1. Every primary cause has more influence on its object than a universal second cause.

2. Thus, when a universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not take its power from it.

3. This is because the universal first cause acts on the object of the second cause, before the universal second cause, which follows it, acts on that same object.

4. Thus, when the second cause, which follows, acts on an object, its action does not exclude the object from the first cause which is above it.

5. And when the second cause is separated from the object, which follows it, the first cause is not separated from it, which is above it, because it is the cause for it.

6. And indeed we exemplify this through "being" and "living" and "man."

7. This is because first of all there has to be a thing being, then living, and after that, man.

8. Thus living is the proximate cause of man; and being, his remote cause.

9. Thus being is more strongly a cause for man than living, because it is the cause for living, which is the cause for man.

10. And similarly, when you posit rationality as a cause for man, being is more strongly a cause for man than rationality, because it is the cause of that cause.

11. And the significance of that which we are saying is that when you remove the rational power from man, man does not remain but living does remain, and so do breathing and sensible. And when you remove living from him, living does not remain but being does remain, because being is not removed from it, but living is removed; because the cause is not removed by the removal of its object, Thus man remains being. Thus when an individual thing is not man, it is an animal, and, if it is not animal it is only being.

12. Therefore it is now manifest and plain that the first remote cause is more comprehensive and more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause.

13. And because of this its operation is of a stronger adherence with the thing than the operation of the proximate cause. And indeed this only happens in this way because a thing is first affected only by the remote power, only then in the second place is it affected by the power which is subordinate to the first.

14. And the first cause assists the second cause in its operation, because every operation which the second cause effects, the first cause also effects; in truth, however, it effects it in a different way, higher and more sublime.

15. And when the second cause is removed from its object, the first cause is not removed from it, because the first cause is of a greater and stronger adherence with the thing than the proximate cause.

16. And the object is made by the second cause only by virtue of the first cause.

17. This is because when the second cause makes a thing, the first cause which is above, flows its power over the thing, because of which it adheres to it with a strong adherence and preserves it.

18. Thus it is now manifest and plain that the remote cause is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause which follows it, and that it flows its power over it and preserves it, and it is not separated from it by the separation of its proximate cause, but rather remains in it and adheres to it with a strong adherence, in the way which we have demonstrated and expounded.

Every primary cause has more influence on its object than a universal second cause (1).

11. To the expression of this he brings to bear one corollary through which he manifests the first principle as though through some sign, whence he adds: thus, when a universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not take its power from it (2).

12. And to this proof he adds a third, saying: this is because the universal first cause acts on the object of the second cause, before the universal second cause acts on that same object (3).

13. And from this he concludes (4–5) that it is placed second and where it really belongs; it is necessary that that which comes earlier leaves last; we see that those which are prior in composition are last in resolution.

14. Thus therefore the intention of this proposition consists in three things: of which the first is that the first cause has more influence on the effect than the second; the second is that the impression of the first causes leaves the effect more slowly; the third is that it comes to it early.

15. Which three things Proclus proposed in two propositions: the first in proposition 56 of his book which is thus: everything which is produced from second causes is also produced more eminently by prior and more causal causes, from which the secondary causes are also produced; but he posits the others in the following proposition, which is thus: every cause both operates before its effect and after it is subsistive of more things (Elements of Theology, 57).

16. These three things being admitted as premises, he proceeds to clarifying them:

first, through example (6–13),

second, through argument, where he says: and the first cause assists (14).

17. The example seems to pertain to formal causes in which a form is more universal to the extent that it seems to be prior.

18. If then we take some man, the form which is specific to him is focused on insofar as it is rational. The form is attended of its genus insofar as it is living and animal. Further, that which is common to all is being.

19. Thus it is clear that in the generation of one particular man being is found first in the subject matter, then living is found, after that is man (6–9); he is animal before man, as is said in On the Generation of Animals, 2.

20. Again: since in the way of corruption the use of reason goes away first and living and breathing remains; second, living and breathing go away and being itself remains (10), because it is not broken down into nothing. And thus this example can be understood according to the way of generation and corruption, which is clear from what he says (11): thus when an individual thing is not man, that is, according to the act proper to man, it is animal, because it remains at that point in that operation of the animal which consists in motion and sensation; and, when it is not animal it is just being, because a body not at all animated remains.

21. This example is verified in the very order of things; for existing things are prior to living things and living things are prior to men, since, when man is taken away, animal is not taken away as a consequence, but the converse is true, because if it is not animal it is not man. And this argument is valid for both that which is possessed of soul and that which is possessed of being.

22. Then when he says: and the first cause (14), he proves the three things said before by argument.

23. First, to be precise, he proves that the first cause has more influence than the second in this way (14): something accrues more outstandingly to the cause than to the caused. But the operation by which the second cause causes the effect is caused by the first cause; for the first cause aids the second cause making it to be operated. Thus the first cause is more of a cause of this operation, by which the effect is produced by the second cause, than the second cause.

24. Proclus in more detail proves it thus (Elements of Theology, 56): since the second cause is the effect of the first cause, it has its substance from the first cause. But from that which something has its substance, that's what it has its potency or power of operating from. But the second cause is the cause of the effect through its potency or power. Therefore, the very fact that the second cause is the cause of the effect comes from the first cause. To be the cause of an effect belongs primary to the first cause, and secondarily to the second cause. What is prior in all things is greater because the more perfect are prior in the order of nature. Therefore, the first cause is more the cause of the effect than the second cause.

25. Second, to be precise, he proves that the impression of the first cause recedes later from the effect, where he says: and when it is removed (15), and he brings in such an argument:

26. That which is in something more strongly inheres in it more. But the first cause makes a stronger impression on the effect than the second cause, as has been proved (14; [23–24]), therefore its impression inheres more; therefore it recedes later.

27. Third, to be precise, he proves that it arrives earlier, when he says: and it is only made (16), with such an argument:

28. The second cause acts on its effect only by the power of the first cause. Therefore also the effect proceeds only from the second cause by the power of the first cause. Thus therefore the power of the first cause gives to its effect that it is touched by the power of the second cause. Therefore, it is first touched by the power of the first cause (17–18).

29. Proclus proves these things thus (Elements of Theology, 57) by one means: the first cause is more a cause than the second. Therefore it is of a more perfect power. But as much as the power of any cause is more perfect, so much it extends itself to more things; therefore the virtue of the first cause extends itself to more things than the virtue of the second cause. but that which is in more things is prior in arriving and last in leaving. Therefore the impression of the first cause arrives first and leaves last (cf. Elements of Theology, 70).

30. One ought to consider in which causes this proposition may have truth.

31. And if indeed the question is seen in regard to kinds of causes, it is clear that it has truth in any kind of causes in its own mode.

32. And the example is brought in to bear in formal causes (6–11).

33. In material causes a similar argument is found. For that which first is strewn around as matter is the cause of more proximate matter so that the thing itself also underlies materially just as prime matter underlies the elements which are in some way the matter of mixed bodies.

34. Each of these he shows to be the same in efficient causes. It is clear that insofar as any efficient cause is prior, just so far its power extends itself to more things. Whence it is fitting that a proper effect be more common to the effect. But a proper effect of a second cause is found in fewer cases, whence it is also more particular. The first cause itself produces or moves an acting cause secondarily and thus is the cause for it that it act.

35. Therefore the three aforesaid things are found (14) which are touched primordially in efficient causes and from this is manifest what is derived for formal causes, whence also the word of influencing is put here and Proclus uses the word of production which expresses the causality of an efficient cause.

36. What is derived from efficient causes to material causes is not at this point clear, because efficient causes which are available to us produce not matter but form.

37. But if we consider universal causes from which the material principles of things also proceed; it is necessary that this order is derived also to material causes from efficient causes.

38. Because the efficacy or causality of the first and supreme cause extends itself to more things, it is necessary that that which subsists first in all things be from the first cause of all things. Thence from second causes are added dispositions by which matter is distributed in single things; which indeed appear to the extent that those things are present to us. For nature exhibits prime matter in all artificial things; thence through whatever prior arts natural matter is disposed so that it conforms to particular artificial things. Moreover, the first cause of all things is compared to the whole of nature, just as nature to art; whence that which subsists first in the whole of nature is from the first cause of all things, which is distributed to each individual thing by the office of secondary cause.

39. In final causes also it is clear that everything said before is verified. For on account of the ultimate end which is universal, all ends are sought, appetite for which arrives after the appetite for the ultimate end and ends before it. But also the reason of this order is reduced to the genus of efficient cause; for the end-in-such is a cause inasmuch as it moves an efficient cause to act and thus inasmuch as it is a reason for something moving, it pertains in some way to the genus of efficient cause.

40. If it is sought in whatever genus of causes, whether the aforesaid are verified in all causes ordered in whatever way, it is clear that the answer is no.

41. We know causes are ordered in two ways: in one way per se; in another way, per accidens. Per se when the intention of the first cause looks toward the ultimate effect through all the mediate causes. Just as when the art of the smith moves his hand, the hand moves the hammer which flattens the beaten iron, to which the intention of the art is brought. Per accidens when the intention of the cause only proceeds to the proximate effect. What is effected by that effect is something else again besides the intention of the first one effecting, just as when someone lights a candle, besides his intention is that again the lit candle lights another, and that one, yet another. That which is besides the intention, we say is per accidens.

42. Thus in causes ordered per se this proposition has truth in cases where the first cause moves all mediate causes to the effect. But in causes ordered per accidens the converse is true: for the effect which is produced per se by proximate cause is produced per accidens by the first cause, existing in addition to its intention. That which is per se is stronger than that which is per accidens. And on account of this he said significantly: universal cause, which is a cause per se.

19. Every superior being is either superior to eternity and prior to it, or it is on the same level as eternity, or it is after eternity and beyond time.

20. Indeed being which is before eternity is the first cause, because it is the cause for it.

21. But being which is with eternity is intelligence, because it is the second being, according to one condition, from which it is not affected nor destroyed.

22. Indeed being which is after eternity and beyond time is soul, because it is lower on the horizon of eternity and still above time.

23. And the designation that the first cause is prior to eternity itself, is because the being which is in eternity has been acquired.

24. And I say that all eternity is being, but not all being is eternity. Thus being is more general than eternity. And the first cause is beyond eternity, because eternity is its effect.

25. And intelligence is put on the same level as eternity, because it is coextensive with it, and it is not changed or destroyed.

26. And soul is connected with eternity, however, in an inferior way, because it is more susceptible to impressions than intelligence, but it is still beyond time, because it is the cause of time.

43. This first proposition being granted as a premise, just as from a certain principle to the whole following tract, here he begins to take up the matter concerning the first causes of things. And it is divided into two parts:

in the first, he talks about the distinction of the first causes;

in the second, about the coordination or dependency of causes on one another, in proposition 16, where he says: all powers which have no end (129).

44. The first part is divided into two parts:

in the first, he distinguishes first causes;

in the second, he makes determinations about individual things in proposition 6, where he says: the first cause is superior (57).

45. Now, the universal causes of things are of three genera, that is to say, the first cause, which is God, intelligences, and souls. Whence, concerning the first, he makes three distinctions:

first, he distinguishes these three genera, of which the first is indivisible, because the first cause is just one thing;

second, he distinguishes intelligences, in proposition 4, where he says: the first of created things is being (37);

in the third, he distinguishes souls, in proposition 5, where he says: superior intelligences (49).

46. Concerning the first, he makes two distinctions:

first, he distinguishes the three aforesaid genera;

second, he shows in what way they are united through a certain participation in the ultimate, in proposition 3, where he says: every noble soul (27).

47. Concerning the first, he posits such a proposition: every superior being is either superior to eternity and prior to it, or it is on the same level as eternity, or it is after eternity and beyond time (19). For the understanding of this proposition it is necessary first to see what eternity is, then, in what way the aforesaid proposition has truth.

48. The name of eternity, then, implies some lack of deficiency or lack of termination: eternity is thus said to be existing as if it were outside of terminations. But because as the Philosopher says in Physics, 8, in every motion there is some corruption and generation inasmuch as something begins to be and something else ceases to be, it is necessary that in whatever motion there is some deficiency, whence every motion is repugnant to eternity. Therefore true eternity, with a lack of deficiency of being, also implies immobility. And because "before" and "after" in duration of time arise from motion, as is clear in Physics, 4, on that account, third, it is necessary that eternity be existing whole all at once, without before and after, according to how Boethius defines it at the end of The Consolation of Philosophy, saying, eternity is the whole perfect and simultaneous possession of endless life.

49. Therefore whatever thing with a lack of deficiency of being has immobility and is without temporal succession, can be said to be eternal. And according to this mode, Platonists and Aristotelians called immaterial separate substances eternal, adding to the definition of eternity that it has always had being; which is not consonant with the Christian faith; such eternity is appropriate to God alone.

50. Indeed we have called them eternal insofar as they begin to obtain from God perpetual and indeficient being without motion and succession of time; whence also Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 10 that those things which are called "eternal" in the Scriptures are not simply coeternal with God. Whence certain ones called eternity thus received "aevum," which they distinguish from eternity received according to the first mode. But if someone should consider rightly, "aevum" and eternity differ only as "anthropos" and "man." For in Greek eternity is called "aevum" just as man is called "anthropos."

51. Therefore, with these premises granted, it must be known that this congruent proposition in the book of Proclus (Elements of Theology, 88) is found under these words: every beingly being is either before eternity or in eternity or participating eternity.

52. Beingly being is said by opposition to movable being just as being is called "standing" as opposed to "being moved." From which it is given to understand that it is what is called in this book every superior being (19), because, specifically, it is beyond motion and time. For being of this kind, according to either author, in either book, is distinguished into three grades; but it is not wholly the same reason in both places.

53. For Proclus brought in this proposition according to the suppositions of the Platonists who, positing an abstraction from universals, posited that insofar as something is more abstract and more universal, to that extent it is prior. For it is clear that this expression, "eternity," is more abstract than "eternal." For by the name of "eternity" the very essence of eternity is designated; but by the name "eternal" is designated that which participates in eternity. And again being itself is more common than eternity: for every eternal thing is a being, but not every being is eternal (cf. Elements of Theology, 24). Whence according to what is said above, separated being itself is before eternity (20); but that which is with eternity (21) is sempiternal being itself. But that which is a participant in eternity and as it were after eternity (22) is everything that participates in that which is eternal.

54. But the author of this book in the first place certainly agrees otherwise with the aforesaid positions. Whence he explains that being which is before eternity is the first cause because it is the cause for eternity (20).

55. And to prove this he brings in that in it—that is, eternity—is acquired being—that is, participated (23). And he proves this because the things that are less common participate in the things which are more common. Now, eternity is less common than being; whence he adds: and I say that every eternity is being, but not every being is eternity; therefore being is more common than eternity (24; cf. Elements of Theology, 87). Therefore, the author thus proves that eternity participates in being; but abstract being itself is the first cause, whose substance is its being. Whence it remains that the first cause is the cause by which sempiternal being is acquired for whatever thing is always existing.

56. But in the other two members of the division the author of this book recedes from the intention of Proclus and accedes more to the common opinions of both the Platonists and Peripatetics.

57. For he expounds the second grade: that being with eternity is intelligence (21). Because indeed eternity, as has been said [48] implies indeficiency with immobility, that which in all aspects is indeficient and immobile attains eternity. Now it is posited according to the aforesaid philosophers that intelligence or separated intellect has indeficiency and immobility, with respect to its being and its power and its operation. Whence proposition 169 of Proclus is every intellect has its substance and potency and operation in eternity. And according to this it is proved here that intelligence is with eternity (21): because it is in every way according to a single characteristic, so that it does not suffer any alteration neither of its power nor of its operation, nor is it destroyed according to its substance. And on account of this also afterwards he says that it is made equal to eternity since it is extended with it and it is not altered (25). Because, that is to say, eternity extends itself to everything that is of the intelligence.

58. Now, he expounds the third grade concerning the soul which has superior being (22), that is to say beyond motion and time. For the soul of this kind comes closer to motion than does the intelligence, because, viz., the intelligence is not attained by motion, neither with respect to its substance nor with respect to its operation. But the soul indeed exceeds time and motion according to its substance, and touches on eternity, but according to its operation it touches on motion: because, as the philosophers prove, it is necessary that everything that is moved by another be reduced into some first thing which moves itself. But this according to Plato indeed is the soul which moves itself but according to Aristotle it is the animated body whose principle of motion is the soul. And thus in either way it is necessary that the first principle of motion be the soul and on that account that motion be the operation of the soul itself. And because motion is in time, time touches on the operation of the soul itself.

59. Whence also Proclus says in proposition 191: every participable soul has an eternal substance indeed, but an operation according to time. And on that account here it is said that it is connected with eternity in an inferior way (26); indeed it is connected with eternity insofar as substance, but in an inferior way, because it participates in eternity in an inferior mode than intelligence.

60. Which he proves because it is more susceptible to impression than the intelligence (26). For the soul not only receives the impression of the first cause as does the intelligence, but also is susceptible to the impression of the intelligence. To the extent that something is more remote from the first, which is the cause of eternity, to that extent it participates more weakly in eternity.

61. And although the soul attains to the lowest level of eternity, yet it is beyond time, just as a cause is above its effect: for it is the cause of time insofar as it is the cause of motion, on which time follows. For he speaks here (26) about the soul which the philosophers attributed to the celestial body and on account of this it is said that it is on the horizon of eternity in an inferior way, and beyond time. For the horizon is the circle terminating the vision, and it is the lowest terminus of the higher hemisphere, but the highest point of the lower. And similarly the soul is the ultimate terminus of eternity and the beginning of time.

62. Dionysius agrees with this opinion in On the Divine Names, 10, with this exception, that he does not assert that the sky has a soul, because the Catholic faith does not assert this. For he says that God is before the eternal and that according to the Scriptures other things are called eternal and temporal; which is to be understood according to the modes posited in the sacred Scriptures; but intermediate between things which are and things which are made (that is, things which can be generated), there are certain ones which are eternal according to one aspect, but according to another aspect participate in time.

27. Every noble soul has three activities: for from its works is animal activity and intellectual activity and divine activity.

28. Activity moreover is divine because it creates nature with the power that is in it from the first cause.

29. Now, activity is intellectual because it knows things by the power of intelligence that is in it.

30. Activity is animal because it moves the first body and all natural bodies, because it is the cause of the motion of bodies and the cause of the activity of nature.

31. And the soul only brings about these activities because it is an example of superior virtue.

32. This is because the first cause created the being of the soul with a mediating intelligence, and for that reason the soul has been created, bringing about divine activity.

33. Thus, after the first cause created the being of the soul, it made it just like a saddle for the intelligence, on which it brings about its operations.

34. Thus for that reason the intellectual soul brings about the intellectual activity. And because the soul receives the impression of intelligence, it is endowed with an activity inferior to that which is in its own impression toward that which is beneath it.

35. This is because it only makes an impression on things by motion, that is to say, because it only receives that which is under it, if it moves it with respect to its own activity. Thus, on account of this cause it is the case that the soul moves bodies; for it belongs to the soul that it should bring bodies to life, when it informs them with its power, and straightaway leads them to right activity.

36. Therefore it is now manifest that the soul has three operations, because it has three powers: that is to say, divine power and the power of intelligence and the power of its being, accordingly we have spoken and demonstrated.

63. Since those things which are from superiors are in inferiors according to some kind of participation, after he has divided three grades of superior beings of which one is superior to eternity, which is God, another is with eternity, which is intelligence, and a third, after eternity, which is the soul (19–22), now he means to show how the third participates that which is from the first and that which is from the second, saying: every noble soul has three operations: for among its operations is the animal operation and the intellectual operation and the divine operation (27).

64. Now, what is called noble soul can be understood from the words of Proclus who posited this proposition under these words: all divine souls have these triple operations qua souls, some as receiving the divine intellect, others as joined to the gods beyond (Elements of Theology, 201). From which it is clear that noble soul is here called divine soul.

65. For the evidence of this it should be known that Plato posited separate, self-subsisting universal forms of things. And because universal forms of this kind have a certain universal causality, according to him, beyond the particular beings which participate them, on that account all forms of this kind subsisting in this way are called gods: for this name "God" implies a certain universal providence and causality [213].

66. Yet among these forms he posited this order: that to the extent that any form is more universal, it is a more simple and a priori cause: for it is participated by posterior forms. Just as if we posit that animal is participated by man and life by animal and thus concerning others. Now the ultimate, which is participated by all and itself participates nothing else, is the separated one and good itself which is called the highest God and the first cause of all things. Whence also in the book of Proclus, proposition 116 is brought in, like this: every god is participable, that is, participates, except the one.

67. And because forms of this kind, which are called gods, are intelligible according to themselves, the thinking intellect is put in act through the intelligible species, they posited, under the order of the gods, that is, of the aforesaid forms, an order of the intellects which participate the aforesaid forms, in so far as they be intelligent. Among which forms is also the ideal intellect [286]. But the aforesaid intellects participate the aforesaid forms, according to an immobile mode, insofar as they understand them. Whence under the order of the intellect, they place a third order of souls which, with the intellects as intermediaries, participate the aforesaid forms according to motion, insofar as, namely, they are the principles of corporal motions, through which superior forms are participated in corporeal matter and thus the fourth order of things is the order of bodies [351].

68. Now, among the intellects, the superior ones are said to be "divine intellects," and the inferior ones are called "intellects," but not "divine," because the idea intellect which is God per se, according to them, is participated by the superior intellects according to each that is, according to what the intellect is and according to what God is; but it is participated by inferior intellects only according to what the intellect is, and on that account they are not divine intellects. For the superior intellects receive not only that they be intellects, but also that they be divine.

69. Similarly also when souls are applied to the gods with the intellects mediating, as if being nearer, the superior souls themselves are also divine on account of the divine intellects to which they are applied or which they participate; now, inferior souls, as they are applied to intellects which are not divine, are non-divine.

70. And because bodies receive motion only through the soul, consequently superior bodies would also be divine, according to them, and inferior bodies would not be divine. Whence Proclus says in proposition 129: every body which is divine through a deified soul is divine; and every soul is divine on account of a divine intellect; and every intellect is divine according to a participation of divine unity.

71. And because they call first separated forms "gods" insofar as they are universal according to themselves, consequently they also call intellects divine and souls divine and bodies divine because they have a certain universal influence and causality over subsequent members of their own genus and of inferior genera.

72. Now Dionysius corrects this position, insofar as they place in order different separated forms which they call gods, as, namely, being per se is one thing and life per se is another and so on and so forth.

73. For it is necessary to say that all these are essentially the first cause itself of all things, from which things participate all perfections of this kind, and thus we do not posit many gods, but one. And this is what he says in On the Divine Names, 5, that it (that is, Sacred Scripture) does not say that good is one thing and existing is another and life or wisdom is another, nor does it say that there are many causes and other deities productive of others things, some exceeding and some subject, but all goods proceed from the one.

74. Now how this can be he shows consequently from this: because since God is being itself and the very essence of goodness, whatever pertains to the perfection of goodness and being, the whole belongs essentially to him so that, namely, he is the essence of life and of wisdom and of power and of the others. Whence after something he adds: for indeed God is not existing in some mode, but simply and without circumscription he has accepted in advance the whole of being in himself.

75. And the author of this book follows this; for he is not found to bring in any multitude of deity, but he establishes unity in God, but distinction in the order of the intellects and of the souls and of the bodies.

76. According to this, therefore, the soul of the celestial body is called noble soul, that is divine soul, according to the opinion of the philosophers who posited an animated heaven. For this soul, according to them, had some universal influence over things through motion and from this it is called divine, in that manner of speaking by which also among men, those who have a universal care for the republic are called divine.

77. Concerning this noble or divine soul, therefore, he says (28) that it has a divine operation and explaining this, he says that its divine operation is because it creates nature insofar as, that is to say, it is the principle of prime motion, to which all nature is subjected, and it has this by a power participated from the first cause, which is the universal cause of all things, from which it obtains a certain universal causality in nature things. And on that account, assigning from this operation to the divine soul appropriately, he says (31) that it is an example, that is to say an image, of superior power, that is to say divine; for in the aforesaid soul the universality of divine power is exemplified because, to be precise, just as God is the universal cause of all beings so the aforesaid soul is the universal cause of natural things which are moved.

78. Now, he posits the operation of the noble or divine soul as intellectual (27). Which indeed, just as he has expounded (29), is because it knows things, insofar as it participates the power of intelligence. How it participates the power of intelligence he shows (32) by the fact that the soul is created by the first cause with the intelligence as intermediary. Whence the soul comes from God just as from the first cause, but from the intelligence just as from a second cause. Now, every effect participates something of the power of its cause; whence, it remains that the soul, just as it makes a divine operation insofar as it is from the first cause, so it makes an operation of intelligence insofar as it comes from it, participating its power.

79. Now this which is said here (32), that the first cause created the existence of the soul with the intelligence as intermediary, certain ones who understand badly have thought the author of this book meant that the intelligences were creators of the substance of the soul.

80. But this is against the Platonist positions: for indeed causalities of this type are posited of simple beings according to participation. But that which is participating is not participated, but that which is first: namely, by essence as such; think: if whiteness were separate, simple whiteness itself—not something participating in whiteness—would be the cause of all white things insofar as they are white. Therefore, according to this the Platonists posited that that which is itself being is the cause of existing for all things; but that which is itself life is the cause of living for all things; and that which is itself intelligence is the cause of understanding for all things. Whence Proclus says in proposition 18 of his book (Elements of Theology): everything giving being to others, is itself firstly that from which it gives a donation to the recipients. What Aristotle says in Metaphysics, 2, that that which is first and maximally being is the cause of subsequent things, is in harmony with this opinion.

81. It should therefore be understand that the very essence of the soul according to the things said before [80] is caused by the first cause which is itself its own existence, but it has consequent participations from other posterior principles; so, namely, that it has "to live" from the first life and "to understand" from the first intelligence. Whence also in proposition 18 of this book (143) it is said: all things have essence on account of the first being and all living things are in motion through their own essence on account of the first life and all intelligible things have knowledge on account of the first intelligence. Thus therefore he means that the first cause has caused the existence of the soul with the intelligence as intermediary, because the first cause alone caused the essence of the soul, but that the soul be intellectual, this it has from the operation of the intelligence.

82. And this sense is shown clearly through the words which follow (33): therefore after, he says, the first cause caused the being of the soul, it placed it like a saddle for the Intelligence, that is as a substrate for the operation of the Intelligence so that, namely, the intelligence performs the operation in it, that is: giving to it that it be intellectual. Whence he concludes that on account of this the intellectual soul performs an intellectual operation. And this also agrees with that which is said in proposition 1 (14) that the effect of the first cause pre-exists the effects of the secondary causes and is more universally diffused. For being which is most common is diffused into all things by the first cause (23–24) but "to understand" is not communicated to all by the intelligence, but to certain ones, by presupposing the being which they have from the first.

83. But also this position, if not plainly understood, is repugnant to the truth and to the opinion of Aristotle, who argued in Metaphysics, 3, against the Platonists who posit an order of this kind of separate causes according to those things which are said before about individual things, that it follows that Socrates will be many animals, that is, Socrates himself and separate man, and also separate animal: for separate man participates animal and so is animals; and Socrates participates both whence he is both man and animal. Therefore, Socrates would not be truly one if he had only what it is to be animals: and from another what it is to be man.

84. Whence, since intellectual being pertains to the very nature of the soul, as its essential difference, if it had being from one thing and intellective nature from another, it would follow that it would not be simply one. Therefore it is appropriate to say that, from the first cause from which it has essence, it also has intellectuality. And this agrees with the opinion of Dionysius cited above [73–74], namely, that the good itself is not one thing, being itself another, and life itself and wisdom itself, but they are one and the same, which is God, from which it is derived in things that they be and live and think, as he showed at that same place. Whence also Aristotle in Metaphysics, 12, meaningfully attributed to God "to understand" and "to live," saying that he is life and intelligence, so that he excludes the aforementioned Platonist positions.

85. Yet in another mode this can have truth, if it is referred not to the intellectual nature, but to the intelligible forms which intellective souls receive through the operation of the Intelligences; whence Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 4, that souls are made through the angels participants of illumination emanating from God (cf. 148 [348]).

86. But the third operation of the noble or divine soul he posits animal (27) and explains (30) that the animal operation is in that it moves the first body and consequently all natural bodies: for it is the cause of motion in things.

87. And he assigns a reason for this later (34), for because soul is lower than intelligence, insofar as receiving the impression of the intelligence, consequently it operates in an inferior mode on those things which are below itself, than the intelligence impresses on the subjects for itself; because primary causes have more influence than secondary causes, as is clear from proposition 1 (1). Now, the intelligence makes an impression on the soul without motion, insofar as, to be precise, it makes the soul know, which is without motion. But the soul makes an impression on body through motion and that which is below it, i.e., body, receives the impression of the soul only insofar as it is moved by it (35).

88. And consequently, he assigns a cause why it should be said that the motion of natural bodies be from the soul. For we see that all natural bodies directly arrive through their operations and motions at owed ends: which could not be done unless they were directed by some intelligence. From this it seems that the motion of bodies be from the soul which flows its power over bodies, by moving them.

89. This position also is not approved in faith, namely, that the motion of the sky be from the Soul: but Augustine leaves this under doubt in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, 2. That it be by God directing all nature and that the corporal creation be moved by God with the Intelligences or Angels as intermediaries, this Augustine asserts in On the Trinity, 3, and Gregory in the Dialogues, 4.

90. Last (36) he now concludes the proposition, that is, that the noble soul has three aforesaid operations.

91. With that which is said about the divine intellect and the divine soul agrees the opinion of Dionysius who in On the Divine Names, 4 called the superior angels divine minds, that is, intellects through whom also souls by a deiform gift participate according to their own power.

92. But he takes divinity according to conjunction to God, not according to a universal influence on caused things. For that is more divine: because, even in God himself, that which he is, is greater than what he causes in others.

37. The first of created things is being, and no created thing is before it.

38. This is because being is beyond sense perception and beyond soul and beyond intelligence, and there is nothing created after the first cause more extensive than or prior to it.

39. For this reason it is thus made superior to all created things and more strongly united.

40. And it is made such only because of its closeness to the pure, the one, and the true being, in which there is no plurality of other sorts.

41. And created being, even though it is one, is nevertheless multiplied, that is to say because it receives multiplicity.

42. And indeed it is only made many because, although it is simple and there is nothing among created things simpler than it, yet it is composed of finite and infinite.

43. This is because everything which from it follows the first cause is achili, that is, intelligence, perfect and ultimate in power and in the other qualities.

44. And the intellectual forms in it are broader and more strongly universal. And that which comes out of it is equally intelligence, however it is below that intelligence in its fulfillment and power and qualities. And the intellectual forms are not thus extended in it, just as their latitude in that intelligence. And indeed the being created first is as a whole intelligence, however intelligence is internally differentiated in it in the way we have said.

45. And because intelligence is differentiated, the intellectual form comes to be differentiated. And just as from one form, because it diversifies, an infinite number of individuals go forth in the world below, so from being which was created first, because it diversifies, infinite intellectual forms appear.

46. Nevertheless, although they are diversified they are not separated from one another, as is the separation of individual things.

47. This is because they are united without corruption and distinguished without separation, since they are a unit which possesses a multitude and a multitude in unity.

48. And the first intelligences inform the second intelligences with qualities which they receive from the first cause, and the qualities in them lead them to the point that they attain their ultimate goal.

93. After the author of this book distinguishes the triple grade of superior being and shows how, in a participative way, the whole is found in the lowest of them, now he intends to show the distinction of the second grade, namely of that being which is with eternity.

94. For the first grade, which is of the first cause existing before eternity, he sets forth as indivisible, as had been said [45].

95. But in this section he proceeds otherwise than in others: for in all the others he sets forth a proposition and, when an explanation has been posited, proves the proposition set forth; but here he proceeds in a manner of divisions;

first he sets forth what is common (37),

second, he divides it, when he says: and although caused being is one (41);

third, he assigns the difference among the parts of the division when he says: that is to say: because everything which follows from it (43).

96. Now that which is common to all distinct intelligences is first caused being, about which he sets forth a proposition thus: the first of created things is being, and there is not anything else created before it (37).

97. And also Proclus posits this proposition in his book (Elements of Theology, 138) under these words: the first and highest of all things participating in the divine character and deified, is being.

98. The reason for this is according to the Platonist positions because, as is said above [66], to the extent that anything is more common, to that extent they posit it as separated being, and as the prior is participated by the posterior, so also being is the cause of posterior things. But in the order of those things which are said about things, they posited the one and the good as most common, even more common than being, because the one or the good is found to be predicated about something about which being is not predicated, according to them: namely, about prime matter, which Plato conjoined with non-being, not distinguishing between matter and privation (as is said in Physics, 1) and yet he attributed unity and goodness to matter, insofar as it has an ordering toward form. For good is not only said about an end, but about that which is ordered to an end. Thus, therefore, the Platonists posited the separated one itself and the good itself as the highest and first principle of things. But after the one and the good nothing is found so commonly as being; and therefore they posited separated being itself as created, since it participates in goodness and unity, but they still placed it first among all created things.

99. But Dionysius departs from the order of separated forms indeed, as is said above [72–74], positing the same order as also the Platonists did, in the perfections which other things participate from one principle which is God: when in On the Divine Names, 4, he pre-ordains the name of good in God, and shows among all divine names that participation of it extends even to non-being, understanding by "non-being," prime matter. For he says, and if it is right to say that even non-being itself desires the good which is above all existing things.

100. But among the other perfections participated in things from God, he places being first. For he says so in On the Divine Names, 5: being is proposed before the other participations of God and being itself according to itself is older than what it is to be life per se and what it is to be wisdom per se and what it is to be divine similitude per se.

101. The author of this book also seems to understand this according to this mode. For he says that the reason for this (37) is because being is beyond sense and beyond soul and beyond intelligence (38). And how it is beyond these he shows, adding: and there is nothing broader after the first cause, that is anything more common and consequently, nor is there a caused thing prior to it. But the first cause is wider because it extends itself to non-being, according to the aforesaid [98]. And from this he concludes (39) that on account of that which has been said, being itself is made superior to all created things, since, that is to say, among the other effects of God it is more common and it is more strongly united, that is more simple. But those things which are less common seem to be related to the more common by a mode of some kind of addition.

102. Nevertheless it seems that it is not his intention to speak about some separated being, as the Platonists spoke; nor about being which is participated commonly in all existing things, as Dionysius speaks; but about participated being in the first grade of a created being, which is superior being (19). And although superior being is in both the intelligence and the soul, yet the being itself in the intelligence itself is considered prior to the reason of intelligence, and it is similarly in the soul. And on account of this he premises (38) that it is above the soul and above intelligence.

103. Therefore, concerning this being which is participated in the intelligences, he assigns a reason why it be maximally united (39); for he says (40) that this depends on account of its propinquity to the first cause which is pure subsisting being and is truly one not participated, in which there is not able to be any multitude of differences found on account of the essence: that which is closer to that which is per se one is more united, as if participating unity more. Whence the intelligence, which is closest to the first cause, has the most united being.

104. Next, when he says: and caused being, although it be one (41), he shows the reason of the distinction which can be in intelligences according to essence.

105. Whence it must be considered that if any form or nature be altogether separate and simple, a multitude cannot fall into it, just as, if something is separated whiteness, it can only be one; now, many different white things are found, which participate whiteness. Thus therefore if caused being were the first abstract being, as the Platonists posited, such being would not be multiplied but would be just one. But because first caused being is participated being in the nature of the intelligence, it is multiplicable according to the diversity of the participants.

106. And this is what he says: and itself indeed (42), i.e., first caused being, is only made many, that is, distinguished into many intelligences, because (that is) it is itself simple and there is not anything among caused things simpler than it, yet it is composed from the finite and infinite.

107. Indeed, Proclus also posits this composition in proposition 89, saying: every beingly being is from the end and from the infinite. Which is explained according to him in this way: For every infinite which exists immobilely exists according to the potency of being; for if that which can last more in being is of greater potency, that which can last into infinity in being is to that extent of infinite potency (cf. Elements of Theology, 84).

108. Whence he premises in proposition 86: everything which truly exists, is infinite, not in multitude or magnitude, but in potency alone, that is, potency of existing, as he explained.

109. Now, if anything should thus have an infinite power of being, which did not participate being from another, then it would be the only infinite, and such is God, as is said below in proposition 16 (132–133). But if there be something which would have infinite power for being according to being which was participated from another, by the very fact that it participates being, it is finite: because that which is participated is not received in the participant in its whole infinity, but in a particular fashion. Therefore, insofar as intelligence is composed in its being from finite and infinite, to that extent the nature of intelligence is called infinite according to its potency of being and the very being which it receives is finite. And from this it follows that the being of the Intelligence can be multiplied, insofar as it is participated being: for this is what composition from finite and infinite means.

110. Then, when he says: this is because everything (43), he shows the difference among the members of the division, that is, among the multiplied intelligences. And this is in three ways.

111. First, with respect to their diverse perfection;

second, with respect to the influence of certain ones over others; at: and the first Intelligences (48);

third, with respect to the effect of the intelligences on souls and this in the following proposition which, in certain books, is found conjoined with this comment, and begins: superior intelligences (49).

112. About the first, he makes two points:

first, he shows the difference;

second, he excludes a certain doubt, at: and because it is diversified (46).

113. About the first, therefore, it should be considered that he assigns a double difference to the intelligences:

one with respect to their nature (43);

but the other with respect to the intelligible species through which they understand (44).

114. Now, as far as their natures, it is necessary that their natures be diversified according to a certain order: for there is no material difference in them, but a formal one. For they are not composed from matter and form, but from the nature which is form, and from participated being as has been said [109]. Now in those which differ materially, nothing prohibits that many be found to behave equally; for in substances, individuals of one species participate equally in the definition of the species. Also, in accidents it is possible that different subjects participate equally in whiteness. But in those things which differ formally, a certain order is always found.

115. For if anyone should diligently consider in all species of one genus he will always find one more perfect than another just as 'white' in colors and 'man' in animals. And this on that account because they differ formally, they differ according to some contrariety: for contrariety is the difference according to form, as the Philosopher says in Metapysics, 10 (9, 1058b). Now, in contraries, there is always one nobler and one viler, as is said in Physics, 1 (5, 189a3–4). And this on that account, because the first contrariety is privation and habitus as is said in Metaphysics, 10 (4, 1055a33). And on account of this, in Metaphysics, 8 (3, 1043b36–1044a2) the Philosopher says that the species of things are like numbers, which diversify by species according to the addition of one upon another.

116. Now, it is manifest that, the more perfect something is, the closer it is to the most perfect one. Whence he posits this difference as far as the nature of the intelligences because its intellectual being, which immediately follows the first cause, is complete intelligence, ultimate in completion, as for the cause being in potency of being and with the remaining goodnesses following. But that intellectual being which is in an inferior way (44) in the order of intelligences indeed retains the nature and reason of intelligence, but nevertheless it is below the superior intelligence in the complement of nature and power of being and operating and in all goodnesses or perfections.

117. As far as the second difference which is from the intelligible species (44), he supposes that the intelligences know through certain intelligible species; and that intelligible species of this kind have more amplitude and universality than do those in inferior intelligences. And this, indeed, we now dismiss undiscussed; it will be manifested in proposition 10 below (92), the whole of which proceeds on this matter.

118. Thence, when he says: and because it is diversified (45), he removes a certain doubt. For because he had said that intelligible species were different in superior and inferior Intelligences, this might seem false to someone, on account of the fact that the object understood is one.

119. And for this reason he shows how intelligible species of this kind are diversified.

And first, he brings in a certain example for this (45);

second, he shows the difference, at: nevertheless, although it is diversified (46).

120. About the first, it is to be considered that, just as has been said above [67], the Platonists posited separated forms of things, through participation of which, the intellects came to be intelligent in act, just as through participation in them corporal matter is constituted in this or that species.

121. And the very same follows, if we do not posit many separate forms but, in the place of them all, we place on first form, from which all are derived, just as was said above [72–74] according to the opinion of Dionysius, which the author of this book seems to follow [75], when he posits no distinction in the divine being.

122. Thus therefore since the intelligences be diverse according to essence, as was said above [114–116], it is necessary that the participated intelligible forms be diverse and different in diverse intelligences, just as also diverse participated forms in this world are found by the sensible, according to the diversity of the individuals who are participating the aforesaid forms.

123. Thence, when he says: nevertheless, although (46), he shows the diversity in the aforesaid example.

124. Because sensible forms, participated in different individuals, are individuated forms and detached from one another by the detachment by which one individual is detached from another, so that the two forms do not pertain to the existence of one things, but of diverse things. Thus intelligible forms are not detached by being in diverse intelligences or intellects, because individual forms are not brought about by this, but they retain the force of their universality, insofar as any of them in the intellect in which it inheres causes a universal cognition of the very thing intellected.

125. And the reason for this appears from what was said above [98–99]: for since the forms of things whether they be in a divided fashion standing by themselves or be united in one first, they have a most universal and divine being, it is clear that the more they approach to this most universal being of forms, the more universal the forms are.

126. And according to this, he said (44), that the participated forms in superior intellects are more universal. Now that which is lowest in things is corporal matter, wherefore it receives forms of this kind as particulars, without any universality. And this is what he says (46) that although intelligible forms are diversified in diverse intelligences, nevertheless they are not divided in this way from one another as diverse individuals are divided in sensible things, because at the same time they have one with a multitude: one, indeed, from the part of universality; but a multitude on account of the diverse mode of participation in diverse intellects (47).

127. And through this is totally excluded the reasoning of Averroes, who wanted to prove the unity of the intellect through the unity of the intelligible form. For he thought that if intelligible forms are diverse in diverse intellects, that they be individuated and intelligible in potency and not in act; which, through what has been premised [124, 126] is clearly frivolous.

128. Thence, when he says: and the intelligence (48), he posits a second difference which follows from the first.

129. For we have found in any order of things, that that which is in act acts on that which is in potency. Now, that which is more perfect is always compared to that which is less perfect as act to potency and on that account more perfect things in any genus are born to act on more imperfect things. Therefore, since superior intelligences are more complete, in power and the rest of goodnesses, consequently, just as the first cause influences superior intelligences, so the superior intelligences influence inferiors and so on to the end.

49. The superior first intelligences which follow immediately upon the first cause, impress the second forms, while staying identical, which are not destroyed such that it is necessary to renew them in another cycle. The second intelligences, moreover, impress the turned-away forms which are separable, such as the soul.

50. For it proceeds from the impression of the second intelligence which follows created being in an inferior manner.

51. And souls are only multiplied in the way that the intelligences are modified. This is because the being of the soul again has an end, but that which, proceeding from it, is inferior, is infinite.

52. Therefore the souls that follow alachili, that is, intelligence, are complete, perfect, of little turning-away and separation; and souls that follow inferior being are, in their attributes and turning-away inferior to the superior souls.

53. And superior souls flow over the inferior souls with goodnesses which they receive from the intelligence.

54. And every soul receiving more power from the intelligence is stronger with regard to its impression, and what is impressed by it is fixed, persisting, and its motion is an even and continuous motion. And that in which the power of intelligence proceeds from it less, is with regard to its impression below the first souls, and it is because what is impressed by it is feeble, vanishing, destructible.

55. However, even though it is such, it yet persists through generation.

56. Now, therefore, it is shown why many intellectual forms were made, and that being is only one, simple, and why many souls were made, certain of which are stronger than certain others, and their being is one, simple, in which there is no differentiation.

130. After, in the preceding proposition, the author has manifested the distinction of the intelligences, here (49) he deals with the distinction of the souls, which indeed he assigns according to the difference of the intelligences which in some manner are causing them, according to his position. Whence, that which is here said about the distinction of souls can be referred to the distinction of the intelligences, since the distinction of causes is manifested through the distinction of effects. Whence also in certain editions, this proposition is not placed by itself, but adjoined to the comment of the preceding proposition, which also appears from the epilogue which is put here (56), which is common to either proposition.

131. Now, the proposition goes like this: the superior first intelligences which follow immediately upon the first cause, impress the second forms, while staying identical, which are not destroyed such that it is necessary to renew them in another cycle. The second intelligences, moreover, impress the turned-away forms which are separable, such as the soul (49).

132. To this proposition, Proclus posits two corresponding propositions, namely, the first (Elements of Theology, 182) which is like this: every divine participated intellect is participated by divine souls; and another (Elements of Theology, 183) which goes like this: every participated intellect which is just intellectual, is participated by souls which are neither divine nor made in a transmutation of intellect and ignorance.

133. For evidence of this proposition (49), one ought to consider three things:

first, concerning the impression of the soul (50 [134–144]);

second, about the distinction of souls (51 [145–147]);

third, about the difference of distinct souls (52-55 [148–155]).

134. Now, about the impression of the soul,

first one ought to consider how it is appropriate to the soul that it be impressed [135–136];

second, by what it is impressed [137–144].

135. That it is appropriate to the soul to be impressed, appears manifestly if someone should consider the definition of impression, for which two things are required:

first, indeed, that that which is impressed be existing in something;

second, that it not be in it superficially according to just some extrinsic contact, but that it be innermost, as if penetrating into the depth.

136. And these two are appropriate to the soul according to its proper definition. For it was said above in proposition 3 (30) that the proper operation of the soul is that it moves bodies, by the fact that the operation of the soul itself is below the proper operation of the intelligence (33), to whom it belongs to know things without motion. Now the principle of motion ought to be applied to the mobile because, as is proved in Physics, 7 (2, 243a4) mover and moved are simultaneous. Whence it is appropriate to the soul according to the proper definition to be in a mobile body. Now the motion by which the soul moves the body is the motion of a living body, which indeed is not by an extrinsic mover like a violent motion or like the motion of light things and heavy things by the one generating, but it is by an intrinsic mover, whence living things are said to move themselves; and on the same account it ought to be that the soul which moves a body be in the body intrinsically, united to it. And on account of this it is said to be impressed.

137. Now if it is asked by what it is impressed, according to the opinion of the author of this book, it is impressed by the intelligence. For he says (50): for it (that is, the inferior soul) is from the impression of the second intelligence (that is, of the second order of intelligences) which (namely, the second intelligence) follow created being in an inferior way that is, in an inferior part of the same first created being which is the being of the intelligences. Or, what he says: which follow, etc., can be referred to the soul which is below the eternity of the intelligence, as is said in proposition 2 (22).

138. But this opinion is not always approved. For we can speak about the impression of the soul in two ways: in one way, from the part of the soul itself which is impressed; in another way, from the part of the matter on which it is impressed. And this distinction has a place in any soul standing by itself, such as any intelligent soul, as is clear below (128 [311]), because the being of its substance does not totally consist in its union to corporal matter like the being of a non-subsisting soul, such as the souls of animals and plants; whence in these the aforesaid distinction is not necessary, because the being of such souls is considered both from the part of the matter receiving it and from the part of the soul itself at the same time.

139. So if we speak about the soul that stands by itself, that is, the soul that is in some way intellectual or celestial—if animated celestial bodies are posited, as the author of this book supposed—or about the human soul from the part of the soul itself, then according to the roots of the positions of the Platonists, which the author of this book follows in many things, the soul is such from the impression of the intelligence; because, as was said above in the third proposition (33 [82]), the Platonists posited that that which is common is caused in something by another principle, and that which is more individualized is caused by another, inferior principle.

140. According to this, therefore, the soul standing by itself has its being from the first cause; but that it be intellectual and that it be the soul it has from second causes which are the intelligences. Whence, since it pertains to the definition of the soul that it be impressed on a body, it will follow that the soul has this from the intelligence, specifically, that it be impressed on a body.

141. But because, as we have shown above [83–84], the aforesaid position does not have truth and is contrary to the opinion of Aristotle, one ought to say that from the first cause, from which such a soul has its being, it would also have that it be intellectual and that it be a soul and, consequently, that it be impressed on a body. Therefore, according to this, the soul is not from the impression of the intelligence, but from the impression of the first cause.

142. But if we speak about the soul of this kind from the part of the susceptible thing on which it is impressed, such as the celestial soul, if the sky should have a soul, the definition would be similar; for the nature of celestial bodies is not caused in any way by the intelligences, but by the first cause from which they have being.

143. But if we speak thus about the human soul from the part of the susceptible thing, it is from the impression of the Intelligence in some way, insofar as, namely, the human body itself is disposed to be susceptive of such a soul by the power of the celestial body operating in the senses, by reason of which it is said that man and the sun beget man (Physics, 2).

144. Now, celestial bodies, also according to the doctors of Christian faith, namely Augustine and Gregory, are posited to be moved by spiritual creatures which are called angels, or intelligences, or separated intellects. And from this it follows that the intelligences act on something to the same point that the soul is imprinted on the human body from the part of the susceptible. And through this mode it can be said that other souls, which are not standing by themselves, are from the impression of the intelligences and the celestial bodies.

145. Thence, it remains to be considered about the second, that is to say, about the distinction of the souls, and he posits the same reason for distinction or multiplication in souls as he had posited in the intelligences (42): for just as the being of the intelligence is composed from the infinite and the finite, insofar as its being is not subsisting, but participated by some nature, by reason of which it can be distinguished into many things, so also is the case with the being of the Soul.

146. And this is what he says (51): and souls are only multiplied in the way that the intelligences are modified. This is because the being of the soul again has an end, but that which, proceeding from it, is inferior, is infinite. Now he says that the participating nature itself is in an inferior way, which nature he calls infinite because of its power to endure in being into infinity. But he calls participated being finite, because it is not participated according to the whole infinity of its universality, but according to the mode of the nature of the participant.

147. Yet, it should be attended that, because the nature of the Intelligence is wholly separate from body, the distinction of the Intelligences follows on the second grade of appropriate nature, without reference to any body. But concerning the definition of the soul it is that it be impressed on a body and on that account the distinction of souls is attendant on a comparison to animated bodies. Whence if animated bodies be of different species, diverse souls will be impressed on them according to their species, just as one ought to say if celestial bodies were animated. Now if animated bodies are of one species, the impressed souls are also of one species; multiplied only by number, as is clear concerning human souls.

148. Thence, the third point is to be considered, namely, the difference of the distinct souls; and he posits three differences (52–55).

149. The first of these is accepted according to the diverse perfection of the souls; for he says (52) that souls, specifically, superior souls, such as are those of celestial bodies, which follow intelligence, as if placed immediately after them in order, are complete, namely in the perfection of animal nature; and he shows a sign of perfection, adding: of little declination and separation. For it was said above in proposition 2 (26 [60–61]) that the soul, insofar as it is lacking from the complement of the intelligence, approaches to motion, and by the same token, to the extent that the souls be higher and closer to the intelligence, they have less to do with motion.

150. For inferior Souls have motion not only insofar as they move a body, but also insofar as they are not always conjoined with their bodies and that they are not always knowing. But superior Souls are always conjoined with their bodies and are always intelligent, yet they partake of motion in that they move celestial bodies, and on that account he says that they are of little declination, because they decline little from the immobility of the Intelligence; and of little separation because they are separated into diverse things but slightly as they may be found sometimes in this, sometimes in that, specifically, as to the only local motion of celestial bodies; but inferior Souls are lacking in the complement and the paucity of declination or separation from superior souls.

151. The second difference is taken up belonging to the influence of the souls on one another. For just as he said above (44) that the first intelligences cause to flow over the second intelligences, goodnesses which they receive from the first cause, so now (53) he says that: superior souls cause the goodnesses which they received from the intelligence to flow over inferior souls. And in both places the reason is the same: because that which is more imperfect is born to be perfected by the more perfect, just as potency by act.

152. The third difference is taken from the part of the effect. For just as he said about the intelligences, that the superior intelligences impress the more noble souls, so now (54) he says about souls that the superior soul receiving power immediately from the intelligence have a stronger impression; because a superior cause always acts more strongly as was said in the first proposition. And on that account, that which is impressed by a superior soul on its body is fixed, standing that is firm and immobile and its motion is equal that is, uniform and continuous as is clear in the celestial body.

153. But the inferior soul to which the power of the intelligence arrives with the superior soul as intermediary, has a weaker impression on its body, as an inferior cause. And on that account that which impresses in the body, such as life and things of that kind, is weak on account of the vulnerability of the body to an exterior agent; evanescent, transmuted by an interior principle, destructible, because finally it totally desists from being, that which is effected in the body by the soul.

154. And yet the body participates sempiternity in some way, namely, according to the species and this through generation (55). Now in this the author of this book thinks better, attributing the corruptibility of human bodies to the weakness of the impression of its soul, than the Platonists who posited also that the human soul have a certain incorruptible body always united to it.

155. It is also obvious that, according to the opinion of this author, when the human soul was perfected by conjunction to the first cause, it could impress perpetual life on its own body. And according to this, the Catholic faith professes a future eternal life, not only in souls, but also in bodies, after the resurrection.

156. Finally (56), he summarizes what things were said in the two propositions.

157. But those propositions which we said [139, 142, 147, 149–150] about the souls of the heavens, we did not say by asserting them, but by reciting the opinions of others.

57. The first cause is beyond all telling. And tongues fall short of its description only because of the account of being itself, because it is above every cause and it is not told except through second causes which are illuminated by the light of the first cause.

58. This is because the first cause does not cease to illuminate its object, and it itself is not illuminated by any other light, since it is the pure light, beyond which there is no light.

59. From that, then, it comes about that the first is the only one whose account falls short; and it is such only because there is no cause beyond it by which it is known,

60. because indeed everything is known and described only by its own cause. Since therefore the thing is simply cause and is not caused, it is not known by a prior cause nor described because it is superior to description, nor does it follow a discourse.

61. This is because description only takes place by means of discourse, and discourse by means of intelligence, and intelligence by means of cogitation, and cogitation by means of meditation, and meditation by means of sense-perception. Now the first cause is above all things, since it is the cause for them; because of that it thus comes about that it does not fall under sense-perception and meditation and cogitation and intelligence and discourse; thus it is not able to be described.

62. And I say again that a thing is either sensible and it falls under sense-perception and it is the object of meditation and it falls under meditation, or it is fixed, standing according to one disposition and is intellectual, or it is subject to change or destruction falling under generation and corruption and falls under cogitation. And the first cause is beyond intellectual sempiternal things and beyond destructible things, on account of which neither sense-perception nor meditation nor cogitation nor intelligence fall under it.

63. And indeed it is only inferred from the second cause which is intelligence and it is named by the name of its first object only in a higher and better way, because that which belongs to its object is again of its cause, however by a more sublime, better and nobler way, as we have shown.

158. After the author of this book distinguishes (19) superior being generally into three grades, of which the first is beyond eternity, which is appropriate to the first cause; the second is with eternity, which is appropriate to the intelligence; the third is below eternity and beyond time, which is appropriate to the soul, here (57) he begins to follow up on the individual grades.

159. And first about the first cause;

second, about the intelligence, in proposition 7, where he says: intelligence is a substance (64);

third, about the soul, in proposition 14, where he says: in every soul (115).

160. About the first cause, now, this is what we can most possibly know: that it exceeds all our knowledge and speech. For he most perfectly knows God who holds this about him: that whatever can be known or said about him, is less than what God is. Whence Dionysius says in the first book of the Mystical Theology, that man by his better knowledge is united with God just as wholly unknown by the fact that he knows nothing about him, knowing that he is beyond all mind.

161. And to show this he adds this proposition (57): the first cause is superior to narration. By narration, then, must be understood affirmation; because whatever we affirm about God does not belong to him in the way that it is meant by us. For the names imposed by us have meaning in the mode by which we understand them, which indeed the divine mode of Being transcends. Whence Dionysius says in the second chapter of Celestial Hierarchy that negations in divine things are true, but affirmations are not well put together or inappropriate.

162 Proclus also posits this proposition in proposition 123 of his book under these words: every divine thing itself, on account of a supersubstantial union, is indeed ineffable and unknowable by all secondary beings, but it can be grasped and known by its participants. On account of this only the first is wholly unknown inasmuch as it is unparticipated being. By what he calls divine, he understands every ideal form, according to the positions of the Platonists; like: per se man, per se life and others of this sort, which they called gods as was said above [65]. Things of this kind have a super-substantial unity according to themselves, because they exceed all subjects participating in them and on that account he says that no one of these can be said or known by inferior beings. But by superior beings they can be known: as the idea of life can be known by the idea of being.

163. And although they cannot be perfectly known or said by inferiors, yet in some way they may be grasped and known by participants, that is through participating things, just as through those things which participate life, something is known about life itself. But that which is simply first, which according to the Platonists is the very essence of goodness, is nearly unknown, because it does not have anything above it which can know it and this is what it means, that which is called amethectum that is not existing after anything.

164. And because the author of this book does not agree with the Platonists on the position of the other ideal separated natures, but posits only the first, as was said above [75], on that account, when others are set aside, about this first cause, he says that it is superior to narration. And he assigns a cause: on account of its super-stantiality, just as Proclus also does; and this is what he adds in the proposition: and tongues fall short of its description only because of the account of being itself, because it is above every cause (57).

165. Then he shows how it may be described, adding: and it is only described through second causes which are illuminated by the light of the first cause (57). And this is the same which Proclus said that it is graspable by participants and knowable.

166. Now, what is said in the proposition, is proved through this mode: for something is known in three ways:

in one way as an effect is known through a cause;

in another way through itself;

in a third way through its effect.

167. First, therefore, he shows that the first cause is not known in the first way, that is through a cause, when he says, that the first cause does not cease to illuminate what it has caused, and it itself is not illuminated by another light, since it is pure light, above which there is no light (58).

168. To the understanding of which it should be considered that visible things are known in a sensible way through a corporal light, whence that through which something is known can be called "light" by similitude. Now, the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics, 9, that each and everything is known through that which it is in act and on that account the very actuality of the thing is a certain light of its own. And because the effect has that which it is in act through its cause, thence it is what is illuminated and known through its cause. Now the first cause is pure act having no possibility joined to it and on that account it is the pure light by which all others are illuminated and rendered knowable.

169. And from this he concludes below (59) that only the first cause is first in this way that it cannot be described, because it does not have a superior cause through which it is described. For things are accustomed to be described through their causes (60).

170. And because he proceeds from cognition to narration, he shows (61) consequently that the first cause, since it is beyond cognition, is necessarily beyond narration. And this on that account, because narration (that is, affirmation) takes place through speech (that is, through some significative word; now speech is through intelligence, because significative voices are signs of intellects; now intelligence takes place through cogitation, that is, through reason; and this is true in men who arrive by ratiocinating to an understanding of truth; and cogitation takes place through meditation, that is, through imagination and other sensitive interior powers which are a slave to human reason; and meditation takes place through the sense because phantasia is movement made by the sense according to act, as is said in On the Soul, 3 (3, 29a1-2). Whence, since the first cause is beyond all things, it exceeds all the aforesaid.

171. And this Dionysius also posits in On the Divine Names, 1, saying: and there is neither sense nor phantasia of him, what he calls meditation, nor opinion, what he calls cogitation; nor name, what he calls speech, nor discourse, what he calls narration, nor knowledge, what he calls intelligence.

172. But second he shows that it is not known by the second mode, that is, through itself, and he proves this (62) by the diverse mode of cognition. For of those things which are known per se, certain ones are known by the sense, such as sensible things; certain ones by meditation, or imagination, such as imaginable things which are not subject to the sense perception; but certain ones are known by the intellect, such as necessary and immobile things; but certain ones are known by reason or cogitation, such as generable and corruptible things, according to which mode the Philosopher says in Ethics, 6 (2, 1139a12–14) that the ratiocinative is about those things which happen to behave otherwise. Whence since the first cause be beyond every genus of this kind of things, it can be known by none of those modes.

173. Proclus brings in this proof also (Elements of Theology, 123) except that he puts meditation in the place of cogitation and opinion in the place of meditation.

174. And indeed about this reason, it is clear that the first cause is beyond sensible things and imaginable things and corruptible things; but what may be beyond sempiternal intelligible things is not manifest. And this proof is set aside here (62) but Proclus (Elements of Theology, 123) proves through this, that all intellectual or rational cognition is of beings: for that which is first acquired by the intellect is being and that in which the definition of being is not found cannot be grasped by the intellect. Whence since the first cause is beyond being, consequently the first cause is beyond sempiternal intelligible things.

175. Now the first cause according to the Platonists indeed is beyond being, in as much as the essence of goodness and unity, which is the first cause, exceeds even separated being itself, just as was said above [66]; but, according to the truth of the matter, the first cause is beyond being, inasmuch as it is infinite existence itself. Now being is called that which participates existence and this is proportionate to our intellect, whose object is "what it is" as is said in On the Soul, 3 (4, 429b10) which only that which has a quiddity participating existence can be grasped by our intellect; but God's quiddity is his very existence, whence it is beyond understanding.

176. And through this mode he brings in this reasoning of Dionysius (On the Divine Names, 1) saying thus, if all cognitions are of existing things and if existence has an end insofar as, precisely, they participate existence finitely, the one who is beyond all substance, is excluded from all cognition.

177. Third, he shows how the first cause is known through effect and he says (63) that the first cause is not signified in these which are said about it, except from the second cause which is intelligence: for we speak thus about God as if about a certain intelligent substance. And on this account, because intelligence is its first caused, whence it is most similar to God and he can be known to the greatest extent through it. But, nevertheless it is not sufficiently known through it, because that which is intelligence is in the first cause in a higher mode; but the cause, exceeding the effect, cannot be sufficiently be known through its effect.

178. Thus therefore it is clear that the first cause is superior to narration, because neither through a cause nor through itself nor through its effect can it be sufficiently known or spoken.

64. Intelligence is a substance which is not divided.

65. This is because if it is not endowed with magnitude, is not body and does not move, then doubtless it cannot be divided.

66. And again, everything divisible is divided only either with respect to number or size or its motion.

67. Thus, when a thing is according to this disposition, it is subject to time, since it only receives division in time. And indeed intelligence is not in time, rather it is on the level of eternity; on account of which it is made higher and superior to every body and every multitude. Because if multitude is found in it, it is only found as if it were a single existing thing. Thus since intelligence is this way, it receives no division internally.

68. And the indication of this is its return on its own essence, that is to say because it is not extended with an extended thing, so that there would be one of its extremities following from another.

69. This is because when it desires knowledge of a corporeal thing it is not extended with it, but remains fixed according to its disposition; since it is a form from which nothing passes away. And indeed bodies are not like this.

70. And the proof that intelligence is not a body, and its substance and its operation are not divided, is that both are one thing. And indeed intelligence is many on account of the qualities which come to it from the first cause. And although it is multiplied in this fashion, yet, because it approximates unity, it is one and is not divided. And indeed intelligence does not admit of division because it is the first created thing which was created by the first cause, and unity is more worthy of it than division.

71. It is therefore now verified that intelligence is a substance that is not endowed with magnitude nor body nor is moved by any of the modes of motion for a body: because of which it is created beyond time [and on a level with eternity] as we have shown.

179. After he has said about the first level of superior being, that is, the first cause, that it cannot be described, now (64) he goes on to the second level, that is, to the intelligences.

And first, he determines about the intelligences, as far as its substance;

second, as far as its cognition, in proposition 8, where he says: every intelligence knows (72).

180. About the first, it should be known that those things which are of a superior order cannot be sufficiently known by those which are of an inferior order, because superiors exceed the mode and power of inferiors. But because human cognition takes its beginning from the senses, those things which are offered to our senses we can know sufficiently, but we cannot arrive at superior cognition from them, except according to those things which have something in common with sensibles that are known by us. But those things which are totally offered to our senses are inferior bodies, with which superior bodies do not come together in the type of essence or the condition of nature; but they do come together in the reckoning of quantity, of light, and of those things which follow on these. And on that account we can extend to knowing about superior bodies and their clarity according to which they are visible to us both the quantity of magnitude and their motions and shape and also their genus according to the mode by which it comes together in genus with inferior bodies; now we can know their proper nature according to the definition of their species only through negation, inasmuch as it transcends the nature of inferior bodies, whence Aristotle in On the Heavens, 1, proves that the celestial body is neither heavy nor light nor generable nor corruptible.

181. Similarly, intelligence transcends the whole order of corporal things. Because nevertheless its quiddity or essence is not itself its own being, but it is a thing subsisting in its own participated being, on that account it comes together in some way in genus with bodies, which also subsist in their being; and thus, according to logical intention each is placed in the genus of substance. And on that account the intelligence indeed can be made known in a narrative or affirmative fashion insofar as its genus, as it may be said to be a substance; but as for the specific difference it cannot be described, but it is necessary that it be made known to us through negation, insofar as it transcends the whole order of corporal things, to which divisibility belongs.

182. And on that account making the essence of intelligence known, as far as it can be made known to us, he proposes this proposition: intelligence is a substance which is not divided (64). Now the first cause is not nature subsisting in its own being as if participated, but itself subsisting being is stronger and on that account it is super-substantial and simply indescribable.

183. Now, Proclus also posits this proposition in his book (Elements of Theology, 171) in these words: every intellect is an indivisible substance.

184. Now, what has been said is proved through division and as it appears from the words posited here (65–66), a double division is premised: of which the first is from the part of the very thing to be divided which has a stable magnitude and a flowing quantity, as it is in time and motion. And this is what he says (65): that is: because if it is not with magnitude, nor is it a body nor is moved, then doubtless it is not divided. For when he says if it is not with magnitude nor is it a body, he excludes stable magnitude, that is, what has place; and he says neither with magnitude nor a body, because body is a complete divisible magnitude according to every dimension, but a surface and a line are incomplete magnitude according to one or two parts. Or this which he says: if it is not with magnitude, is posited to exclude those things which are such by accident, such as whiteness and things like that.

185. He posits another division from the part of the division itself and he says (66) that everything which is divided is either divided according to multitude that is, according to a discrete quantity or according to magnitude which is a division according to a continuous quantity having a single location, or according to motion which is a division of continuous quantity not having a single location. For the division of time and of motion is the same, as is proved in Physics, 6.

186. Now in the first division he sets aside the question of multitude, because division which is according to number follows on the division of the continuous as is clear in Physics, 3, and on that account, in those things in which there is no division according to magnitude there is no division according to multitude.

187. Now, once these divisions have been posited, he shows (67) that the intelligence is divided by none of the aforesaid modes and the proof seems to be like this: everything which is divided, is divided in time; for division is a certain motion from unity into multitude. But intelligence is not in time, but it is wholly in eternity, as was held above in proposition 2 (21). Therefore, it exceeds every aforesaid mode of division. And indeed this is the exposition of this proposition, according to what appears from the words put here (65–67).

188. But it should be known that the words put here are corrupted from a defect of the translation, as is clear through the text of Proclus which is like this (Elements of Theology, 171): for if it is without magnitude and incorporeal and immobile, it is indivisible. But what follows is not brought in through the mode of another division, but through the mode of a proof, for thus he adds: for everything which is divisible in any way, whether according to magnitude or according to multitude or according to operations is divisible. And he proves immediately that it is not divisible according to its operations, for he adds, carried out in time, as if he were saying: all divisible operations are in time. And he adds: now the Intellect is eternal in every respect and beyond bodies and that which is a multitude in it is united. Therefore it is indivisible. He shows the aforesaid things posited above one at a time.

189. And first he follows up on incorporeity, saying thus: that therefore indeed the intellect be incorporeal, which the conversion upon itself shows. Now, it is the conversion of the intellect on itself in which it knows itself. For no body is converted on itself.

190. And indeed he had proved this above, setting forth proposition 15 as such: everything which is conversive on itself is incorporeal. Which he proves thus: for no body is born to be converted on itself. For if that which is converted on something is linked to that on which it is converted, then obviously also all parts of the body which is converted on itself will be linked to all other parts. Which is impossible in all divisible things because of the separation of the parts, some of them lying elsewhere than others.

191. And indeed this proof is added here in a pretty confusing manner, when he says (68): and the proof of that (namely, that the intelligence is not a body) is the return upon its own essence, that is, because it is converted on itself by knowing itself; which is appropriate to it because it is not a body or a magnitude having one part distant from another. And this is what he adds, precisely because it is not extended, with an extension that is to say of magnitude, with an extended thing that is to say, a thing having magnitude, so that one of its extremities would be following from another, that is, in a distinct order of location from one another.

192. And because someone could believe that the intelligence be extended by knowing bodies as if by touching on them, he excludes this, adding (69): which is: because when it wants knowledge of a corporeal thing it is not extended with it, as, to be precise, it would understand magnitude by means of its own magnitude, as Empedocles wished it, but it stands fixed, according to its own disposition, that is, it is not drawn away into different parts. And he proves this through what he adds: since it is a form through which nothing passes. For magnitude is only in matter, but intelligence is an immaterial form through which nothing passes either because one part of it does not stand apart form the others or because, though it be indivisible, nothing about a thing having magnitude escapes its cognition. Now he adds: and indeed bodies are not such. From which it can be concluded that the intelligence is not a body.

193. Then (70) according to what appears from the words here posited, another proof is brought in to show that the intelligence is not a body; because, namely, its operation as well as its substance is indivisible and both have a unity of indivisibility which cannot be in bodies according to its substance; for it is divided both with a division of magnitude and with a division of time according to its operations, neither of which is appropriate to the intelligence.

194. But in the book of Proclus this is brought in to prove another member; that is, to show that the intelligence is not divided according to motion. For he says thus (Elements of Theology, 171): the identity of its operation to its substance makes it plain that the intellect be eternal. And this is the power of this proof: because that thing to whom its operation comes accidentally, receives variation according to that operation, as sometimes it acts and sometimes doesn't, or sometimes does more, sometimes less. But that thing to whom its operation belongs according to its own essence, operates invariably. And such is the intelligence to which the intellectual operation belongs, according to the nature of its essence.

195. Then, he shows the third member, namely that the Intelligence is not divided according to multitude, and to make this clear he brings in the fact that one ought to posit some multitude in the intelligence: for many goodnesses come to it from the first cause, the reason for whose multiplication is because the intelligence cannot attain to the simplicity of the unity of the first cause and on that account the perfection of goodness which in the first cause is united and simple, is multiplied in the intelligence into many goodnesses. And yet, although there be a multitude of goodnesses in the intelligence, those many things cohere indivisibly with one another: for it cannot be that it would retain being and let go of life, or that it would retain life and let go of cognition, as happens in inferior things. And this on that account, because since the intelligence is the first caused thing, it is closest to the first cause and on that account those things which are in the intelligence belong to it in the noblest mode after the first cause: for unity and indivisibility are nobler than division, which the intelligence has indivisibly a multitude of goodnesses which it participates from the first cause.

196. And the proof which Proclus brings in also returns to the same point (Elements of Theology, 171).

197. Finally, then, he concludes the proposition as if it is already proved when he says: now, therefore, it has been verified (71).

72. Every intelligence knows that which is above it and that which is below it; however, it knows what is below it because it is the cause for it, and it knows what is above it because it acquires its qualities from it.

73. And moreover intelligence is an intellectual substance; therefore, according to the manner of its substance it knows things which it acquires from above and things for which it is the cause.

74. Therefore, it discerns what is above it and what is below it, and it knows that that which is above it is the cause for it and that which is below it is caused by it; and it recognizes both its cause and its effect through the mode which is its cause; that is to say, by the mode of its substance.

75. And in the same way, everything that knows, knows something greater and something lesser and lower only according to the mode of its substance and its being, not according to the mode according to which the things are.

76. And since this is such, then doubtless qualities which descend upon intelligence from the first cause are intellectual in it, and in the same way corporeal sensible things are intellectual in intelligence.

77. This is because objects which are in the intelligence are not the impressions themselves, but rather they are the causes of the impressions. And an indication of that is that intelligence itself is the cause of things which are below it because of the fact that it is intelligence. Thus if intelligence is the cause of things because it is intelligence, then doubtless the causes of things in intelligence are also intellectual.

78. Now, therefore, it is manifest that things above intelligence and below it are intellectual, by the intellectual power, and similarly corporeal things endowed with intelligence are intellectual, and intellectual things in the intelligences are intellectual because it is the cause of their cause; and because it only apprehends through the mode of its substance and because it is intelligence it apprehends things with an intellectual apprehension, whether they are intellectual things or corporeal.

198. The notification of intelligence as to its substance having been posited, here (72) he begins to demonstrate its cognition.

And first, he declares the mode by which it knows things other than itself;

second, how it knows itself, and this is in proposition 13, where he says: every intelligence knows it own essence (109).

199. About the first, he makes three points:

first, he declares the mode by which intelligence knows both superiors and inferiors;

second, he shows what it is in a superior way in proposition 9, where he says: every constancy of intelligence (79);

third, he shows how it behaves in the cognition of inferiors, where he says: every intelligence is full of forms (92), in proposition 10.

200. Therefore, to declare the mode by which the intelligence knows both superiors and inferiors, he posits a proposition like this: every intelligence knows what is above it and what is under it; nevertheless it knows what is below it since it is a cause for it and it knows what is above it since it acquires goodnesses from it (72).

201. Indeed, the meaning of this proposition seems on the surface to be that causality is the intelligence's reason for understanding. And indeed if this be rightly considered, it does not have truth neither for that by which the Intelligence is caused nor for those things which it causes: for it is not caused by its own cause through its own knowledge, but rather through the knowledge of the cause which causes it. But those things which are under it, although the intelligence may cause them through its own science, it nevertheless does not know them on that account—because it causes them—but rather it causes them on that account—because it knows them.

202. Now, the true meaning of this proposition is to be taken thus: for it is manifest that in the order of things a cause obtains a higher rank than that which is caused; if, therefore, something be both a cause and an effect, it obtains a middle rank between both, and the intelligence is of this sort. For it is caused by the first cause and is below it. Yet it causes in some way those things which are below it, as is explained in proposition 3 (31 [78–81]) and thus it is above them. Therefore, he means that according to its rank, by which it is a cause and an effect, it holds itself in a middle mode in understanding; for it understands that which is above it in an inferior mode than what that is in itself; and those things which are below it, it understands in a higher mode than they are in themselves.

203. And proposition 173 in the book of Proclus is also brought in in this sense, and it goes like this: every intellect is intellectually, both those things which are before it and those which are after it, because, to be precise, superiors as well as inferiors are in the Intellect according to its mode, that is, intellectually.

204. And this proof is also brought in to this sense: for he says (73) that the intelligence is the intelligible substance, because, namely, intelligible is appropriate to it in the definition of its essence; therefore according to the mode of its own substance it knows things which it acquires from above and things for which it is the cause. And the reason for this is because each and every thing operates according to the mode of its form which is the principle of operation, just as a hot thing makes things hot according to the mode of heat, whence it is proper that every knower knows according to the form which is the principle of knowledge, namely: according to the similitude of the thing known which is in the knower according to the mode of its substance.

205. Whence it is necessary that every knower knows according to the mode of its own substance whatever it knows. Since, therefore, the intelligence (74) be a cause and an effect according to the mode of its own substance, it will be like a certain terminus or boundary determining or distinguishing superiors from inferiors, so that, precisely, it knows superiors through the mode of its own substance, in a mode inferior than the superior thing is in itself; but it knows inferiors in a higher mode than they are in themselves (75).

206. Which indeed is to be understood as the mode of cognition is taken from the part of the knower; precisely because although the first cause be super-intellectual, the intelligence does not know it in a super-intellectual way, but intellectually. And similarly, although bodies be material and sensible in themselves, yet the intelligence does not know them sensibly and materially, but intellectually (76–77).

207. But if the mode of cognition were accepted from the part of the thing known, thus it knows each and every thing just as it is in itself: for the intelligence knows that the first cause is super-intellectually in itself and that corporal things have material and sensible being in themselves.

208. And the meaning of all that has been said here is clear from these.

79. Every constancy and essence of intelligence exists through the pure quality of goodness which is the first cause.

80. And indeed the power of intelligence is of a stronger unity than the second things that are after it, because they do not attain its cognition. And it is only this way because it is the cause for that which is below it.

81. And an indication of this is that which we shall discuss: intelligence is what rules all things which are under it by the divine power that is in it and through it it conserves things, since through it, it is the cause of things; and it retains all things which are under it, and comprehends them.

82. This is because everything which is first among things and the cause for them is what conserves those things and rules them and none of them escapes from it, on account of its eminent power. Thus the intelligence is the leader of the things which are under it and it is what conserves them and rules them, just as nature rules the things under it by the power of intelligence. And in the same way the intelligence rules nature by divine power.

83. And indeed the intelligence is only created as the conserver of things which are after it and their ruler and that which extends its power over them because they are not the substantial power for it, but it is the power of substantial powers, because it is the cause for them.

84. And indeed intelligence comprehends the generated order and nature and the horizon of nature, that is to say, the soul, for it is above nature.

85. This is because nature contains generation and the soul contains nature and the intelligence contains the soul.

86. Therefore intelligence contains all things; and intelligence is only created such on account of the first cause which stands out above all things since it is the cause for intelligence and the soul and nature and for the rest of things.

87. And indeed the first cause is not intelligence or soul or nature, but rather is beyond intelligence and soul and nature, since it is the creator of all things. However it is the creator of intelligence without an intermediary and the creator of soul and nature and the rest of things with the intelligence serving as intermediary.

88. And indeed divine knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge nor like animal (soul-related) knowledge, but rather it is above the knowledge of intelligence and the knowledge of the soul, because it is that which creates knowledge.

89. And indeed divine power is above every intellectual and soul-related and natural power, because it is the cause for all power.

90. And intelligence is what has yliathim (determinative principle) because it is being and form, and in the same way the soul is what has yliathim and nature is what has yliathim. And indeed yliathim does not belong to the first cause, because it is being as such.

91. Because if someone should say: it is necessary that it be yliathim, we would say, its yliathim is infinite and its distinguishing mark is its pure goodness, impressing all qualities on intelligence and on the rest of things with intelligence serving as an intermediary.

209. After he has posited the mode by which the intelligence knows that which is above it and that which is below it, here he shows what is above it, bringing in a proposition to show that the intelligence depends from the first cause, which is like this: every constancy and essence of intelligence exists through the pure quality of goodness which is the first cause (79).

210. Now, Proclus posits this proposition, but universally, saying in proposition 12 of his book: the good is the first cause and principle of all beings. Now, the same thing is meant in this proposition (79) what is called pure goodness and what in Proclus' proposition is called good. For pure goodness is called not participated goodness, that is to say: the very subsisting essence of goodness, which the Platonists used to call the good itself; because that which is the first cause of all things must be essentially and purely and firstly good; because, as Proclus proves, the cause is always better than what is caused, whence it is necessary that that which is the first cause be the best. Now this is that which is the very essence of goodness, whence it is necessary that that which is essentially good be the first cause of all things.

211. And this is what Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 1: since, then, God is the very essence of goodness, through his very being, he is the cause of all existing things.

212. Whence also the intelligences, which have a participated being and goodness, it is necessary that they depend from God who is the pure goodness itself, as an effect from a cause. And this is what he says, that the constancy and essence of the intelligence is through pure goodness (79), precisely because the intelligence has fixed being—that is, immobilely permanent—from the first goodness.

213. Now, he proves this in two ways: first (80) by the effect of the intelligence itself. And the power of this proof consists in this: because if the proper operation of something is found in another thing, it must necessarily be the case that the former thing has its operation from participation of the other, just as an effect has something from a cause; think, if heated iron makes the proper operation of fire, by setting fire, it should be said that this, the iron has from fire, as an effect from a cause. Now the proper operation of God himself is to be the universal reigning cause of all things, as is held in the third proposition (65), whence nothing can extend to this operation except insofar as it participates it from the first cause as its effect.

214. But because the first cause is one to the greatest possible extent, the more simple and unified something is, the more it participates its proper operation. But intelligences are of greater unity and simplicity than inferior things; a sign of which is because whatever things below the intelligence there are, that have a cognitive power, cannot attain to knowing the substance of the intelligence, on account of the excess of its simplicity; through which reason also the corporal sense perception falls short of knowing an intelligible thing. And that it be simpler is clear from this, because it is the cause of inferiors by the mode which was said above [81–85] in proposition 3.

215. And this is made clear by what follows (81) because intelligence rules all things which are below it, by the divine power which is in it. Now by rule is understood the ordination and motion of inferiors to an end and, through its divine power existing in itself, it maintains and preserves things from obstacles to its government; for these two, namely to rule and to maintain, are proper to the cause in comparison to the effect. On that account, therefore, the intelligence through its divine power rules things and maintains them, because by itself it is the cause of things.

216. Now how it retains inferior things, he shows by what he adds, that it maintains all causes which are below it and it comprehends them, namely by impressing its own power on them: for it is not the cause of all inferior things immediately, but only with inferior causes as intermediaries.

217. Now this which he had said, he proves consequently by this (82) because everything which is first in things and a cause for them, maintains those things and rules them, as has been said [215] and none of those things which are under some cause can be taken away from the government and maintenance of that cause by any extraneous power. And on that account, since the Intelligence be first in respect of inferiors and consequently their cause in the manner previously stated [81–85], it is consequence that it behaves with respect to inferiors, something like the duty of a leader in maintaining and ruling. For thus we see that also those things which are below the intelligence have a ruling power by the power of the intelligence, just as through nature which is the principle of motion in natural things they rule and maintain those things which are below nature. Whence similarly the intelligence rules nature and other things which are below it by a divine power. Thus therefore from the above it has been proved that intelligence, like a leader, rules and maintains inferiors by the power of the superior cause, and this is because it is their cause. And that it be their cause proceeds from the fact that it is of a stronger unity.

218. But how, from the fact that it is a cause, it should follow that it maintains those things which are caused and rules them, had not yet been proved and so he adds this proof: and indeed the intelligence is only created as the conserver of things which are after it and their ruler and that which extends its power over them because they are not the substantial power for it, but it is the power of substantial powers, because it is the cause for them (83).

219. The power of this proof is: because each and every thing is ruled and conserved by a certain power of its own through which something operates toward an end and resists obstacles; but the power of a caused thing depends on the power of the cause and not vice-versa: for since power is a principle of operating in each thing, it is necessary that the power be from the power of something from which it has that it be the principle of operating. Now, it was said in the first proposition [23, 24] that an inferior cause operates by the power of a superior cause, whence the power of the superior cause is the power of the power of the inferior cause. And in this way he says (83) that the power of the intelligence is the power of substantial powers, that is, of powers which are proper to the substances of inferior things. So, therefore, it is clear that the intelligence rules and maintains inferior things by stretching out its own power over them from the fact that it is the cause for them.

220. Now, he shows those things which are inferiors which it rules, adding (84) that intelligence comprehends generated things, that is, it contains generable and corruptible things and nature which is the principle of motion in them is found first in the first of bodies; it also comprehends the horizon of nature, namely the soul for it was said above in proposition 2 (22) that the soul is on the horizon of eternity and time, existing below eternity and above time, because it is above nature, which is the principle of motion, which is measured by time.

221. Now, that the intelligence comprehends all the aforesaid things, he proves (85) by the fact that nature contains generation, that is, generated things, because it is the existing principle of generation; indeed, particular nature is of particular generation; but universal nature which is in the celestial body, comprehends universally all generation, as its effect. But the soul contains nature: because, according to the opinion of those who posit an animated celestial body, which the author of this book supposes, the soul is the principle of the motion of the first body and consequently of all nature motions as is held in proposition 3 (30). And again, the intelligence contains the soul, as was said in the same proposition (29).

222. Whence he concludes (86) that the intelligence contains all things, because whatever is contained by that which is contained is contained by the container. And he repeats the cause why this is appropriate to the intelligence, namely, on account of the power of the first cause, to which it is proper to be super-eminent over all things not by a power of someone else, but by its own power: for it, through its own divine power, is the cause of the intelligence and soul and nature and the rest of things, that is, generable and corruptible things. So, therefore, it has been shown that the intelligence depends on the first cause because from it, it has the universal power of containing inferiors.

223. Then, when he says: and indeed the cause (85), he shows the same thing from the condition of the first cause, as if by a demonstration propter quid. For the proof detailed before (80–86) was more by sign.

And first, he sets out the proof (87–90);

second, he excludes an objection, where he says: that if someone were to have said (91).

224. Thus, he says first (87) as if proposing that he intends to prove it, that the first cause is not the intelligence nor is it soul or nature, but it is beyond all those things, just like their creator with a certain order: for it causes the intelligence immediately but the soul and nature and the rest of things, with the intelligence as intermediary. Which is to be understood, as was said above in proposition 3 [79–85], not that their being be caused by intelligence, but that they are created according to their essence only by the first cause, but through the intelligence they obtain certain additional perfections.

225. Now, he begins to prove this, that the first cause causes all the aforesaid things, where he says: and indeed divine knowledge (88).

226. For the understanding of this proof, it should be known that among the perfections arriving in things from the first cause, one is that which arrives at all things, even to generable things and corruptible things—namely, being; another is that which does not come to effects insofar as they are effects, but only to causes insofar as they are causes—namely, power, whence participation of power comes to nature which has a reason of beginning; yet another is that which comes to the intellectual soul, namely, knowledge, which nevertheless is in the soul in an inferior mode than in the intelligence; for it belongs to the intelligence without motion, insofar as it apprehends truth immediately; but it belongs to the soul with a certain motion, according as it proceeds from one thing to another. Thus therefore being and power and knowledge belong to the intelligence and the soul; being and power belong to nature; to generated things, just being. Therefore, if the first cause is the cause of all knowledge and all power and all being, it follows that all things be caused by it.

227. Now, that it be the cause of all these, he proves by the fact that that which is first and most excellent in any order is the cause of all following things in that order. But the first cause has knowledge more excellent than every knowledge, and power more excellent than all power, and being more excellent than every being. Therefore, it is the cause of all knowledge and power and being. And from this it follows that it be the creator of intelligence and soul and nature and the rest of things.

228. Therefore, first (88) he shows about knowledge, and he says that divine knowledge is not just like intelligible knowledge, because the knowledge of the intelligence is by participation of the thing understood, and much less is it like the knowledge of the soul which is not only by participation of the thing understood, but by participation of intellectual light from the intelligence, behaving in a mobile fashion concerning knowledge. Nay rather divine knowledge is beyond the knowledge of the intelligence and beyond the knowledge of the soul, because immobilely and without any participation of intelligible light or of the thing understood it has essential knowledge, understanding things through its own essence. And on this account is why it is the creator of all knowledge; whence it is necessary that it be superior to all knowledge.

229. Now, the same follows concerning power (89) and he says that divine power is beyond all intelligible power and power of souls and nature power because intelligence and soul and nature have their power participated from another, just as the power of a second cause is participated from the power of the first cause which is not participated from another, but itself is the cause of every power.

230. Also, similarly it follows with regard to being (90), showing that the first cause has being in a higher mode than others: for intelligence has yleathin, that is something material or behaving in the material mode; for it is called yleathin from yle, which is matter. And how this may be, he explains, adding since it is being and form: for quiddity and substance of the intelligence is a certain subsisting and immaterial form; but because it is not its own being, but is subsisting in participated being, the very subsisting form is compared to participated being as potency to act and as matter to form. And the soul similarly is having yleathin, not only the form itself subsisting, but also the body itself of which it is the form. Similarly also, nature is having yleathin, because the natural body is composed out of matter and form.

231. Now the first cause in no way has yleathin, because it does not have participated being, but it itself is pure being and consequently pure goodness, because anything insofar as it is being is good. Now it is necessary that every participated thing is derived from it which subsists purely through its own essence; whence it remains that the essence of intelligence and of all beings be from the pure goodness of the first cause.

232. So therefore the reason is clear why he said above (87) that the first cause is not intelligence nor soul nor nature, because its knowledge exceeds the knowledge of intelligence and soul and its power exceeds all power and its being exceeds all being.

233. Then, when he says: that if one were to say (91), he excludes a certain objection: for someone could say that if the first cause be just being, it would seem that it be common being which is predicated of all things and which would not be anything existing individually, distinct from other things: for that which is common is not individuated, except through the fact that it is received in something. But the first cause is something individual, distinct from all other things; otherwise it would not have any operation: for the universal is not to act or to be acted on; therefore it would seem that it be necessary to say that the first cause have yleathin, that is something receiving being.

234. But to this he responds that the very infinity of divine being, namely insofar as it is not terminated by anything receiving it, has in the first cause the place which yleathin has in other things. And this is because, just as in other things the individuation of a common received thing takes place through the fact that it is receiving, thus divine goodness and being is individuated from its very purity, because, specifically, it is not received in anything, and from the fact that it is individuated in this way by its own purity, it has that it can flow goodnesses over the intelligence and other things.

235. As evidence for this it should be considered that something is called individual from the fact that it is not born to be in many; for the universal is that which is born to be in many. But that something not be born to be in many things, this can happen in two ways:

in one way, because it is determined to some one thing in which it is, as white, by reason of its species, is born to be in many, but this white which is received in this subject, can only be in it. Now, this way cannot proceed into infinity, as is proved in Metaphysics, 2 (994a20, 994b17). Whence it is proper to reach something which is not born to be received in anything and have individuation from it, just as prime matter in corporeal things, which is the principle of singularity.

Whence it is necessary that everything which is not born to be in something, from that fact itself it is individual. And this is the second mode by which something is not born to be in many; because, precisely, it is not born to be in anything: just as, if white were existing separated without a subject it would be individual by this mode. And in this way, the individuation is in separated substances which are forms having being and in the first cause itself which is subsisting being itself.

92. Every intelligence is full of forms; however, among intelligences there are those that contain less universal forms, and those that contain more universal forms.

93. This is because the forms which are in the second, lower intelligences in the particular mode, are in the first intelligences in the universal mode; and the forms which are in the first intelligences in the universal mode are in the second intelligences in the particular mode.

94. And there is great power in the first intelligences, since they are of a stronger unity than the second, lower intelligences; and in the second, lower intelligences there are weak powers, since they are of less unity and more multiplicity.

95. This is because the intelligences that are closer to the one, to the pure truth, are of less quantity and greater power, and the intelligences which are farther removed from the one, the pure truth, are of greater quantity and of weaker power.

96. And because the intelligences closer to the one, the pure truth, are fewer in number and greater in power, it so happens from this that the forms which go forth from the first intelligences go forth in a universal and united procession.

97. And moreover we summarize and we say that the forms which come from the first intelligences to the second are of weaker procession and of stronger separation.

98. On account of this it happens that the second intelligences cast forth their visions over the universal form, which is in the universal intelligences, and they divide it and disperse it, since they are not able to receive those forms according to their true nature and being, except by the mode according to which they can receive them, that is to say, by separation and division.

99. And in the same way it only receives anything from things which are above it by the mode according to which it can receive it, not by the mode according to which the thing which is received exists.

236. After the author of this book shows how the intelligence knows those things which are below it and that which is above it, in this way he begins to show how it may know things other than itself, aside from the first cause.

And first, he shows commonly how it may know things other than itself,

second, he shows specifically how it may know sempiternal things in proposition 11, where he says: every intelligence (100).

237. First, therefore, he premises a proposition like this: every intelligence is full of forms; however, among intelligences there are those that contain less universal forms, and those that contain more universal forms (92).

238. And this is also found in the book of Proclus in proposition 177 under these words: every intellect is an existing plenitude of species: this one containing more universal species, that one containing more particular species.

239. About this proposition one ought to consider two things:

first, that which is common to all intelligences or separated intellects, namely: the plenitude of forms or intelligible species;

second, the difference of universality and particularity in them.

240. About the first therefore it is to be considered that just as we have already said above [67], the Platonists, positing separated forms of things, placed under the order of these forms an order of intellects. For because every cognition takes place through an assimilation of the intellect to the thing understood, it was necessary that separated intellects participate abstract forms in order to understand them. And these kinds of participations of abstract forms are intelligible species or forms about which is said here (92).

241. But because according to the opinion of Aristotle, which, concerning this, is more consonant with the Christian faith, we do not posit other separated forms above the order of the intellects, except the separated good itself to which the whole universe is ordered just as to an extrinsic good, as is said in Metaphysics, 12, we ought to say that, just as the Platonists posited that separated intellects, from participation of diverse separated forms, followed diverse intelligible species, so we should say that intelligible species of this kind follow from participation of the first separated form which is pure goodness, which is God. For God himself is goodness itself and being itself, comprehending virtually in himself the perfections of all beings. For he alone knows all things through his essence without participation of any other form.

242. But inferior intellects, since their substances are finite, cannot know all things through their essence, but in order to have cognition of things, it is necessary that they know by participation in the first cause, with intelligible species having been received, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 7, that from wisdom itself, the intelligible and intellectual powers of the angels' minds have simple and happy intellects.

243. And it is to be considered, as Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, 2, that just as, from the word of God, forms proceed into corporal matter for the constitution of things, thus from the very same—that is, the word—cognition of things comes about in angels through the reception of intelligible species of this kind; because also the Platonists posited that according to participation of ideas separated intellects know things and corporal matter is varied according to diverse species.

244. But it should be known that the same diversity of participation is found in intellects and in corporal matter. For the matter of inferior bodies participates, indeed, a certain form to a specific being, but yet by that form the potency of the matter is not filled, which thus extends itself to other forms. But the matter of the celestial bodies is filled by the form which it participates, because potency to another form does not remain in it. Similarly also the inferior human intellects are not filled with intelligible species, but from the beginning indeed, the human possible intellect is like a slate on which nothing has been written, as is said in On the Soul 3 (430a1); but presently, in a certain order, it receives species, nevertheless, it is not filled in this life. But separated intellects, immediately from the beginning, are filled with intelligible species for understanding all things to which their natural faculty extends itself.

245. Whence Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 4 that the intellect beyond the world knows and is illuminated according to principles of existing things. And this is what is said here (92) that intelligence is full of forms, or, as Proclus says more explicitly, it is a plenitude of forms, because intellectuality itself pertains to the proper nature of intelligence or separated intellect.

246. About the difference of universality and particularity of the intelligible species, first it should be attended that just as is said here (92–93) and in the book of Proclus (Elements of Theology, 177) superior things have more universal forms, while inferior have less-universal forms. And Dionysius also says this in The Celestial Hierarchy, 12, where he says that the order of Cherubim participate a higher wisdom and cognition, but inferior substances participate in a more particular wisdom and knowledge.

247. Indeed, this universality and particularity is not to be referred to things understood, as if some understood badly, thinking that God would know only the universal nature of a being. To which the consequence would be that in inferior intellects the cognition of each one thing would stand more in the universal by so much, as much as it would be higher; think, that the one intellect would know only the nature of substance, but the inferior would know the nature of body and so on to the individual species. Which estimation indeed openly contains falsity; for cognition by which something is known only in the universal is an imperfect cognition; but cognition by which something is known in its own species is perfect cognition. For cognition of the species includes cognition of the genus, but not vice-versa. Therefore, it would follow that, as much as an intellect would be superior, so much would its cognition be more imperfect.

248. There is, therefore, this difference of universality and particularity to be attended, only according to that by which the intellect understands; for by how much some intellect is superior, by so much that by which it understands is more universal; thus nevertheless that by that universal, its cognition is also extended to the things which are properly to be understood, so much the more than the cognition of the inferior intellect which knows through something more particular. And we also perceive this in ourselves by experience: for we see that those who are more excellent in understanding comprehend the whole truth of some question or business from fewer things heard or known, which others, being of lesser intelligence, are not able to perceive unless it is shown to them individually; for which reason it is necessary to give examples frequently.

249. And on that account, God whose intellect is most excellent, in only one thing—namely his essence—comprehends all his things. But each of the other separated intellects has knowledge of things by so many fewer species extending themselves to more things, insofar as it is higher. So that, the human intellect, which is lowest, cannot have knowledge of things unless it knows the natures of single things by single species. But corporal matter and the corporal sense-perception in every way are found to be lacking from universal participation of species (99).

250. Therefore, of this difference, which is according to the universality and particularity of species, the same proof is posited here and in Proclus, and it is taken from the effect. For just as the intelligences know through intelligible forms, so also they produce their effects through intelligible forms; because every intellect operates by understanding, as will be said below [253].

251. Now the superior intelligences have greater powers (94). And this is on this account, because they are more simple and of less quantity (95)—that is, composition—insofar as they are nearer to the first one; therefore, it is proper that their operative powers extend themselves to more things, and nevertheless that these same powers be more simple. And from this it is clear that the forms of superior intelligences are more universal (96).

252. Now, how forms which are united in superior Intelligences are multiplied in secondary Intelligences, he shows consequently, assigning the reason of this, just like Proclus (Elements of Theology, 177), from the part of the inferior intelligences.

253. For the inferior intelligences obtain intelligible species from the superior intelligences, by looking back at them in a certain way (98); because the intelligence, just like everything that acts, acts by understanding. So everything that receives, receives in an intelligible fashion, according to the mode of, precisely, its proper nature. And because the nature of the inferior intelligence is not of such simplicity and unity as the nature of the superior intelligence, on that account the intelligible forms are not regarded in the inferior intelligence in that unity in which they are in the superior intelligences. And on account of this, intelligible forms are multiplied more in inferior intelligences than in superiors, so that these things which are understood by a superior intelligence through one intelligible species, the inferior intelligence knows through many.

254. But because, as has been said [253], whatever the intelligence does, it does by understanding, just as also it receives what it receives by understanding, the reason for this multiplication of species can be assigned not only from the part of the intelligence impressing, by whose provision the species are multiplied in the inferior intelligence according to its capacity.

255. Whence Dionysius says in The Celestial Hierarchy, 15: each intellectual essence divides the uniform intelligence given to it by a more divine by a provided power and multiplies it to the leader analogy to inferiors, that is, according to the proportion of inferior substance.

100. Every intelligence knows sempiternal things which are not destroyed and do not fall under time.

101. This is because if intelligence is always that which is not moved, then it is the cause for sempiternal things which are not destroyed [or changed] and do not fall under generation and corruption. And moreover intelligence is only such because it knows a thing through its own being, and its being is sempiternal because it is not corrupted.

102. Thus, since it is such, we say that destructible things are endowed with bodilyness, that is to say from the corporeal cause for a temporal thing, not from the eternal cause for an intellectual thing.

256. Now that it has been shown how the intelligence knows things other than itself, because it knows through intelligible forms with which it is full, here (100) is specifically dealt with about the cognition by which the intelligence knows eternal things.

And first, it is shown that it knows eternal or incorruptible things;

second, he shows the mode by which it knows them, at: of all the first things, certain ones are (103).

257. About the first, he posits a proposition like this (100): every intelligence knows sempiternal things which are not destroyed, nor do they fall under time. By sempiternal things he means things which are beyond time and motion, as is explained in the second proposition [48–50]. He says plainly: which are not destroyed nor do they fall under time; for certain things fall under time which yet are not destroyed, such as the motion of the sky which although it is measured in time will not be destroyed nor will it cease, according to the position of the philosophers.

258. It seems, therefore, on the face of it, that the meaning of this proof is that the Intelligence does not know things which are corruptible and which fall under time, but only incorruptible things existing beyond time. But that this is not the meaning of the proposition (here) is clear from the proposition which is added (101) in which it is not proved that intelligence knows sempiternal things and not corruptibles, but that it only causes sempiternal things immediately, whence it should be explained: every intelligence knows, that is, causes by knowing sempiternal things.

259. And this is clear from the book of Proclus, who brings in two propositions on this matter, of which one is 172: every intellect is the institutor proximately of perpetual things and of intransmutable things according to its substance; the other is 174: every intellect institutes by knowing those things which are after it. From which two propositions the author of this book has conflated one, and while he was eager for brevity, he brought in obscurity.

260. Now he proves under this sense this proposition in the very mode by which Proclus also proved it, and in this proof he makes two points:

for first, he shows that intelligence does not produce immediately things which are corruptible or which fall under time, but only sempiternal things;

second, he shows where corruptibility in things comes from (102).

261. Now, first he shows it thus (101): the intelligence produces its effect according to its own being and this because its "to know" is connatural with it and essential to it. Now, it produces nothing except by understanding, as we have shown [253] above. Whence it remains that whatever it produces, it produces by its own being. But the being of the intelligence is incorruptible and beyond time, being made similar to eternity, as is held in proposition 2 (21, 25 [57]). Therefore, the immediate effect of the intelligence is sempiternal, not falling under corruption or time.

262. Then he shows the second, saying (102) that since the Intelligence does not cause corruptible things immediately, it follows that corruptible things are not immediately from the intelligence, but are from some corporeal cause for a temporal thing. For corruption and generation in these inferior things are caused by the motion of the sky; and that very motion of the sky is not immediately from the intelligence, but from the soul, as was said above in proposition 3 (30 [86]).

263. If someone wished to reduce this process to the meaning which appears superficially from the proposition, he could say further that corruptible things are known by the intelligence as sempiternal. For they are in the intelligence as if not materially, although in themselves they be material, so not temporally but sempiternally; which is shown by the effect: because the immediate effect of the intelligence is sempiternal. For that by which the intelligence knows is the creative principle in it, just as the craftsman works by the form of art.

264. Now this proof which is brought in here (102 [263]), even if it is conceded by certain philosophers, yet does not have necessity. For when this proof is taken up, many fundamentals of the Catholic faith are taken away: for it would follow that the angels could make nothing new immediately in these inferiors, and much less God, who is not only eternal but before eternity, as was said above (20 [54–55]); and it would follow further, that the world would always have existed. For this seems to be the most efficacious reason for those who posit the eternity of the world, which is taken from the immobility of the maker: for it does not seem that it could happen that something which acts now begin to operate, when it would not have been operating before, if it holds itself immobile in every way, unless perchance some exterior mutation be presupposed; because, as Averroes continues in his commentary on Physics, 8, if some voluntary agent wanted to do something after and not before, it would at least be necessary to imagine time, which is the number of motion. And on that account he concludes that it is impossible that a new effect come forth from an immobile and eternal will, unless motion be presupposed.

265. And because this appears to be a very efficacious principle to use for proving the eternity of the world, the solution of this principle is diligently to be attended.

266. Therefore, it should be considered that one ought to speak in one way about the agent which produces something in time and in another way about an agent which produces time at the same time as the thing which is produced in time. For when something is produced in time, it is necessary to accept some proportion in time, whether only of that which is produced, or also of the producer itself; whenever an action is in time not only on the part of that which is acted on, but also on the part of the agent. For something is in time according to the fact that it is in motion, of which time is the number.

267. Therefore, when some mutation is found on the part of that which is acted on and on the part of the agent, then the action is in time according to both; think, when someone is altered by cold, he kindles a new fire to drive the cold away.

268. Now, this does not always happen: for there is something whose substance is not in time but whose operation is in time as will be said below [269]. Thus an agent of this kind without any mutation to himself produces an effect in time which would not have been before. And so also God can produce something new in time which did not exist before, according to a certain proportion of this effect to this time, just as happens in all miraculous effects which are made to happen immediately by God.

269. Nor does it stand in the way to say that he produces by his own being, because his own being is his own to know. And just as his being is one, he understands many and on account of this he can produce many, although his knowledge remains one and simple, so, although it be its own being eternal and immobile, yet it can know something to be temporal and mobile. And on that account, although his own knowledge be sempiternal, through himself he can yet produce a new effect in time. An indicator of this appears in some way in us; for man can, with a permanent immobile will, spread his work into the future, as he will make it at a determined time.

270. But if you say that as often as this happens one ought to know in advance another motion from which it would happen that something earlier was not appropriate to be done, then it was as appropriate for doing, at least the very running-down of time which cannot be understood without motion, we could say that this is indeed true in particular effects of God which he operates in time. For that he raised Lazarus on the fourth day and not before, he did this with respect held for the other preceding change of things.

271. But in the production of the universe this has no place, because at the same time as the world, time also was made and all motion universally; nor was there any time preceding or motion to which it would be necessary for the newness of this effect to be proportioned, but only to the reason of the one who made according as he knew and wished this effect not to have been from eternity but to begin after not being. For thus time is the measure of operation or motion, just as dimension is the measure of the magnitude of a body.

272. If therefore we ask about any particular body, think: about the earth, why it is confined beneath these limits of magnitude and is not extended beyond, the reason for this can be from its proportion to the whole world. And if again, we should ask about the whole universe of bodies, why it does not exceed the bounds of this determined magnitude, the reason for this cannot be from its proportion to another magnitude, but either one must say that corporal magnitude is infinite as the ancient natural philosophers posited, or it must be accepted that the reason for this determinate magnitude is from the sole intelligence and will of the maker. Therefore, just as an infinite God produced a finite universe according to the principle of his wisdom, so an eternal God could produce a new world according to the same principle of wisdom.

103. Of all the first things, certain ones are in certain others according to the mode by which it is permitted that one of them be in another.

104. This is because life and intelligence are in being, and being and intelligence are in life, and being and life are in intelligence.

105. However, being and life in intelligence are two alachili, that is, intelligences, and being and intelligence in life are two lives, and intelligence and life in being are two beings.

106. And indeed it is only such because every one of the first things is either cause or effect. The effect, then, is in the cause according to the mode of the cause, and the cause is in the effect according to the mode of the effect.

107. And [indeed] we summarize and we say that a thing acting upon a thing according to the mode of a cause is only in it according to the mode by which it is its cause, just as sense perceptions act on the soul according to the mode of the soul, and the soul acts on the intelligence according to the intellectual mode, and intelligence acts on being according to the essential mode, and first being acts on intelligence according to the intellectual mode and intelligence acts on the soul according to the mode of the soul, and the soul acts on sense perception according to the sensible mode.

108. Let us go back and say that the sense perception in the soul, and intelligence in the first cause, are through their modes, according to what we have shown.

273. After he shows that the intelligence knows sempiternal things, here (103) he brings in a proposition to show how the intelligences, which are sempiternal things, know one another. Through this, then, something is understood that is in the one knowing and on that account he shows in this proposition how one of the superior beings may be in another. And the proposition is such: of all first things, certain ones are in certain others by the mode by which it is permitted that one of them be in another.

274. This proposition is also put forth as 103 in the book of Proclus, under these words: all are in all, but properly in each one. Now it is the same, what Proclus says: but properly in each one, and what is said here, by the mode by which it is permitted that one of them be in another. For in each place it is meant that one is in the other according to the mode which is appropriate to that in which it is.

275. But by Proclus indeed is brought in this proposition according to the Platonist positions, by which are posited separate subsisting forms of which as was said above [53, 66, 98] each is higher by as much as it is more universal and extending its participation to more things. And according to this, being itself is superior to life itself and life is superior to intellect itself. And on that account, Proclus, determining this in his proposition (Elements of Theology, 103), adds: for life and intellect are in being, and being and knowing are in life, and being and living are in intellect. And so also the author of this book seems to speak, naming separated things of this kind "first"; for he adds below (104) as if explaining: that is: because life and intelligence are in being and being and intelligence are in life and being and life are in intelligence, which is in every way the same with the words of Proclus.

276. Now, Proclus adds in his proposition (Elements of Theology, 103) an exposition of the mode by which one of these may be in another, saying: but in one place intellectually, in another vitally, but in another beingly, that is by the mode of a being, all beings; as if to say that all three of the aforementioned are in the intellect intellectually, in life vitally, in being essentially.

277. But this which is posited in place of this in this book, seems to be corrupt and to have a bad meaning. For it follows (105): nevertheless being and life are two intelligences in the intelligence. For it should be understood that these two—namely being and life—are in the intelligence intellectually. And being and intelligence in life are two lives, that is, both are in life vitally. And intelligence and life in being are two beings—that is, both are in the very being essentially.

278. Now, if it is understood according to what the words sound like, they would contain a false understanding: for the "to live" of a living being is its very being, as is said in On the Soul, 2, and the "to know" itself of the first knower is its life and its being, as is said in Metaphysics, 12. Whence Proclus also excluding this says that the being of intellect is cognitive and its life is cognition (Elements of Theology, 103). Otherwise it would follow inconveniently what Aristotle brings in in Metaphysics, 3 (1003a11) against the Platonists that, to be exact, Socrates would be three animals because he is animal and the common idea of animal, which he participates, is predicated about him and similarly also the idea of man, which is the same animal. For it would follow that each of these three would be not one, but many [83].

279. Now, Proclus appends a clear proof to those things which are said (Elements of Theology, 103), distinguishing that something is said about something in three ways: in one way causally as heat is said of the sun; in another way essentially or naturally, as heat is said of fire; in a third way according to a certain post-habition, that is consequence or participation, when, namely, something is not had fully, but in a posterior and more particular mode, just as fire is found in elemental bodies not in that plenitude according to which it is in fire. Thus therefore that which is essentially in the first is in a participatory way in the second and third; but what is essentially in the second, is in the first indeed causally and in the last participatively; but that which is essentially in the third, is causally in the first and second. And through this mode, all are in all.

280. But because the author of this book does not seem to posit separate forms, that here (104) being and life and intelligence are said to be in one another is to be understood according to the fact that they are found in things having being, life and intelligence: because in being itself is found according to the proper definition "to live" and "to know" causally, according to that mode by which it was said in proposition 1 (9) that being is the first cause, to live and to know, posterior causes.

281. So it should not be understood as the words sound (105), that the intelligence and life be two beings in being itself, but because these two, according as they are in being, they are not anything other than being; and similarly being as it is in life is life itself, since life adds nothing beyond being except a determinate mode of existing or a determinate nature of a being. And the same should be understood in the other comparisons, according to which one of them is said to be in another.

282. But because, according to the meaning of this author, these three are not certain subsisting things, as has been said [75, 280], consequently he applies this proposition to things which subsist through themselves which are: first being, which is God; intelligence; the intellective soul; and the sensitive soul. And he says (106) that in this way the cause is in the effect and vice versa, according to the fact that the cause acts on the effect and the effect receives the action of the cause. Now, the cause acts on the effect through the mode of the cause itself, but the effect receives the action of the cause through its own mode: whence it is necessary that the cause be in the effect through the mode of the effect, and the effect be in the cause through the mode of the cause.

283. So therefore (107) those things which are in the sense sensibly, are in the intellective soul through the mode appropriate to it. And those things which are in the soul through the mode of the soul are in the intellect through the proper mode and those things which are in the intelligence intelligibly are in the first cause essentially, according to its mode. And vice-versa, priors are in posteriors, according to the mode of the posteriors.

284. From which it can be accepted how (108) the intelligences may know one another and the first cause: for each knows the other according to the fact that the other is in it through the mode of that in which it is; because also inferiors are in superiors according to certain more excellent similitudes or species; but superiors are in inferiors according to certain more deficient similitudes or species.

109. Every intelligence knows its own essence.

110. This is because that which knows and that which is known exist at the same time, Thus, since intelligence is knowing and known, then doubtless it sees its own essence.

111. And, when it sees its essence, it knows that it knows its essence through its intelligence.

112. And, when it knows its essence, it knows the rest of things which are below it, because they are from it.

113. However, they are in it according to the intellectual mode. Thus, intelligence and the things intellected are one and the same.

114. This is because, if things of the intellect and intelligence are one, and the intelligence knows its own being, then doubtless when it knows its essence, it knows the rest of things and, when it knows the rest of things, it knows its essence, because when it knows the rest of things, it knows them only because they are intellected. Thus, the intelligence knows its essence and it knows intellectual things at the same time, as we have shown.

285. It having been shown how the intelligence may know things other than itself, now this proposition (109) is brought in to show how it may know itself, which is found in 167 in the book of Proclus under these words: every intellect knows itself.

286. But the meaning of this proposition and its proof we must take from what Proclus says. For as was said above [67] according to the Platonic opinions, the order of intellects is placed under the order of separated forms, from participation of which the intelligences come to be in act. Whence separated forms are compared to them as the intelligible to the intellect. Now, just as they posited certain ideas of other things, so also they posited a certain idea of the intellects which they called the first intellect. Therefore this ideal intellect, insofar as it is intellect, understands; and insofar as it is an ideal form it is the intellectual form. Thus therefore intellect and what is known are united in it in every way. And through this it knows itself perfectly, because its essence is totally intelligible, not only knowing.

287. Now every intellect, according to the Platonists, has a participated intellect, but superior intellects participate that very intellect more perfectly. Whence they participate from it not only that they be intellects but also that they be intelligible and in some way formal intellects. So therefore intellect and what-is-known in some way are joined in them according to their substance. And on that account they also know their own essence, but in a different way from the first intellect. For the first ideal intellect does not participate any prior form of intellectuality, but it itself is the first form of intellectuality. Whence its intelligible object is nothing other than itself. But posterior intellects thus have something of the form of intelligibility in their substance, which yet is derived from the superior ideal intellect. So therefore they understand their essence because they also understand the superior intellect which they participate [312].

288. And this is what Proclus adds in the aforesaid proposition: but indeed the first alone in itself and one in number in this intellect and intelligible. Each, then, of the following knows itself and that which is before it at the same time, and intelligible to the former indeed is what it is, to the latter, that from which it comes (Elements of Theology, 167).

289. But because according to the opinion of Aristotle which in this matter concords more with catholic doctrine, we do not posit many forms above the intellect, but only one which is the first cause, it is necessary to say that just as it is being itself so it is life itself and the first intellect itself. Whence also Aristotle, in Metaphysics, 12, proves that it knows only itself, not so that cognition of other things is lacking from it, but Its intellect is not informed for knowing another intelligible species except itself. So therefore the superior separated intellects, as much as they are close to it, they know themselves both through their own essence and through participation of a superior nature.

290. And on this account, for proving this proposition (109) first here (110) it is brought in that the knower and the known in separated intellects are at the same time, insofar as, namely, according to their own substance they are not only intellects, but intelligibles, according as they are participating most closely in the first intellect. Whence he concludes that intelligence knows it own essence. And because its essence is the essence of one who knows, it follows that, by knowing its essence, it knows that it knows its essence.

291. Consequently then he shows how, because it knows its own essence, it also knows other things (112). For it is held from the proposition set before (113) that all other things are in the intelligence by an intelligible mode and so intelligence and things known are one, according to that [they are] in the intelligence. And on that account (114), when it knows its essence, it knows other things and, for the same reason, whensoever the intelligence knows other things, it knows itself.

292. But whether these are fitting to the intellectual soul we shall consider below (115 [293]).

115. In every soul there are sensible things because it is an example for them, and there are intellectual things in every soul, because it knows them.

116. And it is this way only because it is stretched between intellectual things which are not moved and sensible things which are moved.

117. And because the soul is such, it happens that it imprints corporeal things, on account of which it is the cause of bodies and it is that which is caused from the intelligence which is before it.

118. Therefore the things which are produced from the soul are in the soul according to the intention of an example, that is to say, because sensible things are exemplified according to the example of the soul, and things which fall above the soul are in the soul in the mode of their being acquired by the soul.

119. Thus, since it is such, let us return and say that all sensible things are in the soul according to the mode of a cause, because the soul is the exemplary cause.

120. And I mean by "soul" the power acting on sensible things.

121. However, the effective power in the soul is not material, and the corporeal power in the soul is spiritual, and the power that produces things that have dimension is without dimension.

122. However, intellectual things are in the soul according to an accidental mode, that is to say because intellectual things which are not divided are in the soul according to a divisible mode. Thus, intellectual, united things are in the soul according to the mode which is multiplied, and intellectual things which are not moved are in the soul according to the mode of motion.

123. Thus it has now been shown that intellectual and sensible things are in the soul, however, sensible, corporeal and mobile things are in the soul according to the spiritual, united mode of the soul, and that intellectual, united, stable things are in the soul according to the mode which is multiplied with reference to motion.

293. After he determines about the first cause and the intelligence, here (115) he determines about the soul.

And first, he determines about it according to the relationship which it has to other things;

second, he determines about it according to itself, at: everything that knows (124).

294. About the first, he posits such a proposition: in every soul there are sensible things because it is an example for them, and there are intellectual things in every soul, because it knows them.

295. For the understanding of this proposition, let us see what is written in the book of Proclus about this. For in that same place proposition 195 is cited thus: every soul is all things, sensibles in an exemplary way, intelligibles in an iconic way. And in an iconic way is said in the mode of an image; for an image is what is made to the similitude of another, just as the exemplar is that to whose similitude another is made.

296. Now this proposition is proved much the same here as in the book of Proclus, in this way: for the soul, as is said in proposition 2 (22 [58]) is intermediary between intelligibles which are in every way separated from motion and through this made similar to eternity and sensibles which are moved (116) and fall under time. And because the prior things are causes of the posterior things, it follows (117) that the soul be the cause of bodies and the intelligence be the cause of the soul by the mode explained above (31 [79-81]).

297. It is clear, then, that the effects must pre-exist in the causes in an exemplary way, because causes produce effects according to their similitude, and conversely, things which are caused have the image of their causes, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 2. Thus therefore (118) sensible things which are caused from the soul, are in the soul through the mode of an example, so that, to be precise, things of this kind, which are below the soul, are caused to the example and similitude of the soul. Now, things which are above the soul are in the soul through an acquired mode, that is, through a certain participation, so that, namely, they are compared to the soul as exemplars and the soul to it in a certain way as an image. Thus therefore it appears (119) that sensibles preexist in the soul just as in a cause, which, in a certain way, is the exemplar of the effects.

298. Then he explains consequently (120) what he means by soul, saying: I mean by "soul" a power acting on sensible things. For according to those who posit animate celestial bodies, the soul of the heaven is the cause of all sensible bodies, just as each and every one of the souls of inferior things is the cause of its own body. Therefore, no one of the souls of the inferior things has causality in respect of sensibles and on that account sensibles were not in it through the mode of a cause, but only in the soul of the heaven which beyond sensibles has universal causality and this, he calls here a power acting on sensible things. But each and every one of the souls which are here, has a certain causality with respect to its own body, but it does not cause it through the sense or through the intellect. Whence it does not have in advance the intelligible and exemplary reasons of its own body. Now, it causes it through a natural power; whence also in On the Soul, 2, it is said that soul is the efficient cause of the body. Now, such an agent does not act properly through any exemplary reason except its own nature through which it acts, let us say the exemplar of the effect which is produced to its similitude in some way; and through this mode all the sensible parts of its body preexist in nature by virtue of the soul. For they are fitted to the powers of the soul, which proceed from its nature.

299. And although sensible things be in the soul which is their cause, nevertheless they are not in it through the mode by which they are in themselves. For the power (121) of the soul is immaterial, although it be the cause of material things and spiritual although it be the cause of bodies and it is without corporeal dimension, although it be the cause of things having dimension.

And because the effects are in the cause according to the power of the cause, it is necessary (122) that sensible bodies be in the soul indivisibly and immaterially and incorporeally. And just as inferior things in the soul are in it in a higher mode than in themselves, so superior things, namely the intelligences, are in the soul in an inferior mode than in themselves, namely, iconically or through the mode of an image, as Proclus says (Elements of Theology, 195); in the place of which is spoken here (122): through the accidental mode, that is through a certain inferior mode of participation; so namely that intelligible things which are indivisible in themselves and united and immobile are in the soul in a divisible, multiplied, and mobile fashion, through comparison to the intelligence. For they are proportionate to it as they are the causes of multitude and division and motion of sensible things. Or he says: immobile things are in the soul through a mode of motion, because, according to the Platonists, it is proper to the soul to be that which moves itself; but according to Aristotle it is the principle of motion of a thing which moves itself.

300. Finally (123), wrapping it up, he concludes what has been proposed and it is clear from the premises. And from these things which are said it can appear how superior souls of the heavens, if the heavens are animate, can know sensibles and intelligibles. For they know them thus: according to the fact that they are in them.

124. Everything that knows which knows its own essence is returning to its own essence in a fulfilled return.

125. This is because knowledge is nothing other than the intellectual action. Thus, since that which knows, knows its own essence, then it returns by its intellectual activity to its essence.

126. And this is only because the knower and the known are one thing, since the knowledge of the knower's own essence is from it and to it: it is from it, because it is the knower, and it is to it, because it is the known.

127. This is because knowledge is knowledge of a knower, and the knower knows its own essence, it is its activity returning to its essence; therefore, its substance is returning to its essence again.

128. And by "return of the substance to its essence" I mean only because it is standing fixed by itself, not lacking in its constancy and its essence any other thing to hold it up, since it is simple substance, sufficient through itself.

301. When it has been shown how the soul is related to other things, here (124) he shows how it is related to itself. And a proposition like this is proposed: everything that knows which knows its own essence is returning to its own essence in a fulfilled return.

302. And for the understanding of this proposition certain propositions ought to be considered which are posited in the book of Proclus, of which one is proposition 15 of his book which is like this: everything which is conversive on itself is incorporeal. And we have shown this proposition above [190] in proposition 7 of this book.

303. Let us take the second proposition which is number 16 in the book of Proclus, which is like this: everything which is conversive on itself has a substance separable from body. And the proof of this is because since body cannot be converted on itself, as is held from the proposition put forth before (Elements of Theology, 15), it follows that to be converted on itself is an operation separate from body. Now, that whose operation is separated from body, necessarily its substance is also separable. Whence everything which can be converted on itself is separable from body.

304. Let us take the third proposition from number 43 of his book, which goes like this: everything which is conversive on itself is autohypostatic, that is, subsisting through itself. Which is proved through the fact that each and every one is converted to that which is substantified. Whence, if something is converted on itself according to its existence, it is necessary that it subsist in itself.

305. Let us take the fourth proposition from number 44 of his book: everything which is conversive on itself according to its operation, is also converted on itself according to its substance. And this he proves by the fact that, since to be converted on itself belongs to a perfection, if something which is converted according to its operation is not converted on itself according to its substance, then it would follow that its operation would be better and more perfect than its substance.

306. Let us take the fifth proposition from number 83 of his book which goes like this: everything which is cognitive of itself is conversive on itself in every way. The proof of which is because that which knows itself, is converted on itself by its operation and consequently by its substance, as is clear through the proposition put before (Elements of Theology, 44).

307. We accept the sixth proposition from number 186 of his book, which is like this: every soul is an incorporeal substance and separable from body. Which is proved in this way according to what has been put before [302-306]: the soul knows itself; therefore it is converted on itself in every way; therefore it is incorporeal and separable from body.

308. Therefore, when these have been seen, it is to be considered that three things are posited in this book.

Of which the first is that the soul knows its own essence. For about the soul, it must be understood what is said here (124 [312]).

309. The second is that which is concluded from this, that it returns on its own essence with a complete return. And this is the same as what is said [306] in the proposition of Proclus (Elements of Theology, 83), that: everything which is cognitive of itself, is conversive on itself in every way. And it is understood that the complete return or conversion is both according to substance and according to operation, as has been said [305].

310. Now, that this second point follows from the first, he proves in this way (125): because, when I say that the knower knows his own essence, it means that he knows the intelligible operation. Therefore it is clear that in so far as the knower knows its own essence, it returns, that is to say, is converted through its intelligible operation to its own essence, specifically, by understanding it. And that this ought to be called a return or conversion is manifested (126) by the fact that, when the soul knows its essence, the knower and the known are one thing and thus knowledge by which it knows its own essence, that is its intelligible operation is from it insofar as it is knowing and it is to it insofar as it is the known, and thus there is here a certain circulation which is brought in in the word of "returning" or "converting." Now from this, that it returns according to its operation to its essence, he concludes later (127) that according to its substance it is returning on its essence and thus the complete return is made according to operation and substance.

311. And he explains consequently (128) what it is to return according to substance to one's essence: for those things are said to be converted according to substance on themselves which subsist through themselves, having fixedness so that they are not converted from something else sustaining them, as is an accidental conversion to substance. This this one that account is appropriate to the soul and to each and every thing which knows itself, because every such thing is a simple substance sufficient to itself through itself, as if not needing any sustaining material. And this can be the third point: namely, that soul be separable from body; as is proposed in Proclus' proposition (Elements of Theology, 16 [303]).

312. Now, the first of these [308], namely that the soul knows its own essence, is not proved here; but it is proved in Proclus' book (Elements of Theology, 186), thus: but that it knows itself is manifest; for if it knows what is above it then it is to know also itself as born by so much the more, as knowing itself from the causes which are before it. Here it is diligently to be considered that above (109) when he treats of the cognition of the intellects, he says that the first intellect understands just itself, as has been said in proposition 8, because, that is to say, it is itself the ideal intelligible form [286-287]. But the other intellects to the extent that they are close to it, participate from the first intellect both the form of intelligibility and the power of intellectuality, just as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 4, that the supreme substances are intelligible and intellectual. Whence each and every one of them knows both itself and the superior which it participates.

313. But because the intellective soul participates the first intellect in an inferior mode, in its substance it has only the power of intellectuality. Whence it understands its substance not through its essence, but according to Plato through the superiors which it participates, according to Aristotle, in On the Soul, 3, through the intelligible species which are effected in a certain way as forms insofar as it comes into act through them.

129. All powers which have no end are depending on the first infinite thing which is the power of powers, not because it is self-acquired, fixed, and stable among things that are, but rather because it is the power for existing things that have constancy, stability.

130. Because if someone should say that the first created being, that is to say, intelligence, is the power which has no end, we would say that created being is not a power, but rather that it has a certain power.

131. And moreover its power is only infinite in an inferior way, not in a superior way, since it is not pure power which is not power except because it is power, and it is a thing which does not end in an inferior, not a superior way. Yet, being which is created first, that is to say intelligence, has an end and its power has a limit, according to which it remains its cause.

132. Yet the first being which creates is an infinite pure first thing.

133. This is because, if strong beings have no end because of their acquisition from the first pure infinite being, because they are beings, and if first being itself is what makes things which have no end, then doubtless it is beyond the infinite.

134. Now the first created being, that is to say, intelligence, is not infinite; rather it is said that it is infinite and it is not said that it by itself is what is infinite.

135. Thus the first being is the measure of first intellectual beings and of secondary sensible beings, that is to say because it is that which has created beings and measured them by a measure appropriate to every being.

136. Thus let us return and say that the first being that creates is beyond infinity, but second, created being is infinite; and that which is between first creating being and second created being is not finite.

137. And the rest of the simple qualities such as life and light and those things which are similar to them, are the causes of all things which have qualities, that is to say because the infinite is from the first cause and the first thing which is caused is the cause of all life and similarly the rest of the qualities, descending from the first cause to the first caused thing in the first place, and that is intelligence, from which [the qualities] descend to the rest of intellectual and corporeal objects, with intelligence serving as an intermediary.

314. When the distinction of superior causes has been made and the division of the consequent single parts, here he accedes to showing the comparison of them to one another. And concerning this, he makes three points:

first he shows how the inferiors depend from the superiors;

second, he shows how the superiors influence the inferiors, in proposition 20, where he says: the first cause rules (155);

third, he shows how the inferiors receive in different ways the influx of the first which influences them, in proposition 24, where he says: the first cause exists (176).

315. About the first point, he makes two subpoints:

first, he shows how the inferiors depend from the superiors according to power;

second, how they depend according to their substance and nature, in proposition 18, where he says: all things have essence (143).

316. About the first of these subpoints, he makes two subpoints:

first, he shows that all infinite powers depend from the first infinite power;

second, he shows how they are assimilated more or less to it, in proposition 17, where he says: every united power (138).

317. About the first, he posits this proposition: all powers which have no end are depending on the first infinite thing which is the power of powers, not because it is self-acquired, fixed, and stable among things that are, but rather because it is the power for existing things that have constancy, stability (129). Now this second part seems to be corrupt in all editions. For it ought to be said in the singular: not because it be acquired, fixed, standing in things which exist, but rather it is power, as this is referred to the power of powers. And this is clear in the book of Proclus, whose proposition 92 goes like this: every multitude of infinite potencies is suspended from one first infinity, which is not like a participated potency nor does it subsist in potencies, but according to itself, not being the potency of anything which participates, but the cause of all beings.

318. Where, first, it is to be considered that infinite potency is said of anything whatever that is always existing, just as above [107-108] it is said in proposition 4, insofar as, that is, we have seen that those things that can last longer have a greater power of being; whence those things that can last into infinity have, so far as this is concerned, infinite potency.

Now, according to the Platonist positions, everything which is found in many things must reduce to some first thing which is such through its own essence, from which the others, by participation, are called such. Whence, according to them, infinite powers are reduced to some first one which is essentially infinite in power; not because it is the power participated in any one thing subsisting, but because it is subsisting through its own self.

This then according to the Platonists is not the idea itself of being, because separated being of this kind has indeed an infinite potency, but since this has also finity, just as above (42 [109]) is held in proposition 4. Whence it remains that it is not first potency which is essentially infinity itself. Nor yet did they posit that that ideal infinity be first simply, because infinity itself participates unity and goodness; whence the simply first is one and good. This ideal infinite, then, from which all infinite powers depend, is an intermediary between one and good—which is simply first—and being. And thus Proclus explains this proposition.

319. But because the author of this book does not posit a real diversity among ideal abstract forms of this kind, which are said to be through their own essence, but he attributes all to the first one which is God, as above [72-75] it also appears from the words of Dionysius, on that account according to the intention of this author, this first infinite from which all infinite powers depend is the simply first, which is God.

320. But by being, of which Proclus makes mention (Elements of Theology, 92), which is below the infinite, he does not mean the idea of being, but rather first caused being. And what Proclus proved about the idea of being, is proved here (130) about first being which is intelligence. Therefore he says, if someone wishes to say that the first caused being, which is intelligence, be infinite power, nevertheless it should not be said that it be essentially power; rather it is having power. Whence it is not the first infinite, from which all infinite powers depend.

321. And that it is not the first infinite power he shows (131) because it is not infinite in all ways and in every respect whatsoever, but it is only infinite in an inferior way, not in a superior way. Now, the power of the Intelligence is called infinite in an inferior way because it is not comprehended by those things which are below it; now it is not infinite in a superior way, because it is exceeded by that which is superior to it, by whose comprehension it is limited.

322. Whence Proclus says in proposition 93: everything infinite among beings is not infinite with respect to the things positioned above it nor to its own self. Because, just as he proves at that place, each and every one is circumscribed and terminated by itself and by its superiors; but it cannot be circumscribed by inferiors.

323. On that account the power of the intelligence is not infinite with respect to all things, because it does not have pure power, that is to say, it is not essentially power, as, that is to say, subsisting power would be. For such a thing, which is essentially power, is defined neither in an inferior nor a superior way: for it does not have anything prior to it by which it could be circumscribed. But intelligence which is the first created being has an end and its end is that according to which it remains, that is to say, according to which it is deficient from its superior, as if remaining after it, just as being unworthy to follow it.

324. Thence (132), he shows that the first infinite is that from which depend all infinite powers; and this indeed is accepted here: first creating being, that is to say, God, who is the first pure infinite, as if essentially existing infinite power.

325. And this he proves (133) because the intelligences, which he calls here beings and strong on account of the magnitude of the power which they have, are infinite on account of their acquisition, that is to say their participation from the first which is the pure infinite, that is to say essentially, from which they have not only infinity, but also being. And if the first creating being is that which by his participation makes things to be infinite, then it is necessary that it itself be beyond the infinite. Which indeed, according to those things which are said here, ought to mean that the first being is beyond the infinite which is participated and created.

326. But, according to Proclus, this is said about the idea of the one and the good, which is according to the Platonists beyond the idea of the infinite. And on that account, explaining that he had said that the first being is beyond the infinite, he adds (134) that the intelligence is infinite, that is to say in a participated fashion, but not essentially, so that what it itself is would be that which is infinite.

327. Therefore it is concluded from the premises (135) that, since first being gives being and infinite to the intelligences, it itself is the measure of the first beings, that is, intelligibles and consequently of secondary beings, that is, sensibles, because the first in any genus whatever is the measure of that genus, insofar as, through accession to it or recession from it, something is known to be more or less perfect in that genus. But he explains that the first being is the measure of all beings, because it created all beings with the measure owed, which is appropriate to each and every thing, according to the mode of its nature. For that which in some way more or less accedes to it, is from its disposition.

328. Now at last he collects from the premises, as if making an epilogue for the principal intention, and he says (136) that first creating being is beyond the infinite, namely, that which is infinite by participation. But second being, which is created, that is to say, intelligence, is infinite in a participative fashion. Now that which is intermediary between first created being, which is Intelligence, and second created being, which is corruptible body, is infinite, that is to say the celestial body. But Proclus posits that such an idea of the infinite is intermediary between the idea of good and the idea of being.

329. Now this ordering of things having been established concerning the infinite, he adds similarly concerning other things, and says (137) that all other simple goodness, namely, life and light and suchlike, are the causes of things which have goodnesses of this sort. For just as the first cause is itself infinite and all things have infinity from it, so too the first cause is life itself and light itself and from it the first caused, namely the intelligence, has life and intelligible light. And similarly also the other goodness descend from the first cause: first, indeed, over the first created thing which is intelligence and then over others, with the intelligence as an intermediary whether these others receive intellectual souls or spiritual things.

138. Every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power.

139. This is because the first infinite thing which is intelligence is near to the one, the pure truth. Because of this, then, it so happens that in every power near to the one truth there is more infinite than in a power far from it.

140. This is because power, when it begins to be multiplied, its unity is then destroyed, and when its unity is destroyed, its infinity is destroyed. And its infinity is destroyed only because it is divided.

141. And an indication of this is divided power, and that it, when it is more collected together and unified, it is greater and is stronger and it performs remarkable activities; and when it is more separated and divided, it is diminished and weakened and it performs activities of little value.

142. Now it is therefore manifest and plain that power, to the extent that it comes closer to the one, pure truth, its unity is stronger, and to the extent that its unity is stronger, the infinity in it is more apparent and more manifest and its operations are great operations, remarkable and noble.

330. After, in the preceding proposition, it has been shown that all infinite powers depend from the first infinite power, in this proposition, consequently, it is shown how one power accedes more to the first infinity than others. And he says (138) that every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power. This very same proposition is posited in the book of Proclus under these words: every more united potency is existing in a more infinite fashion than a plurified.

331. Now it is proved doubly in both places: first indeed through reason by this mode (139): just as from the aforesaid proposition it was held (129), all infinite powers depend from the first infinite which is the power of powers. Therefore, it is necessary that, to the extent that a power were closer to that first power, to that extent it participates from its infinity. Now that first power is essentially one. Therefore, it is necessary that to the extent to which something is more one, to that extent it has more infinite power. And, thence it is that the power of intelligence, which is first among the infinite caused powers, is most infinite insofar as being closer to the first one. But powers which are multiplied, from this itself they fall short of unity and on that account their power is diminished.

332. And an example of this appears in cognitive powers: for the intellect, which is not divided in many potencies, is more efficacious in knowing than the senses, which are diversified through many potencies. And, by that same reason, the cognitive power of the Intelligence, which is not divided by sensitive and intellective, is stronger than the human cognitive power, as much concerning sensible singulars as concerning intelligibles to be understood.

333. Second, it is proved through a sign (141): for we see in corporeal particular things that, when many are aggregated and united, their power is made more strongly, from which marvelous operations follow, such as is clear in many men at the same time, dragging a ship which individually could not drag it, nor its proportional parts. And to the extent that the power of a corporeal thing is more divided, to that extent it is made weaker and it makes baser operations, just as a whole home is heated by a great congregated fire, which could not come about if the fire is divided through different parts of the home.

334. From which two proofs, he concludes (143) the proposition, as is clear in the text.

143. All things are beings because of the first being, and all living things are in motion by their own essence because of the first life, and all intellectual things have knowledge because of the first intelligence.

144. This is because, if every cause gives something to its object, then doubtless the first being gives being to all its objects.

145. And in the same way, life gives motion to its objects, because life is a procession going forth from the first being, which is motionless, sempiternal, and the first motion.

146. And in the same way intelligence gives knowledge to its objects.

147. This is because every true knowledge is only intelligence, and intelligence is the first knower which is, and impresses knowledge on the rest of knowing things.

148. Let us return then and say that the first being is motionless and it is the cause of causes, and, if it gives being to all things, then it gives to them according to the mode of creation. However, the first life gives life to those which are under it, not according to the mode of creation, but rather according to the mode of a form. And in the same way intelligence gives to those which are under it concerning knowledge and the rest of things according to the mode of a form.

335. After it has been shown that all things depend from the first according to their power, here he shows that all things depend from the first according to their nature. And about this, he makes two points:

first, he shows the universal dependence of things from the first, according to all things which pertain to their nature or substance;

second, he shows the divine grade of proximity to the first from which they depend, just as he had also said about this dependence of power and this in proposition 19, there: from the intelligences is (149).

336. First, therefore, he posits a proposition like this: all things have essence on account of the first being and all living things are moved by their own essence on account of the first life (143).

337. And this same is said in the book of Proclus in proposition 102 under these words: all beings of whatever kind are from the finite and infinite on account of the firstly being: and all living things are motive of themselves on account of the first life; and all cognitive things participate cognition on account of the first intellect. Now, he says that all things are from the finite and infinite on account of the first being, because, as it is held above in proposition 4: created being is composed out of the finite and infinite (42 [106-108]).

338. Now, for the meaning of this proposition, first it should be considered that all the grades of things seem to reduce to three which are: to be, to live, and to know. And this on that account, because each and every thing can be considered in three ways:

first, according to itself, and thus being is appropriate to it;

second, according as it tends toward something else, and thus it is appropriate to it to be moved;

third, according to the fact that it has others in it and thus it pertains to it to know, because according to this cognition is perfected: that the known is in the knower not materially but formally.

339. Now, just as to have something in it formally and not materially, in which the definition of cognition consists, is the most noble mode of having or containing something, thus to be moved by oneself is the noblest mode of mobility and in this consists the definition of life, for we say they are living which move themselves in some way. Being therefore, which is first, is common to all; but not all things attain that perfection so that they would be motive of themselves, whence not all things are living, but certain ones, which are more perfect among things. Again, because of those which are motive of themselves or of others, not all are motive by the mode of cognition, but through some material principle, as happens in plants, thence also not all living things reach the level of cognition, but only those in which the principle of motion is something formal without matter; for even sense perception itself is susceptive of sensible species without matter, as is said in On the Soul, 2.

340. Second, it should be considered that in every genus the cause is that which is first in that genus, from which all things which are of that genus are constituted in that genus. Just as among elementary bodies, fire is the first hot from which all things acquire heat. Now it is not possible in any order of things to proceed into infinity. Therefore, in the order of beings there must be some first that gives being to all things. And this is what he says (143) that all things have essence on account of the first being (144).

341. Similarly in the genus of living things there ought to be some first thing, and from this all living things have that they live. And because it is proper to a living thing that it be motive of itself, on that account he says (143) that all living things are moved through their essence, that is, moving themselves, on account of the first life, whence it is said in Proclus' book (Elements of Theology, 102): all living things are motive of themselves on account of the first life. And that to move itself proceeds from the first life he proves, adding: since life is a procession proceeding from the first still sempiternal being (145).

342. For the understanding of this it should be known that it is prior for something to be in itself than to be moved into another, whence to be moved presupposes to be. Which if being itself be underlying motion again it will be necessary that some principle of motion be presupposed and thus how far it would reach to some immobile being that is the principle for all things of moving themselves. And this is the first life. Whence it is manifest that life in all living things is a certain procession proceeding from a certain first still and sempiternal being, that is, subject to no mutation.

343. Similarly also in the order of knowing things there must be some first. Now it is manifest that, in the order of perfection and of nature, intellective cognition is prior to the sensitive, because it is more immaterial. Whence also we judge about sensitive cognition through the intellect, as about an inferior through a superior. Now, in the intellective cognition itself, it is manifest that ratiocinative inquisition proceeds from principles known in themselves, of which it is the intellect whence reason follows intellect.

Therefore, the first in the order of knowing things is intellect and on that account it is necessary that all intelligible things—that is cognoscent things—have knowledge—that is, cognition—on account of the first intelligence (143). Whence also in Proclus' book (Elements of Theology, 102) it is said that all cognitive things participate cognition on account of the first intellect. And the reason for this is assigned (146) because all knowledge basically is nothing but intelligence: for intelligence is a certain summit, as Proclus says (Elements of Theology, 102) of all cognition. Whence intelligence is first knowing and flowing cognition over all knowing things.

344. Now just as was said above [65-67, 98, 286], according to the Platonists, the first being which is the idea of being is something beyond the first life, that is, beyond the idea of life and the first life is something beyond the first ideal intellect. But according to Dionysius [72-74, 99-100], the first being and first life and first intellect are one and the same which is God. Whence also Aristotle, in Metaphysics, 12, attributes to the first principle that it be intellect and that its knowing be life; and according to this all things have being, living, and knowing from it.

345. Third, it should be considered that these three are caused in things in different ways, either from different principles according to the Platonists, or from the same principle according to the doctrine of the faith and of Aristotle. For there is a double mode of causing: one, indeed, by which something comes to be, another being presupposed; and in this way something is said to come to be by information, because that which comes later, is related to that which is presupposed, by the mode of a form; in the other way, something is caused with nothing presupposed; and in this way something is said to be made by creation.

346. Therefore, because knowing presupposes living and living presupposes being, but being does not presuppose anything else, thence it is that the first being gives being to all by the mode of creation (148).

347. Now first life, whatever that may be, does not give living by the mode of creation, but by the mode of a form, that is, of information. And similarly it should be said about intelligence.

348. From this it is clear that when he said above (32) that intelligence is the cause of the soul he did not mean that it would be its cause by the mode of creation, but only by the mode of information, as was explained above [79-85, 345].

149. Constituted from the intelligences comes that which is the divine intelligence, since it receives from the first goodnesses which go forth from the first cause by a plentiful reception. And from those comes that which is intelligence as such, since it receives from the first goodnesses only with the first intelligence acting as intermediary. And from the souls comes that which is the intellectual soul, because it is depending on the intelligence; and from those comes that which is soul as such. And from natural bodies comes that to which there is a soul ruling it and directing it; and from these come those things which are just natural bodies, which have no soul.

150. And this takes place only because it is not the intellectual whole nor the ensouled whole nor the bodily whole, nor does it depend on a cause which is above it except that which is fulfilled from it inasmuch as it depends on a cause which above it is whole,

151. that is to say, because not every intelligence depends on the qualities of the first cause except that intelligence among them which is complete, among the first things, and whole. Indeed, it can receive qualities that descend from the first cause and depend on them, so that its unity may become strong.

152. And in the same way not every soul depends on the intelligence, except that among them which is complete, whole and more strongly together with the intelligence, because it depends on the intelligence, and it is completed by the intelligence.

153. And in the same way again not every natural body has a soul, except that among them which is complete, whole, as if it were rational.

154. And the rest of the intellectual orders are according to this form.

349. After he has shown in the preceding proposition that all things depend from the first according to their nature, here he shows how certain ones approach it in different ways according to their participation of natural perfection and he posits such a proposition: constituted from the intelligences comes that which is the divine intelligence, since it receives from the first goodnesses which go forth from the first cause by a plentiful reception. And from those comes that which is intelligence as such, since it receives from the first goodnesses only with the first intelligence acting as intermediary. And from the souls comes that which is the intellectual soul, because it is depending on the intelligence; and from those comes that which is soul as such. And from natural bodies comes that to which there is a soul ruling it and directing it; and from these come those things which are just natural bodies, which have no soul (149).

350. Now this proposition is found in Proclus' book in proposition 111 under these words: of the whole intellectual series, that is, ordination, certain ones are divine intellects receiving post-habitions—that is, participations—from the gods, others are just intellects; and of the whole ensouled (namely series), certain ones are intellectual souls, depending on proper intellects, while others are just souls; and of the whole corporal nature, certain ones also have souls standing by them from above, while others are just natures, lacking the presence of souls.

351. As evidence for this, it should be known that, according to the Platonists, a four-fold order is found in things: the first was the order of Gods, that is of ideal forms among which there was an order according to the order of universality of forms, as was said above [65-66]; now under this order is the order of separated intellects; under which is the order of souls; under which again is the order of bodies. And these three inferior orders are taken according to the three which are touched on in the proposition put before (143 [338]). For bodies just participate being; souls participate being and living further according to their proper nature; intellects participate being, living, and understanding.

352. Now, the causality of these pertains to the divine order whether many ordered gods are placed under one, according to the Platonists; or just one, having all things in itself, according to us. For universality of causality is proper to God.

Now orders of this kind, since they proceed form the first one, have a certain continuity to one another so that the order of bodies touches on the orders of souls and the order of souls touches on the order of intellects which touches on the divine order. Wherever the different orders are conjoined to one another, it is necessary that that which is the highest of the inferior order, on account of its proximity to the superior order will participate something from the perfection of the superior order. And we see this clearly in natural things: for certain animals participate some similitude of reason, and certain plants participate something of the distinction of sex, which is proper to the genus of animals. Whence also Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 7, that through the divine wisdom the ends of the first things are conjoined with the beginnings of the second things.

353. So therefore those who are highest in the order of the intellects or intelligences depend through a certain closer, more perfect participation from God and they participate more from his goodnesses and from his universal causality and they on that account they are called divine intellects or divine intelligences, just as Dionysius also says (Celestial Hierarchy, 7, 2) that the highest angels are, as it were, gathered in the vestibules of Godhood. But inferior intellects which do not reach to such excellent participation of divine similitude are just intellects, not having that divine dignity [150-151].

354. And the same proportion holds concerning souls with respect to intellects: for the highest souls are intellectual, insofar as they are close to the order of intellects; but the other inferior souls are not intellectual, but have only that which is of the soul so that, to be precise, they be vivifying, just as is most clear about the souls of animals and plants (152).

355. And the same proportion holds for the order of bodies with respect to souls: for the nobler bodies which are constituted by a more perfect principle, are animated; but other bodies are inanimate (153).

356. And the same proportion holds for all other orders into which the aforesaid general orders are distinguished, because also in bodies there are diverse orders and similarly in souls and intellects.

155. The first cause rules all created things while not mixing with them.

156. This is because the ruling does not weaken its unity, which is exalted over everything, nor does it destroy it; nor does the essence of its unity, removed from things, prevent it from ruling them.

157. This is because the first cause is fixed, stable with its ever-pure unity, and it rules all created things and impresses on them the power of life and qualities according to their capacity to receive and their possibility. Indeed the first quality flows goodnesses over all things in a single influx; however, each and every thing receives from that influx according to the mode of its capacity and its being.

158. And the first quality only flows goodnesses over all things according to a single mode, because it is goodness only through its existence and its being and its power, so that it is goodness, and goodness and power and being are one thing. Thus, just as the first being and goodness are one thing, it happens that it flows goodnesses over things by a single common influx. And goodnesses and gifts are differentiated from meeting the receiver. This is because those who receive the qualities do not receive in equal measure, but rather certain ones of them receive more than certain others, this indeed is on account of the size of its generosity.

159. Thus let us return and say that between every agent, which acts through its own being only, and the thing made, there is no middleman, nor any other thing in the middle. And there is no middleman between the agent and the product except an addition over being, that is to say when the agent and the product are in the relation of instrument and the agent does not act through its own being, and are composite. On account of this the receiver receives through a connection between itself and its maker and this agent is removed from its product.

160. But an agent, between whom and its product there is no internal middleman, is a true agent and a true ruler, making things according to a proper end, after which it is not possible that there be any other perfection; and it rules what it has made by a final government.

161. This is because it rules things according to the mode according to which it acts and it only acts through its own being; therefore its being will again be its government. On account of this, it so happens that it rules and it acts through the highest degree of perfection and government in which there is no diversity or convolution. And the operations and government are diversified on account of the first causes only according to the merit of the recipient.

357. After it has been shown how inferiors depend from superiors, here (155) it is shown how superiors influence inferiors by their government. And about this he makes two points:

first, he is concerned about the universal government of the first cause,

second, about the government of the intelligence, in proposition 23, where he says: every divine intelligence (172).

358. About the first, he makes two points:

first, he shows the mode of universal government of the first cause;

second, he shows the aptitude of God for reigning, in proposition 21, where he says: the first is wealthy (162).

359. About the first, he posits a proposition like this: the first cause rules all created things while not mixing with them (155). For the understanding of this it should be considered that we see this happening in human governing: that he who has the care of governing many is necessarily distracted by his governing to many things; but the one who is free from the care of governing others can more greatly conserve uniformity in himself. Whence also the Epicurean philosophers, since they conserved divine quiet and uniformity, posited that the gods had no concern for ruling, but were leisurely and carefree in every way, as thus they appeared to be happy.

360. And on that account, against this, in this proposition it is brought in that these two things, the universal government of things and the highest unity by which God is exalted above all things, are not contraries, nor do they impede one another whence immediately, in the beginning of the exposition (156) it is posited: this is because the ruling does not weaken its unity, which is exalted over everything, nor does it destroy it, because, namely, neither in whole nor in part it does not detract from the divine unity through the universal government. And vice-versa: he adds, nor does the essence of its unity, removed from things, prevent it from ruling them.

361. And this whole thing is posited in proposition 122 of Proclus under these words: every divine provides for the secondary things and it is freed from those for which it provides, and its providence does not subordinate its unmixed and unitary excellence, nor does its separate unity remove its providence.

362. To make this proposition clear, three points are brought in:

first, is shown the diverse mode of receiving the influences of the first cause from the part of the thing receiving (157);

second, the unity from the part of the first cause influence is shown, where he says: and the first goodness (158);

third, from these two a proposition is concluded, namely: that the government of the first cause exists without it being mixed with things, where he says: let us return therefore and say (159).

363. He says (157) therefore first that all goodnesses which are found in things flow out from the first cause and each and every thing receives goodnesses of this sort according to the mode and propriety of its substance and power. Now there are diverse natures and powers of diverse things and thence it is that although the first cause influences with one influx over all things, yet Its influx is received in diverse modes in diverse things. An example of this is evident in light which indeed proceeds in one way from a lucid body, but as the diverse rays pass through a varicolored window they make a different appearance.

364. Then (158) he shows that the first cause flows over all things with a single influx. For it flows over things by reason of good: for it has goodness that makes good, that is to say that it is the principle of goodness in all things. Now the goodness of the first cause is its own being itself and its essence, because the first cause is the very essence of goodness. Whence, because its essence is maximally one, because the first principle is one and good according to itself, consequently the first cause acts on things and influences in them in one mode insofar as it is from its own part. But things receive in a different mode from its influx: certain ones more and certain ones less: each and every one according to its own propriety.

365. Then (159) from these premises he concludes the non-mixed-ness of the first cause to other things. And the meaning of this conclusion can be had more fully, if we accept the words which are in the commentary of Proclus who says thus: nor therefore do the providing ones (namely gods) receive a habitude from those for whom it is provided. For they do good to all through the existence which they are. Now everything which makes through its existence, makes without habitude. For habitude is apposition, something placed besides existence, on account of which is it aside from nature (122). Now, he calls habitude some disposition through which the agent is adapted or proportioned to the patient or recipient. And because thus it acts on diverse things, it is necessary that it have diverse dispositions by which it is adapted to diverse things. And according to this, a certain multitude falls on a thing of this kind which acts in different ways on different things, according to their diverse dispositions which are beside nature or its essence, which is one. And thus one acting according to diverse dispositions is mixed with the things on which it acts, according to a certain adaptation to them.

366. But the first cause acts through its existence, as has been proved (158), whence it does not act through any superadded habitude or disposition, through which it would be adapted and commingled with things. And a habitude of this kind is here called middleman or intermediary (159), because, that is to say, through a disposition or habitude of this sort the agent is adapted to the recipient and it is in some way a middle between the essence of the agent and the patient itself. Because therefore the first cause is acting through its own existence, it is necessary that it rule things in one mode; for thus it rules things, just as it acts (161).

367. Whence it is obvious that his government is the best and most beautiful: for every ruler of a multitude tends to this, that he reduce the many which he rules into one. And this is found most fully in the divine government, which is one according to itself and is not diversified in its effects unless according to the diversity, as if according to the diverse merits of the things added below.

162. The first is rich in and of itself and there is nothing richer.

163. And an indication of this is its unity, not because its unity is distributed in it, but rather its unity is pure, inasmuch as it is simple, to the highest degree of simplicity.

164. But if anyone wishes to know that the first is rich, let him cast forth his mind over composite things and ask about them with very thorough questioning. He will find then that every composite thing is imperfect needing indeed, either another thing, or the things out of which it is composed. But a simple, single thing which is goodness, is one and its unity is goodness and its goodness is one thing.

165. Thus, that thing is more rich, which informs, and no impression is made on it by any means. But the rest of the intellectual and corporeal things are not rich in and of themselves, but rather they need the one true thing flowing goodnesses and all graces over them.

368. After he has assigned the mode of divine government, here (162) he shows the sufficiency of God for reigning, which indeed follows from two points:

first, indeed, according to God's abundance;

second, according to his super-excellence and this is here: the first cause (166).

For these two are necessary for one who rules: first, that he have an abundance of goods from which he can provide for his subjects; whence Dionysius says, in On the Divine Names, 12, that domination is the whole perfection possession of beauties and goods and government is the whole distribution of end and law and order.

369. Now, to show an abundant sufficiency in God, he proposes this proposition: the first is wealthy in and of itself and it is more wealthy (162). For evidence of which, Proclus' proposition 127 is accepted, which goes like this: every simple divine is most greatly and firstly, and on account of his, most greatly self-sufficient.

370. Now he proves that God is firstly and maximally simple, by reason of unity: for God is most greatly one since he is the first unity just as he is also the first goodness; and simplicity pertains to the definition of unity. For that which is one, not aggregated from many, is called "simple." Whence God, insofar as he is firstly and maximally one, he is also firstly and maximally simple.

371. And from this, lower he proceeds to show the second part of his proposition, namely, that God be maximally self-sufficient, because self-sufficiency follows on simplicity. For every composite needs the many things from which its unity is constituted, just as it appears in mixed bodies. For diverse things only come together into one through some cause which unites them. Since, therefore, God is firstly and maximally simple, insofar as having the whole of his goodness in a most perfect one, it follows that God be firstly and maximally self-sufficient.

372. But the author of this book sets aside the first part of the proposition which is about simplicity, as if supposing it, and talks only about self-sufficiency, which he calls by the name of richnesses. And in the place where in Proclus' proposition it is said that God is self-sufficient, he says that first he is wealthy in and of himself. For in whatever genus, that which is on account of itself is per se prior. But in the place where it is said there that he is maximally sufficient, here it is said that he is more wealthy, that is, than all others.

373. Now the proof of the proposition is the same in both places. For he says first (163) that divine unity, because it is not dispersed in many parts but it is pure unity, is the signification of this that God be in the end of simplicity, that is, maximally simple.

374. And from this, he proves later (164) that God be maximally self-sufficient, through the indigence which is found in composites, as has already been said [371].

375. But because sufficiency is not only understood in the name of richnesses, but also being able to give supplies over to others, he adds later, to show God is wealthy, about the influx of his goodness on things (165): because on account of the abundance of his goodness he flows over other things and there is nothing that would flow over him. But all other things, whether they be intelligible like the intelligences and the souls, or be corporeal, are not wealthy in themselves (as if having an abundance of goodness from themselves) but they need to participate goodness from the first truly one which flows over them—without anything accruing thence to it—all goodnesses and perfections.

166. The first cause is above every name by which it is named.

167. This is because neither imperfection nor perfection along pertain to it; since the imperfect is not perfect and can effect no perfect activity, insofar as it is imperfect. And what is perfect among us, although it be sufficient in and of itself, yet it cannot create anything else nor impress anything at all by itself.

168. Thus if it is such among us, then we shall say that the first is neither just imperfect nor just perfect, but rather is beyond perfection,

169. since it is what creates things and flows goodnesses over them by a perfect impression, since its goodness is that which has no end or dimensions.

170. Thus the first goodness fills all ages with goodnesses; however, every age receives from this goodness only according to the mode of its capacity.

171. Thus it has been shown and it is manifest that the first cause is above every name by which it is named, and superior to it, and higher.

376. The abundance of divine goodness having been shown, here he shows its excellence, saying: the first cause is beyond every name by which it is named (166). For the understanding of this proposition, it must be considered that that which is here collected under one, Proclus in his book distinguishes through diverse points, of which proposition 115 goes like this: every god is super-substantial and supervital and superintellectual.

377. Which indeed Proclus proved in two ways:

first by a common proof, which is like this: God is unity perfected in itself; now each and every one of the other things which are beneath God is not unity itself but is something participating in unity. Therefore, it is manifest that God is beyond all things of this kind.

Second, he proves it with a special proof: because, namely, for a substance it is not the same thing to be and to be a substance and to be one, but any subsisting substance participates in being and in one. Whence it remains that God, who is one itself and being through himself, be beyond substance and consequently beyond life and intellect, which presuppose substance, as also appears in this book from proposition 18 brought in above (143 [338]).

378. But because the author of this book brings in a proof in common, he is content with just the common proof. For in all things which are below the first cause, some are found existing perfectly, or complete, others imperfect or diminished; indeed the perfect ones seem to be those which subsist by themselves in nature, which are signified by us through a concrete name, like "homo sapiens" and things like that; but those things are imperfect which do not subsist by themselves, such as humanity, wisdom, and things like that which are signified among us by abstract names.

379. Between these two there is this difference: that that which is not complete cannot bring to perfection a perfect operation; for heat doesn't heat things, but something hot does; nor is wisdom wise, rather a wise man is wise. Now that which is complete among us, although it be self-subsisting, is sufficient to itself in this that it needs nothing else on which it leans, as on a subject below it (acting as a support); nevertheless, because form which is the principle of action is in itself limited and participated, it cannot act through the mode of creation or influx (167) just as that which is wholly form acts, because by its own participation according to itself it is wholly productive of others.

380. Since therefore it be thus among us in these things which are small and concrete, it follows that God be neither small nor simply complete, but rather supercomplete (168). For he lacks no action, as a small thing does, and he acts through a mode of one who creates and influences, which they who are complete among us cannot. And this is what he adds below (169) because it is creating things and flowing goodnesses over them with a complete influence. And on that account this is because it is goodness subsisting which has no end, that is, it is not goodness terminated at any participating incorporeal nature, as is the goodness of intelligence; nor does it have dimensions at which it be terminated, as is the case with a corporal goodness.

381. From this he concludes below (170) that, because the first cause is itself unterminated goodness, it follows that it be first goodness and that it fill all ages, that is all distinctions of things and times, with its own goodnesses, even though not all things receive in the same mode and equally its goodness, but each and every one according to the mode of its potency, as is held above (157 [363]) in proposition 20.

382. Therefore the whole power of this proof returns to this, what Proclus briefly touched, namely that God is unity itself, not a united thing just as complete things which are among us and nevertheless he is perfected per se; from which diminished things are deficient, that is non-subsisting forms which are among us.

383. From this here it is concluded below (171) that the first cause is higher than any name which is imposed by us, because every name imposed by us either signifies through a mode of a complete participant, like a concrete name, or it signifies through a mode of a diminished and formal part like an abstract name. Whence no name imposed by us is appropriately worthy of the divine excellence.

172. Every divine intelligence knows things because it is intelligence, and rules them because it is divine.

173. This is because knowledge is a peculiar property of intelligence, and its perfection and completeness do not exist apart from that it thinks. Thus God, blessed and sublime, is what rules, since he fills things with goodnesses. And intelligence is the first created thing and it is what is most similar to the sublime God and on account of that it rules things which are under it. And, just as God, blessed and most high, flows goodness over things, in the same way the intelligence flows knowledge over things inasmuch as they are underneath it.

174. However, although intelligence rules things which are under it, yet God, blessed and sublime, comes before the intelligence with respect to government and rules things with a government of a more sublime and higher order than is the government of the intelligence, since it is that which gives the power of government to intelligence.

175. And an indication of this is that things which do not receive the government of the intelligence, receive the government of the creator of the intelligence, which is because its government does not flee at all from any one of things, since it wishes to make all things receive its goodness. This is because it is not the case that everything desires intelligence nor desires to receive it; and all things desire goodness from the first being and desire to receive it with a great desire. And there is no one who would doubt in this matter.

384. After he has handed down the mode of divine government and shown the sufficiency of God for ruling, here (172) he takes up the matter of the government of the second cause, namely, intelligence: which government of course comes about from the power of the first cause. And he proposes this proposition: every divine intelligence knows things because it is intelligence, and rules them because it is divine. A similar proposition is found in the book of Proclus (Elements of Theology, 134) under these words: every divine mind has knowledge as being mind, but has foreknowledge as being God.

385. It should be considered for evidence for this what is said above in proposition 19 (149) that among the intelligences, certain ones are divine, certain ones non-divine. Indeed the supreme intellects or intelligences are called divine on account of abundant participation of divine goodness from closeness to God. Now, that which participates abundantly in the propriety of another thing is assimilated to it not only in form, but also in action; just as it appears that, of those things which are illuminated by the sun, certain ones participate the light of the sun only to the point that they may be seen; but others to such an extent that they illuminate others, which is the proper action of the sun, as, for example, it appears in the case of the moon.

386. But because form is the principle of action, it is necessary that everything that acquires its action from abundant participation of the influence of a superior agent should have two actions: one, to be precise, according to proper form, but the other according to the form participated by a superior agent: just as a heated knife cuts according to its proper form, but insofar as it is heated, it cauterizes. Thus therefore also each and every one of the supreme intelligences, which is called divine, has a double action: one insofar as it participates abundantly the divine goodness; and the other according to its own nature.

387. Now it is proper to the intelligence (173) insofar as it is something of this sort, to know things, and on that account the divine intelligence, insofar as it is intelligence, is cognizant of things. But it is proper to God, who is the very essence of goodness, that he communicate himself to others. For we see that each thing, insofar as it is perfect and being in act, grants its similitude to other. Whence that which is essentially act and goodness (that is, God) essentially and primordially communicates its goodness to things. And this pertains to his reign: for it is proper for a ruler to lead those which he rules to an owed end, which is good. Thus therefore the divine intelligence, insofar as it participates abundantly the divine goodness, itself comes to be ruling of things.

388. Now, it is manifest that (174) each thing that brings about, according to its proper and natural form, some action, brings about that action more vehemently and perfectly than that which brings it about through participation of a superior agent, just as fire heats more vehemently than a lit body and the sun illuminates more brightly than the moon. Therefore, the government of God, which is his action according to his essential goodness, ought to be higher and more efficacious than the government of the intelligence which comes to it by a participation of divine goodness.

389. And thence it is (175) that the government of the first cause, which is according to the essence of goodness, extends itself to all things. A sign of this is that all desire good, whether with the intellectual or animal or natural appetite. But the government of the intelligence, which is proper to it, does not extend itself to all things, for they do not diffuse intellectual goodness on all things, but only on those things which are born to know. Whence not all things seek an intellectual good, but only the absolute good.

176. The first cause exists in all things according to a single disposition, but all things do not exist in the first cause according to a single disposition.

177. This is because, although the first cause exists in all things, yet each and every one of things receives it according to the mode of its ability [to receive].

178. This is because, among things there are those which receive the first cause in a unified reception, and among them there are those which receive it by a multiple reception, and among them there are those that receive it by an eternal reception, and among them there are those which receive it by a temporal reception, and among them there are those which receive it by a spiritual reception, and among them there are those which receive it by a corporeal reception.

179. And indeed the diversity of the reception does not take place from the first cause but because of the one that receives. This is because that which accepts is diversified: on account of that, what is received is thus diversified. But the one existing thing which makes the impression is not diverse, but flows over all things with goodnesses equally, for goodness informs all things from the first cause equally. Therefore things are the cause of the diversity of the impression of goodness on things. Therefore doubtless all things are not found in the first cause according to a single mode. But now it has been shown that the first cause is found in all things according to a single mode and all things are not found in it by a single mode.

180. Therefore, according to the mode of proximity to the first cause, and according to the mode by which a thing can receive the first cause, according to that quantity, it can receive from it and be delighted through it. This is because a thing receives from the first cause and delights in it only by the mode of its being. And by "being" I mean only cognition, for according to the mode by which a thing recognizes the first, creating cause, according to that quantity, it receives from it and delights in it, as we have shown.

390. After he has shown the mode of divine government and its sufficiency for ruling, here (176) he begins to show how the divine government is participated in different ways by different things:

and first, he manifests this in general;

second, he follows up in particular about the diversity of things which are under the divine government in proposition 25, at: united substances (181).

391. About the first, he posits a proposition like this (176): the first cause exists in all things according to one disposition, but all things do not exist in the first cause according to one disposition.

As evidence for this it should be considered that something is said to be in another in many ways: in one way, really; in another way, according to a habitude of action and passion. According, therefore, to the first mode, it should be said that all things are in the first cause, in a single mode; because, that is, that according to which all things are in the first cause, is one and the same thing, namely: divine power. For the effects are by power in their cause. Now the first cause, according to this mode is in things in a diverse fashion; because, that is, the first cause is in caused things according to the fact that it impresses its similitude on them. Now, different things receive the similitude of the first cause in different ways.

392. But in the second way it is vice-versa: for the first cause acts on all things according to one mode and on that account it is said to be in all things according to one disposition. Now, not all things receive the action of the first cause in the same way and on that account it is said that all things do not exist in the first cause according to one disposition.

393. As a clarification of this proposition, three things follow:

for first, the proposition is clarified;

second, it is proved, at: and indeed diversity (179);

third, a certain corollary is inferred, at: therefore, according to the mode (180).

394. Therefore he says first (170) that on that account all things are said not to be in the first cause according to one disposition, because even if the first cause should exist in all things, insofar as, precisely, it touches on all things by the effect of its action, yet each thing receives Its action according to the mode of its own power.

395. And he gives examples for this (178) according to three diversities first found in things,

of which the first is according to the diversity of unity and multitude which diversity pertains to substances themselves: for those things whose substance is simple receive the action of the first cause in a united fashion; but those whose substance is composed receive it in a multiplied fashion, that is, according to the mode of their own substance.

The second diversity is taken from the part of the duration of things in their being: for certain ones receive the action of the first cause with an eternal reception, namely those whose being is not subject to motion, whence their duration in their being is not varied according to before and after; but certain others receive the action of the first cause with a temporal reception, namely those whose being is subject to motion and consequently their duration is continued according to a succession of before and after.

The third diversity he posits from the part of the very species or form of the thing according to which certain ones are incorporeal according to their species and these receive the influence of the first cause in a spiritual manner; but certain others are, according to their species, corporeal, and things of this kind receive the influence of the first cause by a corporal reception.

396. Now, all this which is premised, the proposition contains which is posited in the book of Proclus (Elements of Theology, 142) which goes like this: to all things the gods are present in the same way, but not all things are present to the gods in the same way, but each individual according to its own order and potency adopts their presence: some uniformly, others in a multiplied way; and some perpetually, others in time and some incorporeally, others corporeally.

397. Then, when he says: and diversity (179), he proves what was premised in this way: for the diversity of reception can come about from two factors: whether from the agent or influencer, or from the recipient. For because the diversity of cause causes diversity in effects, it is necessary that, if an agent be different and the recipient one, the diversity of reception be caused by the agent, not by the recipient, like water which is frozen by cold and melted by heat. Now if, on the other hand, the agent be one and the recipient diverse, there will be a diversity of reception from the part of the recipient, not from the part of the agent, as appears of the sun which hardens clay and melts wax.

398. Now it is clear that the first cause is one, having no diversity, but those which receive the influence of the first cause are diverse. Therefore the diversity of reception is not from the first cause which is pure goodness, flowing goodness over all things but it is because of the diversity of the recipients. Thus therefore it appears that the first cause is found in all things by one mode, but not vice-versa.

399. Now, it should be paid attention to that the action of the first cause is two-fold: one according to which it institutes a thing, which is called creation; but the other according to which it rules the things already instituted. Therefore, in the first action, it does not have a place which is said here (179) because it is proper to reduce the whole diversity of effects into the diversity of recipients, it will be necessary to say that there be some recipients which be not from the first cause. Which is contrary to that which has been said above in proposition 18: all things have essence through the first cause (143).

Whence it is necessary to say that the first diversity of things according to which they have diverse natures and powers be not from any diversity of the recipients, but from the first cause: not because there be any diversity in it, but because it is knowing diversity. For, it is acting according to its knowledge and on that account it produces the diverse grades of things to the complement of the universe. But in the action of government, about which we are now concerned, the diversity of reception is according to the diversity of the recipients.

400. Then, when he says: therefore, the second (180), he brings in a certain corollary from the aforesaid things. For, if the diversity of reception of the influence of the first cause results in things according to the diverse power of the recipients, since those which are closer to the first cause are of greater power, it follows that they receive the first cause and its influence more perfectly. And because every knowing substance, as much as it has being more perfectly, so much it knows the first cause more perfectly and the influence of its goodness, and the more it receives and knows this, the more it delights in it, the consequence is that the closer something is to the first cause, the more it delights in it.

181. The unified, intellectual substances are not generated from any other thing. Every substance which subsists through its own essence is not generated from any other thing.

182. Because if someone should say: it is possible that it be generated from another thing, we say: if it is possible that a substance which subsists through its own essence be generated from any other thing, doubtless that substance is imperfect, needing that from which it is generated to fill it up.

183. And an indication of this is generation itself.

184. This is because generation is only a way from imperfection to completeness. For, if a thing is found not lacking in its generation, that is to say in its form and its formation, no other thing but itself is both the cause of its formation and of its perfection, it is complete, always whole.

185. And it is the cause of its formation and of its perfection only on account of its relation to what is always its cause. Thus, that "putting-together" is its formation and its perfection at the same time.

186. Thus it is now clear that every substance which subsists through its own essence is not generated from another thing.

401. It has been said above (178) that creatures receive in different ways the government of the first cause, according to a triple diversity, namely: of unity and multitude, which pertains to simplicity and composition; of eternity and [time]; of spiritual and corporeal: for corruption and incorruption happen to the corporeal; whence here (181) he begins to follow up on the aforesaid diversities of things.

And first, about the diversity of the corruptible;

second, about the diversity of the simple and the composite, in proposition 28, at: every substance standing through its own essence is simple (194);

third, about the diversity of eternity and of time, in proposition 30, at: every substance caused in time (203).

402. About the first, he makes two points:

first, he shows certain substances to be ungenerable;

second, he is concerned with their lack of corruption, in proposition 26, at: every substance standing through its own self is not falling (187).

403. About the first, he posits two propositions,of which the first is like this: united intelligible substances are not generated from another thing (181). Now, he calls united substances, simple substances, because every composite contains a certain multitude in itself; and he calls intelligible substances those which are born apt to know, which also, since they are immaterial, are intelligible in act. Now, what he says: they are not generated from another thing can be understood either as from a material, according to which, this preposition from means, the habitude of a material cause; or as from an agent cause, according to which the aforesaid preposition means the habitude of an efficient cause. And this meaning seems more to be in agreement with those things which are placed in the proof of the device.

404. The second proposition is such: every substance standing by its own essence is not generated from another thing (182). Now that is called substance standing by its own essence which is subsisting through its own self; but since to subsist through its own self is proper to substance, it would follow according to this that no substance be generated. It must be said therefore that the substance and essence of a thing is principally the form, which the definition principally signifies. Therefore, whatever things have a form founded on matter, substances of this kind are not standing by their own essence; indeed, their essences, i.e., forms, lean on the foundation of matter. Therefore, those substances are standing by their own essence, which are forms alone, not in matter, and it is impossible that for such to be generated.

405. It is, then, to be considered that the first proposition is concluded from this second: for above (128) it was proved that all intelligent substances are standing through their own essence; which is held in proposition 15: every knower who knows (124). If therefore every substance standing through its own essence is not generated, it follows that every intellectual substance be not generated. Now of the two propositions posited, the first (181) is not found in Proclus' book, but only the second (182), which is 45 of his book, like this: every autohypostatic, that is, subsisting through itself, is ungenerable.

406. This sole proposition is proved consequently in the same mode here (183) just as in Proclus' book. For it is manifest that every generated thing is imperfect of itself, because it is being in potency and on that account it lacks what would complete or perfect through that from which it is generated, that is, through the generating one that reduces it from potency into act.

407. And a sign of this is (184) that generation is nothing other than a certain way from the incomplete to the complete, opposed, that is, to the pre-existing incomplete. For the termini of generation are privation and form; but matter, because it exists under privation, has a measure of the imperfect; but because it exists under a form it has a measure of the perfect, and thus it appears that generation is a way or transmutation from imperfect to the opposed perfect. If therefore something which would not need any other thing for its formation, but itself is the cause of its own formation, because, to be precise, its substance is its form, it follows that such a thing would be always complete or perfect. And thus in it there cannot be a transition from the imperfect to the perfect but immediately through its own self it is being and one, as is said in Metaphysics 8. Therefore it remains that every substance which is a subsisting form is ungenerable.

408. But lest from this someone might understand badly that substances of this kind would not have a cause of its being, although it was said above (143) that all things have essence through the first being, he shows consequently (185) how what has been said should be understood. For what has been said (184) that it be the cause of its own formation and complement, is not thus to be understood as if it did not depend from another superior cause, but it is said to be the cause of its own formation by this that it has a sempiternal relation to its first cause, whence through the relation to its cause it has at the same time, that is, immediately, formation and complement.

409. As evidence of this it should be considered that everything participates being according to the habitude which it has to the first principle of being. Now a thing which is composed out of matter and form has being only following from its form, whence through its form it has a habitude to the first principle of being. But because matter pre-exists form in time in this generated thing, consequently it would not always have the aforesaid habitude to the principle of being, and not at the same time when there would have been matter, but later, when the form was added. If therefore any substance be form itself, it follows that it would always have the aforesaid habitude to the first cause, and it would not come to it after some time, but be at the same time, concomitant with its substance which is form.

410. Thus therefore it is manifest that every substance standing through its own essence is not generated from another (186).

187. Every substance that stands in and of itself does not fall under corruption.

188. But if someone says: it is possible that a substance which stands in and of itself fall under corruption, we say: if it is possible that a substance that stands in and of itself falls under corruption, it is possible that it be separated from its essence and be fixed, subsisting through its own essence without its own essence. And this is inappropriate and impossible since, because it is one, simple, non-composite, it itself is cause and that which is caused at the same time. But every corruption of that which falls under corruption takes place only because of its separation from its cause; but while a thing persists depending on its own cause which conserves and preserves it, it does not perish nor is it destroyed. Thus if it is such, the cause of a substance which stands through its own essence is not ever separated, since it is inseparable from its essence, because its cause is itself in its own formation.

189. And it is only its own cause because of its relation to its cause; and that relation is its formation. And therefore, because it is always related to its cause and it is the cause of that relation, it is the cause of itself according to the mode which we have said, that it does not perish nor is it destroyed, since it is the cause and that which is caused at the same time, as we have recently shown.

190. Now therefore it has been verified that every substance standing through itself is neither destroyed nor corrupted.

411. Above (181) it was concerned with the ungenerable: here (187) it is concerned with the incorruptible and the corruptible:

and first, about the incorruptible;

second, about the corruptible, in proposition 27: every destructible substance (191).

412. About the first, a proposition like this is posited: every substance standing through its own self is not falling under corruption (187). Which indeed is posited in Proclus' book in proposition 46 under these words: every autohypostatic is incorruptible.

413. As evidence for this proposition, it should be considered that while the preposition 'per' denotes a cause, that is said to stand or subsist 'per se' which does not have cause of being except itself. Now, there is a two-fold cause of being, namely: the form through which something is in act and the agent which makes it to be in act. If, therefore, it be called standing through its own self which does not depend from a superior agent, thus to stand through its own self belongs to God alone who is the first agent cause from which all second causes depend, as is clear from the things said above (129).

Now, if it be called standing 'per se', that which is not formed by anything else, but itself is the form, thus being standing through its own self belongs to all immaterial substances. For substance, which is composed out of matter and form, is not standing through its own self except by a relation of parts, because, that is, matter is in act through form and form is sustained in matter; just as it is said that something is moving itself by a relation of parts, because one part of it is moving and another part of it is moved. Thus therefore it is clear that to stand through its own self can only belong to a substance that is form without matter.

414. Now a substance of this kind, by necessity, is incorruptible (188): for it is manifest in corruptible things that corruption happens because something is separated from its formal cause through which something has being in act: for just as generation, which is a way to being, is by acquisition of a form, so corruption, which is the way to non-being, is by the loss of a form. Therefore, if a substance standing through its own essence be corrupted, it would be necessary that it be separated from its own formal cause; therefore it would be separated from its essence; which is impossible. Therefore, it is not possible that a substance standing through its own self be corrupted.

415. But lest anyone believe that substances of this kind, standing through their own essence, might not depend on some superior agent cause, he excludes this consequently, there: and a cause is not made (189), and he says that this is not to be understood that a substance of this kind be a cause of its own self, as if it did not depend on the superior agent cause. But this is said, because substance of this kind has through its own self a relation to the first cause, insofar as, namely, it is the cause of its formation; for we see that material things are referred to the first cause so that they accept being from it through their form and on that account substance, whose whole essence is form, has through itself the relation always to its cause and that relation is not caused in a substance of this kind through any other form. And hence it is that it is said to be a cause of itself by the aforesaid mode (185); and hence it is that it cannot be corrupted, as has been shown (188 [414]).

416. It appears, therefore, (190) that every substance standing through its own self is incorruptible.

191. Every destructible substance either is not sempiternal or is composite or is supported by another thing.

192. This is because [destructible] substance is either lacking things from which it is made up and is composed of them, or it is lacking in its constancy and its supporting essence. Thus when that which supports it is separated, it is corrupted and destroyed.

193. Because if substance is not composite nor supported, it is simple and forever, it is not destroyed nor diminished in the least.

417. After he has shown what the condition of an incorruptible substance, here (191) he shows the condition of a corruptible substance, positing this proposition: every destructible, non-sempiternal substance is either composed or supported by another thing. And this same proposition is posited in Proclus' book in proposition 48.

418. The proof of this proposition (192) is: because if everything which is standing through itself is incorruptible, as has been proved (188 [414]), it is necessary that everything that is corrupted not be standing through itself, but need something sustaining. Which indeed happens in two ways: in one way, just as a whole needs parts for its constitution, whence, when the parts come apart from each other, corruption follows; in the other way, because the form is not subsisting, but needs for its fixedness a subject supporting it and on that account when the supporting subject be made indisposed to such a form, it is necessary that a separation of the form from the subject, and thus corruption follows.

419. Whence it is manifest that every corruptible substance either is composed out of different parts through whose dissolution the corruption of the whole follows, as appears in mixed bodies; or the form needs matter or subject for its sustenance and thus, by the transmutation of the subject, corruption follows, just as appears in simple bodies and accidents.

420. And on that account we can accept this corollary (193) that if any substance is not composite, but simple, and is not superimposed over a subject as if needing it for its being, but is standing in itself, this in every way is incorruptible: just as appears in the intelligence and in the intellectual soul, about which it is manifest that it is not a form superimposed over matter to which it gives being, so that, to be precise, it is supported by it totally, because it follows that none of its operations be without the communication of corporal matter. Which appears to be false from these which are proved in On the Soul, 3.

194. Every substance that stands through its essence is simple and is not divided.

195. This is because if someone were to say: it is possible that it be divided, we would say, if it is possible that a substance that stands through itself be divided and itself be simple, it is possible that the essence of part of it exist through its essence again as if it were the essence of the whole. Thus if that is possible, the part returns upon itself, and every one of its parts is returning on itself, just as if it is a return of the whole over its essence; and this is impossible. Thus if this is impossible, a substance that stands through itself is indivisible and is simple.

196. But if it is not simple but is composite, one part of it is better than another part and one part of it is worse than another part; Thus a better thing comes from a lesser thing and a lesser thing from a better thing, insofar as every one of its parts is separated from every other.

197. Because of this its uniformity is not sufficient by itself, since it is in need of its parts from which it is composed. And moreover this does not fit the nature of a simple thing, but rather it is of the nature of composite substances.

198. Thus it is now agreed that every substance that stands through its essence is simple and is not divided; and, insofar as it does not receive division and it is simple, it does not admit of corruption or destruction.

421. After he has followed up on the diversity of substance according to generation and corruption, here (194) he follows up concerning the diversity of substance which can be considered according to simplicity and composition, and he brings to this point two propositions, of which the second (190) seems to be the converse of the first.

422. So, the first is like this: every substance standing through its essence is simple and is not divided. This proposition is also posited in the book of Proclus in proposition 157 under these words: every autohypostatic is indivisible and simple.

423. Where, first it should be considered that simple and indivisible is the same in subject, but they differ in definition: for something is called indivisible through a privation of division, because, that is to say, it is not divisible into many; now, something is called simple, through privation of composition, because, that is to say, it is not composed out of many.

424. First, therefore, it is proved that a substance standing by itself is indivisible (195);

second, that it be simple (196).

425. Now the first is better proved in Proclus' book than here: for this is his proof (Elements of Theology, 157): for if, he asks, it is divisible, being autohypostatic, that is, subsisting by itself, it would establish itself as divisible and turn its whole self to itself and all in all of itself will be; but this is impossible; therefore the autohypostatic is indivisible.

426. As evidence for this, it should be considered that here it is accepted that there is something standing by itself, not by reason of its parts: as, that is, one part of it would stand through another, just as happens in material substances, but by reason of the whole: as, that is, the whole stands whole through itself. Now, each one is turned to it because it stands just as an effect to a cause and it is necessary that it be in it just as in its grounding. Therefore, if something divisible should be standing through itself, it would be necessary that every part of it stand through each, and each be grounded in each. Which is impossible: because thus it would follow that one and the same part of it would be cause and effect at the same time and in respect of the same thing; which is impossible.

427. Now in this book, it is proved thus: that which is proper to something through itself belongs to each part of it, if it be divisible. If, therefore, something divisible be standing through itself, it is necessary that each part of it stand through itself and thus it would not support itself on another for the constitution of the whole.

428. But this proof is not so efficacious, because it is not necessary, that what belongs per se to the whole of something, belong to its individual parts: for there is a certain whole of similar parts, like air and water; and certain of dissimilars, like animal and house.

429. Now, that that which is standing by itself be simple, that is, not composed out of many, is proved by a double reason.

In everything composed out of many parts, it is necessary to posit a certain order of the parts, so that, to be precise, one part of it be better and another worse (196). For many things come to be constituted as one in a certain order, just as also a multitude proceeds from one in a certain order. Whence we see that in the composition of a natural body, the form is what exists before matter and in the composition of a mixed body, one element is dominant and in the composition of the parts of an animal one member is more principal than another and in the parts of any one continuous thing, one part is closer to the point which is the principle of magnitude than the others. Therefore, if anything composed out of many parts be standing through itself, it will be necessary that each part of it be standing out of each, and so a better part will depend on a worse part and vice-versa.

430. The second reason (197) is because everything which is standing through itself is sufficient for itself in its own being, not lacking another for its substance; by which dependence from an agent cause is not excluded, but dependence from a formal and material cause existing before the substance.

431. Now, everything composed out of parts is not sufficient to itself, but it needs for its subsistence the parts out of which it is composed, which behave in the habitude of a material cause to the whole. Therefore, nothing composed out of parts is standing by itself. Therefore every substance standing by itself is simple.

432. Nevertheless it should be known that this second reason (197) is posited distinctly in Proclus' book, but in this book it is brought in by the mode of a conclusion.

199. Every substance is simple, that stands through itself, that is to say through its essence.

200. For it is created without time, and it is in its substantiality superior to temporal substances.

201. And an indication of that is that it is not generated from anything else, since it stands through its essence; and substances generated from something else are composite substances that fall under generation.

202. Thus it is now manifest that every substance that stands through its essence only exists not in time, and [this is because] it is higher than and superior to time and temporal things.

433. Here (199) is posited the proposition converse to the prior which is such: every simple substance is standing through itself, that is: through its essence (194).

434. Yet it should be known that this proposition is not proved in the commentary, but a certain one which is proved (200) is interposed; namely: that a substance standing through itself is caused without time and is, in its substantiality, superior to temporal substances.

435. And this is proposition 51 of Proclus' book under these words: every autohypostatic is exempt from those things which are measured by time according to its substance. Where it should be considered that that which is said: according to its substance can be referred either to the temporal substances themselves, whose substantial being is subject to variation, whence they are said to be measured by time according to their substance; or it could be referred to the substances standing by themselves which according to their substance are superior to temporal substances.

436. Therefore a proof is posited of this proposition brought in above (200) like so (201): for it has been shown above (181-182 [403-404]) that no substance standing through itself falls under generation. Now all substances, which are measured in time according to their substance, fall under generation: for through this, according to their substance they are measured by time, that their substantial being is varied by generation and corruption. Therefore it remains that no substance standing through itself falls under time, but it is superior to all temporal substances (202).

437. Now from this proposition (200) thus proved (201) we can conclude that which was premised [434]: for if this is proper to a substance standing by itself, that it be not falling according to its substance under time; yet this is appropriate to every simple substance, because every generable substance falling under time is composed out of matter and form; it remains that every simple substance be standing through itself. Which was first (199) proposed.

203. Every substance created in time is either always in time and time does not pass by it since it and time were created equally, or it passes by time and time passes by it, since it was created in certain hours of time.

204. This is because if created things follow each other by turns and only a substance similar to a superior substance follows that superior substance, not a substance different from it, there are substances similar to superior substance—and there are created substance which time does not pass by—before the substances which are not similar to sempiternal substances, and there are substances cut off by time, created in certain hours of time. Thus it is not possible that substances created in certain hours of time be continued with sempiternal substances, since they are not similar to them at all. Thus substances sempiternal in time are those which are coextensive with sempiternal substances, and they are intermediaries between fixed substances and substances divided by time. And it is not possible that sempiternal substances which are beyond time follow temporal substances created in time, unless with temporal, sempiternal-in-time substances as intermediaries.

205. And moreover these substances are made intermediaries only because they communicate with sublime substances in permanence and they communicate with temporal substances divided in time by generation; indeed although they are sempiternal yet their permanence is through generation and motion.

206. And substances sempiternal with time are similar to sempiternal substances which are beyond time through durability and are not similar to them in motion and generation. However, substances divided in time are not similar to sempiternal substances which are beyond time according to any mode. Thus if they are not similar to them, then they cannot receive them nor touch them. Thus the substances which touch sempiternal substances which are above time are necessary, and they will be touching the substances divided in time.

207. Thus they will group together by their motion between substances divided in time and sempiternal substances which are beyond time. And they will group together by their durability between substances which are beyond time and substances which are subject to time, that is to say falling under generation and corruption. And they will unite between good substances and bad substances, so that bad substances do not deprive the good substances and deprive them of every goodness and everything appropriate, and there be no permanence or constancy to them.

208. Thus it has now been shown from this that there are two species of durability of which one is eternal, and the other is temporal. However one of the two durabilities is constant, motionless, and the other durability is moved; and one of them is united and all its operations are at the same time, nor is any of them before any other, and the other is running, extended, and certain of its operations are before certain others. And the totality of the one is through their essence and the totality of the other is through its parts of which each one is separated from its companion according to the first and last mode.

209. Thus it is now manifest that certain substances are those which are sempiternal beyond time and from these come substances sempiternal equal to time and time does not pass by them, and from these are those which are divided by time and time passes by them from what is superior to them and inferior to them [i.e., from their beginning to their end] and they are substances that fall under generation and corruption.

438. After he has followed up about the diversity of things which is according to generation and corruption, simplicity and composition, here (203) thirdly he follows up concerning the diversity which is according to the temporal and the eternal.

439. And concerning this, he makes two points:

first, he shows how some things may doubly be sempiternal and temporal;

second, he shows how it is at the same time eternal and temporal, at: between a thing whose substance (210);

or: in the first (203) he posits the order of temporal things to one another;

in the second, the order of eternals to one another, at: between a thing whose substance (210).

440. About the first, he posits a proposition like this: every substance created in time is either always in time and time does not pass by it since it and time were created equally, or it passes by time and time passes by it, since it was created in certain hours of time (203).

441. As evidence of this, it should be considered that, because time is the number of motion, every mobile substance is said to be created in time. Now, there is a twofold mobile substance: one whose motion is in whole time; just as the celestial body, whose motion is made equal with time because time is first and in itself the measure of the motion of the sky and by that motion it measures all other motions. And this whether we posit that the motion of the sky always has been and always will be, as Aristotle and certain other philosophers posited; or even if we posit that the motion of the sky has not always been nor always will be, as the faith of the Church teaches, because thus also the motion of the sky is made equal with time: for time was not before the motion of the sky began nor will there be time after the motion of the sky desists. Whence, in all ways, the substance of the celestial body, by reason of its motion, is always in time and time does not exceed it, but they are made equal to one another.

442. But there are certain mobile substances whose being and motion is not in whole time, but in some part of time, just as appears about generable and corruptible substances. And because a substance of this kind does not have a habitude to all time, but to a part of time, for some part of time is found to be of greater duration than them, and another part less, whence it is that a substance of this kind exceeds time with respect to that part of time which, to be precise, is of less duration than it, and again it is exceeded by time with respect to that part which is of greater duration than it.

443. And in Proclus' book is found this proposition 55 more clearly and briefly thus: everything which subsists according to time is either always in time or having its existence in some part of time.

444. For the manifestation of this premised proposition,

first (204) a proof is posited;

second, a certain corollary is brought in, at: therefore, it has now been shown (208).

445. Now the proof is posited the same in each book. For the order of things proceeds so that similars follow on one another, but those which are entirely dissimilar do not follow each other in the levels of things except through some intermediary. Just as we see that a perfect animal and a plant are entirely dissimilar as far as two: for a perfect animal is sensitive and mobile by a processive motion; but plants have neither of these. Therefore nature does not proceed immediately from perfect animals to plants, but produces in-between imperfect animals which are sensible with animals and immobile with plants.

446. Now, it is manifest that spiritual substances which are made equal to eternity, as has been said above (25), and generable and corruptible substances are entirely dissimilar: for spiritual substances are both always and are immobile, neither of which belongs to generable and corruptible substances, whence one should place between these two extremes some intermediary which is similar to each extreme, as thus the grades of things proceed through similars (204).

447. And thus Proclus proceeds by investigating: between that which is always being immobilely and that which is sometimes in a mobile fashion, there can only be found a three-fold intermediary, namely: that which is always moved; that which sometimes is in an immobile fashion; and that which sometimes is. Now this third cannot be an intermediary because that which sometimes is is the same as that which sometimes is moved, which we said to be an extreme. Also similarly, that which something is in an immobile fashion, cannot be an intermediary: for it is impossible that such a thing exist; for nothing stops being except by some transmutation, whence that which is in an immobile fashion cannot be sometimes being but is always being. Therefore it remains that the intermediary between that which always is in an immobile fashion and that which sometimes is in a mobile fashion is that which is always moved: for this belongs with the superior, in that it is always being, but with the inferior extreme, in that it is to be moved.

448. Now he uses the name of generation (205) commonly for any transmutation, because generation and corruption are included in any motion, as is said in Physics, 8 (254a11-12).

449. So therefore substances which are always moved, i.e., celestial bodies, touch on (206) each extreme according to a certain similitude and through it superior immobile substances are conjoined (207) in a certain way to generable and corruptible inferior substances; insofar as, that is, the power of superior substances is borne down to generable and corruptible things through the motion of celestial bodies.

450. From these he now brings in (208) consequently a certain corollary, to be precise, that perpetuity, or perpetual durability, is two-fold: one through the mode of eternity; but the other through the mode of all time. And these perpetual durations differ in three ways:

first because eternal perpetuity is fixed, standing immobilely; but temporal perpetuity is flowing and mobile, insofar as time is the measure of motion, but eternity is understood as the measure of the immobile.

Second, because eternal perpetuity is all at the same time as if collected into one; but temporal perpetuity has successive extension according to earlier and later which are of the nature of time.

Third, because eternal perpetuity is simple, all existing according to itself, but the universality or totality of temporal perpetuity is according to diverse parts succeeding one another.

210. Between a thing whose substance and act are in a moment of eternity and a thing whose substance and action are in a moment of time 'now' there exists an intermediary, and it is that whose substance is in the eternal 'now' and whose act is in the temporal 'now'.

211. This is because a thing whose substance falls under time, i.e., because time contains it, is falling under time in all its dispositions, because of which its action also falls under time; since, insofar as the thing's substance falls under time. But a thing falling under time in all its dispositions is separated from a thing falling under eternity in all its dispositions. But there is continuity only in similar things. Therefore it is necessary that there be some other third thing intermediate between each, whose substance falls under eternity and whose action falls under time.

212. For it is impossible that there be a thing whose substance falls under time and whose action under eternity; indeed, in this way its operation would be better than its substance; but this is impossible.

213. Therefore it is manifest that between things falling under time with respect to their substances and their operations and things whose substances and operations are falling under the limit of eternity there are things falling under eternity with respect to their substances and falling under time with respect to their operations, as we have shown.

451. In the preceding proposition, the order of temporal things to one another was made manifest; here (210) the order of eternal things to one another is made manifest.

And first, it is posited between eternal things, something which is eternal in every way and something which is eternal in a certain way and temporal in a certain way;

second, the circumstances of that which is in some way eternal and in some way temporal is made manifest, in proposition 32, at: every substance (214).

452. About the first, a proposition like this is posited: between a thing whose substance and act are in a moment of eternity and a thing whose substance and action are in a moment of time 'now' there exists an intermediary, and it is that whose substance is in the eternal 'now' and whose act is in the temporal 'now' (210). And is seems here that moment of eternity or time are taken as a measurement, so that, to be precise, that which is measured by eternity is said to be in a moment of eternity and that which is measured in time is said to be in a moment of time.

453. This proposition is also posited as 106 in Proclus' book, under these words: of each one which is in every way eternal according to substance and operation and of each one which has a substance in time, the intermediary is that which is in some way eternal, but in another way is measured by time.

454. Now it might seem to someone that this medium be the celestial body, which indeed is incorruptible according to its substance, but its motion is measured by time. But this is not well said: for in the preceding proposition, that which is always moved was posited simply between temporal things (204). For as Aristotle said in Physics, IV: just as time measures motion, so now the mobile is the measure of time. Whence the celestial body which is moved is not in a moment of eternity but in a moment of time.

455. And besides, motion is not an action of that which is moved, but rather a passion; but it is the action of the mover as is said in Physics, 3; now, the principle of motion is the soul, as is held in the third proposition (30 [86]). Therefore, because the soul is immobile in itself, but its action is motion, consequently the soul is in a moment of eternity according to its substance, but its act is in time; but of the body which is moved, both substance and operation is in time; and the intelligence's substance and action, in a moment of eternity.

456. Now, the proof of this proposition (211) is similar to the proof of the proposition put before: for above (204) it was said that the grades of beings are continuous with one another according to a certain similitude, whence those which are totally dissimilar follow one another in the order of things through something intermediary which has a similitude with each extreme. Now that thing whose substance and action is in time, is totally dissimilar to that whose substance and action is in eternity. Therefore it is necessary that between these there be a third intermediary thing either so that its substance falls under eternity and its action under time or vice-versa.

457. But this cannot be (212) that the substance of any thing be in time and its action in eternity: because thus action would be higher and better than substance, and effect higher and better than cause, which is impossible. Therefore it remains that that intermediary thing be according to substance in a moment of eternity and according to operation in time. And this is what we set out to prove (213).

214. Every substance falling in certain of its dispositions under eternity and falling in certain others of its dispositions under time is being and coming-to-be at the same time.

215. Indeed, [every] thing falling under eternity is truly being and everything falling under time is truly generation. Thus if it is such, then, if one thing falls under eternity and time it is being and generation not by a single mode but by one mode and another.

216. Thus it is now manifest from what we have said that everything generated falls with respect to its substance under time and has substance depending on pure being which is the cause of durability and the cause of all sempiternal and destructible things.

217. It is necessary that there be one which makes the unities come to be, and it is not brought about, but all the rest of unities are acquired.

218. And an indication of this is what I say: if one is found making what is not acquired to acquire, then what difference is there between it and the first which makes things acquire? Indeed there cannot be except either it be similar to it in all its dispositions or there be differences between them. Thus if it is similar to it in all its dispositions then one of them is not first and the other second. And if one of them is not similar to the other in all its dispositions then doubtless one of them is first and the other second. Thus that in which there is fixed unity is not found to be from any other, it is the one first true thing, as we have shown, and that in which the unity is found to be from another exists on account of the one first true thing. Thus if it is from another its unity is acquired from the first one. Thus from this it comes forth that there is again unity for the one pure truth and the rest of ones and there is unity only because of the one truth which is the cause of unity.

219. Thus it is now manifest and plain that every unity after the true one is acquired, created, but the one pure truth which creates, unites and makes them acquire is not acquired, as we have shown.

458. Because in the preceding proposition it has been proved that there is something whose substance is in eternity and whose action is in time, consequently he shows the condition of this substance in this last proposition, saying: every substance falling in certain of its dispositions under eternity and falling in certain others of its dispositions under time is being and coming-to-be at the same time (214).

459. And this same proposition is posited as 107 of Proclus' book, under these words: everything that is in some way eternal, yet in some way temporal, is at the same time both being and generation.

460. For the manifestation of this he makes three propositions:

first, he premises the proof of the proposition brought in, the whole of which depends on the signification of names (215).

461. For because eternity is a simultaneous whole, lacking the succession of past and future, as is held above [48], that which is in eternity, is called being because it is always in act. Now, time consists in the succession of past and future, whence that which is in time is sort of in coming-about: which the name of generation means. Therefore, what is totally in eternity, is totally being; and what is totally in time, is totally generation; but what is according to one thing in time and according to another in eternity, is at the same time being and generation.

462. Second, at: therefore, it is already manifest (216), he brings in a certain corollary. For the disposition of beings is such that the inferiors depend on superiors. Whence it is necessary that that which is totally generation, as having substance and operation in time, should depend from that which is at the same time being and generation, having substance in eternity and operation in time. Now this, it is necessary, depends from that which is totally in eternity according to substance and operation; and this further depends on the first Being which is beyond eternity, which is the principle of the duration of all things both sempiternal and corruptible.

463. Third, at: it is necessary that the one (217), he shows that from this first one, all things depend.

464. And for the meaning of this which is said here, proposition 116 of Proclus should be taken up, which goes like this: every god is participable, except the one. Which proposition is brought in by him to show how the Platonists posited many gods: for they did not posit them all equal, but they posited one first, who participated nothing but is essentially one and good. But they posited other inferior gods participating that very one and good.

465. And he brings in a proof of this because, he says, it is clear concerning the first and supreme God that he participates nothing, otherwise he would not be the first cause of all things: for always a participant presupposes something prior which is through its essence. But that all other gods are participants he proves because if the first God is essentially one and not participative, either some one of the other gods is similarly one and thus differs in nothing from the first, or it would be necessary that it be participative of the one. For if the one itself is the essence of the first, it is necessary that if something differ from it, as if existing after itself, it would not be such that its essence be itself one, but it would be participating unity.

466. And this is what is proposed here (217) that it is necessary to posit a first one making unities be obtained, that is from which they participate unity, whatever things are one; and it is not obtained, that is it does not participate unity from anything else. And the proof of this is brought in, which has been put before [465].

467. And so is ended the book Of Causes.

468. And let there be thanks to the omnipotent God who is the first cause of all things.