This truth is attested by the manifest authority of the canonical Scriptures and the doctrine of the holy fathers; wherefore the contrary must be judged heretical as stated in Dialogues 4.25, and in Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas 44.

Moreover, the glory of the body is not so essential as the glory of the soul; wherefore it would be more derogatory to the saints if the glory of the soul were delayed, than that the glory of the body be deferred: nor could this detriment to their glory be compensated on account of the joy of each one being increased by the common joy.

Second, they may be understood to go forth for a time: and here we must distinguish what befits them according to the order of nature, and what according to the order of divine providence; for as Augustine says (On the Care of the Dead 16): human affairs have their limits other than have the wonders of the divine power; nature’s works differ from those which are done miraculously.

Consequently, according to the natural course, the separated souls consigned to their respective abodes are utterly cut off from communication with the living. For according to the course of nature, men living in mortal bodies are not immediately united to separate substances, since their entire knowledge arises from the senses: nor would it be fitting for them to leave their abode for any purpose other than to take part in the affairs of the living.

Nevertheless, according to the disposition of divine providence, separated souls sometimes come forth from their abode and appear to men, as Augustine, in the book quoted above, relates of the martyr Felix who appeared visibly to the people of Nola when they were besieged by the barbarians. It is also credible that this may occur sometimes to the damned, and that for man’s instruction and intimidation they be permitted to appear to the living; or again in order to seek our suffrages, as to those who are detained in purgatory, as evidenced by many instances related in the fourth book of the Dialogues. There is, however, this difference between the saints and the damned, that the saints can appear when they will to the living, but not the damned; for even as the saints while living in the flesh are able by the gifts of gratuitous grace to heal and work wonders, which can only be done miraculously by the divine power, and cannot be done by those who lack this gift, so it is not unfitting for the souls of the saints to be endowed with a power in virtue of their glory, so that they are able to appear wondrously to the living when they will: while others are unable to do so unless they be sometimes permitted.

We must also reply to the arguments in the contrary sense.

But the souls of the saints have not at all times had the same rest after death; because since Christ’s coming they have had complete rest through enjoying the vision of God, whereas before Christ’s coming they had rest through being exempt from punishment, but their desire was not set at rest by their attaining their end. Consequently, the state of the saints before Christ’s coming may be considered both as regards the rest it afforded, and thus it is called Abraham’s bosom, and as regards its lack of rest, and thus it is called the limbo of hell.

Accordingly, before Christ’s coming the limbo of hell and Abraham’s bosom were one place accidentally and not essentially: and consequently, nothing prevents Abraham’s bosom from remaining after Christ’s coming and from being altogether distinct from limbo, since things that are one accidentally may be parted from one another.

Hence the reply to the third objection is evident: and the same meaning applies to a Gloss on Luke 16:22: it came to pass that the beggar died, which says, Abraham’s bosom is the rest of the blessed poor, whose is the kingdom of heaven.

On the other hand, if we consider them as to the situation of the place, it is probable that hell and limbo are the same place, or that they are continuous, as it were, yet so that some higher part of hell be called the limbo of the fathers. For those who are in hell receive diverse punishments according to the diversity of their guilt, so that those who are condemned are consigned to darker and deeper parts of hell according as they have been guilty of graver sins. And consequently, the holy fathers in whom there was the least amount of sin were consigned to a higher and less dark part than all those who were condemned to punishment.

This suffices for the reply to the second objection.

Or we may reply with Augustine (On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12), who says of Jacob: when Jacob said to his sons, “You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell,” he seems to have feared most lest he should be troubled with so great a sorrow as to obtain, not the rest of good men, but the hell of sinners. The saying of Job may be expounded in the same way, as being the utterance of one in fear, rather than an assertion.

That souls while yet in the flesh are punished here for their sins has nothing to do with the question, because a punishment of this kind does not place a man outside the state of meriting or demeriting: whereas we are treating now of the abodes to which souls are assigned after the state of merit or demerit.

But the aforesaid view is false, for since a power is so called because it enables us to do or suffer something, and since to do and to be able to do belong to the same subject, it follows that the subject of a power is the same as that which is agent or patient. Hence the Philosopher says in the beginning of On Sleep and Waking that where we find power there we find action. Now it is evident that certain operations of which the soul’s powers are the principles do not belong to the soul properly speaking, but to the soul as united to the body, because they are not performed except through the medium of the body—such as to see, to hear, and so forth.

Hence it follows that such powers belong to the united soul and body as their subject, but to the soul as their inflowing principle, just as the form is the principle of the properties of a composite being. Some operations, however, are performed by the soul without a bodily organ—for instance, to understand, to consider, to will: wherefore, since these actions are proper to the soul, the powers that are the principles thereof belong to the soul not only as their principle but also as their subject. Therefore, since so long as the proper subject remains, its proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted they also must be corrupted, it follows that these powers which use no bodily organ for their actions must remain in the separated soul, while those which use a bodily organ must be corrupted when the body is corrupted: and such are all the powers belonging to the sensitive and the vegetative soul.

On this account some draw a distinction in the sensitive powers of the soul: for they say that they are of two kinds—some, being acts of organs and emanating from the soul into the body, are corrupted with the body; others, from which the former originate, are in the soul, because by them the soul sensitizes the body for seeing, hearing, and so on; and these primary powers remain in the separated soul.

But this statement seems unreasonable: because the soul, by its essence and not through the medium of certain other powers, is the origin of those powers which are the acts of organs, even as any form, from the very fact that by its essence it informs its matter, is the origin of the properties which result naturally in the composite. For were it necessary to suppose other powers in the soul by means of which the powers that perfect the organs may flow from the essence of the soul, for the same reason it would be necessary to suppose other powers by means of which these mean powers flow from the essence of the soul, and so on to infinity. If we have to stop, it is better to do so at the first step.

Hence others say that the sensitive and other like powers do not remain in the separated soul except in a restricted sense, namely, in the root, in the same way as a result is in its principle: because there remains in the separated soul the ability to produce these powers if it should be reunited to the body. Nor is it necessary for this ability to be anything in addition to the essence of the soul, as stated above. This opinion appears to be the more reasonable.

This opinion is refuted by the Philosopher (On the Soul 1.3) who proves that the soul does not move itself, and that it is in no way moved in respect of such operations as seeing, feeling, and the like, but that such operations are movements of the composite only. We must therefore conclude that the acts of the sensitive powers in no way remain in the separated soul, except perhaps as in their remote origin.

If, however, its authority should be maintained, it must be said that the meaning is that the separated soul is affected with imagination and other like powers, not as though such affection were the act of the aforesaid powers, but in the sense that the soul will be affected in the future life for good or ill according to the things which it committed in the body through the imagination and other like powers: so that the imagination and such powers are not supposed to elicit that affection, but to have elicited in the body the merit of that affection.

That which is added—namely, that the soul feels some things without the body, such as fear and so forth—means that it feels such things without the outward movement of the body that takes place in the acts of the proper senses: since fear and like passions do not occur without any bodily movement. It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according to the opinion of the Platonists who maintained this, as stated above.

Or we may reply that images of things are in the soul both as to the sensitive, imaginative, and intellective powers, with greater or lesser abstraction from matter and material conditions. Wherefore Augustine’s comparison holds in this respect that just as the images of corporeal things are in the soul of the dreamer, or of one who is carried out of his mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated soul intellectively: but not that they are in the separated soul imaginatively.

For some have said that the mere fact that the soul sees the fire makes the soul suffer from the fire: wherefore Gregory (Dialogues 4.29) says: the soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it.

But this does not seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the fact that it is seen, is a perfection of the one seeing; wherefore it cannot conduce to his punishment insofar as it is seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or unpleasant nature accidentally, that is, insofar as it is apprehended as something hurtful. Consequently, besides the fact that the soul sees the fire, there must be some relation of the soul to the fire according to which the fire is hurtful to the soul.

Hence others have said that although a corporeal fire cannot burn the soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it as hurtful to itself, and in consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in fulfilment of Psalm 13:5: they have trembled for fear, where there was no fear. Hence Gregory says (Dialogues 4.29) that the soul burns through seeing itself aflame.

But this, again, seems insufficient, because in this case the soul would suffer from the fire not in reality, but only in apprehension: for although a real passion of sorrow or pain may result from a false imagination, as Augustine observes (On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12), it cannot be said in relation to that passion that one really suffers from the thing, but from the image of the thing that is present to one’s fancy. Moreover, this kind of suffering would be more unlike real suffering than that which results from imaginary vision, since the latter is stated to result from real images of things, which images the soul carries about with it, whereas the former results from false fancies which the erring soul imagines: and furthermore, it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are endowed with keen intelligence, would think it possible for a corporeal fire to hurt them, if they were in no way distressed by it.

Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers even really from the corporeal fire. Wherefore Gregory says (Dialogues 4.29): we can gather from the words of the Gospel that the soul suffers from the fire not only by seeing it, but also by feeling it. They explain the possibility of this as follows. They say that this corporeal fire can be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Second, as the instrument of the vengeance of divine justice. For the order of divine justice demands that the soul which by sinning subjected itself to corporeal things should be subjected to them also in punishment. Now an instrument acts not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in virtue of the principal agent: wherefore it is not unreasonable if that fire, seeing that it acts in virtue of a spiritual agent, should act on the spirit of a man or demon, in the same way as we have explained the sanctification of the soul by the sacraments (III, Q. 62, A. 1, 4).

But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in acting on that on which it is used instrumentally, has its own connatural action besides the action whereby it acts in virtue of the principal agent: in fact, it is by fulfilling the former that it effects the latter action, even as in baptism it is by washing the body that water sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces the shape of a house. Hence we must allow the fire to exercise on the soul an action connatural to the fire, in order that it may be the instrument of divine justice in the punishment of sin.

For this reason we must say that a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be hurtful or distressful to it, except insofar as the latter is in some way united to a body: for thus we observe that the corruptible body is a load upon the soul (Wis 9:15). Now a spirit is united to a body in two ways. In one way as form to matter, so that from their union there results one thing simply: and the spirit that is thus united to a body both quickens the body and is somewhat burdened by the body; but it is not thus that the spirit of man or demon is united to the corporeal fire. In another way, as the mover is united to the things moved, or as a thing placed is united to place, even as incorporeal things are in a place. In this way created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place, being in one place in such a way as not to be in another. Now, although of its nature a corporeal thing is able to confine an incorporeal spirit to a place, it is not able of its nature to detain an incorporeal spirit in the place to which it is confined, and so to tie it to that place that it be unable to seek another, since a spirit is not by nature in a place so as to be subject to place. But the corporeal fire is enabled as the instrument of the vengeance of divine justice to detain a spirit in this way; and thus it has a penal effect on it, by hindering it from fulfilling its own will, that is, by hindering it from acting where it will and as it will.

This way is asserted by Gregory (Dialogues 4.29). For in explaining how the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself as follows: since truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to fire, will any wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are imprisoned in flames? Julian¹ says the same as quoted by the Master (Sentences IV, D. 44): if the incorporeal spirit of a living man is held by the body, why shall it not be held after death by a corporeal fire? and Augustine says (The City of God 21.10) that just as, although the soul is spiritual and the body corporeal, man is so fashioned that the soul is united to the body as giving it life, and on account of this union conceives a great love for its body, so it is chained to the fire as receiving punishment therefrom, and from this union conceives a loathing.

Accordingly, we must unite all the aforesaid modes together, in order to understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a corporeal fire: so as to say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal spirit united to it as a thing placed is united to a place; that as the instrument of divine justice it is enabled to detain it (enchained as it were), and in this respect this fire is really hurtful to the spirit, and thus the soul, seeing the fire as something hurtful to it, is tormented by the fire. Hence Gregory (Dialogues 4.29) mentions all these in order, as may be seen from the above quotations.

Or we may reply that Augustine means to say that the things which are the proximate occasion of the soul’s pain or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it apprehended the fire as hurtful to it: wherefore the fire as apprehended is the proximate cause of its distress, whereas the corporeal fire which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its distress.

Accordingly, we must say that the work of one person can in no way avail another for acquiring a state by way of merit (that is, so that a man be able to merit eternal life by the works which I do) because the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of the recipient, and each one is disposed by his own and not by another’s actions—disposed, that is to say, by being worthy of reward. By way of prayer, however, the work of one may profit another while he is a wayfarer, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may obtain the first grace for another:¹ and since the impetration of prayer depends on the liberality of God whom we pray, it may extend to whatever is ordinately subject to the divine power.

On the other hand, as regards that which is consequent upon or accessory to a state, the work of one may avail another, not only by way of prayer but even by way of merit: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of their communion in the root of the work, which root is charity in meritorious works. Wherefore all who are united together by charity acquire some benefit from one another’s works, although according to the measure of each one’s state, since even in heaven each one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that the communion of saints is laid down as an article of faith. Second, through the intention of the doer who does certain works specially for the purpose that they may profit such persons: so that those works become somewhat the works of those for whom they are done, as though they were bestowed on them by the doer. Therefore, they can avail them either for the fulfilment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose that does not change their state.

Nevertheless, we must not believe that the suffrages of the living profit them so as to change their state from unhappiness to happiness or vice versa; but they avail for the diminution of punishment, or something of the kind, that involves no change in the state of the dead.

Or we may reply, according to John Damascene in the sermon quoted above, that these words refer to the retribution which will be made at the final judgment of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness: for then each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the living.

Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are somewhat their own, as stated above.

Second, we may consider the deed of the doer, and then we must draw a distinction, because the deed of a sinner who offers suffrage may be considered in one way insofar as it is his own deed, and thus it can in no way be meritorious either to himself or to another; in another way, insofar as it is another’s deed, and this happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering suffrages, represents the whole Church: for instance, a priest when he performs the burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead a thing is done is understood to do it himself, as Dionysius asserts (On the Heavenly Hierarchies 13), it follows that the suffrages of that priest, albeit a sinner, profit the departed. Second, when he acts as the instrument of another: for the work of the instrument belongs more to the principal agent. Wherefore, although he who acts as the instrument of another be not in a state of merit, his act may be meritorious on account of the principal agent: for instance, if a servant, being in sin, do any work of mercy at the command of his master who has charity. Hence, if a person dying in charity command suffrages to be offered for him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, those suffrages avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they are performed be in sin. Nevertheless, they would avail more if those persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious on two counts.

Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, namely, when they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses his goods not only to the righteous but also to sinners (Matt 5:45), not indeed on account of their merits, but of his loving kindness. Hence a Gloss on John 9:31: God does not hear sinners, says that he speaks as one unanointed and as not seeing clearly.

Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that it matters not whether one obtain suffrages from good or from evil persons, we must reply to them also.

Second, it may be considered as meriting eternal life, and this it has as proceeding from its root, which is charity: and in this way it profits not only the person for whom it is done, but also and still more the doer.

This suffices for the replies to the objections: for the first considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfaction, while the others consider it as meritorious.

Yet they were confronted with a difficulty which troubled them, for it would seem to follow from this (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity, although infinite in duration) that a multiplicity of suffrages would take away that punishment altogether, which is the error of Origen (On First Principles 1; cf. Gregory, Morals on Job 34): and consequently endeavored in various ways to avoid this difficulty.

Praepositivus¹ said that suffrages for the damned can be so multiplied that they are entirely freed from punishment, not absolutely as Origen maintained, but for a time, namely, till the judgment day: for their souls will be reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the punishments of hell without hope of pardon.

But this opinion seems incompatible with divine providence, which leaves nothing inordinate in the world. For guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment. Wherefore it is impossible for punishment to cease unless first of all guilt be expiated: so that, as guilt remains forever in the damned, their punishment will in no way be interrupted.

For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porree devised another explanation. These said that the process in the diminution of punishments by suffrages is as the process in dividing a line, which though finite, is indefinitely divisible, and is never destroyed by division, if it be diminished not by equal but by proportionate quantities: for instance, if we begin by taking away a quarter of the whole, and second, a quarter of that quarter, and then a quarter of this second quarter, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, they say by the first suffrage a certain proportion of the punishment is taken away, and by the second an equally proportionate part of the remainder.

But this explanation is in many ways defective. First, because it seems that indefinite division, which is applicable to continuous quantity, cannot be transferred to spiritual quantity; second, because there is no reason why the second suffrage, if it be of equal worth, should diminish the punishment less than the first; third, because punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be diminished, even as it cannot be done away with unless the guilt be done away with; fourth, because in the division of a line we come at length to something which is not sensible, for a sensible body is not indefinitely divisible: and thus it would follow that after many suffrages the remaining punishment would be so little as not to be felt, and thus would no longer be a punishment.

Hence others found another explanation. For Antissiodorensis¹ (Sentences 4.14) said that suffrages profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their punishment, but by fortifying the person punished: even as a man who is carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in water, for thus he would be enabled to carry it better, and yet his load would be none the lighter.

But this again is impossible, because according to Gregory (Morals on Job 9) a man suffers more or less from the eternal fire according as his guilt deserves; and consequently some suffer more, some less, from the same fire. Therefore, since the guilt of the damned remains unchanged, it cannot be that he suffers less punishment.

Moreover, the aforesaid opinion is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the statements of holy men, and groundless, as being based on no authority. It is also unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off from the bond of charity in virtue of which the departed are in touch with the works of the living. Second, because they have entirely come to the end of life, and have received the final award for their merits, even as the saints who are in heaven. For the remaining punishment or glory of the body does not make them to be wayfarers, since glory essentially and radically resides in the soul. It is the same with the unhappiness of the damned, wherefore their punishment cannot be diminished as neither can the glory of the saints be increased as to the essential reward.

However, we may admit, in a certain measure, the manner in which suffrages profit the damned, according to some, if it be said that they profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor again by diminishing their sense of punishment, but by withdrawing from the damned some matter of grief, which matter they might have if they knew themselves to be so outcast as to be a care to no one; and this matter of grief is withdrawn from them when suffrages are offered for them.

Yet even this is impossible according to the general law, because as Augustine says—and this applies especially to the damned—the spirits of the departed are where they see nothing of what men do or of what happens to them in this life (On the Care of the Dead 13), and consequently they know not when suffrages are offered for them, unless this relief be granted from above to some of the damned in spite of the general law. This, however, is a matter of great uncertainty.

Thus it is safer to say simply that suffrages do not profit the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them, as appears from the authors quoted above.

Or we may say, according to some, that in the midst of fighting, seeing they were in danger, they repented of their sin, according to Psalm 77:34, when he slew them, then they sought him: and this is a probable opinion. Wherefore the offering was made for them.

Or we may say with some that Trajan’s soul was not simply freed from the debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment was suspended for a time, that is, until the judgment day. Nor does it follow that this is the general result of suffrages, because things happen differently in accordance with the general law from that which is permitted in particular cases and by privilege. Even so the bounds of human affairs differ from those of the miracles of the divine power, as Augustine says (On the Care of the Dead 16).

We may also reply with Damascene¹ that such statements are to be explained with reference to the lower causes, that is, according to the demands of the merits of those who are consigned to those punishments. But according to the divine mercy, which transcends human merits, it happens otherwise through the prayers of the righteous than is implied by the expressions quoted in the aforesaid authorities. Now God changes his sentence but not his counsel, as Gregory says (Morals on Job 20): wherefore the Damascene quotes as instances of this the Ninevites, Ahab, and Hezekiah, in whom it is apparent that the sentence pronounced against them by God was commuted by the divine mercy (Cf. I, Q. 19, A. 7).

I say, then, that the dying person, as soon as he provides for certain suffrages to be offered for him, receives the full merit of those suffrages, even before they are discharged, as regards the efficacy of the suffrages that results from the action as proceeding from the principal agent. But as regards the efficacy of the suffrages arising from the action done or from the action as proceeding from the executor, he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages are discharged. And if, before this, he happens to be released from his punishment, he will in this respect be deprived of the fruit of the suffrages, and this will fall back upon those by whose fault he was then defrauded. For it is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded in temporal matters by another’s fault—and the punishment of purgatory is temporal—although as regards the eternal retribution none can be defrauded save by his own fault.

Or we may reply that the blessed departed may derive a reward from suffrages through having provided for suffrage to be offered for himself while living, and this was meritorious for him.

Second, thus: there have been some misguided persons who were baptized for those who had departed this life without baptism, thinking that this would profit them: and according to this explanation the Apostle is speaking, in the above words, merely according to the opinion of certain persons.

However, they profit secondarily and indirectly the person for whom one does that which is the cause of the indulgence. This is sometimes feasible and sometimes not, according to the different forms of indulgence. For if the form of indulgence be such as this: whosoever does this or that shall gain so much indulgence, he who does this cannot transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another, because it is not in his power to apply to a particular person the intention of the Church who dispenses the common suffrages whence indulgences derive their value, as stated above (Q. 27). If, however, the indulgence be granted in this form: whosoever does this or that, he, his father, or any other person connected with him and detained in purgatory, will gain so much indulgence, an indulgence of this kind will avail not only a living but also a deceased person. For there is no reason why the Church is able to transfer the common merits, on which indulgences are based, to the living and not to the dead.

Nor does it follow that a prelate of the Church can release souls from purgatory however he desires, since for indulgences to avail there must be a fitting cause for granting them, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 3).

That, moreover, burial in a sacred place profits the dead does not result from the action done, but rather from the action itself of the doer: when, to wit, the dead person himself, or another, arranges for his body to be buried in a sacred place, and commends him to the patronage of some saint, by whose prayers we must believe that he is assisted, as well as to the suffrages of those who serve the holy place, and pray more frequently and more specially for those who are buried in their midst.

But such things as are done for the display of the obsequies are profitable as being a consolation of the living; and yet they can also profit the dead, not directly but indirectly, insofar as men are aroused to pity thereby and consequently to pray, or insofar as the outlay on the burial brings either assistance to the poor or adornment to the church: for it is in this sense that the burial of the dead is reckoned among the works of mercy.

Others, on the contrary, said that suffrages avail more those for whom they are offered.

Now both opinions have a certain amount of truth: for the value of suffrages may be gauged from two sources. For their value is derived in the first place from the virtue of charity, which makes all goods common, and in this respect they avail more the person who is more full of charity, although they are not offered specially for him. In this way the value of suffrages regards more a certain inward consolation by reason of which one who is in charity rejoices in the goods of another after death in respect of the diminution of punishment; for after death there is no possibility of obtaining or increasing grace, whereas during life the works of others avail for this purpose by the virtue of charity.

In the second place, suffrages derive their value from being applied to another person by one’s intention. In this way the satisfaction of one person counts for another, and there can be no doubt that thus they avail more the person for whom they are offered: in fact, they avail him alone in this way, because satisfaction, properly speaking, is directed to the remission of punishment. Consequently, as regards the remission of punishment, suffrages avail chiefly the person for whom they are offered, and accordingly there is more truth in the second opinion than in the first.

Whether suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in particular?

Consequently, many in purgatory rejoice in one good deed no less than one does. On the other hand, if we consider the value of suffrages inasmuch as they are a kind of satisfaction applied to the dead by the intention of the person offering them, then the suffrage for some person in particular avails him more than that which is offered for him in common with many others; for in this case the effect of the suffrages is divided in virtue of divine justice among those for whom the suffrages are offered.

Hence it is evident that this question depends on the first; and, moreover, it is made clear why special suffrages are appointed to be offered in the Church.

Hence the Master, in the text (Sentences IV, D. 45), mentions two opinions: one, when he says that a rich man derives from general, together with special suffrages, an equal profit to that which a poor man derives from special suffrages alone; for although the one receives assistance from more sources than the other, he does not receive a greater assistance. The other opinion he mentions when he says that a person for whom special suffrages are offered obtains a more speedy but not a more complete release, because each will be finally released from all punishment.

Nevertheless, if anything from special suffrages be left over for those for whom they are offered (for instance, if they need them not) we may well believe that by God’s mercy this is granted to others for whom those suffrages are not offered, if they need them: as affirmed by Damascene who says: God is as wise as he is just; justly he measures possibility to the impotent, and wisely he manages the commuting of defects. And this exchange is effected when what is lacking to one is supplied by another.

But each of the blessed must see in the divine essence as many other things as the perfection of his happiness requires. For the perfection of a man’s happiness requires him to have whatever he will, and to will nothing amiss: and each one wills with a right will, to know what concerns himself. Hence, since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they wish to know what concerns themselves, and consequently it follows that they know it in the Word. Now it pertains to their glory that they assist the needy for their salvation: for thus they become God’s cooperators, than which nothing is more divine, as Dionysius declares (On the Heavenly Hierarchies 3). Wherefore it is evident that the saints are cognizant of such things as are required for this purpose; and so it is manifest that they know in the Word the vows, devotions, and prayers of those who have recourse to their assistance.

Or we may reply that prayer is meritorious on one count, and impetratory on another. For merit consists in a certain equation of the act to the end for which it is intended, and which is given to it as its reward; while the impetration of a prayer depends on the liberality of the person supplicated. Hence prayer sometimes, through the liberality of the person supplicated, obtains that which was not merited either by the suppliant, or by the person supplicated for: and so, although the saints are not in the state of meriting, it does not follow that they are not in the state of impetrating.

But it is not easy to know what these signs may be: for the signs of which we read in the gospels, as Augustine says, writing to Hesychius about the end of the world (Epistle LXXX), refer not only to Christ’s coming to judgment, but also to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, and to the coming of Christ in ceaselessly visiting his Church. So that, perhaps, if we consider them carefully, we shall find that none of them refers to the coming advent, as he remarks, because these signs that are mentioned in the Gospels, such as wars, fears, and so forth, have been from the beginning of the human race—unless perhaps we say that at that time they will be more prevalent, although it is uncertain in what degree this increase will foretell the imminence of the advent.

The signs mentioned by Jerome are not asserted by him; he merely says that he found them written in the annals of the Hebrews: and, indeed, they contain very little likelihood.

We may also reply that all these signs that will happen about the time of the judgment are reckoned to occur within the time occupied by the judgment, so that the judgment day contains them all. Wherefore, although men be terrified by the signs appearing about the judgment day, yet before those signs begin to appear the wicked will think themselves to be in peace and security after the death of Antichrist and before the coming of Christ, seeing that the world is not at once destroyed, as they thought hitherto.

For in the text (Sentences IV, D. 48) it is explained according to the second way, so as to denote all the angels: and then they are said to be moved through wonder at the renewing of the world, as stated in the text.

It can also be explained in reference to ‘Virtue’ as the name of a particular order; and then that order is said to be moved more than the others by reason of the effect, since according to Gregory (Homilies on the Gospels 34) we ascribe to that order the working of miracles which especially will be worked about that time: or again, because that order—since, according to Dionysius (On the Heavenly Hierarchies 11), it belongs to the middle hierarchy—is not limited in its power, wherefore its ministry must regard universal causes. Consequently, the proper office of the Virtues is seemingly to move the heavenly bodies which are the cause of what happens in nature here below. And again the very name denotes this, since they are called the Virtues of heaven. Accordingly, they will be moved then, because they will no more produce their effect, by ceasing to move the heavenly bodies: even as the angels who are appointed to watch over men will no longer fulfill the office of guardians.

Now, although, properly speaking, a corporeal thing cannot be the subject of the stain of sin, nevertheless, on account of sin corporeal things contract a certain unfittingness for being appointed to spiritual purposes; and for this reason we find that places where crimes have been committed are reckoned unfit for the performance of sacred actions unless they be cleansed beforehand. Accordingly, that part of the world which is given to our use contracts from men’s sins a certain unfitness for being glorified, wherefore in this respect it needs to be cleansed. In like manner, with regard to the intervening space, on account of the contact of the elements, there are many corruptions, generations and alterations of the elements which diminish their purity: wherefore the elements need to be cleansed from these also, so that they be fit to receive the newness of glory.

Nor is there any thing that cannot in some way be cleansed by fire: some things, however, cannot be cleansed by fire without being destroyed themselves, such as cloths and wooden vessels. These the law ordered to be cleansed with water, yet all these things will be finally destroyed by fire.

Hence others say that this fire will be generated towards the intervening space through the focusing together of the rays of the heavenly bodies, just as we see them focused together in a burning-glass; for at that time in lieu of glasses there will be concave clouds on which the rays will strike.

But this again does not seem probable: for since the effects of heavenly bodies depend on certain fixed positions and aspects, if this fire resulted from the virtue of the heavenly bodies, the time of this cleansing would be known to those who observe the movements of the stars, and this is contrary to the authority of Scripture.

Consequently others, following Augustine, say that just as the deluge resulted from an outpouring of the waters of the world, so the fashion of this world will perish by a burning of worldly flames (The City of God 20.16). This burning is nothing else but the assembly of all those lower and higher causes that by their nature have a kindling virtue: and this assembly will take place not in the ordinary course of things, but by the divine power: and from all these causes thus assembled the fire that will burn the surface of this world will result.

But if we consider aright these opinions, we shall find that they differ as to the cause producing this fire and not as to its species. For fire, whether produced by the sun or by some lower heating cause, is of the same species as fire in its own sphere, except insofar as the former has some admixture of foreign matter. And this will of necessity be the case then, since fire cannot cleanse a thing unless this become its matter in some way. Hence we must grant that the fire in question is simply of the same species as ours.

Or we may reply that if they refer also to the higher heavens, these are said to perish as regards their movement whereby now they are moved without cessation.

But this opinion is altogether absurd: for it is opposed both to philosophy—which holds it impossible for the lower bodies to be in potentiality to the form of heaven, since they have neither a common matter, nor mutual contrariety—and to theology, since according to this opinion the perfection of the universe with the integrity of its parts will not be assured on account of two of the elements being destroyed. Consequently, `heaven’ is taken to denote the fifth body, while all the elements are designated by earth, as expressed in Psalm 148:7–8, praise the Lord from the earth and afterwards, fire, hail, snow, ice.

Hence others say that all the elements will remain as to their substance, but that their active and passive qualities will be taken from them: even as they say too that in a mixed body the elements retain their substantial form without having their proper qualities, since these are reduced to a mean, and a mean is neither of the extremes. And seemingly the following words of Augustine (The City of God xx, 16) would seem in agreement with this: in this conflagration of the world the qualities of the corruptible elements that were befitting our corruptible bodies will entirely perish by fire: and the substance itself will have those qualities that become an immortal body.

However, this does not seem probable, for since the proper qualities of the elements are the effects of their substantial form, it seems impossible, as long as the substantial forms remain, for the aforesaid qualities to be changed, except for a time by some violent action: thus in hot water we see that by virtue of its species it returns to the cold temperature which it had lost by the action of fire, provided the species of water remain. Moreover, these same elemental qualities belong to the second perfection of the elements as being their proper passions: nor is it probable that in this final consummation the elements will lose anything of their natural perfection.

Wherefore it would seem that the reply to this question should be that the elements will remain as to their substance and proper qualities, but that they will be cleansed both from the stain which they contracted from the sins of men, and from the impurity resulting in them through their mutual action and passion: because when once the movement of the first movable body ceases, mutual action and passion will be impossible in the lower elements: and this is what Augustine calls the qualities of corruptible elements, namely, their unnatural dispositions by reason of which they come near to corruption.

But this opinion is opposed to the authority of Scripture, because it is written that those heavens are kept in store unto fire (2 Pet 3:7), which were cleansed by water; and Augustine says (The City of God 20.18) that the same world which perished in the deluge is reserved unto fire. Now it is clear that the waters of the deluge did not rise to the summit of the space occupied by the elements, but only fifteen cubits above the mountain tops.

Moreover, it is known that vapors or any smoke whatever rising from the earth cannot pierce the entire sphere of fire so as to reach its summit; and so the stain of sin did not reach the aforesaid space.

Nor can the elements be cleansed from corruptibility by the removal of something that might be consumed by fire: whereas it will be possible for the impurities of the elements arising from their mingling together to be consumed by fire. And these impurities are chiefly round about the earth as far as the middle of the air: wherefore the fire of the final conflagration will cleanse up to that point, since the waters of the deluge rose to a height which can be approximately calculated from the height of the mountains which they surpassed in a fixed measure.

We therefore grant the first objection.

The same answer applies to the second objection.

On the other hand, as regards the action which this fire will have after the judgment, it will act on the damned alone, since the good will all have impassible bodies.

This opinion is confuted with sufficient probability by the changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the human body, and the imperfection and instability of knowledge and virtue, all of which are hindrances to the perfection of happiness, as Augustine argues at the end of The City of God (22.22).

Hence others maintained that after this there is another life wherein, after death, man lives according to the soul only, and they held that such a life sufficed to satisfy the natural desire to obtain happiness: wherefore Porphyrius said, as Augustine states (The City of God 22.26): the soul, to be happy, must avoid all bodies. Consequently, these did not hold the resurrection.

This opinion was based by various people on various false foundations. For certain heretics asserted that all bodily things are from the evil principle, but that spiritual things are from the good principle: and from this it follows that the soul cannot reach the height of its perfection unless it be separated from the body, since the latter withdraws it from its principle, the participation of which makes it happy. Hence all those heretical sects that hold corporeal things to have been created or fashioned by the devil deny the resurrection of the body. The falsehood of this principle has been shown at the beginning of the Second Book.¹

Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in the soul, so that the soul makes use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor uses his ship: wherefore according to this opinion, it follows that if happiness is attained by the soul alone, man would not be frustrated in his natural desire for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the resurrection. But the Philosopher sufficiently destroys this foundation (On the Soul 2.2), where he shows that the soul is united to the body as form to matter.

Hence it is clear that if man cannot be happy in this life, we must of necessity hold the resurrection.

Or else they refer to the wicked who are altogether unbelievers, who will not rise again to be judged, since they are already judged (John 3:18).

Or else the restriction may refer to the children consigned to limbo who, although they shall rise again, are not properly said to awake, since they will have no sense either of pain or of glory, and waking is the unchaining of the senses.

Accordingly, the action or movement that is related to nature in the first way can in no way be natural, but is either miraculous if it come from a principle above nature, or violent if from any other principle. The action or movement that is related to nature in the second way is simply natural: but the action that is related to nature in the third way cannot be described as natural simply, but as natural in a restricted sense, insofar, to wit, as it leads to that which is according to nature: but it is called either miraculous, artificial, or violent. For, properly speaking, natural is that which is according to nature, and a thing is according to nature if it has that nature and whatever results from that nature (Physics 2.1). Consequently, speaking simply, movement cannot be described as natural unless its principle be natural.

Now, nature cannot be the principle of resurrection, although resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For nature is the principle of movement in that in which it exists: either the active principle, as in the movement of heavy and light bodies and in the natural alterations of animals; or the passive principle, as in the generation of simple bodies. The passive principle of natural generation is the natural passive potentiality which always has an active principle corresponding to it in nature, according to Metaphysics 8.1: nor as to this does it matter whether the active principle in nature correspond to the passive principle in respect of its ultimate perfection, namely, the form; or in respect of a disposition in virtue of which it demands the ultimate form, as in the generation of a man according to the teaching of faith, or in all other generations according to the opinions of Plato and Avicenna. But in nature there is no active principle of the resurrection, neither as regards the union of the soul with the body, nor as regards the disposition which is the demand for that union: since such a disposition cannot be produced by nature, except in a definite way by the process of generation from seed. Wherefore even granted a passive potentiality on the part of the body, or any kind of inclination to its union with the soul, it is not such as to suffice for the conditions of natural movement. Therefore, the resurrection strictly speaking is miraculous and not natural except in a restricted sense, as we have explained.

Now a univocal efficient cause produces its effect in likeness to its own form, so that not only is it an efficient, but also an exemplar, cause in relation to that effect. This happens in two ways. For sometimes this very form whereby the agent is likened to its effect is the direct principle of the action by which the effect is produced, as heat in the fire that heats: and sometimes it is not the form in respect of which this likeness is observed that is primarily and directly the principle of that action, but the principles of that form. For instance, if a white man beget a white man, the whiteness of the begetter is not the principle of active generation, and yet the whiteness of the begetter is said to be the cause of the whiteness of the begotten, because the principles of whiteness in the begetter are the generative principles causing whiteness in the begotten.

In this way the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection, because the same thing that wrought the resurrection of Christ, which is the univocal efficient cause of our resurrection, is the active cause of our resurrection, namely, the power of Christ’s divinity which is common to him and the Father. Hence it is written: he that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies (Rom 8:11).

And this very resurrection of Christ by virtue of his indwelling divinity is the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection: since the divine operations were wrought by means of Christ’s flesh, as though it were a kind of organ; thus the Damascene instances as an example (On the Orthodox Faith 3.15) the touch of his body whereby he healed the leper (Matt 8:3).

According to some, this sign will be literally Christ’s voice commanding the resurrection, even as he commanded the sea and the storm ceased (Matt 8:26).

Others say that this sign will be nothing else than the manifest appearance of the Son of God in the world, according to Matthew 24:27: as lightning comes out of the east, and appears even into the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be. These rely on the authority of Gregory who says that the sound of the trumpet is nothing else but the Son appearing to the world as judge.¹ According to this, the visible presence of the Son of God is called his voice, because as soon as he appears all nature will obey his command in restoring human bodies: hence he is described as coming with commandment (1 Thess 4:15). In this way his appearing, insofar as it has the force of a command, is called his voice.

And this voice, whatever it be, is sometimes called a cry as of a herald summoning to judgment (Cf. Mt 25:6); sometimes the sound of a trumpet (Cf. 1 Cor 15:52; 1 Thess 4:15), either on account of its distinctness, as stated in the text (Sentences IV, D. 43), or as being in keeping with the use of the trumpet in the Old Testament: for by the trumpet they were summoned to the council, stirred to the battle, and called to the feast; and those who rise again will be summoned to the council of judgment, to the battle in which the world shall fight against the unwise (Wis 5:21), and to the feast of everlasting solemnity.

It must, however, be observed that, although the Gospel mentions their resurrection before Christ’s, we must take this statement as made in anticipation, as is often the case with writers of history. For none rose again with a true resurrection before Christ, since he is the first-fruits of them that sleep (1 Cor 15:20), although some were resuscitated before Christ’s resurrection, as in the case of Lazarus.

The reign of Christ denotes the Church wherein not only martyrs but also the other elect reign, the part denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ in glory as regards all, and special mention is made of the martyrs, because they especially reign after death who fought for the truth even unto death.

The number of a thousand years denotes not a fixed number, but the whole of the present time wherein the saints now reign with Christ, because the number 1,000 designates universality more than the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10, whereas 1,000 is a cube resulting from the multiplication of ten by its square, for 10 X 10 = 100, and 10 X 10 X 10 = 1,000. Similarly, Psalm 104:8 has: the word which he commanded to a thousand, i.e., all, generations.

The reason of this is because the exact length of future time cannot be known except either by revelation or by natural reason: and the time until the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection and the end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous, as stated above (A. 1). And all things that are foreseen by natural reason to happen at a fixed time are reckoned by movement: and it is impossible from the movement of the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is circular, it is for this very reason able by its nature to endure forever. Hence the time between this and the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason.

Similarly, it cannot be known by revelation, so that all may be on the watch and ready to meet Christ: and for this reason when the apostles asked him about this, Christ answered: it is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father has put in his own power (Acts 1:7), whereby, as Augustine says (The City of God 28.53): he scatters the fingers of all calculators and bids them be still. For what he refused to tell the apostles, he will not reveal to others.

Therefore, all those who have been misled to reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved to be untruthful;

for some, as Augustine says (The City of God 28.53), stated that from our Lord’s Ascension to his last coming 400 years would elapse, others 500, others 1,000. The falseness of these calculators is evident, as will likewise be the falseness of those who still do not cease to calculate.

And similarly, the number of days appointed by Daniel does not refer to a number of years to elapse before the end of the world or until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of Antichrist’s preaching and the duration of his persecution.

The same remarks would seem applicable to the statements of Abbot Joachim, who by means of such conjectures about the future foretold some things that were true, and in others was deceived.

Second, because it is more in agreement with divine Scripture which foretells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not predicted properly except of that which has fallen and perished, as the Damascene says (On the Orthodox Faith 4).

Third, because it is more in harmony with the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted and decayed is not renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar does not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into the juice of the grape. Wherefore, since human nature has incurred the defect of the necessity of death, it cannot return to immortality save by means of death.

It is also in keeping with the order of nature for another reason, because, as it is stated in Physics 8.1, the movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature, just as the movement of the heart is a kind of life of the whole body: wherefore even as all the members become dead on the heart ceasing to move, so when the heavenly movement ceases, nothing can remain living with that life which was sustained by the influence of that movement. Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven comes to a standstill must depart from this life.

Nor can it be said that they needed not this redemption because it was granted to them that they should be conceived without sin. For this grace was vouchsafed either to their parents, that the sin of nature might be healed in them (because so long as that sin remained they were unable to beget without communicating original sin), or to nature itself, which was healed. Now we must allow that every one needs the redemption of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature.

One cannot be delivered from an evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the debt or incur the evil: and consequently all could not reap in themselves the fruit of the Lord’s prayer unless all were born debtors and subject to evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from evil cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or free from evil, but only to one who is born with a debt and is afterwards delivered by the grace of Christ.

Nor does it follow, if it can be asserted without error that some die not, that they are born without original sin, although death is a punishment of original sin; because God can of his mercy remit the punishment which one has incurred by a past fault, as he forgave the adulterous woman without punishment (John 8): and in like manner he can deliver from death those who have contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. And thus it does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born without original sin.

For just as Sacred Scripture foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of bodies (Phil 3:21). And thus it follows that even as all die so that the bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death was inflicted by divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of the body, as appears from Genesis 3:19: earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go.

Moreover, the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements, even as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it first be dissolved into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven, and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure elements.

But this assertion is in contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries can be dissolved into its component parts.

Wherefore others say that these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved retain more light through having been united to the soul, and for this reason have a natural inclination to human souls.

But this again is nonsensical, since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an equal share of light and darkness.

Hence we must say differently that in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only by the ordering of divine providence, which decreed that those ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.

Hence the reply to the first objection is clear.

The minor is proved thus. That which passes away into complete nonentity cannot be resumed in identity. This is clear from the fact that there cannot be identity where there is distinction of existence: and existence, which is the act of a being, is differentiated by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Now the form of a mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death, since it is a bodily form, and so also do the contrary qualities from which the mixture results. Therefore, the form of a mixed body does not return in number.

This opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that they said that the soul is not united to the body essentially as form to matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved,¹ or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was possible for them to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being infused into the body begotten of natural generation, as also that it is united to various bodies. The second is that they held intellect not to differ from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to surpass other animals in intelligence because the sensitive power is more acute in him on account of the excellence of his bodily complexion; and hence it was possible for them to assert that man’s soul passes into the soul of a brute animal, especially when the human soul has been habituated to brutish actions. But these two sources are refuted by the Philosopher (On the Soul 2.1), and in consequence of these being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false.

In like manner, the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: while others held that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle as the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople, in his exposition of Job 19:26, in my flesh I shall see God.

Moreover, these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed to by Sacred Scripture. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to the same body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body, which after death falls, rather than the soul, which after death lives. And consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will not be a resurrection, but rather the assumption of a new body.

The minor can be proved in two ways. First, because human nature, which is the form of the whole, is not both form and substance as the soul is, but is a form only. Now such forms pass away into complete nonentity, and consequently they cannot be restored.

Second, because human nature results from union of parts. Now the same union in number as that which was heretofore cannot be resumed, because repetition is opposed to identity (since repetition implies number, whereas identity implies unity, and these are incompatible with one another.) But resurrection is a repeated union: therefore, the union is not the same, and consequently there is not the same human nature nor the same man.

We may also reply that the form of other things subject to generation and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul. For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the being which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to share that being by the resurrection, since the being of the body and the being of the soul in the body are not distinct from one another; otherwise, the union of soul and body would be accidental. Consequently, there has been no interruption in the substantial being of man as would make it impossible for the same man in number to return on account of an interruption in his being, as is the case with other things that are corrupted, the being of which is interrupted altogether since their form does not remain and their matter remains under another being.

Nevertheless, neither does the same man in number recur by natural generation, because the body of the man begotten is not composed of the whole body of his begetter: hence his body is numerically distinct, and consequently his soul and the whole man.

The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna’s, according to whom the form of the whole is not the form of a part only, nor some other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole resulting from the composition of form and matter, embracing both within itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or quiddity. Since, then, at the resurrection there will be the same body in number, and the same rational soul in number, there will be, of necessity, the same humanity.

The first argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity was based on the supposition that humanity is some distinct form supervening form and matter; which is false.

The second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity, because union implies action or passion, and though there be a different union, this cannot prevent the identity of humanity because the action and passion from which humanity resulted are not of the essence of humanity, wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a distinction of humanity: for it is clear that generation and resurrection are not the same movement in number. Yet the identity of the rising man with the begotten man is not hindered for this reason: and in like manner neither is the identity of humanity prevented if we take union for the relation itself: because this relation is not essential to but concomitant with humanity, since humanity is not one of those forms that are composition or order (Physics 2.1), as are the forms of things produced by art, so that if there be another distinct composition there is another distinct form of a house.

But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its substance both rational and sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty in this question, because animal is defined from sense, i.e., the sensitive soul as from its essential form: whereas from sense, i.e., the sensitive power, we know its definition as from an accidental form that contributes more than another to our knowledge of the quiddity (On the Soul 1.1). Accordingly, after death there remains the sensitive soul, even as the rational soul, according to its substance: whereas the sensitive powers, according to some, do not remain. And since these powers are accidental properties, diversity on their part cannot prevent the identity of the whole animal, not even of the animal’s parts: nor are powers to be called perfections or acts of organs unless as principles of action, as heat in fire.

But if it be said that the matter of one part returns to another part of another species, it follows of necessity that there is a change not only in the position of parts, but also in their identity: yet so that the whole matter, or something belonging to the truth of human nature in one is transferred to another, but not if what was superfluous in one part is transferred to another. Now the identity of parts being taken away, the identity of the whole is removed if we speak of essential parts, but not if we speak of accidental parts, such as hair and nails, to which apparently Augustine refers (The City of God 22).

It is thus clear how the transference of matter from one part of another destroys the identity, and how it does not.

But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that even the parts will retain their position at the resurrection, especially as regards the essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the accidental parts, such as nails and hair.

Now there is a threefold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the perfection of the individual—either because it is on the way to corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance, urine, sweat, pus, and so forth—or because it is directed by nature to the preservation of the species in some individual, either by the act of the generative power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk. None of these humidities will rise again, because they do not belong to the perfection of the person rising again.

The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet reached its ultimate perfection which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is directed thereto by nature: and this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the body, for instance, the blood and the other humors which nature has directed to the members that are produced or nourished from it: and yet they have certain definite forms like the other parts of the body, and consequently will rise again with the other parts of the body.

Another kind of humidity is in transition from form to form, namely, from the form of humor to the form of member. Humidities of this kind will not rise again, because after the resurrection each part of the body will be established in its form, so that one will not pass into another. Wherefore this humidity that is actually in transition from one form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity may be considered in a twofold state—either as being at the beginning of its transformation, and thus it is called ‘ros’, namely the humidity that is found in the cavities of the smaller veins—or as in the course of transformation and already beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it is called ‘cambium’: but in neither state will it rise again.

The third kind of humidity is that which has already reached its ultimate perfection that nature intends in the body of the individual, and has already undergone transformation and become incorporate with the members. This is called ‘gluten’, and since it belongs to the members it will rise again just as the members will.

In order, therefore, to see what it is that belongs to the truth of human nature, we must observe that there have been three opinions on the question. For some have maintained that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human nature, and that whatever belongs to the truth of human nature, all of it belonged to the truth of human nature when this was created; and that this multiplies by itself, so that it is possible for the seed whereof the child is begotten to be detached therefrom by the begetter, and that again the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on, and that thus was the whole human race multiplied. Therefore, according to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment, although it seem to have the appearance of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth of human nature.

Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by the natural transformation of the food into the human body, if we consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation of which the act of the generative power is directed: but that if we consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the preservation and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is directed, that which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human nature of the individual not primarily but secondarily. For they assert that the truth of human nature, first and foremost, consists in the radical humor, that, namely, which is begotten of the seed of which the human race was originally fashioned: and that what is changed from food into true flesh and blood does not belong principally to the truth of human nature in this particular individual, but secondarily: and that nevertheless this can belong principally to the truth of human nature in another individual who is begotten of the seed of the former. For they assert that seed is the surplus from food, either mingled with something belonging principally to the truth of human nature in the begetter, according to some, or without any such admixture, as others maintain. And thus the nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical humor in another.

The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to the truth of human nature even in this individual, because distinction in the human body does not require that any designated material part must remain throughout the whole lifetime; any designated part one may take is indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what belongs to the species in it, although as regards what is material therein it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humor is not distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that it be called radical when begotten of the seed, and nutrimental when produced by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that it be called radical when it reaches the term of generation by the act of the generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental when it has not yet reached this term, but is still on the way to give nourishment.

These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the Second Book (Sentences II, D. 30) insofar as the question at issue is concerned.

It must accordingly be observed that this question requires different answers according to these opinions. For the first opinion, on account of its explanation of the process of multiplication, is able to admit perfection of the truth of human nature, both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the due quantity of each individual, without taking into account that which is produced from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the destruction that might result from the action of natural heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting. Wherefore since at the resurrection human nature ought to be restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat tend to destroy the natural humor, there will be no need for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and this reaches the aforesaid perfection in number and quantity by being detached and multiplied.

The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the multiplication that results from generation, must admit that something of this product from food shall rise again: not all, however, but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all that was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man who was begotten of this seed, because this belongs chiefly to the truth of human nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives from nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the perfection of his quantity, and not all, because this does not belong to the perfection of human nature except insofar as nature requires it for the perfection of quantity. Since, however, this nutrimental humor is subject to ebb and flow, the restoration will be effected in this order: what first belonged to the substance of a man’s body will all be restored, and of that which was added second, third, and so on, as much as is required to restore quantity; for two reasons.

First, because that which was added was intended to restore what was wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to the truth of human nature to the same extent as that which came first. Second, because the addition of extraneous humor to the first radical humors results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher instances as an example (On Generation and Corruption 1) the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens the strength of the wine, so that in the end the wine becomes watery: so that although the second water be drawn into the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to the wine. Even so, that which is second changed from food into flesh does not so perfectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does not belong in the same degree to the truth of human nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly, it is clear that this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will rise again, but not the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.

The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature, because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during his whole lifetime any designated matter that belongs essentially and primarily to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and flowing that belongs to the truth of human nature merely on account of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the species, as the second opinion asserted. But it states that all the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature generated belong to the truth of human nature as regards what they have of the species, since thus they remain; but not as regards what they have of matter, since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as in the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the population by death, while others take their place: wherefore the parts of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain formally, since these others occupy the very same offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to remain the same in number. In like manner, while certain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their species; and nevertheless the same man in number remains.

On the other hand, the third opinion agrees with the second because it holds that the parts which come second do not reach the perfection of the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently the third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it holds that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that which comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two opinions agree.

According to the second and third opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he approached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue of the species, and if he approached equally in both, he will rise again in that wherein he was first, because in that he first was directed to the resurrection by union with the rational soul of that man. Hence if there were any surplus in the flesh eaten not belonging to the truth of human nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise again in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection in the first will rise again in him and not in the second; but in the second its place is taken either by something of that which was the product from other food, or if he never partook of any other food than human flesh, the substitution is made by divine power so far as the perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die before the perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as neither does the ebb and flow of parts.

But according to the other two opinions we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed into seed, because it is after much separation that the seed is distilled from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food. That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence, according to the rule already laid down (ad 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in the person born of the seed; while the remaining matter will rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product.

The first opinion is not troubled by this objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food: but there are many other reasons against it as may be seen in the Second Book.¹

The second and first opinions, however, do not make this distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both state what is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we speak of totality of matter. However, they differ in this: the first opinion maintains that nothing will rise again of that which was engendered from food, whereas the second holds that something, but not all, thereof will rise again, as stated above (A. 4).

But the first and second opinions, which draw a distinction between parts of species and parts of matter, say that although the rational soul perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by means of the parts of species, wherefore they are not equally directed to the resurrection.

In another way we use the word ‘passive’ properly, and thus the Damascene defines passion (On the Orthodox Faith 2.22) as being a movement contrary to nature. Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its operation. The reason of this is that whatever is patient is drawn to the bounds of the agent, since the agent assimilates the patient to itself, so that therefore the patient as such is drawn beyond its own bounds within which it was confined. Accordingly, taking passion in its proper sense, there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of the saints after resurrection; wherefore they are said to be impassible.

The reason, however, of this impassibility is assigned differently by different persons. Some ascribe it to the condition of the elements, which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the elements will remain then as to substance, yet that they will be deprived of their active and passive qualities.

But this does not seem to be true: because the active and passive qualities belong to the perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were restored without them in the body of the man that rises again, they would be less perfect than now. Moreover, since these qualities are the proper accidents of the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it would seem most absurd for the cause to remain and the effect to be removed.

Wherefore others say that the qualities will remain, but deprived of their proper activities, the divine power doing this for the preservation of the human body.

This, however, would seem to be untenable, since the action and passion of the active and passive qualities is necessary for the mixture [of the elements], and according as one or the other preponderates the mixed [bodies] differ in their respective complexions. This must apply to the bodies of those who rise again, for they will contain flesh and bones and like parts, all of which demand different complexions. Moreover, according to this, impassibility could not be one of their gifts because it would not imply a disposition in the impassible substance, but merely an external preventive to passion, namely, the power of God, which might produce the same effect in a human body even in this state of life.

Consequently, others say that in the body itself there will be something preventing the passion of a glorified body, namely, the nature of a fifth¹ or heavenly body, which they maintain enters into the composition of a human body to the effect of blending the elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for the rational soul; but that in this state of life, on account of the preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth body will predominate, so that the human body will be made impassible in likeness to the heavenly body.

But this cannot stand, because the fifth body does not enter materially into the composition of a human body, as was proved above (Sentences II, D. 12, Q. 1, A. 1). Moreover, it is absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly body, should endow the human body with a property of glory, such as the impassibility of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to Christ’s power the transformation of the human body, because such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly (1 Cor 15:48), and he will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of his glory, according to the operation whereby also he is able to subdue all things unto himself (Phil 3:21). And again, a heavenly nature cannot exercise such power over the human body as to take from it its elemental nature, which is passible by reason of its essential constituents.

Consequently, we must say otherwise that all passion results from the agent overcoming the patient, else it would not draw it to its own bounds. Now it is impossible for agent to overcome patient except through the weakening of the hold which the form of the patient has over its matter, if we speak of the passion which is against nature, for it is of passion in this sense that we are speaking now. For matter is not subject to one of two contraries except through the cessation (or at least the diminution) of the hold which the other contrary has on it. Now the human body and all that it contains will be perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as the soul will be perfectly subject to God. Wherefore it will be impossible for the glorified body to be subject to any change contrary to the disposition whereby it is perfected by the soul; and consequently those bodies will be impassible.

Or we may say that since, according to the Philosopher (Metaphysics 6.12), essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes employ accidental differences in order to signify essential differences from which the accidental differences result. Hence mortal is put in the definition of man not as though mortality were essential to man, but because that which causes passibility and mortality in the present state of life, namely, composition of contraries, is essential to man, but it will not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul over the body.

For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and consequently not susceptible to impressions from without,¹ and much less so than the heavenly bodies, because they will have actual sensations not by receiving species from sensibles, but by emission of species.

But this is impossible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense is to be a passive power, as the Philosopher proves (On the Soul 2). Wherefore if the saints in the resurrection were to have sensations by emitting and not by receiving species, sense in them would be not a passive but an active power, and thus it would not be the same specifically with sense as it is now, but would be some other power bestowed on them; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive power never becomes active.

Consequently, others say that the senses will be actualized by receiving species, not indeed from external sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers, so that as now the higher powers receive from the lower, so on the contrary the lower powers will then receive from the higher.

But this mode of reception does not result in real sensation, because every passive power, according to its specific nature, is determined to some special active principle, since a power as such bears relation to that with respect to which it is said to be the power. Therefore, since the proper active principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside the soul, and not an intention thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the imagination or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation. Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom there is this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on account of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations.

Consequently, we must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must, however, be observed that the organs of sense are transmuted by things outside the soul in two ways. First, by a natural transmutation, namely, when the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand is heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact with a fragrant object. Second, by a spiritual transmutation, as when a sensible quality is received in an instrument according to a spiritual mode of being, namely, when the species or the intention of a quality, and not the quality itself, is received: thus the pupil receives the species of whiteness and yet does not itself become white. Accordingly, the first reception does not cause sensation, properly speaking, because the senses are receptive of species in matter but without matter; that is to say, without the material being which the species had outside the soul (On the Soul 2). This reception transmutes the nature of the recipient because in this way the quality is received according to its material being. Consequently, this kind of reception will not be in the glorified bodies, but the second, which of itself causes actual sensation without changing the nature of the recipient, will be.

Or we may say that the reason why one power is hindered in its act when another power is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for such an intense operation unless it be assisted by receiving from the principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should receive. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect, one will be able to operate intensely without thereby hindering the operation of another power, even as it was with Christ.

The minor is proved thus: That which is actually lightsome is not receptive of a visible species, and consequently a mirror placed under the sun’s rays does not reflect the image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil, like the whole body, will be endowed with clarity. Therefore, it will not receive the image of a colored body.

The minor is proved thus. Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, the angle must be proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because what is seen from a greater distance is less seen and at a lesser angle, so that the angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the object. Therefore, if the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things within a certain distance, and that consequently it does not see a thing from a greater distance than we see now: and this would seem very absurd. And thus it would seem that the sense of sight will not be actual in glorified bodies.

But this is seemingly untrue, because the medium in these senses is the same as in the others. For in the sight the medium is the air, and this is also the medium in hearing and smelling (On the Soul 2.7). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium in contact, since taste is a kind of touch (On the Soul 2.9). Scent also, which is the object of the sense of smell, will be there, since the Church sings that the bodies of the saints will be a most sweet scent. There will also be vocal praise in heaven; hence a Gloss says on Psalm 149:6, the high praises of God shall be in their mouth, that hearts and tongues shall not cease to praise God. The same is had on the authority of a Gloss on 2 Esdras 12:27, with singing and with cymbals.

Hence, according to others, we may say that smelling and hearing will be in act there, but taste will not be in act, in the sense of being affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from what we have said (Q. 81, A. 4): unless perchance we say that there will be taste in act through the tongue being affected by some neighboring humor.

But in the glorified bodies odor will be in its ultimate perfection, being in no way hampered by humidity: wherefore it will affect the organ with a spiritual alteration, like the odor of a volatile evaporation. Such will be the sense of smell in the saints, because it will not be hindered by any humidity: and it will take cognizance not only of the excellences of odors, as happens with us now on account of the very great humidity of the brain, but also of the minutest differences of odors.

For just as a subtle thing is said to be penetrative, for the reason that it reaches to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intellect said to be subtle because it reaches to the insight of the intrinsic principles and the hidden natural properties of a thing. In like manner, a person is said to have subtle sight because he is able to perceive by sight things of the smallest size: and the same applies to the other senses. Accordingly, people have differed by ascribing subtlety to the glorified bodies in different ways.

For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (The City of God 13.22), ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual substances are said to be subtle: and they said that at the resurrection the body will be transformed into a spirit, and that for this reason the Apostle describes as being spiritual the bodies of those who rise again (1 Cor 15:44).

But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body cannot be changed into a spirit, since there is no community of matter between them: and Boethius proves this (On the Person and the Two Natures). Second, because, if this were possible, and one’s body were changed into a spirit, one would not rise again a man, for a man naturally consists of a soul and body. Third, because if this were the Apostle’s meaning, just as he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural [animale] bodies as being changed into souls [animam]: and this is clearly false.

Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at the resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety by means of rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising again will be like the air or the wind, as Gregory relates (Morals on Job 14.56).

But this again cannot be maintained, because our Lord had a palpable body after the Resurrection, as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must believe that his body was supremely subtle. Moreover, the human body will rise again with flesh and bones, as did the body of our Lord, according to Luke 24:39, a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see me to have, and Job 19:26, in my flesh I shall see God, my Savior: and the nature of flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid rarity.

Consequently, another kind of subtlety must be assigned to glorified bodies by saying that they are subtle on account of the most complete perfection of the body. But this completeness is explained by some in relation to the fifth, or heavenly, essence, which will be then predominant in them.

This, however, is impossible, since first of all the fifth essence can in no way enter into the composition of a body, as we have shown above (Sentences, D. 12, Q. 1). Second, because granted that it entered into the composition of the human body, it would be impossible to account for its having a greater predominance over the elemental nature then than now, unless either the amount of the heavenly nature in human bodies were increased (thus human bodies would not be of the same stature, unless perhaps elemental matter in man were decreased, which is inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise again)—or unless elemental nature were endowed with the properties of the heavenly nature through the latter’s dominion over the body, and in that case a natural power would be the cause of a property of glory, which seems absurd.

Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by reason of which human bodies are said to be subtle will result from the dominion of the glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, by reason of which dominion the glorified body is said to be spiritual, as being wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby the body is subject to the soul is to the effect of its participating in its specific being, insofar as it is subject to the soul as matter to form; and second, it is subject to the soul in respect of the other operations of the soul, insofar as the soul is a principle of movement. Consequently, the first reason for spirituality in the body is subtlety, and after that agility and the other properties of a glorified body. Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking of spirituality indicates subtlety: wherefore Gregory says (Morals on Job 14.56) that the glorified body is said to be subtle as a result of a spiritual power.

This suffices for the replies to the objections which refer to the subtlety of rarefaction.

But there are two reasons why this cannot be maintained. First, because the grossness which the gift of subtlety removes is a kind of defect, for instance, an inordinateness of matter in not being perfectly subject to its form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will rise again in the body, both as regards the matter and as regards the form. And the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by reason of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on account of any defect of nature. For since fullness is opposed to vacancy, that alone does not fill a place which, being put in a place, nevertheless leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum is defined by the Philosopher (Physics 4.6, 7) as being a place not filled by a sensible body. And a body is said to be sensible by reason of its matter, form, and natural accidents, all of which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also plain that the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as evidenced by the body of our Lord (Luke 24:39): nor will it lack matter, or form, or natural accidents, namely, heat, cold, and so forth. Hence it is evident that the glorified body, the gift of subtlety notwithstanding, will fill a place: for it would seem madness to say that the place in which there will be a glorified body will be empty.

Second, their aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hinder the coexistence of a body in the same place is more than to fill a place. For if we suppose dimensions separate from matter, those dimensions do not fill a place. Hence some who held the possibility of a vacuum said that a vacuum is a place wherein such dimensions exist apart from a sensible body; and yet those dimensions hinder another body from being together with them in the same place. This is made clear by the Philosopher (Physics 4.1, 4.8; Metaphysics 2.2), where he considers it impossible for a mathematical body, which is nothing but separate dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible body. Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow that for this reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the removal of the lesser does not involve the removal of the greater.

Accordingly, we must say that the obstacle to our body’s being now in the same place with another body can in no way be removed by the gift of subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place together with another body, except something in it that requires a different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity save that which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place is not required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a place, not by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the fact of its being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves (Physics 4), and as is self-evident.

In like manner, neither can matter cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does not occupy a place except through its dimensive quantity. Similarly, neither does form occupy a place, unless it have a place through its matter. It remains, therefore, that the necessity for two bodies occupying each a distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quantity, to which a place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying a place. Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing from it, the necessity of this distinction is found in its dimensive quantity alone. If the example of a separate line is taken, supposing there to be two such lines, or two parts of one line, they must occupy distinct places, else one line added to another would not make something greater, and this is against common sense. The same applies to surfaces and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands place through being the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to be two lines, or two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter, without there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is the principle of the distinction between individuals, it follows that, as Boethius says (On the Trinity), we cannot possibly conceive two bodies occupying one place, so that this distinction of individuals requires this difference of accidents.

Now subtlety does not deprive the glorified body of its dimension; wherefore it in no way removes from it the aforesaid necessity of occupying a distinct place from another body. Therefore, the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place together with another body, but it will be possible for it to be together with another body by the operation of the divine power: even as the body of Peter had the power whereby the sick were healed at the passing of Peter’s shadow (Acts 5:15) not through any inherent property, but by the power of God for the upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the divine power make it possible for a glorified body to be in the same place together with another body for the perfection of glory.

The minor is proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same place. The dimensions of A will either be the same as the dimensions of the place, or they will differ from them. If they differ, then some of the dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions that are within the bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they be in a placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason the dimensions of B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. Now things that are the same with one and the same thing are the same with one another.¹ Therefore, the dimensions of A and B are the same. But two bodies cannot have identical dimensions, just as they cannot have the same whiteness. Therefore, A and B are one body. But they were two. Therefore, they are at the same time one and two.

The minor is proved as follows: It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one another only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in the same place, the two circles described in them would touch one another as a whole. Similarly, it is contrary to the definition of a line that there be more than one straight line between two points: yet this would be the case were two bodies in the same place, since between two given points in the various surfaces of the place, there would be two straight lines corresponding to the two bodies in that place.

The minor is proved thus. Supposing two bodies to be in the same place, the one being greater than the other as to every dimension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater, and the place occupied by the greater body will be its common place; while it will have no proper place, because no given surface of the body will contain it, and this is essential to place. Therefore, it will not have a proper place.

But it begs the question, because according to this nothing else has been said but that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the dimensions of the place; excepting that the dimensions of the thing placed are contained within the bounds of the place, and that the distance between the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance between the bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be distant by their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the dimensions of two bodies be the dimensions of one place is nothing else than that two bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at issue.

Accordingly, if we remove matter, there can be no distinction between lines save in respect of a different placing: and in like manner neither can there be a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimensions whatever. Consequently, geometry cannot suppose one line to be added to another as being distinct therefrom unless it be distinct as to place. But supposing by a divine miracle a distinction of subject without a distinction of place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the distinction of subjects. Again, we can understand a difference of points, and thus different lines described on two bodies that are in the same place are drawn from different points to different points; for the point that we take is not a point fixed in the place, but in the placed body, because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from a point which is its term. In like manner, the two circles described in two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account of the difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a whole, but on account of the distinction of subjects, and thus while wholly touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle described by a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other circle described by the locating body.

Nevertheless, it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in the same place with another glorified body, both because a becoming order will be observed in them, which demands distinction, and because one glorified body will not be in the way of another. Consequently, two glorified bodies will never be in the same place.

The same answer applies to the second objection.

First, by a variation in quantity in respect of the same matter, so that in fact the matter which at first is subject to a greater quantity is afterwards subject to a lesser. Some have held this to be the case with the glorified bodies, saying that quantity is subject to them at will, so that whenever they want, they are able to have a great quantity, and whenever they like, a small quantity.

But this is impossible, because no movement affecting that which is intrinsic to a thing is possible without passion to the detriment of its substance.¹ Hence in incorruptible, i.e., heavenly, bodies, there is only local movement, which is not according to something intrinsic. Thus it is clear that change of quantity in respect of matter would be incompatible with the impassibility and incorruptibility of a glorified body. Moreover, it would follow that a glorified body would be sometimes rarer and sometimes denser, because since it cannot be deprived of any of its matter, sometimes the same matter would be under great dimensions and sometimes under small dimensions, and thus it would be rarefied and densified, which is impossible.

Second, that the quantity of a glorified body become smaller than itself may be understood by a variation of place; namely, so that the parts of a glorified body insinuate themselves into one another, so that it is reduced in quantity, however small it may become. And some have held this to be the case, saying that by reason of its subtlety a glorified body will be able to be in the same place with a non-glorified body: and that in like manner its parts can be one within the other, so much so that a whole glorified body will be able to pass through the minutest opening in another body: and thus they explain how Christ’s body came out of the virginal womb; and how it went into his disciples, the doors being shut.

But this is impossible; both because the glorified body will not be able, by reason of its subtlety, to be in the same place with another body, and because even if it were able to be in the same place with another body, this would not be possible if the other were a glorified body, as many say; and again because this would be inconsistent with the right disposition of the human body, which requires the parts to be in a certain fixed place and at a certain fixed distance from one another. Wherefore this will never happen, not even by a miracle.

Consequently, we must say that the glorified body will always be in a place equal to itself.

Accordingly, the glorified body has by its nature those qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the touch, and yet since the body is altogether subject to the spirit, it is in its power thereby to affect or not to affect the touch. In like manner, it is competent by its nature to resist any other passing body, so that the latter cannot be in the same place together with it: although, according to its pleasure, it may happen by the divine power that it occupy the same place with another body, and thus offer no resistance to a passing body. Therefore, according to its nature the glorified body is palpable, but it is competent for it to be impalpable to a non-glorified body by a supernatural power. Hence Gregory says (Homilies on the Gospels 25) that our Lord offered his flesh to be handled, which he had brought in through the closed doors, so as to afford a complete proof that after his resurrection his body was unchanged in nature, though changed in glory.

Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the fifth, i.e., the heavenly essence, which will then be predominant in the glorified bodies. But of this we have frequently observed that it does not seem probable (Q. 82, A. 1; Q. 83, A. 1). Wherefore it is better to ascribe it to the soul, whence glory flows to the body.

But this will not hold, because the glorified body will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it will never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move from one place to another, it is not essentially transferred from place to place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it is directed to one place after being directed by the intention to another: and in this sense it is said to move from one place to another.

Hence others¹ say that it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, since it is a body, to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in time, but that by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain infinitude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass through the interval, and consequently to be moved instantaneously.

But this is impossible since it implies a contradiction: which is proved as follows. Suppose a body, which we will call Z, to be in motion from A to B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A, is not in motion; and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is past. Therefore, if it is at any time in motion it must be neither wholly in A nor wholly in B. Therefore, while it is in motion, it is either nowhere, or partly in A and partly in B, or wholly in some other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would be a dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. Nor again is it possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being in some way in the intervening space, for since B is a place distant from A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z which is in B is not continuous with the part which is in A.

Therefore, it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in C and partly in some other place that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth. Therefore, it follows that Z does not pass from A to B unless it is first in all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it passes from A to B without ever being moved, which implies a contradiction, because the very succession of places is local movement. The same applies to any change whatever having two opposite terms, each of which is a positive entity, but not to those changes which have only one positive term, the other being a pure privation. For between affirmation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance; wherefore that which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote from affirmation (and conversely) by reason of something that causes either of them or disposes thereto, so that while that which is moved is wholly under a negation, it is changed into affirmation, and vice versa. Thus in such things to be changing precedes to be changed, as is proved in Physics 6.5. Nor is there any comparison with the movement of an angel, because being in a place is predicated equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is clear that it is altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to another, unless it pass through every interval.

Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from this that a glorified body is at the same instant in two or more places together, namely, in the ultimate term and in all the intervening places, which is impossible.

To this, however, they reply that although it is the same instant really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which different lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures the instantaneous according to its reality and not according to our way of considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in a different way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are not simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered in a different way does not make it possible for one point of place to contain things that are locally distant from one another.

Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; and that nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in less time than another, because there is no limit to the divisibility of time, no matter how short a space we may take.

Or we may say that in the blessed there will never be an inordinate will: so that they never will wish their body to be instantaneously where it cannot be, and consequently whatever instant the will shall choose, at that same instant the body will be in whatever place the will shall determine.

But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds from an error in the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation resulting from the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural movement, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for the proportion of one total to the other is not the same as the proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made.¹ And so there would not be the same proportion between one whole sensible movement and another, as between the retardations resulting from the resistance of the medium.

This is an error of the imagination, because each part of a movement has as much speed as the whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has as much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any retardation or acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its parts, which is not the case with lines: and consequently the retardation that comes to a movement is not another part of the movement, whereas in the case of the lines that which is added is a part of the total line.

Consequently, in order to understand the Philosopher’s argument, as the Commentator explains, we must take the whole as being one, that is, we must take not only the resistance of the movable to the moving power, but also the resistance of the medium through which the movement takes place, and again the resistance of anything else, so that we take the amount of retardation in the whole movement as being proportionate to the moving power in comparison with the resisting movable, no matter in what way it resist, whether by itself or by reason of something extrinsic. For the movable must always resist the mover somewhat, since mover and moved, agent and patient, as such, are opposed to one another.

Now sometimes it is to be observed that the moved resists the mover by itself, either because it has a force inclining it to a contrary movement, as appears in violent movements, or at least because it has a place contrary to the place which is in the intention of the mover (and such resistance even heavenly bodies offer their movers.) Sometimes, the movable resists the power of the mover only by reason of something else and not by itself. This is seen in the natural movement of heavy and light things, because by their very form they are inclined to such a movement: for the form is an impression of their generator, which is the mover as regards heavy and light bodies. On the part of matter we find no resistance, neither of a force inclining to a contrary movement nor of a contrary place, since place is not due to matter except insofar as the latter, being circumscribed by its dimensions, is perfected by its natural form. Hence there can be no resistance save on the part of the medium, and this resistance is connatural to their movement. Sometimes again the resistance results from both, as may be seen in the movements of animals.

Accordingly, when in a movement there is no resistance save on the part of the movable, as in the heavenly bodies, the time of the movement is measured according to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and the Philosopher’s argument does not apply to these, since if there be no medium at all their movement is still a movement in time. On the other hand, in those movements where there is resistance on the part of the medium only, the measure of time is taken only according to the obstacle on the part of the medium. Thus, if the medium be removed, there will be no longer an obstacle; and so either it will move instantaneously, or it will move in an equal time through a vacuum and through a plenum, because granted that it moves in time through a vacuum, that time will bear some proportion to the time in which it moves through a plenum.

Now it is possible to imagine another body more subtle in the same proportion than the body which filled the space, and then if this body fill some other equal space it will move in as little time through that plenum as it did previously through a vacuum, since by as much as the subtlety of the medium is increased, by so much is the length of time decreased, and the more subtle the medium, the less it resists. But in those other movements where resistance is offered by both the movable and the medium, the quantity of time must be proportionate to the power of the mover as compared with the resistance of both movable and medium together.

Hence, granted that the medium be taken away altogether, or that it cease to hinder, it does not follow that the movement is instantaneous, but that the time is measured according only to the resistance of the movable. Nor will there be any inconsistency if it move in an equal time through a vacuum and through a space filled with the most subtle body imaginable, since the greater the subtlety we ascribe to the medium, the less it is naturally inclined to retard the movement. Wherefore it is possible to imagine so great a subtlety as will naturally retard the movement less than does the resistance of the movable, so that the resistance of the medium will add no retardation to the movement.

It is therefore evident that, although the medium offer no resistance to the glorified bodies insofar as it is possible for them to be in the same place with another body, nevertheless their movement will not be instantaneous, because the movable body itself will resist the motive power from the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have said in reference to the heavenly bodies.

And even if its power were simply infinite, it would not follow that it causes an instantaneous movement unless the resistance of the movable were overcome altogether. Now, although the resistance of the movable to the mover that results from opposition to such a movement, by reason of its being inclined to a contrary movement, can be altogether overcome by a mover of infinite power, nevertheless the resistance it offers through contrariety towards the place which the mover intends by the movement cannot be overcome altogether except by depriving it of its being in such and such a place or position. For just as white resists black by reason of whiteness, and all the more according as whiteness is the more distant from blackness, so a body resists a certain place through having an opposite place, and its resistance is all the greater according as the distance is greater. Now it is impossible to take away from a body its being in some place or position except one deprive it of its corporeity, by reason of which it requires a place or position: wherefore so long as it retains the nature of a body, it can in no way be moved instantaneously, however greater be the motive power. Now the glorified body will never lose its corporeity, and therefore it will never be possible for it to be moved instantaneously.

Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to crystal not because they are transparent, but on account of this likeness, for as much as that which is enclosed in crystal is visible, so the glory of the soul enclosed in the glorified body will not be hidden. But the first explanation is better, because it safeguards better the dignity of the glorified body, and is more consistent with the words of Gregory.

Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place—which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole. Concerning these deformities and like defects, such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity 92) as the Master remarks (Sentences IV, D.44). Among modern masters, however, there are two opinions on this point.

For some say that such deformities and defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they consider that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost unhappiness from which no affliction should be rebated.

But this would seem unreasonable, for in the restoration of the rising body we look to its natural perfection rather than to its previous condition. Hence those who die under perfect age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Consequently, those who had natural defects in the body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will be restored without those defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such defects and deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of punishment is according to the measure of guilt. But it happens that a certain damned sinner, subject to minor sins, has deformities or defects that someone else who would be damned for more serious sins did not have. Wherefore if he who had deformities in this life should rise again with them, while the other who had them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again without them (though deserving of greater punishment), the mode of the punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact, it would seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he suffered in this world, which is absurd.

Hence others say with more reason that he who fashioned nature will wholly restore the body’s nature at the resurrection. Therefore, whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance, fever, purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away with at the resurrection: whereas those defects in the human body which are the natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness, passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the resurrection.

Second, this happens through the principle of corruption being hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, because the conflicting qualities that exist in man’s body were withheld by the grace of innocence from conducing to the body’s dissolution: and much more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection the two aforesaid modes of incorruptibility will be united together in the bodies of the blessed.

If, however, we say that death is penal by reason of the bodily pain which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will continue to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to be in everlasting death, as is written: death shall feed upon them (Ps 48:15).

Since, therefore, after the resurrection and the cessation of the heavenly movement it will be impossible for a body to be altered by its natural quality, as stated above (A. 2), it will not be possible for any body to be passive with a passion of nature. Consequently, as regards this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they will be incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to move, there will still remain the passion which is after the manner of the soul, since the air will both receive light from the sun and will convey the variety of colors to the sight. Therefore, in respect of this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be passible.

But the glorified bodies, although they receive something and are in a manner patient to sensation, will nevertheless not be passible, since they will receive nothing to distress or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned, which for this reason are said to be passible.

Nor does it follow that because the bodies of the damned suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore are not tormented by the fire, because the sensible object has a natural aptitude to please or displease the senses not only as regards its natural action of stimulating or injuring the organ, but also as regards its spiritual action: since when the sensible object is duly proportionate to the sense, it pleases, whereas the contrary is the result when it is in excess or defect. Hence subdued colors and harmonious sounds are pleasing, whereas discordant sounds offend the hearing.

This is the more probable and more common opinion, although the Master (Sentences IV, D. 43) says the contrary, namely, that a man’s sins blotted out by repentance will not be made known to others at the judgment. But it would follow from this that neither would his repentance for these sins be perfectly known, which would detract considerably from the glory of the saints and the praise due to God for having so mercifully delivered them.

Wherefore others say that the wicked will see all their sins and those of others generically at the same time: and this suffices for the accusation or absolution necessary for the judgment; but that they will not see them all down to each single one at the same time. But neither does this seem consonant with the words of Augustine (The City of God 20), who says that they will count them all with one glance of the mind; and what is known generically is not counted.

Hence we may choose a middle way, by holding that they will consider each sin not instantaneously, but in a very short time, the divine power coming to their aid. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (The City of God 20) that they will be discerned with wondrous rapidity. Nor is this impossible, since a space of time, however short, is potentially an infinite number of instants.

This suffices for the replies to the objections on either side of the question.

Hence at this judgment the divine justice will be made manifest in all things, whereas now it remains hidden in the fact that at times some persons are dealt with for the profit of others otherwise than their manifest works would seem to require. For this same reason, there will then be a general separation of the good from the wicked because there will be no further motive for the good to profit by the wicked, or the wicked by the good: for the sake of which profit, the good are meanwhile mingled with the wicked so long as this state of life is governed by divine providence.

Moreover, the details mentioned in the Gospels and Epistles in connection with the last advent are not sufficient to enable us to determine the time of the judgment, for the trials that are foretold as announcing the proximity of Christ’s coming occurred even at the time of the early Church, in a degree sometimes more, sometimes less marked; so that even the days of the apostles were called the last days (Acts 2:17) when Peter expounded the saying of Joel 2:28, it shall come to pass in the last days, as referring to that time. Yet it was already a long time since then: and sometimes there were more and sometimes fewer afflictions in the Church. Consequently, it is impossible to decide after how long a time it will take place, nor fix the month, year, century, or thousand years, as Augustine says in the same book (Epistle to Hesychius 199). And even if we are to believe that at the end these calamities will be more frequent, it is impossible to fix what amount of such calamities will immediately precede the judgment day or the coming of Antichrist, since even at the time of the early Church persecutions were so bitter, and the corruptions of error were so numerous, that some looked forward to the coming of Antichrist as being near or imminent; as related in Eusebius’ History of the Church 6.7 and in Jerome’s book On Illustrious Men 52.

Or we may say that those clouds will be produced by divine power in order to show the parallel between his coming to judge and his ascension; so that he who ascended in a cloud may come to judgment in a cloud. For the cloud, on account of its refreshing influence, indicates the mercy of the Judge.

Second, the expression ‘to judge’ is used equivalently in a way; for consent to an action is considered equivalent to doing it. Wherefore those who will consent with Christ the Judge, by approving his sentence, will be said to judge. In this sense it will belong to all the elect to judge: wherefore it is written: the just shall judge nations (Wis 3:7–8).

Third, a person is said to judge assessorially and by similitude, because he is like the judge in that his seat is raised above the others: and thus assessors are said to judge.¹ Some say that the perfect, to whom judiciary power is promised (Matt 19:28), will judge in this sense, namely, that they will be raised to the dignity of assessors, because they will appear above others at the judgment, and go forth to meet Christ, into the air. But this apparently does not suffice for the fulfilment of our Lord’s promise: you shall sit judging (Matt 19:28), for he would seem to make judging something additional to sitting.

Hence there is a fourth way of judging, which will be competent to perfect men as containing the decrees of divine justice according to which men will be judged: thus a book containing the law might be said to judge, wherefore it is written: [Judgment took her seat] and the books were opened (Rev 20:12).¹ Richard of St. Victor expounds this judging in this way (On Judiciary Power in the Final and Universal Judgment), wherefore he says: those who persevere in divine contemplation, who read every day the book of wisdom, transcribe, so to speak, in their hearts whatever they grasp by their clear insight of the truth; and further on: what else are the hearts of those who judge, divinely instructed in all truth, but a codex of the law?

Since, however, judging denotes an action exercised on another person, it follows that, properly speaking, he is said to judge who pronounces judgment on another. But this happens in two ways. First, by his own authority: and this belongs to the one who has dominion and power over others, and to whose ruling those who are judged are subject, wherefore it belongs to him to pass judgment on them. In this sense to judge belongs to God alone. Second, to judge is to acquaint others of the sentence delivered by another’s authority, that is, to announce the verdict already given. In this way perfect men will judge, because they will lead others to the knowledge of divine justice that these may know what is due to them on account of their merits: so that this very revelation of justice is called judgment. Hence Richard of St. Victor says (On Judiciary Power in the Final and Universal Judgment) that for the judges to open the books of their decree in the presence of those who are to be judged signifies that they open their hearts to the gaze of all those who are below them, and that they reveal their knowledge in whatever pertains to the judgment.

The same answer applies to the second objection.

Second, by reason of merit, since exaltation corresponds by way of merit to humility. Now of all the things that make man contemptible in this world, poverty is the chief: and for this reason the excellence of judicial power is promised to the poor, so that he who humbles himself for Christ’s sake shall be exalted.

Third, because poverty disposes a man to the aforesaid manner of judging. For the reason why one of the saints will be said to judge, as stated above (A. 1), is that he will have the heart instructed in all divine truth, which he will be thus able to make known to others. Now in the advancement to perfection, the first thing that occurs to be renounced is external wealth, because this is the last thing of all to be acquired. And that which is last in the order of generation is the first in the order of destruction: wherefore among the beatitudes (whereby we advance to perfection), the first place is given to poverty. Thus judicial power corresponds to poverty, insofar as this is the disposition to the aforesaid perfection. Hence also it is that this same power is not promised to all who are voluntarily poor, but to those who leave all and follow Christ, in accordance with the perfection of life.

Or we may reply that poverty does not suffice alone to merit judicial power, but is the fundamental part of that perfection to which the judicial power corresponds. Therefore, among those things regarding perfection which follow after poverty we may reckon both virginity and martyrdom and all the works of perfection: yet they do not rank as high as poverty, since the beginning of a thing is its chief part.

Or we may reply that, as some say, three things are requisite for the judicial power: first, that one renounce temporal cares, lest the mind be hindered from the contemplation of wisdom; second, that one possess divine justice by way of habit, both as to knowledge and as to observance; third, that one should have taught others this same justice; and this teaching will be the perfection whereby a man merits to have judicial power.

Which of these opinions is nearer the truth we cannot know for certain. Yet I think it truer to say that just as, among the saved, order will be observed so that some will be enlightened and perfected by others (because all the orders of the heavenly hierarchies will continue forever),¹ so, too, will order be observed in punishments, men being punished by demons, lest the divine order, whereby the angels are placed between the human nature and the divine, be entirely set aside. Wherefore, just as the divine illuminations are conveyed to men by the good angels, so too the demons execute the divine justice on the wicked. Nor does this in any way diminish the punishment of the demons, since even in torturing others they are themselves tortured, because then the fellowship of the unhappy will not lessen but will increase unhappiness.

There is, however, this difference: that merit exalts, whereas sin debases. Therefore, since the angelic nature is higher than the human, some on account of the excellence of their merit will be so far exalted as to be raised above the angels both in nature and rewards,¹ so that some angels will be enlightened by some men. On the other hand, no human sinners will, on account of a certain degree of virtue, attain to the eminence that attaches to the nature of the demons.

But there is no discussion of merits save where good and evil merits are mingled together. Now those who build on the foundation of faith, gold, silver, and precious stones (1 Cor 3:12), by devoting themselves wholly to the divine service, and who have no notable admixture of evil merit, are not subjected to a discussion of their merits. Such are those who have entirely renounced the things of the world and are solicitously thoughtful of the things that are of God: wherefore they will be saved but will not be judged. Others, however, build on the foundation of faith, wood, hay, stubble;¹ they, in fact, love worldly things and are busy about earthly concerns, yet so as to prefer nothing to Christ, but strive to redeem their sins with alms, and these have an admixture of good with evil merits. Hence they are subjected to a discussion of their merits, and consequently in this account will be judged, and yet they will be saved.

The arguments in the contrary sense consider judgment as regards the payment of rewards.

The argument in the contrary sense considered the judgment of retribution.

But if we speak of the judgment of retribution, we must distinguish a twofold retribution. One corresponds to the angels’ personal merits. This was made from the beginning both for those raised to bliss and those plunged into misery. The other corresponds to the merits, good or evil, procured through the angels, and this retribution will be made in the judgment to come, because the good angels will have an increased joy in the salvation of those whom they have prompted to deeds of merit, while the wicked will have an increase of torment through the manifold downfall of those whom they have incited to evil deeds.

Consequently, the judgment will not regard the angels directly neither as judging nor as judged, but only men; but it will regard the angels indirectly somewhat, insofar as they were concerned in men’s deeds.

The same answer applies to the third objection.

Likewise, man will not need the second service as to intellective knowledge, since by that knowledge he will see God immediately in his essence. The carnal eye, however, will be unable to attain to this vision of the essence; wherefore that it may be fittingly comforted in the vision of God, it will see divinity in its corporeal effects, wherein manifest proofs of the divine majesty will appear, primarily in Christ’s flesh, and secondarily in the bodies of the blessed, and afterwards in all other bodies. Hence those bodies also will need to receive a greater inflow from the divine goodness than now, not indeed so as to change their species, but so as to add a certain perfection of glory: and such will be the renewal of the world. Wherefore at the one and the same time, the world will be renewed and man will be glorified.

Others say that the movement of the heaven will cease naturally. But this again is false, since every body that is moved naturally has a place in which it rests naturally, to which it is moved naturally, and to which it is not moved except by violence. Now no such place can be assigned to the heavenly body, since it is not more natural to the sun to move towards a point in the east than to move away from it, wherefore either its movement would not be altogether natural, or its movement would not naturally terminate in rest.

Hence we must agree with others who say that the movement of the heaven will cease at this renewal of the world, not indeed by any natural cause, but as a result of the will of God. For the body in question, like other bodies, was made to serve man in the two ways above mentioned (A. 1): and hereafter in the state of glory man will no longer need one of these services, namely, that in respect of which the heavenly bodies serve man for the sustenance of his bodily life. Now in this way the heavenly bodies serve man by their movement, insofar as by the heavenly movement the human race is multiplied, plants and animals needful for man’s use generated, and the temperature of the atmosphere rendered conducive to health. Therefore, the movement of the heavenly body will cease as soon as man is glorified.

The same answer applies to the second objection, that the Lord is speaking there of the duration of the seed of Israel with regard to the present state. This is evident from the words: then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a nation before me forever. For after this state there will be no succession of days: wherefore the laws also which he had mentioned will cease after this state.

Or it may refer to the desire of the future renewal which it awaits from the divine disposal.

Or, according to some, the heaven will rest in that situation wherein it was made, else one of its revolutions would remain incomplete. But this argument seems improbable, for since a revolution of the heaven takes no less than 36,000 years to complete, it would follow that the world must last that length of time, which does not seem probable. Moreover, according to this it would be possible to know when the world will come to an end. For we may conclude with probability from astronomers in what position the heavenly bodies were made, by taking into consideration the number of years that have elapsed since the beginning of the world; and in the same way it would be possible to know the exact number of years it would take them to return to a like position: whereas the time of the world’s end is stated to be unknown.

We grant the other objections which argue in the contrary sense (namely, the first three) because they conclude in due manner. But since the remaining two seem to conclude that the movement of heaven will cease naturally, we must reply to them.

To the first, then, we reply that movement ceases when its purpose is attained, provided this is a sequel to, and does not accompany, the movement. Now the purpose of the heavenly movement, according to philosophers, accompanies that movement, namely, the imitation of the divine goodness in the causality of that movement with respect to this lower world. Hence it does not follow that this movement ceases naturally.

To the second we reply that although immobility is simply nobler than movement, yet movement in a subject which thereby can acquire a perfect participation of the divine goodness is nobler than rest in a subject which is altogether unable to acquire that perfection by movement. For this reason the earth, which is the lowest of the elements, is without movement: even though God, who is exalted above all things, is without movement, by whom the more noble bodies are moved. Hence also it is that the movements of the higher bodies might be held to be perpetual, so far as their natural power is concerned, and never to terminate in rest, although the movement of lower bodies terminates in rest.

Others, however, with greater probability, take this diminishment to mean not a real lessening of light, but a lessening in reference to man’s use; because after sin man did not receive as much benefit from the light of the heavenly bodies as before. In the same sense we read: cursed is the earth in your work: thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to you (Gen 3:17–18), although it would have brought forth thorns and thistles before sin, but not as a punishment to man.

Nor does it follow that, supposing the light of the heavenly bodies not to have been lessened essentially through man sinning, it will not really be increased at man’s glorification. For man’s sin wrought no change upon the state of the universe, since both before and after sin man had an animal life, which needs the movement and generation of a corporeal creature; whereas man’s glorification will bring a change upon the state of all corporeal creatures, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 7). Hence there is no comparison.

But this is not in harmony with the authority and commentaries of holy men. Consequently, we must answer this argument by saying that although the heavenly bodies far surpass the human body, yet the rational soul surpasses the heavenly bodies far more than these surpass the human body. Hence it is not unreasonable to say that the heavenly bodies were made for man’s sake; not, however, as though this were the principal end, since the principal end of all things is God.

Or we may say that, though the whole earth be glorified, the wicked will nevertheless be in exterior darkness, since even the fire of hell, while shining for them in one respect, will be unable to enlighten them in another.

But plants and animals are not adapted to the renewal of incorruption, as stated above. Therefore, for this very reason man did not merit that they should be renewed, since no one can merit for another, or even for himself, that which another or himself is incapable of receiving. Hence, granted even that dumb animals merited by serving man, it would not follow that they are to be renewed.

But this opinion is altogether untenable. First, because it is in contradiction to the authority of canonical scripture, as Augustine declares (On Seeing God 147). Second, because, since understanding is an operation most proper to man, it follows that his happiness must be held to consist in that operation when perfected in him. Now since the perfection of an intelligent being as such is the intelligible object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect man does not attain to the vision of the divine essence, but to something else, we shall be forced to conclude that something other than God is the object of man’s happiness: and since the ultimate perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it follows that something other than God is the effective principle of man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to the philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from the separate substances, so that finally we may be able to understand these substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be asserted that our intellect will at length attain to the vision of the divine essence, and according to the philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of separate substances.

It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some, like Alpharabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our intellect understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to the vision of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two arguments. The first is that just as the specific nature is not diversified in various individuals, except as united to various individuating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in me and you, except insofar as it is united to various imaginary forms.

Consequently, when the intellect separates the idea understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a quiddity understood, which is one and the same in the various persons understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which it abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says (Metaphysics iii). On the other hand, if the quiddity abstracted from this particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that the intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and consequently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to some quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we understand by a separate quiddity.¹

But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is not of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities of material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the divine essence, which more than any other is of a different nature from any created quiddity. Second, because granted that it be of the same nature, nevertheless the knowledge of a composite thing would not lead to the knowledge of a separate substance, except in the point of the most remote genus, namely substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect unless it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man only as an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially: and much less is it to know only the nature of substance in him. Hence to know God thus, or other separate substances, is not to see the essence of God or the quiddity of a separate substance, but to know him in his effect and as in a mirror.

For this reason Avicenna in his Metaphysics propounds another way of understanding separate substances: namely, that separate substances are understood by us by means of intentions of their quiddities, such intentions being images of their substances; not indeed abstracted therefrom, since they are immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls.

But this way also seems inadequate to the divine vision which we seek. For it is agreed that whatever is received into any thing is therein after the mode of the recipient: and consequently the likeness of the divine essence impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode of our intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect reception of the divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness may occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way there is a deficient likeness, when the form is participated according to the same specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection: such is the defective likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in comparison with one that has much.

In another way, the likeness is yet more defective when it does not attain to the same specific nature but only to the same generic nature: such is the likeness of an orange-colored or yellowish object in comparison with a white one. In another way, still more defective is the likeness when it does not attain to the same generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a being: and in this way every likeness received into a creature is defective in comparison with the divine essence. Now in order that the sight know whiteness, it is necessary for it to receive the likeness of whiteness according to its specific nature, although not according to the same manner of being, because the form has a manner of being in the sense different from that which it has in the thing outside the soul: for if the form of yellowness were received into the eye, the eye would not be said to see whiteness. In like manner, in order that the intellect understand a quiddity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness according to the same specific nature, although there may possibly not be the same manner of being on either side: for the form which is in the intellect or sense is not the principle of knowledge according to its manner of being on both sides, but according to its common ratio with the external object. Hence it is clear that by no likeness received in the created intellect can God be understood, so that his essence be seen immediately. And for this reason those who held the divine essence to be seen in this way alone said that the essence itself will not be seen, but a certain brightness, as it were a radiance thereof. Consequently, neither does this way suffice for the divine vision that we seek.

Therefore, we must take the other way, which also certain philosophers held, namely, Alexander and Averroes (On the Soul 3). For since in every knowledge some form is required whereby the object is known or seen, this form by which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate substances is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect from composite things, as the first opinion maintained, nor an impression left on our intellect by the separate substance, as the second opinion affirmed; but the separate substance itself united to our intellect as its form, so as to be both that which is understood, and that whereby it is understood. And whatever may be the case with other separate substances, we must nevertheless allow this to be our way of seeing God in his essence, because by whatever other form our intellect were informed, it could not be led thereby to the divine essence.

This, however, must not be understood as though the divine essence were in reality the form of our intellect, or as though from its conjunction with our intellect there resulted one being simply, as in natural things from the natural form and matter: but the meaning is that the proportion of the divine essence to our intellect is as the proportion of form to matter. For whenever two things, one of which is the perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient, the proportion of one to the other, namely, of the more perfect to the less perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter: thus light and color are received into a transparent object, light being to color as form to matter. When, therefore, intellectual light is received into the soul together with the indwelling divine essence, though they are not received in the same way, the divine essence will be to the intellect as form to matter.

That this suffices for the intellect to be able to see the divine essence by the divine essence itself may be shown as follows. As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being) and matter, there results one thing simply, so from the form whereby the intellect understands, and the intellect itself, there results one thing intelligibly. Now in natural things a self-subsistent thing cannot be the form of any matter, if that thing has matter as one of its parts, since it is impossible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if this self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders it from being the form of some matter and becoming that whereby the composite itself is¹ as instanced in the soul. Now in the intellect we must take the intellect itself in potentiality as matter, and the intelligible species as form; so that the intellect actually understanding will be the composite, as it were, resulting from both. Hence if there be a self-subsistent thing that has nothing in itself besides that which is intelligible, such a thing can by itself be the form whereby the intellect understands. Now a thing is intelligible in respect of its actuality and not of its potentiality (Metaphysics ix): in proof of which an intelligible form needs to be abstracted from matter and from all the properties of matter. Therefore, since the divine essence is pure act, it will be possible for it to be the form whereby the intellect understands: and this will be the beatific vision. Hence the Master says (Sentences II, D. 1) that the union of the body with the soul is an illustration of the blissful union of the spirit with God.

We may also reply that proportion, according to the strict sense in which it is employed, signifies a ratio of quantity to quantity based on a certain fixed excess or equality; but is further transferred to denote any ratio of any one thing to another; and in this sense we say that matter should be proportionate to its form. In this sense nothing hinders our intellect, although finite, being described as proportionate to the vision of the divine essence; but not to the comprehension thereof, on account of its immensity.

Nevertheless, although the divine essence is more distant, as to the property of its nature, from our intellect, than is the substance of an angel, it surpasses it in the point of intelligibility, since it is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, which is not the case with other separate substances. Nor will that knowledge whereby we shall see God in his essence be in the genus of accident as regards that whereby he will be seen, but only as regards the act of the one who understands him, for this act will not be the very substance either of the person understanding or of the thing understood.

But when it understands other things, the object actually understood becomes one with the intellect in act, insofar as the form of the object understood becomes the form of the intellect inasmuch as the intellect is in act; not that it becomes identified with the essence of the intellect, as Avicenna proves (De Naturalibus vi), because the essence of the intellect remains one under two forms whereby it understands two things in succession, in the same way as prime matter remains one under various forms. Hence also the Commentator (On the Soul 3) compares the potential intellect, in this respect, to prime matter. Thus it by no means follows that our intellect in seeing God becomes the very essence of God, but that the latter is compared to it as its perfection or form.

Accordingly, in the heavenly vision there will be no third medium, namely, so that God be known by the images of other things, as he is known now, for which reason we are said to see now in a glass: nor will there be the second medium, because the essence itself of God will be that whereby our intellect will see God. But there will only be the first medium, which will upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for it to be united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid manner. Yet this medium will not cause that knowledge to be mediate, because it does not come in between the knower and the thing known, but is that which gives the knower the power to know.¹

Moreover, the likeness of the corporeal object is received into the sight according to the same ratio as it is in the object, although not according to the same mode of being.

Wherefore this likeness leads to the object directly, whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in this way to God, as shown above: and for this reason the comparison fails.

I say then that God can in no way be seen with the eyes of the body, or perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen directly, neither here, nor in heaven: for if that which belongs to sense as such be removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that which belongs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be no sight. Accordingly, seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and sight as such a sense perceives color, it is impossible for the sight to perceive that which is neither color nor magnitude, unless we call it a sense equivocally. Since, then, sight and sense will be specifically the same in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be impossible for it to see the divine essence as an object of direct vision.

Yet it will see it as an object of indirect vision, because on the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in bodies, especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body of Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so clearly that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our intellect will not then see God from seeing his creatures, yet it will see God in his creatures seen corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally is indicated by Augustine (The City of God 22), as is clear if we take note of his words, for he says: it is very credible that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by those that are made, but as when we see men we do not believe but see that they live.

Now it is impossible for a created intellect, by seeing the divine essence, to know all that God can do, because the more perfectly a principle is known, the more things are known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who is quick of intelligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of intelligence. Since, then, the extent of the divine power is measured according to what it can do, if an intellect were to see in the divine essence all that God can do, its perfection in understanding would equal in extent the divine power in producing its effects, and thus it would comprehend the divine power, which is impossible for any created intellect to do.

Yet there is a created intellect, namely, the soul of Christ,¹ which knows in the Word all that God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding others who see the divine essence there are two opinions. For some say that all who see God in his essence see all that God sees by his knowledge of vision. This, however, is contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that according to faith all the angels see God in his essence.

Wherefore others say that others than Christ, although they see God in his essence, do not see all that God sees because they do not comprehend the divine essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause should know all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not in the competency of a created intellect. Consequently, of those who see God in his essence, each one sees in his essence so much the more things according as he sees the divine essence the more clearly: and hence it is that one is able to instruct another concerning these things. Thus the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints can go on increasing until the day of judgment, even as other things pertaining to the accidental reward. But afterwards it will increase no more, because then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is possible that all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision.

We may also reply that in a material mirror both object and mirror are seen under their proper image, although the mirror be seen through an image received from the thing itself, whereas the stone is seen through its proper image reflected in some other thing, where the reason for seeing the one is the reason for seeing the other. But in the uncreated mirror a thing is seen through the form of the mirror, just as an effect is seen through the image of its cause and conversely. Consequently, it does not follow that whoever sees the eternal mirror sees all that is reflected in that mirror: since he who sees the cause does not of necessity see all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause.

Sometimes, however, ignorance is taken in a broad sense of any kind of nescience: and thus the angels and saints in heaven will be ignorant of certain things. Hence Dionysius says (On the Divine Names 4) that the angels will be cleansed from their ignorance. In this sense ignorance is not a penalty but a defect. Nor is it necessary for all such defects to be done away with by glory: for thus we might say that it was a defect in Pope Linus that he did not attain to the glory of Peter.

We may also say that the soul’s happiness will increase in intensity.¹ For man’s body may be considered in two ways: first, as being dependent on the soul for its completion; second, as containing something that hampers the soul in its operations, through the soul not perfectly completing the body. As regards the first way of considering the body, its union with the soul adds a certain perfection to the soul, since every part is imperfect, and is completed in its whole; wherefore the whole is to the part as form to matter. Consequently, the soul is more perfect in its natural being when it is in the whole—namely, man who results from the union of soul and body—than when it is a separate part.

But as regards the second consideration the union of the body hampers the perfection of the soul, wherefore it is written that the corruptible body is a load upon the soul (Wis 9:15). If, then, there be removed from the body all those things wherein it hampers the soul’s action, the soul will be simply more perfect while existing in such a body than when separated therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in being, the more perfectly is it able to operate: wherefore the operation of the soul united to such a body will be more perfect than the operation of the separated soul. But the glorified body will be a body of this description, being altogether subject to the spirit. Therefore, since beatitude consists in an operation,¹ the soul’s happiness after its reunion with the body will be more perfect than before. For just as the soul separated from a corruptible body is able to operate more perfectly than when united thereto, so after it has been united to a glorified body its operation will be more perfect than while it was separated. Now every imperfect thing desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul naturally desires reunion with the body, and on account of this desire which proceeds from the soul’s imperfection, its operation whereby it is borne towards God is less intense. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12.35) that on account of the body’s desire, it is held back from tending with all its might to that sovereign good.

In the first way, the mansions are distinguished according to the charity of heaven, which, the more perfect it will be in any one, the more will it render him capable of the divine clarity, on the increase of which will depend the increase in perfection of the divine vision.

In the second way, the mansions are distinguished according to the charity of the way. For our actions are meritorious not by the very substance of the action, but only by the habit of virtue with which they are informed. Now every virtue obtains its meritorious efficacy from charity, which has the end itself for its object.¹ Hence the diversity of merit is all traced to the diversity of charity, and thus the charity of the way will distinguish the mansions by way of merit.