem non, sequestratas facere stationes ipsorum.

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676. Quoniam autem et propter proprias vitas insolescunt, oportet facere principatum quendam qui consideret viventes nocive ad politiam, in democratia quidem ad democratiam, in oligarchia autem ad oligarchiam: similiter autem et in unaquaque aliarum politiarum.

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677. Et quod iucundum autem civitatis sigillatim observare propter easdem causas: huius autem remedium super oppositis partibus firmare actiones et principatus. Dico autem opponi epiiches multitudini, egenos autem opulentis, et tentare commiscere egenorum multitudinem, et eam quae divitum, vel quod medium augere. Hoc enim dissolvit eas quae propter inaequalitatem seditiones.

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678. Maximum autem et in omni politia et legibus, et alia provisione sic ordinari, ut non sit principatus lucrari.

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679. Hoc autem maxime in oligarchiis oportet servare: non enim sic indignantur coerciti ab eo, quod est principari, multi. Imo gaudent, siquis sinit circa propria vacare. Quare si putaverint principantes furari communia, tunc ambo contristantur, scilicet honoribus non participare, et lucris.

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680. Singulariter autem contingit simul esse democratiam et aristocratiam si hoc instituerit aliquis: contingit enim et insignes et multitudinem utrosque habere quae volunt. Licere quidem enim scilicet omnibus principari, democraticum. Insignes autem esse in principatibus, aristocraticum. Hoc autem erit cum non sit lucrari principatibus. Egeni enim non volent principari eo quod nullum sit lucrum, sed circa propria esse magis; opulenti autem potuerunt, propter nullo communium indigere.

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681. Quare accidet egenis quidem fieri opulentos propter immorari circa opera, insignibus autem, non subici quibuscumque.

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682. Et ut non furentur quae communia, traditio fiat pecuniarum praesentibus omnibus civibus, et rescripta penes fraternitates et contubernia, et tribus reponatur. Eius autem quod est sine lucro principari oportet esse honores lege statutos, lege approbatis.

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683. Oportet autem in democratiis quidem opulentis parcere non solum in non faciendo possessiones aeque partiales, sed neque fructus: quod in quibusdam politiarum latet factum. Melius autem et prohibere volentes oblationes facere sumptuosas quidem non utiles, puta chorigias quidem, et lampadarchias et quaecumque aliae tales.

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684. In oligarchia autem egenorum facere facere curam multam, et principatus a quibus receptiones iis tribuere, et siquis opulentorum iniuriatus fuerit istis, maiores increpationes esse, quam si sibi ipsis. Et haereditates non secundum dationem esse, sed secundum genus, neque plures quam unam eandem haereditare; sic enim utique aequaliores substantiae erunt, et egenorum utique plures ad abundantiam pertingent.

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685. Expedit autem et in democratia et in oligarchia aliorum, vel aequalitatem, vel possessionem dare iis qui minus communicant politia hac: in democratia quidem opulentis, in oligarchia autem egenis; excepto, quicumque principatus sunt domini politiae. Hoc autem iis qui ex politia committere solis vel pluribus.

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686. Tria autem quaedam oportet habere futuros principari principales principatus: primo quidem amorem ad consistentem politiam, deinde potentiam maximorum operum principatus, tertio autem virtutem et iustitiam in unaquaque politia eam quae ad politiam: si enim non idem iustum secundum omnes politias, necesse et iustitiae esse differentias.

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687. Habet autem dubitationem, quando non acciderit haec omnia circa eundem, quomodo oportet facere divisionem: puta si militaris quidem aliquis fuerit, nequam autem, et non politiae amicus; alius autem iustus et amicus, qualiter oportet fieri electionem.

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688. Videtur autem quod oportet respicere ad duo: quo plus participant omnes, et quo minus: propter quod in militia quidem ad experientiam magis virtute: minus enim militia participant, epiichia autem plus. In custodia autem et cameratione contrarium: ampliori enim virtute: minus enim militia participant, epiichia autem plus. In custodia autem et cameratione contrarium: ampliori enim virtute indiget quam qualem multi habent. Scientia autem communis omnibus.

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689. Dubitabit autem utique aliquis si potentia exstiterit politiae, et amor, quid opus est virtute? facient enim, quae expediunt, per ipsa duo.

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690. Aut quia contingit eos qui haec duo habent incontinentes esse, quare quemadmodum, et ipsis non serviunt scientes, et amantes ipsas, sic et ad commune nihil prohibet quosdam se habere.

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691. Simpliciter autem quaecumque in legibus, ut conferentia dicimus politiis, omnia haec salvant politias.

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692. Et quod saepe dictum est maximum elementum, ut valentior sit multitudo quae vult politiam quam quae non vult.

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693. Praeter autem omnia haec, oportet non latere quod utique latet transgressas politias quod medium.

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694. Multa enim eorum quae videntur demotica solvunt democratias et oligarchicorum oligarchias. Qui autem putant hanc esse unam virtutem, trahunt ad excessum, ignorantes quemadmodum naris est transgressa quidem rectitudinem eam quae pulcherrima ad aquilinum vel simum, sed tamen adhuc pulchra et gratiam habens ad aspectum, non tamen si intendataliquis adhuc magis ad excessum: primo quidem abiciet mediocritatem partis, finaliter autem ita quod neque narem faciet apparere propter excellentiam et deffectum contrariorum. Eodem autem modo habet et de aliis partibus. Accidit itaque hoc et circa alias politias. Etenim oligarchiam et democratiam est, ut habetur sufficienter non ex existente optimo ordine: si autem aliquis intendat magis utramque ipsarum, primo quidem deteriorem faciet politiam, tandem autem neque politiam.

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695. Propter hoc oportet non ignorare legislatorem et politicum qualia salvant demoticum et qualia corrumpunt democratiam et qualia oligarchiam; neutrum enim ipsarum continget esse et permanere sine divitibus et sine multitudine: sed quando aequalitas facta fuerit substantiae, aliam necesse esse hanc politiam. Quare corrumpentes iis quae secundum excessum legibus, corrumpunt politiam.

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696. Peccant autem in democratiis quidem demagogi uti multitudo domina legum; dominos enim faciunt super civitatem pugnantes cum divitibus: oportet autem contrarium semper videri dicere pro divitibus, in oligarchiis autem pro populo oligarchicos. Et iurare contra quam nunc iurent oligarchicos. Nunc quidem in quibusdam iurant: et populo malignus ero, et consulam quodcumque habebo malum: oportet autem et existimare et simulare contrarium insinuantes in iuramentis quod non iniuste agat in populum.

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697. Maximum autem omnium dictorum ad permanendum politias, quod nunc negligunt omnes, scilicet erudiri ad politias. Profectus enim nullus ultilissimarum legum, et conglorificatarum ab omnibus politizantibus, si non erunt assueti et eruditi in politia: siquidem leges demoticae, demoticaliter: si autem oligarchicae, oligarchicaliter. Quod quidem est in viro incontinentia, est et in civitate. Est autem erudiri ad politiam non haec facere quibus gaudent oligarchizantes, et democratiam volentes; sed quibus poterunt, ii quidem oligarchizare, ii autem democratizare, nunc autem in oligarchiis quidem principantium filii deliciantur; qui autem egenorum, fiunt exercitati et laboriosi. Quare, et volunt magis et possunt insolescere.

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698. In democratiis autem, quae maxime videntur esse democraticae, contrarium conferentis consistit. Causa autem huius, quia male definiunt quod liberum. Duo enim sunt quibus videtur democratia definita esse; in id, quod populum esse dominum, et libertate. Quod quidem enim iuste, aequale videtur esse: aequale autem quodcumque videatur multitudini, hoc esse dominans: liberum autem et aequale quodcumque voluit quis facere. Quare vivere in talibus democratiis unusquisque ut vult, et ad quod abundat, ut ait Euripides.

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699. Hoc autem parvum: non enim oportet putare servitutem esse vivere ad politiam, sed salutem. Ex quibus quidem ergo politiae transmutantur et corrumpuntur, et per quae salvantur et permanent, ut simpliciter est dicere, tot sunt.

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Postquam philosophus declaravit causas et principia corruptionis et transmutationis rerumpublicarum et in universali, et in particulari, determinat in universali et in particulari causas et elementa per quae salvantur. Et primo dat intentum suum. Secundo prosequitur, ibi, primo quidem igitur et cetera. Est autem intelligendum, quod in dando elementa, per quae salvantur respublicae, non procedit sicut processit superius in dando causas destructionis earum: quia superius primo dedit causas corruptionis et transmutationis rerumpublicarum in universali, secundo in particulari secundum unamquamque rempublicam divisim. Sed hic sic non facit: sed simul dat elementa per quae salvatur unaquaeque respublica in generali et in particulari. Dans igitur intentionem suam dicit, quod postquam determinatum est de causis et principiis transmutationis uniuscuiusque reipublicae in universali et particulari, consequenter determinandum est de salvatione uniuscuiusque reipublicae, determinando quae sunt elementa, et in universali et in particulari, per quae salvantur.

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Deinde cum dicit primo quidem prosequitur. Et dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit unde possunt accipi elementa per quae salvantur respublicae. Secundo accipit ipsa, ibi, in bene autem temperatis et cetera. In prima dicit, quod primo istud manifestum est, quod si habemus, quae sunt causae et principia per quae corrumpuntur respublicae, habemus quae sunt causae et principia per quae salvantur. Et ratio huius est, quia contrariorum contraria sunt principia. Sed corruptio et salvatio sunt contraria; ergo habent contraria principia. Si ergo habemus quae sunt principia transmutationis et corruptionis rerumpublicarum habemus quae sunt principia salvationis, quoniam contraria.

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Deinde cum dicit in bene autem accipit huiusmodi principia. Et est intelligendum, quod respublica potest corrumpi vel destrui corruptione propinqua, vel remota. Et secundum hoc dividitur in duas. In prima dat elementa quae praeservant rempublicam a corruptione remota magis. Secundo dat elementa quae praeservant eam a corruptione propinqua magis, ibi, salvantur autem et cetera. Circa primam intelligendum, quod respublica potest corrumpi corruptione remota tripliciter. Primo propter negligentiam eius quod parvum est. Secundo propter persuasionem adulatorum. Tertio propter malum modum ordinis reipublicae. Et secundum hoc dividitur pars ista in tres. In prima dat elementa per quae salvatur a corruptione quae est per negligentiam eius quod est parvum. Secundo illa per quae salvatur a corruptione quae est per adulationem. Tertio illa per quae salvatur ab ea quae est propter malum ordinem. Et incipit secunda ibi, deinde non credere et cetera. Tertia ibi, adhuc autem videre et cetera. In prima dicit, quod in omnibus rebuspublicis bene mixtis hoc oportet observari, quod non fiat transgressio in aliquo; et maxime quod non fiat secundum hoc quod est modicum. Aliquando enim contingit, quod subintrat talis seditio, quae fit secundum modica, et latet propter eius paucitatem, vel non curatur. Et si negliguntur huiusmodi praevaricationes, facient unam magnam praevaricationem, quae corrumpet rempublicam. Sicut enim parvae expensae frequenter factae corrumpunt totam substantiam alicuius, sic parvae et modicae praevaricationes frequenter factae corrumpunt totam rempublicam. Huiusmodi autem corruptio latet saepe, quia non fit simul et secundum magna, sed fit paulatim et secundum modica. Mens enim quandoque paralogizatur, huiusmodi enim parvae praevaricationes paralogizantur ipsam, sicut quaedam oratio sophistica. Arguit enim sic penes seipsum. Si unaquaque praevaricatio parva est, et omnes parvae sunt: sed istud verum est uno modo, alio modo non est verum: quia totum et omnia simul sumpta, non sunt parva, sed divisim sumpta parva sunt. Dicendum est igitur, quod ly omnes potest teneri collective vel divisive: si divisive, vera est: omnes enim praevaricationes divisim sumptae parvae sunt: si collective, falsum est; omnes enim coniunctae non sunt parvum quid, sed magnum. Et tunc concludit quod unum elementum est, ut caveatur ne fiat aliqua transgressio vel praevaricatio.

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Deinde cum dicit deinde non ponit documentum quod praeservat a corruptione quae fit per persuasionem adulatorum. Adulatores enim suadent multitudini quae placent illi; et non suadent propter bonum multitudinis, sed propter bonum suum. Unde contingit quod talia quandoque suadent ex quibus corrumpitur respublica; et ideo dicit philosophus, quod deinde cavendum est ne aliquis credat adulatoribus qui coniungunt se multitudini gratia sophismatis, hoc est ut decipiant. Quod autem istis non sit credendum, apparet, nam ex operibus possunt argui. Secundum autem quod dicit philosophus decimo Ethicorum, de his quae sunt in passionibus et actionibus sermones minus sunt credibiles operibus. Et ideo si suadeant aliquid et faciunt contrarium, magis credendum est operibus ipsorum quam persuasionibus. Quae autem et qualia sunt per quae apparenter adulatores decipiunt, dictum est prius.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit tertium elementum quod praeservat a corruptione quae est propter inordinationem vel in seipsis, vel in aliis. Et primo proponit quoddam manifestum contingens in multis. Secundo ex illo concludit elementum suum, ibi, propter quod si plures et cetera. In prima dicit, quod iterum manifestum est et potest videri quod quaedam respublicae mansivae sunt, non quia sint recte ordinatae, sicut status optimatum simplex; sed quia principantes bene utuntur, et his quae sunt in republica, et his quae sunt extra. His autem quae sunt sub republica, non faciendo iniustitiam contra illos qui sunt extra rempublicam et in vocando ad rempublicam eos qui sunt principaliores et meliores in multitudine, et non faciendo iniuriam quae est per dehonorationem his qui sunt ambitiosi honoris; vocando etiam populares ad officia et actus, in quibus possint lucrari; et in bene se habendo adinvicem et populariter, ita quod principantes aequaliter inter se recipiunt. Sicut enim populares quaerunt quod aequale et iustum est in republica illa, sic non solum iustum, sed expediens est, principantes in statu paucorum aequaliter recipere; et quando ista contingunt, dato quod respublica non sit recte ordinata, mansiva est multum.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod concludit elementum suum. Et dicit, quod propter hoc, quod similes debent aequaliter recipere, si plures sint similes et aequales in republica, plura sunt introducenda, quae in statu populari statuta sunt et ordinata. Verbi gratia, lege statutum est in statu populari, quod principatus sint breves, puta sex mensium, vel alicuius parvi temporis, et non amplioris: et istud accipiendum est, si sint plures similes in republica. Et rationem eius duplicem assignat. Prima est, quod ubi sunt similes, oportet aequaliter recipere; ergo ut omnes possint attingere ad principatum, oportet accipere legem illam: sic enim omnes poterunt attingere ad principatum; quia ex quo non durabit principatus nisi per sex menses, multi poterunt succedere in eo. Hoc autem quod similes aequaliter recipiunt, populare est; et ideo in republica in qua sunt plures similes, aliqua popularia ordinanda sunt: propter quod in talibus, in quibus sunt multi similes, fiunt duces populi, sicut dictum est prius. Alia ratio est, quia si statuatur quod principatus non duret nisi per sex menses, tunc status paucorum et optimatum minus incident in potentiam, idest in aliam speciem status paucorum, in quo valde pauci principantur, divites valde, et non secundum legem. Et ratio est, quia non est facile aliquem consimiliter malignari in pauco tempore et in multo, quoniam in statu paucorum et populi, propter hoc fiunt tyrannides. Quia aut in utraque assumuntur illi qui excellunt alios tyrannizantes; sicut in statu populari, duces populi; in statu paucorum, potentes valde: aut quia illi, qui habent principatus excellentes, multo tempore principantur.

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Deinde cum dicit salvantur autem ponit principia per quae salvantur respublicae a corruptione propinqua. Et primo ponit unum commune. Secundo ponit plura specialia, ibi, adhuc insignium contentiones et cetera. In prima dicit, quod non solum salvantur respublicae quia sunt remotae a principiis corrumpentibus ipsas; sed etiam quandoque salvantur, quia sunt prope; et hoc, quia qui timent de transmutatione reipublicae tenent eam quantum possunt. Et ideo principantes qui curam habent de republica oportet ordinare et praeparare timores, ut possint conservare rempublicam et nihil corrumpatur eorum quae ad rempublicam ordinantur: sicut debent ordinare propter conservationem reipublicae ut civitas custodiatur de nocte, et praefingere quod illud quod longe est, sit prope, ut quod inimici sint prope; et debet praecipere quod sint parati ad arma; quia cives et etiam populares videntes talia timebunt, et observabunt melius rempublicam.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc insignium ponit documenta specialia. Et est intelligendum quod respublica corrumpitur aliquando propter honores, vel inhonorationes, aliquando propter insolentias civium, aliquando propter lucrum vel damnum, aliquando propter impotentiam, aliquando corrumpitur propter ineruditionem et inassuefactionem. Et secundum hoc ista pars dividitur in quinque. In prima ponit documenta quae praeservant a corruptione quae fit propter honores vel inhonorationes. In secunda ponit documentum quod praeservat a corruptione quae fit propter insolentias civium, ibi, quoniam autem et propter proprias. In tertia ponit documentum per quod praeservatur respublica a corruptione quae fit propter damnum et lucrum, ibi, maximum autem. In quarta ponit documentum quod praeservat a corruptione quae est propter impotentia, ibi, et quod saepe dictum est. Quinto ponit documentum quod praeservat a corruptione quae accidit propter ineruditionem et inassuefactionem, ibi, et maxime quidem tentare. Prima in tres: quia respublica potest tripliciter corrumpi propter honores et inhonorationes. Primo propter contentionem eorum qui sunt honorabiles in civitate. Secundo propter distributionem honorum. Tertio propter intentum honoris praeter proportionem. Et secundum hoc dividitur in tres. In prima ponit documentum quod praeservat a corruptione quae fit propter contentionem eorum qui sunt honorabiles in civitate. Secundo ponit documentum quod praeservat a corruptione quae fit propter distributionem honorum, ibi, ad eam autem. Tertio ponit documentum quod praeservat a corruptione quae fit propter incrementum honoris praeter proportionem, ibi, commune. In prima dicit quod cum respublica aliquando corrumpatur propter contentionem insignium, et eorum qui sunt honorabiles, cavendum est per leges et per alia statuta ne accidant tales contentiones; et si acciderint, curandum est qualiter possint sedari. Similiter cavendum est, quod illi qui non sunt in contentione, non ponantur in ipsa. Ista enim est principium multorum magnorum malorum. Ad civem autem pertinet cognoscere malum in principio, non ad quemcumque alium: et ideo in principio cives debent obviare huic contentioni: quia secundum quod dictum est superius, contentiones divitum valde de facili invalescunt.

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Deinde cum dicit ad eam autem ponit secundum documentum quod praeservat a corruptione quae fit propter distributionem honorum: et dividitur in duas. In prima ponit elementum. In secunda tangit inconveniens quod accidit propter defectum huius, ex quo apparet ratio dicti, ibi, in oligarchiis enim. In prima intelligendum, quod respublica omnis in principio instituta fuit in aliquo ordine, ut quod principatus duret per annum vel biennium, et quod habentes tantas divitias, vel tantum honorati, attingant ad principatum, vel aliud huiusmodi. Contingit autem recedere ab isto ordine vel secundum excessum, vel secundum defectum: remanente tamen illa republica. Dicit igitur quod, cum in republica aliquando fiat transmutatio propter honorabilitatem, sicut in statu paucorum et republica secundum intentionem et remissionem, et hoc manente eadem republica, expedit considerare ordinem, qui nunc est in civitate, conferendo ad statum in quo respublica fuit instituta a principio: puta si in aliqua fuit institutum in principio, quod principatus duraret per annum, considerare ad istud tempus; in maioribus autem ad triennium vel ad quinque annos. Et tunc considerandum est, si excessus ab illo quod fuit a principio institutus sit multiplex, et si defectus sit submultiplex. Et si quidem recessus sit multiplex, remittendus est: et si sit defectus, intendendus est secundum proportionem debitam secundum primam institutionem, lege posita quod liceat intendere et remittere honorabilitates quando videbitur faciendum.

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Deinde cum dicit in oligarchiis ostendit inconveniens quod accidit propter defectum huiusmodi. Et dicit quod ubi ita fiat sicut dictum est in statu paucorum et respublica, continget rempublicam transmutari in paucorum potentiam; et paucorum potentiam magis remissam in speciem illam quae dicitur potentatus, in qua principantur valde divites et secundum sententias proprias, non secundum legem quae pessima est: et hoc, si fiat excessus secundum superabundantiam; si autem fiat remissio, ex republica fiet status popularis; ex paucorum vero, respublica vel popularis status.

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Deinde cum dicit commune autem ponit elementum quod praeservat a corruptione quae est propter incrementum honoris praeter proportionem: et dividitur in duas. In prima ponit documentum. In secunda adiungit aliud secundum documentum, quod praeservat a corruptione quae est propter excessum potentiae, ibi, et maxime quidem. In prima dicit quod istud est commune in statu populari et paucorum, et universaliter in omni republica ad salvationem, quod non permittatur aliquis crescere secundum aliquam dignitatem praeter proportionem vel dignitatem; sed dandi sunt parvi honores secundum multum temporis magis, quam magni valde et secundum breve tempus. Et ratio huius est: quia civitates propter huiusmodi excellentias praeter proportionem, corrumpuntur. Iterum non omnes possunt ferre bonam fortunam: hoc enim est virtuosi: sicut enim dicit philosophus in quarto Ethicorum, sine virtute non est facile ferre moderate bonas fortunas. Et ideo si dentur alicui non virtuoso honores praeter proportionem ad alios, et ad dignitatem ipsius, gravabit eos, et destruet civitatem. Si autem non fiat ita semper, sed dentur alicui a casu, vel propter aliquam causam tales honores, et simul non simul auferendi sunt omnes: sed paulatim, et secundum modica: paulatim enim adimentes nihil videbitur sibi adimere; modica enim parum reputantur.

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Deinde cum dicit et maxime ponit documentum, quod praeservat a corruptione, quae est propter excessum potentiae, propter similitudinem ad praecedens. Et dicit, quod maxime ordinandum est a legibus, vel alio quocumque convenienti, quod nullus fiat multum excellens praeter proportionem in potentia, nec amicorum, nec pecuniarum: tales enim potentiae de facili, sicut dictum est in tertio huius, possent corrumpere civitatem: si autem non sic ordinetur semper, sed contingat aliquem vel aliquos excedere alios in potentia, tunc ordinandum est, quod habeat mansionem divisam a civitate, quia tunc minus poterit gravare civitatem.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem tangit documentum, quod praeservat a corruptione, quae fit propter insolentias civitatis. Et quia exultatio et elatio propinquae sunt insolentiae, quae est ab elatione, adiungit elementum contra exultationem et elationem, ibi, et quod iucundum. In prima intelligendum est, quod vita uno modo dicitur anima, quae est principium operationis, secundum quod dicimus, anima et vita sunt idem: alio modo dicitur vita operatio, cuius anima est per se principium. Tertio modo dicitur conversatio in qua aliquis assuetus est, et quae delectat ipsum: et sic accipit hic philosophus vitam: et dicit, cum cives insolescant et declinent a republica propter proprias vitas, oportet ordinare quemdam principatum, qui consideret quis insolenter vivit in civitate, et nocivus est ad rempublicam; sicut sunt illi, qui multum expendunt in civitate et nescitur unde habeant: ut puta in statu populari, qui nocui sint: similiter etiam in statu paucorum, et sic de aliis rebuspublicis. Si enim tales dimittantur, erit detrimentum civitatis. Cum enim nimis expendant cum substantia eorum finita sit, oportebit eos iniuriari et accipere ab aliis.

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Deinde cum dicit et quod adiungit aliud documentum contra exultationem et elationem. Et dicit, quod cum per exultationem et elationem accidant dissensiones in civitate, et insolentiae, diligenti remedio providendum divisim, et sigillatim observandum est. Si enim dimittantur qualitercumque se habere, ut voluerint, in huiusmodi ludis et exultationibus, fient ad reipublicae bonum cives insolentes, et bona sua expendent secundum quod non oportet. Unde accidet, quod oportebit accipere undecumque: et propter hoc cavendum est qualiter fiant. Est autem remedium ad hoc, quod semper in huiusmodi actionibus et elationibus accipiantur partes oppositae, et virtuosi ponantur cum multitudine, ut per virtutem multitudinis excessus reprimatur. Similiter ponendi sunt pauperes cum divitibus, ut excessus eorum adinvicem reprimatur. Et si multitudo misceatur cum divitibus, adiungendi sunt medii. Et si una pars vellet excedere, alia pars cum mediis reprimet eam: per hoc enim destruuntur seditiones, quae fiunt propter inaequalitatem: quia si divites velint excedere, egeni turbantur contristantes, et seditionem procurant; per medios autem istud saepe sedatur.

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Deinde cum dicit maximum autem tangit elementum quod praeservat a corruptione quae est propter damnum et lucrum; et dividitur in duas partes. In prima ponit elementa specialia praeservantia a corruptione, quae est propter damnum et lucrum. In secunda ponit documentum magis generale, ibi, simpliciter autem quaecumque in legibus et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda ostendit quod exiguntur ad perfectionem principatus ratione cuiusdam dicti, ibi, tria autem quaedam oportet. Prima in duas. In prima ponit elementum generale quantum ad omnes respublicas. In secunda ponit elementa particularia quantum ad quasdam determinate, ibi, oportet autem in democratiis. Prima in duas. In prima ponit documentum. In secunda manifestat, ibi, hoc autem maxime in oligarchiis et cetera. In prima dicit, quod documentum maximum in omni republica ad salvandum ipsam est ordinare et videre, ne principatus sit lucrativus: quod potest exponi dupliciter. Uno modo, quod principatus non vendatur; quia si venderetur, tunc qui plus haberet in pecuniis, plus haberet de principatu, quod est inconveniens. Alio modo potest sic exponi, quod principatus non sit lucrativus, hoc est quod principans ex principatu non lucretur.

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Deinde cum dicit hoc autem manifestat ex utilitate quae sequitur in paucorum et populari statu. Et ideo primo ostendit quod huiusmodi documentum sit utile. Secundo qualiter potest fieri quod principatus non sit lucrativus, ibi, et ubi non furentur. Prima in duas. Primo manifestat ex utilitate quae sequitur in paucorum statu. Secundo ex utilitate quae sequitur in populari et optimatum statu, ibi, singulariter autem est. In prima dicit, quod istud documentum maxime expedit in paucorum statu; quia si divites principantur, et nihil lucrentur propter principatum, tunc populares si excludantur a principatu, non indignabuntur nec tristabuntur, immo gaudebunt si permittantur vacare circa propria negotia. Si autem credant quod ex principatu lucrentur aliqua furantes bona, tristabuntur propter duo. Primo, quia non participabunt principatu, et tunc reputabunt se inhonoratos. Secundo, quia non habebunt lucrum sicut alii, et tunc movebunt seditiones contra divites. Quare manifestum est, quod expedit multum in paucorum statu ordinare principantes ex principatu nihil lucrari.

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Deinde cum dicit singulariter autem manifestat ex utilitate quae sequitur in optimatum et populari statu: et dividitur in duas secundum duas utilitates quas ponit. Secunda ibi, quare accidit et cetera. In prima dicit, quod si istud statuatur, scilicet quod principantes nihil lucrentur ex principatu, contingit eamdem rempublicam simul esse optimatum et popularem: si enim hoc statutum fuerit, et insignes et divites et populares habebunt ea quae volunt habere: hoc autem pertinet ad popularem statum, scilicet quod omnibus liceat principari. Quod autem insignes principentur, pertinet ad optimatum statum. Ista autem contingent si nihil lucrentur ex principatu: quia pauperibus licebit principari: sed nolunt eo quod non est lucrum: sed magis volunt vacare circa propria negotia. Sed divites poterunt principari, quia non indigent bonis communibus, nec propter curam propriam poterunt impediri. Quare manifestum est, quod utrique habebunt quae volunt: his autem sic se habentibus, bene simul salvantur popularis et optimatum status. Quare manifestum est, quod expedit ordinare, quod principantes nihil lucrentur ex principatu.

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Deinde cum dicit quare accidet ponit secundam utilitatem. Et dicit, quod si ita ordinetur quod nihil lucrentur divites ex principatu, accidet, quod egeni erunt divites, quia poterunt curare de propriis. Insignes autem non subiicientur deterioribus. Hoc autem maxime appetunt isti, scilicet non subiici, illi vero divites fieri: quare erit pax et concordia in civitate: haec autem sunt causa salutis civitatis: quare manifestum est, quod expedit sic ordinari, quod nihil lucrentur ex ipso principatu.

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Deinde cum dicit et ubi non declarat qualiter contingit fieri principatus non lucrativos, per duo documenta. Et dicit quod ne principantes furentur bona communia, ordinandum est, quod communis pecunia tradatur in praesentia omnium civium, et quod habeantur rescripta, sive literae super his quae reponentur apud societates, vel contubernia, vel aliquas tribus: sic enim non poterunt furari de bonis communibus. Secundum documentum est, quod loco lucri ordinentur honores qui fiant eis, et reverentiae: puta si veniat ad civitatem, quod recipiatur cum magna reverentia et solemnitate: et alia huiusmodi: sic enim minus appetent bona communia.

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Deinde cum dicit oportet autem ponit elementa particularia, per quae salvantur popularis et paucorum status a corruptione quae est a divitibus et propter damnum. Et primo ponit illa documenta. Secundo declarat quod expedit utrisque, scilicet populari et paucorum statui, ibi, expedit autem. Prima in duas. Primo ponit documentum quantum ad popularem statum. Secundo quantum ad paucorum, ibi, in oligarchia autem. In prima dicit, quod ut salvetur popularis status, oportet non solum quod possessiones non sint aequales, sed plus habeant divites quam pauperes: immo etiam de fructibus oportet quod non sint aequales, sed quod plus participent divites; quia aliter divites movebunt seditionem, et contingere poterit quod corrumpetur respublica: quod patet in quibusdam rebuspublicis. Sed istud magis est ordinandum quod nullus faciat expensas et oblationes sumptuosas et non utiles, puta choreas et ludos, et aliae tales expensae debent prohiberi in civitate et consimiles, quia non sunt utiles, immo sunt nocivae.

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Deinde cum dicit in oligarchia ponit documentum quantum ad paucorum statum: et ostendit quid oportet facere ne pauperes moveantur contra divites. Et dicit, quod in paucorum statu oportet principantes habere multam curam de pauperibus, et est expediens ut dentur eis principatus, ex quibus possint aliqua habere. Et si aliquis dives iniuriatus fuerit alicui pauperi, magis puniatur quam si alicui diviti: sic enim non facient pauperes seditiones contra divites. Iterum oportet ordinare, quod haereditates perpetuo distribuantur, et secundum genus, non secundum dominationem, et ad tempus. Et oportet ordinare, quod unus non habeat plures haereditates quam unam. Et ratio huius est, quia sic possessiones erunt magis aequales (quod appetunt populares) et plures pauperes poterunt ad abundantiam necessariorum pertingere; et si sic fiat, salvabitur magis paucorum status.

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Deinde cum dicit expedit autem ostendit quid expedit communiter in utraque republica: et dicit, quod hoc expedit in populari et paucorum statu, quod si bona aliquorum per sententiam alicuius magistratus in communi distribui debent, distribuantur illa plus illis qui non attingunt ad rempublicam; in populari statu quidem divitibus, in paucorum vero statu pauperibus. Verumtamen si magistratus sint in quibus sit plurimum auctoritatis, non debent distribui illis qui non attingunt ad principatum in populari statu, scilicet divitibus; sed debent attribui divitibus in paucorum, multitudini in populari. Sed in omnibus aliis istud habet veritatem, quod quae veniunt ad commune, debent distribui his qui attingunt ad rempublicam: sic enim optime salvabitur utraque respublica.

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Deinde cum dicit tria autem declarat quae requiruntur ad perfectionem principantis in principali principatu. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo movet quasdam dubitationes, ibi, habet autem dubitationem. In prima dicit, quod debentem perfecte principari principali principatu, tria oportet habere. Primum est amor principatus: oportet enim, si perfecte debeat principari, quod diligat principatum. Et ratio huius est, quia perfecte principans debet habere prudentiam; quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Princeps autem cum habet regere alios, oportet quod habeat rectam rationem de agibilibus. Quare oportet quod habeat prudentiam perfectam. Sed prudentiam non potest habere, nisi habeat appetitum rectum ad finem; hoc autem non potest esse, nisi diligat finem, et ea quae sunt ad finem, secundum quod huiusmodi principatus principium est eorum quae ordinantur ad finem reipublicae. Quare manifestum est, quod bene principantem oportet habere amorem ad principatum et rempublicam. Secundo oportet, quod habeat potentiam respectu operum principantis, quae maxima sunt. Et hoc patet: princeps enim habet dirigere in finem reipublicae subditos. Inter autem subditos, quidam sunt bene persuasibiles ratione; et quantum ad tales non est opus coactione: alii autem sunt, quibus non de facili suadetur a ratione, sed sunt inobedientes et insolentes; et pro talibus indiget potentia coactiva: coercere autem et punire non potest, nisi habeat potentiam: quare manifestum est, quod oportet quod habeat potentiam. Tertio oportet quod habeat virtutem: et hoc apparet ex dictis: oportet enim principantem habere prudentiam: hoc autem non est, nisi habeat appetitum rectum. Sed rectitudo appetitus est per virtutem moralem. Quare oportet, quod habeat virtutem et iustitiam secundum quamlibet rempublicam. In qualibet enim republica intenditur aequale secundum aliquam dignitatem propriam ei: et ideo in unaquaque republica oportet esse iustitiam secundum illam rempublicam. Et dico secundum illam rempublicam: quia non est eadem iustitia secundum unamquamque. Et hoc apparet: ratio enim habitus ex obiecto sumitur: obiectum vero iustitiae iustum est: ergo ratio iustitiae sumitur ex ratione iusti. Sed iustum non est idem secundum unamquamque politiam, sed sunt diversae differentiae eius: ergo iustitia non erit eadem secundum unamquamque rempublicam, sed erunt diversae differentiae illius.

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Deinde cum dicit habet autem movet dubitationes; et dividitur in duas, secundum quod movet duas. Secunda ibi, dubitabit autem utique et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima movet dubitationem. In secunda solvit, ibi, videtur autem oportere et cetera. In prima dicit, quod dubitationem habet, si unus et idem non habeat ista omnia; sed unus habeat unum tantum, alius aliud; cui attribuetur principatus? Verbi gratia si sit unus qui habeat potentiam militarem, sed sit sine virtute, nequam et reipublicae inimicus; alius autem qui sit virtuosus, et diligat rempublicam: impotens autem, cui attribuetur principatus? Utrum ei qui habet potentiam militarem, sed est sine virtute et nequitiosus, et non diligat principatum; aut ei qui virtutem habet et diligit principatum, sed non est militaris?

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Deinde cum dicit videtur autem solvit istam dubitationem; et dicit, quod in electione principis oportet considerare ad duo: scilicet ad illud quo plus possunt cives attingere ad finem principatus, et ad illud quo minus. Et ratio huius est, quia principatus rationem sumit ex fine; et ea quae sunt ad finem rationem sumunt ex fine. Et ideo ille est assumendus in principem, qui habet illud secundum quod possunt magis pertingere ad finem reipublicae. Et propter hoc in militia sive ducatu exercitus magis considerandum est ad experientiam quam ad virtutem. Quia per experientiam in armis, possunt magis pertingere ad finem reipublicae quam per virtutem. Virtuosi autem minus experti sunt, ut frequenter, in talibus, sunt tamen meliores multum. Et ideo ad talem principatum magis debet eligi ille qui habet experientiam cum sola prudentia imperfecta, quam ille qui habet virtutem perfectam et non habet experientiam. Sed in custodia sive in regimine civitatis et in administratione aerarii, debet eligi ille qui habet virtutem; quia in tali principatu requiritur magis virtus quam experientia quam multi habent. Scientia autem est communis omnibus: oportet enim quod habeant scientiam principes et in ducatu exercitus, et in regimine civitatis: aliter enim non possunt dirigere in finem intentum ea quae sunt ad finem.

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Deinde cum dicit dubitabit autem movet secundam dubitationem. Et primo movet eam. Secundo solvit, ibi, aut quia et cetera. In prima dicit, quod dubitabit aliquis, siquis diligat rempublicam et potentiam habeat, ad quid necessaria est virtus? Non enim videtur quod sit necessaria; quia per alia duo, scilicet potentiam et amorem, videtur quod possint fieri ea quaecumque expediunt ad principatum.

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Deinde cum dicit aut quia solvit dubitationem; et dicit, quod cum potentia et amore ad principatum requiritur virtus si debeat bene et perfecte regi: quia habentes potentiam civilem et amorem reipublicae, contingit esse sicut incontinentes, hoc est sic esse dispositos ad rempublicam, sicut incontinens est ad seipsum; ergo sicut erat de incontinente, sic est de istis. Nunc autem sic est quod incontinens; quamvis habeat rectum iudicium et scientiam de agibilibus et amorem sui, nihilominus tamen prosequitur concupiscentias et motus passionum. Et sic non proficit ei scientia quam habet de agibilibus. Sic igitur erit de istis, quod quamvis diligant principatum et habeant potentiam, quia tamen non habent virtutem, per quam regulent suas operationes, deficient et male se habebunt in principatu.

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Deinde cum dicit simpliciter autem dat unum documentum generale. Et dicit, quod simpliciter illa de quibus sunt leges quae conferunt ad rempublicam salvant rempublicam. Leges enim sunt de conferentibus ad rempublicam: talia vero salvant eam; et ideo de quibuscumque sunt leges salvant rempublicam.

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Deinde cum dicit et quod postquam philosophus posuit elementum per quod salvatur respublica a corruptione quae est propter lucrum, nunc ponit elementum per quod salvatur a corruptione quae est propter impotentiam. Et primo ponit elementum. Secundo adiungit aliud circa hoc propter convenientiam, ibi, praeter haec et cetera. In prima dicit, quod maximum et efficacissimum documentum ad salvandum rempublicam est procurare, ut pars illa quae diligit et vult salvationem reipublicae sit valentior et potentior quam alia quae non vult nec diligit: sic enim vel quam maxime durabit respublica.

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Deinde cum dicit praeter autem adiungit circa hoc aliud documentum contra excessum a medio. Circa quod duo facit. Primo ponit elementum. Secundo ex hoc concludit aliud quod speciale est in populari statu, ibi, peccant autem et cetera. Prima in tres. In prima ponit documentum. Secundo assignat rationem, cum dicit, multa enim et cetera. Tertio cum dicit, propter hoc etc. concludit elementum declaratum. In prima dicit, quod praeter omnia elementa quae dicta sunt, oportet non latere, scilicet quid est medium et proportionale, per quod salvatur respublica, ut conservetur et non fiat transgressio ab eo: excessus enim ab huiusmodi medio causa est transgressionis factae in pluribus.

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Deinde cum dicit multa enim assignat rationem documenti; et dicit, quod bene oportet salvare medium, quia videmus quod multa quae apparent esse popularia, corrumpunt popularem statum propter hoc quod recedunt a medio. Similiter multa sunt quae corrumpunt paucorum statum, quae videntur esse paucorum. Qui autem credunt esse virtutis opus intendere quantumcumque ea quae videntur salvare unamquamque rempublicam, puta credentes opus virtutis popularis esse quantumcumque intendere popularia, et paucorum statui intendere facientia ad statum paucorum omnia quantumcumque, declinant a medio secundum excessum et corrumpunt volentes salvare. Sicut enim est in partibus corporis, sic est in republica. Sic autem est in partibus corporis, quod est aliqua determinata commensuratio partium secundum quam partes pulcherrime se habent. Sicut naris; quae si parum transgressa est ad simum vel aquilinum, adhuc pulchra est et gratiosa in aspectu; si tamen plus declinet ad excessum vel defectum, primo contingit declinare a media ratione in qua manet forma naris. Finaliter autem tantum contingit declinare, quod non contingit remanere formam naris propter excellentiam vel defectum. Eodem modo se habet in aliis partibus corporis. Similiter se habet circa alias respublicas: contingit enim popularem et paucorum statum esse in ordine optimo secundum illas respublicas: si autem aliquis declinet, vel secundum intensionem, vel secundum remissionem, faciet rempublicam peiorem. Tantum autem poterit intendere vel remittere quod corrumpet ipsam omnino. Et sic manifestum est quod ad salvationem reipublicae oportet considerare quid est medium in quo salvatur respublica.

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Deinde cum dicit propter hoc concludit elementum iam declaratum; et dicit: propter hoc, quod quaedam popularia corrumpunt statum popularem, et quaedam ad statum paucorum pertinentia corrumpunt paucorum statum, oportet legislatorem et civem non ignorare quae et qualia pertinentia ad statum paucorum, evertant statum paucorum et popularia popularem. Nulla enim istarum potest esse sine divitibus et sine pauperibus. Sunt enim de integritate reipublicae multitudo et divitiae: propter quod si aliquis voluerit adaequare substantias omnino, et ita omnes aequaliter esse divites, non remanebit eadem respublica, sed corrumpetur. Et sic manifestum est, quod illi qui procedunt excedendo legibus ad hoc ducentibus, transmutant et corrumpunt rempublicam.

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Deinde cum dicit peccant autem ponit elementum speciale ad salvandum popularem et paucorum statum; et dicit, quod adhuc manifestum est quod in paucorum et populari statu est error. In populari quidem peccant ductores populi in statu populari, scilicet in quo tota multitudo velut monarchia quadam dominatur, non secundum legem: ductores enim pugnantes contra divites dividunt civitatem in duo: adulantes enim multitudini movent eam contra divites: hoc autem non est faciendum si debeat popularis status salvari: sed multitudo pro divitibus debet videri facere quod volunt. Sic enim salvari poterunt. In paucorum statu similiter peccat paucorum potentia opprimens multitudinem; ex quo contingit corruptio paucorum status. Et ideo si debeat salvari, oportet paucorum potentiam videri facere pro populo: et facere iuramenta contraria eis quae faciunt: consueverunt enim paucorum status potentiae cum instituuntur in principatibus iurando dicere: iuro quod populum odio habebo, et consilio annitar, ut male habeat. Similiter in populari statu, iurat populus: malignus ero divitibus et consulam quae illi mala esse sciam. Hoc autem non est faciendum. Sed oportet opinari contrarium esse faciendum, et insinuare in iuramento quod potentes paucorum non facient iniustum populo. Et populus debet iurare quod non iniuste aget contra divites.

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Deinde cum dicit maximum autem ponit elementum quod universaliter salvat rempublicam a corruptione quae est propter ineruditionem et inassuefactionem. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo reprobat quoddam observatum in populari statu, ibi, in democratiis autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod inter omnia elementa maximum et efficacissimum ad salvandam rempublicam quod modo omnes eligunt, est, scilicet erudiri in legibus et in eis quae ordinantur ad rempublicam, et assuefieri in illis. Ratio autem quare oportet assuefieri in illis, est, quia illa in quibus homines sunt assueti delectabilia sunt eis, et magis placent et magis diliguntur. Quae autem magis diliguntur, magis salvantur. Si igitur assueti fuerint homines in his quae sunt reipublicae, plus diligent et delectabuntur in illis, et sic conservabunt eam. Si autem non assueti et eruditi fuerint in republica et in legibus significantibus ordinem reipublicae, puta si degentes in paucorum statu non fuerint assueti et eruditi legibus paucorum, et populares legibus status popularis, nulla utilitas erit eis ex legibus bonis et gloriosis existentibus. Sic enim continget esse in tali civitate, in qua sunt leges optimae, et tamen cives non sunt assuefacti in illis, sicut est in incontinente. Sic autem est in incontinente, quod quamvis habeat rectum iudicium rationis aliquo modo; quia tamen sequitur impetum passionum, non proficit sibi rectitudo rationis. Similiter in proposito, quamvis civitas habeat bonas leges, si tamen non sunt cives assueti et eruditi in illis, non proficient in eis, quia non operabuntur secundum illas. Sunt autem erudiendi et assuefacere debent non in illis ad quae si possunt pertingere delectabuntur tam pauci potentes quam populares; sed in illis in quibus eruditi poterunt observare rempublicam; ut populares illis per quae poterunt vivere populares et servare popularem statum. Paucorum potentes in illis per quae poterunt observare paucorum statum, et vivere secundum illum. Nunc autem in civitatibus accidit contrarium: quia in paucorum statu, filii divitum nutriti sunt in deliciis, et inclinantur ad eas, et in illis delectantur; pauperes autem assueti sunt in laboriosis. Propter quod manifestum est quod filii divitum et pauperum volunt et possunt et magis vivere insolenter quantum ad rempublicam. Propter quod manifestum est quod in talibus non sunt erudiendi.

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Deinde cum dicit in democratiis removet errorem specialiter accidentem in populari statu. Et dividitur in duas. In prima proponit ipsum et tangit rationem eius. In secunda removet, ibi, hoc autem parvum et cetera. In prima dicit, quod in populari statu observatur aliquod quod videtur populare: scilicet quod contrarium est ei quod confert ad rempublicam, quod unusquisque vivat secundum quod voluerit. Et ratio huius est, quia male definiunt liberum. Sunt enim duo secundum quae definitus est popularis status: scilicet potestas et libertas; ut scilicet multitudo dominetur, et secundum libertatem. Illud enim iustum dicitur quod est aequale. Aequale autem videtur illud in statu populari esse quod videtur multitudini. Liberum autem dicunt quod aliquis faciat quicquid voluerit. Propter quod in populari statu quilibet vivit secundum quod vult, et secundum quod possibile est ei, et secundum quod plus abundat, ut dixit Euripides.

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Deinde cum dicit hoc autem removet istum errorem; et dicit, quod non est opinandum servitutem esse vivere secundum rempublicam; immo libertatem et salutem. Et ratio huius est, quia secundum quod vult philosophus, liberum est quod est causa sui vel in genere causae agentis vel finalis. Unumquodque autem maxime dicitur illud quod est principale in eo. In homine vero principale est intellectus. Et ideo homo est maxime intellectus vel operatur secundum intellectum; ergo homo maxime dicitur liber cum operatur secundum intellectum et rationem, et ad bonum sui secundum intellectum et rationem. Cum autem vivit secundum rempublicam operatur secundum rationem; ergo vivere secundum rempublicam non est esse in servitute, sed libertate magis. Et tunc recapitulat; et dicit, quod principia ex quibus corrumpuntur et transmutantur respublicae et principia ex quibus salvantur et mansivae sunt, tot sunt quot dicta sunt simpliciter, ut est dicere: quod dicit propter principia salvantia et corrumpentia monarchias de quibus dicetur iam.

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L. 8 (Ε.10, 1310a39–1311a22)Regni et tyrannidis origo.

Regni et tyrannidis origo.

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700. Restat autem supervenire de monarchia, ex quibus corrumpitur, et per quae salvari nata est. Fere autem consimilia dictis circa politias, sunt et quae accidunt circa regna et tyrannides: regnum enim secundum aristocratiam est, tyrannis autem ex oligarchia extrema componitur, et democratia: propter quod utique et maxime nociva subditis est, veluti ex duabus malis composita, et transgressiones et peccata habens quae ab ambabus politiis.

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701. Existit autem generatio mox ex contrariis utrique monarchiarum. Regnum quidem enim ad auxilium quod a populo epiichis factum est, et instituitur rex unus epiichorum secundum excessum virtutis, vel actionum quae a virtute, vel secundum excessum talis generis.

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702. Tyrannus autem ex populo et multitudine ad insignes, quatenus populus nihil molestetur ab ipsis. Manifestum autem ex iis, quae acciderunt: fere enim plurimi tyrannorum facti fuerunt ex demagogis, uti est dicere credibiles facti ex contrariari insignibus. Haec quidem enim hoc modo constituerunt tyrannides iam civitatibus augmentatis.

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703. Quae autem ante istas, ex regibus transgredientibus patria magis despoticum principatum appetentibus. Hae autem ex electis ad principales principatus: antiquitus enim populi instituerunt multi temporis conditores populi et prospectores. Hae autem ex oligarchiis eligentibus unum aliquem dominum ad maximos principatus.

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704. Omnibus enim inerat modis iis ad efficere de facili, si solum voluissent, propter potentiam praeexistere: iis quidem regalis principatus, iis autem eam quae honoris. Phidon quidem circa Argum et alii tyranni constiterunt regno existente: qui autem circa Ioniam, et Phalaris ex honoribus. Panaetius autem in Leontinis et Cypselus in Corintho, et Pisistratus Athenis, et Dionysius in Syracusis, et alii eodem modo ex demagogis.

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705. Sicut diximus enim, regnum institutum fuit secundum aristocratiam: secundum dignitate enim est, vel secundum genus, vel secundum beneficium, vel secundum haec et potentiam. Omnes enim cum beneficiassent, vel potentes beneficiare civitates vel gentes, adepti sunt honorem hunc: ii quidem secundum bellum prohibentes servire: sicut Codrus: ii autem liberantes, sicut Cyrus; vel cum instituissent regionem, sicut Lacedaemoniorum reges, et Macedonum, et Molossorum.

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706. Vult enim rex esse custos, ut quidem qui possident substantias nihil iniustum patiatur populus autem nullam sustineat iniuriam.

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707. Tyrannus autem, sicut dictum est, saepe autem nihil commune respicit nisi propriae utilitatis gratia. Est autem intentio tyrannica quidem, quod delectabile; regalis autem, quod bonum.

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708. Propter quod in supergressionum, quae quidem pecuniarum, tyrannicae; uae autem ad honorem, regales magis. Et custodia regalis quidem, civilis; tyrannica autem per extraneos.

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709. Quod autem tyrannis habeat mala, et quae democratiae et quae oligarchiae manifestum. Ex oligarchia quidem, eo quod finis sit divitiae; sic enim solum et permanere necessarium custodiam et delitias: et multitudini nihil credere: propter quod et ablationem faciunt armorum. Et suspectam habere turbam, et a munitione repellere, et demorari in domo commune est ambarum et oligarchiae et tyrannidis.

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710. Ex democratia autem, et oppugnare insignes et corrumpere occulte et manifeste, et fugare, tamquam contra machinantes et impeditores adversus principatus; ex iis enim accidit fieri et insidias, iis quidem principari volentibus: unde et Periandri ad Thrasybulum consilium fuit, excedentium spicarum evulsio, quasi opportunum sit semper excedentes perimere.

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Postquam philosophus determinavit causas et principia corruptionis et salvationis rerumpublicarum in quibus plures dominantur, determinat causas et principia corruptionis et salvationis, in quibus unus dominatur, sicut sunt monarchiae. Et dividitur in duas. In prima determinat quae sunt causae et principia corruptionis et salvationis rerumpublicarum monarchiarum. In secunda ostendit quae illarum est minoris durationis, ibi, atqui omnium et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima praemittit intentum suum. In secunda prosequitur, ibi, existit autem generatio et cetera. In prima dicit, quod postquam determinatum est quae sunt principia salvationis et corruptionis rerumpublicarum in quibus plures dominantur, restat consequenter considerandum de monarchia, quae scilicet sunt causae et principia ex quibus corrumpitur, et quae sunt principia et causae ex quibus nata est salvari. Illa autem quae accidunt circa monarchiam regalem et tyrannidem, sunt similia eis quae dicta sunt de aliis rebuspublicis. Nam regnum congruit statui optimatum. Sicut enim assumitur princeps secundum virtutem in statu optimatum, sic in regno. Tyrannis autem componitur ex statu paucorum ultimo, qui est pessimus inter omnes paucorum status, et populari statu ultimo, qui similiter pessimus est inter omnes populares status: propter quod tyrannis ipsa multum nociva est subditis, cum sit composita ex duobus malis, et habeat peccata et transgressiones utriusque illarum.

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Deinde cum dicit existit autem prosequitur; et dividitur in duas. In prima praemittit quiddam de istis monarchiis, quarum quaedam dicta sunt prius. In secunda prosequitur de causis corruptionis et salvationis ipsarum cum dicit, sicut igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit ex quibus componitur utraque monarchia. Secundo declarat quoddam dictum de tyrannide, ibi, quod autem tyrannis et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima facit quod dictum est. In secunda ostendit quid intenditur in utraque, cum dicit: tyrannis autem et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima declarat ex quibus componitur utraque monarchia, ut appareat ex quibus corrumpitur et salvatur. In secunda declarat quoddam dictum, ibi, sicut autem diximus et cetera. Adhuc prima in duas. In prima ostendit ex quibus componitur regnum. In secunda ex quibus tyrannis, ibi, tyrannis vero et cetera. In prima dicit quod utraque monarchia ex contrariis generatur. Regnum enim factum est propter auxilium bonorum contra multitudinem, ne multitudo gravaret ipsos studiosos; et assumitur rex ex virtuosis excedens secundum virtutem vel in opere virtutis; vel assumitur secundum nobilitatem generis ne isti graventur a multitudine.

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Deinde cum dicit tyrannus autem ostendit ex quibus generatur tyrannis. Et primo ex quibus nunc generatur. Secundo ex quibus generabatur, ibi, quae autem ante et cetera. Dicit igitur quod tyrannus assumptus est a populo, et ex populo et multitudine contra divites et insignes, ne populus molestetur a divitibus: hoc autem manifestum est ex his quae contigerunt. Plures enim tyranni, ut est dicere, facti sunt ex his qui erant ductores populi, quibus multum credebat populus eo quod libenter imponebant crimina divitibus calumniantes eosdem: huiusmodi autem tyrannides augmentatis civitatibus factae fuerunt.

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Deinde cum dicit quae autem ostendit ex quibus generabatur prius. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo facilem modum generationis ipsius ex praedictis tangit, ibi, omnibus enim inerat modis et cetera. In prima dicit, quod antiquitus tyrannides quae factae fuerunt ante istas, quaedam factae fuerunt ex regibus qui leges et consuetudines paternas in quibus nutriti fuerant transgrediebantur; et qui magis volebant principari principatu dominativo, qui est domini ad servum, volentes uti subditis tamquam servis. Contigit enim quod aliquis secundum hunc modum existens incepit tyrannizare et opprimere subditos, et sic ex rege factus fuit tyrannus. Aliquando autem fuit facta tyrannis ex eis qui electi fuerant ad principatus excellentiores et potentiores. Antiquitus enim populus instituit multos principantes et perspectores populi sive rectores. Et istis autem contingebat aliquos magis perversos trahere ad se dominium civitatis et tyrannizare. Aliquando etiam facta fuit tyrannis ex paucorum potentia, viris eligentibus unum potentem ad principatus maximos, qui postmodum tyrannizabat. Omnibus istis modis fiebat antiquitus tyrannis.

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Deinde cum dicit omnibus enim tangit facilem modum generationis ipsius tyrannidis. Et dicit, quod huiusmodi tyrannides de facili poterant fieri ex praedictis, quia potentiam habebant. Quidam enim principabantur principatu regali. Et manifestum est quod tales potentiam habebant, propter quod de facili poterant fieri tyranni. Alii autem principabantur principatu qui est secundum aliquam honorabilitatem. Tales etiam potentiam habebant; ideo de facili poterant tyrannizare. Et exemplificat. Quidam enim qui dicebatur Phidon apud Argum fuit tyrannus, et quidam alii similiter principantes ex principatu regali. Illi autem qui tyrannizaverunt circa Ioniam et Phalaris assumpti fuerunt ex statu paucorum principatibus honorabilibus. Sed Panaetius qui tyrannizavit in Leontinis et Cypselus qui in Corintho et Pisistratus qui Athenis et Dionysius qui Syracusis et alii qui eodem modo fuerunt tyranni, fuerunt prius duces ex favore populorum. Isti enim potentiam habebant. Quare manifestum est, quod facile fuit istos esse tyrannos propter potentiam quam habebant.

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Deinde cum dicit sicut diximus probat quoddam dictum. Dixerat enim quod regnum est institutum secundum statum optimatum: hoc probatur. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo ostendit quod est officium regis, ibi, vult enim rex et cetera. In prima dicit, quod sicut dictum est prius, regnum est institutum secundum statum optimatum. Et hoc apparet, quia institutum est secundum dignitatem vel virtutis, vel generis, vel propter beneficium impensum regioni, vel propter ista simul et potentiam. Et hoc apparet, quia omnes antiqui reges, ut ita dicatur, cum fecissent aliquod beneficium civitati vel genti regionis, vel qui potentes fuerant beneficiare, istum honorem receperunt quod assumpti fuerunt in regem: quidam enim, sicut Codrus qui praeliatus fuit contra adversarios civitatis et prohibuit ne servi essent illis, factus fuit rex. Alii autem quia liberaverunt a servitute; sicut Cyrus factus fuit rex Persarum, quia liberavit a servitute regis Chaldaeorum. Alii quia civitatem constituerunt; alii quia acquisierunt regionem, sicut reges Lacedaemoniorum, et Macedonum, et Molossorum.

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Deinde cum dicit vult enim ostendit quod est officium regis. Et dicit, quod officium regis est esse custodem iustitiae. Et vult custos esse iusti. Et ideo recurrere ad regem est recurrere ad iustum animatum. Et hoc apparet, quia rex intendit bonum commune custodire et servare. Haec autem non potest nisi sit custos iusti. Et ideo officium suum est, ut sit custos iusti; ita quod habentes possessiones et divitias nullam iniustitiam patiantur a non habentibus, nec populus sustineat aliquam iniuriam a divitibus.

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Deinde cum dicit tyrannus autem ostendit quis est finis in utraque monarchia: ex quo apparet una differentia inter ipsas. Et primo ostendit quid utraque intendit. Secundo manifestat per effectus, ibi, propter quod supergressionum et cetera. In prima dicit, quod tyrannus non intendit bonum commune, sed intendit proprium. Et ratio huius est, quia tyrannus intendit delectationem secundum sensum; et ideo appetit illud per quod existimat se habere eam: hoc autem est superexcessus pecuniarum: propter quod intendit pecunias acquirere, credit enim per pecunias habere omnia: rex autem intendit bonum commune. Illum enim dicimus regem qui principatur propter bonum multitudinis. Talem autem oportet esse virtuosum, et ita nolle iniuriari subditis. Oportet ipsum esse divitem, ne aliquid iniuste accipere a subditis compellatur.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod manifestat quod dictum est, per effectus. Et dicit, quod propter hoc quod tyrannus appetit delectationes propter quas appetit pecunias, manifestum est quod excessus insuper accipiendo pecunias, tyrannici sunt. Intendunt enim tyranni bonum proprium non commune. Sed supergressiones honorum regales sunt magis. Et ratio huius est, quia rex debet esse excellens secundum virtutem, excellentiae vero virtutis debetur excellentia honoris. Et ideo ad regem pertinet habere excellentes honores; et magis supergressionem honorum quam pecuniarum. E contrario autem est in tyranno. Et propter hoc idem etiam custodia regalis est civilis, sed tyrannica est per extraneos. Et ratio huius est, quia rex dominatur subditis illis volentibus. Et ideo confidit de ipsis, propter quod custoditur ab eis; tyrannus autem cum opprimat eos, dominatur eis illis nolentibus; et ideo non confidit in eis, propter quod custoditur ab extraneis. Posset etiam aliter introduci illa pars tyrannus autem ut diceret quod intendit assignare differentias inter regnum et tyrannidem; et dividitur in tres propter tres differentias quas ponit.

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Deinde cum dicit quod autem manifestat quoddam dictum de tyrannide. Prius enim dictum fuit quod componitur ex duobus malis: hoc declarat. Et primo declarat quae mala habet ex statu paucorum. Secundo quae mala habet ex statu populari, ibi, ex democratia autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod manifestum est quod tyrannis accipit mala quae sunt in statu paucorum et multitudinis. Ex statu paucorum mala haec habet: quia sicut finis status paucorum sunt divitiae, sic etiam in tyrannide. Sicut enim dominans in statu paucorum finaliter intendit divitias, sic tyrannus. Item tyrannus est sicut solus sine amicis, sicut dominans in statu paucorum. Isti enim, quia opprimunt multitudinem odio habentur; et ideo sunt soli sine amicis; sic tyrannus solus est, quia non habet amicos. Item sicut oportet dominantes in paucis habere custodiam, quia multos inimicos habent, et sunt sine amicis, sic oportet tyrannum custodiam habere: et quia hoc non potest sine divitiis: ideo intendit divitias. Item oportet ipsum non credere multitudini sicut potentatus paucorum: cum enim odio habeatur a multitudine, non confidit in ipsa; et ideo non credit eidem; et propter hoc prohibet multitudinem non habere arma, sicut potentes paucorum, ne possit insurgere contra ipsum. Item habet turbam suspectam; et ideo expellit eos a munitionibus et ponit extraneos in eisdem. Item compellit eos morari in domo et non habere societatem adinvicem, ne possint machinari aliquid contra ipsum. Ista igitur omnia mala communia sunt potentiae paucorum et tyrannidis.

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Consequenter cum dicit ex democratia ostendit quae mala habet ex populari statu; et dicit, quod ex populari statu habet ista mala: scilicet impugnare divites et insignes interficere: et hoc manifeste et occulte: utroque enim modo tyrannus persequitur insignes. Et habet ex statu populari pugnare et relegare eos tamquam illos qui machinantur et insidias praeparant contra principatum. A divitibus enim et insignibus fiunt machinationes et procurantur dissensiones, quandoque a quibusdam, quia volunt principari; a quibusdam vero, quia procurant forte aliquos principari, non volentes sibi obtinere principatum. Unde tyranni, multum quandoque eos persequuntur. Unde Periander dedit consilium Thrasybulo tyranno qualiter principatus suus duraret: habuit enim consilio ab eodem, sicut dictum fuit in tertio huius, opportunum esse excedentes spicas evellere: per quod innuebatur quod divites et insignes oportet interimere.

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L. 9 (Ε.10, 1311a22–1312a20)Quibus ex causis tyrannides et regna dissolvantur.

Quibus ex causis tyrannides et regna dissolvantur.

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711. Sicut igitur fere dictum est, transmutationum ipsa principia oportet putare circa politias esse et circa monarchias. Propter iniustitiam enim et propter timorem et propter contemptum multi subditorum insurgunt adversus monarchias. Iniustitiae autem maxime propter iniuriam, aliquando autem et propter propriorum spoliationem. Sunt autem et fines iidem, quaemadmodum ibi et circa tyrannides, et circa regna. Magnitudo enim divitiarum et honoris existit monarchis quae desiderant omnes.

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712. Insurrectionum autem, hae quidem ad corpus fiunt principantium, hae autem ad principatum. Quae quidem igitur propter contumeliam, ad corpus. Contumelia autem existente multarum partium, quaelibet ipsarum fit causa irae. Iratorum autem fere plurimi punitionis gratia insurgunt, sed non excellentiae.

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713. Velut Pisistratidarum quidem propter propulsasse Armodii sororem, et illusisse Armodio. Armodius quidem enim propter sororem, Aristogiton autem propter Armodium.

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714. Insidiati sunt autem Periandro ei, qui in Ambracia, tyranno, quia simul bibens ipse cum pueris interrogavit ipse, si iam ex ipso praegnantes sunt.

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715. Quae autem Philippi a Pausania, quia permisit contumeliam pati ipsum sub Attalo.

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716. Et quae Amyntae parvi Hypoderda, quia insultavit ad staturam ipsius.

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717. Et quae Eunuchi Evagorae Cyprio: quia enim mulier recusavit filium ipsius, occidit tamquam contumeliam passus.

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718. Multae autem insurrectiones factae sunt et propterea quod aliqui monarcharum in corpus verecundiam fecerunt.

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719. Velut et quae Crataei ad Archelaum, semper enim graviter se habebat ad colloquium: quare sufficiens et minor fuit occasio propterea, quod filiarum nullam dedit cum promisisset ipsi, sed priorem quidem detinens a bello adversus Syriam et Arabeum dedit regi Elibeae, iuniorem autem filio Amintae, existimans sic utique illum nihil differre, et eum qui ex Cleopatra; sed abalienationis principium extitit graviter ferre ad veneream gratiam.

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720. Cum insurrexit autem et Hellanocrates Larissaeus propter eandem causam: tamquam enim utens statura ipsius non deduxit spondens, propter contumeliam, et non propter amativam concupiscentiam, putavit esse factam colloquutionem.

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721. Pharon autem et Heraclides Aenii Cotyn peremerunt, supplicium inferentes.

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722. Adamus autem discessit a Cotyo, quia puer existens excisus fuit ab ipso, tamquam iniuriam passus.

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723. Multi autem et propterea quod in corpus afflicti fuerunt percussionibus, irati, ii quidem destruxerunt, hi autem aggressi sunt tamquam iniuriam passi, et ea quae circa principatus et regales potentatus.

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724. Velut in Mytilene Pentalidas circumstantes et verberantes Megecles insurgens cum amicis peremit.

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725. Et posterius Smerdes Penthilum, cum plagas accepisset, et ab uxore extractus, peremit.

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726. Et insurrectionis Archelae Decamnichus dux fuit, exacerbans insurgentes primus: causa autem irae, quia ipsum tradidit flagellandum Euripidi poetae. Euripides autem infremuit cum dixisset ipse aliquid adversus foetorem oris. Et alii autem multi propter tales causas, ii quidem perempti sunt, ii autem insidias passi sunt.

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727. Similiter autem, et propter timorem: unum enim aliquid erat hoc causarum, sicut politias et monarchias: velut Xerxen Artabanes timens criminationem, quae circa Darium, quia suspendit cum non iussisset Xerses, sed putans indulgeri tamquam non memorantem propter coenam.

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728. Hoc autem propter contemptum, sicut Sardanapalum videns quidam percutientem se cum mulieribus, si vere hoc fabulantes dicunt; si autem non de illo, sed de alio erit utique hoc verum. Et Dionysio posteriori Dion insurrexit propter despectionem, videns cives sic se habentes, et ipsum semper ebrium.

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729. Et amicorum autem quidam insurgunt propter despectionem, propter confidere enim contemnunt, tamquam oblituri. Et putantes posse obtinere principatum, modo quodam propter contemnere insurgunt; tamquam potentes enim et contemnentes periculum propter potentiam invadunt de facili, sicut ducentes exercitus monarchis, sicut Cyrus Astyagi, et vitam contemnens et potentiam, propter potentiam quidem inoperosam fuisse, ipsum autem delitiari. Et Seuthes thrax Amadoco existens dux exercitus. Ii autem et propter plura horum insurgunt, ut et despicientes, et propter lucrum, sicut Ariobarzani Mithridates.

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730. Maxime autem propter hanc causam invadunt, qui quidem natura audaces et honorem habent bellicum a monarchis: virilitas enim potentiam habens audax est: propter quas ambas tamquam de facili praevalituri faciunt insurrectiones.

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Postquam philosophus praemisit quaedam de monarchia; prosequitur de causis et principiis corrumpentibus et salvantibus ipsas. Et primo de corrumpentibus. Secundo de salvantibus, ibi, salvantur autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima determinat de principiis corrumpentibus ipsas in universali. Secundo determinat de principiis corrumpentibus in speciali, ibi, corrumpuntur autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima proponit principia corruptionis in universali. Secundo prosequitur in speciali magis, ibi, insurrectionum autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod sicut dictum est prius, principia fere transmutationis et corruptionis rerumpublicarum eadem sunt cum principiis transmutationis et corruptionis monarchiarum: nam regnum est secundum statum optimatum; et ideo quae sunt principia corruptionis status optimatum, sunt principia corruptionis monarchiae regalis. Tyrannis enim est secundum statum paucorum et popularem ultimum; et ideo quae corrumpunt illos, corrumpunt tyrannidem. Principia autem corrumpentia monarchias sunt tria: contumelia, metus et contemptus. Propter enim contumeliam et timorem et contemptum insurgunt subditi contra monarchias. Sunt autem aliquando contumeliae propter iniuriam, quae scilicet est in persona; aliquando vero sunt per subtractionem bonorum propriorum. Item monarchiarum et rerumpublicarum praedictarum prius sunt iidem fines. Sicut enim intenduntur divitiarum multitudo et magnitudo in illis, sic intenditur magnitudo divitiarum in tyrannide et magnitudo honoris in regno. Ista autem omnes appetunt; et ideo aliquando fit iniuria propter corruptionem.

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Deinde cum dicit insurrectionum autem prosequitur de istis causis et principiis corruptionis monarchiarum. Et primo prosequitur de illis quae sunt principia corruptionis per se. Secundo adiungit unum principium per accidens, ibi, eorum autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima determinat causas insurrectionis. In secunda ostendit qui maxime insurgunt propter tales causas, ibi, maxime autem et cetera. Prima in tres. In prima declarat qualiter aliquando fiunt insurrectiones contra monarchas propter iniustitiam. Secundo qualiter propter timorem, ibi, similiter autem et cetera. Tertio qualiter propter contemptum, ibi, hoc autem propter. Prima in duas. Primo enim declarat quod aliquando fit insurrectio contra monarchiam propter iniuriam quae est contumelia. Secundo quod propter afflictionem corporis, ibi, multi autem propter. Prima in duas. In prima proponens distinctionem insurrectionis, assignat rationem, quare contumelia affecti insurgunt in corpus. In secunda declarat per exempla, ibi, velut Pisistratidarum. In prima dicit, quod aliquando insurrectiones fiunt in monarchiis in corpus principantium, aliquando contra principatum: et quae fiunt propter contumeliam fiunt contra corpus. Et hoc patet: quia cum sint multae partes contumeliae, quaelibet est inductiva irae, ut apparet secundo rhetoricae. Irati autem fere moventur propter punitionem personalem magis quam propter depositionem a principatu; et ideo manifestum est, quod insurrectiones quae fiunt per contumeliam, sunt in corpus, non contra principatum.

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Deinde cum dicit velut Pisistratidarum manifestat per exempla. Et primo de contumelia in personam coniunctam qualiter sit causa insurrectionis in corpus monarchae. Secundo de contumelia in personam propriam, ibi, multae autem. Primum declarat per quinque exempla, et secundum hoc habet quinque partes. Secunda ibi, insidiati autem sunt Periandro. Tertia ibi, quae autem Philippi. Quarta ibi, et quae Amyntae. Quinta ibi, et quae eunuchi et cetera. In prima dicit: ita dictum est, quod fit insurrectio contra personam coniunctam monarchiae: sicut fuit insurrectio contra filios Pisistrati: nam cum contumeliam intulissent sorori Armodii, et ulterius ipsum Armodium compellassent, Armodius propter sororis contumeliam et Aristogiton propter Armodium contra illos insurrexerunt. Et sic patet quod facta fuit insurrectio propter contumeliam in personam coniunctam.

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Deinde cum dicit insidiati sunt ponit secundum exemplum; et dicit, quod quidam qui habitabant in Ambracia insidiati sunt cuidam qui dicebatur Periander: quia iste Periander cum quadam vice biberet cum filiis illorum, dixit illis pueris, si erant praegnantes ex ipso: ipse enim forte abutebatur eis; et ideo innuebat quod illis pueris fuisset abusus; et ideo quaerebat si ex ipso erant praegnantes: tunc alii moti propter contumeliam puerorum insurrexerunt contra Periandrum.

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Deinde cum dicit quae autem ponit tertium exemplum; et dicit, quod insurrectio quae fuit contra Philippum regem Macedoniae, facta a quodam qui dicebatur Pausanias, facta fuit, quia Philippus permisit Pausaniam contumeliam pati a quodam Attalo qui erat coniunctus eidem Philippo vel consanguinitate vel officio. Fuit autem iste Philippus rex Macedoniae, pater Alexandri magni.

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Deinde cum dicit et quae Amyntae ponit quartum exemplum; et dicit, quod Amyntas occisus est a Darda, quia iactaret se in illius aetatem et statum eius irrideret quod erat passus.

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Deinde cum dicit et quae eunuchi ponit quintum exemplum; et dicit, quod Evagoras Cyprius insurrexit contra eunuchum regem, quia eius filiam in concubinam elegerat, et interfecit illum. Sic igitur apparet ex istis, quod contumelia facta in personam coniunctam causa est insurrectionis contra personam monarchae.

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Deinde cum dicit multae autem declarat quod contumelia facta in personam propriam causa est insurrectionis contra personam monarchae. Et primo proponit. Secundo probat per exempla, ibi, velut et quae Crataei et cetera. Adhuc secunda dividitur in quatuor, secundum quod declarat per quatuor exempla. Secunda ibi, cum insurrexit autem et cetera. Tertia ibi, Pharon autem. Quarta ibi, adamas autem. In prima dicit, quod multae insurrectiones factae sunt contra monarchas, quia faciebant contra contumeliam vel verecundiam in personam alicuius.

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Deinde cum dicit velut et quae declarat; et dicit: ita dictum est, propter contumeliam factam in personam propriam fiunt insurrectiones; sicut fuit facta insurrectio Crataei contra Archelaum. Iste enim Archelaus graviter se habebat ad Crataeum colloquendo et conversando. Causa enim quam praetendebat, etsi ut sufficiens proponebatur, minor tamen fuit et occasionalis magis: scilicet quia Archelaus cum promisisset Crataeo dare unam de filiabus suis, nullam voluit dare, sed filiam primogenitam post bellum quod habuit contra Syriam et Arabiam, dedit cuidam regi qui dicebatur Elibeas, filiam minorem dedit filio Amyntae: credens quod cum ille esset filius Cleopatrae, non esset adversaturus. Ista enim causa insurrectionis praetendebatur: sed causa principalis et principium inimicitiae et separationis ab eo fuit, quia volebat eum ad concubitum inducere.

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Deinde cum dicit cum insurrexit ponit secundum exemplum; et dicit quod Hellanocrates Larissaeus insurrexit contra eumdem Archelaum propter causam eamdem. Cum enim sicut promiserat, eum non deduceret et abuteretur aetate ipsius, credidit quod hoc faceret propter contumeliam et non propter amicitiam; et ideo insurrexit contra eumdem.

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Deinde cum dicit Pharon autem ponit tertium exemplum; et dicit, quod Pharon et Heraclides insurrexerunt contra Aenii Cotyn et inferentes supplicium patri interfecerunt eum. Et hoc fuit propter contumeliam eis factam a filio illius.

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Deinde cum dicit adamas autem ponit quartum exemplum; et dicit, quod adamas recessit a Cotyo monarcha, quia cum esset puer ille Cotys castravit eum, et tunc adamas propter iniuriam, quam passus fuerat, insurrexit contra illum.

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Deinde cum dicit multi autem ostendit quod quandoque fit insurrectio propter afflictionem in corpore; et dividitur in partes duas. In prima proponit. In secunda manifestat cum dicit, ut Megacles et cetera. In prima dicit, quod multi qui afflicti fuerant in corporibus sustinentes percussiones vel vulnera insurgentes contra ipsum monarcham destruxerunt sive interfecerunt. Alii passi iniuriam propter talem afflictionem, invaserunt principatum et potentatum.

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Deinde cum dicit velut Megacles manifestat quod dixit; et dividitur in tres; secundum quod manifestat per tria exempla. Secunda ibi, et posterius et cetera. Tertia ibi, et insurrectionis Archelai et cetera. In prima dicit, ita dictum est quod fiunt insurrectiones propter afflictionem. Sicut enim in Mytilene insula Megacles insurrexit contra quosdam convicinos suos et circumstantes, propter hoc quod manus iniecerunt in eum, clavis pulsantes et verberantes eumdem, propter quod cum amicis suis interfecit eos.

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Deinde cum dicit et posterius ponit secundum exemplum; et dicit, quod postmodum cum Smerdes a Penthilo fuisset verberatus et caesus ab uxore eius evasisset, insurrexit contra illum et interfecit eum.

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Deinde cum dicit et insurrectionis ponit tertium exemplum; et dicit, quod Decamnichus fuit dux et causa principalis insurrectionis, quae fuit facta contra Archelaum, et fuit primus exacerbans et commovens illos qui insurrexerunt in ipsum. Causa autem irae quare alii insurrexerunt et ipse insurrexit, fuit, quia Archelaus tradidit eum flagellandum Euripidi poetae, qui contra ipsum iratus infremuit, quia Decamnichus dixit quod os habebat foetidum: propter hoc motus Euripides flagellavit Decamnichum; quod fuit causa irae. Propter quod insurrexit ipse contra Archelaum. Sic igitur multi insurrexerunt propter tales causas; et quidam ipsorum interfecti sunt, alii graves insidias et turbationes passi sunt.

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Deinde cum dicit similiter autem declarat quod aliquando fit insurrectio propter timorem; et dicit, quod sicut fit insurrectio propter iniuriam, sic aliquando fit propter timorem. Timor enim est una de numero causarum insurrectionis, sicut iniuria contra monarchas: sicut Artabanes voluit repellere Xerxen a principatu monarchico, quia timebat ipsum propter crimen quod commiserat contra Darium, quia suspenderat quemdam notum eius, quamvis Xerses non praecepisset, sed credebat quod indulgeret eidem non memorans factum post comestionem, sed cum recoluisset et voluisset punire ipsum, timens punitionem insurrexit contra eum.

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Deinde cum dicit hoc autem declarat, quod aliquando fit insurrectio propter contemptum. Et primo facit hoc in universali. Secundo ostendit quod amici etiam quandoque propter contemptum insurgunt, ibi, amicorum autem quidam et cetera. Dicit igitur primo, quod fiunt insurrectiones aliquando propter contemptum, sicut quidam videns Sardanapalum deditum voluptatibus et comessationibus, semper ludentem cum mulieribus in palatio, nunquam exeuntem ad praelia, nec exercentem se in venationibus (si verum est hoc de ipso, sicut dicunt fabulantes; si autem non est verum de illo, tamen de aliquo alio poterit esse hoc verum), insurrexit contra illum. Similiter Dion insurrexit contra Dionysium qui posterius tyrannizavit, quia despexit eum videns ipsum semper ebrium et voluptuosum, et videns quod cives ipsum contemnebant.

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Deinde cum dicit et amicorum declarat quod amici propter despectum aliquando insurgunt contra amicos, quia contemnunt eos: quia enim confidunt de ipsis et familiares sunt eis, contemnunt eos quandoque credentes quod obliviscantur iniuriae illatae propter amicitiam. Nimia enim familiaritas parit contemptum. Et quia credunt posse obtinere principatum, et quia contemnunt, insurgunt contemnentes periculum: unde de facili invadunt: tum quia sperant obtinere: tum quia potentiam habent, non timentes periculum, tum quia contemnunt: sicut duces exercitus aliquando monarchas invadunt propter causam istam: sicut Cyrus contemnes modum vivendi Astyagis turpem et inhonestum et potentiam quae inutilis erat ad praelia, videns ipsum delitiose vivere et praeter rationem, insurrexit contra ipsum. Similiter autem et Seuthes dux exercitus de Thracia provincia recessit ab Amadoco propter eamdem causam, et insurrexit contra ipsum. Sunt etiam alii qui propter plura istorum insurgunt: et quia contemnunt et propter lucrum: sicut Ariobarzanem Mithridates.

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Deinde cum dicit maxime autem declarat qui maxime insurgunt propter tales causas: et dicit, quod maxime qui naturaliter audaces sunt, sicut illi in quibus est abundantia caloris et spiritus et potentiam habent et facti sunt duces exercitus a monarchis. Inclinatio enim ad opera virilia, sive ad audaciam et potentiam, reddunt hominem audacem in actu; et propter ista duo quasi existimantes se praevalere, insurgunt.

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L. 10 (Ε.10, 1312a21–1313a17)Honor, odium et contemptus tyrannidem evertit; regnum domestica seditio.

Honor, odium et contemptus tyrannidem evertit; regnum domestica seditio.

Polit.L10

731. Eorum autem qui propter amorem honoris insurgunt, est alius modus causae praeter dictos prius. Non enim sicut quidam tyrannos invadunt videntes lucra magna et honores magnos existentes ipsis, sic et eorum qui propter amorem honoris insurgunt unusquisque praeelegit periclitari: sed illi quidem propter dictam causam; ii autem ac si utique aliqua alia fieret actio singularis et propter quam nominati fierent et noti; sic et monarchas invadutn non possidere volentes monarchiam sed gloriam.

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732. Sed tamen paucissimi numero sunt propter hanc causam impetum facientes: supponi enim oportet nihil curare de eo quo est salvari, si non debeat praevalere in actione: quibus assequi quidem oportet Dionis existimationem, non facile autem ipsam adesse multis. Ille enim cum paucis militavit adversus Dionysium, sic habere dicens, quod ubicumque possit procedere, sufficiens sibi tantum participare actionis; veluti, sicut modicum invasisset terrae, mox accideret mori, huic, bene habere sibi mortem.

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733. Corrumpitur autem tyrannis, uno quidem modo sicut aliarum politiarum unaquaeque ab extrinseco, si contraria aliqua sit politia valentior: consiliari quidem enim palam quod existit propter contrarietatem electionis. Quae autem volunt potentes, agunt omnes. Contrariae autem politiae, demos quidem tyrannidi secundum Hesiodum, sicut figulus figulo. Etenim democratia ultima tyrannis est: regnum autem et aristocratia propter contrarietatem politiae: propter quod Lacedaemonii plurimas dissolverunt tyrannides et Syracusani pro tempore quo politizabant bene.

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734. Aliquando autem ex se ipsa, quando qui participant seditiones fecerunt; sicut qui circa Gelonem, et nunc quae eorum quae circa Dionysium. Quae quidem Gelonis Thrasybulo Hieronis fratre filium Gelonis abducente, et ad delectationes excitante, ut ipse principaretur, familiaribus autem congregatis, ne tyrannis omnino dissolveretur, sed Thrasybulus: congregati autem ipsorum tamquam tempus habentes, eiecerunt omnes ipsos. Dionysium autem Dion aggressus curator existens et assumens populum, illum eiiciens peremit.

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735. Duabus autem existentibus causis propter quas maxime insurgunt contra tyrannides, scilicet, odio et contemptu, alterum quidem horum oportet existere tyrannis, scilicet odium: ex contemptu autem fiunt multae dissolutionum. Signum autem. Eorum quidem enim qui acquisierunt plurimi conservaverunt principatus; qui autem susceperunt mox, ut est dicere, perempti omnes. Fruitive enim viventes facile contemptivi fiunt, et multas opportunitates dant insurgentibus.

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736. Partem autem quandam irae et odii oportet ponere; modo enim quodam earundem actionum causa fiat.

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737. Saepe autem et magis operosa quam odium: robustius enim insurgunt, propterea quod non utitur ratiocinatione passio. Maxime autem significat furoribus assequi propter iniuriam: propter quam causam Pisistratidarum destructa est tyrannis, et multae aliarum: sed magis odium: ira quidem enim cum tristitia adest, quare non facile ratiocinari: inimicitia autem sine tristitia.

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738. Ut autem in summa est dicere, quotcumque causas diximus oligarchiae intemperatae et ultimae, et democratiae extremae, tot et tyrannidis ponendum: etenim hae existunt entes divisibiles tyrannides.

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739. Regnum autem ab extrinsecis quidem minime corrumpitur; propter quod et multi temporis est; ex se ipso autem plurimae corruptiones accidunt.

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740. Corrumpitur autem secundum duos modos: uno quidem seditionem facientibus iis, qui participant regno; alio autem modo magis tyrannice tentantibus gubernare, quando exegerunt esse domini plurium et praeter legem.

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741. Non fiunt autem regna nunc; sed si fiant, monarchiae et tyrannides magis; propter regnum quidem esse voluntarium principatum, dominium autem maiorum, et propter multos esse similes, et nullum differentem tantum ut correspondeat ad magnitudinem et dignitatem principatus. Quare propter hoc quidem non permanent voluntarii: si autem per fraudem principatur aliquis vel per violentiam, iam hic videtur tyrannis esse.

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742. In iis autem quae secundum genus regnis ponere oportet causam corruptionis cum iis quae dicta sunt, et quod est fieri multos contemptibiles facile, et hoc quod est potentiam non possidentes tyrannicam sed regalem honorem iniurari: facilis enim fieri dissolutio; non volentibus enim mox non erit rex; sed tyrannus non volentium. Corrumpuntur ergo monarchiae propter has et alias tales causas.

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Postquam philosophus posuit principia per se corruptionis monarchiarum, consequenter adiungit unum principium eius per accidens. Et primo ponit causam istam sive principium. Secundo ostendit quod pauci insurgunt propter illam, ibi, sed tamen paucissimi. In prima dicit, quod aliqui uno modo insurgunt propter appetitum honoris. Alio modo insurgunt quandoque quam sint modi prius dicti secundum quos aliqui insurgunt. Sunt enim aliqui qui propter amorem honoris qualibuscumque insurgunt facientes seditionem, non sicut alii qui invadunt eos ut obtineant divitias et honores magnos, quos vident eos habere: conveniunt tamen in hoc hi et illi quod exponunt se periculo et eligunt periclitari: sed propter aliam et aliam causam. Quidam scilicet propter hoc ut obtineant divitias aut principatum aut utrumque; alii autem ut faciant aliquam actionem singularem et notabilem, propter quam nominati sint apud alios, non curantes nec principatum nec divitias.

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Deinde cum dicit sed tamen ostendit quod paucissimi insurgunt propter talem causam: et dicit, quod quamvis aliqui insurgant contra monarchiam propter appetitum huiusmodi honoris, paucissimi tamen sunt; quoniam talis qui impetum facit contra monarchiam, si debeat praevalere, oportet quod non timeat mortem: et sic existimet sicut existimabat Dion cum insurrexit contra Dionysium: sed hoc non est facile multis. Ille enim Dion cum paucis militibus invasit et insurrexit contra Dionysium: et dicebat, quod quomodocumque posset procedere contra illum, hoc sufficiebat sibi, si tantum faceret quod terram invaderet et Dionysium: et si postmodum mors sibi accideret, bene erat sibi; non curans nec timens de ipsa. Sed istud difficile est: et pauci sunt sic negligentes vitam propriam et contemnentes mortem. Propter quod manifestum est, quod pauci sunt qui invadant monarchiam propter appetitum huiusmodi honoris.

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Deinde cum dicit corrumpitur autem determinat causas et principia corruptionis monarchiarum in speciali. Et primo tyrannidis. Secundo regni, ibi, regnum autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima tangit modos quibus corrumpitur. In secunda tangit causas propter quas maxime corrumpitur, ibi, duabus autem et cetera. Prima in duas, secundum quod tangit duos modos corruptionis tyrannidis. Primus modus est a causa extrinseca, secundus ab intrinseca. Secundus ibi, aliquando autem ex seipsa et cetera. In prima dicit, quod tyrannis uno modo corrumpitur, sicut quaelibet alia respublica a causa extrinseca, ut si fuerit aliqua respublica potentior contraria propinqua illi; tunc enim illa valentior, quia contraria est isti, ipsam corrumpet. Non enim potest dici, quod per consilium poterit praecavere ne corrumpatur: quia ad bene consiliandum requiritur appetitus recti finis. Consiliari enim est de his quae sunt ad finem; et recte consiliari de his quae sunt ad rectum finem. Sed tyrannus non habet rectum finem, nec appetitum rectum: immo electio sive appetitus ipsius est contrarius recto fini; et ideo non poterit resistere alteri reipublicae propter consilium, cum alia sit potentior. Omnes enim volentes aliquid agere, si habeant potentiam, agunt quae volunt; et ideo alia respublica contraria et valentior corrumpet istam. Tyrannidi autem contrariatur popularis status, sicut dixit Hesiodus, per accidens, sicut figulus contrarius est figulo. Non enim est figulus per se contrarius figulo; immo est sibi similis; sed per accidens, inquantum unus impedit bonum alterius, scilicet lucrum: sic popularis status contrarius est tyrannidi, non per se, sed inquantum una impedit aliam: ultima enim species eius pessima est, quae est quaedam tyrannis, sicut patet ex quarto huius. Sed regnum et optimatum status per se contrarii sunt; intendunt enim diversos fines, quia unus corrumpit alium. Propter quod contingit quod Lacedaemonii multas tyrannides corruperunt, quia potentiores erant; similiter Syracusani quamdiu habuerunt bonam rempublicam, habebant enim optimatum.

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Deinde cum dicit aliquando autem tangit secundum modum corruptionis; et dicit, quod aliquando corrumpitur tyrannis non a causa extrinseca, sed intrinseca; contingit enim quod tyrannus habeat quandoque aliquos familiares qui attingunt aliquo modo ad principatum et participant honoribus. Quando igitur tales faciunt seditionem, contingit quod corrumpitur tyrannis; sicut contigit circa tyrannidem Gelonis prius, posterius autem circa eam quae Dionysii. Familiares enim Gelonis insurrexerunt contra ipsum et expulerunt eum. Similiter et quidam contra Dionysium. Seditio autem quae fuit facta contra Gelonem fuit facta a Thrasybulo qui frater fuit Hieronis, qui filium Gelonis abducens ab eo quod est secundum rationem, traducebat per illecebras et voluptates, ut sic contemptibilis fieret populo quod repelleretur a principatu, et ipse Thrasybulus principaretur. Cum igitur congregasset familiares et amicos, cavens ne dissolveretur tyrannis, sed ipse tyrannizaret, considerantes tempus conveniens, ipsum Gelonem et omnes amicos ipsius expulerunt, et remansit Thrasybulus solus. Contra Dionysium insurrexit Dion, qui curam habebat de republica: erat enim familiaris eidem; et assumens sibi populum in auxilium insurrexit contra ipsum et expulit eum et interfectus est.

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Deinde cum dicit duabus autem tangit causas propter quas maxime corrumpitur. Et primo tangit causas istas secundum se et absolute. Secundo concludit causas corruptionis eiusdem in comparatione ad respublicas intentas, scilicet paucorum et popularis status, ibi, ut autem in summa et cetera. In prima tangit illas causas. In secunda tangit quamdam aliam quae reducitur ad unam illarum, ibi, partem autem quamdam et cetera. In prima dicit, quod cum sint duae causae propter quas aliqui maxime insurgunt contra tyrannum, scilicet odium et contemptus, odium debetur tyranno magis per se. Et ratio huius est, quia principatur melioribus se, et praeter utilitatem ipsorum; et cum hoc intendit bonum proprium solum, odio habetur ab illis; talis est tyrannus. Principatur enim tyrannus melioribus se, quia virtuosis; et non intendit nisi bonum proprium; et ideo tyranno debetur odium. De contemptu autem adiungit, quod propter contemptum multoties corrumpitur tyrannis. Et huius signum est, quia illi qui acquisierunt principatum per virtutem et industriam propriam, magis conservaverunt principatum, quia tales qui acquisierunt bellicosi fuerunt; tales autem non sunt contemptibiles. Sed illi qui receperunt tyrannidem ab alio, statim amiserunt, et propter principatum mortui sunt: quia enim vivebant delectabiliter vacantes comessationibus et venereis, contemptibiles erant: et quia vacabant delitiis, dabant multas opportunitates et occasiones insurgendi aliis: tum quia oportet quod ponant se quandoque in potestate mulierum, tum quia inebriati sunt saepe, et per consequens, impotentes facti.

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Deinde cum dicit partem autem tangit aliam causam quam reducit ad odium; et est illa causa ira; et habet duas partes. In prima reducit iram ad odium. In secunda assignat duas differentias inter iram et odium, ibi, saepe autem et cetera. Dicit igitur primo, quod ira pars est odii; hoc est corruptio quae fit propter iram, aliquo modo fit propter odium, ut non oporteat ipsam ponere causam distinctam. Est enim ira appetitus recontristationis; et ideo manifestum est quod iratus vult malum alii: hoc autem pertinet ad odium. Unde ira aliquo modo est causa earumdem actionum quarum est causa odium.

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Deinde cum dicit saepe autem assignat duas differentias inter iram et odium; et dicit, quod frequenter ira est magis operosa, hoc est plus operatur, quam odium. Irati enim cum maiori impetu et robustius insurgunt quam habentes odium. Et ratio huius est, quia passio irae est sine ratiocinatione. Iratus enim, et si audiat aliqualiter rationem, imperfecte tamen audit. Bene enim audit iratus quod vindicta est accipienda, sed qualiter accipienda non audit. Unde similis est famulo qui imperfecte audit mandatum domini, propter quod contingit quod male exequatur quandoque. Similiter est de irato. Imperfecte enim audit rationem; et ideo male exequitur vindictam. Unde furiosus videtur propter iniuriam; et quamvis ira sit magis operosa, tamen odium magis nocet. Secunda differentia est, quod ira est cum tristitia; et ideo non de facili iratus potest ratiocinari: propter enim motum passionis non potest: sed odium est sine tristitia; et ideo est cum ratiocinatione.

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Deinde cum dicit ut autem concludit causas corruptionis tyrannidis in comparatione ad respublicas intentas, scilicet paucorum et popularis status. Et dicit, quod ut in summa dicamus, quot diximus principia et causas corruptionis paucorum status intemperatae, quae est ultima species ipsius, et popularis status ultimae, tot sunt causae et principia tyrannidis: quia istae respublicae, scilicet paucorum ultima et popularis sunt tyrannides quaedam, differentes tantum secundum hoc quod in his tyrannizant plures, in illa autem unus.

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Deinde cum dicit regnum autem determinat causas et principia corruptionis regni. Et primo regni absolute et secundum se. Secundo regni quod procedit secundum genus, ibi, regnum autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima tangit ex quibus minime corrumpitur regnum. In secunda ostendit quibus modis corrumpitur, ibi, corrumpitur et cetera. In prima dicit, quod regnum ab extrinsecis non corrumpitur. Et ratio huius est, quia rex principatur bonis et secundum virtutem, subditis volentibus. Talis autem respublica non corrumpitur ab extrinsecis. Et propter hoc regnum multo tempore durat. Ex se autem multis modis corrumpitur.

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Deinde cum dicit corrumpitur autem ostendit quibus modis corrumpatur ex se. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo ostendit quare nunc non fiunt multa regna, ibi, non fiunt et cetera. In prima dicit, quod regnum ab extrinseco duobus modis corrumpitur. Uno modo quando illi qui attingunt ad principatum et sunt principes regni, faciunt seditionem. Contingit enim, talibus facientibus seditionem, quod propter potentiam quam habent expellant regem a principatu et mutent monarchiam in aliam rempublicam. Alio modo corrumpitur quando rex vult principari tyrannice, sicut quando vult esse dominus plurium quam debeat esse, ipsis nolentibus et praeter legem. Tunc enim contingit, quod subditi insurgunt contra eumdem et ipsum expellant et mutent rempublicam in aliam.

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Deinde cum dicit non fiunt ostendit quare non fiunt modo plura regna. Et dicit, quod modo non fiunt plura regna, et si fiant sunt magis monarchiae tyrannicae quam regna. Et huius assignat duplicem rationem. Prima est, quod regnum debet esse principatus voluntarius; principatur enim subditis nolentibus qui principatur in principatu regio, et regem oportet esse dominum maiorum in civitate vel regno. Difficile est autem unum invenire qui volentibus pluribus principetur, et qui sit dignus dominus esse maiorum. Et ideo non sunt plura regna. Secunda ratio est, quia quae est proportio dignitatis et honoris regis ad dignitatem et honorem subditorum, eadem debet esse proportio virtutis principantis ad virtutem subditorum. Nunc autem dignitas et honor regalis multum excellit dignitatem subditorum. Igitur virtus regis debet excedere virtutem omnium vel plurium: talem autem invenire non est possibile, vel nimis est difficile. Et ideo si aliquis assumatur in regem, non principabitur volentibus subditis; ergo non multo tempore principabitur. Si autem aliquis per fraudem vel violenter principetur, non est rex, sed tyrannus, quia non principatur subditis volentibus.

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Deinde cum dicit in iis autem assignat causam corruptionis regnorum secundum genus; et dicit, quod regnorum secundum genus causae et principia corruptionis sunt eadem cum his quae dicta sunt superius, et quae iam dicentur. Prima est, quia multi de facili fiunt contemptibiles. Contingit enim quod post patrem sequitur filius, qui omnibus contemptibilis est propter inhonestatem vitae. Ex hoc autem insurgunt subditi et expellunt eum et mutant rempublicam. Secunda causa est, quia non habet rex tantam potentiam, quanta est potentia tyrannica sufficiens ad puniendum malos; sed contingit ipsum regem pati iniuriam. Ubi autem ista contingunt, de facili corrumpitur regnum, quia subditis nolentibus ipsum principari statim non est rex, sed tyrannus. Tyrannus enim dominus est subditorum nolentium ipsum esse dominum. Et nunc recapitulat; et dicit, quod monarchiae propter istas causas et alias similes corrumpuntur.

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L. 11 (E.11, 1313a18–1314a31)Primus modus conversandi tyrannidem per incrementum administrationis tyrannicae.

Primus modus conversandi tyrannidem per incrementum administrationis tyrannicae.

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743. Salvantur autem palam, ut simpliciter quidem est dicere, ex contrariis.

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744. Ut autem secundum unumquodque eo quod est regna quidem ducere ad moderatius: quanto enim pauciorum fuerint domini, ampliori tempore necessarium manere omnium principatum: ipsi enim, et fiunt minus despotici, et moribus aequi magis, et a subditis invidetur eis minus.

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745. Propter haec enim et circa Molossos multo tempore regnum permansit, et quod Lacedaemoniorum, propterea quod a principio in duas partes divisus fuit principatus et rursum Theopompo moderante, et in aliis, et instituente ephororum principatum: a potestate enim auferens auxit tempore regnum: quare modo quodam fecit non minu, sed maius ipsum: quod quidem et ad uxorem respondisse dicunt ipsum, quae dixerat si nihil verecundatur minus regnum tradens filiis quam a patre accepit: non oportet hoc dicere: trado enim diuturnius.

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746. Tyrannides autem salvantur secundum duos modos contrariissimos: quorum alter est qui traditus est, et secundum quae dispensant plurimi tyrannorum principatum. Horum autem multa aiunt instituisse Periandrum Corinthium: multa enim talia est accipere et a principatu Persarum. Sunt autem, et olim dicta ad salvationem, ut possibile est, tyrannidis excellentes perimere, et sapientes destruere, et neque communicationes sinere, neque sodalitatem, neque disciplinam, neque aliud nihil tale, sed omnia cavere, unde consueverunt fieri duo, sapientia et persuasio, et neque scholas, neque alias collectiones permittere fieri vacativas.

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747. Et omnia facere ex quibus quam maxime ignoti invicem erunt omnes: notitia enim fidme facit magis ad invicem.

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748. Et praefectos populi semper palam esse, commorari circa ianuas; sic enim minime latebit quid agunt.

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749. Et deprehendere si assuifiant modicum semper servientes: et illa quaecumque talia Persica et barbara tyrannica sunt: omnia enim idem possunt.

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750. Et tentare non latere quaecumque extiterit quis dicens vel agens subditorum, sed esse attentos, velut circa Syracusanos vocati podagogides, et auribus audientes, quos misit Hieron ubi fuerit aliqua congregatio et collectio: confident enim minus timentes tales; et si confidant, latebunt minus.

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751. Et criminari invicem et turbare, et amicos cum amicis, et populum cum insignibus, et divites cum se ipsis.

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752. Et pauperes facere subditos tyrannicum, quatenus neque custodia alatur.

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753. Et occupati circa quotidiana non vacantes sint ad machinandum. Exemplum autem huius, pyramides quae circa Aegyptum, et anathemata Cypsellidarum, et Olympii aedificatio a Pisistratidibus, et eorum quae de Samo opera multi imperii.

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754. Omnia enim haec possunt idem, scilicet non vacationem et penuriam subditorum, et illatio vectigalium, velut in Syracusis, in quinque enim annis sub Dionysio substantiam omnem inferri accidit.

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755. Adhuc autem et bellorum procurator tyrannus, ut utique sine vacatione sint et permaneant in indigentia praesidis existentes.

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756. Regnum quidem salvatur per amicos; tyrannicum autem maxime diffidere amicis, tamquam volentibus quidem omnibus, potentibus autem iis maxime.

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757. Et adhuc quae circa democratiam fiunt ultiam tyrannica sunt omnia. Et Ginoecoratia circa domos ut enuntient contra viros, et servorum remissio propter eandem causam: neque enim machinant servie et mulieres contra tyrannos, gaudentes quia necessarium benivolos esse et tyrannidibus et democratiis.

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758. Etenim demus vult esse monarchia, propter quod et adulator apud utrasque esse honoratus: est enim demagogus demi adulator: apud tyrannos autem quia humiliter colloquuntur, quod quidem est opus adulationis. Etenim propter hoc ponirophilon, id est malorum amicus est tyrannus: adulationem enim recipientes gaudent. Hoc autem nullus utique faciet sunsum habens liberum, sed amant qui epiiches si non adulentur. Opportuni maligni ad maligna, clavo enim clavus, sicut proverbium.

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759. Et nullo gaudere venerabili, neque libero tyrannicum: ipsum enim esse solum vult tyrannus, qui autem contra venerabilis et liberalis aufert excellentiam, et quod despoticum tyrannidis. Odiunt igitur quemadmodum dissolventes principatum. Et uti conviviis.

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760. Et condiuturnari extraneis magis quam civilibus, tyrannicum, tamquam hos quidem adversarios, hos autem non contrariantes. Haec et talia tirannica quidem, et salvativa principatus: nihil autem deficit magis malignitatis.

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761. Sunt autem, ut est dicere, omnia haec comprehensa tribus speciebus. Coniecturat enim tyrannus tria: unum quidem ut modica sapiant subditi, nulli enim utique pusillanimus insidiabitur; secundum autem ut discredant invicem, non dissolvitur enim prius tyrannus, antequam credant aliqui sibi ipsis: propter quod et epiicheis adversantur tamquam nocivis ad principatum, non solum propterea quod non volunt sibici despotice, sed et quia fideles sunt sibi ipsis et aliis, et quia non produnt neque se ipsos neque alios. Tertium autem negotiorum impossibilitas: nullus enim manum mittit ad impossibilia: quare neque tyrannidem dissolvere non existente potentia.

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762. Ad quos quidem igitur reducuntur volita tyrannorum isti tres existunt entes: omnes enim utique reducet quis tyrannica ad has hypotheses, hoc quidem ut non credant invicem, hoc autem ut non possint, hoc ut parum sapiant. Unus quidem igitur modus per quem fit salvatio tyrannidibus, talis sit.

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Postquam philosophus determinavit de principiis corrumpentibus monarchias, determinat de principiis salvantibus ipsas. Et primo in generali. Secundo in speciali, ibi, ut autem secundum unumquodque et cetera. In prima dicit, quod monarchiae, ut simpliciter est dicere, salvantur ex contrariis quibus corrumpuntur. Contrariorum enim extranea sunt principia. Corruptio et salvatio reipublicae sunt contraria; ergo ex contrariis principiis fiunt.

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Deinde cum dicit ut autem determinat in speciali de principiis salvantibus ipsas. Et primo de salvantibus monarchiam regalem. Secundo de salvantibus tyrannidem, ibi, tyrannides autem et cetera. In prima intelligendum quod regnum est optima respublica et optime ordinata. Et ideo ex ratione sua maxime salvabilis est. Propter quod philosophus non tangit nisi unum modum salvandi regnum. Et primo tangit ipsum. Secundo manifestat, ibi, propter hoc enim et cetera. Dicit igitur quod regnum salvatur per hoc, quod principatus trahitur ad mediocritatem secundum unumquodque quod pertinet ad ipsum: ut si aliquid pertineat ad regem qui dominus est omnium, et in omnibus principatur, in quo videantur gravari subditi quod multum illis displiceat, illud temperare, aut illis remittere. Quanto enim pauciorum erit dominus, tanto durabilior erit principatus; quia quanto erit pauciorum dominus, tanto minus dominative principabitur, et sic de paucioribus iudicabit et plures attingent ad principatum, et habebunt quod competit eis secundum dignitatem, et tunc videbitur esse aequalis subditis. Sic autem rege se habente, minus ei subditi invidebunt, et sic se habentibus, principabitur subditis volentibus; hoc autem facit principatum durabiliorem.

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Deinde cum dicit propter haec manifestat quod dictum est per exemplum. Et dicit, quod propter istam causam circa Molossos regnum multum duravit. Similiter autem et regnum Lacedaemoniorum: a principio enim diviserunt principatum in duas partes, et sic moderaverunt eum: similiter Theopompus qui posterius ibi regnavit, consequenter moderavit principatum. Cum enim esset dominus omnium, instituit principatum ephororum, tradens ipsum aliis quasi auferens a sua potestate. Ex quo fecit regnum suum aliquo modo maius et durabilius multo. Propter quod respondisse dicitur uxori suae, cum argueret eum dicens, si non verecundabatur quod regnum minus traderet filiis suis quam recepisset a progenitoribus, dixit, quod hoc non debebat dicere; quia quamvis non traderet eis aequalem secundum potestatem, tradebat tamen diutius, quod videtur esse melius.

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Deinde cum dicit tyrannides autem determinat de principiis salvantibus tyrannidem. Tyrannis enim, quia de ratione sua inordinata est, de facili est corruptibilis. Et ideo dat elementa plura quibus salvari potest. Salvatur autem duobus modis. Uno modo intendendo ipsam. Secundo remittendo. Et secundum hoc dividitur in duas. In prima prosequitur modum secundum quem salvatur per intensionem. Secundo modum, qui est per remissionem, ibi, alter autem et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima ponit unum modum secundum quem salvatur intendendo absolute. Secundo in comparatione ad regnum, ibi, regnum quidem et cetera. Prima in tres, quia tyrannis tripliciter intenditur. Uno modo faciendo subditos ignorantes. Secundo incognitos. Tertio pauperes. Et ideo dividitur in tres. In prima ponit modos secundum quos fiunt ignorantes. Secundo, modos per quos fiunt incogniti, ibi, et omnia facere et cetera. Tertio, modos quibus fiunt pauperes, ibi, et pauperes facere et cetera. In prima dicit, quod tyrannis duobus modis valde contrariis salvatur. Quorum unus est secundum intensionem, alius secundum remissionem. Et alter istorum dictus est prius, secundum quem tyranni dispensant, ut communiter, sive regunt principatum tyrannicum. Periander autem, ut dicitur, multa talia instituit ex quibus intenditur tyrannis, et multa talia possunt accipi a Persis. Fuerunt autem et aliqua data antiquitus ad salvationem tyrannidis. Quorum unum fuit excellentes in potentia vel divitiis interimere, quia tales per potentiam quam habent possunt insurgere contra tyrannum. Iterum interficere sapientes: tales enim per sapientiam suam possunt invenire vias ad expellendum tyrannidem; iterum ad salvationem tyrannidis expedit non permittere communicationes, nec sodalitatem sive societatem, ne inter se uniantur per amicitiam. Ex hoc enim facilius possent insurgere contra tyrannum. Iterum non permittere disciplinam, et quaecumque possunt inducere sapientiam; sed omnia vitare, quia tales possunt invenire vias diversas ad insurgendum contra ipsum, et expellendum eum: propter quod cavenda sunt omnia illa ex quibus fiunt sapientes, vel sapientia activa, vel speculativa, vel etiam illa ex quibus fit persuasio, et ipsi persuasivi. Et ideo nec scholas nec alias collectiones, per quas contingit vacare circa sapientiam permittendum est; sapientes enim ad magna inclinantur; et ideo magnanimi sunt, et tales de facili insurgunt.

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Deinde cum dicit et omnia tangit modos, quibus fiunt incogniti. Et dividitur in quinque, secundum quod tangit quinque. Secunda, ibi, et praefectos et cetera. Tertia, ibi, et deprehendere et cetera. Quarta, ibi, et ne lateant et cetera. Quinta, ibi, et criminari invicem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod ad salvandum tyrannidem oportet ordinare et facere ex quibus subditi maxime inter se adinvicem erunt ignoti, quia notitia facit quod magis credunt sibi adinvicem. Ex hoc autem quod credunt sibi adinvicem, facilius uniuntur et potentius insurgunt. Et ideo ordinanda sunt talia per quae maxime sint ignoti.

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Deinde cum dicit et praefectos ponit secundum modum. Et dicit, quod secundo ad salvationem tyrannidis expedit facere quod praepositi et servientes sint manifesti in locis in quibus debent subditi congregari, et circa ianuas civitatis vel subditorum, ut videant et sentiant quod dicunt vel agunt subditi. Sic enim magis erit manifestum quid faciunt, et minus poterunt machinari contra tyrannum minus invicem credentes.

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Deinde cum dicit et deprehendere ponit tertium modum. Et dicit, quod oportet ad salvationem tyrannidis ordinare quod si subditi aliqua malefaciant, aut in aliquo insolescant et devient ab eo quod est ordinatum a tyranno, etiam modicum, deprehendere eos a servientibus ordinatis ad hoc, similiter ordinare alia quaecumque et barbara et Persica sunt tyrannica. Omnia enim talia possunt idem, scilicet salvare tyrannidem. Ex hoc enim quod subditi erunt occupati in aliquibus, timentes magis, minus poterunt insurgere.

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Deinde cum dicit et tentare ponit quartum modum. Et dicit quod tentandum est ut non lateant quaecumque dicunt et faciunt subditi; sed diligenter attendere quaecumque, et sic facere sicut fecerunt circa Syracusanos tyranni. Ordinaverunt enim quosdam qui dicebantur deductores quos misit hieron, qui audirent quae dicerent et facerent subditi: sic similiter ordinandi sunt aliqui qui ubi fuerit aliqua congregatio audiant quae dicuntur ibi et fiunt. Sic enim illi qui congregabuntur propter timorem minus confident de seipsis, et per consequens nihil machinabuntur, aut si confidant de se, minus poterunt latere, et ulterius poterit magis caveri.

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Deinde cum dicit et criminari ponit quintum modum. Et dicit, quod ad salvandam tyrannidem oportet quod tyrannus procuret, quod subditi imponant sibi invicem crimina et turbent seipsos, ut amicus amicum, et populus contra divites, et divites inter se dissentiant: sic enim minus poterunt insurgere propter eorum divisionem. Omnis enim virtus divisa minor est.

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Deinde cum dicit et pauperes ponit modos quibus fiunt pauperes. Et dividitur in quatuor, secundum quod ponit quatuor modos. Secunda ibi, et occupati et cetera. Tertia ibi, omnia enim haec et cetera. Quarta ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. In prima dicit quod ad salvationem tyrannidis, oportet facere subditos pauperes; sic enim minus poterunt insurgere contra tyrannum. Facere autem pauperes subditos, etsi contingit multipliciter, contingit tamen ad praesens quadrupliciter. Primo non dando expensas custodibus civitatis de bonis communibus, sed eos compellere ad solvendum ex toto.

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Deinde cum dicit et occupati ponit secundum modum. Et dicit, quod ordinandum est, quod subditi sint occupati circa opera quotidiana, ut sic occupati non possint machinari, vel non sint vacantes ad machinandum aliquid contra tyrannum. Sicut habemus exemplum de tyrannidibus quae fuerunt circa Aegyptum, ubi subditi compellebantur occupari circa opera quotidiana. Sicut apparet de filiis Israel, quos occupabant circa lutum et lateres. Similiter donaria Cypsellidarum, similiter aedificatio Olympii quae fuit facta a Pisistratide, similiter opera eorum quae erant de Samo insula quae erant magnifica. Omnia enim ista possunt idem facere; scilicet, quod subditi non possunt vacare ad machinandum aliquid contra tyrannum. Ex quo enim sunt occupati circa opera talia, non possunt tractare qualiter expellant tyrannum. Item possunt facere penuriam et paupertatem subditorum: ex quo enim compelluntur apponere ad aedificia facienda, et occupari circa talia, oportet depauperari.

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Deinde cum dicit omnia enim ponit tertium modum. Et dicit, quod procuranda sunt vectigalia, hoc est exactiones multae et magnae: sic enim cito poterunt depauperari subditi, sicut factum fuit in Syracusis. Ibi enim Dionysius qui principabatur, tantas procuravit exactiones, quod omnes divitiae subditorum venerunt ad ipsum in quinque annis.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit quartum modum. Et dicit, quod ad salvationem tyrannidis tyrannus debet procurare bella inter subditos, vel etiam ad extraneos, ita quod non possint vacare ad aliquid tractandum contra tyrannum, et magis timentes. Sic etiam erunt indigentes praeside, et tunc plura poterit exigere ab eisdem.

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Deinde cum dicit regnum quidem ponit alium modum per quem salvatur in comparatione ad alias respublicas et ad alia quaedam. Et dividitur in quatuor. In prima ponit modum per quem salvatur in comparatione ad regnum. In secunda ponit modum per quem salvatur in comparatione ad popularem statum, ibi, et adhuc quae fiunt et cetera. In tertia ponit alium modum in comparatione ad liberum et venerabilem, ibi, et nullo gaudere et cetera. In quarto ponit alium modum in comparatione ad cives et extraneos, ibi, et condiuturnari et cetera. In prima dicit, quod regnum salvatur per amicos. Subditi enim diligunt regem et volunt eum principari; hoc autem salvat regnum. Et ideo salvatur regnum per amicos: tyrannus autem ad salvandum tyrannidem, non debet confidere in amicis. Et ratio huius est, quia amici potentes sunt: ex hoc enim, quod amici sunt aliqui principis, potentes sunt. Item inclinantur et volunt principari omnibus. Et ideo non debet confidere in eis si debeat salvare tyrannidem.

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Deinde cum dicit et adhuc ponit alium modum in comparatione ad statum popularem. Et primo ponit ipsum. Secundo assignat rationem cuiusdam dicti, ibi, etenim demus vult et cetera. In prima dicit, quod ad salvandum tyrannidem, tyrannus debet ordinare ea quae sunt circa popularem statum ultimum qui pessimus est omnium. Omnia enim illa tyrannica sunt, ut mulierum potentiae coram populo coram quo permissum est ei proponere contra viros quae voluerint. Et manumissio servorum contra cives. Mulieres enim quasi sunt medietas civitatis. Ipsae autem et servi non machinantur aliquid contra tyrannum. Nam gaudent servi de manumissione, mulieres vero super libertate praedicta. Oportet enim eos esse benivolos et tyrannidibus et popularibus. Et propter hoc non insurgunt de facili.

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Deinde cum dicit etenim demus reddit causam cuiusdam dicti. Dixerat enim quod in tyrannide ordinanda sunt illa quae fiunt in populari statu ultimo. Huius reddit causam. Et dicit quod propter hoc debet tyrannus ordinare quae sunt in populari statu ultimo, quia popularis status ultimus est sicut monarchia, totus populus dominatur sicut unus monarcha. Unde adulatores inveniuntur et in populari statu ultimo, et apud tyrannos, et honorantur ab eis. In populari statu quidem, populares ductores populi. Ductor enim, adulator in populari statu est, quia dicit quae placent populo. Apud tyrannos autem honorantur, quia humiliter loquuntur. Hoc autem pertinet ad adulatores: humiliter enim loquendo et deiiciendo se credunt placere. Propter hoc etiam tyrannus est amicus malorum, quia recipit adulatores, et congaudet iisdem: tales autem secundum se mali sunt. Sed nullus qui habet sensum liberum, hoc est qui inclinationem habet ad virtutem, hoc faciet: sed diligit virtuosos, et eos qui non adulantur, qui secundum se boni existentes opportunitatem quamdam habent ad reprimendum malignitatem adulatoris, qui secundum quod huiusmodi malignus est; quoniam, sicut in proverbio dicitur, clavus clavo retunditur. Diligunt igitur bonos odientes adulatores, ut per eos reprimant malitiam adulatorum.

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Deinde cum dicit et nullo ponit alium modum in comparatione ad liberum et venerabilem. Et dicit, quod tyrannus non debet congaudere libero et venerabili sive virtuoso, quia tyrannus vult esse solus dominus. Venerabilis enim et liber contrarii sunt illi, nec possunt sustinere excellentiam quam habet praeter rationem, nec tyrannidem quam exercet principando dominative. Propter quod odiunt tyranni liberos et venerabiles tamquam dissolventes eorum principatum.

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Deinde cum dicit et condiuturnari ponit alium modum in comparatione ad cives et extraneos. Et dicit, quod tyrannus magis debet convivere et assuescere diuturnis comessationibus cum extraneis quam cum civibus, tamquam cives sint adversarii, extranei vero non. Ista igitur et similia sunt tyrannica, et salvant principatum. Nec aliquid malignitatis deficit in talibus; sed omnem malignitatem et iniquitatem continent, sicut mala secundum se ipsa, bona tamen ad salvationem tyrannidis. In quo innuit, quod non sunt facienda simpliciter homini, sed ei qui voluerit salvare tyrannidem quae secundum se mala est.

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Deinde cum dicit sunt autem reducit istos modos omnes ad tres. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo recolligit illos, ibi, ad quos et cetera. In prima dicit, quod omnia ista sub tribus speciebus, ut est dicere, comprehenduntur: quia tyrannus tria considerat ad salvandum principatum suum. Primum est ut subditi sint ignorantes, et pauca scientes. Cuius ratio est, quia nullus pusillanimis insidiatur alicui. Et ideo ne subditi insidientur ei, considerat qualiter subditi sint ignorantes. Ignorantia enim pusillanimes facit. Magnanimum enim oportet habere scientiam magnorum et arduorum: est enim virtus qua aliquis inclinatur ad magna et ardua simpliciter decentia ipsum. Secundum est, quod ignoti sint sibi invicem subditi. Et ratio huius est, quia tyrannis non prius dissolvitur quam credant sibi invicem. Et propter hoc tyrannus contrarius est virtuosis, quia nocivi sunt ad principatum tyrannicum, non solum quia nolunt subiici tyranno dominative, sed quia sunt sibiipsis fideles, et aliis concivibus, nec manifestant ea quae volunt facere vel ipsi vel alii concives eorum contra tyrannos. Tertium est, quod reddat eos impotentes faciendo eos pauperes. Et ratio huius est, quia nullus manum mittit ad illa quae credit esse impossibilia; et ideo manifestum est, quod non dissolvetur tyrannis si subditi non habeant potentiam.

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Deinde cum dicit ad quos recolligit modos istos. Et dicit quod isti sunt tres modi ad quos reducuntur omnia quae placent, et volunt tyranni. Si enim aliquis consideret, reducet omnia tyrannica ad istas tres hypotheses. Quarum una est, ut non credant sibi invicem; alia ut sint impotentes; alia ut parum sciant subditi. Unus igitur modus per quem salvatur tyrannis est iste, qui est intendendo tyrannidem.

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L. 12 (Ε.11–12, 1314a31–1316a1)Secundus modus conservandae tyrannidis per appropinquationem ad regnum.

Secundus modus conservandae tyrannidis per appropinquationem ad regnum.

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763. Alius autem ut ex contrario dictis habet curam. Est autem accipere ipsum ex corruptione regnorum. Sicut enim unus modus corruptionis regni facere magis tyrannicum principatum, sic tyrannidis salvatio facere ipsum magis regalem, unius servantem solum potentiam, ut principetur non solum volentibus, sed et nolentibus; praetendens enim et hoc, praetendit et tyrannizare. Sed haec quidem sicut suppositionem oportet manere; alia autem haec quidem facere, haec autem videri simulantem quod regale bene.

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764. Primo quidem, ut videatur curare communia, neque expendat gratuita talia, in quibus multitudines moleste ferant, quando ab ipsis quidem accipiunt operantibus et laborantibus assidue, dant autem meretricibus et extraneis et artificibus copiose.

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765. Rationemque reddat acceptorum et expensarum, quod quidem iam fecerunt quidam tyrannorum: sic enim utique quod dispensans, oeconomus, sed non tyrannus esse videbitur.

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766. Non oportet autem timere, ne forte deficiat pecuniis, dominus existens civitatis; sed extorribus tyrannis a domo, et expedit hoc magis, quam relinquere cum conregaverit. Minus enim utique qui servant insilient rebus. Sunt autem tyrannorum, qui servant terribiliores egredientibus a populo quam civibus: ii quidem enim peregrinantur, hi autem subsistunt.

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767. Deinde introitus oportet videre colligere dispensationis gratia, et si aliquando opportunum fuerit uti ad bellicas opportunitates. Universaliter autem exhibere se ipsum custodem et camerariium, tamquam communium, sed non tamquam propriorum.

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768. Et videri non saevus, sed reverendus. Adhuc autem talem, ut non timeant occurrentes, sed magis verecundentur: hoc tamen adipisci non facile, non existentem facile contemptibilem. Propter quod oportet, et si non aliarum virtutum curam habeat, tamen politicae; et opinionem efficere de se ipso talem.

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769. Adhuc autem non solum ipsum videri, nullum subditorum iniuriantem, neque iuvenem, neque iuvenculam, sed neque alium ullum eorum qui circa ipsum.

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770. Similiter autem et habere uxores familiares ad eas quae aliorum, tamquam et propter uxorum iniurias multae tyrannides perierunt.

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771. Et circa fruitiones corporales contrarium facere, quam nunc quidam tyrannorum faciunt; non solum enim mox diluculo hoc faciunt, et continue multis diebus, sed etiam videri aliis volunt hoc operantes, ut tamquam felices et beatos admirentur: sed maxime quidem moderatos esse talibus; si autem non, tamen videri aliis diffugere: neque enim facile invasibilis neque facile contemptibilis qui sobrius, sed qui ebrius; neque qui vigil, sed dormiens.

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772. Contrariumque faciendum olim dictis fere omnibus: praeparare enim oportet et ornare civitatem, tamquam procuratorem existentem, et non tyrannum.

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773. Adhuc autem quae ad Deos videri semper in studio habentem differenter: minus enim timent pati aliquid iniquum a talibus, si deicolam putant esse principem et curare de diis; et machinantur minus, tamquam habeant propugnatores etaim Deos.

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774. Oportet autem sine insipientia videri talem, bonosque circa aliquid factos honorare, ita ut putentur nunquam honorari magis a civibus suae legis existentibus.

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775. Et tales quidem honores distribuere ipsum. Supplicia autem per alios principes, et praetoria.

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776. Communis autem custodia omnis monarchiae, nullum virum facere magnum; sed siquidem, plures, servabunt enim invicem.

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777. Si aliquid forte oporteat facere magnum, nequaquam secundum morem audacem; maxime enim invasivas talis mos penes omnes actiones.

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778. Et si a potentatu aliquem videatur dimittere, gradatim hoc agere, et non totam simul auferre potestatem.

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779. Adhuc autem omnem quidem iniuriam cohibere, praecipue autem duas; eam scilicet quae in corpus flagellationem, et eam quae in aetatem. Maxime autem hanc faciendum reverentiam, circa amatores honoris: eam quidem enim quae ad pecunias minorationem amatores pecuniarum ferunt graviter: eam autem quae ad inhonorationem, amatores honoris, et epiiches hominum. Propter quod quidem non uti oportet talibus, aut supplicia videri facientem patriae, et non propter parvipensionem. Eas autem quae ad aetate collocutiones propter amativas causas, sed non propter potestatem: totaliter enim reputatas inhonorationes redimere maioribus honoribus.

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780. Invadentium autem, ad corporis differentiam, hi maxime terribiles, et indigent ampliori custodia, quicumque non eligunt acquirere vivere cum peremerint. Propter quod maxime vereri oportet putantes iniuriam pati, aut ipsos, aut eos, quorum curantes existunt; non parcunt enim sibi ipsis qui propter furorem invadunt, sicut et Heraclitus dixit, dicens, difficile esse cum furore pugnare; animae enim pretium fieri.

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781. Quoniam autem civitates ex duabu partibus constitutae sunt, ex egenis hominibus et opulentis, maxime quidem utrosque oportet existimare salvari, propter principatum et alios ab aliis iniustum pati nihil. quicumque autem fuerint valentiores, hos proprios facere maxime principatus; quod si hoc extiterit rebus, neque servorum liberationem facere tyrannum, neque armorum ablationem; sufficiens enim altera pars apposita ad potentiam ut valentiores sint insurgentibus.

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782. Superfluum autem dicere per singula talium. Intentio enim manifesta, quia oportet non tyrannicum, sed oeconomum et regalem videri esse subditis, et non suum curantem, sed procuratore et mediocritates vitae persequi non excellentias.

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783. Adhuc autem insignes quidem affari, multos autem demagogizare. Ex his enim necessarium non solum principatum esse pulchriorem et magis zelabilem, quam quod meliores principentur, et non humilem, neque odio habitum, et timore perseverare, sed et principatum esse durabiliorem.

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784. Adhuc autem ipsum disponere secundum morem, vel bene ad virtutem, vel semibonum existentem, et non malignum, sed semimalignum.

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785. Equidem omnibus malis politiis, paucioris temporis sunt oligarchia, et tyrannis.

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786. Plurimo enim tempore fuit, quae circa Sicyonem tyrannis, quae Orthagori puerorum, et ipsius Orthagori; permansit enim ipsa annis centum: huius autem causa, quia subditis utebantur moderate, et multis legibus serviebant, et quia bellicosus fuit Clisthenes, non fuit facile contemptibilis, et quantum ad multa, curis demagogizabat. Dicitur igitur Clisthenes, respondentem de victoria, ipsum quomo coronavit. Quidam autem aiunt, esse imaginem eius qui iudicavit sic, statuam quae in foro sedet. Aiunt autem et Pisistratum aliquando sustinuisse sententiam, cum esset vocatus ad Ariopagum.

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787. Secundo autem circa Corinthum quae Cypselidorum; etenim haec perseveravit annis septuaginta tribus, et mensibus sex. Cypsellus quidem tyrannizavit annis triginta, Periander autem quadragintaquatuor, Psammiticus autem qui Gordiae annis tribus. Causae autem eaedem, et huius; Cypsellus quidem enim demagogus erat, et a principio permansit sine armorum custodia. Periander autem fuit quidem tyrannicus, sed bellicosus.

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788. Tertia autem quae Pisistraticorum Athenis; non fuit vero continua; bis enim fuit Pisistratus tyrannizans, ita ut et in annis triginta tribus, decem et septem annis tyrannizavit, pueri autem decem et octo; quare omnes anni fuerunt triginta et quinque.

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789. Reliquarum autem, quae circa Hieronem et Gelonem, circa Syracusas; non autem permansit ipsa multis annis, sed omnes duobus deficientibus de viginti. Gelon quidem enim septem annis tyrannizavit, octavo vitam finivit, decem autem Hieron. Thrasybulus autem undecimo mense excidit. Multae autem tyrannides, pauci temporis fuerunt omnes penitus. Quae quidem igitur circa politias, et quae circa monarchias, ex quibus corrumpuntur et iterum salvantur, fere dictum est de omnibus.

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Postquam philosophus posuit unum modum salvationis tyrannidis qui est per intensionem, ponit alium modum, qui est per remissionem. Et primo in generali ostendit quomodo per huiusmodi remissionem salvatur. Secundo in particulari, ibi, primum enim et cetera. In prima dicit, quod alius est modus salvandi tyrannidem contrarius modis dictis prius; nam modi dicti prius salvant tyrannidem intendendo ipsam, iste autem modus per remissionem. Istum autem modum contingit accipere per similitudinem ad corruptionem regnorum: quia sicut uno modo regnum corrumpitur per hoc quod accedit ad tyrannidem declinando a rectitudine rationis, sic salvatur tyrannis per hoc quod accedit ad regnum, et ad illud quod est secundum rationem. Ex se enim regnum salvabile est; et ideo expedit ad salvandum tyrannidem remittere ipsam, et accedere ad regnum servando, et retinendo principatum unius; scilicet ut ipse solus principetur non quidem ipsis volentibus sed nolentibus, sicut plures faciunt, et non praetendat velle principari ipsis volentibus. Nam hoc praetendere, est praetendere quod ipse velit tyrannizare. Et istud, quod scilicet solus sit princeps et tyrannus, accipiendum est sicut suppositio aliorum. Haec quidem facienda sunt secundum veritatem ad salvandum tyrannidem; alia autem simulanda ut videantur saltem regalia quamvis non sint.

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Deinde cum dicit primo quidem ostendit in particulari qualiter salvatur per remissionem. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo recolligit quaedam dicta, excusando se ab ulteriori consideratione, ibi, superfluum et cetera. Prima in duas. In prima ostendit qualiter tyrannis salvatur per remissionem, cum civitas non est divisa. In secunda cum est divisa, ibi, quoniam autem et cetera. Prima in quatuor. In prima declarat qualiter salvatur per remissionem et cetera. Primo quo ad pecunias. Secundo qualiter quo ad conversationes, ibi, et oportet autem et cetera. Tertio qualiter quo ad honores, ibi, verumtamen et cetera. Quarto qualiter quo ad demissionem a principatu, ibi, si vero et cetera. Circa pecunias est considerare tria: scilicet consumptionem, ratiocinationem, receptionem: et secundum hoc dividitur in tres. In prima declarat quid observandum est quo ad expensas rationabiles. Secundo quo ad ratiocinationem, cum dicit, rationem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quid circa receptionem, ibi, deinde redditur. In prima dicit, quod ad salvandum rempublicam tyrannicam, oportet, quod tyrannus sic se habeat ut videatur habere curam de communi, et quod non expendat ea quae accipit a subditis gratis et in superfluis, ut in talibus quae contristant subditos, ut quando accipiunt a subditis laborantibus et operantibus assidue, et postmodum abundant de meretricibus et extraneis, et quos habent sibi saepe familiares, artificibus et histrionibus: quando enim sic facit tyrannus, odio habetur a subditis, et facilius insurgunt contra ipsum: et ideo cavendum est, quod non expendat bona, quae accipit a subditis, in illis quae molestant ipsos.

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Deinde cum dicit rationemque reddat ostendit quid observandum est quantum ad ratiocinationem. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo removet dubium, ibi, nec erit ei, et cetera. In prima dicit, quod ad hoc quod salvet tyrannidem et videatur habere curam de communi bono, oportet ipsum reddere rationem de acceptis et expensis factis; quod fecerunt quidam tyranni; unde diuturniorem fecerunt principatum suum. Et ratio huius est, quia ille qui sic dispensabit et reget rempublicam videbitur esse oeconomus quidam, idest dispensator: videbitur enim laborare propter bonum commune et non videbitur tyrannus.

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Deinde cum dicit non oportet removet dubium, sive respondet obiectioni. Diceret enim aliquis quod si tyrannus reddat rationem de expensis, deficiet ei pecunia. Removet hoc; et dicit, quod non oportet tyrannum timere, ne pecuniae et divitiae deficiant; omnia enim quae sunt in civitate, ad usus et utilitates communes, sunt eius, cum sit dominus civitatis. Cuius ratio est, quia bona exteriora sunt propter bona animae et corporis, et bona corporis propter bona animae, et ista omnia sunt propter bonum commune civitatis: et ideo illius sunt quodammodo bona subditorum, cuius est ordinare omne in finem civitatis: sed eius qui dominus est civitatis est ordinare bona exteriora in finem civitatis; propter quod eius sunt omnia. Et ideo non est timendum tyranno, quod deficiat sibi pecunia; quia poterit accipere a subditis, secundum tamen quod ordinari habet in finem civitatis; sed illi timendum est magis qui accipit a domibus subditorum praeter rationem. Ex hoc enim odio habetur a subditis; et ideo timere debet, quod insurgant contra ipsum. Unde magis expedit ipsis, scilicet dimittere divitias in domibus subditorum, et uti eis ad bonum commune cum necesse fuerit, quam omnino amittere eas congregatas in domo propria, quod fiet si insurgant in eum. Cum enim apud cives fuerit pecunia, et non extorserit eam tyrannus, minus insilient contra ipsum tunc: tyranni etiam quia accipiunt a subditis et servant penes se, magis timentur ab illis qui egrediuntur cum eis, et commilitant eis quasi propinqui eis quam civibus, quia primi comperegrinantur ei extra civitatem, cives autem magis resident in ea; et ideo magis possunt insurgere et diripere thesaurum.

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Consequenter cum dicit deinde introitus tangit quid observandum est circa receptionem pecuniarum. Et dicit, quod tyrannus debet redditus et oblationes gratis factas fideliter colligere ut dispenset illa; et si aliquando opportunum fuerit, expendere illa in praelia: et universaliter debet se exhibere tamquam custodem et camerarium civitatis et bonorum communium, non sicut propriorum: sic enim minus odio habebitur, et erunt magis contenti.

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Deinde cum dicit et videri ostendit qualiter tyrannis salvatur in comparatione. Et primo in comparatione ad cives. Secundo cum dicit, contrarium faciendum, in comparatione ad totam civitatem et divina. Adhuc circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter salvatur per comparationem bene se habens quantum ad actus exteriores. Secundo cum dicit, et circa voluptates qualiter quantum ad delectationes. Circa primum adhuc duo facit. Primo facit quod dictum est quantum ad personam propriam. Secundo cum dicit, eodemque modo quantum ad coniunctam. Adhuc primo ostendit quid observandum est ad tyrannidis salvationem quantum ad gestus exteriores. Secundo cum dicit, insuper non, quantum ad actus exteriores in quibus est iustitia vel iniustitia. In prima parte duo tangit. Primum est quod expedit tyranno ad salvandum tyrannidem quod non appareat subditis saevus, sive crudelis: et ratio huius est, quia ex hoc quod apparet subditis saevus, reddit se odiosum eis, ex hoc autem facilius insurgunt in eum: sed debet se reddere reverendum propter excellentiam alicuius boni excellentis; reverentia enim debetur bono excellenti: et si non habeat illud bonum excellens, debet simulare se habere illud. Secundum est quod tangit, et sequitur ex primo, quod debet se reddere talem quod si subditi obvient ei, quod non timeant cum timore servili, sed magis revereantur. Non timeant quidem: quia si timerent eum haberent eum odio: revereantur autem: est enim reverentia tristitia propter apparentem ingloriationem: ex hoc enim quod aliquis obviat alicui et ille habet bonum in quo deficit, reveretur, quia non habet illud, aut non illo modo. Et ideo tyrannus debet se reddere talem quod videatur subditis ipsos excellere in aliquo bono excellenti, in quo ipsi deficiunt, ex quo revereatur. Tamen talem se sic reddere, non est facile, quin sequitur contemptus si quidem non reddit se timendum. De facili enim contemnitur qui non timetur; et ideo si velit non terribilis videri, et cum hoc non contemni, debet laborare ad virtutes, et opera ipsa quae reddunt hominem non contemptibilem propter excellentiam suam: et si non potest habere omnes virtutes et actus earum, saltem laboret ad virtutem civilem quae videtur praecipua; et si non habeat eam secundum veritatem, faciat quod opinentur ipsum habere eam: quamvis enim hoc non sit in se bonum, ad hoc tamen bonum est, ut non sit facile contemptibilis.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ostendit quid observandum est quantum ad actus exteriores in quibus est iustitia et iniustitia; et dicit, quod tyrannus sic se debet habere quod non videatur alicui inferre iniuriam, nec iuveni, nec iuvenculae; et quod non solum ipse in persona propria, sed quod nullus qui est circa ipsum, iniurietur aliis.

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Deinde cum dicit similiter autem ostendit quid observandum est quantum ad personam coniunctam; et dicit, quod tyrannus sic debet facere quod uxor sua sit familiaris uxoribus subditorum, quia propter iniuriam illatam uxoribus multae tyrannides destructae sunt; et ideo debet procurare, quod uxor sua sit amica familiaris uxoribus subditorum: sic enim habebit quasi medietatem civitatis, quia mulieres cum pueris fere sunt medietas eius, sicut dixit in secundo.

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Deinde cum dicit et circa ostendit quid observandum est ei quantum ad delectationes corporales; et dicit, quod circa delectationes corporales debet contrarium facere quam faciant nunc quidam tyranni. Sunt enim quidam qui non solum volunt prosequi huiusmodi delectationes etiam multis diebus, sed volunt videri ab aliis prosequi easdem, tamquam sint beati et felices propter ipsas et reputentur ab aliis tales, et ex hoc habeantur in admiratione apud eos: sed debet magis, aut moderatus esse circa eas, aut si non sic, tamen debet se talem exhibere quod videatur fugere eas; quia ille qui sobrius est in persequendo huiusmodi, non de facili invaditur nec contemnitur; sed ille qui est ebriosus invasibilis est de facili, et de facili contemnitur. Ille etiam qui vigilat circa actus virtutum non de facili invaditur, nec contemptibilis est; sed ille qui dormit, hoc est qui non operatur secundum virtutem, de facili invaditur et contemnitur. Qui enim operatur secundum virtutem, reputatur aliquid magnum propter virtutem quam omnes reputant et boni et mali, quamvis secundum maius et minus. Qui autem reputatur magnus, is non invaditur de facili nec contemnitur: nullus enim contemnit quem reputat: qui autem inordinate operatur, e contrario se habet.

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Deinde cum dicit contrariumque faciendum ostendit quid observandum est in comparatione ad totam civitatem et divina. Et primo quid in comparatione ad totam civitatem. Secundo cum dicit, videri etiam oportet etc. quid in comparatione ad divina. In prima dicit, quod ad salvandum tyrannidem faciendum est contrarium eis quae dicta sunt prius: scilicet quod tyrannus debet praeparare et ornare civitatem, scilicet faciendo turres et muros, et aedes, et habitacula, et alia huiusmodi communia, et ordinando cives tamquam sit procurator civitatis, et non tyrannus; sic enim benivolus apparebit et non tyrannus.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ostendit quid observandum est in ordine ad Deum; et dicit, quod ad salvationem tyrannidis tyrannus in his quae ad religionem et cultum divinum pertinent studiose et reverenter se debet habere; et tanto magis differenter ab aliis quanto magis excellit. Cuius ratio est, quia si subditi existiment principantem religiosum et deicolam esse, non timebunt male pati ab ipso. A divino enim nullus expectat malum per se; et minus inclinabuntur insidiantes, opinantes ipsum Deum esse sibi propitium et propugnatorem pro eo contra machinantes in eum.

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Deinde cum dicit oportet autem ostendit quid observandum est quantum ad distributionem honoris; et dividitur in quatuor, secundum quod quatuor tangit. Secunda ibi, et tales quidem. Tertia ibi, communis autem. Quarta ibi, si aliquid. In prima dicit, quod oportet tyrannum esse sapientem, ut sciat considerare finem et dignitatem hominis; vel saltem, ut videatur esse probus et sine improbitate: et oportet quod bonos et virtuosos cives quantum ad actus aliquarum virtutum honoret, et sic ut putent se magis honorari ab eo quam a concivibus propriis; quia sic maxime erit benivolus subditis.

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Deinde cum dicit et tales tangit secundum; et dicit, quod ad benivolentiam maiorem honores debent distribui per ipsum, sed supplicia debent infligi per alios principes et iudicia.

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Deinde cum dicit communis autem tangit tertium, dicens, quod ad custodiam communem omnis monarchiae multum expediens est nullum virum facere magnum valde aut in potentia aut divitiis. Magnus enim existens in potentia aut in divitiis facilius insurget. Si autem oportet facere, magis expedit facere plures. Vix enim erunt unanimes, et unus iuvabit contra alterum.

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Deinde cum dicit si aliquid tangit quartum; et dicit, quod si oportet facere aliquem magnum secundum potentiam, non debet facere illum qui audax est secundum morem et inclinatur ad audaciam; quia talis est maxime invasivus secundum omnes actiones; et ideo quia inclinatur ad magna, cum haberet potentiam, de facili insurgeret.

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Deinde cum dicit et si a potentatu ostendit quid observandum est in dimissione a principatu vel honore; et dicit, quod si oporteat aliquem dimittere a potentatu, gradatim debet deponi, ut non primo auferatur ei potestas tota, sed pars aliqua, deinde alia, usque quo totam amiserit; quia minus contristabit illum, et per consequens minus insurget et poterit minus insurgere auferens secundum parvum; quia quod parvum est, reputatur ut nihil. Si autem totum simul vellet auferre, multum contristaretur et posset insurgere.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ostendit quid maxime observandum quantum ad iniurias. Et primo quod omnes iniuriae sunt cavendae. Secundo cum dicit, invadentium autem quorum sunt maxime cavendae. In prima dicit, quod tyrannus volens salvare tyrannidem, omnem iniuriam debet prohibere et nullam facere. Praecipue autem duas debet vitare ne faciat eas. Prima est flagellatio corporis; et alia est iniuria quae est secundum aetatem, scilicet inhonoratio. Flagellationem quidem corporis, quia ista servilis est; cives autem liberi volunt esse; et ideo si iniuriaretur eis flagellando, possent insurgere. Iniuriam quae est secundum aetatem non debet facere, sed exhibere maximam reverentiam senibus secundum virtutem et amatoribus honorum, quia unusquisque graviter fert iniuriam circa illud quod multum diligit: quia amatores pecuniarum graviter ferunt quod pecunia ipsorum diminuatur; et amatores honoris graviter ferunt si inhonorentur vel si non reddantur eis honores debiti; et virtuosi eodem modo. Propter quod similiter oportet quod ipse honoret virtuosos et amatores honoris; aut si inferat eis supplicia et inhonorationem, oportet quod videatur hoc facere propter bonum pacis et non propter parvipensionem; et correptiones per verba vel increpationes quae solent fieri ad aliquos facere ad virtuosos et senes secundum aetatem, non propter ostensionem potestatis, sed propter amorem, ut videatur eos diligere: et si alicui fierent aliquae inhonorationes huiusmodi, debet postmodum ei exhibere maiores honores ad mitigationem ipsorum.

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Deinde cum dicit invadentium autem ostendit quorum iniuriae sunt maxime cavendae; et dicit quod iniuriae illorum, qui inclinantur ad invadendum personam principis, maxime sunt cavendae: nam isti sunt maxime terribiles, et contra ipsos oportet exhibere maiorem custodiam, qui non curant de vita sua si possint principem interficere. Et ideo maxime erunt cavendi ne iniuria fiat eis, vel illis quorum curam gerunt. Si enim fiat eis aliqua exacerbatio, non parcunt invadentes per furorem. Sicut enim dixit Heraclitus, difficile est pugnare contra furiosum, quia talis pro pretio parvo ponit animam, sive vitam.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem ostendit quid faciendum est si civitas fuerit divisa. Et dicit, quod cum civitas constituta sit ex duobus, scilicet ex pauperibus et divitibus, oportet istos et illos salvari propter principatum: ita quod tyrannus nec istis nec illis iniuriam faciat. Et debet cavere ne invicem iniurientur. Meliores autem debet assumere ad principatum. Si enim ita fieret, non oportet tyrannum manumittere servos, nec auferre arma a subditis. Si enim una pars velit insurgere contra ipsum, alia pars cum principe sufficiens erit ad repellendum ipsam si fuerint divisi.

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Deinde cum dicit superfluum autem recolligit quaedam dicta excusans se ab ulteriori consideratione. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, praeterea egregios viros per familiaritatem sibi etc. adiungit quaedam. In prima dicit quod discurrere per singula quae faciunt ad salvationem tyrannidis, superfluum est, sed aliquis per rationem poterit discurrere. Est enim manifestum, quod oportet, principatum non esse tyrannicum, sed tamquam patrem familiae. Et quod videatur regalis subditis, et non gratia sui ipsius principari civitati, et potius ostendere se procuratorem et tenere statum mediocrium non excellentium.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem insignes adiungit quaedam. Et primo adiungit unum quantum ad insignes. Secundo cum dicit adhuc autem ipsum, quantum ad ipsum tyrannum. In prima dicit quod debet tyrannus esse affabilis insignibus et magnis viris in civitate, multitudinem autem debet retinere in obsequio per gratiam: sic enim principatus non solum erit pulchrior et magis amabilis, scilicet, si melioribus principetur et non humilibus, nec odio habebitur princeps, nec perseverabit in timore; immo principatus erit durabilior.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ipsum adiungit aliud quantum ad tyrannum. Et dicit quod tyrannus ad salvationem tyrannidis seipsum debet disponere bene principari secundum mores et secundum virtutem, et magis debet seipsum facere semibonum quam malignum, et semimalignum quam malignum, etsi non secundum virtutem, tamen secundum apparentiam. Quanto enim erit minus malus vel secundum virtutem vel secundum apparentiam, tanto minus odient ipsum.

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Deinde cum dicit equidem omnibus declarat quae istarum rerumpublicarum sunt brevis durationis per se, et quae non. Et primo proponit. Secundo probat, ibi, plurimo enim tempore. In prima dicit, quod inter respublicas minoris per se durationis sunt paucorum status secundum ultimam speciem, et tyrannis. Et ratio huius est, quia plus recedunt a regno quod per se diuturnius est, et sunt praeter voluntates subditorum. Tales autem respublicae minoris temporis sunt quam aliae.

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Deinde cum dicit plurimo enim probat. Et primo ostendit quod quaedam istarum sunt durationis longae propter dictas causas. Secundo ostendit propositum, scilicet quod quaedam sunt brevis durationis, ibi, reliquarum autem. Prima in tres, secundum quod inducit in tribus quae fuerunt longae durationis propter dictas causas. Secunda, ibi, secunda autem et cetera. Tertia ibi, tertia autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod tyrannis quae fuit circa Sicyonem civitatem multo tempore duravit, ubi tyrannizavit Orthagoras et filii eius. Duravit enim centum annis. Et ratio huius fuit, quia moderate se habuerunt ad subditos, et secundum aliquas leges disponebant tyrannidem, et serviebant subditis. Clisthenes enim qui fuit filius Orthagorae, quia fuit bellicosus, non fuit contemptibilis et ducebat populum cum favore in multis. Et ideo quia iste moderate utebatur subditis, diu tyrannizavit; et in tantum moderavit tyrannidem utens legibus quibusdam et ordinatione sapientum, quod quandoque de propriis factis subibat iudicium seniorum sicut et alii, et sustinebat sententias; et ideo dicunt adhuc in civitate illa, quomodo Clisthenes coronavit iudicem qui victoriae eius contradixit quia cum requireretur in iudicio de victoria, respondit sicut quicumque alius de subditis non velut tyrannus. Dixerunt autem quidam statuam, quae est in foro, esse imaginem istius iudicis, qui iudicavit, quem coronandum iudicavit. Dicitur etiam quod Pisistratus, cum tyrannizaret, cum vocaretur ad Ariopagum, ubi reddebantur sententiae, sententiam sustinuit, et ideo tyrannizavit longo tempore.

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Deinde cum dicit secunda autem tangit secundam. Et dicit quod secunda tyrannis quae multum duravit, fuit circa Corinthum quae fuit Cypsellidarum sic dictorum a genere. Ista enim duravit septuagintatribus annis, et sex mensibus, quia Cypsellus tyrannizavit triginta annis, Periander quadraginta quatuor, imperfectis tamen. Psammetius qui dicitur Gordii filius, tribus annis similiter imperfectis. Et est intelligendum quod sex menses pro uno anno accipiebat. Causae autem, quare tantum duravit, eaedem sunt cum praedictis. Cypsellus enim ductor populi erat, et in principio non fecit custodiam armorum. Periander autem fuit tyrannus, sed fuit valde bellicosus; et ideo non fuit contemptibilis.

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Deinde cum dicit tertia autem tangit tertiam. Et dicit quod tertia tyrannis quae multum duravit, fuit Pisistratidarum Athenis. Ista autem non fuit continua, quia Pisistratus bis tyrannizavit ibidem. Ex triginta tribus enim annis ipse septem et decem primo tyrannizavit. Filii vero eius consequenter tyrannizaverunt decem et octo; et sic sunt in universo quinque et triginta anni, quibus duravit illa tyrannis.

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Deinde cum dicit reliquarum autem ostendit propositum principale; scilicet quae respublicae tyrannicae fuerunt minoris durationis. Et dicit, quod illa tyrannis qua hieron et Gelon tyrannizaverunt in Syracusis non fuit multum diuturna; non enim duraverunt nisi in octodecim annis; quia Gelon septem annis tyrannizavit, in octavo mortuus est. Hieron vero decem annis solum. Thrasybulus nono mense mortuus est. Multae etiam aliae tyrannides pauci temporis fuerunt, quia tyrannis contra naturam est; quae autem contra naturam sunt, per se brevis durationis sunt. Et tunc recapitulat; et dicit quod quae sint principia et causae quibus corrumpantur respublicae et monarchiae, et iterum quae sint principia ex quibus salventur, fere dictum est.

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L. 13 (Ε.12, 1316a1–1316b27)Discussio de interitu rerumpublicarum a Platone in actavo de Republica assignato.

Discussio de interitu rerumpublicarum a Platone in actavo de Republica assignato.

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790. In politia autem dicitur quidem de transmutationibus a Socrate, non tamen dicitur bene. Optimae enim politiae et primae existentis non dicit transmutationem proprie: ait enim causam esse id quod est, non manere aliquid, sed in aliqua periodo transmutari; principium autem esse horum, quorum epitritus fundus quinario coniugatus, duas harmonias exhibet; dicens, quando numerus diagrammatis huius solidus fuerit.

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791. Tamquam natura quandoque producente et meliores et peiores disciplina, hoc ipsum dicens forte non male. Contingit enim esse aliquos, quos disciplinari et fieri studiosos viros impossibile est.

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792. Sed haec quidem utique erit propria transmutatio eius quae ab illo dicitur optima politia, magis quam aliarum omnium, et eorum quae fiunt omnium. Et per tempus, per quod dicit omnia transmutari, et quae non simul incoeperunt fieri, simul transmutantur; velut si die priori ante tropicum facta fuerunt, simul transmutatur.

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793. Adhuc autem propter quam causam ex hac in eam quae Lacedaemoniorum fit transmutatio? saepius enim in contrariam transmutantur omnes politiae quam in eam quae prope. Eadem autem ratio et de aliis transmutationibus; ex Lacedaemoniensi enim, ait, transmutantur in oligarchiam. Ex hac autem in democratia, in tyrannidem autem ex democratia. Et quidem etiam e contrario transmutantur; puta ex demo in oligarchiam, et magis quam in monarchiam.

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794. Adhuc autem tyrannidis non dicit, neque si erit transmutatio, neque si non erit, propter quam causam, et in qualem politiam. Huius autem causa, quia non facile utique habet dicere; indeterminatum enim. Quoniam et secundum illum oportet, et in primam et optimam; sic enim utique fieret continuum et circulus. Sed transmutatur et in tyrannidem tyrannis: sicut quae Sicyonis, ex ea quae Myronis, in eam quae Clisthenis: et in oligarchiam, sicut quae in Chalcide, quae Antileontis; et in democratiam, sicut quae Gelonis in Syracusis; et in aristocratiam, sicut quae Carilai, in Lacedaemonia, et in Carchedone. Et in tyrannidem transmutatio fit ex oligarchia; sicut in Sicilia, fere plurimae antiquarum in Leontinis in tyrannidem Panaetii, et in Gela, eam quae Cleandri, et in Rhegio in eam quae Anaxilai, et in aliis civitatibus multis similiter.

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795. Inconveniens autem et putare in oligarchiam propter hoc transmutari, quia amatores pecuniarum, et pecuniosi, qui in principatibus, sed non quia quod multum excedunt in substantiis, non iustum putant aequalem participare per civitatem eos qui nihil possident cum his qui possident.

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796. In multisque oligarchiis non licet pecuniosum fieri, sed leges sunt prohibentes. In Carchedone autem democratizantes pecuniosi sunt, et sic transmutatae fuerunt.

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797. Inconveniens enim est dicere, duas civitates esse eam quae oligarchia divitum et pauperum. Quid enim haec magis quam Lacedaemonica passa est vel quaecumque alia, ubi non omnes possident aequalia, vel non omnes similiter erunt boni viri, nullo autem pauperiori facto quam prius, nihil minus transmutantur in demum ex oligarchia, si fiant plures qui egeni, et ex demo in oligarchiam, si valentius fuit quod opulentum quam multitudo, et ii quidem non curent, ii autem adhibeant intellectum.

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798. Multisque existentibus causis per quae fiunt transmutationes, non dicit, sed unam, quia prodigi facti usurarii fiunt pauperes, ut a principio divitibus existentibus omnibus aut plurimis: hoc autem est falsum. Sed quando quidam praesidum perdiderunt substantias, innovant; quando autem aliorum, nihil fit dirum, et transmutantur nihil magis nunquam in demum quam in aliam politiam. Adhuc autem, et si honoribus non participant, et si iniusta patiantur, vel iniurias, seditiones faciunt, et transmutant politias, etsi non consumpserint substantiam, propter licere sibi quodcumque voluerunt facere; cuius causam, eam quae valde libera, esse dicit.

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799. Pluribus autem existentibus oligarchiis et democratiis, tamquam una existente utraque, dicit transmutationes Socrates.

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Postquam philosophus determinavit de salvatione et corruptione rerumpublicarum secundum intentionem propriam, hic intendit reprobare opinionem Platonis de corruptione earumdem. Et circa hoc primo praemittens intentionem suam, innuit opinionem eius. Secundo cum dicit tamquam natura approbat eam in quodam bene dicto. Tertio cum dicit, sed haec quidem etc. improbat in male dictis. Circa primum est intelligendum, quod opinio Platonis de corruptione rerumpublicarum non est bene cognita a nobis. Tum quia non venit ad nos per libros eiusdem nec expositorum eius. Tum quia dicta Aristotelis hic de ea obscura sunt valde propter brevitatem ipsorum. Unde magis videtur eam supponere quasi manifestam tempore suo quam expresse ponere; exceptis quibusdam paucis. Sed ex suppositionibus quibusdam Platonis in aliis, et ex illis brevibus, quae hic ponit Aristoteles et obscuris, et ex ipsa reprobatione poterit aliqualiter videri opinio praedicta ipsius. Posuit autem Plato, sicut ex aliis apparet, quod ipsum unum sit substantia eorum quae dicuntur; non distinguens inter unum quod est principium numeri, et unum quod est substantiale. Et quia replicatione unius quod est principium numeri causatur numerus, concessit quod ex replicatione unius substantialis causetur numerus. Ex replicatione autem substantiae non generatur nisi substantia; et ideo concessit substantiam eorum quae ex pluribus sunt, esse numerum quemdam, et formas eorum substantiales esse numeros quosdam; sicut formam hominis, leonis, caeli et etiam animae. In numeris autem primo invenitur proportio quae est certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad aliam. Proportionum autem numeralium quaedam sunt temperatae magis, in quibus extrema magis accedunt ad naturam unius; quaedam autem intemperatae magis, sicut sesquialtera magis temperata est quam sesquisexta vel sesquiseptima, vel dupla, vel tripla; et ideo substantias entium compositorum posuit consistere in quadam proportione numerali principiorum ex quibus sunt; sed quorumdam in temperata magis, quorumdam autem in intemperata, quorumdam autem in mediis. Et quia respublica ex pluribus componitur, sicut ex materia, est enim ordo inhabitantium civitatem ad per se sufficientiam vitae; ideo posuit rationem eius consistere in proportione aliqua: cuiusdam quidem in ea quae maxime temperata est, quam dixit esse optimam et maxime unam ut apparuit ex secundo huius: alterius autem in intemperata valde, quam dixit esse pessimam: mediarum autem in mediis: quarum quae magis accedunt ad temperatam primam meliores sunt; quae autem ad intemperatam, peiores.

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Secundo aliud principium posuit, quod in entibus compositis ex pluribus, illud quod magis unum est, minus ex se est corruptibile; tum quia magis accedit ad secundum se unum separatum, quod est ex seipso, est incorruptibile; tum quia etiam quod magis est unum, magis est ens in actu secundum quod huiusmodi, quia unum est ens convertuntur; et quod magis est ens in actu, minus est ens in potentia ex se; et quod minus est in potentia ex se, minus est corruptibile: propter quod rempublicam primam et optimam quae maxime una est, posuit minime corruptibilem ex seipsa.

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Tertio posuit quod omnia quae fiunt hic secundum naturam reducuntur in superioribus in aliquam figuram caelestem; ita quod cum incipit sensibilis generatio figurae in caelo per motum stellarum, incipit transmutatio ad substantiam generandam hic; et cum generata est figura praedicta, generatum est ens naturale ab illa; et cum incipit recessus stellarum a praedicta figura, similiter incipit hic declinatio sequentis figuram illam dispositione naturali. Et cum corrupta est figura, corruptum est et illud; ita ut profectus et defectus rei naturalis mensuratur secundum quantitatem accessus stellarum ad figuram determinatam et recessus ab eadem. Et quantitas istius motus caelestis in ordine ad rem naturalem dicitur periodus eius naturalis. Et quia tempus accessus et recessus stellarum secundum naturam sunt aequalia, quia uniformiter moventur; ideo tempus profectus seu generationis rei est aequale tempori defectus seu corruptionis eiusdem, quamvis multoties in maiori accidit corrumpi quam generari, vel e contrario, propter inaequalitatem materiae, sicut Aristoteles dicit secundo de generatione. Corruptio autem rei quae accidit secundum declinationem a praedicta figura caelesti dicitur corruptio secundum tempus a philosopho. Quia igitur respublica est aliquid causatum, hic dixit eam causari ab aliqua figura caelesti, et corrumpi per recessum ab ea in quodam periodo temporis determinato. Et sic posuit optimam rempublicam corrumpi in eam quae Lacedaemoniorum, quae fuit quaedam species status optimatum, non in aliam. De tyrannide autem non dixit si corrumpitur, an non; nec si corrumpitur, quomodo corrumpatur: nec potuit rationabiliter dicere. Posuit etiam quod in statu paucorum fiebat transmutatio ex optimatum statu seu populari vel aliis huiusmodi, quia principantes erant amatores pecuniarum. Et pecuniosi facti principantur aliis propter pecuniam, cogentes eos servire ad utilitatem propriam.

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Haec igitur, ut videtur, est opinio Platonis in summa, quam recitat et reprobat philosophus dicens, quod de transmutationibus rerumpublicarum dictum est a Socrate, idest a Platone introducente Socratem loquentem in republica sua, non tamen secundum rationem et bene. Dixit enim quod cum multae respublicae essent et altera earum esset optima, illius optimae et primae simpliciter secundum naturam non esse transmutationem proprie, idest ex se minime esse corruptibilem, quia prima et optima respublica maxime est una secundum ipsum; illud autem quod maxime unum est, minime ex se est corruptibile, sicut dictum est prius. Dixit tamen corruptionem eius esse per accidens et ab alio: cuius causam dicit esse, quia nihil eorum quae sunt hic composita ex pluribus ex se natum est manere continue, sed necesse est transmutari in aliqua periodo determinata, hoc est in aliqua quantitate motus caelestis mensurantis durationem ipsius, sicut dictum est prius. Principium esse et permanentiae illarum rerumpublicarum quarum fundus, idest substantia super quam fundantur omnia accidentia, est epitritus, idest numerus continens proportionem sesquitertiam quae invenitur primo inter quatuor et tria quae aggregata faciunt septem, coniunctus quinario qui continent proportionem sesquialteram quae reperitur inter tria et duo; ex quibus aggregatum, puta ex septem et quinque, scilicet duodecim, continet duas praedictas harmonias, sesquialteram et sesquitertiam, dixit esse causam per se quia numerus huiusmodi diagrammatis, idest figurationis, solidus est. Constat enim ex ductu unius sesquialteris in alterum, puta tria in quatuor. Entia autem illa quorum substantia est numerus aliquis solidus, sunt maioris durationis. Et non vult aliud dicere, ut videtur, nisi quod respublica illa cuius substantia est duodenarius numerus continens proportionem sesquialteram et sesquitertiam quae magis ad unitatem videntur accedere, solidus existens, est maioris durationis, quia numerus iste solidus est.

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Deinde cum dicit tamquam natura approbat ipsam in quodam bene dicto; dicens, quod Plato dixit quasdam respublicas esse maioris durationis propter causam praedictam; ac si natura producens eas in esse produceret quasdam pravas et quasdam meliores secundum disciplinam, hoc ipsum dicens forte non male. Contingit enim esse aliquos gubernantes quos ex nativitate et figura caelesti in hora nativitatis impossibile, hoc est difficile, est fieri studiosos et bonos. Sunt enim aliqui ex dispositione naturali quam acquirunt ex figura caelesti in principio inclinantur ad turpia, et ea quae praeter rationem sunt. Alii autem qui ex dispositione naturali inclinantur ad honesta, et ea quae secundum rationem. Talem enim inclinationem ad honesta vel turpia causari ex figura caelesti necesse est dicere, quamvis necessitatem non imponat in his quae operantur secundum intellectum.

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Deinde cum dicit sed haec reprobat eam in male dictis. Et primo quantum ad ea quae dixit de corruptione optimae reipublicae. Secundo quantum ad ea quae de corruptione quarumdam aliarum, cum dicit, adhuc autem tyrannidis et cetera. Circa primum primo reprobat eam quantum ad hoc, quod dixit ipsius non esse transmutationem proprie. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem etc. quantum ad terminum transmutationis. In prima parte dicit, quod non bene dixit non eius esse transmutationem proprie, sed per transmutationem figurae caelestis in periodo determinata. Haec enim transmutatio causata est a motu caeli quae est omnium eorum quae fiunt natura et per tempus saltem secundum accidens, inquantum tempus est mensura motus, qui facit distare quod est, ut dicitur quarto physicorum. Propter quod dicit omnia quae fiunt hic naturaliter transmutari; et illa quae simul incoeperunt transmutari, et illa quae non, simul corrumpi. Sicut si aliqua facta fuerunt in die praecedente tropicum, hoc est conversionem solis a signis meridionalibus ad Septentrionalia vel e contrario, simul terminantur et finiuntur, magis est propria optimae reipublicae quam aliarum. Istud enim quod simpliciter generatur, simpliciter corrumpitur et quod secundum quid generatur, secundum quid corrumpitur, sicut apparet ex primo de generatione. Unde substantiae, cuius est generatio simpliciter, est corruptio simpliciter. Et accidentis, cuius est generatio secundum quid. Reipublicae autem optimae primae est simpliciter generatio: quia cum generatio sit una in esse, eius magis erit generatio quae magis est ens, in generabilibus dico. Optima autem et prima in genere rerumpublicarum maxime est ens. Ergo ipsius erit corruptio et magis quam aliarum. Sed istud quod concludit ratio ista, stat cum dicto Platonis, qui dixit, quod respublica optima et prima ex se, minime est corruptibilis: quia maxime una et actu incorruptibilis est, et corrumpitur ab alio; et illa corruptio eius est corruptio simpliciter, quia entis simpliciter, quod concludit ratio Aristotelis. Et ideo secundum rem non reprobat ipsum, sed ad illos qui intelligerent, Platonem dixisse reipublicae primae non esse corruptionem, simpliciter decipi per aequivocationem huius termini. Proprie: quod uno modo significat illud quod simpliciter est, alio autem modo illud quod est ex se, in qua significatione hic utebatur ipse.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem propter reprobat eam quantum ad terminum transmutationis; dicens, quod adhuc quaerendum est a Platone, propter quam causam ex optima republica fit transmutatio secundum eum in eam quae Lacedaemoniorum, quae fuit quaedam species status optimatum, sicut apparuit ex quarto, propinqua optimae. Nos enim videmus ad sensum quod saepius transmutatio fit in contrariam rempublicam quam in propinquam, sicut a regno in tyrannidem. Eadem autem ratio est de transmutationibus aliarum consequentium secundum ipsum. Dixit enim quod ex republica Lacedaemoniorum fit transmutatio in paucorum potentiam, sicut in propinquiorem ei, et ex dicta in popularem, ex qua in tyrannidem, sicut in pessimam et ultimam; et tamen nos videmus e contrario fieri saepius transmutationem ex statu populari in paucorum quam in tyrannidem. Et est intelligendum, quod si Plato intellexit optimam rempublicam corrumpi in eam quae propinqua est ei natura, et similiter consequentes in propinquiores eis solum, falsum intellexit, et procedit dictum Aristotelis contra eum. Si autem non intellexit solum, sed quod facilius, verum dixit, nec Aristoteles hoc improbat, immo dicit in secundo de generatione, quod in habentibus symbolum facilius est transitus.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem tyrannidis reprobat quantum ad alias. Et primo, quia non dixit nec potuit bene dicere de corruptione tyrannidis. Secundo cum dicit, inconveniens autem, quia non dixit de transmutatione paucorum potentiae in alias vel aliarum in ipsum. In prima parte dicit quod adhuc Socrates seu Plato non determinavit si tyrannidis est aliqua transmutatio vel non est. Et si est, propter quam causam et in quam rempublicam est. Et causa huius est, quia non facile posset illud dicere secundum rationem, quia non est determinatum, nec determinatur ab eo bene, suppositis dictis ipsius; quoniam secundum ipsum si corrumpatur tyrannis, oportet eam corrumpi naturaliter in primam et optimam. Quia sic erit circulus quidam in corruptionibus ipsarum; puta si optima corrumpatur in statum optimatum; et haec in rempublicam quae in statu paucorum; et ista in statum popularem, quae in tyrannidem, et tyrannis in optimam per consequens. Sed nos videmus quod non sic transmutatur tyrannis in optimam semper, sed transmutatur quandoque tyrannis in tyrannidem, sicut illa quae est apud Sicyonios ex Myronis in eam quae est Clisthenis. Transmutatur etiam quandoque in paucorum potentiam, sicut in Chalcide tyrannis quae Antileontis transmutata fuit in eam. Item in statum popularem, sicut illa quae fuit Gelonis in Syracusis. Et in optimatum, sicut illa quae fuit Charilai apud Lacedaemonios. Et e contrario ex paucorum potentia transmutatio facta in tyrannidem, sicut in Sicilia plurimae antiquae paucorum gubernationes transmutatae sunt, sicut in Leontinis in tyrannidem Panaetii. Et in civitate quae dicitur Gela in illam quae Cleandri. Et in Rhegio, quae est civitas Calabriae, in eam quae Anaxilai. Similiter autem se habet in aliis civitatibus multis.

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Deinde cum dicit inconveniens autem reprobat opinionem eius quantum ad hoc quod dixit de transmutatione paucorum potentiae, in paucorum potentiam. Et primo reprobat causam ipsam transmutationis quam posuit. Secundo cum dicit, in multisque oligarchiis etc. propter insufficientiam. Causam autem improbat per tres rationes: quarum secundam ponit cum dicit, in multisque. Tertiam cum dicit, inconveniens enim est dicere et cetera. In prima parte dicit, quod inconveniens est credere et dicere, quod transmutatio fiat in paucorum potentiam ex aliis, puta ex statu populari, vel optimatum, vel huiusmodi, quia principantes sunt amatores pecuniarum, et ideo acquirentes undecumque et qualitercumque pecuniosi fiunt, pecuniosi autem facti, aestimantes quasi se habere omnia, et praecellere omnes, faciunt se dominos per potentiam pecuniarum: et non magis propter hoc, quia excedentes in substantiis, puta divites, existimant non iustum esse, seipsos, et pauperes qui nihil possident habere aequale de honoribus et bonis communibus; sed ipsos debere plus habere secundum praeeminentiam divitiarum propriarum ad eas quae pauperum. Et est intelligendum quod causa quam assignat Aristoteles huius transmutationis, puta non aestimare eos et pauperes non habere aequale, est causa proxima ipsius. Causa autem quam assignavit Socrates, est magis causa remota et prima. Ex abundantia enim divitiarum concipiunt aestimationem praedictam, ad quam sequitur voluntas transmutationis reipublicae.

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Deinde cum dicit in multisque ponit secundam rationem; dicens, quod adhuc multae sunt potentiae paucorum, in quibus non licet superexcedentem acquirere pecuniam, sed sunt leges aliquae prohibentes excedere quantitatem determinatam, et tamen transmutatio ad eas fuit facta; ergo non per acquisitionem pecuniae: et hoc est intelligendum cum transmutatur unus paucorum status in alium. Item in Carthagine regnantes in populari statu, efficiuntur multi pecuniosi, et tamen non transmutantur in paucorum statum, sed in aliam rempublicam magis; ergo abundantia pecuniae non fuit proxima causa et per se transmutationis in paucorum statum.

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Deinde cum dicit inconveniens enim ponit tertiam rationem; dicens, quod irrationabile est civitatem quae regitur secundum paucorum potentiam habere duas civitates, hoc est duas communicationes civium, unam videlicet divitum, et aliam pauperum quae sibiinvicem contrariantur; non enim est ratio, quare hoc magis inveniatur in ista quam in Lacedaemonia, quae fuit optimatum potentia quaedam, vel in quacumque alia republica, ubi non omnes habent aequales possessiones seu divitias, vel ubi omnes non sunt aequaliter boni viri; et ideo si in una non est principium corruptionis, nec in aliis. Videmus autem, quod nullo facto pauperiore, quam prius esset, ex paucorum statu fit transmutatio in statum popularem, si pauperes sint plures et potentiores. Et e contrario nullo facto ditiori fit transmutatio ex populari republica in paucorum, si opulenti sint potentiores quam multitudo egenorum, et adhibeant curam ad transmutandum rempublicam, alii autem negligant. Quare proxima causa transmutationis in paucorum statum ex populari, non est ob hoc ipsum, quod principantes sint facti magis pecuniosi.

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Deinde cum dicit multisque existentibus reprobat ipsum propter insufficientiam causae. Et primo ex hoc, quod cum sint multae causae praedictae transmutationis, unam tantum assignavit. Secundo cum dicit, pluribus autem etc. quia cum plures sint paucorum status et populares, tantum assignavit unam causam omnium. In prima parte dicit, quod adhuc cum multae existant causae et principia transmutationis popularis status in paucorum potentiam, et e contrario, non dixit nisi unam tantum; quia videlicet usurarii, hoc est divites praeter rationem secundum prodigalitatem expendentes propria, efficiuntur pauperes, et deinde volentes ditari, corrumpunt rempublicam. Hoc autem dicit ac si omnes vel plures essent aequaliter divites a principio. Hoc autem falsum est; sed magis videtur esse causa una, quod quando aliqui magni et praesidentes in civitate perdunt substantias, et volunt eas innovare, trahunt ad se rempublicam transmutantes, ut ex hoc ditentur. Et tunc fit transmutatio non magis in popularem rempublicam quam in quamcumque aliam. Quando autem aliqui communium et popularium ditantur, nihil fit durum per quod respublica transmutetur, ut frequentius, quia non sunt ita magnanimi. Adhuc autem, et si reputent se dignos honoribus, et non participent ipsis, et si iniustum reputent se pati in rebus, vel iniurias in personis, seditiones movent in civitate, et transmutant rempublicam, sicut dictum est prius. Item quamvis non consumpserint substantiam, seu divitias, aliquando transmutant ipsam propter hoc, quod reputant sibi licere facere quodcumque voluerint. Cuius causam dixit Plato esse eam, quae libera est, hoc est ipsam libertatem. Insufficienter enim assignavit causam transmutationis praedictarum rerumpublicarum.

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Deinde cum dicit pluribus autem reprobat ex eo, quod cum sint multae, assignavit causam sicut unius tantum, dicens, quod insufficienter dixit Socrates, quia pluribus existentibus speciebus status popularis et paucorum, sicut dictum est prius in quarto, assignavit causas earum tamquam utraque earum esset una secundum speciem, et species earum adinvicem non differrent: hoc autem falsum est. Hae enim diversae sunt et species diversas habent, quare et causas diversas. Diversorum enim oportet esse diversas causas proprias aliquo modo. Et in hoc terminatur intentio Aristotelis in hoc quinto.

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Bk. 6Quibus observationibus popularis status conservari queat. Et paucorum gubernatio tractari, ne ad aliud genus transeat, ac postremo de magistratibus in urbe regenda necessariis.

Quibus observationibus popularis status conservari queat. Et paucorum gubernatio tractari, ne ad aliud genus transeat, ac postremo de magistratibus in urbe regenda necessariis.

Polit.lib6

L. 1 (Ζ.1, 1316b31–1317a39)Popularis status varietas non solum pendet a diversitate operationum, sed etiam ab institutis in eundem finem minus tendentibus.

Popularis status varietas non solum pendet a diversitate operationum, sed etiam ab institutis in eundem finem minus tendentibus.

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800. Quot quidem igitur differentiae, et quae eius quod consiliativum, et dominans politiae, et eius qui circa principatus ordinis, et de praetoriis, et qualia ad qualem politiam coordinata sunt; adhuc autem de corruptione et salvatione politiarum, ex qualibus sit, et propter quas causas, dictum est prius.

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801. Quoniam autem fuerunt species plures democratiae existentes, et aliarum similter politiarum, simulque de illis, siquid residuum, non deterius considerare, et modum congruum et conferentem assignare ad unamquamque. Adhuc autem et collectiones ipsorum dictorum omnimodorum considerandum.

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802. Haec enim combinata faciunt politias variari, ut aristocratiae sint oligarchiae, et politiae sint magis democratiae. Dico autem combinationes quas oportet quidem considerare, non sunt autem consideratae nunc: puta si quod quidem consilians et quod circa electionem principatum oligarchice fuerit institutum; quae autem circa praetoria, aristocratice, aut hoc quidem, et quod circa consilians oligarchice, aristocratice autem, quod circa electiones principatuum, aut secundum aliquem alium modum non omnia componantur quae politiae convenientia.

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803. Qualis quidem igitur democratia ad qualem congruit civitatem, similiter autem, et qualis oligarchiarum, quali multitudini, et reliquarum autem politiarum quid quibus expediat, dictum est prius.

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804. Attamen oportet fieri palam, non solum qualis harum politiarum sit optima civitatibus, sed et qualiter oportet instituere, et has et alias, pertractemus breviter.

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805. Et primo de democratia dicamus: simul enim, et de opposita politia manifestum: haec autem est, quam quidam vocant oligarchiam.

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806. Sumendum autem ad hanc methodum, quia quae demotica, et quae videntur democratiis assequi.

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807. Ex his enim compositis deocratiae species fieri accidit, et democratias plures una esse, et differentes. Duae enim sunt causae, propter quas democratiae sunt plures: primo quidem, quae dicta est prius, quia diversi populi: sit enim haec quidem agricola multitudo, haec autem banausum et mercenarium, quorum primo assumpto cum secundo, et tertio rursum cum ambobus, non solum differt in fieri meliorem et deteriorem democratiam, sed ex eo, quod non eandem. Secunda autem de qua nunc dicimus. Quae enim democratiis assequuntur, et videntur esse propria politiae huius, simul posita, faciunt democratias alias: huic quidem enim pauciora huic autem assequuntur plura, huic autem omnia haec.

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808. Opportunum autem unumquodque ipsorum cognoscere ad instituendum, quamcumque ipsarum aliquis extiterit volens, et ad directiones. Quaerunt quidem enim qui politias instituunt, omnia convenientia ad hypothesim congregare: peccant autem hoc facientes, quemadmodum in iis quae circa corruptiones et salvationes politiarum dictum est prius. Nunc autem exigentias et mores, et quae appetunt dicamus.

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Postquam philosophus determinavit de principiis et causis corrumpentibus et salvantibus respublicas et in universali et in particulari, intendit nunc ostendere ex quibus et quomodo sunt instituendae. Et primo declarat ex quibus et quomodo instituendae sunt respublicae transgressae. Et in secunda parte ex quibus et quomodo respublica optima et recta in principio septimi, ibi, de politia optima. Respublicae autem transgressae erant tres. Paucorum, popularis et tyrannis: inter quas tyrannis pessima est, nec alicui expedit simpliciter, quia nihil malignitatis ei deficit, sicut dicebatur in quinto. Et ideo de ipsa non determinat ex quibus et quomodo sit instituenda. Unde tantum in isto sexto intendit determinare, qualiter aliae duae sint instituendae. Et dividitur in duas; quoniam in prima parte praemittit intentionem suam, et ordinem considerandi. In secunda cum dicit, hypothesis quidem igitur, prosequitur. Circa primum duo facit: quoniam primo dat intentionem suam. Secundo dat ordinem considerandi cum dicit, et primo de democratia. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enim continuans se quaedam dicta recolligendo, dat intentionem suam in universali. Secundo cum dicit, qualis quidem igitur democratia, in particulari. Circa primum duo facit. Primo recolligit quaedam determinata prius. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem fuerunt, tangit quae restant consideranda in universali. In prima dicit: in praecedentibus, puta in fine quinti huius, determinatum est, quae et quot species differentiae sunt eius quod consiliatur in republica, et etiam eius quod dominatur simpliciter, et etiam ipsorum principantium universaliter, et etiam iudiciorum, quae reddunt sententias disceptantibus. Iterum etiam dictum est, quae istarum cui reipublicae conveniunt principaliter, quia non omnia omnibus competunt. Iterum etiam dictum est ex quibus et qualibus causis et principiis, et quomodo se habentibus contingit salvari et corrumpi respublicas et in universali et in particulari.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem tangit in universali quaedam quae restant consideranda; et dividitur in duas. In prima tangit illa. In secunda reddit causam cuiusdam dicti, cum dicit, haec enim combinata. In prima dicit, quod quia plures sunt species reipublicae sicut dictum est prius, puta popularis, et paucorum, et sic de aliis: adhuc etiam plures sunt species popularis, et plures etiam aliarum rerumpublicarum de quibus aliqua considerata sunt prius, si aliquid remanserit de illis non consideratum et non declaratum, et quod minus expediens est cognoscere, considerandum est nunc de illo, puta de institutione secundum unamquamque speciem. Item considerandus est modus, qui congruit unicuique illarum, et confert ad consequutionem finis uniuscuiusque; adhuc autem et commixtiones modorum rerumpublicarum.

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Deinde cum dicit haec enim reddit causam cuiusdam dicti immediate. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum, quod sunt quaedam partes materiales in habentibus materiam, quae non pertinent ad speciem; sicut aurum vel cuprum non pertinent ad speciem circuli. Alia autem sunt quae pertinent ad ipsam, sicut carnes et ossa ad speciem animalis vel hominis. Et quia tales partes ad speciem pertinent, ideo secundum diversitatem istarum accidit diversificari speciem. In republica sunt quaedam partes sic non pertinentes ad rempublicam, sicut iste homo vel ille, vel hoc officium vel illud: quaedam autem secundum speciem, sicut principans et consiliativum et iudicium, et sic de aliis; et ideo secundum distinctionem istorum diversificantur species reipublicae. Contingit autem commixtiones vel combinationes istarum fieri, puta quod accipiatur consiliativum unius et iudicium alterius, et sic de aliis; et secundum hoc contingit diversimode misceri respublicas. Et hoc est, quod ipse dicit, quod considerandae sunt combinationes partium pertinentium ad speciem diversarum rerumpublicarum. Istae enim partes diversimode combinatae faciunt diversitatem rerumpublicarum, ita quod istae quae sunt optimatum secundum aliquid videntur esse paucorum secundum aliquid quidem; et illae quae sunt respublicae secundum aliquid, videantur populares secundum aliud. Dico autem exponendo praedictas combinationes quae restant considerandae, et ab aliis sunt omissae; ut si in aliqua republica vel in aliqua civitate consilium et ea quae pertinent ad electionem principum accipiantur ex paucorum statu, id autem quod pertinet ad iudicia ex optimatum statu, aut ea quae sunt circa iudicia aut etiam circa consilium ex paucorum statu, ea vero quae ad electionem pertinent ex optimatum, aut secundum aliquem alium modum talem quo nunc accipiuntur omnia quae conveniunt uni reipublicae non ex propriis eius, sed ex his quae conveniunt aliis vel aliis. Secundum enim diversitatem istorum contingit diversimode misceri respublicas.

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Deinde cum dicit qualis quidem in speciali magis dat intentionem. Et primo recolligit iterum quaedam determinata prius. Secundo cum dicit, attamen oportet, declarat quae restant determinanda nunc in speciali. Primo igitur dicit, quod in praecedentibus, puta in quarto, dictum est qualis species status popularis, quali multitudini conveniat; et qualis species paucorum, quali multitudini insignium conveniat; et similiter de reliquis rebuspublicis dictum est quae cui vel qualibus conveniat; non enim quaelibet cuilibet expedit, sicut nec quodlibet genus fistulae cuilibet fistulatori, sed determinatum determinato.

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Deinde cum dicit attamen oportet tangit quae sunt consideranda nunc; dicens, quod quamvis ista considerata sint, tamen oportet manifestari non solum qualis respublica cui multitudini conveniat, sed etiam qualiter et ex quibus et quomodo unaquaeque illarum sit instituenda; et ideo de hac pertractandum est nunc breviter.

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Consequenter cum dicit et primo dat ordinem considerandi; et dividitur in duo. Quoniam primo tangit quod de populari statu primo est considerandum. Secundo cum dicit, sumendum autem, ostendit quo ordine sit considerandum de ea. In prima dicit, quod primo considerandum est ex quibus et quomodo instituendus sit popularis status. Simul enim quantum ad unitatem tractatus consequenter manifestum erit de republica quae opponitur illi, quam vocant paucorum potentiam. Post haec autem in sequenti tractatu dicemus de optima.

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Deinde cum dicit sumendum autem tangit ordinem considerandi de populari statu; quod facit primo. Secundo cum dicit, ex his enim, assignat rationem ordinis. In prima dicit, quod est considerandum ex quibus et qualibus instituenda sunt illa quae sunt sicut principia et hypotheses, et omnia quae assequuntur sicut proprietates vel accidentia ipsi; deinde determinandum est, ex quibus et qualibus instituatur.

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Deinde cum dicit ex his enim assignat rationem propositi ordinis; et dividitur in duas, secundum quod duas rationes assignat, et incipit secunda ibi, opportunum autem. In prima dicit, quod bene dictum est, quod prius considerandum est proprietates et accidentia popularis status, quoniam ex diversa compositione istorum contingit fieri plures modos popularis reipublicae differenter a seinvicem, et etiam species plures: propter enim duas causas contingit esse plures species ipsius. Quarum una dicta est prius, scilicet diversitas multitudinis: respublicae enim diversificantur secundum diversitatem eius quod principatur in eis, multitudo autem in populari republica principatur; et ideo secundum diversitatem multitudinis contingit eam diversificari. Est enim quaedam multitudo agricolarum, alia autem opificum, et tertia ministrorum quae mercedem accipit pro labore; in quibus si agricolarum multitudo accipitur cum secunda, puta cum opificibus seorsum; et iterum tertia multitudo, puta ministrorum cum duabus aliis seorsum, facient populares status differentes, non tantum secundum melius et deterius, sed etiam secundum speciem; quoniam ista combinatio et illa diversum ordinem multitudinis ad finem faciunt, et diversitas multitudinis in ordine ad finem diversitatem inducit secundum speciem popularis reipublicae. Alia autem causa est, de qua diximus nunc, quoniam in popularibus potentiis sunt quaedam hypotheses et accidentia propria diversa, quae diversimode composita diversas respublicas populares inducunt; puta si in aliqua accipiantur plura, in alia autem pauciora, in alia autem omnia; ista enim diversificant eas, sicut apparebit consequenter.

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Deinde cum dicit opportunum autem assignat secundam rationem; dicens, quod expediens est considerare principia et proprietates popularis status ad instituendam unamquamque speciem ipsius ad votum, et ad hoc ut aliquid dirigatur in ea: cognoscere enim principia et proprietates alicuius operabilis principium est ad operandum illud et dirigendum in eo. Illi autem qui respublicas quaerunt instituere volentes congregare omnia convenientia reipublicae ad instituendum unamquamque, peccant, sicut dictum est in quinto huius, ubi dictum est quae sunt salvantia et corrumpentia respublicas. Quaedam enim respublicae congregant omnia convenientia ad suppositiones, quaedam autem vel plura, quaedam pauciora, sicut iam dictum est prius. Nunc autem consequenter dicamus exigentias vel proprietates convenientes et consuetudines, et ea quae appetunt sicut fines vel ea quae sunt ad fines popularis status.

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L. 2 (Ζ.2, 1317a40–1318a10)De fine popularis status, et aliis quibusdam in ipsum tendibus.De fine popularis status, et aliis quibusdam in ipsum tendibus.

809. Hypothesis quidem igitur democraticae politiae libertas: hoc enim dicere consueverunt, tamquam in sola hac politia participantes libertate; hoc enim coniectare aiunt omnem democratiam.

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810. Libertatis autem unum quidem in parte subici, et principari. Etenim iustum democraticum est, habere aequale secundum numerum, sed non secundum dignitatem. Huius autem existentis iusti multitudinem necessarium esse dominans, et quodcumque videatur pluribus, hunc esse finem, et hoc est quod iustum. Aiunt enim oportere aequale habere unumquemque civium. Quare in democratiis accidit magis esse dominos egenos divitibus, plures enim sunt. Dominans autem quod pluribus visum.

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811. Unum quidem igitur libertatis signum, hoc quod terminum politiae ponunt omnes, qui demotici. Unum autem vivere ut vult quis. Hoc enim opus libertatis esse aiunt, siquidem servientis ipsum vivere non ut vult. Et democratiae quidem igitur terminus iste secundus.

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812. Hinc autem venit id, quod est non subici, maxime autem sub nullo; si autem non, secundum partem; et facit hac ad libertatem eam, quae secundum aequale.

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813. Talibus autem suppositis, et tali existente principatu, talia demotica: scilicet eligere principatus omnes ex omnibus, principari omnes quidem super unumquemque, unumquemque autem in parte super omnes; sortiales esse principatus, vel omnes, vel quicumque non indigent experientia et arte; non ab honorabilitate aliqua esse principatus, aut quam parvissima.

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814. Non bis eundem principari, aut raro, aut paucis, exceptis iis quae penes bellum, pauci, exceptis iis, quae penes bellum, pauci temporis esse principatus iis quae penes, vel omnes, vel quoscumque contingit. Iudicare omnes, vel ex omnibus, et de omnibus, vel de plurimis et de maximis et de principalissimis, puta de correctionibus, et de politia, et de propriis commutationibus.

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815. Congregationem esse dominam omnium (principatum autem nullum nullius, aut quam paucissimorum), aut maximorum dominam.

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816. Principatuum autem, maxime demoticum consilium, ubi non mercedes de factis omnibus: ii enim auferunt et huius principatus potentiam: ad se ipsum enim reducit iudicia omnia populus abundans pretio, sicut dictum fuit prius in methodo, quae ante hanc.

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817. Deinde praemiare maxime quidem omnes, congregationem praetoria, et principatus; si autem non, principatus, et praetoria et consilia, et congregationes praecipuas; aut principatuum necesse convivari cum invicem.

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818. Adhuc autem, quoniam oligarchia, et genere, et divitiis, et disciplina determinatur; quae demotica, videtur contraria horum esse, ignobilitate, paupertate, banausia.

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819. In principatibus autem, nullum perpetuum esse; si autem aliquis deficiat ex antiqua transmutatione, tunc circumtollere potentiam ipsius et ex eligibilibus sortiales facere.

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820. Communia quidem democratiae haec sunt. Accidit autem ex iusto confesso esse democratico (hoc autem esse aequale habere omnes secundum numerum), quae maxime videtur esse democratia, et demus. Aequale enim nihil magis principari egenos quam divites; neque dominos esse solos, sed omnes ex aequo secundum numerum. Sic enim utique putabant existere aequalitatem civitati, et libertatem.

Polit.L2

Postquam philosophus praemisit intentionem suam, prosequitur intentum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Quoniam primo ostendit ex quibus et quomodo instituantur popularis status et paucorum. In secunda cum dicit, consequens autem est etc. determinat de principatibus pertinentibus ad huiusmodi respublicas. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit ex quibus et quomodo instituatur status popularis. Secundo cum dicit, fere autem etc. ex quibus paucorum status sibi oppositus. Circa primum duo facit. Primo praemittit suppositiones et conditiones populares status. Secundo cum dicit, democratiis autem etc. determinat ex quibus et quomodo est instituenda. Circa primum, primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, quod maxime videtur etc. movet dubitationem. Circa primum duo facit. Quoniam in prima praemittit quasdam suppositiones status popularis. Secundo cum dicit, talibus autem praesuppositis etc. concludit multas conditiones ipsius. Circa primum duo facit. Quoniam primo praemittit unam suppositionem primam et principalem. Secundo cum dicit, libertatis autem etc., subdividit eam in duas. In prima igitur dicit, quod una et principalis suppositio status popularis est libertas: quod probat ex communi dicto aliorum; quia sicut omnes consueverunt dicere, ac si solum in ista republica cives participarent libertate. Dicunt enim quod omnes in statu populari intendunt libertatem aliqualiter. Si igitur dictum commune veritatem habet, oportet libertatem esse suppositionem in ipsa. Et est intelligendum quod libertas dicitur qua aliquid potest ex propria voluntate movere se et ad finem sibi positum: quod apparet, quia liber est, secundum philosophum, qui est suiipsius causa, vel in ratione moventis, inquantum ex propria voluntate movetur et ex propria ratione, vel etiam inquantum movetur vel agit gratia finis proprii non ad finem alterius. Accipitur etiam libertas pro ipsa operatione vel actu quo aliquis dicitur a se moveri vel agi ad finem proprium. Hoc autem, sive illo, sive hoc modo sumatur, aliqui habent ex naturali dispositione; et tales sunt liberi natura, sicut dicebatur in primo huius. Aliqui autem habent hoc ex ordine reipublicae quod non aguntur ab alio, quam a se, nec ad finem alterius, sed ex se et ad finem reipublicae. Et sic appropriant sibi popularis status fautores libertatem.

Polit.L2

Consequenter cum dicit libertatis autem subdividit; et ponit quosdam effectus ipsius. Et dividitur in duas, secundum duos effectus quos ponit, vel secundum duo membra in quae dividit. Secunda ibi, unum quidem igitur et cetera. In prima dicit, quod una pars libertatis vel unus effectus in populari statu est nullum simpliciter subiici vel principari, sed omnes secundum partem; ita quod quilibet secundum aliquod tempus subiiciatur, secundum aliud principetur, aut principetur uno principatu particulari et subiiciatur alii. Ratio autem huius est quoniam iustum populare est omnes habere de honoribus vel bonis communibus secundum aequalitatem quantitatis, non secundum dignitatem personae vel aequalitatem proportionis; sed tantum pauper quantum dives, tantum idiota quantum studiosus. Cum autem cuiuslibet iusti oporteat esse aliquem institutorem et conservatorem, et hoc sit illud quod principale est in multitudine civili, cum multitudo popularis sit principalis in populari statu, necesse est in ea multitudinem esse dominam huius iusti popularis. Ut quia finis in multitudine civili est illud, quod intendit principans, et iustum quod considerat in ordine ad finem, manifestum est quod necesse est illud esse finem in populari statu, et iustum, quod videtur multitudini. Dictum autem est prius, omnes debere habere aequale secundum quantitatem: et quia multitudo est domina iusti et simpliciter principatur in ea, et ipsa est maior egenorum quam divitum, accidit egenos magis principari in tali republica quam divites, quia dominans est quod videtur pluribus. Egeni autem sunt plures quam divites: quia igitur necesse est aliquos principari, non possunt autem omnes simul principari, necesse est omnes in parte principari et subiici. Unus igitur effectus vel signum libertatis est quod dictum est, quem omnes in populari statu ponunt, sicut terminum et finem in ea.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit unum quidem ponit secundum effectum vel signum. Et primo ponit ipsum. Secundo cum dicit, hinc autem venit et cetera. Infert primum ex isto. In prima dicit, quod aliud signum vel effectus libertatis est vivere secundum voluntatem, ita quod unusquisque operetur secundum motum propriae voluntatis non coactus ab aliquo, nec determinatus ad aliud determinate operandum. Hoc enim est secundum, quod dicunt, opus libertatis: quod apparet quia opus servitutis est vivere, vel operari, non secundum voluntatem propriam sed secundum alterius libitum vel votum, non ad finem proprium, sed ad finem alterius: ergo per oppositum opus libertatis est operari secundum voluntatem, et ad finem proprium. Iste igitur est secundus terminus, quem ponunt populares in sua republica.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit hinc autem infert primum ex secundo; dicens, quod ex isto effectu, qui est operari ut vult aliquis, sequitur primus effectus, scilicet non velle subiici, aut simpliciter sub nullo esse, si possibile esset. Sed quia hoc non est possibile, subiici scilicet, et principari omnes simpliciter, expedit subiici et principari secundum partem, et subiici et principari facit ad libertatem, quae attenditur in hoc, vel quantum ad hoc, quod omnes sunt aequales.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit talibus autem concludit ex praedictis multas proprietates popularis status. Et dividitur in duas. In prima ponit eas. In secunda recolligit cum dicit, communia quidem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Quoniam primo ponit conditiones, vel proprietates, quae attenduntur circa assumptionem principatus, et eorum qui principantur, et ex quibus et quando. Secundo cum dicit, deinde praemiare etc. illas quae attenduntur quantum ad remunerationem principantium. Tertio cum dicit, praeterea etc., quae attenduntur quantum ad conditiones eorum qui sunt in hac republica. Circa primum facit duo. Quoniam primo tangit conditiones pertinentes ad assumptionem principatus, scilicet tempus et potestatem. Secundo cum dicit, principatuum autem etc., tangit qui debet esse maximum principatus in hac republica. Circa primum primo tangit eas quae pertinent ad assumptionem principatus. Secundo cum dicit, non bis eumdem etc. eas quae pertinent ad durationem principatus. Tertio cum dicit, congregationem esse dominam etc., eam quae pertinet ad potentiam eius. Circa primum tangit quatuor conditiones. Dicens primo, quod praedictis suppositis in populari statu, et multitudine principante in eodem, necesse est has conditiones, quae sequuntur, observari in ea. Primo quidem, omnes principatus tam maiores quam minores eligere, idest accipere ex omnibus indifferenter, non considerando ad dignitatem aliquam: sic enim omnes magis habebunt quoddam aequale quod est iustum in eo. Secundo omnes principari super unumquemque, hoc est omnes coniunctim, super unumquemque divisim; et iterum unumquemque divisim, cum acceptus fuerit in alio et alio principatu, divisim super omnes. Sic enim omnes principabuntur et subiicientur secundum partem; id autem est effectus libertatis primus. Tertio principatus eligi per sortem, vel universaliter omnes, vel saltem illos, in quibus non indigetur multa sapientia et prudentia, puta ducatum exercitus, vel consilium. Tales enim non expedit eligi sorte. Contingeret enim ad tales principatus assumi idiotam quemcumque, quod esset periculosum reipublicae. Quarto principatus assumi, non ab aliqua excellentia vel dignitate virtutis vel divitiarum, aut saltem a minima: quod dicit propter primam speciem popularis status, in qua assumuntur ad principatum ab aliqua dignitate divitiarum, vel virtutis, sicut apparuit in quarto: sic enim magis aequales erunt, et minus subiicientur.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit non bis ponit conditiones duas pertinentes ad rationem principatus; dicens primo, quod in republica hac expediens est, eumdem bis non principari in aliquo principatu, vel raro et paucis principari; sic enim plures poterunt attingere ad principatum, praeterquam in ducatu exercitus, in quo periculosa est mutatio frequens, propter experientiam longam, quae exigitur in illo. Secundo expedit statuere in eadem, et brevis durationis esse principatus, vel simpliciter omnes, vel illos saltem, qui habent iudicare de omnibus casibus, quantum ad omnes cives, vel saltem de pluribus, vel de maximis et principalissimis, sicut de correctione principatuum aliorum, et de ordine reipublicae et commutationibus regulandis secundum legem iustitiae. Expedit autem principatus esse brevis temporis, si possibile sit, ut plures attingere possint ad eos, et principari secundum partem. Maxime autem hoc expedit in magnis, ne nimis ditati insurgant contra multitudinem tyrannizantes.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit congregationem esse tangit conditionem pertinentem ad potentiam. Dicens quod expediens est in huiusmodi republica congregationem multitudinis esse dominam simpliciter omnium in hac republica. Principatus autem expedit habere nullius dominium si possibile sit, aut saltem paucorum, et nullo modo maximorum. Sic enim magis salvabitur aequalitas multitudinis: si enim principatus dominarentur simpliciter, aut in magnis, excederent alios praeter proportionem et aequalitatem, quae in ipsa intenditur.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit principatuum autem manifestat quis principatus magis necessarius est in ipsa. Dicens quod principatus maxime necessarius in populari statu est illud quod vocatur consilium, quod habet potestatem deliberandi de magnis et arduis. Cuius ratio est, quia multitudo popularis, quae in ipsa dominatur, ut in pluribus, imprudens est et sine virtute; et ideo sequitur impetum voluntatis in operationibus suis: quare si debeat recte agere, oportet habere dirigens et regulans: hoc autem est consilium: et ideo consilium maxime necessarium est in statu populari, praeterquam in illa, in qua laborantes in communibus, praemium accipiunt magnum. Haec enim multitudo removet potentiam huius principatus, et reducit ad se omnia iudicia et deliberationes propter pretium, sicut dictum fuit in praecedentibus in quarto huius.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit deinde praemiare ponit conditionem quae pertinet ad retributionem: dicens quod post ea quae dicta sunt, expediens est remunerari omnes venientes ad congregationes, ut libentius veniant, et ad iudicia ut plures iudicent, et firmior sit sententia, et principatus, ut fidelius et magis laborent: et hoc dicunt si possibile est civitati. Si autem non est possibile omnes remunerari, saltem oportet praemiare principatus et iudicia, et consilia, et congregationes maximas et praecipuas et principatus cum quibus necesse est alios plures civitatis convivere. Tales enim principatus nullus acciperet propter magnitudinem expensarum, nisi bene praemiaretur, sicut est dux exercitus.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit proprietatem, quae pertinet ad conditionem gubernantium. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, in principatibus autem etc. resumit quamdam conditionem dictam prius de principatu, ut aliquid addat. In prima dicit: quoniam status paucorum, et popularis sunt respublicae adinvicem contrariae quodammodo, et contrariorum sunt contrariae proprietates, oportet eas proprietates habere contrarias. Cum igitur in paucorum statu gubernantes determinentur per nobilitatem generis, et per divitias et per virtutem, necesse est, quod gubernantes in populari statu determinentur per contraria; puta per ignobilitatem generis, paupertatem et ignorantiam, seu per sordidum opificium, ita quod sicut in paucorum statu sunt principantes nobiles et divites et virtuosi, sic in statu populari viles et pauperes et inordinati.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit in principatibus resumit quamdam proprietatem dictam prius de principatu, et adiungit alias; dicens primo, quod expedit in populari statu nullum esse principatum durationis perpetuae. Si enim esset aliquis perpetuus, pauciores possent attingere ad ipsum, et habere aequale et populare, et iterum possent ditari improportionabiliter, et per divitias et potentiam tyrannizare. Adiungit autem, quod si aliquis principatus deviet vel declinet ab eo quod ordinatum est in antiqua lege ipsorum, amoveatur ab eo potentia vel principatus secundum legis ordinationem: iterum si fuerint aliqui principatus eligibiles, expedit mutare modum assumptionis eorum, et facere quod accipiantur sorte: sic enim magis assumentur ex quibuscumque. Sed hoc est intelligendum de illis principatibus in quibus non indigetur prudentia magna et experientia, sicut est consilium et ducatus exercitus; tales enim oportet eligere considerando ad dignitates praedictas, sicut prius dixit philosophus.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit communia quidem recolligit dicta addendo causam; dicens quod ea quae dicta sunt, sunt quaedam communes proprietates popularis status. Omnes autem huiusmodi proprietates quae videntur esse popularis status, et ordinatio populi in ipso, sequuntur ex definitione iusti popularis prius posita, quae est omnes habere aequale secundum quantitatem, non secundum dignitatem aliquam, aequale enim secundum quantitatem est non magis principari divites, quam pauperes, nec virtuosos, quam idiotas, nec aliquos solitarios esse dominos, sed omnes aequaliter secundum numerum; si enim hoc modo se habeant, existimabunt se habere secundum aequalitatem et etiam libertatem.

Polit.L2

L. 3 (Ζ.3, 1318a11–1318b5)Quomodo in populari statu quippiam iuste decernatur.

Quomodo in populari statu quippiam iuste decernatur.

Polit.L3

821. Quod autem post hoc dubitatur, quomodo habebunt quod aequale: utrum oportet honorabilitates dividere ipsis mille, eas quae quingentorum et ipsos mille aequale posse quingentis? aut non sic oportet poni iis aequalitatem: sed dividere quidem sic: deinde ex quingentis aequales accipientem, et ex mille, hos dominos esse divisionum et praetoriorum. Utrum igitur haec quae secundum multitudinem honorabilitatum politia, iustissima secundum demoticum iustum, aut magis quae secundum multitudinem?

Polit.L3

822. Aiunt enim demotici, hoc iustum quodcumque videatur pluribus; oligarchici autem quodcumque videatur ampliori substantiae; secundum multitudinem enim substantiae aiunt oportere iudicari.

Polit.L3

823. Habent autem ambo inaequalitatem et iniustitiam. Si quidem enim quodcumque qui pauci, tyrannis: etenim si unus habeat plura aliis divitibus, secundum oligarchicum iustum, principari solum iustum.

Polit.L3

824. Si autem quodcumque qui plures secundum numerum, iniusta agent depopulantes quae divitum et paucorum, sicut dictum est prius.

Polit.L3

825. Quae igitur utique erit aequalitas, quam confitentur utrique, considerandum ex quibus iustis determinant. Dicunt enim quod quodcumque videbitur pluribus civium, hoc oportet esse dominans. Sit itaque haec, non causa tamen omnino: sedquoniam duae partes existunt, ex quibus civitas, divites et pauperes, quodcumque utrisque videatur, vel pluribus, hoc sit quod dominans: si autem contraria videantur, quodcumque qui plures, et quorum honorabilitas amplior. Puta si ii quidem decem, ii autem viginti; videbatur autem divitum quidem ipsis sex, pauperiorum autem ipsis quindecim, adiungantur autem pauperibus quidem divitum quatuor, divitibus autem pauperum quinque quoruncumque igitur honorabilitas excedit, simul numeratis utrisque, hoc dominans utrisque. Si autem aequales evenerint, communem hanc putandum esse dubitationem, sicut nunc si divisa in duo congregatio fiat, vel praetorium: aut enim sortiendum, aut aliquid aliud tale faciendum.

Polit.L3

826. Sed de aequali quidem, et iusto quamvis sit valde difficile invenire veritatem, de ipsis tamen facilius fortiori, quam permittere potentes supergredi: semper enim quaerunt quod iustum et quod aequale qui minores, praeeminentes autem nihil curant.

Polit.L3

Postquam philosophus praemisit suppositiones et conditiones popularis status, in parte ista movet quamdam dubitationem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim movet eam. Secundo, circa eius dissolutionem tangit opinionem quorumdam, et reprobat, ibi, aiunt enim demotici et cetera. In tertia cum dicit, quae igitur utique, solvit eam secundum intentionem suam. In prima igitur movet dubitationem, quae oritur ex praecedentibus. Dixerat enim, quod si omnes aequaliter principentur, non magis dives quam pauper in populari statu habebunt secundum aequalitatem et libertatem. Dicit igitur, quod illud quod dubitationem habet ex praecedentibus est hoc, quomodo scilicet, cum in qualibet civitate vel republica, etiam populari statu, sint divites et pauperes, habebunt tam hi quam illi illud quod est aequale et iustum: utrum scilicet in distribuendis honoribus tantum oporteat distribuere vel dare mille pauperibus, quantum quingentis divitibus; et ipsos mille tantam habere potestatem in tractatibus communibus, quantam habent quingenti divites. Aut non secundum hunc modum, sed accipiendo mille pauperes ex una parte et quingentos ex alia, dividendo secundum modum praedictum, ulterius ex quingentis divitibus accipere aliquos paucos per electionem, deinde ex mille pauperibus aliquos similiter paucos qui in eadem proportione se habeant ad ipsos mille de quibus eliguntur, sicut illi pauci qui accipiuntur ex istis quingentis ad illos quingentos; et isti simul congregati sunt domini in dividendo bona communia, in iudicando et eligendo. Est igitur dubitatio, utrum aliquod istorum iustum et aequale in republica populari, aut nulla istorum: sed magis omnia attribuere maiori multitudini, ita quod multitudo maior sit omnium domina.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit aiunt enim tangit quorumdam opinionem primo. Secundo cum dicit, habent autem ambo etc., reprobat utramque. In prima dicit, quod de ista dubitatione aliter videtur popularibus aliter dominantibus in paucis. Populares enim dicunt illud esse iustum et aequale simpliciter quod videtur pluribus: multitudo enim principatur in tali republica; et ideo iustum attenditur per comparationem ad ipsam, sicut dicebatur prius; in paucorum potentia autem illud dicunt esse iustum simpliciter quod videtur habentibus ampliores divitias. Dicunt enim debere omnia determinari secundum habitudinem ad divitias quae sunt principale in ea.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit habent autem reprobat utramque. Et primo secundum. Secundo cum dicit, si autem quodcumque etc. primum. In prima dicit, quod utraque istorum quae dicta sunt inaequalitatem quamdam habent in re et iniustitiam in comparatione ad finem. Si enim illud est iustum fieri in civitate quod videtur divitibus paucis existentibus, tunc sequitur rempublicam converti in tyrannidem. Cuius ratio est, quoniam si illud quod est iustum videtur ditioribus, et oportet omnia secundum quantitatem divitiarum determinari, tunc si unus habeat ampliorem substantiam quam alii, iustum erit quod videtur huic soli, et omnia oportet determinari secundum voluntatem eius, et per consequens ipsum solum principari secundum voluntatem eius. Hoc autem est tyrannis: si igitur omnia oporteat determinari secundum iudicium divitum, respublica convertetur in tyrannidem.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit si autem improbat primum: dicens, quod si illud esset iustum quod videtur pluribus, et oportet sequi iudicium plurium; cum plures habeant potentiam maiorem, et etiam sequantur impetum voluntatis in iudicando, convertentur ad opera iniustitiae diripientes ea quae sunt divitum paucorum existentium, sicut dictum est in quarto prius.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit quae igitur dissolvit eam secundum intentionem suam primo. Secundo cum dicit, sed de aequali etc., removet obiectionem quae posset fieri. In prima dicit resumendo dubitationem et dando intentum in determinando eam, dicens quod ex definitione vel determinatione iusti sive aequalis quam ponunt utrique accipiendum est quae sit aequalitas sive iustitia quam intendunt, secundum quam oportet distribuere singula. Conveniunt enim in hoc utrique, quod iustum est esse illud dominans et principans in republica quod videtur pluribus partibus reipublicae. Hoc enim supponatur, non tamen simpliciter, sed cum determinatione quadam. Duae enim sunt partes ex quibus civitas de necessitate componitur; scilicet divites et pauperes. Quod igitur videbitur istis et illis simul consentientibus ut pluribus, non dico totius multitudinis, sed pluribus de divitibus et pluribus de pauperibus, hoc sit principans et fiat in tota republica. Si autem contingat, quod contrarientur adinvicem, ita quod non omnibus divitibus idem videatur, sed quibusdam unum, quibusdam aliud, similiter non omnibus pauperibus, sed quibusdam unum quibusdam aliud: verbi gratia, si ponamus quod sint decem divites et viginti pauperes, unum autem videatur faciendum sex divitibus, et quinque pauperibus adiunctis eis, oppositum autem videatur quindecim pauperibus et quatuor divitibus, tunc iustum determinandum erit non secundum praedictum modum, sed secundum aliquam excellentiam aliam, vel virtutis, vel desiderii ad bonum commune. Et tunc illud quod videbitur parti, quae excellit secundum illud, collatione facta, iustum erit. Si autem aequales inveniantur, puta in virtute, tunc remanet dubitatio eadem si debentes iudicare in iudicio sint divisi in duas partes, ita quod non inveniatur excellentia, quorum sententiae standum erit? Et tunc in utroque istorum aut determinandum est sorte cui illorum sit, aut aliquo alio accidente simili sorti.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit sed de aequali removet obiectionem quae posset fieri. Diceret enim aliquis quod electio principatus et distributio honorum communium maxime sunt in civitate: maxima autem committere sorti et viae per quam contingit accipi deteriorem, inconveniens est: ergo inconveniens videtur quod dictum est, quod ubi non invenitur praeeminentia sit sortiendum. Hoc intendens removere, dicit, quod cum difficillimum sit invenire aequalitatem quid sit iustum et aequale in casibus praedictis; et determinare secundum rationem rectam, tamen melius est per sortem dirimere controversias, quam permittere quod soli divites principentur: semper enim de duobus malis minus malum praeeligendum est: malum est autem sorti committere et solos divites principari: minus autem malum est sorti committere, quam divites principari: quia pauperes, quos quandoque contingit per sortem principari, magis volunt communiter iustitiam et aequalitatem quam divites. Divites enim ex ipsa abundantia divitiarum inclinantur ad contumeliam et elationem, et ad alia iniuriosa; et ideo nihil curant de iustitia: propter quod si oporteat alterum ipsorum eligi, magis est eligendum committere sorti, quam permittere divites solos principari in statu populari.

Polit.L3

L. 4 (Ζ.4, 1318b6–1319a38)Quibus institutis optimus popularis status conservetur.

Quibus institutis optimus popularis status conservetur.

Polit.L4

827. Democratiis autem existentibus quatuor, optima quidem quae prima ordine, quemadmodum dictum est in sermonibus qui ante hos. Est autem et antiquissima omnium haec. Dico autem primam, sicut siquis distinguat populos; optimus enim populus, qui terrae cultivus est.

Polit.L4

828. Quare et facere contingit democratiam, ubi vivit multitudo ab agricultura, vel pascuis.

Polit.L4

829. Propter quidem enim quod non multam substantiam habet, neque vacans, ut non saepe congregationes faciat. Propterea autem quod non habent necessaria, circa opera immorantur, et aliena non concupiscunt, sed delectabilius est ipsis laborare quam politizare et principari ubicumque non fuerint acceptiones magnae a principantibus. Qui multi enim magis appetunt lucrum quam honorem. Signum autem etenim antiquas tyrannides sustinuerunt, et oligarchias sustinent, siquis ipsos operari non prohibeat, neque auferat aliquis. Celeriter enim ii quidem ditantur ipsorum, ii autem non egent.

Polit.L4

830. Adhuc autem, quod domini sunt eligendi et corrigendi, supplet indigentiam si quid ambitionis habent; quoniam apud quosdam demos, quamvis non participent electione principatuum, sed quidam eligibiles secundum partem ex omnibus, sicut et in Mantinea, eius autem quod est consiliari domini sint, sufficienter hoc multis: et oportet putare, etiam hoc schema esse quoddam democratiae, sicut in Mantinea aliquando erat.

Polit.L4

831. Propter quod utique et expediens est prius dictae democratiae, et existere consuevit eligere quidem principatus, et corrigere, et iudicare omnes, principari autem maximis electos, et ab honorabilitatibus maioribus, a maioribus autem ab honorabilitatibus quidem nullum, sed eos qui possunt.

Polit.L4

832. Necesse autem politizantes sic politizare bene: principatus enim semper meliores erunt populo consulente, et epiicheis non invidente, et epiicheis et insignibus sufficere hunc ordinem: subicientur enim non sub aliis deterioribus, et principabuntur iuste, propter quod correctionum sint alii domini: suspendere enim et non omne licere facere quodcumque videatur, expediens: potestas enim agendi quodcumque voluerit aliquis non potest servare quod in unoquoque hominum tribuale.

Polit.L4

833. Quare necessarium accidere, quod quidem est maximi profectus in politiis, principari epiiches impeccabiles existentes nihil minorata multitudine.

Polit.L4

834. Quod quidem igitur haec democratiarum sit optima, manifestum, et propter quam causam, quia propter qualem quendam esse populum.

Polit.L4

835. Ad instituendum autem populum agricolam, aliquae legum apud antiquos positarum antiquitus, utiles omnes, aut totaliter non licere possidere ampliorem terram mensura quadam, aut ab aliquo loco ad municipium et civitatem.

Polit.L4

836. Erat autem antiquitus in multis civitatibus lege statutum neque licere vendere primas sortes.

Polit.L4

837. Est autem, et quam dicunt Oxyli legem esse tale aliquid potens non mutuare ad aliquam partem terrae existentis unicuique.

Polit.L4

838. Nunc autem oportet dirigere, te lege Aphytalorum; ad id enim quod dicimus, est utile. Illi enim quidem existentes multi, possidentes autem terram paucam, tamen omnes terram colunt; appretiantur enim non totas possessiones, sed secundum tantas partes dividentes, ut habeant excedere pretio etiam pauperes.

Polit.L4

839. Post agricolarum autem multitudinem optimus populus est, ubi pastores sunt, et vivunt ex pecoribus. Multa enim habet consimiliter agriculturae, et actionibus ad bellica maxime isti exercitati sunt secundum habitus, et utiles secundum corpora, et potentes venari.

Polit.L4

840. Aliae autem omnes multitudines fere ex quibus reliquae democratiae consistunt, multo deteriores iis; vita enim prava et nullum opus cum virtute eorum quae tractat multitudo et quae banausorum, et quae forensium hominum, et quae mercenaria.

Polit.L4

841. Adhuc autem propterea quod circa forum et circa municipium conversantur, omne tale genus, ut est dicere, facile congregationes facit. Qui autem terrae cultores, propterea quod dispersi sunt per regionem, neque concurrunt, neque similiter indigent synodo hac.

Polit.L4

842. Ubi autem et accidit regionem positionem habere talem, ut regio multum a civitate semota sit, facile, et democratiam facere bonam, et politiam. Cogitur enim multitudo in agris facere habitacula.

Polit.L4

843. Quare oportet, et si haec turba forensis sit, non facere in democraticis congregationibus sine multitudine quae per regionem.

Polit.L4

Postquam philosophus praemisit hypotheses et proprietates status popularis; intendit hic determinare ex quibus et quomodo species ipsius instituantur. Et dividitur in duas; quoniam in prima parte ostendit ex quibus et quomodo instituitur optima respublica popularis. In secunda cum dicit, quomodo ergo etc., ex quibus et quomodo aliae. Prima in duas. Quoniam primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, ubi autem et accidit etc., ostendit ubi facile est eam instituere. Prima dividitur in partes tres. Quoniam in prima parte dicit ex quibus est optima respublica popularis. In secunda cum dicit, ad instituendum autem etc., declarat quibus legibus firmanda et instituenda. In tertia cum dicit, post agricolarum autem etc., declarat qualiter aliae multitudines populares se habent ad illam, ex qua instituitur optima respublica popularis. In prima duo facit. Quoniam in prima parte declarat ex quibus est optima respublica popularis. In secunda cum dicit, propter quidem enim etc., probat quoddam suppositum. In prima primo facit quod dictum est. In secunda cum dicit, quare et facere etc., concludit corollarium. In prima dicit, cum sint quatuor species status popularis, optima est quae est prima secundum ordinem inter illas, sicut dictum est prius. Optima enim respublica simpliciter regnum est in qua unus principatur; deinde status optimatum in quo pauci virtuosi. Deinde autem respublica in qua adhuc plures bellicosi. Deinde autem haec species popularis status in qua plures agriculturam colentes principantur. Deinde autem aliae species ipsius plus et plus deficientes ab ea, sicut dictum est in quarto huius. Ista autem est antiquissima omnium statuum popularium, et antiquior multitudo et magis naturalis est agricultiva. Dixit autem ipsam primam esse, quia est ex prima multitudine et optimo populo, cuiusmodi est terrae cultivus, siquis supponat distinctionem multitudinis popularis in terrae cultivam et non terrae cultivam. Et consistit virtus rationis suae in hoc. Optima et prima respublica popularis est ex optima et prima multitudine populari: optima autem et prima multitudo est terrae cultiva; ergo prima et optima est respublica popularis ex multitudine agricultivae.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit quare et facere concludit corollarium; dicens, quod quia optimus populus est agricultivus; ideo de facili contingit fieri optimam rempublicam popularem, ubi est talis populi multitudo: ex optima enim materia bene disposita contingit fieri optimum compositum, et in his quae fiunt natura, et in his quae fiunt arte.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit propter quidem probat quod supposuit; scilicet quod multitudo agricultiva sit optimus populus. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, quod quidem igitur etc., concludit conclusionem principaliter intentam. Primum probat ex tribus: et secundum hoc potest dividi in tres partes. Primum enim probat quod agricultiva multitudo est optima, quia non est machinativa. Secundo cum dicit, propterea autem et cetera. Quia non est concupiscitiva. Tertio cum dicit, adhuc autem quod domini sunt etc. quia non est ambitiosa. In prima parte dicit, quod multitudo agricultiva, quia non habet divitias multas, non multum potest vacare ab operationibus exterioribus; sed necesse est intendere ad culturam terrae ex qua sustentatur, et ad alia necessaria; et quia non potest vacare ab exterioribus, non appetit facere congregationes; et ideo minus machinari potest. Solent enim in congregationibus propter mutuam collocutionem et adinvicem confidentiam machinari inveniendo vias et modos insurgendi contra divites aut principantes. Et quia minus machinativa est, melior est ad politizandum. Secundo cum dicit, cum enim laborandum sit illis circa necessaria etc. probat quod est optima, quia non est concupiscitiva; dicens quod huiusmodi multitudo, propter hoc quod non habet necessaria ad bene vivendum, necesse habet intendere circa exteriora opera exterius in regione; et quia operationibus exterioribus intendunt, minus concupiscunt aliena. Habitantes enim exterius in regione, intendentes propriis operibus, non percipiunt divitias et bona principantium; et quia non advertunt, minus concupiscunt. Imo magis delectabile est eis intendere negotiationi circa propria, quam intromittere se de republica aut principatu, etiam ubi tunc non contingit multum lucrari in principatu vel republica; multitudo enim popularis magis intendit et appetit lucrum proprium quam honorem. Hoc enim est eis magis necessarium. Et signum eius quod dictum est, est quoniam multi tales antiquitus tyrannides crudeles sustinuerunt et status paucorum potentatus, et adhuc etiam multi sustinent, cum non prohibentur ab operibus propriis, nec multum aufertur de substantia eorum: sic enim intendentes propriis operibus, quidam eorum faciliter fiunt divites, alii vero non egentes: et quia sic aliena non concupiscunt, meliores sunt ad gubernandum, quia minus insurgunt et minus rapiunt aut furantur: hoc enim erat una causa corruptionis rerumpublicarum determinata in quinto huius.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem probat idem propter hoc, quod non est ambitiosa. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo concludit corollarium cum dicit, quapropter utile est. In prima parte dicit, quod si huiusmodi multitudo habeat aliquem appetitum honoris, quod necesse est, quia homines naturaliter honorem appetunt, ut apparet secundo rhetoricae, appetitui eorum satis fit per hoc quod in quibusdam rebuspublicis popularibus dominium habet in eligendo et corrigendo principatus, quod est maximum. In aliis autem popularibus statibus, quamvis non attingant ad electionem principatuum, cum principatus per partes eligibiles sunt ex omnibus indifferenter, sicut in Mantinea, ubi hoc servabatur, in aliis autem potestatem habet huiusmodi multitudo super consilium reipublicae quod ordinat de omnibus, et hoc ipsum quod dominium habet super ipsum consilium multis est sufficiens ad supplendum appetitum praedictum. Et est opinandum, quod ista quae dicta sunt, scilicet multitudinem habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo principatus, et ipsos attingere ad aliquos principatus minores: et habere dominium super consilium, est sicut quidam ornatus et bona dispositio status popularis, sicut fuit in civitate Mantinea praedicta.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit propter quod concludit ad manifestationem eius quod dictum est, quoddam corollarium primo. Secundo cum dicit, necesse autem politizantes etc. assignat rationem eius. Primo ergo dicit, quod quia ea quae dicta sunt, sunt ornatus quidam status popularis, et bona dispositio, dispositio expediens est in praedicta specie status popularis, et consuevit observari in ea, agricultivam multitudinem habere potestatem super electione principatus et correctione, et iudicare cum erraverint, et principatus maiores eligi ab ea ex eis, qui habent honorabilitates maiores, vel virtutum vel divitiarum, vel ex maioribus secundum nobilitatem; aut non eligi per eos qui habent tales honorabilitates magnas, sed eos qui possunt intendere, non coacti propter indigentiam circa necessaria vacare.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit necesse autem assignat rationem huius dicti primo. Secundo cum dicit, itaque necesse est infert corollarium ex ipsa. In prima parte dicit, quod si hoc observetur, quod dictum est, necesse erit in tali republica optime gubernare; ex hoc enim multae utilitates contingent in republica. Primo quidem ex parte principis; sic enim magistratus per meliores regentur, cum assumuntur ab aliqua honorabilitate: iterum ex parte populi contingit populum consistere, et non insurgere, nec etiam invidere excellentibus viris et insignibus sufficiet haec ordinatio. Si enim principatus assumantur ab honorabilibus, non subiicientur deterioribus ipsis, si quidem eos non contingat principari; iterum principantes magis iuste principabuntur, considerantes quod sunt alii in republica qui possunt corrigere eorum delicta si iniuste egerint. Hoc enim expediens est in tali statu populari corrigere et suspendere delictum principantium, ita quod non liceat eis facere quodcumque videbitur ipsis. Habens enim potestatem agendi quodcumque videtur ei, non habet potentiam observandi secundum rationem excessus qui sunt in unoquoque hominum.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit quare necessarium ex istis concludit corollarium; dicens quod ex his, quae dicta sunt, si observentur, necessarium est accidere in republica maxime perfectum, scilicet bonos et iustos principari, et non delinquere, timentes punitionem et correctionem; et multitudinem nihil minus habere quam debet, est enim domina maiorum.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem concludit conclusionem principaliter intentam; dicens quod manifestum est ex dictis, quod haec species status popularis quae dicta est, optima est; et propter quam causam; quoniam propter hoc, quod populus ex quo constituitur, optimus est.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit ad instituendum declarat quibus legibus utendum est ad consistentiam ipsius; et dividitur in partes quatuor, secundum quatuor leges, quas dicit expedire ad consistentiam ipsius. Secunda ibi, erat et quem dicunt antiquitus et cetera. Tertia cum dicit, est autem et cetera. Quarta ibi, hunc autem oportet et cetera. In prima dicit, quod ad instituendum populum agricultivum in populari statu praedicto, sunt utiles quaedam leges apud antiquos quosdam positae. Prima quidem est, non licere possidere aliquem in civitate quantamcumque quantitatem terrae, sed secundum mensuram determinatam: nam si liceret possidere quantumcumque possent acquirere, et ditarentur nimis, et non remaneret populus agricola. Aut si permittatur habere quantumcumque mensuram terrae, non tamen in loco propinquo municipio civitatis, sed in remoto magis; hoc enim modo necesse haberet magis habitare in loco remoto a civitate quam in ipsa, et minus posset machinari et nocere.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit erat autem ponit secundam legem. Et dicit, quod antiquitus statutum fuit in multis civitatibus, et lege ordinatum, quod aliquid quod ad propositum expedit, scilicet, non licere vendere vel alienare primas sortes quas acceperunt a progenitoribus, sicut filiis Israel non licebat secundum legem alienare simpliciter haereditates, sed tantum obligare ad tempus; sic enim per alienationem possessionum aliqui non efficiebantur pauperes nec alii per acquisitionem ditiores praeter proportionem.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit est autem ponit tertiam; dicens, quod est quaedam alia lex quam dicunt fuisse Oxyli legislatoris, quae eamdem potentiam habet cum praecedenti; scilicet non mutuare aliquid super portionem terrae quam aliquis habet, nec etiam ipsam posse obligare: et est eadem ratio istius legis et praecedentis, nisi quod ista magis restringit quam illa. Illa enim prohibet alienationem terrae simpliciter in qua transfertur dominium, ista autem obligationem retento dominio etiam.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit nunc autem ponit quartam; dicens, quod adhuc oportet populum agricolam dirigere secundum legem et statuta Aphytalorum, idest illius gentis; ipsa enim utilis est ad hoc; illi enim quamvis multi existerent, et haberent paucam terram, omnes erant agricultores: illi enim si haberent terras vel possessiones ultra determinatam mensuram in lege, dabant ad pretium vel ad censum pauperibus vel minus habentibus, non totam, sed dividentes eas secundum aliquas partes; et retinebant sibi quantum determinatum erat a lege, residuum tradentes secundum dictum modum, ut sic etiam pauperes per terram acceptam ad censum aliqualiter venirent ad aliquem excessum divitiarum.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit post agricolarum declarat qualiter multitudines populares aliae se habent ad istam; et dividitur in duas. In prima declarat, quod multitudo pastoralis melior est post istam. In secunda cum dicit, aliae autem omnes etc. declarat quod omnes aliae deteriores sunt ipsa. In prima parte dicit quod optima multitudo popularis post agricultivam est illa, quae est ex pastoribus viventibus ex pecoribus. In multis enim consimiliter se habet ad agricultivam; sicut enim illa necesse habet immorari extra civitatem circa agricultivam, sic ista circa custodiam et procurationem animalium. Item ista multitudo est magis exercitata in actionibus bellicis secundum habitus; sunt enim exercitati in custodiendo a lupis et latronibus. Item corpora habent bene disposita, et sunt fortes secundum corpus, assuefacti frigoribus, et exercitati circa venationes: tales autem bene dispositi sunt ad actus bellicos: unde Vegetius, in libro de re militari, dicit meliores milites eligendos esse ex venatoribus et carnificibus et fabris malleatoribus.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit aliae autem declarat quod aliae multitudines deteriores sunt multo. Ista autem dividitur in duas, secundum quod hoc probat per duas rationes. Quarum secundam ponit cum dicit, adhuc autem. In prima dicit quod omnes aliae multitudines popularis status, puta mercenariorum in suis operationibus, et forensis quae negotiatur circa forum venalium et vilium personarum, quae locat opera sua mercede, sunt multo deteriores his quae dictae sunt; parum enim participant de vita, quae est secundum rationem; et nullae operationes eorum secundum quod huiusmodi, sunt exercitantes ad virtutem. Contrarium autem invenitur in praedictis multitudinibus; quare istae sunt multo deteriores illis.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundam rationem; dicens, quod praeter illud quod dictum est, multitudo forensis et mercenaria, quae circa municipium civitatis moratur, ut in pluribus volunt facere congregationes, in quibus colligationes et conspirationes faciunt contra principem, et etiam perverse sententiant, propter hoc quod ab ipsis congregationibus lucrum recipiunt. Ista autem sunt corruptiva reipublicae; et ideo peiores sunt ad gubernandum. Terrae cultores autem qui habitacula habent dispersa per regiones iuxta terras quas excolunt, non conveniunt libenter ad huiusmodi congregationes, quia per hoc retardarentur ab operibus necessariis, nec indigent similiter hac congregatione, propter hoc quod magis habent ad vitam necessaria curare.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit ubi autem concludit ex praecedentibus, ubi contingit fieri bonam rempublicam popularem. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo concludit documentum cum dicit, quare oportet. Dicit igitur primo, quod si in aliquo loco regio sic sit disposita, aut terra cultiva multum remota sit a municipio civitatis, facile est in illa civitate bonum statum popularem facere et instituere. Cuius ratio est, quia multitudo agricolarum cogitat aedificare in locis magis remotis a civitate et habitare in illis propter quod raro venient ad congregationes; et ideo contra principantes non machinabuntur, et ipsi principantes in pace principabuntur.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit quare oportet concludit documentum, quasi ad remotionem obiectionis quae posset fieri. Diceret enim aliquis quod quamvis agricolae non multum curent venire ad congregationes propter causam praedictam, forensis tamen multitudo et mercenaria volent frequenter facere congregationes; et incidet inconveniens contra praedicta. Quasi ad huius remotionem dicit quod si turba forensis et mercenaria saepe velit congregari, expedit ordinari per legem vel tenere per consuetudinem non facere congregationes aliquas in quibus habeant potestatem de magnis, non vocatis illis, qui habitant extra civitatem in regione: ex hoc enim sequuntur duo commoda. Primum, quod pauciores erunt congregationes: illi enim non saepe convenire possunt propter remotionem et necessaria. Secundo, quia isti minus malitiosi sunt et meliores, ut frequentius reprimunt aliqualiter malitiam et astutiam forensis multitudinis.

Polit.L4

L. 5 (Ζ.4–5, 1319a38–1320b17)Quo pacto sit administrandus popularis status qui omnes indifferenter admittit.

Quo pacto sit administrandus popularis status qui omnes indifferenter admittit.

Polit.L5

844. Quomodo quidem igitur oportet instituere optimam et primam democratiam, dictum est. Manifestum autem, et quomodo alias. Consequenter enim oportet transgredi et deteriorem semper multitudinem separare.

Polit.L5

845. Ultimam autem, propterea quod omnes communicant, neque ferre est omnis civitatis, neque facile permanere non bene commpositam legibus et consuetudinibus. Quae autem accidit corrumpere, et hanc et alias politias, dicta sunt prius plurima fere.

Polit.L5

846. Ad firmandum autem hanc democratiam, et faciendum populum potentem, consueverunt praesides assumere quam plurimos, et facere cives non solum legitimos, sed spurios, et eos qui ex utrocumque cive. Dico autem puta ex parte vel matre. Omne enim conveniens magis tali populo.

Polit.L5

847. Consueverunt quidem igitur demagogi instituere sic: oportet tamen assumere donec utique excedat multitudo insigniorum et mediorum, et non ultra hoc procedere. Excedentes enim inordinatiorem faciunt politiam, et insignes exacerbant magis ad graviter sufferre democratiam. Quod quidem evenit fieri causam seditionis circa Cyrenem. Paucum quidem enim malum negligitur, multum autem factum magis in oculis est.

Polit.L5

848. Adhuc autem, et talia instituta sunt opportuna ad democratiam talem, velut Clisthenes Athenis usus fuit volens augere democratiam, et circa Cyrenem, qui demum instituebant. Tribus enim aliae faciendae plures, et fraternitates, et in propriis sacris colligendum in pauca et communia, et omnia sophisticandum, ut utique quam maxime permisceantur omnes invicem. Consuetudines autem disiungantur quae priores.

Polit.L5

849. Adhuc autem, et tyrannica instituta, demotica videntur omnia; dico autem, puta anarchia servorum. Haec autem utique erit usque ad aliquid expediens et mulierum et puerorum.

Polit.L5

850. Et vivere, ut quis vult, dissimulare. Multum enim erit politiae tali auxilians: delectabilius enim multis vivere inordinate, quam temperate.

Polit.L5

851. Est autem opus legislatoris, et volentium consistere talem quandam politiam, non instituere maximum opus, neque solum unum, sed ut salvetur magis. Uno enim aut duobus aut tribu diebus non difficile manere politizantes qualitercumque. Propter quod oportet de quibus consideratum est prius, quae salvationes et correctiones politiarum, ex iis tentare facere firmitatem verentes quidem corrumpentia, ponentes autem tales leges, et non scriptas et scriptas, quae comprehendent maxime salvantia politias; et non putare hoc esse demoticum, neque oligarchicum, quod faciet civitatem quam maxime democratizari neque oligarchizari; sed quod plurimo tempore.

Polit.L5

852. Qui autem demagogi gratiosi populis multa democratizant per praetoria, propter quod oportet, ad haec contra agere eos qui cordi habent politiam, lege statuentes nihil esse publicum, eorum quae condemnantur, et feruntur ad commune, sed sacrum. Qui quidem enim iniusta agunt, nihil minus verentes erunt, damnificabuntur enim similiter: turba autem minus corrumpet sententias de iis qui iudicantur, cum nihil debeat accipere.

Polit.L5

853. Adhuc autem eas, quae fiunt, publicas vindictas, quam paucissimas semper facere, magis damnis prohibentes eos, qui vane scribunt; non enim populares, sed insignes consueverunt inducere. Oportet autem politiae, omnes cives maxime quidem benivolos esse; si autem non, nunquam ut adversarios putare dominos.

Polit.L5

854. Quoniam autem ultimae democratiae multorum hominum sunt, et difficile congregari sine mercede, hoc autem ubi redditus non existunt entes, adversarium insignibus, ab illatione enim et depopulatione necessarium fieri, et praetoria malorum, quae multas iam democratias everterunt: ubi quidem igitur redditus non existunt entes, oportet facere congregationes paucas et praetoria, multorum quidem paucis autem diebus: hoc enim facit, et ad non timere divites expensas, si divites quidem non accipiant praetoriale, pauperes autem. Facit autem, et ad iudicare sententias multo melius. Divites enim multis quidem diebus non volunt a propriis abesse, brevi autem tempore volunt.

Polit.L5

855. Ubi autem sunt redditus, non facere quod nunc demagogi faciunt; obvenientia enim distribuunt, accipiunt autem simul et rursum indigent eisdem; perforata enim lagena est tale auxilium pauperibus.

Polit.L5

856. Sed oportet vere demoticum providere, qualiter multitudo non valde egens sit: haec enim causa eius, quod est pravam esse democratiam.

Polit.L5

857. Artificiandum igitur, qualiter abundantia fiat diuturna. Quoniam autem expedit hoc etiam divitibus, quae quidem a redditibus fiunt congregantes simul tota oportet distribuere pauperibus.

Polit.L5

858. Maxime autem si quis potest tantum congregans quantum ad fundiculi acquisitionem; si autem non, ad occasionem negotiationis, et agriculturae.

Polit.L5

859. Et si non omnibus possibile, saltem secundum tribus, vel secundum partem aliquam alteram in partem distribuere. In hoc autem ad necessarios synodos divites inferre mercedem, respuentes vanas oblationes.

Polit.L5

860. Tali autem quodam modo Carchedonii politizantes, amicum acquisiverunt populum. Semper enim aliquos de populo emittentes ad negotia domus, faciunt divites. Gratiosorum autem et intellectum habentium insignium est, et assumentes pauperes, occasiones quidem dantes, provocare ad operationes.

Polit.L5

861. Bene habet autem imitari et Tarentinorum principatum: illi enim communia facientes possessa pauperibus ad usum, benivolam instituunt multitudinem. Adhuc autem principatus omnes duplices fecerunt; hos quidem eligibiles, hos autem sortiales: sortiales quidem ut populus ipsis participet, eligibiles autem, ut politizarent melius. Est autem hoc facere et de eodem principatu, partientes, hos quidem sortiales, hos autem eligibiles. Quomodo quidem igitur oportet democratias instituere, dictum est.

Polit.L5

Postquam philosophus declaravit ex quibus et quomodo instituenda est optima respublica popularis, declarat ex quibus et quomodo sunt instituendae aliae species ipsius deteriores vel inordinatiores; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim breviter tangit ex quibus et quomodo instituantur praedictae species. In secunda cum dicit, ultimam autem etc. insistit circa ultimam et inordinatissimam. In prima parte dicit, quod ex praedictis manifestum est, quomodo instituenda sit optima respublica popularis, quantum ad bonam ordinationem, et primam secundum naturam. Ex quo potest esse manifestum quomodo aliae species ipsius sint instituendae. Si enim optima respublica popularis ex multitudine optima instituenda est, et secundum ordinationem optimam sibi convenientem, cum aliae deficiant ab ipsa, quaedam minus et quaedam plus, manifestum est quod oportet transgrediendo et a bona multitudine deteriorem accipiendo multitudinem et a recta ordinatione permittendo maiorem inordinationem secundum plus et minus, ita quod minus inordinata respublica popularis post primam sit ex multitudine minus inordinata et magis inordinata ex magis inordinata; et maxime inordinata, puta ultima, ex maxime inordinata: sic enim differunt species status popularis secundum quod apparuit in quarto huius.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit ultimam autem insistit circa ultimam. Et primo tangit quod non est bene mansiva de se. Secundo cum dicit, ad firmandum autem etc. declarat ex quibus maxime contingit eam firmare. In prima dicit, quod ultima species popularis status non potest bene sustineri a tota civitate, puta a divitibus et pauperibus nobilibus et ignobilibus, nisi sit bene ordinata legibus et consuetudinibus convenientibus ei. Et ratio huius est, quia in hac republica populari tota multitudo, quaecumque sit, in civitate principatur, sicut aliquis unus, et secundum quod ei videtur. Nunc autem huiusmodi multitudo quantum ad maiorem sui partem imprudens est et inordinata et in operibus suis sequitur impetum magis quam rationem: propter quod opprimunt maiores et corrumpunt iudicia, ex quo contingit corruptio reipublicae. Quae autem sunt quae possunt corrumpere hanc rempublicam et etiam alias respublicas in universali et in particulari dicta sunt prius pro maiori parte fere. Dicit autem fere, quia possunt esse aliqua, quae prius non tangebantur.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit ad firmandum ostendit per quae contingit firmare huiusmodi rempublicam. Et dividitur in partes duas. Quoniam primo docet per quae contingit eam firmare intendendo ipsam. Secundo cum dicit, est autem opus, per quae contingit eam firmari remittendo. Circa primum ponit quatuor observanda per quae contingit eam firmare intendendo. Et secundum ponit cum dicit, adhuc autem et talia. Tertium cum dicit, adhuc autem tyrannica. Quartum cum dicit, et vivere ut quis vult et cetera. Circa primum ponit primo documentum illud. Secundo cum dicit, consueverunt quidem igitur etc. docet ipsum moderari. In prima dicit, quod principes in hac republica populari ad faciendum eam firmiorem et ad faciendum multitudinem popularem valde potentem, consueverunt adiungere plurimos extraneos, et aliquando aliquos qui non sunt legitimi cives, sed spurii qui sunt ex alterutro cive patre vel matre: hoc enim conveniens est huic reipublicae: pluribus enim adiunctis reipublicae fortior est multitudo, fortior autem existens magis potest reprimere excessus divitum et volentium tyrannizare.

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Deinde cum dicit consueverunt quidem declarat qualiter moderandum est istud documentum, quia non quocumque modo observatum expedit: dicens, quod ductores populi consueverunt facere sicut dictum est: hoc tamen aliqualiter expedit, aliqualiter autem non; quamdiu enim potestas divitum et nobilium et mediorum inter divites et pauperes excedit potestatem ipsius multitudinis, expedit adiungere extraneos usquequo potentia multitudinis excedat; sed ultra hoc notabiliter adiungere quamplurimos, non simpliciter expedit, propter duo. Primo, quia si numerus advenarum excedat multum, accidit rempublicam magis inordinatam esse, quia extranei adiuncti, aut imprudentes sunt et sine virtute, ut in pluribus, aut non assuefacti in ordine reipublicae; et ideo ipsis habitis additur quidem ad potentiam et ad indiscretionem. Excessus autem potentiae sine discretione rempublicam corrumpit. Secundo, quia cum multi extranei adiunguntur, turbantur nobiles, et insignes, et magis graviter sustinent rempublicam, propter hoc quod deteriores ipsis assumuntur ad dominium reipublicae. Et haec fuit causa seditionis factae in republica Cyrenensium, scilicet notabilis multitudo assumptorum ad rempublicam: si enim pauci adiuncti fuissent, non essent ita notabiles, nec ita curarent. Parvum enim malum negligitur, quia illud quod est parvum reputatur quasi nihil, quia proprium inest ei, aut quia omnino non cognoscitur; magnum autem magis est manifestum, propter quod magis curatur.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundum documentum; dicens, quod praeter haec instituta vel statuta, quae Clisthenes instituit Atheniensibus ad agendum vel fortificandum statum popularem ipsorum, sunt convenientia ad firmandum praedictam rempublicam similiter et illa quae instituerunt popularis reipublicae conditores circa Cyrenem. Unum quidem eorum est, quod aliquae tribus de novo faciendae sunt in civitate per aliquorum eiusdem generis receptionem, et inexistentes augmentandae sunt per coniugia. Secundum vero, quod fraternitates et societates circa aliqua particularia et propria plures existentes reducendae sunt in paucas et communes magis, ita ut sint pauciores secundum numerum societates, plurium autem hominum: et sic omnia sunt excogitanda, ut omnes adinvicem in civitate sint permixti vel secundum tribus, quod fit per coniugia, vel per sodalitates, quod fit, vel per conversationes, vel congregationes communes: sic enim magis adinvicem erunt uniti per dilectionem, et per consequens fortiores, quia omnis virtus coniuncta fortior est seipsa divisa. Tamen hoc faciendo observandum est quod eaedem leges et consuetudines observentur nunc et prius. Si enim mutatis tribubus et sodalitatibus mutarentur leges et consuetudines, necesse esset rempublicam mutari, quia leges et consuetudines in republica instituendae sunt secundum ordinem ad rempublicam, sicut dicebatur prius in tertio libro.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit tertium; dicens, quod cum his statuta tyrannorum videntur esse utilia ad statum popularem huiusmodi; quia iste status est sicut quaedam tyrannis, sicut licentia servorum, hoc est principatus super servos, similiter principatus super mulieres et super pueros, coram quibus competat actio, servis contra dominos et mulieribus contra viros et pueris contra parentes: ista enim instituunt tyranni, ut per hoc magis habeant benevolentiam puerorum, mulierum et servorum quae sunt magna pars civitatis; et per eamdem rationem hoc expediens est in praedicta populari republica. Sed intelligendum, quod hoc utile est usque ad aliquid, non autem quantum ad omnia: instituere enim principatus praedictos coram quibus competat actio mulieribus, servis et pueris, quantum ad omnia quae possent proponere contra viros, dominos et parentes inconveniens est, et dividere civitatem. Tamen instituere aliquos principatus coram quibus competat actio contra praedictos, tamen quantum ad pauca et magna, non est inconveniens in ista republica, quamvis simpliciter inconveniens sit et malum.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit et vivere ponit quartum; dicens, quod adhuc ad firmandum statum popularem talem utile est, quod principantes ea dissimulent vivere subditorum, ut volunt, non puniendo malas actiones omnes voluntarias: hoc enim multum auxiliatur tali reipublicae: quia multis delectabilius est inordinate vivere quam temperate et secundum virtutem. Homines enim ut in pluribus a ratione recta deficiunt. Ad defectionem autem rationis sequitur vivere praeter rationem et ordinem. Pauci autem sequuntur rationem rectam; et ideo pauci temperate assuescunt vivere, multi autem inordinate; et ideo delectabilius est pluribus inordinate vivere, quia magis assuescunt; et ideo magis diligunt rempublicam in qua permittuntur in delectationibus vivere. Et est notandum quod non dicit philosophus quod praecipiendum sit in ista republica, quantumcumque sit male ordinata, vivere ut quis voluerit, nec etiam permittendum cum scitum fuerit; sed dissimulandum quod minus est. In nulla enim societate hominum si debet manere, praecipiendum est hoc, nec permittendum usquequaque et passim, sed dissimulandum quandoque propter qualitatem personae vel alicuius alterius circumstantiarum; et ideo rationabiliter dixit Commentator super sexto Ethicorum, illum non esse verum legislatorem, sed corruptorem magis, qui tales delectationes sequendas lege statuit vel permisit passim, sicut fecit Machometus: propter quod in brevi tempore adhaeserunt legi ipsius multi, quia delectabilius fuit eis vivere inordinate quam secundum ordinem.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit est autem docet ex quibus firmanda est per remissionem magis; et circa hoc primo tangit praeeminentiam huius viae ad praecedentem. Secundo cum dicit, qui autem demagogi ponit documenta. In prima dicit, quod ad legislatorem, et ad eos qui volunt permanere rempublicam istam talem qualem, pertinet non multum laborare instituendo magnum opus, neque solum, idest multum intendendo eam, sed magis pertinet ad eos laborare, ut salvetur plurimo tempore: non enim difficile est rempublicam qualitercumque ordinatam permanere pauco tempore, uno vel paucis diebus; sed difficillimum est ipsam manere multo tempore; et ideo oportet reducere ad memoriam, quae sunt salvantia et corrumpentia respublicas, de quibus consideratum est in quinto, et per ea tentare quomodo salvetur respublica, fugientes ea quae corrumpunt ipsam, et instruentes leges, et consuetudines non scriptas, in quibus comprehenduntur illa, quae salvent eamdem. Et non debet aliquis credere, quod illud statutum sit magis populare, vel paucorum potentiae, quod magis facit civitatem populariter vivere, vel secundum statum paucorum; sed illa quae faciunt eam permanere plurimo tempore; sicut philosophus scripsit prius in quinto; ubi dixit: multa eorum, quae videntur popularia, solvunt populares status, et paucorum. Si igitur illa expeditiora sunt per quae magis contingit salvari statum popularem; talia autem sunt remittentia vel quae attenduntur secundum remissionem.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit qui autem ponit documenta, quae attenduntur penes remissionem ipsius. Et circa hoc primo ponit documentum sumptum ex distributione communium acceptorum ex condemnatione. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem eas, ponit documentum aliud sumptum ex his quae sunt attendenda circa publicas vindictas. Tertio cum dicit, quoniam autem ultimae etc. ponit alia, quae accipiuntur ex his, quae circa congregationes et iudicia sunt servanda. In prima dicit, quod illi qui sunt ductores populi qui intenduntur habere gratiam ipsius, multa instituunt in statu populari, faciendo in iudiciis ad utilitatem pauperum apparentem, et damnum divitum: puta quod illa quae obveniunt ex condemnatione aliquorum distribuantur multitudini pauperum: propter quod contingit multitudinem male quandoque sententiare propter dilectionem pecuniae; et ideo oportet illum, qui habet cordi salvationem popularis status, obviando contrarium intendere, et ordinare lege vel statuto, quod nihil eorum quae confiscantur ex bonis condemnatorum, distribuatur multitudini, sed dedicetur Deo, et fiat sacrum. Ex hoc enim continget, quod iniusta volentes agere, non minus dubitabunt, quam si deberent distribui multitudini: aequalia enim amittent modo utroque: et iterum multitudo minus corrumpet iudicia et sententias circa ea quae iudicatura est, non sperans inde lucrum aliquod accipere.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit documentum, quod sumitur ex his quae observanda sunt circa publicas vindictas. Circa quod est intelligendum, quod cum poenae quantitas debeat respondere quantitati delicti secundum legem iustitiae, delictorum autem quaedam sunt occulta, quaedam autem manifesta et publica, oportet poenam aliquando esse occultam, aliquando autem manifestam; occultorum scilicet occultam, et publicorum publicam. Homines autem naturaliter magis verentur publicam. Contingit autem quandoque, quod in statu populari multitudo pro minori et occulto delicto inducit publicam poenam, ex quo contingit inimicitias fieri inter cives, et quod prohibet philosophus in hoc documento, dicens quod expedit ad salvationem reipublicae vindictas cavere, puta fustigationem et eiectionem a republica; vel ad minus valde paucas facere, prohibendo eos qui tales faciunt vel scribunt timore magni damni: tales enim vindictas publicas magis assueverunt populares indicere contra insignes quam contra populares: propter quod periculosiores sunt. Unde dicit philosophus quia sunt principia magnae dissensionis: quia secundum philosophum in quinto huius, totaliter insignium dissensiones consumere faciunt et totam civitatem: et prius, dixerat de dissensione dominorum loquens, quod oportet subditos vereri, et dissolvere praesidia, et potentum dissensiones; expedit enim in republica cives omnes, si possibile est, benivolos esse; si autem non est possibile, ad minus cavere quod nunquam sint adversarii illis qui debent dominari subditis. Facere autem tales publicas vindictas multas principium est malivolentiae, et ideo vitandae sunt.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem ponit documenta sumpta ex his quae accidunt circa congregationes et iudicia. Et circa hoc primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, tali autem quodam modo etc. inducit exempla ad manifestationem quorumdam dictorum. Circa primum declarat primo qualiter se habendum est quantum ad congregationem et iudicia, ubi non existunt redditus. Secundo cum dicit, ubi autem sunt redditus, non facere et cetera. Qualiter se habendum est ubi existunt. In prima parte ipse dicit, quod ultima species popularis status, de qua nunc est sermo, est multorum hominum, quoniam ipsi omnes communicant, et difficile est omnes congregari sine mercede: multos enim et pauperes congregari sine mercede difficile est: mercedem autem dare omnibus, ubi redditus non sunt, non potest esse sine praeiudicio divitum. Necesse est enim mercedem tribuere ex his quae inferuntur ab illis, vel quae accipiuntur ab eis de pauperando eos, et ex hoc fiunt mala iudicia malorum: propter quae destructae sunt multae respublicae populares: unde oportet in populari statu, in quo non sunt redditus communes, quam paucissimas, et tantum necessarias facere congregationes, et iudicia fieri quidem ex multis, sed paucis diebus. Et istud quidem expedit propter duo: si enim fiunt paucae congregationes, pauciora expendentur in ipsis, et divites non timebunt paucas expensas, quamvis ipsi non accipiant, sed pauperes tantum. Secundo quia multo melius si conveniant multi et insignes et pauperes, iudicabunt secundum legem iustitiae. Plures autem poterunt convenire si paucae fiant congregationes et pauca iudicia: divites enim ubi non lucrentur, nec honorem reportant, nolunt dimittere propria multis diebus vel saepe; pauco autem tempore magis sustinent.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit ubi autem declarat quomodo se habendum est, ubi redditus existunt. Et primo quid cavendum est. Secundo cum dicit, sed oportet eum, quid sit observandum. In prima dicit, quod in statu populari, ubi redditus sunt, cavendum est ne fiat illud quod ductores populi vel procuratores in ea consueverunt facere. Illa enim quae obveniunt diversis temporibus, cum obvenerint, distribuunt multitudini per partes; et ipsi sic accipientes de facili consumunt, et statim indigent: hoc enim tale auxilium est istis, sicut lagena perforata pauperibus: quidquid enim paulatim immittitur ex una parte, effunditur ex alia, nec unquam hoc modo contingit eam repleri.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit sed oportet tangit quid est observandum magis. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo tangit vias per quas contingit devenire ad illud, cum dicit, artificiandum igitur et cetera. In prima dicit, quod ita dictum est, quod non oportet facere sicut ductores populi faciunt; sed oportet, cum quis habet curam popularis status, providere qualiter multitudo popularis pauperum abundet, vel non egeat: egestas enim ipsius facit eam esse pravam: difficile est enim indigentem existentem operari bene, sicut dicitur primo Ethicorum; et ideo laborandum est multum, qualiter sint abundantes continue.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit artificiandum igitur tangit vias aliquas per quas contingit eos fieri divites. Et dividitur secundum tres vias quas tangit: et incipit secunda pars, ibi, maxime autem et cetera. Tertia ibi, et si non omnibus et cetera. In prima dicit, quod expediens est ad vitandum indigentiam in statu populari, congregare in aliqua quantitate notabili ea quae obveniunt ex redditibus communibus; et tunc simul pauperibus distribuere secundum aliquas magnas partes simul, ut unusquisque de multitudine, si potest fieri, tantum accipiat simul, quod possit sibi acquirere fundiculum aliquem, hoc est parvam mensuram terrae ex qua ulterius lucrari possit: hoc enim expedit divitibus, quia non gravantur per hoc; et etiam pauperibus magis quam si secundum parvas partes et saepe reciperent: quod nunc observant ductores populi secundum quod dictum est prius.

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Deinde cum dicit maxime autem ponit secundam; dicens quod si hoc non potest fieri commode, saltem dandae sunt eis occasiones inducentes eos ad negotiationes et agriculturam, ut sic ex utroque ditentur.

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Deinde cum dicit et si non ponit tertiam; dicens, quod si non est possibile singulis divitibus aliquid inferre ad distribuendum pauperibus, saltem expedit ipsos immittere aliquam quantitatem pecuniae, vel secundum tribus vel secundum fraternitates, vel secundum aliquam aliam talem collectionem, ad distribuendum pauperibus in congregationibus necessariis. Et ut liberius haec faciant, tollendae sunt expensae supervacuae, quas solent facere divites; puta expensae conviviorum, et oblationum vanarum.

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Deinde cum dicit tali autem manifestat per exemplum praedicta. Et primo per exemplum Carthaginensium. Secundo cum dicit, bene autem habet et cetera. Per exemplum Tarentinorum. In prima parte dicit, quod Carthaginenses bene politizantes acquisiverunt amicitiam populi secundum modum praedictum: semper enim insignes et divites accipiebant aliquos de pauperibus destinantes eos ad negotia domuum suarum procuranda, et mercedem dantes faciebant eos divites. Iterum insignes magis gratiosi, et magis secundum intellectum agentes, assumebant pauperes, dantes eis occasiones aliquas, per quas provocabantur ad operationes, ex quibus ditabantur.

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Deinde cum dicit bene habet ponit secundum exemplum; dicens, quod adhuc expedit ad salvandum statum popularem imitari Tarentinos. Principantes enim inter eos divites existentes iumenta et fructum possessionum suarum faciebant communem multitudini dominium retinentes per actum liberalitatis; et secundum hoc fecerunt multitudinem pauperum benivolam sibi. Iterum omnes principatus duplices instituebant; alteros assignatos per electiones, alteros autem per sortem. Per sortem quidem aliquos, ut pauperes participarent; per electionem autem ut meliores possent accipere qui melius regerent rempublicam. Continget autem hoc facere et de diversis principatibus unum accipere sorte, reliquum electione; et etiam in eodem, unum principatum sic, alium autem illo modo. Et tunc recapitulat dicens, quod quomodo oportet instituere statum popularem, et ex quibus et qualiter firmare maxime infirmum circa illas, dictum est.

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L. 6 (Ζ.6–7, 1320b18–1321b3)Paucorum status administrationem continet.

Paucorum status administrationem continet.

Polit.L6

862. Fere autem et circa oligarchias, quomodo oportet, manifestum ex iis: ex contrariis enim unamquamque oligarchiam oportet colligere, ad contrariam democratiam.

Polit.L6

863. Reputantem bene temperatam quidem maxime oligarchiarum, et primam, haec autem est quae propinqua vocatae politiae, qua oportet, honorabilitates dividere, has quidem minores, has autem maiores facientes. Minores quidem a quibus participabunt necessariis principatibus. Maiores autem a quibus principalioribus, habentique honorabilitatem licere participare politia, tantam populi multitudinem introducentes per honorabilitatem cum qua valentiores erunt iis qui non participant. Semper autem oportet assumere ex meliori populo communicantes.

Polit.L6

864. Similiter autem et consequentem oligarchiam intendentes oportet parum instituere.

Polit.L6

865. Oppositae ultimae democratiae ei quae maxime potestativa et maxime tyrannica oligarchiarum, quando quidem pessima, tanto ampliori cautela opus est.

Polit.L6

866. Sicut enim corpora, quae bene disponuntur ad sanitatem et naves quae bene se habent nautis ad navigationem, sustinent plura peccata ut non corrumpantur propter ipsa, quae autem aegrotantia se habent corporum et navium resolutae et nautas pravos sortitae, neque prava possunt ferre peccata; ita et politiarum pessimae plurima indigent cautela.

Polit.L6

867. Democratias quidem igitur totaliter multitudo hominum salvat; haec enim opponitur ad iustum id, quod secundum dignitatem; oligarchiam autem palam quod e contrario a bona ordinatione oportet sortiri salvationem.

Polit.L6

868. Quoniam autem quatuor quidem sunt maxime partes multitudinis, agricultiva, banausa, forensis, mercenaria, quatuor autem quae opportuna ad bellum, equestre, armativum, nudum, nauticum: ubi enim accidit regionem equitabilem esse, hic quidem bene apte habet instituere oligarchiam fortem, salus enim habitantibus per hanc potentiam est, nutriturae autem equorum magnas substantias possidentium sunt; ubi autem armativam, consequentem oligarchiam; quod enim armativum est, divitum magis quam egenorum.

Polit.L6

869. Nuda autem potentia et nautica popularis omnino haec quidem. Nunc quidem igitur ubi est talis magna multitudo cum dissenserint agonizant deterius. Oportet autem ad hoc remedium accipere a ducibus exercitus bellicis, qui combinent ad equestrem potentiam et armativam eam quae congruit nudorum. Hac autem praevalent in dissensionibus divitibus populares; nudi enim existentes et ad equestrem et armatam agonizant facile. Ex iis quidem igitur constituere hanc potentiam sibi ipsis est constituere.

Polit.L6

870. Oportet autem divisa aetate, et iis quidem existentibus senioribus, iis autem iuvenibus, adhuc existentes iuvenes ipsorum filios doceri leves et nudas operationes, sequestratos autem ex pueris athletas esse ipsos operum.

Polit.L6

871. Appositionem autem fieri multitudini politeumatis, vel quemadmodum dictum est prius, iis qui honorabilitatem habent, vel sicut Thebanis, abstinentibus per tempus aliquod a banausis operibus, vel sicut in Massilia discretionem facientes digniorum qui in politeumate, et eorum, qui extra civitatem.

Polit.L6

872. Adhuc autem, et principatibus praecipuis, quos oportet eos, qui in politia, obtinere, opus est apponere oblationes, ut voluntarius populus non participet, et compassionem habeat ad principes tamquam principantes, multum pretium dantes principatus.

Polit.L6

873. Congruit autem sacrificia immittentes facere magnifica, et praeparare aliquid communium ut iis, quae circa convivationes, participet populus, et civitatem videns ornatam, haec quidem sursum suspensis, haec autem aedificiis, gaudens videat manentem politiam. Accidet autem, et insignibus esse memorialia expensarum.

Polit.L6

874. Sed hoc nunc, qui circa oligarchias, non faciunt, sed contrarium: acceptiones enim quaerunt non minus quam honorem: propter quod quidem bene habet dicere has esse democratias parvas. Quomodo quidem igitur oportet firmare democratias et oligarchias, determinatum sit hoc modo.

Polit.L6

Postquam philosophus ostendit ex quibus et quomodo instituenda est respublica popularis, nunc ostendit ex quibus et quomodo instituenda est respublica paucorum. Et primo circa hoc dans intentionem, dicit, quod ostenso ex quibus et quomodo instituenda est respublica popularis, manifestum est fere quomodo instituendae sunt respublicae paucorum. Fereautem dicit propter aliqua quae sunt propria reipublicae paucorum. Cum enim species status paucorum quodammodo contrarietur speciebus status popularis; et contraria ex contrariis instituuntur et contrario modo, oportet unamquamque speciem status paucorum ex his institui quae contrariantur illis ex quibus componitur contraria respublica popularis et modo contrario illi.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit reputantem bene prosequitur. Et primo declarat ex quibus et quomodo optima respublica paucorum est instituenda. Deinde cum dicit, similiter autem etc., ex quibus et quomodo species consequentes. In prima parte dicit, quod species status paucorum quae reputatur maxime temperata, instituenda est modo consequenter, haec autem species status paucorum est propinqua ei quae vocatur respublica nomine communi, in qua principantur habentes arma et dignitatem aliquam divitiarum, sicut dictum est in quarto etiam et in qua honorabilitates quae attenduntur penes divitias distinguuntur in maiores et minores: sunt enim quidam habentes maiores divitias, quidam minores. Similiter principatuum sunt quidam magis necessarii et minores, quidam autem principaliores et maiores; et minores autem habentes divitias inter ipsos participant principatibus magis necessariis et maiores principalioribus; et licitum est in ipsa omnes habentes aliquam dignitatem divitiarum attingere ad rempublicam. Ad instituendum igitur istam oportet inducere tantam multitudinem habentium honorabilitatem divitiarum determinatam, ut cum ipsa sint potentiores his qui non participant republica; et universaliter oportet istam multitudinem assumi ex meliori populo; melior enim status paucorum ex meliori populo habente divitias instituitur, sicut in omnibus aliis ex melioribus fit melius.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit similiter autem declarat et qualiter et quomodo instituuntur aliae. Et primo tangit modum instituendi omnes in universali. Secundo cum dicit, oppositae ultimae etc. insistit circa ultimam et pessime ordinatam. In prima parte est intelligendum quod species status paucorum quatuor consequenter se habent secundum ordinem. Prima enim est ex ampliori multitudine et minori honorabilitate divitiarum et magis secundum rationem et legem ordinatam, sequens autem ex pauciori multitudine et maiori abundantia divitiarum et minus utens legibus. Tertia autem adhuc ex minori et ampliori multitudine divitiarum. Ultima autem et pessima ex quam paucissima multitudine et maxima honorabilitate; et ideo non recta legibus, sed voluntate principantium; ideo consequens semper attenditur respectu antecedentis. Dicit igitur quod similiter speciem reipublicae paucorum consequentem post primam et consequentem post illam usque ad ultimam oportet sustinere per intensionem eius quod observatur in institutione praecedentis: ut verbi gratia si prima ex multitudine magna et parva honorabilitate divitiarum instituitur, sequens ex minori multitudine et maiori honorabilitate; et sic usque ad ultimam inclusive, quae instituitur ex quam paucissima multitudine paucorum et maxima honorabilitate divitiarum.

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Deinde cum dicit oppositae ultimae insistit circa ultimam et pessimam. Et circa hoc primo ostendit quod indiget multa cautela. Secundo cum dicit, democratias quidem igitur etc., ostendit quomodo contingit ipsam firmari melius. Circa primum primo proponit. Secundo cum dicit, sicut enim corpora etc. probat. In prima parte dicit, quod illa species status paucorum opponitur ultimae speciei status popularis, quae maxime est potestativa et etiam tyrannica; quia in ipsa, totus populus, tota multitudo velut unus tyrannus principatur; tanto indiget ampliori cautela quanto ipsa est pessima omnium.

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Consequenter cum dicit sicut enim declarat hoc per simile, et in his quae fiunt arte, et in his quae fiunt natura, quae sunt nobis magis nota: dicens, quod sicut corpora animalium quae bene disposita sunt ad sanitatem propter bonam adinvicem primorum compositionem vel proportionem et naves quae bene compaginatae sunt in ordine ad navigationem possunt sustinere plures errores, ut puta ictus vel passiones ab extrinsecis, ita ut non de facili corrumpantur propter illa; illa autem corpora animalium quae male disposita sunt propter malam dispositionem humorum, et naves non bene compaginatae, sed quasi resolutae habentes pravos nautas, non possunt etiam sustinere modicos errores: immo corpora animalium talium a modicis passionibus corrumpuntur, naves vero huiusmodi ad modicum impulsum venti, vel undae, vel ictum rupis franguntur, ita est et de rebuspublicis. Illae quae optime ordinatae sunt secundum rationem multos impulsus et magnos sustinere possunt. Male autem ordinatae a modicis corrumpuntur; et ideo maiori indigent cautela. Civitatem enim oportet intelligere compositam ex pluribus adinvicem ordinatis, sicut animal ex pluribus membris et navem ex pluribus lignis.

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Deinde cum dicit democratias quidem docet ex quibus contingit eam firmari melius. Et primo in generali. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem etc., in speciali. In prima parte dicit, quod respublicae populares tyrannice et pessime ordinatae salvantur propter multitudinem hominum gubernantium in eis; talis enim multitudo potentiam quamdam habet; propter enim multitudinem istam opponitur iusto secundum dignitatem, ita ut per potentiam eius suppeditetur huiusmodi iustum secundum rationem in ipsa. Status autem paucorum ei oppositi qui potentatus dicuntur et sunt tyrannicae, non salvantur per potentiam multitudinis, quia talem non habent; et ideo oportet quod e contrario salventur propter bonam ordinationem secundum rationem et iusti salvationem.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem docet in speciali ex quibus firmatur. Et primo declarat ex quibus contingit fieri fortem paucorum statum et minus fortem. Secundo cum dicit, appositionem autem fieri etc. ponit elementa ad firmandum ipsam. Adhuc circa primum duo facit. Quoniam primo declarat ex quibus contingit constituere magis fortem statum paucorum et consequentem. Secundo cum dicit, nuda autem potentia etc. ponit ex quibus minus fortem et magis inordinatam. In prima parte ad declarandum intentum praemittit distinctionem multitudinis in civitate; et dicit, quod quamvis sint plures partes multitudinis, sicut tactum est prius, maxime inveniuntur quatuor ad quas aliae reducuntur; puta agricultiva ad quam reducit pascualis: navalis, et illa quae circa forum negotiatur, et mercenaria ad quam reducuntur viles artifices. Iterum quatuor sunt modi hominum qui bene dispositi sunt ad bellum; puta equites qui pugnant; et nautae qui in navibus pugnant; et expediti leves armaturas habentes. Ubi igitur accidit esse regionem in qua sunt multi bellantes in equis secundum artem, contingit fortem statum paucorum facere, maxime si fuerint unanimes inter se. Cuius ratio est, quia statui paucorum insidiatur potentia multitudinis; ab ipsa autem potest salvari per potentiam equestrem quae praevalet in armis. Et iterum nutriturae equorum sunt factivae divitiarum; et ideo pertinent ad eos qui habent substantias magnas: cuius modi sunt in statu paucorum. Ubi autem est multitudo utentium armis ad pedes et ad defensionem et ad impugnationem, contingit facere fortem statum paucorum post primam quae dicta est: habere enim multitudinem talium armorum et usum eorum magis pertinet ad divites quam ad egenos, quia divites dominantur in statu paucorum.

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Deinde cum dicit nuda autem declarat quae est multitudo ea qua non contingit fieri fortem statum paucorum. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo tangit remedia per quae contingit illam melius ordinari ad fortem statum paucorum cum dicit, oportet autem et cetera. In prima dicit, quod potentia multitudinis, quae non utitur armis, sed ordinatur ad leves operationes, puta ad cursum, ad ascensum murorum; et navalis, quae in aqua pugnat, omnino sunt populares non paucorum: tales autem propter defectum virtutis et rationis sequuntur impetum; et ideo ubi est multa multitudo talium, si dissensionem habeant ad superiores, pugnant, contendentes deterius contra eosdem; et ideo non bene ordinabiles sunt ad statum paucorum. Secundo cum dicit, oportet autem etc., tangit remedia. Primo unum. Secundo cum dicit, oportet autem etc., aliud. In prima dicit, quod contra inordinationem et malitiam praedictae multitudinis oportet duces exercitus adducere remedium, videlicet adiungendo ad equestrem multitudinem, et etiam ad pedestrem, utentem tamen armis, tantum de multitudine expeditorum quantum eis congruit, et non plus; ut videlicet ad tantam multitudinem equestrium apponatur tanta multitudo expeditorum quanta est eis necessaria ad finem, sic tamen quod non praevaleat in potentia, et non sit maior. Similiter autem et ad armativam. Ratio autem quare expedit talem multitudinem ordinari bene in exercitu, est, quia nos videmus, quod popularis multitudo quando dissentit a divitibus praevalet contra eos propter virtutem expeditorum, quia expediti faciles existentes, faciliter insurgunt contra equestres, et etiam contra pedestres armatos, quia ipsi divites sunt et oppressivi suipsius; et ideo expedit paucorum potentiae divitibus retinere sibiipsis hanc potentiam expeditorum contra populares, et eos constituere et ordinare sic, ut per benivolentiam et bonam ordinationem cum eisdem expeditis praevaleant contra eos.

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Deinde cum dicit oportet autem ponit secundum remedium, quod etiam est ad declarationem dicti; dicens quod adhuc expedit paucorum statui ad bonam ordinationem expeditorum distinguere secundum aetates, videlicet in iuniores et seniores ipsorum, et iuniores filios ipsorum exercere ad cursum, saltum, ascensum; ulterius autem magis provectos et fortiores constituere athletas ad opera facienda, puta vel ad onera portanda, vel ad duellum, vel ad aliquod aliud tale. Et ex hoc sequuntur duo. Primo quod benivolentiam expeditorum habebunt, quasi habentes curam et sollicitudinem de bona ordinatione ipsorum: aliud autem, quia ipsi iuvenes magis exercitati erunt in eis, quae expediunt statui paucorum.

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Deinde cum dicit appositionem autem ponit elementa ad salvandum potentatum paucorum. Et primo ponit huiusmodi elementa. Secundo cum dicit, sed hoc etc. tangit dicta non observari nunc in paucorum statibus. In prima ponit unum elementum. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem etc. ponit secundum. Tertio cum dicit, congruit autem sacrificia etc. ponit aliud. In prima dicit, quod ad salvandum potentatum paucorum expedit aliquos de popularibus apponi reipublicae, utputa de his qui aliquam honorabilitatem habent divitiarum, vel sicut fiebat Thebis, puta, quod nullus accipiebatur ad rempublicam ipsorum qui non abstinuisset a foro venalium per decennium, sicut dicebatur prius in quarto, vel sicut observabant in Massilia quadam alia civitate, qui distinguebant inter dignitatem eorum qui attingebant ad rempublicam, et eorum qui non participabant; et si inveniebant aliquos non participantes digniores vel aeque dignos quibusdam qui participabant, assumebant ipsos, vel aliquos ex eis: per talem enim appositionem popularium ipsi reipublicae magis diligunt ipsam, et ideo magis nituntur eam salvare. Hoc tamen est observandum, sicut dicebatur prius, quod non assumatur magna multitudo talium; possunt enim inordinationem facere paucorum potentiam; sed tanta, ut cum ipsa valentiores sint reliqua multitudine regionis.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundum elementum; dicens, quod expediens est eos qui assumuntur ad praecipuos et honorabiliores principatus in tali republica facere oblationes donariorum magnorum vel Deo, vel communitati. Ex hoc enim sequuntur duae utilitates: una quod populares non affectabunt principatus propter magnitudinem donariorum, et ideo magis quieti erunt: alia quia multum compatientur principantibus videntes eos multa expendere in eis: pauperes enim divitias maximum bonum reputant, ex quo sequitur maior quietatio ipsorum.

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Deinde cum dicit congruit autem ponit tertium; dicens, quod adhuc expedit assumendos ad principatum sacrificia magnifica facere, et magnitudinem expensarum, et facere aliquod convivium magnum toti civitati, ut sic populus participans convivio, et videns civitatem bene dispositam et ornatam, et secundum aedificia communia et propria, et etiam multa seorsum posita, et dedicata ad honorem Dei, gaudeat, et per consequens velit manere rempublicam; et iterum magnitudo expensarum expediens est insignibus sicut memoriale, et ad diffusionem famae: sicut enim dicit Aristoteles in quarto Ethicorum, amantur maxime liberales omnium aliorum qui aliis praestant virtutibus; utiles enim sunt et prosunt dando; propter quod magis diffunditur fama hominis per actum dationis liberalis.

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Consequenter cum dicit sed hoc nunc tangit contrarium esse in consuetudine modernorum; dicens, quod ea quae dicta sunt non observant moderni, qui regunt in paucorum republica vel insignes; non enim quaerunt bonam famam magis, aut etiam honores, sed magis extorsiones pecuniarum calumniose, seu qualitercumque: propter hoc modernae respublicae paucorum sunt pravae respublicae populares, in quibus quaeritur magis extorsio pecuniae, quam honor. Et tunc recapitulat dicens, quod ex quibus et quomodo contingit bene firmare status populares et paucorum male ordinatos intantum est determinatum.

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L. 7 (Ζ.8, 1321b4–1323a10)De magistratibus a quibus civitates administrandae sunt.De magistratibus a quibus civitates administrandae sunt.

875. Consequens autem dictis est, dividere bene quae circa principatus quod, et qui, et quorum, sicut dictum est prius.

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876. Sine necessariis quidem enim principatibus impossibile est esse civitatem; sine iis autem qui ad bonum ordinem et ornatum, impossibile habitari bene.

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877. Adhuc autem necessarium in parvis quidem pauciores esse principatus, in magnis autem plures, sicut extitit prius dictum. Quales igitur congruit simul ducere, et quales separare, oportet non latere.

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878. Primo quidem igitur cura necessariorum, quae circa forum, cui oportet quendam principatum praeesse aspicientem circa contractus, et bonum ornatum: fere enim necessarium omnibus civitatibus, hunc quidem emere, hunc autem vendere, ad eam quae ad invicem necessariam utilitatem; et hoc est accommodatissimum ad autarchaim, propter quam videntur in unam politiam convenisse.

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879. Altera autem cura huic habita, et propinqua, quae eorum quae circa municipium publicorum et propriorum, qualiter bonus ornatus sit et cadentium aedificiorum et viarum salvatio et directio, et confinium ad invicem, qualiter sine querela se habeant, et curae aliae quaecumque iis similis modi. Vocant autem plurim astynomiam talem principatum; habet autem partes plures numero, quarum ad alias alios sintituunt in civitatibus magis populosis, velut murorum factores; et fontium curatores, et portus custodes.

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880. Alia autem necessaria et consimiles huic. De eisdem quidem enim, sed circa regionem est, et de eo quod extra oppidum. Vocant autem principes hos, ii quidem agronomos ii autem hylores. Hae quidem igitur curae horum sunt tres.

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881. Alius autem principatus ad quem redditus communium referuntur, a quibus custodientibus patiuntur ad unamquamque dispensationem. Vocant autem receptores hos et camerarios.

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882. Alius autem principatus ad quem rescribi oportet proprios contractus et iudicia ex praetoriis: apud eosdem autem istos, et scripturas sententiarum fieri oportet, et inductiones. Alicubi quidem igitur partiuntur et hunc in plures: est autem unus principalis horum omnium: vocantur autem Hieromnimones et praesides, et aliis iis nominibus propinquis.

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883. Post hunc autem consequens quidem, necessariissimus autem fere, et maxime difficilis principatuum est, qui circa actiones condemnatorum et praepositorum scriptionibus, et circa custodias corporum.

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884. Gravis quidem igitur est, propter multam habere inimicitiam; ita ut ubi non est magna lucrari, neque principari sustinent ipso, neque qui sustinent volunt agere secundum leges.

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885. Necessarius autem est, quia nullus profectus est fieri quidem sententias de iustis, has autem non accipere finem. Quare si factis non communicare invicem impossible, et executionibus non factis.

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886. Propter quod, melius non unum esse hunc principatum, sed alios ex aliis praetoriis, et circa praepositiones eorum quae rescripta sunt eodem modo tentare dividere. Adhuc autem quaedam agere, et ipsos principatus, aliosque et novorum magis novos, et eos qui instantium, cum alter condemnaverit, alterum esse exequentem, velut astynomus eos qui agoranomon; eos autem qui ab iis, alios.

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887. Quanto enim utique minor inimicitia infuerit exequentibus, tanto magis accipient finem executiones. Eosdem quidem igitur esse condemnantes et exequentes inimicitiam habet duplicem: de omnibus autem eosdem, adversarios omnibus.

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888. In multis autem locis divisi sunt qui custodit, ad eum qui exequitur; velut Athenis vocatorum undecim; propter quod melius et hunc separare, et sophisma quaerere etiam circa hunc: necessarius quidem enim non minus dicto.

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889. Accidit autem epiiches quidem fugere maxime hunc principatum, pravos autem non securum facere dominos. Ipsi enim indigent custodia aliorum, magis quam possint alios custodire.

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890. Propter quod oportet, non unum repositum principatum esse apud ipsos, neque continue eodem, sed iuvenum, ubi aliquis epheborum vel custodiarum est ordo. Et principatuum oportet secundum partes facere curam alios. Hos quidem igitur principatus, tamquam necessariissimos ponendum esse primos.

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891. Post hos autem necessarios quidem nihil minus, in maiori autem schemate ordinatos. Etenim experientia et fide indigent multa, tales autem erunt utique qui circa custodiam civitatis, et quicumque ordinantur ad bellicas opportunitates. Oportet autem et in pace et in bello, portarum et murorum custodiae similiter curatores esse, exquisitionis et coordinationis civium.

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892. Hic quidem igitur in omnibus iis principatus plures sunt, hic autem pauciores, velut in parvis civitatibus unus in omnibus. Vocant autem duces exercitus et principes belli tales. Adhuc autem et si sint equites, aut nudi, aut sagittarii, aut nautici, et super horum unumquemque aliquando constituuntur principatus vocati navarchiae, et equiarchiae, et ordinum archiae, et particulariter autem quod sub iis hierarchiae, insidiarum dispositiones, et phylarchiae, et quaecumque partes horum: quod autem omne una quaedam horum est species curae bellicorum. Circa hunc quidem igitur principatum habet hoc modo.

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893. Quoniam autem principatuum quidam etsi non omnes tractant multa communium, necessarium alium esse sumentem rationem, et emendantem ipsum, nihil aliud tractantem. Vocant autem hos, ii quidem correctores, ii autem ratiocinatores, ii autem exquisitores, ii vero synigores.

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894. Praeter omnes autem hos principatus qui maxime dominans est omnium. Idem enim saepe habet finem, et ephoriam quae praesidet multitudini, ubi dominans est populus: oportet enim esse congregans, quod dominans politiae. Vocantur autem hic quidem praeconsules propter praeconsiliari; ubi autem multitudo est consilium magis. Politici quidem igitur principatuum tot quidem sunt.

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895. Alia autem species curae quae circa Deos, velut sacerdotes et curatores eorum quae circa sacra, ut serventur existentia, et erigantur decidentia aedificiorum, et aliorum quaecumque ordinata sunt ad Deos.

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896. Accidit autem, curam hanc alicubi quidem esse unam, velut in parvis civitatibus, alicubi autem multas et separatas sanctitatis, puta sacrorum factores et templorum custodes et camerarios sacrarum pecuniarum. Habitus autem huic qui determinatus ad immolationes communes omnes quascumque non assignat lex sacerdtibus, sed a communi mensa habent honorem. Vocant autem quidem principes hos, ii autem reges ii vero prytanes.

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897. Necessariae quidem igitur curae sint de iis, ut est dicere summatim, circa daemonia et bellica, et circa redditus, et ea quae expenduntur, et circa forum, et circa municipium, et portus, et regionem. Adhuc quae circa praetoria, et commutationes, scripturas et executiones et custodias, et circa ratiocinationes; et exquisitiones, et correctiones principatuum, et finaliter quae circa consilians sunt communium. Proprii autem civitatibus, quae magis vacant et magis gaudent.

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898. Adhuc autem soliciti de bono ornatu, de gyneconomia, de custodia legum, de lege puerorum, de principatu exercitiorum. Adhuc autem cura circa agones gymnasticos et dionysiales, et utique si quas tales alteras accidit fieri theorias.

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899. Horum autem manifeste quidam sunt non demotici principatuum, puta gyneconomia et paedonomia: egenis enim necesse uti mulieribus et pueris tamquam consequentibus propter inservilitatem.

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900. Tribus autem existentibus principatibus secundum quos eligunt quidem principatus principales, scilicet custodibus legum, praeconsulibus, consilio: qui quidem legum custodes, aristocraticum, oligarchicum autem qui praeconsules, consilium vero demoticum. De principatibus quidem igitur in typo fere dictum est de omnibus.

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Postquam philosophus declaravit ex quibus et qualiter instituantur respublicae minus rectae, determinat nunc de principatibus earumdem, supplendo quod in fine quarti omiserat. Et circa hoc primo dat intentionem et rationem eius. Secundo cum dicit, primo quidem etc. prosequitur. Circa primum primo dat intentionem suam; dicens, quod post ea quae dicta sunt, oportet determinare ea quae pertinent ad principatus: puta quot sunt principatus necessarii in huiusmodi rebuspublicis, et qui secundum speciem, et quorum sint domini, sicut dicebatur prius in fine quarti.

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Deinde cum dicit sine necessariis dat necessitatem huius considerationis; et dividitur in duo. Primo enim assignat rationem unam. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem etc. aliam. In prima parte intendit rationem hanc. De illis sine quibus, aut impossibile est esse civitatem, aut bene habitari, et consequenter, oportet determinare vel considerare rempublicam: sed sine principibus, aut non est possibile civitatem, aut non bene habitari: ergo et cetera. Maiorem supponit sicut manifestam, minorem subiungens, dicens quod sine principatibus necessariis, puta sine principatu principali, et ducatu exercitus, et etiam iudicio, et aliis huiusmodi, non potest esse civitas: sine principatibus autem qui curant de bono ornatu civium quantum ad exteriora vel accidentia magis, non potest bene habitari.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundam rationem; dicens, quod praeterea in civitatibus parvis necesse est pauciores principatus, et plures in unum coniungi; tum quia pauciores sufficiunt, tum quia non plures inveniuntur esse sufficientes. In magnis autem civitatibus, oportet plures esse, et unum dividi in plures propter oppositas causas, sicut dictum fuit in quarto huius. Oportet igitur civem non ignorare quales principatus convenit coniungere in unum, et quales dividere in plures: hoc autem non contingit nisi sciatur qui et quot sunt, et quorum domini, et quam habitudinem habent adinvicem, et qui propinquiores et qui remotiores secundum naturam: ergo necesse est ista praeconsiderare.

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Deinde cum dicit primo quidem prosequitur: et est intelligendum, quod simul determinat qui et quorum et quot. Et dividitur in partes duas. Quia primo facit quod dictum est. In secunda cum dicit, horum autem etc., ad quam rempublicam pertineant quidam illorum magis. Adhuc circa primum primo declarat de necessariis magis. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem soliciti etc., de his quae ad bonum ornatum. Adhuc primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, necessariae quidem igitur etc. recolligit. Circa primum adhuc primo determinat de principantibus rebuspublicis. Secundo cum dicit, alia autem specie etc. de his qui curant de divinis. Circa primum adhuc primo determinat de principantibus minoribus particularibus. Secundo cum dicit, praeter omnes autem hos etc. de universali et summo. Adhuc prima in duas. Primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem etc. de eo, qui habet curam super correctione et emendatione ipsorum. Circa primum adhuc primo determinat de principantibus, qui habent curam super rebus exterioribus. Secundo de his qui habent curam de personis civium, cum dicit, post hunc autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Quoniam primo determinat de his qui habent curam super rebus exterioribus. Deinde cum dicit altera autem cura, etc. de eo, qui habet curam de rescriptis super praedictis et accessoriis. Prima dividitur in tres. Primo determinat de eo qui habet curam de his quae circa forum. Secundo cum dicit, alia autem necessaria etc. de his quae circa aedificia et immobilia. Tertio cum dicit, alius autem principatus etc. de eo qui habet curam super redditibus communibus. In prima parte dicit, quod primo oportet esse quemdam principatum circa forum eorum quae sunt necessaria civitati, qui aspiciat, quod contractus talium iuste et legitime fiant, et etiam aedificia circa forum bene ordinata sint; puta in quibus fiunt huiusmodi contractus. Cuius ratio est, quia in omnibus civitatibus fere necesse est aliqua recipere per emptionem, et aliqua emittere per venditionem, et quantum ad totam civitatem et respectu aliorum, et quantum ad cives inter se. Fere autem dicit, quia contingit esse aliquam civitatem per se sufficientem, in qua hoc non est necessarium. Et hoc est convenientissimum ad per se sufficientiam: est enim civitas communitas perfecta omnis per se sufficientiae terminum habens, ut dicebatur in primo, propter quam convenerunt in unam civitatem. Quia enim una domus non est sibi sufficiens, ideo coniungitur alii in vico: et quia unus vicus nec pauci sufficiunt sibi omnino, ideo plures coniunguntur in civitate una quae per se sufficiens est: per se autem sufficiens non potest esse, nisi per commutationes mutuas, quae fiunt per emptionem et venditionem, vel inter se, vel ad alios legitime factas: hoc autem non essent nisi esset aliquis dirigens, et reducens inaequale ad aequalitatem per sapientiam et publicam potestatem: hoc autem est principatus: est igitur necessarius principatus quidam circa contractus.

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Deinde cum dicit altera autem determinat de principatibus, qui curant de aedificiis publicis et propriis. Et primo de his qui curant de his quae in civitate. Secundo cum dicit, alia autem etc. de his quae extra. In prima parte dicit, quod alius est principatus consequenter se habens ad istum, et propinquus eidem, qui habet curam de aedificiis communibus et propriis, et stratis, et aquae ductibus, et aliis huiusmodi qualiter fiant ut expedit, et bene disposita sint, secundum quod expedit civitati, et qualiter ruinosa aedificia reparentur et qualiter confinia aedificiorum sic determinentur, ut sint sine querela, et de aliis huiusmodi quae sunt similia huic curae. Quidam autem vocant hunc principatum aedilitatem. Praedictus autem principatus plures partes habet secundum modum; quarum aliae et aliae ad alia et alia ordinantur in civitatibus magnis; puta factores murorum et curatores fontium et custodes portus et fortalitiorum civitatis.

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Deinde cum dicit alia autem determinat de his quae in regione; dicens, quod alius principatus est necessarius consimilis praedicto: de illis enim eisdem de quibus curat praedictus est iste extra civitatem in regione; puta ille qui curat de castris et aedificiis et aquaeductibus et confinibus agrorum et aliorum quae sunt extra civitatem. Appellant autem quidam istos definitores, alii custodes agrorum. Isti igitur sunt tres principatus necessarii.

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Deinde cum dicit alius autem (...) redditus determinat de eo qui habet curam circa redditus communes; dicens, quod alius est principatus qui habet curam circa communes redditus: ad quem tria pertinent: scilicet recipere ipsos a differentibus et custodire receptos et distribuere quod necessarium est in unaquaque dispensatione secundum ordinationem civitatis vel superiorum: et vocantur a quibusdam receptores, a recipiendo; a quibusdam autem quaestores.

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Deinde cum dicit alius autem (...) rescribi determinat de eo, coram quo fiunt rescripta de contractibus et iudiciis; dicens, quod alius est principatus ad quem referuntur omnia rescripta contractus et iudicia, ut habeant auctoritatem, scilicet per signi eius appositionem; apud quos etiam oportet manere registrum cum rescripto contractuum et sententiarum, et etiam eorum qui inducuntur in civitate. Iste vero principatus in civitatibus maioribus distinguitur in plures, sed unum oportet esse principalem omnium, sicut nunc videmus in curiis magnatum aliquem cancellarium principalem et alios plures esse sub eo, puta notarios et registrarios et huiusmodi; et vocantur a quibusdam praefecti vel memoriales, quia apud eos debet remanere memoria magnorum quae fiunt in civitate. Ab aliis autem aliis nominibus propinquis.

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Deinde cum dicit post hunc determinat de eo qui principatur super ipsa substantia civium. Et primo de eo qui habet curam super actionibus condemnandorum et proscribendorum. Secundo cum dicit, post hoc autem etc. de eo qui habet curam super custodia civium. Circa primum, primo ostendit quod principatus talis gravis et necessarius est. Secundo cum dicit, contingitque, tangit quoddam accidens circa ipsum. Circa primum primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, praeterea melius est etc. tangit quaedam expedientia ad movendum gravitatem ipsius. Circa primum primo proponit. Secundo cum dicit, gravis quidem igitur etc. probat. In prima dicit, quod post praecedentem principatum qui maxime necessarius est, sicut primum principium in unoquoque genere, et est maxime difficilis inter omnes, puta ille qui curat de exactionibus condemnandorum ad mortem, et relegandorum secundum accusationes inscriptas, et circa custodiam corporum ipsorum antequam condemnentur aut proscribantur.

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Deinde cum dicit gravis quidem probat vel assignat rationem istorum. Et primo gravitatis ipsius. Secundo cum dicit, necessarius autem etc. assignat rationem necessitatis. In prima dicit, quod principatus praedictus gravis est valde propter multas inimicitias multorum: amici enim condemnandorum et proscribendorum habent ad ipsum odium ut in pluribus, siquidem ille vel illi qui diligunt aliquos sunt inimici inimicorum illorum: et tanta est inimicitia ad ipsum, quod ubi non contingit multum lucrari, pauci aut nulli sustinerent praeesse in isto principatu; et si sint aliqui qui sustinent, nolunt procedere in ipso secundum rigorem, timentes inimicitias vel offensionem: timor enim et amor saepe solent pervertere iudicium principantis.

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Deinde cum dicit necessarius autem probat vel assignat causam necessitatis; dicens, quod necessarius quidem est huiusmodi principatus, quia nihil proficuum est recte secundum iustitiam sententiare de actionibus, et sententias rectas non deducere ad finem per executionem. In operabilibus enim iudicium rectum est propter operationem sicut propter finem: agere autem aliquid eorum quae sunt ad finem per se et non deducere ad finem vel attingere, non est proficuum, propter quod si impossibile est communicationem civium invicem salvari non factis sententiis rectis de controversiis suborientibus inter ipsos, impossibile est eamdem communicationem civium adinvicem salvari, nisi sententiae latae recte executioni demandentur. Si igitur necessarium est in civitate communicationem salvari necessitate quae est in ordine ad finem, necessarium est eadem necessitate iustas sententias demandare executioni: hoc autem principaliter fit per huiusmodi principatum: quare huiusmodi principatus necessarius est si debeat salvari communicatio.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod tangit quaedam expedientia circa ipsum; et dividitur in partes duas. Primo tangit quaedam documenta et rationem assignat. Secundo cum dicit, in multis autem locis etc. adiungit aliud. Circa primum primo tangit documenta. Secundo cum dicit, quanto enim etc. assignat rationem. In prima dicit, quod quia huiusmodi principatus est necessarius et gravis et expedit istum principatum non esse unum tantum, sed distingui in plures, et alios ex aliis iudiciis accipere, ut puta quod alius sit qui audiat accusationem, alius qui inquirat, alius autem qui sententiet: et similiter eos qui circa rescripta intendunt, oportet tentare dividere, puta ut unus scribat accusationem, alius inquisitionem, alius sententiam. Iterum expedit quosdam de istis agere aliqua et quosdam alia, puta eos qui magis fuerunt in principatu iudicare minus periculosa, novos autem nova, et veteres magis periculosa, et iterum negotiorum instantium si aliter condemnaverit alterum exequi; verbi gratia, eos quos principantes intra civitatem condemnaverint principantes extra civitatem magis puniant exequendo, et e contrario.

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Deinde cum dicit quanto enim assignat rationem; dicens, quod ista observanda sunt, quoniam quanto minor erit inimicitia huiusmodi principantibus, tanto sententiae et executiones magis de fine accipient. Eosdem autem esse condemnantes et exequentes inimicitiam habet propter duo: tum quia condemnat, tum quia exequitur; eos autem omnia tractare quae pertinent ad dictum principatum inimicitiam habet quantum ad omnia. Si autem dividantur, ita quod alter sit condemnans et alter sit exequens; et diversa diversis attribuantur, dividetur inimicitia: quare minor erit ad singulos; et sententiae et executiones magis finem accipient; quod est expedientius.

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Deinde cum dicit in multis adiungit aliud; dicens, quod in multis civitatibus divisi sunt, ille qui custodit illos qui condemnandi sunt et ille qui exequitur sententiam, sicut Athenis illi qui vocabantur undecim viri; et ideo expedientius est et illos separare et alia sophismata et adumbrationes circa hoc facere per quae contingat minorem esse inimicitiam, et per consequens minus gravem principatum; necessarius enim est non minor praedicto.

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Deinde cum dicit accidit autem tangit accidens inducens impedimentum circa ipsum. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, propter quod etc. tangit remedia. In prima dicit, quod propter difficultatem quae est in isto principatu, viri boni fugiunt huiusmodi principatum, malos autem non est securum apponere in ipso, mali enim magis indigent regula et custodia aliorum quam possint alios regere vel etiam custodire: regulans enim alium in se oportet esse regulatum prius.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod tangit remedia; dicens, quod quia boni fugiunt principatum istum propter causam praedictam, expediens est non esse tantum unum principantem in huiusmodi negotio, nec etiam continue eosdem principari, sed modo hos modo alios; quia etiam nos videmus quod ubi est aliquis ordo iuniorum, vel ubi est ordo custodiarum civium et principatuum, oportet istorum curam facere particulariter, nunc quidem hos, nunc autem illos. Isti autem principatus qui dicti sunt, ponendi sunt necessarii et primi respectu praedictorum prius.

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Deinde cum dicit post hos inquirit vel prosequitur de eo qui habet curam super custodiam civium. Et circa hoc primo dat necessitatem ipsius. Secundo cum dicit, hic quidem igitur etc. tangit eius divisionem. In prima ipse dicit, quod post praedictos principatus necesse est ponere alios non minus necessarios si debeat salvari commutatio civilis, ordinatos tamen in excellentiori gradu dignitatis, quoniam indigent ad executionem principatus prudentia multa, quae habetur per experientiam longi temporis, et multa fide, idest multa fidelitate. Isti autem sunt qui custodiunt civitatem, et ordinantur ad opportunitates bellicas contra inimicos civitatis. Expedit enim, si debeat salvari, esse curatores ipsius, et in tempore pacis, et in tempore belli. Tales etiam sunt illi ad quos pertinet custodire portas et muros; similiter illi qui habent curam exquirendi insidias, et de ordinatione civium adinvicem pacifica. Tales autem ad recte operandum indigent prudentia multa et fidelitate, quia indiscretio et infidelitas ipsorum de facili induceret corruptionem civitatis.

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Deinde cum dicit hic quidem tangit divisionem ipsius; dicens, quod ista cura in quibusdam civitatibus continet principatus plures, sicut in magnis et magis ordinatis ad bellum. In aliis autem pauciores, sicut in parvis civitatibus contingit aliquem unum de civibus praefici in tota cura, vel aliquos paucos. Et aliqui vocant istos principatus, ducatus exercitus, alii principes belli. Iterum si in civitate inveniantur equites multi, aut pedites, sicut expositum est prius, aut sagittarii, qui ordinantur ad pugnam sagittando, vel nautici, qui pugnant in navibus, aut aliqui alii tales, super unumquodque istorum in maioribus civitatibus ordinantur aliqui principantes, ex hoc nominationem habentes; sicut praefecti navales, et equitum, et legionum. Et adhuc magis particulatim sub unoquoque istorum sunt multi principatus particulares, puta in nauticis praefectis triremium, similiter et ille qui habet curam super dispositione insidiarum, et illi qui dicuntur praefecti cohortium et tribuni militum, et quicumque alii tales diversitatem talem habent. Omnia tamen ista habent unam speciem curae communem, quae dicitur cura belli; et per consequens unum principatum supremum ad quem omnes alii ordinantur. Hoc ergo modo se habent circa principatum.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem prosequitur de eo, cuius est corrigere alios quosdam principatus, dicens: quoniam quidem principantes in civitate, quamvis non omnes, habent tractare bona communia, scilicet colligendo et dispensando; difficile autem est huiusmodi bona tractare sine aliqua inquisitione vel appropriatione, eo quod omnes habent appetitum huiusmodi bonorum, si non sint studiosi et fidelissimi viri, necessarium est esse aliquem principatum super istos, cuius sit sumere rationem super receptis et expensis, et corrigere ubi invenerit delinquentes. Aliter enim contingeret distractio in bonis communibus civitatis et iniustitia. Expedit autem, quod ille principatus super nullo alio habeat curam, ut diligentius possit curare de praedictis. Vocantur autem isti principatus a quibusdam correctores, eo quod corrigere habent delinquentes; a quibusdam vero rationales, eo quod debent audire rationes; a quibusdam scrutatores, eo quod habent exquirere diligenter; ab aliis procuratores.

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Deinde cum dicit praeter omnes determinat de maximo principatu; dicens, quod praeter praedictos principatus est alius necessarius, ille scilicet qui habet dominium super omnibus, et ad quem omnes alii ordinantur, a quo accipientes rationem operandi diriguntur in eis quae subsunt curae ipsorum, et ad quem finaliter reducuntur omnes operationes civitatis. Oportet autem id quod cogit summam habere in republica auctoritatem. Appellant autem quibusdam in locis praeconsultores, ex eo quia ante deliberant: ubi vero multitudo est, consilium dicitur.

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Deinde cum dicit alia autem determinat de principatu qui dirigit in his quae ad Deum pertinent. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim praemittit opportunitatem ipsorum. Secundo cum dicit, accidit autem etc. ponit distinctionem istius principatus vel unionem in diversis civitatibus. In prima dicit, quod alia est species principatus necessaria in civitate; puta eorum quae ad divina pertinent, cuius sunt sacerdotes sacra tractantes, et eorum qui curant de aedificiis sacrarum domuum, qualiter salvae maneant, et si aliqua decidant erigantur; et etiam aliorum quorumcumque, quae ad cultum divinum ordinantur.

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Deinde cum dicit accidit autem ponit divisionem et unionem eius in rebuspublicis diversis, dicens, quod iste principatus alicubi est unus tantum curans de omnibus quae pertinent ad praedictum cultum, sicut in civitatibus parvis; alicubi autem sunt multi et separati principatus, puta sacrificia offerentes et custodes templorum et aerarii sacrarum pecuniarum Deo dedicatarum, consequenter autem ille qui ordinatur ad dispensandas immolationes communes quas non assignavit lex ipsis sacerdotibus, sed recipiunt ipsas a mensa communi. Erant enim apud gentiles quaedam quae immolabantur, quae sacerdotes accipiebant de propriis; quaedam autem quae ministrabantur eis a communi; et isti a quibusdam vocabantur reges, a quibusdam vero pontifices maximi.

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Deinde cum dicit necessariae quidem recolligit praedictos principatus dicens quod principatus necessarii, ut contingit dicere in summa sunt de his et circa hoc: puta principatus circa rem divinam, et principatus circa bellica, et ille qui curam habet super acceptione reddituum et dispensatione eorum, et ille qui habet dominium circa forum quantum ad commutationes, et ille qui circa municipium civitatis, et exterius circa portum et regionem subiectam civitati; iterum ille qui circa iudicia et circa Scripturas commutationum et circa executiones sententiarum, et ille qui habet curam super custodia civitatis et regionis, et ille qui habet audire compositum et corrigere delinquentes, et finaliter circa consilia. In civitatibus autem, quae magis vacant ab exterioribus bellis, et intendunt speculationi, et magis delectantur circa talia, sunt alii proprii principatus, de quibus nunc dictum non est, nec de republica talium civitatum, sed tantum dictum est de principatibus pertinentibus ad statum paucorum et popularem, de quibus erat prius determinatum; quamvis quaedam istorum pertineant etiam ad praedictas civitates.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem determinat de principatibus non necessariis magis; dicens, quod adhuc praeter principatus praedictos et necessarios sunt alii principatus curantes de bono ornatu civitatis et civium, de mulierum disciplina et de custodia legum, ita quod nullus transgrediatur, et de lege puerorum puta disciplina et cura ipsorum, de gymnasiorum gubernatione, iterum de ludis gymnasticis, in quibus homines exercebant se nudi, et de musicis, et aliis huiusmodi spectaculis.

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Deinde cum dicit horum autem declarat ad quas respublicas pertineat quidam horum principatuum. Et primo declarat hoc, de quibus minus principalibus. Secundo cum dicit, tribus autem existentibus etc. de principalibus. In prima dicit, quod quidam istorum principatuum non competunt statui populari, puta principatus mulierum, puerorum lex vel principatus. Et ratio huius est, quia in populari statu est multitudo egenorum, egeni autem necesse habent uti mulieribus et pueris tamquam quibusdam consequentibus de necessitate, ad operationes necessarias et serviles propter carentiam servorum; hi enim quia servos non habent, utuntur mulieribus et pueris sicut servis.

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Deinde cum dicit tribus autem declarat hoc idem de quibusdam principatibus; dicens, quod, cum sint tres principatus secundum quos eligunt alios principales principatus, scilicet conservatores legum, praeconsultores et consilium; legum conservatores pertinent ad statum optimatum, quia legum conservatores prudentia indigent, et virtute, quae sunt principalia in statu optimatum. Praeconsultores autem pertinent ad paucorum statum. Consilium vero ad popularem. Sic igitur in typo et figuraliter dictum est fere de omnibus magistratibus.

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Bk. 7Optimam absolute civitatem ostendit, tum felicitatis habita ratione quam per optimum virum consequimur, tum eorum quae ad felicitatem ducunt: moderata civium multitudine, sufficienti regionis ubertate, accommodato urbis situ, eximia magistratuum moderatione, prompto tam in bello quam in pace subditorum ministerio, convenienti feminarum observatione, et apta liberorum educatione.

Optimam absolute civitatem ostendit, tum felicitatis habita ratione quam per optimum virum consequimur, tum eorum quae ad felicitatem ducunt: moderata civium multitudine, sufficienti regionis ubertate, accommodato urbis situ, eximia magistratuum moderatione, prompto tam in bello quam in pace subditorum ministerio, convenienti feminarum observatione, et apta liberorum educatione.

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L. 1 (Η.1, 1323a14–1324a4)Quod optima vita, et privatim unicuique, et publice civitatibus, est ad virtutem vivere, reliquis bonis ad id adiuvantibus.

Quod optima vita, et privatim unicuique, et publice civitatibus, est ad virtutem vivere, reliquis bonis ad id adiuvantibus.

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901. De politia optima facturum convenientem inquisitionem, necesse determinare prius quae sit eligibilissima vita. Immanifesto enim existente hoc, et optimam politiam necessarium esse immanifestam. Optime enim agere convenit eos qui optime politizant existentibus sibi, nisi aliquid fiat praeter rationem. Propter quod oportet prius confessum esse quae sit quae omnibus (ut est dicere) eligibilissima vita; post haec, utrum communiter et seorsum eadem, vel altera.

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902. Putantes igitur sufficienter multa dicere, et eorum quae extrinsecis sermonibus de optima vita, et nunc utendum ipsis. Ut vere enim ad unam divisionem nullus dubitabit utique, quoniam tribus existentibus partitionibus eorum quae extrinsecus, et eorum quae in corpore, et eorum quae in anima, omnia haec existere beatis oportet.

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903. Nullus enim utique dicet beatum eum qui nullam partem habet fortitudinis, neque temperantiae neque iustitiae, neque prudentiae, sed formidantem quidem volantes muscas, abstinentem autem a nullo extremorum, si appetat comedere vel bibere, gratia quadrantis perimentem amicissimos amicos, similiter autem et quae circa prudentiam, sicut imprudentem et mendacem, sicut quidam puerulus, vel insensatus.

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904. Sed haec quidem dicta, ut omnes utique concedent, differunt autem in quanto et excessibus. Virtutis quidem enim quantamcumque habere sufficiens esse putant. Divitiarum autem, et pecuniarum, et potentiae, et gloriae, et omnium talium infinitum quaerunt excessum.

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905. Nos autem ipsis dicemus, quod facile quidem de iis, et per opera provenire fidem, videntes quia acquirant et conservant non virtutes extrinsecis, sed illa iis. Et videndo feliciter, sive in gaudere est, sive in virtute omnibus, sive in ambobus, quia magis existit ornatis moribus quidem et intellectu ad excessum, circa extrinsecam autem possessionem bonorum mediocribus quam iis qui illa quidem possident ampliora optimis, in iis autem deficiunt.

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906. Quinimmo, et secundum rationem considerantibus facile conspicabile est. Quae quidem enim extra, habent terminum sicut organum quoddam. Omne autem quod utile est, eorum excessum aut nocere necessarium, aut nihil proficuum esse habentibus. Bonorum autem quae circa animam unumquodque quanto quidem utique excedit, tanto magis utile esse, si oportet et in iis dicere non solum quod bonum, sed et quod utile.

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907. Totaliterque palam quod assequi dicemus dispositionem optimam uniuscuiusque rei ad invicem secundum excessum quem distantia quidem sortita est, quantum dicimus esse, ipsas has dispositiones. Quare siquidem est anima pretiosior et possessione et corpore et simpliciter et nobis, necesse et dispositionem optimam uniuscuiusque proportionaliter iis habere.

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908. Adhuc autem, et animae gratia eligibilia nata sunt haec, et oportet omnes eligere bene prudentes, sed non illorum gratia animam.

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909. Quod quidem igitur unicuique felicitatis adiacet tantum quantum quidem virtutis et prudentiae, et eius quod est agere secundum has, sit confessum nobis teste Deo utentibus, qui felix quidem est et beatus, propter nullum autem extrinsecorum bonorum, sed propter se ipsum ipse, et propterea quod qualis quis est secundum naturam. Quoniam et bonam fortunam a felicitate, propter hoc necessarium esse alteram. Bonorum quidem enim quae extra animam causa casus et fortuna: iustus autem nullus neque temperatus a fortuna, neque propter fortunam est.

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910. Habitum autem est et eisdem rationibus opportunum et civitatem felicem esse eam quae optima et agentem bene. Impossibile autem bene agere iis qui non bona agunt. Nullum autem bonum opus, neque viri neque civitatis, sine virtute et prudentia. Fortitudo autem civitatis et iustitia et prudentia eandem habet potentiam et formam, quibus participans unusquisque hominum dicitur iustus, et prudens et temperatus.

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911. Sed haec quidem in tantum sint prooemialiter dicta sermone: neque enim non attingere ipsa possibile, neque omnis convenientes rationes contingit dicere, alterius enim studii opus sunt haec. Nunc autem supponantur tantum, quod vita quidem optima et seorsum uniuscuiusque, et communiter civitatibus, quae cum virtute redundante, in tantum, ut sit participare iis, quae secundum virtutem, actionibus. Ad dubitantes autem dimittentes in praesenti methodo considerandum posterius, siquis dictis existit non persuasus.

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Postquam Aristoteles declaravit ex quibus et qualibus et quomodo instituenda est respublica minus recte ordinata, intendit nunc declarare quomodo et ex quibus instituenda est simpliciter optima, sive sit respublica communi nomine nominata, sive respublica optimatum, sive regnum. Et circa hoc praemittit quaedam pertinentia ad declarationem intenti sui. Cum dicit, de republica autem ipsa etc. ostendit ex quibus et qualibus est instituenda. Ad instituendum autem rempublicam optimam oportet praecognoscere quaedam ex parte formae ipsius reipublicae quae sumitur ex ratione ipsius finis. Quaedam autem ex parte materiae quae sunt cives ipsi, et locus, et habitatio. Et secundum hoc circa primum duo facit. Quoniam primo inquirit de fine ipsius reipublicae. Secundo cum dicit, de reliquis dicendum etc. inquirit de materia. Circa primum, adhuc primo praemittit intentionem suam. Et secundo cum dicit, putantes etc. prosequitur. Circa primum dat intentionem suam respectu duorum; dicens primo, quod qui vult facere inquisitionem certam et convenientem materiae subiectae de republica optima simpliciter non ex suppositione, necesse habet prius considerationem facere, quae vita sit eligibilissima simpliciter, idest quae sit actio optima simpliciter. Dicitur enim vita uno modo de hoc quod est principium motus ex se. Sicut dicitur quod anima et vita sunt idem. Consequenter autem dicitur de operatione procedente ab huiusmodi principio intrinseco; sicut dicimus, quod sentire et intelligere sunt vitae quaedam: et secundum hoc eligibilissimum hominis est vita optima vel actio eius secundum excellentiorem animae potentiam. Et rationem huiusmodi assignat: quoniam si non fuerit manifestum quae sit optima operatio hominis simpliciter, non erit manifestum quae sit optima respublica simpliciter; quoniam optime versantes in republica necessarium est attingere ad optimam vitam, seu actionem hominis, aut simpliciter, aut secundum exigentiam dispositionum inexistentium, secundum quarum diversitatem necessarium est actionem seu finem diversificari, sicut actionem artificis optimam necesse est diversificari propter diversitatem materiae ex qua operatur. Dico autem quod optime versantes in republica oportet attingere ad optimam operationem, nisi fuerit aliquid quod accidet praeter rationem; puta vel defectus naturae vel alicuius exteriorum quae necessario exiguntur ad optimam actionem.

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Igitur volentem considerare de optima republica oportet primo praeaccipi, sicut manifestum est, quae sit vita optima vel etiam actio eligibilissima omnibus hominibus, ut est dicere: quod adiungit propter hoc, quod quidam sunt male nati vel in malis consuetudinibus nutriti, qui vix aut nunquam possunt attingere ad optimam vitam, seu actionem hominis. Consistit autem virtus rationis eius in hoc, quia ad cognitionem cuiuscumque oportet praecognoscere ea, ex quibus per se sumitur ratio. Per hanc enim cognoscitur unumquodque. Ratio autem optimae reipublicae sumitur ex optimo fine hominis, sicut universaliter ratio operabilium ex ratione finis. Finis autem optimae reipublicae est optimus finis hominis, quia respublica non est aliud quam ordo civitatis, sicut dicitur tertio huius. Ratio autem ordinis sumitur ex fine; et ideo ad cognitionem optimae reipublicae oportet praecognoscere quis sit optimus finis hominis seu actio. Deinde dat intentionem suam respectu alterius; dicens, quod post hoc erit considerandum utrum eadem sit optima vita vel actio uniuscuiusque seorsum viventis civis et totius civitatis, an alia et alia huiusmodi et illius.

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Deinde cum dicit putantes igitur prosequitur; et primo inquirit quae sit optima vita hominis vel optimus finis. Secundo cum dicit, unum autem etc.; utrum eadem unius et totius civitatis, optima autem vita seu actio est felicitas. Primo igitur inquirit quae sit felicitas hominis. Secundo quae ipsius civitatis, cum dicit, habitum autem est et cetera. Circa primum primo praemittit suppositionem praedictam. Secundo cum dicit, nemo enim dicere etc. manifestat eam quantum ad alteram partem. Circa primum intelligendum est, quod bonum hominis est esse perfectum ipsius hominis, quia bonitas perfectio quaedam est. Homo autem compositus est ex corpore, sicut ex materia, et ex anima, sicut ex forma; et ideo quoddam est esse eius perfectum quo ad corpus, quoddam autem secundum animam. Et adhuc quia ad perfectionem animae et corporis indiget quibusdam exterioribus, sicut organis, puta nutrimento et aliis et huiusmodi, est aliud esse perfectum hominis quantum ad ista bona exterius. Et ideo est triplex bonum hominis: scilicet bonum secundum animam et secundum corpus, et exteriora bona. Felicitas autem cum sit bonum perfectissimum ipsius hominis, aggregat omnia ista. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod nos putamus multa sufficienter dixisse de ultimo fine hominis, in his quae sunt dicta in extrinsecis sermonibus, hoc est in libro Ethicorum qui est extrinsecus ab his quae considerantur in hoc libro per se: et nunc utamur eis ad propositum. Et ut ad unam divisionem reducamus, nulli dubium est, quin bonis hominis distinctis in tres partes, videlicet in ea quae exterius, puta divitias et amicos, et in ea quae secundum corpus, puta sanitatem et vivacitatem sensuum et huiusmodi, et in ea quae secundum animam, quia omnia ista necesse sit inesse beatis. Beatitudo enim est perfectissimum bonum hominis. Si ergo omnia ista sunt bona hominis, necesse est omnia ista in eo existere. Si enim aliquod istorum deficeret, ex illa parte contingeret imperfectio. Ex hoc est quod Boetius dicit tertio de consolatione, quod felicitas est status aggregatione omnium bonorum perfectus.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit nullus enim probat quantum ad alteram partem, scilicet quantum ad ea quae sunt secundum animam, ex quodam quod omnes concedunt; dicens, quod hoc manifestum est de bonis secundum animam, quia nullus bene dispositus diceret illum simpliciter esse felicem qui non attingeret ad aliquam partem virtutis, puta fortitudinis, vel temperantiae, vel iustitiae, vel prudentiae, quae sunt quatuor virtutes principales. Nullus enim diceret illum felicem esse, qui non aggrederetur aliqua terribilia vel formidaret muscas volantes et paveret ad sonum folii vel ad apparitionem umbrae: nec etiam illum qui in usu ciborum vel venereorum non abstinet ab aliquo extremorum, sed appeteret comedere vel bibere quodcumque vel quomodocumque, et uteretur venereis quomodocumque vel quantumcumque. Similiter autem nec illum qui nullam habens aequitatem iustitiae, sed gratia quadrantis (quae est quarta pars denarii) habendi quomodocumque vellet perimere amicos dilectissimos. Similiter autem se habet in his quae circa prudentiam. Nullus enim diceret illum esse beatum, qui sit imprudens et sine discretione et mendax est, sicut puer aliquis sensum non habens, nec usum rationis. Hoc autem non esset nisi ad beatitudinem pertinerent operationes virtutis.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit sed haec inquirit, hoc supposito, in quo istorum principaliter consistat felicitas. Et primo tangit errorem quorumdam. Secundo cum dicit, at enim nos etc. reprobat: ex quo apparet intentum suum. In prima parte dicit, quod omnia praedicta bona pertinere ad felicitatem concedunt ut omnes: quod dicit propter aliquos sylvestres, qui etiam nihil sciunt de felicitate. Differenter tamen dicunt ista pertinere ad ipsam secundum quantitatem et excessum virtutis vel aliorum. Quidam enim dicunt sufficere ad felicitatem perfectam quantumcumque virtutis etiam modicum, divitiarum autem et pecuniarum quae sunt divitiae accidentales, et potentiae, et gloriae, et famae et omnium talium, dicunt pertinere ad excessum infinitum; et ideo ipsam dicunt consistere principaliter in bonis exterioribus. Sed quidam in divitiis, quidam in gloria, quidam etiam in bonis corporis, puta in voluptate vel in aliquo huiusmodi principaliter, per posterius autem in virtute, scilicet secundum quod ordinantur ad illa.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit nos autem reprobat opinionem istam, ostendens contrarium, scilicet ipsam principaliter consistere in virtute. Et circa hoc primo ponit rationes hoc ostendentes. Secundo cum dicit, quod igitur felicitatis etc., inducit conclusionem, subiungendo quasdam persuasiones. Circa primum ponit quatuor rationes. Secunda ibi, quin etiam et cetera. Tertia ibi, omninoque patet et cetera. Quarta ibi, insuper animi gratia et cetera. Circa primum dicit, quod nos reprobantes dictum istorum dicemus quod est facile facere fidem ex ipsis operationibus nobis magis manifestis de his quod felicitas, sive consistat in operatione virtutis, sive in delectatione, sive in utroque, magis existit et principalius in moribus, idest in consuetudinalibus operationibus ordinatis secundum rationem et in excellentia operationis perfectae intellectualis, cum mediocri possessione bonorum exteriorum, quam in abundantia praeter opportunum huiusmodi bonorum exteriorum et deficientia virtutis vel intellectualis operationis. In illo enim bono principalius felicitas consistit quo acquiruntur et conservantur et bene ordinantur alia, quam in illis quae acquiruntur, conservantur et diriguntur per alia. Illud enim quo aliquid dirigitur et mensuratur, principalius videtur. Sed nos videmus ad sensum quod bona exteriora et quaedam corporis acquiruntur, conservantur et dispensantur secundum rationem rectam per operationem virtutis et intellectus, et non e contrario. Unde dicitur in quarto Ethicorum, quod sine virtute non est facile bene sustinere bonas fortunas. Divitiarum enim abundantia secundum se inclinat ad id quod praeter rationem est. Unde secundo rhetoricae dicitur, quod divites contumeliosi et elati, et iactatores sunt patientes aliquid a possessione divitiarum. Ergo principalius consistit felicitas in excellentia virtutis et operatione intellectus quam bonorum exteriorum.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quinimmo et secundum ponit secundam rationem: dicens, quod insuper facile potest videri volentibus considerare secundum rationem quod felicitas consistit per se et principalius in actione aliqua secundum virtutem. In illo enim bono per se et principalius consistit felicitas cuius appetitus nullum terminum habet, quam in eo quod habet appetitum determinatum. Sicut enim dicitur in primo huius, finis medicinalis est ad sanare in infinitum, et cuiuslibet artium finis est in infinitum: quam maxime enim illum volunt facere. Eorum autem quae ad finem, non infinitum. Sed appetitus bonorum exteriorum terminum habent, appetitus autem eorum quae circa animam non habent: ergo principalius consistit in bonis animae quam in exterioribus. Minorem istius rationis probat sic; dicens, quod bona exteriora terminum quemdam habent in ordine ad appetitum: quaeruntur enim sicut organum quoddam necessarium ad operationem. Omne autem quod rationem organi et utilis habet, si excedat ab eo quod est secundum rationem, necessarium est esse nocivum aut nihil proficere; sicut de fistula apparet, quoniam si sint maiores aut plures quam possint moveri a fistulante, nocent, aut non proficiunt: ergo de necessitate terminum quemdam habent usque ad quem quaeruntur, et non ulterius. Bona autem secundum animam quanto magis excedunt, tanto utiliora sunt, si oportet ista non solum bona dicere, sed etiam utilia. Quod adiungit, quia secundum veritatem in bonis secundum animam est aliquid quod habet rationem boni et non utilis, puta ultimus finis qui non est propter aliud; utile autem dicimus quod ordinatur in finem alium. Hoc autem non esset nisi appetitus bonorum secundum animam infinitus esset, et quaererentur sine termino. Sic igitur patet, quod bona exteriora terminum quemdam habent. Illa autem quae sunt secundum animam nullum in ordine ad appetitum. Et haec fuit minor propositio.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit totaliterque palam ponit tertiam rationem; dicens, quod universaliter manifestum est, quod optimam dispositionem cuiuslibet ad invicem respectu alterius dicimus attendi secundum excessum, quem habet dispositio respectu dispositionis alterius, quam sortitur per distantiam illarum rerum, quarum dicimus esse illam dispositionem et aliam. Et per hoc totum nihil aliud intendit, ut videtur, nisi quod illa dispositio in unoquoque est optima, quae consequitur naturam optimam. Si igitur anima melior et excellentior est quam possessiones exteriores, et quam ipsum corpus, et simpliciter secundum rem, et quo ad nos; necesse est dispositionem animae ad dispositionem corporis et possessionis exterioris proportionabiliter se habere: et ideo sicut anima est optima pars hominis, necesse est dispositionem eius secundum se esse optimam. Quare si optima dispositio hominis est felicitas ipsius, necesse est felicitatem ipsius consistere in aliquo bono animae.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit quartam rationem, dicens. Felicitas consistit principaliter in illo bono, cuius gratia quaeruntur alia, et non e contrario. Hoc enim dicimus finem ultimum, sicut dicitur primo Ethicorum. Sed bona corporis et exteriora eliguntur gratia ipsius animae, et tantum quaeruntur inquantum sunt utilia ad actionem et opus. Et hoc videmus omnes et bene prudentes eligere, et non e contrario animam et bona ipsius quaerere gratia istorum. In bonis igitur animae principalius consistit felicitas.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem inducit conclusionem principaliter intentam cum quibusdam persuasionibus, dicens, quod sic igitur propter praedictas rationes tantum unicuique adiacere felicitatis practicae quantum virtus moralis, et prudentiae, et virtutis intellectualis, et actionum quae sunt secundum has virtutes, sit nobis concessum et manifestum invocantibus Deum in testem qui beatus est simpliciter. Attingit enim ad optimum suum non propter aliquod extrinsecum sibi, sed propter seipsum: quoniam si felicitaretur propter aliquod extrinsecum, cum felicitas sit finis, haberet aliquem finem divisum a seipso, et esset aliquid melius ipso. Finis enim melior est eis quae sunt ad finem, quod est nefas dicere. Et ideo felix est propter ipsam naturam suam, ita quod felicitas eius sit ipsa natura eius differens ratione tantum. Si enim non esset ipsa natura eius, sed aliquid additum ei, sequeretur in eo esse compositionem, et quod esset aliquid prius eo, quod esset principium compositionis, et aliquid melius eo, sicut dictum est: quae valde absurda sunt, et ideo felix est secundum naturam suam et non per aliquod extrinsecum. Et propter hoc, scilicet quia felicitas non consistit in exterioribus bonis, sed in his quae sunt secundum animam, dicimus bonam fortunam esse diversam a felicitate. Bonorum enim qui sunt extra animam fortuna et casus sunt causa, unde et dicuntur bona fortunae. Virtuosus autem, puta iustus aut temperatus nullus est nec a fortuna, nec propter fortunam, sed propter consuetudinem et rationem rectam. Et ideo huiusmodi bona animae altera sunt a bonis fortunae.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit habitum autem ostendit, quae sit felicitas, seu vita optima civitatis. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, sed haec quidem tantum etc. excusat se a certiori consideratione de istis. In prima parte dicit, quod consequenter opportunum est ostendere, et per virtutem rationum earumdem, de felicitate civitatis, quae est. Illam enim civitatem dicimus esse felicem, et etiam optimam, quae optima operatur. Felicitas enim supponatur esse optima operatio ex primo Ethicorum. Impossibile autem est optime operari illos, qui non optima operantur: bonum enim in operatione sequitur bonitatem obiecti, sive operati. Sed nullum bonum opus est, neque unius viri secundum seipsum, neque civitatis, sine virtute morali, et prudentia intellectuali: ergo impossibile est civitatem esse felicem et optimam simpliciter sine virtute morali et intellectuali. Consistit igitur felicitas in aliquo pertinente ad virtutem. Sed quia aliquis posset dicere, quod fortitudo et iustitia et aliae virtutes morales non sunt unius naturae, et ideo non oportet quod si felicitas unius hominis consistat in actionibus istarum, quod propter hoc felicitas civitatis consistat in actionibus earumdem, quasi hoc volens removere, dicit quod fortitudo civitatis et iustitia, et prudentia, et aliae virtutes eamdem habent potentiam in ordine ad operationem et formam quantum ad naturam ipsam in se cum fortitudine, et iustitia, et prudentia, et aliis virtutibus, quibus informatur unusquisque homo secundum seipsum, et dicitur iustus, prudens, temperatus. Et est intelligendum, quod virtus totius civitatis et virtus uniuscuiusque est eiusdem naturae in se, et in ordine ad operationem; non differens nisi sicut totum a parte et amplius a minori. Virtus enim moralis civitatis aggregatur ex virtutibus partialibus civium: et ideo sicut unius naturae est risibilitas in uno homine, et in centum, ita eadem est virtus in uno, et in tota civitate.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit sed haec excusat se a certiori consideratione de istis; dicens, quod de felicitate unius hominis et totius civitatis tantum dictum sit ratione per modum prooemii, respectu sequentium. Non enim declaratione dictorum de ipsa possibile est intelligentem effugere omnem rationem: sunt enim quaedam manifesta ex se, ex quibus declarantur praedicta. Nec etiam possibile est pertransire omnes rationes, quae possent adduci, propter multitudinem earum et brevitatem tractatus. Omnia enim ista dicere alterius studii est opus. Istae enim pertractatae sunt in primo et in decimo Ethicorum de felicitate, quae est secundum unum. Nunc vero supponatur ad propositam intentionem, quod vita optima et felicitas, et uniuscuiusque secundum seipsum, et totius civitatis, est perfectio quae est cum virtute, non secundum quod habitus quidam est, sic enim in potentia est ad ulteriorem perfectionem; sed secundum quod redundat in opus, intantum unumquemque vel civitatem contingat participare actionibus virtutis, dimittentes in praesenti consideratione alia quae considerari possunt, considerantes ipsa posterius, si aliquis non credat rationibus praedictis.

Polit.L1

L. 2 (Η.2–3, 1324a5–)De felicitate cuiusque et civitatis, deque vita contemplativa, activa et dominante.De felicitate cuiusque et civitatis, deque vita contemplativa, activa et dominante.

912. Utrum autem felicitatem eandem esse dicendum uniuscuiusque hominum et civitatis, vel non eandem, reliquum est dicere.

Polit.L2

913. Manifestum autem et hoc: omnes enim utique confitebuntur esse eandem. Quicumque enim in divitiis vivere bene ponunt in uno, isti, et civitatem totam si fuerit dives, beatificant. Et quicumque tyrannicam vitam maxime appretiantur, isti et civitatem plurimis principantem felicissimam esse dicent utique. Si etiam aliquis unum propter virtutem recipit, et civitatem feliciorem dicet eam quae studiosorum.

Polit.L2

914. Sed iam duo haec sunt, quae consideratione egent. Unum quidem, utrum eligibilior vita, quae per simul politizare, et communicare civitate, vel magis quae peregrina, et a politica communione absoluta. Adhuc autem quam politica communione absoluta. Adhuc autem quam politiam ponendum et qualem dispositionem civitatis optimam, sive omnibus existente eligibili communicare civitate, sive et quibusdam quidem non, plurimis autem.

Polit.L2

915. Quoniam autem et politici intellectus et theoriae hoc est opus, sed non circa unumquodque eligibile, nos autem nunc hanc eligimus speculationem. Id quidem accessorium utique erit, hoc autem opus methodi huius.

Polit.L2

916. Quod quidem igitur necessarium esse politiam optimam hanc, secundum quem ordinem, et quicumque utique optime aget et vivet beate, manifestum est.

Polit.L2

917. Dubitatur autem ab ipsis qui confitentur vitam cum virtute esse eligibilissimam, utrum politica et activa vita eligibilis vel magis absoluta ab omnibus exterioribus velut contemplativa quaedam quam solam quidam aiunt esse philosophicam. Fere enim has duas vitas hominum honoratissimi ad virtutem videntur praeeligentes; et priorum, et eorum qui nunc; dico autem duas, politicam et philosophicam. Differt autem non modicum, utro modo se habeat veritas: necesse enim prudentem de meliorem coordinare intentionem et hominum unicuique et communi politiae.

Polit.L2

918. Putant autem ii quidem proximis principari, despotice quidem factum cum iniustitia esse maxime, politice autem quod quidem iniustum non habere; impedimentum autem habere ei quae circa se ipsum iucunditati.

Polit.L2

919. Iis autem ex contrario alii existunt opinantes, viri enim solam vitam activam esse et politicam; in unaquaque enim virtute non esse actiones magis solitariis quam iis qui communia agunt et politizantibus. Ii quidem igitur sic existimant.

Polit.L2

920. Ii autem despoticum et tyrannicum modum politiae aiunt solum esse felicem: apud quosdam autem iste et legum et politiae terminus quatenus despotizent vicinis. Propter quod et plurimorum legalium dispersim, ut est dicere, positorum apud plurimos, tamen si alicubi ad aliquid unum leges respiciunt, ut imperent coniecturant omnes, sicut in Lacedaemonia et Creta ad adversarios coordinata sunt fere disciplina, et legum multitudo.

Polit.L2

921. Adhuc autem in gentibus omnibus potentibus supergredi talis potentia honorata esset, velut inter Scythas et Celtas.

Polit.L2

922. In aliquibus enim et leges quaedam sunt provocantes ad virtutem hanc, sicut in Carchedone aiunt ornatum ex liliis accipere quotcumque militiis militaverunt. Erat autem aliquando et circa Macedoniam lex, eum qui nullum occidisset inimicorum virum circumcingi capistro. Inter Scythas autem non licebat bibere in festo quodam scyphum circumportatum ei, qui nullum inimicum occidisset. Inter Iberos autem qui sunt gens bellicosa, tot numero obeliscos commassant circa sepulchrum, quot utique peremerint inimicorum: et alia multa utique apud alios sunt talia: haec quidem legibus comprehensa, haec autem consuetudinibus.

Polit.L2

923. Quamvis videbitur utique valde inconveniens esse forte volentibus considerare, si hoc est opus politici posse speculari qualiter principetur et despotizet vicinis et volentibus et non volentibus. Qualiter enim utique erit hoc politicum, aut lege feribile, quod neque legale est? non legale autem, non iuste solum, sed et iniuste principari. Imperare autem est et non iuste. Neque enim medici, neque gubernatoris opus est suasisse aut sanasse, huius quidem eos qui curantur, huius autem nautas. Sed videntur multi despoticam putare esse politicam: et quod quidem singuli sibi non aiunt esse iustum neque expediens, hoc non verecundantur ad alios studentes. Isti quidem enim apud se iuste principari quaerunt, ad alios autem nihil curant iustorum.

Polit.L2

924. Inconveniens autem si non natura hic quidem despotizans est, hic autem non despotizans. Quare si quidem habet hoc modo, non oportet omnibus tentare despotizare, sed despotibus, sicut neque venari ad salsiciam vel hostiam homines, sed id quod est ad hoc venabile. Est autem venabile quodcumque sylvestre fuerit esibile animal.

Polit.L2

925. Aut non erit utique et secundum se ipsum una civitas felix quae politizat, videlicet bene. Siquidem contingit civitatem habitari alicubi secundum se ipsam legibus utentem studiosis, cuius coordinatio politiae non ad bellum, neque ad imperandum erit adversariis. Nihil enim existit tale.

Polit.L2

926. Palam ergo, quia omnes quae ad bellum curas, bonas quidem ponendum; non autem tamquam finem omnium summam, sed illius gratia has. Studiosi autem legislatoris est considerare civitatem, et genus hominum, et omnes aliam communionem, vita bona qualiter participabunt, et contingente sibi felicitate. Different tamen statutorum quaedam legalium. Ex haec legislativae est videre si aliqui extiterint vicini, quali ad quales studendum, aut qualiter devenientibus ad quoscumque utendum. Sed hoc quidem posterius utique sortietur congrua consideratione, ad quem finem oportet optimam politiam tendere.

Polit.L2

927. Ad eos autem qui confitentur quidem vitam quae cum virtute esse eligibilissimam, differentes autem de usu ipsius, dicendum nobis ad utrosque ipsos. Ii quidem enim reprobant politicos principatus, putantes vitam liberi alteram quandam esse a politica, et omnium eligibilissimam: ii autem hanc optimam. Impossibile enim nihil agentem agere bene. Bonam autem actionem et felicitatem esse idem.

Polit.L2

928. Quia haec quidem utrique dicunt recte, hac autem non recte. Ii quidem, quod liberi vita melior quam despotica: hoc enim verum: neque enim servo in quantum servus uti venerabile; iussio enim quae de necessariis nullo participat honestorum.

Polit.L2

929. Putare vero omnem principatum esse despotiam, non rectum: non enim minus distat liberorum principatus ab eo qui servorum quam rursum quod natura liberum a natura servo. Determinatum est autem de ipsis sufficienter in primis sermonibus.

Polit.L2

930. Magis autem laudare sine actione esse quam agere, non verum; felicitas enim actio est. Adhuc autem multorum, et pulchrorum, finem habent, quae iustorum et temperatorum actiones.

Polit.L2

931. Et quidem forte utique existimabit aliquis, iis ita determinatis, quod dominans esse omnium optimum: sic enim utique plurimarum et pulcherrimarum dominus erit actionum. Quare non oportet potentem principari parcere proximo, sed magis auferre; et neque patrem pueros, neque pueros patrem, neque totaliter amicum, amicum nullum reputare, neque ad hoc curare. Quod enim optimum, eligibilissimum: bene autem agere optimum.

Polit.L2

932. Hoc quidem igitur vere dicunt forte, siquidem existit privantibus et vim inferentibus, quod entium eligibilissimum. Sed forte non est possibile existere, sed supponunt hoc. Non enim adhuc bonas actiones contingit esse ei, qui non differt tantum, quantum vir a muliere, aut pater a natis, aut despotes a servis. Quare qui transgreditur, nihil utique tantum dirigere posterius quantum iam transgressus est virtutem. Similibus enim bonum et iustum in parte, hoc enim aequale et simile: non aequale autem aequalibus, et non simile similibus, praeter naturam: nullum autem eorum quae praeter naturam, bonum.

Polit.L2

933. Propter quod, et si aliquis alius fuerit melior secundum virtutem et secundum potentiam activam optimis, huic bonum assequi, et huic obedire, iustum: oportet autem non solum virtutem, sed etiam potentiam existere secundum quam erit activus.

Polit.L2

934. Sed si haec dicimus bene, et felicitatem bonam operationem ponendum, et communiter omnis civitatis utique erit et secundum unumqueque optima vita quae activa: sed activam non necessarium esse ad alteros, sicut putant quidam, neque meditationes solas has esse activas eas quae convenientium gratia fiunt ex agere; sed multo magis eas quae ipsarum gratia theorias et meditationes. Bona enim actio finis: quare actio aliqua. Maxime autem agere dicimus, et dominos extrinsecarum actionum architectores intelligentibus.

Polit.L2

935. At vero neque sine actione esse necessarium civitates secundum se locatas, et ita vivere eligentes: contingit enim secundum partes et hoc accidere. Multae enim communicationes ad invicem partibus civitatis sunt. Similiter autem et hoc existit circa unumquemque hominum. Vacationem enim utique Deus habebit bene, et totus mundus quibus non sunt extrinsecae actiones praeter proprias quae ipsorum.

Polit.L2

936. Quod quidem igitur eandem vitam necessarium esse optimam unicuique hominum, et communiter civitatibus et hominibus, manifestum est.

Polit.L2

Postquam philosophus ostendit, quae sit optima vita unius, et quae optima civitatis, vult inquirere nunc, utrum eadem sit unius secundum seipsum et totius civitatis. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, sed haec iam duo etc. movet quasdam dubitationes. Et circa primum praemittit intentionem suam. Secundo cum dicit, manifestum autem etc., prosequitur. In prima dicit, quod post praedicta relinquitur considerandum, utrum felicitas uniuscuiusque hominis secundum se, et civitatis communiter, sit eadem secundum rationem, vel altera. Hoc enim fuit secundum propositorum prius.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem declarat ipsam esse eamdem quasi ex communi opinione omnium; dicens, quod manifeste apparet felicitatem unius hominis et civitatis esse eamdem et unius rationis, quoniam omnes loquentes de felicitate, hoc videntur dicere. Quicumque enim ponunt felicitatem hominis in divitiis consistere, isti etiam dicunt civitatem beatam esse si fuerit abundans divitiis. Qui autem vitam tyrannicam qua aliquis vivit principans tyrannice aliis, dicunt esse excellentissimam, isti civitatem felicissimam esse dicunt, quae plurimis civitatibus et regionibus principatur tyrannice. Si etiam aliquis dicit aliquem unum felicem esse propter operationem virtutis, ille dicet civitatem esse optimam quae magis studiosa et magis participat actionibus virtutis, et sic de aliis. Per quodcumque enim dicit aliquis aliquem felicitari, per illud idem dicit et totam civitatem. Omnes igitur confitentur unam esse felicitatem uniuscuiusque hominis seorsum et civitatis. Et hoc rationabiliter contingit: quoniam quorum est una natura, eorum est unus ultimus finis. Unus autem homo et omnes cives civitatis sunt unius speciei: ergo unius et omnium civium est unus ultimus finis.

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Deinde cum dicit sed iam movet duas dubitationes ad declarationem dictorum. Et primo movet eas. Secundo cum dicit, quod igitur necessarium sit etc. prosequitur eas. Et circa primum primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem et politici etc. manifestat modum considerandi de eis. In prima dicit, quod circa praedicta incidunt duae dubitationes, quae sunt dignae consideratione, ad evidentiam dictorum et dicendorum consequenter. Quarum una est: cum sint duae vitae hominis magis principales, scilicet practica et speculativa, quae istarum sit eligibilior: utrum illa quae consistit in communicatione civili in simul vivendo civiliter, scilicet activa, vel illa quae peregrina est et absoluta ab huiusmodi communicatione civili, scilicet contemplativa. Vocat autem vitam contemplativam absolutam et peregrinam, quia principaliter consistit in applicatione hominis secundum intellectum ad primum obiectum eius et optimum, quae non potest esse sine sedatione motuum et perturbationum sine quibus non est vita civilis: et ideo oportet ipsam esse absolutam a communicatione civili; et per consequens peregrinam. Peregrinum enim dicitur quod longe ab habitudine consueta est. Magis autem consueta vita communiter est vita civilis. Et propter hoc dicit Eustratius supra primum Ethicorum, quod speculativus separatus est a corpore et sensibilibus secundum electionem, quamvis non secundum rem. Secunda dubitatio est, quae sit optima respublica simpliciter, et quae optima ordinatio civitatis, supposito quod sit magis eligibilis vita civilis vel omnibus hominibus, vel si non omnibus, tamen pluribus, etsi omnes homines non eligant vivere civiliter. Sunt enim quidam qui aut non possunt communicare civiliter propter defectum naturae vel consuetudinis, sicut bestiales homines, aut quia reputant se per se sufficientes, non eligunt vitam civilem, sicut homines divini, sicut dicitur in primo huius; plures tamen eligunt ipsam.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem dat modum considerandi de istis dubitationibus; dicens, quoniam considerare de hoc quod est eligibile omnibus, aut etiam plurimis, est opus intellectus civilis et pertinet ad speculationem eius; non autem considerare illud quod est eligibile huic vel illi; quoniam considerat bonum commune per se, bonum autem huius vel illius non nisi in ordine ad bonum commune. Ideo nos intendimus hunc modum speculationis circa praedictas dubitationes considerando eas secundum quod referuntur ad totam civitatem et non secundum quod referuntur ad hunc vel ad illum civem. Hoc enim modo considerare de ipsis est accessorium. Primo autem modo principalis intentionis est: ita quod intendit philosophus, ut videtur quantum ad primam dubitationem, utrum vita speculativa totius civitatis non minus sit eligibilior quam respublica. Et quantum ad secundam, quae sit optima dispositio civitatis non huius vel illius.

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Deinde cum dicit quod quidem prosequitur istas dubitationes. Et primo praemittit quamdam suppositionem; dicens, quod ex se manifestum est quod illa respublica et ille ordo civitatis optimus est secundum quem quilibet vel plurimi operantur optime et vivunt feliciter. Optima enim operatio et felicitas finis sunt optimae reipublicae; et ideo ex hoc habet rationem civitatis.

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Deinde cum dicit dubitatur autem prosequitur. Et primo prosequitur eas ratiocinando. Secundo cum dicit, ad eos autem etc., determinando. Prima adhuc in duas: quoniam primo arguit ad primam. Secundo cum dicit, ii quidem igitur etc. arguit ad secundam. Prima adhuc dividitur in partes duas. Primo enim adhuc resumit dubitationem. Secundo cum dicit, putant autem ii quidem etc. arguit ad ipsam. In prima parte dicit, quod ab illis qui dicunt optimam vitam hominis esse in optima operatione virtutis, dubitatur, utrum vita civilis quae consistit in communicatione civili et activa quae consistit in directione vel ordine operationum quae sunt ad alterum, sit eligibilior, vel illa quae est absoluta a turbatione civili et actionibus exterioribus magis, quam dicimus contemplativam, quam solam intendimus philosophos intendere. Has enim duas vitas homines excellentes qui honoratissimi sunt propter virtutem et qui nunc sunt et qui nos processerunt, videntur fere praeeligere, sicut praecellentes. Fere autem apponit, quia sunt quidam homines bestiales rectum usum rationis non habentes, qui vitam pecudum eligunt, puta voluptuosam, non aliquam praedictarum duarum. Dico autem duas vitas, scilicet civilem et philosophicam, sive contemplativam. Nec refert parum scire quae istarum eligibilior sit, et quomodo veritas se habeat. Necesse enim est sapientem et optimum virum, et civitatem optimam ad meliorem ipsarum dirigere intentionem suam: non potest autem ad meliorem intentionem dirigere, nisi sciatur quae sit melior; et ideo necesse est sapientem cognoscere, quomodo se habeat veritas circa praedictam dubitationem.

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Deinde cum dicit putant autem arguit. Et primo quod absoluta sit melior. Secundo cum dicit, iis autem ex contrario etc. quod civilis. In prima parte arguit dupliciter quod contemplativa sit melior; dicens, quod quidam opinantur quod principari dominative hoc est principatu domini ad servum, et alios civiles actus exercere, non potest esse sine iniustitia magna. Optima autem vita huiusmodi iniustitiam, quae magis accidit in civili communicatione, non habet, quia optima vita nihil praeter rationem habet: igitur optima vita non est civilis, sed absoluta magis. Secundo hoc idem arguit. Illa vita quae praestat impedimentum delectationi quae circa ipsum, non est optima: optimam enim vitam oportet habere maximam delectationem: sed vita civilis impedimentum praestat huic delectationi; non est igitur optima, sed magis absoluta.

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Deinde cum dicit iis autem ponit rationem in oppositum; dicens, quod alii e contrario opinantur dicentes, quod ad virum optimum pertinet sola vita activa civilis. Illa enim vita pertinet ad optimum virum in qua sunt plures actiones et excellentiores virtutes: nunc autem plures actiones secundum unamquamque virtutem non sunt ducentibus vitam solitariam quam his qui ducunt civilem et tractantes communia. Isti enim exercent opera fortitudinis et liberalitatis quae non multum pertinent ducentibus vitam solitariam, sed magis e contrario; ergo civilis vita magis pertinet ad optimum virum: erit igitur optima. Hi quidem igitur habent hanc opinionem.

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Deinde cum dicit ii autem videtur arguere ad secundam dubitationem. Fuerunt enim quidam qui dixerunt optimam civitatem et optimam dispositionem civitatis esse vitam dominativam et tyrannicam, qua quis principatur pluribus tyrannice. De hoc igitur intendit inquirere hic. Et primo arguit quod talis dispositio reipublicae sit optima. Secundo cum dicit, quamvis videbitur utique etc. arguit in oppositum. Tertio cum dicit, palam igitur etc., ex rationibus concludit veritatem. Prima pars dividitur in tres partes. Primo enim adducit rationem sumptam ex termino legis et reipublicae. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem in gentibus et cetera. Ex honoratione dominantium. Tertio cum dicit, in aliquibus enim et leges etc. ponit rationem sumptam ex provocatione quae per leges est. In prima parte dicit, quod quidam fuerunt qui dixerunt ordinem reipublicae tyrannicum et dominativum quo aliquis principatur principatu dominativo, solum felicem esse et maxime homini eligibilem. Quorum una ratio videtur, quoniam ille videtur optimus modus reipublicae et optimus finis, ad quod ordinantur leges et respublica; lex enim et respublica rationem sumunt ex fine. Nunc autem videmus quod apud quosdam leges et respublica ad hoc ordinantur finaliter quatenus pluribus principentur dominative: propter quod quamvis legalia pluribus sint diversa, (ut est dicere) et non ordinata ad unum finem, sed quaedam ad unum, quaedam ad alium, si tamen alicubi ordinantur ad unum, videmus quod omnes intendunt finaliter hoc, ut principentur vicinis pluribus: sicut apparet in legibus Lacedaemoniorum et Cretensium; tota enim disciplina iuventutis et legum multitudo ad hoc coordinata sunt fere, ut plures eis subiiciantur, et ipsi pluribus principentur tyrannice ad utilitatem ipsorum, non subditorum; ergo talis modus reipublicae est optimus.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundam rationem, quae videtur esse. Ille modus reipublicae optimus videtur propter quem homines maxime honorantur. Excellentiae enim boni debetur honor. Sed nos videmus quod in omnibus gentibus quae possunt alios supergredi principando talis potentia supergrediendi vel dominandi honorata est, sicut apud Scythas et apud Persas et Thraces et Gallos; ergo talis modus reipublicae optimus est.

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Deinde cum dicit in aliquibus enim ponit tertiam rationem cuius virtus est. Ille modus reipublicae optimus est ad quem leges maxime intendunt provocare; legis enim latoris est cives quales quosdam facere, quoniam boni operatores provocando per remunerationem bene operantur: sed ad talem modum reipublicae plures leges provocant; ergo talis modus reipublicae optimus est. Minorem propositionem ipse declarat quasi in quatuor legibus observatis apud diversos: dicens primo quod apud aliquos sunt aliquae leges provocantes ad virtutem, qua aliquis potest supergredi pluribus: sicut dicitur quamdam legem fuisse apud Carthaginenses tot ornatus ex annulis accipere quot militiis militaverit vincens adversarium. Fuit etiam lex in Macedonia, militem qui nullum inimicum occidisset circumcingi capistro in vituperium. Item apud Scythas non licebat secundum legem et consuetudinem in quodam festo pateram circumlatam exhibere ei qui non interfecisset aliquem inimicorum in vituperium; ei autem qui interfecerat licebat ad laudem et ad honorem ipsius. Inter Iberos quoque, quae sunt gentes bellicosae multum, tot obeliscos numero apponunt circa sepulcrum alicuius militis, quot interfecerit inimicos: et alia talia multa apud alios diversos, quorum quaedam ordinata sunt legibus alia sola consuetudine observantur.

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Deinde cum dicit quamvis videbitur ponit rationes tres in contrarium: quarum secundam cum dicit, inconveniens autem et cetera. Et tertiam cum dicit, aut non erit utique et cetera. In prima parte dicit ita. Quidam dixerunt quod modus reipublicae tyrannicus est optimus, quamvis videatur valde inconveniens et praeter rationem esse, si aliqui voluerunt considerare hoc esse opus ad civem pertinens, posse considerare qualiter principetur principatu dominativo quocumque, sive volentibus sive nolentibus: hoc enim non videtur. Illud enim quod illegale est, vel illegitimum, non est civile, aut lege ordinabile: leges enim ordinantur de legitimis et legalibus. Principari autem vicinis non solum iuste, sed etiam iniuste, manifestum est quod legale non est nec legitimum; et principari contingit non solum iuste, sed etiam non iuste; ergo principari quocumque modo non est civile, aut ordinabile secundum legem. Et iterum, sicut est in aliis artibus operativis, ita in republica et legislativa. In aliis autem sic est; puta in medicina opus medicorum est non suadere aegroto ut sanetur, sed ipsum sanare. Similiter in gubernativa, opus est gubernantis non curare nautas ab infirmitate, sed dirigere ad gubernandum navem. Ergo similiter in republica et legislativa opus erit civilia et legalia ordinare, non illegalia; et principari eis, qui nati sunt et debent subiici. Adiungit autem increpationem contra contrarium opinantes; dicens, quod quamvis ita sit, sicut conclusum est prius secundum veritatem, tamen plures videntur opinari modum reipublicae dominativum optimum esse, non verecundantes ordinare sicut iustum et expediens, quod sibi ipsis non credunt iustum esse et expediens ad finem; ipsi enim volunt sibiipsis iuste principari et fieri quae sunt expedienda; quod autem aliis principentur iniuste, non curant: et hoc valde verecundum est. Siquidem verecundia est de turpi. Turpe autem est homini praeter rationem rectam agere. Recta autem ratio dicit non facere alii quod sibi non vult fieri.

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Deinde cum dicit inconveniens autem ponit secundam rationem, et est. Inconveniens est et irrationabile illis principari dominative, qui non sunt nati subiici dominativa subiectione. Hoc enim contra naturam videtur, et per consequens violentum, et violentum praeter rationem est. Quidam autem sunt, qui non sunt nati subiici tali subiectione. Inconveniens enim est si sint aliqui nati subiici tali subiectione, et alii non nati nec dispositi ad hoc; sicut inconveniens est aliquem non esse servum et aliquem liberum naturaliter, sed omnes servos: ergo irrationabile est principari omnibus dominative. Quare si veritas hoc modo se habet, non oportet secundum rationem tentare velle dominari omnibus, sed illis qui nati sunt; sicut nec optimum est homines venari ad mensam vel sacrificium quodcumque animal, sed illud quod ad hoc conveniens est, puta esibile et mundum: unde venabile animal dicimus quodcumque sylvestre fuerit aptum ad generandum nutrimentum.

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Deinde cum dicit aut non ponit tertiam rationem; dicens, quod adhuc possibile est esse aliquam civitatem secundum seipsam, ab aliis separatam, unam bene gubernantem, et felicem existentem; puta si contingat aliquam esse talem civitatem remotam secundum situm ab aliis, quae regatur legibus rectis ordinabilibus in finem rectum, et tamen ordo reipublicae illius, et leges hanc signantes, non ordinantur ad bellum, neque ad subiiciendum vicinos, neque ad dominandum adversantibus qualitercumque. Supponatur enim, quod non sint aliqui propinqui, quibus possint et velint dominari, sed habet bonum suum in seipsa. Hoc autem non esset si optimus modus reipublicae esset principari aliis qualitercumque, iuste vel iniuste. Non est igitur optimus ordo reipublicae dominative principari vicinis.

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Deinde cum dicit palam ergo ex rationibus praedictis concludit veritatem. Ad cuius evidentiam est intelligendum quod actiones bellicae in civilibus per se ordinantur ad duo; scilicet ad repellendum insurgentes et iniuriantes, ne serviant iniuste, et ad compellendum servire illos qui nati sunt et debent servire; et cum ordinantur ad alterum istorum duorum, bonae sunt et eligibiles secundum rationem rectam. Per accidens autem contingit, quod ordinentur ad repellendum eos, quibus nati sunt servire, vel ad impugnandum non natos servire, et sic nec bonae nec secundum rationem eligibiles. Et ideo actiones bellicae et praeparatio curae earum absolute, nec bonae nec eligibiles sunt, sed tantum secundum primum modum; et adhuc tunc non sunt quaerendae sicut ultimus finis, vel sicut illud quod ordinatur in finem, scilicet in pacem et tranquillitatem civitatis. Et hoc est quod intendit concludere primo; dicens, quod manifestum est ex rationibus praedictis, quod omnes curae et praeparationes eorum quae ad bellum, ad repellendum violentias, vel ad impugnandum alios secundum rationem rectam, bonae quidem sunt et eligibiles, sicut dictum est prius; non tamen in hoc consistit optimum reipublicae vel civitatis. Non enim gratia huius quaeruntur alia, et ipsum non propter aliud; sed ipsum gratia alterius finis. Nullus enim eligit bellare eius quod est bellare gratia, neque praeparare bellum. Videtur enim quis occisor violentus esse, si amicos oppugnatores faceret, ut pugnae et occisiones fierent, sicut dicitur in decimo Ethicorum. Et ideo ad legislatorem, cuius est bonum civitatis procurare, pertinet considerare ipsam civitatem, et quantum ad fortitudinem, quae est ex situ, et quantum ad ordinationem reipublicae, et etiam modum hominum, quem habent ex naturali inclinatione, et aliam communicationem eorum adinvicem, et alios, scilicet ad quam vitam ordinabiles sunt ex natura, omnibus istis pensatis, sive sit optima simpliciter, sive optima his: et tunc ordinare leges et statuta, per quae poterunt attingere ad hanc optimam vitam, et felicitatem convenientem sibi. Differentiam tamen quamdam oportet esse huiusmodi statutorum legalium. Primo quidem secundum diversitatem finium et vitae: ad alium et ad alium enim finem, alias et alias oportet ordinare leges. Secundo, quia quaedam sunt de his quae immediate ordinantur in finem, quaedam autem de his quae ordinantur ad aliud eorum quam ad finem, quaedam autem ad removendum prohibentia. Iterum ad legislatorem pertinet considerare si aliqui sint vicini civitatis, quales sunt eorum dispositiones, si fortes vel effeminati, si liberi naturaliter vel servi; et tunc conferendo conditiones civium et civitatis aliorum ad conditionem civitatis propriae, considerare qualiter se habendum ad illos, et qualiter utendum ad quoscumque ex contingentibus; puta si sint servi natura, et effeminati, debellandum eos, siquidem cives sint contrariae dispositionis. Si autem viriles et liberi secundum naturam, civibus e contrario se habentibus, aut serviendum eis sicut natura inclinat, aut pacem habendum. Sed de istis erit conveniens considerationem in sequentibus facere, ad quem finem oportet tendere rempublicam optimam, et qualiter ordinanda sunt ea quae ad finem talem.

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Deinde cum dicit ad eos intendit solvere praedictas dubitationes. Sed est intelligendum, quod dissolutio secundae pendet ex dissolutione primae. Si enim declaratum fuerit quae sit eligibilissima vita simpliciter, statim ostensum erit, quae sit optima respublica et optimus ordo eius. Illam enim rempublicam et illum ordinem eius oportet esse optimum secundum se, quae unitur optimae, et in quibus intenditur optima vita. Et ideo tantum solvit principaliter primam. Sed quia circa primam dubitationem fuerunt opiniones subcontrariae, primo declarat, quod utraque illarum quantum ad aliquid recte, et quantum ad aliquid non recte dicit. Secundo cum dicit, quod si haec etc. dissolvit eamdem. Circa primum primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, quinimmo respondebit etc. removet obviationem, quae posset fieri. Et circa primum primo proponit. Secundo cum dicit, utrique eorum etc. manifestat. In prima parte dicit, quod ad illos qui opinantur vitam, quae consistit cum virtute, esse optimam et eligibilissimam, differunt tamen in usu cuius virtutis existat, dicendum ad utrosque, quoniam utrique in aliquo dicunt recte, in aliquo autem non recte. Quidam enim ipsorum reprobantes civiles principatus tamquam praeter rationem existentes, putant vitam liberi, hoc est absolutam et contemplativam, alteram esse, vel diversam omnino a civili, et esse optimam et eligibilissimam inter omnes. Alii autem e contrario, vitam civilem optimam dicunt esse, rationem adducentes, quoniam vita contemplativa in vacatione, et in vacando videtur consistere. Nunc autem impossibile est eum, qui nihil agit, bene agere. Bona autem actio et felicitas sunt idem: hoc enim dicimus felicitatem: ergo impossibile est ducentem vitam contemplativam, habere felicitatem simpliciter. Civilis autem vita multas actiones bonas et pulchras habet; ergo videtur, quod ista vita sit eligibilior alia.

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Deinde cum dicit quia haec manifestat in quo dicentes vitam contemplativam optimam, bene et male dixerunt: ex quo apparet in quo alia opinio male dixit quodammodo per oppositum. Et primo in quo bene. Secundo cum dicit, putare vero omnium etc. in quo male. Ad evidentiam primi, et quorumdam posterius dicendorum, intelligendum est, quod sicut philosophus dicit in primo metaphysicae, liber est qui est suiipsius causa. Quod non potest intelligi sic, quod aliquis sit causa suiipsius primo: nihil enim est causa sui: sed est intelligendum, quod liber sit ille, qui secundum aliquid proprium sibi est causa sibi operandi. Et tunc veritatem habet, quod liber est suiipsius causa in duplici genere causae: et in ratione agentis, et ratione finis. In ratione agentis, inquantum per aliquod principium quod est principale in eo operatur. In ratione autem finis, inquantum operatur ad finem sibi debitum secundum principium illud. Et quia homo maxime in esse constituitur per intellectum, est enim intellectus, vel maxime secundum intellectum secundum Aristotelem in decimo Ethicorum, et ideo homo liber dicitur, qui per virtutem intellectualem existentem in eo operatur non accipiens ab alio rationem operandi, nec impedimentum habens ex parte materiae; et qui operatur ad finem qui debetur ei secundum naturam praedictam. Et quanto magis natus est operari secundum illud quod perfectius est in intellectu in eo, et ad finem excellentiorem secundum idipsum, tanto liberior est. Et ideo qui simpliciter operatur secundum virtutem intellectualem, et ad finem secundum intellectum, perfectissime liber est. E contrario autem, homo servus dicitur, qui non est natus operari secundum virtutem intellectus proprii, sed virtutem et rationem operandi accipiens ab alio, obediens, operatur. Et quia finis correspondet agenti, servus etiam est qui operatur principaliter ad finem alterius; et ideo sicut liber homo est qui est suiipsius causa, et in ratione finis et agentis; ita servus qui neutro istorum modorum principatur sibi, et hoc propter imperfectionem intellectus in eo secundum se, vel ex dispositione materiae. Et ita vita liberi dicitur vita secundum rationem propriam, servi autem secundum rationem alienam. Dicitur igitur, quod opinantes vitam contemplativam esse optimam, rationabiliter dicunt in hoc, quod dicunt, quod vita liberi est operatio secundum rationem propriam, melior est quam vita dominativa, hoc est servilis. Semper enim in unoquoque genere illud quod est per se, melius est eo quod est per accidens. Istud enim simpliciter verum est, quoniam servus secundum quod servus, deficiens est. Bonum autem honorabile est bonum excellens. Iussio enim passive, quae est de his quae sunt necessaria ad vitam, quae fit ei a domino, non est aliquid secundum se honestum, quia honestum est quod secundum se quaeritur, ut in secundo rhetoricae dicitur; iussionem autem passivam nullus bene dispositus eligeret.

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Deinde cum dicit putare vero declarat in quo male: et dividitur in duas, secundum quod declarat in duobus, in quo male dixerunt. Secunda ibi, magis autem laudare et cetera. In prima parte ipse dicit, quod ulterius in hoc, quod acceperunt omnem principatum universaliter esse dominativum, idest principatum domini ad servum, non recte dixerunt. Est enim quidam principatus liberorum, et quidam servorum; et differunt isti principatus adinvicem, non minus quam naturaliter liberum et naturaliter servum. Oportet enim principatus differre adinvicem secundum differentiam subditorum. Principatus enim ad subditum dicitur. Natura autem liberum et natura servum differunt secundum rationem; et de hoc dictum est sufficienter in primo tractatu libri istius; ergo principatus liberorum et servorum secundum rationem differunt. Non igitur omnis principatus est dominium vel servitus.

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Deinde cum dicit magis autem declarat in quo male dixerunt secundo; dicens quod ulterius in eo quod dixerunt laudabiliorem vitam illam quae est sine actione quam illam quae est cum actione, non recte dixerunt. Felicitas enim actio quaedam est, et felicitas optima est optima vita. Ergo optima vita est actio, non privatio actionis. Adhuc operationes quae sunt secundum habitum iustitiae et temperantiae finem habent multorum bonorum et bene ordinatorum, ita quod actio aliqua iustitiae finis est eorum quae secundum iustitiam proximius, et actio aliqua secundum temperantiam finis est propinquus eorum quae secundum temperantiam: et similiter se habet de his quae sunt secundum alios habitus virtutum. Ulterius tamen istae actiones ad alium finem ulteriorem ordinantur quae est actio quaedam; et ideo tam finis proximus agibilium quam finis remotus actio quaedam est. Finis autem actionis vita est optima. Ergo optima vita est actio et non privatio actionis.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit et quidem tangit obviationem, quam primo ponit. Secundo cum dicit, hoc isti forsan etc. removet eam. In prima parte dicit, quod forte aliquis poterit opinari per ea quae determinata sunt de optima vita, scilicet quod ipsa est actio, quod optimum sit esse dominium omnium qualitercumque. Optimum enim est attingere ad optimam vitam: optima autem vita videtur esse secundum praedicta, secundum quam principatur omnibus. Optima enim vita est optima actio, dominans autem omnium dominus est plurimarum actionum et pulcherrimarum; et ideo optimum videtur principari omnibus. Propter quod, si verum est optimum virum potentem aliis principari, non expedit parcere cuicumque quantumcumque proximo, quin principetur eidem, sicut patet: neque patrem reputare filios, neque filios patrem, neque universaliter amicus amicum ut non principetur eisdem, nec curare quantumcumque sint coniuncti, vel boni, vel qualiter aliter se habentes. Universaliter enim id quod est optimum eligibilissimum est: optime autem agere optimum videtur esse; ergo est eligibilissimum. Si igitur principari qualitercumque et quibuscumque est optime agere, est eligibilissimum.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit hoc quidem removet obviationem; quod primo facit. Secundo cum dicit, propter quod et si aliquis, removet obiectionem quamdam. Primo igitur removet obviationem praedictam, declarans non esse optimum principari omnibus qualitercumque; dicens, quod hoc quod dictum est, vere dictum est, forsitan, si quidem ita esset quod principantibus privando alios iure suo et inclinatione naturali et inferendo violentiam inesset illud quod est eligibilissimum homini. Sed hoc forte est impossibile: quod adiungit, quia magni opinabantur contrarium; ipsi tamen hoc supponunt, sicut secundum se manifestum. Sed hoc est impossibile; quoniam actiones principantis non contingit esse optimas, nisi idem principans tantum differat ab eis quibus principatur in dispositione naturali et acquisita quantum distat vir a muliere, aut pater a filiis, aut dominus a servis: actiones enim diversificantur secundum diversitatem agentium, ut agentia sunt. Si igitur aliquis transgrediatur volens dominari aliquibus non habens hanc differentiam ad illos quam vir habet ad mulierem vel pater ad natum vel dominus ad servum, non optime operabitur principando, nec etiam poterit tantum recte agere in posterioribus quantum transgressus est in principio volens principari non dispositus ad hoc: parvus enim error in principio magnus est in principiatis. Et iterum eos qui sunt similes et aequales, et secundum naturam et secundum virtutem, bonum est et iustum omnes principari non simpliciter, sed secundum partem; puta unum in uno tempore, alium in alio; vel unum in uno principatu alium in alio. Iustum enim est similes et aequales, simile et aequale habere; non aequales autem, neque secundum virtutem, neque secundum naturam, habere aequale, vel e contrario aequales habere inaequale et non similes habere simile, hoc est praeter naturam: similes enim et aequales ad aequalia et similia inclinantur secundum naturam; sed nullum eorum quae sunt praeter naturam bonum est, quoniam quod est praeter naturam est violentum et nullum violentum est bonum; ergo aliquem principari quibuscumque et qualitercumque non est bonum.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit propter quod removet obiectionem quae posset fieri. Crederet enim aliquis propter praedicta, quod non expediret aliquem unum principari omnibus aliquo modo, sed esset praeter naturam, quod est contra regni rationem quod est optima respublica. Hoc intendens removere, dicit, quasi concludendo ex dictis, quod propter hoc, quia similes et aequales iustum est habere simile et aequale in principando secundum partem, si aliquis inveniatur in civitate qui fuerit melior aliis etiam bonis existentibus secundum virtutem et secundum potentiam activam in regendo per quam possit coercere malos, huic bonum est subiici; quia naturale est quod deficiens supponatur perfecto in unoquoque genere, et etiam iustum est obedire sibi uni soli principanti. Iustum est enim unumquemque secundum dignitatem propriae virtutis habere: talis autem ponitur esse melior aliis secundum virtutem et secundum potentiam. Expedit autem debentem bene principari habere non solum virtutem per quam inclinetur in bonum et sciat dirigere actiones subditorum, sed etiam oportet ipsum habere potentiam per quam possit sic agere coercendo declinantes a rectitudine rationis.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit sed si haec dissolvit primam dubitationem ex cuius dissolutione apparet dissolutio alterius. Et primo dissolvit eam. Secundo cum dicit, at vero neque sine actione etc. respondet rationi adductae in oppositum. Circa primum est intelligendum quod felicitas est operatio hominis secundum intellectum. In intellectu autem est considerare speculativum, cuius finis est cognitio veritatis, et practicum cuius finis est operatio. Et secundum hoc duplex felicitas assignatur hominis. Una speculativa quae est operatio hominis secundum virtutem perfectam contemplativam quae est sapientia. Alia autem practica quae est perfectio hominis secundum perfectam virtutem hominis practicam quae est prudentia. Est autem quaedam operatio secundum prudentiam et speculatio secundum sapientiam hominis secundum seipsum solum. Et est quaedam operatio prudentiae et speculatio totius civitatis; et ideo est quaedam felicitas practica et speculativa quaedam hominis secundum seipsum, et est quaedam felicitas practica totius civitatis et quaedam contemplativa totius civitatis.

Polit.L2

Felicitas autem speculativa secundum unum hominem melior est practica quae est secundum unum hominem, sicut evidenter docet Aristoteles in decimo Ethicorum; quoniam illa perfectio intellectus eligibilior est quae est respectu obiecti magis intelligibilis, quia ratio perfectionis sumitur ex obiecto; talis autem est speculativa. Felicitas enim est perfectio intellectus respectu primi et maxime intelligibilis. Felicitas autem practica est perfectio intellectus respectu agibilis ab homine, quod multo deficit a ratione intelligibilis primi; ergo felicitas contemplativa unius eligibilior est quam felicitas practica; et iterum magis est continua et sufficiens et delectabilis haec quam illa. Et eadem ratione contemplativa totius civitatis eligibilior est quam politica seu civilis, et contemplativa totius civitatis simpliciter eligibilior est contemplativa quae est secundum unum; similiter civilis practica quae est secundum unum. Et hoc est quod intendebat dicere Aristoteles primo Ethicorum: si idem est uni et civitati, maiusque et perfectius quod civitati videtur et suscipere et salvare. Amabile enim et uni; melius vero et divinius genti et civitati. Et ratio huius potest esse, quia contemplativa et civilis civitatis comparantur ad contemplativam secundum unum, sicut totum ad partem: totum autem rationem magis perfecti et maioris boni habet quam pars; et ideo ista quam illa.

Polit.L2

Hoc supposito dicit Aristoteles, quod si ea quae dicta sunt prius bene dicta sunt, et felicitas est optima operatio hominis secundum virtutem perfectam, vita autem perfecta est operatio optima et perfecta, necesse est optimam vitam et totius civitatis et secundum unumquemque, esse activam et in operatione consistere. Sed optima vita activa non existit in directione operationum quae sunt ad alium in principando et communicando qualitercumque secundum quod quidam credunt. Nec etiam illae solae meditationes intellectus activae sunt quae sunt de operabilibus vel gratia operabilium contingentium; sed multo magis illae considerationes et meditationes optimae sunt quae secundum se perfectae sunt et secundum se quaeruntur non propter aliquid aliud. Et ratio huius est, quoniam optimus finis hominis et civitatis est bona actio. Non possunt autem duae vel plures actiones differentes specie optimae esse. Quare optimus finis hominis est aliqua actio hominis, et illa secundum quam maxime agere dicitur. Maxime autem agere dicitur secundum intellectum speculativum: maxime enim dicimus agere illos qui secundum quod huiusmodi dominium habent extrinsecarum actionum omnium; tales enim sunt sicut architectonici. Speculativi autem maxime dominium habent operationum extrinsecarum, sicut rationem imponentes, et sicut architectores. Intellectus enim practicus qui dirigit in operationibus exterioribus supponit, sicut principium, rectum appetitum finis. Et rectus appetitus finis non est sine rectitudine voluntatis. Rectitudo vero voluntatis supponit rectitudinem intellectus bonum vel finem ostendentis. Si quidem voluntas nihil vult quod non sit intellectum prius, sicut dicitur primo rhetoricae. Iste autem intellectus est intellectus non practicus, sed speculativus, si practicus per se dependet a voluntate, iste autem non: quare prima regula agendi universaliter est intellectus speculativus; secundum ipsum agere dicimus; quare optima actio hominis est speculatio, et per consequens ultimus finis eius. Non igitur meditatio de agibilibus est optima operatio hominis, sed consideratio vel speculatio speculativa; et maxime illa quae est de primis, aut de primo simpliciter.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit at vero respondet ad rationem in oppositum: quod primo facit. Secundo cum dicit, quod quidem igitur etc. inducit conclusionem principaliter intentam. Fuit autem ratio quod optima vita hominis est vita activa; sed contemplativa vita sive absoluta sine actione est; igitur et cetera. Ad quam respondet concedendo maiorem per interemptionem minoris; dicens quod civitates secundum se locatae non principantes exterioribus civibus et ita vivere eligentes inter se invicem communicantibus, et etiam speculantes, non sunt sine actione omnino, sed habent multas et pulchras actiones: quamvis enim non habeant actiones ad extrinsecos in principando vel subiiciendo aliis, inter se tamen habent unam partem respectu alterius, quoniam multas habent communicationes partes civitatis adinvicem: similiter hoc se habet et circa unumquemque hominem secundum seipsum: quamvis enim non habeat actiones ad alterum, nihilominus tamen contingit ipsum habere actiones perfectas in speculando secundum seipsum. Talem enim vacationem quae est in operationibus speculativis, Deus qui est maxime perfectus habet optime; et totum etiam universum operationes habet: et tamen Deus non habet operationem extrinsecam quae sit alia ab operatione sua, nec etiam mundus habet operationes in aliquid extrinsecum praeter illas quae sunt partium adinvicem. Non igitur est verum quod homo sive civitas ducens vitam speculativam sit sine actione.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem inducit conclusionem principaliter intentam prius; dicens, quod ex his quae dicta sunt est manifestum quod optimam vitam uniuscuiusque hominis secundum seipsum et totius civitatis necesse est esse unam et eamdem secundum rationem, quia speculationem; differunt tamen differentia partis ad totum.

Polit.L2

L. 3 (Η.4, 1325b33–1326b25)Quod tanta debeat esse in civitate multitudo, ut sibi satis sit ad vitam optime degendam.

Quod tanta debeat esse in civitate multitudo, ut sibi satis sit ad vitam optime degendam.

Polit.L3

937. Quoniam autem prooemialiter dicta sunt, quae nunc dicta sunt de ipsis, et circa alias politias nobis consideratum est prius, principium reliquorum dicere, primo quales quasdam suppositiones oportet esse de futura consistere ad votum civitate.

Polit.L3

938. Non enim possibile est politiam fore optimam sine moderate abundantia; propter quod oportet multa praesupponi, quemadmodum optantes esse, tamen nihil horum impossibile; dico autem, puta de multitudine civium, et regionis.

Polit.L3

939. Sicut enim et aliis conditoribus, puta textori et navifico, oportet materiam existere idoneam existentem ad operationem (quanto enim haec extiterit praeparata melius, necesse et quod fit ab arte esse melius), ita et politico et legislatori oportet convenientem ateriam existere idonee se habentem.

Polit.L3

940. Est autem politici successus, primum multitudo hominum, quos, quot, et quales quosdam existere oportet natura; et secundum regionem similiter, quantam esse, et qualem quandam hanc.

Polit.L3

941. Putant quidem igitur plurimi congruere magnam esse felicem civitatem: si autem hoc verum, ignorant qualis magna, et qualis parva civitas; secundum numerum enim multitudinem inhabitantium iudicant magnam.

Polit.L3

942. Oportet autem magis non ad multitudinem sed ad potentiam aspicere: est enim quoddam et civitatis opus: quare potentem maxime hoc efficere, hanc esse maximam: velut Hippocratem non hominem, sed medicum, dicet utique aliquis esse maiorem differente secundum magnitudinem corporis.

Polit.L3

943. Non solum, sed et si oportet iudicare respicientes ad multitudinem, non secundum contingentem multitudinem hoc putandum. Necessarium enim forte in civitatibus existere et multorum servorum numerum, et advenarum et extraneorum. Sed quicumque sunt pars civitatis, et ex quibus constat civitas propriis partibus: horum enim excessus multitudinis magnae civitatis signum: ex qua autem banausi quidem multi numer egrediuntur, armorum autem viri pauci, hanc impossible esse magnam; non enim idem magna civitas et multorum hominum.

Polit.L3

944. Non solum, sed et hoc ex operibus manifestum, quia difficile, forte autem impossibile bene regi legibus eam quae valde multorum hominum. Earum enim quae videntur politizare bene, nullam videmus existentium remissam ad multitudinem. Hoc autem palam est per suasionem rationum. Lex enim ordo quidam est, et bonam legislationem necessariam bonam ordinationem esse: valde autem excedens numerus non potest participare ordine. Divinae enim utique potentiae opus hoc, quae et hoc omne continet.

Polit.L3

945. Quoniam quod bonum in multitudine et magnitudine consuevit fieri: propter quod et civitatem, cuius cum magnitudine dictus terminus existit, hanc esse optimam, necessarium.

Polit.L3

946. Sed est magnitudinis civitatis quaedam mensura, sicut et aliorum omnium animalium, plantarum organorum. Etenim horum unumquodque neque valde parvum, neque secundum magnitudinem excedens habebit suam potentiam; sed aliquando quidem totaliter erit privatum natura, aliquando autem prave habens: puta navis palmi quidem non erit navis omnino, nec duorum stadiorum: ad aliquam autem manitudinem veniens quandoque quidam propter parvitatem, pravam faciet navigationem, quandoque autem propter excessum.

Polit.L3

947. Similiter autem, et civitas, quae quidem ex paucis valde, non per se sufficiens; civitas autem per se sufficiens. Quae autem ex multis valde, in necessariis quidem per se sufficiens sicut gens, sed non civitas; politiam enim non facile existere. Quis enim dux exercitus erit valde excedentis multitudinis, aut quis praeco non magnae vocis?

Polit.L3

948. Propter quod primam quidem civitatem necessarium esse eam quae ex tanta multitudine, quae prima multitudo causa per se sufficiens est ad vivendum bene, secundum politiae communionem.

Polit.L3

949. Contingit autem, et eam quae excedit secundum multitudinem esse maiorem civitatem. Sed hoc non est, sicut diximus, infinitum. Quis autem sit excessus terminus, ex operibus videre facile est.

Polit.L3

950. Sunt enim actiones civitatis, horum quidem principantium horum autem subditorum: principantis autem opus est iussio et iudicium. Ad iudicandum autem de iustis et ad distribuendum principatus secundum dignitatem necessarium cognoscere invicem cives quales quidem sunt; tamquam ubi hoc non accidit fieri, prave necesse fieri quae circa principatus et iudicia. Circa utraque enim non iustum proprio impetu agere; quod quidem in ea quae valde multorum hominum, existit manifeste.

Polit.L3

951. Adhuc autem extraneis et advenis facile transumere politiam; non enim difficile latere propter excessum multitudinis.

Polit.L3

952. Palam igitur quod iste est civitatis terminus optimus, multitudinis maximus excessus ad autarchiam vitae facile conspirabilis. De magnitudine quidem igitur civitatis determinatum sit hoc modo.

Polit.L3

Postquam philosophus inquisivit de his quae supponenda sunt ad futuram optimam rempublicam ex parte finis, inquirit nunc de his quae supponenda sunt ex parte finis ipsius. Et circa hoc primo praemittit intentionem suam, et ordinem considerandi. Secundo cum dicit, putant plerique etc., prosequitur. Circa primo dat intentionem suam. Secundo cum dicit, neque enim fieri etc. probat quod oportet aliqua supponi considerantem de republica optima ex parte materiae. Tertio cum dicit, est autem civilis etc. tangit quae sunt illa. In prima parte dicit, quoniam ea quae dicta sunt prius de fine optimae reipublicae introducta sunt sicut quoddam prooemium ad evidentiam dicendorum, et de rebuspublicis minus bene ordinatis, puta de statu paucorum et multitudinis, determinatum est in praecedenti libro ex quibus et quomodo sunt instituendae, relinquitur nobis considerandum nunc quales suppositiones ex parte materiae reipublicae oportet supponere ad optimam ordinationem futuram secundum votum ipsius reipublicae; puta ex parte civium, et regionis, et quae sunt sicut materia ipsius.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit non enim probat, quod oportet aliqua supponi, per duas rationes, quarum secundam ponit cum dicit, ut enim et cetera. In prima parte intendit rationem hanc. Ad optimam rempublicam futuram oportet supponere omnia illa, sine quibus non potest institui vel esse, sicut ex se est manifestum. Sed non est possibile esse optimam rempublicam sine abundantia multorum moderata, tamen oportet multa supponi si debeat institui optima respublica quasi optantibus illa, quamvis non obtinentibus; non tamen impossibilia haberi. Dico autem multa oportet supponi quantum ad multitudinem civium et regionis.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit sicut enim ponit secundam rationem et est. Sicut est de aliis conditoribus, hoc est artificibus, ita est de civili. De aliis autem artificibus, puta textore, et naviculario, et quocumque alio tali, sic videmus, quod si debeant recte operari secundum artem, oportet praeexistere materiam convenientem existentem, et organa convenientia, sicut textori fila, naviculario ligna, et serram bene dispositam. Videmus etiam, quod quanto huiusmodi organa et materia melius disposita sunt, tanto operatio quae secundum artem est melior et convenientior est; ergo similiter civili viro et legislatori ad ordinationem civium et civitatis convenientem, oportet praeexistere materiam et organa idonea.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit est autem tangit quae sunt illa quae sunt supponenda; dicens quod ad successum civilem pertinet primo et praeexigitur multitudo hominum, sicut materia; scilicet, qui et quot, et quales secundum dispositionem naturalem debeant esse vel oporteat eos existere. Et secundo ad ipsum pertinet regio; scilicet, quantam oporteat esse secundum quantitatem, et qualem secundum dispositionem ad bonam ordinationem futuram.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit putant quidem prosequitur. Et dividitur in partes duas. Quia primo inquirit de his quae supponenda sunt ex parte materiae remotae reipublicae, scilicet civium et regionis. Secundo cum dicit, cum vero inquirit de illis quae supponenda sunt ex parte materiae propinquae, quae sunt consiliativum, bellicum, agricolae, loca munita et aedificia. Circa primum adhuc primo inquirit de magnitudine et multitudine civium regionis. Secundo cum dicit, nunc quales autem etc. de dispositione naturali ipsorum. Circa primum adhuc primo inquirit de magnitudine civitatis quantum ad multitudinem civium. Secundo cum dicit, de regione autem etc. de ea quae regionis. Circa primum inquirendo primo ponit opinionem quorumdam de magnitudine civitatis, et reprobat eam. Secundo cum dicit, cum et bonum etc. determinat de ea secundum intentionem suam. Circa primum ponit opinionem aliorum. Secundo cum dicit, sed oportet etc. arguit in contrarium. Circa primam partem dicit quod multi antiquorum opinati sunt civitatem illam felicem esse quae magna est. Quamvis hoc veritatem habeat, scilicet civitatem felicem magnam esse, ipsi tamen non bene determinant cuiusmodi civitas magna, et cuiusmodi parva sit; nec bene accipiunt magnitudinem ipsius. Opinantur enim magnitudinem civitatis debere attendi simpliciter secundum multitudinem civium sine aliqua determinatione; sicut si magnum exercitum diceremus simpliciter qui est ex pluribus bellatoribus.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit oportet autem ponit rationes in contrarium; per quas probatur quod magnitudo civitatis non consistit in multitudine civium absolute, sed cum determinatione aliqua: et sunt tres. Quarum secundam ponit cum dicit, non solum, sed et si et cetera. Tertiam non solum, sed et hoc et cetera. Circa primum est intelligendum, quod omnis res est propter suam operationem per se. Haec enim est ultima eius perfectio. Omnes autem dispositiones rei, puta quantitas, qualitas sunt propter ipsam rem; et ideo tam res quam dispositiones eius sunt propter operationem. Et quia ratio eorum quae sunt propter aliquid sumitur ex eo propter quod sunt, necesse est rationem rei et omnium dispositionum eius sumi ex ratione operationis. Secundum rationem autem operationis est ratio potentiae, quae est principium immediatum ipsius. Hoc igitur supposito, dicit quod in determinando magnitudinem civitatis, non oportet respicere ad multitudinem civium secundum quod huiusmodi, sed magis ad potentiam ipsius, per quam potest in operationem suam. Civitatis enim est aliqua propria operatio; puta illa quae est secundum virtutem principalem. Si igitur ratio magnitudinis sumatur ex ipsa operatione quae est sicut finis, illam civitatem oportet dicere magnam simpliciter, quae potest in operationem sibi debitam perfecte; sicut Hippocratem non dicimus esse maiorem hominem aliquo excedente ipsum secundum magnitudinem corporis, sed dicimus eum maiorem medicum illo, quoniam excedit ipsum in arte medicinae, quamvis excedatur ab illo magnitudine corporis.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit non solum, sed et si ponit secundam rationem. Et quia in eo quod componitur ex pluribus partibus, necesse est magnitudinem includere multitudinem quamdam partium; dicit, quod non solum oportet magnitudinem civitatis attendi secundum rationem operationis; sed si oportet considerare ad multitudinem civium ex quibus componitur, non tamen ad quorumcumque multitudinem vel quamcumque contingentem; quoniam in civitatibus est quaedam multitudo servorum et quaedam advenarum et extraneorum confluentium ad ipsam: tales autem non sunt per se pars civitatis, sicut consequenter ostendet; et ideo magnitudo civitatis non est accipienda secundum multitudinem istorum. Sed quoniam magnitudo rei attenditur secundum multitudinem partium, ex quibus componitur secundum aliquem modum, magnitudo civitatis debet attendi secundum multitudinem partium per se, cuiusmodi sunt liberi, et bellici, et consiliantes. Excessus enim multitudinis istorum signum est magnitudinis civitatis. Illam autem impossibile est magnam esse simpliciter, ex qua possunt egredi multi numero mercenarii aut servi, viri autem bellici pauci, aut consiliantes pauci; isti enim sunt per se pars, illi autem non. Non enim dicimus, idem esse civitatem magnam et multorum hominum; quia magnitudo civitatis attenditur secundum multitudinem partium per se ipsius, et non omnes homines inhabitantes eam sunt per se partes eius.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit non solum, sed et hoc ponit tertiam rationem; dicens, quod non solum ex dictis manifestum est quod magnitudo civitatis non attendatur secundum multitudinem hominum quantamcumque; sed etiam ex operibus accidentibus potest hoc videri. Videmus enim, quod difficile est, vel etiam impossibile, civitatem, quae est multorum hominum, valde bene legibus et consuetudinibus bene regi: difficile quidem si sint multi prudentes, impossibile autem si pauci. In republica autem omnes vel plures idiotae sunt. Nulla etiam illarum civitatum quae bene gubernatur remittitur ad recipiendum quantamcumque multitudinem. Et iterum per rationem potest hoc idem apparere. Lex enim secundum quam regitur civitas, ordo quidam est; et bona legislatio, bona quaedam ordinatio; et ideo quod non est facile aut non possibile ordinari, non est facile aut non possibile bene legibus regi. Nunc autem excellens multitudo hominum non potest participare ordinem. Excedentem enim multitudinem ordinare est opus divinae virtutis, quae totum hoc universum continet et ordinat; ergo difficile, aut non possibile est multitudinem excedentem hominum bene legibus regi. Sed haec est operatio civitatis regi legibus rectis: ergo civitas non debet esse quantaecumque multitudinis excedentis hominum.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit quoniam quod inquirit de magnitudine civitatis. Et primo declarat, quod magnitudo civitatis consistit in quadam multitudine determinata. In secunda cum dicit, propter quod etc. concludit quae sunt illa. Prima in duas: quia primo concludit hoc ex praecedentibus. Secundo cum dicit, sed est magnitudinis civitatis quaedam etc. probat hoc per simile in naturalibus. In prima parte dicit, quod in omnibus habentibus per se magnitudinem et multitudinem, bonitas consistit aliqualiter in multitudine partium ad seinvicem ordinatarum, et ad finem; et in magnitudine aggregata ex multitudine, quam consequitur virtus, per quam potest in finem; et hoc secundum aliquam rationem. Civitas autem habet per se multitudinem quamdam et magnitudinem: ergo civitatem illam dicemus optimam, quae habet magnitudinem et multitudinem secundum dictum terminum, qui anteceditur secundum tria, quae apparent ex tribus rationibus praecedentibus: scilicet secundum ordinem ad finem et operationem, quod accipiebatur in prima, et secundum partes principales, quod accipiebatur in secunda, et secundum quod bene regibilis legibus rectis, quod in tertia: ita quod secundum illam civitatem dicimus magnam simpliciter, quae habet multitudinem tantam partium per se, quod bene potest legibus regi, et attingere ad operationem per se ipsius.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit sed est magnitudinis probat idem per simile in naturalibus. Et primo proponit similitudinem. Secundo cum dicit, similiter autem et civitas etc. applicat eam ad propositum. In prima parte dicit, quod magnitudinis civitatis est aliqua determinata mensura et ad maius et etiam ad minus, quam non contingit transgredi secundum rationem, sicut magnitudinis rerum naturalium. Naturalium enim, puta animalium et plantarum, est terminus quidam determinatus ad plus, et etiam ad minus, quem non est transgredi secundum naturam. Omnia enim naturalia habent formas determinatas per se, ad quas consequuntur quantitates et passiones determinatae. Et hoc est quod Aristoteles dicit secundo de anima: omnium natura constantium positus est terminus et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti. Et hoc quidem contingit videre ad sensum: quoniam unumquodque istorum si deficiat a magnitudine sibi determinata ad minus, vel si excedat magnitudinem determinatam ad maius, non habet propriam virtutem per quam determinatur. Sed aliquando quidem deficit a natura speciei propriae, puta cum multum deficit aut excedit; aliquando autem etsi attingat ad naturam speciei, prave tamen attingit quantum ad dispositiones, puta cum parum deficit aut excedit, sicut navis. Si fuerit unius palmi speciem navis non habebit omnino; similiter nec si sit duorum stadiorum. Si autem habeat aliquam magnitudinem parum deficientem, aut parum excedentem magnitudinem sibi naturalem, male se habebit ad operationem eius quae est navigatio, aut propter parvitatem, aut propter excessum.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit similiter autem applicat simile ad propositum dicens quod similiter civitas cum sit a natura inclinante et ratione perficiente quae imitatur eam, habet magnitudinem determinatam ad minus et etiam ad maius. Illa enim quae componitur ex paucis civibus non est per se sufficiens, sicut nec vicus. Civitas autem est communitas per se sufficiens, sicut dictum est prius; ergo illa quae est ex paucis civibus valde, rationem civitatis non habet. Illa autem quae est ex multitudine superabundanti, per se sufficiens est sibi in necessariis ad vitam, sicut regio aliqua, sed non sicut civitas. Civitatem enim oportet habere ordinem quemdam civilem. Multitudinem autem superabundantem habere ordinem civilem aut difficile est valde aut impossibile; et ideo illa quae ex multitudine superabundanti est, proprie rationem civitatis non habet. Sic ergo illa quae deficit a multitudine determinata, et illa quae excedit, proprie civitates non sunt. Nullus enim dux exercitus potest principari multitudini excellenti ad maius, sed determinatae, nec aliquis est praeco qui non habet aliquam magnitudinem vocis, sicut fuit quidam nomine Stentor.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit propter quod concludit quis est terminus magnitudinis civitatis. Et primo quis est terminus eius ad minus. Secundo cum dicit, contingit autem etc. quis est ad maius. In prima parte dicit, quod propter hoc, quia civitatem oportet esse per se sufficientem, et per se sufficiens non est ex paucis existens, primam civitatem secundum viam generationis qua minor rationem civitatis non habet, necessarium est esse illam quae ex tanta multitudine componitur quae est per se sibi sufficiens ad bene vivendum secundum communicationem civilem propter diversitatem officiorum et artificiorum, qua minor non esset per se sufficiens.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit contingit autem declarat quis est terminus eius ad maius. Et circa hoc primo proponit. Secundo cum dicit, sunt enim etc. probat. Tertio cum dicit, patet igitur etc. concludit intentum recapitulando. In prima parte dicit, quod contingit civitatem quae excedit eam quae dicta est secundum multitudinem, esse maiorem civitatem; sed non contingit excessum esse in infinitum ita ut quae magis excedit magis sit civitas. Quis autem sit terminus talis excessus ultra quem non est civitas, facile est considerare ex operationibus.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit sunt enim manifestat hoc ex duobus. Secundo ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. In prima parte est intelligendum, quod sicut dicitur in primo huius, omnia quaecumque secundum naturam et artem sunt, definita sunt virtute quadam et operatione, in quam cum possunt dicuntur, cum autem non possunt non dicuntur nisi aequivoce. Civitas vero est aliquid eorum quae secundum aliquid est a natura et secundum aliquid ab arte; et ideo operationem determinatam habet, in quam cum potest dicitur civitas, cum autem non potest, non dicitur. Operatio autem principalis civitatis attenditur secundum partem principaliorem in ea, quae est ipse principans. Operatio autem principalis principantis est dirigere subditos secundum rationem praecipiendo et distribuendo bona communia et iudicando recte; ad quae praeexigitur cognitio civium. Dicit igitur quod civitatis sunt aliquae operationes: quaedam quas exercet per principantes, quaedam autem quas per subditos. Operatio autem principantis est iudicare et praecipere recte, et distribuere recte principatus: quia istae competunt sibi per virtutem quae est prudentia, quae est propria ei. Ad hoc autem quod recte iudicet de iustis et quod recte distribuat principatus et bona communia ipsis civibus, necessarium est ipsum cognoscere cives quales quidem sunt secundum virtutem et quam differentiam habent invicem secundum virtutem, ut secundum exigentiam dignitatis virtutis distribuat principatus et iudicet et differenter secundum differentiam dignitatis eorum, aut sic ubi non sit secundum hunc modum, oporteat distributionem bonorum communium et iudicia prave se habere. Circa enim ista operari non secundum rationem rectam, sed secundum proprium impetum, periculosum est et iniustum: et tamen hoc necesse est accidere in civitate quae est superabundantis multitudinis. Non enim omnes cives a principante bene possunt cognosci. Tantam igitur oportet esse multitudinem civium ad plus in civitate, quae recte debet operari, quanta potest a principante cognosci.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem probat idem ex secundo sic. In civitate superabundantis multitudinis contingit esse multos extraneos et advenas et alios non diligentes rempublicam. Extraneis autem et advenis et non diligentibus rempublicam facile est rempublicam transmutare propter multitudinem ipsorum. Non enim difficile est latere eorum machinationem propter excessum multitudinis. Magis enim latent male operantes in maiori multitudine quam minori. Hoc autem est malum civitati et contra naturam eius: ergo malum et contra naturam civitatis est ipsam esse superabundantis multitudinis.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit palam igitur inducit conclusionem intentam, dicens: manifestum est igitur ex his quae dicta sunt, quod optimus terminus civitatis est excessus multitudinis maximus, qui est sufficiens ad per se sufficientiam vitae, et est facile auxiliabilis et ordinabilis secundum rationem rectam; ita quod terminus civitatis ad minus accipitur a ratione per se sufficiente, ad maius autem a ratione bonae ordinationis. Sic igitur determinatum sit de magnitudine civitatis.

Polit.L3

L. 4 (Η.5, 1326b26–1327b19)De modo agri, urbis situ, nundinatione et nautica turba.De modo agri, urbis situ, nundinatione et nautica turba.

953. Consimiliter autem, et quae de regione habent. De eo quidem enim, quod est qualem quandam, palam quia per se sufficientissimam omnis quicumque laudabit utique: talem autem necessarium esse omnia ferentem; omnia enim existere et nullo indigere autarches.

Polit.L4

954. Multitudine autem et magnitudine tantum, ut possint habitantes vivere vacantes libere simul et temperate. Hunc autem terminum, si bene vel non bene dicimus, considerandum posterius diligentius, quando totaliter de possessione, et de ea quae circa substantiam abundantia, accidet facere mentionem qualiter oportet habere, et quomodo ipsam ad usum: multae enim circa considerationem hanc sunt dubitationes propter trahentes ad utrumque excessum vitae, hos quidem ad tenacitatem, hos autem ad delitias.

Polit.L4

955. Speciem autem regionis non difficile dicere: oportet autem quaedam suaderi et ab iis, qui circa ducatum exercitus sunt experti: quia oportet quidem adversariis esse difficile adibilem, ipsis autem facile exibilem. Adhuc autem sicut multitudinem hominum diximus oportere facile conspicabilem esse, ita et regionem, quod autem facile conspicabile, est regionem esse facile auxiliabilem.

Polit.L4

956. Civitatis autem potentiam, si oportet facere ad votum, ad mare convenit poni bene, et ad regionem. Unus quidem qui dictus terminus: oportet enim adesse auxilia locorum omnium. Reliquus autem ad delationes fructuum, qui nascuntur; adhuc autem eius quae circa ligna materiae, et utique si quam aliam operationem talem regio existat praesidens facile deportabilem.

Polit.L4

957. De communicatione autem ad mare, utrum proficua sit bene legibus rectis civitatibus, aut nociva, multa existunt dubitantes.

Polit.L4

958. Advenire enim aliquos in aliis nutritos legibus inconferens aiunt esse ad bonam legislationem, et hominum multitudinem fieri quidem enim ex usu maris, emittentes, et suscipientes negatiatorum multitudinem, contrariam autem esse ad politizare bene.

Polit.L4

959. Quod quidem igitur, si hoc non accidit, melius et ad securitatem, et ad abundantiam necessariorum civitatem et regionem participare mari, non immanifestum.

Polit.L4

960. Etenim ad facilius ferre adversarios facile auxiliabiles, oportet esse secundum ambo salvandos, et per terram, et per mare, et ad laedendum invadentes, si non secundum ambo possibile, tamen si secundum alteram existet magis, participabit ambobus. Quaecumque autem non extiterunt apud ipsos entia, suscipere haec et superflua nascentium emittere, sunt necessariorum.

Polit.L4

961. Sibi autem negotiativam, sed non alii oportet esse civitatem. Qui autem exhibent se ipsos omnibus forum, acquisitionis gratia hoc agunt. Quam autem civitatem non oportet tali participare super acquisitione, neque negotiatorium oportet habere tale.

Polit.L4

962. Quoniam autem et nunc videmus multis exsistens, et regionibus et civitatibus suburbia et portus bene iacentia ad civitatem, ut neque occupetur ipsum municipium, neque sit longe valde, sed optime muris, et aliis talibus firmaculis, manifestum, quod si quidem bonum aliquod accidit fieri propter communicationem ipsorum, existet civitati hoc bonum; si autem aliquid nocivum, caveri legibus facile, dicentes, et determinantes quos non oportet et quos oportet misceri ad invicem.

Polit.L4

963. De nautica autem potentia, quod quidem opportunum existere usque ad aliquam multitudinem, non immanifestum: non enim solum sibi ipsis et vicinorum aliquibus oportet et terribiles esse et posse auxiliari, sic ut per terram et mare.

Polit.L4

964. De multitudine autem iam et magnitudine potentiae huius aspiciendum ad vitam civitatis. Si quidem enim ducali et politica vivat vita, necessarium, et hanc potentiam existere ad actiones commensuratam.

Polit.L4

965. Multitudinem autem hominum quae sit circa nauticam turbam, non necessarium existere civitatibus. Neque enim ipsos oportet esse partem civitatis: quod quidem enim supergressivum liberum et pedestrium est quod dominans est et obtinet navigium.

Polit.L4

966. Multitudine autem existente vernaculorum et regionis, agricolarum copiam necessarium est esse et nautarum. Videmus autem hoc et nunc existens quibusdam, puta civitati Heracleotarum: multas enim replet triremes, aedificata civitate, magnitudine aliis contractiore.

Polit.L4

967. De regione quidem igitur et portibus et civitatibus, et mari, et de nautica potentia, sit determinatum hoc modo. De civili autem multitudine, quem quidem terminum oportet existere, prius diximus.

Polit.L4

Postquam philosophus inquisivit de his quae supponenda sunt ex parte magnitudinis civitatis civilis, inquirit nunc de his quae supponenda sunt ex parte regionis adiacentis. Et circa hoc primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, de regione quidem igitur etc. recapitulat determinata. Regio autem quaeritur secundum quod utilis est ad bene vivendum civiliter. Ad hoc autem oportet ipsam esse quantam et qualem et bene positam. Et secundum hoc dividitur pars ista in partes duas. Quia primo declarat qualem et quantam oporteat eam esse. Secundo determinat de situ ipsius, cum dicit, speciem autem et cetera. Circa primum primo ostendit qualem oporteat eam esse. Secundo cum dicit, multitudine autem et magnitudine etc. quantum secundum quantitatem. In prima parte intelligendum est, quod cum regio omnis quaeratur propter cives vel usum ipsorum, oportet ipsam esse proportionatam civibus, et dispositionem ipsius quaerere secundum quod competit usui ipsorum. Et ideo dicit, quod illa quae ad regionem pertinent proportionaliter se habent his quae dicta sunt de magnitudine civitatis quo ad cives. Qualem enim oporteat ipsam esse, manifestum est per se sufficientem usui inhabitantium. Quilibet enim regionem talem laudat quae sufficiens est ad omnia illa quae sunt necessaria ad bene vivere. Talem autem oportet fertilem esse et ferre omnia ex quibus sustentatur natura humana quo ad potum et cibum et quo ad prohibitionem intemperantiae incontinentis. Hoc enim dicimus per se sufficiens quod omnia habet et nullo indiget. Regionem igitur talem oportet esse secundum qualitatem quod possit omnia ferre quae sunt necessaria ad per se sufficientiam vitae. Hoc autem potest facere si fuerit temperata secundum qualitates primas, calidum, frigidum, humidum, siccum; quod convenit ei per convenientem habitudinem ad figuram caelestem et loci dispositionem.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit multitudine autem declarat quantam oportet eam esse. Et quia non quaeritur regio, ut dictum est, nisi secundum quod ordinatur ad vitam humanam, dicit, quod oportet esse tantam secundum magnitudinem totius et secundum multitudinem consideratam secundum diversitatem terrae sativae et non sativae, consitae et pascualis et huiusmodi, ita quod homines in ea possint vivere secundum quod competit homini, hoc autem est secundum virtutem; et ideo tantam oportet esse ipsam, quod habitantes in ea possint vivere secundum virtutem quae est directiva eorum ex quibus sustentatur natura, quae est temperantia et liberalitas. Temperantia quidem, secundum quod ex ipsa sustentatur natura absolute; liberalitas in comparationem ad alterum. Tantam igitur oportet esse eam, quod habitantes possint vivere temperate non declinantes ad delitias, et liberaliter non retracti per tenacitatem. Utrum autem iste terminus magnitudinis civitatis bene assignatus sit vel non, posterius considerabimus diligentius, quando considerabimus de possessione et abundantia substantiae. Quantam enim oporteat eam esse et quomodo ordinare ad usum, sunt multae dubitationes et contrariae, propter inclinationes naturales ad utrumque excessum, horum quidem ad delitias et intemperantiam, horum autem ad parcitatem. Solent enim frequenter homines in agibilibus, forte autem et in speculabilibus, formare sibi opiniones secundum inclinationes: ut qui inclinantur ad delitias opinantur in ipsis summum bonum esse, et divitias debere quaeri secundum quod faciunt ad delitiandum; et similiter in aliis, ut frequenter. Hoc autem eis accidit propter infirmitatem intellectus eorum non potentis supergredi sensum, nec discutere veritatem propter naturae inclinationem.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit speciem autem determinat de situ regionis: et primo in se. Secundo cum dicit, civitatis autem potentiam etc. in comparatione ad mare et aridam. In prima parte dicit, quod facile est considerare secundum rationem qualem oportet esse speciem, idest dispositionem vel situm regionis; et conveniens est persuaderi ad hoc ab his quae observant vel dicunt hi qui experti sunt circa ducatum exercitus. Dux enim exercitus circa dispositionem regionis negotiatur et expertus est. Dicendum est igitur secundum quod ab ipsis persuasi sumus, quod oportet ipsam esse difficile adibilem ab impugnantibus et facile exibilem ab inhabitantibus. Si enim esset facilis aditus adversariis, faciliter destrueretur ab eis: similiter et si esset difficilis exitus ipsis, non de facili possent repellere adversantes. Fit autem hoc per habitudinem locorum convenientem in habitudinem ad montes vel fluvios, vel loca praerupta. Adhuc oportet multitudinem hominum in civitate esse bene conspicacem, ita quod quaelibet pars si indigeat, possit de facili auxiliari a qualibet, vel iuvare. Est autem intelligendum, quod sicut animal est aliquid unum compositum ex partibus diversis unitis in toto, ita quod operatio cuiuslibet ad bonum cuiuslibet ordinatur, sicut operatio oculi ad bonum pedis et illa quae pedis ad bonum oculi, et sic de aliis; ita et civitas est communitas ex pluribus composita, quorum operationes ad bonum singulorum ordinabiles sunt, saltem secundum quod sunt partes civitatis: ita et similiter regionem oportet esse aliquod unum compositum ex pluribus partibus sic dispositis quod quaelibet ordinabilis sit ad bonum cuiuslibet; et ideo oportet ipsam esse sic dispositam secundum situm, quod quaelibet pars possit auxiliari a qualibet quantum ad defensionem ab adversariis vel quantum ad necessaria vitae, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit civitatis autem determinat de situ civitatis in comparatione ad mare et aridam. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, de nautica autem, inquirit de potentia et turba navali. Utrum expediat civitati vel non. Circa primum primo declarat quomodo oportet civitatem esse sitam ad aridam et mare. Secundo cum dicit, de communicatione autem movet dubitationem. In prima parte dicit, quod si oportet positionem civitatis ad votum habere, oportet quod bene situetur in ordine ad aridam et ad mare, ita ut aliqualiter utrique communicet, si possibile est. Et huius una ratio est, quae dicta est prius: quoniam oportet civitatem bene et facile auxiliabilem esse contra impugnantes: hoc autem magis inerit si sit communis duorum, scilicet maris et aridae, habens auxilium ab utroque. Alia autem est, quia oportet civitatem sustentari ex fructibus regionis propriae vel alterius: quod non potest fieri nisi deferantur ad ipsam; facilius autem deferuntur, si fuerit communis maris et aridae. Iterum materia lignorum, et si aliquid aliud tale sit, quod inveniatur in regione necessarium civitati, expedit quod possit de facili deferri ad ipsam: hoc autem fit si fuerit communis maris et aridae; et ideo expedit eam esse communem utriusque istorum.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit de communicatione movet dubitationem de propinquitate ad mare. Et proponit primo circa hoc dubitationem antiquorum. Secundo cum dicit, advenire enim aliquos etc. prosequitur ipsam. In prima parte dicit, quod de propinquitate et communicatione civitatis ad mare, utrum expediat civitatibus bene gubernantibus et rectis bene legibus, multi dubitant multas adducentes rationes ad utramque partem.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit advenire enim prosequitur eam; et primo tangit nocumenta quae accidunt ex ipsa. Secundo cum dicit, quod quidem igitur etc. utilitates maiores consequentes. Tertio cum dicit, sibi enim etc. docet vitare nocumenta ex propinquitate possibilia contingere. In prima parte tangit duo propter quae videretur quod non expediret civitatem esse propinquam mari: necesse enim convenire multos institutos vel instructos in aliis legibus et exercitatos in aliis consuetudinibus, sicut videmus nunc de omnibus civitatibus et villis propinquis mari. Nutriti autem in aliis legibus et exercitati in aliis consuetudinibus, distrahunt cives ab observantia propriarum legum et ab his ad quae sunt assueti, propter communicationem et convictum: ex convictu enim formantur mores: hoc autem inconveniens est civitati et corruptivum reipublicae; ergo non expedit eam esse propinquam mari. Secundum est quoniam in civitate propinqua mari necessarium est aggregari multitudinem nocivam reipublicae; propter opportunitatem enim maris emittentes in quibus superabundant et suscipientes in quibus deficiunt necesse est subintrare multitudinem negotiatorum seu mercatorum: talis autem multitudo contrariatur ad bene gubernare, quia lex ipsorum facit divitias magis esse pretiosas virtute, quare contrariatur rectae reipublicae; et ideo non videtur expedire civitatem esse propinquam mari.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem arguit in oppositum, tangens utilitates provenientes ex propinquitate. Et primo proponit eas. Secundo cum dicit, etenim ad facilius, manifestat eas. In prima parte dicit, quod non immanifestum est quod multo melius est regionem esse propinquam mari usque ad aliquid, et propter maiorem abundantiam necessariorum ad vitam et ad securitatem maiorem ipsius, si possent praedicta inconvenientia vel nocumenta vitari.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit etenim ad facilius manifestat; et primo primum, dicens: civitatem si non debeat servire, oportet sic esse dispositam, quod faciliter et sine damno possit sustinere impetus debellantium. Ad faciliter autem ferre ipsos et cum minori damno facit quod possint se iuvare contra eos per mare et per terram: etenim si non possunt laedere eos qui sic debellant, tamen secundum alteram magis poterunt si communicentur ambobus: ab arida enim iuvabunt se in mari et a mari in arida contra eos. Expediens est igitur eam communicare mari.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit sibi autem docet vitare nocumenta quae videntur sequi ex dicta communicatione. Duo autem illa quae tangebantur, ad unum videbantur reduci. Quod enim aliqui nutriti in aliis legibus, aut multitudo negotiatorum advenientium per mare noceant civitati, hoc est inquantum distrahunt cives ab ordine civili; et ideo simul docet utrumque vitare. Et circa hoc duo facit: quoniam primo inquirit usque ad quantum quaerenda est in civitate negotiatio. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem et nunc docet vitare praedicta nocumenta. Circa primum est intelligendum quod negotiatio in civitate quaeritur propter commutationem necessariorum ad bene vivendum: huiusmodi autem commutatio quaeritur propter per se sufficientiam vitae; et ideo negotiatio in civitate usque ad hoc quaerenda est per se quod facit ad per se sufficientiam ipsius, et non amplius, sicut ea quae sunt ad finem quaeruntur secundum quod competunt fini: et propter hoc non est quaerenda propter alios principaliter. Dicit igitur, quod civitatem quae non sibi sufficit in omnibus ad bene vivendum expedit esse negotiativam sibi, hoc est secundum quod facit ad per se sufficientiam ipsius; sed non aliis, idest non ad per se sufficientiam aliarum civitatum vel regionum principaliter. Illi autem qui exhibent se negotiativos ad omnes quasi facientes forum omnium in propria civitate, faciunt hoc gratia acquisitionis divitiarum, nimis reputantes divitias pretiosas: quod est nocivum reipublicae rectae. Civitatem igitur illam quam non oportet participare acquisitionem superfluarum divitiarum, non oportet recipere superexcedentem multitudinem negotiatorum, sed tantam quantum facit ad per se sufficientiam vitae.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem docet vitare nocumenta praedicta; dicens, quod sic faciendum est in civitate bene ordinanda circa communicationem ad mare, sicut videmus fieri et existere in regionibus et civitatibus bene ordinatis et propinquis ei. Sic autem videmus quod in talibus et regionibus et civitatibus municipium civitatis distantiam quamdam habet a mari, ita ut suburbia et portus in quibus recipiuntur negotiatores sint disposita apte inter civitatem et mare, ita ut ipsa civitas non occupetur a mari, nec sit valde longe ab eo, sed sint muri et aliae munitiones, puta turres vel castra interiacentia civitati et suburbio. Consimiliter faciendum est in civitate fienda ad votum, si possibile sit. Manifestum est enim, quod si ita se habeat et mare fuerit sic propinquum civitati, ut dictum est, quod si aliquod bonum possit contingere propter communicationem ad mare inerit civitati sic dispositae: si autem ad nocumentum possibile sit evenire, id cavendum est per leges diversas determinantes quos oportet recipere ad municipium et quos non oportet, et usque ad quod et quibus oportet coniungi per mercimonia, et quibus non, et quomodo. Sic igitur apparet quod civitatem esse coniunctam mari omnino non expedit, tum propter dicta nocumenta quae Aristoteles agit, tum quia magis aegrotativa esset, et propter alia multa: nec etiam expedit eam esse nimis remotam; multas enim ab eo recipit utilitates, sicut ipse tangit: et sic medio modo expedit eam poni ad mare, ut utilitates quae a mari sunt inde recipiat de facili et incommoditates possit vitare.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit de nautica autem inquirit de potentia et turba navali, quomodo civitas se habet ad eas; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim manifestat quod potentia navalis usque ad aliquem terminum expedit civitati. Secundo cum dicit, multitudinem autem etc. ostendit quod turba navalis non debet esse pars civitatis, quamvis necessaria sit. Circa primum primo ostendit, quod potentia navalis expedit civitati. Secundo cum dicit, de multitudine autem iam et magnitudine etc. declarat usque ad quem terminum. In prima parte dicit, quod de potentia navali quae ordinatur ad bellum per mare, manifestum est quod optimum est ipsam inesse civitati bene ordinatae usque ad aliquem terminum multitudinis: quoniam expedit civitatem non solum sibiipsi vivere, sed etiam ad alios, puta vicinos, debellando eos si iustum sit eis servire, aut prohibendo insultus eorum si vellent debellare iniuste. Quapropter oportet quod sint terribiles eis et possint sibi auxiliari multipliciter contra eos. Hoc autem erit si habeant potentiam, sicut per terram pedestrem, ita per mare navalem. Expedit igitur civitati potentiam habere nauticam.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit de multitudine declarat usque ad quid; dicens quod de multitudine et magnitudine potentiae navalis usque ad quem terminum expediat civitati, considerandum est inspiciendo ad vitam, idest ad finem per se intentum in civitate. Illud enim quod ordinatur ad finem intentum, quaerendum est, inquantum utile est ad ipsum et non amplius. Si igitur finis alicuius civitatis sit vita ducalis et civilis, hoc est finis ad quem ordinatur ducatus exercitus, scilicet subiugare alios et civiliter regere illos, tunc potentia navalis debet esse commensurata, ita ut tanta sit, ut per ipsam et pedestrem potentiam possint debentes sibi servire debellare, et insurgentes in eos repellere: non maior neque minor secundum quod possibile est.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit multitudinem autem declarat, quod turba nautica non debet esse pars civitatis. Quod primo facit. Secundo cum dicit, multitudine autem existente etc. declarat quod est necessaria ei. In prima parte dicit, quod multitudinem hominum quae est circa turbam navalem non expedit inesse civitatibus sicut partem, neque ipsos nauticos oportet esse partem civitatis: superexcessivos enim in iniuriis et qui volunt esse liberi omnino a subiectione quacumque, et qui sunt pedestres ad virtutem deficientes ab ipsa, non debent esse pars civitatis; quoniam illos, qui sunt pars civitatis, oportet esse non iniuriosos, et subiici in parte, et ordinabiles ad virtutem. Nautica autem turba quae dominatur navigio, et obtinet ipsum, huiusmodi est, quia iniuriosa est, et subiici non vult et deficit a virtute, sicut frequenter, et in pluribus; ergo non expedit eam esse partem civitatis.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit multitudinem autem declarat, quod multitudo navalis necessaria est civitati; dicens quod cum in civitate sit multitudo servorum et tenuiorum hominum, necessarium est in ipsa existere multitudinem agricolarum et colentium terram regionis et multitudinem nautarum. Et hoc quidem apparet per inductionem. Sic enim videmus in pluribus civitatibus bene ordinatis, et specialiter in civitate Heracleotarum. Quamvis enim civitas eorum sit contractior, idest minor secundum multitudinem multis aliis, multas possunt de viris nauticis ordinatis ad bellum implere triremes, idest naves trium ordinum remorum.

Polit.L4

Deinde cum dicit de regione recapitulat determinata, dicens, quod iam in praecedentibus dictum est de regione, quantam et qualem oportet eam esse; et de portu et civitate qualiter se debeat habere ad mare, et de potentia nautica quod necessaria est civitati et usque ad quid. Prius autem dictum fuit de multitudine civili, quantam oportet eam esse, et usque ad quem terminum expediat civitati bene ordinatae.

Polit.L4

L. 5 (Η.7, 1327b19–1328a21)Quales esse debeant qui civitatem incolunt et regunt.

Quales esse debeant qui civitatem incolunt et regunt.

Polit.L5

968. Quales autem quosdam natura oportet esse, nunc dicamus. Fere itaque deprehendet utique quis hoc respiciens ad civitates approbatas Graecorum, et ad totum orbem terrae, ut occupatus est gentibus.

Polit.L5

969. Quae quidem enim in frigidis locis gentes, et quae circa Europam sunt quidem plenae animositate, intellectu autem et arte magis deficientes; propter quod liberae quidem perseverant magis, non politizare autem, et vicinis principari non potentes. Quae autem circa Asiam, intellectivae quidem, et artificiosae secundum animam, sine animositate autem; propter quod subiectae quidem et servientes perseverant.

Polit.L5

970. Genus autem Graecorum, sicut mediat secundum loca, ita ambobus participat. Etenim animosum et intellectivum est, propter quod quidem liberum perseverat, et maxime politizans, et potens principari omnibus una sortiens politia. Eandem autem differentiam, et graecorum gentes ad invicem, hae quidem enim habent naturam monocolam, hae autem bene mixtae sunt ad utrasque potentias has.

Polit.L5

971. Manifestum igitur quod oportet intellectivos esse et animosos natura eos, qui debent esse evagogi legislatori ad virtutem.

Polit.L5

972. Quod quidem enim aiunt quidam, oportere existere custodibus: scilicet amativos quidem esse notorum, da ignotos autem sylvestres, animus est qui facit quod amativum: haec enim est animae potentia, qua diligimus. Signum autem, ad consuetos enim et amicos animus attolitur magis quam ad ignotos parvipendi putans. Propter quod, et Archilocus convenienter amicis querelans disputat ad animum. Non enim ab amicis a lanceis perforationes. Et quod principans autem, et quod liberum a potentia hac existit omnibus: principativum enim et invincibile animus.

Polit.L5

973. Non bene autem habet dicere, graves esse ad ignotos: ad nullum enim oportet esse talem, neque sunt qui magnanimi natura agrestes, nisi ad iniusta agentes: hoc autem magis adhuc ad consuetos patiuntur, quod quidem dictum est prius, si iniuste pati putent. Et hoc accidit secundum rationem: apud quos enim deberi beneficentiam putant, cum nocumento et hac privari putant. Unde dictum est: severi enim inimici fratrum; et ii quidem ultra diligentes, ii autem et ultra odiunt.

¹²

Polit.L5

974. De politizantibus quidem igitur quot oportet existere, et quales quosdam natura; adhuc autem regionem quantam quandam, et qualem quandam, determinatum est fere: non enim eandem certitudinem oportet quaerere per rationes, et eorum quae fiunt per sensum.

Polit.L5

Postquam philosophus de civili multitudine determinavit, transit nunc ad inquirendum quales secundum naturam oporteat esse gubernantes recte. Et circa hoc primo praemittit intentionem suam cum ordine considerandi. Secundo cum dicit, quae quidem enim in frigidis etc. prosequitur. Tertio cum dicit, de politizantibus quidem etc. recapitulat dicta. In prima parte ipse dicit, quod determinato de his quae supponenda sunt ex parte magnitudinis civitatis in generali, restat consequenter dicere quales secundum naturalem dispositionem oporteat esse futuros bene gubernantes; quod secundo proponebatur prius inquirendum. Fere autem fiet hoc manifestum, si aliquis voluerit considerare inspiciendo ad civitates Graecorum quas dicimus bene gubernare, et etiam ad totum orbem terrae, secundum quod est occupatus gentibus et civitatibus, considerando dispositiones naturales earum; ex istis enim aliqualiter poterit concludi intentum.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit quae quidem prosequitur. Et circa primum praemittit diversas dispositiones regionum ad gubernandum. Secundo cum dicit, pater igitur etc., ex hoc infert intentum. Et circa primum adhuc primo tangit, qui sunt inepti ad gubernandum naturaliter. Secundo cum dicit, at Graecorum genus qui sunt apti magis. Circa primum est intelligendum, quod quamvis intellectus per se non communicet corpori in operatione sua, communicat tamen corpori communicanti, secundum Commentatorem libro de anima. Quicquid enim intelligit, in phantasmatibus sensibilibus intelligit; quia cum speculatur, necesse est simul phantasma aliquod speculari. Phantasmata autem in actu sensibilia sunt in actu, sicut dicitur tertio de anima. Sensibile vero in actu, et sensus in actu, sunt unum in actu; et ideo secundum diversam dispositionem sensus in actu diversimode disponitur intellectus ad intelligendum. Sensus autem in actu diversimode disponitur secundum diversitatem organi et spiritus, specialiter in subtilitate et grossitie in quo primo videntur sigillari, formae sensibilium. Et ideo secundum diversitatem spiritus in grossitie et subtilitate, et aliis huiusmodi, diversimode disponitur intellectus ad intelligendum; ita ut qui habent spiritus subtiles et claros bene repraesentativos formarum sensibilium, bene nati sunt intelligere; qui autem grossos et turbidos, prave. Multitudo etiam spiritus naturalis et sanguinis, et per consequens caliditatis, facit homines robustos. Robur enim facit spiritus, secundum philosophum libro de somno: et multitudo calidi animosos et excessivos, quia calidum maxime activum est inter qualitates. Habitantes autem in regionibus calidis, caliditate regionis poros aperiente, exhalat humidum, trahens secum calidum intrinsecum; et ideo sunt pauci sanguinis et caliditatis. Spiritus autem, et si paucos habeant, claros tamen et mundos habent, et ideo bene intellectivi sunt. Habitantes autem in frigidis, frigiditate extrinseca poros concludente, fortificatur calidum interius, et sunt fortis digestionis, et plurimo indigent cibo. Spiritus autem multos habent propter multitudinem calidi, grossos tamen propter grossitiem et multitudinem alimenti, et propter minorem exhalationem. Et ideo propter abundantiam caliditatis et sanguinis animosi sunt, propter grossitiem autem spirituum et turbulentiam minus intellectivi. Qui autem habitant in temperatis regionibus, medio modo se habent inter istos, mediocriter dispositi ad animositatem et ad operationem intellectus. Hoc supposito, dicit quod habitantes in regionibus frigidis, et circa Europam quae est regio protensa ad Aquilonem in parte remota a via solis, sunt naturaliter animosi propter abundantiam sanguinis et caliditatis, propter causam dictam; in intellectu autem (speculativo scilicet) et arte, hoc est intellectu factivo, inveniuntur deficientes magis, et ideo quia animosi sunt, et potentes, libere vivunt in regionibus propriis potentes, et audentes repellere insultus insurgentium; nesciunt autem bene gubernare, nec principare vicinis propter defectus intellectus et prudentiae quae requiruntur ad bene gubernandum et principandum recte. Habitantes autem in regionibus calidis, et circa Asiam, quae est regio protensa ad meridiem prope viam solis, bene intellectivi sunt, et artificiosi multum secundum animam, propter subtilitatem et munditiam spirituum in eis causa praedicta; tamen timidi et sine animositate sunt propter defectum sanguinis et caliditatis naturalis; et ideo subiecti sunt, et serviunt aliis, non audentes, nec potentes repellere debellantes, nisi forte quandoque per fraudem et dolum excogitare per intellectum quem habent subtilem.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit genus autem declarat qui sunt magis apti; dicens quod illi, qui medium locum tenent inter praedictas regiones Europam et Asiam, sicut genus Graecorum, sicut medium tenent secundum locum, ita et secundum dispositiones. Non enim tantum est frigidum apud eos, sicut in Septentrione, nec tantum calidum sicut apud eos qui circa Asiam; et ideo temperati existentes secundum calidum et frigidum ambobus participant; sunt enim intellectivi, minus tamen quam qui circa Asiam, et etiam animosi minus quam qui circa Europam; et ideo permanent liberi in regione sua, potentes et audentes aliqualiter repellere debellantes: bene etiam nati sunt gubernare inter se, et principari aliis secundum aliquam unam rempublicam propter vigorem intellectus et rationis in eis. In ipsa etiam regione Graeciae invenitur differentia gentis alicuius ad alias in eadem regione, quae totius Graecorum ad duas praedictas; ita quod in aliqua eius parte habitantes habent naturam quasi unius membri, vel dispositionis unius; puta quia accedunt ad Septentrionem magis inter Graecos, magis animosi sunt inter ipsos naturaliter. Habitantes autem in alia parte, alterius dispositionis sunt; sicut habitantes in parte propinquiori Asiae, magis intellectivi sunt inter eos. Alii autem sunt bene mixti sive proportionati ad utrasque potentias istas, scilicet intellectivam et animativam; sicut illi qui magis accedunt ad medium per aeque distantia.

Polit.L5

Sed contra ista argueret aliquis rationabiliter: quod cum ea quae sunt naturalia, semper vel in pluribus eodem modo se habeant, sed Graeci sunt nati principari aliis, non autem illi qui circa Asiam vel Europam, sequeretur, quod Graeci semper vel in maiori parte principarentur aliis, et alii non ipsis, cuius contrarium apparet ex historiis antiquorum (Chaldaei enim et Persae qui sunt circa Asiam, multo tempore dominati sunt ipsis, et vicinis eorum, monarchiam tenentes: similiter Romani qui circa Europam sunt, plurimo tempore dominati sunt Graecis, quam e contrario: diuturnior enim fuit monarchia Romanorum quam Graecorum): ergo videtur quod ipsi non sint nati principari aliis, sed magis e contrario.

Polit.L5.sc

Ad hoc est intelligendum, quod dispositiones naturales rerum naturalium, quae sunt hic, reducuntur in dispositionem caelestem, sicut dicit philosophus in primo Meteororum dicens: est autem ex necessitate continuus iste mundus superioribus lationibus, ut omnis sui virtus gubernetur inde. Unde motus principium omnibus illam causam putandum esse. Et hoc satis ostendit octavo physicorum. Dispositio autem caelestis per comparationem ad ea quae sunt hic, duplex est: una communis quae attenditur secundum propinquitatem vel remotionem a via solis, qui maxime movet ista inferiora. Et secundum hoc quidam hic existentes sunt calidi, quidam frigidi, quidam temperati, et inclinantur ad ea ad quae ista disponunt. Et quantum esset de inclinatione naturali Graecorum in tali dispositione magis temperati essent natura, et magis attingerent ad utrumque dictorum prius, scilicet animositatem et intellectum proportionaliter, et magis nati essent gubernare et principari aliis, et Septentrionales magis animosi deficientes intellectu; qui autem circa Asiam, e contrario. Alia autem est dispositio caelestis in ordine ad ea, quae attenditur secundum figuram stellarum erraticarum ad seinvicem et ad fixas, et in ordine ad ea quae sunt hic: et ista dispositio vel ista figura continue alia et alia est aliquo modo, quamvis non sensibiliter hoc appareat, et respectu alterius et alterius loci alia et alia; ita quod si respectu huius regionis sit nunc talis figura caelestis, consequenter in alio tempore erit alia; et si respectu huius regionis sit talis, respectu alterius erit alia. Si igitur aliqua dispositio insit alicui civitati vel regioni ex tali figura caelesti, durante figura inerit dispositio illa naturaliter. Et secundum hunc modum potest dici, quod Graeci ex figura caelesti tali aliquando nati fuerunt bene gubernare, et principari aliis; aliquando autem alia; puta Chaldaei vel Romani: et si ista figura non permanet nunc, nunc non sunt nati ad eadem, sed ad alia, secundum exigentiam figurae nunc existentis.

Polit.L5

Ulterius etiam intelligendum est, quod dispositio civitatis vel regionis naturalis non tantum consideratur ex figura caelesti absolute, sed etiam ex dispositione partium regionis vel civitatis secundum habitudinem quam habet ad montes vel mare, vel loca, paludosa vel munda. Virtus enim figurae caelestis non recipitur in contento, nisi mediante continente proximo. Et secundum hoc potest contingere quod quamvis aliqua civitas vel regio sit frigida naturaliter et inclinetur ad ea quae disponit frigidum, quantum est ex dispositione figurae caelestis communis, tamen secundum dispositionem regionis per comparationem ad montes vel mare, contingit eam esse calidam excellenter, aut etiam temperatam, vel e contrario. Ex quo contingit quod quamvis existentes in aliqua regione non inclinentur ad gubernandum bene ex figura caelesti communi, tamen ex speciali dispositione ipsius hoc potest ei contingere.

Polit.L5

Tertio est intelligendum, quod virtus caelestis cum sit materialis et corporea, intellectus autem immaterialis et separatus, non agit per se ipsum, sed tantum per accidens inquantum dependet ex sensu; et ideo intellectus et voluntas non necessitantur in operationibus suis a virtute caelesti per se. Unde potest contingere quod quamvis aliqui ex virtute caelesti vel naturali dispositione non inclinentur ad gubernandum, nec ad operationes intellectus vel virtutis, si tamen per electionem intendant studio sapientiae et exercitio virtutum, continget eos esse intellectivos et bene gubernantes: et e contrario si bene nati ad ista dent se otio et exercitio in malis operationibus, efficientur insipientes et male gubernantes, et servi aliorum fient. Et hoc forte fuit una causa destructionis regni Romanorum et Graecorum; tenentes enim monarchiam viventes in tranquillitate dederunt se otio et voluptatibus carnalibus et avaritiae, nolentes vacare sapientiae; et ideo facti minus intelligentes et minus exercitati in actionibus civilibus et bellicis, non paruerunt subiecti ipsis nescientibus et impotentibus obviare. Per praedicta apparet solutio ad obiectum.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit manifestum igitur infert ex praecedentibus quales nati sunt bene gubernare et principari. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, nam quod de etc. manifestat hoc ex dicto quorumdam. In prima parte dicit, quod quia Graeci bene gubernant, et principantur aliis naturaliter, quia animosi sunt, et bene intellectivi, Asiani autem servi sunt aliorum, quia inanimosi sunt, quamvis vigeant intellectu; Septentrionales autem aliis non principantur, quia deficiunt intellectu, quamvis sint animosi; manifestum est, quod oportet eos esse de numero legislatorum qui debent esse boni ductores ad virtutem, et bene gubernare inter se, et principari aliis; esse animosos, ut possint malos compescere, et debellantes impugnare; et bene intellectivos, ut sciant se dirigere et alios in operationibus.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem probat hoc ex dicto quorumdam. Et circa hoc primo ex parte illius dicti ostendit intentum. Secundo cum dicit, non bene autem habet etc. reprobat alteram partem eiusdem dicti. In prima parte dicit, quod illud quod quidam dicunt, ostendit quod oportet bene gubernantes esse animosos. Dicunt enim quod oportet custodes aliorum et principantes esse amativos notorum, ad ignotos autem sylvestres, et duros magis. Signum autem primi est, quia animus hominis magis attollitur colloquendo et bene faciendo, reputans se debere magis reputari ab eis respectu notorum et consuetorum quam respectu ignotorum, putans se parvipendi. Noti enim et consueti magis reputantur amici, ignotus autem quasi non amicus; et ideo disponitur homo ad notum et consuetum sicut ad seipsum, ad ignotos autem sicut ad inimicum; et propter hoc sicut quilibet reputat seipsum, et magni pendit, ita vult reputari et magnipendi ab amico et noto; ab inimico autem et ignoto, putat non reputari et parvipendi. Non autem quod custodes oportet esse amativos, quia animus, idest voluntas est quae facit homines amativos invicem; haec enim potentia principium est dilectionis. Propter quod Archilocus querelans de amicis disputat ad animum, quasi ad amicum, dicens, quod homines non sustinent vulnerationes a lanceis ab amicis, sed bona magis. Amare enim est velle alicui bonum propter ipsum. Velle autem est actus voluntatis, ergo et diligere. Inclinatio autem ad principandum et ad actus libertatis est ab ista potentia omnibus qui ad hoc inclinantur: principativum enim et invincibilem, et liberum dicimus animum, quia principari primo et per se est agere, immediatum autem principium agendi in nobis est animus sive voluntas; et ideo animus est principativum quid. Libertas autem est, quae in natura intellectiva per virtutem eius quod principale est in ea et intrinsecum agit in finem proprium secundum illum idem. Agere autem in natura intellectuali ad finem proximo competit animo et voluntati, secundum Aristotelem nono metaphysicorum. Et ideo libertas est virtus quaedam voluntatis in ordine ad intellectum praecedentem, et finem sequentem. Si igitur animus est secundum quem principamur et liberi sumus, et animus est quo amamus, quod competit principantibus et custodibus, ut iam dictum est, convenienter dictum est quod principantes oporteret esse animosos.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit non bene reprobat alteram partem dicti aliorum; dicens, quod non convenienter dicunt in eo, quod aiunt, quod principantes vel superiores in civitate oportet esse infestos et diros ad ignotos: non enim expedit ad aliquem hominem bonum esse tales, quia facto et verbo expedit magis se reddere amabiles. Viri etiam magnanimi, qui sunt digni principari, non sunt severi seu diri ad aliquos, nisi contra iniustos; quia non expedit eos esse diros, nisi eis qui contrariantur eis secundum quod huiusmodi. Ipsi autem secundum quod huiusmodi, virtuosi sunt, vel debent esse; magnanimitas enim est ornatus virtutum, ut dicitur quarto Ethicorum. Virtuti autem contrariatur malitia, seu iniustitia, secundum quod iniustitia se extendit ad omnem malitiam. Magis autem duri sunt ad notos, seu amicos, si fuerint mali, sive putent se iniuste pati ab eis: et hoc rationabiliter faciunt: si enim ab amicis iniuste patiuntur, nocumentum reportant ab eo a quo credebant se iuvari debere; et ipso privantur, propter quod indignantur magis; amicus enim est velut alter ipse, ut dictum est. Et ideo sicut aliquis ad seipsum disponitur, ita ad amicum. A seipso autem expectat unusquisque bonum, et non nocumentum, propter quod et ab amico: unde si putet reportare nocumentum, indignatur. Et quanto magis amicus, tanto magis creditur teneri ad beneficentiam. Et ideo dicitur proverbialiter, quod fratrum inimicitia crudelis est valde; et quod illi, qui valde diligunt se invicem, fiunt valde inimici ex casu, sicut eadem fiunt calidissima et frigidissima, sicut dicit Aristoteles, quarto Meteororum. Dicimus enim de magno amico magnum inimicum fieri. Sic igitur non expedit magnanimum vel principantem esse agrestem ad aliquem, nisi ad iniustum; et magis si fuerit amicus prius.

Polit.L5

Deinde cum dicit de politizantibus recapitulat, dicens, quod de viventibus in civitate determinatum est quot oportet esse secundum multitudinem in civitate ordinata, et quales secundum naturalem dispositionem. Iterum de regione dictum est, quantam et qualem oportet eam esse ad bene habitandum in civitate, per rationes verisimiles, et concordantes sensui. Non enim eamdem certitudinem oportet quaerere eorum, quae sunt manifesta ratione sola non conveniente usquequaque sensui, et eorum quae conveniunt cum sensu.

Polit.L5

L. 6 (Η.8, 1328a21–1328b23)Sex esse sine quibus civitas consistere non potest.

Sex esse sine quibus civitas consistere non potest.

Polit.L6

975. Quoniam autem, sicut aliorum secundum naturam constantium non hae sunt partes totius consistentiae, sine quibus totum non erit utique; palam quia neque civitatis partes ponendum quascumque civitatibus necessarium existere, neque alterius communionis ullius, ex qua unum aliquid genere.

Polit.L6

976. Unum enim aliquid, et commune oportet esse, et hoc communicantibus, sive aequale sive inaequale transmutant, veluti sive alimentum hoc est, sive regionis multitudo, sive aliquid aliud talium est. Quando autem fuerit hoc quidem huius gratia, hoc autem cuius gratia, nihil in iis commune, sed aut huic quidem facere, huic autem accipere. Dico autem puta organo omni ad id, quod sit opus, et condentibus: domus enim ad aedificatorem, nihil est quod sit commune, sed est domus gratia aedificatorum ars. Propter quod opus est possessione civitatibus: possessio autem nulla pars est civitatis. Multa autem animata sunt partes possessionis, civitas autem communitas quaedam est similium, gratia autem vitae contingentis optimae.

Polit.L6

977. Quoniam autem est felicitas quod optimum, haec autem virtutis operatio, et usus quidam perfectus; accidit autem sic, ut hos quidem contingat participare ipsa, hos autem modicum, aut nihil: palam quod haec causa, quare fiant civitatis species et differentiae, et politiae plures. Alio enim modo et per alia singuli haec venantes, et vitas alteras faciunt, et politias.

Polit.L6

978. Considerandum autem, et quot sint haec, sine quibus civitas non erit utique. Etenim quas dicimus esse partes civitatis, in iis utique erit, propterea quod necessarium existere. Sumendum igitur operum numerum.

Polit.L6

979. Ex iis enim erit palam. Primo quidem igitur oportet existere alimentum, deinde artes (multis enim organis indiget id quod est vivere), tertio autem arma, communitates enim necessarium et in ipsis habere arma et ad principatum, inobedientium gratia et ad conantes iniusta inferre extrinsecus. Adhuc pecuniarum aliquam abundantiam, quatenus habeant et ad opportunitates quae secundum se ipsos et ad bellicas. Quinto autem et praecipue ea quae circa divinorum curam quam vocant sacerdotium. Sextum autem numero et omnium necessariissimum iudicium de conferentibus et iustis ad invicem.

Polit.L6

980. Opera quidem igitur haec sunt quibus indiget omnis civitas, ut dicere: civitas enim multitudo est non quaecumque sed ad vitam per se sufficiens, ut diximus. Si autem aliquid horum contingat deficere, impossibile simpliciter per se sufficientem communionem hanc esse.

Polit.L6

981. Necesse igitur secundum operationes has consistere civitatem: oportet ergo agricolarum esse multitudinem quae praeparet alimenta, et artifices, et quod pugnax, et quod opulentum, et sacerdotes, et iudices necessariorum et conferentium.

Polit.L6

Postquam philosophus inquisivit de his quae supponenda sunt ad rempublicam rectam ex parte materiae remotae, inquirit nunc de his quae supponenda sunt ex parte materiae propinquae. Civitatis autem materia propinqua est duplex. Una proprie sicut liberi principantes, et subiecti, qui attingunt ad civitatem. Alia autem domus, et aedificia civitatis et regionis, quae magis se habent in ratione organi. Dividitur igitur pars ista in duas: quia primo inquirit, quae sunt partes civitatis proprie dictae. Secundo de aedificiis, et domibus, et dispositione civitatis et regionis, cum dicit, civitatem autem et cetera. Adhuc in prima parte ostendit primo, quae sunt necessaria ad consistentiam civitatis. Secundo cum dicit, determinatis autem etc. inquirit quae eorum sunt partes civitatis. Circa primum adhuc ostendit, quod non omnia quae requiruntur ad consistentiam civitatis, sunt partes ipsius. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem etc., declarat quae exiguntur ad consistentiam eius. Primum ostendit duabus rationibus. Secundum ponit ibi, unum enim aliquid et cetera. In prima parte dicit: sicut est in his quae fiunt et constant secundum naturam, ita in civitate, quae est a natura inclinante, et ratione perficiente. In his autem quae fiunt et constant natura, non omnia quae requiruntur ad consistentiam ipsorum sunt partes illorum: sed quaedam sunt sicut materia, quaedam autem ad ornatum, et quaedam ad alia; sicut in animali alimentum et humores non sunt partes in actu, sed sicut materia; pili autem ad ornatum sunt, seu ad protectionem, sudores autem sicut decidentia a natura. Ergo manifestum est, quod neque civitatis, neque communicationis alterius cuiuscumque, ex pluribus ex quibus fit aliquod unum ratione, omnia dicenda sunt partes, sine quibus non existunt.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit unum enim ponit secundam rationem ad idem, quae est haec. Omnium partium per se alicuius totius est aliquid unum commune, per quod determinantur et sunt, et haec est forma totius. Et ad hoc attingunt omnes sive aequaliter sive inaequaliter per transmutationem factam ad illud ex aliqua materia; sive illa sit alimentum, sicut in animalibus et plantis, sive multitudo hominum in regione, sive in civitate, vel aliquid aliud, sicut in quibuscumque aliis. Quando vero aliqua plura sic se habent, quod unum est gratia alterius ut finis, alterum autem est sicut finis ipsorum, non est aliquod unum commune secundum rationem, sed ad alterum istorum pertinet attingere aliquod principaliter, ad alterum autem attingere accipiendo virtutem ab alio: sicut se habet organum ad opus factum, et ad agens principale, quibus non est aliquid commune secundum rationem, sicut domui et aedificatori nihil est commune secundum quod huiusmodi, sed ars aedificatoria et organa aedificandi sunt propter ipsam domum. Igitur quorum unum est gratia alterius secundum quod huiusmodi, non sunt partes alicuius unius. Possessio vero in civitate est gratia possidentis. Quamvis igitur sit necessaria civitati, non erit aliqua pars civitatis, cuius partes sunt possidentes per se. Sed multa sunt animata, quae sunt possessio alterius, sicut iumentum, et servus, qui est organum animatum alterius possessio existens, sine quibus tamen non est civitas: ergo multa sunt in civitate, quae non sunt partes ipsius. Civitas enim est communitas quaedam ex pluribus similibus secundum naturam composita gratia per se sufficientis et optimae vitae.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem intendit declarare quae sunt necessaria ad consistentiam civitatis. Et circa hoc primo tangit ex quibus sumitur diversitas rerumpublicarum et civitatum. Secundo cum dicit, considerandum etc. ex quibus sumitur numerus eorum quae sunt necessaria ad civitatem. Tertio cum dicit, ex iis enim etc. sumit eorum numerum. In prima parte est intelligendum, quod ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem ex fine sumitur: et ideo diversitas eorum primo est ex diversitate finis, deinde ex diverso modo se habendi ad ipsum. Finis autem civitatis felicitas est; et ideo dicit: quoniam felicitas est optimum, quod intenditur, sicut finis in civitate; felicitas autem est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam, et exercitium illius perfectum; et contingit aliquos in civitate habentes attingere ad huiusmodi operationem perfectam, alios autem contingit attingere modicum, alios autem nihil, sed ad contrarium magis: manifestum est quod haec est causa quare sint diversae species et differentiae rerumpublicarum: diversitas enim rerumpublicarum est ex diversitate finis, vel ex diverso modo se habendi ad finem. Ex hoc enim quod diversos fines eligunt vel eumdem, alio et alio modo, et per alia et alia venantur, diversas vitas faciunt, et per consequens diversas respublicas. Diversi enim modi vivendi diversae respublicae sunt. Diversae igitur respublicae sunt ex diversitate finium, vel ex diverso modo se habendi ad finem.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit considerandum autem declarat ex quibus sumitur numerus eorum, quae sunt necessaria ad civitatem. Et praemittens intentionem suam, dicit, quod post haec considerandum est nobis quae et quot sunt illa quae sunt necessaria ad consistentiam civitatis. Inter ista enim invenientur illa quae per se sunt partes illius. Et quia unumquodque eorum quae sunt natura vel arte, determinatur aliqua propria operatione, sicut dicitur primo huius, sumendae sunt operationes eorum quae sunt in civitate. Et diversitate enim istarum, manifesta erit multitudo necessariorum ad eam.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit ex iis enim primo assumit operationes necessarias civitati. Secundo cum dicit, necesse igitur etc. concludit multitudinem eorum quae requiruntur ad consistentiam eius. Circa primum primo assumit operationes dictas. Secundo cum dicit, opera quidem igitur etc. probat eas esse necessarias. In prima parte dicit, quod civitati cuicumque, si debeat esse civitas, oportet praeexistere praeparationem alimenti, siquidem debeant vivere et nutriri. Deinde autem operationes artium, puta fabricationem et carpentationem et huiusmodi; multis enim indigent organis existentes in civitate quae praeparantur per huiusmodi opera. Deinde tertio oportet in ipsis esse arma: communicantibus enim communicatione civili sunt necessaria propter duo: primo quidem ad seipsos ad puniendum insolentes et transgredientes leges vel principatus gratia inobedientium constitui mandatum. Secundo ad repellendum extrinsecus volentes inferre molestiam iniuste. Deinde oportet eos habere pecuniarum abundantiam aliquam similiter propter duo. Primo propter opportunitates ad commutationes inter se faciendas. Secundo ad expeditiones bellorum si emergant. Deinde autem quinto expedit inesse civitati quod principium est inter dictam curam et cultum divinum, quod appellatur sacerdotium. Sexto oportet inesse rectam deliberationem de conferentibus et nocivis, et iudicium iustum de his quae veniunt in disceptatione.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit opera quidem probat huiusmodi opera esse necessaria una ratione communi; dicens quod huiusmodi operationes sunt necessariae civitati omni, ut ita dicatur: quod adiunctum est propter aliquas civitates quae propter dispositionem regionis non similiter indigent omnibus praedictis, aut non indigent similiter, ut forte abundantia pecuniarum propter abundantiam divitiarum naturalium. Et ratio huius quod dictum est, est quoniam civitas communitas quaedam multitudinis civium est, non quaecumque, sed per se sufficiens ad bene vivere, ut est dictum. Si vero aliquod praedictorum operum contingat deficere in aliqua multitudine, ut puta praeparationem alimenti vel artificiatorum, aut etiam arma, non erit per se sufficiens ad bene vivere, ut ex se manifestum est; ergo non erit civitas. Si ergo debeat esse civitas, necesse est omnia huiusmodi opera inesse ipsi.

Polit.L6

Deinde cum dicit necesse igitur concludit numerum eorum quae sunt necessaria in civitate; dicens, quod si huiusmodi operationes sunt necessariae, et ipsae non possunt esse sine quibusdam aliis, puta praeparatio alimenti sine agricolis, opera artium sine artificibus, opera armorum sine pugnantibus, divitiae sine opulentis, nec cultus divinus sine sacerdote, nec iudicium sine iudice, manifestum est quod ad consistentiam civitatis, necessarii sunt agricolae, artifices, bellici, divites, sacerdotes et iudices.

Polit.L6

L. 7 (Η.9–10, 1328b24–1329b39)Quinam in optima civitate habendi sint pars civitatis.

Quinam in optima civitate habendi sint pars civitatis.

Polit.L7

982. Determinatis autem iis, reliquum considerare, utrum omnibus communicanda omnia haec (contingit enim eosdem omnes esse et agricolas et artifices, et consiliarios et iudicantes): aut secundum unumquodque opus dictorum alios supponendum. Aut haec quidem propria, haec autem communia eorum ex necessitate sunt.

Polit.L7

983. Non in omni autem politia haec. Sicut enim diximus, contingit et omnes communicare omnibus, et non omnes omnibus, sed quosdam quibusdam: haec enim et faciunt politias alteras. In democratiis enim participant omnes omnibus, in oligarchiis autem e contrario.

Polit.L7

984. Quoniam autem existimus considerantes de optima polita, haec autem secundum quam civitas utique erit maxime felix: felicitatem autem, quod sine virtute impossibile est existere, dictum est prius: manifestum quod in optima politizante civitate, et habente iustos viros simpliciter, sed non ad suppositionem, neque banausam vitam, neque forensem oportet quaerere cives. Vilis enim talis vita, et ad virtutem subcontraria. Neque oportet agricolas esse; opus est enim vacatione, et ad virtutis generationem, et ad actiones politicas.

Polit.L7

985. Quoniam autem quod bellicum et quod consiliativum de conferentibus, et iudicans de iustis inexistit, et videntur maxime esse partes civitatis; utrum altera et hoc ponendum, aut eisdem dandum ambo.

Polit.L7

986. Manifestum utique et hoc, quia modo quidem aliquo eisdem, modo autem aliquo et alteris. Qua quidem enim alterius aetatis utrumque operum, et haec quidem indiget prudentia, haec autem potentia, alteris. Qua autem impossibilium est, potentes violenter agere et prohibere, hos sufferre subiectos semper, hac eosdem. Qui enim armorum domini, et manendi et non manendi politiam sunt domini. Relinquitur igitur eisdem quidem utrisque dare politiam hanc; non autem simul; sed sicut aptum natum est, potentia quidem in minoribus, prudentia autem in senioribus est. Igitur sic ambobus distribui expedit et iustum esse videtur: habet enim haec divisio quod secundum dignitatem.

Polit.L7

987. At vero, et possessiones oportet esse circa hos. Necessarium enim abundantiam existere civibus, cives autem isti: quod enim banausum non participat civitate, neque alia nulla pars, quae non virtutis conditiva est. Hoc autem palam ex suppositione: felicitari quidem enim necessarium existere cum virtute, felicem aut civitatem non ad partem aliquam ipsius respicientes oportet dicere, sed ad omnes cives. Manifestum autem, et quod oportet possessiones esse horum; siquidem necessarium agricolas esse servos, aut barbaros, aut vernaculos.

Polit.L7

988. Reliquum autem ex dinumeratis, quod sacerdotum genus. Manifestum autem, et horum ordo: neque enim agricolam neque banausum sacerdotem constituendum. A civibus enim decet honorari Deos. Quoniam autem divisum est id quod civile in duas partes, hoc est in id quod armorum, et quod in consiliativum. Decet autem cultum exhibere diis, et requiem habere circa ipsos eos, qui propter tempus abdicati sunt; hos assignandum utique erit sanctificationibus.

Polit.L7

989. Sine quibus quidem igitur civitas non consistit, et quot partes civitatis, dictum est. Agricolas enim, et artifices, et omne quod mercenarium, necessarium existere civitatibus: partes autem civitatis, id quod armorum, et consiliativum: et separatum est utique unumquodque horum, hoc quidem semper, hoc autem secundum partem.

Polit.L7

990. Videtur autem non nunc neque recenter hoc esse notum iis qui de politia philosophizant, quod oportet divisam esse seorsum secundum genera civitate, et quod bellicum alterum esse, alterum quod terrae cultivum: in Aegypto enim habet hoc modo. Adhuc autem et nunc, quae circa Cretam. Quod quidem igitur circa Aegyptum Sesostris, ut aiunt, ita lege statuit. Minos autem quae circa Cretam. Aliqua autem videtur esse, et conviviorum institutio. Quae quidem circa Cretam facta circa regimen Minois.

Polit.L7

991. Quae autem circa Italiam multo antiquiora iis: aiunt enim historiae inhabitantium ibi Italum quendam fuisse regem Oenotriae, a quo nomen transumentes Italos pro Oenotriis vocatos esse, et oram hanc Europae Italiae nomen accepisse, quaecumque existit intra sinum Scylleticum, et Lameticum. Distant autem haec ab invicem itinere mediae dici. Hunc itaque Italum dicunt Oenotrios pastores existentes fecisse agricolas, et leges ipsis alias posuisse, et convivia constituisse primo, propter quod et nunc ibidem observant convivia, et leges quasdam ordinatas ab illo. Apud Tyrrheniam autem habitant prius Opici dicti, et nunc vocati cognominatione Ausones. Quod autem ad Iapygiam et Ionium Chaones vocatum Syrtem. Erant autem et Chaones Oenotrii genere.

Polit.L7

992. Conviviorum quidem igitur institutio, hinc facta fuit prius: separatio autem quae secundum genus civilis multitudinis, ex Aegypto: multis enim excedit temporibus regimen Minois Sesostris.

Polit.L7

993. Fere quidem igitur et alia oportet putare inventa fuisse saepe in multo tempore, magis aute infinites: necessaria quidem enim opportunitatem ipsam verisimile est docere: quae autem ad bonam aptitudinem et circumstantiam, existentibus iam iis, rationabile accipere incrementum. Quare et circa politias oportet putare eodem modo habere.

Polit.L7

994. Quod autem omnia antiqua, signum quae circa Aegyptum sunt; isti enim antiquissimi quidem videntur esse, leges autem sortiri fuerunt, et ordines politicos. Propter quod oportet dictis quidem sufficienter uti, praetermissa autem tentare quaerere.

Polit.L7

995. Quod quidem igitur oportet regionem esse arma possidentium, et participantium politia, dictum est prius, et quod agricolas oportet esse alteros ab ipsis, et quantam, et qualem oportet esse regionem.

Polit.L7

Postquam philosophus ostendit quae sunt necessaria ad consistentiam civitatis, declarat quae istorum sunt partes ipsius, et quae non: et gratia huiusmodi inquirit quae istorum contingit attribuere uni et quae non, et quomodo. Et circa hoc primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, de distributione autem etc., quia dixerat agricolas non debere esse partes civitatis optimae, determinat de divisione regionis, et quos oportet esse agricolas. Circa primum primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, quod quidem igitur etc. recapitulat. Circa primum adhuc facit, quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, videtur autem etc., declarat illud non esse novum, sed ab antiquis inventum prius. Circa primum dans intentionem suam ponit dubitationem, utrum omnia praedicta vel quaedam possunt eidem convenire. Secundo solvit cum dicit, non in omni autem. Primo igitur dicit, quod post declarationem dictorum, relinquitur considerandum, utrum omnia praedicta sex sint communicanda omnibus in civitate, ita quod idem sit agricola, artifex et miles, et sic de aliis. Hoc enim bene possibile est, scilicet eosdem esse agricolas et consiliarios, et sic de aliis. Aut unumquodque istorum attribuendum est uni conditioni hominum, puta quod quidam sint agricolae, alii autem et diversi milites, et sic de aliis? An magis quaedam istorum sint attribuenda eisdem, quaedam autem omnino diversis? Hoc enim dubitationem habet, cuius determinatio valet ad declarandum intentum principale.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit non in omni dissolvit dubitationem; et primo ponit solutionem in generali. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem existimus etc. manifestat eam in speciali. Primo ergo in generali solvit eam, dicens, quod in civitate bene ordinata non expedit omnia praedicta communicare omnibus, sed nec singula singulis; sed quaedam ipsorum oportet esse propria quorumdam tantum et non aliorum, quaedam autem communia pluribus necessario. Sed hoc non habet veritatem in omni republica, sed in bene ordinata tantum. Sicut enim prius dicebatur in tertio huius, contingit omnia praedicta communicare omnibus existentibus in civitate, et non omnia omnibus, sed quaedam quibusdam; et hoc diversimode: et secundum hoc diversificari respublicas in statu populari. Igitur quae male ordinata respublica est, omnibus omnia praedicta necesse est communicare, quia scilicet in ea tota multitudo dominatur. In statu autem paucorum e contrario quaedam quibusdam, ut arma sacerdotium, consilium et iudicium eisdem forte, ut divitibus, quia dominantur, agricultura autem quibusdam aliis, et artificium aliis omnino diversis.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem existimus manifestat solutionem in speciali. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, sine quibus quidem etc. recolligit eam. Circa primum primo declarat quae dictorum non possunt eisdem attribui. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem quod bellicum etc. declarat quae contingit eisdem attribui. Ex quo apparet quae per se sunt partes civitatis. Circa primum considerandum est, quod ratio partis per se consideranda est ex ratione totius, et ratio totius in his quae ordinantur ad finem, sumitur ex fine. Et ideo ratio partium per se civitatis quaerenda est ex ratione reipublicae. Et ratio reipublicae ex ratione felicitatis quae est finis eius. Felicitatem autem impossibile est existere sine virtute, quae est principium eius. Et propter hoc ratio partium civitatis optimae per virtutem determinatur. Hoc supposito dicit, quoniam intendimus facere considerationem de republica optima simpliciter, non ex suppositione, secundum quam dicimus partes per se civitatis attingere ad felicitatem simpliciter quae est finis eius; felicitas autem non potest existere sine virtute, sicut dictum est prius, est enim operatio hominis secundum virtutem perfectam: manifestum est quod mercenariorum vitam ducentes, vel etiam forensem, seu mercativam, non oportet dicere esse cives vel partes per se civitatis optime se gubernantis, habentis viros simpliciter bonos non ex suppositione. Cuius ratio est, quia cives in civitate optima oportet operari ad felicitatem, et habere illud quod est principium ipsius. Hoc autem est virtus civilis; ergo oportet cives in huiusmodi civitate virtuosos esse. Mercenariam autem vitam ducentes aut forensem virtuosi non sunt et huiusmodi. Vita enim eorum vilis existens ad eam non dirigitur, nec ordinatur; immo magis est non conveniens vel subcontraria ei; ergo tales non sunt cives, neque pars civitatis optimae. Nec etiam agricolae seu terram colentes; quoniam civibus necessaria est vacatio ab operationibus necessariis et vilibus, et intendere contemplationi quandoque et operationibus liberalibus ad generationem virtutis et ad actiones communes, per quas determinantur: huiusmodi autem vacatio non potest inesse agricolis, cum sint dediti agriculturae et laboribus extrinsecis; ergo non sunt cives vel pars civitatis.

Polit.L7

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem quod bellicum inquirit quae praedictorum possunt inesse eidem. Et primo declarat quod bellicum et consiliativum debent eidem attribui aliquo modo. In secunda cum dicit, reliquum autem etc. declarat quod ista eadem et sacerdotium eidem aliquo modo, et alteri alio aliquo modo attribuenda sunt. Circa primum primo movet dubitationem. Secundo cum dicit, manifestum utique etc. dissolvit eam. Circa primum est intelligendum quod aliquis bene consiliativus est per habitum prudentiae per quem ex fine bene ratiocinatur et inquirit de his quae sunt ad finem. Sicut autem aliquis se habet ad prudentiam perfectam, ita et ad alias virtutes morales, quia simul sunt et non sunt; et ideo consiliativum determinatur virtute. Bellicum etiam oportet habere virtutem per quam sit aggressivus terribilium; et per consequens prudentiam aliquam ad hoc necessariam et alias aliqualiter virtutes: unde et dicebat prius philosophus in secundo huius, quod militaris vita multas habet partes virtutis; et ideo bellici et consiliativi simpliciter determinantur virtute. Et quia illi qui determinantur virtute, sunt partes civitatis optimae; ideo tales sunt partes ipsius per se; et ideo hoc supposito dicit, quod illi qui ordinantur ad bellum in civitate optima et ad consiliandum de conferentibus et ad iudicandum iuste inter disceptantes, necessarii sunt in eadem. Et maxime ubi videntur esse partes ipsius propter rationem praedictam, inquirendum est dubitando utrum iidem sint ordinandi ad bellum et ad consilium, an alii ad hoc, alii autem et diversi ad illud.

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Deinde cum dicit manifestum utique dissolvit; et primo manifestat quod ista duo aliquo modo eidem, aliquo modo alii sunt attribuenda. Secundo cum dicit, at vero et possessiones etc. ostendit quod istorum esse debent possessiones. Et in parte ista dicit, quod manifestum erit ex dicendis quod et bellicum et consiliativum sunt attribuenda eidem uno modo, alio modo alteri. Dicitur enim ad praesens idem et diversum dupliciter. Idem scilicet secundum suppositum et secundum formam, sicut Socrates idem ex supposito, ipse autem et Plato diversi. Socrates autem et Plato albi, sunt idem in forma. Socrates autem albus prius et niger posterius est alter a seipso; sicut Porphyrius dicit, quod Socrates senex differt a se puero differentia accidentali. Intendit igitur quod bellicum et consiliativum eidem secundum suppositum sunt attribuenda, differenti tamen secundum prius et posterius et secundum fortius et minus forte, magis provectum et minus. Secundum enim quod alteri aetati oportet attribuere bellicum, puta iuventuti, et alteri consiliativum, puta aetati magis provectae, et secundum quod consiliativum indiget prudentia quae magis viget in aetate provecta, et bellicum robore corporali, quod magis in iuventute, oportet ea alteri attribui; bellicum quidem iuvenibus, consiliativum autem provectis. Secundum vero quod impossibile esse eos qui possunt violentiam inferre et deiicere principantes facere semper subiectos, oportet utrumque eidem attribui. Viri autem bellici qui sunt armorum domini, potentiam habent faciendi manere rempublicam et non manere propter armorum violentiam; et ideo relinquitur utrumque istorum dari debere eisdem in republica recta, sed non secundum idem tempus; sed unicuique dare illud tempore in quo magis aptum est ad illud. Sed in iuvenibus viget virtus corporalis magis quam prudentia vel virtus quae maxime necessaria est in bellicis; et ideo bellicum attribuendum est ipsis in tempore iuventutis. Prudentia autem et virtus magis vigent in provectis quae magis sunt necessariae ad consilium et iudicium; et ideo consiliativum et iudicativum attribuenda sunt eis quando sunt provectae aetatis. Sic igitur ambo oportet attribui eisdem, in alia tamen et alia aetate: et hoc iustum videtur. Iustum enim est unumquemque habere secundum dignitatem. Dividere autem sic secundum dignitatem videtur. Dignum est enim unumquodque ordinari ad illud ad quod magis natum est, ac quanto magis natum aptum est; sic enim facit natura. Iustum est igitur ista distribui secundum praedictum modum.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero declarat quod istorum debent esse possessiones in eadem, dicens quod adhuc expedit in civitate optima possessiones esse circa hos, ita quod ipsi sint earum domini, aut maxime, quia necessarium est cives in ipsa abundantes esse. Siquidem civitas optima ordinatur per se ad sufficientiam secundum dispositionem suam. Isti autem qui dicti sunt cives sunt simpliciter. Artifices autem et quicumque alii qui non sunt factivi operationum virtutis, non participant civilitate per se. Et huiusmodi declaratio est ex suppositione; quoniam nullus potest felicitari nisi cum virtute quae est principium felicitatis. Civitatem autem optimam dicimus esse felicem simpliciter, non quantum ad aliquam partem et quantum ad aliquam non, sed quantum ad omnes cives, ut est dicere. Omnes igitur cives oportet esse virtuosos; qui ergo non sunt virtuosi, secundum quod huiusmodi, non sunt cives. Si igitur cives oportet esse abundantes, ut praedictum est, et hoc non oportet esse nisi sint domini possessionum, aut maxime necesse est eos esse dominos possessionis; et hoc si supponamus quod expedit in tali civitate agricolas esse servos, et hos aut barbaros aliunde venientes aut ministros.

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Deinde cum dicit reliquum autem declarat quod sacerdotium aliqualiter est attribuendum eisdem et aliqualiter diversis cum praedictis; et quibus non est attribuendum dicens; quod ex his quae dicta sunt necessaria civitati, enumeratis prius, relinquitur genus sacerdotum, cuius ordo ad alios satis est manifestus. Non enim expedit in republica bene ordinata artificem seu agricolam vel forensem sacerdotem constituere. Sacerdos enim ordinatur ad cultum divinum celebrandum et honorem Deo exhibendum pro subditis. Nunc autem conveniens est cultum exhiberi Deo et honorem a principalioribus civibus. Omnia enim excellentiora exhibenda sunt Deo propter eius excellentiam, a quo est omne bonum, et quicquid est. Si igitur agricolae et artifices vel forenses cives non sunt, ut probatum est prius, non expedit eos esse cives in civitate bene ordinata. Sed quoniam cives distincti sunt in duo, sicut dictum est prius, videlicet in ordinatos ad arma et consiliarios, quos aliquando contingit abdicatos esse propter intolerantiam laboris et emeritos propter exercitium praeteritum in bellicis et iudiciis, et oportet eos habere requiem maxime in speculativis, cum motus passionum sensibilium sint omnino in eis sedati, ut in pluribus; eos autem qui intendunt honori et cultui divino oporteat habere requiem et vacationem contemplationis, expedit eos promoveri ad honorem sacerdotii, et assignari ad sanctificationem hanc eos, qui abdicati sunt propter labores in praeterito passos, et emeriti propter honesta exercitia in bellicis et consiliis. Est autem intelligendum, quod sicut natura illud quod est perfectius et in tempore in quo perfectius est ad perfectiorem ordinat operationem, seu finem, sic et ratio vel ars quae imitatur naturam. Homines autem post tempus eruditionis et exercitii in disciplinabilibus imperfectiorem prudentiam habent propter motum fortiorem passionum in eis. Robur autem corporale et magnanimitatem habent maiorem propter iuventutem: hoc autem magis competit in bellicis; et ideo rationabiliter tales in aetate illa ad bellica docet ordinare philosophus. Deinde autem procedente aetate represso calido et aliqualiter remissis motibus passionum, remittitur robur et magnanimitas secundum aliquid: ratio autem et prudentia magis vigent. Sedendo enim et quiescendo fit anima sciens et prudens. Istud autem convenit deliberationi et iudiciis; et ideo secundum rationem tales ordinandi sunt ad consilia et iudicia. Ulterius autem magis procedente aetate remisso calido propter tempus et fere mortificatis passionibus, ut est dicere, aut regulatis propter longum exercitium, fere deficit robur corporale et maxime viget intellectus. Illud autem maxime requiritur in his quae ordinantur ad cultum divinum. Oportet enim eos vacare ab exterioribus actionibus et maxime intendere speculationi divinorum; et ideo in aetate tali convenienter assignandi sunt cives ad cultum divinum; ita ut primo exercitentur in bellicis, deinde in agibilibus, ultimo autem vitam finiant in speculatione divinorum, in quo ponitur ultimus finis hominis.

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Deinde cum dicit sine quibus recolligit determinata; dicens, quod sic igitur determinatum est quae sunt illa quae sunt necessaria ad consistentiam civitatis, et quot illorum sunt partes ipsius. Agricolae enim et artifices et mercenarii, qui pro mercede commutant opera, necessarii sunt in civitate, sed nequaquam sunt partes ipsius per se. Bellici autem et consiliativi et sacerdotes sunt partes civitatis, et sunt distincti a praecedentibus secundum omne tempus, a se autem invicem secundum partem temporis; ita ut idem prius ordinetur ad bellum, deinde ad consilium et ultimo ad sacerdotium.

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Deinde cum dicit videtur autem declarat ista fuisse ab antiquis inventa. Et primo narrando. Secundo cum dicit, quod autem omnia etc. per signum. Circa primum primo declarat distinctionem bellicorum et consiliariorum ab aliis, et institutionem conviviorum civilium fuisse antiquas. Secundo cum dicit, fere quidem igitur etc. concludit idem de aliis. Circa primum primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, conviviorum quidem igitur declarat quod istorum fuerit primo. Circa primum primo declarat distinctionem praedictorum institutam esse ab antiquo. Secundo cum dicit, quae autem circa etc. distinctionem conviviorum. Circa primum dicit, quod volentibus philosophice considerare de republica, apparet hoc non nunc primo neque recenter esse notum quod oportet in civitate genus bellicorum et consiliariorum esse distinctum ab agricolis et artificibus et mercenariis secundum quod huiusmodi. In Aegypto enim, ubi primo concessum est studere, secundum quod dicitur primo metaphysicorum, primo observaverunt leges statuentes. Deinde autem posterius in Creta quae est insula in Graecia. Dicunt enim quod Sesostris legislator Aegyptiorum hoc primus ordinavit per legem de quo sit memoria. Circa Cretam autem Minos legislator ipsorum.

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Deinde cum dicit quae autem declarat institutionem conviviorum ordinatam esse ab antiquis; dicens, quod institutio conviviorum civilium quibus participant omnes cives determinatis festis vel temporibus, videtur esse facta ab aliis multis, Cretensibus scilicet et Italicis. Sed illa quae ordinata fuerunt in Creta, ordinata fuerunt maxime circa tempus regiminis Minois regis. Illa autem quae in Italia, multo fuerunt antiquiora praedictis. Dicunt enim cosmographi illius regionis quemdam regem fuisse Italum nomine in illa quae tunc dicebatur Oenotria a quo accipientes nomen, dicti prius Oenotri, vocati sunt Itali, et hanc partem Europae quae sita est inter sinum maris Scylleticum, ita dictum a Scylla periculo maris in quo saepe periclitantur naves propter collisionem ad rupes praeruptas, et sinum Lameticum quod videtur esse, quod dividit praedictam Italiam ex parte opposita, quae videntur adinvicem parum differre circa locum in quo concurrunt, videlicet per intermedium diei, dicunt assumpsisse nomen Italiae ab eodem. Hic igitur Italus dicitur collegisse pastores illius regionis, primo in unum ordinem civilem, et constituisse quosdam eorum agricolas, alios autem forte artifices et alios bellicos, et leges ordinasse determinantes regulam vivendi eisdem, et instituisse convivia communia omnibus primo. Propter quod et nunc ibidem observant convivia et leges quasdam ordinatas ab illo, quod intelligendum est pro tempore philosophi. Apud Tyrrheniam autem quae est alia pars Italiae, habitabant prius opici dicti et tunc Ausonii pro tempore suo. Apud Iapygiam autem et Ionium quae est alia pars Italiae vocata prius Syrtes habitabant dicti Chaones qui fuerunt quondam de genere Oenotriorum qui dicuntur fuisse Graeci quidem. Unde et quaedam pars Italiae quondam magna Graecia dicebatur. Sed est intelligendum, quod propter mutationem inhabitantium regionem praedictam, vel propter bellum, vel occupationem vel epidemiam plura praedictorum nominum partium regionis praedictae mutata sunt, aut etiam oblita, et alia imposita; et ideo nescimus bene communiter quas partes regionis illius quaedam praedictorum nominum significent.

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Deinde cum dicit conviviorum quidem declarat, quod istorum a quo primo fuit inventum; dicens, quod institutio conviviorum communium legitur primo facta fuisse in Italia a praedicto Italo: distinctio autem civilis multitudinis secundum modum praedictum in Aegypto. Institutio enim quae fuit facta sub regimine Minois apud Cretam multo posterior fuit facta quam in Aegypto, quam dicitur fecisse legislator eorum Sesostris.

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Deinde cum dicit fere quidem concludit idem de aliis civilibus; dicens, quod oportet credere praedicta et alia fere civilia inventa et observata prius multo tempore, aut magis infinities. Si enim supponamus, quod omnia quae fiunt hic reducantur ad motum et figuram caelestem de necessitate, et motus caeli est aeternus secundum opinionem philosophi, oportebit ista inferiora circulari infinities, ut videtur secundum ordinationem. Civilium quaedam sunt necessaria ad vivendum absolute, sicut agricultura, quaedam autem ad bene vivendum. Illa igitur quae sunt necessaria, primo invenerunt ipsa necessitate coacti; quae vero ordinantur ad bene vivendum istis existentibus inventa fuerunt et rationabiliter acceperunt incrementum. Similiter et circa respublicas totas: illa enim quae est necessaria ad vivendum absolute, rationabiliter inventa esse creditur prius; quae autem ordinatur ad bene vivendum, et optima est, posterius, procedendo ab imperfecto ad perfectum secundum modum naturae.

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Deinde cum dicit quod autem manifestat dicta per signum; dicens, quod signum quod omnia civilia antiqua sint, et inventa prius, sunt ea, quae fuerunt in Aegypto, et sunt adhuc observata: isti enim sunt antiquissimi philosophantes, et ordines civiles instituentes, leges et ordinem civilem invenientes et observantes, sicut etiam Plato dicit in primo Timaei: et ideo eis quae dicta sunt prius, et ab eis observata, utendum est gubernantibus bene civitates. Si autem aliqua omissa sunt ab eis, vel etiam a nobis, tentandum est ea invenire.

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Deinde cum dicit quod quidem recapitulat quaedam determinata; dicens, quod sic igitur determinatum est prius, quod regionem et possessionem principaliter oportet esse bellicorum, et aliorum participantium republica, puta consiliariorum et sacerdotum; et quod agricolas et mercenarios et artifices non expedit esse cives in optima civitate. Prius autem dictum fuit quantam secundum quantitatem, et qualem secundum dispositionem, oportet esse regionem optimam.

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L. 8 (Η.10, 1329b39–1330a33)Qualis agri totius facienda sit partitio.Qualis agri totius facienda sit partitio.

996. De distributione autem, et de agricolis, quos et quales esse oportet, dicendum primo: quoniam neque communem dicimus oportere esse possessionem, sicut quidam dixerunt, sed usuum amicabiliter factam communem, neque egere alimento aliquem civium.

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997. De conviviis autem simul videtur optimum esse omnibus civitatibus bene institutis existere: propter quam autem causam simul videtur et nobis, posterius dicemus. Oportet autem iis communicare omnes cives; non facile autem egenos a propriis affere, quod statutum, et gubernare aliam domum.

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998. Adhuc quae ad Deos expensae, sunt communes toti civitati.

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999. Necessarium igitur in duas partes divisam esse regionem; et hanc quidem esse communem, hanc autem propriam; et harum utramque divisam esse dupliciter omnibus: communis quidem altera pars ad oblationes ad Deos; altera autem ad expensas conviviorum. Eius autem quae singularium, altera pars ad proprias necessitates, altera autem ad civitatem.

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1000. Ut duabus sortibus unicuique distributis utrisque locis omnes participent. Quod enim aequale sic habet, et quod iustum, et ad municipales vicinos adversarios magis consentaneum. Ubi enim non hunc habet modum, ii quidem parvipendunt inimicitiam ad vicinos, ii autem nimis curant, et praeter id quod bonum.

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1001. Propter quod quibusdam lex est, vicinantes conterminis non participare honore eorum quae ad ipsos praeliorum, tamquam propter proprium non utique potentes consiliari bene. Regionem quidem igitur necesse est dividi hoc modo propter praedictas causas.

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1002. Terram autem culturos maxime quidem, si oportet ad votum, servos esse neque omnibus eiusdem tribus, neque animosi: sic enim utique ad operationem erunt utiles, et ad nihil insolescere securi. Secundo autem barbaros, vernaculos consimiles dictis secundum naturam, horum autem proprios quidem in propriis esse possidentium substantias; eos autem qui in communi terra, communes. Quo autem modo oportet uti servis, et quia melius omnibus servis praemium proponi libertatem, posterius dicemus.

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Postquam declaravit philosophus quae sunt partes civitatis per se, et quae non, et quod agricolas non expedit esse partes ipsius, quorum est excolere regionem, transit nunc ad determinandum divisionem regionis, et quos et quales oportet esse cultores ipsius. Et circa hoc primo determinat de divisione regionis quomodo facienda est. Secundo cum dicit, terram autem etc. quos et quales oportet esse cultores ipsius. Circa primum praemittit quasdam suppositiones cum intentione sua. Secundo cum dicit, necessarium igitur etc. ex dictis concludit regionis divisionem. Tertio cum dicit, ut duabus sortibus etc. rationem assignat. Circa primum primo praemittens intentionem suam, primo praemittit quasdam suppositiones ex parte possessionum. Secundo cum dicit, de conviviis autem etc. ex parte conviviorum. Tertio cum dicit, adhuc autem etc. quamdam ex parte expensarum in cultu divino factarum. Primo igitur dicit, quod post praedicta dicendum est de regione, qualiter distribuenda est, et de cultoribus eius quos secundum scientiam, et quales secundum conditionem oporteat eos esse; supponentes primo, quod non expedit in civitate bene ordinata possessiones esse communes, sicut Plato et sequaces eius dixerunt, sicut ostensum fuit in secundo. Magis enim negligeretur cura ipsarum necessaria. De communibus enim minus curant homines quam de propriis, quia magis propria diligunt. Sed expedit eas appropriatas esse singulis quantum ad proprietatem et curam, facere autem eas communes aliis quantum ad usum per actum liberalitatis et amicabiliter. Secundo supponendum est, quod non expedit in eadem civitate aliquem civem indigere alimento, et eis quae sunt necessaria ad vitam; quia civitas optima est per se sufficiens, et civis per civitatem determinatur.

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Deinde cum dicit de conviviis praemittit tres suppositiones ex parte conviviorum communium: quarum prima est quod de conviviis communibus, simul videtur cum praecedentibus opportunum esse ea fieri in civitate optima. Causa vero propter quam opportunum est et nobis videtur, in sequentibus huius libri dicetur: disponunt enim ad familiaritatem civium et amicitiam ipsorum. Secundo de eisdem supponendum est, quod oportet omnes cives tam divites quam pauperes communicare ipsis; aliter enim non essent communia toti civitati per quam determinatur civis. Tertio accipiendum est, quod cum sint egeni vel minus divites, paucas habentes possessiones, non est facile eos sine gravamine magno afferre ad convivia communia quod proportionale est, et sustentare familiam propriam de modica substantia sua; modica enim possessio, ad duo minus est sufficiens.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit unam suppositionem quantum ad expensas divinorum; dicens quod adhuc accipiendum est, quod expensae quae fiunt in cultu divino, puta in sacrificiis ad hoc ordinatis, communes sunt toti civitati, siquidem praedictus cultus communis est.

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Deinde cum dicit necessarium igitur infert divisionem regionis ex dictis suppositionibus; dicens, si verae sunt praedictae suppositiones, expedit in civitate optima possessionem regionis esse divisam, et alteram partem eius esse communem ad communes eius expensas faciendas, et alteram propriam unicuique ad familiares opportunitates: et quaelibet istarum partium dividitur in duas, ita ut una pars possessionis communis ordinetur ad oblationes, vel cultum divinum; altera autem ad expensas communes in conviviis communibus faciendas. Altera autem pars eius, quae propria est singulis, ordinetur ad necessitates proprias unicuique; alia vero ad negotia communia civitatis, puta ad munitionem, custodiam et ornatum.

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Deinde cum dicit ut duabus assignat distinctionis praedictae rationes duas, quarum secundam ponit cum dicit, quamobrem et cetera. In prima parte dicit, quod sic convenienter divisa est regio in duas sortes, et quaelibet illarum distincta in duas et hoc rationabiliter; quia sic ea divisa per diversas sortes, omnes in civitate participabunt utraque divisione; quia omnes participabunt possessione communi, saltem in quantum participant conviviis communibus. Propria autem manifestum est, quod participant omnes. Hoc autem aequale et iustum videtur, et per consequens rationabile. Rationabiliter igitur dividitur secundum praedictum modum.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod tangit secundam rationem, et est. Expedit possessiones regionis dividi secundum quod magis conveniens est civibus in ordine ad vicinos conterminales eisdem, et potentes adversari: sed eam dividi secundum modum praedictum magis conveniens est ipsis in respectu ad vicinos municipii civitatis volentes adversari. Cuius signum est, quia ubi non observant istum modum, sed ubi omnes possessiones sunt communes, parvipendunt inimicitiam vicinorum, non curantes si occupent partem possessionis civitatis, minus enim dolent de amissione communium; ubi autem omnes possessiones sunt propriae vel fere nimis curant de inimicitia vicinorum, et praeter illud quod bonum est; verentur enim amittere possessiones proprias, eas magis diligentes, quam communes. Et ideo in quibusdam civitatibus solet esse lex, vicinos conterminales non participare honore vel consilio eorum in ordine ad bellum, vel quodcumque aliud magnum; quasi non possent bene consiliari propter affectionem aliquam propriam inimicitiae, vel amoris. Expediens est igitur regionem dividi secundum praedictum modum, propter praedictas rationes.

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Deinde cum dicit terram autem declarat quos et quales oportet esse cultores regionis; dicens, quod in civitate optima terrae cultores si possint haberi ad votum, oportet esse servos robustos corpore, ut bene elaborare ipsam possint; deficientes intellectu, ne sint inventivi fraudum contra dominos. Sed circa hos oportet duo observare. Primo, quod non sint eiusdem tribus; sic enim uniti adinvicem magis possunt esse fortes quam cives. Secundo quod nec animosi: si enim essent, magis auderent insurgere. Expedit igitur eos esse robustos corpore, deficientes intellectu, pusillanimes, et non eiusdem tribus: sic enim magis utiles erunt ad terrae elaborationem et nihil insolescent contra dominos machinantes. Deinde autem expedit, si isti non possunt haberi, terrae cultores esse barbaros in alia regione natos servire et ministros natura; tales enim sunt similes praedictis secundum dispositionem naturalem. Sed colentes terras proprias uniuscuiusque civis oportet esse proprios illorum, quorum sunt terrae; eos autem qui terram communem, expedit esse servos communitatis. Quomodo autem dominus se debeat habere ad servos in utendo ipsis, et melius est ad inducendum eos ad bene operandum proponi eis libertatem in praemium si bene operentur, cum autem verbere vel afflictione affici debeant, in sequentibus huius tractatus dicetur.

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L. 9 (Η.11–12, 1330a34–1331b23)Quo in loco sit urbs extruenda, et quo pacto.

Quo in loco sit urbs extruenda, et quo pacto.

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1003. Civitatem autem, quod quidem oportet communem esse aridae et maris, et regionis similiter, ex contingentibus dictum est prius.

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1004. Ipsius autem ad se ipsam, si ad votum oportet adipisci positionem, ad quatuor utique respicientes, primum quidem tamquam necessarium ad sanitatem. Quae enim ad ventos flantes ab oriente, saniores. Secundo autem ad Boream. Recentiores, enim hae magis. Reliquorum autem ad politicas actiones, et ad bellicas, bene habere. Ad bellicas quidem igitur, ipsis quidem boni exitus esse oportet, adversariis autem difficile adibilem, et difficile comprehensibilem. Aquarum autem, et rivorum, maxime quidem existere multitudinem convenientem; si autem non hoc inventum est, per praeparationem susceptaculorum aquarum imbrium copiosorum, et magnorum, ut nunquam deficiant, prohibiti a regione propter multitudinem.

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1005. Quoniam autem oportet de sanitate inhabitantium solicitari, hoc autem est imponi locum in tali et ad talem bene, secundo autem aquis sanis uti; et huius curam habere non accessorie. Quibus enim pluriis utuntur ad corpus, et saepissime, haec plurimum conferunt ad sanitatem. Aquarum autem et spiritus natura, hanc habent naturam.

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1006. Propter quod quidem in bene sapientibus civitatibus oportet distingui, si non omnes similes, neque copiosae sint talium aquarum, seorsum eas quae ad alimentum aquas, et eas quae ad aliam opportunitatem.

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1007. De locis autem munitis non omnibus politiis similiter habet quod expediens: puta arx, oligarchicum et monarchicum: democraticum autem aequalitas, aristocraticum autem neutrum, sed magis fortia loca plura.

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1008. Dispositio autem familiarium habitationem delectabilior putatur et utilior ad alias actiones, si bene penetrabilis sit secundum modum iuniorem et dominativum equorum. Ad bellicas autem securitates e contrario, ut habebant secundum antiquum. Difficils enim exitus illa extraneis, et difficile perscrutabilis invadentibus: propter quod oportet utrisque iis participare. Contingit enim si quis ita praeparaverit, sicut inter agricolas quas vocant quidem vinearum systadas.

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1009. Et totam quidem civitatem non facere facile penetrabilem, secundum partes autem et loca; sic enim ad securitatem et ad ornatum bene habebit.

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1010. De muris autem dicentes, non oportere habere virtuti contra factas civitates valde antique existimant, et hoc videntes opere redargutas eas, quae illo modo decorantur.

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1011. Est autem ad consimiles quidem, et non multum differentes multitudine, non bonum tentare salvari per murorum munitionem.

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1012. Quoniam autem et accidit, et contingit; maiorem excessum fieri insurgentium, quam sit virtus humana, et ea quae in paucis; si oportet salvari, et non pati male, neque iniurias sustinere, firmissimam munitionem murorum existimandum esse bellicosissimam; aliterque, et nunc inventis iis, quae circa sagittas et machinas ad certitudinem insultus.

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1013. Simile enim velle muros non circumponere civibus, et regionem facile ingressibilem quaerere, et circumtollere montana loca. Similiter autem et propriis habitationibus non circumponere muros, tamquam non virilibus futuris habitatoribus.

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1014. At vero, neque hoc oportet latere, quod circumponentibus quidem muros circa civitatem, licet utroque modo uti civitatibus, et tamquam non habentibus; iis autem quae non habent non licet.

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1015. Sed utique hoc habet modo, non quia muri solum circumponendi, sed et de iis curandum, quatenus et ad ornatum habeant civitati decenter, et ad bellicas opportunitates, et ad alias et ad nunc adinventas. Sicut enim invadentibus cura est, per quos modos supergrediuntur; sic haec quidem inventa sunt, haec autem quaerere oportet, et philosophari custodientes. A principio enim neque conantur invadere bene praeparatos.

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1016. Quoniam autem oportet multitudinem quidem civium in conviviis distrubutam esse, muros autem distinctos esse observatoriis, et turribus in locis opportunis, et haec quidem utique hoc modo disponet aliquis. Eas autem quae divinis appropriantur habitationes, et principalissima antiquorum convivia congruit locum idoneum habere.

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1017. Et eundem quaecumque non sacrorum lex determinavit seorsum, vel aliquod oraculum aliud Apollonis responsivum, erit autem utique talis locus quia apparentiam habet ad virtutis positionem sufficienter et ad vicinas partes civitatis eminenter.

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1018. Decet autem sub hoc quidem loco, talis quidem fori esse praeparationem, qualem et circa Thessaliam nominant quem liberum vocant: hoc autem est quod oportet purum esse a venalibus omnibus, et neque banausum neque agricolam, neque alium aliquem talem appropinquare, non vocatum a principibus.

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1019. Erit autem utique bene gratiosus locus, si et gymnasia seniorum habeant ordinem hunc: decet enim divisum esse secundum aetates et hunc ornatum; et apud iuniores quidem principes aliquos demorari, matronas autem apud principes. Quae enim in oculis praesentia principum maxime efficit veracem verecundiam, et eum qui liberorum timorem.

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1020. Venalium autem forum oportet esse aliud ab hoc, et seorsum habens locum seu synagogum iis quae a mari mittuntur, et iis quae a regionibus omnibus.

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1021. Quoniam autem civitatis multitudo dividitur in sacerdotes et in principes, decet et sacerdotum convivia habere ordinem circa aedes sacras, principatum autem quicumque circa contractus faciunt curam, et circa scripturas sententiarum, et vocationes, et alium talem dispensationem. Adhuc autem circa agronomiam, et eam quae vocatur astynomia apud forum quidem oportet et in concursu quodam communi constitui: talis autem qui circa necessarium forum locus est. In vacatione enim esse id quod superius ponimus, hoc autem ad necessarias actiones. Distributa autem ese oportet dicto ordine et quae circa regionem.

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1022. Etenim in principantibus quos vocant ii quidem Hylores, ii autem Agronomos, et servatoria, et convivia ad custodiam necessarium existere. Est autem sacra per regionem esse distributa, haec quidem diis, haec quidem heroibus.

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1023. Sed immorari nunc diligenter exquirentes, et dicentes de talibus inutile est; non enim difficile est talia intelligere, sed facere magis. Dicere quidem enim voti opus est, evenire autem fortunae. Propter quod de talibus quidem, quod quidem ad plus dimittatur nunc.

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Postquam philosophus declaravit ea quae supponenda sunt ex parte multitudinis civilis ad rectam rempublicam, vult nunc declarare quae supponenda sunt ex parte situs civitatis et aedificiorum eius et regionis in speciali magis. Et primo ostendit quae supponenda sunt ex parte situs civitatis in speciali. Secundo cum dicit, de locis autem etc. quae ex parte munitionum et aedificiorum. Circa primum recolligit quaedam dicta prius de situ civitatis. Secundo cum dicit, ipsius autem ad seipsam etc. declarat quae ulterius supponenda sunt circa situm eius in speciali. Primo igitur dicit, quod prius determinatum est a nobis quod si civitas optima debeat situari ad votum, oportet quod communicet mari et terrae secundum quod contingit melius, ut ex utroque possit iuvari et in necessariis ad vitam et contra vicinos debellantes.

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Deinde cum dicit ipsius autem declarat quae attendenda sunt de positione civitatis in ordine ad sanitatem et ad bellica. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem oportet etc. de quibus istorum magis sollicitandum est propter sanitatem. Circa primum tangit quatuor ad quae oportet respicere in bona positione ipsius: quorum duo primi per se ordinantur ad sanitatem, tertium ad bellicas opportunitates. Quartum vero ad hoc et ad necessitatem vitae. Dicit igitur, quod si oportet civitatem ipsam situari ad votum, oportet respicere ad quatuor principaliter. Primo quidem quod declinationem habeat et sit propatula, si fieri potest, ad orientem et ad ventos flantes ab ortu qui sunt saniores aliis; tamquam hoc sit opportunum ad bonam dispositionem civium, scilicet sanitatem. Sunt venti Orientales saniores, quoniam plurima materia ipsorum plus moratur sub via solis; et ideo calidiores sunt secundum philosophum secundo Meteororum. Propter caliditatem autem suam nubes resolvuntur et aerem subtiliant et mundificant; quae faciunt ad bonam dispositionem et sanitatem. Siquidem aer paludosus et nubilosus et grossus est aegrotativus: e contrario vero ventus Occidentalis frigidus est et parum moratur sub via solis, nec est fortis flatus, ut frequentius; et ideo propter frigiditatem vapores congregat et aerem ingrossat et propter parvitatem flatus non potest nubes propellere; ista autem non conveniunt ad bonam dispositionem corporum; et ideo loca propatula ad occidentem non sunt salubria bene ut frequentius. Secundo expedit civitatem declinare ad Boream et ad ventos boreales, sic enim recentior erit et magis remota a putrefactione, quia venti illi recentiores sunt et saniores. Cuius ratio est, quia ventus Septentrionalis frigidissimus est, et fortissimi flatus et ratione fortitudinis flatus et nubes et vapores grossos propellit ab aere mundificando ipsum; ratione vero frigiditatis congregat calidum intrinsecum claudendo poros exterius; et propter primum prohibet putrefactionem, propter secundum confortat digestionem, et ista bene competunt sanitati. E contrario ventus Australis calidus est et tortuosi flatus et virtute caliditatis elevat vapores et poros aperit et virtute flatus tortuosi nubes congregat; et ideo ingrossat aerem et ad putrefactionem disponit et debilitat digestionem; quae sunt principia aegritudinis; et ideo ventus Australis non est bene salubris. Tertio autem oportet civitatem situari, ut bene se habeat ad actiones civiles et ad opportunitates bellicas, propter quas oportet eam sic disponi, ut sit boni exitus civibus et facilis, difficilis autem et mali aditus debellantibus; et per consequens difficile comprehensibilis; quod fit vel per naturalem dispositionem, vel montium, vel rupium, vel aquarum, vel per artificialem, puta turrium vel munitionum. Quarto expedit eam sic poni quod habeat multitudinem aquarum fontalium vel fluvialium convenientium sanitati et munitioni si possibile est. Si autem hoc non est possibile, oportet invenire et praeparare susceptacula aquarum fluvialium et defossarum, puta cisternas et puteos potentes continere copiam multam ipsarum, ita ut non contingat eos deficere propter multitudinem, etiam si ab adversariis prohiberentur aquae exteriores.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem declarat de quibus praedictorum magis solicitandum est ad sanitatem; quod primo facit. Secundo cum dicit, propter quod etc. ponit quoddam documentum. Primo dicit, quoniam conditorem civitatis oportet esse solicitum multum de sanitate inhabitantium civitatem. Primo enim et principaliter oportet esse solicitum de bona dispositione animae. Secundo de bona dispositione corporis in ordine ad animam. Bona autem dispositio corporis, seu sanitas primo videtur causari ex dispositione civitatis ad talem vel talem situm, puta ad orientem vel Boream, propter bonam dispositionem aeris. Secundo vero causatur ex usu aquarum bene dispositarum, puta dulcium et levium; et ideo de istis et de aere debet curare principaliter non accessorie. Illa enim multum conferunt ad sanitatem et bonam dispositionem, quibus ut plurimum et frequentissime utuntur homines ad vitam corporis sustentandam. Hae sunt naturae aquarum et aeris. Aqua enim utuntur secundum se ad potum et ad cibum saltem secundum quod mixta est. Aere autem ad respirationem; ergo multum conferunt ad sanitatem. Oportet igitur conditorem civitatis multum sollicitari de bona dispositione aquarum et aeris; forte autem magis de dispositione aeris. Siquidem aer inspiratus cum minori alteratione pervenit ad principium vitae, scilicet ad cor.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod ponit quoddam documentum circa naturam aquarum in civitate; dicens, quod propter hoc, quia aquae multum conferunt ad sanitatem, si non fuerint omnes aquae in civitate similes, nec copiosae, distinguuntur seorsum accipiendo eas de numero ipsarum quae ad alimentum sunt convenientes, et seorsum alias quae ad alias opportunitates in civitatibus sapienter ordinatis; ut convenientibus ad alimentum, si copiosae non fuerint, non utantur ad alia, nec non convenientibus utantur ad alimentum.

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Deinde cum dicit de locis autem inquirit de his quae supponenda sunt ex parte munitionum et aedificiorum. Et circa hoc primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, sed immorari etc. excusat se ab ulteriori consideratione talium. Circa primum primo declarat quae supponenda sunt circa munitiones et aedificia in ipsa civitate. Secundo cum dicit, etenim in principantibus etc. quae in regione exterius. Circa primum primo inquirit de munitionibus et aedificiis communibus civitatis. Secundo cum dicit, at vero neque etc. de his quae ordinantur ad principalia opera civitatis. Circa primum primo tangit, quod non eodem modo se habet de munitionibus et in omnibus rebuspublicis. Secundo cum dicit, privatorum autem etc. inquirit de ipsis et de aedificiis in civitate optima. In prima parte dicit, quod illud quod est expediens et melius circa loca munita, non eodem modo se habet in omnibus rebuspublicis; sed in statu paucorum et monarchia expedit esse arcem, idest partem superiorem civitatis fortissimam esse in qua dominantes in paucorum statu et monarchae morantes possint defendere se, si opus sit, ab impetu multitudinis insurgentis si contingat. In statu autem populari expedit aequalitas aedificiorum, ut nullus propter fortitudinem munitionis alios expugnans, tyrannizet vel dominetur solus. In statu autem optimatum, in quo principantur plures virtuosi intendentes bonum commune, neutrum istorum expedit, seu magis multitudo locorum fortium per quos possit tueri civitas communiter.

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Deinde cum dicit dispositio autem declarat qualem oporteat esse dispositionem habitationum propriarum et munitionum. Et primo inquirit de dispositione habitationum familiarium propriarum. Secundo ibi, et totam quidem etc. de communibus, puta de muris et munitionibus. Circa primum est intelligendum quod antiqui habitationes familiares fortiores faciebant propter adversarios, et rudiores, quia non ita erant experti; posteriores autem magis delectabiles et utiliores ad quaedam et subtiles magis propter maiorem experientiam. Dicit igitur quod dispositio habitaculorum familiarium et hippodamium, idest domicilium equorum, idest ad equos nutriendos, si fuerit bene penetrabilis, hoc est propatula et bene eventabilis secundum modum aedificandi posteriorum, est magis delectabilis ad inhabitandum et utilior ad aliquas actiones, puta ad nutritionem animalium; sed dispositio eorum secundum antiquum utilior est propter securitatem ab insurgentibus propter fortitudinem et minus delectabilis propter ruditatem ipsius: erat enim difficilis introitus impugnantibus et difficile penetrabilis eis. Et ideo si debeant disponi ad votum familiaria habitacula, oportet quod habeant ista duo; ut scilicet sint fortia contra bellantes et difficilis aditus eis secundum dispositionem antiquorum, et delectabilia et utilia ad actiones familiares secundum dispositionem posteriorum. Si enim aliquis ita praeparaverit, continget habitationem eius esse similem habitationi agricolarum, quos vocant quidam custodes vinearum, quibus in vineis et in campis solitarie immorantur: quorum habitacula sic sunt disposita, ut dictum est prius, ut bene se habeant ad actiones familiares et contra volentes nocere.

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Deinde cum dicit et totam quidem inquirit de dispositione munitionum totius civitatis. Et primo in generali. Secundo cum dicit, de muris autem etc. specialiter de muris. In prima parte dicit, quod similiter, sicut dictum est de familiaribus habitationibus quod expedit eas esse dispositas dicto modo, ita dicendum est rationabiliter quod expedit totam civitatem esse dispositam quantum ad munitiones, ut non sit facile penetrabilis adversariis, scilicet turribus et fossis et aliis huiusmodi dispositis secundum partes et loca quibus magis competunt. Si enim sic se habeant, melius se habebit ad securitatem propter ipsas munitiones et ad ornatum; et per consequens ad delectationem propter debitum ordinem et situm.

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Deinde cum dicit de muris autem inquirit de muris. Fuit autem opinio quorumdam quod muri non sunt necessarii civitati optimae quae habet optimos viros: tum quia propter confidentiam murorum forte redderentur negligentes in actionibus bellicis: tum quia ubi est maior fortitudo et melior, non competit multum minor: fortitudo autem virorum optimorum maior est et melior ad defensionem civitatis quam ea quae murorum; ergo videtur fortitudo murorum non competere eidem. Primo igitur proponit opinionem istam simpliciter non esse tenendam, movens rationem ad hoc. Secundo cum dicit, est autem ad consimiles etc. declarat quibus non competunt multum, et quibus sunt necessarii. Tertio cum dicit, si ergo per hunc modum etc. concludit ex dictis esse multum curandum de eis, et propter quas causas. Circa primum dicit, quod dicentes de muris non oportere eos circumponere civitati bene ordinatae ad virtutem, et habenti viros virtuosos, valde antiquam habent aestimationem, et simpliciter et praeter rationem; maxime cum videant illas, quae hoc modo decorantur sine muris in sola multitudine confidentes, ex ipso opere redargutas, et ductas ad inconveniens: multae enim fuerunt civitates habentes viros fortes et bonos, quae propter defectum munitionis et murorum succubuerunt, et captae sunt.

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Deinde cum dicit est autem declarat, respectu quorum non multum competunt, et respectu quorum sunt necessarii. Et primo, facit primum. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem et accidit etc. secundum. In prima parte dicit, quod civitati habenti bonos viros, non multum competit salvari per munitionem murorum, a consimilibus secundum virtutem, et non multum differentibus secundum multitudinem: in loco enim proprio in quo potentiores videntur cives virtuosi, videntur se posse defendere a consimilibus virtute, vel parum excedentibus; et ideo non sunt eis necessarii muri ad hoc; quia non est faciendum per plura, quod bene potest fieri per unum: et iterum opprobriosum est, quod aliquis qui potest expugnare per propriam virtutem, nitatur expugnare per propriam et alienam.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem ostendit, quod respectu superexcellentis multitudinis et virtutis sunt necessarii. Et ad hoc adducit rationes tres: quarum secundam ponit cum dicit, simile enim velle muros et cetera. Tertiam cum dicit, at vero neque et cetera. In prima parte dicit: quoniam virtutem insurgentium contra civitatem contingit esse maiorem multo quam sit virtus eorum qui inhabitant civitatem, et paucorum, et illi qui sunt maioris virtutis multo, ut frequentius debellent eos qui minoris, munitio murorum bellicosissima, idest apta ad bellandum, necessaria est civitati, quae minoris virtutis est, ut pluribus modis possit resistere impugnantibus, et propter alia multa, et ad evitandum et ad repellendum ictus sagittarum, et machinarum diversarum, quae inventae sunt ad certitudinem insultus. Dicit autem munitionem murorum esse necessariam non simpliciter, sed ex suppositione finis, si debeat civitas salvari, nec pati nocumentum aut iniuriam sustinere, aut fieri servam.

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Deinde cum dicit simile enim ponit secundam rationem; dicens, quod simile idem videtur dicere muros non circumponendos esse civitatibus, et circum tollere, hoc est de circuitu tollere montana loca, idest fortia loca prohibentia adversarios, et regionem facere facile penetrabilem ab ipsis: similiter dicere muros non circumponere habitationibus propriis, ac si timeretur, quod non essent futuri habitatores viriles, simile est facere eam penetrabilem furibus et raptoribus: nunc autem inconveniens est civitatem aut propriam inhabitationem facile penetrabilem facere adversantibus; ergo inconveniens est muros non apponere utrique.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero ponit tertiam rationem; dicens, quod adhuc oportet intelligere, quod si circumponantur muri civitati habenti viros virtuosos, possunt repellere insultum adversantium, et per muros, et per virtutes ipsorum, et uti contra eos, et tamquam habentes murum, et tamquam non habentes: qui autem muros non habent non possunt nisi altero tantum: nunc autem melius est pluribus modis vicissim resistere adversario, quam uno tantum.

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Deinde cum dicit sed utique concludit curandum esse de muris, et propter quas causas; dicens quod si ea quae dicta sunt se habent ut dictum est, manifestum est, quod non solum circumponendi sunt muri civitati, sed etiam multum curandum est de eis, ut bene sint dispositi ad ornatum et decorem civitatis, sed etiam ad repellendas opportunitates bellicas adversariorum, et quae nunc inventae sunt et quas contingit inveniri, et ad eos impugnandum. Sicut enim invadentes curant diligenter quibus modis possunt supergredi invasos, utentes instrumentis inventis, et tentantes invenire alia, sic cura debet esse invasis quomodo possint se custodire, utendo eis quae inventa sunt, et quaerendo non inventa per viam physicam. Si enim invadentes scirent invadendos bene munitos esse et potentes resistere, non multum conarentur eos invadere a principio. Nullus enim conatur ad illud quod credit esse impossibile, vel simpliciter, vel sibi.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem determinat de dispositione habitationum, quae ordinantur ad actus principales. Et primo dispositionem earum quae ordinantur ad quosdam actus communes omnibus. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem civitatis etc. earum quae ordinantur ad actus speciales quorumdam. Circa primum primo manifestat dispositionem eorum quae ordinantur ad cultum divinum, et convivia. Secundo cum dicit, venalium autem etc. eorum quae ordinantur ad commutationem. Circa primum primo dat intentionem suam. Secundo cum dicit, et eumdem etc. prosequitur. In prima parte dicit: quoniam in civitate perfecta necessarii sunt muri, ut dictum est prius, et necessarium est eos esse distinctos per observatoria, et turres positas in locis opportunis ad defensionem et ornatum, adhuc autem expedit communitatem civilem convivia communia facere, et expedit eam esse distinctam in eis, secundum quod quidam in ipsa inveniuntur excellentiores, quidam autem minus excellentes: habitationes dispositas ad huiusmodi convivia disponet aliquis rationabiliter, secundum quod dicetur.

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Deinde cum dicit et eumdem prosequitur. Et circa hoc primo declarat quales debent esse secundum se habitationes huiusmodi. Secundo cum dicit, erit autem etc. in comparatione ad cives. Circa primum primo declarat quales oportet eas esse interius. Secundo cum dicit, decet autem etc. quales exterius. Circa primum est considerandum, quod omnia quae hic sunt, et nos et operationes nostrae, ex bonitate et munificentia divina causantur; et ideo tenemur et ad reverentiam et honorem, cum aliter retribuere non possumus; reverentia autem et honor per cultum exhibentur, quem oportet fieri in aliquo loco determinato ad hoc; et ideo in civitate unita ex similibus oportet esse aliquem unum locum convenientem ad hoc ordinatum. Et quia antiquitus gentiles convivia communia faciebant temporibus ordinatis ad cultum divinum, et ob reverentiam divinorum, ideo habitationes ad convivia erant eadem cum his quae ordinabantur ad cultum divinum. Dicit igitur philosophus, quod habitationes illas quae ordinantur ad cultum divinorum, et ad convivia principalissima ab antiquis ordinata temporibus praedicti cultus, expedit habere locum convenientem, et excellentem, ita ut dispositio eius ostendat praeeminentiam eius cui exhibetur cultus et reverentiam colentium ad ipsum; et unum et eumdem principalem in tota civitate; ne si plures essent, esset occasio divisionis civitatis: nisi in aliquibus partibus civitatis, lex quae ordinat de cultu divino determinavit esse aliquam talem habitationem seorsum, vel aliquas, dependentes tamen ad primam et principalem, in quibus cultus exhibeatur alicui oraculo, vel Apollinis, vel uniuscuiusque alterius responsivi secundum opinionem gentilium, qui stellas opinabantur quosdam deos. Locus autem iste conveniens erit, si bene fuerit dispositus quantum ad duo. Primo quidem quod habeat positionem bene se habentem ad apparentiam virtutis. Secundo, quod eminentior sit respectu partium civitatis. Ex ipsa enim eminentia situs ostenditur praeeminentia eius qui colitur, et ex apparentia virtutis dispositio colentium.

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Deinde cum dicit decet autem declarat quales decet esse istas habitationes exterius; dicens, quod expediens est sub loco huiusmodi habitationum, et ad meliorem eventationem, et ad deductionem, esse quemdam forum praeparatum inter ipsas, et reliquas habitationes, quod quidam dicunt debere esse liberum, vel ab immunditiis et turpibus, vel quia ibi existentes et confugientes aliquam libertatem habeant, vel utrumque; huiusmodi autem locum oportet esse segregatum ab omnibus venalibus, quia locus iste, locus vacationis est; et ideo oportet ipsum esse sequestratum a tumultu. Venalia autem non tractantur sine tumultu. Et iterum locus hic ordinatus est ad virtutum exercitia. Negotiatio vero quae est circa venalia, remota est ab hoc. Et iterum expediens est mercenarios et agricolas, et alios tales viles quorum operationes per se non ordinantur ad virtutes, non accedere ad locum hunc, nisi vocentur ab aliquo principum propter aliquam necessitatem, si locus iste totaliter ordinatus est ad exercitia virtutum.

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Deinde cum dicit erit autem declarat quales oportet eas esse in comparatione ad cives; dicens quod locus praedictus bene gratiosus erit, et conveniens cultui divino, si distinctus fuerit secundum gradus diversos, ita ut aliqua pars ordinetur ad gymnasia seniorum exercenda, alia autem ad divinorum actus secundum ordinem; et sit praeeminentia illius ad istum in dispositione et ornatu secundum praeeminentiam seniorum ad iuvenes. Rationabile enim est locum habitationis et ornatum eius distinctum esse secundum distinctionem aetatum, ita ut ipsa distinctio loci distinctionem residentium ostendat; et expedit etiam, quod tempore praedicti cultus, inter iuniores, sint aliqui principantes, et matronae apud principes resideant; sic enim minus praeter rationem agent iuvenes ex fervore iuventutis, et mulieres ex mutabilitate earum. In praesentia enim seniorum causatur verecundia vera, quae est timor de turpi, et timor liberalis, qui est turbatio ex phantasia futuri mali, quae solent retrahere magis mulieres et iuvenes ab operatione turpi. Differentia est inter timorem liberum et servilem: quia liber est quo aliquis timet amittere bonum honestum, et secundum rationem; servilis autem est quo aliquis timet amittere bonum secundum corpus, vel pati malum secundum ipsum. Corpus enim servus est quodammodo respectu animae.

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Deinde cum dicit venalium autem declarat dispositionem habitationum, quae ordinantur ad commutationem dicens, quod forum rerum venalium oportet esse aliud, et remotum a loco praedicto; quia locus venalium locus tumultuosus est, et locus praedictus ad vacationem ordinatus quietem exigit: et expedit quod habeat seorsum locum congregativum bonorum, quae a mari immittuntur, et seorsum aliorum, quae ab ipsa regione; et ulterius in speciali secundum diversitatem generum rerum venalium; ita quod alia pars ordinetur ad pannos, alia ad calceamenta, alia ad alia; sic enim facilius expedientur commutationes, si sciverit unusquisque locum determinatum ad unumquodque commutabilium.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem declarat dispositionem habitationum eorum qui sunt principaliores in civitate; dicens: quoniam autem multitudo partium civitatis distinguitur in sacerdotes qui ordinantur ad cultum divinum, et principes qui curant de ordine civili, opportunum est habitationem sacerdotum, et locum ad convivia ipsorum situari iuxta sacras aedes ordinatas ad cultum divinum, ut locus habitationis ipsorum non sit remotus a loco cultus ad quem ordinatur; et quia expedit eos habere locum quietum propter contemplationem in qua maxime debent vivere inter alios. Principes autem qui ordinantur ad directionem contractuum, et ad sententiandum super disceptationibus super eisdem, et ad Scripturas sententiarum et vocationum civium, et ad alias huiusmodi dispensationes tales, et qui ordinantur ad regulandum agros vel agrestes, et qui ad regulandum corpus civitatis, etc., expedit habere habitationes circa forum commune, et in loco ubi communiter concurrunt plures, qualis est locus qui est circa forum rerum venalium; quia hic locus ordinatur ad necessarias commutationes quibus plures indigent. Locus autem ad cultum ordinatus qui est in superiori parte, indiget vacatione.

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Deinde cum dicit etenim in declarat dispositionem habitationum exterius in regione, dicens quod similiter in regione exterius, oportet aedes et habitacula disposita et distributa esse secundum ordinationem proportionalem ei quae est in civitate. Sunt enim in ipsa principes et magistratus quos oportet habere habitacula convenientia principatui ipsorum, et ad ornatum, et ad fortitudinem. Iterum oportet esse in regione aedes communes in diversis partibus regionis, ut opportunum est ad custodiendum redditus et bona communia exterius collecta. Et iterum expedit in regione exterius esse sacras aedes, seu templa particularia, in diversis partibus, secundum quod opportunum est, distributa. Aliqua quidem ad cultum deorum, alia vero ad cultum heroum: quod dicit secundum consuetudinem gentilium, qui cultum divinum exhibebant animabus virorum, qui excellentes fuerunt in virtute heroica.

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Deinde cum dicit sed immorari excusat se a diligentiori consideratione de his; dicens, quod de istis tanta sunt dicta et restant dicenda plura. Sed immorari diutius in diligenter inquirendo et determinando de ipsis, non utile propter facilitatem. Non enim multum difficile est considerare quare oporteat illa ordinare secundum rationem; sed facere ipsa magis difficile est propter raritatem eorum quae ad hoc sunt necessaria. Determinare enim talia et considerare secundum intellectum, est facere opus voti, seu voluntatis. Ipsa autem fieri vel esse, pendet ex fortuna magis, quam a bona dispositione civium: et abundantia bonorum exteriorum quae sunt necessaria ad praedicta, aliqualiter dependet ex ea. Et ideo illa quae ulterius possent considerari de ipsis, praetermittuntur ad praesens.

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L. 10 (Η.13–14, 1331b24–1333a11)Quod et eadem et diversa sit, magistratuum et subditorum disciplina.

Quod et eadem et diversa sit, magistratuum et subditorum disciplina.

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1024. De ipsa autem politia ex quibus et qualibus oportet consistere civitatem quae debet esse beata, et politizare bene, dicendum. Quoniam autem duo sunt, in quibus sit bene omnibus: horum autem est, unum quidem in eo quod intentionem et finem actionum ponit recte: unum autem invenire actiones ferentes ad finem: contingit enim haec et dissonare ab invicem et consonare: aliquando enim intentio quidem latet bona, in agere autem ut adipiscantur ipsam peccant: aliquando autem omnia quidem quae ad finem adipiscuntur, sed finem posuerunt pravum; aliquando autem in utroque peccant, velut circa medicativam, neque quale quid oportet esse, quo convalescit corpus, iudicant, aliquando bene, neque ad suppositum ipsis terminum adipiscuntur factiva. Oportet autem in artibus et scientiis haec ambo obtineri: finem, et eas quae in finem actiones.

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1025. Quod quidem igitur bene vivere et felicitatem appetunt omnes, manifestum. Sed haec adipiscendi, iis quidem potestas iis autem non, propter quandam fortunam aut naturam. Indiget enim et successu aliquo vivere bene: huius autem minori quidem qui melius dispositi, ampliori autem qui deterius: hi autem mox non recte quaerunt felicitatem potestate existente.

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1026. Quoniam autem propositum est, optimam politiam videre, haec autem secundum quam optime politizabit secundum quam felicitari maxime continget civitatem; palam quia felicitatem quid sit, oportet non latere.

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1027. Dicimus autem et determinavimus in Ethecis, si quae positionum illarum utilitas est, operationem esse et usum virtutis perfectum, et hanc non ex suppositione, sed simpliciter.

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1028. Dico autem ex suppositione, quae necessaria; simpliciter autem quod bene: puta quae quidem circa iustas actiones sententiae, supplicia, punitiones a virtute quidem sunt, necessaria autem et quod bene, necessario habent. Eligibilius quidem enim nullo talium indigere neque virum, neque civitatem. Quae autem ad honores et abundantias simpliciter sunt optimae electiones. Alterum quidem enim mali cuiusdam electio est; tales autem actiones e contrario; praeparationes enim bonorum sunt et generationes.

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1029. Utetur autem utique studiosus vir et paupertate et aegritudine et aliis pravis fortuniis bene; sed quod beatum, in contrariis est. Etenim hoc determinatum est secundum morales sermones, quod talis est, qui studiosus, cui propter virtutem bona sunt, quae simpliciter bona.

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1030. Palam autem et quod necessarium usus hos studiosos et bonos esse simpliciter. Propter quod et putant homines felicitatis causas extrinsecas bonorum esse, sicut eius quod est citharizare pulchre et bene, pro causa habetur lyra, magis quam ars.

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1031. Necessarium igitur ex dictis hoc quidem existere, hoc autem praeparare legislatorem. Quare ad votum optamus civitatis consistentiam quorum fortuna domina, dominam enim existere ponimus: studiosam autem esse civitatem, non adhuc fortunae opus est, sed scientiae et electionis.

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1032. At vero studiosa civitas est in cives participantes politia studiosos esse. Nobis autem omnes cives participant politia. Hoc ergo considerandum qualiter vir sit studiosus. Etenim si omnes contingit studiosos esse, non secundum unumquemque autem civium, sic eligibilius, assequitur enim ei quod secundum unumquemque, et id quod omnes.

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1033. At vero boni et studiosi fiunt per tria. Tria autem haec sunt, natura, consuetudo, et ratio.

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1034. Etenim nasci oportet primum, puta hominem, sed non aliorum aliquod animalium, sic et qualem quendam secundum corpus et secundum animam.

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1035. Quaedam autem nulla utilitas nasci, consuetudines enim transmutari faciunt: quaedam enim sunt per naturam id utrumque se habentia, per consuetudines autem ad deterius et ad melius.

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1036. Alia quidem igitur animalium maxime quidem natura vivunt, parva autem quaedam et consuetudinibus, homo autem et ratione: solus enim habet rationem. Quare oportet haec consonare invicem. Multa enim praeter consuetudines et naturam agunt propter rationem, si persuadeantur aliter habere melius.

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1037. Quod quidem itaque natura quales esse oportet futuros facile ductibiles a legislatoribus, determinavimus prius: reliquum iam opus disciplinae: haec quidem enim assuefieri addiscunt, haec autem audientes.

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1038. Quoniam autem omnis politica communitas constat ex principantibus et subiectis, haec omnia considerandum, si alios oportet esse principantes et subiectos, aut eosdem per vitam: palam enim quod consequi oportebit et disciplinam secundum divisionem hanc.

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1039. Siquidem igitur fuerint tantum differentes alteri ab alteris, quantum deos et heroes existimamus ab hominibus differre, confestim primo secundum corpus multam habentes excellentiam, deinde secundum animam, ut indubitata sit et manifesta excellentia principantium respectu subiectorum, palam quia melius semper eosdem, hos quidem principari, hos autem subici secundum semel.

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1040. Quoniam autem hoc non facile accipere, neque est sicut inter Indos ait Scylax esse reges tantum differentes a subiectis: manifestum quod propter multas causas necessarium omnes similiter communicare, eo quod est secundum partem principari et subici: quod enim aequale idem similibus, et difficile manere politiam constitutam praeter id quod iustum. Cum subditis enim existunt omnes volentes insolescere, qui per regionem; totque multitudine esse eos qui in politeumate ut sint valentiores iis omnibus, unum aliquod impossibilium est.

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1041. At vero quod oportet principantes differre a subditis, indubitatum est.

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1042. Qualiter igitur haec erunt et qualiter participabunt, oportet considerare legislatorem. Dictum est autem prius de ipso. Natura enim dedit electionem faciens eidem enim hoc quidem iunius, hoc autem senius: quorum hoc quidem subici decet, hoc autem principari. Indignatur autem nullus secundum aetatem subditus, neque putat esse valentior, aliterque, et futurus suscipere talem honorem, cum sortitus fuerit adveniente aetate. Est quidem igitur, ut eosdem principari et subici dicendum, est autem ut alteros.

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1043. Quare, et disciplinam est ut eandem necessario, est autem ut alteram esse. Futurum enim bene principari, subditum fuisse primo aiunt oportere.

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1044. Est autem principatus, sicut in primis dictum est sermonibus, hic quidem principantis gratia, hic autem subditi: horum autem, hunc quidem despoticum esse dicimus, hunc autem liberorum.

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1045. Differunt autem quaedam praeceptorum non operibus, sed eo quod alicuius gratia. Propter quod multa eorum quae videntur esse ministerialia opera, et iuvenum liberis honestum ministrare. Ad honestum enim et non honestum non sic differunt actiones secundum se, ut in fine, et eo quod cuius gratia.

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Postquam inquisivit philosophus de his quae supponenda sunt ad instituendam optimam rempublicam ex parte finis et materiae civitatis ipsius, transit nunc ad declarandum ex quibus et qualibus instituenda est optima civitas. Et circa hoc primo praemittit intentionem suam, dicens, declarato quae supponenda sunt ad futuram optimam rempublicam, nunc determinandum est nobis de ipsa republica, scilicet ex quibus et qualibus instituenda est civitas quae debet felicitari et bene gubernari simpliciter. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem etc. prosequitur. Et circa hoc primo ostendit, quod illos ex quibus constituitur optima civitas, oportet esse studiosos. Secundo cum dicit, at vero boni etc. declarat per quot, et quomodo efficiuntur tales: quia non sufficit in agibilibus scire qualem oportet esse unumquemque, quoniam bonum et studiosum, sed qualiter contingit fieri talem. Circa primum adhuc primo ostendit, qualem oportet esse civitatem optimam, quoniam studiosam. Secundo cum dicit, at vero studiosa etc. ex hoc concludit, quales oportet esse cives ex quibus componitur, quoniam studiosos. Civis enim definitur per civitatem. Et quoniam civitas optima determinatur per finem optimum, primo praemittit quaedam de ipsis. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem etc. ex ipsis ostendit quae sunt necessaria ad civitatem optimam, et qualem oportet eam esse. Circa primum primo tangit ea quae requiruntur ad hoc quod homo sit optimus. Secundo cum dicit, quod quidem igitur etc. quod non omnes homines eodem modo se habent ad illud optimum. Circa primum est intelligendum, quod sicut in universo invenitur duplex bonum, scilicet separatum, et bonum ordinis, et bonum separatum maius est quam bonum ordinis, quod determinatur per ipsum secundum Aristotelem duodecimo metaphysicorum; bonum autem perfectum ex istis bonis aggregatur: sic in homine qui dicitur minus universum, duplex invenitur bonum quodammodo, scilicet quod est finis, et quod ordinis: et bonum ordinis eorum quae ad finem, per finem determinatur; et perfectum bonum hominis ex istis duobus bonis aggregatum est. Hoc igitur supponens, dicit: quoniam duo sunt per quae contingit omnes homines esse bonos, et sunt boni et qui boni sunt: quorum unus est finis operationum rectus, et intentio ipsius recta; aliud autem est inventio actionum et organorum ordinatorum ad ipsum finem. Optimum enim uniuscuiusque consistit in optimo fine eius, et in ordinatione aliorum ad ipsum. Accidit autem aliquando ista dissonare et consonare ad seinvicem. Dissonare quidem: quia aliquando finis bonus ponitur, et intentio recta ad ipsum subest. Peccatum autem est in actione eorum quae sunt ad finem, vel in ordine. Aliquando autem e contrario illa quae ordinantur ad finem subsunt omnia et recte ordinata, sed finis positus et intentus malus est. Consonare quidem, quia aliquando contingit quod peccatur in utroque; et in fine, et in his quae ad ipsum; sicut circa medicinam accidit aliquando, quod medicus non recte iudicat quale contingit fieri corpus quod convalescit, et ad quem terminum sanitatis contingit ipsum deduci. Nec etiam bene accipit illa vel ordinat quae deducunt ad suppositum terminum sanitatis. Aliquando autem utrumque recte accipit, rectum ponens et intendens finem, et ea quae sunt ad ipsum recte ordinans. Homines vero in omnibus artibus et scientiis, et universaliter virtutibus finaliter intendunt optimum in illis: et ideo oportet, si debeant fieri in illis optimi, attingere ad ambo: puta ad finem rectum et ad ordinationem actionum et organorum quae ad finem. Apparet igitur, quod in qualibet arte et scientia speculativa vel practica, homo est optimus per finem optimum, et ea quae ad ipsum.

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Deinde cum dicit quod quidem declarat quod non omnes homines eodem modo se habent ad suum optimum seu felicitatem; dicens quod manifestum est ex se, quod omnes homines naturaliter appetunt bene vivere. Omnia enim naturaliter appetunt suam perfectionem. Sed non omnibus hominibus inest aequaliter habilitas ad adipiscendum hoc; sed quidam sunt dispositi bene ad acquirendum eam, quidam autem indispositi, aut propter materiam, aut propter naturalem complexionem per quam inclinantur ad operationes inordinatas, aut propter formam, quia aliquod bonorum fortunae quae sunt necessaria, deficit eis. Indiget enim debens felicitari et bene vivere, inclinatione naturali ad hoc, et successu aliquo in exterioribus bonis. Si quidem privatum omnibus bonis fortunae impossibile est bene operari. Sed illi qui melius dispositi sunt ex natura ad hoc, minori indigent successu; qui autem minus, ampliori. Aliqui etiam ita depravati sunt per consuetudinem, vel aliquid aliud, quod quamvis inclinentur ex natura ad felicitatem et bene vivere, non tamen recta via vel modo quaerunt eam: et ita, quod aliquis non felicitetur, potest contingere, aut quia non recte ponit felicitatem, aut quia non recte quaerit quae ad ipsam, aut propter utrumque.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem declarat qualem oportet esse optimam civitatem. Et primo ostendit, quod ad hoc primo necessarium est praeintelligere quid est ipsa felicitas, quasi praemittens intentum. Secundo cum dicit, dicimus autem etc. declarat illud. In prima parte dicit: quoniam propositum intentionis nostrae est considerare de optima republica qualis sit, optima autem respublica est secundum quam civitas optime gubernat et vivit, civitas autem optime gubernat et vivit quae attingit ad felicitatem optimam. Et ideo oportet nos praeconsiderare illud, per quod determinatur. Civitatem autem seu rempublicam optimam, per felicitatem determinamus, ut dictum est.

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Deinde cum dicit dicimus autem declarat intentum. Et primo praemittit definitionem felicitatis, et eam explanat. Secundo cum dicit, utetur quidem utique etc. ostendit qualem oportet esse civitatem optimam. Circa primum, primo praemittit definitionem felicitatis in aliis positam; dicens, quod ad manifestationem intenti diximus, et determinavimus in libro Ethicorum, si quidem ea quae determinata sunt, bene utilia sunt ad propositum, felicitatem esse operationem et usum virtutis perfectum simpliciter, et non ex suppositione. Felicitatis quidem est operatio, quia habitus in potentia est et imperfectus; felicitatem autem perfectum bonum dicimus. Virtutis autem, quia virtus est quae habentem perficit, et operationem eius bonam reddit: felicitas autem bonum hominis est perfectum: ergo secundum virtutem eius. Usus autem perfectus est, quia una operatio sola non facit hominem felicem, sed multae et continuae. Continuati autem alicuius actus usus perfectus est illius actus, secundum quod usus est idem quod exercitium. Unde ista definitio eadem est secundum rem, ei quae ponitur primo Ethicorum, qua dicitur, quod est operatio hominis secundum virtutem perfectam, et in vita perfecta; ita ut quod ponitur hic usus perfectus, sit idem ei quod ibi ponitur, in vita perfecta.

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Deinde cum dicit dico autem explanat ultimam particulam, scilicet, non ex suppositione. Ad cuius evidentiam est intelligendum, quod finis secundum se rationem boni habet. Eorum autem quae ordinantur ad ipsum, quaedam sunt quae rationem boni de se habent aliquam, et aliquam ex ordine ad finem, sicut medicina dulcis. Alia vero quae secundum quod huiusmodi rationem boni et eligibilis non habent, sed tantum ex ordine ad finem; sicut medicina amara; secundum se enim eligibilis non est, sed propter sanitatem tantum. Et prima bona dicuntur simpliciter bona. Secunda autem bona dicuntur ex hoc solum necessaria. Dicit igitur, quod operationem bonam ex suppositione dico quae necessaria quidem est ad finem, sed secundum se rationem boni non habet. Simpliciter autem bonam dico, quae secundum se rationem boni habet, non tantum ex fine, sicut in actionibus iustitiae. Sententiae enim condemnandorum et supplicia et punitiones eorum procedunt a virtute iustitiae, et necessariae quidem sunt in civitate, quia aliter non salvaretur civitas nec communicatio, et rationem boni habent, quia necessariae. Secundum se autem eligibiles non sunt absolute. Eligibilius enim esset, si contingeret quod homines vel civitates talibus non indigerent. Sed actiones quae sunt circa honores et circa abundantiam exteriorum, sunt simpliciter eligibiles secundum se. Rationem autem quare primae sunt eligibiles, et non istae, tangit dicens quod electio sententiarum et suppliciorum et aliorum huiusmodi in civitate, est electio alicuius, quod malum est, secundum quod huiusmodi, sed in ordine ad finem. Electio autem eorum quae circa honores et circa divitias et actiones eorum, e contrario, est electio cuiusdam boni secundum se, quia sunt dispositiones quaedam ad bonum et generationes eius. Honor enim disponit et factivus est boni secundum animam, inquantum aliquis propter honorem operatur magna et honorabilia. Divitiae autem naturales sunt factivae boni secundum corpus principaliter.

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Deinde cum dicit utetur autem declarat ex dictis qualem oportet esse civitatem optimam. Et circa hoc, primo ipse declarat qualiter ipse studiosus utitur bonis praedictis utrisque. Secundo cum dicit, palam autem etc. declarat quod usus istorum qui est secundum virtutem studiosus est. Tertio cum dicit, necessarium igitur etc. ex dictis concludit qualem oportet esse civitatem optimam. In prima parte dicit quod vir studiosus qui virtutem perfectam et appetitum ordinatum habet, bene utitur his quae secundum se rationem boni non habent, sunt tamen ordinabilia in finem: puta paupertate et aegritudine, defectu amicorum et huiusmodi, secundum illud quod beatum est et perfectius est in usu contrariorum, puta divitiarum, et sanitatis, et amicorum. Meliorem enim operationem facit ex suppositione istorum, quia, secundum quod determinatum est a nobis in sermonibus moralibus ad Eudemum, bonus et studiosus est, cui simpliciter bona sunt bona propter ipsam virtutem. Cui autem simpliciter optima non sunt optima, non est bonus vel studiosus; quemadmodum neque esse sanus videtur, cui sana simpliciter non sunt sana. Sed sanitas et divitiae secundum se, rationem boni habent: ergo bene utetur eis studiosus propter virtutem. Studiosus etiam secundum rectam rationem utitur omnibus datis, quia per rationem operatur. Ratio autem recta dicit, quod utatur unoquoque secundum quod contingit melius ad finem. Si igitur paupertas et aegritudo, et eorum contraria ordinabilia sunt in felicitatem, utetur studiosus istis pro paupertate et divitiis meliori modo, quo contingit ad ipsam. Similiter et eorum oppositis. Sed paupertate aut aegritudine suppositis, minus perfectas faciet operationes, cum secundum se non sint bona. Divitiis autem et sanitate suppositis, perfectiores, quia secundum se rationem boni habent: sicut bonus coriarius ex corio dato meliores calceos quos contingit, facit; sed ex meliori meliores, ex peiori autem peiores.

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Est autem intelligendum, ad evidentiam dictorum et dicendorum iam, quod felicitas per se non existit in bonis exterioribus, puta in divitiis, nec etiam in usu earum: in ipsis quidem non existit per se, quia felicitatem nullus quaerit propter aliquid aliud, divitias autem quaerunt propter aliud: vel propter necessitatem vitae, vel propter operationem virtutis: ergo in ipsis non existit per se. In usu autem eius per se non consistit: quoniam optimus usus divitiarum qui est in consumendo eas, ut dicit Aristoteles primo rhetoricae, videtur ordinari per se immediate ad bonum corporis, puta ad sustentationem naturae, vel saltem ad aliud ordinatur: felicitatem autem non dicimus ad aliud ordinari. Et adhuc felicitas operatio virtutis perfectissimae est. Bonus autem usus divitiarum non est operatio perfectissimae virtutis; quia liberalitas seu magnificentia, quarum est operatio, non sunt perfectissimae virtutes, sed prudentia aut sapientia magis: ergo in usu ipsarum non consistit per se felicitas: oportet tamen ipsas praeexistere ipsi felicitati.

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Felicitas enim consistit in optima operatione intellectuali per se. Ad operationem autem optimam quamcumque, seu speculativam seu practicam, oportet praesupponere consistentiam subiecti, et bonam dispositionem. Consistentia autem, et bona dispositio, non sunt sine suppositione eorum quae sunt necessaria ad vitam et bonam dispositionem, quae sunt divitiae seu bona exteriora: ergo divitias necesse est praeexistere felicitati tam speculativae quam practicae, quamvis alia ratione speciali sint praenecessariae practicae seu civili. Quod autem est praenecessarium ad aliquid, videtur ordinari ad ipsum sicut ad finem, et sicut instrumentum ad operationem. Et ideo divitiae ordinantur ad felicitatem sicut ad finem, et sicut organum ad operationem. Ea autem quae ordinantur ad finem, vel se habent ad aliud sicut organum ad operationem, oportet esse commensurata, seu proportionata, fini seu actioni, et non excedere vel deficere a media ratione. Divitias igitur quas necesse est praeexistere felicitati, oportet esse commensuratas ei, ita ut nec maiores nec minores quaerantur quam sint necesse ad ipsam: maiores tamen exiguntur ad practicam seu civilem quam ad speculativam. Ad speculativam enim sufficiunt secundum quod utiles sunt ad sustentationem vitae, et bonam dispositionem corporis. Ad practicam autem, seu civilem, exiguntur ad hoc, et ad expeditionem operationum practicarum, seu civilium; et quanto perfectior est, tanto maiores. Et si a praedicta commensuratione superexcedant, aut totaliter tollunt felicitatem, aut saltem diminuunt ipsam. Sicut tanta potest esse magnitudo fistulae, quod peior erit fistulatio; et adhuc tanta, quod penitus non erit. Similiter si deficiant a mensura secundum quam sunt necessariae divitiae ad perfectam felicitatem, secundum aliquid, parum diminuent ipsam. Si autem secundum multum, totaliter tollent. Sicut si minor sit fistula quam quae nata est moveri a fistulatore, parum debilior erit fistulatio; si autem multum, omnino non erit. Sic igitur felicitas per se non existit in divitiis, nec in usu earum per se.

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Verumtamen ipsae et usus earum qui non est sine ipsis, sunt praenecessaria ad ipsam secundum quamdam mensuram et proportionem; a qua si deficiant secundum minus et parum, minus perfecta erit felicitas. Et hoc intendebat Aristoteles quando dixit quod studiosus utetur paupertate et aegritudine bene ut contingit, quod autem beatum in contrariis est. Si autem multum, non erit omnino. Eodem autem modo se habet et si excedat secundum maius a praedicta mensura. Utrum autem necessarium sit eas praeexistere per se vel per alterum, vel sicut proprias, vel sicut communes, non refert ad propositum; dum tamen praeexistant secundum hoc, quod commensuratae sunt. Ille tamen modus praeexistendi vel praehabendi eas eligibilior videtur, quo habentur secundum hoc, quod necessariae et commensuratae sunt ipsi fini, et quo minus impediuntur homines a rectitudine operationis, sive per affectum sive per sollicitudinem inordinatam circa eas.

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Deinde cum dicit palam autem declarat, quod usus praedictos oportet esse studiosos; dicens, quod manifestum est quod necesse est usus praedictorum bonorum, scilicet divitiarum et sanitatis, et huiusmodi, studiosos esse et bonos, quia usus qui sunt secundum virtutem studiosi sunt et boni: sed usus praedictorum bonorum a studioso per se a virtute sunt: studiosus enim, secundum quod huiusmodi, virtuosus est; ergo oportet usus praedictos studiosos esse. Propter quod credunt bona extrinseca, quorum usus studiosus est, et a virtute esse. Similiter causas felicitatis quae est operatio secundum ipsam: existimantes, sicut si aliquis existimaret quod lyra esset causa bene citharizandi magis quam ars. Hoc autem inconveniens est. Ars enim principalis causa citharizandi est ut unde principium et ratio motus: lyra autem sicut materia vel organum motum ab arte. Similiter virtus seu ratio principium est felicitatis, sicut unde motus vel ratio; bona autem exteriora sicut materia vel organum motum ab illis.

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Deinde cum dicit necessarium igitur concludit qualem oporteat esse civitatem optimam, dicens. Si civitatem optimam oportet felicitari, felicitas autem est operatio vel usus perfectus secundum virtutem, usus autem perfectus secundum virtutem, est usus bonorum operum a studioso, necessarium est ipsam civitatem quam secundum votum quaerimus optimam, habere abundantiam bonorum exteriorum quorum usus necessarius est, et ipsam esse studiosam: usum oportet esse studiosum. Quorum primum necesse est praeexistere, cuius fortuna est domina. Dicimus enim ipsam esse dominam huiusmodi bonorum. Secundum autem oportet legislatorem procurare per disciplinam et consuetudinem, scilicet ipsam esse studiosam. Studiositas enim civitatis non est opus fortunae, quia secundum rationem est, et fortuna est causa praeter rationem. Sed est operatio scientiae dirigentis, et electionis inclinantis.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero declarat ex dictis quales oportet esse cives, quoniam studiosos; dicens, quod civitas studiosa non est, nisi quia cives participantes reipublicae studiosi sunt. Civitas enim non est aliud quam communitas quaedam civium secundum aliquam rationem. Si ergo civitatem optimam oportet studiosam esse, ut probatum est, oportet omnes cives in ea studiosos esse. Nos enim supponimus nunc quod in optima civitate omnes cives participant republica. Et ideo ulterius considerandum est nobis, qualiter civis fiat studiosus. Quamvis autem bonum et eligibile sit unumquemque divisim studiosum esse, melius tamen et eligibilius est si contingat omnes collectim esse studiosos. Quia illud quod est posterius secundum viam generationis, perfectius et melius est in bonis et eligibilius, eo quod prius est, si actus bonus melior est potentia ad ipsum. Sed omnes collectim esse studiosos assequitur secundum viam generationis, eo quod est unumquemque divisim studiosum esse, utroque existente eligibili et bono. Ergo melius est et eligibilius.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero declarat per quot, et quomodo efficiantur boni et studiosi. Et circa hoc declarat primo per quot et quae efficiuntur tales. Secundo cum dicit, quod quidem itaque etc. quales oportet esse eos secundum hoc. Circa primum, primo proponit per quot et quae efficiuntur studiosi. Secundo cum dicit, etenim nasci oportet etc. declarat. In prima parte dicit, quod viri fiunt boni secundum virtutem, et studiosi secundum rationem, per tria. Ista autem tria sunt naturalis dispositio ad virtutem, et illud quod est secundum rationem, et consuetudo in operatione, et etiam ratio dirigens.

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Deinde cum dicit et enim declarat. Et primo quod natura faciat ad hoc. Secundo cum dicit, quaedam autem etc. quod consuetudo. Tertio cum dicit, alia quidem igitur etc. quod ratio. In prima parte dicit, quod debentem fieri bonum et studiosum oportet esse dispositum a natura primo. Omnibus enim, quae fiunt natura vel arte, oportet supponi materiam et bonam aptitudinem eius, si quod recipitur in alio recipitur per modum recipientis: et ideo debentem esse bonum et studiosum oportet esse bene natum ad hoc: puta, quod si homo habens intellectum et rationem, sed non aliquod brutum irrationale. Et ulterius sic existens homo sit bene dispositus secundum corpus, et per consequens secundum animam. Bene dispositi secundum corpus, bene dispositi sunt secundum animam ut in pluribus. Si enim anima secundum se unius rationis sit secundum speciem in omnibus hominibus, et non suscipiat intensionem et remissionem, cum sit forma substantialis, diversitas operationum ipsius et proprietatum, erit propter diversitatem corporum et materiae, vel alicuius extrinseci alterius.

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Deinde cum dicit quaedam autem declarat, quod consuetudo ad hoc faciat; dicens, quod quosdam homines non est utilitas nasci, hoc est ex nativitate non sunt dispositi ad bonum, nec ad opus intellectus, per consuetudinem autem transmutantur: sunt enim quidam qui per naturam indifferenter se habent ad virtutem et ad contrarium, per consuetudinem autem in operatione respectu alterius determinantur ad alterum, puta vel ad melius vel ad deterius. Sed illi qui bene dispositi sunt ad virtutem, puta consuetudine, indigent operatione ad hoc ut fiant boni; qui autem ad contraria inclinantur ex natura, non possunt fieri boni, aut cum difficultate et multa consuetudine.

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Deinde cum dicit alia quidem declarat quod ratio: dicens quod alia animalia ab homine, sola naturali inclinatione, hoc est memoriis et imaginationibus agunt actiones suas; quaedam autem parva secundum quantitatem agunt aliquas actiones per consuetudinem, sic illa quae bonam aestimativam habent, ut canis, equus, et similia. Homo vero actiones suas dirigit ratione; solus enim inter animalia rationem habet, per quam determinatur. Quare hoc oportet consonare inter se, scilicet naturam, consuetudinem, et rationem: semper enim posterius praesupponit prius. Multa enim sunt quae agunt homines praeter naturam et consuetudinem propter rationem, si suadeatur ab illa contrarium esse melius; sicut in continente apparet, quod quamvis inclinetur ad prosequutionem passionis, sequitur tamen rationem persuadentem contrarium.

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Deinde cum dicit quod quidem declarat quales oportet eos esse. Et primo continuat dicta ad dicenda. Secundo cum dicit, cum vero etc. prosequitur. In prima parte dicit, quod prius determinatum est quales oportet esse secundum naturam futuros studiosos et bonos, ubi dictum est quales oportet esse bene gubernantes. Nunc autem considerandum est nobis quales oportet esse secundum disciplinam, ad quam reducuntur consuetudo et ratio: addiscunt enim aliqua per assuefactionem, aliqua autem audientes ratiocinantem alium.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem prosequitur. Volens autem ostendere quales oportet esse cives secundum disciplinam, quoniam in civitate in qua sunt quidam principantes et quidam subiecti, primo inquirit, utrum eamdem oporteat esse disciplinam principantium et subiectorum in optima civitate. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem civis etc. prosequitur principale intentum. Et circa hoc primo praemittit intentionem suam, et modum considerandi. Secundo cum dicit, siquidem igitur etc. prosequitur. In prima parte dicit, quod omnis civitas composita est ex principantibus et subiectis. In omnibus enim quae ex pluribus constituta sunt, sive natura, sive arte, ex quibus est unum aliquod commune, sive ex coniunctis sive ex divisis, videtur esse principans aliquid, et aliquid subiectum: sicut ostensum est in primo huius. Considerandum est a nobis iam utrum expedit in civitate optima aliquos et diversos esse principantes et subiectos per vitam, aut eosdem secundum suppositum, differentes secundum aliquam dispositionem: quia manifestum est quod consequenter se habebit huic divisioni de disciplina ipsorum de qua intendimus nunc. Si enim omnino sint diversi principantes et subiecti, et disciplinam oportebit esse aliam; si autem iidem, eamdem proportionaliter. Cuius ratio est, quia illud per quod determinantur principans et subiectum est disciplina recta in ordine ad operationem, diversitas autem vel unitas determinantium. Si igitur principantes et subiecti diversi sunt omnino, et disciplina ipsorum diversa erit; et si iidem, et eadem proportionaliter.

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Deinde cum dicit siquidem igitur prosequitur. Et primo inquirit, utrum expedit eosdem esse principantes et subiectos, aut non. Secundo cum dicit, quare et disciplinam etc. ex hoc concludit proportionale de disciplina. Circa primum primo ostendit, ubi expedit eosdem principari semper et alios subiici. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem hoc non facile etc. declarat quod communiter melius et magis necessarium est eosdem esse principantes et subiectos in alio tempore. Circa primum intelligendum est prius quod participans se habet ad subiectum sicut agens ad passum et movens ad motum: principantis enim est movere et dirigere subiectum, subiecti vero moveri et dirigi secundum quod huiusmodi. Movens autem et agens secundum quod tale excellentius est passo et moto secundum quod huiusmodi; quia illud est in actu, hoc autem in potentia; et ideo principans in eo quod principans, oportet esse excellens: excellentia autem moventis respectu moti attenditur in ordine ad operationem quantum ad formam eius principaliter, deinde autem quantum ad dispositiones materiae substantis ipsi formae, tertio quantum ad exteriora coadiuvantia ad ipsam. Et ideo oportet quod excellentia principantis respectu subiecti in ordine ad finem attendatur principaliter ad formam, secundum quam agit ut huiusmodi, deinde autem quantum ad dispositiones materiae, et ultimo quantum ad exteriora. Forma autem secundum quam operatur principans in optima republica est disciplina recta secundum rationem rectam, puta prudentia et virtus civilis. Dispositiones autem materiae sunt bonae dispositiones ipsius ad istas, sicut inclinatio naturalis et bona dispositio corporis; coadiuvantia autem exterius sunt potentia et divitiae. Et ideo expedit principantem in optima republica, si possibile est, excedere subiectum et quantum ad prudentiam et virtutem quae sunt bona animae, et quantum ad bona corporis et quantum ad exteriora. Unde dixit philosophus octavo Ethicorum: non est rex qui non est per se sufficiens et omnibus superexcellens. Et ideo si inveniatur aliquis unus in civitate vel regno qui omnibus istis superexcellat alios, iustum est ipsum principari solum quamdiu est talis: si autem secundum successionem inveniatur tale in aliquo genere, expedit secundum genus principari sicut prius, ut in tertio dictum est. Si autem inveniantur plures qui sic excedant reliquam multitudinem, expedit eos principari per vitam. Et hoc est quod ipse dicit: si fuerint aliqui in civitate qui tantum differant ab aliis, quantum credimus deos, idest divinos homines, et heroes, idest attingentes ad virtutem heroicam, quae est perfectissima virtutum sive intellectualium, seu moralium, differre ab aliis hominibus communiter, (ita ut primo secundum vitam generationis multam habeant excellentiam secundum corpus, idest secundum dispositiones materiales, puta secundum magnitudinem et pulchritudinem et inclinationem ad virtutem, deinde autem et secundum perfectiones animae, ita ut excellentia istorum respectu illorum sit manifesta sine dubitatione); manifestum est quod melius est semper eosdem in tota vita, hos quidem esse principantes, scilicet excellentiores, hos autem esse subiectos, scilicet deficientes. Excellentius enim et perfectius, quamdiu est huiusmodi, natum est principari ei quod deficit secundum naturam respectu illius.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem declarat quod melius et magis necessarium est communiter eos principari et subiici secundum aliud et aliud tempus. Et primo declarat, quod melius est eosdem esse principantes et subiectos secundum aliud et aliud tempus. Secundo cum dicit, at vero quod etc. quod necesse est eosdem secundum aliquid esse alteros. Tertio cum dicit, qualiter igitur etc. qualiter expedit eosdem esse et alteros. Circa primum intelligendum est, quod aliquos esse sicut excellentes totam multitudinem, ut praedictum est, est rarum valde propter summam perfectionem ipsorum: rarum autem difficile est invenire; et ideo dicit: quoniam non est facile nunc in civitatibus accipere vel invenire aliquos excellentes in tantam reliquam multitudinem, nec inveniuntur reges tantum differentes a subditis, quantum heroes ab hominibus sicut scylax dixit esse inter Indos; manifestum est quod melius et magis necessarium est eosdem quandoque principari, quandoque autem subiici secundum partem, propter multas rationes. Illi enim qui sunt similes secundum naturam et virtutem, habent idem iustum et aequale, et aequaliter debent recipere de communibus. Principari autem honor communis est: et ideo illi qui sunt similes secundum praedictum modum, aequaliter debent principari. Sed non possunt secundum idem tempus omnes; ergo secundum aliud et aliud. Iterum respublica fundata super iniustum subditorum non est bene mansiva, quia cum subditis gravatis per iniustitiam sunt omnes mali et insolentes in regione, qui volentes de facili possunt corrumpere rempublicam: sed respublica in qua iidem semper principantur similibus existentibus super iniustum fundatur et inaequale; ergo bene mansiva non est. Sed quia aliquis diceret quod potentia subditorum et insolentium reprimi potest per potentiam principantium, quasi removens hoc, dicit: subditi et insolentes in regione multi sunt, et magnam potentiam habent valde. Tot autem invenire secundum multitudinem in republica principantes qui sint potentiores omnibus istis, est aliquid de numero impossibilium; ergo illorum potentia per istos reprimi non potest.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero declarat, quod oportet eosdem esse aliqualiter alteros, dicens: at enim manifestum est consideranti secundum rationem et indubitanter, quod principantes et subiectos oportet habere aliquam diversitatem, quia principans ad subditum se habet sicut movens et ens in actu ad motum et ens in potentia; ista autem secundum se differentiam aliquam habent; ergo principantem et subditum oportet aliqualiter differre. Et ideo oportet legislatorem et civem considerare qualiter oportet illos esse eosdem et alteros, et qualiter sic se habentes participabunt principatui et subiectioni.

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Deinde cum dicit qualiter igitur declarat, qualiter oportet eos esse eosdem et alteros; dicens quod prius ubi determinatum est de partibus civitatis per se, dictum est de hoc. Natura enim faciens in eodem genere hominum aliud Iunius, aliud senius procedendo de imperfecto ad perfectum, dedit nobis modum per quem possimus eligere, quando idem magis debet principari quam subiici. Manifestum est enim, quod idem secundum quod Iunius est, magis expedit subiici. Iunius enim secundum quod huiusmodi imperfectius est, secundum quod huiusmodi, et robustius ad operandum opera ministerialia; hanc autem ad subditum pertinent. Senius autem perfectius est, quia posterius secundum generationem, et secundum virtutem et secundum intellectum. Non enim pueri iudicant sensibus ut presbyteri, ut dicitur septimo physicorum, c. 2. Per haec autem determinatur principans, ut dictum est prius. Sed quia aliquis diceret, quod iuvenes indignantur, si secundum aetatem illam sint subditi, hoc removet dicens quod nullus iuvenis bene ordinatus indignabitur, si subiiciatur in aetate iuventutis, nec putat se valentiorem esse senioribus et progenitoribus suis, siquidem eos reveretur. Non credens autem valentior esse, non indignabitur si subiiciatur. Et aliter, quia futurus suscipere honorem principatus ex ordine reipublicae cum fuerit perfectus. In aetate senili vero habet rationem per quam debeat indignari, si nunc non principetur. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod expedit eosdem principari et subiici uno modo, puta secundum appositum, altero autem secundum alium modum, puta secundum Iunius et senius.

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Deinde cum dicit quare et disciplinam concludit proportionaliter se habere de disciplina primo. Secundo cum dicit, est autem principatus etc. distinguit principatum, ut appareat in quo praedicta veritatem habeant, et in quo non. Primo igitur concludit, quod si in civitate bene ordinata oportet eosdem esse principantes et subiectos secundum unum modum, alios secundum alium, necesse est disciplinam ipsorum uno modo esse unam, alio autem modo alteram; quia principans et subiectum in optima civitate determinantur per disciplinam, puta per prudentiam et virtutem, per quas hic recte obedit, ille recte praecedit; et ideo sicut principantes et subiecti sunt iidem vel alteri, ita et disciplinam oportet esse eadem vel alteram. Dicunt enim quod illum qui debet principari oportet prius subditum fuisse, et subditum addiscere quae oportet principantem facere: non enim bene principatur qui non quandoque sub principe fuit, ut dicitur in tertio huius.

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Deinde cum dicit est autem distinguit principatum, ut appareat in quo veritatem habet quod dictum est. Quod primo facit. Secundo cum dicit, differunt autem quidem etc. declarat unde assumenda est differentia subditi in utroque principatu. In prima parte dicit, quod duplex est principatus, sicut dictum est in primis sermonibus, idest in tertio libro. Unus quidem qui principaliter est ad bonum principantis, propter autem bonum subditi secundum accidens. Alius autem est qui principaliter est propter aliquod bonum subditorum, vel alicuius communis principanti et subiecto ex consequenti propter utilitatem principantis. Et primus istorum dicitur principatus dominativus, qui est domini ad servos. In principatu igitur dominativo non expedit eumdem esse principantem et subiectum secundum aliquod tempus, sed eosdem esse principantes semper, puta servos secundum naturam; non enim sunt similes secundum naturam. In principatu autem politico expedit quod dictum est quantum ad principari et subiici, et quantum ad disciplinam; sunt enim isti similes secundum naturam, quia liberi.

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Deinde cum dicit differunt autem declarat, ex quo sumenda est differentia per se utrorumque principantium. Et est intelligendum, quod operum ministerialium quaedam sunt honesta magis, quaedam autem inhonesta et servilia. Honesta opera ministerialia indifferenter conveniunt subditis in utroque principatu, sed ad alium et alium finem. Dicit igitur quod quaedam praecepta, puta honesta, communiter servis et liberis quantum ad operationem non differunt: eodem enim modo ea exequuntur, et liberi subditi et servi: sed magis differunt in ordine ad finem: quia servus operatur gratia domini, liber autem gratia sui vel boni communis. Et hoc accidit propter hoc, quia honestum est iuxta liberos subditos, multa eorum quae videntur ministerialia opera exercere, sicut dictum est, et actiones non sic differunt honesto et inhonesto secundum se acceptae sicut in ordine ad finem, gratia cuius sunt et dicuntur magis honestae et inhonestae quam secundum se, et ut naturales sunt.

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L. 11 (Η.14–15, 1333a11–1334b5)Cum vita otio et negotio constet, oportet leges non minus ad pacem, quam ad bellum cives instruere.

Cum vita otio et negotio constet, oportet leges non minus ad pacem, quam ad bellum cives instruere.

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1046. Quoniam autem civis et principantis eandem virtutem esse dicimus, et optimi viri, eundem autem subditum prius oportere fieri, et principantem posterius; hoc utique erit legislatori tractandum, qualiter viri boni fiant, et per quas adinventiones, et quid quod finis optimae vitae.

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1047. Divisae sunt autem duae partes animae: quarum haec quidem habet rationem secundum se, haec autem non habet quidem secundum se, rationi autem obedire potest: quarum dicimus virtutes esse, secundum quas vir bonus dicitur aliqualiter. Harum autem in qua magis quod finis, dividentibus quidem sic ut nos dicimus, non immanifestum qualiter dicendum. Semper enim quod deterius melioris gratia est: et hoc manifestum similiter in iis quae secundum artem, et in iis quae secundum naturam.

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1048. Melius autem quod rationem habet. Divisum est autem dupliciter, secundum modum quo consuevimus dividere: haec quidem practica ratio est, haec autem speculativa. Eodem igitur modo necesse et hanc partem divisam esse: videlicet, et actiones proportionaliter dicamus habere: et oportet natura melioris eligibiliores esse potentibus sortiri, aut omnibus, aut duabus. Semper enim unicuique hoc maxime eligibile, quo sortiri est summi.

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1049. Divisa est autem et tota vita, in non vacationem et vacationem, et bellum et pacem. Et agibilium, haec quidem in necessaria et utilia, haec aut in bona, de quibus necesse eandem electionem esse et partibus animae et actionibus ipsarum: bellum quidem pacis gratia: non vacationem autem vacationis, necessaria autem et utilia bonorum gratia.

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1050. Ad omnia quidem igitur aspicienti politico leges ferendae et secundum partes animae, et secundum actiones ipsarum; magis autem ad meliora et ad fines. Eodem autem modo et circa vitas et rerum divisiones. Oportet enim posse non vacare et bellare, magis autem pacem ducere, et vacare, et necessaria et utilia agere, magis autem oportet bona.

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1051. Quare ad has intentiones et pueros adhuc existentes erudiendum, et alias aetates quaecumque indigent eruditione.

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1052. Qui autem nunc optime videntur politizare graecorum et legislatorum, qui has instituerunt politias, neque ad optimum finem videntur ordinasse quae circa politias, neque ad virtutes, leges, et eruditionem. Sed graviter declinaverunt ad eas quae videntur esse utiles et supergressivas. Consimiliter autem iis et quidem eorum qui posterius scripserunt, protulerunt eandem opinionem: laudantes enim Lacedaemoniorum politiam, laudant legislatoris intentionem, quod omnia ad imperare et ad bellum, legis statuta fecerunt.

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1053. Quae et secundum rationem facile sunt arguibilia, et operibus sunt redarguta. Sicut enim plurimi hominum zelant multis dominari, quia multo successu fiunt eufortuniorum, sic et Thybron videtur laudans Lacedaemoniorum legislatorem, et aliorum unusquisque scribentium de politia ipsorum, quia propterea quod exercitati fuerunt ad pericula, multis principabantur.

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1054. Quamvis palam, quod quoniam nunc quidem non adhuc inest Lacedaemonibus principari non felices neque legislator bonus. Adhuc autem ridiculum, si manentes in legibus ipsis, et nullo impediente ne uterentur legibus, abiecerunt vivere bene.

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1055. Non recte autem existimant neque de principatu, quem oportet videri honorantem legislatorem. Eo enim quod est despotice principari, liberorum principatus melior et magis, cum virtute.

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1056. Adhuc autem, non propter hoc oportet civitatem felicem putare, et legislatorem laudare, quia praevalere potuit ad principari super vicinos. Haec enim magnum habent nocumentum. Palam enim quod et civium potenti hoc tentandum prosequi, qualiter possit propriae civitati principari: de quo quidem accusant Lacedaemones Pausaniam regem, et quidem habentem tantum honorem.

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1057. Neque itaque talium legum et rationum politica nulla, neque proficua, neque vera est. Haec enim optima et sigillatim et communiter legislatorem efficere oportet haec in animabus hominum. Idque quod hominum, et quod adversariorum studium, non huius gratia oportet meditari, ut servituti subiciant indignos; sed ut primo ipsi non serviant aliis, deinde ut zelent praesidatum gratia utilitatis subditorum, sed non gratia despoticae omnium. Tertio autem despotizare dignis servire.

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1058. Quod autem oportet legislatorem magis studere grtia ordinis et pacis, testantur ea quae fiunt rationibus. Plurimae enim talium civitatum, bellantes quidem salvantur; postquam autem obtinuerunt principatum, pereunt; rubiginem enim contrahunt, sicut ferrum, pacem ducentes. Causa autem legislator, non erudiens posse vacare.

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1059. Quoniam autem idem finis esse videtur et communiter et sigillatim hominibus, et eundem terminum esse necessarium optimo viro, et optimae politiae; manifestum quod oportet eas quae ad vacationem virtutes existere.

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1060. Finis enim, sicut dictum est saepe pax quidem belli, vacatioo autem non vacationis. Utiles autem virtutum ad vacationem, et deductionem sunt quarum in vacatione est opus et quarum in non vacatione. Oportet enim multa necessariurum existere, ut deinceps vaces: propter quod temperatam esse civitatem convenit, et fortem et perseverantem. Secundum proverbium enim non est servis vacatio.

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1061. Qui autem non possunt periclitari viriliter, servi invadentium sunt. Fortitudine quidem igitur et perseverantia opus est ad non vacationem, philosophia autem ad vacationem, tempterantia autem et iustitia in utrisque temporibus, et magis pacem ducentibus et vacantibus. Bellum quidem enim cogit iustos esse, et temperate agere; fruitio autem bonae fortunae et vacare cum pace, iniuriatores facit magis. Multa igitur indigent iustitia et multa temperantia, qui optime videntur agere et omnibus beatis frui; velut si qui sunt, sicut poetae aiunt, in beatorum insulis, maxime enim ii indigebunt philosophia, et temperantia, et iustitia, quanto magis vacant in abundantia talium bonorum.

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1062. Quod quidem igitur futuram felicitari et studiosam futuram civitatem oportet iis virtutibus participare, manifestum. Cum enim sit turpe non posse uti bonis, adhuc autem magis non vacantes quidem et bellantes videri bonos; pacem autem ducentes et vacantes, serviles. Propter quod oportet, non sicut Lacedaemoniorum civitas virtuti studere. Illi quidem enim non hac differunt ab aliis in non putare eadem aliis maxima bonorum; sed in fieri haec magis per quandam virtutem. Quoniam autem maiora bona quam quae belli haec, et fruitionem horum, aut eam quae virtutum, et quis propter ipsam, manifestum ex iis.

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Postquam philosophus ostendit, quod in republica recta principantis et subiecti est eadem disciplina uno modo, et altero alia, transit nunc ad declarandum qualiter et per quas adinventiones efficiantur cives bene disciplinati seu studiosi. Et circa hoc primo dat intentionem suam et ordinem considerandi. Secundo cum dicit, divisae sunt autem etc. prosequitur. In prima parte dicit: quoniam intendimus principaliter considerare qualiter, et per quae civis efficiatur disciplinatus et studiosus, eadem autem est disciplina seu virtus civis optimi in optima republica per quam ordinatur in felicitatem perfectissimam, quae est finis, et illa etiam principantis in ipsa, similiter autem optimi viri, etsi eumdem oportet prius subditum esse cum est iuvenis et imperfectus, posterius autem principantem cum est perfectus: magis considerandum est civitatem gubernanti, seu legislatori, qualiter et per quas adinventiones fiunt optimi viri et bene disciplinati. Et quia ratio istorum sumitur ex fine ultimo vitae humanae, considerandum est quis est ille finis. Hoc enim ostenso, apparebit qualiter et per quas adinventiones cives fiant bene disciplinati et studiosi.

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Deinde cum dicit divisae sunt prosequitur. Et primo declarat quis est finis ultimus vitae humanae. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem idem finis etc. declarat, quod virum et civitatem felices oportet habere omnes virtutes. Tertio cum dicit, qualiter autem et per quae etc. declarat per quae et qualiter erunt bene disciplinati, seu virtuosi. Quid autem sit felicitas declarat per divisionem partium animae primo. Secundo cum dicit, divisa est autem vita tota etc. declarat vitam humanam et agibilia ab homine proportionaliter dividi et se habere partibus animae praedictis. Circa primum, primo ostendit felicitatem consistere in eo quod pertinet ad partem animae rationalem per essentiam. Secundo cum dicit, melius autem etc. declarat eam consistere in operatione partis animae rationalis speculativae. Circa primum est intelligendum quod ultimus finis vitae humanae non consistit principaliter in aliquo eorum quae per se pertinent ad corpus (corpus enim et perfectiones ipsius sunt propter animam); sed magis in aliquo eorum quae ad animam pertinent, quae est excellentior pars hominis. In anima autem est considerare partem rationalem quocumque modo, et irrationalem omnino. In actu autem partis animae irrationalis omnino non potest consistere ultimum finis vitae humanae; quoniam necesse est ipsum consistere in aliquo quod est proprium hominis, in quo distinguitur ab aliis, quia ultimus finis hominis est proprius ei: pars autem animae irrationalis omnino communis est sibi et aliis: ergo non consisteret in aliqua perfectione pertinente ad partem illam, sed magis in aliqua pertinente ad partem animae rationalem aliquo modo. Sed cum haec pars animae divisa sit in plures, vult declarare philosophus in perfectione cuius illarum consistat, dicens: partes animae rationem habentis sunt duae distinctae adinvicem: quarum altera est quae est rationalis per essentiam accipiens rationem in ratione, quod quid est, alia autem est quae secundum se non est rationalis, nec accipit rationem in ratione dicente quid est, sed rationalis est secundum quamdam participationem, quia nata est obedire rationi, vel ordinari vel deduci ab ea.

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Cuiuslibet autem istarum partium animae rationalis sunt aliquae virtutes morales; puta temperantia, iustitia in irrationali. In rationali autem per essentiam sunt rationes, puta prudentia, sapientia. Et manifestum est ex dictis, quod in actu alicuius harum consistit ultimus finis hominis: sed in qua et cuius actu manifestum est qualiter est dicendum eis, qui dividunt partes animae rationalis secundum quod nos divisimus eas. In unoquoque enim genere illud quod deterius est et minus bonum, est gratia melioris: et hoc apparet per se, et in his quae fiunt a natura, et in his quae fiunt arte. In natura enim materia est gratia formae, et elementa prima simplicia propter mixta, in quibus imperfecta sunt gratia perfectorum, puta in genere animalium. Similiter et in his quae sunt secundum artem se habet: ligna enim et lapides sic disponuntur gratia formae domus, domus autem est gratia habitationis. Ratio autem dicti est, quoniam id quod deterius est in unoquoque genere, rationem imperfecti et entis in potentia habet: melius autem in eodem rationem perfecti et entis secundum actum. Imperfectum autem et ens in potentia se habent ad perfectum et ens in actu, sicut potentia ad actum in eodem genere. Potentia autem est gratia actus in eodem genere: ergo ens in potentia et ens imperfectum, est gratia entis in actu et perfecti, et ulterius deterius gratia melioris in eodem genere. Sed rationale per essentiam melius est in partibus animae rationali participatione: quia illud quod per essentiam est tale, melius et perfectius est eo quod per aliud est tale: ergo rationale participatione erit gratia rationalis per essentiam, et per consequens perfectio eius gratia perfectionis istius. Si igitur illud cuius gratia aliud est, rationem finis habet respectu illius, pars animae rationalis per essentiam, et aliqua perfectio eius erit finis partis rationalis per participationem et perfectionem eius.

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Deinde cum dicit melius autem declarat, quod ultimus finis vitae humanae consistit in operatione partis animae speculativae; dicens quod pars animae rationalis per essentiam divisa est in duas partes, sicut communiter solemus dividere: quarum altera est practica, quae ratiocinatur de agibilibus possibilibus aliter se habere: altera autem speculativa, quae negotiatur principaliter circa naturam entium, et impossibilium aliter se habere secundum quod huiusmodi. Et quia operationes consimiliter dividuntur principiis, et se habent adinvicem proportionaliter sicut illa; necesse est operationes huiusmodi partium divisas esse, et alteram esse operationem practicam, alteram autem speculativam, et ista se habere adinvicem proportionaliter, sicut practicum ad speculativum se habet. Et per consequens operationes melioris partis secundum naturam oportet esse meliores secundum se et eligibiliores illis, qui possunt sortiri illis, aut omnibus operationibus aut saltem duabus si non fuerint nisi duae. Operatio enim sequitur naturam per se, et ideo perfectioris est perfectior, et unicuique illud est magis eligibile, quo potest attingere ad summum et perfectissimum; hoc autem est operatio perfectioris secundum naturam. Ex quibus accipienda est ista propositio: quod melioris partis animae et excellentioris melior est operatio, et magis eligibilis simpliciter, et per consequens magis rationem finis habens. Sed pars animae speculativa melior et perfectior est natura quam practica. Quod quidem apparet ex ratione obiecti. Illa enim pars animae intellectualis perfectior et melior est in genere intellectus cuius obiectum magis habet rationem intelligibilis: quia natura potentiae consideratur ex ratione obiecti, et magis intelligibile secundum naturam perfectius est in genere intelligibilium. Sed obiectum intellectus speculativi magis habet rationem intelligibilis, quam obiectum intellectus practici. Huius enim obiectum est bonum agibile, et possibile aliter se habere; quae minus rationem intelligibilis propter rationem motus et possibilitatis adiunctorum habent. Obiectum autem intellectus speculativi est natura entium intransmutabilium, aut non secundum quod transmutabilia, quae magis rationem intelligibilis habent, sicut remota magis a motu et materia: ergo pars animae speculativa excellentior et nobilior erit practica. Sequitur igitur, quod operatio ipsius perfectior et eligibilior erit, et magis habens rationem finis. Istius principalis rationis, maiorem solum ponit philosophus cum declaratione eius.

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Deinde cum dicit divisa est declarat primo totam vitam humanam et agibilia ab homine consimiliter dividi partibus animae et actionibus, et dividentia proportionaliter se habere illis. Secundo cum dicit, ad omnia quidem igitur etc. ex dictis concludit quaedam corollaria. Tertio cum dicit, qui autem nunc etc. reprobat opinionem quorumdam contrariam dictis. Primo igitur dicit: quoniam actus et obiecta proportionaliter dividuntur ipsis potentiis, et se habent adinvicem dividentia, sicut et ipsae potentiae ad se, tota vita humana, idest conversatio secundum rationem, quae est actus animae rationem habentis, divisa est proportionaliter partibus animae dictae in negotium, idest in exercitium virtutum moralium principaliter, quae sunt ad alterum, et in otium, idest in exercitium virtutum contemplativarum, quod magis in otio fit, et in exercitium belli et pacis: et agibilia ab homine divisa sunt in bona necessaria et utilia ad finem, et in bona secundum seipsa, circa quae oportet se habere electionem sicut circa partes animae; ut sicut pars animae rationalis per participationem est gratia rationalis per essentiam, et huiusmodi gratia speculativae, ita hic bellum quaerendum propter pacem, et exercitium virtutum practicarum propter otium in contemplatione, ut consequenter magis dicet, et bona necessaria et utilia in finem propter illa quae sunt secundum se bona.

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Deinde cum dicit ad omnia concludit corollaria duo. Secundum ibi, quare ad has et cetera. In prima dicit: quia civilis gubernatoris et legislatoris est per leges et consuetudines facere bonos cives civitatis, gubernatorem expedit aspiciendo ad omnia praedicta leges ordinare; puta aspiciendo partes animae, debet quidem ferre leges, per quas bene disponantur ad virtutes et actiones, et per quas actiones ipsarum dirigantur secundum rationem; et magis debet esse sollicitus ad ordinandum meliora, et quae rationem finis habent; puta circa partem animae principaliorem, et actiones eius: sic enim videmus naturam magis sollicitam esse circa nobiliora. Eodem modo expedit ipsum ferre circa vitas, idest conversationes, et circa divisiones agibilium, puta circa utilia et secundum se bona ad dirigendum in eis. Expedit enim civitatibus habere potentiam operandi operationes virtutum practicarum, et debellare quandoque, quod fit in non vacando; et ulterius in otio et in tranquillitate vivere, et magis quanto hoc est melius quod fit in vacatione: et oportet eos utilia in finem posse agere, magis autem ea quae sunt secundum se bona. Ad omnia autem ista indigent aut habitibus quibusdam aut consuetudine inclinantibus, aut legibus et ratione dirigentibus.

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Deinde cum dicit quare ad has concludit secundum corollarium, intendens quod quia ex similibus operationibus similes habitus fiunt et operationes per leges diriguntur, nec parum differt sic vel sic a iuvene assuefieri; sed multum expediens est in civitate ordinata, pueros adhuc existentes ad intentionem legum erudiri et assuefieri, obedire eis et operari secundum eas; similiter eos qui sunt alterius aetatis indigentis eruditione et assuefactione. Consueta enim sunt delectabiliora. Delectabiliora autem libentius et facilius operantur.

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Deinde cum dicit qui autem reprobat opinionem contrariam quibusdam praedictorum. Et primo tangit opinionem ipsam et reprobat eam. Secundo cum dicit, quod autem oportet etc. manifestat quoddam acceptum prius. Circa primum primo tangit opinionem erroneam. Secundo cum dicit, quae est secundum rationem etc. reprobat eam. Tertio cum dicit, neque itaque etc. concludit contrarium ipsius, quod est principale intentum. In prima parte dicit, quod quidam Graecorum qui optime dicuntur a quibusdam gubernare et legislatores instituentes respublicas ipsorum contra praedicta peccaverunt in duobus. Primo quidem, quia ordinem civilem non ordinaverunt ad finem optimum hominis. Secundo quia leges quae significant ordinem civilem et eruditionem non instituerunt ad operationes virtutum optimarum, sed magis declinaverunt ad ea quae videntur utilia, per quae possent ditari et supergredi dominando aliis. Similiter autem et quidam philosophantes qui de republica scripserunt posterius, enunciaverunt eamdem opinionem, puta Plato et alii quidam qui laudantes rempublicam Lacedaemoniorum, laudaverunt intentionem legislatoris, quia omnia statuta ordinavit ad principandum vicinis, et ad bellum per quod subiicerentur.

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Deinde cum dicit quae et secundum reprobat eam; et primo ex ipsis operationibus manifestat ipsam redargutam. Secundo cum dicit, non recte autem etc. per rationes. Ex operibus autem docet eam redargutam dupliciter. Secundum facit, ibi, quamvis palam et cetera. In prima parte dicit quod respublica et leges et statuta praedictorum facile possunt redargui per rationem et factis contingentibus redarguta sunt. Si enim ordo civilis ipsorum et leges et eruditiones essent optimae, tunc ex virtute illorum principarentur aliis: nunc autem hoc non videmus. Sicut enim plures homines appetunt principari pluribus, quia principantes fortunatos videntur habere successus, sic Thybron et quilibet alius scribens de republica Lacedaemoniorum laudaverunt legislatorem eorum, quia multis principabantur, non quidem propter ordinem civilem per se, sed quia exercitati erant ad pericula bellorum, quamvis etiam manifestum sit quod nunc pluribus non principantur, nec etiam sunt felices remanente eadem republica. Legis igitur lator in ordinando praedictam rempublicam bonus non fuit.

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Deinde cum dicit quamvis palam ponit secundum; dicens, quod adhuc dignum est derisione, si Lacedaemonii praedicti perseverantes in eisdem legibus, quibus prius, nullo prohibente eos vivere secundum eas, non vivunt bene secundum rationem. Irrationabile enim est, si leges eorum et respublica rectae sunt quod viventes secundum eas non vivant recte. Palam autem est, quod ipsi tenentes easdem leges, non ducant optimam vitam: leges igitur et ordinatio reipublicae ipsorum rectae non sunt.

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Deinde cum dicit non recte docet eam esse redarguibilem per rationem; et principaliter quantum ad principatum. Et circa hoc primo ponit rationem unam. Secundo cum dicit, praeterea etc. aliam. In prima parte dicit, quod legislator Lacedaemoniorum et aliorum praedictorum non rectam existimationem habent de principatu supremo in republica quem maxime videtur honorare et iudicant honorandum, sicut optimum: principatus enim ipsorum est principatus dominativus quo principantur etiam indigni servire. Tali enim principatu est alius principatus civilis liberorum excellentior et magis secundum virtutem; quare magis laudandus erit.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundam rationem; dicens, quod non est rationabile credere civitatem esse felicem, et legislatorem ipsius laudare, quia potest principari super vicinos qualitercumque: principari enim ipsis quomodocumque optimum non est, sed magnum nocumentum affert civitati. Si enim hoc optimum esset, si in civitate aliquis inveniretur praepotens aliis expediret ipsum propriae civitati principari solum et tentare qualiter posset eam totam subiicere sibi: de quo sicut de inconvenientia Lacedaemones increpaverunt Pausaniam regem ipsorum qui honorem regalem habens apud eos et divitias et possessiones multas, voluit propriae civitati ipsorum principari solus. Praedictus igitur modus principandi optimus non est.

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Deinde cum dicit neque itaque concludit contrarium; dicens, quod ex praedictis rationibus manifestum est quod nulla legum praedictarum et rationum quae ad praedictum modum gubernandi ordinatur civilis est, hoc est ordinata optime, neque proficua civitatibus; neque etiam vera est in se; quia non ordinata ad optimum finem, ut praetendunt. Eadem enim optima et privatim et publice inducere oportet in animos hominum legislatorem; et studium civium quod habent et ad cives et etiam ad adversarios non ordinari ad hoc ut subiiciant servituti eos qui non sunt naturaliter servi. Talis enim principatus cum sit contra inclinationem naturalem, non potest esse continuus, nec amicabilis. Sed debent intendere primo, quod ipsi non efficiantur servi aliorum indigni existentes. Secundo, si appetant principatum, appetant ipsum propter utilitatem subditorum non propriam; nec propter hoc ut principentur eis dominative. Haec enim est differentia inter dominativum et civilem, quia principans principatu dominativo principatur per se non propter utilitatem subditi; e contrario est de civili, sicut dictum est in tertio huius. Tertio autem debent intendere qualiter principabuntur eis qui nati sunt eis servire: hoc enim est iustum, et ad tales contingit movere iustum bellum si fuerint rebelles.

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Deinde cum dicit quod autem declarat quoddam suppositum per signum; dicens, quod ea quae apparent ad sensum testificantur rationi; quia magis oportet legislatorem intendere ad pacem quam ad bellum, et magis studere gratia huius quam illius, sicut suppositum est prius. Videmus enim quod plurimae civitates quamdiu sunt in exercitio belli contra adversarios salvantur. Cum autem obtinuerint contra eos et vivunt in pace, corrumpitur respublica eorum. Bellantes enim multas virtutes habent, sicut dictum est prius, puta temperantiae, fortitudinis, liberalitatis et religionis, propter quas sibiinvicem minus sunt iniuriosi. Pacem autem habentes occasionem exercitandi in actibus huiusmodi virtutum non habent, dant autem se voluptatibus congregantes divitias per quas aestimant se posse voluptuose vivere: propter quod efficiuntur sibiinvicem iniuriosi et seditionem inducunt. Delicatam enim et quietam vitam ducentes, quasi rubiginem pravorum habituum et consuetudinum contrahunt: exercentes autem se in bellicis clarificantur per actus virtutum, sicut ferrum, quia tum facili rubiginem contrahit, elaboratum autem quamvis usus consumat, clarificat tamen et emendat, sicut Seneca dicit. Causa autem huius fuit legislator ipsorum qui non ordinavit eis honestas occupationes quibus vacarent cum cessarent a bellis, puta exercitium studii in philosophia et partibus eius; hoc enim multas et admirabiles delectationes habet puritate et firmitate, sicut dicit philosophus decimo Ethicorum.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem declarat quod civitatem et unumquemque existentes simpliciter felices oportet habere omnem virtutem. Et primo hoc declarat. Secundo cum dicit, quod quidem igitur etc. concludit hoc declaratum, adiungens quamdam persuasionem. Circa primum primo ostendit quod debentem felicitari simpliciter oportet praehabere omnes virtutes quae exiguntur ad vacationem. Secundo cum dicit, finis est enim etc. ostendit quod oportet praehabere omnes virtutes et ad vacationem et quae non ad vacationem ordinantur. Circa primum est intelligendum quod si finis est, necesse est praeexistere ea quae ad finem sunt per se; sicut si fistulatio est, necesse est praeexistere fistulas. Ultimus autem finis uniuscuiusque hominis est contemplatio aliqua alicuius intelligibilis; et idem est finis totius civitatis optime ordinatae, sicut ostensum est in principio istius septimi. Ad hanc autem ordinatur primo habitus intellectus perfectissimus cuius est actus speculatio intelligibilis primi. Deinde habitus imperfecti ipsius per quos dirigitur in speculando entia quorum cognitio via est in cognitionem intelligibilis primi. Tertio habitus partis animae appetitivae per quos regulatur appetitus ne praeter rationem divertatur homo ab intelligibilibus primis, detentus circa passiones et motus irrationales. Deinde autem virtutes per quas acquirit bona exteriora, secundum quod necessaria sunt ad finem, et repellit motus impedientium ab ipso. Ergo necesse est, si finis uniuscuiusque hominis vel civitatis existat, praeexistere huiusmodi virtutes omnes. Et ideo dicit, quoniam idem finis videtur esse et communiter omnium hominum secundum quod homines sunt simpliciter et uniuscuiusque singulariter accepti secundum quod homo, et idem ultimus terminus actionum optimi viri et optimae reipublicae, sicut ostensum est prius in isto septimo; huiusmodi autem est speculatio perfecta intelligibilium primorum quae in vacatione ab exterioribus existit, maxime autem ad hunc ordinantur omnes virtutes quae sunt ad quietem hominis ab exterioribus: manifestum est quod si homo secundum seipsum vel tota civitas felicitetur, necessarium est praeexistere omnes virtutes quae sunt ad vacationem seu quietem.

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Deinde cum dicit finis enim declarat quod necessarium est praehabere omnes quae ad vacationem et quae ad non vacationem. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, quid autem non habent etc. tangit quod virtutes ordinantur ad vacationem et non vacationem et quae ad utrumque. Circa primum intendit, quod sicut dictum est, omnes virtutes quae ordinantur ad vacationem praeexiguntur ad felicitatem uniuscuiusque civitatis: sed ad vacationem contemplationis ordinantur omnes virtutes et quae ad vacationem et quae ad non vacationem sunt; ergo omnes praeexiguntur ad felicitatem. Minorem huius declarat dicens, quod sicut supra dictum est saepe, finis belli est pax: nullus enim bellatur belli gratia, sed pacis magis, sicut dicitur decimo Ethicorum. Et finis operum quae non in vacatione sunt, sunt ea quae in vacatione; quia ea quorum opus in vacatione et non vacatione, utilia sunt ad vacationem et delectationem quae in ea, aut quia in earum operatione consistit finis, aut quia disponunt ad ipsum, aut removent prohibentia. Si enim aliquis debeat vacare, multa oportet praeexistere. Necessarium est igitur civitatem et unumquemque debentem felicitari, habere temperantiam et iustitiam et sapientiam et ceteras huiusmodi virtutes quae ad vacationem sunt, et fortitudinem, et perseverantiam; et quae ad non vacationem. Dico autem civitatem debentem felicitari, oportere praehabere virtutes quae ad vacationem quantum ad partes principales eius, quae sunt liberi, non quantum ad servos. Ad servos enim non pertinet vacatio, sicut proverbium dicit.

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Deinde cum dicit qui autem tangit quae sunt virtutes quae per se ordinantur ad vacationem vel ad utrumque; intendens quod illis virtutibus opus est ad non vacationem et bellum quibus prohibentur ne sint servi aliorum: sed illi qui non sunt dispositi aggredi pericula maxima quae in bello, nec sunt perseverativi in eis, servi sunt eorum qui invadunt eos, qui prohibentur per fortitudinem et perseverantiam. Fortitudinis igitur et perseverantiae virtutibus opus est ad non vacationem. Philosophia autem necessaria est ad vacationem contemplationis, contemplatio enim est opus eius. Ad utrumque autem necessariae sunt, temperantia per quam reprimuntur motus concupiscentiarum, et iustitia per quam diriguntur operationes hominis ad alterum: magis tamen vacantibus et ducentibus pacem quam non vacantibus: propter exercitium belli et periculum quod in eo est, disponuntur ad opera temperantiae, quia secundum poetam, otia si tollas, periere cupidinis arcus: sed ad opera aliarum virtutum multarum. Militaris enim vita multas partes habet virtutis, sicut dicebatur in secundo huius: e contrario, fruitio bonorum fortunae in tranquillitate disponit ad iniurias; possessio enim divitiarum contumeliosos et elatos facit: credentes enim omnia habere per ipsas, credunt omnia bona possidere in possidendo eas, sicut dicitur secundo rhetoricae; et ideo efferuntur per elationem et contemnunt alios. Propter quod eis qui volunt feliciter agere et frui omnibus quae ad beatitudinem pertinent necessaria est temperantia et iustitia multa: sicut si qui sunt in insulis beatorum, sicut poetae dicunt, dicentes insulas quasdam esse in quibus animae bene operantium dum vivunt feliciter perseverant post mortem. Talibus autem maxime necessaria est philosophia, in cuius actu consistit ultimus finis, et temperantia per quam sedantur concupiscentiae et iustitia per quam regulantur operationes ad alterum; et tanto magis quanto magis perseverant in abundantia honorum talium.

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Deinde cum dicit quod quidem recolligit dicta, adiungendo quamdam persuasionem; dicens, quod ex his quae dicta sunt, manifestum est quod civitatem quae futura est felix et virtuosa simpliciter omnes virtutes oportet habere et quae ad vacationem et quae ad non vacationem sunt. Si enim turpe est hominem qui determinatur ratione non posse uti secundum rationem bonis interioribus et exterioribus, adhuc magis turpe est non posse uti eisdem secundum ipsa cum vacat a bellicis operationibus, cum tunc magis intendere possit et pauciora habens impedimenta, sed non vacando ab exterioribus et bellando videri facere opera bonorum, vacando autem et pacem ducendo ducere vitam servilem et praeter rationem. Et ideo non oportet civitatem debentem felicitari tantum intendere et studere virtuti, hoc est fortitudini quae ordinatur ad bellum, sicut fecerunt Lacedaemonii: non enim differenter se habuerunt ad alios in hoc quod non crederent eadem esse maxima bona hominis quae alii, scilicet opera virtutum; sed magis in hoc quod opinabantur hoc fieri per unam virtutem, alii autem per aliam: ipsi enim opinabantur optimum bonum hominis consistere in actu fortitudinis bellicae, alii autem in actu sapientiae magis. Manifestum est igitur ex his quae dicta sunt, quoniam contingit esse quaedam bona maiora hominis quam quae secundum bellum sunt, et esse ista magis contingit in fruitione et actu quam in habitu, et istorum illa magis quae propter seipsa quaeruntur quam quae propter alia.

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L. 12 (Η.15–17, 1334b5–1337a7)Qua cura corporis alendi sint cives.

Qua cura corporis alendi sint cives.

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1063. Qualiter autem, et per quae erit hoc, utique speculandum. Divisimus itaque prius quod natura et consuetudine et ratione opus est. Horum autem quales quidem quosdam esse oportet natura, determinatum est prius. Reliquum autem considerare, utrum instruendi prius ratione vel consuetudinibus. Haec enim oportet ad invicem consonare consonantia optima. Contingit enim peccare, et rationem ab optima suppositione et per similia duci.

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1064. Manifestum utique hoc, primo quidem sicut in aliis, quomodo genertio a principio est, et finis ab aliquo principio alterius finis. Ratio autem nobis et intellectus naturae finis. Quare ad hoc generationum et consuetudinum studium oportet praeparare.

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1065. Deinde sicut corpus et anima duo sunt, ita et animae videmus duas partes: quod irrationabile, et rationem habens: et habitus horum duos secundum numerum: quorum hic quidem est appetitus, hic autem intellectus. Sicut autem corpus prius generatione quam anima, ita et quod irrationabile quam rationem habens. Manifestum autem ex hoc, animus enim et voluntas, adhuc autem et concupiscentia, et mox natis existunt pueris, ratiocinatio autem et intellectus, procedentibus nata sunt fieri.

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1066. Propter quod primo quidem corporis curam necessarium esse priorem quam eam quae animae, deinde eam quae appetitus; gratia vero intellectus eam quae appetitus, huius autem eorum quae animae.

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1067. Siquidem igitur a principio legislatorem videre oportet, qualiter corpora optima fiant eorum quae educantur, primo quidem curandum circa coniugium, quando et quales quosdam existentes oportet facere nuptialem collucutionem.

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1068. Oportet autem leges ferre circa hanc communicationem aspicientem ad ipsos, et ad tempus vivendi, ut conveniant aetatibus ad idem tempus, et non dissonent potentiae, huius quidem adhuc potentis generare, hac autem non potente, aut hac quidem, viro autem non: hae enim faciunt et dissensiones ad invicem, et diversitates.

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1069. Deinde ad puerorum successionem: oportet enim neque subdeficere pueros aetatibus patrum, sine profectu enim senioribus gratia quae a pueris, quod autem a patribus auxilium pueris: neque valde prope esse, multam enim habent displicentiam, verecundiaque minus existit talibus, tamquam coaetaneis, et circa dispensationem querulosum quod propinquum.

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1070. Adhuc autem unde incipientes ad hoc devenimus, quatenus corpora natorum existant ad legislatoris voluntatem. Fere itaque omnia accidunt secundum unam curam.

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1071. Quoniam enim non determinatus est finis generationis, ut ad plurimum est dicere, viris quidem numerus septuaginta annorum ultimus quinquaginta autem mulieribus, oportet principium coniugationis secundum aetatem ad tempora haec descendere.

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1072. Est autem iuvenum vel iuniorum coitus pravus ad puerorum procreationem: in omnibus enim animalibus imperfecti iuvenum foetus, et femellae, et hoc magis, et parvis secundum formam, quare necessarium hoc ipsum et in hominibus accidere. Argumentum autem, in quibuscumque enim civitatum laxantur iuvenes coniugari, et iuvenculas, imperfecti et parvi corporis sunt.

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1073. Adhuc autem in partibus iuvenes dolent magis, et perimuntur plures. Propter quod et oraculum quidem aiunt factum fuisse propter talem causam Troezeniis, tamquam multis pereuntibus propter nubere magis iuvenculos, et non ad fructuum productionem.

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1074. Adhuc autem et ad temperantiam expedit coitus facere senioribus; intemperantiores enim videntur iuvenculae, quae usae fuerint coitibus.

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1075. Et masculorum corpora laedi videntur ad augmentum, si adhuc corpore crescente fecerunt coitum: etenim huius quoddam tempus determinatur, quod non excedit multum adhuc.

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1076. Propter quod has quidem congruit circa aetatem decem et octo annorum coniugari, hos autem circa triginta septem aut parum. In tanto enim tempore perfectis corporibus coniugatio erit, et ad profectum puerorum procreationis conveniet temporibus opportune. Adhuc autem successio puerorum iis quidem erit inchoante acmi, si fiat secundum rationem mox generatio, iis autem resoluta iam aetate ad numerum septuaginta annorum.

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1077. De eo quidem igitur quod est quando oportet fieri coniugium, dictum est. His autem quae circa temporaneitatem temporibus oportet uti, quibus multi utuntur, bene etiam nunc determinantes hieme fieri commorationem hanc. Oportet autem et ipsos speculari ad puerorum procreationem, et quae a Physicis. Medici enim tempora corporum dicunt sufficienter, et de spiritibus Physici boreales australibus laudantes magis.

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1078. Qualibus autem quibusdam corporibus existentibus maxime utilitas erit iis, qui generantur, scientibus quidem magis dicendum in iis quae de disciplina. Typo autem sufficiens dicere et nunc. Neque enim qui athletarum optimus habitus ad politicam bonam habitudinem, neque ad evexium neque ad sanitatem, et puerorum procreationem, neque qui curis indigens, et male habens valde, sed medius horum.

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1079. Oportet quidem igitur habere habitum labores passivum, pasivum autem labores non violentos, neque ad unum solum, sicut athletarum habitus, sed et actiones liberorum. Similiter autem oportet idem existere et viris et mulieribus.

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1080. Oportet autem, et praegnantes curare de corporibus, neque desidia torpentes, neque subtili cibo utentes. Hoc autem facile legislatori facere praecipienti quotidie aliquod iter facere ad deorum reverantiam, iis quae sortitae sunt eum qui de generatione honorem. Intellectum vero e contrario corporibus pigrius congruit deducere. Quae enim generantur videntur absumentia ab ea quae habet, sicut nascentia a terra.

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1081. De reservatione autem et alimento genitorum sit lex, nullum orbatum nutrire; propter multitudinem autem puerorum, ordo gentium prohibet nihil reservari genitorum.

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1082. Oportet enim determinatam esse multitudinem puerorum procreationis: si autem aliquibus fiant propter hoc combinatis, antequam sensus insit et vita, fieri oportet abortum: quod enim sanctum, et quod non determinatum, et ipso vivere erit.

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1083. Quoniam autem principium quoddam aetatis viro et mulieri determinatum est, quando oportet incipere coniugationem, et quanto tempore deservire congruit ad puerorum procreationem, sit determinatum. Seniorum enim foetus, sicut et iuniorum, imperfecti fiunt et corporibus et intellectibus. Qui autem decrepitorum, debiles. Propter secundum intellectus ac mens, hoc autem est in plurimis (quam quidem poetarum aliqui dixerunt mensurantes hebdomadibus aetatem) circa tempus quinquaginta annorum: ut quatuor aut quinque annis excedentem aetatem hanc, dimittere oportet eam quae ad manifestam generationem.

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1084. Quod autem reliquum sanitatis, gratia aut alicuius alterius talis causa, oportet videri facientes collocutionem.

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1085. De ea autem quae ad aliam et ad alium sit quidem simpliciter non bonum tangentem videre nullatenus nullo modo, cum fuerit et appelletur connubium. Circa tempus autem puerorum procreationis, siquis appareat tale quid agens, damnificetur inhonoratione decenti ad peccata.

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1086. Natis autem pueris, magnam putari esse differentiam ad corporum potentiam alimentum, quale quoddam utique sit, apparet et per alia animalia considerantibus, et per gentes, quibus cura est inducere bellicum habitum, lactis abundans alimentum est maxime familiare corporibus, magis autem vino propter aegritudines.

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1087. Adhuc autem et motus quoscumque contingit facere tantillos, expedit. Ad non defluere autem membra propter teneritudinem utuntur et nunc quaedam gentium instrumentis quibusdam mechanicis, quae faciunt impervertibile corpus animalium et talium.

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1088. Expedit autem mox etiam a frigore consuescere ex parvis pueris. Hoc enim et ad sanitatem et ad bellicas actiones maxime proficuum: propter quod apud multos barbarorum est consuetudo, iis quidem in fluvium frigidum abluere natos, iis autem involvere parvum circumponere, puta Celtis. Omnia enim quaecumque possibile assuescere, mox inchoantibus melius quidem assuescere, gradatim autem assuescere. Bene autem apta puerorum habitudo propter caliditatem ad frigidorum exercitium.

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1089. Circa primam quidem igitur expedit facere curam talem et huic consimilem.

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1090. Habitam autem huic aetati usque ad quinque annos, in qua nondum neque ad eruditionem aliam bene habet adducere, neque ad necessarios labores ut non impediant incrementum, oportet tanto sortiri motu, ut diffugiant inertiam corporum quam oportet instituere et per alias actiones et per ludum. Oportet autem et ludos esse neque illiberales neque superlaboriosos neque remissos.

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1091. Et de sermonibus autem et fabulis, quales quosdam oportet audire tantillos, cura sit principibus quos vocant paedonomos. Omnia enim talia oportet praevia facere ad posteriores conversationes, propter quod ludos plures oportet esse imitationes posterius studendorum.

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1092. Cohibitiones autem puerorum in ploratibus non recte detestantur qui prohibent in legibus; conferunt enim ad incrementum; fit enim quodammodo exercitatio corporibus. Detentio enim spiritibus facit robur laborantibus, quod accidit et pueris qui cohibentur.

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1093. Considerantum autem paedonomis horum deductionem et aliam et quomodo quam minime cum servis erunt: hanc enim aetatem et usque ad septem annos necessarium domi alimentum habere. Rationabile igitur assumere illiberalitatem ab auditis et visis, et tantillos existentes.

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1094. Totaliter quidem igitur turpiloquium ex civitate, sicut aliquid aliud oportet legislatorem exterminare, ex dicere enim de facili quodcumque turpium fit, et ipsum facere prope. Maxime quidem igitur ex iuvenibus quatenus neque dicant neque audiant nihil tale. Si quis autem apparuerit aliquid dicens aut agens vetitum, liberum quidem, nondum autem dignificatum demissione, in continuis dehonestationibus punire, et verberibus; seniorem autem aetate hac inhonorationibus illiberalibus utilitatis gratia.

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1095. Quoniam autem dicere aliquid talium exterminamus, manifestum quia et videre aut picturas aut sermones inhonestos. Curae quidem igitur sit principibus nihil, neque sculpturam neque picturam, esse talium actionum imitationem, nisi apud aliquos Deos tales, quibus et lasciviam attribuit lex. Ad haec autem dimittit lex eos qui habent aetatem amplius provectam et pro ipsis et pueris cultu honorare Deos. Iuniores autem neque iamborum neque comoediae spectatores ponendum antequam aetatem accipiant in qua existet communicare.

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1096. Iam de missione et ab ebrietate, et ab eo quod fit a talibus nocumento, omnes impassibiles facit disciplina. Nunc quidem igitur in transcursu horum fecimus sermonem; posterius autem insistentes oportet determinare magis sive non oportet primo, sive oportet, dubitantes, et qualiter oportet; secundum praesens autem tempus meminimus tamquam necessario.

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1097. Forte autem non male dicebat quod tale. Theodoros tragoediae gesticulator. Nulli enim unquam permisit ante se inducere, neque vilium hypocritarum tamquam appropriatis theatris primis auditibus. Accidit autem idem hoc et ad hominum collucutiones, et ad eas quae rerum. Omnia enim amamus, prima magis. Propter quod oportet iuvenibus facere omnia extranea quae prava; maxime autem ipsorum quaecumque habent infectionem, aut inhaesionem.

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1098. Transactis autem quinque annis, duobus usque ad septem oportet speculatores fieri disciplinarum quas oportet addiscere ipsos.

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1099. Duae autem sunt aetates ad quas necessarium dividi disciplinam post eam quae a septem annis usque ad pubescentiam, et iterum post eam quae a pubescentia usque ad annos viginti et unum. Qui autem enim septenniiis dividunt aetates ut ad multum, dicunt non bene; oportet autem divisionem naturae consequi. Omnis enim ars et disciplina, quod deficit naturae vult supplere. Primo quidem igitur considerandum, si est faciendum ordinem aliquem circa pueros; deinde utrum expedit communiter facere curam ipsorum, vel secundum proprium modum: quod fit et nunc in plurimis civitatum; tertio autem quaelem quendam oportet omnem hunc.

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Postquam philosophus ostendit quis sit ultimus finis optimae vitae humanae, transit ad declarandum qualiter et per quas adinventiones fiunt optimi viri in ordine ad ipsam. Et circa hoc primo praemittit intentionem suam et ordinem considerandi. Secundo cum dicit, manifestum utique etc. prosequitur. In prima parte dicit, quod declarato quis sit ultimus terminus optimae vitae humanae, consequenter considerandum est per quae et qualiter fient boni et studiosi in ordine ad ipsum. Distinximus autem prius tria quae necessaria sunt ad hoc, scilicet natura, consuetudo et ratio, secundum quales oportet esse futuros studiosos et bene gubernantes secundum naturam quoniam intellectivos et animosos, sicut dictum est prius; et ideo relinquitur nunc considerandum quales oportet esse secundum consuetudinem et disciplinam. Prius tamen considerandum est, utrum prius instruendi sunt secundum rationem vel intellectum, aut secundum consuetudinem seu appetitum; et utrum prius disponi secundum animam, aut secundum corpus: oportet enim ista consonare adinvicem consonantia debita, ita quod illud quod natum est prius disponi secundum naturam disponatur prius, et quod posterius, posterius. Contingit enim multoties peccare rationem ab eo quod est optimum et duci per similia et apparentia quaedam, ad ea quae praeter naturam sunt, ita ut prius nitatur disponere quod posterius natum est perfici. Sed cum ratio posterior sit natura et imitetur eam, optimum est in his quae rationis sunt sequi dispositionem naturae, ita ut prius consideret et disponat quae prius nata sunt considerari et disponi secundum naturam.

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Deinde cum dicit manifestum utique prosequitur. Et primo declarat quod futuri studiosi et boni prius disponendi sunt secundum corpus quam secundum animam, et secundum appetitum quam secundum intellectum. Secundo cum dicit, siquidem igitur etc. qualiter disponendi sunt secundum ista. Circa primum primo ostendit quod generationem hominis et consuetudinem oportet ordinari ad rationem et intellectum. Secundo cum dicit, deinde ut corpus et anima etc., ostendit quod appetitus irrationalis prior est quam intellectus in actu perfecto. Tertio cum dicit, propter quod etc., concludit ex istis quod prius oportet curare de dispositione corporis quam animae, et appetitus irrationalis quam intellectus. Primo igitur dicit: in omnibus in quibus est aliquis finis ea quae sunt ad finem oportet ordinare in ipsum et disponere secundum quod ipsi congruunt. Manifestum est autem, quod sicut in aliis qui sunt secundum naturam et secundum artem generatio incipit ab aliquo principio primo imperfecto et terminatur in aliquid perfectum et finem; huiusmodi autem finis (hoc est terminus) est alicuius moti ab aliquo principio imperfecto; ita et in homine generatio incipit ab aliquo imperfecto et tendit in aliquid perfectum et finem. Huiusmodi autem terminus et finis naturalis hominis est ratio et intellectus in actu non in potentia: quare generationem ipsius hominis et studium circa consuetudines et dispositiones ipsius, oportet ordinari ad rationem, et ipsa disponi secundum quod ipsi congruunt.

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Deinde cum dicit deinde sicut ostendit quod appetitus irrationalis generatione praecedit intellectum in actu; dicens, quod postea sicut corpus et anima sunt duo differentia adinvicem, quia corpus rationem materiae et subiecti habet, anima autem rationem actus, ita animam hominis videmus duas partes habere: quarum altera rationem moti et subiecti habet, reliqua autem rationem principalis moventis: videlicet appetitus irrationalis qui natus est regulari a ratione, et rationalis pars per essentiam quae rationem moventis habet. Et istorum duorum sunt duo habitus differentes secundum numerum. Primi quidem virtus moralis, secundi autem intellectualis: et alterum istorum appetitus est, alterum autem intellectus seu ratio. Sicut igitur corpus secundum viam generationis praecedit animam, ita appetitus irrationalis intellectum et rationem in actu: et hoc apparet ex hoc quod animus, idest virtus irascibilis et voluptas et concupiscentia insunt pueris statim ex nativitate. Intellectus autem et ratio in actu, non insunt nisi procedente tempore. Si aliquis argueret contra hoc quod dictum est, quoniam appetitus irrationalis in homine est qui non est regulatus ratione secundum se, regulatus tamen a rationali per essentiam, sed rationale secundum se prius videtur esse quam regulatum a ratione, tum quia movens est prius moto, tum quia simplex prius composito, sicut albedo quam album: et est dicendum ad hoc, quod prius dicitur aliquid alio, hoc quidem secundum substantiam et perfectionem, et sic intellectus praecedit appetitum, sicut movens motum et forma materiam; hoc autem secundum viam generationis, sicut materia prior est forma. Et tunc appetitus potest considerari secundum quod natus est regulari a ratione, et sic prior est generatione intellectu seu ratione determinante ipsum: aut secundum quod regulatur in actu, et sic posterior est sicut compositum simplici. Et per hoc apparet solutio ad rationem.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod concludit ex dictis quod prius oportet disponi corpus quam animam, et appetitum quam intellectum: dicens, quod propter hoc, quia prius oportet quaerere et disponere ea quae sunt ad finem quam ipsum finem, et corpus ordinatur ad intellectum et rationem sicut in finem, ut probatum est prius, et appetitus similiter sicut materia ad formam; manifestum est quod prius oportet facere curam corporis quam animae. Deinde eam quae appetitus propter ipsum intellectum, et gratia ipsius: et gratia istius eiusdem curare omnia illa quae sunt ipsius animae. Omnes enim partes animae et habitus ordinantur ad perfectionem, quae secundum intellectum est.

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Deinde cum dicit siquidem igitur declarat qualiter et per quae disponendi sunt ad virtutem. Et primo qualiter secundum corpus et appetitum. Secundo cum dicit, quod quidem etc., in principio octavi, qualiter secundum intellectum et rationem. Circa primum primo praemittit intentionem suam et ordinem considerandi. Secundo cum dicit, oportet quidem igitur etc. prosequitur. In prima parte dicit: quoniam legislatorem optimum primo oportet intendere qualiter et per quae cives optime disponantur secundum corpus, dispositio autem optima civium primo dependet ex bona dispositione generantium in actu generationis, qui fit per coniunctionem maris et feminae per copulam nuptialem: ergo consideranda sunt ei ea quae sunt circa huiusmodi copulam seu coniugium: videlicet qua aetate, et quo tempore, et qualibus existentibus copulandis iucunda est huiusmodi coniunctio nuptialis.

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Deinde cum dicit oportet autem prosequitur. Et quoniam bona dispositio civium, sicut dictum est, primo pendet ex dispositione generantium; deinde ex dispositione matris, tempore gestationis; tertio autem ex convenienti alimento et consuetudine post nativitatem: primo declarat qualiter disponendi sunt generantes ad bonam dispositionem prolis futuram. Secundo cum dicit, oportet autem et praegnantes etc. qualiter praegnantes. Tertio cum dicit, de reservatione autem etc. qualiter curandi seu disponendi sunt pueri post nativitatem. Circa primum primo ostendit quando facienda est copula nuptialis. Secundo cum dicit, qualibus autem quibusdam etc. quales oportet esse copulandos secundum habitudinem corporis. Circa primum primo ostendit qua existente aetate utriusque oportet eam fieri. Secundo cum dicit, de eo quidem igitur etc. quali existente temperatura seu dispositione continentis. Circa primum primo ostendit, quod oportet eam fieri tempore et aetate determinatis. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam enim determinatus est etc. declarat quae sunt tempus et aetas determinata in quibus oportet fieri. Primum ipse primo declarat per rationem sumptam ex cautela dissensionum et diversitate copulandorum. Secundo cum dicit, deinde ad puerorum successionem etc. per rationem sumptam ex eis quae accidunt secundum successionem puerorum ad patres. Tertio cum dicit, adhuc autem etc. ex ea quae sumitur ex bona dispositione prolis vel puerorum futura. In prima parte dicit, quod oportet legislatorem intendentem bonam dispositionem puerorum futuram ordinare leges et statuta circa communicationem nuptialem civium, considerando ad dispositionem ipsorum tempore quo copulantur, ut scilicet sint perfecta in se, et bene se habentia ad generationem; et considerando ad tempus vitae utriusque, et maris et feminae; quantum scilicet uterque secundum naturam vivere potest, ita ut conveniant ad actum generationis primo in aetate qua hic perfecte potest generare, et illa concipere, supposita bona dispositione ipsorum in se, et in ordine ad finem temporis vitae eorum, ut simul vel fere hic possit generare, et illa concipere; et non dissonent potentiae, ita ut iste possit generare, et illa non concipere, aut e contrario ista possit concipere, ille vero non generare, propter dispositionem iuventutis, vel senectutis: ista enim inducunt dissensionem et diversitatem inter ipsos. Si enim copulentur tempore quo unus possit generare, alter non, propter aetatem adinvicem dissentiunt, et ideo copulam alteram petunt, quod est inconveniens. Ut igitur vitetur dissensio, et diversitas inter eos, copulandi sunt in aetate conveniente utrique in ordine ad tempus durationis ipsorum.

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Deinde cum dicit deinde ad puerorum ponit secundam rationem; dicens, quod secundo copulandi sunt in aetate convenienti considerando successionem puerorum ad patres. Sicut enim parentes secundum legem naturae tenentur filiis ad nutrimentum et disciplinam usque ad perfectum, ita necessitate quadam parentibus impotentibus factis, tenentur filii subvenire in necessitatibus. Auxilium autem quod potest accidere senioribus parentibus a pueris genitis in senectute eorum, sine profectu est propter impotentiam puerorum. Similiter auxilium quod potest accidere pueris in senectute genitis a parentibus senioribus existentibus, debile est propter impotentiam eorum ex senectute: et ideo non expedit copulam nuptialem fieri senibus existentibus, neque etiam valde prope principium nativitatis, hoc est nimis iuvenibus existentibus: multum enim displicet quandoque iuvenes existentes pueros habere quasi coaetaneos, et minus male verentur filii parentes iuvenes, et verecundantur minus male in eorum conspectu, quasi coaevi, et nutriti cum eis propter consuetudinem, et magis conqueruntur in invicem circa ea quae ad mutuam dispensationem pertinent, cum sint simul aeque potentes, vel impotentes aeque; et ita cum filius requirit a patre iuvari necessitatibus, potest respondere ipsum aequaliter posse sibi et e contrario.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit tertiam rationem, dicens quod adhuc idem potest ostendi per rationem sumptam ex his quae diximus prius, unde incoepimus sermonem de hoc. Oportet enim copulam nuptialem tali aetate et tali tempore fieri, quibus corpora puerorum nascentium contingat disponi melius ad virtutem, et secundum intentionem legislatoris. Hoc autem magis contingit fieri si fiat tempore et aetate determinatis, ut consequenter apparebit: ergo expedit eam fieri tempore determinato. Sic igitur omnia quae sunt circa curam nuptialem unam communem curam habent fere, ut scilicet fiat tempore determinato. Fere autem dicit forte, quia non idem tempus determinatum convenit omnibus propter diversitatem materiae.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam enim intendit declarare, qua aetate expedit eam fieri ex termino generationis in utroque, et ex inconvenientibus quae accidunt si fiat nimis cito. Et secundum hoc primo praemittit quaedam necessaria ad declarationem intenti. Secundo cum dicit, propter quod has quidem etc. ex illis concludit intentum suum. Circa primum primo tangit quid sit terminus generationis in utroque, secundum quem oportet considerare. Secundo cum dicit, est autem iuvenum, vel iuniorum etc. ostendit quod coitus iuvenum non est conveniens ad generationem. In prima parte dicit: ultimus terminus generationis hominibus determinatus est, sicut et aliis. In omnibus enim quae contingit esse et non esse, est tempus determinatum quo contingit esse, et per consequens agere, sicut dicit primo caeli et mundi, et iste terminus masculis, ut in pluribus, est septuaginta anni: quia tunc sensibiliter debilitatum est calidum naturale, quamvis in aliquibus sit longior, in aliquibus brevior propter dispositionem materiae aliam et aliam; femellis autem quinquaginta, ut in pluribus. Brevior autem est periodus generationis mulieris quam viri, quia mulieres naturaliter sunt minoris virtutis et caliditatis quam viri. Et quia expedit propter dissensionem vitandam in coniugandis simul terminare potentiam generationis in utroque, opportunum est in determinando principium ipsius condescendere commensurando ad tempora haec.

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Deinde cum dicit est autem ostendit, quod coitus iuniorum est pravus. Et dividitur in quatuor partes, secundum quatuor rationes quas adducit ad hoc. Secundam ponit cum dicit, adhuc autem in partibus et cetera. Tertiam cum dicit, adhuc autem et ad temperantiam et cetera. Quartam cum dicit, et masculorum corpora et cetera. Primo igitur ponit primam, quae sumitur ex ordine ad generationem; dicens, quod coitus iuniorum, sive masculi sive femellae, pravus est ad generationem puerorum. Et hoc quidem apparet ad sensum: quia in omnibus animalibus partus iuniorum sunt imbecilles et imperfecti, quia imperfectio partus est ex imperfectione principiorum generantium, sicut universaliter imperfectio effectus est ex imperfectione causarum, et feminae crebrius quam mares, et parva corpora gignuntur. Cum enim principium generativum in semine non potest digerere menstruum mulieris propter indigentiam caliditatis, ut deducat ad similitudinem suam secundum omnes dispositiones, sed magis vincatur propter superabundantiam frigidi et humidi, de necessitate transmutat in contrarium, et in femellam. Talis autem dispositionis sunt semina iuniorum. Et iterum generati ab eis parvi sunt secundum formam, idest secundum figuram: extensio enim secundum figuram causatur a magnitudine calidi, cuius est movere sursum: quod est imperfectum in iunioribus, ut dictum est. Quare si sic accidit in omnibus animalibus, necesse est ita accidere in hominibus, in quibus argumentum speciale apparet ad hoc: quoniam in quibuscumque civitatibus seu regionibus permittuntur iuvenes et iuvenculae coniugari, et permisceri ad generationem, generantur parvi et imperfecti secundum corpus, et per consequens minus utiles ad opera bellica.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundam, quae sumitur ex accidenti parturientibus; dicens, quod ad hoc mulieres concipientes in aetate imperfecta in partu maiorem sustinent dolorem, et plurimae moriuntur, tum propter membri ad hoc ordinati arctitudinem, tum propter virtutis debilitatem: quanto enim virtus minor est ad resistendum, tanto dolor maior, sicut videmus onera eadem graviora apparere debilibus. In iunioribus autem supponimus virtutem minorem esse, et ideo maiorem dolorem accidere, qui tantus potest esse, quod mortem inducit. Et propter hoc dixerunt antiqui apud Graecos factum esse oraculum Troezeniis, ut dolor eius adiutorio mitigaretur et foetus ad ortum produceretur, cum multae in iuventute mulieres morerentur, et fructus non veniret ad productionem propter imperfectionem.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit tertiam, quae sumitur in ordine ad virtutem; dicens, quod adhuc coitus est minus expediens iunioribus ad temperantiam, et magis expedit senioribus existentibus: iuvenculae enim quae magis assuetae sunt coire in iuventute intemperantiores sunt. Illa enim ad quae assueti sumus, magis sunt delectabilia; et ad ea quae sunt magis delectabilia, magis inclinamur.

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Deinde cum dicit et masculorum ponit quartam rationem; dicens, quod adhuc corpora masculorum coeuntium in imperfecta aetate dum corpus est in augmento, laeduntur, et defectum patiuntur a quantitate eis determinata et in complexione: alimentum enim digestum principium est nutritionis et augmentationis et generationis. Tempore enim augmenti totum quod convertitur de alimento adveniente, vel fere, necessarium est ad nutritionem et augmentum, et parum vel nihil est de superfluo, quod ordinatur ad generationem; et ideo si multum coeant, necessarium est, quod illud quod deberet transire in augmentum et nutritionem convertatur in semen; quare detrimentum patientur in augmento et nutritione. Est enim quoddam tempus determinatum, in quo animalia nata sunt augmentari, quod non multum exceditur a tempore deputato ad generationem: statim enim deficiente augmento, et perfectis corporibus, cum plus convertitur de alimento quam sit necessarium ad nutritionem, convenientius ordinatur ad generationem. Coitus etiam non perfectis corporibus detrimentum inducit quantum ad complexionem propter exsiccationem, et infrigidationem; simul enim consumitur calidum et humidum. Unde philosophus dicit in libro de causis, longitudinis et brevitatis vitae quod coitiva et multispermia cito senescunt, quia sperma superfluum existens amplius desiccat emissum; et ideo mulus longioris vitae est quam ea ex quibus generatur, quia minus spermatizat; et passeres masculi brevioris, quia magis coitivi sunt.

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Deinde cum dicit propter quod concludit ex dictis quando et qua aetate opportunum est fieri copulam nuptialem; dicens, quod propter hoc quod finis generationis in viris, ut in pluribus est septuagesimus annus vel circa, mulieribus autem quinquagesimus vel circa ut in pluribus, et expedit coniugatos simul deficere a potentia generandi, ut probatum est prius, et coitus iuniorum in imperfectis corporibus parvus est; corpora autem mulierum, ut in pluribus perficiuntur in decem et octo annis vel circa, virorum autem in triginta sex, aut parum plus aut minus; expediens est magis eos coniugari muliere existente decem et octo annorum vel circa, viro autem triginta sex aut parum plus vel minus. Sic enim coniungentur corporibus perfectis; et per consequens virtutibus, quibus existentibus erit coniugatio ipsorum in tempore convenienti ad perfectionem generationis puerorum. Virtutibus etiam perfectis perfectior erit actio et etiam ipsum generatum; et iterum successio puerorum ad patres opportunius fiet si statim cum copulati sunt mulieres decemocto, viri triginta sex annorum existentibus, statim generent: succedent enim filii parentibus in principio status corpore perfecto, scilicet circa trigesimum annum matre agente quinquagesimum, patre septuagesimum vel circa, impotentes fere existent quasi resoluta aetate, impotentia tamen eorum supplebitur per filiorum potentiam perfectorum existentium. Quando igitur oportet fieri coniugium considerato bono coniugatorum et generandorum, dictum est.

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Est autem intelligendum quod quamvis viri et mulieres sint eiusdem speciei, non tamen eadem periodus est vitae utriusque ipsorum: quia tempus durationis ipsorum non sequitur eos ratione speciei communis utrique, sed sequitur virtutem complexionis: virtus autem complexionis multo fortior est in viro quam in muliere propter abundantiam calidi et meliorem proportionem eius ad alias qualitates; et ideo viri longioris vitae sunt secundum naturam mulieribus. Et quia illud quod perfectius est pluri tempore indiget ad sui perfectionem quanto plura exiguntur ad eius perfectionem, viri autem perfectiores sunt mulieribus; ideo pluri tempore indigent ad sui perfectionem quam mulieres, ut in pluribus: quamvis propter indispositionem materiae possit accidere e contrario. Philosophus autem determinavit tempus perfectionis mulierum decem octo annos vel circa, virorum autem triginta septem vel circa; quia sic apparebat ei forte, ut in pluribus, aut quia secundum proportionem horum numerorum adinvicem excedit virtus complexionis viri virtutem complexionis mulieris secundum naturam. Si autem obiiciatur prius debere fieri coniugationem nuptialem quam determinat philosophus; primo, quia generatio fit ex superfluo alimenti, quando igitur primo incipit esse superfluum alimenti, et masculi incipiunt spermatizare videtur quod deberet fieri talis copulatio, hoc autem contingit multo tempore prius quam determinet philosophus, puta tempore pubescentiae; ergo prius videtur debere fieri. Et praeterea hoc iura determinant quae videntur considerare bonum commune, matrimonia scilicet posse fieri muliere existente duodecim annorum, viro existente quatuordecim vel circa.

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Ad hoc est intelligendum, secundum intentionem philosophi, quod si consideremus bonam dispositionem generantium et bonam habitudinem generandorum futuram, et per consequens utilitatem communem civitatis seu regionis per se, melius est coniunctionem istam fieri perfectis corporibus utriusque quod est tempore determinato a philosopho vel circa, ut in pluribus: perfectis enim corporibus perfectae erunt virtutes, nec detrimentum aliquod patientur in augmento, aut complexione secundum quod huiusmodi, nisi propter superfluitatem, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Et pueri melius erunt dispositi quantum ad corpus, quia a magis et melius dispositis generabuntur, et per consequens secundum animam, quia bona dispositio corporis disponit ad bonam dispositionem animae; et sic magis apti erunt ad virtutes et actus civiles. Propter accidens tamen aliquod expedit tardius vel citius fieri in aliquibus, puta si tardius vel citius perficiantur corpora, aut si timeatur fornicatio cum alienis, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Quamvis autem prius in aliquibus inveniatur superfluum alimenti et emissio seminis, non tamen sequitur quod tunc melius et aptius sit ad generationem, sicut accipiebat ratio in oppositum. Non enim oportet in his quae procedunt de imperfecto ad perfectum quod quando aliquid potest aliquid primo quod tunc perfecte possit; sicut quando aliquis potest citharizare qualitercumque non sequitur quod optime possit, sed magis e contrario: quae enim sunt priora secundum viam generationis, imperfectiora sunt; quae autem posteriora perfectiora, sicut vir puero, ut dicitur nono metaphysicorum. Iura autem non determinant optimum esse fieri matrimonium tempore pubescentiae, scilicet muliere existente duodecim annorum vel circa, viro quatuordecim vel circa, sed tunc concedunt posse fieri primo, quia tunc primo potest valere consensus propter usum rationis, tunc primo vel circa inexistentis, et quia tunc primo incipit aliquod superfluum alimenti fieri, ut in pluribus, quamvis imperfectum.

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Deinde cum dicit de eo quidem declarat qua temperie vel dispositione aeris expedientius sit fieri hanc coniunctionem. Circa quod intelligendum est quod bona dispositio generati sequitur bonam dispositionem principiorum generantium in actu. Dispositio autem generantium sequitur aliquam dispositionem continentis; unde et locus dicitur principium generationis, sicut et patet a Porphyrio: dispositio autem continentis mutatur secundum dispositionem temporum et ventorum et horum huiusmodi; et ideo est expediens intendentem bonam dispositionem generatorum considerare bonam dispositionem continentis et temporis et ventorum. Et ideo dicit, quod ad huiusmodi copulam vel coniunctionem faciendam oportet uti temporibus, et his quae circa temperiem, hoc est dispositionem aeris secundum tempus, quibus utuntur multi bene et rationabiliter, dicentes hanc debere magis fieri tempore hiemis: tunc enim frigiditate continentis clausis poris fortificatur calidum interius, et congregatur virtus et fortior est. In aestate autem poris apertis exhalat calidum interius; fortiore autem existente virtute et calido melius est commisceri ad generationem. Expedit autem considerare ad generationem puerorum ea quae dicuntur a philosophis naturalibus et a medicis. Medici enim sufficienter dicunt dispositionem temporum in ordine ad corpora respectu operationum diversarum. Naturales autem eas quae ventorum; dicentes, boreales et Orientales meliores Australibus et Occidentalibus ad bonam dispositionem corporum, sicut dictum et expositum fuit prius, ubi determinatum fuit de optimo situ civitatis.

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Deinde cum dicit qualibus autem declarat quales oportet esse copulandos ad generationem secundum habitudinem corporis. Et circa hoc primo declarat quales oportet esse quoad quantitatem. Secundo cum dicit, oportet quidem igitur habere habitum labores in comparatione ad exercitium. In prima parte dicit, quod qualiter existentibus corporibus eorum qui copulantur secundum habitudinem quantitatis maxime utilia erunt ad bonam dispositionem eorum qui generantur, dicendum est in his quae pertinent ad disciplinam civium; figuraliter autem et in summa sufficit dicere nunc. Manifestum est enim quod habitudo corporis athletarum, qui sunt valde magni corpore, non est perfecte bona dispositio corporis, tum propter ponderositatem, tum quia virtus spiritus et calidi evanescit in tanta protensione membrorum. Nec etiam ad sanitatem, propter easdem rationes; et per consequens nec ad rationem intellectus et rationis quae sequuntur dispositionem corporis, ut in pluribus. Et quia bona civilis communicatio indiget bona dispositione quantum ad corpus et quantum ad animam, non est optima ad eam. Similiter habitudo imperfectorum secundum quantitatem et morbidorum qui indigent maiori cura, non est optima propter imperfectionem et improportionem; sed media habitudo magis. In omnibus enim et quae sunt secundum naturam et quae secundum rationem, media sunt eligibilia magis; et ideo habitudo media secundum quantitatem in generantibus eligibilior est.

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Deinde cum dicit oportet autem declarat quales oportet esse per comparationem ad exercitia; dicens, quod expedit ad bonam dispositionem generandorum futuram habere bonam habitudinem corporis, et exercitatos esse per aliquos labores ad exercitandum virtutem et caliditatem quae per motum excitantur: non tamen per violentos, ne per laboris violentiam spiritus exhaletur et debilitetur. Et ideo oportet exercitari vel laborare non aliquo uno solum, sicut athletae laborant ad superandum, sed multis pertinentibus ad cives et liberos. Expediens enim est exercitari futurum bonum civem in multis operationibus liberorum, ut consequenter facilius et magis cum delectatione illas operentur. Oportet autem et viros et mulieres exercitari, sed unumquemque in operationibus decentibus eum.

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Deinde cum dicit oportet autem declarat quod curandum est de mulieribus praegnantibus ad bonam puerorum dispositionem; dicens, quod oportet legislatorem curam habere de bona dispositione corporum mulierum praegnantium: pueri enim generati nutrimentum videntur assumere a muliere habente in utero, per venas et poros a natura ad hoc ordinatos, sicut terrae nascentia per radices assumunt a terra. Nutrimentum autem assumptum a muliere consimiliter disponitur complexioni mulieris, et puer de necessitate disponitur secundum dispositionem nutrimenti ex quo nutritur, et maxime in principio; et ideo oportet puerum disponi secundum dispositionem mulieris gestantis. Igitur expediens est ad bonam dispositionem prolis futuram curare de bona dispositione mulieris: specialiter autem expedit curare ne sint torpentes multum per desidiam quae frequenter accidit mulieribus praegnantibus propter defectum calidi et superabundantiam humidi grossi indigesti. Si enim praegnans torpeat nimis per desidiam, oportebit calidum et spiritus in puero torpere. Deinde expedit cavere ne utantur cibo nimis subtili, tum quia facilis digestionis existens facit repletionem quamdam inanem magis quam veram; tum quia statim propter facilem digestionem eius assumitur in membris fortioris virtutis secundum totum vel fere, ita quod parum aut nihil erit superfluum quod transeat in nutrimentum foetus. Facile autem erit cavere desidiam legislatori, si praecipiat praegnantibus quae sortitae sunt honorem generationis et fugerunt opprobrium sterilitatis secundum antiquos, facere aliquam peregrinationem quotidie vel bis vel ter in septimana vel aliquid huiusmodi ad aliquod oraculum propter deorum reverentiam; ut quos habuerunt propitios in conceptu, benivolos habeant ubi magis necesse est, scilicet in partu. Et loquitur secundum opinionem gentilium antiquorum qui opinabantur multitudinem deorum esse, et illos vel corpora super caelestia vel virtutes aliquas in corporibus. Quamvis autem ad bonam dispositionem puerorum futuram ad rempublicam oporteat mulieres labores aliquos exercere, ut sint sine pigritia, tamen natos iam et incipientes disciplinari ad bonum intellectus quod est speculatio, non oportet multum laborare, sed pigrius disponi corpore, ne per laboris continuitatem distrahuntur a disciplina et per motum spiritus nimis accendantur, ut sint nimis mobiles, quod non competit speculationi. Oportet enim formas sensibilium in quibus speculatur intellectus fixionem habere in subiecto primo eorum, quod est spiritus.

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Deinde cum dicit de reservatione declarat qualiter pueri postquam sunt nati sint disponendi, et quia non expedit de omnibus curare, aut non aequaliter, aut propter imperfectionem, aut propter multitudinem. Et primo tangit qualiter se habendum est ad orbatos, et ubi excedunt secundum multitudinem. Secundo cum dicit, satis autem pueris qualiter perfecti multitudinem convenientem non excedentes disponendi sunt. Circa primum, primo declarat qualiter se habendum est ad orbatos. Secundo cum dicit, oportet enim determinatam etc. qualiter se habendum est, ubi excedunt multitudinem determinatam. In prima parte dicit, quod si contingat aliquem vel aliquos esse orbatos sensu aliquo vel sensibus, vel membro aut membris, quibus minus sint utiles ad operationes intellectus et rempublicam, de reservatione ipsorum et alimento administrando feratur lex a legislatore nullum talem nutriri: quod intelligendum cum tanta cura et diligentia, cum quanta nutriendi sunt perfecti nati. Illud enim quod ordinatum est ad aliquem finem, quanto magis natum est attingere ad ipsum, tanto magis disponendum est ad ipsum; et quanto minus, tanto minus curandum. Sic enim videmus naturam magis sollicitam esse de perfectioribus. Pueri autem nati perfecti membris et sensibus perfectius nati sunt attingere ad finem humanum; ergo magis disponendi sunt. Orbati autem aut sensu aut membro, nati sunt attingere aliqualiter, ex quo animam et intellectum habent, sed non aeque perfecte; et ideo curandum est de eis, sed non aequaliter ut de perfectis. Et universaliter inquantum unusquisque natus est attingere ad finem, in tantum disponendum est, cum sit propter ipsum. Loquimur autem hic de fine humano secundum vitam praesentem, quia sic loquitur de ipso philosophus.

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Deinde cum dicit oportet enim declarat quid faciendum est si excedant secundum multitudinem. Est enim intelligendum quod, cum civitas sit communitas per se sufficiens ad vitam, oportet cives per se sufficientes esse, et non pauperes; et ideo cavenda sunt ita in civitate quae inopiam inducunt, hoc autem est multitudo filiorum debentium succedere in haereditate: magna enim et multa haereditas parentum cum dividetur in multitudinem filiorum, valde tenuis erit secundum unumquemque, maxime in tertiam vel quartam generationem, sicut ad sensum videmus. Non enim placuit philosopho lex seu consuetudo de successione primogeniti secundum totum: tum quia cum primogeniti sint singuli, posteriores autem multi ut frequenter, sequeretur plures liberorum esse pauperes quam divites: tum quia habentes possessiones sunt partes civitatis, non habentes autem, non. Civium enim oportet esse possessiones, ut dictum est prius. Quare si posteriores geniti non succederent in aliquo parentibus, plures liberorum non contingeret esse cives, sed expelli a civitate: tum quia posterius nati, sicut et primi, possunt esse bene nati ad magna: non habentes autem unde operentur ad quae nati sunt, compelluntur accipere undecumque, insidiantes civibus et aliis per furtum, per rapinam et homicidia, et coniungunt se adversariis, quae omnia sunt inconvenientia. Supposito igitur quod omnes succedere debeant in haereditate qualitercumque, primo proponit ad vitandam superfluam multitudinem filiorum legem seu consuetudinem quarumdam gentium. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem principium quoddam, ponit documentum ad hoc secundum intentionem suam magis. In prima parte dicit, quod ad vitandam multitudinem puerorum superfluam, ordo idest lex vel consuetudo gentium quarumdam prohibet nullum genitorum ultra multitudinem determinatam debere reservari: oportet enim, si debeat civitas esse dives, determinatam esse multitudinem ipsorum: aliter enim depauperaretur si dimitteretur quilibet generare quantumcumque. Sed quia datum est pueros non reservari ad vitam, declarat, si necesse sit istud fieri, qualiter cum minori culpa fiet: dicens, quod si aliquibus coniugatis fiant plures quam sit determinatum a lege, et necesse est eos exterminari, magis procurandum est fieri abortum antequam sensus et vita insint quam cum infuerint: procurans enim abortum postquam infuerint, homicida a lege reputatur; et magis peccant; semen enim et non semen determinatur per sensum et motum. Sic igitur Aristoteles non dicit secundum intentionem suam, quod debeant exterminari aliqui nati; sed secundum legem gentium; nec quod procurandus sit abortus absolute, sed si interficiendi sunt ab aliquibus, magis faciendum est hoc ante sensum et vitam, non sicut bonum secundum se, sed sicut minus malum.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem ponit documentum ad hoc secundum intentionem suam, sumptum ex determinatione temporis deputati ad generationem; circa quod tria facit. Primo declarat qualiter determinandum est tempus deputatum ad generationem, ad vitandum superfluitatem puerorum. Secundo cum dicit, ac de cetero ex hoc concludit commixtionem ultra tempus illud non debere fieri propter generationem. Tertio cum dicit, de ea autem quae ad aliam declarat quod huiusmodi commixtio non est facienda cum alieno vel aliena. In prima parte dicit: quoniam principium aetatis ad generationem deputatae determinatum est viro et mulieri, huic quidem trigesimusseptimus illi vero vigesimusoctavus annus vel circa, similiter autem et finis, viro scilicet septuagesimus mulieri quinquagesimus secundum naturam communem, oportet tempus intermedium quo possunt generare magis determinari et breviari ad superfluam multitudinem vitandam. Manifestum est enim quod foetus seniorum etiam circa septuagesimum annum in viro, vel quinquagesimum in muliere imperfecti sunt et corporibus et intellectibus propter debilitatem virtutis generantium, quae quanto magis distat a statu, minor est, sicut et foetus iuniorum etiam circa tempus determinatum a natura. Foetus vero decrepitorum ultra tempus deputatum a natura omnino debiles sunt corpore, propter debilitatem virtutis in eis, et propter hoc, quia calidum remissum est in eis, et passiones sedatae sunt naturaliter, et multa experti sunt propter tempus. Sunt etiam in statu secundum intellectum; anima enim sedendo et quiescendo fit sciens et prudens, sicut dicitur septimo physicorum: haec autem vera sunt ut in pluribus. Ideo aetatem hanc deputatam ad generationem manifestum est, quam quidam poetarum determinaverunt hebdomadibus quibusdam annorum, videlicet septenario numero. Itaque qui quatuor aut quinque annis hanc aetatem excesserint, relinquere debent procreandi studium, usque ad quinquagesimum annum, vel ad aetatem excedentem tempus hoc quatuor vel quinque annis in viris; ut sic viri deserviant manifeste generationi a trigesimoseptimo anno usque ad quinquagesimumquintum annum ad plus, et mulieres proportionaliter a decimoctavo usque ad trigesimumseptimum annum; tunc enim uterque ipsorum maxime est in statu perfecto secundum naturam, et virtutes magis perfectae sunt; propter quod pueri, et melius dispositi generabuntur et pauciores.

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Deinde cum dicit quod autem concludit ultra tempus hoc non debere fieri commixtionem propter generationem; dicens quod in reliquo tempore non debent coniugati commisceri adinvicem manifeste propter generationem; sed si commisceantur, permittatur hoc gratia sanitatis, aut alicuius alterius. Contingit enim aliquando quod in vasis seminariis est multitudo seminis, aut naturalis quae propter multitudinem gravat naturam, aut innaturalis ibi vel in aliis partibus corporis, quas contingit evacuari per coitum, et per consequens alleviare naturam, et melius disponi ad sanitatem.

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Deinde cum dicit de ea autem declarat, quod mixtio talis non debet fieri ad alium vel ad aliam personam. Propter quod est intelligendum quod mixtio maris et feminae naturaliter in homine est ad generationem prolis et nutritionem et eruditionem: ad hoc autem neuter istorum sufficit per se; et ideo oportet quod uniantur ad hoc per consensum mutuum, non per aliquod parvum tempus, sed usque ad perfectionem prolis secundum corpus et secundum animam; quod erit si incipiant generare in tempore determinato a philosopho circa finem vitae eorum. Puer enim si fuerit masculus, non perficitur usque ad trigesimum septimum annum vel circa, et si isti trigintaseptem adiungantur trigintaseptem annis patris generantis antequam generaret, erunt septuagintaquatuor, quando impotens erit naturaliter ad generandum et circa finem vitae. Et ideo communicatio maris et feminae per totam vitam ad perfectionem prolis est a natura inclinante; et omnis commixtio quae fit praeter huiusmodi communicationem, innaturalis est. Et ideo dicit quod de commixtione viri cum aliena muliere, vel mulieris cum alieno viro, sit lex et teneatur ut bonum non permittere, nec etiam velle videre tangentem alienum aliquo modo. Si enim permittatur aliquis accedere ad aliquam quae sua non est per fornicationem, cum post mixtionem non maneant mixti per consensum ad educationem prolis, sequitur malum et imperfectio eius maxime; nullo ergo modo permittatur fieri commixtio cum alio vel alia ubi et est et appellatur coniugium. Tunc enim et sequitur malum prolis et incertitudo et iniustitia. Minime vero permittendum est circa tempus procreationis filiorum; tunc enim maxime accideret error per incertitudinem. Et si aliquis appareat tale aliquid faciens, puniatur punitione commensurata peccato, ut secundum mensuram peccati sit plagarum modus, ut alibi dicitur. Ita quod prohibet philosophus hic primo sicut malum per se commixtionem cum aliena, quamvis sit libera; magis autem commixtionem cum ea quae est alterius propter iniustitiam; maxime autem cum ea quae est alterius tempore deputato ad generationem.

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Deinde cum dicit natis autem declarat qualiter curandi sunt pueri perfecti et reservandi post nativitatem. Et primo, qualiter in prima aetate quae dicitur secundum philosophum usque ad tertium annum. Secundo cum dicit, habitam autem huic qualiter in secunda quae extenditur usque ad quinque annos inclusive. Tertio cum dicit, transactis autem quinque annis qualiter in tertia quae extenditur usque in finem septimi. Circa primum primo declarat qualiter curandi sunt et disponendi sunt quantum ad nutrimentum conveniens. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem et motus quantum ad exercitia et consuetudinem. In prima parte dicit. Cum pueri nati sunt ex matribus, manifestum est quod alimentum magnam facit differentiam ad potentiam corporum et dispositionem secundum differentiam qualitatis suae: quale enim est secundum virtutem, tale facit et corpus. Virtus enim alimenti quod convertitur in illud quod alitur, remanet in eo: sicut saporem pabuli videmus apparere in lacte, et vim vini in aceto, et virtutem lactucae in sanguine generato ex ea. Sicut enim virtutes miscibilium manent in mixto, quamvis formae corrumpantur, ita et virtus ex quo generatur aliud aliqualiter in eo quod generatur: patiuntur enim agentia naturalia a contrariis. Manifestum est autem, et considerando in aliis animalibus, et etiam in gentibus diversis quibus cura est in pueris inducere habitum et dispositionem ad bellum, quod lactis natura abundans est alimentum conveniens et familiare corporibus humanis, et enim alia plura animalia fetus post partum ad tempus ex lacte nutriunt, et similiter gentes bene volentes disponere pueros; quoniam, sicut Aristoteles dicit secundo de generatione, ex eisdem sumus et nutrimur. Nutrimentum enim convertitur in substantiam rei alitae; et eiusdem substantiae et formae oportet esse materiam unam. Et ideo quanto alimentum aliquod similius est ei ex quo generatur aliud, tanto convenientius est ad nutriendum ipsum. Lac autem valde simile est secundum complexionem menstruo ex quo generatur puer: superfluum enim alimenti derivatum a natura ad matricem menstruum est, derivatum autem ad mamillas et dealbatum ibi, est lac. Et ideo convenientissimum alimentum pueris post partum est lactis natura, et magis mulieris quam bestiae, et adhuc maxime matris propriae quam alienae; unde illi qui nutriuntur ex lacte matris propriae, melius debent esse dispositi secundum naturam. Propter quod Avicenna dicit, quod extremum mamillae matris propriae ponere in ore infantis, valde confert ad removendum omne nocumentum. Lac tamen matris propriae statim post partum non est conveniens puero, donec complexio distemperata per parum temperetur. Expedit autem pueris non conferre vinum in nutrimentum propter aegritudines accidentes ex ipso: vinum enim multum vaporativum est propter caliditatem et humiditatem, et pueris multum ascendit nutrimentum ad partes superiores; et ideo pueris habentibus vinum multus fit descensus evaporationis a capite. Unde contingit quandoque coarctatio pori et respirationis quod est epilepsia, et aliae infirmitates ex hac materia generare; similiter et accensio colerae rubeae, et quae accidunt ex ea. Nec differt dare vinum pueris et nutricibus, secundum Aristotelem: sed si oportet bibere, oportet quod sit modicum et aquaticum valde.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem declarat qualiter curandi sunt quantum ad exercitia et consuetudines. Et primo declarat in quibus assuescendi sunt. Secundo cum dicit, circa primam quidem etc. quod secundum ordinem determinatum. Circa primum ostendit quod assuefaciendi sunt ad motum. Secundo cum dicit, expedit autem etc. quod ad frigora. In prima parte dicit quod adhuc pueros statim post nativitatem expedit assuesci ad motus tantillos quoscumque et parvos, puta manuum et pedum et aliarum partium. Motu enim ipsarum partium exercitatur et acuitur calor naturalis in eis, qui consumens humidum superfluum in eis exsiccat corpus et fortius facit. Et Avicenna adiungit quod cum motu procuranda est consonantia musicae et vox cantilenae ad delectandum in consonantiis musicis propter causam dicendam posterius. Ad hoc autem, quod membra puerorum propter fluxibilitatem humidi abundantis non effluant a figura debita, consueverunt quaedam gentes uti quibusdam instrumentis mechanicis, quibus cum alligantur membra puerorum faciliter et subtiliter fiunt impervertibilia; sicut cunabulo utuntur ad directionem totius corporis et pileo rotundo ad debite figurandum caput. Oportet enim in ista aetate nutricem suaviter membra tangere, et quod dilatandum est dilatare, et quod subtiliandum est subtiliare, et unumquodque convenienti figura figurare, et manus et brachia ad genua ducere, et crura et tibias fascia ligare, et caput pileo rotundo astringere; tunc enim puer est bene susceptibilis et ducibilis, sicut cera mollis.

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Deinde cum dicit expedit autem declarat, quod assuescendi sunt ad frigora, dicens, quod expedit ad bonam dispositionem puerorum in hac aetate ad frigora moderata assuescere parvos existentes, hoc enim proficit ad sanitatem corporis et ad bellicas actiones futuras: cum enim assueti sunt a iuventute ad tolerantiam frigoris non gravantur in superveniente aetate a frigore in bellicis, ubi necesse est quandoque, nec patiuntur aegritudines quae ab ipso sunt. Iterum propter consuetudinem ad frigus fortificatur calidum et fortiora redduntur corpora; et ideo consuetudo est apud multos barbarorum quibusdam abluere pueros in aqua frigida statim natos. Aliis autem parvo involucro induere eos, sicut contingit gallis morantibus circa plagam Occidentalem: universaliter enim omnia quaecumque possibile esse assuescere ad bonum habitum futurum melius est assuescere et statim a principio, quando sunt magis ducibiles: non parum enim differt, sic vel sic a puero assuesci, sed multum, magis autem omne tunc assuescit, sicut dicitur primo Ethicorum.

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Deinde cum dicit circa primam declarat secundum gradum; dicens, quod ad exercitium in tolerando frigora expedit assuescere statim secundum gradum, tum ut primo assuefiant ad toleranda magis temperata frigida, deinde excedentia magis et magis secundum quod magis fortificatur virtus vel complexio: et hoc propter calidum fortificandum et alias utilitates, cavendo autem ne gravetur natura propter excessum frigidi cui exponitur. Similiter autem se habet de assuefactione in aliis convenientibus: natura enim puerorum propter teneritudinem et mollitiem nata est assuesci ad quaecumque non dura nec gravantia naturam ipsorum. Circa primam igitur aetatem optimum est talem curam et similem habere circa eos.

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Deinde cum dicit habitam autem declarat quomodo curandi sunt in habita aetate quae incipit in tertio anno. Et circa hoc primo declarat quibus sunt assuefaciendi. Secundo cum dicit, cohibitione vero puerorum etc. a quibus prohibendi sunt. Circa primum primo declarat quod assuefaciendi sunt in aetate hac quibusdam moribus. Secundo cum dicit, et de sermonibus autem etc. quod in his quae pertinent ad auditum. In prima parte dicit, quod in aetate consequente quae incipit a tertio anno et protenditur usque ad finem quinti, in qua non sunt nati ad eruditionem seu disciplinam propter tenuitatem complexionis et virtutum imperfectionem nec ad magnos labores, ut propter violentiam non impediantur crescere, oportet eos exercere in aliquo modico motu, ut exercitata caliditate resolvente humidum superfluum diffugiat inertia corporum. Huiusmodi autem exercitium in motu oportet fieri per actiones alias et per ludos. Ludos autem oportet esse non declinantes ad servilitatem, sed liberales magis; nec etiam superlaboriosos vel violentos, ut non graventur virtutes propter excessum; neque nimis molles et remissos, ne comprehendantur a desidia.

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Deinde cum dicit et de sermonibus declarat quod expedit eos in aetate hac exerceri in his quae ad auditum pertinent; dicens, quod expedit eos in aetate hac exerceri in audiendo aliquos parvos sermones et fabulas aliquas, propter hoc, ut exerceantur in locutione et rationibus nominum; et de hoc debent habere curam principes eorum publice illis praefecti. Sed hoc observandum est in hac aetate, quod omnia in quibus assuefiunt, et motus et operationes et ludi, sermones et fabulae quos audiunt et etiam ea quae vident sint imagines quaedam eorum in quibus posterius serio conversari debent, et quasi via ad illa in quibus consequenter studere debent seu intendere: ad illa enim quae assuescunt in primis magis posterius inclinant, quia assueta sunt magis delectabilia.

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Deinde cum dicit cohibitiones autem declarat quibus prohibendi sunt. Et primo tangit quod cohibitio a fletu prodest eis. Secundo cum dicit, considerandum autem etc. a quorum conversatione auditu et visione cavendi sunt. Primo igitur dicit, quod quidam civitatis gubernatores non inconvenienter detestantur in ordinatione et republica suis cohibitiones puerorum a ploratibus; hoc enim expediens est et conferens ad augmentum virtutis et nutrimentum, fit enim per hoc quaedam exercitatio corporis ad ista: cum enim cohibentur a ploratu, fit retentio spiritus interius, in ploratu autem diffusio exterius. Retentio autem spiritus interius robur facit; propter enim congregationem ipsius interius fortificantur, virtus enim unita fortior est seipsa dispersa, fortitudo autem spiritus ad incrementum et ad alia multa valet.

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Deinde cum dicit considerandum autem declarat primo a quorum conversatione auditu et visu cavendi sunt. Secundo cum dicit, iam demissione ab ebrietate etc. tangit per quid faciliter hoc potest fieri, excusando se ab ulteriori inquisitione de talibus. Tertio cum dicit, forte autem non male etc. reprobat circa hoc opinionem contrariam. Circa primum primo ostendit quod cavendi sunt a conversatione cum servis. Secundo cum dicit, totaliter quidem igitur turpiloquium etc. quod a turpium auditione. Tertio cum dicit, quoniam autem dicere etc. quod ab inhonestorum visione. Circa primum dicit: puerorum rectores quorum est regulare pueros, considerare debent educationem puerorum quomodo bene regulentur: ipsi enim in omnibus debent esse eorum regula, sicut in eodem ratio est regula virium inferiorum: unde sicut in eodem tota deordinatio virium inferiorum rationali parti animae imputatur, sic tota deordinatio puerorum quam accipiunt in prima aetate imputanda est magistris. Debent autem curare et quantum ad alia et quantum ad hoc ut quanto minus poterint, cum servis conversentur; in hac enim aetate usque ad septimum annum necesse habent conversari in domo et alimentum accipere in ea, in qua servi negotiantur. Conversantes enim cum servis accipiunt quamdam inclinationem ad actiones serviles ex eis quae audiunt et vident servos dicentes et operantes, etiam cum sint parvi et bene informabiles ad quamcumque. In eis enim in quibus assuescunt maxime in prima aetate delectantur; delectati autem faciliter inclinantur ad ipsa.

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Deinde cum dicit totaliter quidem ex hoc infert quod cavendi sunt a turpium auditu; dicens, quod oportet bonum legislatorem turpiloquia, puta de venereis et de aliis quae sunt praeter rationem et honestatem omnino exterminare ex civitate, sicut quodcumque aliud turpe: hoc enim quod aliquis de facili dicit aliquid turpe, consequitur ipsum prope facere. Saepe enim dicendo aliquod turpe agibile saepius meditatur de eodem, et ex frequenti meditatione de ipso sequitur inclinatio maior in ipsum faciendum. Et quamvis universaliter sit prohibendum a civitate, maxime tamen prohibendum est iuvenibus et ad praesentiam ipsorum, ita ut nec loquantur ipsi nec audiant ab aliis aliquid tale. Omnia enim quae audiunt vel vident vel operantur in prima aetate, admirantur tamquam nova eis, propter quod et ea melius memorantur et magis delectantur, miranda enim sunt delectabilia, ad ea autem in quibus delectantur facilius inclinantur. Si autem aliquis transgrediatur dicens aut faciens aliquid contra huiusmodi prohibitum, si fuerit liber non adeptus aliquam dignitatem, puniatur, privando ipsum de mensa in conviviis communibus et aliquibus dehonestationibus et verberibus decentibus transgressionem: si autem fuerit senior aetate praecedentibus et adeptus aliquam dignitatem, puniatur inhonorationibus servilibus non decentibus statum eius propter utilitatem, cum operatus sit non decentia ipsum. Praelatus enim si peccat manifeste amplius puniendus est quam privata persona, et quia transgreditur in peccando, et quia praebet subditis occasionem peccandi credentibus bonum esse et sibi licere quaecumque viderunt ipsum facientem aut dicentem.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem declarat quod cavendi sunt a visione inhonestorum; dicens, quoniam facere aut dicere aliquid turpe dicimus debere exterminari a civitate, manifestum est quod videre picturas aut sermones inhonesta repraesentantes cavendum est in civitate, et maxime a iuvenibus: ex visione enim talium fit imaginatio et memoria ipsorum et maxime iuvenibus existentibus propter admirationem; ad imaginationem autem fortem eorum contingit disponi appetitum et virtutes motivas ab ipsa: phantasia enim et intelligentia habent rerum virtutes, sicut dicit Aristoteles in libro de motione animalium; et ideo principes cavere debent, ne sculptura quae fit per incisionem, neque pictura quae fit per appositionem quae sint repraesentativae istorum, fiant in loco privato, nec publico, nisi forte in oraculis aliquorum deorum, quibus lex attribuit aliquas lascivias, sicut Veneri lasciviam circa venerea: et loquitur secundum opinionem gentilium antiquorum. Ad cultum autem illorum, ubi tales lasciviae fiunt aut sunt imagines earum repraesentativae lex permittit parentes magis provectos existentes pro se et pueris deos huiusmodi honorare. Iuvenes autem non esse inspectores istorum, neque iamborum, neque tragoediarum aut comoediarum in quibus repraesentantur gesta et mores rusticorum seu ruralium, usque ad aetatem in qua debent communicare mensa communi, in conviviis publicis puta quando in eis incipit vigere ratio.

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Deinde cum dicit iam de missione declarat per quae possunt faciliter prohiberi, excusando se ab ulteriori consideratione de istis; dicens, quod ab inhonestorum auditu et visione, et ab ebrietate, et universaliter a turpium operatione prohibebuntur, et impassibiles erunt, si occupentur in aliqua disciplina et assuefaciant delectari in ea: occupati enim cum delectatione in ipsa, ad alia non attendunt. Sed de talibus nunc pertranseundo dictum est: posterius autem insistendo determinabitur magis, si oportet puerorum esse aliquam disciplinam vel non, dubitando; et si oportet, qualiter est et qualiter instruendi sunt: nunc autem de hoc recordationem fecimus secundum quod necessarium erat.

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Deinde cum dicit forte autem inquirit quoddam signum, quo ostenduntur ea quae in principio audimus et cognoscimus fieri nobis delectabilia, et quod eis favemus, et consequenter in eis persistimus, tamquam in re nobis grata et delectabili. Dicit enim quod Theodorus tragoediarum actor non male in hoc censebat, quod cum erat acturus aliquid, nolebat quod aliquis prius aliquid repraesentaret quam ipse, qualiscumque hystrio esset; et hoc ideo, quia auditores magis favent his quos primo audierint; ex quo patet quod amamus ea quae primo cognoscimus, et quibus primo assuescimus. Manifestum enim est quod idem accidit, quantum ad assuefactionem hominum in locutionibus et rerum operationibus. In utrisque enim consuetudo inclinat ad similia. Omnia enim quae primo operamur, seu videndo seu audiendo seu alitercumque, puta in prima aetate, magis diligimus, quia magis delectamur in eis, admirantes ea sicut nova: ea autem quae magis diligimus, magis possumus operari. Quare si expedit in prima aetate pueros audire comoedias, aut tragoedias, magis inclinabuntur ad ea quae repraesentantur per eas in aetate futura: quod est inconveniens: et ideo oportet a iuvenibus omnia turpia, etiam inhonesta in prima aetate facere extranea, vel per assuefactionem in contrariis, vel per afflictionem poenae operantibus. Inter ista autem magis illa quae maioris sunt adhaesionis, et facilioris, puta inhonestatem quae circa venerea, et circa potum et cibum; concupiscentia enim talium, quasi innata est nobis statim ex iuventute, secundum philosophum secundo Ethicorum.

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Deinde cum dicit transactis autem declarat qualiter instruendi sunt in habita aetate, puta a fine quinti anni usque ad finem septimi: breviter se expedit, dicendo quod transactis quinque annis, duobus sequentibus usque ad finem septimi oportet iuvenes esse inspectores disciplinarum, in quibus erudiendi sunt; ut si sunt erudiendi in equestri, oportet fieri inspectores equestrium; si in musica, musicalium; ut per auditum et inspectionem talium assueti, magis inclinentur ad ea.

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Deinde cum dicit duae autem volens se continuare ad sequentia, distinguit tempus sequens conveniens disciplinae; dicens, quod duae sunt aetates, secundum quas necessarium est dividi disciplinam convenientem unicuique illarum; puta illam quae est a fine septimi anni usque ad pubescentiam, idest usque ad finem decimiquarti et illam quae est a pubescentia usque ad duodecimum annum. Qui autem omnes aetates distinguunt per septennia, dicentes primam aetatem continere primum septennium, et secundam secundum, et tertiam tertium, quantum ad omnes aetates, non bene dicunt: oportet enim, quod divisio aetatis consequenter accipiatur divisioni naturalis dispositionis hominis, ut mensuratur tempore; et ideo secundum diversitatem status conversationis et dispositionis naturalium, ut mensurantur tempore, oportet aetates diversificari. Sed iste status aliquando diversificatur in minori tempore quam in septennio, quandoque in ampliori. Alius enim est status conversationis naturalis hominis in tribus primis annis, alius in duobus sequentibus et alius in duobus similiter sequentibus; et ideo secundum hoc tres aetates ante septem annos perfectos distinguuntur. Deinde alius status conversationis et modi vivendi est in sequenti septennio a praecedentibus, et alius in sequenti; et ideo istae duae aetates septenniis distinguuntur. Status autem vel modus vivendi conversationis sequens longior est, et protenditur usque ad trigesimumseptimum vel circa; et ita non mensuratur uno septennio, sed pluribus; et sic de aliis. Et ideo non dividuntur aetates universaliter septenniis; sed oportet assequi distinctioni naturali. Omnis autem ars et disciplina in actu nata est supplere defectum naturae, et inquantum perficit aptitudinem naturae ad ipsam, per hoc quod sciens in aptitudine fit sciens in actu, vel per hoc quod formam inducit in materia extrinseca apta nata; et ideo erudiendi sunt ad unamquamque disciplinam, ad quam apti sunt. Est igitur considerandum primo, utrum sit facienda aliqua cura circa disciplinam propriam puerorum; et dato quod sic, secundo utrum oporteat ipsam esse communem vel propriam, sicut nunc faciunt in multis civitatibus. Et dato quod magis expediat esse communem, tertio est considerandum qualem oportet esse huiusmodi disciplinam. Et de istis considerabit in sequenti libro, statim incipiens octavum librum a determinatione primi istorum. Et in hoc terminat philosophus intentionem suam in isto septimo.

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Bk. 8Quibus animi disciplinis erudiendi sint cives optimae civitatis.

Quibus animi disciplinis erudiendi sint cives optimae civitatis.

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L. 1 (Θ.1–4, 1337a11–1339a10)Ex utilibus disciplinis ea discenda sunt, quae operantem non reddant vilem.

Ex utilibus disciplinis ea discenda sunt, quae operantem non reddant vilem.

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1100. Quod quidem igitur legislatori maxime vigilandum circa iuvenum disciplinam, nullus utique dubitabit; etenim in civitatibus non factum hoc laedit politias. Oportet autem ad unamquamque politizare: mos enim politiae uniuscuiusque qui conveniens, et conservare consuevit politias, et instituit a principio: puta qui quidem democraticus, democratiam; qui autem oligarchicus, oligarchiam: semper autem optimus mos melioris causa politiae.

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1101. Adhuc autem ad omnes potentias et artes sunt quae oportet praeerudiri, et praeassuescere, quod singularum operationes. Quare palam quod et ad actiones virtutis.

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1102. Quoniam autem unus finis civitati omni, manifestum quod et disciplinam unam et eandem necessarium esse omnium.

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1103. Et huius curam esse communem et non seorsum, quomodo unusquisque nunc curat de suis pueris seorsum et disciplina propria quaecumque videbitur docens: oportet autem communium commune facere, et studiosum.

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1104. Simul autem neque oportet putare civium ipsorum aliquem sibi esse, sed omnes civitatis. Cura autem uniuscuiusque partis nata est respicere ad eam quae totius curam.

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1105. Laudabit autem utique aliquis et in hoc Lacedaemonios etenim plurimum faciunt studium circa pueros, et hoc communiter. Quod quidem igitur leges ferendum de disciplina et hanc communiter faciendum, manifestum.

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1106. Quae autem sit disciplina, et qualiter oportet erudiri, oportet non latere, nunc autem dubitatur per opera: non enim eadem omnes existimant oportere addiscere iuvenes, neque ad virtutem, neque ad vitam optimam. Neque manifestum, utrum ad intellectum oportet magis, aut ad animae morem. Et ex ea quae ad activam vitam disciplina turbatione plena consideratio; et nulli palam utrum studere oportet circa tendentia ad virtutem, vel circa superfluum. Omnia enim haec acceperunt iudices quosdam; et de iis quae ad virtutem nihil est concordatum; etenim virtutem non eandem mox omnes honorant. Quare rationabiliter diversificantur et ad studium ipsius.

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1107. Quod quidem igitur necessaria utilium doceri non immanifestum; quod autem non omnia divisis liberalibus operibus et illiberalibus manifestum quod talibus oportet participare quaecumque utilium facient participantem non banausum. Banausum enim opus oportet putare esse, hoc, et artem hanc, et doctrinam quaecumque ad usus et actiones virtutis efficiunt inutile liberorum corpus, aut animam, aut intellectum. Propter quod tales artes quaecumque faciunt corpus deterius disponi, banausas vocamus et mercenarias operationes; non vacantem enim faciunt mentem et depressam.

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1108. Est autem et liberalibus scientiis aliquibus usque ad aliquid participare non illiberale. Assiduare valde autem ad perfectionem, obnoxium dictis nocumentis. Habet autem multam differentiam, et quod cuius gratia agit quis aut addiscit. Ipsius quidem enim gratia aut amicorum, aut propter virtutem, non illiberale. Qui autem ad ipsum agit propter alios saepe mercenarium et servile utique videbitur agere. Praemissae quidem igitur nunc erudientes eruditiones, sicut dictum est prius, ad utrumlibet se habent.

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1109. Sunt autem quatuor fere quae addiscere consueverunt; litteras et luctativam, et musicam, et quartam quidam protractivam: et litteras quidem et protractivam tamquam utiles ad vitam existentes et valde bonas, luctativam autem tamquam conferentem ad fortitudinem.

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1110. De musica autem dubitabit utique aliquis. Nunc quidem enim ut delectationis gratia plurimi participant ipsa, alii autem a principio instituerunt in disciplina propter naturam ipsam quaerere (quod quidem saepe dictum est) non solum non vacare recte, sed et vacare posse bene. Hoc enim principium omnium, ut et iterum dicamus de ipsa.

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1111. Si enim ambo quidem oportet, magis autem eligibile vacare quam non vacatio; et similiter quaerendum quid facientes oportet vacare: non itaque ludentes: finem enim necessarium esse vitae nobis ludum. Si autem hoc impossibile, et magis in non vacationibus utendum ludis, laborans enim indiget requie, ludus autem gratia requiei est, non vacare autem accidit cum labore et fatigatione, propter hoc oportet ludos introducere observantem tempus ad usum, tamquam adducentem pharmaciae gratia. Remissio enim talis motus animae, et propter delectationem requies.

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1112. Vacare autem videtur ipsum habere delectationem, et vivere beate; hoc autem non existit non vacantibus, sed vacantibus. Non vacans quidem non vacat gratia alicuius tamquam non existentis. Felicitas autem finis est, quam non cum tristitia, sed cum delectione putant esse omnes. Hanc vero delectationem non adhuc eandem ponunt, sed secundum se ipsos unusquisque, et secundum habitum suum, optimus autem... (Antiqua hic deficiente versione recentiorem substituimus)

Polit.L1

1113. [Itaque manifestum est, quod oportet ad otium quoque degentum addiscere quaedam, et erudiri, et has eruditiones ac disciplinas sui ipsarum esse gratia. Illas vero quae ad negotium, tamquam necessarias, et gratia aliorum.

Polit.L1

1114. Quapropter musicam antiqui inter disciplinas collocavere, non tamquam rem necessariam. Nihil enim habet tale, neque tamquam utile, ut litterae ad lucrum, et ad rem familiarem, et ad studia, et ad civiles actiones complurimas. Videtur quoque figurandi peritia utilis esse ad iudicandum melius artificum opera. Neque ut gymnastica ad sanitatem et robur; nullum enim horum vidimus ex musica fieri. Restat ergo, quod ad degendum in otio; ad quod, et apparet eam adhiberi; quam enim putant degentiam esse ingenuorum hominum, in ea instituunt.

Polit.L1

1115. Quapropter Homerus in poemate suo ita inquit. Sed quale est vocari ad mensam opipare paratam. Deinde nominans quosdam alios, subdit et citharoedum, qui omnes demulceat. Et alio loco ait Ulyxes, optimam esse degendi rationem, quando laetis hominibus, convivae audiunt citharoedum sedentes per ordinem.

Polit.L1

1116. Quod igitur sit disciplina quaedam, quam non ut utilem, neque ut necessariam docendi sunt filii, sed ut liberalem et honestam, manifestum est. Utrum autem una sit numero, an plures, et quaenam istae, et quomodo, posterius dicetur. Nunc tantum id praemissum sit, quod apud antiquos habemus testimonium ex his disciplinis quas diximus; musica enim hoc manifestat.

Polit.L1

1117. Ac etiam de utilibus, quod aliqua addiscere pueros oportet, non modo propter utilitatem, ut patet in litteris, verum etiam propter multas disciplinas alias, quae per litteras addiscuntur.

Polit.L1

1118. Similiter vero figurandi peritiam, non ut in venumdando emendoque vasa non decipiantur, sed potius quia contemplari facit pulchritudinem corporum. Quaerere enim utilitatem ubique minime congruit magnanimis et ingenuis hominibus.

Polit.L1

1119. Cum vero manifestum sit, utrum moribus an ratione sit disciplina tradenda, et an circa corpus primo, vel circa mentem, patet ex his, quod adolescentes gymnasticae, et paedotribicae sunt tradendi, quarum altera qualem aliquam facit habitudinem corporis, altera operationes.

Polit.L1

1120. Nunc autem quae civitates curam habere puerorum maxime videntur, partim athletarum habitudinem inducere student, in quo deformant corpora, ac augmentationem eorum impediunt. Lacones vero in hoc quidem non errant, sed efferatos laboribus reddunt adolescentes, quasi hoc utile sit maxime ad fortitudinem.

Polit.L1

1121. Atqui, ut iam saepius diximus, neque ad unam virtutem neque ad hanc maxime respiciendum est ab eo qui curam facit institutionis.

Polit.L1

1122. Et si ad hanc, non tamen id consequuntur, neque enim in aliis animalibus, atque in gentibus videmus fortitudinem adesse maxime efferatis, sed potius mansuetioribus, et leoninis moribus. Multaeque sunt gentes quae ad caedes hominum, et ad eorum comestionem insultant, ut circa pontum Achaei et Eniochi, et ex mediterraneis aliae gentes, similiter his vel magis, quae quidem gentes clanculum per insidias latrocinantur, ad bellica tamen opera nihil valent].

Polit.L1

1123. ...Secundum praevalentes aliis. Nunc autem et luctativis agonibus, et bellicis deficientes ab aliis; non enim eo quod iuvenes exercitabant, isto modo differebant, sed eo solum, quod ad eos qui non studerent, conabantur.

Polit.L1

1124. Quare quod bonum, sed non quod ferale oportet praeagonizare. Neque enim lupus, neque aliarum ferarum aliqua agonizaret utique aliquod bonum periculum, sed magis vir bonus. Qui autem valde ad hoc remittunt pueros, et qui sine paedagogo necessariorum faciunt, bansausos efficiunt, et secundum virtutem ad unum solum opus utiles politiae facientes, et ad hoc deterius aliis, ut ait sermo.

Polit.L1

1125. Oportet autem non ex prioribus operibus iudicare, sed ex iis quae nunc. Contra agonizantes enim disciplinae nunc habent, prius autem non habebant.

Polit.L1

1126. Quod quidem igitur utendum luctativa, et qualiter utendum, confessum est; usque ad pubescentiam enim leviora exercitia afferendum, violentum alimentum, et eos qui ad necessitatem labores reiicientes, ut nullum impedimentum sit ad incrementum. Signum enim non parvum quod possunt haec instituere. In Olympionicis enim quidem vir duos vel tres inveniat eosdem vicisse viros et pueros, propter iuvenes involuntarios auferre potentiam a necessariis exercitiis.

Polit.L1

1127. Quando autem a pubescentia annis tribus ad alias eruditiones fiunt, tunc congruit et laboribus, et siccis alimentis submittere sequentem aetatem. Simul enim intellectui et corpori laborare non oportet; contrarium enim efficere natus est uterque laborum, impediens, qui quidem corporis labor, intellectum; qui autem huius, corpus.

Polit.L1

Postquam philosophus declaravit qualiter et quibus iuvenes sint disponendi et instituendi quantum ad corpus, et usque ad finem tertiae aetatis, quae secundum ipsum terminatur in fine septimi anni, nunc intendit declarare qualiter instruendi et disponendi sunt secundum intellectum in duabus sequentibus aetatibus, quae terminantur in fine vigesimiprimi anni: et secundum ordinem praemissum prius dividitur liber iste in partes tres. Quoniam primo ostendit, quod puerorum oportet facere curam circa disciplinam in civitate optima. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem, declarat, quod communem. Tertio cum dicit, quae autem sit, declarat, quae sit illa, et qualiter erudiendi sint in ipsa. Circa primum praemittit primo conclusionem suam, dicens, quod nullus habens rectum usum rationis dubitat quin legislatori curanti de bono communi civitatis, maxime negotiandum sit circa disciplinam et bonam dispositionem iuvenum. Deinde cum dicit, nam mos, probat hoc per unam rationem. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem, per aliam. In prima parte ipsa intendit rationem hanc. De illo oportet negotiari legislatorem, et curam habere, quod non factum in civitatibus laedit et corrumpit respublicas: maxime enim debet intendere bonum et salvationem reipublicae. Sed non curare de bona dispositione puerorum, et dimittere eos assuesci in quibus volunt, laedit et corrumpit rempublicam. Cuius declaratio est, quia expedit civitatem gubernanti assuescere, et disponere futuros cives ad unamquamque rempublicam secundum modum convenientem ei, sicut materiam ad formam. Consuetudo enim uniuscuiusque reipublicae et dispositio conveniens principium est instituendi rempublicam et conservandi ipsam institutam, sicut bona praeparatio materiae ad formam principium est educendi formam illam in esse et conservandi illam eductam; sicut videmus, quod consuetudo popularis principium est instituendi et salvandi popularem statum, et consuetudo paucorum potentiae statum paucorum, et similiter in aliis. Et semper consuetudo melior principium institutionis est et salvationis sive conservationis melioris reipublicae, sicut excellentior dispositio materiae est principium generationis excellentioris formae. Ex quo manifestum est, quod bona dispositio et consuetudo iuvenum ad rempublicam instituit et salvat ipsam: quare per oppositum indispositio ipsorum et negligentia circa hoc destruit et corrumpit eamdem. Quare de bona dispositione seu disciplina puerorum oportet legislatorem curare.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ponit secundam rationem; dicens, quod adhuc sicut est in aliis potentiis et artibus operativis respectu operationum, sic est in virtutibus politicis, et scientia politica respectu actionum politicarum. Sed ita se habet in aliis potentiis et artibus quod omnibus oportet praeexistere aliquam bonam dispositionem materiae, aut aliquam eruditionem, aut assuefactionem. Hoc etiam videmus in speculativis: quoniam omnis ars et omnis doctrina ratiocinativa fit ex praeexistenti cognitione: et in operativis similiter, sicut in fistulativa: debens enim recte fistulare prius assuescit in quibusdam praeludiis et rudimentis: similiter autem et in aliis se habet: oportet enim materiam bene disponi ad actionem, quia actus activorum fiunt in patiente bene disposito. Quare in virtutibus et scientia politica oportet ad actionem rectam futuram praeerudiri et assuefieri et disponi in quibusdam: et de hoc debet curare legislator, cuius est intendere bonum, et salvationem reipublicae.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem volens probare quod oportet de pueris curam communem habere, probat prius, quod omnium in civitate una oportet esse disciplinam unam, intendens rationem hanc. Quorumcumque est unus finis per se, eorum est disciplina una de eis quae ad finem ordinantur, quia ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem ex fine sumitur: et quorum est ratio una, et disciplina una, secundum quod huiusmodi. Omnium autem viventium in civitate secundum rempublicam unam, est unus finis, puta finis reipublicae. Quare manifestum est, quod omnium oportet esse unam et eamdem disciplinam de necessitate.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit et huius curam probat, quod oportet de his fieri curam communem quantum ad disciplinam. Et primo per rationes. Secundo cum dicit, laudabit utique per exemplum. Circa primum ponit rationes duas: quarum primam tangens, dicit, quod de disciplina puerorum oportet legislatorem facere curam unam et non divisim, sicut nunc in quibusdam civitatibus unusquisque curat de propriis pueris secundum quod videtur sibi, seorsum instruens disciplina propria quaecumque videtur sibi utilis, alius et alius, in alia et alia. Et huius ratio est, quoniam eorum quorum est disciplina una et communis, expedit facere curam communem et studium, ut cura sit proportionalis disciplinae. Sed omnium in civitate una est disciplina una, et una et eadem ratio, ut probatum est prius. Ergo de omnibus est facienda cura communis et eadem quantum ad illa.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit simul autem ponit secundam rationem, et est. Cura de parte et dispositio debent esse secundum habitudinem ad totum: tum quia pars est propter ipsum totum, tum quia rationem et esse habet ab ipso. Nunc autem simul cum his quae dicta sunt oportet intelligere unumquemque civem non esse suiipsius solum, neque gratia sui, sed omnes civitatis et gratia eius; ergo cura uniuscuiusque civium et dispositio facienda est secundum habitudinem ad totam civitatem et bonum ipsius. Secundum igitur eumdem modum curandi sunt et disponendi iuvenes secundum quod tota civitas curatur et disponitur ad bonum commune. Sed de istis facienda est cura communis; ergo et de iuvenibus.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit laudabit autem manifestat idem per exemplum; dicens, quod rationabiliter poterit aliquis laudare Lacedaemonios, qui reputantur bene gubernare in hoc, maximam enim curam et studium impendunt circa disciplinam puerorum, et hoc non privatim, sed communiter, bene existimantes quod bona dispositio puerorum communis induceret bonam rempublicam consequenter. Quod igitur oportet legislatorem curare et ferre leges de disciplina iuvenum, et quod hanc curam et disciplinam de ea oportet esse communem, manifestum est ex dictis.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quae autem declarat quae sit illa disciplina, et qualiter sunt erudiendi in ea. Et circa hoc primo praemittit intentum et necessitatem considerationis de ipso. Secundo cum dicit, quod quidem igitur, prosequitur. In prima parte dicit, quod civitatis gubernatorem oportet non latere quae sit huiusmodi disciplina puerorum communis, et qualiter et usque quo oporteat pueros erudiri in ipsa. Cuius ratio est, quoniam multi dubitant de ipsa, sicut apparet ex operibus et diversis opinionibus de ea: non enim omnes opinantur pueros debere erudiri in eisdem disciplinis, neque in ordine ad virtutem, neque in ordine ad idem optimum: sed quidam in una, puta in iudicativa seu rhetorica, quidam in alia, puta medicativa, vel exercitativa, vel huiusmodi. Nec etiam manifestum est omnibus, utrum magis oportet eos erudiri seu assuefieri in his quae pertinent ad intellectum, puta in virtutibus intellectualibus, vel in his quae pertinent ad morem animae, hoc est in virtutibus moralibus quae sunt in parte appetitiva ipsius. Iterum consideratio de disciplina, quae ordinatur ad vitam activam, plena est turbatione: quae scilicet sit optima, cui magis intendendum sit: diversi enim diversa ponunt, secundum quod diversos fines in agibilibus sibi constituunt. Adhuc non est manifestum utrum magis studendum sit circa operationes vitae activae, aut circa ea quae tendunt ad virtutem quae est principium illius, an circa superflua, puta circa delectationes sensibiles non necessarias: diversi enim circa hoc diversa opinantur, et quilibet istorum habet proprios iudices. Iterum de virtutibus quae sit principalis nihil concorditer dicunt: non enim omnes honorant eamdem, sicut principaliorem, sed alii aliam et alii aliam. Quia igitur de his diversi diversimode existimant, et secundum diversitatem existimationis sequitur diversitas studii, rationabiliter diversificantur circa studium istorum: quaelibet enim studet et intendit circa id quod sibi melius et possibilius existimat. Quare rationabiliter considerandum est quae sit disciplina omnis, circa quam sit studendum, sicut circa optimum pueris.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem prosequitur. Et primo declarat in universali in quibus erudiendi sunt, quoniam in utilibus et liberalibus. Secundo cum dicit, sunt autem quatuor, magis determinate declarat quae sint illa. Circa primum primo ostendit quod in utilibus et liberalibus sunt erudiendi. Secundo cum dicit, sunt etiam quaedam, declarat usque ad quid et cuius gratia. Et circa primum est intelligendum quod homo liber est, qui est suipsius causa et in ratione causae moventis et in ratione finis, sicut dictum est prius. In ratione quidem moventis, quando ab illo per quod est homo et quod est principale in eo, puta ab intellectu, movetur praeiudicando et ordinando modum et rationem agendi. In ratione autem finis cum movetur ad bonum et finem ipsius secundum illud idem quod principale est in eo secundum intellectum; et tanto magis liber est secundum naturam, quanto magis natus est moveri ab eo quod principalissimum est in eo et ad finem et bonum eius secundum illud idem. Homo autem servus dicitur qui non est natus moveri propter indispositionem materiae ab intellectu proprio per quem determinatur, sed ab intellectu et ratione alterius; nec etiam operatur sui gratia, sed gratia illius alterius. Et quanto minus natus est moveri a se et magis ab alio et ad finem alterius, tanto magis servus est. Ad hoc autem quod moveatur ab alio et agat ad finem alterius, requiritur robur corporale. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit; quia ubi deficit virtus intellectus et formae, excedit virtus corporis et materiae. Et propter hoc dixit Aristoteles in primo huius, quod vigentes intellectu, etsi deficiant corpore sunt naturaliter aliorum domini: robusti autem corpore, deficientes intellectu, sunt naturaliter servi.

Polit.L1

Et secundum hoc scientia libera vel liberalis dicta est ab antiquis secundum quam homo per se disponitur secundum intellectum ad finem proprium. Illa autem secundum quam disponitur in ordine ad bonum corporis per se et ad bona exteriora, servilis, quia ordinatur ad bonum eius secundum hoc quod debet servire in homine, ut mechanica, quia moechari facit quodammodo intellectum circa ea quae non sunt propria sibi secundum quod huiusmodi. Et inter liberas illa libera est maxime quae immediate disponit intellectum ad finem optimum; puta illa in cuius operatione consistit felicitas: illa autem quae mediate disponit intellectum ad ipsum, minus; sicut scientiae posteriores in quibus scire contingit ordinare ad scire in superiori, quamvis contingat ipsum quaerere propter seipsum. Et illa minime liberalis est inter speculativas, in qua minime quaeritur scire propter se, et quae per plura media ordinatur ad bonum hominis ultimum. Similiter inter servas illa magis serva est in qua magis deprimitur intellectus seu ratio circa utiliora et magis extranea ab homine secundum quod homo; sicut illa quae ordinatur ad bona exteriora magis quam illa quae ordinatur ad bonum corporis. Quamvis autem liberali maxime non contingat uti male quantum ad usum per se ipsius, posterioribus tamen etiam minus liberalibus quantum etiam ad usum earum per se contingit. Sicut circa finem ultimum hominis simpliciter non contingit male se habere; his autem quae sunt ad ipsum, contingit quandoque male uti. Et hoc contingit quando per considerationem vel exercitium in eis retrahitur aliquis, vel a fine, vel ab his quae propinquiora sunt fini; sicut contingit per considerationem in aliqua scientia posteriori respectu alicuius minus scibilis retrahitur aliquis a consideratione in prima respectu maxime scibilis.

Polit.L1

Hoc igitur viso supponens Aristoteles quod expedit pueros erudiri in disciplinis utilibus ad finem, sicut manifestum, probat quod non in omnibus utilibus, sed in liberalibus; dicens, quod manifestum est ex se, quod expedit pueros in civitate bene ordinata erudiri in disciplinis utilibus ad finem reipublicae: illa enim quae ordinantur ad finem aliquem expedit praeparari et disponi ad ipsum. Pueri autem ordinandi sunt ad finem reipublicae; et disciplina et eruditio sunt quaedam praeparationes ipsorum ad ipsum. Quod autem non expediat eos erudiri in omnibus utilibus universaliter, sed tantum in utilibus et liberalibus, manifestum est distinctis disciplinis per liberales quae per se disponunt intellectum ad finem, et illiberales quae per se ordinantur ad bonum corporis, sicut dictum est. Sed talibus expedit eos participare quaecumque de numero utilium ad finem per se faciunt participantem mercenarium. Mercenariam autem operationem et artem et doctrinam oportet intelligere eas quaecumque corpora liberorum aut animam, aut etiam intellectum male et inutiliter disponunt ad usus et actiones virtutum moralium et intellectualium, vel etiam ad usum perfectissimae virtutis quae est felicitas propter quod et huiusmodi artes quaecumque disponunt corpus deterius ad huiusmodi artes, et in quarum operationibus absorbetur intellectus, utiles dicimus, sicut artes forenses vel artes etiam in quibus corpus maculatur, quoniam per usum earum faciunt mentem non vacantem circa ea quae sunt bona eius per se et deprimunt eam ad ea in quibus perfectio ipsius secundum se non invenitur.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit est autem declarat usque ad quid et cuius gratia oportet erudiri in liberalibus et assuefieri; et dicit quod quamvis eruditio et usus primae et principalis virtutis quaerenda fuit quantacumque et sine termino, tamen participare scientiis liberalibus aliquibus, puta quarum usus ordinatur ad usum excellentiorem, usque ad aliquem terminum non liberale est. Continue autem et assidue exercere se in eis usque ad quantamcumque perfectionem valde nocivum est, propter dicta nocumenta; quia scilicet accensio et consideratio continua in eis retrahit aut simpliciter aut in parte ab usu optimae virtutis. Et iterum manifestum est, quod scientiae istae et usus earum ordinantur in finem ulteriorem. Quamvis autem appetitus finis infinitus sit, appetitus tamen eorum quae ad finem ordinantur non est infinitus, sed determinatus a fine. Et ideo usque ad aliquid erudiri et considerare in eis liberale est, scilicet inquantum utiles sunt ad finem, et non amplius. Sed multa differentia est ad quem finem aliquis addiscit aut exercetur in eis. Si enim propter actum virtutis excellentioris suiipsius, non est pravum nec illiberale; aut si etiam propter bonum virtutis aliquorum amicorum, quia amicus est velut alter ipse. Si autem aliquis addiscat eas et operetur in eis saepe propter alios, ut inde reportet commodum et utilitatem secundum bona exteriora, sicut multi iuristarum et medicorum faciunt, mercenarium et servile erit. Dictum enim est prius disciplinam servilem esse quae ordinatur ad corpus et ad bona exteriora cum depressione intellectus. Dicit autem qui hoc agit saepe propter alios, quia quandoque bonum est uti talibus scientiis ad alios, aliquando propter bonum aliorum tantum sine utilitate propria, ut quando necessitatem habentes a se vel ab aliis non possunt iuvari opportune, aliquando etiam propter utilitatem propriam ut reportent lucrum rationabile, secundum tamen quod utile est ad finem et bonum secundum intellectum non deprimendo intellectum ipsum in usu ipso. Praemissae igitur disciplinae seu eruditiones ad utrumque se habent, quia contingit eis bene uti ad finem et male, quemadmodum dictum est.

Polit.L1

Consequenter cum dicit sunt autem declarat determinate quae sunt scientiae convenientes pueris. Et primo praenumerat eas. Secundo cum dicit, de musica vero, declarat cuius gratia et qualiter sunt in eis erudiendi. In prima parte dicit, quod quatuor sunt disciplinae fere quas consueverunt iuvenes addiscere in civitatibus quae bene gubernantur: scilicet disciplinam literarum, puta grammaticam seu rationalem universaliter, et luctativam et musicam et artem figurandi quae communis est pictoriae et sculptoriae, sicut valde utiles ad operationes vitae humanae, et valde bonae secundum seipsas, inquantum in eis aliqualiter perficitur intellectus. Gymnastica utilis est tamquam conferens ad fortitudinem et robur iuvenum.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit de musica declarat cuius gratia et qualiter erudiendi sunt in eis. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, de musica autem regreditur ad inquirendum de musica, ut magis appareat veritas de ea. Circa primum primo ostendit quare et cuius gratia erudiendi sunt pueri in musica. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem, cuius gratia in disciplina literarum. Tertio cum dicit, ac etiam de utilibus, cuius gratia in figurativa. Quarto cum dicit, similiter vero, cuius gratia et usque ad quid et qualiter in gymnastica. Circa primum primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, quod igitur recolligit dicta. Circa primum adhuc primo ostendit, quod sunt quaedam scientiae quas expedit addiscere propter deductionem in vacatione. Secundo cum dicit, quapropter musicam, etc. ex his concludit musicam addiscendam esse propter delectationem in vacatione, non propter utilitatem. Circa primum adhuc primo tangit, quod non vacatio est propter vacationem. Secundo cum dicit, itaque manifestum, etc. ex dictis concludit propositum suum. Adhuc in prima parte ostendit, quod non vacatio est propter vacationem habentem delectationem secundum seipsam. Secundo cum dicit, si enim utroque etc. quod vacatio quae est in quiete rationem finis habet secundum se, et quaerenda est non propter aliud. Tertio cum dicit, otium autem, etc. ostendit quod vacatio in his quae ad intellectum pertinent habet delectationem secundum seipsam, et rationem finis. In prima parte dicit, quod de disciplina musicae cuius gratia iuvenes erudiendi sunt in ea, dubitabit aliquis propter diversitatem quae accidit circa eam. Quidam enim participant ea propter delectationem, quae est circa sensum. Sonus enim musicus proportionaliter movet auditum, cuius apprehensionem sequitur delectatio sensibilis, sic participant eam rurales. Alii autem instituerunt eam ut disciplinam quamdam, videlicet propter cognitionem proportionum, et ipsarum harmoniarum speculationem; propter hoc quod natura humana secundum intellectum appetit, sicut saepe dictum est, non solum non vacare, idest agere operationes extrinsecas recte, sed etiam posse bene vacare, idest vacando ab operationibus exterioribus intendere circa speculationem. Speculatio enim primi intelligibilis rationem primi principii habet in operationibus. Est enim ultimus finis hominis, sicut dictum est prius. Quamvis enim ambo sint eligibilia, scilicet non vacare, idest intendere exterioribus operationibus, et vacare, idest intendere interioribus, vacatio tamen magis habet rationem eligibilis et boni quam non vacare. Inquirenda est ergo vacatio aliqua sicut finis omnium aliorum, quae oportet facere gratia ipsius, sicut bellum propter pacem. Et hoc satis ostensum est prius, et decimo Ethicorum.

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Deinde cum dicit si enim quia forte aliquis crederet, quod cum in ludo sit delectatio quaedam delectabilis, quod ipsa haberet rationem finis, cuius gratia alia quaerenda essent. Et ideo ostendit contrarium huiusmodi; dicens, quod quamvis non vacare eligendum sit propter vacationem, non tamen propter eam quam exercemus ludentes. Si enim ita esset, tunc ludus et exercitium in ipso esset finis vitae nostrae. Quia igitur hoc est impossibile, ludus enim laboriosus est, et cum tristitia et nocumento saepe, manifestum est, quod inconveniens est non vacationis finem esse ludum; et manifestum est magis intendendum ludis in non vacationibus, ut magis possint operari; quia laborans in operando indiget requie propter restitutionem et salvationem virtutum. Cuiuscumque enim est aliquod tempus determinatum ad operationem agere, si excesserit illud necesse est languescere, sicut philosophus dicit in libro de somno: propter hoc indiget remissione illius. Ludus autem propter requiem est, vel est requies quaedam. Sed operari operationes exteriores accidit cum labore et fatigatione, tum propter motum membrorum praeter naturam, tum propter consumptionem spirituum. Et ideo oportet ludos introducere observantes tempus et locum opportunum, et alias circumstantias ad usum ipsorum, tamquam ad requiem adducant, et quaerantur quasi gratia pharmaciae, idest medicinae. Ut sicut medicina amara existens ad sanitatem deducit, ita etiam ludus, etsi sit cum tristitia et labore, ad restitutionem virtutum. Remissio enim motus laboriosi animae propter delectationem consequentem requies quaedam est virtutum animae. Sic igitur vacatio, quae in ludo, rationem finis non habet, sed magis quaeritur propter requiem a fatigatione quae in operatione est. Huiusmodi autem requies propter ipsam operationem quaeritur.

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Deinde cum dicit vacare autem ostendit, quod in vacatione in operationibus circa speculabilia est felicitas et delectatio secundum se; dicens quod operatio circa speculabilia habet secundum seipsum delectationem et felicitatem et vitam beatam, sicut ostensum est prius. Beate autem vivere non existit in non vacatione, sed in vacatione magis. Non vacans enim, idest exercens operationes exteriores, operatur gratia alicuius finis non existentis in illa operatione, sed in aliqua ulteriori. Sicut bellum exercens operatur propter pacem, et currens in stadio currit propter bravium. Felicitas autem perfecta rationem finis ultimi habet, quae non est cum tristitia, sed cum delectatione excellentissima. Operationem enim excellentissimam sequitur excellentissima delectatio. Siquidem operationem per se sequitur delectatio. Sed hanc felicitatem et operationem non eamdem ponunt omnes, sed diversi diversam, secundum diversitatem aestimationum et habituum. Unusquisque enim operationem secundum habitum quem existimat perfectissimum ponit felicitatem esse, et delectationem propriam ei. Secundum veritatem autem operatio, quae est secundum excellentissimum habitum, felicitas est; et delectatio, consequens ipsam excellentissima. Habitus autem ille optimus est, qui est secundum virtutem perfectissimam, et respectu perfectissimi obiecti. Per ista enim duo determinatur, puta per potentiam et obiectum.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit itaque manifestum concludit ex dictis, quod sunt aliquae disciplinae quaerendae propter delectationem quae in vacatione est; dicens, quia in vacatione consistit felicitas, quae rationem finis habet, et delectationem maximam, ut dictum est. Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, quaerenda sunt propter ipsum, et delectationem quae in ipso est; et si sunt quaedam disciplinae vel eruditiones ordinatae ad felicitatem per se, manifestum est, quod oportet ad vacationem quae in contemplatione, et delectatione, quae in ipsa est, addiscere disciplinas quasdam, et erudiri in eis, et istas esse gratia suiipsius, tamquam bonas secundum seipsas, quamvis valeant ad felicitatem. Eas autem quae ordinantur ad non vacationem, seu ad operationes exteriores, vel opera exteriora, esse necessarias, quamvis non simpliciter bonas secundum seipsas; sicut extrinseca bona ad quae ordinantur sunt necessaria ad vitam, sicut organa quaedam seu materia, et non simpliciter bona secundum seipsa.

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Deinde cum dicit quapropter musicam ex dictis declarat, quod musica addiscenda est propter eruditionem et delectationem, non sicut necessaria. Et primo declarat hoc per rationem. Secundo cum dicit, quapropter Homerus etc. per dicta Homeri. In prima parte ipse dicit, quod propter praedicta antiqui musicam dixerunt esse quaerendam propter eruditionem et delectationem, quae in vacatione, et non propter aliquam utilitatem extrinsecam. Necesse est enim musicam quaerere, aut propter necessitatem extrinsecorum bonorum, aut propter delectationem quae est in vacatione, et non propter aliquam utilitatem extrinsecam. Omnis enim scientia aut propter hoc aut illud quaeritur. Speculativa quidem propter delectationem quae in vacatione, practica autem propter opus. Sed ipsa non est quaerenda propter necessarium vel utile aliquod extrinsecum. Non enim secundum se est utilis ad acquisitionem pecuniarum, seu oeconomiam, sicut scientia literarum utilis est ad istas, et ad doctrinam aliarum, et ad actiones politicas multas: nec etiam utilis est sicut videtur figurativa esse utilis ad recte iudicandum artificum opera, ut non decipiantur. Nec etiam est utilis ad sanitatem et robur per se, sicut luctativa. Neutrum enim istorum facit musica per se, quamvis quandoque faciat per accidens; ergo relinquitur debere ipsam addiscere propter scire, et deductionem, quae in vacatione est, ad quod antiqui sapientes ordinaverunt ipsam. Delectationem enim quam credunt esse liberorum, et in qua eos exerceri dicunt fieri per musicam, ad hoc eam ordinantes.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit quapropter Homerus declarat hoc per dicta Homeri tria, quae imperfecte ponit. Dicit igitur, quod propter praedicta, Homerus in quodam metro ita inquit de ipsa, quasi adversando quibusdam dicentibus ipsam esse necessariam, dicens ita non esse. Sed contingit delectari in eam per se, sicut vocari ad epulas delectabile est per se multis. Et iterum in alio metro dicens alteros quosdam esse, qui dicunt cantativam naturam, hoc est musicam, esse valde delectabilem, sicut delectantem omnes. Et in aliis introduxit Ulyxem dicentem hanc esse optimam hominum delectationem, ipsis gaudentibus in epulando, si audiant cantilenas musicas a citharoedo, ipsi dico residentes. In primo autem dicto dicit habere omnem delectationem absolute. In secundo delectationem naturalem. In tertio optimam.

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Deinde cum dicit quod igitur recolligit dicta, dicens quod ex his quae dicta sunt, manifestum est quod est aliqua disciplina in qua erudiendi sunt pueri, non sicut in utili aut necessaria propter extrinseca bona, sed sicut in liberali et honesta secundum seipsum. Utrum autem ipsa sit una vel plures secundum numerum, et si sint plures, quae sunt hae, et qualiter addiscendae, posterius determinabit. Nunc autem tantum praemanifestum est nobis, quod ab antiquis habemus testimonium quoddam, quod sunt aliqua erudimenta puerorum liberalia et honesta secundum se, et quod musica hoc operatur manifeste.

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Deinde cum dicit ac etiam declarat cuius gratia addiscenda est scientia literarum; dicens, quod adhuc manifestum est, quod oportet pueros erudiri in quibusdam disciplinis utilibus, non tantum propter utilitatem exteriorum, quae sequitur ex eis, sed propter hoc quod ad scientias et ad liberales actiones valent. Sicut in scientia literarum, quae non tantum utilis est ad extrinseca bona, sicut dictum est prius, et propter hoc addiscenda, sed etiam propter hoc quod per ipsam contingit fieri eruditiones multas in aliis scientiis, puta eas quae fiunt per disciplinam audiendo ab alio, quod non fit nisi per sermonem significativum, cuius significationem et rationem modi significandi, simul autem et ordinationem convenientem docet praedicta scientia.

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Deinde cum dicit similiter vero declarat cuius gratia erudiendi sunt in figurativa. Dicens quod simul expedit pueros erudiri in figurativa, quae sub se continet scriptivam et pictivam, aut etiam sculptivam, non solum ut non decipiantur in vendendo propria, sed etiam ut sint inseductibiles circa emptionem et venditionem vasorum universaliter, quorum valor praeter eum qui materiae, cognoscitur per artem praedictam, quod pertinet ad utilitatem. Aut magis erudiendi sunt in ea, quia per ipsam magis possunt considerare pulchritudinem corporum, quae consistit in debita proportione quantitatis membrorum adinvicem et ad totum, et etiam ad colorem, quod est bonum et delectabile secundum seipsum. Et huiusmodi gratia erudiendi sunt magis liberi et magnanimi. Quaerere enim in omnibus utilitatem in exterioribus bonis, et illud quod amplius est in eis, non congruit liberis et magnanimis secundum quod huiusmodi. Liberi enim sunt vigentes intellectu magis quam secundum corpus. Et ideo magis intendunt bonum secundum intellectum, quam secundum corpus, et quam exteriora. Magnanimi enim ex inclinatione animi et virtute habitus inclinantur ad maxima et honorabilissima, quae sunt bona secundum intellectum; et ideo respectu istorum despiciunt extrinseca bona (unde dicit philosophus quarto Ethicorum, quod neque bene fortunatus gaudiosus erit, neque infortunatus tristis) et etiam bonum corporis. Unde dicit in eodem, quod est magnorum factivus, et cum periclitetur in magnis et bonis non parcens vitae; et ideo ad liberum et ad magnanimum pertinet magis quaerere praeeminentiam in bonis quae secundum intellectum sunt, quam in bonis exterioribus, et secundum intellectum magis amare seipsum, sicut idem philosophus dicit in nono Ethicorum.

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Deinde cum dicit cum vero declarat cuius gratia, et quibus, et qualiter exercitandi sunt in luctativa, seu agonistica. Et circa hoc primo manifestat cuius gratia. Secundo cum dicit, nunc autem etc., qualiter et in quibus agonibus. Primo igitur dicit: quoniam ex his, quae dicta sunt prius, iam manifestum est, utrum erudiendi sunt prius, in consuetudinibus disponentibus appetitum, vel in his quae pertinent ad intellectum, quoniam secundum appetitum prius, et etiam circa corpus prius, quam circa intellectum; manifestum est, quod pueri in hac aetate tradendi sunt luctativae et etiam paedotribicae. Quarum prima facit bonum habitum corporis ad fortitudinem et ad armorum usum. Secunda autem bene dirigit et regulat operationes ipsorum in ordine. Dicitur autem paedotribica disciplina qua paedonomus dirigit operationes puerorum ad virtutem a paedos quod est puer et tribe quod est exercitium.

Polit.L1

Deinde cum dicit nunc autem primo declarat qualibus agonibus erudiendi sunt. Secundo cum dicit, quod igitur etc. quo ordine. Et circa primum adhuc primo declarat quod non in nimiis laboribus. Secundo ex hoc concludit magis erudiendos esse in dignis et humanis agonibus, cum dicit, quare quod bonum et cetera. Primum probat reprobando opinionem et usum contrarium. Quem primo ponit. Secundo cum dicit, atqui ut, improbat. In prima parte ipse dicit, quod nunc civitates quae magis videntur habere sollicitudinem de bono habitu puerorum, inducunt in eis habitum athleticum, idest habitum ad robur athletae, exercentes eos in operationibus laboriosis tollentes pulchritudinem corporum et augmentum impedientes propter excessum laboris in eis. Lacedaemonii enim qui magnam curam habuerunt de eis, peccaverunt manifeste in isto peccato, facientes eos efferatos in huiusmodi operationibus, ac si huiusmodi efferatio conferret maxime ad fortitudinem bellicam.

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Deinde cum dicit atqui ut reprobat usum et opinionem istorum. Et primo in hoc quod eos exercitabant tantum ad unam virtutem. Secundo cum dicit, si enim ambo etc. quia nec ad illam bene. Unde in prima parte dicit, quod praedictae civitates sic exercitabant pueros propter fortitudinem, quamvis manifestum sit, sicut dictum est prius, quod non expedit futuros bene gubernare exercitari tantum ad unam virtutem, sed magis ad omnes. Si quidem felicitatem oportet habere omnes virtutes, ut probatum fuit; ipsi autem tantum exercitabant eos ad unam. Iterum dato quod sufficiat exerceri ad unam maxime, non tamen ad hanc quam ipsi opinabantur, puta ad fortitudinem. Maxime enim expedit exercitari ad optimam virtutem. Optima autem virtus non est fortitudo, sed aut iustitia, aut prudentia magis.

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Deinde cum dicit et si ad hanc ostendit, quod neque ad hanc convenienter exercitabant eos, per duas rationes, quarum secundam ponit cum dicit, praeterea scimus et cetera. In prima dicit, quod et si expedit pueros exercitari maxime ad fortitudinem secundum opinionem ipsorum, tamen non bene invenerunt agones et modos exercitandi ad ipsam, exercitantes eos in operibus ad crudelitatem et immisericordiam, puta in homicidiis, rapinis et aliis huiusmodi. Et hoc apparet, quia neque illa animalia bruta magis assequuntur fortitudinem secundum veritatem quaecumque sunt silvestria et crudelia magis, puta lupus aut draco, sed magis illa quae habent mores mitiores et leoninos et sunt magis assueta praedictis, sicut leo qui fortissimus animalium dicitur esse et multas habere proprietates similes proprietatibus quarumdam virtutum. Et canes quidam qui ex hoc etiam nobiles dicuntur. Nec etiam gentes quae magis crudeles et immisericordes sunt magis habent fortitudinem secundum veritatem. Multae enim inveniuntur quae inclinantur, vel ex natura quadam corrupta, vel ex consuetudine, ad interficiendum homines et comedendum carnes humanas. Sicut Achaei et Eniochi dicuntur, et circa pontum habitantes, sicut etiam Tartari. Similiter et aliae gentium non habitantium iuxta mare, quaedam sunt similes praedictis. Quaedam autem sunt quae ordinantur ad rapinas et latrocinia facienda. Et tamen omnes istae participant parum fortitudine. Quare exerceri in huiusmodi operibus ad crudelitatem pertinentibus, non est exerceri ad fortitudinem veram. Fortitudo enim vera habitus est in medietate consistens quae circa timores et audacias, sufferentes faciens et periculorum et mortis quando oportet et ubi et veri boni gratia; secundum quam oportet, quandoque aliquos aggredi, aliquando refugere, aliquando interficere et aliquando parcere. Exercitati autem in operibus feralibus, quamvis multum aggressivi sint, non tamen boni gratia, non considerantes quando et ubi oportet, nec etiam parcentes cuicumque.

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Deinde cum dicit secundum praevalentes ponit secundam rationem; dicens, quod adhuc nos scimus, quod Lacedaemonii quamdiu exercitaverunt se in huiusmodi laboribus, praevaluerunt vicinis, praeliantes adversus eos; nunc autem deficiunt ab aliis quibusdam vicinis eorum in agonibus luctativis et bellicis, non habentes artem luctandi, et modum et prudentiam bellandi, sicut alii habent. Et ideo non dominantur nunc. Non enim differebant prius ab aliis praevalentes eis propter hoc per se, quod exercitabant pueros ad habitus ferales. Sed quoniam exercitati in talibus habitibus pugnabant cum eis qui ad hoc non studuerant omnino. Praevalet enim aliquis quandoque alicui, quia ipse exercitatus est ad praelium, alter vero non; aut propter inexperientiam et inexercitium eius cui praevalet, quamvis praevalens non habet artem bellandi. Nunc autem vicini eorum exercitati sunt in luctativa arte et bellica. Et ideo praevalent eis feralibus existentibus, non exercitatis autem in artibus praedictis.

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Deinde cum dicit quare quod concludit ex dictis, quod magis exercitandi sunt pueri in agonibus humanis et in ordinatis ad virtutem. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, oportet autem non ex proprio etc. removet obiectionem quae posset fieri. Primo igitur dicit, quoniam praedictae civitates non convenienter erudiunt pueros exercitantes eos in feralibus operibus, manifestum est, quod magis expediens est multum praeexercitare eos in agonibus et actibus ad bonum deducentibus, quam in feralibus; quia nec lupus nec alia aliqua fera, quantumcumque crudeles sint, non bene se haberent in experiendo aliquod periculum bonum. Similiter nec homo habens proprietates ipsorum propter declinationem a ratione recta ad alterum extremum; sed vir studiosus secundum rationem operans magis. Quicumque vero permittunt pueros exercitari in huiusmodi et sine paedagogo in necessariis faciunt eos sordidos, hoc est depressos secundum intellectum et magis intendentes bonum corporis, et disponunt eos secundum veritatem ad unum opus reipublicae, puta ad robur corporis, quamvis magis expediret eos esse dispositos ad plura vel ad omnia. Et iterum ad illud unum multo deterius disponunt ipsos quam alii, secundum quod dixit ratio vel sermo prius. Sed quia aliquis posset dicere quod exercitatio in feralibus expedientior esset civitatibus, quoniam antiqui in talibus exercitati praevaluerunt aliis, sicut Lacedaemonii, hoc removet.

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Consequenter cum dicit oportet autem dicens, quod de his quae conveniunt civitatibus et rebuspublicis rectis non debemus iudicare ex operibus civitatum antiquarum et ex dispositionibus priorum hominum omnino, sed magis ex his quae fiunt nunc. Antiqui enim pugnabant contra inexercitatos et insuetos ad arma, contra quos non erat necesse habere multum exercitium et artem ipsorum, parum enim exercitati poterant eis praevalere. Nunc autem homines sunt exercitati in agonibus et usu armorum magis; et ideo disciplinae et eruditiones in talibus nunc habent opus et locum magis contra tales quam prius haberent.

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Deinde cum dicit quod quidem manifestat quo ordine sunt exercitandi in istis. Et primo ostendit quod usque ad pubescentiam continue erudiendi sunt in facilioribus. Secundo cum dicit, quando autem a pubescentia etc. quod in sequenti aetate exercitandi sunt in intensioribus, et debent uti alimentis siccis magis quam prius. In prima dicit, quod cum ex dictis manifestum sit quod pueri exercitandi sunt in luctativa quae inclinat ad habitus morales virtutum, manifestum etiam potest esse qualiter et quo ordine sunt exercitandi. Usque enim in finem pubescentiae exercitandi sunt in levioribus exercitiis et moderatis magis, reiicientes ab eis exercitium violentum et labores qui ordinantur ad necessitatem vitae, qui ad servos pertinent; ita ut per violentiam per talia non fiat aliquod impedimentum ad incrementum et bonam dispositionem corporis. Per labores enim immoderatos debilitantur virtutes et complexio. Signum autem quod exerceri in facilioribus valet ad bonam dispositionem corporis, exerceri autem in violentis gravat, est, quia si ponamus quod aliquis vir exercitatus recte prius inveniat duos alios homines in violentis exercitatos in iuventute, ut in Olympionicis, continget istum devincere illos viros iam existentes perfectos secundum aetatem, quamvis pueros secundum fortitudinem; propter hoc quod exercitia violenta et necessaria abstulerunt ab huiusmodi iuvenibus in prima aetate potentiam et vigorem.

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Deinde cum dicit quando autem declarat in quibus exercendi sunt in aetate sequenti; dicens, quod quando fiunt apti ad alias eruditiones fortiores, puta post pubescentiam vel post tres annos sequentes vel circa, tunc expedit eos exercitari in exercitiis magis laboriosis, convenientibus tamen aetati; ita ut sicut natura magis et magis perficitur, ita plus et plus addatur ad exercitia proportionaliter: et tunc etiam expedit eis magis administrare alimentum siccum, quod magis disponit ad fortitudinem. Sed cavendum est, quod simul non exerceantur in eis quae pertinent ad bonam dispositionem intellectus et ad bona corporis per se. Contrariantur enim sibi invicem et contraria operantur; et labor in exercitio corporali impedit intellectum, et labor in his quae ad intellectum et dispositionem corporis. Cuius ratio est, quia quandocumque aliquae duae potentiae fundantur in aliqua substantia una, intensio in actu unius remittit operationem alterius, quia omnis virtus divisa minor est seipsa unita. Potentia autem ad operationes corporales, puta ad augmentationem et nutritionem, et potentia intellectiva, ad unam substantiam pertinent. Et ideo intensio in actu alterius impedit aliam.

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L. 2 (Θ.5–6, 1339a11–1341b18)Num civis musicam addiscere debeat.

Num civis musicam addiscere debeat.

Polit.L2

1128. De musica autem quaedam quidem dubitavimus ratione et prius; bene autem habet, et nunc resumentes ipsa producere, ut sicut aditus fiat rationibus, quas utique aliquis dicet enuntians de ipsa.

Polit.L2

1129. Neque enim quam potentiam habet, facile de ipsa discutere, neque cuius gratia oportet participare ipsa; utrum ludi gratia, et requiei, sicut somno, et ebrietate. Haec enim secundum se quidem, neque studiosorum sunt, sed delectabilia, simulque solicitudinem cessare faciunt, ut ait Euripides: propter quod et ordinant ipsam, et utuntur in omnibus similiter, vino, ebrietate, et musica: ponunt autem, et saltationem in iis. Aut magis ad virtutem tendere secundum aliquid existimandum musicam, tamquam potentem, sicut exercitativa quale aliquod corpus efficere, et musicam morem qualem quendam facere, assuescentem gaudere recte ad deductionem; aut aliquid confert et ad prudentiam, etenim hoc tertium ponendum dictorum.

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1130. Quod quidem igitur oportet iuvenes non ludi gratia erudire non immanifestum: non enim ludunt addiscentes, cum tristitia addiscere.

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1131. At vero neque in deductionem pueris, et talibus aetatibus congruit attribuere, neque enim imperfecto convenit finis.

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1132. Sed forte utique videbitur puerorum studium ludi gratia esse viris factis et perfectis. Sed si hoc est tale, cuius utique gratia oportet addiscere ipsos, sed non sicut reges Persarum et Medorum per alios facientes, ipsum transumere delectationem et eruditionem? Etenim necessarium, melius efficere opus eos, qui hoc ipsum fecerunt et artem iis qui tanto tempore curaverunt quantum ad addiscere solum. Si autem talia oportet celebrare ipsos, et circa negotium pulmentorum ipsos oportebit praeparare: sed inconveniens.

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1133. Eandem autem dubitationem habet, et si potest mores meliores facere. Hoc enim quid oportet addiscere ipsos, si non alios audientes, recteque gaudere et posse iudicare, sicut Lacedaemonii? Illi enim non addiscentes, tamen possunt iudicare recte, ut aiunt, bonas et non bonas melodiarum.

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1134. Eadem autem ratio utique, et si ad bonam diuturnationem et deductionem liberalem utendum ipsa, quod oportet addiscere ipsos, sed non aliis utentibus frui.

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1135. Considerare autem licet existimationem quam habemus de diis. Non enim Iupiter ipse cantat et citharizat poetis. Sed etiam banausos vocamus tales, et agere non viri non inebriati aut ludentis. Sed forte de iis quidem posterius considerandum.

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1136. Prima autem quaestio est, utrum non ponendum in disciplinam, musicam aut ponendum; et quid potest dubitatorum trium, utrum disciplinam, aut ludum, aut deductionem.

Polit.L2

1137. Rationabiliter autem in omnia ordinatur et videtur participare. Ludus enim gratia requiei est. Requiem autem necessarium delectabilem esse: eius enim, quae per labores, tristitiae medicina quaedam est. Et deductionem confesse oportet non solum habere quod bonum, sed et delectationem: felicitari enim ex ambobus iis est. Musicam autem omnes esse dicimus delectabilissimorum, et nudam existentem, et cum melodia. Ait enim et Museus esse hominibus delectabilissimum cantare: propter quod in conventus et deductiones rationabiliter assumunt ipsam, tamquam potentem laetificare. Quare et hinc existimabit utique aliquis oportere ipsam erudiri iuniores.

Polit.L2

1138. Quaecumque enim innocua delectabilium non solum congruunt ad finem, sed ad requiem. Quoniam autem in fine quidem accidit hominibus raro fieri, saepe autem requiescunt, et utuntur ludis, non quantum ad plus, sed et propter delectationem, utile utique erit requiscere in delectationibus quae ab ipsa.

Polit.L2

1139. Accidit autem hominibus facere ludos finem: habet enim forte delectationem quandam et finis, sed non quantumcumque. Quaerentes autem hanc, accipiunt ut hanc illam, propterea quod finsi actionis habet similitudinem quandam: finis enim nullius gratia futurorum est eligibilis, et tales delectationum nullius gratia futurorum sunt, sed factorum, laborum et tristitiae. Propter quam quidem igitur causam quaerunt felicitatem fieri per has delectationes, hanc merito utique quis existimabit causam.

Polit.L2

1140. De eo autem, quod est communicare musica, non propter hanc solam, sed neque propterea quod utilis est ad requiem, ut videtur, non solum. Sed quaerendum, ne forte hoc quidem accidat, honorabilior est autem natura ipsius, quam secundum dictam opportunitatem, et oportet non solum communi delectatione participare ab ipsa cuius habent sensum omnes (habet enim musica delectationem naturalem, propter quod omnibus aetatibus, et omnibus moribus usus ipsius est amicus).

Polit.L2

1141. Sed videre, si qua et ad morem confert, et ad animam. Hoc autem utique erit palam, siquales quidam moribus sumus per ipsam.

Polit.L2

1142. At vero, quod efficiamur quales quidam, manifestum per multa quidem, et altera, non minime autem per melodias Olympi: hae enim confesse faciunt animas raptas. Raptus autem eius, qui circa animam moris, passio est.

Polit.L2

1143. Adhuc autem audientes mutationum fiunt omnes compatientes, et sine rhythmis, et molodiis ipsis.

Polit.L2

1144. Quoniam autem accidit musicam esse delectabilium, virtutem autem circa gaudere recte, et amare, et odire; palam quod oportet addiscere, et assuefieri nihil ita, ut iudicare recte, et gaudere decentibus moribus, et bonis actionibus.

Polit.L2

1145. Sunt autem similitudines maxime penes veras naturas in rhythmis et melodiis irae et mansuetudinis, adhuc autem fortitudinis et temperantiae, et omnium contrariorum iis, et aliorum moralium. Palam autem ex operibus; transmutamus enim animam audientes talia.

Polit.L2

1146. Assuetudo autem in similibus ei quod est tristari et gaudere prope est eo quod ad veritatem eodem habeat modo: puta si quis gaudet imaginem alicuius videns non propter aliam causam, sed propter formam ipsam, necessarium, huic illam visionem cuius videt imaginem secundum se esse delectabilem.

Polit.L2

1147. Accidit autem sensibilium in aliis nullam quidem existere similitudinem ad mores, puta in tangibilibus, et gustabilibus; sed in visibilibus, debiliter. Figurae enim sunt tales, sed ad modicum, et omnes tali sensu communicant. Adhuc autem non sunt hae similitudines morum, sed signa magis, factae figurae et colores morum, et hoc est a corpore in passionibus non solum. Sed quantum differt, et circa horum speculationem, oportet non quae Pausionis contemplari iuvenes, sed quae Polygnoti, et si quis alius pictorum aut sculptorum est moralis.

Polit.L2

1148. In melodiis autem ipsis sunt imitationes morum: et hoc est manifestum: mos enim harmoniarum distat natura, ut audientes aliter disponatur, sed non eodem modo se habeant ad utramque ipsarum: sed ad quasdam quidem planctive, et contracte magis, velut ad eam quae vocatur olydiste; ad has autem mollius mente, puta ad remissas: medio autem modo et constanter maxime adulteram, quale videtur facere quae Doristae sola harmoniarum, raptos autem quae Phrygistae. Hoc enim bene dicunt qui circa ludum hunc philosophati sunt; accipiunt enim testimonia rationum ex ipsis operibus.

Polit.L2

1149. Eodem modo habent et quae circa rhythmos, ii quidem habent enim morem stabiliorem, ii autem motivum, et horum ii quidem honorabiliores habet motus, ii autem liberaliores.

Polit.L2

1150. Ex iis quidem igitur quod potest morem animae qualem quendam musica facere.

Polit.L2

1151. Palam, quia docendum et erudiendum in ipsa iuvenes. Est autem congruum ad naturam tantillum doctrinae musicae: iuvenes quidem enim propter aetatem indelectabile nihil sufferunt volentes. Musica autem naturae delectabilium est; et quaedam videtur cognatio harmoniis et rhythmis esse. Propter quod multi aiunt sapientium, ii quidem harmoniam esse animam, ii autem habere.

Polit.L2

1152. Utrum autem addiscere eosdem cantantes et manu operantes, aut non, sicut dubitatum est prius, nunc dicendum.

Polit.L2

1153. Non immanifestum, quod multam habet differentiam ad fieri quales quosdam, si quis ipse communicet operibus. Unum enim aliquid impossibilium aut difficilium est, eos qui non communicaverunt operibus, iudices esse studiosos.

Polit.L2

1154. Simul autem, et oportet pueros habere quandam occupationem, et Architae platagem quam dant pueris quatenus utentes hac nihil destruant eorum quae in domo. Non enim potest iuvenis quiescere: hic quidem igitur est congruens parvis ludorum: disciplina autem platagae maioribus iuvenum. Quod quidem igitur erudiendum musicam, ita ut communicetur omnibus, manifestum ex talibus.

Polit.L2

1155. Decens autem et non decens aetates, non difficile determinare, et solvere ad dicentes banausam esse curam.

Polit.L2

1156. Primo quidem enim, quoniam gratia iudicii oportet participare operibus; propter hoc oportet iuvenes quidem existentes uti opoeribus, seniores autem factos, opera quidem dimittere, posse autem bona iudicare, et gaudere recte, propter eruditionem factam in iuventute.

Polit.L2

1157. De increpatione autem facte, qua quidem increpant tamquam faciente musica banausos. non difficile solvere, considerantes usque ad quantum operibus communicandum iis qui politizant ad virtutem politicam, et qualibus melodiis et qualibus rhythmis communicandum, adhuc autem in qualibus organis eruditionem faciendum. Etenim verisimile hoc differe. In iis enim solutio est increpationis: nihil enim prohibet modos quosdam musicae operari quod dictum est.

Polit.L2

1158. Manifestum igitur quod oportet eruditionem ipsius neque impedire ad posteriores actiones, neque corpus facere banausum, et inutile ad bellica et politica exercitia: ad usus quidem iam, ad eruditiones autem posterius. Accidit autem utique circa eruditionem, si neque qui intendunt ad agonem technicos elaboraverunt, neque qui mirabilia et superflua operum quae nunc venerunt ad agones, ex agonibus autem ad eruditionem, sed talia quo usque utique possint gaudere bonis melodiis et rhythmis, et non solum eo quod commune musicae, sicut et aliorum quaedam animalium, adhuc autem et multitudo humilium et puerorum.

Polit.L2

1159. Palam autem ex iis et quibus organis utendum. Neque enim fistulas ad disciplinam adducendum, neque aliud aliquod organicum, puta citharam, et si quid tale alterum est; sed quaecumque facient ipsorum auditores bonos aut musici ludi, aut alterius.

Polit.L2

1160. Adhuc autem non est ipsa fistula morale, sed magis irae excitativum. Quare ad talia tempora ipsa utendum in quibus speculatio potest purificationem magis quam eruditionem.

Polit.L2

1161. Apponamus autem quod accidit ipsi contrarium ad disciplinam, et prohibere uti ratione fistulationem. Propter quod bene reprobaverunt priores ipsius usum a iuvenibus et liberis, quamvis primo usi fuissent ipsa.

Polit.L2

1162. Magis enim vacantes facti propter abundantias et magnanimiores ad virtutem, adhuc et prius, et post Medica sapientes facti ex operibus, omnes sequebantur eruditionem nihil discernentes, sed superinquirentes. Propter quod et fistulativam adduxerunt ad eruditiones. Etenim in Lacedaemonia quidam chori ductor fistulavit choro, et circa Athenas ita devenit. Quare fere plurimi liberorum participant ipsa. Palam autem ex titulo quem statuit Thrassipus, Euphantidi, cum chorum duxisset. Posterius autem reprobata est per experientiam ipsam melius potentibus iudicare quod ad virtutem, et quod non ad virtutem tendit. Similiter autem et multa organorum antiquorum, puta pictides et barbiti, et quae ad delectationem faciunt audientibus utentium, septigona et trigona, et sambucae, et omnia quae indigent manuali scientia.

Polit.L2

1162. Rationabiliter autem habet, et quod de fistulis ab antiquis in fabulis dictum est: aiunt enim Palladem, cum invenisset fistulas abiecisse: non male enim habet dicere, et propter inhonestatem faciei hoc fecisse contristantem Deam, non solum, sed magis verisimile, quia ad intellectum nihil est eruditio fistulationis. Palladi autem attribuimus scientiam et artem.

Polit.L2

1163. Quoniam autem organorum et operationum reprobamus technicum ludum (technicum autem dicimus eum, qui ad agones: in hoc enim agens non gratia virtutis sui et operatur, sed gratia delectationis audientium, et huius onerosae): propter quod non liberorum iudicamus esse operationem, sed serviliorem, et banausos utique accidit fieri. Mala enim intentio ad quam faciunt finis. Speculator enim onerosus existens, transmutare consuevit musicam. Quare, et artifices qui ad ipsum cogitant, facit, et ipsos quales quosdam, et corpora propter motus.

Polit.L2

Postquam philosophus ostendit quae sunt disciplinae in quibus consueverunt pueri erudiri in civitatibus, et cuius gratia erudiendi sint in eis, regreditur nunc ad declarandum certius cuius gratia erudiendi sint in musica, et quando et in quibus partibus eius. Et circa hoc primo praemittit intentionem suam et causam intenti. Secundo cum dicit, quod igitur etc. prosequitur. Circa primum praemittit intentionem suam. Secundo cum dicit, neque enim etc. assignat rationem ipsius recolligendo quaedam dicta prius. Primo igitur dicit, quod de disciplina musicae quaedam dubitando rationabiliter diximus prius. Et ideo, ut dubium certificetur, bene expediens est nunc producere sermonem de ipsa resumentes quae dicta sunt prius, ut sint sicut aditus rationibus quas aliquis faciet determinando de ipsa.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit neque enim recolligendo quaedam dicta prius, assignat rationem intenti; dicens, quod certius determinandum est de ipsa, quia non est facile cognoscere de ipsa quam virtutem et potentiam et cuius scientia habeat, et etiam utrum participandum sit ea causa ludi et requiei, sicut aliqui requirunt somnum vel ebrietatem. Somnus enim et ebrietas secundum se nec bona nec studiosa sunt: utrumque enim in potentia quadam est operationum: et tamen delectabilia sunt hominibus. Somnus quidem propter remissionem laboris et requiem; ebrietas autem quia delectabilis est propter spirituum multiplicationem; et iterum faciunt cessare sollicitudinem de agibilibus. Non enim sollicitatur de agibilibus, qui non considerat de eis. Somnus autem et ebrietas considerationem removent, et rationis usum. Et propter delectationem hanc et remotionem sollicitudinis quidam ordinant ipsas, et utuntur consimiliter ad ista vino, ebrietate et musica; addunt autem aliqui istis saltationem. Non est igitur facile disserere de musica, an quaerenda propter hoc, aut magis existimandum sit ipsam valere ad virtutem tamquam potentem morem qualem quemdam facere in assuescendo recte iudicare, et delectari secundum rationem, sicut exercitativa quale quoddam corpus efficit, et disponit ad virtutem, et prudentiam confert aliquid: et enim hoc ponendum est tertium eorum cuius gratia quaerenda est. Est autem intelligendum, quod sonus harmoniae musicae primo comprehenditur ab auditu, et cum proportionaliter movet ipsum, et secundum mediam rationem, in qua constitutus est, delectationem inducit, et huic delectationi possunt participare omnes. Sed ulterius in intentione soni harmoniaci intellectus considerat rationem et causam proportionis, quasi aliquod intelligibile secundum seipsum, in quo est quaedam perfectio intellectus quam videtur hic philosophus vocare degendi rationem. Et haec est una causa propter quam dicet statim quaerendam esse musicam, scilicet propter cognitionem veritatis in ea. Istam autem cognitionem veritatis de proportionibus musicalibus consequitur delectatio intellectualis, sicut omnem operationem intellectualem. Et haec est alia causa propter quam dicit philosophus eam esse quaerendam: non tamen seorsum nominat eam a delectatione de qua dictum est prius, vel a degendi ratione. Sed iudicium de proportionibus harmoniacis, et delectatio consequens, sunt de his quae sunt secundum rationem rectam, et similia his quae sunt secundum virtutem. Et propter hoc, exercitium in iudicando de ipsis, et in delectando circa ipsas, est quodammodo exercitium ad ea quae sunt secundum virtutem, sicut dicetur consequenter. Et secundum hanc viam musica dicitur habere potentiam ad mores: et hoc est tertium, cuius gratia expedit secundum philosophum exercitari in ea.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit quod quidem prosequitur, producens sermonem de ipsa ad veritatis inquisitionem. Et primo procedit circa praedicta disputando. Secundo cum dicit, prima vero quaestio etc. magis determinando veritatem. Circa primum, primo arguit, quod pueri non sunt erudiendi in musica causa ludi, nec deductionis. Secundo cum dicit, eadem quoque dubitatio quod non propter virtutem. Circa primum, primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, sed forsan videbitur etc. ponit opinionem quorumdam contra quoddam dictum, et arguit in contrarium. Circa primum, primo arguit, quod non sint erudiendi in ea causa ludi, dicens quod ex ratione sequenti manifestum est, quod iuvenes non sunt erudiendi in musica causa ludi. Ludus enim non quaeritur nisi propter delectationem quae in eo est. Illud igitur non est quaerendum propter ludum quod delectationem non habet. Sed addiscere in pueris delectationem non habet, est enim eis cum tristitia, quia laboriosum, et quia non apprehendunt bonum quod est in eo; ergo ab eis non est quaerendum addiscere musicam, vel quodcumque aliud propter ludum.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit at vero neque arguit, quod nec propter deductionem; dicens, quod adhuc pueris et aliis aetatibus similibus secundum morem pueris non oportet attribuere degendi rationem, quae est, ut dictum est, perfectio intellectus in cognitione veritatis. Perfectio autem in cognitione veritatis quodammodo rationem finis habet, et secundum se boni. Finis autem et bonum per se non congruunt pueris et similibus secundum aetatem hanc, quia finis secundum se debetur ei quod perfectum est, pueri autem et similes secundum aetatem hanc imperfecti sunt.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit sed forte ponit opinionem contrariam cuidam dicto; dicens primo, quod forte aliter videbitur contra illud quod conclusum est per primam rationem, quod pueri erudiendi et exercitandi sunt in musica non gratia ludi, seu delectationis secundum sensum inexistentium tunc quando erudiuntur vel exercitantur: tunc enim non insunt sicut concludit ratio, sed futurorum, in aetate perfecta quando erunt iam viri perfecti. Sed ipse contra hoc arguit cum dicit, quod si hoc tale etc. dicens, quod si propter delectationem futuram in aetate perfecta quaerenda est musica, non oportet ipsos futuros perfectos addiscere ipsam cum sunt pueri; sed sicut reges Persarum et Medorum delectari in actibus musicalibus exercitatis per alios cantatores, vel histriones, non per ipsos. Similiter enim videntur delectari et erudiri cum exercentur per alios, sicut cum per seipsos. Sed ipse solvit rationem hanc cum dicit, et enim necesse est melius etc. dicens, quod immo expedit magis ipsos pueros addiscere et exercitari in ea propter delectationem futuram in aetate perfecta, quia est necessarium eos qui exercitati sunt in operibus secundum aliquam artem, et ex illis acquisierunt habitum ipsius, melius facere operationem, quae secundum illam, quam hi qui laboraverunt aliquanto tempore in ea quantum ad discere propter lucrum proprium, et delectationem aliorum, sicut exercitatus in operibus citharizandi, et ex hoc habens habitum, melius citharizat et magis delectatur. Operationes enim consuetae, et quae sunt secundum habitum, magis sunt delectabiles, sicut innuit philosophus secundo rhetoricorum. Dicit tamen interpres, quod ante illam literam etenim etc. necessarium videtur sibi aliquid deficere. Consequenter cum dicit, quod si oportet etc. arguit contra solutionem praedictam dicens, si oportet pueros addiscere musicam, quia melius operantur in aetate perfecta, et magis delectantur tunc eadem ratione oportebit eos laborare circa praeparationem pulmentorum et alia servilia, ut melius ipsimet operantur et delectentur posterius. Sed hoc est inconveniens; ergo et primum videbitur esse inconveniens. Sed manifestum est quod non est simile; quia musica et operatio quae secundum seipsa liberales sunt, et delectationem et deductionem liberales habent quae decent liberos; praeparatio autem pulmenti et aliorum servilium, nec deductionem nec delectationem habent liberalem secundum seipsa, sed sunt servilia; et ideo conveniunt servis et nullo modo liberis.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit eamdem autem arguit, quod non oporteat in ea erudiri iuvenes propter mores, per duas rationes; quarum secundam ponit cum dicit, considerare hoc. Circa primum primo ponit rationem. Secundo cum dicit, eadem quoque etc. extendit eam ad probandum, quod non valet ad deductionem liberalem. Dicit igitur primo, quod eadem ratio quae dicta est prius facit dubitare, si musica potest meliores secundum mores facere, et propter hoc addiscenda sit: non enim potest meliores secundum mores facere, nisi propter consuetudinem iudicando et delectando circa ea quae secundum rationem sunt. Sed ad recte iudicare et delectari proportionibus musicalibus, non oportet ipsosmet addiscere musicam; audientes enim ab aliis ista videntur posse facere sicut Lacedaemonii: ipsimet enim non addiscunt musicam, et tamen possunt recte iudicare, ut dicunt, melodias bonas et non bonas: ergo non oportet eam ipsosmet addiscere. Sed est intelligendum quod mentiuntur Lacedaemonii dicentes se recte posse iudicare melodias, non edocti prius. Nullus enim recte iudicat nisi quae novit. Non novit nisi quae accipit vel inveniendo per se, vel addiscendo ab alio, secundum Aristotelem in elenchis: ergo nullus potest recte iudicare nisi de his quae didicit. Sumitur autem hic addiscere, secundum quod communiter se habet ad accipere ab alio, vel invenire per seipsum; ad propositum enim non refert.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit eadem autem extendit eam ad probandum de deductione; dicens, quod eadem ratio dubitare facit, si utendum est ipsa musica addiscendo eam propter deductionem et occupationem diuturnam, sunt enim liberales. Possunt enim occupari et deduci aequaliter, ut videtur, circa musicalia, et ipsis, et aliis operantibus.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit considerare autem ponit secundam rationem, et loquens secundum opinionem gentilium qui multitudinem deorum ponebant, inter quos Iovem principalem credebant, dicit quod ad declarationem eius quod dictum est, expedit considerare existimationem quam habemus de iis, et de his qua circa ipsos, et etiam ea quae dicunt poetae de ipsis. Iupiter enim qui existimatur principalis secundum eos, et cui attribuunt actiones liberales, non cantat, nec citharizat poetis, hoc est, poetae non attribuunt sibi has operationes, quamvis attribuant ei auditum et iudicium de talibus: sed illos qui exercent operationes tales vocamus viles magis; et adhuc recte agere actiones liberales non interest viri inebriati, aut etiam ludentis. Sed cantans musicalia, aut quasi inebriatus est, aut sicut ludens: ergo cantare musicalia non est viri perfecti. Et posset haec esse tertia ratio principalis. Et adiungit, quod de his forte convenienter fiet consideratio.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit prima autem determinat veritatem circa praedicta. Et primo resumit dubitationes. Secundo cum dicit, rationabiliter etc. dissolvit eas. Dicit igitur primo, quod prima quaestio de musica est, utrum sit ponenda disciplina quaedam ad virtutem moralem secundum se appetibilis, aut non, et quid potest, et quam virtutem habet. Iterum quae dubitata sunt prius, utrum disciplinae, aut ludi, aut deductiones.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit rationabiliter autem dissolvit praedictas dubitationes, manifestans, quod participandum est musica propter tria praedicta. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, utrum autem etc. inquirit utrum debeat participare utrique parti musicae, et ei quae consistit in proportionibus sonorum, quae cantativa dicitur, et ei quae in instrumentis, quae instrumentalis vocatur. Circa primum primo declarat quod participandum est musica propter ludum et deductionem. Secundo cum dicit, de communione autem etc. quod valet ad virtutem et mores. In his dissolvuntur tria quaesita prius. Circa primum primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, quaecumque enim declarat propter quid plures requiescunt in delectationibus quae secundum musicam, et finem in eis ponunt. In prima parte dicit, quod rationabile est addiscere musicam, et ei participare, propter tria praedicta, scilicet ludum, deductionem, et disciplinam et mores. Et de ludo et deductione, hoc manifestum est primo. Ludus enim propter requiem quaeritur, et gratia ipsius. Requies autem de necessitate delectationem habet sibi adinvicem, quia requies medicina quaedam est tristitiae inductae per laborem prius; per ipsam enim est remissio laboriosi motus fatigantis et tristitiam inducentis. Remissio autem fatigantis, et contristantis est delectabilis. Deductio autem, quae est operatio quaedam intellectus secundum rationem, non solum secundum se rationem boni et eligibilis habet, sed etiam delectationem habet adiunctam: et felicitas aggregatur ex his duobus, videlicet ex perfecta operatione intellectuali, et ex delectatione: sed ex perfecta operatione intellectuali per se et essentialiter, ex delectatione autem sicut ex conveniente per se. Perficit enim delectatio felicitatem sicut superveniens finis, ut decor iuventutem, sicut dicitur decimo Ethicorum. Ex quo manifestum est, quod ex quo ludus secundum se delectationem habet, et deductio quoddam bonum intellectuale est, et delectationem habet secundum seipsam, et quicquid est bonum secundum intellectum, et secundum se delectationem habens, quaerendum est quodammodo gratia ludi cuiusdam, et deductionis. Musica autem secundum se delectabilissima est, et nuda existens, idest non cum melodia, et cum melodia: dicit enim Musaeus quod cantare delectabilissimum est homini: propter quod in conventibus hominum et deductionibus rationabiliter utuntur ipsa, sicut potente inducere laetitiam et delectationem. Sunt etiam in ipsa theoremata, in quorum consideratione consistit bonum intellectus per se et delectatio; ergo manifestum est, quod rationabiliter quaerenda est gratia ludi cuiusdam et deductionis. Et propter hoc aliquis opinabitur secundum rationem, quod expedit iuniores erudiri et assuefieri in ea. Quaecumque enim sunt delectabilia sine nocumento operantis vel alterius, non solum convenientia sunt ad finem inquantum augent operationem, sed etiam ad requiem, inquantum remittunt tristitiam quae a labore est.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit quaecumque enim declarat propter quid plures quaerunt requiescere in delectationibus musicalibus et finem ponunt in eis. Primo facit primum. Secundo cum dicit, contingit autem etc. secundum. In prima parte dicit: quoniam pauci homines attingunt ad finem ultimum vitae humanae et raro, tum propter impedimenta ex parte naturae, aut consuetudinis, aut etiam exteriora, multi autem et frequenter requiescunt, quia fugiunt naturaliter tristitiam quae est ab operatione laboriosa quae remittitur per ipsam, et utuntur ludis musicalibus, et aliis, non quantum ad plus, idest ad pluralia, sed propter delectationem solam, utile videtur eis requiescere in delectationibus quae sunt in actibus ipsius. Ex quo enim non possunt attingere ad felicitatem quae in fine humano est, quaerunt autem ipsam delectationem per se et requiescunt in ea quae in ludo et musica, ad istam enim attingere possunt.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit accidit autem declarat propter quid finem in ipsis faciunt, dicens, quod contingit homines facere ludos et delectationem, quae est in eis, finem. Et ratio huius est, quia finis vitae humanae quamdam habet delectationem, non quamcumque, sed maximam. Similiter ludus et musica habent quamdam delectationem; et ideo quaerentes primam quae in fine est, non attingentes, accipiunt illam quae in ludis et musica pro ipsa quae nobilior est, per hoc quod ista similitudinem quamdam habet ultimi finis. Finis enim ultimus non est gratia alicuius futuri, aut etiam facti eligibilis. Hoc enim dicimus finem ultimum, propter quod sunt omnia alia, et ipsum non propter aliud. Delectationes etiam tales quae sunt in ludis aut musica, non quaeruntur propter aliquod futurum, nec sunt gratia ipsius, sed magis gratia laboris et tristitiae factorum, ut remittantur vel exterminentur. Causa igitur propter quam aliqui quaerunt felicitatem et finem sibi per huiusmodi delectationes, haec est, et hanc rationabiliter existimabit aliquis.

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Deinde cum dicit de eo autem ostendit quod participandum est musicae, quia aliquo modo disponit ad virtutes morales. Et primo praemittit intentum suum. Secundo cum dicit, sed videre si qua etc. dat modum et ordinem considerandi. Tertio cum dicit, at vero quod efficiantur etc. prosequitur. In prima parte dicit, quod quaerendum est consequenter, utrum expediat communicare musicae non propter hanc causam solam, puta deductionem, sed propter hoc quod utilis est ad requiem operationis laboriosae, et non solum ad hoc. Sed quaerendum est, quia forte praedicta accidunt ipsi, an natura ipsius honorabilior existens ordinetur ad aliquid honorabilius quam sint dictae opportunitates. Oportet enim in musica non solum communicare communi delectationi quae secundum ipsam est, quam sentiunt universaliter omnes: (tales enim delectationem naturalem habent quae causatur ex motu proportionali auditus per actum ipsius, propter quod exercitium ipsius diligitur ab omnibus aetatibus et ab habentibus quoscumque mores), sed etiam videre oportet ulterius si aliquid confert ad virtutem moralem et ad operationem rectam quae est secundum animam.

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Deinde cum dicit sed videre dat ordinem considerandi; dicens, quod hoc ipsum, quod aliquid confert ad mores et ad animam, manifestum erit, si quales quidam, hoc est dispositi ad mores, efficiantur per ipsam, et hoc declaratum fuit prius.

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Deinde cum dicit at vero prosequitur. Et primo ostendit, quod quales quosdam et bene dispositos ad mores facit. Secundo cum dicit, palam quia docendum etc., ex hoc concludit iuvenes debere erudiri in ea. Primum ostendit, primo per signa. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem accidit etc. per rationem. Adducit autem duo signa: quorum secundum ponit cum dicit, adhuc autem et cetera. In prima parte dicit, quod manifestum est, quod per usum musicae quales quidem et bene dispositi ad mores sumus, et per alia multa et per melodias Olympi, quibus sacerdotes gentiles Iovis qui colebatur in Olympo monte Graeciae, utebantur in sacris ipsius ad deductionem colentium exercitandam. Per usum enim istarum rapiebantur animae hominum quasi alienatorum a sensibus exterioribus et immobilium factorum propter intentionem animae circa aliquid intrinsecum. Raptus autem est passio quaedam factiva moris, seu consuetudinis circa animam ad aliquid simile. Ex quo manifestum est, quasi per signum quoddam, quod melodiae musicae quales quosdam et dispositos faciunt ad mores.

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Sed ad videndum quid sit raptus, et secundum quam partem animae et propter quam causam, est intelligendum, quod raptus proprie et principaliter dictus, motus quidam tractus est; tractus autem motus violentus est ab alio ad se vel ad alterum, sicut dicitur septimo physicorum. Violentum autem est cuius principium est ab extra, non conferente vim passo. Et ideo raptus est motus alicuius praeter inclinationem eius naturalem vel voluntariam a principio extrinseco. Huiusmodi autem violentia potest considerari vel quantum ad terminum et modum motus simul, ut cum ignis ab aliquo extrinseco rapitur deorsum, vel quantum ad modum motus tantum, ut cum velocius propellitur sursum quam natus sit moveri. Deinde autem per similitudinem hanc translatum est nomen eius ad signandum motum hominis secundum animam ad aliquid ad quod secundum se non habet inclinationem, vel eo modo quo non habet, sed non ad quemcumque talem. Sed cum naturale sit homini intelligere ex phantasmatibus sensibilibus exterioribus secundum actum existentibus, translatum est ad significandum operationem intellectualem qua homo fertur in aliquod intellectuale vel sibi connaturale vel supra naturam, per aversionem sensuum ad interiora et eorum immobilitationem.

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Ex quo apparet quid sit raptus ut hic sumitur. Est enim operatio partis animae intellectualis secundum quam ab aliquo extrinseco fertur in aliquid non naturale sibi, aut naturale, per aversionem et immobilitationem sensuum. Et quia operatio partis animae appetitivae est secundum eius inclinationem et a principio intrinseco non violento; raptus autem e contrario non potest esse operatio partis animae appetitivae sensibilis vel intellectualis. Causa autem ipsius per se et naturalis videtur esse intensio vehemens animae circa aliquid, quae est vel ex vehementi desiderio attingendi ad aliquid vel fugiendi ab aliquo, vel vehemens adhaesio ad aliquid per dilectionem vel delectationem, vel delectatio maxima circa aliquid. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis vehementer intendit circa aliquid intrinsecum, contingit quod anima revocet spiritum qui est primum instrumentum sensus et motus ab exterioribus ad sensitivum et cogitativum primum, circa quae magis tunc laborat. Hoc enim est de proprietatibus naturae mittere spiritum ad locum ubi magis indiget: et per consequens sensus exteriores et membra immobilitantur, et efficitur homo quasi immobilis et sine sensu exteriori in actu: et tunc anima non laborans in sensu vel motu exteriori corporis quasi libera speculatur magis circa aliqua quae vel sunt supra communem potestatem hominum, aut secundum naturam, non tamen cum sensu exteriori, quod est magis naturale. Qui autem paucos et debiles spiritus habent et bene mobiles, cum minori intensione animae circa aliquid intrinsecum rapiuntur. Non enim possunt pauci spiritus et debiles, sufficere ad motum fortem interiorem et exteriorem, sicut accidit in mulieribus quibusdam. Qui autem habent abundantes spiritus non rapiuntur nisi cum vehementissima intensione animae circa aliquid, sicut in viris quibusdam accidit. Vehemens autem desiderium, seu dilectio vel delectatio, quae faciunt vehementem intensionem animae, vel causantur a vehementi consideratione intellectus immediate vel ab aliqua superiori causa immediate movente voluntatem ipsam, vel ab interiori, scilicet causa superiori mediante intellectu.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem confirmat id quod dixit, sumpto loco ab eo quod minus videtur. Dicit enim quod etiam audientes aliqua verba quae repraesentent aliquid aut triste aut iucundum afficiuntur etiam si cum nulla melodia aut versu exprimantur, quod tamen minus videbatur: ergo cum verbis adiungitur melodia, quae habet maiorem vim ad movendum propter conformitatem ad animam et potentiam auditus, multo magis per musicam afficietur animus audientis ad diversas animi passiones.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem hoc idem per rationem declarat. Videtur autem ratio ipsius esse haec. Assuefieri iudicare recte de actionibus moralibus, et recte gaudere et delectari in eis, est efficacissimum ad rectitudinem morum et actionum moralium: sed assuefieri iudicare recte de harmoniis musicalibus et delectari secundum rationem in eis est assuefieri recte iudicare de actionibus moralibus et delectari in eis recte; ergo hoc est efficacissimum ad rectitudinem actionum moralium. Istius rationis primo probat maiorem. Secundo cum dicit, sunt autem similitudines etc. minorem. Maiorem autem probat sic. Quoniam musicae, idest actiones quae sunt secundum musicam, sunt de numero delectabilium secundum se, sicut dictum est prius, virtus autem moralis consistit circa delectationes et tristitias, amorem et odium, et circa alias huiusmodi passiones, sicut circa propriam materiam, circa quam quaerit illud quod secundum rationem et medium: est manifestum, quod nihil oportet addiscere, et nihil ita assuefieri ad generationem habituum moralium rectorum et actionum ipsorum, sicut iudicare recte de motibus ipsarum passionum et de his quae circa ipsas, et delectari secundum rationem in eis. Cuius ratio est, quia ad rationem et generationem virtutis moralis requiritur recta ratio, per quam discernatur illud quod rectum est, et secundum rationem, quas consequitur delectatio proportionalis, sicut apparet ex secundo Ethicorum.

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Deinde cum dicit sunt autem probat minorem. Videtur autem probare eam per rationem hanc. Assuefieri iudicare de eo, quod est simile actionibus et delectationibus moralibus, est assuefieri iudicare de ipsis actionibus moralibus, et delectari in eis: sed harmoniae musicae sunt similes passionibus et habitibus et actionibus moralibus; ergo assuefieri iudicare et delectari recte in harmoniis musicis, est assuefieri iudicare et delectari recte in habitibus et actionibus moralibus. Istius rationis primo ponit minorem cum quadam declaratione eius. Secundo cum dicit, assuetudo autem in similibus etc. maiorem et probationem eius. Tertio cum dicit, accidit autem sensibilium etc. regreditur ad declarandum minorem. Dicit igitur primo, quod passionum similitudines, puta irae et mansuetudinis, timoris et audaciae et huiusmodi, adhuc autem et habituum, sicut fortitudinis et temperantiae, liberalitatis et illiberalitatis et huiusmodi, et aliorum habituum contrariorum his, et universaliter aliorum moralium, puta electionum et operationum, inveniuntur naturaliter in melodiis musicalibus et rhythmis. Melodiae enim musicae et rhythmi in quibusdam determinatis proportionibus numerorum circa sonos vel temperantiam consistunt: similiter passiones animae consistunt in quadam determinata proportione agentis ad passum, et consequuntur aliquam determinatam proportionem calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci: ira enim est accensio sanguinis circa cor, et timor infrigidatio quaedam: habitus etiam morales in quadam determinata ratione appetitus ad rationem movendi, virtutes etiam in quadam media ratione extremorum consistunt, similiter et omnia alia moralia. Et hoc etiam manifestum est ad sensum; quia audientes aliquas melodias aut rhythmos, transmutantur secundum animam, aliquando quidem ad iram, aliquando ad mansuetudinem, aliquando ad timorem: quod non est nisi propter aliquam similitudinem istorum ad illa.

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Deinde cum dicit assuetudo autem ponit maiorem, et probat, dicens, quod assuesci gaudere et tristari in eis, quae sunt similia delectationibus et tristitiis moralibus, est propinquum ei quod est delectari in eisdem; quia illud quod est simile alicui, quasi eodem modo se videtur habere ad veritatem sicut illud. Similia enim parum distare videntur: similitudo enim unitas quaedam est. Talia autem accipit intellectus ut eadem frequenter, sicut dicitur secundo physicorum. Et ideo assuefieri in eis quae sunt similia alicui, est assuefieri quodammodo in illo. Verbi gratia, si aliquis respiciens vel considerans imaginem formae alicuius, puta Herculis, et delectetur in ipsa secundum quod imago est forma illius, visio formae ipsius Herculis secundum seipsam de necessitate erit sibi delectabilis, et magis, quoniam propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis, sicut dicitur primo posteriorum.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit accidit autem regreditur ad declarandum minorem. Et primo tangit, quod in sensibilibus secundum alios sensus, aut nullae aut modicae sunt similitudines morum. Secundo cum dicit, in melodiis autem ipsis etc. declarat, quod in his quae sunt secundum auditum, sunt manifestae. Circa primum est intelligendum, quod in sensibilibus secundum unumquemque sensum, sunt aliquae similitudines passionum et habituum moralium, et actionum; quoniam omnia sensibilia consistunt in aliquibus proportionibus determinatis primorum suorum, quemadmodum passiones et habitus, et alia moralia. Adhuc etiam videmus, quod ad aliquas alterationes factas ab ipsis sensibilibus secundum unumquemque sensum movetur ad aliquas actiones vel passiones morales bonas vel malas, quod non est nisi propter aliquam similitudinem: quare in omnibus invenitur aliqua similitudo istorum. Verum tamen non in omnibus aequaliter: cum enim omnia moralia sequantur apprehensionem aliquam secundum rationem, rationabile videtur, quod sensibilia secundum illos sensus, quae nos magis cognoscere faciunt secundum rationem, maiorem habeant similitudinem secundum quod huiusmodi, ad moralia: tales autem sunt visus et auditus secundum Aristotelem libro de sensu. Et ideo in sensibilibus secundum istos sensus magis existunt similitudines morum. In tangibilibus autem, quae maxime materialia sunt, et prima secundum viam generationis, minime; in gustabilibus autem et odorabilibus modice, propter propinquitatem eorum ad tangibilia. Adhuc autem magis manifeste inveniuntur in audibilibus quam in visibilibus. Rationabile enim est, quod in sensibilibus secundum illum sensum inveniantur magis manifeste, qui magis faciunt ad cognitionem secundum rationem quam praeexigunt omnia moralia in actu: ad hoc autem magis facit auditus secundum accidens. Sermo enim audibilis existens causa est disciplinae non secundum se, sed secundum accidens: ex nominibus enim constat; nominum vero unumquodque symbolum est, sicut dicitur libro praedicto de sensu. Et ideo rationabiliter in audibilibus inveniuntur magis manifestae similitudines moralium in actu quam in visibilibus. Adhuc autem audibilia fortius movent quam visibilia et pluribus modis. Visibilia enim movent visum sola quadam alteratione tenui, et quasi insensibili. Audibilia autem movent secundum alterationem quamdam, et secundum motum quemdam localem medii et organi. Quare manifestius excitant passiones similitudinem habentia.

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Hoc supposito, dicit Aristoteles quod in sensibilibus quae sunt secundum alios sensus, contingit nullam existere similitudinem morum, sicut in gustabilibus et tangibilibus. Similiter autem et odorabilibus. Dicit autem nullam, quia paucam et immanifestam: quod autem paucum et immanifestum est, nihil reputatur. In visibilibus autem invenitur aliqua, sed debilis: figurae enim quae maxime comprehenduntur a visu, maxime videntur esse tales. Sunt enim quaedam acutae, quaedam obtusae, sicut et passiones, sed secundum modicum sunt similes; et ideo non multum movet haec similitudo. Et iterum omnia visum habentia habent sensum huiusmodi figurarum, et tamen non omnia attingunt ad mores; quod tamen videtur si proprie similitudinem haberent ad ipsos. Iterum figurae et colores non sunt proprie similitudines morum expressae sicut harmoniae, sed magis signa quaedam coincidentia cum ipsis moribus. Et talia signa morum bene contingit accipere in passionibus sensibilibus, non solum in visibilibus, sed in odorabilibus et tangibilibus et aliis. Sed differt secundum quantitatem; quia manifestius inveniuntur in visibilibus, quam in aliis, et circa horum speculationem quantum ad rectum iudicium et delectationem convenientem oportet contemplari iuvenes, intendentes considerationem istorum propter mores, non figuras et picturas Pausionis, qui pictor erat imaginum repraesentantium turpia et inhonesta, sed eas quas Polygnotus, qui pingebat figuras repraesentativas honestorum, et si quis alius fuerit pictor aut sculptor figurarum repraesentativarum moralium.

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Deinde cum dicit in melodiis declarat, quod in audibilibus manifeste inveniuntur similitudines morum. Et hoc primo declarat in melodiis musicis. Secundo cum dicit, eodem modo habent etc. declarat eodem modo se habere in rhythmis. Tertio cum dicit, ex his quidem igitur infert conclusionem principalem. In prima parte dicit, quod in ipsis melodiis musicalibus manifeste inveniuntur imitationes morum: et hoc manifestum est: natura enim ipsarum harmoniarum tantum differt, ut audientes statim aliter et aliter disponantur secundum passiones et motus, et non eodem modo se habeant homines in audiendo unamquamque ipsarum; sed in audiendo quasdam efficiuntur planctivi, et quasi contracti per retractionem spirituum ad interiora, cuius est illa quam dicimus Lydiam mixtam. Est autem Lydia mixta melodia vel cantilena septimi toni, quae propter acumen magnarum vocum, fortiter percutit spiritus et retrahit ad interiora, propter quod ad compassionem disponit. Alias autem audientes, puta remissas, magis disponuntur ad mollitiem, cuiusmodi sunt forte ea quae dicitur Lydia, quae est melodia quinti toni, et ea quae dicitur hypolydia, quae est sexti toni, quae propter remissionem vocum et motuum maxime per semitonia, quae frequenter accipiunt, manifeste videmus movere ad mollitiem. Alias autem audientes bene disponuntur et constanter se habent in operibus. Talis autem est illa quae dicitur Dorica sola, quae est cantilena primi toni, quae maxime moralis est. Aliae autem sunt quae raptos faciunt, sicut ea quae dicitur Phrygia, quae est melodia tertii toni, quae propter fortem percussionem in vocibus fortissime revocat spiritus ab exterioribus ad interiora, quod disponit ad raptum. Ita enim dicunt, et convenienter, illi qui circa hunc ludum musicae philosophati sunt, et accipiunt testimonia rationum suarum ex ipsis operibus sic igitur apparet quod in melodiis maxime sunt similitudines morum, et quod homines per ipsas disponuntur ad eos. Quod maxime videtur contingere propter duo: quorum alterum accidit ex parte operationis vel consequentis ipsam operationem animae. Sensus enim auditus in quadam media ratione consistit. Et ideo cum movetur a sono sibi proportionabili, est delectatio secundum ipsum sensum: cum etiam ratio in auditu secundum actum iudicat mediam rationem tonorum, et in intelligendo est delectatio intellectualis proportionalis delectationi quae est in operibus moralibus consistentibus in eadem proportione: delectatio autem in aliqua operatione adauget operationem illam, sicut dicitur in decimo Ethicorum, et per consequens eam quae ei assimilatur. Alterum autem ex parte dispositionis materiae et organi; quoniam spiritus organum est primum omnium virtutum animae et sensitivarum et motivarum; et ideo diversus motus spirituum vel per alterationem, vel per hanc et motum localem ex quibus contingit contractio vel ebullitio vel expulsio, diversimode disponitur homo ad passiones vel actiones. Hoc autem modo harmoniae musicae maxime possunt movere spiritum diversimode secundum diversitatem earum.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit eodem modo declarat idem de rhythmis; dicens, quod eodem modo se habent illa quae circa rhythmos. Quidam enim ipsorum habent virtutem per quam disponunt ad morem stabilem. Alii autem per quam disponunt et ad instabilem. Et iterum quidam ipsorum habent motus ad onerosa et illiberalia magis, alii autem ad delectabilia et illiberalia. Est autem rhythmus numerus syllabarum determinatus in oratione simili fine terminatus.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit ex iis quidem infert conclusionem principalem; dicens, quod ex his, quae dicta sunt, manifestum est quod musica qualem quemdam et bene dispositum ad morem potest facere: quare manifestum est, quod utilis est ad mores.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit palam quia concludit ex dictis, iuvenes debere erudiri in ea, adiungendo novam rationem ad hoc, et dicit: si musica qualem quemdam et bene dispositum ad mores nata est facere; in eo autem, quod disponit ad mores, expedit iuvenes erudiri et assuefieri in musica. Est etiam disciplina musicae conveniens naturae puerorum tantillae et parvae existenti propter aliam rationem. Iuvenes enim non possunt sustinere aliquid indelectabile vel contristans propter aetatem: habent enim operationem sensuum perfectam propter vigorem virtutum. Tales autem operationes consequuntur fortes delectationes; et ideo fortiter delectantur, nec possunt sustinere tristitias. Harmoniae autem musicae sunt de natura delectabilium. Similiter autem et rhythmi. Est enim quaedam similitudo naturalis rhythmorum ad harmonias. Utrumque enim consistit in proportionibus numeralibus. Et quia harmonia est delectabilis secundum se, multi antiquorum sapientum dixerunt, alii animam esse idem quod harmoniam, alii autem habere harmoniam, sicut Plato, et sequentes ipsum, dicentes animam esse numerum seipsum moventem.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit utrum autem inquirit, utrum oporteat participare musicam quantum ad actum utriusque partis eius, cantativae scilicet et instrumentalis. Et primo manifestat, quod sic. Secundo cum dicit, decens autem, et non decens etc. declarat, quod differenter oportet se habere quantum ad hoc, secundum diversas aetates. Circa primum primo praemittit dubitationem, dicens quod post ea quae dicta sunt, est considerandum, utrum opportunum sit ad bonam dispositionem civium eosdem addiscere musicam et exercitari in ea quantum ad utendum actu, idest cantando, et manu operando, hoc est tangendo organa, aut non secundum quod propositum fuit prius.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit non immanifestum dissolvit eam; ostendens, quod expedit communicare musicam secundum utrumque modum, per duas rationes. Quarum secundam tangit, cum dicit, simul autem et cetera. Primo igitur dicit, quod manifestum est, quod communicare actibus musicalibus magnam differentiam secundum praeeminentiam habet ad faciendum iuvenes quales quosdam et bene dispositos. Studiosum enim iudicium de moralibus vel de eorum similibus multum valet ad bene disponendum eos ad mores, sicut dictum est prius. Sed ex hoc, quod aliquis communicat operibus musicae, studiosius iudicat de eis quae sunt similia moribus. Unum enim de numero impossibilium est, aut valde difficillimum est illos iudicare de agibilibus bene qui non communicaverunt operationibus. Studiosum enim iudicium est per facilem et delectabilem reductionem in principia prima. Facilis autem et delectabilis reductio in principia non est nisi per habitum inclinantem ad modum naturae, qui generatur in nobis ex frequenti operatione. Et iterum ad rectitudinem iudicii exigitur certitudo, quae maxime videtur in agibilibus causari ex operibus. Opportunum est igitur participare musicam quantum ad actus operationes.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit simul autem ponit secundam rationem, dicens, quod simul cum eo quod dictum est, quod oportet pueros mobiles existentes habere aliquid circa quod occupentur. Et ideo convenienter introductum est instrumentum, quod dicitur Architae tabella, ita dictum ab inventore Archita, quem attribuunt pueris, ut circa istam occupati non destruant aliquid eorum quae in domo sunt. Iuvenes enim, propter multitudinem motuum in eis existentium propter aetatem, quiescere non possunt. Et propter hoc, ludus illius tabellae conveniens est eis saltem ad occupationem. Disciplina autem, idest rectus usus ipsius, reservanda est magis provectis secundum aetatem, qui magis discernere possunt quid est secundum artem et quid non. Quod igitur expediat iuvenes erudiri in musica per communicationem operum, manifestum est.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit decens autem declarat quod differenter oportet se habere in hoc secundum aetates diversas, simul cum hoc removendo quamdam increpationem adductam in contrarium prius. Et primo praemittit intentum suum. Secundo cum dicit, primo quidem etc. prosequitur. In prima parte dicit, quod in usu musicae quid sit decens et non decens secundum aetates diversas, puta iuventutis et senectutis, non est difficile sapientem determinare, nec etiam solvere rationem opinantium exercitium in musica inutile et sordidum esse.

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Deinde cum dicit primo quidem prosequitur; et primo primum. Secundo secundum, cum dicit, de increpatione autem facta et cetera. Primo igitur dicit, quod exercitium in his quae secundum musicam non aequaliter competit, nec eodem modo secundum omnem aetatem. Primo enim hoc manifestum est quod omnibus operibus musicae, cantativae scilicet et instrumentalis, oportet participare propter rectitudinem et certitudinem iudicii, quod secundum se bonum et delectabile est, sicut quaedam perfectio intellectus et in ordine ad mores, sicut dictum est prius. Iuniores autem rectitudinem iudicii simpliciter habere non possunt propter motum multum existentem in eis, et propter inexperientiam, possunt tamen multum laborare. Seniores autem e contrario minus laborare possunt, rectius autem iudicare propter quietationem et experientiam. Et propter hoc, opportunum est iuvenes participare musicam utendo operibus et cantando et instrumenta tangendo; seniores existentes opera ipsa dimittere propter debilitatem; audiendo autem, bene posse iudicare rationes harmoniarum propter virtutem et perfectionem intellectus, et delectari recte consequenter propter hoc quod eruditi sunt prius in his in iuventute.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit de increpatione intendit removere increpationem quorumdam volentium excludere musicam a iuvenibus. Et primo tangit ex quibus contingit eam removeri. Secundo cum dicit, manifestum igitur etc. declarat quae et qualia oportet esse ista. Primo igitur dicit, quod non est difficile dissolvere increpationem per quam quidam increpant musicam et usum ipsius. Illud enim rationabiliter increpandum videtur quod iuvenes viles facit et male dispositos secundum intellectum; hoc autem facit musica et usus ipsius, ut dicunt. Quaedam enim melodiae ad mollitiem disponunt, quaedam alia quae distrahunt ab operibus secundum rationem; et ideo rationabiliter increpanda est. Non est, inquit, difficile solvere ipsam, considerando usque ad quantum oportet communicare musicam eis qui intendunt ordinare actiones puerorum ad bonum civile. Non enim quantumcumque communicandum est ei; sed inquantum utilis est ad rempublicam, et considerando qualibus melodiis et qualibus rhythmis communicandum est. Adhuc etiam in qualibus organis erudiendum et exercitandum. In istis enim est differentia quaedam ad propositum, et in ipsis est solutio increpationis propositae. Nihil enim prohibet, immo manifestum est melodias et rhythmos et organa aliqua mala disponere iuvenes secundum intellectum et utiles facere. Alia autem bene disponere ad intellectum et mores. Et ideo expedit considerare quibus organis melodiis et rhythmis utendum est ad bonum intellectus et mores, et quibus non. Et per hoc tolletur praedicta increpatio.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit manifestum igitur declarat quae et qualia oportet esse musicalia, quibus utendum ad bonum intellectus et mores. Et primo in universali. Secundo cum dicit, palam autem ex iis etc. in particulari. In prima parte ipse dicit, quod manifestum est, quod eruditionem et usum ipsius musicae oportet esse tantum et tale, et per talia, ut non impediant hominem ad actiones civiles futuras, neque faciant corpus ipsius male dispositum ad operationes intellectus et inutile ad bellicas opportunitates et civilia exercitia propter debilitationem: ad exercitium quidem et paulativam assuefactionem nunc, ad eruditiones autem praedictas posterius. Omnia enim quae circa iuniores sunt, oportet commensurari et determinari secundum hoc quod utilia sunt ad finem reipublicae, quod est bonum perfectum secundum intellectum. Contingit autem bene se habere iuvenes circa eruditionem in musicalibus, si illi qui incipiunt ire ad agones non elaboraverint in cognitis organis laboriosis et gravantibus corpus ad motum, labore immoderato gravante corpus et virtutem eorum, nec etiam exerceant se in mirabilibus et superfluis operibus, qui nunc deduxerunt ad ludum agonisticum, et ex eo devenerunt ad eruditionem volentes iuvenes erudiri in eis; sed magis si exercitentur in facilioribus et moderatis laboribus cantibus et organis musicalibus usque ad hoc quod possint delectari recte in harmonia musica et rhythmis considerantes; et non solum in communi musica, in qua omnes sensum habentes delectantur, sicut quaedam animalia bruta et multitudo puerorum et etiam vilium hominum sive servilium.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit palam autem declarat in speciali quae et qualia oportet esse musicalia, et in quibus exercitandum est ad mores. Et primo declarat quae et qualia oportet esse organa in quibus exercitandum est. Secundo cum dicit, considerandum adhuc etc. quibus melodiis et rhythmis utendum est magis ad mores. Circa primum primo ostendit ex praecedentibus, in quibus organis exercitandum vel non exercitandum. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem non est ipsa fistula etc. manifestat hoc per rationem. In prima parte dicit, quoniam non est utendum organis in quibus movendis gravatur corpus immoderate et quae immoderatae per sonum eorum excitant spiritus, sed magis moderatis. Manifestum est ex hoc qualibus organis utendum ad mores et qualibus non. Non enim utendum est ad disciplinam fistula. Fistula autem est organum universaliter, quod sonat per expulsionem spiritus. Et est intelligendum dictum Aristotelis, ut videtur, de fistulis illis quae exsufflatione multi spiritus indigent ad hoc ut reddant sonum, et immoderatum sonum faciant, sicut tibiae et Musae quaedam. Tales enim propter multam exsufflationem spiritus gravant corpus, et propter magnitudinem soni nimis excitant spiritus. Nec etiam utendum est organis quae propter magnitudinem, sed et confusionem soni confundunt spiritus, sicut cythara et siquid alterum tale est; sed illis magis utendum est, quae bene disponunt auditores secundum corpus et secundum animam ad mores, aut ad ludos musicos, aut alios qui eis proportionantur.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem probat hoc per rationem. Et primo de fistula. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem organorum etc. de organis. Circa primum primo probat quod ad aliud utendum est fistula. Secundo cum dicit, apponamus autem quod accidit etc. quod non ad disciplinam. In prima igitur parte dicit, quod praeter ea quae dicta sunt, manifestum est, quod fistula non est organum disponens ad mores, sed magis propter magnitudinem et multitudinem soni est excitativum irae, propter fortem motum spirituum. Et ideo magis utendum est ipsa in talibus temporibus in quibus exercitium est in ea propter purificationem, idest dispositionem ad iram et audaciam, puta in bellis et insultibus, quam eruditionem vel dispositionem ad mores, sicut nunc videmus uti eadem in bellicis, et ad illud quod dictum est, et ad terrorem adversariorum.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit apponamus autem probat, quod non est utendum ea ad disciplinam. Et primo dat rationem. Secundo cum dicit, rationabiliter autem habet etc. per dictum fabulare. In prima parte dicit, quod in his quae dicta sunt adiungendum est, quod ex usu fistulae accidit contrarium disciplinae, puta indisciplina, quia contingit fistulationem prohibere usum rationis rectum. Propter quod rationabiliter antiqui virtutem eius considerantes, prohibuerunt usum ipsius a iuvenibus et liberis bene dispositis secundum intellectum, quamvis primo usi fuissent ipsa. Cum enim primo incoeperunt vacare studio et disciplinae propter abundantiam necessariorum ad vitam et magnanimiores existentes ad virtutem, hoc est ad fortitudinem prius, postea in operationibus facti prudentiores, sequebantur eruditionem in doctrina quacumque, non discernentes quae esset utilis, et quae non, et superinquirentes quamcumque: propter quod adduxerunt fistulationem ad eruditiones volentes in ea erudiri; quoniam in Lacedaemonia primo quidem choreator in chorea fistulavit, et dehinc devenit Athenas; propter quod plurimi liberorum Atheniensium voluerunt participare ipsa propter novitatem ipsius secundum consuetudinem eorum. Et hoc manifestum est ex titulo quem Thrasippus statuit qui bene duxerat chorum. Non autem ponit titulum: forte autem potuit esse: hic iacet fistulator optimus vel aliquid tale alterum. Posterius autem quando melius potuerunt iudicare propter experientiam longam, quid utile vel inutile esset ad virtutem, considerantes quod non disponit ad eam, sed magis ad contrarium, reprobaverunt ipsam, prohibentes eruditionem et usum ipsius a iuvenibus. Similiter autem et multa alia organorum antiquorum similia fistulis quantum ad hoc, sicut pectades et barbiti, quod nos dicimus Musam, et alia quae etsi faciant ad delectationem utentium, tamen nihil disponunt ad mores, sicut heptagona, idest instrumentum septem angulorum vel septem chordarum; et trigona, idest trium angulorum vel chordarum, et sambuca ex duabus longis chordis. Forte et omnia quae indigent manuali scientia multa, prohibentes ex hoc considerationem intellectus. Huiusmodi autem organa communiter non sunt nota nobis, aut non sub istis nominibus.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit rationabiliter autem hoc idem manifestat per dictum fabulare; dicens, quod propter hoc rationabiliter dictum est, quod de quibusdam aliis in fabula dictum est ab antiquis, quod cum pallas invenisset fistulas et considerasset eas et usum earum, abiecit easdem. Nec est malum dicere propter quod; quia scilicet contristata est propter hoc quod in usu ipsarum dehonestabatur facies. Oportet enim fauces inflari ad retentionem spiritus exsufflandi ad motum ipsarum, quod deformat faciem. Et multitudo spiritus exsufflantis debilitat corpus. Nec solum propter hoc, sed magis verisimile est, quia eruditio et usus fistulationis ad perfectionem intellectus nihil facit. Palladem autem dicimus deam scientiae et artis. Sic igitur pallas, id est ratio recta et ars recte diiudicans, reprobat usum fistulae, quia inutile ad corpus, tum quia deformat, tum quia debilitat, et quia non disponit ad perfectionem intellectus, sed ad contrarium magis, quia nimis commovet et confundit spiritus.

Polit.L2

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem probat ludum artificiosum non valere ad mores; dicens, quod iuste reprobamus ludum artificiosum organorum et operationis. Ludum autem artificiosum hic dicimus ludum qui fit in agonibus vel theatris ad exercitandum homines ad fortiter agonizandum vel delectandum solum. In isto enim ludo operans non operatur propter exercitium ad virtutem in seipso, sed ad exercitandum audientes et gratia delectationis eorum non cuiuscumque, sed onerosae et servilis. Et quia operatio et delectatio liberorum non sunt tales, non iudicamus talem ludum esse ludum liberorum, sed servorum, et quae facit viles et depressos secundum intellectum. Finis enim ad quem faciunt istos ludos, et intentio, non est bonus secundum seipsum. Intendunt enim ad delectationem audientium tantum, aut lucrum proprium. Operationes enim istius ludi onerosae existentes consueverunt mutare musicam, modo ludentes vel cantantes uno modo, nunc vero alio, secundum diversitatem audientium et finis intenti ad quem intendunt eos deducere: propter quod artifices, idest auctores ludi facti secundum artem, qui cogitant ad iustum ipsum, facit quales quosdam, idest dispositos secundum passiones animae secundum modum dictum prius; et etiam secundum corpus, propter motus et gestus quos exercet in ludendo; non autem bene disponit ad mores, nisi forte secundum accidens.

Polit.L2

L. 3 (Θ.7, 1341b19–1342b34)Quid ex musica ediscendum sit, et quo pacto ea utendum.

Quid ex musica ediscendum sit, et quo pacto ea utendum.

Polit.L3

1164. Considerandum adhuc circa harmonias, et rhythmos, et ad eruditionem, utrum harmoniis omnibus utendum, et omnibus rhythmis, aut dividendum. Deinde iis, qui ad eruditionem laborant, utrum eandem determinationem ponamus, aut oportet tertiam aliquam aliam.

Polit.L3

1165. Quoniam musicam quidem videmus per melodiarum factionem, et per rhythmos existentes, horum autem unumquodque non oportet latere, quam potentiam habeat ad disciplinam, et utrum eligendum magis bene melodizatam musicam, aut bene rhythmizatam.

Polit.L3

1166. Putantes igitur multa bene dicere de iis, quosdam modernorum musicorum, et eorum qui ex philosophia quicumque existunt, expertos se habentes in disciplina, quae circa musicam, eam quidem quae per singula disceptationem commitemus quaerere volentibus ab illis: nunc autem legaliter dividimus modos, typos solum dicentes de ipsis.

Polit.L3

1167. Quoniam autem divisionem acceptamus melodiarum, ut dividunt quidam eorum qui in philosophia, has quidem morales, has autem practicas, has quidem raptus factivas ponentes, et harmoniarum naturam ad singula horum convenientem aliam partem ponunt. Dicimus autem non unius utilitatis gratia oportere uti musica, sed plurium gratia; et enim ludi gratia et purificationis. Quis autem dicimus purificationem, nunc quidem simpliciter, iterum in iis quae de Poetica, dicemus manifestius.

Polit.L3

1168. Tertio autem ad deductionem ad remissionemque, et ad distensionis requiem, manifestum quod utendum quidem omnibus harmoniis, non tamen eodem modo omnibus utendum. Sed ad disciplinam quidem maxime moralibus, ad auditum autem aliorum manu laborantium et practicis et raptivis.

Polit.L3

1169. Quae enim circa quasdam animas accidit passio fortiter, haec in omnibus existit, differt autem in eo quod minus et magis, velut misericordia et timor: adhuc autem raptus, etenim ab hoc motu decentes quidam sunt, ex sacris autem melodiis videmus hos, quando usi fuerint melodiis de irascentibus animam, restitutos sicut medicina sortitos et purificatione. Idem autem hoc necessarium pati et misericordes et timidos, et totaliter passivos. Alios autem quantum talium adiacet unicuique; et omnibus fieri quandam purificationem et alleviari cum delectatione. Similiter autem, et melodiae purificativae exhibent innocuam regionem hominibus. Propter quod talibus quidem harmoniis et talibus melodiis ponendum theatralem musicam tractantes agonizatores.

Polit.L3

1170. Quoniam autem spectator duplex, hic quidem liber et eruditus, hic autem onerosus ex banausis et mercenariis et aliis talibus compositus, assignandum agones et speculationes et talibus ad requiem. Sunt autem sicut ipsorum animae distortae ab eo quisecundum naturam habitu, sic et harmoniarum trangressiones sunt et melodiarum rigidae, et discerptae. Facit autem delectationem singulis quod conveniens secundum naturam. Propter quod dandum potestatem agonizantibus ad spectatorem talem tali aliquo genere musicae uti.

Polit.L3

1171. Ad ludum autem, sicut dictum est, moralibus melodiarum utendum, et harmoniis talibus: talis autem quae doristicae, sicut diximus prius. Suscipere autem oportet, et siquam aliam nobis approbaverint communicantes eo, quod in philosophia, et exercitio, et disciplina quae circa musicam.

Polit.L3

1172. In politia autem Socrates non bene phrygistem solam admittit cum ea, quae doristice; et haec reprobans organorum fistulam. Habet enim eandem potentiam phrygista harmonia, quam quidem fistula inter organa: ambo enim iram provocantia, et passionis illativa.

Polit.L3

1173. Manifestat autem poesis; omnis enim petulantia, et omnis talis motus, maxime autem organorum, est in fistulis, harmoniarum autem in melodiis phrygistiis accipiunt hoc quod decens: puta dithyrambus confesse videtur esse phrygium: et huius exempla multa dicunt, quia circa sensum hunc, alique, et quia Philoxenus conatus in doristica facere dithyrambum fabulam, non fuit potens, sed ab ipsa natura decidit in phrygistam convenientem harmoniam.

Polit.L3

1174. Iterum de doristica autem omnes confitentur, tamquam stabilissima existente, et maxime habente morem virilem. Adhuc autem quoniam medium quidem superabundantium laudamus, et dicimus persequi oportere: doristica autem hanc habet naturam ad alias harmonias, manifestum quod doricas melodias oportet erudiri iuniores.

Polit.L3

1175. Sunt autem duae considerationes, quod possibile, et quod decens: etenim quae possibilia oportet tractare magis, et quae decent singulo. Sunt autem et haec determinata aetatibus, velut abdicatis per tempus non facile cantare rigidas harmonias, sed remissas natura iniit talibus. Propter quod bene increpant et hoc adversus Socratem quidam eorum qui circa musicam, quod remissas harmonias reprobaverit ad disciplinam tanquam inebrietatis petulantia (impetuosum enim ebrietas facit magis), sed abdicatas. Quare ad futuram aetatem seniorum oportet tales harmonias tangere, et melodias tales.

Polit.L3

1176. Adhuc autem si qua est talis harmoniarum, aut decet puerorum aetatem, propterea quod potest ornatum habere simul et intellectum, ut quae lydistica videt pati maxime harmoniarum. Palam, quia tres hos terminos faciendum ad disciplinam: quod medium, quod possibile, et quod decens.

Polit.L3

Postquam philosophus ostendit quibus organis utendum et non utendum ad mores, transit nunc ad considerandum quibus et qualibus melodiis et rhythmis sit utendum et simpliciter et ad eruditionem, idest disciplinam. Et circa hoc primo praemittit intentum suum. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem divisionem etc. prosequitur. Adhuc in prima parte primo proponit intentum suum principale. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam musicam quidem videmus etc. tangit quid considerandum est ad declarationem intenti principalis. Tertio cum dicit, putantes igitur multa etc. tangit quae de praedictis supponenda sunt ab aliis. Dicit igitur primo, quod post praedicta considerandum est circa naturam et usum harmoniarum et rhythmorum et simpliciter et in ordine ad eruditionem, idest disciplinam. Simpliciter quidem utrum omnibus harmoniis et rhythmis utendum sit in civitate, aut oportet dividere ipsas et dicere, quod quibusdam utendum est, quibusdam autem non. Deinde per comparationem ad eruditionem: utrum scilicet his quae laborant ad ipsam utendum sit omnibus ad eam. Aut etiam utrum sit ponenda eadem determinatio in ipsis per comparationem ad disciplinam, quae et simpliciter, aut aliqua alia diversa.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit quoniam musicam tangit quae consideranda sunt ad declarationem dictorum. Dicens: quoniam ad sensum videmus musicam distingui per melodiam in cantu vel organis et per rhythmos, oportet considerare ad evidentiam propositi, quam potentiam et virtutem habeat unaquaeque istarum ad disciplinam et mores. Illis enim quae habent virtutem convenientem ad ipsa, utendum est ad ea, aliis autem non. Adhuc autem utrum magis eligenda sit ad mores et eruditionem musica bene melodizata, aut ea quae bene rhythmizata est.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit putantes igitur quae de istis supponenda sunt ab aliis. Dicens, quod nos opinantes quod multi modernorum considerantium in musica et alii ex philosophis antiquis qui perfecti fuerunt bene se habentes in hac disciplina ex parte, idest participati musicae considerationem specialem circa singula praedictorum, omittemus requirendum ab eis vel a scriptis ipsorum. Nunc vero in universali dicemus de ipsis secundum quod ad propositum facit, dividentes legaliter modos ipsius musicae, declarantes quibus utendum est ad mores vel simpliciter ad quamcumque.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem prosequitur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim praemittit quasdam divisiones. Secundo cum dicit, tertio autem ad deductionem etc. concludit quibus et qualibus harmoniis utendum est. Primo igitur dicit, quoniam divisionem melodiarum musicalium approbamus rationabiliter, secundum quam quidam approbati in philosophia dividunt eas dicentes alias illarum esse morales, seu disponentes ad mores, alias autem practicas, idest passionum irae et mansuetudinis factivas, alias autem raptus factivas, quae faciunt audientem quasi immobilem et non sentientem, exquisitius assignantes melodiam et harmoniam determinatam ad unumquemque ipsorum, naturaliter Phrygiam dicunt raptus factivam, Lydiam mixtam autem disponentem ad planctum et compassionem; Doricam autem ad mores, sicut dictum est prius. Dicimus quod musica non est simpliciter quaerenda gratia alicuius utilitatis unius nec utendum est ipsa propter unum solum, sed gratia plurium. Etenim utendum est eadem causa ludi et purificationis. Quid autem dicimus purificationem, nunc quidem simpliciter supponatur. In poetica autem magis manifeste dicetur de ea. Videtur autem esse purificatio corruptio alicuius passionis nocivae inexistentis. Et quia corruptio unius est per generationem alterius; ideo est corruptio unius passionis vel per generationem contrariae, sicut irae corruptio per generationem mansuetudinis. Tertio autem utilis ad deductionem est, seu delectationem intellectualem et mores, sicut dictum est prius.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit tertio autem concludit ex praedictis, quibus harmoniis utendum est et qualibus. Et primo facit in universali. Secundo cum dicit, quoniam autem spectator etc. ostendit quibus in speciali utendum est. Circa primum primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, quae enim circa quasdam animas etc. probat quoddam suppositum. Dicit igitur primo, quod ex his quae dicta sunt prius, manifestum est quod ad remissionem laboris et ad requiem distentionis, hoc est operis unius distensi, utendum est universaliter omnibus harmoniis musicis quantum ad bene dispositos natura. Omnes enim harmoniae musicae quae in media quadam ratione consistunt quantum ad sensum, qui similiter in quadam media ratione consistit, videntur delectationem inducere in habentibus sensus bene dispositos natura: quod dico propter eos qui indispositi sunt secundum sensum vel animam qui in harmoniis bene proportionatis contristantur propter contrarietatem, in proportionatis autem et distortis delectantur propter similitudinem, ut consequenter dicetur. Sed ad disciplinam et mores utendum est maxime moralibus, idest disponentibus ad mores secundum auditum eorum qui manu, vel corpore, vel etiam anima laborant in aliqua passione: practicis et raptivis, hoc est ducentibus ab aliqua passione ad contrarium vel ad medium.

Polit.L3

Deinde cum dicit quae enim probat quoddam suppositum. Supposuit enim, quod sunt harmoniae quaedam purificativae a passionibus nocivis quibusdam per generationem oppositarum vel mediarum. Hoc autem intendit manifestare hic per illud quod apparet ad sensum. Et est intelligendum quod passio animae secundum quod hic loquitur, est motus partis animae appetitivae sub phantasia boni vel mali. Et ideo sequitur apprehensionem boni convenientis vel mali disconvenientis; et si sequatur apprehensionem boni convenientis cum delectatione est secundum quod huiusmodi. Si autem apprehensionem mali disconvenientis, cum iustitia. Et quia pars animae appetitiva est virtus quaedam in corpore et organo; ideo sequitur in esse et operatione sua dispositionem materiae et corporis; et ideo huiusmodi passiones ipsius aliquam dispositionem qualitatum primarum sequuntur: sicut audaciam abundantia caliditatis circa cor; timor autem infrigidationem quamdam; ira autem accensionem sanguinis vel spiritus. Et quia huiusmodi dispositio qualitatum in omnibus hominibus est, inquantum omnes compositi sunt ex ipsis sicuti ex materia, sed tamen magis et minus secundum quod quidam magis calidi, quidam minus, et secundum quod quidam magis frigidi, quidam autem minus sunt; propter hoc omnes huiusmodi passiones quadam aptitudine et virtute sunt in omnibus. Sed in quibusdam magis secundum actum et intense; in quibusdam autem magis secundum potentiam et remisse. Et ideo dicit, quod bene dictum est quod harmoniae quaedam sunt factivae passionum; quoniam passiones quae fiunt in animalibus quorumdam secundum excellentiam quamdam, secundum quod quidam sunt excellenter audaces, quidam excellenter timidi, et sic de aliis, existunt universaliter in omnibus virtute; sicut calidum et frigidum, et humidum et siccum, quae sunt principia istorum secundum magis et minus, secundum quod magis vel minus dominantur qualitates, quae disponunt ad eas. Sicut misericordia timor et raptus qui est immobilitas sensuum et partium exteriorum propter revocationem caloris et spiritus ad interiora. Sunt enim aliqui qui a passione huiusmodi detinentur. Videmus enim ad sensum, quod quando aliqui usi fuerunt melodiis quibusdam, quibus antiqui solent uti in veneratione deorum, quod restituuntur et fiunt maxime de irascentibus mansueti, quasi sortiti medicinam quamdam, et purificationem a passione nociva, et praeter naturam. Idem autem hoc contingit existentibus in passione misericordiae et timiditatis, et universaliter in quacumque alia passione quantumcumque adiacet unicuique, et omnibus insit quaedam alleviatio et purificatio passionis, propter delectationem factam ex melodia disponente ad contrarium.

Polit.L3

Eodem autem modo huiusmodi melodiae purificativae faciunt regionem innocuam hominibus inquantum passiones reprimunt, propter quas sibi invicem iniuriabantur. Et est intelligendum quod omnes huiusmodi passiones in aliqua proportione calidi et frigidi et aliarum qualitatum primarum consistunt dispositive et materialiter, quamvis alterius istarum sit a dominio, et omnes cum delectatione quadam vel tristitia existunt, vel cum utroque, quamvis cum altero magis. Quae enim causantur ex phantasia boni convenientis secundum quod huiusmodi, cum delectatione sunt: quae autem ex phantasia mali disconvenientis, cum tristitia. Harmoniae autem musicae similiter in quadam media ratione sonorum existunt, quae similes sunt aliquando proportioni in qua consistit passio aliqua, aliquando autem dissimiles. Delectatur autem quilibet in eo quod conveniens et proportionale est ei secundum naturam, tristatur autem per contrarium. Propter quod existens in passione aliqua sive cum delectatione sive contra, audiens melodiam in consimili proportione magis intenditur in eadem passione: audiens autem melodiam in contraria proportione existentem, remittitur quasi per contrarium: sicut si aliquis sit in passione irae quae est cum tristitia et accensione quadam audiat melodiam in contraria proportione causantem delectationem, et remittentem calidum, sedabitur ab ira. Similiter autem et in aliis passionibus se habet. Et propter hoc tractantes musicam uti debent melodiis et harmoniis talibus contrariis ad sedandum excessus passionum.

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Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem in speciali declarat quibus et qualibus melodiis utendum est. Et primo quibus et qualibus utendum est ad requiem indisciplinatorum et vilium. Secundo cum dicit, ad ludum autem, quibus utendum est ad disciplinam liberorum et disciplinatorum magis. In prima parte dicit quod spectator, idest auditor harmoniae musicalis duplex est. Unus quidem liber, idest bene dispositus ad opera intellectus, et bene disciplinatus. Alter autem servus et onerosus compositus ex vilibus et mercenariis, et aliis huiusmodi. Indoctis onerosis et servilibus assignandi sunt agones et speculationes convenientes eis ad requiem et delectationem. Laborantes enim istis indigent quandoque. Sicut autem ipsi secundum animam male dispositi sunt, et distorti ab illo habitu qui est secundum naturam, ita sunt quaedam harmoniae rigidae valde, et distortae a media ratione. Omnibus autem delectabile est id quod conveniens est eis secundum naturalem inclinationem eorum; quia delectatio est operatio connaturalis habitus non impedita, sicut dicitur septimo Ethicorum. Et ideo agonizantibus et operantibus in musicalibus concedendum est, quod possint uti aliquo tali genere musicae, rigido scilicet et distorto, ad talem spectatorem vilem et indispositum, ut ipso delectatus quiescat; secundum quod dicimus communiter quod plus valet ruralis fistula quam aliquod nobilius instrumentum. Intelligendum est, quod anima potest considerari secundum seipsam, ut est forma quaedam specifica hominis, vel secundum dispositionem materiae in hoc individuo vel in illo. Si consideretur secundum naturam propriam, sic nulla inclinatio ad imperfectionem, nec etiam imperfectio invenitur in ea; immo, quantum in se est, perfecta est naturaliter, quantum est ex inclinatione eius; tale enim est unumquodque secundum naturam quale est generatione perfecta, sicut dicitur in primo huius. Et sic anima cuiuscumque hominis non invenitur distorta a naturali habitu; et secundum quod huiusmodi, quilibet liber est. Si autem consideretur secundum dispositionem materiae in hoc individuo et in illo, quia inveniuntur quaedam dispositiones quae non disponunt eam ad illud ad quod inclinamur secundum naturam suam, sed quaedam ad contrarium magis, sic anima vel homo secundum eam distortus est a perfectione ad quam inclinatur secundum naturam.

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Deinde cum dicit ad ludum autem declarat quibus moralibus utendum est ad disciplinam. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, sunt autem duae considerationes declarat, quod omnes et omniquaque non debent uti iis, sed cum determinatione. Circa primum primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo cum dicit, in politia autem Socrates reprobat opinionem Platonis circa quoddam dictum. Tertio cum dicit, iterum de doristica regreditur ad declarandum quoddam suppositum. In prima parte dicit quod ad disciplinam, quae delectabilis est sicut ludus, utendum est moralibus melodiis et harmoniis disponentibus ad hanc. Talis autem est illa quae vocatur Dorica, sicut diximus prius et apparebit consequenter; ergo ad disciplinam utendum est ea, et adiungendum est ei aliquas, si quas approbaverint sicut convenientes ad hoc, qui exercitati sunt in philosophico exercitio et disciplina musicali.

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Deinde cum dicit in politia autem reprobat opinionem Platonis circa praedicta. Et primo facit hoc. Secundo cum dicit, manifestat autem poesis declarat quoddam suppositum. In prima parte dicit, quod Socrates in republica sua, idest Plato introducens Socratem loquentem, non convenienter dicit solam Phrygiam melodiam cum ea quam dicimus Doricam debere recipi in civitate ad disciplinam et mores iuvenum, simul cum hoc reprobans fistulam inter organa tamquam non convenientem ad ea: illam enim eamdem naturam et virtutem quam habet fistula inter organa, habet melodia Phrygia inter harmonias, ambo enim provocant iram, et sunt illativa passionis ad quam disponit calidum propter fortitudinem motus et percussionis, ratione quorum habent excitare caliditatem in spiritibus. Si ergo fistula reprobanda est sicut inepta ad disciplinam et mores, eadem ratione et melodia Phrygia; et si ista utilis est, eadem ratione et illa.

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Deinde cum dicit manifestat autem declarat quoddam suppositum, puta quod eamdem naturam habeat Phrygia in melodiis, et fistula in organis; dicens, quod ea habere eamdem naturam manifestat poesis, quae dicit, quod omnis bacchatio, idest impetuositas, et omnis motus consimilis passioni violentae, maxime causatur a motu fistulae in organis, et in harmoniis musicalibus a melodia Phrygia. Accipiunt autem ad huiusmodi declarationem hoc, quod conveniens et verum videtur, puta quod dithyrambus manifeste videtur esse modus quidam melodiae Phrygiae. Ad hoc autem exempla multa adducunt illi qui circa obiectum huius sensus, scilicet auditus, laborant, et alia. Et quia Philoxenus musicus fabulans aliquando visus fuit dithyrambos facere in melodia Dorica, scilicet primi toni, non potuit autem, quia non conveniebat illi, sed ex ipsa inclinatione naturae eius incidit in Phrygiam, cum qua magis conveniebat: hoc autem non esset nisi dithyrambus. De quo manifestum est, quod convenit cum fistula vel tuba propter fortitudinem motus, et est factivus irae et passionis fortis. Et est modus quidam cantus qui dicitur Phrygius, scilicet tertii toni apud nos; et per consequens Phrygia conveniret cum fistula.

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Deinde cum dicit iterum de doristica regreditur ad probandum minorem rationis praedictae, scilicet quod melodia Dorica maxime sit moralis; dicens, quod Dorica melodia loquentes omnes universaliter confitentur, quod inter omnes melodias stabilissima existit; propter quod convenit cum virtute ad quam requiritur constantia mentis in his quae sunt secundum rationem, et maxime habet morem virilem idest virtuosum. Quod quidem per rationem apparet: medium enim inter duas superabundantias excellentiae et defectus laudamus, et approbamus magis, et in his quae sunt secundum naturam, puta complexionem temperate calidam laudamus magis, quam eam quae excellenter frigida est: et in his quae sunt secundum artem et secundum rationem; virtutem enim, quae in medio consistit, laudamus; superabundantiam autem et defectum quae rationem extremorum habent, vituperamus. Adhuc autem dicimus, quod medium in omnibus magis prosequendum est sicut bonum. Melodia autem Dorica rationem medii habet respectu aliarum; non enim ita excellenter acuta est sicut illa, quae dicitur Lydia mixta, quae est septimi toni; nec etiam ita depressa in gravitate, sicut hypodorica, vel hypophrygia, quae est secundi, vel quarti toni. Et ideo manifestum est, quod maxime laudanda est, et prosequenda, sicut disponens ad virtutem; propter quod iuvenes magis exercitandi sunt in ea.

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Deinde cum dicit sunt autem declarat, quod non quocumque modo quibuscumque, sed secundum diversas determinationes secundum diversitatem aetatum. Et circa hoc primo declarat quibus et qua determinatione expedit uti senibus. Secundo cum dicit, adhuc autem si qua quibus et qualibus, iuvenibus, concludens conditiones universaliter, quae requiruntur in melodia conveniente unicuique aetati. Dicit igitur primo, quod non omnibus melodiis et moralibus et mediis expedit uti omnibus quomodocumque, sed cum determinatione. Sunt autem duo per quae determinatur, videlicet quod possibile, et quod decens: illa enim magis oportet agere aut operari inter bona operabilia, quae possibilia sunt operanti. Nullus enim manum immittit ad illud quod impossibile reputat, vel simpliciter, vel sibi, quamvis etiam bonum sit secundum se. Et illa quae decent ipsum operantem. Aliqua enim sunt bona et possibilia operanti, quae tamen non decent ipsum; sicut bonum est dare parvum munusculum, et possibile est regi, non tamen decet ipsum, siquidem magnificus est; et ideo illa, quae bona sunt et possibilia operanti et decentia ipsum, magis facienda sunt. Possibilitas autem et decentia distinguuntur secundum diversitatem aetatum: aliqua enim sunt possibilia viro perfecto, et decentia ipsum: quae non sunt possibilia iuveni et decentia ipsum: et ideo sunt aliquae harmoniae utiles ad mores secundum se, quae tamen non conveniunt quibusdam, quia non sunt eis bene possibiles, sicut eis qui sunt abdicati, hoc est declinantes per tempus vel senium ab aequalitate, non faciliter possunt cantare harmonias rigidas et acutas propter debilitatem virtutis, et spiritus, sed magis remissas secundum naturam.

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Propter quod quidam posteriorum musicorum convenienter reprobaverunt Socratem qui reprobavit omnes harmonias remissas utiliter tamquam inutiles ad mores, et disciplinam, dicens eas esse sicut inebriativas hominum. Sed cum ebrietas duo faciat in homine; scilicet motus impetuositatem, et declinationem a sobrietate et dispositione naturali, dixit esse ipsas inebriativas non secundum potentiam ebrietatis, idest secundum impetuositatem. Verum enim est, quod ebrietas impetuosum hominem facit: huiusmodi enim melodiae remissae talem impetuositatem non inducunt: sed dixit eas esse inebriativas, sicut abdicativas, idest declinantes ab aequalitate et medio. Et propter hoc inclinantes homines ad ea quae declinant ab aequalitate et rectitudine. Hoc autem dicebat Plato ac si omnes homines et semper existerent in statu et aequalitate medii secundum naturam ei nullus declinaret ab ea. Si enim ita esset, nulli expediret uti harmoniis remissis. Sed quia quidam sunt in statu et aequalitate, quidam autem ab ea declinant per senium vel alio modo, unumquodque autem delectatur in eo quod conveniens est ei secundum naturam, sicut dictum est prius; ideo non expedit omnes uti melodiis mediis, sed quibusdam expedit uti remissis mediis; et ideo ad aetatem futuram senum qui declinant ab aequalitate praedicta et sunt debilis virtutis expedit uti melodiis et harmoniis remissis.

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Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ostendit quae expediunt iuvenibus, concludens conditiones, quae exiguntur in musica ordinanda ad mores utiliter; dicens, quod adhuc si est harmonia talis media non remissa quae decet aetatem puerorum, propter hoc quod ornatum quemdam habet propter consonantiam ratione cuius delectet, similiter autem et doctrinam, hoc est disponit ad disciplinam, huiusmodi autem vim videtur maxime habere harmonia ea quae dicitur Lydia quae est cantilena quinti toni, sicut dictum est prius; manifestum est quod in musica disponente ad disciplinam oportet tria praeexistere: videlicet quod rationem medii habeat inter acutas et graves, et quod possibilis sit ipsi utenti, et decens conditionem ipsius. Si enim talis fuerit, manifestum est, quod utentes ea magis inclinabuntur ad virtutem et mores, inclinati autem magis operabuntur secundum rationem, operantes autem secundum rationem faciliter attingunt ad felicitatem quae consistit in perfectissima operatione hominis secundum supremam eius virtutem respectu perfectissimi obiecti ipsius. Est Deus benedictus in saecula saeculorum.

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