The Nature of the Good

Augustine of Hippo · Against Manichaeanism
contra Manichaeos
Against the Manichees
Revisions II
C. 9One Book on the Nature of the Good Against the ManicheesDe natura boni contra Manichaeos liber unus
Liber De natura boni adversus Manichaeos est, ubi ostenditur naturam incommutabilem Deum esse ac summum bonum, atque ab illo esse ceteras naturas sive spiritales sive corporales, atque omnes, in quantum naturae sunt, bonas esse; et quid vel unde sit malum, et quanta mala Manichaei ponant in natura boni et quanta bona in natura mali, quas naturas finxit error ipsorum.
The book On the Nature of the Good is against the Manichees, where it is shown that God is an unchangeable nature and the highest good, and that from him come all other natures, whether spiritual or corporeal, and that all of them, insofar as they are natures, are good; and what evil is and from where it comes, and how many good things the Manichees place in the nature of evil and how many evils in the nature of the good, natures that their error has invented.
NatureGood
Hic liber sic incipit: Summum bonum quo superius non est, Deus est.
This book begins thus: The highest good, than which there is none higher, is God.
NatureGood
Bk. 1God is the highest and unchangeable good, from whom come all other good things, both spiritual and corporeal.Deus summum bonum et incommnutabile; a quo caetera omnia bona spiritualia et corporalia.
1. Summum bonum, quo superius non est, Deus est; ac per hoc incommutabile bonum est, ideo vere aeternum et vere immortale. Caetera omnia bona non nisi ab illo sunt sed non de illo. De illo enim quod est, hoc quod ipse est; ab illo autem quae facta sunt, non sunt quod ipse. Ac per hoc, si solus ipse incommutabilis, omnia quae fecit, quia ex nihilo fecit, mutabilia sunt. Tam enim omnipotens est ut possit etiam de nihilo, id est ex eo quod omnino non est, bona facere, et magna et parva, et caelestia et terrena, et spiritalia et corporalia.
1. The highest good, than which there is none higher, is God; and for this reason he is an unchangeable good, and therefore truly eternal and truly immortal. All other good things are only from him but not of him. For what is of him is what he himself is; but the things made by him are not what he is. And so, if he alone is unchangeable, all the things he has made, because he made them out of nothing, are changeable. For he is so omnipotent that he can make good things even out of nothing, that is, out of what does not exist at all—both great and small, both heavenly and earthly, both spiritual and corporeal.
NatureGood.1.1
Quia vero et iustus est, ei quod de se genuit, ea quae de nihilo fecit non aequavit. Quia ergo bona omnia, sive magna, sive parva, per quoslibet rerum gradus, non possunt esse nisi a Deo, omnis autem natura in quantum natura est, bonum est; omnis natura non potest esse nisi a summo et vero Deo: quia omnia etiam non summa bona, sed propinqua summo bono, et rursus omnia etiam novissima bona, quae longe sunt a summo bono, non possunt esse nisi ab ipso summo bono. Omnis ergo spiritus etiam mutabilis et omne corpus a Deo: et haec est omnis facta natura. Omnis quippe natura aut spiritus, aut corpus est. Spiritus incommutabilis Deus est. Spiritus mutabilis facta natura est sed corpore melior. Corpus autem spiritus non est, nisi cum ventus, quia nobis invisibilis est et tamen vis eius non parva sentitur, alio quodam modo spiritus dicitur.
But because he is also just, he did not make the things he made out of nothing equal to what he begot of himself. Therefore, since all good things, whether great or small, through whatever grades of being, cannot exist except from God, and since every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good, every nature can exist only from the highest and true God—for all good things, even those that are not the highest but are near to the highest good, and again all good things, even the lowest, which are far from the highest good, cannot exist except from the highest good itself. Therefore every spirit, even a changeable one, and every body is from God; and this is the whole of created nature. For every nature is either spirit or body. The unchangeable spirit is God. A changeable spirit is a created nature, but better than a body. A body, however, is not spirit, except that the wind, because it is invisible to us and yet its considerable force is felt, is in a certain other way called spirit.
NatureGood.1.1
Quomodo id possit ad corrigendos Manichaeos sufficere.
How this can suffice to correct the Manichees.
2. Propter eos autem, qui cum intellegere non possunt omnem naturam, id est, omnem spiritum et omne corpus naturaliter bonum esse, moventur spiritus iniquitate et corporis mortalitate, et ob hoc aliam naturam maligni spiritus et mortalis corporis, quam Deus non fecerit, conantur inducere: sic arbitramur ad eorum intellectum, quod dicimus posse perduci. Fatentur enim omne bonum non esse posse, nisi a summo et vero Deo: quod et verum est, et ad eos corrigendos, si velint advertere, sufficit.
2. But there are those who, since they cannot understand that every nature—that is, every spirit and every body—is naturally good, are disturbed by the wickedness of a spirit and the mortality of a body, and on this account try to introduce another nature, of a malicious spirit and a mortal body, which God did not make. For their sake we judge that what we are saying can be brought within their understanding. For they admit that nothing good can exist except from the highest and true God, which is both true and, if they are willing to attend to it, sufficient for their correction.
NatureGood.1.2
Modus, species et ordo generalia bona in rebus a Deo factis.
Measure, form, and order are the general goods in the things made by God.
3. Nos enim catholici Christiani Deum colimus a quo omnia bona sunt, seu magna, seu parva; a quo est omnis modus, seu magnus, seu parvus; a quo omnis species, seu magna, seu parva; a quo omnis ordo, seu magnus, seu parvus. Omnia enim quanto magis moderata, speciosa, ordinata sunt, tanto magis utique bona sunt; quanto autem minus moderata, minus speciosa, minus ordinata sunt, minus bona sunt. Haec itaque tria, modus, species et ordo, ut de innumerabilibus taceam quae ad ista tria pertinere monstrantur, haec ergo tria, modus, species, ordo, tamquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo factis, sive in spiritu, sive in corpore. Deus itaque supra omnem creaturae modum est, supra omnem speciem, supra omnem ordinem. Nec spatiis locorum supra est sed ineffabili et singulari potentia, a quo omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo. Haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi parva sunt, parva bona sunt; ubi nulla sunt, nullum bonum est. Et rursus ubi haec tria magna sunt, magnae naturae sunt; ubi parva sunt, parvae naturae sunt; ubi nulla sunt, nulla natura est. Omnis ergo natura bona est.
3. For we Catholic Christians worship God, from whom come all good things, whether great or small; from whom comes all measure, whether great or small; from whom comes all form, whether great or small; from whom comes all order, whether great or small. For the more things are measured, formed, and ordered, the more they are good; and the less they are measured, formed, and ordered, the less they are good. These three, then—measure, form, and order—not to mention the countless things that are shown to belong to these three—these three, then, measure, form, and order, are like general goods in the things made by God, whether in spirit or in body. And so God is above every measure of the creature, above every form, above every order. He is above, not by intervals of place, but by his ineffable and singular power, from which come all measure, all form, all order. Where these three are great, there are great goods; where they are small, there are small goods; where they are absent, there is no good. And again, where these three are great, there are great natures; where they are small, there are small natures; where they are absent, there is no nature. Therefore every nature is good.
NatureGood.1.3
Malum est corruptio modi, speciei aut ordinis.
Evil is the corruption of measure, form, or order.
4. Proinde cum quaeritur unde sit malum, prius quaerendum est quid sit malum; quod nihil aliud est quam corruptio vel modi, vel speciei, vel ordinis naturalis. Mala itaque natura dicitur quae corrupta est: nam incorrupta utique bona est. Sed etiam ipsa corrupta, in quantum natura est, bona est; in quantum corrupta est, mala est.
4. Accordingly, when it is asked from where evil comes, we must first ask what evil is. It is nothing other than the corruption either of natural measure, or of form, or of order. A nature is called evil, then, when it has been corrupted, for an uncorrupted nature is certainly good. But even a corrupted nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good; insofar as it is corrupted, it is evil.
NatureGood.1.4
Natura excellentioris ordinis etiam corrupta melior interdum inferiore etiam incorrupta.
A nature of a more excellent order, even when corrupted, is sometimes better than a lower one, even when uncorrupted.
5. Fieri autem potest ut quaedam natura, quae modo et specie naturali excellentius ordinata est, etiam corrupta melior sit adhuc quam est incorrupta altera, quae minore modo et specie naturali inferius ordinata est. Sicut in hominum aestimatione, secundum qualitatem quae aspectibus adiacet, melius est utique corruptum aurum quam incorruptum argentum, et melius est corruptum argentum quam plumbum incorruptum. Sic et in naturis potentioribus atque spiritalibus, melior est etiam corruptus per malam voluntatem spiritus rationalis quam irrationalis incorruptus. Et melior est quilibet spiritus etiam corruptus quam corpus quodlibet incorruptum. Melior est enim natura quae cum praesto est corpori, praebet ei vitam, quam illa cui vita praebetur. Quantumlibet autem corruptus sit spiritus vitae qui factus est, vitam praebere corpori potest: ac per hoc melior illo est, quamvis incorrupto, corruptus.
5. It can happen that a certain nature, which is more excellently ordered in its natural measure and form, may, even when corrupted, still be better than another that is uncorrupted but is ordered lower in a lesser measure and natural form. So, in human estimation, according to the quality that meets the eye, corrupted gold is certainly better than uncorrupted silver, and corrupted silver is better than uncorrupted lead. So too among the more powerful and spiritual natures, a rational spirit corrupted through an evil will is better than an irrational one that is uncorrupted. And any spirit whatever, even when corrupted, is better than any body whatever, even when uncorrupted. For a nature that, when present to a body, gives it life is better than the one to which life is given. However corrupted the created spirit of life may be, it can still give life to a body; and on this account, even when corrupted, it is better than the body, however uncorrupted.
NatureGood.1.5
Natura quae non potest corrumpi, summum bonum; quae potest, aliquod bonum est.
A nature that cannot be corrupted is the highest good; one that can be corrupted is some good.
6. Corruptio autem si omnem modum, omnem speciem, omnem ordinem rebus corruptibilibus auferat, nulla natura remanebit. Ac per hoc omnis natura quae corrumpi non potest summum bonum est, sicut Deus est. Omnis autem natura quae corrumpi potest, etiam ipsa aliquod bonum est: non enim posset ei nocere corruptio nisi adimendo et minuendo quod bonum est.
6. But if corruption were to take away all measure, all form, and all order from corruptible things, no nature would remain. And on this account every nature that cannot be corrupted is the highest good, as God is. But every nature that can be corrupted is itself also some good; for corruption could not harm it except by taking away and diminishing what is good.
NatureGood.1.6
Rationalium spirituum corruptio alia voluntaria, alia poenalis.
The corruption of rational spirits is partly voluntary, partly penal.
7. Creaturis autem praestantissimis, hoc est rationabilibus spiritibus, hoc praestitit Deus ut si nolint, corrumpi non possint, id est si obedientiam conservaverint sub Domino Deo suo ac sic incorruptibili pulchritudini eius adhaeserint: si autem obedientiam conservare noluerint, quoniam volentes corrumpuntur in peccatis, nolentes corrumpantur in poenis. Tale quippe bonum est Deus, ut nemini eum deserenti bene sit. Et in rebus a Deo factis tam magnum bonum est natura rationalis, ut nullum sit bonum quo beata sit nisi Deus. Peccantes igitur in suppliciis ordinantur. Quae ordinatio, quia eorum naturae non competit, ideo poena est; sed quia culpae competit, ideo iustitia est.
7. But to the most excellent creatures, that is, to rational spirits, God granted this: that if they are unwilling, they cannot be corrupted—that is, if they keep their obedience under the Lord their God and so cling to his incorruptible beauty; but if they have been unwilling to keep their obedience, then, since they are corrupted willingly in sins, let them be corrupted unwillingly in punishments. For God is such a good that it is well with no one who deserts him. And among the things made by God, rational nature is so great a good that there is no good by which it is made happy except God. Sinners, then, are set in order amid their torments. This ordering, because it does not befit their nature, is therefore a punishment; but because it befits their fault, it is therefore justice.
NatureGood.1.7
Ex rerum inferiorum corruptione ac interitu pulchritudo universi.
The beauty of the universe arises from the corruption and passing away of lower things.
8. Cetera vero quae sunt facta de nihilo, quae utique inferiora sunt quam spiritus rationalis, nec beata possunt esse, nec misera. Sed quia pro modo et specie sua etiam ipsa bona sunt, nec esse quamvis minora et minima bona nisi a summo bono Deo potuerunt, sic ordinata sunt ut cedant infirmiora firmioribus, et invalidiora fortioribus, et impotentiora potentioribus, atque ita coelestibus terrena concordent tamquam praecellentibus subdita. Fit autem decedentibus et succedentibus rebus temporalis quaedam in suo genere pulchritudo, ut nec ipsa quae moriuntur, vel quod erant esse desinunt, turpent aut turbent modum et speciem et ordinem universae creaturae: sicut sermo bene compositus utique pulcher est, quamvis in eo syllabae atque omnes soni tamquam nascendo et moriendo transcurrant.
8. But the rest of the things that were made out of nothing, which are certainly lower than the rational spirit, can be neither happy nor wretched. Yet because they too are good according to their measure and form, and could not exist—however lesser and least their good may be—except from the highest good, God, they are so ordered that the weaker yield to the stronger, the feebler to the more forceful, and the less powerful to the more powerful, and thus earthly things accord with heavenly ones as things made subject to those that surpass them. Now from things passing away and succeeding one another there arises a certain temporal beauty of its own kind, so that not even the very things that die, or that cease to be what they were, deform or disturb the measure and form and order of the whole creation—just as a well-composed discourse is certainly beautiful, even though in it the syllables and all the sounds pass by as though being born and dying.
NatureGood.1.8
Paena peccanti naturae, ut recte ordinetur, constituta.
Punishment is appointed for a sinning nature so that it may be rightly ordered.
9. Qualis autem et quanta poena cuique culpae debeatur, divini iudicii est, non humani: quae utique et cum conversis remittitur, magna est bonitas apud Deum. Et cum debita redditur, nulla est iniquitas apud Deum, quia melius ordinatur natura ut iuste doleat in supplicio quam ut impune gaudeat in peccato. Quae tamen etiam sic habens nonnullum modum et speciem et ordinem, in quacumque extremitate adhuc aliquod bonum est. Quae si omnino detrahantur et penitus consumantur, ideo nullum bonum erit quia nulla natura remanebit.
9. But what kind and how great a punishment is owed to each fault belongs to divine, not human, judgment. When it is remitted to those who have turned back, there is great goodness with God; and when the debt is paid, there is no injustice with God, because a nature is better ordered so that it justly grieves in punishment than so that it rejoices unpunished in sin. Yet such a nature, even thus retaining some measure and form and order, is still in whatever extremity some good. But if these are altogether taken away and utterly consumed, then there will be no good, because no nature will remain.
NatureGood.1.9
Naturae coruptibiles, quia ex nihilo factae.
Corruptible natures are corruptible because they were made out of nothing.
10. Omnes igitur naturae corruptibiles nec omnino naturae essent nisi a Deo essent, nec corruptibiles essent si de illo essent, quia hoc quod ipse est essent. Ideo ergo quocumque modo, quacumque specie, quocumque ordine sunt, quia Deus est a quo factae sunt; ideo autem non incommutabiles sunt, quia nihil est unde factae sunt. Sacrilega enim audacia coaequantur nihil et Deus, si quale est illud, quod de Deo natum est, tale velimus esse illud quod ab eo de nihilo factum est.
10. All corruptible natures, therefore, would not be natures at all unless they were from God, nor would they be corruptible if they were of him, because they would be what he himself is. For this reason, in whatever measure, whatever form, whatever order they exist, it is because God is the one by whom they were made; but they are not unchangeable because there is nothing out of which they were made. For it is with sacrilegious boldness that nothing and God are made equal, if we wished what was made by him out of nothing to be such as that which was born of God.
NatureGood.1.10
Noceri nec Deo potest, nec alii naturae nisi ipso permittente.
Neither God nor any other nature can be harmed except by his permission.
11. Quapropter nec naturae Dei noceri omnino potest, nec alicui naturae sub Deo noceri iniuste potest: quia et cum peccando iniuste aliqui nocent, voluntas iniusta eis imputatur. Potestas autem qua nocere permittuntur non est nisi a Deo, qui et ipsis nescientibus novit quid illi pati debeant quibus eos nocere permittit.
11. Therefore the nature of God can in no way be harmed, nor can any nature under God be harmed unjustly; for even when some do harm unjustly by sinning, it is the unjust will that is imputed to them. But the power by which they are permitted to do harm is only from God, who knows—even when they do not know it—what those whom he permits them to harm ought to suffer.
NatureGood.1.11
Omnia bona nonnisi a Deo.
All good things are only from God.
12. Haec omnia tam perspicua, tam certa, si vellent advertere, qui aliam naturam inducunt, quam non fecit Deus; non tantis blasphemiis implerentur, ut et in summo malo tanta bona ponerent, et in Deo tanta mala.
12. If those who introduce another nature, which God did not make, were willing to attend to all these things—so plain, so certain—they would not be filled with such great blasphemies as to place such great goods in the highest evil and such great evils in God.
NatureGood.1.12
Sufficit enim, ut supra dixi, ad eorum correctionem, si velint attendere, quod eos etiam invitos cogit veritas confiteri, omnia prorsus bona non esse nisi a Deo. Non ergo ab alio sunt magna bona, et ab alio parva bona: sed et magna et parva bona non sunt nisi a summo bono, quod Deus est.
For it is enough, as I said above, for their correction, if they are willing to attend, that the truth compels them, even against their will, to confess that absolutely all good things are only from God. Great goods, then, are not from one source and small goods from another; rather, both great and small goods are only from the highest good, which is God.
NatureGood.1.12
Bona singula seu parva, seu magna, esse a Deo.
All good things, whether small or great, are from God.
13. Commemoremus ergo bona quanta potuerimus, quae dignum est ut Deo auctor tribuamus, et his sublatis videamus utrum aliqua natura remanebit. Omnis vita et magna et parva, omnis potentia et magna et parva, omnis salus et magna et parva, omnis memoria et magna et parva, omnis virtus et magna et parva, omnis intellectus et magnus et parvus, omnis tranquillitas et magna et parva, omnis copia et magna et parva, omnis sensus et magnus et parvus, omne lumen et magnum et parvum, omnis suavitas et magna et parva, omnis mensura et magna et parva, omnis pulchritudo et magna et parva, omnis pax et magna et parva, et si qua similia occurrere poterunt, maximeque illa quae per omnia reperiuntur, sive spiritalia sive corporalia, omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo, et magnus et parvus, a Domino Deo sunt. Quibus bonis omnibus qui male uti voluerit, divino iudicio poenas luet: ubi autem nullum horum omnino fuerit, nulla natura remanebit.
13. Let us, then, recall as many goods as we can which it is fitting to attribute to God as their author, and, with these taken away, let us see whether any nature will remain. All life, great and small; all power, great and small; all soundness, great and small; all memory, great and small; all virtue, great and small; all understanding, great and small; all tranquility, great and small; all abundance, great and small; all sense, great and small; all light, great and small; all sweetness, great and small; all measure, great and small; all beauty, great and small; all peace, great and small; and whatever similar things may come to mind, and especially those that are found throughout all things, whether spiritual or corporeal—all measure, all form, all order, great and small—are from the Lord God. Whoever wishes to make evil use of all these goods will pay the penalty by divine judgment; but where none of these is present at all, no nature will remain.
NatureGood.1.13
Parva bona in maiorum comparatione contrariis nominibus appellantur.
Small goods, in comparison with greater ones, are called by contrary names.
14. Sed in his omnibus quaecumque parva sunt, in maiorum comparatione contrariis nominibus appellantur: sicut in hominis forma quia maior est pulchritudo, in eius comparatione simiae pulchritudo deformitas dicitur: et fallit imprudentes, tamquam illud sit bonum, et hoc malum; nec intendunt in corpore simiae modum proprium, parilitatem ex utroque latere membrorum, concordiam partium, incolumitatis custodiam, et caetera, quae persequi longum est.
14. But among all these, whatever is small is, in comparison with the greater, called by a contrary name—just as, because in the human form there is greater beauty, in comparison with it the beauty of an ape is called ugliness. And this deceives the imprudent, as though the one were good and the other evil; nor do they attend to the proper measure in the body of the ape, the equality of its limbs on either side, the harmony of its parts, the safeguarding of its wholeness, and the rest, which it would take long to recount.
NatureGood.1.14
In simiae corpore pulchritudinis bonum inesse, licet minus.
There is the good of beauty in the body of an ape, though a lesser one.
15. Sed ut quod dicimus intellegatur, et nimium tardis satis fiat, vel etiam pertinaces et apertissimae veritati repugnantes cogantur quod verum est confiteri, interrogentur utrum corpori simiae possit nocere corruptio. Quod si potest, ut foedius fiat; quid minuit, nisi pulchritudinis bonum? Unde tamdiu aliquid remanebit, quamdiu corporis natura subsistit. Proinde si consumpto bono natura consumitur, bona ergo est natura.
15. But so that what we are saying may be understood, and so that satisfaction may be given even to the very slow, or so that even those who are stubborn and who resist the most evident truth may be compelled to confess what is true, let them be asked whether corruption can harm the body of an ape. If it can, so as to make it more hideous, what does it diminish but the good of beauty? Hence something will remain as long as the nature of the body subsists. Accordingly, if, when the good is consumed, the nature is consumed, then the nature is good.
NatureGood.1.15
Sic et tardum dicimus veloci contrarium: sed tamen qui se omnino non movet, nec tardus dici potest. Sic acutae voci contrariam vocem dicimus gravem, vel canorae asperam: sed si omnem speciem vocis penitus adimas, silentium est ubi vox nulla est: quod tamen silentium, eo ipso quod vox nulla est, tamquam contrarium voci solet opponi. Sic et lucida et obscura tamquam duo contraria dicuntur: habent tamen et obscura aliquid lucis, quo si penitus careant, ita sunt tenebrae lucis absentia, sicut silentium vocis absentia.
So too we call the slow the contrary of the swift; but one who does not move at all cannot even be called slow. So too we call a low voice the contrary of a high one, or a harsh voice the contrary of a tuneful one; but if you take away every form of voice altogether, there is silence where there is no voice—and yet that silence, by the very fact that there is no voice, is usually set against voice as its contrary. So too the bright and the dark are called two contraries; yet even dark things have something of light, and if they lacked it utterly, then there would be darkness, the absence of light, just as silence is the absence of voice.
NatureGood.1.15
Privationes in rebus decenter a Deo ordinatae.
Privations in things are fittingly ordered by God.
16. Quae tamen etiam privationes rerum sic ordinantur in universitate naturae, ut sapienter considerantibus non indecenter vices suas habeant. Nam et Deus certa loca et tempora non illuminando, tenebras fecit tam decenter quam dies. Si enim nos continendo vocem, decenter interponimus in loquendo silentium; quanto magis ille quarumdam rerum privationes decenter facit, sicut rerum omnium perfectus artifex? Unde et in hymno trium puerorum, etiam lux et tenebrae laudant Deum (Cf. Dan 3, 51 e 72); id est, eius laudem in bene considerantium cordibus pariunt.
16. Yet these privations of things too are so ordered in the totality of nature that, to those who consider wisely, they fittingly have their own turns. For God, by not illuminating certain places and times, made darkness as fittingly as the day. For if we, by holding back the voice, fittingly insert silence into our speaking, how much more does he, as the perfect craftsman of all things, fittingly make the privations of certain things? Hence even in the hymn of the three young men, light and darkness too praise God (See Dan 3:51, 72); that is, they bring forth his praise in the hearts of those who consider rightly.
NatureGood.1.16
Natura in quantum natura est, nulla mala.
No nature is evil insofar as it is a nature.
17. Non ergo mala est, in quantum natura est, ulla natura; sed cuique naturae non est malum nisi minui bono. Quod si minuendo absumeretur, sicut nullum bonum, ita nulla natura relinqueretur, non solum qualem inducunt Manichaei, ubi tanta bona inveniuntur, ut nimia eorum caecitas mira sit; sed qualem potest quilibet inducere.
17. No nature, then, insofar as it is a nature, is evil; but for any nature there is no evil except the diminishing of its good. And if by diminishing it were consumed, then, just as there would be no good, so no nature would be left—not only such a nature as the Manichees introduce, in which so many goods are found that their excessive blindness is astonishing, but any nature that anyone might introduce.
NatureGood.1.17
Hylen, quae rerum informis materies antiquis dicebatur, non esse malum.
Matter, which the ancients called hyle, the formless stuff of things, is not evil.
18. Neque enim vel illa materies, quam antiqui hylen dixerunt, malum dicenda est. Non eam dico, quam Manichaeus hylen appellat dementissima vanitate, nesciens quid loquatur, formatricem corporum: unde recte illi dictum est, quod alterum deum inducat: nemo enim formare et creare corpora nisi Deus potest; neque enim creantur, nisi cum eis modus et species et ordo subsistit, quae bona esse, nec esse posse nisi a Deo, puto quod iam etiam ipsi confitentur.
18. For not even that matter which the ancients called hyle is to be called evil. I do not mean what Mani, in his most senseless folly, not knowing what he says, calls hyle—the shaper of bodies; for which it was rightly said to him that he introduces another god, since no one can form and create bodies except God. For they are not created except when measure and form and order subsist in them, which are good and cannot exist except from God, as I think even they themselves now confess.
NatureGood.1.18
Sed hylen dico quamdam penitus informem et sine qualitate materiem, unde istae quas sentimus qualitates formantur, ut antiqui dixerunt. Hinc enim et silva graece
dicitur, quod operantibus apta sit, non ut aliquid ipsa faciat, sed unde aliquid fiat. Nec ista ergo hyle malum dicenda est, quae non per aliquam speciem sentiri, sed per omnimodam speciei privationem cogitari vix potest.
Rather, by hyle I mean a certain matter wholly formless and without quality, out of which are formed the qualities that we perceive, as the ancients said. For it is from this that it is also called silva in Greek, because it is suited to those who work, not so that it may make anything itself, but so that something may be made out of it. Therefore this hyle is not to be called evil either—matter that can scarcely be conceived, not through any form by which it might be perceived, but through the complete privation of form.
NatureGood.1.18
Habet enim et ipsa capacitatem formarum: nam si capere impositam ab artifice formam non posset, nec materies utique diceretur. Porro si bonum aliquod est forma, unde qui ea praevalent, formosi appellantur, sicut a specie speciosi, procul dubio bonum aliquod est etiam capacitas formae. Sicut quia bonum est sapientia, nemo dubitat quod bonum sit capacem esse sapientiae. Et quia omne bonum a Deo; neminem oportet dubitare, etiam istam, si qua est, materiem non esse nisi a Deo.
For it too has the capacity for forms; for if it could not receive the form imposed on it by the craftsman, it certainly would not be called matter. Moreover, if form is some good—whence those who excel in it are called comely (formosi), just as the well-formed (speciosi) are so called from form (species)—then without doubt the capacity for form is also some good. Just as, because wisdom is a good, no one doubts that to be capable of wisdom is a good. And because every good is from God, no one ought to doubt that this matter too, if it exists at all, is only from God.
NatureGood.1.18
Esse vere, proprium Dei.
Truly to be is proper to God.
19. Magnifice igitur et divine Deus noster famulo suo dixit: Ego sum qui sum; et dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos (Ex 3, 14). Vere enim ipse est quia incommutabilis est. Omnis enim mutatio facit non esse quod erat. Vere ergo ille est qui incommutabilis est. Cetera quae ab illo facta sunt, ab illo pro suo modo esse acceperunt.
19. Magnificently and divinely, then, our God said to his servant: I am who I am; and you shall say to the sons of Israel: He who is has sent me to you (Exod 3:14). For he himself truly is, because he is unchangeable. For every change makes what was not to be. Truly, then, is he who is unchangeable. The other things that were made by him have received their being from him according to their own measure.
NatureGood.1.19
Ei ergo qui summe est, non potest esse contrarium nisi quod non est. Ac per hoc sicut ab illo est omne quod bonum est, sic ab illo est omne quod naturaliter est; quoniam omne quod naturaliter est, bonum est. Omnis itaque natura bona est et omne bonum a Deo est: omnis ergo natura a Deo est.
To him, then, who supremely is, nothing can be contrary except what is not. And on this account, just as from him is everything that is good, so from him is everything that naturally is, since everything that naturally is, is good. And so every nature is good, and every good is from God; therefore every nature is from God.
NatureGood.1.19
Dolor nonnisi in naturis bonis.
Pain exists only in good natures.
20. Dolor autem, quod praecipue malum nonnulli arbitrantur, sive in animo sive in corpore sit, nec ipse potest esse nisi in naturis bonis. Hoc enim ipsum quod restitit ut doleat, quodam modo recusat non esse quod erat, quia bonum aliquod erat. Sed cum ad melius cogitur, utilis dolor est; cum ad deterius, inutilis. In animo ergo dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori. Sunt autem mala sine dolore peiora. Peius est enim gaudere de iniquitate quam dolere de corruptione: verumtamen etiam tale gaudium non potest esse nisi ex adeptione bonorum inferiorum, sed iniquitas est desertio meliorum. Item in corpore melius est vulnus cum dolore, quam putredo sine dolore, quae specialiter corruptio dicitur: quam non vidit, id est non passa est mortua caro Domini, sicut in prophetia praedictum erat: Nec dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem (Ps 15, 10; cf. Act 2, 31).
20. But pain, which some judge to be especially an evil—whether it be in the mind or in the body—cannot itself exist except in good natures. For the very fact that something resists so as to feel pain in some way refuses not to be what it was, because it was some good. But when it is forced toward something better, the pain is useful; when toward something worse, useless. In the mind, then, pain is caused by the will resisting a greater power; in the body, pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful body. But evils without pain are worse. For it is worse to rejoice in iniquity than to grieve over corruption; yet even such joy cannot exist except from the attainment of lower goods, while iniquity is the desertion of better ones. Likewise in the body a wound with pain is better than putrefaction without pain, which is specifically called corruption; this the dead flesh of the Lord did not see—that is, did not suffer—as was foretold in the prophecy: Nor will you let your holy one see corruption (Ps 16:10 (15:10); see Acts 2:31).
NatureGood.1.20
Nam vulneratum esse confixione clavorum et percussum de lancea (Cf. Io 19, 34; 20, 25) quis negat? Sed etiam ipsa quae proprie ab hominibus corruptio corporis dicitur, id est ipsa putredo, si adhuc habet aliquid quod alte consumat, bonum minuendo, crescit corruptio. Quod si penitus absumpserit, sicut nullum bonum, ita nulla natura remanebit, quia iam corruptio quod corrumpat non erit. Et ideo nec ipsa putredo erit, quia ubi sit omnino non erit.
For who denies that he was wounded by the piercing of the nails and struck by the lance? (See John 19:34; 20:25) But even that which is properly called by men the corruption of the body—that is, putrefaction itself—if it still has something to consume more deeply, grows as corruption by diminishing the good. But if it has consumed it utterly, then, just as there will be no good, so no nature will remain, because now there will be nothing for corruption to corrupt. And therefore not even the putrefaction itself will exist, because there will be nowhere for it to be at all.
NatureGood.1.20
Modica a modo dicta.
Small things (modica) are so named from measure (modus).
21. Ideo quippe et parva atque exigua iam communi loquendi usu modica dicuntur, quia modus in eis aliquis restitit, sine quo non iam modica sed omnino nulla sunt. Illa autem quae propter nimium progressum dicuntur immodica, ipsa nimietate culpantur. Sed tamen ipsa etiam sub Deo, qui omnia in mensura et in numero et pondere disposuit (Sap 11, 21), necesse est utaliquo modo cohibeantur.
21. Indeed, things small and slight are now in common usage called "modest" (modica), precisely because some measure (modus) remains in them, without which they are no longer slight but altogether nothing. But those things that, because of excessive extent, are called immoderate are blamed for that very excess. Yet they too, under God, who arranged all things in measure and number and weight (Wis 11:20 (11:21)), must necessarily be held in check in some measure.
NatureGood.1.21
Modus an aliqua ratione Deo ipsi conveniat.
Whether measure belongs to God himself in any sense.
22. Deus autem nec modum habere dicendus est, ne finis eius dici putetur. Nec ideo tamen immoderatus est, a quo modus omnibus tribuitur rebus, ut aliquo modo esse possint. Nec rursus moderatum oportet dici Deum, tamquam ab aliquo modum acceperit. Si autem dicamus eum summum modum, forte aliquid dicimus; si tamen in eo quod dicimus summum modum intellegamus summum bonum. Omnis enim modus, in quantum modus est, bonus est. Unde omnia moderata, modesta, modificata, dici sine laude non possunt; quamquam sub alio intellectu modum pro fine ponamus, et nullum modum dicamus ubi nullus est finis. Quod aliquando cum laude dicitur, sicut dictum est: Et regni eius non erit finis (Lc 1, 33). Posset enim dici etiam: non erit modus, ut modus pro fine dictus intellegeretur. Nam qui nullo modo regnat, non utique regnat.
22. But God must not be said to have measure, lest he be thought to have a limit. Yet he is not for that reason without measure, he by whom measure is granted to all things so that they can exist in some measure. Nor again should God be called measured, as though he had received measure from someone. But if we should call him the highest measure, perhaps we say something—provided that in saying "the highest measure" we understand the highest good. For all measure, insofar as it is measure, is good. Hence all things measured, modest, and moderated cannot be spoken of without praise; although under another understanding we use "measure" for "limit," and we speak of no measure where there is no limit. This is sometimes said with praise, as it was said: And of his kingdom there will be no end (Luke 1:33). For it could also be said: there will be no measure, so that "measure" would be understood as said for "limit." For one who reigns in no measure certainly does not reign.
NatureGood.1.22
Unde interdum dicatur malus modus, mala species, malus ordo.
Whence we sometimes speak of an evil measure, an evil form, an evil order.
23. Malus ergo modus, vel mala species, vel malus ordo, aut ideo dicuntur quia minora sunt quam esse debuerunt, aut quia non his rebus accommodantur quibus accommodanda sunt; ut ideo dicantur mala quia sunt aliena et incongrua, tamquam si dicatur aliquis non bono modo egisse quia minus egit quam debuit, aut quia ita egit sicut in re tali non debuit, vel amplius quam oportebat, vel non convenienter: ut hoc ipsum quod reprehenditur, malo modo actum non ob aliud iuste reprehendatur, nisi quia non est ibi servatus modus. Item species mala vel in comparatione dicitur formosioris atque pulchrioris, quod ista sit minor species, illa maior, non mole sed decore; aut quia non congruit huic rei cui adhibita est, ut aliena et inconveniens videatur: tamquam si nudus homo in foro deambulet, quod non offendit si in balneo videatur. Similiter et ordo tunc malus dicitur, cum minus ipse ordo servatur: unde non ibi ordo sed potius inordinatio mala est, cum aut minus ordinatum est quam debuit, aut non sicut debuit. Tamen ubi aliquis modus, aliqua species, aliquis ordo est, aliquod bonum et aliqua natura est. Ubi autem nullus modus, nulla species, nullus ordo est, nullum bonum, nulla natura est.
23. An evil measure, then, or an evil form, or an evil order are so called either because they are less than they ought to have been, or because they are not fitted to the things to which they ought to be fitted; so that they are called evil because they are alien and incongruous—as if someone were said to have acted in no good measure because he did less than he ought, or because he acted in a way he ought not to have acted in such a matter, or more than was fitting, or unsuitably—so that this very thing that is blamed, that it was done in an evil measure, is justly blamed for no other reason than that measure was not preserved in it. Likewise a form is called evil either in comparison with one more shapely and more beautiful, because this one is a lesser form and that one greater—not in bulk but in comeliness—or because it does not suit the thing to which it has been applied, so that it seems alien and unsuitable, as if a naked man were to walk about in the marketplace, which gives no offense if he is seen in the bath. Similarly, order too is then called evil when order itself is less preserved; hence it is not order that is evil there but rather disorder, when something is either ordered less than it ought, or not as it ought. Yet where there is some measure, some form, some order, there is some good and some nature. But where there is no measure, no form, no order, there is no good, no nature.
NatureGood.1.23
Testimoniis Scripturae probatur Deum esse incommutabilem. Filium Dei esse genitum, non factum.
It is proved by the testimonies of Scripture that God is unchangeable, and that the Son of God is begotten, not made.
24. Haec quae nostra fides habet, et utcumque ratio vestigavit, divinarum Scripturarum testimoniis munienda sunt: ut qui ea minore intellectu assequi non possunt, divinae auctoritati credant et ob hoc intellegere mereantur.
24. These things, which our faith holds and which reason has in some measure tracked out, must be fortified by the testimonies of the divine Scriptures, so that those who cannot grasp them by lesser understanding may believe the divine authority and on that account may deserve to understand.
NatureGood.1.24
Qui autem intellegunt, sed ecclesiasticis Litteris minus instructi sunt, magis ea nos ex nostro intellectu proferre, quam in illis Libris esse, non arbitrentur. Itaque Deum esse incommutabilem, sic scriptum est in Psalmis: Mutabis ea et mutabuntur; tu autem idem ipse es (Ps 101, 27-28). Et in Libro Sapientiae de ipsa Sapientia: In se ipsa manens innovat omnia (Sap 7, 27). Unde et apostolus Paulus: Invisibili, incorruptibili soli Deo (1 Tim 1, 17). Et apostolus Iacobus: Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum, apud quem non est commutatio nec momenti obumbratio (Iac 1, 17).
But let those who understand, yet are less instructed in the ecclesiastical writings, not suppose that we are bringing these things forth from our own understanding rather than that they are in those books. And so, that God is unchangeable is written thus in the Psalms: You will change them and they will be changed; but you are the same (Ps 102:26-27 (101:27-28)). And in the Book of Wisdom, concerning Wisdom herself: Remaining in herself, she makes all things new (Wis 7:27). Hence the apostle Paul also says: To the invisible, incorruptible, only God (1 Tim 1:17). And the apostle James: Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration (Jas 1:17).
NatureGood.1.24
Item quia id quod de se genuit, hoc est quod ipse est, ita ab ipso Filio breviter dicitur: Ego et Pater unum sumus (Io 10, 30). Quia non est autem factus Filius, quippe cum per illum facta sint omnia, sic scriptum est: In principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum, hoc erat in principio apud Deum. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil (Io 1, 1-3); id est, non est factum sine ipso aliquid.
Likewise, that what he begot of himself is what he himself is, is briefly stated by the Son himself thus: I and the Father are one (John 10:30). And that the Son was not made, since through him all things were made, is written thus: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God; this was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing (John 1:1-3); that is, nothing was made without him.
NatureGood.1.24
Illud Evangelii: Sine ipso factum est nihil, male intellectum a nonnullis.
The words of the Gospel, "without him was made nothing," wrongly understood by some.
25. Neque enim audienda sunt deliramenta hominum, qui nihil hoc loco aliquid intellegendum putant, et ad huiusmodi vanitatem propterea putant cogi posse aliquem, quia ipsum nihil in fine sententiae positum est. Ergo, inquiunt, factum est; et ideo quia factum est, ipsum nihil aliquid est. Sensum enim perdiderunt studio contradicendi, nec intellegunt nihil interesse utrum dicatur: Sine illo factum est nihil; an: Sine illo nihil factum est: quia et si illo ordine diceretur: Sine illo nihil factum est; possunt nihilominus dicere, ipsum nihil aliquid esse, quia factum est.
25. For we must not listen to the ravings of men who suppose that "nothing" in this passage is to be understood as something, and who suppose that someone can be forced into this kind of folly because "nothing" is placed at the end of the sentence. Therefore, they say, it was made; and therefore, because it was made, "nothing" itself is something. For they have lost their sense in their eagerness to contradict, and do not understand that it makes no difference whether one says: without him was made nothing, or: without him nothing was made; because even if it were said in that order, without him nothing was made, they could nonetheless say that "nothing" itself is something, because it was made.
NatureGood.1.25
Quod enim revera est aliquid, quid interest utrum ita dicatur: " Sine illo facta est domus "; an: " Sine illo domus est facta ": dum intellegatur aliquid sine illo factum, quod aliquid domus est? Ita quia dictum est: Sine illo factum est nihil; quoniam nihil utique non est aliquid, quando vere et proprie dicitur: sive dicatur: Sine illo factum est nihil; sive: Sine illo nihil factum est, vel nihil est factum; nihil interest. Quis autem velit loqui cum hominibus, qui hoc ipsum quod dixi: " Nihil interest ", possunt dicere: " Ergo interest aliquid ", quia ipsum nihil aliquid est?
For with regard to something that really is something, what difference does it make whether one says, "without him a house was made," or, "without him was made a house"—provided that it is understood that something was made without him, which something is a house? So because it was said, without him was made nothing, since "nothing" is certainly not something when it is spoken truly and properly, whether one says without him was made nothing, or without him nothing was made, or nothing was made, it makes no difference. But who would wish to speak with men who, with regard to this very thing I have said, "it makes no difference," can say, "Therefore something makes a difference," because "nothing" itself is something?
NatureGood.1.25
Hi autem qui sanum habent cerebrum, rem manifestissimam vident, hoc idem intellegi cum dixi: " Nihil interest ", quod intellegeretur si dicerem: " Interest nihil ". At isti si alicui dicant: "Quid fecisti? " et ille respondeat, nihil se fecisse: consequens est ut ei calumnientur dicentes: " Fecisti ergo aliquid, quia nihil fecisti "; ipsum enim nihil aliquid est. Habent autem et ipsum Dominum in fine sententiae ponentem hoc verbum, ubi ait: Et in occulto locutus sum nihil (Io 18, 20). Ergo legant, et taceant.
But those who have a sound brain see the most evident point: that the same thing is understood when I have said, "it makes no difference" (nihil interest), as would be understood if I were to say, "it differs in nothing" (interest nihil). But these men, if someone says to them, "What have you done?" and he answers that he has done nothing, will, as a consequence, slander him, saying: "Therefore you have done something, because you did nothing"; for "nothing" itself, they say, is something. They have, however, the Lord himself placing this word at the end of a sentence, where he says: And in secret I have spoken nothing (John 18:20). Let them therefore read, and be silent.
NatureGood.1.25
Creaturas ex nihilo factas esse.
Creatures were made out of nothing.
26. Quia ergo Deus omnia quae non de se genuit sed per Verbum suum fecit, non de his rebus quae iam erant sed de his quae omnino non erant, hoc est de nihilo fecit, ita dicit Apostolus: Qui vocat ea quae non sunt tamquam sint (Rom 4, 17). Apertius autem in Libro Machabaeorum scriptum est: Oro te, fili, respice ad caelum, et terram, et omnia quae in eis sunt. Vide et scito quia non erant ex quibus nos fecit Dominus Deus (2 Mach 7, 28).
26. Therefore, because God made all the things that he did not beget of himself, but made through his Word—not out of things that already existed but out of things that did not exist at all, that is, out of nothing—the Apostle says thus: Who calls the things that are not as though they were (Rom 4:17). But it is written more plainly in the Book of Maccabees: I beseech you, my son, look upon heaven and earth and all that is in them. Consider and know that the Lord God made us out of things that did not exist (2 Macc 7:28).
NatureGood.1.26
Et illud quod in Psalmo scriptum est: Ipse dixit et facta sunt (Ps 148, 5). Manifestum est quod non de se ista genuerit sed in verbo atque imperio fecerit. Quod autem non de se, utique de nihilo. Non erat enim aliud unde faceret, quod apertissime Apostolus dicit: Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia (Rom 11, 36).
And that which is written in the Psalm: He himself spoke, and they were made (Ps 148:5). It is manifest that he did not beget these things of himself but made them by his word and command. And what is not of himself is certainly out of nothing. For there was nothing else out of which he might make it, as the Apostle says most plainly: For from him and through him and in him are all things (Rom 11:36).
NatureGood.1.26
Ex ipso et Deo ipso non idem significare.
"From him" and "of him" do not signify the same thing.
27. Ex ipso autem non hoc significat quod De ipso. Quod enim de ipso est, potest dici ex ipso. Non autem omne quod ex ipso est recte dicitur de ipso. Ex ipso enim caelum et terra quia ipse fecit ea, non autem de ipso quia non de substantia sua. Sicut aliquis homo si gignat filium et faciat domum, ex ipso filius, ex ipso domus; sed filius de ipso, domus de terra et ligno. Sed hoc quia homo est, qui non potest aliquid etiam de nihilo facere. Deus autem ex quo omnia per quem omnia, in quo omnia, non opus habebat aliqua materia quam ipse non fecerat adiuvari omnipotentiam suam.
27. But "from him" (ex ipso) does not signify the same as "of him" (de ipso). For what is of him can be said to be from him. But not everything that is from him is rightly said to be of him. For heaven and earth are from him, because he made them, but not of him, because not of his substance. Just as if some man begets a son and makes a house: the son is from him, the house is from him; but the son is of him, the house is of earth and wood. But this is because he is a man, who cannot make anything out of nothing. But God, from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things, had no need to be aided in his omnipotence by any matter that he himself had not made.
NatureGood.1.27
Peccata non ex Deo, sed ex voluntate esse peccantium.
Sins are not from God but from the will of those who sin.
28. Cum autem audimus: Omnia ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso (Rom 11, 36), omnes utique naturas intellegere debemus quae naturaliter sunt. Neque enim ex ipso sunt peccata, quae naturam non servant sed vitiant. Quae peccata ex voluntate esse peccantium multis modis sancta Scriptura testatur, praecipue illo loco quo dicit Apostolus: Existimas autem hoc, o homo, qui iudicas eos qui talia agunt et facis ea, quoniam tu effugies iudicium Dei? An divitias benignitatis et patientiae eius et longanimitatis contemnis, ignorans quoniam patientia Dei ad paenitentiam te adducit? Secundum duritiam autem cordis tui et cor impoenitens, thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae et revelationis iusti iudicii Dei, qui reddet unicuique secundum opera sua (Rom 2, 3-6).
28. But when we hear: All things are from him and through him and in him (Rom 11:36), we must certainly understand all the natures that naturally exist. For sins, which do not preserve nature but corrupt it, are not from him. And that these sins are from the will of those who sin, holy Scripture testifies in many ways, especially in that passage where the Apostle says: But do you suppose, O man, you who judge those who do such things and do them yourself, that you will escape the judgment of God? Or do you despise the riches of his kindness and patience and forbearance, not knowing that the patience of God leads you to repentance? But according to your hardness of heart and your impenitent heart, you store up for yourself wrath on the day of wrath and of the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to each according to his works (Rom 2:3-6).
NatureGood.1.28
Peccatis nostris Deum non inquinari.
God is not defiled by our sins.
29. Nec tamen, cum in Deo sint universa quae condidit (Cf. Col 1, 16; Rom 11, 36), inquinant eum qui peccant de cuius sapientia dicitur: Attingit autem omnia propter suam munditiam et nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit (Sap 7, 24-25). Oportet enim ut sicut Deum incorruptibilem et incommutabilem, ita consequenter etiam incoinquinabilem credamus.
29. And yet, although all the things he has founded are in God (See Col 1:16; Rom 11:36), those who sin do not defile him, of whose wisdom it is said: She reaches through all things by reason of her purity, and nothing defiled enters into her (Wis 7:24-25). For just as we must believe God to be incorruptible and unchangeable, so, consequently, we must believe him to be incapable of being defiled.
NatureGood.1.29
Bona etiam minima et terrena esse a Deo.
Even the least and earthly goods are from God.
30. Quia vero et minima bona, hoc est terrena atque mortalia ipse fecit, illo Apostoli loco sine dubitatione intellegitur ubi loquens de membris carnis nostrae: Quia si glorificatur unum membrum, congaudent omnia membra; et si patitur unum membrum, compatiuntur omnia membra (1 Cor 12, 26). Etiam hoc ibi ait: Deus posuit membra, singulum quodque eorum in corpore prout voluit (1 Cor 12, 18). Et: Deus temperavit corpus, ei cui deerat maiorem honorem dans, ut non essent scissurae in corpore sed idem ipsum ut pro invicem sollicita sint membra (1 Cor 12, 24-25). Hoc autem quod sic in modo et specie et ordine membrorum carnis laudat Apostolus in omnium animalium carne invenis, et maximorum et minimorum; cum omnis caro in bonis terrenis ac per hoc minimus deputetur.
30. But that he himself made even the least goods—that is, the earthly and mortal ones—is understood without doubt from that passage of the Apostle where, speaking of the members of our flesh, he says: For if one member is glorified, all the members rejoice together; and if one member suffers, all the members suffer together (1 Cor 12:26). He also says there: God placed the members, each one of them in the body, as he willed (1 Cor 12:18). And: God so tempered the body, giving greater honor to the part that lacked it, so that there might be no divisions in the body, but that the members might be equally solicitous for one another (1 Cor 12:24-25). But this which the Apostle praises in the measure and form and order of the members of the flesh you find in the flesh of all animals, both the greatest and the least; since all flesh is reckoned among earthly goods and on this account among the least.
NatureGood.1.30
Punire ac donare peccata peraeque ad Deum pertinere.
To punish and to forgive sins belong equally to God.
31. Item quia cuique culpae qualis et quanta debeatur poena, divini iudicii est, non humani sic scriptum est: O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei; quam inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius et investigabiles viae eius! (Rom 11, 33) Item quia bonitate Dei donantur peccata conversis, hoc ipsum quod Christus missus est (Cf. Io 20, 21), satis ostendit. Qui non in sua natura qua Deus est, sed in nostra quam de femina assumpsit pro nobis mortuus est: quam Dei bonitatem circa nos et dilectionem sic praedicat Apostolus: Commendat, inquit, suam caritatem Deus in nobis, quoniam cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Multo magis, nunc iustificati in sanguine ipsius, salvi erimus ab ira per ipsum. Si enim, cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius: multo magis reconciliati salvi erimus in vita ipsius (Rom 5, 8-10).
31. Likewise, that what kind and how great a punishment is owed to each fault belongs to divine, not human, judgment is written thus: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! (Rom 11:33) Likewise, that by the goodness of God sins are forgiven to those who turn back, the very fact that Christ was sent (See John 20:21) sufficiently shows. He died for us, not in his own nature, by which he is God, but in ours, which he took from a woman; and the Apostle proclaims this goodness and love of God toward us thus: God, he says, commends his love toward us, in that, while we were still sinners, Christ died for us. Much more, now justified by his blood, shall we be saved from wrath through him. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by his life (Rom 5:8-10).
NatureGood.1.31
Quia vero etiam cum peccatoribus poena debita redditur, non est iniquitas apud Deum, sic dicit: Quid dicemus? Numquid iniquus Deus qui infert iram? (Rom 3, 5) Uno autem loco et bonitatem et severitatem ab illo esse breviter admonuit, dicens: Vides ergo bonitatem et severitatem Dei: in eos quidem qui ceciderunt, severitatem, in te autem bonitatem, si permanseris in bonitate (Rom 11, 22).
But that there is no injustice with God even when the due punishment is rendered to sinners, he says thus: What shall we say? Is God unjust who inflicts wrath? (Rom 3:5) And in one place he briefly noted that both goodness and severity are from him, saying: See then the goodness and the severity of God: toward those who fell, severity; but toward you, goodness, if you remain in goodness (Rom 11:22).
NatureGood.1.31
A Deo esse et ipsam nocendi potestatem.
Even the very power to do harm is from God.
32. Item quia etiam nocentium potestas non est nisi a Deo, sic scriptum est loquente Sapientia: Per me reges regnant et tyranni per me tenent terram (Prov 8, 15-16). Dicit et Apostolus: Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo (Rom 13, 1). Digne autem fieri, in libro Iob scriptum est: Qui regnare facit, inquit, hominem hypocritam propter perversitatem populi (Iob 34, 30). Et de populo Israel dicit Deus: Dedi eis regem in ira mea Angelos malos non a Deo, sed peccando factos esse malos.
32. Likewise, that even the power of those who do harm is only from God, it is written thus, where Wisdom speaks: Through me kings reign, and tyrants through me hold the earth (Prov 8:15-16). The Apostle also says: For there is no power except from God (Rom 13:1). And that this is rightly done, it is written in the book of Job: Who makes a hypocrite to reign, he says, because of the perversity of the people (Job 34:30). And concerning the people of Israel God says: I gave them a king in my wrath. That the evil angels were made evil not by God but by sinning.
NatureGood.1.32
(Os 13, 11). Iniustum enim non est ut improbis accipientibus nocendi potestatem, et bonorum patientia probetur et malorum iniquitas puniatur. Nam per potestatem diabolo datam et Iob probatus est ut iustus appareret (Cf. Iob 1, 12; 2, 6), et Petrus tentatus ne de se praesumeret (Cf. Mt 26, 31 -35; 69-75), et Paulus colaphizatus ne se extolleret (Cf. 2 Cor 12, 7), et Iudas damnatus ut se suspenderet (Cf. Mt 27, 5; Act 1, 16-20).
(Hos 13:11) For it is not unjust that, when the wicked receive the power to do harm, both the patience of the good should be tested and the iniquity of the evil should be punished. For through the power given to the devil, Job was tested so that he might appear just (See Job 1:12; 2:6), and Peter was tempted lest he presume upon himself (See Matt 26:31-35, 69-75), and Paul was buffeted lest he exalt himself (See 2 Cor 12:7), and Judas was condemned so that he hanged himself (See Matt 27:5; Acts 1:16-20).
NatureGood.1.32
Cum ergo per potestatem quam diabolo dedit, omnia iuste ipse Deus fecerit (Cf. Sap 12, 15); non tamen pro his iuste factis sed pro iniqua nocendi voluntate, quae ipsius diaboli fuit, ei reddetur in fine supplicium, cum dicetur impiis qui eius nequitiae consentire perseveraverint: Ite in ignem aeternum quem paravit Pater meus diabolo et angelis eius (Mt 25, 41).
Since, then, through the power he gave to the devil, God himself did all things justly (See Wis 12:15), yet not for these just deeds, but for the unjust will to do harm, which was the devil's own, punishment will be rendered to him in the end, when it will be said to the impious who have persevered in consenting to his wickedness: Go into the eternal fire, which my Father has prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt 25:41).
NatureGood.1.32
33. Quia vero et ipsi mali angeli non a Deo mali sunt conditi, sed peccando facti sunt mali, sic Petrus in epistola sua dicit: Si enim Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercit, sed carceribus caliginis inferi detrudens tradidit in iudicio puniendos servari (2 Pt 2, 4).
33. But that the evil angels themselves were not created evil by God, but became evil by sinning, Peter says thus in his epistle: For if God did not spare the angels who sinned, but, thrusting them down into the prisons of the gloom of hell, handed them over to be kept for punishment in the judgment (2 Pet 2:4).
NatureGood.1.33
Hinc Petrus ostendit adhuc eis ultimi iudicii poenam deberi, de qua Dominus dicit: Ite in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis eius (Mt 25, 41), quamvis iam poenaliter hunc inferum, hoc est inferiorem caliginosum aerem tamquam carcerem acceperint: qui tamen quoniam et coelum dicitur, non illud coelum in quo sunt sidera, sed hoc inferius cuius caligine nubila conglobantur, et ubi aves volitant;
Here Peter shows that the punishment of the last judgment is still owed to them, of which the Lord says: Go into the eternal fire, which has been prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt 25:41)—although they have already, by way of punishment, received this hell, that is, this lower gloomy air as a kind of prison. Yet because this too is called heaven—not that heaven in which the stars are, but this lower one, in whose gloom the clouds are massed together and where the birds fly;
NatureGood.1.33
nam et coelum nubilum dicitur, et volatilia coeli appellantur (Cf. Gen 2, 20; Mt 6, 26): secundum hoc apostolus Paulus eosdem iniquos angelos (Cf. Sap 2, 24), contra quos nobis invidos pie vivendo pugnamus, spiritalia nequitiae in coelestibus (Eph 6, 12) nominat. Quod ne de illis superioribus coelis intellegatur, aperte alibi dicit: Secundum principem potestatis aeris huius, qui nunc operatur in filiis diffidentiae (Eph 2, 2).
for the cloudy sky too is called heaven, and birds are called the birds of heaven (See Gen 2:20; Matt 6:26)—according to this the apostle Paul calls these same wicked angels (See Wis 2:24), against whom, as they envy us, we fight by living devoutly, the spiritual forces of wickedness in the heavens (Eph 6:12). And lest this be understood of those higher heavens, he plainly says elsewhere: According to the prince of the power of this air, who now works in the sons of unbelief (Eph 2:2).
NatureGood.1.33
Peccatum non est malae naturae appetitio, sed melioris desertio.
Sin is not the desire of an evil nature but the desertion of a better one.
34. Item quia peccatum vel iniquitas non est appetitio naturarum malarum sed desertio meliorum, sic in Scripturis invenitur scriptum: Omnis creatura Dei bona est (1 Tim 4, 4). Ac per hoc et omne lignum quod in paradiso Deus plantavit, utique bonum est (Cf. Gen 2, 8-9). Non ergo malam naturam homo appetivit cum arborem vetitam tetigit; sed id quod melius erat deserendo, factum malum ipse commisit. Melior quippe Creator, quam ulla creatura quam condidit; cuius imperium non erat deserendum ut tangeretur prohibitum, quamvis bonum; quoniam deserto meliore bonum creaturae appetebatur, quod contra Creatoris imperium tangebatur. Non itaque Deus arborem malam in paradiso plantaverat, sed ipse erat melior qui eam tangi prohibebat.
34. Likewise, that sin or iniquity is not the desire of evil natures but the desertion of better ones, it is found written thus in the Scriptures: Every creature of God is good (1 Tim 4:4). And on this account every tree that God planted in paradise is certainly good (See Gen 2:8-9). Therefore man did not desire an evil nature when he touched the forbidden tree; rather, by deserting what was better, he himself committed the deed that was made evil. For the Creator is certainly better than any creature he founded; and his command was not to be deserted so as to touch what was forbidden, although good; for, the better being deserted, the good of the creature was desired, which was touched against the command of the Creator. So God had not planted an evil tree in paradise, but he himself, who forbade it to be touched, was better.
NatureGood.1.34
Arbor Adamo vetita, non quia mala, sed quia homini bonum ut subditus sit Deo.
The tree forbidden to Adam was forbidden not because it was evil but because it is good for man to be subject to God.
35. Ad hoc enim et prohibuerat ut ostenderet animae rationalis naturam, non in sua potestate sed Deo subditam esse debere, et ordinem suae salutis per obedientiam custodire, per inobedientiam corrumpere. Hinc et arborem quam tangi vetuit sic appellavit dignoscentiae boni et mali (Gen 2, 9); quia cum eam contra vetitum tetigisset, experiretur poenam peccati et eo modo dignosceret quid interesset inter obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum.
35. For he had forbidden it precisely in order to show that the nature of the rational soul ought to be not in its own power but subject to God, and that it preserves the order of its salvation through obedience and corrupts it through disobedience. Hence he also called the tree that he forbade to be touched the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Gen 2:9); because when he had touched it against the prohibition, he would experience the punishment of sin and in that way would come to know the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience.
NatureGood.1.35
Nulla creatura Dei mala, sed ea male uti est malum.
No creature of God is evil, but to make evil use of it is evil.
36. Nam quis ita desipiat ut Dei creaturam, maxime in paradiso plantatam, vituperandam putet? Quando quidem nec ipsae spinae ac tribuli (Cf. Gen 3, 17-19), quos peccatori in labore conterendo, secundum Dei iudiciariam voluntatem terra peperit, recte vituperentur. Habent enim et tales herbae modum et speciem et ordinem suum, quae quisquis sobrie consideraverit laudanda reperiet. Sed ei naturae ista mala sunt quam peccati merito sic coerceri oportebat.
36. For who would be so foolish as to think that a creature of God, especially one planted in paradise, should be reproached? Since indeed not even thorns and thistles themselves (See Gen 3:17-19), which the earth brought forth for the sinner to wear himself out in labor, according to God's judicial will, are rightly reproached. For such plants too have their own measure and form and order, which whoever considers soberly will find worthy of praise. But these things are evil for that nature which, by the desert of sin, had to be thus restrained.
NatureGood.1.36
Non est ergo, ut dixi, peccatum malae naturae appetitio sed melioris desertio. Et ideo factum ipsum malum est, non illa natura qua male utitur peccans. Malum est enim male uti bono.
Therefore, as I said, sin is not the desire of an evil nature but the desertion of a better one. And so the deed itself is evil, not the nature that the sinner makes evil use of. For it is evil to make evil use of a good.
NatureGood.1.36
Unde Apostolus damnatos quosdam divino iudicio reprehendit, qui coluerunt et servierunt creaturae potius quam Creatori (Rom 1, 25). Neque enim creaturam reprehendit, quod qui fecerit, Creatori facit iniuriam, sed eos qui male usi sunt bono, meliore deserto.
Hence the Apostle reproaches certain men condemned by divine judgment, who worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator (Rom 1:25). For he does not reproach the creature—whoever does so does injury to the Creator—but those who made evil use of a good, the better being deserted.
NatureGood.1.36
Malis peccantium Deus bene utitur.
God makes good use of the evils of those who sin.
37. Proinde si custodiant omnes naturae modum et speciem et ordinem proprium, nullum erit malum. Si autem his bonis quisque male uti voluerit, nec sic vincit voluntatem Dei, qui etiam iniustos iuste ordinare novit; ut si ipsi per iniquitatem voluntatis suae male usi fuerint bonis illius, ille per iustitiam potestatis suae bene utatur malis ipsorum, recte ordinans in poenis qui se perverse ordinaverint in peccatis.
37. Accordingly, if all natures preserved their proper measure and form and order, there would be no evil. But if anyone wishes to make evil use of these goods, not even so does he overcome the will of God, who knows how to order even the unjust justly; so that if they, through the iniquity of their own will, make evil use of his goods, he, through the justice of his power, makes good use of their evils, rightly ordering in punishments those who have ordered themselves perversely in sins.
NatureGood.1.37
Ignis aeternus malos crucians non malus.
The eternal fire that torments the wicked is not evil.
38. Nam nec ipse ignis aeternus, qui cruciaturus est impios, mala natura est, habens modum et speciem et ordinem suum, nulla iniquitate depravatum. Sed cruciatus est damnatis malus, quorum peccatis est debitus. Neque enim et lux ista, quia lippos cruciat, mala natura est.
38. For not even the eternal fire itself, which is to torment the impious, is an evil nature, having its own measure and form and order, depraved by no iniquity. But the torment of it is evil for the damned, to whose sins it is due. For neither is this light an evil nature because it torments bleary eyes.
NatureGood.1.38
Aeternus ignis dicitur, non sicut Deus, sed quia sine fine.
It is called eternal fire, not as God is eternal, but because it is without end.
39. Aeternus autem ignis non sicut Deus aeternus, quod etsi sine fine sit non est tamen sine initio. Deus autem etiam sine initio est. Deinde quia licet perpetuus peccatorum suppliciis adhibeatur, mutabilis tamen natura est. Illa est autem vera aeternitas, quae vera immortalitas, hoc est illa summa incommutabilitas quam solus Deus habet, qui mutari omnino non potest. Aliud est enim non mutari, cum possit mutari, aliud autem prorsus non posse mutari. Sicut ergo dicitur homo bonus, non tamen sicut Deus de quo dictum est: Nemo bonus nisi unus Deus (Mc 10, 18). Et sicut dicitur anima immortalis, non tamen sicut Deus de quo dictum est: Qui solus habet immortalitatem (1 Tim 6, 16). Et sicut dicitur homo sapiens, non tamen sicut Deus de quo dictum est: Soli sapienti Deo (Rom 16, 27). Sic dicitur ignis aeternus, non tamen sicut Deus cuius solius immortalitas ipsa est vera aeternitas.
39. But the eternal fire is not eternal as God is, since, even though it is without end, it is nevertheless not without beginning. God, however, is even without beginning. Next, although it is applied perpetually to the punishments of sinners, it is nevertheless a changeable nature. But that is true eternity which is true immortality, that is, that highest unchangeableness which God alone has, who can in no way be changed. For it is one thing not to be changed when one could be changed, and another to be altogether unable to be changed. So a man is called good, yet not as God is, of whom it was said: No one is good but God alone (Mark 10:18). And the soul is called immortal, yet not as God is, of whom it was said: Who alone has immortality (1 Tim 6:16). And a man is called wise, yet not as God is, of whom it was said: To God alone wise (Rom 16:27). So the fire is called eternal, yet not as God is, whose immortality alone is true eternity.
NatureGood.1.39
Nec Deo noceri potest nec alii, nisi Dei iusta ordinatione.
Neither God nor anyone else can be harmed except by the just ordering of God.
40. Quae cum ita sint secundum catholicam fidem et sanam doctrinam, et intellegentibus perspicuam veritatem, nec naturae Dei nocere potest quisquam, nec natura Dei nocere iniuste cuiquam, vel nocere impune patitur quemquam. Qui enim nocet, ait Apostolus, recipiet id quod nocuit, et non est personarum acceptio apud Deum (Col 3, 25).
40. Since these things are so according to the Catholic faith and sound doctrine, and are plain to those who understand the truth, no one can harm the nature of God, nor can the nature of God harm anyone unjustly, nor does it allow anyone to do harm with impunity. For he who does harm, says the Apostle, will receive back what he did in harm, and there is no respect of persons with God (Col 3:25).
NatureGood.1.40
Quanta bona Manichaei ponant in natura mali, et quanta mala in natura boni.
How many goods the Manichees place in the nature of evil, and how many evils in the nature of the good.
41. Quod Manichaei si vellent sine pernicioso studio defendendi erroris sui, et cum Dei timore cogitare; non scelestissime blasphemarent inducendo duas naturas, unam bonam quam dicunt Deum, alteram malam quam non fecerit Deus: ita errantes, ita delirantes, imo vero ita insanientes, ut non videant, et in eo quod dicunt naturam summi mali, ponere se tanta bona, ubi ponunt vitam, potentiam, salutem, memoriam, intellectum, temperiem, virtutem, copiam, sensum, lumen, suavitatem, mensuras, numeros, pacem, modum, speciem, ordinem; in eo autem quod dicunt summum bonum, tanta mala, mortem, aegritudinem, oblivionem, insipientiam, perturbationem, impotentiam, egestatem, stoliditatem, caecitatem, dolorem, iniquitatem, dedecus, bellum, immoderationem, deformitatem, perversitatem.
41. If the Manichees were willing to consider these things without a pernicious zeal for defending their error, and with the fear of God, they would not blaspheme so wickedly by introducing two natures, one good, which they call God, the other evil, which God did not make—so erring, so raving, indeed so insane that they do not see that in what they call the nature of the highest evil they place such great goods, where they place life, power, soundness, memory, understanding, temperateness, virtue, abundance, sense, light, sweetness, measures, numbers, peace, measure, form, order; while in what they call the highest good they place such great evils—death, sickness, forgetfulness, foolishness, disturbance, powerlessness, neediness, stupidity, blindness, pain, iniquity, disgrace, war, immoderation, deformity, perversity.
NatureGood.1.41
Principes enim tenebrarum et vixisse in sua natura dicunt, et in suo regno salvos fuisse, et meminisse, et intellexisse. Sic enim concionatum illi dicunt principem tenebrarum, ut neque ipse talia dicere, neque ab eis quibus dicebat audiri sine memoria et intellectu potuisset: et habuisse temperiem animo et corpori suo congruam, et virtute potentiae regnasse, et copias elementorum suorum ac fecunditates habuisse, et sensisse se invicem ac sibi vicinum lumen, et oculos habuisse, quibus illud longe conspicerent; qui utique oculi sine aliquo lumine lumen videre non poterant, unde recte etiam lumina nominantur: et suavitate suae voluptatis esse perfruitos, et dimensis membris atque habitationibus determinatos fuisse.
For they say that the princes of darkness both lived in their nature, and were safe in their kingdom, and remembered, and understood. For they say that the prince of darkness so harangued that neither could he himself say such things, nor could he be heard by those to whom he spoke, without memory and understanding; and that he had a temperateness suited to his mind and body, and reigned by the virtue of power, and had abundances and fruitfulnesses of his elements, and that they perceived one another and the light near them, and had eyes with which they beheld it from afar—eyes which certainly could not see light without some light, whence they are rightly even called lights; and that they enjoyed the sweetness of their pleasure, and were bounded by measured limbs and dwellings.
NatureGood.1.41
Nisi autem etiam qualiscumque pulchritudo ibi fuisset, nec amarent coniugia sua, nec partium congruentia corpora eorum constarent: quod ubi non fuerit, non possunt ea fieri quae ibi facta esse delirant. Et nisi pax aliqua ibi esset, principi suo non obedirent. Nisi modus ibi esset, nihil aliud agerent, quam comederent, aut biberent, aut saevirent, aut quodlibet aliud sine aliqua satietate : quamquam nec ipsi qui hoc agebant, formis suis determinati essent, nisi modus ibi esset: nunc vero talia dicunt eos egisse, ut in omnibus actionibus suis modos sibi congruos habuisse negare non possint.
But unless some kind of beauty too had been there, they would neither love their spouses, nor would their bodies consist of the congruence of parts; and where this is not present, those things cannot come about which these men rave were done there. And unless there were some peace there, they would not obey their prince. Unless there were measure there, they would do nothing else than eat, or drink, or rage, or do whatever else without any satiety—although not even those who did this would be bounded by their own shapes unless measure were there; but now they say they did such things that they cannot deny they had measures suited to themselves in all their actions.
NatureGood.1.41
Si autem species ibi non fuisset, nulla ibi qualitas naturalis subsisteret. Si nullus ordo ibi fuisset, non alii dominarentur, alii subderentur, non in suis elementis congruenter viverent, non denique suis locis haberent membra disposita, ut illa omnia quae vana isti fabulantur, agere possent.
But if form had not been there, no natural quality would have subsisted there. If no order had been there, some would not have ruled and others been subject, they would not have lived congruously in their elements, and finally they would not have had their limbs arranged in their proper places, so as to be able to do all those things that these men idly fable.
NatureGood.1.41
Dei autem naturam si non mortuam dicunt, quid secundum eorum vanitatem suscitat Christus? Si non dicunt aegram, quid curat? Si non dicunt oblitam, quid commemorat? Si non dicunt insipientem, quid docet? Si non dicunt perturbatam, quid redintegrat? Si non victa et capta est, quid liberat? Si non eget, cui subvenit? Si non amisit sensum, quid vegetat? Si non est excaecata, quid illuminat?
But as for the nature of God: if they do not say it was dead, what does Christ, according to their vanity, raise up? If they do not say it was sick, what does he heal? If they do not say it forgot, what does he recall to it? If they do not say it was foolish, what does he teach? If they do not say it was disturbed, what does he restore? If it was not conquered and captured, what does he set free? If it is not in need, whom does he help? If it did not lose its sense, what does he quicken? If it was not blinded, what does he illuminate?
NatureGood.1.41
Si non est in dolore, quid recreat? Si non est iniqua, quid per praecepta corrigit? Si non est dedecorata, quid mundat? Si non est in bello, cui promittit pacem? Si non est immoderata, cui modum legis imponit? Si non est deformis, quid reformat? Si non est perversa, quid emendat?
If it is not in pain, what does he refresh? If it is not iniquitous, what does he correct by precepts? If it is not disgraced, what does he cleanse? If it is not at war, to whom does he promise peace? If it is not immoderate, on whom does he impose the measure of the law? If it is not deformed, what does he re-form? If it is not perverse, what does he amend?
NatureGood.1.41
Omnia enim haec a Christo, non illi rei praestari dicunt, quae facta est a Deo, et arbitrio proprio peccando depravata; sed ipsi naturae; ipsi substantiae Dei, quae hoc est quod Deus.
For they say that all these things are bestowed by Christ, not on that thing which was made by God and depraved by sin through its own choice, but on the very nature, the very substance of God, which is what God is.
NatureGood.1.41
Manichaeorum de Dei natura blasphemiae.
The blasphemies of the Manichees concerning the nature of God.
42. Quid istis blasphemiis comparari potest? Nihil omnino, sed si aliarum perversarum sectarum considerentur errores: si autem iste sibi error ex parte altera, de qua nondum diximus, comparetur, adhuc etiam multo peius et exsecrabilius in Dei naturam blasphemare convincitur.
42. What can be compared to these blasphemies? Nothing at all—but only if the errors of other perverse sects are considered. But if this error is compared with itself, on the other side, of which we have not yet spoken, it is convicted of blaspheming against the nature of God still much more grievously and detestably.
NatureGood.1.42
Dicunt enim etiam nonnullas animas, quas volunt esse de substantia Dei et eiusdem omnino naturae, quae non sponte peccaverint, sed a gente tenebrarum, quam mali naturam dicunt, ad quam debellandam non ultro, sed patris imperio descenderunt, superatae et oppressae sint, affigi in aeternum globo horribili tenebrarum.
For they say that certain souls also, which they hold to be of the substance of God and of altogether the same nature, who did not sin of their own accord but were overcome and oppressed by the race of darkness—which they call the nature of evil, and against which, to wage war, they descended not voluntarily but by the command of the Father—are fixed forever to a horrible globe of darkness.
NatureGood.1.42
Ita secundum eorum sacrilega vaniloquia, Deus se ipsum in quadam parte a magno malo liberavit, et rursus se ipsum in quadam parte damnavit, quam liberare ab hoste non potuit, et tamquam de ipso hoste devicto insuper triumphavit.
Thus, according to their sacrilegious idle talk, God freed himself in a certain part from a great evil, and again condemned himself in a certain part, which he could not free from the enemy, and, moreover, triumphed over the very enemy as if conquered.
NatureGood.1.42
O scelestam et incredibilem audaciam, talia de Deo credendi, talia loquendi, talia praedicandi! Quod cum defendere conantur, ut in peiora irruant clausis oculis, dicunt malae naturae commixtionem facere ista, ut bona Dei natura tanta mala patiatur: nam ipsam apud se ipsam nihil horum pati potuisse vel posse. Quasi inde laudanda sit natura incorruptibilis, quia ipsa sibi non nocet, et non quia nihil ei noceri ab aliquo potest.
O wicked and incredible boldness, of believing such things about God, of speaking such things, of preaching such things! When they try to defend this, so as to rush, with closed eyes, into worse things, they say that the commingling of the evil nature brings these things about, so that the good nature of God suffers such great evils; for in itself, by itself, it could suffer or could suffer none of these things. As though the incorruptible nature were to be praised because it does itself no harm, and not because nothing can be harmed in it by anyone.
NatureGood.1.42
Deinde si natura tenebrarum nocuit naturae Dei, et natura Dei nocuit naturae tenebrarum; duo ergo mala sunt quae sibi invicem nocuerunt, et meliore animo fuit gens tenebrarum, quia et si nocuit, nolens nocuit: neque enim nocere, sed frui voluit bono Dei. Deus autem illam exstinguere voluit, sicut Manichaeus apertissime in Epistola ruinosi sui Fundamenti delirat. Oblitus enim quod paulo ante dixerat: Ita autem fundata sunt eiusdem splendidissima regna supra lucidam et beatam terram, ut a nullo unquam aut moveri, aut concuti possint;
Next, if the nature of darkness harmed the nature of God, and the nature of God harmed the nature of darkness, then there are two evils that harmed each other; and the race of darkness was of better disposition, because even if it did harm, it did harm unwillingly: for it did not wish to do harm, but to enjoy the good of God. But God wished to extinguish it, as Mani most plainly raves in the Letter of his ruinous Foundation. For he forgot what he had said a little before: And so the most splendid realms of the same were founded upon a shining and blessed land, such that they could never be moved or shaken by anyone;
NatureGood.1.42
postea dixit: Lucis vero beatissimae Pater, sciens labem magnam ac vastitatem quae ex tenebris surgeret, adversus sua sancta impendere saecula, nisi aliquod eximium ac praeclarum et virtute potens numen opponat, quo superet simul ac destruat stirpem tenebrarum, qua exstincta perpetua quies lucis incolis pararetur.
afterward he said: But the Father of the most blessed light, knowing the great calamity and devastation that would rise up from the darkness against his holy ages unless he set against it some excellent and illustrious deity, powerful in virtue, by which he might overcome and at the same time destroy the stock of darkness, so that, when it was extinguished, perpetual rest might be prepared for the inhabitants of light.
NatureGood.1.42
Ecce timuit labem ac vastitatem impendentem saeculis suis. Certe sic erant fundata super lucidam et beatam terram, ut a nullo unquam moveri aut concuti possent? Ecce a timore nocere voluit vicinae genti, quam destruere et exstinguere conatus est, ut perpetua quies lucis incolis pararetur. Quare non addidit, et perpetuum vinculum? An illae animae quas in globo tenebrarum in aeternum configit, non erant incolae lucis, de quibus aperte dicit, quod errare se a priore lucida sua natura passae sint?
Behold, he feared the calamity and devastation hanging over his ages. Were they certainly so founded upon a shining and blessed land that they could never be moved or shaken by anyone? Behold, out of fear he wished to harm the neighboring race, which he tried to destroy and extinguish, so that perpetual rest might be prepared for the inhabitants of light. Why did he not add, "and a perpetual chain"? Or were those souls which he fixes forever to the globe of darkness not inhabitants of light, of whom he plainly says that he allowed them to stray from their former luminous nature?
NatureGood.1.42
ubi et nolens coactus est dicere, libera eas voluntate peccasse, qui non vult peccatum ponere nisi in necessitate naturae contrariae: ubique nesciens quid loquatur, et tamquam ipse iam inclusus sit in tenebrarum globo quem finxit, quaerens qua exeat, et non inveniens.
where, even against his will, he was compelled to say that they sinned by free will—he who does not wish to place sin except in the necessity of a contrary nature: everywhere not knowing what he says, and as though he himself were now shut up in the globe of darkness that he invented, seeking a way out and not finding it.
NatureGood.1.42
Sed dicat quod vult seductis et miseris, a quibus multo amplius quam Christus honoratur, ut hoc pretio tam longas et tam sacrilegas eis fabulas vendat. Dicat quod vult, includat in globo tamquam in carcere gentem tenebrarum, et forinsecus affigat naturam lucis, cui de hoste exstincto quietem perpetuam promittebat: ecce peior est poena lucis quam tenebrarum, peior est poena divinae naturae quam gentis adversae.
But let him say what he will to the seduced and wretched, by whom he is honored much more than Christ, so that at this price he may sell them such long and such sacrilegious fables. Let him say what he will, let him shut up the race of darkness in a globe as in a prison, and fix on the outside the nature of light, to which he promised perpetual rest from the enemy once extinguished: behold, the punishment of the light is worse than that of the darkness; the punishment of the divine nature is worse than that of the hostile race.
NatureGood.1.42
Illa quippe etsi in tenebris intus est, ad naturam eius pertinet in tenebris habitare: animae autem quae hoc sunt quod Deus, non poterunt recipi, sicut dicit, in regna illa pacifica, et a vita ac libertate sanctae lucis alienabuntur, et configentur in praedicto horribili globo: unde et adhaerebunt, inquit, iis rebus animae eaedem quas dilexerunt, relictae in eodem tenebrarum globo, suis meritis id sibi conquirentes. Certe non est liberum voluntatis arbitrium? Videte quomodo insaniens quid dicat ignorat, et contraria sibi loquendo peius bellum contra se gerit, quam contra deum ipsius gentis tenebrarum.
For that race, even if it is within the darkness, it belongs to its nature to dwell in darkness; but the souls which are what God is will not be able to be received, as he says, into those peaceful realms, and will be estranged from the life and freedom of the holy light, and will be fixed to the aforesaid horrible globe; whence those same souls, he says, will also cling to the things they loved, left in the same globe of darkness, acquiring this for themselves by their own deserts. Surely there is no free choice of the will? See how, in his madness, he does not know what he says, and, by speaking things contrary to himself, wages a worse war against himself than against the god of the race of darkness itself.
NatureGood.1.42
Deinde si propterea damnantur animae lucis, quia dilexerunt tenebras; iniuste damnatur gens tenebrarum, quae lucem dilexit. Et gens quidem tenebrarum lucem ab initio dilexit, quam etsi violenter, tamen possidere voluit, non exstinguere: lucis autem natura in bello tenebras exstinguere voluit; eas ergo victa dilexit.
Next, if the souls of light are condemned because they loved the darkness, then the race of darkness is condemned unjustly, since it loved the light. And the race of darkness loved the light from the beginning, which it wished to possess, even if violently, not to extinguish; but the nature of light, in the war, wished to extinguish the darkness; therefore, being conquered, it loved it.
NatureGood.1.42
Quod vultis eligite: utrum necessitate compulsa ut diligeret tenebras, an voluntate seducta. Si necessitate, quare damnatur? si voluntate, quare Dei natura in tanta iniquitate deprehenditur? Si necessitate Dei natura coacta est diligere tenebras, victa est ergo, non vicit: si voluntate, quid iam miseri dubitant peccandi voluntatem tribuere naturae quam Deus ex nihilo fecit, ne tribuant eam luci quam genuit?
Choose what you will: whether it was compelled by necessity to love the darkness, or seduced by will. If by necessity, why is it condemned? If by will, why is the nature of God caught in such great iniquity? If by necessity the nature of God was forced to love the darkness, then it was conquered, it did not conquer; if by will, why do the wretches now hesitate to attribute the will to sin to a nature that God made out of nothing, lest they attribute it to the light that he begot?
NatureGood.1.42
Mala ante mali commixtionem multa tribui naturae Dei a Manichaeis.
The Manichees attribute many evils to the nature of God before the commingling of evil.
43. Quid, si etiam ostendimus, ante commixtionem mali, quam fabulose confictam dementissime crediderunt, in ipsa lucis natura, quam dicunt, magna mala fuisse? quid ad istas blasphemias addi posse videbitur? Illic enim fuit antequam pugnaretur, dura et inevitabilis pugnandi necessitas: ecce iam magnum malum antequam bono misceretur malum: dicant hoc unde, cum adhuc nulla esset facta commixtio. Si autem necessitas non erat, voluntas ergo erat: unde et hoc tam magnum malum, ut Deus ipse naturae suae nocere vellet, cui noceri ab hoste non poterat, mittendo eam crudeliter miscendam, turpiter purgandam, inique damnandam?
43. What if we also show that, before the commingling of evil—which they most senselessly believed, fabulously invented—there were great evils in the very nature of light, as they say? What will seem possible to be added to these blasphemies? For there was there, before the fighting, a hard and inevitable necessity of fighting: behold, already a great evil before evil was mingled with the good. Let them say whence this came, when as yet no commingling had been made. But if there was no necessity, then there was will; whence also this so great an evil, that God himself wished to harm his own nature, which could not be harmed by the enemy, by sending it to be cruelly mingled, basely purified, unjustly condemned?
NatureGood.1.43
Ecce quantum malum perniciosae et noxiae et immanissimae voluntatis, antequam ullum malum de gente contraria misceretur. An forte nesciebat hoc eventurum membris suis, ut diligerent tenebras et inimicae existerent sanctae luci, sicut ipse dicit, hoc est, non tantum Deo suo, sed etiam Patri de quo erant? Unde ergo hoc in Deo tam magnum ignorantiae malum, antequam ullum de gente contraria misceretur malum? Si autem hoc futurum sciebat, aut sempiterna in illo erat crudelitas, si de suae naturae futura contaminatione et damnatione nihil dolebat; aut sempiterna miseria, si dolebat: unde et hoc tantum malum summi boni vestri ante ullam commixtionem summi mali vestri?
Behold how great an evil of a pernicious and harmful and most monstrous will, before any evil from the contrary race was mingled. Or did he perhaps not know that this would befall his members—that they would love the darkness and become enemies of the holy light, as he himself says, that is, not only of their God, but also of the Father of whom they were? Whence, then, this so great evil of ignorance in God, before any evil from the contrary race was mingled? But if he knew this would happen, then either there was an everlasting cruelty in him, if he grieved nothing over the future contamination and condemnation of his nature, or an everlasting wretchedness, if he grieved: whence also this so great evil of your highest good before any commingling of your highest evil?
NatureGood.1.43
Ipsa certe particula naturae ipsius, quae in illius globi aeterno vinculo configitur, si hoc sibi imminere nesciebat, etiam sic erat in natura Dei sempiterna ignorantia; si autem sciebat, sempiterna miseria: unde hoc tantum malum, antequam ullum de gente contraria misceretur malum? An forte magna caritate gaudebat, quia per eius poenam perpetua quies caeteris lucis incolis parabatur?
That very portion of his nature which is fixed in the eternal chain of that globe—if it did not know that this hung over it, then even thus there was in the nature of God everlasting ignorance; but if it knew, then everlasting wretchedness: whence this so great evil, before any evil from the contrary race was mingled? Or did he perhaps rejoice with great love, because through its punishment perpetual rest was prepared for the rest of the inhabitants of light?
NatureGood.1.43
Hoc quam nefas sit dicere qui videt, anathemet. Sed si hoc saltem ita faceret, ut ipsa luci inimica non fieret, posset fortasse non tamquam Dei natura, sed tamquam aliquis homo laudari, qui pro patria sua vellet mali aliquid pati, quod quidem malum ad tempus posset esse, non in aeternum: nunc vero et illam in globo tenebrarum confixionem dicunt aeternam, et non cuiusque rei, sed naturae Dei; et utique iniquissimum et exsecrabile et ineffabiliter sacrilegum gaudium erat, si Dei natura gaudebat se tenebras dilecturam, et luci sanctae inimicam futuram.
Let whoever sees how impious it is to say this anathematize it. But if at least he did this in such a way that it did not itself become an enemy of the light, perhaps he could be praised—not as the nature of God, but as some man who, for the sake of his country, was willing to suffer some evil, an evil that could indeed be temporary, not eternal. But as it is, they say that fixing in the globe of darkness is eternal, and not of any chance thing, but of the nature of God; and it was certainly a most iniquitous and detestable and unspeakably sacrilegious joy, if the nature of God rejoiced that it would love the darkness and become an enemy of the holy light.
NatureGood.1.43
Unde hoc tam immane et scelestum malum, antequam ullum ex gente contraria misceretur malum? Quis tam perversam et tam impiam ferat insaniam, summo malo tribuere tanta bona, et summo bono, quod Deus est, tanta mala?
Whence this so monstrous and wicked evil, before any evil from the contrary race was mingled? Who could endure such perverse and impious madness, to attribute such great goods to the highest evil, and to the highest good, which is God, such great evils?
NatureGood.1.43
Turpitudines incredibiles a Manichaeo excogitatae in Deo.
The incredible obscenities devised by Mani in God.
44. Iam vero quod ipsam partem naturae Dei dicunt ubique permixtam in coelis, in terris, sub terris, in omnibus corporibus siccis et humidis, in omnibus carnibus, in omnibus seminibus arborum, herbarum, hominum, animalium: non potentia divinitatis sine ullo nexu incoinquinabiliter, inviolabiliter, incorruptibiliter omnibus rebus administrandis regendisque praesentem, quod nos de Deo dicimus; sed ligatam, oppressam, pollutam, quam solvi, liberari, purgarique dicunt, non solum per discursum solis et lunae, et virtutes lucis, verum etiam per Electos suos: hoc genus nefandissimi erroris quam sacrilegas et incredibiles turpitudines eis suadeat, etiamsi non persuadeat, horribile est dicere. Dicunt enim virtutes lucis transfigurari in masculos pulchros, et opponi feminis gentis tenebrarum; et easdem rursus virtutes lucis transfigurari in feminas pulchras, et opponi masculis gentis tenebrarum; ut per pulchritudinem suam inflamment spurcissimam libidinem principum tenebrarum, et eo modo vitalis substantia, hoc est, Dei natura, quam dicunt in eorum corporibus ligatam teneri, ex eorum membris per ipsam concupiscentiam relaxatis, soluta fugiat, et suscepta vel purgata liberetur. Hoc infelices legunt, hoc dicunt, hoc audiunt, hoc credunt, hoc in libro septimo Thesauri eorum (sic enim appellant scripturam quamdam Manichaei, ubi istae blasphemiae conscriptae sunt) ita positum est:
44. But now, as to their saying that that very part of the nature of God is everywhere intermingled—in the heavens, on the earth, beneath the earth, in all bodies dry and moist, in all flesh, in all the seeds of trees, plants, men, and animals—not present by the power of divinity, without any bond, undefilably, inviolably, incorruptibly to administer and govern all things, which is what we say of God, but bound, oppressed, polluted, which they say is loosed, freed, and purified, not only through the course of the sun and moon and the powers of light, but also through their Elect: how this kind of most abominable error persuades them to sacrilegious and incredible obscenities, even if it does not persuade them, is horrible to tell. For they say that the powers of light are transformed into beautiful males and set against the females of the race of darkness; and that the same powers of light are again transformed into beautiful females and set against the males of the race of darkness; so that by their beauty they may inflame the foulest lust of the princes of darkness, and in that way the vital substance—that is, the nature of God, which they say is held bound in their bodies—loosed from their members through that very concupiscence relaxed, may flee away, and, received or purified, may be set free. This the wretches read, this they say, this they hear, this they believe, this in the seventh book of their Treasure (for so they call a certain writing of Mani, where these blasphemies are written down) is set down thus:
NatureGood.1.44
Tunc beatus ille Pater, qui lucidas naves habet diversoria et habitacula seu magnitudines, pro insita sibi clementia fert opem, qua exuitur et liberatur ab impiis retinaculis et angustiis atque angoribus suae vitalis substantiae. Itaque invisibili suo nutu illas suas virtutes, quae in clarissima hac navi habentur, transfigurat, easque parere facit adversis potestatibus, quae in singulis coelorum tractibus ordinatae sunt. Quae quoniam ex utroque sexu masculorum ac feminarum consistunt, ideo praedictas virtutes partim specie puerorum investium parere iubet generi adverso feminarum, partim virginum lucidarum forma generi contrario masculorum: sciens eas omnes hostiles potestates, propter ingenitam sibi letalem et spurcissimam concupiscentiam facillime capi, atque iisdem speciebus pulcherrimis quae apparent mancipari, hocque modo dissolvi. Sciatis autem hunc eumdem nostrum beatum Patrem hoc idem esse, quod etiam suae virtutes, quas ob necessariam causam transformat in puerorum et virginum intemeratam similitudinem. Utitur autem his tamquam propriis armis, atque per eas suam complet voluntatem. Harum vero virtutum divinarum, quae ad instar coniugii contra inferna genera statuuntur, quaeque alacritate ac facilitate id quod cogitaverint, momento eodem efficiunt, plenae sunt lucidae naves. Itaque cum ratio poposcerit ut masculis appareant eaedem sanctae virtutes, illico etiam suam effigiem virginum pulcherrimarum habitu demonstrant.
Then that blessed Father, who has the luminous ships as his refuges and dwellings or magnitudes, by the clemency innate in him brings help, by which his vital substance is stripped and freed from the impious bonds and straits and anguishes. And so by his invisible nod he transforms those his powers, which are held in this most shining ship, and makes them appear to the adverse powers, which are arrayed in the several tracts of the heavens. And since these consist of both sexes, of males and of females, therefore he bids the aforesaid powers appear, partly in the guise of beardless boys to the adverse race of females, partly in the form of luminous virgins to the contrary race of males: knowing that all those hostile powers, on account of the deadly and foulest concupiscence inborn in them, are most easily captured, and are enslaved to those same most beautiful appearances that appear, and in this way are dissolved. But know that this same our blessed Father is this very thing which his powers also are, which for a necessary cause he transforms into the inviolate likeness of boys and virgins. And he uses them as his proper weapons, and through them accomplishes his will. And full of these divine powers, which after the manner of a marriage are arrayed against the infernal races, and which with alacrity and ease in the same moment accomplish whatever they have devised, are the luminous ships. And so, when reason demands that these same holy powers appear to the males, at once they also display their form in the dress of most beautiful virgins.
NatureGood.1.44
Rursus cum ad feminas ventum fuerit, postponentes species virginum, puerorum investium speciem ostendunt. Hoc autem visu decoro illarum ardor et concupiscentia crescit, atque hoc modo vinculum pessimarum cogitationum earum solvitur, vivaque anima quae eorumdem membris tenebatur, hac occasione laxata evadit, et suo purissimo aeri miscetur; ubi penitus ablutae animae ascendunt ad lucidas naves, quae sibi ad vectationem atque ad suae patriae transfretationem sunt praeparatae. Id vero quod adhuc adversi generis maculas portat, per aestus atque calores particulatim descendit, atque arboribus caeterisque plantationibus ac satis omnibus miscetur, et caloribus diversis inficitur. Et quo pacto ex ista magna et clarissima navi figurae puerorum ac virginum apparent contrariis potestatibus, quae in coelis degunt, quaeque igneam habent naturam; atque ex isto aspectu decoro, vitae pars quae in earumdem membris habetur, laxata deducitur per calores in terram: eodem modo etiam illa altissima virtus, quae in navi vitalium aquarum habitat, in similitudine puerorum ac virginum sanctarum per suos angelos apparet his potestatibus, quarum natura frigida est atque humida, quaeque in coelis ordinatae sunt. Et quidem his quae feminae sunt, in ipsis forma puerorum apparet: masculis vero, virginum. Hac vero mutatione et diversitate divinarum personarum ac pulcherrimarum, humidae frigidaeque stirpis principes masculi sive feminae solvuntur, atque id quod in ipsis est vitale fugit: quod vero resederit, laxatum deducitur in terram per frigora, et cunctis terrae generibus admiscetur.
Again, when they come to the females, putting aside the appearances of virgins, they show the appearance of beardless boys. But at this comely sight the ardor and concupiscence of those powers grows, and in this way the chain of their most wicked thoughts is loosed, and the living soul which was held in their members, set free by this occasion, escapes, and is mingled with its own most pure air; where, the souls being thoroughly washed, they ascend to the luminous ships, which have been prepared for them for conveyance and for crossing over to their own homeland. But that which still carries the stains of the adverse race descends bit by bit through the heats and warmths, and is mingled with the trees and the rest of the plantings and all the crops, and is infected by the diverse warmths. And in the way that from that great and most shining ship the figures of boys and virgins appear to the contrary powers, which dwell in the heavens and which have a fiery nature, and from that comely sight the part of life which is held in their members, set loose, is drawn down through the heats to the earth: in the same way also that most lofty power, which dwells in the ship of the vital waters, appears in the likeness of holy boys and virgins, through its angels, to those powers whose nature is cold and moist, and which are arrayed in the heavens. And indeed to those that are female, the form of boys appears in them; but to the males, that of virgins. By this change and diversity of the divine and most beautiful persons, the male or female princes of the moist and cold stock are loosed, and that which in them is vital flees away; but that which settles back is, when loosed, drawn down to the earth through the cold, and is mingled with all the kinds of the earth.
NatureGood.1.44
Quis hoc ferat? quis hoc credat, non dico ita esse, sed vel dici potuisse? Ecce qui docentem timent anathemare Manichaeum, et non timent credere haec facientem et haec patientem Deum!
Who could endure this? Who could believe this—I do not say that it is so, but even that it could have been said? Behold those who fear to anathematize Mani as he teaches, and do not fear to believe that God does these things and suffers these things!
NatureGood.1.44
Turpitudines quaedam nefariae de ipsis Manichaeis non immerito creditae.
Certain wicked obscenities not undeservedly believed of the Manichees themselves.
45. Per Electos autem suos purgari dicunt eamdem ipsam commixtam partem ac naturam Dei, manducando scilicet et bibendo, quia eam in alimentis omnibus dicunt ligatam teneri; quae cum ab Electis velut sanctis in refectionem corporis manducando et bibendo assumuntur, per eorum sanctitatem solvi, signari et liberari. Nec attendunt miseri, quam non incongrue de illis creditum sit, quod frustra negant, nisi eosdem libros anathemaverint, et Manichaei esse destiterint. Si enim, sicut dicunt, in omnibus seminibus est ligata pars Dei, et ab Electis manducando purgatur; quis non digne credat eos facere, quod inter virtutes coelorum et principes tenebrarum fieri in Thesauro suo legunt; quandoquidem et carnes suas de gente tenebrarum esse dicunt, et in eis ligatam teneri vitalem illam substantiam, partem Dei, credere atque affirmare non dubitant? Quae utique si solvenda est, et manducando purganda, sicut eos fateri cogit funestus error ipsorum; quis non videat, quis non exhorreat, quanta turpitudo et quam nefaria consequatur?
45. But through their Elect they say that this same commingled part and nature of God is purified, namely by eating and drinking, because they say it is held bound in all food; and when these are taken by the Elect, as holy ones, by eating and drinking for the refreshment of the body, through their holiness it is loosed, marked, and freed. Nor do the wretches consider how not unfittingly that has been believed of them which they vainly deny, unless they anathematize those same books and cease to be Manichees. For if, as they say, in all seeds there is bound a part of God, and it is purified by the Elect's eating, who would not deservedly believe that they do what they read in their Treasure takes place between the powers of the heavens and the princes of darkness; since they say that their own flesh too is of the race of darkness, and do not hesitate to believe and affirm that that vital substance, the part of God, is held bound in it? And if it certainly must be loosed and purified by eating, as their deadly error compels them to confess, who does not see, who does not shudder, what great obscenity and how wicked a thing follows?
NatureGood.1.45
Epistolae Fundamenti nefaria doctrina.
The wicked doctrine of the Letter of the Foundation.
46. Nam et a quibusdam principibus gentis tenebrarum sic dicunt Adam primum hominem creatum, ut lumen ab eis ne fugeret teneretur. In epistola enim quam Fundamenti appellant, quomodo princeps tenebrarum, quem patrem primi hominis inducunt, ad ceteros socios suos tenebrarum principes locutus fuerit et egerit, ita scripsit Manichaeus:
46. For they also say that Adam, the first man, was created by certain princes of the race of darkness, so that the light might be held by them and not flee away. For in the letter which they call the Foundation, Mani wrote thus, of how the prince of darkness, whom they bring in as the father of the first man, spoke and acted toward the rest of his fellow princes of darkness:
NatureGood.1.46
Iniquis igitur commentis ad eos qui aderant ait: Quid vobis videtur maximum hoc lumen quod oritur? Intuemini quemadmodum polum movet, concutit plurimas potestates. Quapropter mihi vos potius aequum est, id quod in vestris viribus habetis luminis praerogare: sic quippe illius magni qui gloriosus apparuit, imaginem fingam, per quam regnare poterimus, tenebrarum aliquando conversatione liberati.
With wicked devices, then, he said to those who were present: What does this great light seem to you which rises? See how it moves the pole, how it shakes very many powers. Wherefore it is rather fitting that you give over to me what of the light you have in your own forces: for in this way I will fashion the image of that great one who appeared in glory, through which we shall be able to reign, freed at last from the way of life of the darkness.
NatureGood.1.46
Haec audientes, ac diu secum deliberantes, iustissimum putaverunt id quod postulabantur praebere. Nec enim fidebant se idem lumen iugiter retenturos: unde melius rati sunt principi suo id offerre, nequaquam desperantes eodem se pacto regnaturos. Quo igitur modo lumen illud quod habebant praebuerint, considerandum est. Nam hoc etiam omnibus divinis scripturis arcanisque coelestibus aspersum est: sapientibus vero quomodo sit datum scire minime est difficile: nam coram aperteque cognoscitur ab eo qui vere ac fideliter intueri voluerit.
Hearing these things, and deliberating long among themselves, they thought it most just to grant what was asked of them. For they did not trust that they would keep that same light forever: whence they judged it better to offer it to their prince, by no means despairing that they would reign in the same manner. In what way, then, they gave over that light which they had, must be considered. For this too is sprinkled through all the divine scriptures and the heavenly mysteries: but to the wise it is by no means difficult to know how it was given: for it is recognized openly and plainly by him who has wished to look upon it truly and faithfully.
NatureGood.1.46
Quoniam eorum qui convenerant frequentia promiscua erat, feminarum scilicet ac masculorum, impulit eos ut inter se coirent: in quo coitu alii seminarunt, aliae gravidae effectae sunt. Erant autem partus iis qui genuerant similes, vires plurimas parentum uti primi obtinentes. Haec sumens eorum princeps uti praecipuum donum gavisus est.
Since the gathering of those who had come together was mixed, namely of females and of males, he urged them to couple among themselves: in which coupling some sowed, others were made pregnant. And the offspring were like those who had begotten them, obtaining, as their first did, the very many forces of their parents. Taking these, their prince rejoiced as in a special gift.
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Et sicuti etiam nunc fieri videmus, corporum formatricem naturam mali inde vires sumentem figurare: ita etiam ante dictus princeps sodalium prolem accipiens, habentem parentum sensus, prudentiam, lucem simul secum in generatione procreatam, comedit; ac plerisque viribus sumptis ex istiusmodi esca, in qua non modo inerat fortitudo, sed multo magis astutiae et pravi sensus ex fera genitorum gente, propriam ad se coniugem evocavit, ex ea qua ipse erat stirpe manantem; et facto cum ea coitu, seminavit, ut caeteri, abundantiam malorum quae devoraverat: nonnihil etiam ipse adiiciens ex sua cogitatione ac virtute, ut esset sensus eius omnium eorum quae profuderat formator atque descriptor; cuius compar excipiebat haec, ut semen consuevit culta optime terra percipere. In eadem enim construebantur et contexebantur omnium imagines, coelestium ac terrenarum virtutum, ut pleni videlicet orbis, id quod formabatur, similitudinem obtineret.
And just as we see done even now, that the nature which shapes bodies, taking its forces thence, gives evil form: so too the aforesaid prince, receiving the offspring of his companions, which had the senses, the prudence, the light of their parents, procreated together with itself in their generation, devoured them; and, having taken very many forces from food of this kind, in which there was not only strength, but much more the cunning and depraved senses from the savage race of their begetters, he summoned to himself his own consort, flowing from the same stock from which he himself was; and, having coupled with her, he sowed, like the rest, the abundance of evils that he had devoured: adding also something himself from his own thought and power, so that his sense might be the shaper and describer of all the things he had poured forth; and his consort received these, as well-tilled earth is wont to receive seed. For in her were built up and woven together the images of all things, of the heavenly and earthly powers, so that what was being formed might obtain the likeness, as it were, of the full world.
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Turpitudines horribiles cogit perpetrare.
It compels the perpetration of horrible obscenities.
47. O monstrum scelestum! o exsecranda perditio et labes deceptarum animarum! Omitto quid sit, de natura Dei quod sic ligetur, haec dicere. Hoc saltem attendant miseri decepti et errore mortifero venenati, quia si per coitum masculorum et feminarum ligatur pars Dei, quam se manducando solvere et purgare profitentur, cogit eos huius tam nefandi erroris necessitas, ut non solum de pane et oleribus et pomis, quae sola videntur in manifesto accipere, sed inde etiam solvant et purgent partem Dei, unde per concubitum potest, si feminae utero concepta fuerit, colligari. Hoc se facere quidam confessi esse in publico iudicio perhibentur, non tantum in Paphlagonia, sed etiam in Gallia, sicut a quodam Romae christiano catholico audivi: et cum interrogarentur, cuius auctoritate scripturae ista facerent, hoc de Thesauro suo prodidisse, quod paulo ante commemoravi. Isti autem cum hoc eis obiicitur, solent respondere, nescio quem inimicum suum de numero suo, hoc est, Electorum suorum descivisse, et schisma fecisse, atque huiusmodi spurcissimam haeresim condidisse. Unde manifestum est, quia hoc etiam si isti non faciunt, de ipsorum libris hoc faciunt quicumque faciunt.
47. O wicked monstrosity! O execrable ruin and downfall of deceived souls! I pass over what it is to say these things of the nature of God, that it should be thus bound. Let the wretched, deceived and poisoned by a deadly error, at least attend to this: that if through the coupling of males and females a part of God is bound, which they profess to loose and purify by eating, the necessity of this so wicked error compels them to loose and purify the part of God not only from bread and vegetables and fruits, which alone they appear openly to receive, but also from that whence, through intercourse, it can—if conceived in a woman's womb—be bound together. That certain men have confessed to doing this in a public trial is reported, not only in Paphlagonia, but also in Gaul, as I heard from a certain Catholic Christian at Rome; and when they were asked by what authority of Scripture they did these things, they revealed that it was from their Treasure, which I recalled a little before. But when this is charged against them, they are accustomed to answer that some enemy of theirs—I know not who—from among their own number, that is, of their Elect, defected and made a schism, and founded a most filthy heresy of this kind. Hence it is manifest that, even if these men do not do this, whoever do it, do it out of their very books.
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Abiiciant ergo libros, si crimen exhorrent, quod committere coguntur, si libros tenent; aut si non committunt, mundius vivere contra suos libros conantur. Sed quid agunt, cum eis dicitur: Aut purgate lumen, de quibus potueritis seminibus, ut nec illud recusetis, quod vos non facere asseritis; aut Manichaeum anathemate, qui cum dicit in omnibus seminibus esse partem Dei, et concumbendo ligari; quidquid autem luminis, hoc est, eiusdem partis Dei ad escas Electorum pervenerit, manducando purgari: quid vobis suadeat videtis, et eum adhuc anathemare dubitatis? Quid agunt, inquam, cum hoc eis dicitur? Ad quas tergiversationes se convertunt, cum aut tam nefaria doctrina sit anathemanda, aut tam nefaria turpitudo facienda
Let them, then, cast away the books, if they shudder at the crime which they are compelled to commit if they hold the books; or, if they do not commit it, let them try to live more purely against their own books. But what do they do when it is said to them: Either purify the light from whatever seeds you can, so as not to refuse even that which you assert you do not do; or anathematize Mani, who, when he says that in all seeds there is a part of God, and that it is bound by intercourse, but that whatever light, that is, that same part of God, comes to the food of the Elect, is purified by eating: you see what he urges upon you, and do you still hesitate to anathematize him? What do they do, I say, when this is said to them? To what evasions do they turn, when either so wicked a doctrine must be anathematized, or so wicked an obscenity committed
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in cuius comparatione iam illa omnia mala quae intolerabilia paulo ante commemorabam, eos de natura Dei dicere, quod necessitate oppressa sit ut bellum gereret, quod aut sempiterna ignorantia secura erat, aut sempiterno dolore et timore sollicita, quando sibi veniret corruptio commixtionis et vinculum aeternae damnationis, quod denique gesto bello sic fuerit captivata, oppressa, polluta, quod post falsam victoriam sic futura sit in horribili globo in aeternum confixa et ab originis suae felicitate separata, tolerabilia videantur, cum per se ipsa, si considerentur, sustineri non possint?
in comparison with which all those evils that I recalled a little before as intolerable—that they say of the nature of God that it was oppressed by necessity to wage war, that it was either secure in everlasting ignorance, or troubled with everlasting grief and fear over when the corruption of commingling and the chain of eternal condemnation would come upon it, that finally, the war once waged, it was thus made captive, oppressed, polluted, that after a false victory it is thus to be fixed forever in the horrible globe and separated from the happiness of its origin—those evils seem tolerable, though in themselves, if they are considered, they cannot be borne?
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Orat Augustinus pro Manichaeorum resipiscentia.
Augustine prays for the conversion of the Manichees.
48. O magna patientia tua, Domine misericors et miserator, longanimis et multum misericors, et verax (Cf. Ps 102, 8); qui facis oriri solem tuum super bonos et malos, pluis super iustos et iniustos (Cf. Mt 5, 45); qui non vis mortem peccatoris, quantum ut revertatur et vivat (Cf. Ez 33, 11); qui partibus corripiens, das locum poenitentiae, ut relicta malitia credant in te, Domine (Cf. Sap 12, 2; Iob 24, 23); qui patientia tua ad poenitentiam adducis, quamvis multi secundum duritiam cordis sui et cor impoenitens thesaurizent sibi iram in die irae et revelationis iusti iudicii tui, qui reddis unicuique secundum opera sua (Cf. Rom 2, 4-6); qui in qua die conversus fuerit homo a nequitia sua ad misericordiam et veritatem tuam (Cf. Act 3, 26; Ez 18, 21-22), omnes iniquitates eius oblivisceris: praesta nobis, dona nobis, ut per nostrum ministerium, quo exsecrabilem et nimis horribilem hunc errorem redargui voluisti, sicut iam multi liberati sunt, et alii liberentur, et sive per sacramentum sancti Baptismi tui, sive per sacrificium contribulati spiritus et cordis contriti et humiliati (Cf. Ps 50, 19), in dolore poenitentiae, remissionem peccatorum et blasphemiarum suarum (Cf. Mt 12, 31), quibus per ignorantiam te offenderunt, accipere mereantur. Tantum enim valet praepollens misericordia et potestas tua et veritas Baptismi tui, clavesque regni coelorum in sancta Ecclesia tua (Cf. Mt 16, 19), ut nec de illis desperandum sit, quamdiu in hac terra per tuam patientiam vivunt, qui etiam scientes quantum malum sit talia de te sentire vel dicere, propter aliquam temporalis et terrenae commoditatis consuetudinem vel adeptionem in illa maligna professione detinentur, si ad tuam ineffabilem bonitatem saltem increpati tuis correptionibus (Cf. Ps 24, 7; 140, 5) fugiant, et omnibus carnalis vitae illecebris coelestem vitam aeternamque praeponant.
48. O great is your patience, O Lord, merciful and compassionate, long-suffering and very merciful, and true (See Ps 103:8 (102:8)); you who make your sun rise upon the good and the evil, and rain upon the just and the unjust (See Matt 5:45); you who do not will the death of the sinner, so much as that he turn back and live (See Ezek 33:11); you who, chastising in part, give place for repentance, so that, forsaking their wickedness, they may believe in you, O Lord (See Wis 12:2; Job 24:23); you who by your patience lead to repentance, although many, according to the hardness of their heart and their impenitent heart, store up for themselves wrath on the day of wrath and of the revelation of your just judgment, who render to each according to his works (See Rom 2:4-6); you who, on the day on which a man has turned from his wickedness to your mercy and truth (See Acts 3:26; Ezek 18:21-22), forget all his iniquities: grant us, give us, that through our ministry, by which you have willed this execrable and exceedingly horrible error to be refuted, just as many have already been freed, so others too may be freed, and—whether through the sacrament of your holy Baptism, or through the sacrifice of a troubled spirit and a contrite and humbled heart (See Ps 51:17 (50:19)), in the grief of repentance—may deserve to receive the forgiveness of their sins and of their blasphemies (See Matt 12:31), by which through ignorance they offended you. For so great is the power of your surpassing mercy and your truth and of the Baptism of your name, and of the keys of the kingdom of heaven in your holy Church (See Matt 16:19), that we must not despair even of those—so long as by your patience they live on this earth—who, even knowing how great an evil it is to think or say such things of you, are held in that malign profession for the sake of some habit or gain of temporal and earthly advantage, if, rebuked by your chastisements (See Ps 25:7 (24:7); 141:5 (140:5)), they flee at least to your ineffable goodness, and set the heavenly and eternal life before all the allurements of carnal life.
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