I answer that, As stated in Sirach 10:15, pride is the beginning of all sin, because thereby man clings to his own judgment, and strays from the divine commandments. Consequently, that which destroys sin must make man give up his own judgment. Now, he that persists in his own judgment is called metaphorically rigid and hard: wherefore anyone is said to be broken when he is torn from his own judgment. But in material things, whence these expressions are transferred to spiritual things, there is a difference between breaking and crushing or contrition, as stated in Meteorology 4, in that we speak of breaking when a thing is sundered into large parts, but of crushing or contrition when that which was in itself solid is reduced to minute particles. And since, for the remission of sin, it is necessary that man should put aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a certain state of continuity and solidity in his mind, therefore it is that the act through which sin is cast aside is called contrition metaphorically.

I answer that, Contrition as to the literal signification of the word does not denote an act of virtue, but a corporeal passion. But the question in point does not refer to contrition in this sense, but to that which the word is employed to signify by way of metaphor. For just as the inflation of one’s own will unto wrong-doing implies, in itself, a generic evil, so the utter undoing and crushing of that same will implies something generically good, for this is to detest one’s own will whereby sin was committed. Wherefore contrition, which signifies this, implies rectitude of the will; and so it is the act of that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the act, namely, of penance, as is evident from what was said above (Sentences IV, D. 14, Q. 1: Q. 85, A. 2–3).

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question: for some say that attrition may become contrition, even as lifeless faith becomes living faith. But seemingly this is impossible; since, although the habit of lifeless faith becomes living, yet never does an act of lifeless faith become an act of living faith, because the lifeless act passes away and remains no more, as soon as charity comes. Now attrition and contrition do not denote a habit, but an act only: and those habits of infused virtue which regard the will cannot be lifeless, since they result from charity, as stated above (Sentences III, D. 27, Q. 2, A. 4; I, Q. 65, A. 4). Hence, until grace is infused, there is no habit by which afterwards the act of contrition may be elicited; so that attrition can in no way become contrition: and this is the other opinion.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), contrition implies the crushing of something hard and whole. Now this wholeness and hardness is found in the evil of fault, since the will, which is the cause thereof in the evil-doer, sticks to its own ground, and refuses to yield to the precept of the law, wherefore displeasure at such an evil is called metaphorically ‘contrition.’ But this metaphor cannot be applied to evil of punishment, because punishment simply denotes a lessening, so that it is possible to have sorrow for punishment but not contrition.

I answer that, Contrition is sorrow respecting and, so to speak, crushing the hardness of the will, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Consequently, it can regard those sins only which result in us through the hardness of our will. And as original sin was not brought upon us by our own will, but contracted from the origin of our infected nature, it follows that, properly speaking, we cannot have contrition on its account, but only displeasure or sorrow.

I answer that, Every actual sin is caused by our will not yielding to God’s law, either by transgressing it, or by omitting it, or by acting beside it: and since a hard thing is one that is disposed not to give way easily, hence it is that a certain hardness of the will is to be found in every actual sin. Wherefore, if a sin is to be remedied, it needs to be taken away by contrition which crushes it.

I answer that, In every series of things moving and moved ordained to one another, we find that the inferior mover has its proper movement, and besides this, it follows in some respect the movement of the superior mover: this is seen in the movement of the planets, which, in addition to their proper movements, follow the movement of the first heaven. Now, in all the moral virtues, the first mover is prudence, which is called the charioteer of the virtues. Consequently, each moral virtue, in addition to its proper movement, has something of the movement of prudence: and therefore, since penance is a moral virtue, as it is a part of justice, in addition to its own act it acquires the movement of prudence.

I answer that, The same thing is crushed which hitherto was hard and whole. Hence contrition for sin must be in the same subject in which the hardness of sin was hitherto: so that there is no contrition for the sins of others.

I answer that, Contrition may be considered in two ways: as to its origin, and as to its term. By origin of contrition I mean the process of thought when a man thinks of his sin and is sorry for it, even if without the sorrow of contrition, but with only that of attrition. The term of contrition is when that sorrow is already informed by grace. Accordingly, as regards the origin of contrition, a man needs to be contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as regards its term, it suffices for him to have one general contrition for all, because then the movement of his contrition acts in virtue of all his preceding dispositions.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 1, A. 2), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and is the very essence of contrition, being nothing else than displeasure at past sin, and this sorrow in contrition surpasses all other sorrows. For the more pleasing a thing is, the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the last end is above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us away from the last end, should be, above all things, displeasing.

I answer that, Contrition as regards the sorrow in the reason, i.e., the displeasure whereby the sin is displeasing through being an offense against God, cannot be too great; even as neither can the love of charity be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow, contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction of the body may be too great. In all these things the rule should be the safeguarding of the subject, and of that general well-being which suffices for the fulfilment of one’s duties; hence it is written: present your bodies . . . a reasonable sacrifice (Rom 12:1).

I answer that, We may speak of contrition in two ways: first, insofar as it corresponds to each single sin, and thus, as regards the sorrow in the higher appetite, a man ought to be more sorry for a more grievous sin, because there is more reason for sorrow, viz. the offense against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more inordinate the act is, the more it offends God. In like manner, since the greater sin deserves a greater punishment, the sorrow also of the sensitive part, insofar as it is voluntarily undergone for sin as the punishment thereof, ought to be greater where the sin is greater. But insofar as the emotions of the lower appetite result from the impression of the higher appetite, the degree of sorrow depends on the disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of impressions from the higher faculty, and not on the greatness of the sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 3, A. 1), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the sin committed; the other is in the sensitive part, and results from the former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of the present state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end of the way. Hence, since past sin retards the course of our life towards God (because the time which was given to us for the course cannot be recovered), it follows that the state of contrition remains during the whole of this lifetime as regards the detestation of sin. The same is to be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the will as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow ought to remain during the whole of man’s eternity, i.e., during the whole of the state of this life. For this reason Hugh of St. Victor says that when God absolves a man from eternal guilt and punishment, he binds him with a chain of eternal detestation of sin.¹

I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethics 2.6–7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance, there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity or as to its duration, except insofar as the act of one virtue hinders the act of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently, the more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he ought to.

I answer that, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first, its genus, which is sorrow; second, its form, for it is an act of virtue informed by charity; third, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory. Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly country cannot have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by reason of the fullness of their joy: those which are in hell have no contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which informs sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for their sins that is informed by grace, yet it is not meritorious, for they are not in the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these three can be found.

I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two ways: either as part of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments (Sentences IV, D. 1, Q. 1, A. 4; III, Q. 62, A. 1); while, as an act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin’s forgiveness. For a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification, and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise in the case of an agent’s disposition to act, because this is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.

I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways. First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt, but also the remission of all punishment. Second, on the part of the sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice for the remission of both guilt and punishment.

I answer that, As we have often said (Q. 1, A. 2; Q. 3, A. 1; Q. 4, A. 1), contrition includes a twofold sorrow. One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e.g., if a sin were less displeasing to a man than separation from his last end ought to be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity. The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor again is it under our control.

I answer that, Christ’s Passion, without the power of which neither original nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the reception of the sacraments, which derive their efficacy from it. Therefore, for the remission of both actual and original sin a sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently, those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin (which is incompatible with salvation) are necessary for salvation: and so just as baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for salvation, so also is the sacrament of penance. And just as a man through asking to be baptized submits to the ministers of the Church, to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that, through the sacrament of penance dispensed by him, he may receive the pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the penitent’s confession. Therefore, confession is necessary for the salvation of a man who has fallen into actual mortal sin.

I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the sacraments. And since the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but a product of a certain innate power, as Cicero states (On Rhetorical Invention 2), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but of the divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is sometimes called natural, insofar as whatever a thing derives from its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature. But such things are above nature as God reserves to himself; and these are wrought either through the agency of nature, in the working of miracles, in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is according to divine but not natural law.

I answer that, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into mortal sin after baptism.

I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what is on his conscience.

I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition, namely, when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to have the purpose of confessing.

I answer that, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church which is founded by God. Thus they need to be appointed by the Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone, who is the foundation of the Church. Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be saved without baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, insofar as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however, dispense from confession, insofar as it is obligatory in virtue of the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.

I answer that, Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which is a kind of manifestation; second, the matter manifested, which is sin; third, the person to whom the manifestation is made, who is the priest; fourth, its cause, which is hope of pardon; fifth, its effect, which is release from part of the punishment and the obligation to pay the other part. Accordingly, the first definition, given by Augustine, indicates the substance of the act, by saying that it lays bare; the matter of confession, by saying that it is a hidden disease; its cause, which is the hope of pardon; while the other definitions include one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter.

I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 6–7; II-II, Q. 80; Q. 85, A. 3; Q. 109, A. 3), for an act to belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply some condition belonging to virtue. Now, although confession does not include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his conscience: for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips what he does not hold in his heart, it is not a confession but a fiction. Now, to express in words what one has in one’s thoughts is a condition of virtue; and, consequently, confession is a good thing generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it be devoid of other due circumstances.

I answer that, It must be observed with regard to virtues that when a special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above the object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence, although the ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality, as appears from Ethics (2.7; 4.1). The same applies to the confession of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth absolutely, yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness, begins to belong to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethics 4.7) that a confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue of justice rather than to truth. In like manner, the confession of God’s favors in praise of God belongs not to truth, but to religion: and so too the confession of sins, in order to receive pardon for them, is not the elicited act of the virtue of truth, as some say, but of the virtue of penance. It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, insofar as the act of confession can be directed to the end of many virtues.

I answer that, The grace which is given in the sacraments descends from the Head to the members. Thus, he alone who exercises a ministry over Christ’s true body is a minister of the sacraments, wherein grace is given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in the sacrament of penance, none but a priest is the minister of the sacrament: and consequently sacramental confession, which should be made to a minister of the Church, should be made to none but a priest.

I answer that, Just as baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is penance. And baptism, through being a necessary sacrament, has a twofold minister: one whose duty it is to baptize in virtue of his office, who is the priest, and another, to whom the conferring of baptism is committed in a case of necessity. In like manner, the minister of penance, to whom in virtue of his office confession should be made, is a priest; but in a case of necessity even a layman may take the place of a priest, and hear a person’s confession.

I answer that, By venial sin man is separated neither from God nor from the sacraments of the Church: wherefore he does not need to receive any further grace for the forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be reconciled to the Church. Consequently, a man does not need to confess his venial sins to a priest. And since confession made to a layman is a sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, and since it proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to remit sins, just as the beating of one’s breast, or the sprinkling of holy water.¹

I answer that, The other sacraments do not consist in an action of the recipient, but only in his receiving something, as is evident with regard to baptism and so forth, though the action of the recipient is required as removing an obstacle, i.e., insincerity, in order that he may receive the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of his free-will. On the other hand, the action of the man who approaches the sacrament of penance is essential to the sacrament, since contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are acts of the penitent, are parts of penance. Now our actions, since they have their origin in us, cannot be dispensed by others, except through their command. Hence whoever is appointed a dispenser of this sacrament must be such as to be able to command something to be done. Now a man is not competent to command another unless he have jurisdiction over him. Consequently, it is essential to this sacrament not only for the minister to be in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has no jurisdiction cannot administer this sacrament any more than one who is not a priest. Therefore, confession should be made not only to a priest, but to one’s own priest; for since a priest does not absolve a man except by binding him to do something, he alone can absolve, who, by his command, can bind the penitent to do something.

I answer that, A priest may be hindered in two ways from hearing a man’s confession: first, through lack of jurisdiction; second, through being prevented from exercising his order, as those who are excommunicate, degraded, and so forth. Now, whoever has jurisdiction can depute to another whatever comes under his jurisdiction; so that if a priest is hindered from hearing a man’s confession through want of jurisdiction, anyone who has immediate jurisdiction over that man, priest, bishop, or Pope, can depute that priest to hear his confession and absolve him. If, on the other hand, the priest cannot hear the confession on account of an impediment to the exercise of his order, anyone who has the power to remove that impediment can permit him to hear confessions.

I answer that, If we consider the power of the keys, every priest has power over all men equally and over all sins: and it is due to the fact that, by the ordination of the Church, he has a limited jurisdiction or none at all that he cannot absolve all men from all sins. But since necessity knows no law (Decretals) in cases of necessity the ordination of the Church does not hinder him from being able to absolve, since he has the keys sacramentally: and the penitent will receive as much benefit from the absolution of this other priest as if he had been absolved by his own. Moreover, a man can then be absolved by any priest not only from his sins, but also from excommunication by whomsoever pronounced, because such absolution is also a matter of that jurisdiction which by the ordination of the Church is confined within certain limits.

I answer that, After the forgiveness of sin, a punishment is required for two reasons, viz. to pay the debt, and to afford a remedy. Hence the punishment may be imposed in consideration of two things. First, in consideration of the debt, and in this way the quantity of the punishment corresponds radically to the quantity of the fault before anything of the latter is forgiven: yet the more there is remitted by the first of those things which are of a nature to remit punishment, the less there remains to be remitted or paid by the other, because the more contrition remits of the punishment, the less there remains to be remitted by confession. Second, consideration of the remedy is either as regards the one who sinned, or as regards others: and thus sometimes a greater punishment is enjoined for a lesser sin; either because one man’s sin is more difficult to resist than another’s (thus a heavier punishment is imposed on a young man for fornication than on an old man, though the former’s sin be less grievous), or because one man’s sin, for instance, a priest’s, is more dangerous to others than another’s sin, or because the people are more prone to that particular sin, so that it is necessary by the punishment of the one man to deter others.

I answer that, Confession is an act of virtue and a part of a sacrament. Insofar as it is an act of virtue, it has the property of being meritorious, and thus is of no avail without charity, which is the principle of merit. But insofar as it is part of a sacrament, it subordinates the penitent to the priest who has the keys of the Church, and who by means of the confession knows the conscience of the person confessing. In this way it is possible for confession to be in one who is not contrite, for he can make his sins known to the priest, and subject himself to the keys of the Church: and though he does not receive the fruit of absolution then, yet he will begin to receive it when he is sincerely contrite, as happens in the other sacraments. Wherefore he is not bound to repeat his confession, but to confess his lack of sincerity.

I answer that, In prescribing medicine for the body, the physician should know not only the disease for which he is prescribing, but also the general constitution of the sick person, since one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which would be adapted to one disease would be harmful to another. The same is to be said in regard to sins, for one is aggravated when another is added to it; and a remedy which would be suitable for one sin might prove an incentive to another, since sometimes a man is guilty of contrary sins, as Gregory says (Book of Pastoral Rule 3.3). Hence it is necessary for confession that man confess all the sins that he calls to mind, and if he fails to do this, it is not a confession, but a pretense of confession.

I answer that, Confession is not only an act of virtue, but also part of a sacrament. Now, although insofar as it is an act of virtue it matters not how it is done, even if it be easier to do it in one way than in another, yet, insofar as it is part of a sacrament, it has a determinate act, just as the other sacraments have a determinate matter. And as in baptism, in order to signify the inward washing, we employ that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in the sacramental act which is intended for manifestation we generally make use of that act which is most commonly employed for the purpose of manifestation, that is, our own words; for other ways have been introduced as supplementary to this.

I answer that, Some of the above conditions are essential to confession, and some are requisite for its well-being. Now those things which are essential to confession belong to it either as to an act of virtue, or as part of a sacrament.

I answer that, Penance, as a sacrament, is perfected chiefly in confession, because by the latter a man submits to the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments: for contrition has the desire of confession united thereto, and satisfaction is enjoined according to the judgment of the priest who hears the confession. And since in the sacrament of penance, as in baptism, that grace is infused whereby sins are forgiven, therefore confession in virtue of the absolution granted remits guilt, even as baptism does. Now baptism delivers one from the death of sin not only by being received actually, but also by being received in desire, as is evident with regard to those who approach the sacrament of baptism after being already sanctified. And unless a man offers an obstacle, he receives, through the very fact of being baptized, grace whereby his sins are remitted, if they are not already remitted. The same is to be said of confession, to which absolution is added because it delivered the penitent from guilt through being previously in his desire. Afterwards at the time of actual confession and absolution he receives an increase of grace, and forgiveness of sins would also be granted to him, if his previous sorrow for sin was not sufficient for contrition, and if at the time he offered no obstacle to grace. Consequently, just as it is said of baptism that it delivers from death, so can it be said of confession.

I answer that, Confession together with absolution has the power to deliver from punishment for two reasons. First, from the power of absolution itself: and thus the very desire of absolution delivers a man from eternal punishment, as also from the guilt. Now this punishment is one of condemnation and total banishment, and when a man is delivered from that he still remains bound to a temporal punishment, insofar as punishment is a cleansing and perfecting remedy; and so this punishment remains to be suffered in purgatory even by those who have been delivered from the punishment of hell. Which temporal punishment is beyond the powers of the penitent dwelling in this world, but is so far diminished by the power of the keys that it is within the ability of the penitent, and he is able, by making satisfaction, to cleanse himself in this life.

I answer that, Guilt and the debt of punishment prevent a man from entering into paradise: and since confession removes these obstacles, as shown above (A. 1–2), it is said to open paradise.

I answer that, We can have no hope for the forgiveness of our sins except through Christ: and since by confession a man submits to the keys of the Church, which derive their power from Christ’s Passion, therefore do we say that confession gives hope of salvation.

I answer that, Confession produces its effect on the presupposition that there is contrition which blots out guilt: so that confession is directly ordained to the remission of punishment, which it causes in virtue of the shame which it includes, and by the power of the keys, to which a man submits by confessing. Now it happens sometimes that by previous contrition a sin has been blotted out as to the guilt, either in a general way (if it was not remembered at the time) or in particular (and yet is forgotten before confession), and then general sacramental confession works for the remission of the punishment in virtue of the keys, to which man submits by confessing, provided he offers no obstacle so far as he is concerned. Yet so far as the shame of confessing a sin diminishes its punishment, the punishment is not diminished for that man who does not express his shame for a sin before the priest.

I answer that, Those things which are done outwardly in the sacraments are the signs of what takes place inwardly: wherefore confession, whereby a man subjects himself to a priest, is a sign of the inward submission whereby one submits to God. Now God hides the sins of those who submit to him by penance; wherefore this also should be signified in the sacrament of penance, and consequently the sacrament demands that the confession should remain hidden, and he who divulges a confession sins by violating the sacrament. Besides this there are other advantages in this secrecy, because thereby men are more attracted to confession, and confess their sins with greater simplicity.

I answer that, The seal of confession does not extend directly to other matters than those which have reference to sacramental confession, yet indirectly matters also which are not connected with sacramental confession are affected by the seal of confession, those, for instance, which might lead to the discovery of a sinner or of his sin. Nevertheless, these matters also must be most carefully hidden, both on account of scandal and to avoid leading others into sin through their becoming familiar with it.

I answer that, The seal of confession affects the priest as minister of this sacrament: which seal is nothing else than the obligation of keeping the confession secret, even as the key is the power of absolving. Yet as one who is not a priest in a particular case has a kind of share in the act of the keys (when he hears a confession in a case of urgency) so also does he have a certain share in the act of the seal of confession, and is bound to secrecy, though properly speaking he is not bound by the seal of confession.

I answer that, There are two reasons for which the priest is bound to keep a sin secret: first and chiefly, because this very secrecy is essential to the sacrament, insofar as the priest knows that sin as it is known to God, whose place he holds in confession: second, in order to avoid scandal. Now the penitent can make the priest know, as a man, what he knew before only as God knows it, and he does this when he allows him to divulge it: so that if the priest does reveal it, he does not break the seal of confession. Nevertheless he should beware of giving scandal by revealing the sin, lest he be deemed to have broken the seal.

I answer that, There are three opinions about this question. For some say that a man can by no means tell another what he has heard in confession, even if he knew it from some other source either before or after the confession: while others assert that the confession debars him from speaking of what he knew already, but not from saying what he knew afterwards and in another way.

I answer that, An act is said to be the act of a virtue in two ways. First, materially; and thus any act which implies no malice or defect of a due circumstance may be called an act of virtue, because virtue can make use of any such act for its end, e.g., to walk, to speak, and so forth.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethics 5.3–4), the mean of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind, because the adverb satis, ‘enough,’ denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that satisfaction is formally an act of justice.

I answer that, Justice aims not only at removing inequality already existing by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethics 2.3) punishments are medicinal. Therefore, satisfaction, which is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins: so that when one man makes satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes heed for the future.

I answer that, Man becomes God’s debtor in two ways: first, by reason of favors received, second, by reason of sin committed: and just as thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed.

I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin. Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin the satisfaction of one does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by another’s fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing through the actions of another, except accidentally insofar as a man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another, since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin. But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction.

I answer that, Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sentences IV, D. 15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must be consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is renewal of friendship: therefore, if there be anything to hinder the renewal of friendship, there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore, every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to make satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither would a man make satisfaction who threw himself at another’s feet for having slapped him, and then gave him another slap.

I answer that, Some have said that if, when all a man’s sins have been pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction for them, he falls into sin and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction will be valid, so that if he die in that sin, he will not be punished in hell for the other sins.

I answer that, Some have said that works done while in a state of charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done without charity are informed so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious of eternal life.

I answer that, Properly speaking, a merit is an action on account of which it is just that the agent should be given something. Now justice is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards something due on the part of the recipient. Second, there is metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the part of the giver, for it may be right for the giver to give something to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the fitness of the divine goodness is justice; thus Anselm says (Proslogion 10) that God is just when he spares the sinner, because this is befitting. And in this way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of which the agent himself has a claim to receive something, and this is called merit of condignity. The second is an act the result of which is that there is a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness, wherefore it is called merit of congruity.

I answer that, Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two ways: first, as though one were delivered from the punishment which he already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment unless he be absolved from guilt (for an effect is not diminished or taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), the pain of hell cannot be mitigated by works done without charity, since they are unable to remove or diminish guilt.

I answer that, As stated above, satisfaction regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its means, and also future sin, from which we are preserved thereby: and in both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works. For compensation for an offense implies equality, which must be between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been taken. And, although nothing can be taken away from God so far as he is concerned, yet the sinner for his part deprives him of something by sinning as stated above. Consequently, in order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it needs to be good, that it may conduce to God’s honor, and it must be penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.

I answer that, Compensation for a past offense can be enforced either by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by another, such compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory nature, whereas when it is made by the offender it is also satisfactory. Consequently, if the scourges which are inflicted by God on account of sin become in some way the act of the sufferer, they acquire a satisfactory character. Now they become the act of the sufferer insofar as he accepts them for the cleansing of his sins by taking advantage of them patiently. If, however, he refuse to submit to them patiently, then they do not become his personal act in any way, and are not of a satisfactory, but merely of a vindictive, character.

I answer that, Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but three kinds of goods: bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or external goods. By almsgiving we deprive ourselves of some goods of fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of any of them, either in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God, but we should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.

I answer that, Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not conversely, the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act without the matter into which it passes, hence the habit of a virtue is possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for the reason that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its act—thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence, but not the act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof. And so, since the innocent in the state of innocence do not have sins that they have committed, which are the matter of repentance, but they could have had them, the act of repentance cannot exist in them, but the habit can. And it does if they have grace, with which all the virtues are infused.

I answer that, The cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but only as regards the acts which they exercise in respect of their end. Wherefore, since the virtue of penance is a part of justice which is a cardinal virtue, whoever has the habit of penance in this life will have it in the life to come. But he will not have the same act as now, but another, namely, thanksgiving to God for his mercy in pardoning his sins.

I answer that, In us, penance is taken in two senses: first, as a passion, and thus it is nothing but pain or sorrow on account of a sin committed; and though as a passion it is only in the concupiscible part, yet by way of comparison the name of penance is given to that act of the will, whereby a man detests what he has done, even as love and other passions are spoken of as though they were in the intellectual appetite.

I answer that, In material things a key is an instrument for opening a door. Now the door of the kingdom is closed to us through sin both as to the stain and as to the debt of punishment. Wherefore the power of removing this obstacle is called a key.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (On the Soul 2), powers are defined from their acts. Wherefore, since the key is a kind of power, it should be defined from its act or use, and reference to the act should include its object from which it takes its species, and the mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be well-ordered. Now the act of the spiritual power is to open heaven not absolutely, since it is already open, as stated above, but for this or that man; and this cannot be done in an orderly manner without due consideration of the worthiness of the one to be admitted to heaven. Hence the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, namely, power; the subject of the power, namely, the ecclesiastical judge; and the act, of excluding or admitting, corresponding to the two acts of a material key which are to open and shut. The object of which act is referred to in the words from the kingdom, and the mode in the words worthy and unworthy, because account is taken of the worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised.

I answer that, Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act. Therefore, in the act of justice, whereby a man is given what he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or power is necessary for both these things, for we cannot give save what we have in our power; nor can there be judgment without the right to enforce it, since judgment is determined to one particular thing, which determination it derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles which cannot be resisted, and in practical matters from the power of command vested in the one who judges. And since the act of the key requires fitness in the person on whom it is exercised—because the ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key, admits the worthy and excludes the unworthy, as may be seen from the definition given above—therefore the judge requires both judgment of discretion whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also the very act of receiving; and for both these things a certain power or authority is necessary. Accordingly, we may distinguish two keys, the first of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of the person to be absolved, while the other regards the absolution. These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since both belong to the minister by virtue of his office, but in comparison with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.

I answer that, According to Hugh, the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, contain an invisible grace (On the Sacraments 2). Now this sanctification is sometimes essential to the sacrament both as regards the matter and as regards the minister, as may be seen in confirmation, and then the sacramental virtue is in both together. Sometimes, however, the essence of the sacrament requires only sanctification of the matter, as in baptism, which has no fixed minister on whom it depends necessarily, and then the whole virtue of the sacrament is in the matter. Again, sometimes the essence of the sacrament requires the consecration or sanctification of the minister without any sanctification of the matter, and then the entire sacramental virtue is in the minister, as in penance. Hence the power of the keys which is in the priest stands in the same relation to the effect of penance as the virtue in the baptismal water does to the effect of baptism. Now baptism and the sacrament of penance agree somewhat in their effect, since each is directly ordained against guilt, which is not the case in the other sacraments.

I answer that, Whatever may be said of the effect of baptism conferred on one who has already received grace applies equally to the effect of the actual exercise of the power of the keys on one who has already been contrite. For a man may, through faith and contrition, obtain the grace of the remission of his sins as to their guilt previous to baptism; but when, afterwards, he actually receives baptism, his grace is increased, and he is entirely absolved from the debt of punishment, since he is then made a partaker of the Passion of Christ.

I answer that, The operation of the priest in using the keys is conformed to God’s operation, whose minister he is. Now God’s operation extends both to guilt and to punishment: to the guilt indeed, so as to loose it directly, but to bind it indirectly, insofar as he is said to harden when he withholds his grace. But his operation extends to punishment directly in both respects, because he both spares and inflicts it. In like manner, therefore, although the priest in absolving exercises an operation ordained to the remission of guilt in the way mentioned above (A. 1), nevertheless, in binding, he exercises no operation on the guilt (unless he be said to bind by not absolving the penitent and by declaring him to be bound). But he has the power both of binding and of loosing with regard to the punishment. For he looses from the punishment which he remits, while he binds as to the punishment which remains. This he does in two ways—first, as regards the quantity of the punishment considered in general, and thus he does not bind save by not loosing, and declaring the penitent to be bound; second, as regards this or that particular punishment, and thus he binds to punishment by imposing it.

I answer that, In using the keys, the priest acts as the instrument and minister of God. Now, no instrument can have an efficacious act except insofar as it is moved by the principal agent. Wherefore Dionysius says that priests should use their hierarchical powers according as they are moved by God (On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchies). A sign of this is that before the power of the keys was conferred on Peter mention is made of the revelation of divinity made to him (Matt 16:17); and before the power of forgiveness, the gift of the Holy Spirit is given to the apostles (John 20:22), for by it they act as sons of God (Rom 8:14). Consequently, if anyone were to presume to use his power against that divine motion, he would not realize the effect, as Dionysius states (On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchies). And besides, he would be turned away from the divine order, and consequently would be guilty of a sin.

I answer that, Some have held that, under the old law, the keys of the kingdom were in the hands of the priests, because the right of imposing punishment for sin was conferred on them, as related in Leviticus 5, which right seems to belong to the keys; but these keys were incomplete then, whereas now they are complete as perfected by Christ on the priests of the new law.

I answer that, The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in the principal agent, but not in the same way, since it is more perfectly in the latter. Now, like other sacramental powers, the power of the keys which we have is instrumental, whereas it is in Christ as principal agent in the matter of our salvation: by authority, if we consider him as God, by merit, if we consider him as man. But the very notion of a key expresses a power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or by an instrument. Consequently, we must admit that Christ had the key, but in a higher way than his ministers; hence he is said to have the key of excellence.

I answer that, There are two kinds of key. One reaches to heaven itself directly by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the entrance into heaven; and this is called the key of order. Priests alone have this key, because they alone are ordained for the people in the things which appertain to God directly.

I answer that, There is this difference between a principal and an instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce its own likeness in the effect, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently, a thing becomes a principal agent through having a form which it can reproduce in another, whereas an instrumental agent is not constituted thus, but through being applied by the principal agent in order to produce a certain effect. Since, therefore, in the act of the keys the principal agent by authority is Christ as God, and by merit is Christ as man, it follows that on account of the very fullness of divine goodness in him, and of the perfection of his grace, he is competent to exercise the act of the keys. But another man is not competent to exercise this act as principal agent, since neither can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he merit sufficiently; hence he is nothing more than an instrumental agent. Consequently, the recipient of the effect of the keys is likened not to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect of the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders.

I answer that, Just as participation of a form to be induced into an effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument. Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use of the keys, however much he may through sin be deprived of grace whereby sins are forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived of the use of the keys.

I answer that, In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter. For since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the person on whom they are used, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 2), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a man under one’s authority. And since it is by appointment of the Church that one man has authority over another, so a man may be deprived of his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors. Consequently, since the Church deprives heretics, schismatics, and the like by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in some respect, insofar as they are thus deprived they cannot have the use of the keys.

I answer that, That which has to do with singular matters is not equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general principles of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians who adapt those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is need for others to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to the Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the Angels, who are given charge over individual men, as we have explained above (I, Q. 113, A. 1–2). Consequently, there should be a like order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate authority over all should be vested in one individual, and that there should be others under him, having distinct authority over various people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power to exercise authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used becomes the proper matter of that act. Therefore, he that has power over all indiscriminately can use the keys on all, whereas those who have received authority over distinct persons cannot use the keys on everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in cases of necessity, when the sacraments should be refused to no one.

I answer that, The power of order, considered in itself, extends to the remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain matters to himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior; otherwise, any simple priest who has jurisdiction can absolve from any sin.

I answer that, The power of the keys, considered in itself, is applicable to all, as stated above (A. 2): and that a priest is unable to use the keys on some particular person is due to his power being limited to certain individuals. Therefore, he who limited his power can extend it to whom he wills, so that he can give him power over himself, although he cannot use the power of the keys on himself, because this power requires to be exercised on a subject and therefore on someone else, for no man can be subject to himself.

I answer that, When a man enters the Church by baptism, he is admitted to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation of the sacraments: and this latter presupposes the former, since the faithful are united together in the participation of the sacraments. Consequently, a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways. First, by being deprived merely of the participation of the sacraments, and this is the minor excommunication. Second, by being deprived of both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the definition. Nor can there be a third consisting in the privation of communion with the faithful but not of the participation of the sacraments, for the reason already given, namely because the faithful communicate together in the sacraments. Now, there are two things the faithful share in. They share in spiritual things, like mutual prayers and the agreement for receiving sacred things, which legal acts and licit communion are contained in these verses: if for his crimes anyone is made anathema, he is denied mouth, prayer, farewell, communion, table. He is denied mouth, namely, he may not be given a kiss of peace; prayer, lest we pray with those excommunicated; farewell, lest they be greeted; communion, namely, so that no one shares with them in the sacraments; table, lest anyone eat with them.

I answer that, The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways in order to draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving him to himself so that, being deprived of those helps whereby he was kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to God whom he had abandoned in his pride. In both these respects the Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the judgment of God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he may blush, she imitates the judgment whereby God chastises man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual things, she imitates the judgment of God in leaving man to himself, in order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.

I answer that, By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear from the definition of the keys (Q. 17, A. 2), and since no one becomes unworthy unless he loses charity (which is the way leading to the kingdom) by committing a mortal sin, it follows that no man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. And since by injuring a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act against charity, the Church can excommunicate a man for having inflicted temporal injury on anyone.

I answer that, An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First, on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through hatred or anger, and then nevertheless the excommunication takes effect, though its author sins, because the one who is excommunicated suffers justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him.

I answer that, In the tribunal of conscience the plea is between man and God, whereas in the outward tribunal it is between man and man. Thus, the loosing or binding of one man in relation to God alone belongs to the tribunal of penance, whereas the binding or loosing of a man in relation to other men belongs to the public tribunal of external judgment. And since excommunication severs a man from the communion of the faithful, it belongs to the external tribunal. Consequently, those alone can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the judicial tribunal. Hence of their own authority only bishops and higher prelates, according to the more common opinion, can excommunicate, whereas parish priests can do so only by commission or in certain cases, as those of theft, rape, and the like, in which the law allows them to excommunicate.

I answer that, Priests alone are competent to dispense the sacraments wherein grace is given: therefore, they alone can loose and bind in the tribunal of penance. On the other hand, excommunication regards grace not directly but consequently, insofar as it deprives a man of the Church’s prayers, by which he is disposed for grace or preserved therein. Consequently, even those who are not priests, provided they have jurisdiction in a contentious court, can excommunicate.

I answer that, Jurisdiction can only be used in relation to another man. Consequently, since every excommunicated person is severed from the communion of the faithful, he is deprived of the use of jurisdiction. And as excommunication requires jurisdiction, an excommunicated person cannot excommunicate.

I answer that, Since by jurisdiction a man is placed above those over whom he has jurisdiction through being their judge, it follows that no man has jurisdiction over himself, his superior, or his equal, and that, consequently, no one can excommunicate either himself, or his superior, or his equal.

I answer that, No man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now sin consists in an act: and acts do not belong to communities, but, generally speaking, to individuals. Wherefore individual members of a community can be excommunicated, but not the community itself.

I answer that, A man who is under sentence of one excommunication can be excommunicated again, either by a repetition of the same excommunication, for his greater shame so that he may renounce sin, or for some other cause. And then there are as many principal excommunications as there are causes for his being excommunicated.

I answer that, Excommunication is twofold: there is minor excommunication, which deprives a man merely of a share in the sacraments, but not of the communion of the faithful. Hence it is lawful to communicate with a person lying under an excommunication of this kind, but not to give him the sacraments.

I answer that, A person may incur excommunication in two ways. First, so that the excommunication includes both himself and whosoever communicates with him: and then, without any doubt, whoever communicates with him incurs a major excommunication. Second, so that the excommunication is simply pronounced on him; and then a man may communicate with him either in his crime, by counsel, help or favor, in which case again he incurs the major excommunication, or he may communicate with him in other things by speaking to him, greeting him, or eating with him, in which case he incurs the minor excommunication.

I answer that, Some hold that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, by word or in any of the forbidden ways mentioned above (A. 2), except in those cases allowed by law (Decretals). But since it seems very hard that a man should be guilty of a mortal sin by uttering just a slight word to an excommunicated person, and that by excommunicating a person one would endanger the salvation of many, and lay a snare which might turn to one’s own hurt, it seems to others more probable that he is not always guilty of a mortal sin, but only when he holds communion with him in a criminal deed, or in an act of divine worship, or through contempt of the Church.

I answer that, Anyone can absolve from minor excommunication who can absolve from the sin of participation in the sin of another. But in the case of a major excommunication, this is pronounced either by a judge, and then he who pronounced sentence or his superior can absolve, or it is pronounced by law, and then the bishop or even a priest can absolve except in the six cases which the Pope, who is the maker of laws, reserves to himself.

I answer that, Evil of fault and evil of punishment differ in this, that the origin of fault is within us, since all sin is voluntary, whereas the origin of punishment is sometimes without, since punishment does not need to be voluntary. In fact, the nature of punishment is rather to be against the will. Wherefore, just as a man commits no sin except willingly, so no sin is forgiven him against his will. On the other hand, just as a person can be excommunicated against his will, so can he be absolved therefrom.

I answer that, Excommunications are not connected together in any way, and so it is possible for a man to be absolved from one, and yet remain under another.

I answer that, All admit that indulgences have some value, for it would be blasphemy to say that the Church does anything in vain. But some say that they do not avail to free a man from the debt of punishment which he has deserved in purgatory according to God’s judgment, and that they merely serve to free him from the obligation imposed on him by the priest as a punishment for his sins, or from the canonical penalties he has incurred.

I answer that, On this point there are many opinions. For some maintain that indulgences have not the efficacy claimed for them, but that they simply avail each individual in proportion to his faith and devotion. And consequently those who maintain this say that the Church publishes her indulgences in such a way as to induce men to do well by a kind of pious fraud, just as a mother entices her child to walk by holding out an apple.

I answer that, Temporal things are subordinate to spiritual matters, since we must make use of temporal things on account of spiritual things. Consequently, an indulgence must not be granted for the sake of temporal matters as such, but insofar as they are subordinate to spiritual things: such as the quelling of the Church’s enemies, who disturb her peace; or such as the building of a church, of a bridge, and other forms of almsgiving. It is therefore evident that there is no simony in these transactions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged, not for a temporal but for a spiritual commodity.

I answer that, Indulgences are effective inasmuch as the works of satisfaction done by one person are applied to another not only by virtue of charity, but also by the intention of the person who did them being directed in some way to the person to whom they are applied. Now a person’s intention may be directed to another in three ways: specifically, generically and individually. Individually, as when one person offers satisfaction for another particular person; and thus anyone can apply his works to another. Specifically, as when a person prays for the congregation to which he belongs, for the members of his household, or for his benefactors, and directs his works of satisfaction to the same intention: in this way the superior of a congregation can apply those works to some other person by applying the intention of those who belong to his congregation to some fixed individual. Generically, as when a person directs his works for the good of the Church in general; and thus he who presides over the whole Church can communicate those works by applying his intention to this or that individual.

I answer that, The power of granting indulgences follows jurisdiction, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2). And since deacons and others, who are not priests, can have jurisdiction either delegated, as legates, or ordinary, as bishops elect, it follows that even those who are not priests can grant indulgences, although they cannot absolve in the tribunal of penance, since this follows the reception of holy orders.

I answer that, The Pope has the plenitude of pontifical power, being like a king in his kingdom: whereas the bishops are appointed to a share in his solicitude, like judges over each city. Hence them alone the Pope, in his letters, addresses as brethren, whereas he calls all others his sons. Therefore, the plenitude of the power of granting indulgences resides in the Pope, because he can grant them as he chooses, provided the cause be a lawful one: while, in bishops, this power resides subject to the Pope’s ordination, so that they can grant them within fixed limits and not beyond.

I answer that, The granting of indulgences belongs to jurisdiction. But a man does not, through sin, lose jurisdiction. Consequently, indulgences are equally valid whether they be granted by one who is in mortal sin, or by a most holy person; since he remits punishment, not by virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid up in the Church’s treasury.

I answer that, Some hold that indulgences avail those even who are in mortal sin for the acquiring of grace, but not for the remission of their punishment, since none can be freed from punishment who is not yet freed from guilt. For he who has not yet been reached by God’s operation unto the remission of guilt cannot receive the remission of his punishment from the minister of the Church, neither by indulgences nor in the tribunal of penance.

I answer that, Indulgences avail both seculars and religious, provided they have charity and satisfy the conditions for gaining the indulgences: for religious can be helped by indulgences no less than persons living in the world.

I answer that, Failing the condition of a grant, no grant ensues. Hence, as an indulgence is granted on the condition that a person does or gives a certain thing, if he fails in this, he does not gain the indulgence.

I answer that, An indulgence should be given for some reason, in order for anyone to be enticed by the indulgence to perform some action that conduces to the good of the Church and to the honor of God. Now the prelate to whom is committed the care of the Church’s good and of the furthering of God’s honor does not need to entice himself thereto. Therefore, he cannot grant an indulgence to himself alone; but he can avail himself of an indulgence that he grants for others, since it is based on a cause for granting it to them.

I answer that, Some penances should be public and solemn for four reasons. First, so that a public sin may have a public remedy; second, because he who has committed a very grave crime deserves the greatest shame even in this life; third, in order to deter others; fourth, that he may be an example of repentance, lest those should despair, who have committed grievous sins.

I answer that, Solemn penance ought not to be repeated for three reasons. First, lest frequency bring it into contempt. Second, on account of its signification; for it signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise, which happened only once. Third, because the solemnization indicates, in a way, that one makes profession of continual repentance. Therefore, repetition is inconsistent with solemnization.

I answer that, Every solemn penance is public, but not vice versa. For solemn penance is done as follows: on the first day of Lent, these penitents clothed in sackcloth, with bare feet, their faces to the ground, and their hair shorn away, accompanied by their priests, present themselves to the bishop of the city at the door of the church. Having brought them into the church, the bishop with all his clergy recites the seven penitential psalms, and then imposes his hand on them, sprinkles them with holy water, puts ashes on their heads, covers their shoulders with a hairshirt, and sorrowfully announces to them that as Adam was expelled from paradise, so are they expelled from the church. He then orders the ministers to put them out of the church, and the clergy follow reciting the responsory: in the sweat of your brow, etc. Every year on the day of our Lord’s Supper they are brought back into the church by their priests, and there shall they be until the octave day of Easter, without, however, being admitted to Communion or to the kiss of peace. This shall be done every year as long as entrance into the church is forbidden to them. The final reconciliation is reserved to the bishop, who alone can impose solemn penance (Cap. lxiv, dist. 50).

I answer that, Among the visible operations of the Church, some are sacraments, as baptism, and some are sacramentals, as exorcism. The difference between these is that a sacrament is an action of the Church that reaches to the principal effect intended in the administration of the sacraments, whereas a sacramental is an action which, though it does not reach to that effect, is nevertheless directed towards that principal action. Now the effect intended in the administration of the sacraments is the healing of the disease of sin: wherefore it is written: this is all the fruit, that the sin . . . should be taken away (Isa 27:9). Since, then, extreme unction reaches to this effect, as is clear from the words of James, and is not ordained to any other sacrament as an accessory to it, it is evident that extreme unction is not a sacramental but a sacrament.

I answer that, Strictly speaking, a thing is one numerically in three ways. First, as something indivisible, which is neither actually nor potentially several, such a point and unity. Second, as something continuous, which is actually one, but potentially several, such as a line. Third, as something complete that is composed of several parts, such as a house, which is, in a way, several things even actually, although those several things go together towards making one. In this way, each sacrament is said to be one thing inasmuch as the many things which are contained in one sacrament are united together for the purpose of signifying or causing one thing, because a sacrament is a sign of the effect it produces. Hence when one action suffices for a perfect signification, the unity of the sacrament consists in that action only, as may be seen in confirmation. When, however, the signification of the sacrament can be both in one and in several actions, then the sacrament can be complete both in one and in several actions, even as baptism in one immersion and in three, since the washing which is signified in baptism can be completed by one immersion and by several. But when the perfect signification cannot be expressed except by means of several actions, then these several actions are essential for the perfection of the sacrament, as is exemplified in the Eucharist, for the refreshment of the body which signifies that of the soul can only be attained by means of meat and drink. It is the same in this sacrament, because the healing of the internal wounds cannot be perfectly signified save by the application of the remedy to the various sources of the wounds. Hence several actions are essential to the perfection of this sacrament.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some hold that this sacrament and confirmation were not instituted by Christ himself, but were left by him to be instituted by the apostles; for the reason that these two sacraments, on account of the plenitude of grace conferred in them, could not be instituted before the mission of the Holy Spirit in perfect plenitude. Hence they are sacraments of the new law in such a way as not to be foreshadowed in the old law. But this argument is not very cogent, since, just as Christ, before his Passion, promised the mission of the Holy Spirit in his plenitude, so could he institute these sacraments.

I answer that, The spiritual healing which is given at the end of life ought to be complete, since there is no other to follow; it ought also to be gentle, lest hope, of which the dying stand in utmost need, be shattered rather than fostered. Now oil has a softening effect, both penetrating to the very heart of a thing and easily spreading over it. Hence in both the foregoing respects it is a suitable matter for this sacrament. And since oil is, above all, the name of the liquid extract of olives, for other liquids are only called oil from their likeness to it, it follows that olive oil is the matter which should be employed in this sacrament.

I answer that, Some hold that mere oil is the matter of this sacrament, and that the sacrament itself is perfected in the consecration of the oil by the bishop. But this is clearly false, since we proved when treating of the Eucharist that that sacrament alone consists in the consecration of the matter (Q. 2, A. 1).

I answer that, The minister of a sacrament produces the effect, not by his own power, as though he were the principal agent, but by the efficacy of the sacrament which he dispenses. This efficacy comes, in the first place, from Christ, and from him flows down to others in due order, namely, to the people through the medium of the ministers who dispense the sacraments, and to the lower ministers through the medium of the higher ministers who sanctify the matter. Therefore, in all the sacraments which require a sanctified matter, the first consecration of the matter is performed by a bishop, and the application thereof sometimes by a priest, in order to show that the priest’s power is derived from the bishop’s, according to Psalm 132:2: like the precious ointment on the head, that is, Christ, that ran down upon the beard of Aaron first, and then to the skirt of his garment.

I answer that, Some have held that no form is essential to this sacrament. This, however, seems derogatory to the effect of this sacrament, since every sacrament signifies its effect. Now the matter is indifferent as regards its effect, and consequently cannot be determined to any particular effect save by the form of words. Hence in all the sacraments of the new law, since they effect what they signify, there must be things and words. Moreover, James 5:14–15 seems to ascribe the whole force of this sacrament to prayer, which is the form thereof, as we shall state further on (ad 2; A. 8–9). Wherefore the foregoing opinion seems presumptuous and erroneous; and for that reason we should hold with the common opinion that this, like all the other sacraments, has a fixed form.

I answer that, The form of this sacrament is expressed by way of a petition, as appears from the words of James, and from the custom of the Roman Church, who uses nothing other than words of supplication in conferring this sacrament. Several reasons are assigned for this:

I answer that, The prayer given above (A. 8) is a suitable form for this sacrament, for it includes the sacrament by the words: by this holy unction, and that which works in the sacrament, namely, the mercy of God, and the effect, namely, remission of sins.

I answer that, Each sacrament was instituted for the purpose of one principal effect, though it may, in consequence, produce other effects besides. And since a sacrament causes what it signifies, the principal effect of a sacrament must be gathered from its signification. Now this sacrament is conferred by way of a kind of medicament, even as baptism is conferred by way of washing, and the purpose of a medicament is to expel sickness. Hence the chief object of the institution of this sacrament is to cure the sickness of sin. Therefore, just as baptism is a spiritual regeneration, and penance a spiritual resurrection, so extreme unction is a spiritual healing or cure. Now just as a bodily cure presupposes bodily life in the one who is cured, so does a spiritual cure presuppose spiritual life. Hence this sacrament is not an antidote to those defects which deprive man of spiritual life, namely, original and mortal sin, but is a remedy for such defects as weaken man spiritually, so as to deprive him of perfect vigor for acts of the life of grace or of glory; which defects consist in nothing else but a certain weakness and unfitness, the result in us of actual or original sin, against which weakness man is strengthened by this sacrament.

I answer that, Just as baptism causes a spiritual cleansing from spiritual stains by means of a bodily washing, so this sacrament causes an inward healing by means of an outward sacramental healing: and even as the baptismal washing has the effect of a bodily washing, since it effects even a bodily cleansing, so too, extreme unction has the effect of a bodily remedy, namely, a healing of the body. But there is a difference, for the bodily washing causes a bodily cleansing by a natural property of the bodily element, and consequently always causes it, whereas extreme unction causes a bodily healing not by a natural property of the matter, but by the divine power, which works reasonably. And since reasonable working never produces a secondary effect except insofar as it is required for the principal effect, it follows that a bodily healing does not always ensue from this sacrament, but only when it is requisite for the spiritual healing: and then it produces it always, provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient.

I answer that, A character is not imprinted except in those sacraments whereby man is deputed to some sacred duty. Now this sacrament is for no other purpose than a remedy, and man is not deputed thereby to do or receive anything holy. Therefore, it does not imprint a character.

I answer that, According to Dionysius (On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchies 5) there are some who exercise hierarchical actions, and some who are recipients only. Hence laymen are officially incompetent to dispense any sacrament: and that they can baptize in cases of necessity is due to the divine dispensation, in order that no one may be deprived of spiritual regeneration.

I answer that, A deacon has the power to cleanse but not to enlighten. Hence, since enlightenment is an effect of grace, no sacrament whereby grace is conferred can be given by a deacon in virtue of his office: and so he cannot confer this sacrament, since grace is bestowed therein.

I answer that, According to Dionysius (On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchies 5), the office of perfecting belongs to a bishop, just as it belongs to a priest to enlighten. Therefore, those sacraments are reserved to a bishop’s dispensation which place the recipient in a state of perfection above others. But this is not the case with this sacrament, for it is given to all. Consequently, it can be given by ordinary priests.

I answer that, This sacrament is a spiritual healing, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 1–2), and is signified by way of a healing of the body. Hence this sacrament should not be conferred on those who are not subjects for bodily healing, namely, those who are in good health.

I answer that, This sacrament is the last remedy that the Church can give, since it is an immediate preparation for glory. Therefore, it ought to be given to only those who are so sick as to be in a state of departure from this life, through their sickness being of such a nature as to cause death, the danger of which is feared.

I answer that, The devotion of the recipient, the personal merit of the minister, and the general merits of the whole Church are of great account towards the reception of the effect of this sacrament. This is evident from the fact that the form of this sacrament is pronounced by way of a prayer. Hence it should not be given those who cannot acknowledge it, and especially to madmen and imbeciles, who might dishonor the sacrament by their offensive conduct, unless they have lucid intervals when they would be capable of acknowledging the sacrament, for then the sacrament should be given as to children the same in that state.

I answer that, This sacrament, like the Eucharist, requires actual devotion in the recipient. Therefore, just as the Eucharist ought not to be given to children, so neither ought this sacrament to be given to them.

I answer that, This sacrament is shown to us under the form of a healing. Now bodily healing has to be effected by applying the remedy not to the whole body, but to those parts where the root of the disease is seated. Consequently, the sacramental unction also ought to be applied to those parts only in which the spiritual sickness is rooted.

I answer that, The principles of sinning are the same in us as the principles of action, for a sin is an act. Now there are in us three principles of action: the first is the directing principle, namely, the cognitive power; the second is the commanding principle, namely, the appetitive power; the third is the executive principle, namely, the motive power. Now all our knowledge has its origin in the senses. And, since the remedy for sin should be applied where sin originates in us first, for that reason the places of the five senses are anointed: namely, the eyes on account of the sight; the ears on account of the hearing; the nostrils on account of the smell; the mouth on account of the taste; the hands on account of the touch, which is keenest in the finger tips. In some places too the loins are anointed on account of the appetite. And the feet are anointed on account of the motive power, of which they are the chief instrument. And since the cognitive power is the first principle of human activity, the anointing of the five senses is observed by all as being essential to the sacrament. But some do not observe the other unctions—some anoint the feet but not the loins—because the appetitive and motive powers are secondary principles.

I answer that, Even those who are deformed should be anointed, and that as near as possible to the part which ought to have been anointed. For though they have not the members, nevertheless, they have, at least in the root, the powers of the soul corresponding to those members, and they may commit inwardly the sins that pertain to those members, though they cannot outwardly.

I answer that, No sacramental or sacrament having a perpetual effect can be repeated, because this would imply that the sacrament had failed to produce that effect; and this would be derogatory to the sacrament. On the other hand, a sacrament whose effect does not last forever can be repeated without disparaging that sacrament, in order that the lost effect may be recovered. And since health of body and soul, which is the effect of this sacrament, can be lost after it has been effected, it follows that this sacrament can, without disparagement thereto, be repeated.

I answer that, This sacrament regards not only the sickness, but also the state of the sick man, because it ought not to be given except to those sick people who seem, in man’s estimation, to be nigh to death. Now some diseases do not last long; so that if this sacrament is given at the time that the sick man is in a state of danger of death, he does not leave that state except the disease be cured, and thus he needs not to be anointed again. But if he has a relapse, it will be a second sickness, and he can be anointed again. On the other hand some diseases are of long duration, as hectic fever, dropsy and the like, and those who lie sick of them should not be anointed until they seem to be in danger of death. And if the sick man escape that danger while the disease continues, and be brought again thereby to the same state of danger, he can be anointed again, because it is, as it were, another state of sickness, although strictly speaking, it is not another sickness.

I answer that, God wished to produce his works in likeness to himself, as far as possible, in order that they might be perfect and that he might be known through them. Hence, that he might be portrayed in his works not only according to what he is in himself, but also according as he acts on others, he laid this natural law on all things, that last things should be reduced and perfected by middle things, and middle things by the first, as Dionysius says (On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchies 5). Wherefore that this beauty might not be lacking to the Church, he established holy orders in her so that some should deliver the sacraments to others, being thus made like to God in their own way, as cooperating with God; even as in the natural body, some members act on others.

I answer that, The Master’s definition of order applies to holy orders as a sacrament of the Church. Hence he mentions two things, namely the outward sign, a kind of seal, i.e., a kind of sign, and the inward effect, whereby spiritual power, etc.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 29, A. 1; III, Q. 60), a sacrament is nothing else than a sanctification conferred on man with some outward sign. Wherefore, since by receiving holy orders a consecration is conferred on man by visible signs, it is clear that holy orders is a sacrament.

I answer that, This sacrament consists chiefly in the power conferred. Now power is conferred by power, as like proceeds from like; and again power is made known by its use, since powers are manifested by their acts. Hence in the form of holy orders the use of the order is expressed by the act which is commanded; and the conferring of power is expressed by employing the imperative mood.

I answer that, The matter employed outwardly in the sacraments signifies that the power which works in the sacraments comes entirely from without. Wherefore, since the effect proper to this sacrament, namely, the character, is not received through any operation of the one who approaches the sacrament, as was the case in penance, but comes wholly from without, it is fitting that it should have a matter, yet otherwise than the other sacraments that have matter; because that which is bestowed in the other sacraments comes from God alone, and not from the minister who dispenses the sacrament; whereas that which is conferred in this sacrament, namely, the spiritual power, comes also from him who gives the sacrament, as imperfect from perfect power. Hence the efficacy of the other sacraments resides chiefly in the matter which both signifies and contains the divine power through the sanctification applied by the minister; whereas the efficacy of this sacrament resides chiefly with him who dispenses the sacrament. And the matter is employed to show the powers conferred in particular by one who has it completely, rather than to cause power; and this is clear from the fact that the matter is in keeping with the use of power.

I answer that The works of God are perfect (Deut 32:4); and consequently whoever receives power from above receives also those things that render him competent to exercise that power. This is also the case in natural things, since animals are provided with members by which their soul’s powers are enabled to proceed to their respective actions unless there be some defect on the part of matter. Now just as sanctifying grace is necessary in order that man receive the sacraments worthily, so is it that he may dispense them worthily. Therefore, as in baptism sanctifying grace is given whereby a man is adapted to receive the other sacraments, so is it in the sacrament of holy orders whereby man is ordained to the dispensation of the other sacraments.

I answer that, There have been three opinions on this point. For some have said that a character is imprinted only in the order of priesthood; but this is not true, since none but a deacon can exercise the act of the diaconate, and so it is clear that in the dispensation of the sacraments, he has a spiritual power which others have not.

I answer that, No one can receive what he has not the power to receive. Now the character of baptism gives a man the power to receive the other sacraments. Therefore, he that has not the baptismal character can receive no other sacrament; and consequently the character of holy orders presupposes the character of baptism.

I answer that, For the reception of holy orders something is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, and something as congruous to the sacrament. For the validity of the sacrament it is required that one who presents himself for holy orders should be capable of receiving them, and this is competent to him through baptism; wherefore the baptismal character is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, so that the sacrament of holy orders cannot be conferred without it. On the other hand, as congruous to the sacrament a man is required to have every perfection whereby he becomes adapted to the exercise of holy orders, and one of these is that he be confirmed. Wherefore the character of holy orders presupposes the character of confirmation as congruous but not as necessary.

I answer that, It is not necessary for the higher orders that one should have received the minor orders, because their respective powers are distinct, and one, considered in its essentials, does not require another in the same subject. Hence even in the early Church some were ordained priests without having previously received the lower orders and yet they could do all that the lower orders could, because the lower power is comprised in the higher, even as sense in understanding, and dukedom in kingdom. Afterwards, however, it was decided by the legislation of the Church that no one should present himself to the higher orders who had not previously humbled himself in the lower offices. And hence it is that according to the Canons (Decretals) those who are ordained without receiving a preceding order are not reordained, but receive what was lacking to them of the preceding order.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchies 3), even as the more subtle and clear essences, being filled by the outpouring of the solar radiance, like the sun enlighten other bodies with their brilliant light, so in all things pertaining to God a man must not dare to become a leader of others unless in all his habits he be most deiform and godlike. Wherefore, since in every order a man is appointed to lead others in divine things, he who being conscious of mortal sin presents himself for holy orders is guilty of presumption and sins mortally. Consequently, holiness of life is requisite for holy orders as a matter of precept, but not as essential to the sacrament; and if a wicked man be ordained, he receives the order nonetheless, and yet with sin.

I answer that, For any human act to be rightly ordered there must be the direction of reason. Wherefore in order that a man exercise the office of an order, it is necessary for him to have as much knowledge as suffices for his direction in the act of that order. And consequently one who is to be raised to orders is required to have that knowledge, and to be instructed in Sacred Scripture, not the whole, but more or less, according as his office is of a greater or lesser extent—that is, those who are placed over others, and receive the care of souls, know things pertaining to the doctrine of faith and morals, and that others know whatever concerns the exercise of their order.

I answer that, A cause should be proportionate to its effect. And consequently as in Christ, from whom grace comes down on all men, there must be fullness of grace, so in the ministers of the Church, to whom it belongs, not to give grace, but to give the sacraments of grace, the degree of holy orders does not result from their having grace, but from their participating in a sacrament of grace.

I answer that, Our Lord describes the faithful servant whom he has set over his household to give them their measure of wheat. Hence he is guilty of unfaithfulness who gives any man divine things above his measure: and whoever promotes the unworthy does this. Therefore, he commits a mortal crime as being unfaithful to his sovereign Lord, especially since this is detrimental to the Church and to the divine honor which is promoted by good ministers. For a man would be unfaithful to his earthly lord were he to place unworthy subjects in his offices.

I answer that, The law prescribes that man should follow justly after that which is just (Deut 16:20). Wherefore whoever fulfills unworthily the duties of his order follows unjustly after that which is just, and acts contrary to a precept of the law, and thereby sins mortally. Now anyone who exercises a sacred office in mortal sin without doubt does so unworthily. Hence it is clear that he sins mortally.

I answer that, Multiplicity of orders was introduced into the Church for three reasons. First, to show forth the wisdom of God, which is reflected in the orderly distinction of things both natural and spiritual. This is signified in the statement that when the queen of Sheba saw the order of Solomon’s servants she had no longer any spirit in her (1 Kgs 10:4–5), for she was breathless from admiration of his wisdom.

I answer that, Some show the sufficiency of the orders from their correspondence with the gratuitous graces which are indicated in 1 Corinthians 12. For they say that the word of wisdom belongs to the bishop, because he is the ordainer of others, which pertains to wisdom; the word of knowledge to the priest, for he ought to have the key of knowledge; faith to the deacon, for he preaches the Gospel; the working of miracles to the subdeacon, who sets himself to do deeds of perfection by the vow of continency; interpretation of speeches to the acolyte, this being signified by the light which he bears; the grace of healing to the exorcist; diverse kinds of tongues to the psalmist; prophecy to the lector; and the discerning of spirits to the porter, for he excludes some and admits others.