What Is the Intention of the Discussion and What Is the Tradition Concerning the Divine Names

C. I, § 1. 1. Yet now, O blessed one, after the Theological Hypotyposes, I shall cross over to the opening up of the divine names, as is possible.

2. Yet be even now by us the predefined law of the eloquences, that we should assert the truth of things said about God not in persuasive words of human wisdom (1 Cor 2:4) but in the demonstration of the power of the theologians, moved by the Spirit,

3. according to which we are joined to ineffable and unknown things, ineffably and unknowingly, according to the better union of our reasonable and intellectual power and operation.

4. Therefore universally we must not dare to say nor even to think anything about the supersubstantial and hidden deity (Isa 45:15), beyond those things which divinely are expressed to us from the holy eloquences (1 Cor 4:6).

5. For it is fitting to attribute to it the supersubstantial science of the ignorance of supersubstantiality, which is above reason and intellect and substance itself, and looking to the superior as much as the ray of the thearchic eloquences sends itself to superior splendors, let us be constrained by temperance and sanctity about divine things.

6. For if it is fitting at all to believe all-wise and most true theology, divine things are revealed and inspected according to the proportion of the minds of each, with the thearchic goodness segregating, in saving justice, by immeasurability from the measured, as incomprehensible, as befits God.

7. For just as intelligible things are incomprehensible and uncontemplatable by sensible things; and simple and unfigurable things by these things which are in composition and figure; and the intangible and the unfigurable lacking of the form of incorporeal things by things formed according to the figures of bodies; according to the same ratio of truth, that unity is super-posited above substances which is supersubstantial, and above minds that which is above mind, and to all deliberations that is indeliberable which is above deliberation, and ineffable by every word that which is above word, the good; unity unifying every unity and supersubstantial substance and unintelligible intellect and an unspeakable word and irrationality, unintelligibility, and unnameability, according to nothing existing of existing things and indeed the cause of being for all things, yet itself not existing, as above every substance and such that it might articulate properly and knowingly about itself.

§ 2. 8. Therefore, as has been said, concerning this supersubstantial and hidden deity, we must not dare to say nor to think anything beyond those things that divinely have been expressed to us from the holy eloquences.

9. For just as this itself handed on concerning itself in the eloquences, as befits its being good, for all existing things whatever is science and contemplation of it is inaccessible, as segregated from all things supersubstantially. And you shall find that many of the theologians have praised it not only as invisible and incomprehensible but likewise as inscrutable and non-investigable, as with no vestige existing of those who have crossed over to its hidden infinity.

10. Nevertheless the good is not universally incommunicable to each of existing things, but gathering singularly in itself the supersubstantial ray of each of existing things by proportional illuminations, kindly it super-appears above and extends to its possible contemplation and communion and assimilation holy minds, which, as is acceptable and as befits holy men, send themselves to it, and neither do they proudly presume to higher things than those fittingly given by the apparition of God, nor do they fall to lower things out of subjection to what is worse, but firmly and indeclinably they are extended to its super-resplendent ray and with commensurate love of the fitting illuminations, with holy reverence and chastely and in a holy manner they are elevated higher.

1. In this book, therefore, which is entitled On the Divine Names, after the custom of those who artfully handed on the sciences,

first, he sets out certain things necessary for the following consideration;

second, he begins to pursue his principal intention in chapter 3, which begins, and we shall inspect the naming of the good.

2. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows the ratio of the divine names;

second, he shows that the names that are treated in this book are common to the whole Trinity; and this in chapter 2, which begins at per se goodness, determining and manifesting.

3. About the first, he does two things:

first, he connects himself to the preceding book, where speaking to blessed Timothy, he says that after the Theological Hypotyposes, that is, the divine distinctions by which the persons in the Trinity are distinguished from one another, he shall cross over to the opening up, that is, to the manifestation of the divine names, according to his ability. For to expound these perfectly seems to be beyond man.

4. Second, at yet be even now, he begins to set out certain things necessary to the following work. Yet he sets out two things:

first of all, the mode of proceeding in this work, for this is necessary to know beforehand in whatever doctrine.

Second, he shows the ratio of the divine names which he intends to treat in this book, at following these thearchic laws.

And these two are expressed well enough in the title of this chapter, which has itself thus: What Is the Intention of the Discussion, as regards the first; and What Is the Tradition Concerning the Divine Names, as regards the second.

5. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows from what he must proceed in this work;

second what things must be handed on, at therefore universally we must not dare.

6. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows from what he must proceed in this work, because it must not be supported by human reason, but by divine revelation, receiving this from the Apostle who says in 1 Corinthians 2:4–13: not in persuasive words of human wisdom . . . : but in the doctrine of the Spirit, comparing spiritual things to spiritual things.

And this is what he says: yet be, that is, let there be, even, that is, also, now the law of the eloquences, that is, which is handed on in the Sacred Scriptures, predefined, that is, predetermined, by us, just as once it was by the Apostle; which indeed is the law: that we should assert, that is, should build up or manifest the truth of things said about God, not in persuasive words of human wisdom, that is, not being supported, as the principal middle terms for proving a proposition, by the principles of human wisdom, which proceeds according to natural reason, but in the demonstration of the power of the theologians, that is, of those who handed on the canonical Scripture, namely the apostles and prophets, of the power, I say, moved by the Spirit, namely the Holy Spirit. For Denys, in his doctrine, is supported by the authority of Sacred Scripture, which has strength and power according as the apostles and prophets were moved to speaking by the Holy Spirit revealing to them and speaking in them.

7. Second, he introduces the ratio of the aforementioned law, at according to which we are joined.

And the power of such a ratio is: we can be supported by the principles of human wisdom in those doctrines in which things are handed on which are knowable and speakable for men, and which can be both known and said by these who have that doctrine.

But in the doctrine of the faith there are proposed to man certain things unknown and unspeakable to which those having faith adhere, not by knowing or by perfectly explicating by word, although they adhere to them more certainly and an adhering of this sort is higher than any natural knowledge. In the doctrine of the faith, therefore, we cannot be supported by the principles of human wisdom.

8. And this is what he says: according to which, namely the power of revelation proceeding from the Holy Spirit into the apostles and prophets, through faith we are joined to ineffable and unknown things, that is, to the divine truth which exceeds every human speech and thought. Nor does faith so join us to them that it makes them known and spoken by the believing man as they are, for this would pertain to open vision, but it joins ineffably and unknowingly: for we see now through a mirror, as is said in 1 Corinthians 13:12.

9. And lest anyone were to despise this joining on account of its imperfection, he adds, according to the better union of our rational and intellectual power and operation, that is, above the power and operation of our reason and intellect, so that a genitive might be put for an ablative, after the custom of the Greeks.

For we are joined through faith to higher things than are those to which natural reason attains, and we adhere to them more certainly, as much as divine revelation is more certain than human knowledge. Yet he says, rational and intellectual, because of those things that we naturally know, certain of them are observed by us per se without any investigation, and intellect properly pertains to these; whereas certain of them are known through inquiry, and reason pertains to those. Yet he says, of operation and power, because we know many things by power, which we are not actually regarding.

10. Then when he says, therefore universally we must not dare, he shows what things are handed on in this doctrine;

and first, he poses a proposition;

second, he manifests it, at for it is fitting to attribute.

11. Yet he concludes the proposition from premises. For this also is observed in human sciences: that principles and conclusions are of the same genus. And therefore the principles from which this doctrine proceeds are those which have been received through the revelation of the Holy Spirit and are had in the Sacred Scriptures. Therefore this is what he concludes: that in no way ought anyone to dare to say, with his mouth, nor even to think anything about the hidden supersubstantial deity, which is above every substance, and through this is hidden for us to whom created substances are proportionate for knowing and consequently for speaking, beyond those things which divinely are expressed to us from the holy eloquences, that is, are expressed through the holy eloquences. Yet significantly he does not say, in the holy eloquences, but from the holy eloquences, because whatever can be drawn out from these things that are contained in Sacred Scripture, are not alien to this doctrine, even though they are not contained in Sacred Scripture.

12. Then, when he says, for it is fitting to attribute, he introduces an argument to manifest the proposition;

and first, he poses the argument;

second, he proves certain things that he presupposes in the argument, at for if it is fitting at all.

13. Therefore such is the power of his argument: from what is known by anyone alone, no one can know or speak, unless as much as is manifested by him. Yet it befits God alone perfectly to know himself according to what he is. Therefore no one can speak or think truly about God except inasmuch as it is revealed by God. Which divine revelation indeed is contained in the Sacred Scriptures.

14. And this is what he says: that it is fitting to attribute to it, namely to God alone, supersubstantial science of the ignorance of supersubstantiality, that is, of the unknown divine supersubstantiality; which supersubstantiality indeed is not unknown on account of any defect on its part, but on account of its excess, namely because it is above created reason and intellect and above created substance itself which is the object commensurate with a created intellect, just as uncreated essence is proportionate to uncreated science. And for this reason just as the divine essence is supersubstantial, so also he calls his science supersubstantial. For it is always necessary that the object of a knowing power should be proportionate to that knowing power.

15. Nevertheless lest we should be altogether set in ignorance of God, he adds, it befits us, I say, looking, through spiritual contemplation, to the superior, that is, to what is above us, namely God, to tend, as much as the ray of thearchic eloquences sends itself, that is, extends itself, to superior splendors, that is, to the intelligible truths of divine things.

For the truth of Sacred Scripture is a certain light through the mode of a ray derived from the first truth, which light indeed does not extend itself to this: that through it we should be able to see the essence of God or know all things that God in himself knows or that the angels or the blessed seeing his essence know, but up to some fixed term or measure, the intelligible truths of divine things are manifested by the light of Sacred Scripture.

16. And thus, while we extend to knowing divine things no more than the light of Sacred Scripture extends itself, let us be constrained through this, as though restrained by fixed limits, about divine things, by a certain temperance and sanctity: by sanctity indeed while we conserve the pure truth of the Sacred Scriptures from every error; whereas by temperance, while we do not force ourselves upon them more than is given to us.

17. Then when he says, for if it is fitting at all, he manifests what he had presupposed in this argument:

and first of all, that God is known to himself alone, yet hidden to us;

second, he manifests the mode in which the divine knowledge is communicated to us, at nevertheless the good is not universally incommunicable.

18. He shows the first in two ways:

first of all, by arguments;

second, by authorities, at for just as this itself handed on.

19. Yet he poses, first, two arguments;

of which the first is thus: divine things are revealed by God according to the proportion of those to whom they are revealed; but to know the infinite is above the proportion of a finite intellect; therefore this very what-God-is itself is not known by anyone from divine revelation.

20. And this is what he says: certain divine things are revealed by God and inspected by us, according to the proportion of the minds of each. And I say this: if it is fitting at all to believe theology, that is, Sacred Scripture all-wise and most true. For Matthew 25:15 says, he gave . . . to each according to his power.

21. And it must be noted that he poses two reasons from which it is had that Sacred Scripture is most of all to be believed. For that someone is not believed happens from two causes: either because he is or is reputed to be ignorant, or because he is or is reputed to be a liar. Whence, since Sacred Scripture is all-wise and most true because revealed and handed on by God who is truth and knowing all things, Sacred Scripture is most of all to be believed.

22. And I say this, with the thearchic, that is, divine, goodness segregated from the measured, that is from finite things, by immeasurability, that is, by the infinity of the divine essence, not indeed so that in no way it may be known, but so that it may not be comprehended. And on account of this he adds, as incomprehensible. For indeed by the blessed the divine essence is attained by the mind yet is not comprehended. And this indeed God does in saving justice. For the ratio of distributive justice consists in this: that there is given to each according to his condition. And just as through the order of distributive justice established by the prince of a city, the whole political order is saved, so through this order of justice the whole order of the universe is saved by God; for with this subtracted all things would remain confused. And this indeed he does as befits God; for it befits him by his goodness to save those whom he fashions.

23. He poses a second argument, at for just as intelligible things, which is thus: a superior grade of beings cannot be comprehended through an inferior, just as intelligible things cannot be comprehended perfectly through sensible things, nor simple things through composite things, nor incorporeal things through corporeal things; but God is above every order of existing things; therefore through nothing of existing things can he be comprehended.

24. And this is what he says: for just as intelligible things are incomprehensible and uncontemplatable by sensible things, that is, through sensible things; and simple and unfigurable things through those which are in composition and figure, that is, which are composite and figured (for there is no figure except of composite things); and just as a lacking or privation of the form, namely bodily, of things incorporeal, which lacking or privation indeed is intangible and unfigurable, that is, incorporeal things themselves, which lack form and are intangible and unfigurable (so that we might understand the abstract to be posited for the concrete) are incomprehensible and uncontemplatable by things formed according to the figures of bodies, that is, for bodies themselves, thus, I say, is this according to the same ratio of truth: that unity is super-posited, that is, God, who is unity itself as though existing as one through his own essence, which is supersubstantial, is super-posited above substances; and which is above mind is super-posited above minds, that is, intellectual spirits; and the good itself, namely God, which is above deliberation, that is, above every reason, is indeliberable to all deliberations, that is, non-investigable by any created reason; and which is above word, that is, above every speech of a creature, is ineffable, that is, unspeakable, by every created word.

25. Where he touched on four things, namely: substances, which are objects of knowledge; mind, that is, simple intellect; deliberation, that is, inquiring reason, which pertains to the knowing powers; and word, which pertains to the manifestation of thought. Yet he posits these four because he not only intends to show that God cannot be comprehended through any knowing power or manifested perfectly by speech, but that neither through any created object or through whatever created likeness. Whence also in the examples that he posits, he does not say that intelligible things are incomprehensible to the senses, but to sensible things, because through sensible things intelligible things cannot be comprehended. And there is the same ratio concerning the others.

26. And it must be considered that not only did he say that intelligible things are incomprehensible for sensible things, but also uncontemplatable, because through those things that are of an inferior order, not only can those things that are of a superior order not be comprehended, but neither can they be contemplated. For then we contemplate through another, when through one thing we can see the essence of another in order to know of it what it is. Yet its essence is comprehended when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable. For he who knows a demonstrable conclusion through a probable middle term, although he contemplates it in some way, nevertheless does not comprehend it because he does not attain to the perfect mode of his knowledge.

27. Therefore God is indeed incomprehensible to every created intellect, because he is above every mind and reason, as having more from the clarity of truth in his essence, which pertains to his knowability, than any creature from its power for knowing. Whence no creature can attain to the perfect mode of the knowledge of him, which he named supersubstantial science, and this would be to comprehend him.

Nevertheless a created intellect can contemplate his essence by attaining it in some way, nevertheless not through any object or species or whatever created likenesses, because none of these can lead by the hand to the divine essence, much less than a body to an incorporeal essence.

Therefore, according to Denys’ argument, it is necessary to say that God both is incomprehensible to every intellect and uncontemplatable to us in his essence, as long as our knowledge is bound to created things, as connatural to us; and this is the case in the state of the way.

28. And because he had called God a unity, lest anyone should believe that he is a unity formally inhering in things, as though participated in these things, to exclude this he adds, unity, namely subsisting per se, unifying every unity, that is, diffusing unity in all things, which in whatever mode participate in unity. Then, because he had named God supersubstantial unity and good above mind, someone could believe that God in no way can be called substance or mind or something of this sort, and for this reason, to exclude this he adds that God is indeed substance but supersubstantial.

29. For the evidence of which it must be considered that names, since they are imposed by us, so signify according as things fall in our knowledge. Since therefore this very what-God-is itself is above our knowledge, as has been shown, yet our knowledge is commensurate with created things, names imposed by us do not so signify according as they correspond to the divine excellence, but according as they apply to the existence of created things.

Yet the being of created things is drawn off from the divine being according to a certain deficient assimilation.

Therefore, according as in whatever way there is a likeness of created things to God, names imposed by us can be said of God, not indeed such as they are of creatures, but through a certain excess, and this signifies what he says: that God is supersubstantial substance; and likewise what he adds: that he is unintelligible intellect, that is, not such as are intellects that are understood by us; and he is an unspeakable word, that is, not such as are the words that are said by us.

30. Yet just as names imposed by us can be said of God according as there is some likeness of creatures to God, so according as creatures fail of the representation of God, names imposed by us can be removed from God and their opposites predicated. Whence he adds that God so is called reason, that he can be called also irrationality; and so is called intellect, that he can be called unintelligibility; and so is called word, that he can be called unnameability—not indeed on account of these things being deficient for him, but because according to nothing of existing things is it existing, that is, he does not exist according to the mode of any existing thing; and he indeed is the cause of existing for all things, pouring his likeness in some way into all things, so that thus he can be named from the names of creatures; yet it is non-existing, not as though failing of being, but as existing above every substance; and he is unnameable, such that it might articulate properly and knowingly about itself, that is, according to the propriety of his being and according to his perfect science of himself, by which mode no one can articulate him.

31. From the things already said, he infers the principal conclusion when he adds, therefore concerning this supersubstantial and hidden deity, as has been said, we must not dare to say nor to think anything beyond those things that divinely have been expressed to us from the holy eloquences; which has been expounded above.

32. Then, when he adds, for just as this itself handed on, what was shown above by arguments, he shows by authority, when he says that this, deity, handed on concerning itself in the holy eloquences, as befits its being good, that is, his goodness, in order to hand on the truth, namely, concerning himself; this, I say, itself handed on, because for all existing things science and contemplation of it is inaccessible, that is, no one can come to it, not indeed by whatever sort of science or contemplation, but by that by which there is known what he is or from this there is contemplated what he is; which indeed is comprehensive science of his substance. And this science indeed or contemplation is inaccessible to that reason, because it is segregated from all things supersubstantially, that is, according to the supersubstantial excess of the deity. For to him alone does it apply to know of himself what he is.

33. And this especially seems to be taken from what is said in Exodus 33:20: man shall not see me and live; and 1 Timothy 6:16: he inhabits inaccessible light, which no one from among men sees nor can see. And you shall find that many of the theologians have praised it not only as invisible and incomprehensible, but also as inscrutable and non-investigable, according to Job 11:7: perhaps comprehending the vestiges of God; and Romans 11:33: how incomprehensible are his judgments and unsearchable his ways.

34. And why he should be called non-investigable, he consequently expounds: as with no vestige existing of those who have crossed over to its hidden infinity. Yet one negation there is superfluous, and he speaks according to the propriety of the term: for to investigate properly is to be led through the vestiges of someone going through the way to the end of the way. Therefore the deity could be investigated, if any men having come to the knowledge of him had left for us some instructions, as though certain vestiges, through which we could come to see God. But this is not the case: either because no men have crossed over to this, if it should be referred to comprehensive vision, or because those who have crossed over to seeing God through his essence, as all the blessed, could not express to us the divine essence itself. Whence also Paul, snatched up to the third heaven, says that he heard arcane words, which are not permitted to man to speak (2 Cor. 12:4).

35. Therefore he excludes a threefold mode of knowledge:

first of all, that by which something is seen through itself, and this when he calls the deity invisible;

second, the mode in which something is known through the inquiry of reason, and this when he calls it inscrutable: for to scrutinize implies inquiry;

third, the mode in which something is known by learning from another, when he says non-investigable.

36. Then, when he says, nevertheless the good is not universally incommunicable, he manifests how the knowledge of the hidden deity is communicated to others. For it would be against the ratio of the divine goodness, if he so retained his knowledge to himself that he would communicate it to absolutely no other, since it is of the ratio of the good that it should communicate itself to others. And for this reason he says that although the science of the supersubstantial God must be attributed to God alone, nevertheless, since God is the good itself, it cannot be that he would not communicate to any of existing things.

37. Nor nevertheless is his knowledge so communicated to others just as he knows himself; but gathering, that is, firmly conserving singularly in itself the supersubstantial ray, that is, reserving the supersubstantial knowledge of his truth to himself alone, he super-appears, as though he should say, appears from above, kindly, as though not from necessity but from grace, by proportional illuminations, that is, according to proportional illuminations, of each of existing things, as though he should say, the ratio of his goodness is such that, with a certain mode of knowledge reserved to itself which is singular to itself, from his grace he communicates to inferiors some mode of knowing, according to his illuminations, which are according to the proportion of each.

38. And not only does he super-appear and illuminate, but also the very fact that inferior minds, illuminated using the light given, come to know him, is from him. And this is what he adds: that it extends the holy minds to the contemplation of it possible to them, because, as has been said above, in some mode he is contemplatable by all things. And because those who contemplate him in some way are made one with him (according as the intellect in act is in some way the being understood in act) and consequently they are assimilated to him as informed by him, he adds, and communion and assimilation.

39. Yet consequently he shows the conditions of the holy minds that are extended into God:

the first of which is that, according as it is licit for them from divine concession, and according as it befits them from their proper condition, they bear themselves to him. Whence he adds, which, namely minds, send themselves to it, that is, God, as is acceptable and as befits holy men, namely such that they presume neither to something higher from pride, namely above what has been given to them fittingly according to the apparition or revelation of God, nor again do they fall to lower things, that is, they do not throw themselves down below what has been given to them, from subjection to what is worse, that is, from a certain pusillanimity, by which, abandoning better things, they adhere to worse ones.

The second condition of the holy minds is that firmly and indeclinably they are extended to its super-resplendent ray, that is, to the truth manifested to them from above, so that firmness might be referred to certitude and indeclinability to immobility.

The third condition is that they should exhibit the affection of love for the divine things manifested; and this is what he adds: and with commensurate love of fitting illuminations, namely such that their affection about these things pursues them, which are given to them according to their measure, through which they are elevated to divine things by spiritual wings, namely intellectual contemplations, with holy reverence and chastely and in a holy manner: reverently indeed, inasmuch as they abstain from other things which are above these; yet chastely, inasmuch as they do not detain themselves with inferior things; whereas in a holy manner, inasmuch as they adhere firmly to these things which are given to them according to the ordination of God.

§ 3. 11. Following these thearchic laws, which both govern all the holy adornments of the supercelestial orders and substances, which indeed is above mind and substance, venerating the hiddenness of the thearchy, with inscrutable and holy reverences of mind, and venerating unspeakable things with a chaste silence, we are extended to splendors shining upon us in the holy eloquences and by these we are illuminated to the thearchic hymns, illuminated by these super-mundanely and figured to the holy enunciations of the hymns both unto seeing through them commensurately the thearchic lights given to us and unto praising the principle of the whole apparition of holy light, which the good gives, as it handed on from itself in the holy eloquences:

12. as that it is the cause and principle and substance and life of all things; and the calling back and resurrection of those cutting themselves off from it; yet the renewal and reformation of those things that have lapsed into the corruptive of the deiform; yet the holy gathering of those things that are moved according to a certain unclean commotion; and the confirmation of the standing; and the uplifting leading by the hand to it of acts from above; and the illumination of those that are illuminated; and the principle of perfection of those things that are perfected; and the thearchy of those things that are deified; and the simplicity of those things that are simplified; and the unity of those things that are united; supersubstantially the super-principal principle of all principles; the good handing on of what is hidden, according as is fitting; and, so that it might be said more simply, the life of the living, the substance of existing things, the principle and cause of all life and substance, on account of its goodness which both leads existing things to being and contains them.

§ 4. 13. Yet these things we remember from the divine eloquences and, so that it might be said thus, you shall find every holy hymn of the theologians by dividing the names of God manifestively and lauditively to the good processions of the thearchy.

14. Whence in almost every theological business, we see the thearchy praised in a holy manner: as monad indeed and unity, on account of the simplicity and unity of supernatural impartibility from which, as by unifying power, we are united and, with our divisible othernesses super-mundanely concluded, we are gathered together to a deiform monad and to a unition imitative of God; yet as Trinity on account of the manifestation of the supersubstantial fecundity of the three persons, from which every paternity in heaven and on earth is also named (Eph 3:15); yet as cause of existing things, because all things are led to being on account of its substantifying goodness. Yet wise and beautiful, because all existing things conserving their proper nature uncorrupted, are full of all divine harmony and holy adornment. Yet kind differently, because in one of its own persons it has communicated with us totally unto truth, calling back to itself and restoring human extremity, from which ineffably simple Jesus was composed and eternal he received temporal presentation and was made among our nature, who supersubstantially exceeds every order according to every nature, with unchangeable and unconfused gathering of what is proper and also whatever other deific lights, the hidden tradition of our leaders has given to us manifestively according to the succession of the divine eloquences.

15. These things also we have been taught: now, indeed, according to our proportion, through the holy veils of the eloquences and of the hierarchical traditions, with kindness veiling intelligible things with sensible things and supersubstantial things with existing things and placing forms and figures around unformable and unfigurable things and multiplying and composing supernatural and unfigurable simplicity with a variety of divisible signs; yet then, when we shall be incorruptible and immortal and shall attain the Christoform and most blessed end, we shall be always with the Lord (1 Thess 4:17), according to the eloquence, filled indeed with the visible apparition of God himself in most chaste contemplations, refulgent about us with most manifest splendors, just as around the disciples in that most divine transformation (Matt 17:5, Mark 9:6, Luke 9:32, 34), yet participants of the intelligible gift of his own light, by impassible and immaterial mind and a unition above mind, by unknown and blessed admissions of super-clear rays in a more divine imitation of the supercelestial minds. For we shall be equal to the angels, as the truth of the eloquences says, and sons of God, existing as sons of the resurrection: (Luke 20:36)

16. Yet now, as is possible for us, indeed we use proper signs for divine things and from them again proportionally we are extended to the simple and united truth of intelligible miracles, and after every unition of deiform things according to us, sedating our intellectual operations, we send ourselves to the supersubstantial ray, according as it is permissible for us;

17. in which there preexist all the ends of all knowledge super-ineffably, which it is possible neither to know, nor to say, nor totally to contemplate in any mode, because it is segregated from all things and super-unknown;

18. and indeed it pre-receives in itself the terminations of all substantial knowledge and powers simultaneously and all supersubstantially, and above all celestial minds it is gathered by incomprehensible power.

19. For if knowledge is of all existing things and if existing things have an end, what is above every substance also is segregated from all knowledge.

§ 5. 20. And indeed, if it is better than every speech and all knowledge, it also is gathered universally above mind and substance.

40. After Denys has shown the mode of this doctrine as regards those things that are handed on in it and from which it proceeds, here he begins to pursue the ratio of the divine names, about which he is concerned in this book:

and first, he shows what knowledge of God we can receive through the divine names;

second, how God can be named, at and indeed it pre-receives in itself.

41. About the first he does two things:

first he shows what knowledge of God we can receive through the divine names;

second, he shows how, after knowledge of this sort, this very what-God-is itself remains hidden to us, and this at yet now, as is possible for us.

42. About the first he does two things:

first he shows how knowledge of God can be received through the divine names;

second, he assigns the difference between this knowledge and the knowledge that will be in the fatherland, at these things also we have been taught.

43. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows what knowledge of God we can receive through the divine names;

second, he shows this as though by examples, through certain names of God, at yet now, as is possible for us.

44. Therefore he says first that we, following these, namely the aforementioned thearchic, that is, divine, laws, namely that commensurately according to our measure and firmly and with love we should imitate the divine illuminations; which laws indeed govern not only holy men, but also the holy adornments of the supercelestial orders and substances, that is, adorn the beautiful and ordered dispositions of the angels; venerating through this also the hiddenness of the deity, which indeed is above mind and substance, by inscrutable reverences of the mind, that is, disposed to God in that we do not scrutinize the hidden things of God; and holy, because such reverence pertains to sanctity; and venerating the unspeakable things of the deity with a chaste silence, which indeed he says, because we venerate hidden things by not scrutinizing them and ineffable things by keeping silent about them; and this indeed arises from sanctity and chastity of mind, not extending itself beyond its limits;

thus, I say, venerating divine things, according to the result of the divine laws, we are extended to splendors shining upon us in the holy eloquences, that is, to the truths of Sacred Scripture revealed to men, and by these splendors of Holy Scripture, we are illuminated to the thearchic hymns, that is, to know the divine names, by which God is praised. For through these we know how to praise God as living, good, and other things of this sort, which here are handed on to us concerning God in the Sacred Scriptures;

we, I say, illuminated by these hymns, super-mundanely, that is, beyond the power of natural reason, and in a certain way configured to the holy enunciations of the hymns, that is, of the divine praises which are handed on in the Scriptures through the divine names, namely inasmuch as we are informed by their faith. Illuminated, I say, and figured unto this, namely, so that through hymns of this sort we might see, according to our measure, the thearchic, that is, divine, light given to us; and to this: so that we might praise the principle of the whole holy apparition of spiritual light; which principle indeed hands on not only spiritual light to our minds, but universally the good, as it hands on the very principle from itself in the holy eloquences; in Psalm 103:28 it is said: when you open your hand, all things shall be filled with goodness; and in Luke 11:13: your Father from heaven shall give the good Spirit to those asking him.

45. This therefore is the sense of the foregoing: that we should desist from the scrutinizing of divine things according to our reason, but should adhere to Sacred Scripture, in which the divine names are handed on to us, through which the gifts of God and the principle of the gifts are manifested to us. Therefore through the divine names, which are handed on to us in the Sacred Scriptures, we know two things, namely: the diffusion of holy light and of whatever goodness or perfection, and the very principle of this diffusion, as when we call God living, we know the diffusion of life in creatures and that the principle of this diffusion is God. And this principle indeed we do not know through the divine names as he is, for this is unspeakable and inscrutable, but we know him as principle and as cause.

46. And to manifest the ratio of this principle, first he posits certain things that pertain to the universal ratio of the principle, when he says, as that it is the cause and principle of all things, so that cause might be referred to the end, which is the first of causes, and principle to the agent cause, from which operation and motion begins. Yet afterwards he posits those things that pertain to the ratio of the principle with respect to determinate effects: and first, as regards the institution of things, when it is said, and substance and life, namely because through this principle all existing things exist and all living things live; then, as regards the betterment of things in spiritual matters, which indeed is considered according to three things, that is, according to purgation, illumination, and perfection.

47. Yet these three things are fulfilled by the angels according to intellect only: who indeed purge, by removing ignorance; who illuminate the intellect, by granting help for knowing the truth; yet who perfect while they lead to the knowledge of the truth. For the perfection of a thing consists in this: that it should attain to the end. Whence in the seventh chapter of the Angelic Hierarchies it is said that the assumption of the divine science is purgation, illumination, perfection.¹

But it pertains to God to change not only the intellect but also the will for the better, and as regards this he speaks here concerning purgation, illumination, and perfection.

48. Yet he posits five things pertaining to purgation. For since sin, by which the will is polluted, occurs because a man, on account of a temporal good, is turned away from the unchangeable good, the first thing in the purgation of his will is that the will should be led back to the unchangeable good; and as regards this he says that divinity is the calling back and resurrection of those cutting themselves off from it, namely through sin. And he posits calling back and resurrection, because not only does he draw us, which is to call back, but he also gives strength so that, having been called back, we might rise.

Yet the second is that, because God pleases the human will, he should forsake that changeable good on account of which he receded from God; and as regards this he says that God is the renewal and reformation of those things that have lapsed into the corruptive of the deiform, that is, of the divine likeness in us; yet this is sin.

Yet it happens, while God begins to please someone and sin to displease him, that from the beginning he should suffer a certain wavering of mind, drawn now here and now there, whence he needs to be gathered in one; and as regards this, third, he says that God is the holy gathering of those things that are moved according to a certain unclean commotion.

Yet further man needs, after he has been gathered in one, to be confirmed in it, lest through temptations he should be removed easily from that state; and as regards this he says, fourth, that he is the confirmation of the standing.

Yet further it is necessary that man should advance to better things; and as regards this, fifth, he says that he is the uplifting leading by the hand of acts from above, that is, of those that are done from above, that is, that advance, to it, namely to the deity. Yet he is called the uplifting leading by the hand, because not only does he stretch out a hand of help to those wishing to advance, but also he arouses to advancing.

49. After these five, therefore, which pertain to purgation, he adds something concerning illumination, when he says, and of those that are illuminated, the illumination, which illumination indeed is understood as regards this: that he hands on the light of his grace to the perfection of the intellect or to the perfection of affection.

50. And further he adds something concerning perfection, which indeed he touches on in two ways:

first of all, according as something is said to be perfected through attaining a proximate end, for example, justice or whatever sort of virtue; and this when he says, and the principle of perfection of those things that are perfected, with respect to their proper perfection, because whatever the proper perfection of a thing is principally preexists in God, just as the guidance of a city principally preexists in the ruler.

Whereas as regards the attainment of the ultimate end, he says, and the thearchy, that is, the principal deity, of those things that are deified. For the rational creature is said to be deified through this: that in his mode, he is united to God; such that deity principally applies to God himself, whereas secondarily and participatively to these who are deified.

51. Yet further, he posits those things that pertain to the betterment of all things commonly. Yet it must be considered that a twofold procession is found in things, namely of resolution and of composition; and according to both, things tend to the divine likeness.

For according to the way of resolution, things tend from composition to simplicity, which chiefly is in God; and as regards this he says that he is the simplicity of those things that are simplified.

Yet according to the way of composition, things tend from multitude to unity, while one is made from many. Yet unity first is in God; and as regards this he says, and the unity of those things that are united.

Yet not only is it communicated by God to things that they should subsist in themselves and be made better, but also that they should be the principle or cause of existence and betterment for other things; and as regards this, he adds that he is supersubstantially the super-principal principle of all principles. For he is not a principle in the same mode as other things, but more eminently; for thus he has being more eminently.

And in order to comprehend simultaneously the universal effects of God, he adds that he is the good handing on of what is hidden. For it is manifest that whatever things are in creatures, preexist more eminently in God. But creatures indeed are manifest to us, yet God is hidden. And therefore, according as the perfections of things are derived from God through a certain participation into creatures, in what is manifest there is made a handing on of what is hidden; and this is made according as is fitting, namely, according to the determinate proportion of each.

52. And because he had said that God is the substance and life of all things, lest anyone were to understand that God were formal essence or life coming into the composition of things, he excludes this perverse understanding, when he adds, and, so that it might be said more simply, that is, said universally, the life of the living and substance, that is, essence, of what exists, which is the agent principle and fontal cause of all life and substance, not indeed on account of his necessity, but on account of its goodness, which both leads existing things to being and contains them, that is, conserves them in being. And as he expounds concerning substance and life, so it must be understood also concerning all the following things, namely so that God might be understood to be the calling back and reformation of things and the simplicity and unity and other things that he said above, inasmuch as he is the principle and cause of these.

53. Then, when he says, yet these things we remember from the divine eloquences, he manifests through certain divine names posited in the Scriptures, that we gain knowledge of God from the aforementioned divine names; and he says that these things that have been said above, namely, that through the divine names God is known as principle and cause, we do not say from our own selves, but we commemorate it by receiving from the divine eloquences and, so that it might be said thus, every holy hymn, that is, praise of God, of the theologians, you shall find, if you search diligently in the Scriptures, by dividing, that is, distinguishing, the names of God to the good processions of the thearchy, that is, according to the processions of perfection, which come from the divine goodness into creatures.

54. For that God is called good, living, wise, and is named by many other names, is not from some multitude or diversity existing in his nature (because all these things are one in him), but from the diverse perfections of creatures we receive diverse names, which we attribute to God as the first principle of all these processions; and this manifestively and lauditively: manifestively, indeed, inasmuch as God is made known to us through his effects and inasmuch as through names of this sort, attributed to God, it is manifested to us that perfections of this sort are in things from God; whereas lauditively, inasmuch as the whole of this pertains to the goodness of God: that perfections should be communicated to things.

55. And he first expounds this in the name of unity, adding that in almost every theological business, that is, in every book of theology, we see the thearchy, that is, deity, praised as monad and unity; which two seem to signify the same thing, since one is Greek and the other Latin. Which name of unity indeed seems especially to be attributed to God on account of two things: first of all, on account of what he is in himself; and this he touches on when he says, on account of the simplicity and unity of supernatural impartibility. For the ratio of unity consists in impartibility; for one is being that is not divided.

Yet it happens that some things are not divided in act that are divided in potency, as a line or a house, both of which can be called one, but not simply. Whereas there is something undivided not only actually, but also potentially, such as unity and a point; and these can be called not only one, but also simple.

Yet in God there consists both indivisibilities, because he is not divided actually or potentially; and for this reason significantly he said, on account of the simplicity and unity, and he adds, of supernatural impartibility, because no simplicity or unity of natural things can be compared to the divine simplicity and unity.

56. Whereas second, the name of unity is attributed to God on account of his communicating unity to things; and this is what he adds: from which, namely from the divine unity, as by marvelous unifying power, two things come to us: the first of which is that we are united, that is, we have a certain unity, according to which there is said one man or one animal; the second is that, since our unity is not so perfect that it excludes every diversity, even those things that are diverse in us, are reduced to a certain unition, according to which even those things that are simply diverse in creatures, are one by a certain order, so that in this way at least they might imitate the unity of God; and this is what he says, that we are gathered together to a certain deiform, that is, like God, monad, that is, unity, as regards those things that already have been made one; and to a certain unition imitative of God, as regards those things that are being made one; and this, with our divisible, that is, which occur from some division, othernesses, that is, diversities, concluded, super-mundanely, that is, by super-mundane power.

Or what he says, we are united, can be referred to the fact that each thing is one in itself; yet what follows, and with our divisible othernesses, can be referred to the fact that many things, although they are diverse and other, nevertheless are reduced to a certain unity either perfectly or imperfectly. For monas, that is, unity, designates the perfection of unity; whereas unition designates the way to unity, in which the imperfection of unity is shown.

57. Then he shows the same in the name of Trinity; and he says that we find that God is praised as Trinity to manifest the supersubstantial fecundity of the three persons, which are not distinguished except according to origin; from which divine fecundity indeed there is derived every paternity, that is, the fecundity that is understood by the name of paternity, as the Apostle says, in Ephesians 3:15, that from God the Father every paternity in heaven and on earth is named; nor only named, but also exists or is caused.

58. Yet third, he manifests the same in the name of cause; and he says that God is praised as the cause of existing things, on account of the fact that all things are led to being from his goodness, substantifying things, yet not from necessity of nature.

59. Yet fourth, he manifests the same through the name of wise and of beautiful; and he says that the theologians praise the deity as wise and beautiful, because all existing things, in which their proper nature is found preserved without corruption, are full of all divine harmony, that is, perfect consonance or order from God and are, again, full of holy adornment; so that what he says: harmony, might be referred to wisdom to which it belongs to order and to measure things; yet what he says: adornment, especially might be referred to beauty. Yet through the fact that something is diminished from harmony or adornment, corruption occurs in things, according to a departure from their proper nature, as sickness in bodies and sin in the soul.

60. Fifth he manifests the same concerning the name of kindness; and he says that divine Scripture praises the deity as kind, differently however from the aforementioned names. For according to the aforementioned names, God is praised inasmuch as he has not communicated what is his; yet he is praised as kind, inasmuch as in the work of the Incarnation, in one of the deity’s own persons, namely in the person of the Son, it has communicated with us, that is, with these things that pertain to our nature, not bearing a celestial body, as Valentinus said; unto truth, that is, according to truth, not fantastically, as Mani said; totally, that is, as regards all the parts of our nature, not assuming a body without a soul or a soul without a body or a soul and a body without an intellect, as Arius and Apollinaris said.

And to show the end of the Incarnation, he adds, calling back from the state of sin human extremity, that is, human nature, which is the last of creatures, according to the order of creation, to itself, namely the deity, and not only calling back by removing, but also restoring, by operating.

61. And lest anyone were to believe that he has so communicated with us, according to dwelling only, as Nestorius said, as opposed to according to a true union in person and hypostasis, namely such that he, who is God, is truly man, he adds, from which, namely from the deity operating, or from which, that is, according to which humanity, Jesus, who is ineffably simple, according to deity, himself the same in hypostasis is composed according to humanity; and he who is eternal, according to deity, received temporal presentation, that is, to be temporal in this present time, according to human nature; and who, according to deity, supersubstantially excels every order according to every nature, was made among our nature, truly man contained under the human species just as other men also; through all of which he gives to understand that the same supposit is God and man.

62. And lest anyone perversely would understand that God is made man according to some conversion of deity into flesh or into soul or even according to some assemblage such that there would be one nature of God and man, as Eutyches devised, he adds, with unchangeable and unconfused gathering, that is, firm preservation, of what is proper, that is, the propriety of either nature, because neither was divinity converted into humanity nor humanity into divinity.

63. And because about the mystery of the Incarnation many things could be said, which he omits at present, because his principal intention is not about this, he adds that not only the aforementioned things are understood through the divine kindness, but also whatever other deific lights, that is, whatever other divine illuminations and truths, the hidden tradition of our leaders, namely of the apostles and the other doctors after them, has given to us manifestively according to the succession of the divine eloquences, that is, according to what is handed on in Sacred Scripture.

64. Then when he adds, these things also we have been taught, he shows the difference between the knowledge that we receive in the present life concerning God through the divine names, and the knowledge that the saints have in the future life, when he says that these things that have been said in the exposition of the divine names concerning God, we have been taught now, that is, in the present life, according to our proportion through the holy veils of the eloquences, that is, of Sacred Scripture, and of the hierarchical traditions, that is, of the other dogmas that the apostles and their disciples handed on that are not contained in Sacred Scripture, as for example those that pertain to the knowledge of the sacred mysteries. For hierarchy is the same as sacred principate, whence the apostles and the other prelates of the Church are called hierarchs as though sacred princes.

Yet he says, through the holy veils, because in the present life, through those things that have been handed down to us, we cannot see the very essence of God, as it is in itself, but we are instructed concerning God in the Scriptures through the likeness of his effects, as through certain veils, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12: we see now through a mirror in obscurity.

65. Whereas such are the veils that he expounds adding that from the goodness of God intelligible things are veiled about through sensible ones, as when the Scriptures speak of God and the angels under the likeness of certain sensible things, as is clear in Isaiah 6:1: I saw the Lord sitting upon a lofty throne; and below: the seraphim were standing upon it, six wings on one and six wings on the other (Is. 6:2); and likewise there are veiled supersubstantial things, namely divine things, with existing things, as when there are attributed to God not only sensible things, but also the intelligible perfections of creatures, as when we attribute to God life, intellect, and perfections of this sort found in created things; likewise from the same goodness bodily forms and figures are placed around incorporeal things not thus formable or figurable;

and, likewise, a thing simply supernatural and unfigurable manifoldly is composed through a variety of divisible signs, namely inasmuch as God himself, who is supernatural and simple, is manifested to us through diverse things in Scripture, whether they should be diverse processions or diverse likenesses. Yet significantly he said with kindness; for that intelligible things are expressed to us in the Scriptures through sensible things and supersubstantial things through existing things and incorporeal things through bodily things and simple things through composed and diverse things, is not on account of envy, so that the knowledge of divine things might be withdrawn from us, but on account of our utility, because Scripture condescending to us has handed on to us those things that are above us, according to our mode. And this mode of knowledge indeed is that by which we can know God in the present life.

66. Yet then, namely after the blessed resurrection, when we shall be incorruptible and immortal, with this corruptible receiving incorruption, and this mortal receiving immortality, as is said in 1 Corinthians 15:53, and when we attain the Christoform end, that is, assimilation to Christ, according to Philippians 3:21: he shall reform the body of our humility, configured to the body of his clarity, and most blessed because not only shall the soul be beatified but also, in its own mode, the body shall be glorified, then we shall be always with the Lord, according to the eloquence, as is said in 1 Thessalonians 4:17.

We, I say, filled with the visible apparition, that is, sensible and bodily, of God himself, as regards the humanity of Christ, and this in most chaste contemplations, because to the flesh of Christ we are not affected carnally, but spiritually, according to that saying of the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 5:16: and if we have known according to the flesh of Christ, but now we do not know; with Christ himself, I say, refulgent about us through the clarity of his body, with most manifest splendors, just as was made around the disciples in that most divine transformation, that is, the Transfiguration, as is had in Matthew 17:2: his face was resplendent as the sun; and not only shall we be filled with the sensible apparition of him, but we shall also be participants of the intelligible gift of Christ’s own light, which he pours out into us, according to the power of his divinity.

67. And we shall participate in this light in impassible and immaterial mind. For our mind now is indeed passible accidentally, from the union to the body, and it is made material according to affection for material things; and for this reason, now, it is not suitable for the participation of so great a light, as there shall be then, when in no way shall it be impeded through bodily passions or subjected to material affections. And through this participation of light we shall be also participants in the unition that is above mind, namely because our mind shall be united, as to the intelligible, to God himself who is above mind; and this shall be done through unknown and blessed admissions of super-clear rays, that is, of divine illuminations that, now, are hidden to us as unexperienced; by which, then, these same minds shall be beatified.

And this indeed men shall attain, according to the imitation of the supercelestial minds, that is, of the angels, in a more divine mode than now; for now, although in whatever contemplation of truth human minds are enlightened to the union of the angels, nevertheless we fall very short from equality with them, but then we shall be equal to the angels, as the truth of the eloquences says, and they shall be sons of God, existing as sons of the resurrection, as is had in Luke 20:36.

68. Then when he says, yet now, as is possible for us, he shows that after all the knowledge that we have of God in the present life, the very what-God-is itself remains hidden to us; and about this, he does two things:

first, he proposes what he intends;

second, he proves the proposition, at in which there preexist all the ends.

69. He says therefore, first, that now, that is, in the present life, as has been expounded above, we use, as is possible for us, proper signs for knowing divine things; which signs indeed are both perfections that proceed from God into creatures, and also metaphors that are transferred through likeness from creatures to God. And indeed signs of this sort are called proper for the knowledge of divine things on our part, because it is not possible for divine things to be made known to us otherwise than by this mode. Nor nevertheless do we so use signs of this sort in knowledge of divine things, that our mind remains in them, reckoning that God is nothing beyond things of this sort, but from those signs again we are extended, according to our proportion, to the simple and united truth of intelligible miracles, that is, of wonderful contemplations, which we receive concerning divine things through signs of this sort. Yet he says, to the simple and united truth, so that simplicity might correspond to the composition of signs; whereas unity to their multitude and diversity.

70. And lest anyone should believe that through the aforementioned signs, we can comprehend perfectly the truth and intelligence of divine things, he adds that we send ourselves to the supersubstantial ray, that is, to knowing the truth about God, but not perfectly; but according as it is permissible for us, namely, sedating, that is, quieting, our intellectual operations, lest they should be borne beyond what is given to us; and this I say, after every unition of deiform things according to us, as if he should say: after we will have been united to divine things according to deiformity through knowledge, however much it is possible for us, still something about divine things remains hidden to us, from the investigation of which it is necessary that we should sedate our intellect.

71. Then when he says, in which there preexist all the ends, he proves what he had said; and about this he does three things:

for first he introduces a proof;

second, he expounds it, at and indeed it pre-receives in itself;

third, he proves a certain thing that he had presupposed in the proof, at for if knowledge is of all existing things.

72. Yet for the evidence of the first part, it must be considered that no finite power extends itself to the infinite, but it is concluded at some fixed term; whence, since every knowing power of a creature is finite, of whatever knowledge of a creature there is a fixed term beyond which it does not tend. And an example of this can be received from the diverse sciences. For geometry has some term, beyond which it does not tend; and likewise natural science. And this indeed must be understood concerning whatever created knowledge. Yet it is manifest that what exceeds the term of some knowledge is not attained by that knowledge.

Yet the supersubstantial ray, that is, the divine truth itself, exceeds all the termini and ends of whatever knowledge, because all the ends of whatever knowledge preexist more eminently in the ray itself, as in a primordial cause, in a mode ineffable to us, on account of its eminence. Whence it remains that we cannot know the aforementioned ray by inquiring nor express it by speaking nor perfectly contemplate it in whatever mode; not on account of a defect of it, but because it is distinct from all things and, consequently, unknown to all things, as though existing above all things.

73. Then when he says, and indeed it pre-receives in itself, he expounds what he had said: namely, that the ends of knowledge preexist in the supersubstantial ray; and he says that since that ray is supersubstantial, yet the knowing powers and the knowledge itself are substantial, that is, proportionate to created substances and consequently finite, it is manifest that the aforementioned ray pre-receives in itself, as the supreme cause, the terminations of all the aforementioned knowledge and powers, not indeed successively, as though it should have now this, now that, but simultaneously and unitedly; nor again particularly, as though it should have this termination and not that, but all universally; nor, again, does it have terminations of this sort in itself in the mode in which they are in created substances, but supersubstantially.

74. And because someone could refer what he had said: which it is possible neither to know, only to the knowledge of the present life, he extends this beyond this even to the angels; and he says that that supersubstantial ray is gathered not only above human minds, but even above celestial, that is, angelic, minds, not that it might be attained by them in no mode, but such that it cannot be comprehended, and this is what he says: by incomprehensible power.

75. Then when he says, for if knowledge is of all existing things, he proves what he had presupposed, namely that in God there preexist the terminations of all knowledge. And his argument is thus: all knowledge is of existing things; for the object of knowledge is being. Yet existing things are finite. Therefore finite being is the object of finite knowledge. Therefore God, since he is infinite, exceeds every finite substance, prepossessing in himself the ends of all things; and, consequently, he is separated from all knowledge, inasmuch as he exceeds all knowledge of a creature, so that he can be comprehended by none.

How God Can Be Named

21. Existing indeed as circum-apprehensive and comprehensive and pre-apprehensive of all things, yet universally this is incomprehensible by all and neither is there sense of it, nor phantasm, nor opinion, nor name, nor speech, nor touch, nor knowledge; how shall a divine speech concerning the divine names be treated by us, with the deity having been demonstrated to be unspeakable and super-nameable and supersubstantial?

22. But what we have said when we expounded the Theological Hypotyposes, one, unknown, supersubstantial, the good itself, what is, triune unity, I say, which is simultaneously God and simultaneously good, it is possible neither to say nor to think. But also the unitions of holy virtues befitting the angels, which it is necessary to call admissions or receptions, of super-unknown and super-clear goodness, are ineffable and unknown, and only shall be in those who above angelic knowledge are considered worthy by the angels themselves.

23. Deiform minds united to these in imitation of the angels, as is possible, because according to the quieting of every intellectual operation there is made such a unition of the deified minds to the supreme light, praise it most properly through removal from all existing things; taught this truly and supernaturally by illumination, from the most blessed unition to it, which indeed is the cause of all existing things, yet nothing itself, as substantially segregated from all things. Therefore indeed for none of those, however great lovers of truth they are, is it possible to praise what is above every truth, the thearchic supersubstantiality, in whatever mode it is, the super-essence of super-goodness, neither as reason or virtue, nor as mind or life or substance; but as excellently segregated from every habit, motion, life, phantasm, opinion, name, word, deliberation, intellect, substance, station, gathering, unition, end, infinity, all things whatsoever are existing.

24. Yet because, as the essence of goodness, as being through itself, it is the cause of all existing things, it is fitting to praise the prince of good, the providence of the thearchy, from all things caused, because all things are both around it and for its sake, and it is before all things, and all things consisted in it, and to be this is the deduction and substance of the totality of things and all things desire it: intellectual things indeed and rational things, by knowledge; yet those things subject to them, sensibly; and other things according to vivifying motion or substantial and habitual aptitude.

§ 6. 25. Therefore the theologians, knowing this, praise it both as unnameable and from every name: unnameable indeed as when they say that the thearchy itself, in one of the mystical visions of the apparition of God, significantly rebukes him who said, what is your name? (Gen 32:27) And as when they say that he, driving him off from all knowledge from the naming of God, says, why do you ask my name? And this is wonderful. (Gen 32:29) Yet is this name not truly wonderful which is above every name (Phil 2:9), which is unnameable, which is gathered above every name that is named, whether in that age, or in the future? (Eph 1:21) Yet of many names as when they introduce it again saying, I am who am (Ex 3:14); life; light; God; truth; and when those experienced of the deity, praise the cause of all things with many names from many caused things as good; as beautiful; as wise; as lovable; as God of gods; as Lord of lords; as holy of holies; as eternal; as existing; and as cause of the ages; as granter of life; as wisdom; as mind; as reason; as knower; as prepossessing all the treasures of all knowledge; as virtue; as power; as king of kings; as ancient of days; as without aging and invariable; as salvation; as justice; as justification; as liberation; as exceeding all things in magnitude; as in the subtle breeze. And indeed they say also that it is in minds and in souls, and in bodies, and in heaven and on earth; and simultaneously the same in the same, mundane, circa-mundane, super-mundane, supercelestial, supersubstantial, sun, luminary, fire, water, spirit, dew, cloud, stone itself and rock, all existing things and nothing of existing things.

§ 7. And therefore both the unnameable and the names of all existing things shall befit the cause of all things and existing above all things, so that the kingdom of all should be diligently, and all things should be about it and segregated from it as from a cause, as from a principle, as from an end, and it, according to the eloquence, should be all things in all things (1 Cor 15:28).

26. And truly it is praised as the principal substance of all things both perfective and contentive, guard and food and conversive to itself; and this unitively and communicably segregatedly. For not only is it the cause of containing or of life or of perfection, so that from this alone or another providence, goodness that is above name should be named, but it pre-receives simply and incircumfinitely in itself all existing things by the most perfect goodnesses of one and the same and of the cause of all things and, from all existing things, it is praised and named fittingly.

§ 8. 27. And indeed the theologians commend not only those namings of God from perfect or particular providences or foreseeings, but it is sometimes from certain divine apparitions in the holy temples or elsewhere, illuminating the masters or prophets, according to various different causes and virtues, they name the super-resplendent and super-nameable goodness; and they place around it human or fiery or amber forms and figures, and they praise its eyes and ears and hair and face and hands and spine and wings and arms and back and feet; and they place around it crowns and thrones and chalices and bowls, and certain other mystical things, concerning which we shall tell in the Symbolic contemplation according to our virtue.

28. Yet now, gathering from the eloquences whatever things belong to the present business and using the things that have been said as a certain canon and observing them, let us proceed to the opening up of the intelligible namings of God.

29. And let us observe with the inspective deliberation of God, that always according to every theology, the hierarchical law induces that we should tell properly the contemplations by which God appears; and let us appoint holy ears for the opening up of the holy namings of God, gathering holy things in holy men according to the divine tradition and removing them from the mockeries and delusions of the unlearned; yet more the unlearned themselves, if certain men totally are such, liberating them in this from the assault of God.

30. Therefore to guard this is useful to you indeed, O beautiful Timothy, according to most holy commemoration, and to make divine things neither speakable nor exposable to the unlearned; yet may God, unspeakable and unnameable, give to me, as befits God, to praise the many deific namings of the deity, and not remove the word of truth from my mouth (Ps 119:43).

76. After Denys had shown what knowledge of God we can receive through the divine names, here he shows how God can be named;

and first he raises a doubt,

second he solves it, at but what we have said when we expounded.

77. The doubt therefore is thus: he has shown that God is mightier than every speech and every thought of ours, and not only does he exceed our speech and thought, but universally he is gathered above every mind, even the angelic, and above every substance. And lest anyone were to believe that God is removed above all things such that not only is he not known, but that he does not even know the things that are below him, he adds that he is circum-apprehensive of all things, inasmuch as he knows the proprieties and circumstances of things; and comprehensive, inasmuch as he knows perfectly the quiddities or essences of all things; and pre-apprehensive, namely inasmuch as he does not receive the knowledge of things from things as we do, but his knowledge preexists before the things, as their cause; and nevertheless this is incomprehensible by all things, and neither can he be comprehended by sense nor by phantasm or imagination, nor by opinion, in which also brutes share; nor even can he be comprehended through those things that are proper to rational things: because neither is there a name of this, as comprehending him, nor any complex speech, nor touch, that is, simply intuited understanding, nor knowledge, which comes from the deduction of principles to conclusions. If therefore he is such, how could any speech concerning the divine names be treated by us?—since it has been demonstrated that the supersubstantial deity cannot be signified by voice, as existing above every name. For it seems ridiculous to wish to treat concerning the names of a thing that cannot be named.

78. Then when he says, but what we have said when we expounded, he solves the aforementioned doubt; and about this he does two things:

first, he shows how God can be named;

second, how it can be discussed concerning the divine names, at yet now, gathering from the eloquences.

79. The first part is divided into three, according to the three modes of the namings of God, which he assigns;

the second part begins at yet because, as the essence of goodness;

the third part begins at and indeed the theologians commend.

80. About the first, he does two things:

first he posits the root of the first mode of namings;

second, he assigns the first mode of the namings of God, at deiform minds united to these.

81. Therefore he says first that, as was said in the book On the Theological Hypotyposes, one itself per se, which is God, which is unknown and supersubstantial, that is, above every substance, and which is the good itself, that is, the very essence of goodness, and which is what is itself, that is, being itself per se, namely the triune unity itself, I say, in which there is not any grade, but all three per se are simultaneously and equally God and simultaneously and equally the good itself, not that the Son is the shadow of goodness as Origen and Arius said—that one, I say, according to what it is in itself, it is possible neither to say, nor to think, for us; for we cannot see the very essence of God, which is unity in Trinity, in the present life.

82. And although the angels see his essence, nevertheless even the unitions of holy virtues that befit the angels are ineffable and unknown to us, namely the unitions by which they are united through knowledge to the divine essence, by attaining it in some way, but not by comprehending it; which, namely the unitions, it is necessary to call admissions or receptions of the divine goodness, super-unknown and super-clear; for it is not unknown on account of obscurity, but on account of an abundance of clarity. Yet they can be called admissions, inasmuch as the divine goodness itself sends itself in a certain mode to holy minds; yet receptions, inasmuch as holy minds grasp it, according to their mode. And although now admissions of this sort are ineffable and unknown to us, nevertheless they shall be in some men, but only those who are considered worthy by the angels themselves, that is, by the society and company of the angels, as regards super-angelic knowledge. For the vision of God through his essence is above the nature of whatever created intellect, not only human, but also angelic.

83. Then when he says, deiform minds united to these, he assigns the first mode of the namings of God, namely that which is made through removal, and he says that the minds of the holy ones conformed to God, namely of the prophets and apostles, united, that is, joined to the aforementioned admissions and receptions, according to the imitation of the angels, not indeed equally to the angels but as is possible in this life, praise God most properly through removal from all existing things; and this because the unition of holy minds to God, which is above every light, thus is made, namely through removal from all existing things, according to the quieting of every intellectual operation, that is, in the ultimate stage, in which their every intellectual operation is quiet. For this is the ultimate to which we can attain about divine knowledge in this life: that God is above everything that can be known by us, and for this reason the naming of God that is through removal is most proper; for those who praise God thus through removal, through God’s illumination truly and supernaturally are taught this from the most blessed joining to God; which God, since he is the cause of all existing things, himself is nothing of existing things, not as though failing from being, but supereminently segregated from all things. And for this reason the divine supersubstantiality, which is the essence of goodness, by these who are lovers of the divine truth, which is above every truth, cannot be praised, in whatever mode it is, that is, comprehensively, such that he should be called neither reason or virtue nor mind or life or substance. And there is the same ratio concerning all the other names that signify the processions of God into creatures.

84. But they praise it as super-excellently segregated from every habit, which can be referred to artificial things or to whatever exterior circumstances; also from motion, as regards natural things; life, as regards living things; phantasm, opinion, that is, reckoning, as regards sensitive things; uncomplex name, complex word, deliberation, that is, inquisitive reason, as regards rational things, as men are; intellect, as regards intellectual things, as angels are; and universally as regards all things he says, substance, if the being of things were considered; station, gathering, as regards the permanence of things: so that station might be referred to the firmness of a thing according as is consists in itself; whereas gathering, according as it is firm in other things; and as regards the perfection of things, he adds, unition, end, infinity, and universally from all things in whatever mode they exist.

This therefore is the first mode of the namings of God, through the negation of all things, the reason being that he is above all things, and whatever is signified by whatever name is less than what God is, because he exceeds our knowledge, which we express through names imposed by us.

85. Then when he says, yet because, as the essence of goodness, he hands on the second mode of the namings of God, namely those that name God as cause; and about this he does three things:

first, he introduces the ratio of namings of this sort;

second, he posits the namings themselves, at therefore the theologians knowing this;

third, he excludes a certain error, at and truly it is praised.

86. Yet for the evidence of the first part, it must be considered that since effects proceed through a certain assimilation from their causes, according to the mode in which something is a cause, it prepossesses in itself a likeness of its effect. For if something is the cause of something else according to its species or nature, the effect has in itself a likeness according to its nature: as a man generates a man and a horse a horse. Whereas if it should be a cause of something else according to some superadded disposition, according to this also it shall have a likeness of its effect. For the builder is the cause of a house, not according to his nature, but according to his art, whence the likeness of the house is not in the nature of the builder, but in his art.

87. Yet further it must be considered that, since the good has the ratio of an end, because the good is what all things desire, yet the end is the first of causes, the good is that to which the ratio of causing first applies. Therefore, according as something has itself to the good, according to this it has itself that it should be a cause.

88. Therefore because God is good, not indeed good as though participating goodness, but as the essence itself of goodness, not through any created disposition is he the cause of things, but through his being itself he is the cause of all existing things; nor through this is it excluded that he acts through intellect and will, because his understanding and willing is his very being. And therefore in himself his cause prepossesses the likeness of all his effects.

89. Yet every cause can be named from the name of its effect, inasmuch as it has in itself a likeness of it. For if there should be a likeness according to identity of ratio, that name will befit cause and caused, as the name of man, the generator and the generated. Whereas if there should not be a likeness according to the same ratio, but it should be more supereminent in the cause, the name will not be said of both according to one ratio, but supereminently of the cause, as heat of the sun and fire.

90. Therefore, because the likeness of all things preexists in the divine essence not through the same ratio, but more eminently, it follows that it is fitting to praise the providence of the deity from all things caused, as the prince of all good, that is, having principally in itself the whole good and diffusing it to others; nevertheless not univocally but supereminently, which happens on account of the fittingness of creatures with it; which fittingness indeed he designates when he adds, because also all things are around it. For effects are said to consist around a cause, inasmuch as they approach to a likeness of it, according to the likeness by which lines going out from the center stand around it, according to a certain likeness, derived from it.

91. Yet some things are found to be around something, which thing nevertheless is on account of those that stand around, as a column is on account of the house. Yet God is not on account of creatures, but conversely, and for this reason he adds, and for its sake all things are, by that mode of speaking by which medicine is said to be for the sake of health, that is, on account of health.

92. Yet it happens among us, that what is on account of the end is the active cause of the end and prior to it in generation, as medicine has itself to health; and lest God should be believed to be an end in this way, he adds, and he is before all things. For there are some things on account of the end that although they do not precede that on whose account they are, nevertheless confer something on it, as clothing is on account of man; and to exclude this from God, he adds, and all things consist in him, whence from none of them can he receive anything, but all things acquire whatever they have from him.

93. And lest anyone should believe that God is the cause of things only through the mode of an end, as certain men posited, and not through the mode of a fashioner and conserver, he adds, and to be this, namely the deity or divine providence, is of the totality of things, that is, of all things or of perfect things, the deduction, that is, the production, and substance; as if he should say: deity itself through its own being is the cause of production and of existing things.

94. Yet it must be considered further that every effect is converted to the cause from which it proceeds, as the Platonists say. The ratio of which is that each thing is converted to its good, by desiring it; yet the good of an effect is from its cause, whence every effect is converted to its cause, by desiring it. And for this reason after he had said that all things are deduced from the deity, he adds that all things are converted to it through desire; and this is what he says: and all things desire it.

95. And lest anyone should believe that all things know it, he shows how, in diverse ways, diverse things desire it, adding, intellectual things indeed, that is, angels, and rational things, that is, men, desire it by knowledge, that is, by knowing it, for it cannot be known unless by intellect or reason; yet things subject to these desire it not by knowledge, but other things indeed only sensibly, as brute animals; and other things according to a vivifying mode, as plants; or according to substantial aptitude, as those things that are moved according to generation and corruption; or habitual, as in other motions, which are according to quality and quantity and where; for all things of this sort, although they do not know God, nevertheless are said to desire him, inasmuch as they tend to a certain particular good. Yet in every particular good the first good is refulgent, from which whatever good has that it is desirable.

96. Then when he says, therefore the theologians knowing this, he posits the divine namings according to the aforementioned ratio, and he says that the theologians, considering the aforementioned things, namely that God is segregated from all things and nevertheless is the cause of all things, sometimes indeed call him unnameable, yet sometimes there are attributed to him the names of all things: unnameable indeed, they call him, as when they say that this deity in one of the mystical visions, which were according to imaginative divine apparition, significantly rebukes him who asked, what is your name? of the angel who appeared in the person of God. And so that he would exclude him from all knowledge that could come from the name of God, he said, why do you ask my name which is wonderful? And this is had in Genesis 32:27–29. And truly this name is wonderful, which is above every name, as is said in Philippians 2:9; which is unnameable, as though gathered above every name that is named whether in that age or in the future, as is had in Ephesians 1:21.

97. And not only is God praised in the Scriptures as unnameable but also as of many names, as when God himself is introduced saying, I am who am (Ex. 3:14); and life and truth (John 14:6); and light (John 8:12); and God (Ex. 3:6): I am the God of Abraham.

98. And not only do they introduce him saying many names of himself, but also those who were experienced about the deity, as the apostles and prophets, praise God as the cause of all things from many caused things. Yet it is not necessary to distinguish here the diversity of these caused things that he adds here, because they will be distinguished in the distinction of the chapters, when he reduces all effects of this sort to fixed chapters. For they praise him as good (Luke 18:18); as beautiful (Song 1:15); as wise (Job 9:4); as lovable (Song 5:16); as God of gods (Ps. 49:1); as holy of holies (Dan. 9:24); as eternal (Baruch 4:7); as existing: are you not he who alone is? (Job 14:4); as cause of the ages (Sir. 24:14); as granter of life (Acts 17:25); as wisdom (1 Cor. 1:21); as mind, and another translation has intellect (Is. 29:16); as reason: I who speak justice, where another translation has: I who dispute justice (Is. 63:1), or better it can be said that reason in Greek is logos, which also signifies word, which is found in many places in the Scriptures; as knower (2 Tim. 2:19); as prepossessing all the treasures of all knowledge (Col. 2:3); as virtue (1 Cor. 1:24); as power (Ps. 88:9); as king of kings (Rev. 19:16); as ancient of days (Dan. 7:9); as without aging and invariable (James 1:17); as salvation (Matt. 1:21); as justice, as justifying, as liberation or redemption, according to another translation (1 Cor. 1:30); as magnitude exceeding all things (Job 23:6); as in the subtle breeze (1 Kings 19:12); and they say that it is also in minds, or hearts (Eph. 3:17); in souls (Wis. 7:27); and in bodies (1 Cor. 6:13); in heaven and on earth (Jer. 23:24); and simultaneously in the same, that is, as regards the same matter, they say that the same is mundane, that is, in the world (John 1:10); circa-mundane (Sir. 24:14); super-mundane (Is. 66:1); and supercelestial: high over all nations is the Lord, and above the heavens his glory (Ps. 112:4); supersubstantial (Matt. 6:11); sun (Mal. 4:2); luminary, that is, star (Rev. 22:16); fire (Deut. 4:12); water (John 4:10); spirit (Joel 2:28); and dew (Hos. 14:6); cloud (Hos. 6:4); stone (Ps. 117:22); rock (1 Cor. 10:4); and all other existing things are attributed to him as cause; and it is nothing of existing things, inasmuch as it super-exceeds all things. And therefore it both befits God, who is the cause of all things and nevertheless existing above all things, to be unnameable, inasmuch as existing above all things, and nevertheless all names of existing things befit him, as cause of all things; and he adds the reason.

99. For the evidence of which it must be considered that the rule of the universe is best. Yet for the goodness of rule there is required that he who rules should not be altogether alien from those who are ruled, but should have some concordance with them, in order that he can be useful; and nevertheless that he should super-exceed his subjects, lest he should be contemptable, so that he can command them. And this what he adds: so that the kingdom of all, that is, the rule of the universe, should be diligently, that is, should proceed in the best way, all things are about the first cause, as though derived from it according to a certain likeness; and from it all things are segregated, as from a cause, on account of which all things are; as from a principle, from which they flow; as from an end, which they attain; and it, through this mode, should be all things in all things, inasmuch as every perfection of all things is God himself causally, according to the eloquence, for this is written in 1 Corinthians 15:28.

100. Then when he says, and truly it is praised, he excludes the error of certain men. For there were certain Platonists who reduced the processions of perfection to diverse principles, positing that there is one principle of life, which they called first life, and that there is another principle of understanding, which they called first intellect, and another of existing, which they called first being and good. And to exclude this, he says that God truly is praised as the principal substance of all things, inasmuch as he is the principle of existing for all things; and he is called the perfective cause of all things, inasmuch as he gives all perfections to things; and he is called the contentive cause, guard and food, which three seem to pertain to the conservation of things. For there are certain things that do not need anything except to be conserved in their principles, because they cannot be corrupted from without, as the celestial bodies, and as regards this he says that he is a contentive cause, because he contains these in being. Whereas there are certain things that, although they do not fail from their own principles, can be corrupted from without, as water by fire, and as regards this he says, guard, because these are defended by God, lest, beyond the order of their ratio, they should be corrupted by those things. Yet there are certain things that for their conservation need supplemental things, as men and animals need food, and as regards this he says, food, namely because he administers to all things those things that are necessary for their conservation. He is also even a cause conversive to itself, because the very fact that things are converted to God, by desiring him as their end, is in them from God. And all these things befit God unitively, that is, not according to diverse virtues, but according to one simple virtue; and communicably segregatedly, because he so communicates the aforementioned causalities to others, that nevertheless a certain singular mode of causing remains separately for him.

101. Yet for this reason he is thus praised diversely as cause, because not only is it the cause of containing, that is, of the salvation of things, or of life or of perfection, so that the divine goodness that is above every name, should be named, that is, ought to be named, from this alone or another providence, that is, causality, but the divine goodness itself pre-receives simply in itself all existing things, that is, not such that it is composed out of all things, but those that are many composed things in themselves, in God are one simply and incircumfinitely, because when singular names determinately signify something distinct from others, coming into divine predication, they do not signify this finitely, but infinitely: as the name of wisdom as it is received in created things signifies something distinct from justice, as for example existing in a determinate genus and species, but when is it received in divine matters, it does not signify something determined to a genus and to a species or a distinction from other perfections, but something infinite; and for this reason God is praised and named fittingly from the most perfect goodnesses, that is, perfections, which come to things through the providence of that supreme cause; which although it is one and the same, is nevertheless of diverse things—nay rather, the cause of all things, as when he is named by the name of substance or of life or of something of this sort, and also it is named from all existing things, on account of the participated perfections in them, as if he were named sun on account of clarity and rock on account of firmness and thus concerning the others.

102. Then when he says, and indeed the theologians commend, he posits the third mode of the namings of God, and he says that the holy theologians commend to us not only those namings of God that are taken from perfect or particular providences or foreseeings, so that through providences we should understand perfections communicated to things, as goodness and wisdom; yet through foreseeings, the things themselves participating perfections of this sort, as man or the sun—of which providences indeed those are called perfect that are universal, as good, existing, and things of this sort; yet particular that befit some genus of things, as wise and just, but it happens that sometimes they name the goodness of God that is super-nameable, on account of its super-splendor, from certain divine apparitions, that is, imaginative visions, by which the prophets or masters were illuminated, which he says on account of those who have written hagiographies; or in the holy temples or in whatever other places, and this according to diverse causes and virtues. For from diverse rationes, diverse apparitions have been made, whence they place around him human or fiery or amber forms, and unto his praise they describe for him eyes and ears and other members, and they place around it crowns and honors and other things of this sort, which is easy to consider from diverse places in Scripture. And concerning names of God of this sort he premises that he will tell in the book On the Symbolic Theology, which is not had among us.

103. Then when he says, yet now, gathering from the eloquences, he shows how the divine names must be treated, and about this he does three things:

first he shows which divine names must be treated in this book;

second, what mode of doctrine must be observed both as regards those teaching and as regards those listening, at and let us observe with the inspective deliberation;

third, he exhorts Timothy, to whom he is writing, to observe this, at therefore to guard this is useful.

104. Therefore he says, first, that now we must proceed, in this book, to the manifestation of the intelligible divine names, that is, those that are not taken from sensible things symbolically, but from intelligible perfections proceeding from him into creatures, as are being, living, and things of this sort, such that there are gathered from the Sacred Scriptures whatever names pertain to the present business; and that these things that have been said in this chapter must be used as a certain rule, which it is necessary to respect in the whole present work. For since there have been introduced three genera of the namings of God,

concerning the first, which is through removal, it is treated in the Mystical Theology;

concerning the third, which is through sensible likenesses, in the book On the Symbolic Theology.

105. Then when he says, and let us observe with the inspective deliberation, he shows the mode of determining concerning the divine names, when he says that it must be considered that we should tell properly, in this book, the contemplations by which God appears. And he says, properly, against metaphorical apparitions. And again it must be observed that to the manifestations of the holy names of God, there are admitted holy ears, namely those of the faithful, who listen piously and reverently, not those of the infidels, who mock and blaspheme, such that we might gather holy things in holy men, according to the divine tradition, with God commanding: do not give the holy to dogs (Matt. 7:6); so that thus holy things might be removed from the derisions of the unlearned—nay rather, the men themselves, if those who are totally resisting divine things should be freed from the assault of God; for these by deriding divine things do not harm divine things, but themselves. And this, I say, must be provided for in this work, because always according to every theological doctrine the hierarchical law, that is, that which is handed on through the holy princes, induces, that is, commands or exhorts, that these things must be observed according to a certain deliberation, which does not come from human wisdom, but from the very circumspection of God.

106. Then when he says, therefore to guard this is useful, he induces Timothy to observe these things; and he says that it is useful for him to guard the things already said, but that he should ponder these in a most holy way, and that those things that are divine he should neither tell nor expose in whatever way, that is, give to the unlearned, namely to the infidels or whatever unlearned men who, not grasping on account of inexperience, deride.

107. Yet last, he ends the present chapter in a prayer, asking God that he should give to him with the praise of God, according as befits God, to hand on the diverse namings of the deity, which cannot be expressed or named by voice, and that he should not remove the word of truth from his mouth.

What Things Are Said Commonly and What Distinctly in the Trinity

C. II, § 1. 31. Per se goodness, determining and manifesting the whole thearchic essence, whatever it is, is praised by the eloquences. For what else is there to say from the holy theology, when it says that the thearchy itself narrating says, why do you ask me about the good? No one is good but God alone (Matt 19:17, Mark 10:18, Luke 18:19). Therefore, this having been inquired into also in the others, we must demonstrate that all the namings of God befitting God always are praised by the eloquences, not particularly, but in the whole and perfect and integral and first deity, and all these simply, absolutely, and totally unobservedly are appointed to the universal totality of the perfect and all deity.

32. And indeed, as we remembered in the Theological Hypotyposes, if anyone should say that this is said not of the whole deity, he also dares unfittingly to tear apart the super-united unity. Therefore it must be said that even the Word, good itself by nature, said, I am good (Matt 20:15); and indeed one of the God-received prophets praises the good Spirit (Ps 143:10); and again, if anyone should have said that: I am who am, (Ex 3:14) is not praised of the whole deity, yet he tries to circumscribe it according to one part, how shall they hear: these things he says who is, who was, who is to come, omnipotent (Rev 1:8); and: yet you are the very same (Ps 102:27); and: the Spirit of truth, who is, who proceeds from the Father? (John 15:26) And if they say that not the whole thearchy is life, how can what the holy Word said be true: as the Father raises the dead and vivifies, so also the Son vivifies whom he wills (John 5:21); and: the Holy Spirit is who vivifies? (John 6:63) Yet because the whole deity has also the domination of the whole of things, indeed it is not said of the deigenic or filial deity, as I reckon, in as many places of theology as Lord is said frequently in Father and Son; but also the Holy Spirit is Lord (2 Cor 3:17); and there is praised the beautiful and the wise in the whole deity, and light and deific and cause; and all things whatever that are of the whole thearchy, the eloquences reduce to all thearchic praising: comprehensively indeed, as when they say, all things are from God (1 Cor 2:12); yet diffusively, as when they say, all things were made through him and in him, and all things consist in him (Col 1:16); and: send out your Spirit and they shall be created (Ps 104:30).

33. And, so that anyone should say it summarily, the thearchic Word itself said, the Father and I are one (John 10:30); and: everything that the Father has is mine (John 16:15); and: all mine are his and his, mine (John 17:10); and again, whatever things are of the Father himself, it attributes communicatively and unitively to the thearchic Spirit: divine operations, honor, fontal and unfailing cause, and distribution of kind gifts. And I reckon that nothing in the divine eloquences, not perverted by the intentions of their companions, contradicts these, because all befitting God pertain to the whole thearchy, according to the perfect Word in God.

34. Therefore these things having been demonstrated and determined by us from the eloquences, briefly indeed in these and particularly, yet in others sufficiently, whatever naming of God we try to treat totally, it is fitting to receive it in the whole deity.

§ 2. 35. Yet if anyone should say, we introduce confusion in this against the division befitting God, we do not reckon that such a word as this is sufficient to persuade that this is true.

36. For if anyone indeed is one who totally resists the eloquences, he shall be altogether far also from our philosophy, and if there is for him no concern of the veneration of God from the eloquences, how can there be concern for us of that leading by the hand to theological science? Yet if he respects the truth of the eloquences, we also, using this as a canon and light, unto excusing, as we can, go indeclinably, saying that a certain theology indeed hands on unitively, yet a certain one discretely; and it is fitting granted neither to divide the united, nor to confound the discrete, but following this, according to truth, to respect the divine splendors; for thence assuming the divine manifestations as a certain best canon of truth, we shall strive to guard those placed there in our very selves, not multiplied and not lessened and not perverse, ourselves guarded in the guarding of holy things and confirmed by them to guard those guarding them.

§ 3. 37. Therefore the united of the whole deity, as we have demonstrated in the Theological Hypotyposes through many things from the eloquences, are: super-good, super-God, supersubstantial, super-living, super-wise, and whatever are of exceeding removal; with these also all causal names: good, beautiful, existing, generative of life, wise, and whatever from his kind gifts are named by the cause of all good things. Yet the discrete, the supersubstantial name of the Father and use and of the Son and of the Spirit, with no conversion or communion totally super-induced. Yet again it is discrete with this, according to us the perfect and invariable essence of Jesus, and whatever substantial mysteries of kindness are according to this.

108. After Denys, in the preceding chapter, handed on the mode of proceeding in this work and the ratio of the divine names, in this second chapter he intends to show that the divine names, which are treated in this book, are common to the whole Trinity; and for this reason this chapter is entitled On United and Discrete Theology, because in this chapter there is handed on those things that are said commonly of the whole Trinity and those that are said of the distinct persons. And there is handed on also in this same chapter what is the ratio of community and distinction in divine things, which pertains to the second part of the title, when he says, and What Is Divine Unition and Discretion.

109. Yet this chapter is divided into two parts:

in the first he shows what things are said commonly and what distinctly in the Trinity;

in the second he assigns the ratio of community and of distinction, at yet it is necessary, as I reckon.

110. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows that the divine names, which must be treated in this book, must be received in the whole Trinity;

in the second, he removes an objection made to the contrary, at yet if anyone should say.

111. About the first, he does three things:

first, he posits the intended truth;

second, he proves it, at and indeed, as we remembered;

third, he excuses himself from a more diligent proof, at therefore these things having been demonstrated.

112. Therefore he says, first, that per se goodness is praised by the eloquences, that is, the Sacred Scriptures, as determining, that is, distinguishing from others, and manifesting the whole divine essence, whatever it is, because whatever the divine essence befits, it befits it to be goodness per se and conversely. And he proves this through the fact that in Sacred Scripture the divinity itself is introduced, in the person of the Son, saying, why do you ask me about the good? No one is good but God alone, as is had in Luke 18:19; which must be understood concerning goodness per se. And because it is such concerning the name of goodness, therefore also in the other books after the inquiry, we must demonstrate that all names befitting to God are praised in the Sacred Scriptures, not particularly, as though befitting only one perfectly, but in the whole and perfect integral and first deity of the Trinity.

113. Yet a whole here is not received according as it is composed of parts, for thus it could not correspond to the deity, as repugnant to its simplicity, but as according to the Platonists a certain totality is said to be before parts, which is before the totality that is out of parts; as if we should say that a house that is in matter is a whole out of parts, and a house that preexists in the art of the builder is a whole before parts. And in this mode the whole universe of things, which is as a whole out of parts, preexists as in a primordial cause in the deity itself; and thus, the deity itself of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, is called whole, as though prepossessing all things in itself.

114. Perfect must not be received according to the mode of signifying of a word by which perfect is said as though completely made, as we say that we have per-walked, when we have completed a walk; whence what is not made cannot be called perfect according to this ratio; but because things that are made then arrive at the end of their perfection, when they attain the nature and virtue of their proper species, thence it is that this name perfect is assumed to signify everything that attains its proper virtue and nature. And in this mode the divinity is called perfect, inasmuch as it is most of all in its nature and virtue.

115. Yet the integral and the perfect seem to be the same; nevertheless they differ by ratio: for something seems to be called perfect in attaining to its proper nature, yet integral through the removal of diminution, as we say that some man is not integral, if after he attains his proper nature, he is mutilated in some member. And because nothing can be subtracted from the deity of the Trinity, to signify this he adds, integral.

116. Yet first to signify that the deity of three persons is not participated deity; for first is said of what is unparticipated, as per se deity and per se goodness. And they seem to be posited to exclude the error of Origen and Arius, who posited that the deity of the Son is participated.

117. And in order that he might show that the names of God not only are said commonly of the three persons, but equally and in the same mode, he adds that it also must be demonstrated that all the aforementioned namings are appointed, that is, attributed, simply, absolutely, and totally unobservedly, to the universal totality of the perfect and all, that is, whole, deity; so that what he says: universal, might be referred to the number of persons, whereas the other things to the perfection of essence; and this: simply, which responds to what he had said: first; for those things that are unparticipated are called good simply, whereas those that are participated are called goods particularly, according to Augustine: take this and that and you shall see the good of every good;¹ absolutely, which responds to what he had said: integral; for those things that are corrupted cannot be named absolutely, as a dead man is not called man absolutely; totally unobservedly, that is, without the rest of distinction observing, which responds to what he had said: perfect; for unless there were perfect deity in whichever of the persons, it would be necessary to observe how something was said of one and how of another.

118. Then when he says, and indeed, as we remembered, he proves what he had presupposed;

and first: it is said specially of certain names;

second: of all, at and, so that anyone should say it summarily.

119. Therefore he says, first, that, as was commemorated in the book On the Theological Hypotyposes, if anyone should say that this which has been said: no one is good but God alone, is not said of the whole deity, that is, of all the persons, and through this he presumes an error, daring to divide the unity of the divine unity, it must be said against him that even the Word itself, that is, the Son of God, as naturally having goodness, said, I am the good shepherd (John 10:11), and in the psalms it is said, of course in Psalm 142:10: your good spirit. And likewise if anyone should have said that what is said in Exodus 3:14: I am who am, is not praised of the whole Trinity, that is, of all the persons, but of one only, how shall he receive what is said in Revelation 1:4: these things he says who is and who was and who is to come, omnipotent; and what the Apostle introduces about the Son: yet you are the very same (Heb. 1:12); and about the Holy Spirit: the Spirit of truth who is, who proceeds from the Father (John 15:26)?—although our letters do not have: who is. And likewise if anyone should say that not the whole divinity is life, how is what the Son of God said true: as the Father raises the dead and vivifies, so also the Son vivifies whom he wills (John 5:21); and: the Spirit is who vivifies (John 6:64)? And that the whole deity has the domination of all things, could not be said in as many places in Sacred Scripture as this name Lord is said frequently of Father and Son, and this so that we might speak of the deigenic deity of Father or the filial deity of the Son. But the Spirit also is Lord, as is said in 2 Corinthians 3:17. And likewise there is praised the beautiful and the wise, in all the persons of the deity, and light and deific and cause and all things whatever that are of the whole deity the sacred eloquences reduce to all divine praising, sometimes indeed simultaneously by comprehending that it befits all the persons, as when it is said, all things are from God (Rom. 11:36), yet sometimes distinct concerning one person, as when it is said of the Son: all things were made through him and in him and . . . consist in him (Col. 1:16); and in the psalms: send out your Spirit and they shall be created (Ps. 103:30).

120. Then when he says, and, so that anyone should say it summarily, he shows the proposition commonly of all the names of God, saying that, so that in sum it might be said of all the names of God, the very Word of God said, the Father and I are one (John 10:30), through which it is shown that whatever things are said of the Son also are said of the Father; and: and everything that the Father has is mine (John 16:15); and likewise whatever things are of the Father and of the Son, Sacred Scripture attributes commonly and unitedly to the divine Spirit: divine operations, divine honor, fontal and unfailing cause, and distribution of kind gifts. And all these things are had in 1 Corinthians 12:11: one and the same Spirit works all these things. And these things are so true that I reckon that no custom in the divine eloquences, which does not have a corrupt intention in them, contradicts these, namely that all the names befitting God pertain to the whole deity, according to the perfect mode of speaking of God.

121. Then when he says, therefore these things having been demonstrated, he excuses himself from a more diligent inquiry of the aforementioned things; and he says that these things have been determined here briefly and particularly from the Sacred Scriptures, but more sufficiently in another book. Whence whatever naming of God we shall try to expound in the present work, it is necessary that this name be received in the whole deity, that is, in all the persons; and to this end there is introduced the whole present chapter.

122. Then when he says, yet if anyone should say, he excludes an objection;

and first, he poses the objection;

second, the mode of solving, at for if anyone indeed is one.

123. Yet someone could object that through the fact that all names that are said of the Father are attributed to the Son and the Holy Spirit, the distinction of persons is removed altogether and confusion is introduced in the divine persons, which does not befit God. But he says that if anyone should object thus it must not be reckoned that his speech is sufficient to persuade that he tells the truth; for the distinction of persons is not removed through this.

124. Then when he says, for if anyone indeed is one, he posits the mode of solving, saying that if the man who so objects totally contradicts the Sacred Scriptures, such a man is altogether withdrawn from our wisdom. For it does not pertain to theology to prove those things that are of faith to him who does not receive the Scriptures, since faith is above reason. Whence if he does not have concern to venerate the divine eloquences, how can there be concern for us to lead him by the hand to the divine science?—because in the philosophical sciences it is such that no wise man disputes against one denying the principles of his art.

125. But if anyone thus objecting should wish to respect the truth of the sacred eloquences, we, using Sacred Scripture as a certain rule and light manifesting truth, proceed, not declining from Sacred Scripture, to excuse ourselves from the aforementioned objection, and we say that Sacred Scripture hands on certain things commonly concerning the three persons, certain things more distinctly, and it is fitting for us granted not to distinguish those that are common, nor to confound those that are distinct; but, by following Sacred Scripture, according to our ability, to respect the divine truths. Because it is necessary that we, receiving from Sacred Scripture the manifestation of God, should guard those things that are posited in Sacred Scripture as a certain best rule of truth, such that we should neither multiply, by adding; nor lessen, by subtracting; nor pervert, by expounding badly; because while we guard holy things we are guarded by them, and we are confirmed by them to guard those who guard holy things. For it is necessary not only to conserve those things that are handed on in the Sacred Scriptures, but also those things that are said by the sacred doctors, who conserved Holy Scripture intact.

126. Then when he says, therefore the united of the whole deity, he manifests the solution posed as regards what he said: that Sacred Scripture hands on certain things about the Trinity unitedly and certain things discretely; and he says that the united of the whole deity, that is, those common to the whole Trinity, as has been said in the book On the Divine Hypotyposes and has been proven through many authorities received from the Sacred Scriptures, are two genera of names:

first of all, those that are said of God remotively through a certain excellence, as super-good, supersubstantial, super-living, super-wise, and whatever others are said of God through removal, on account of his excess; with these, I say, there must be co-numbered all causal names, that is, which designate God as the principle of the procession of perfections that emanate from him into creatures, namely: good, beautiful, existing, generative of life, wise, and whatever others through which the cause of all good things is named from the gift of his goodness. And from this there can be received the magistral rule that all names designating an effect into creatures pertain to the divine essence.

127. Yet the discrete names, that is, those pertaining distinctly to the three persons, are: the supersubstantial or hypostatic, that is, personal, name of the Father and use of the Father, that is, his act which is generation; and likewise the name of the Son and his act, which is to be generated; and the name of the Holy Spirit and his act which is procession; such that, in such things, no conversion ought to be super-induced, as if he were to say that the Father generates the Son and conversely; or whatever sort of communion, as if he were to say that the Father and the Son generate some other person. And likewise the mystery of the Incarnation pertains distinctly to a divine person, because only the person of the Son was incarnated; and this is what he says: that with the aforementioned things it is discrete: because the perfect and invariable essence of Jesus according to the nature of the deity, is according to us through the unition of humanity; and whatever other substantial, that is, personal, mysteries pertain to the kindness of the Incarnation.

§ 4. 38. Yet it is necessary, as I reckon, taking it up again, for us to expound more the perfect mode of divine unition and discretion, in order that every speech should be made conspicuous to us: rejecting indeed everything various and not plain, yet discretely and plainly and ordinately, determining proper things according to virtue.

39. For our holy masters of theological tradition, which I have said also in other works, indeed call the divine unitions, which are of the super-ineffable and super-unknown singularity, hidden and inegressible super-gatherings;

40. yet discretions befitting the good, thearchic processions and manifestations.

41. And they say, following the holy eloquences, and the proper things of the said unition and again of discretion, that there are certain proper discretions and unitions.

42. As in divine unition, that is, supersubstantiality, there is united indeed and common to the principal Trinity: supersubstantial essence, super-godly divinity, super-good goodness, which is identity above all things of the total propriety existing above all things, unity above principate; ineffable, by ignorance of much light, perfectly not intelligible, the positing of all things, the removal of all things, which is above every positing and removal;

43. the dwelling of the principal persons in one another, if it is necessary so to say, all the totally super-united gathering.

44. In which mode the lights of lamps, so that I might use sensible and proper examples, being in one house, both are all together wholly in the whole of one another, and have diligent discretion from one another properly subsisting, united by discretion and discrete by unition.

45. And indeed we see, with many lamps being in the house, the lights of all united into one certain light and resplendent by one indiscrete clarity, and no one, as I reckon, could discern the light of this lamp from the others out of the air containing all the lights, and see one without another, with all in all blended without mixing.

46. But also if anyone should take one out from the house, there shall leave with it also its whole proper light, tearing away with it nothing of the other lights in itself and leaving nothing of its own self to the others. For there was of these, which I have said, perfect unition of whole to whole, not mixed universally and with no part confused.

47. And these things totally in the body air and light dependent upon material fire. Yet there we say that supersubstantial unition is gathered, not over only those unitions that are in the body, but also over all those that are in souls themselves and in minds themselves, which they have not mixedly and super-mundanely, the whole through the whole deiform and supercelestial lights, according to the proportional participation of the unition segregated from all participating things.

§ 5. 48. Yet there is discretion in the supersubstantial theologies, not which I said: only that according to this unition each of the principal persons unmixedly and unconfusedly is gathered, but also that those that are of the supersubstantial fecundity of God, are not converted to one another: yet the only font of supersubstantial deity is the Father, nor is the Son the Father, nor is the Father the Son, with the hymns guarding by religion the proper things of each of the thearchic persons. Those things indeed, according to the ineffable both unition and essence, are both unitions and discretions.

128. Because in the solution to the objection posed above he had said that a certain theology concerning the divine persons hands on unitively and a certain one discretely, he intends here to expound of what sort is unition and discretion in divine matters;

and first, he expounds according as it is possible;

second, he says that it cannot totally and perfectly be expounded by us, at but indeed whatever causes.

129. About the first he does two things:

first, he hands on the mode according to which he intends to expound;

second, he expounds according to that mode, at for our holy masters of theological tradition.

130. Therefore he says that for a fuller understanding of the solutions given, it is necessary, according to his reckoning, to expound more the perfect mode of divine unition and discretion, taking up the solution again from the beginning, such that every speech of ours about this might be made conspicuous, that is, manifest. To attain which, he posits two things to be avoided and three to be observed: for there must be avoided or rejected everything various, confused or mixed. For when someone says diverse things confusedly and indistinctly, it is necessary that he should speak now about this, now about that, and thus variety appears in his speech; there must be rejected everything not plain, that is, obscure, which indeed can happen if intelligible things are handed on without the leading by the hand of sensible examples or if some manifest things were to be handed on through unaccustomed words. Yet against these two, he posits two things to be observed: namely that his speech should determine, according to the virtue of speaking, proper things, that is, things connatural to us; discretely, against what he had said: various; and plainly, against what he had said: not plain; and he adds a third, namely, ordinately; for it is necessary, for this doctrine to be manifest, that it should be proceeded according to the order of the discipline, by beginning from more manifest things and from those through the knowledge of which others are known. He even promises that he will expound the perfect mode of divine unition and discretion, because he will assign all the modes according to which unition and discretion can be received in divine things, yet not that he can manifest the very mode, according as it is perfect in God; for this is above our power, as he will prove below.

131. Then when he says, for our holy masters of theological tradition, he pursues the exposition of divine unition and discretion:

and first, as it pertains to the deity;

second, as it pertains to the humanity of Christ, at yet it is discrete by the divine operation.

132. About the first, he does two things:

first, he expounds the two modes of unition and discretion;

second, he applies both, at and they say, following the holy eloquences.

133. About the first, he does two things:

first, he expounds the common mode of unition;

second, the common mode of discretion, at yet discretions befitting the good.

134. Therefore he says, first, that as he had said in his other books, namely in the book On the Divine Hypotyposes, our holy masters of theological tradition, that is, of Christian doctrine, namely the apostles and their disciples, call the divine unitions certain hidden and inegressible divine super-gatherings that are of the divine singularity, super-ineffable and super-unknown.

135. For the evidence of which it must be considered that, since every multitude of things flows out from a first principle, the first principle, according as it is considered in itself, is one; yet according to the emanation by which a multitude proceeds from it, already there is found from what the first principle can be distinguished, because the ratio of multitude consists in distinction. Therefore to consider the first principle, according as it is in itself, this is to consider its unition, and this existence of the first principle in itself, he calls super-gathering; and he names this super-gathering both hidden and inegressible: hidden indeed because God can be known by us, inasmuch as we know the participations of his goodness; yet according as he is in himself, he is hidden to us; yet he says inegressible, because according as it is in itself the first principle is communicated to none, and thus it is as though it does not go out from itself: and on account of this the divinity itself so considered, through excellence distinguishing it from all things, he calls singularity, because the singular is what is incommunicable.

136. Then when he says, yet discretions befitting the good, he expounds, through its opposite, the common mode of discretions; and he says that the aforementioned teachers call discretions processions and manifestations of the deity, which befit it inasmuch as it is the good itself, because it is of the ratio of the good that from it there should proceed effects through its communication. And it must be considered that against what he had said above: hidden and inegressible, he posited fittingly enough processions and manifestations, because it is manifested through effects going forth from it, and in a certain mode the deity itself proceeds into its effects, while it hands on a likeness of itself to things, according to the proportion of each, such that, nevertheless, its excellence and singularity remain for itself, uncommunicated to things and hidden to them. Therefore these processions are called discretions, because unless other things were to flow out from a first principle, the first principle would not have anything by which it would be discerned.

137. Then when he says, and they say, following the holy eloquences, he applies both of the said modes;

and first, he poses a subdivision;

second, he manifests it, at as in divine unition.

138. Therefore he says, first, that those who follow the Sacred Scriptures and follow the proper rationes of the aforementioned unition and again of the aforementioned discretion, say that both in the aforementioned common unition there are certain proper unitions and discretions, and also in the aforementioned common discretion.

139. Then when he says, as in divine unition, he expounds the subdivision;

and first, he shows how, in the aforementioned common mode of unition, there is a certain unition and discretion;

second, he shows that, even in the aforementioned discretion, there is unition and discretion, at yet there is discretion in the supersubstantial theologies.

140. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows how in the aforementioned unition there is a proper unition;

second, how in the aforementioned unition there is discretion, at the dwelling of the principal persons.

141. Therefore for the understanding of this part it must be considered that, since above he received the ratio of divine unition from the fact that God in himself is considered according to his excellence, that consideration is twofold. For there can be considered that super-excelling essence of God in itself: either according to the essence, and thus it is united and common to the whole Trinity; or according as one of the persons is in another, and thus in unition there is found discretion.

142. Therefore this is what he says: as in divine unition, that is, supersubstantiality, as though he should say: I so receive the divine unition in this mode according to the common ratio of unition posited above, according as the ratio of union consists in a certain excellence of the deity; in this common unition, I say, whatever pertains to the super-excellence of the divine essence is united and common to the principal Trinity, and, through this, he gives to understand that the ratio of proper unity, which now he is expounding, is nothing other than the being common to the three persons; and he exemplifies: as supersubstantial essence, super-godly divinity, that is, above the mode of deity communicated to things, and super-good goodness, and identity which is above all things, namely according to which God is the same to himself, and unity above principate, unity, I say, of the total existing propriety, namely above all things.

143. And he says this because one has the ratio of a principle. Yet one is one according as it is undivided in itself; yet this is what retains the propriety of its nature. As if he should say that God, inasmuch as he is unity, is the principle over every principle, having in himself his propriety by which he exists above all things. To this excellence also there is that he is unknown by us on account of the excellence of his light, and that he is perfectly intelligible, that is, comprehensible, by no created intellect, and that all things can be affirmed of him and all things denied, according to the mode expounded in the preceding chapter, since nevertheless he is above every affirmation and negation; for he is above every understanding of ours, which composes affirmations and negations.

144. Then when he says, the dwelling of the principal persons, he expounds how discretion is in the common mode of unition, which is super-excelling gathering; and about this, he does three things:

first, he posits what he intends;

second, he manifests the proposition, through a sensible example, at in which mode the lights of lamps;

third, he shows the example to be failing of the representation of so great a thing, at and these things totally in the body air etc.

145. Therefore he says that the dwelling of the principal persons in one another, that is, according as one of the divine persons is in another, and the gathering of one into another, if it should be necessary so to be named, since it imports distinction, nevertheless is totally super-united, that is, pertaining to that unition of excellence about which it has been said above.

146. Then when he says in which mode the lights of lamps, he manifests, through a sensible example, that in the aforementioned unition there can be discretion; in which example indeed he does three things:

first, he posits a sensible example, in which he says that there is simultaneously unition and discretion;

second, he shows that in that example there is unition, at and indeed we see;

third, that in it there is discretion, at but also if anyone should take one.

147. Therefore he says first that so that we might use examples sensible and proper to us, the lights of many lamps, being in one house, both are all together wholly in the whole of one another and nevertheless have diligent, that is, best and perfect, discretion from one another properly subsisting; and thus many lights are united with discretion and discrete with unition.

148. Then when he says, and indeed we see, he shows that the aforementioned lights have unition with one another; and he says that we see, with many lamps being in one house, that the lights of all the lamps are united into one certain light, because in the same part of the air the lights of all the lamps are resplendent; and this is what he adds: and resplendent by one indiscrete, that is, indistinct, clarity, according to place or subject; and no one, as I reckon, could discern the light of this lamp, in the air, according as it contains all lights, from the others, and see one of them without another, because one whole light is blended with another, without mixing, namely removing discretion.

149. Then when he says, but also if anyone should take one, he shows that discretion remains there, because if anyone should take out one of the lamps, as in one of the candles, simultaneously its whole proper light would leave with it, which was from that lamp in the house—from which it is clear that the light, in the house, will be found lessened; nevertheless such that the light leaving will not simultaneously tear away something of the other lights with it, nor also will something of itself remain with the other lights; which could not be, if there were made a mixing of lights, as if water should be mixed with ash or flour, the whole cannot be extracted, so that nothing should remain of the flour or ash mixed in and also so that nothing from the ashes or flour should be lost or should leave simultaneously. But because this does not happen in the lights, it is for this reason that there was perfect joining of the whole of the lights to the whole, without every mixing and with no confusion of the parts existing.

150. Yet it must be considered that, concerning light, there was a twofold opinion of the physicists:

for certain men said that light is a body, and according to this opinion, the example introduced seems to proceed plainly enough. For thus Denys seems to speak about many lights from diverse lamps proceeding in the one air, as if he were to speak of many bodies, and especially because he says that they have subsisting discretion, for to subsist pertains to substances only, and on account of this he says that one light leaves without another, in which there seems to be designated a certain local motion, which pertains to bodies only.

151. Whereas if light should not be a body, but a quality, according to the opinion of others, the lights would not have subsisting discretion, or rather, from the diverse lamps, as from diverse agent causes, there would be made one light only, more intense in the air, and with one light removed, the superaddition of intensity would cease, as from many causes heating, heat is extended into the heatable and, with one cause subtracted, the heat is lessened.

Yet this second opinion is the truer; whence it can be said that Denys here is speaking of the subsisting discretion of the lights and of the leaving of one of them with respect to the lamps and not according to themselves. Nevertheless it must be considered that both the philosophers and also the sacred doctors were accustomed, sometimes, for manifesting a proposition, to use some examples according to some opinions probable with some men, although they themselves did not follow it.

152. Then when he says, and these things totally in the body air, he shows that that example fails of the representation of so great a thing; and he says that these things which have been said of the diverse lights, totally occur in bodily and material things, namely in the body air as in a place, whether the lights should be bodies, or in a subject if light is a quality; and, again, with sensible light being dependent upon material fire. But in the divine persons, we say that supersubstantial unition is gathered, not over only those unitions that are in the body, but also over all those that are in souls themselves and in angelic minds; which unitions indeed the deiform and supercelestial lights, that is, the angels themselves, have, the whole through the whole not mixedly and super-mundanely, namely while one angel is joined to the whole of another through understanding and affection. And unconfused unition of this sort in minds and souls is made according to the proportional participation of that unition that is in the divine persons, which is super-segregated from all participating things, namely because none of the participating things can perfectly imitate the divine unition.

153. Then when he says, yet there is discretion in the supersubstantial theologies, he expounds how in the common mode of discretion signified above, there is found both discretion and unition, that is, something common to the whole Trinity and something distinct pertaining to the persons. For it has been said above that the divine discretions are named according to the processions of the deity. Yet procession is twofold: one indeed according as one person proceeds from another, and through this the divine persons are multiplied and distinguished, and as regards this proper discretion is considered in the common mode of discretion; the other is the procession according to which a creature proceeds from God, according to which there is made a multitude of things and the distinction of creatures from God, and this is united discretion, that is, common to the whole Trinity.

154. First, therefore, he expounds how some discretion pertains to the discretion of persons;

second, how some discretion pertains to the unity of essence, at yet if also a procession befitting the good.

155. Therefore he says, first, that discretion in the supersubstantial theologies to the divine persons, not only is that which I said: that through this common unition, which pertains to the superexcellence of the deity, each of the divine persons unmixedly and unconfusedly is gathered into the others, but also that those that pertain to the supersubstantial fecundity of God never are converted to one another, as those that pertain to personal gathering were converted. For mutually the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, but nevertheless not mutually does the Father generate the Son and the Son the Father; and this is what he adds: that only the Father is the font of supersubstantial deity, as in a font there is understood authority or a principle not from a principle; nor is the Son the Father nor the Father the Son, since the divine praises, according to the faith of the Christian religion, conserve the divine proprieties of each of the divine persons.

156. Finally by way of an epilogue, he adds that those things that have been said are unitions and discretions pertaining to the ineffable divine essence itself and to its ineffable unition; because what follows concerning unition and discretion pertains to creatures.

How Under the Common Mode of Discretion There Is Contained a Certain Proper Unition, Which Is According to the Proportion of Creatures from God, Pertaining to the Whole Trinity

49. Yet if also a procession befitting the good, of the divine and super-united unition, driving and multiplying goodness itself into plurality, is a divine discretion, then there are united indeed according to divine discretion the incomprehensible traditions, substantifications, vivifications, sapientifications, and other gifts of goodness which is the cause of all things, according to which from participations and participatings participated things are praised not participably. And this is common and united and one to the whole deity, that all the whole itself is participated from each of the participating things and from none, by no part.

50. In which mode a point in the middle of a circle from all the lines placed around it in the circle, and just as many impressions of a seal participate the archetype seal and with the whole and the same existing in each of the impressions and in none according to no part.

51. Yet the imparticipability of divinity, the cause of all things, exceeds even these, because neither is there a touch of it, nor a certain other communion of mixing to parts.

§ 6. 52. Although someone might say: the seal is not in the whole of its impressions, whole and the same; yet the cause of this is not the seal, for one and the same bears all of itself to each; but the diversity of participating things makes dissimilar impressions of one and the same whole principal form, just as if they should be soft indeed and easily figurable and plain and immaculate and not of a contrary figure and hard, nor shall easily fusible and unstable things have a cleansed and plain permanent figure; yet if something should fail of the aforementioned suitability, this also shall be the cause of the unparticipated and not plain and whatever of other things should be made by unsuitability of participation.

53. Yet it is discrete by the divine operation kind to us, that the supersubstantial Word should be made according to us from us totally and truly, and should do and suffer whatever are of his human contemplation, elect and remote. For the Father and the Spirit have communicated in these according to no ratio; unless someone should say that according to will befitting the good and kind and according to every super-posited and ineffable divine operation, which also the one made according to us, invariable, according as God and the Word of God, did. So also we strive both to unite divine things by word and to discern them, just as they are both united and discrete.

157. After Denys has expounded how under the common mode of discretion, which is according to procession, there is contained a proper discretion, which is according to the procession of one person from another, now he intends to expound how under the same common mode of discretion, there is contained also a certain proper unition, which is according to the procession of creatures from God, pertaining to the whole Trinity; and about this he does two things:

first, he proposes what he intends;

second, he manifests it through examples, at in which mode a point.

158. Yet for the evidence of the first part, it must be considered that someone could say that the procession of creatures is not contained under divine discretion, whence although the procession of creatures commonly pertains to the whole Trinity, nevertheless it cannot be said that any divine discretion is common or united in the Trinity. And for this reason he wishes to show that the procession of creatures is in a certain way a divine discretion, nevertheless not in that mode in which is the procession of divine persons. For in the procession of divine persons, the same divine essence itself is communicated to the person proceeding, and thus there are many persons having the divine essence, but in the procession of creatures the divine essence itself is not communicated to the creatures proceeding, but it remains uncommunicated or unparticipated; but its likeness, through those things that it gives to creatures, is propagated and multiplied in creatures, and thus in a certain way the divinity, through a likeness of itself, not through its essence, proceeds into creatures and in a certain way is multiplied in them, such that this procession of creatures can be called a divine discretion, if respect should be had to the divine likeness, yet not if the divine essence should be respected.

159. Therefore this is what he says, that if the divine essence befitting goodness can be called a procession, which essence is of the divine super-united unition, that is, unity of essence, in which the three persons are united, which is above every unity, which in a certain way drives or leads itself out of its goodness into plurality and multiplies itself, namely according to its likeness, if, I say, such a procession, by reason of the fact that through it the divine unity in a certain way is multiplied, can be called a divine discretion, then consequently it must be said that the traditions, that is, the donations of divine gifts, which are uncomprehended on the part of the principle, are united, that is, common to the whole Trinity according to divine discretion, that is, according to the common mode of divine discretion, which is considered according to procession.

160. And he shows what those traditions are, adding, substantifications, according as he gives being to all subsistent things; vivifications, according as he gives life; sapientifications, according as he gives wisdom; and other gifts of the divine goodness, which is the cause of all things, according to which divine gifts participated through likeness, not participably, inasmuch as the essence remains unparticipated, are praised from participations, that is, from participated gifts, as are being, wisdom, and life, and participatings, namely by which those are communicated. Yet he speaks plurally of divine things either on account of the plurality of persons or on account of the plurality of names which are attributed to God himself; and this is common to the whole divinity.

161. And lest there should be understood only a community of reason, as genus is common to species and species to individuals, he adds, and united, to show that in the three it is one in number. And lest anyone should understand unity gathered from many, as a house is united from parts, he adds, and this one, namely all the whole divinity itself, that is, according to whichever person, is participated from each of the participating things through likeness and is participated from none of the participating things in no part of it, through the commixing of its substance. Yet he says that that whole is participated, nevertheless not totally or perfectly, which is incomprehensible to all, as has been said above.

162. And because this last saying seemed difficult and implying contradiction, here he manifests it consequently through examples, when he says, in which mode a point; and about this he does three things:

first, he posits the examples;

second, he shows that they are deficient, at yet the imparticipability of divinity;

third, he objects against the aforementioned and resolves it, at although someone might say.

163. Therefore he says that, concerning the participation of the deity, it is just as a point which is in the middle of a circle is participated by all the lines placed around it in the circle, namely which are protracted from the center to the circumference, inasmuch as whatever line obtains indivisibility according to width, unto the likeness of a indivisible point, as we imagine that a point by its motion makes a line and nevertheless that the point according to its position is distinct from the length of the line.

164. And just as also many impressions of a seal participate the archetype seal, that is, the principal figure of the seal (for archetype derives from arch, which is foremost, and type, which is figure) with the whole and the same archetype existing in each of the impressions, according to likeness, and in none of them according to no part of it through the commixing of substance.

165. Then when he says, yet the imparticipability of divinity, he shows that these examples are deficient from divine representation, and he says that the imparticipability of divinity, which is the cause of all things, exceeds these aforementioned examples, because the deity is more imparticipable and less commixed with participating things, than a point and a seal. For there is no touch of the deity to creatures, namely by that mode in which, from a seal and wax, there is made one through contact; nor also is there a certain other communion through which he is mixed with the parts of things, as a point is mixed with a line, inasmuch as it is its term.

166. Then when he says, although someone might say, he objects against what he had said: that the whole seal exists in each of its impressions. For someone can say that this is not true, because some impression is found that does not perfectly receive the form of the seal.

167. But he responds that the cause of this is not on the part of the seal, because one and the same whole seal bears itself to each impression, but the diversity of participating things makes dissimilar impressions, that is, representations, of one and the same principal form, which has the form totally.

Yet he shows how the form of one seal is received in diverse ways in diverse things, adding, for if those things in which an impression is made are so soft that they can easily receive the figure; and plain, that is, without swellings, so that a uniform impression is made in them; and immaculate, lest a commixing of foreign matter should impede the impression of the figure; and nor is there a contrary figure, as if anyone should wish to impress the figure of one seal on wax already signed with another seal; and nevertheless for receiving the figure they are somehow hard, such that they are not easily fusible and heatable, or too watery and soft and unstable, because thus the impression of the figure would not remain; with these conditions existing, the matters in which an impression is made shall have a certain figure of the seal, without the mixing of another figure, impressed and plain, that is, unswollen, without deformity, and permanent. But if anything should fail of the aforementioned suitability of figuring, this shall be the cause: that the figure is not participated or that it is not plainly, that is, uniformly, participated, and of other defects, whatever ones pertain to unsuitability of participation.

168. Then when he says, yet it is discrete by the divine operation, he expounds the discretion that is according to the humanity of Christ, and he says that it is discrete, that is, pertaining only to one person, the supersubstantial Word, that is, the Son of God, to be made according to us, that is, a man like us in nature; from us, with flesh received, not brought from heaven, according to Valentinus; totally, that is, not with soul or intellect removed, according to Arius and Apollinarius; and truly, not fantastically, according to Mani. And not only is the Incarnation itself discrete, but also the actions and passions of God incarnate; whatever things attributed to Christ are with a certain election and segregation from the others, according to a consideration of his humanity, as to be conceived, to be born, to eat, to drink, to sleep, to be crucified, and other things of this sort; for the Father and the Spirit have communicated in these according to no ratio, because neither of them was incarnated or died; unless perhaps someone should say that they communicated in the aforementioned according to will befitting the divine goodness and kind in regard to us: for the Father and the Holy Spirit accepted the Incarnation of the Son and his passion and other things of this sort and likewise communicated according to every divine operation super-posited above creatures and ineffable to us, which Christ, having been made according to us, that is, made a passible man, remaining invariable according as God and the Word of God, did. For he was not made man such that he lost divinity, but existing as man he had the divine operation, which is common to himself and to the Father and to the Holy Spirit. And thus here there is destroyed the error of those positing one operation in Christ, through the fact that he attributes to Christ the divine operation common to the whole Trinity and an operation proper to himself.

169. Yet last by way of an epilogue, he says that thus we strive by our speech both to unite and to discern divine things, just as, according to the truth of the matter, they are united and discrete.

That the Divine Discretions Cannot be Manifested Sufficiently by Us

§ 7. 54. But indeed whatever causes of these unitions and discretions we found in the eloquences befitting God, in the Theological Hypotyposes, treating the proper things of each, we expounded as was possible, reflecting on certain things indeed whereas opening up by speech and adducing both a holy and a revealed understanding into manifest visions of the eloquences, yet for certain things, as for mystic things, united according to the divine tradition above intellectual operation.

55. For all divine things and whatever have been manifested to us, are known by participations only. Yet these, whatever sort they are, according to proper principle and gathering, are above mind and every substance and knowledge.

56. Just as if we should name the supersubstantial hidden, God or life or substance or light or reason, we understand nothing else than deific or substantific or vivific or sapientific virtues led forth from it to us; yet we send ourselves to this, according to absolution, from all intellectual operations, seeing no deification or life or substance, which diligently is comparable to the cause segregated from all things according to all excess.

57. Again we receive from the holy eloquences that the Father indeed is fontal deity, yet the Son and the Holy Spirit of the deigenic deity, if it is proper so to speak, springs of the divine nature and as flowers and supersubstantial lights. Yet how these are it is possible neither to say nor to think;

§ 8. but even unto this is every virtue of our intellectual operation: that every divine paternity and filiation is given both to us and to the supercelestial virtues from the patriarchy segregated from all things and the filiarchy, from which gods and sons of gods and fathers of gods, become deiform and are named minds, namely spiritually by such paternity and perfect filiation; that is: incorporeally, immaterially, intelligibly, with the thearchic Spirit super-gathered above every intelligibility, immateriality, and deification and with the Father and the Son segregated from every paternity and divine filiation by exceeding.

58. For neither is there diligent comparison for things caused and causes, but indeed things caused have contingent images of causes; yet these causes are segregated from things caused and are super-gathered according to the ratio of a proper principle. And, so that I might use our examples, delights and sadnesses are called effective of delighting and saddening, yet these are neither delighted nor saddened; and fire heating and burning, is not said to be heated or burned; and if anyone should say that per se life lives, or per se light is illuminated, he does not speak rightly, according to my reason, unless he says these things according to another mode, because those things that are of things caused preexist in causes abundantly and substantially.

§ 9. 59. But what is manifestive of all theology, the divine composition of Jesus according to us both is ineffable by every word and unknown by every mind even the first most worthy of the angels itself. And manfully indeed we receive that mystically he was made this substance; yet we do not know how he was composed from virginal bloods by another law beyond nature; how with dry feet, having bodily weight and heaviness of matter, he walked on a wet and unstable substance, and whatever other things of Jesus are of the apparition of supernatural light or of natural reason.

60. Yet these things both have been said sufficiently by us in other places and have been praised exceedingly supernaturally by a noble leader in his Theological Elements: which he either received from the holy theologians, or observed from an expert scrutinizing of the eloquences, from much struggling about them and contrition, or even was taught from a certain more divine inspiration, not only learning, but also suffering divine things, and from compassion for them, if it is proper so to speak, was perfected unto the unteachable and mystic unition and faith of these; and, so that we might appoint the many and blessed visions of his powerful deliberation in short, he says these things of Jesus in the Theological Elements gathered by him.

170. After Denys has expounded the mode of divine unition and discretion, he excuses himself from a perfect manifestation of these; and it is divided into two parts:

in the first, he shows that the divine discretions and unitions cannot be manifested sufficiently by us;

in the second, he pursues the discretion that is according to the procession of creatures, because this especially pertains to the intention of the present book, at therefore concerning these indeed.

171. About the first, he does two things:

first, he poses an excuse from a perfect manifestation of the aforementioned things;

second, he assigns the reason, at for all divine things.

172. Therefore he says, first, that in the book On the Theological Hypotyposes, he expounds as was possible for him the causes, that is, the rationes of the aforementioned unitions and discretions, whatever ones he found in the Sacred Scriptures, befitting God, treating what was proper to each; such that, nevertheless, he reflected on and examined certain things by a truthful speech and opened up, that is, uncovered, and further reduced into manifest visions of the eloquences, that is, manifest authorities of Sacred Scripture that contain the visions and revelations made to the prophets and apostles; what could be understood in a holy and manifest way, after examination and opening up.

173. For it does not suffice in divine things to examine and uncover the truth by human ingenuity, unless the truth, which is found after examination, accords with Sacred Scripture and is confirmed through it. And when he opened up certain things thus, nevertheless for certain things, as for mystic things, that is, hidden things, he was united above intellectual operation and this according as it was handed on by God: for it is ordained for us by God, that in these things that are above our intellect, we should be united by adhering through faith.

174. Then when he says, for all divine things, he assigns the reason why in divine things there are certain mystic things, which exceed our intellect; and about this, he does two things:

first, he manifests this on the part of the deity;

second, on the part of the humanity of Christ, at but what is manifestive of all theology.

175. About the first, he does three things:

first, he assigns the reason for the aforementioned things;

second, he manifests the assigned reason through examples, at just as if we should name;

third, he proves it through a likeness in other causes and things caused, at for neither is there diligent comparison.

176. Therefore he says, first, that all divine things also that have been manifested to us, are known by us only by participations. The reason for which is that nothing is known unless according as it is in the knower. Yet there are certain knowable things that are below our intellect, which indeed have a simpler being in our intellect than in themselves, as are all bodily things, whence things of this sort are said to be known by us through abstraction. Yet divine things are simpler and more perfect in themselves than in our intellect or in whatever other things known to us, whence the knowledge of divine things is said to be made not through abstraction, but through participation.

177. But this participation is twofold: one indeed, according as divine things are participated in the intellect itself, namely as our intellect participates the intellectual virtue and light of the divine wisdom; whereas the other, according as divine things are participated in things that offer themselves to our intellect, namely inasmuch as through the participation of the divine goodness all things are good, and through the participation of the divine being or life, things are called existing or living. And we know divine things according to both of these participations.

178. Yet it has been shown above that God is participated by creatures through likeness, such that nevertheless he remains unparticipated above all things through the propriety of his substance. Whence, if divine things are not known by us unless by participations only, the consequence is that these divine things, as they are both according to the proper ratio of principle and according as divine things are gathered in themselves, are above all things, as above every mind and above every substance and above all knowledge.

179. Then when he says, just as if we should name, he manifests the proposed reason through examples;

and first, in the processions of creatures;

second, in the processions of the divine persons, at again we receive from the holy eloquences.

180. Therefore he says, first, that if we should name that hidden of the divine essence, which is above every substance, either God or life or substance or light or reason or whatever other such name, through this we do not understand this very what-God-is itself, but the intellect conceives nothing else, except virtues that come to things from God, by which formally they are deified or substantified or vivified or sapientified. But since God is above all processions of this sort, it is necessary that we should send ourselves into God, unto knowing him according to removal from all intellectual operations, that is, from everything that falls into our intellect, and this for this reason: because through the intellect we cannot see any deification or life or substance that perfectly can be compared to that cause that is segregated from all things according to total excess. For nothing falls into the vision of our intellect except some created and finite being that altogether fails of uncreated and infinite being, and for this reason it is necessary that we should understand God to be above everything that we can apprehend by intellect.

181. Then when he says, again we receive from the holy eloquences, he manifests the same in these things that pertain to the processions of the divine persons, and he says that from the Sacred Scriptures we receive that the Father is fontal deity, that is, that the Father is the font and principle of the whole deity, and that the Son and the Holy Spirit, if it is proper so to speak, are certain springs of deigenic deity, that is, of the Father who is God generating, springs I say not outside of the divine nature, as creatures, but in the divine nature itself, and they are also as flowers and supersubstantial lights.

182. Nor is it a marvel if we say these things plurally of the divine persons, because if the signified of the metaphors should be received in metaphorical sayings, it is necessary that they should be predicated singularly of the divine persons; whereas if the metaphors themselves should be received, they can be predicated plurally; for through light truth is understood metaphorically. Therefore we can say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are one light, because they are one truth; we can also say that they are two lights, so that the sense might be that they are signified through two lights, that is, through two rays proceeding from one light, as through two flowers, because each proceeds from the Father. Nevertheless neither through this is there excluded that the Holy Spirit should proceed from the Son.

183. But how these are we cannot say nor think, namely so that we might express or know how that paternity or filiation is, but even unto knowing this alone the whole virtue of our intellect extends itself: that both to us and to the supercelestial virtues, namely the angels, from the principal divine paternity, which is segregated from all creatures, and likewise from the principal filiation, every paternity and filiation is given that is according to propagation in divine things, namely as one angel purges, illuminates, and perfects another and one man another; from which, namely the principal paternity and filiation, the minds of the angels conformed to God both are made through participation of divine gifts and are named in the Scriptures gods and sons of gods and fathers of gods, through assimilation to the principal paternity and filiation.

184. And lest it should seem that communication of the proper things of the Holy Spirit is lacking, he adds that such paternity and filiation is perfected in the holy angels spiritually, when he expounds spirituality through three things: for spiritual signifies something incorporeal and immaterial and intelligible. And although this spirituality is found in angels, nevertheless the divine Spirit is super-gathered above every intelligible immateriality of angels or souls, just as both the Father and the Son are segregated through the mode of excess from every paternity and filiation that is in creatures, according to the participation of divine things.

185. Then when he says, for neither is there diligent comparison, he proves what he had said, through assimilation in other causes and things caused, and he says that between causes and things caused, there cannot be diligent, that is, perfect, comparison, because causes exceed the things they cause, but there is a certain other comparison of things caused to causes, inasmuch as things caused have images, that is, likenesses, of causes. For every cause produces its effect through some mode of likeness, nevertheless things caused do not attain a perfect likeness of the cause; contingent, that is, as it happens according to its proportion. But for this reason it is not a perfect comparison: because causes are separated from things caused, inasmuch as they are super-posited above them, according to the ratio of a proper principle, that is, in that ratio in which principles are.

186. And he manifests this through examples taken up from things that are before us: and first of all from the passions, according as delights and sadnesses make men to be delighted and saddened not through the mode of an efficient cause, but of a formal cause, as it is said that whiteness makes a white thing, but these delights and sadnesses are neither delighted or saddened. For of what is delighted or saddened, delight or sadness is predicated through participation, but not of delight or sadness itself through its essence, and thus the cause exceeds the effect. Then he posits an example in agent causes when he says, fire that heats and burns is not said to be heated or burned, but to be hot and thus, through its own nature, to heat other things. Afterwards he posits an example in formal causes, namely concerning per se life, and per se light, so that thence through this there might not be understood some separated light or life, but the participated forms themselves, according to which mode neither can it be said of life that it lives or of light that it is illuminated, according to the aforementioned ratio, unless perhaps equivocally, so that life might be understood to live, because it is the cause of living. And he assigns the ratio of these examples and similar ones, through the fact that those things that are of things caused through the mode of participation, are of causes superabundantly and substantially, as to live is participative of a living thing, whereas it is of life itself essentially.

187. Then when he says, but what is manifestive of all theology, he manifests the same about the humanity of Christ;

and first, through his own words;

second, through the words of Hierotheus, at yet these things both have been said.

188. Therefore he says, first, that although among all the things that are said of God, the most manifest seems to be what pertains to the Incarnation, nevertheless the composition by which, divinely, Jesus is composed according to us, that is, according as he has our nature, cannot sufficiently be expressed by whatever word, nor sufficiently known by whatever mind, even of the supreme angel itself. We receive indeed according to the Scriptures, as a certain hidden mystery, that Jesus himself was made substance manfully, that is, of a manly hypostasis, but we do not know sufficiently how his body was compacted from virginal bloods, by a certain law beyond nature: for he was made by the power of the Holy Spirit, which is incomprehensible to every created mind. And we cannot perfectly know even how he walked upon the water of the sea, which is a wet and unstable substance, with dry feet, not indeed with heaviness of body set aside through the assumption of the gift of agility, as certain men have said, but still with his feet having the heaviness of matter: for this was done by incomprehensible divine power. And the same ratio is in all of whatever other things pertain to the knowledge of Jesus, which exceeds natural light or natural reason.

189. Yet these things both have been said sufficiently by us in other places and have been praised exceedingly supernaturally by a noble leader in his Theological Elements. To those things necessary for the mystery of the Incarnation that he had introduced above, he adds certain words of Hierotheus concerning the praise of Christ; and about this he does two things:

first, he shows whence Hierotheus received these words that he said; namely that he had these either from the teaching of the apostles or from the study of the Sacred Scriptures or from a special revelation made to him;

second, he posits his words, at the cause of all things.

190. Therefore he says, first, that the aforementioned things that pertain to the praise of Christ he said sufficiently in other places, namely in the book On the Divine Hypotyposes, and they are also, exceedingly excellently above the natural mode, praised by a certain Hierotheus, who was a noble leader, that is, teacher, a disciple of the apostles, and this in a certain book of his that he entitled On the Theological Elements, that is, obscure divine comments; and consequently he posits three modes by which Hierotheus was able to acquire the things that follow: one mode is that he received them by learning from the holy theologians, that is, from the apostles; another mode is that he, by his own proper study, inspected them, from a wise and subtle examination of the Holy Scriptures. Which subtle examination indeed consists in two things: the first of which he adds, saying, from much struggling about them, in which assiduousness of study is designated: for then someone struggles much with Scripture, when, having inspected the difficulty of Scripture, he presses on to seeing the difficulty; the second he adds, saying, and contrition, in which there is designated a diligent exposition of Scripture, for what is contrited or ground is divided even unto the smallest bits; then therefore someone grinds Sacred Scripture, when he seeks out the subtle senses latent in it.

191. The third mode of having is that he was taught these things that he said from a certain more divine inspiration, which commonly is made for many, not only learning, but also suffering divine things, that is, not only receiving the knowledge of divine things in the intellect, but also by loving, he is united to these through affection. For passion seems to pertain more to the appetite than to knowledge, because things known are in the knower according to the mode of the knower and not according to the mode of the things known, but the appetite moves to things, according to the mode in which they are in themselves, and thus in a certain way it is affected to those things.

192. Yet just as some virtuous man, from the habit of virtue that he has in his affection, is perfected for judging rightly about these things that pertain to that virtue, so he who is affected to divine things, divinely receives right judgment about divine things. And for this reason he adds that from compassion for divine things, that is, from the fact that by loving divine things he is joined to them (if nevertheless the union of love ought to be called compassion, that is, simultaneous passion), Hierotheus was perfected, that is, instituted, unto the unition and faith of these, that is, so that he would be united to these things that he said through the unition of faith; I say, unteachable, that is, that cannot be taught by a human master; and mystic, that is, hidden, because it exceeds natural knowledge. And, so that we might comprehend in a few the many and blessed visions, that is, revelations, of powerful deliberation, that is, of his, namely Hierotheus’, virtuous examination, although he said many other things, nevertheless these, that follow, he says to the praise of Jesus Christ, in the book named above.

The Words of Hierotheus Concerning the Deity and Incarnation of Christ

§ 10. 61. The cause of all things and fulfilling is the deity of Jesus;

62. which parts consonant to the totality it saves and neither is it part nor whole and both whole and part, as receiving together in itself and super-having and pre-having both part and whole of all things.

63. It is perfect indeed in imperfect things, as the foremost of perfection, yet imperfect in perfect things, as super-perfect and pre-perfect.

64. Form, making form in things lacking form, as the foremost of form; without form in forms, as above form.

65. Substance, supervening immaculately on the whole of substances and supersubstantially segregated from the universe of substance.

66. Determining the whole of the principles and orders and gathered above every principate and order.

67. And it is the measure of existing things and the aevum above aevum and before aevum;

68. and full in things having less, super-full in full things.

69. Unspeakable, ineffable, above mind, above life, above substance, it has the supernatural supernaturally, the supersubstantial supersubstantially.

70. Whence, because also from kindness he comes even to nature, and truly is made substance and super-God exists as man—yet by propitiation are these things praised by us above mind and reason—although also in these he has the supernatural and the supersubstantial, not only according as he communicated with us invariably and unconfusedly, having suffered nothing to his super-fullness from ineffable emptying, but because also, what is to all new things more new, in our natural things he was supernaturally, in substantial things supersubstantially, having all our things above us.

193. Then when he says, the cause of all things, he posits the words of Hierotheus concerning Christ;

and first, he posits those things that pertain to the praise of the deity of Christ;

second, those things that pertain to the praise of his Incarnation, at whence, because also from kindness.

194. About the first, he does two things:

first, he comprehends in summary the praise of the deity of Christ;

second, he explicates it in particular, at which parts consonant to the totality.

195. Therefore he says, first, that the deity of Jesus Christ is the cause of all things, inasmuch as through it all things are reduced into being; and it is also fulfilling of all things, inasmuch as through it all things are filled with their perfections.

196. Then when he says, which parts consonant to the totality, he expounds, through singulars, the aforementioned causality.

Where it must be considered that, first, he shows that the aforementioned deity is the cause of those things that pertain to the essence of things;

second, of those things that are an example of the essences of things, at and it is the measure of existing things.

197. About the first, it must be considered that, in the essences of things, such a process and order indeed must be considered:

for, first, there are the principles of things;

second, the substance of a thing, constituted from principles;

third, the determination of a thing to its proper species which is through form;

fourth, from form the thing attains perfection, not only in specific being, but also as regards its proper operation and end:

fifth, diverse things that each have a certain perfection in themselves, united by a certain order, perfect some whole.

198. Therefore Hierotheus proceeds to show the divine causality of the deity of Christ, by circling backwards, through the way of resolution, beginning this from the whole; and he says that the deity of Jesus conserves the parts consonant, that is, proportionate, to the totality, in which the perfection of the whole consists; and neither is it part nor whole and it is both whole and part. The deity of Christ is indeed whole and part, as not divided in itself, but simultaneously receiving both part and whole of all things, because whatever is of perfection, in whatever whole or part, preexists whole in God. Yet it is neither whole nor part, because it does not have the perfection of whole and part by the same mode as whole and part, but more supereminently and priorly.

199. Second, he shows the causality of the deity of Christ as regards the perfection of things, at it is perfect indeed, and he says that the deity of Christ is called perfect, through comparison to imperfection, inasmuch as it is the principal cause of every perfection; but if it should be compared to perfect things, it is called not perfect, not as though failing of perfection, but having perfection supereminently and priorly.

200. Third, he shows the same about forms; and he says that the deity of Christ compared to those things that lack form, can be called form effectively, inasmuch as it is form making form; whereas compared to forms, it can be called without form, not through defect, but through excess, because it surpasses every form.

201. Fourth, he shows the same as regards substances; and he says that the deity of Christ can be called substance causally, inasmuch as it supervenes upon the whole of substances, that is on all and each according to the whole, through the mode of a certain participation; but nevertheless it supervenes immaculately, because it is not participated through the commixing of substance, but through the mode of likeness; and, again, it is segregated from every substance, inasmuch as it exists supersubstantially.

202. Fifth, he shows the same as regards principles; and he says that the deity of Christ determines all principles (for of diverse things there are diverse principles) and determines the order of the principles to the things principled, but nevertheless, it is super-gathered above every order and above every principate.

203. Then he shows the same through a comparison to those things that are the example of a thing;

and first, as regards the measure of the duration of things, and he says that the deity of Christ is the measure of existing things, as though determining for each the measure of its being, or because each one has being inasmuch as it approaches it; and also it is the aevum which is called the measure of being, as time is the measure of duration, and nevertheless it is above aevum, inasmuch as it is a measure super-exceeding the created whole.

204. Second, he shows its causality, as regards the supervening perfection by which the capacity of things is fulfilled, as the intellect is fulfilled by intelligible species; and he says that the deity of Christ, compared to deficient things that are called less existing, is called full, as though the cause of fullness, and compared to those things that are full, is called super-full, as though exceeding above every fullness.

205. Third, he shows it through comparison to the understanding and speech that are outside a thing, and he says that it is unspeakable and ineffable, because by neither a complex nor an uncomplex speech can it be expressed sufficiently; and it is above mind and above all life, because it exceeds all knowledge and every act of life.

206. And because he had attributed many supernatural things to the deity of Christ, consequently he shows that it does not have these in a defective mode, but in a supereminent one; and this is what he says: that it has what is supernatural supernaturally and what is supersubstantial supersubstantially. For to absolve from sins is supernatural, but a pure man does not have this supernaturally as the Son of God has it, and it must be said likewise concerning other things of this sort.

207. Then when he says, whence, because also from kindness, he praises the humanity of Christ, and he says that the deity of Christ is so great and excellent; thence it is that through his kindness he comes even to our nature and truly is made substance, that is, a hypostasis of our nature, and although he was super-God, he was made man, that is, human. These things that are said according to his propitiation, through which he assumed human nature, ought to be praised above mind and above reason. For although he received the proper things of our nature, nevertheless in these human things he had the supernatural and the supersubstantial, that is:

in one mode, inasmuch as he communicated with us, assuming our nature without variation of the divine nature and without its commixing and confusion with human nature, such that through ineffable emptying, concerning which the Apostle speaks in Philippians 2, he suffered nothing to his super-fullness, that is, nothing was diminished from the fullness of his deity; for “emptied” is not said through the diminution of deity, but through the assumption of our deficient nature;

in another mode, because what is among all new things more new and wondrous, he was in our natural things supernaturally and in our substantial things supersubstantially, having above us all the human things that he received from us; because his flesh is of greater virtue and dignity than that of another and his soul worthier than every soul and his acts were also of mutually unifying operation, by virtue of the deity.

C. II, § 1. 71. Therefore concerning these that indeed is enough; yet let us proceed to the intention of the word, the common and united names of divine discretion, according as it is possible for us, reconsidering.

72. And so that we might predetermine consequently concerning all, we say that the divine discretion is, as has been said, the processions befitting the thearchy by the good. For giving to all existing things and super-filling the participations of all good things, unitively indeed it is discerned and into a plurality it is driven singularly and it is multiplied from one inegressibly.

73. Afterwards, because God is existing supersubstantially, yet he gives being to existing things and leads out all substances, that one existing thing is said to be multiplied, because from it many existing things are led out. Yet nevertheless it remains one in multiplication and united in procession and full in discretion, because it is segregated supersubstantially from all existing things, and because all things are led out from it unitively, and because the effusion of its undiminishable distributions is not lessened.

74. But also existing as one, handing on one to every part and whole and one and multitude, it is one simply supersubstantially, neither a part existing of a multitude, nor a whole from parts, and thus neither is it one, nor does it have one. Yet far from these, it is one above the one that is in existing things, and leading out the multitude and perfecting and containing it.

75. Again, many gods having been made from its deification of each deiform thing according to virtue, discretion and multiplication seem to be and are said of the one God, yet nevertheless there is foremost God and super-God supersubstantially one God, indivisible, and in divisible things united in his own self, unmixed and not multiplied. And understanding this supernaturally, our and our leader’s common leader by the hand unto divine illumination, who is much in divine things, who is the light of the world, says these things moved by God, in his holy letters: for if there are many called gods, whether in heaven or on earth—as indeed there are many gods and many lords—but for us indeed there is one God the Father from whom are all things and we in him, and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things and we through him (1 Cor 8:5–6).

76. For in divine things unitions surpass and pre-rule over discretions, and nevertheless are united even after the inegressible and unitive discretion of the one.

77. We shall attempt, according as it is possible, to praise those common and united discretions of the whole deity or processions befitting the good, from the namings of God manifesting them in the eloquences. With this, as it has been said, known before: that every beneficent naming of God, in whichever of the thearchic persons it is posited, is received in the whole thearchic totality, unobservantly.

208. After Denys has expounded the mode of divine discretion and unition, here he pursues that mode that principally pertains to the matter of this book, namely the divine discretion that is considered according to the procession of creatures; which indeed is a united discretion and common to the whole Trinity, as was said above.

209. About this, therefore, he does two things:

first, he expounds how that discretion is with unition;

second, he promises that he will determine about those things that pertain to this discretion in what follows, at we shall attempt, according as it is possible.

210. About the first, he does three things:

first, he says what the intention is about;

second, he manifests the proposition, at and so that consequently we might predetermine;

third, he assigns the reason for the things said, at for in divine things unitions.

211. Therefore he says, first, that concerning those things that pertain to the praise of Christ, there suffice for the present those things that have been said both by him and by Hierotheus; but it must be proceeded further to those things that pertain to the intention of the word that he intends in this work, namely so that we might examine, according to our ability, the names pertaining to that divine discretion that is considered according to the procession of creatures; which indeed are names common to the whole Trinity, and not only common, but also united. For animal is common to man and to horse, nevertheless not the same animality in number is in each; but goodness and essence and things of this sort so are common to the whole Trinity, that they are one in number in the three.

212. Then when he says, and so that consequently we might predetermine, he manifests how there can be divine discretion with unition; and this he manifests in four things:

first of all, in the good itself;

second, in being, at afterwards, because God is existing;

third, in one, at but also existing as one;

fourth, in the very name of deity, at again, many gods having been made.

For these four seem especially to befit God: first of all, on account of their community, for what seems to befit the infinity of the divine nature is not determined to genus or species, and also on account of the use of the name, which all attribute to the supposit principle of things.

213. Therefore he says, first, that we say that the divine discretion is the processions of the deity, which befit him according to the ratio of the good, as has been said above. And for this reason let us begin first from the good, so that consequently we might show more manifestly in the others what will have been shown concerning the good. For the good has itself universally to all processions: for whatever God communicates to a creature, he communicates from his goodness. Whereas the other names designate some special processions. And therefore, what will have been manifested in the universal will be able to be seen more plainly in special instances.

214. Yet it must be considered that a multitude proceeds from one in three ways:

in one way indeed, through division, as one whole is divided into many parts, but such a multitude removes the fullness and unity which was in the whole.

In another way, through the mode of community, as from one genus there come forth many species and from one species many individuals, but that one is not multiplied thus as a singular one, but a common one.

In a third way, some one is multiplied before us through effusion, as from one font there come forth many brooks, but this is done with a certain going out, namely inasmuch as water going out from the font diffuses itself into many brooks.

215. Yet in the existence of all good participations of wisdom, of life, and of things of this sort, goodness itself indeed is discerned, that is, distinguished, while distinct good things come forth from it, but this is done unitively: for nothing is diminished from the fullness by which all good things are united in it; and again into a plurality it is driven singularly, that is, it is plurificated into a plurality in its effects not as something universal, but remaining singular in its own self; and again it is multiplied through diffusion from one, inegressibly, because nothing of its substance goes out. And this is because discretion and multiplications and diffusion are considered according to certain likenesses of the divine goodness; yet with the divine goodness itself remaining, according to its essence, indistinct and one and gathered in itself.

216. Then when he says, afterwards, because God is existing, he manifests the same in being, and he says that because God is supersubstantially being, as regards his existence, but nevertheless he gives being to all existing things and produces universally the substances of things, on account of the fact that that one supersubstantial being that God is, is said to be multiplied in his things, namely, by likeness; and although many existing things are led out from it, but still nevertheless, being of this sort remains one, according to its existence, in multiplication that is made through its likeness; and it remains united, that is, unified, in procession; and it remains full and whole in distinction. And this because, in its substance, it is supersubstantially segregated from all beings; and because all things are produced from it unitively, that is, according to one virtue, which is not divided by producing diverse things; and because the diffusion of its gifts, which it distributes to things, cannot be lessened nor is lessened. For it must not be said that he so communicates good things to one that he cannot communicate more: for in none is the fullness of his goodness, through communication of this sort, diminished.

217. Then when he says, but also existing as one, he shows the same as regards one, and he says that God, since he is one and gives being one to part and whole and common unity and multitude, inasmuch as every multitude somehow participates one, he, I say, thus existing as one and giving unity, supersubstantially is one simply, as good and being; because he is not something of those to which he gives being one. For he is not as the one that is part of a multitude, since nothing can be numbered equally together with him; nor also is he one, as something whole constituted from parts; and thus he is not one in that mode in which other things are, nor does it have one as participating it; but nevertheless it is one, withdrawn from those that are this one, inasmuch as it is above the one that is found in existing created things; and this is the one that produces the multitude of things in being and perfects them, by attributing to things their proper perfections, and contains them, by conserving all things in their being and in their order.

218. Then when he says, again, many gods having been made, he shows the same in the very name of deity; and he says that discretion and multiplication seem to be and are said of the one God, inasmuch as many gods are made from the fact that God deifies some creatures through conformity to God according to the virtue of each deified thing, not that they could be conformed perfectly to him or that through existence they should be called gods. And although there are and are called many beatified gods, still nevertheless there is one principal God who is above every communicated deity, the supersubstantially existing one God. And since he exists in all things, he remains existing indivisible in the divisible things to which he communicates being and is united in himself and not mixed with the multitude and not multiplied according as he is considered in himself.

219. And understanding this supernaturally, blessed Paul, who was the leader by the hand, that is, the instructor, unto divine illumination both of Denys himself and also of his leader, that is, Hierotheus (who, namely Paul, knew many things concerning divine things and who is the light of the world, as he says in Acts 13:47 that he fulfilled in himself what is said in Isaiah 49:6: I have placed you unto the light of the nations), these things he says in his holy epistles, namely in 1 Corinthians 8:6, moved through inspiration by God, because although there are those who are called gods whether in heaven or on earth . . . nevertheless for us there is one God the Father from whom are all things and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things and we through him. For from this authority, it is clear that the multitude of deified things, both in the heavens as are the angels and on earth as are holy men, do not prejudice the unity of the deity, which is common to the Father and the Son.

220. Then when he says, for in divine things unitions, he assigns the reason for the things said. For the aforementioned procession and multiplication and discretion do not remove the divine unity for this reason: because in divine things unitions surpass discretions and rule over them; for the unitions are considered according to the divine essence itself, yet the discretions according to the likenesses of God impressed on things, which fail much of their principle, and for this reason divine things nevertheless remain united, after that one which is God is discerned through diverse likenesses, by inegressible discretion, because nothing goes out from the divine essence, and unitive, because such discretion does not remove the divine unity.

221. Then when he says, we shall attempt, according as it is possible, he promises that he will discuss about things of this sort in what follows, and he says that he shall attempt, according to his ability, with the praise of God, to expound the aforementioned discretions that are united and common to the whole deity or also are named processions befitting the divine goodness. Yet he intends to manifest them from the divine names that are handed on in the Scriptures, which demonstrate processions of this sort, as when we call God living or wise, there is demonstrated the procession of life and of wisdom from God into creatures. Nevertheless this ought to be known beforehand: that, as has been said, whatever naming of God pertaining to his beneficence, of whichever of the divine persons it should be said, must be received, without a doubt, concerning all the persons.

What Is the Virtue of Prayer, and On Blessed Hierotheus, and On Reverence, and On the Theological Treatise

There Is Prefaced a Certain Prooemium to the Whole Work

C. III, § 1. 78. And we shall inspect the naming of the good, first, if it seems, perfect and manifestive of the whole of the processions of God, invoking the foremost of good and supergood Trinity, which is manifestive of the whole of the providences kindly given by it.

79. For it is necessary that we should be led to it, as to the foremost of the good, first by prayers, and approaching more to it, in this to be taught the best good things gathered around it.

80. For it indeed is present to all things, yet not all things are present to it. Yet when we invoke it indeed by most chaste prayers and by revealed mind and by aptitude for divine unition, then we also are present to it.

81. For it is not in a place such that it should also be absent from a certain place or should cross over from some to others;

82. but it remains to say that it is in all existing things from the infinity that is over all things and comprehends all things.

83. Therefore let us extend ourselves by prayers to a higher respect of the divine good rays;

84. just as if a chain of much light, hanging from the celestial summit, yet descending before us, always grasping it with hands changed to the higher, we would seem indeed to draw it downwards, yet in reality we would not pull it down present both upwards and downwards, but we ourselves would drive upwards to the higher splendors of the rays of many lights.

85. Or just as if we had ascended a ship and were to hold certain ropes extended from a certain rock to us and as given to us to help, we would not lead the rock to us, but ourselves truly and the ship to the rock; just as conversely, if someone standing on a ship should thrust, he would do nothing against the rock standing and immobile, but he shall separate himself from it, and as much more as he shall thrust it, more shall he be thrust from it.

86. On account of which both before everything and more theology it is useful to begin from prayer, not as drawing the virtue everywhere present and nowhere, but as by divine memories and invocations drawing ourselves to it.

§ 2. 87. And this is perhaps worthy of excusing: that although our noble leader Hierotheus supernaturally gathered the Theological Elements, as though those do not suffice we have composed both others and the present theology.

88. For indeed, if he would have deigned to treat all theological business consequently and the chapter of the whole of theology had crossed over to particular considerations, we would not have arrived at so great a fury or depravity that either we would have reckoned that we introduce theologies more perspicaciously than him or more divinely, or that we would speak vain things saying the same things twice; besides also we would do injury to one who is both our master and our friend, and we having been introduced by his eloquences after divine Paul, snatching his noblest contemplation and manifestations to ourselves. But because in reality, prudently leading into divine things, he expounded definitions conspicacious to us and comprehending many things in one, commanding us and according to us whatever masters of souls that are newly perfected, as is possible, to open up and to discern, with a speech commensurate to us, the conspicacious and unitive convolutions of the most intellectual virtue of that man; and many times this man exhorted us to this and sent back this book as super-exceeding, for this reason also we determine this indeed as of the perfect deliberations of the masters for those who are above the many, as certain second eloquences and followings of the christs of God; yet to these who are according to us, we hand on divine things according to our proportion. For if strong food is of the perfect, of how great a perfection is it to feed others with this?

89. Rightly therefore was this also said by us: that vision indeed and the inspecting of equal intelligible things per se and conspicacious doctrine needs advanced virtue; yet the science of words bearing unto this and discipline befits the subjects sanctifying and sanctified.

90. Although this also has been observed by us very studiously: that to things discerned by this divine leader, according to plain manifestation, we totally do not apply the hand at any time to that same manifestation of the proposition of the same eloquence.

91. Because also among these our hierarchs having received God, when we also, as you know, and he and many of our holy brothers, came together unto a vision of the body of the prince of life and that had received God; yet there was present also James the brother of the Lord and Peter, the highest and most advanced summit of the theologians; afterwards it seemed, after the vision, that all the hierarchs would praise, as each was sufficient, the goodness of the infinite virtue of the thearchic infirmity, he surpassed, as you know, all the other holy masters after the apostles, wholly exceeding, wholly suffering ecstasy from himself and suffering communion to the things praised, and by all by whom he was heard and seen and known and not known, judged to have been accepted by God and a divine praiser. And what shall I say to you concerning the things theologized there? For if I do not forget even myself, many times I know from you also hearing certain parts of those hymns moved by God. Such was your zeal to follow divine things not leisurely.

§ 3. 92. And, so that we might pass over those mystical things, as must not be said to the many and as known to you, when it was necessary to communicate to many and to lead whom it is possible unto the knowledge of holy things that is according to us, how he exceeded many of the holy masters by the spending of time and by purity of mind and by diligence of demonstrations and by the rest of holy speeches. Wherefore never did we attempt to gaze against such a great sun.

93. For thus for ourselves we feel and know that we can neither grasp to understand sufficiently the intelligible things of divine matters, nor say and speak out those things that are speakable of the knowledge of God. Yet we fall far short of the science of divine men unto theological truth, because we come to this entirely on account of abundant reverence so that we neither totally hear nor say anything concerning divine philosophy unless we should receiving it according to mind, as it is not proper to neglect knowledge occurring of divine things; and not only did the desires of minds, according to nature amiably always desiring whatever they can grasp of supernatural contemplations, persuade us of this, but also this best disposition of the divine laws, prohibiting indeed that those things that are above us should be scrutinized much, both as above dignity and as impossible; yet commanding to discern attentively and to hand on kindly to others all things whatever are desired by us and are given.

94. Therefore both persuaded by these things and not lazing or fearing, but also not suffering to forsake without help those not prevailing to contemplate things better than us, we committed ourselves to write, daring indeed to introduce nothing new, but by subtler and particular investigations of singulars, discerning and manifesting those things that were said truly by Hierotheus conspicaciously.

222. After Denys has introduced certain things necessary for the following doctrine, here he begins to pursue his intention,

and first he prefaces a certain prooemium to the whole following work;

second he begins to treat the doctrine concerning the divine names, which he intends.

223. About the first, he does two things:

first he shows that it is necessary that he should begin from prayer;

second, he excuses himself that, after Hierotheus, he has tried to treat the same things about which he had treated, and how he observes reverence for his master, at and this is perhaps worthy of excusing,

and these two are touched on in the title of the chapter, which is thus: What Is the Virtue of Prayer, as regards the first part of the chapter;

and On Blessed Hierotheus, and On Reverence, and On the Theological Treatise, as regards the second part.

224. About the first, he does three things:

first, he proposes what he intends;

second, he manifests the proposition through argument, at for it is necessary that we should be led to it;

third, through examples, at just as if a chain of much light.

225. Therefore he says, first, that if this shall seem fitting, among the other divine namings, now we ought to consider the naming of the good, that is, according to which God is named good.

226. And to receive a naming of this sort, it must be considered that the Platonists, not distinguishing matter from privation, posited it in the order of non-being, as Aristotle says in the first book of the Physics.¹ Yet the causality of being does not extend itself except to beings. And therefore according to them the causality of being does not extend itself to prime matter, to which nevertheless the causality of the good extends itself. A sign of which is that this most of all desires the good. Yet it is proper to an effect that it should be converted through desire to its cause. And therefore the good is a more universal and higher cause than being, because its causality extends itself to more things.

227. And although Denys seems to touch on this in the following chapter, nevertheless he seems to have considered another ratio of this order. For he intends in this book to discuss about the divine names manifesting the processions of creatures from God, according as he is the cause of things. Yet what has the ratio of a cause first and universally is the good. Which appears from a twofold ratio:

first of all, because the good has the ratio of an end; yet the end, first, has the ratio of a cause. For form is a cause inasmuch as it makes matter to be actual; yet matter first is made actual when it begins by the agent.

Second, because an agent makes something like itself, not inasmuch as it is a being in whatever mode, but inasmuch as it is perfect. For the perfect, as is said in the fourth book of the Meteorologies, is what can make something like itself.¹ Yet the perfect has the ratio of the good.

228. And therefore, whatever God makes for creatures, whether to be or to live or whatever else, the whole proceeds from the divine goodness and the whole pertains to the goodness of the creature. And for this reason he says that the naming is perfect, inasmuch as it comprehends all things and is manifestive of all the divine processions.

229. Yet to treat of the procession of the good, it is necessary that we, by praying, should invoke the holy Trinity, which is the principle of every good and is above all goodness. For just as, from its kindness, it gives all gifts foreseen by it, so it alone can manifest these sufficiently: for works of art are best known in the artist.

230. Then when he says, for it is necessary that we should be led to it, he manifests the proposition through argument, saying that it is necessary that we, to know the divine processions of the divine goodness, should invoke the Trinity by praying; and about this, he does three things:

first, he poses the argument for the principal proposition;

second, a manifests a certain thing presupposed in the argument, at for it indeed is present to all things;

third, he proves a certain thing assumed in this argument, at for it is not in a place.

231. Therefore he says that it is necessary that we should be led forth, that is, extended, through prayers, to the Trinity itself, as to the principle of every good procession, because through the fact that we pray, we approach it; and as much more as we approach it, so much more can we learn the gifts of its goodness, which are gathered around it, as though derived from it through a likeness of goodness; for as much as someone more approaches something, he knows more the things that are around it.

232. Then when he says, for it indeed is present to all things, he manifests a certain thing that he had proposed, namely that through prayer we approach the holy Trinity, and he says that this holy Trinity indeed is present to all things, inasmuch as it communicates its gifts to all things, but not all things are present to it, inasmuch as they fail of the participation of it. But when we invoke it, then we are present to it, approaching to it.

233. But in order for prayer to make us near to it, three things are required:

first, that sensuality should be cleansed from all carnal and mundane affections, allured by which we are drawn back down, and he touches on this when he says, by most chaste prayers;

second, that our intellect should not be overshadowed by the darkness of phantasms, which happens to those men who do not wish to grasp spiritual things over bodily ones, as those who posited that God is figured by the figure of a human body, on account of which also we are impeded from the ascent to God, and as regards this he says, by revealed mind;

third, that our will should be ordered to God through charity and devotion, and this is what he adds: and apt for divine unition.

234. Then when he says, for it is not in a place, he proves what he had presupposed, namely that the deity is present to all things; which indeed he proves by two arguments. For deity is not in a place as defined or circumscribed by place. Yet everything that is present somewhere, not existing elsewhere, or that so crosses over to a certain place that it leaves others, is in a place as circumscribed or defined. Therefore this cannot be said of the deity. Yet it is manifest that it is present to something, at least to its own self; therefore it is present to all things.

235. He poses the second argument at but it remains to say. Every infinite thing that is over all things and comprehends all things, is present to all things; but the Trinity is of such a sort; therefore it remains that it is present to all things.

236. And from this it can be received that no creature is everywhere, since from the infinity of God this remains through the consequence: that God is everywhere.

237. Yet finally, he concludes the principal intention: that we ought to extend ourselves through prayer to a higher consideration of the rays of the divine goodness.

238. Then when he says, just as if a chain of much light, he manifests the proposition through examples:

and first, he posits two examples to manifest the proposition;

second, he concludes the principal proposition, at on account of which and before everything.

239. The first example is that we imagine a chain of much light that hangs from the summit of heaven and descends all the way to the earth, before our face. If we were to receive that chain and always change hands toward the higher, we would seem indeed to draw the chain downwards, but according to the truth we would not bring it down, since it would be present upwards and downwards, but we ourselves would be elevated into the greater splendor of that luminous chain.

240. He posits the second example at or just as if we had ascended a ship, and he says that if we were to ascend onto a ship and were to hold certain ropes, which were extended from some rock outside to us, which were given to us to help, we would not draw the rock to us, but according to the truth of the thing we would lead both ourselves and the ship to the rock, and on the contrary if someone standing on a ship should thrust at a rock that stands beside the sea, he would do nothing against the rock, which is standing and immobile, but he shall separate himself from it and so much more as he shall thrust at it more.

241. Yet in order that these examples should be adapted to the proposition, it must be considered that it is necessary to judge about prayer according to five opinions in different ways:

for certain men totally destroyed the providence of God, positing that all things happen by chance, and this was the opinion of the Epicureans;

whereas certain men posited the providence of God about incorporeal and universal things, but removed divine providence from human things, and this was the opinion of certain Peripatetics;

whereas certain men extended divine providence even to all things, but they said that from divine providence all things have necessary events, totally removing contingency from things, and this was the opinion of the Stoics, positing, according to the inevitable series of causes that they named fate, that all things happen of necessity;

fourth was the opinion of certain Egyptians who said that the providence of God is mutable;

fifth was the opinion of certain Platonists saying that divine providence is immutable, but under it some things are contained mutably and contingently.

242. Therefore the first three opinions totally empty the fruit of prayer. For if God has no concern about things or at least has no concern about human things or if all things occur of necessity, in vain are prayers poured out to God. Yet the fourth opinion does not remove the fruit of prayer, but grants to it more than its due, namely to change divine providence. Whence, only the fifth opinion has right judgment concerning prayer, which Denys here follows, namely that through prayer we draw our mutable existing selves to the participation of divine providence, yet let us not believe that we can change divine providence.

243. Therefore the chain of light hanging from the immobile summit of heaven or the ropes that are extended from the immobile rock, signify the order of divine providence proceeding from the immobility of the divine wisdom. Yet that he says that the chain is present everywhere in heaven and on earth and then to all things, signifies that he extends his providence to all things, against the first opinion. Yet what he says concerning the immutability of the rock and that the chain of light cannot be drawn to us, signifies that divine providence is immobile, against the fourth position or opinion. Yet that he says that we ourselves are led upwards through the immobile chain and we approach the rock through the rope or are separated from it through thrusting, signifies our mobility for following the fruit of divine providence, against the third position.

244. Finally, he concludes the proposition, namely that, before all things, yet especially before theological business, it is useful that we should begin from prayer, not such that through prayer we should draw the divine virtue, which is present everywhere and is nowhere concluded, but as through divine commemoration and invocation drawing our own selves and uniting with him.

245. The necessity of prayer having been set forth, Denys proceeds to an excusing of himself;

and first, he posits whence he could seem accusable to someone;

second, he excuses himself, at for indeed, if he would have deigned.

246. Therefore he says, first, that this seems worthy of accusation: that although Hierotheus, who was his noble master, by speaking subtly united certain treatises on divine things, Denys has written both other treatises on divine things and the present book as if the treatises of Hierotheus were not sufficient, which seems to pertain to a certain irreverence.

247. Then when he says, for indeed, if he would have deigned, he proceeds to the excusing of himself; and about this, he does three things:

first, he excuses himself from irreverence;

second, he shows his reverence for Hierotheus, at because also among these our hierarchs;

third, he concludes his intention by composing in this work, at therefore both persuaded by these things.

248. Yet he excuses himself in three ways: the first excusing is that those things that Hierotheus had said unto one, he has treated from the mandate of Hierotheus and at the petition of Timothy through singulars; and this is what he says: that if Hierotheus would have deigned to treat in order all things that pertain to theological consideration, and had wished to run through the treatment of the whole of theology, namely that he carried out as though in a certain genus and summary, by scrutinizing in particular, Denys would not have arrived at so great a fury or depravity, that he would wish to write concerning divine things.

249. Yet that he would have reached to fury or depravity, he shows by either of two ways, one of which is that Denys would have reckoned to elevate himself to theological considerations more perspicaciously than Hierotheus and more divinely; the other way is that he would not believe himself to say higher things, and then two unfitting things would follow: one of which is that by repeating the same things that Hierotheus had said, he would write uselessly and thus would incur vain speech; the other unfitting thing is that, as though by snatching thievishly to himself the noblest contemplation and manifestation of divine things of Hierotheus himself, he would do injury to him, since nevertheless he was his master and friend, and Denys was introduced to theological knowledge especially from the words of Hierotheus, nevertheless after the doctrine of Paul.

250. But Hierotheus expounded certain conspicacious, that is, received with great difficulty and understanding, determinations, and comprehending many things in one universal, according to the truth of the thing leading men prudently to divine things; and he commanded Denys and other men like him who are masters of souls that are newly instructed, that according to their ability there would be manifested and distinguished by them the universal determinations of profound contemplation of that man, in which he rolled many things in one, and that they would do this with a speech commensurate to them, not universal such as Hierotheus had used. Timothy himself also exhorted Denys many times to this very completion, and he had sent back the book of Hierotheus to him, as exceeding his capacity.

251. Therefore because those things are such, for this reason we determine the aforementioned book to be of the perfect considerations of the masters, not apt for whomever, but for these only who exceed the multitude by their capacity, such that that book has a certain second authority from the eloquences of canonical Scripture, to which no authority can be equated; such that the words of that book consequently have themselves to the words of the christs of God, that is, to the words of the holy apostles, who are called christs, on account of the fullness of spiritual grace and on account of the dignity of the priest.

And thus since so high a book as this befits only the perfect, we according to our proportion hand on divine things to these who are according to us, that is, to the imperfect, like us. For we do not suffice to hand on the perfect doctrine to the perfect, because if solid food, that is, perfect doctrine, is only of the perfect, as is said in Hebrews 5:14, because only these can grasp perfect doctrine, it is of greater perfection to feed others with such food. For it is greater to teach others perfect doctrine, than to be able to take it from others. Yet it must be considered that as much as some intellect is higher and more perfect, so much more can it comprehend many things in one. Yet infirmity of intellect is required in order that singulars might be unfolded singularly. And for this reason he called the doctrine of Hierotheus, comprehending many things in few, perfect.

252. He posits a second excusing at rightly therefore was this also said, and he says that rightly can it be said, unto his excusing, that in order that someone through himself should inspect the understanding of the divine eloquences, which are the eloquences of Sacred Scripture and that transparent doctrine of theirs considered in them, it requires perfect virtue. But that someone should have science and consideration of words leading into the aforementioned consideration and doctrine, and that he should learn those words, can befit even the more imperfect, both the doctors whom he calls sanctifying and the ones taught whom he calls sanctified. Therefore just as to inspect and to reach the perfect science of divine things pertained to Hierotheus who was perfect, so to have the science of expounding the aforementioned doctrine and to teach the exposition of this sort pertains to the lesser, among whom Denys counts himself.

253. The third excusing is posited at although this also has been observed, and it says that Denys also observed this studiously: that he totally did not apply the hand also to manifesting the words of Hierotheus in those things that Hierotheus chose to distinguish according to plain manifestation.

254. Then when he says, because also among these our hierarchs, he shows the reverence that he has for Hierotheus;

and first, by showing its magnitude;

second, by recognizing his proper humility, at for thus for ourselves we feel.

For from these two it follows that someone has someone else in reverence: that he perceives great things about him and small things about himself. Yet he commends Hierotheus in two ways:

first of all, as regards the fact that he was most subtle and wholly divine;

second, as regards the fact that he knew how to give milk to the little ones in Christ, at and, so that we might pass over those mystical things.

255. Therefore he says, first, that Denys himself simultaneously with Timothy and Hierotheus himself and many other holy brothers, came together with the apostles to see the body of the one who is the principle of the whole of life and that received God. And this can be understood concerning a bodily vision of Christ, of which the Apostle makes mention in 1 Corinthians 15:38. For the body of Christ is the body of God who is the prince of life, and that body received God through unition, whence also it is called a temple, according to John 2:21: yet he said this concerning the temple of his body. It can also be understood that they came together to see the body of the blessed virgin Mary in her death, which also received God, by the Incarnation. And in that meeting, there was present also James the brother of the Lord and Peter who was the highest head of all the apostles.

256. Yet after the aforementioned vision, it seemed to all that all the apostles and bishops who were there, would praise the infinite goodness of the divine infirmity, that is, humanity, as was possible to each. And then Hierotheus surpassed all the masters after the apostles, to whom no other can be compared; and by that praise, he was wholly exceeding all sensible and mundane things and as though placed outside of himself, he seemed joined to these things that he praised through a certain unition, and thus by all, whoever heard and saw, whether they had known him before or not, he was judged accepted by God and a divine praiser. And what can be said of these things that he theologized there, which were so sublime? Which, as Denys says, if it does not fall from his mind, many times he recognized certain parts of those divine praises, which Hierotheus brought forth, with God inspiring, while he heard them brought forth by Timothy. For so great was Timothy in the study of divine things, that those that he heard, he also took care to retain in memory.

257. Then when he says, and, so that we might pass over those mystical things, he commends him concerning the education of the simple; and he says that, in order that he might omit to speak of those hidden things said there, because they were known to Timothy, this must be said: that, when it was necessary to communicate divine things to the multitude and to lead back whom he could to know holy things, by knowledge proportionate to the imperfect, Hierotheus exceeded many of the holy masters by the spending of time, because he spent or expended more time in teaching, and by purity of mind, because he was not wrapped up in phantasms or errors by which he would have been impeded from right judgment of truth, and by diligence of demonstrations, that is, efficacy of words in demonstrating the truth, and by the rest of holy speeches, that is, in the other things that are required for holy speeches. Whence he concludes that it was never his attempt to look against so great a sun, namely Hierotheus, by preferring or equating himself to him.

258. Then when he says, for thus for ourselves we feel, he shows what humble things he perceives about himself; and he says that he is so conscious that he is not sufficient for understanding divine things not only that are above the human intellect, but even many that are understood by other men; and likewise he reckons himself insufficient for saying and manifesting those things that can be said by others concerning the divine knowledge; and he reckons himself to fall far short of the science of theological truth, which the more perfect have had. And he introduces this for this reason: because he has been led to this on account of the perfect reverence that he has for greater men and for the divine philosophy; because he totally does not dare to think or to say anything concerning the divine wisdom, unless those things that he can grasp according to his mind and those also he hears and says, because it is not proper to neglect the knowledge of divine things that it happens that someone can have.

259. And he was persuaded of this in two ways:

first of all, from the natural desire of minds that with a certain love always desire the contemplation of supernatural things that they can grasp, because through this they are most of all perfected;

second, because the best disposition of divine laws prohibits that those things that are above us should be scrutinized much, both because they are above our dignity, and because it is impossible for us to attain them, as is clear in Ecclesiasticus 3:22, where it is said, lest you should seek things higher than you.

But those things that are desired by us and are given to us in order that we might be able to grasp them, the divine law commands us to discern attentively and to hand on kindly to others, according to Wisdom 7:13: which without fiction I learned and without envy I communicate. And this also is had from many other places in Scripture.

260. Then when he says, therefore both persuaded by these things, he concludes his intention, and he says that he has been persuaded from the above and that he is not called back from finding the truth of divine things, according to the possibility of science, neither on account of sloth nor on account of the fearfulness of pusillanimity. Again, his mind could not have suffered that he would dismiss without help those who could not have contemplated greater things than he. On account of all these things, he disposed himself to write this work, nevertheless such that he would dare to introduce nothing new, but those things that conspicaciously were said by Hierotheus in a certain universal understanding, he wishes to distinguish and manifest, through certain investigations more particular and subtler, by descending to singulars. And he speaks through a likeness of bodily things, in which as much as some whole is divided into many parts, there are effected subtler parts.

How the Good Is in God and How It Is Communicated to Angels and to Rational Souls

C. IV, § 1. 95. If therefore it is necessary, now by speech let us go to this naming of the good, which the theologians excellently attribute to the super-god deity and from all things determine it, as I suppose, the thearchic essence, calling it goodness; and because that which is good as substantial good, extends goodness to all existing things.

96. For just as our sun, not reasoning or preferring, but through being itself, illuminates all things prevailing to participate its light according to proper ratio, so indeed also the good, above the sun, as an archetype segregatedly above an obscure image, through this essence proportionally sends out rays of the whole of goodness to all existing things.

97. On account of those there subsisted all intelligible and intellectual substances and virtues and operations;

98. on account of those they are and live and have life unfailing and undiminishable by the whole of corruption, existing cleansed of death and matter and generation, and elevated from variation unstable and fluid and sometimes bearing otherwise.

99. And they are understood as incorporeal and immaterial, and they understand super-mundanely as minds, and they are illuminated properly by the rationes of existing things, and again they bring proper things to their kindred.

100. And they have a dwelling from goodness, and thence a gathering for them, and containing, and guarding, and the food of good things.

101. And desiring it they have both being and wellbeing and, as is possible, they are figured to it and boniformed, and they communicate to those following, as the divine law introduces, gifts coming to them from the good.

§ 2. 102. Thence super-mundane orders for these, unitions to one another, in graspings of one another, unconfused discretions, the virtues of subjects driving upwards to betters, providences of the more advanced about the seconds, the guardings of the proper things of the virtue of each and unchangeable convolutions about themselves, about the desire of the good, identities and summits and whatever other things have been said by us in the treatise On the Angelic Proprieties and Orders.

103. But also whatever things of the celestial hierarchy are fitting for the angels— cleansings, super-mundane illuminations, and things perfective of the whole angelic perfection—are from the cause of all things and fontal goodness.

104. From which also boniformly it is given to this also to manifest in them the hidden goodness, and to be angels as enunciative of the divine silence and as clear lights interpretative of that which is in the foremost and aforementioned secret places.

105. But also after those clear and admirable minds, souls and whatever things are of souls are good on account of the good super-goodness: to be intellectual themselves, to have substantial life, to be and to be able to be unconsumable,

106. extended to angelic lives, to be driven upwards through those as good leaders to the principate of all goods, and thence to be made in participation of emanating illuminations, according to their proportion;

107. and to participate the deiform gift according to virtue, and whatever other things have been numbered by us in our speech On the Soul.

261. The prooemium having been set out above, now he comes to pursuing his principal intention. And in order that the intention, number, and order of the following chapters might be clear, it must be considered that, as has been said in chapters 1 and 2, in this book he intends to expound the divine names by which there are manifested the processions of God into creatures.

Yet the common principle of all these processions is the good, as has been said in chapter 3, because whatever proceeds from God into creatures, he communicates this to his creature on account of his goodness. And for this reason, first, he treats in this chapter 4 concerning the good, and also concerning those things that pertain to the consideration of the good.

262. Yet if the singular processions were to be considered, which the divine names manifest, we shall see that three things from the divine goodness are attributed to things:

first of all, as they are and are perfected in themselves;

second, as they are compared to one another;

third, as they are ordered to an end.

263. Yet if these things were to be considered in themselves: first and more commonly, what is found in them is to be; second, to live; third, to know; fourth, to be just or virtuous. And according to this order, he pursues concerning the divine names:

first of all after the good, concerning being in chapter 5;

second, concerning life in chapter 6;

third, concerning wisdom in chapter 7;

fourth, concerning virtue and justice in chapter 8.

264. Yet the comparison of things to one another is considered according to two things:

first, according to something intrinsic, as one thing is said to be like or equal to another, the same or diverse, on account of agreement in substance, quantity, or quality, and concerning these he treats in chapter 9;

whereas second, according to something extrinsic, whether according as they are contained under one part or according as they are contained under one measure, and concerning these he treats in chapter 10, where it is treated concerning omnipotent and Ancient of Days;

yet peace and tranquility of order follows this ordering, whence in chapter 11 it is treated concerning peace.

265. But about the order of things to an end, two things must be considered,

namely the providence of the one governing and ordering to the end, and concerning this it is treated in chapter 12, where it is treated concerning King of Kings and Lord of Lords,

and the end itself to which things come through providence and governance, and this pertains to chapter 13, in which it is treated concerning perfect and one.

266. Whereas for knowing the content of this fourth chapter, it must be considered that opposites are of the same consideration; yet evil is opposed to good, whence in the chapter concerning good he determines also concerning evil.

Again, because an act is known through its object, act and object are reduced to the same consideration; yet the good is the proper object of love, whence in this chapter of the good, he treats also concerning love and concerning ecstasy, which is an effect of love, as will be clear, and concerning zeal, which signifies a certain intensity of love.

Likewise, since the good is what all things desire, whatever things of themselves import the ratio of the appetible, seem to pertain to the ratio of the good; yet light and the beautiful are things of this sort, concerning which he also treats in this chapter.

And the title of the chapter expresses this intention, which title is thus: On the Good, Light, the Beautiful, Love, Ecstasy, and Zeal.

267. First, therefore, in this chapter he determines concerning the good;

and first, he shows how the good is in God;

second, how it is communicated to creatures, at on account of those there subsisted.

268. About the first, he does two things:

first he shows how it is attributed to God;

second he introduces an example, at for just as our sun.

269. Therefore he says, first, that after the things said above, now it is necessary to direct a speech concerning this name good that is attributed excellently in Sacred Scripture to the supreme deity, which is distinguished in goodness from all other things, as is clear through Luke 18:19: no one is good but God alone. And this on account of two things:

first of all, because the divine essence itself is goodness itself, which does not happen in other things: for God is good through his essence, whereas all other things through participation; for each thing is good, according as it is a thing in act; yet it is proper to God that he should be his own being, whence he alone is his goodness.

Likewise, other things, although inasmuch as they are, they are good, nevertheless attain perfect goodness through something super-added above their being; but God in his own being itself has the fulfillment of his goodness. Likewise, other things are good through an order to something else, which is the ultimate end; yet God is not ordered to any end outside of himself. And therefore, the first thing that is proper to the divine goodness is that goodness itself is the divine essence; the second thing proper to it is that it extends goodness to all things, which through participation are said to be derived from that which is said through its essence.

270. Then when he says, for just as our sun, he manifests through an example what he had said about the diffusion of goodness, and he says that just as our material sun illuminates all things that can participate its light through their proportion, through their natural being, not by reasoning or by preferring one to another, so also the good that God is, which is the archetype, that is, the principal exemplar or figure, separated through excellence above the sun, as above a certain obscure and deficient image, through its essence proportionally sends out rays of its goodness to all existing things as regards all things that pertain to goodness.

271. Yet it must be considered that he did not replicate in God: not reasoning or preferring, which he had said of the sun; but just as he had said of the sun that through its very being it illuminates, so concerning God he adds that through his essence he hands on goodness to all things. For the being of the sun is not its understanding or willing, even if it were to have intellect and will, and for this reason what it makes through its being, it does not make through intellect and will. But the divine being is its understanding and willing, and for this reason what it makes through its being, it makes through intellect and will. And for this reason significantly he says that God is segregated from the sun, as an archetype above an obscure image.

272. Then when he says, on account of those they are and live, he shows how goodness diffused by God is found in creatures:

and first, how it is found in the angels;

second, how it is found in rational souls, at but also after those clear and admirable minds;

third, how it is found in other corruptible creatures, at but also concerning those irrational souls;

fourth, how it is found in prime matter, at yet if also it is above all existing things;

fifth, how it is found in the celestial bodies, at but, what fled us in the middle running past.

273. About the first, he does two things:

first he shows how the good is found in angels according to themselves;

second, as considered under proper rule and order, at thence super-mundane orders.

274. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows how the good is found in angels, as regards their nature;

second, as regards their behavior, at and they have a dwelling from goodness;

third, as regards their order to the end, at and desiring it they have both being and wellbeing.

275. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows how they have being from the divine goodness;

second, how they have living, at on account of those they are and live;

third, how they have understanding, at and they are understood as incorporeal.

276. Therefore he says, first, that on account of the rays, that is, the diffusion of the divine goodness, there are produced in subsistent being the heavenly creatures in which there is found substance, virtue, and operation, as is said in the eleventh chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy.¹ And they are called intelligible, inasmuch as they are actually according to their natures, and intellectual, inasmuch as they understand actually; although the Platonists distinguished in separated substances the intelligible from the intellectual. For the intellect through participation of the intelligible is made intelligent, and for this reason the intelligible is more abstract and higher. And according to this, it can be said that he calls the supreme angels intelligible substances, yet the inferior angels intellectual substances. Although it is better that intelligible should be understood inasmuch as they are understood, and intellectual inasmuch as they understand.

277. Then when he says, on account of those they are and live, he pursues concerning the life of the angels, and he says that on account of the diffusion of the divine goodness, the angels not only have being, but also living, by a more eminent life than us; for it does not fail through death as does our life, when it is prolonged. For this occurs in inferior living things because they are subject to generation and corruption and variety which is according to quality and quantity, through which unstable things are rendered both ceasing and having themselves in diverse ways; and this befalls inferior things, which have matter; but the angels are elevated and purified above all these things.

278. Then when he says, and they are understood as incorporeal, he pursues concerning their intellect:

and first, how they are intelligible, and he says that they are understood as incorporeal and immaterial. For bodies are sensible and imaginable, nevertheless not intelligible actually; likewise, no form existing in matter is intelligible actually, but only potentially. For this reason angels are intelligible actually, inasmuch as they are incorporeal and immaterial.

Second, he shows how they understand, and he says that they understand super-mundanely, that is, above the mode in which we understand, as certain separated minds and intellects. For immaterial form is understood from the fact that it is in a mind, but it understands through the fact that it is subsisting mind.

Third, he says what they understand and whence; and he says that they are illuminated by God concerning intelligible rationes through the intelligible rationes of existing things, because through intelligible rationes put into them by God they have knowledge of things, not by gathering intelligible rationes from things, as we do.

Fourth, he says that they bring proper understandings to those that are proximate to their genus, inasmuch as superiors manifest their understandings to inferiors.

279. Then when he says, and they have a dwelling from goodness, he posits those things that pertain to their behavior, and he posits five things through a likeness of bodily things:

for bodily things have their dwelling in a place, according as they are substances; yet angels have their dwelling or habitation through the operation of intellect and will in these things that they understand and love, according to that saying of the Apostle in Philippians 3:20: our dwelling is in the heavens.

Yet bodily habitation needs a foundation on which it may be founded, and likewise the dwelling that is according to intellect is founded on the first intelligible truth, and the dwelling that is according to will on the ultimate end; and for this reason he says that from the divine goodness not only is there a dwelling for them, but also a gathering or foundation, according to another translation.¹

Again, inferior bodily things are contained under the order of superiors, so also angels are contained under the order of divine providence; yet God alone is he who contains and is contained, and for this reason he adds, and containing.

Likewise, bodily things, inasmuch as they are corruptible, need guarding lest they should be corrupted; yet angels are not mutable according to substance, but according to will, and for this reason they need to be guarded by God lest their will should be averted from the divine order, and this is what he adds: and guarding.

Likewise, living bodies need refreshment through which they are sustained, and likewise angels are conserved in being through the fact that their intellect and affection is satisfied by the divine enjoyment and the consideration of intelligible things; for this reason, fifth, he adds, and the food of good things.

280. Then when he says, and desiring it they have both being and wellbeing, he pursues concerning the order to the end. For the divine goodness converts all things to itself, as has been said above, and for this reason it follows that on account of the divine goodness the angels desire it, not as though lacking what they desire, as imperfect, but as having being and wellbeing, as regards their being made both configured to the divine goodness and deiform, inasmuch as they communicate to their inferiors divine gifts, which come to them from the highest good, and this as the divine law introduces. For it is sanctioned by the divine law that the good things that we receive from God we should communicate to inferiors, and thus we are conformed to his goodness, from which all good things flow forth.

281. Having posited these things pertaining to their nature that the angels attain from the divine goodness,

here first, he posits those things that pertain to them according as they are contained in an order;

second, those things that pertain to them according as they are in a hierarchy, at but also whatever things of the celestial hierarchy;

third, those things that befit them according as they are named angels commonly, at from which also boniformly.

282. Therefore he says, first, that from the divine goodness there are super-mundane orders for the aforementioned substances, as indeed certain ones are said to be in the order of seraphim, certain ones in the order of cherubim, and similarly concerning the others.

283. Yet it must be considered that three things come together in an order:

first of all distinction with fittingness;

second, cooperation;

third, the end.

Yet I say distinction with fittingness, because where there is no distinction, order has no place; yet if the things that are distinguished were to come together in nothing, they would not be of one order. Therefore it is necessary that the angels, who are of one order, should be united to one another, inasmuch as they are contained under one order, and this is what he says: unitions to one another. Nevertheless certain things are united in an order as such without continuity or contact, as houses in a city and cities in a kingdom, but the unitions of the angels in an order are with a certain contact or even continuity, and for this reason he adds, in graspings of one another, namely because one angel grasps another in itself through intellect and affection. Nevertheless such a union does not remove the distinction that is according to the propriety of the substance of each, and for this reason he adds, unconfused discretions.

284. Yet just as of each substance there is a proper operation, so of whatever order there is to be received some cooperation of those that are contained under the order, for which cooperation three things are required:

first of all, that inferiors should elevate themselves toward superiors so that they might be placed under them and aided by them, and this is what he says: that from the divine goodness, there are for them the virtues of subjects, that is, of inferior substances, driving upwards, that is, elevating them, to betters, that is, superiors.

Second, that superiors should provide for inferiors, and this is what he adds: providences of the more advanced, that is, of superiors, about the seconds, that is, about inferiors.

And lest any should so extend itself to superiors or to inferiors that it should be forgetful of itself, he adds a third: that each one should be solicitous for the guarding of its proper virtue, and this is what he says: the guardings of the proper things of the virtue of each, that is, of those things that properly pertain to the virtue of each, namely that each should guard itself in its grade.

285. For just as of every order there is some operation, so also an end. Yet of those things that are in an order there is to be received a twofold end: namely one that is in the things ordered themselves, inasmuch as they are ordered to one another, which consists in the habitude of one to another; and this end he touches on when he says, and unchangeable convolutions, that is, revolutions, about themselves.

About which it must be considered that since circular motion is uniform through the whole, in whatever part of it, it has its principle and end in potency, not in act; yet right motion is diversified according to principle and end and the distance to each. And therefore the intelligible operations of angels, by the ratio of uniformity, are called convolutions: for the intelligible operations of angels have what pertains to perfection in circularity, namely uniformity, without what pertains to imperfection, namely change; and for this reason he names unchangeable convolutions about them, according as one angel understands and loves another.

The second end is the good that is above the order, and according to this, just as a leader is the end of an army, so God is the end of the angels contained under the order; and he touches on this end when he says, about the desire of the good, that is, God, identities, because all come together in this, or because they always in the same mode have themselves around this, and summits, according to another letter, because they desire God more sublimely than the rest.¹ And not only are there for them from the divine goodness those things pertaining to the ratio of order, but also whatever other things have been said in the book The Hierarchies of Angels, in which he treats on the angelic proprieties and orders.

286. Then when he say, but also whatever things of the celestial hierarchy, he enumerates those things that pertain to the ratio of hierarchy, and he says that also from the cause of all things and the divine goodness, which is the font of all goodness, there come to the angels whatever actions of the celestial hierarchy are fitting for them. Yet it must be considered that, since a hierarchy is a sacred principate, yet it pertains to a prince to direct, the action of the hierarchy will be to direct to sacred things; and according to this there are threefold hierarchical actions, namely: cleansings, that is, purgations; super-mundane illuminations; and those things that are perfective of the whole angelic perfection. Yet one angel cleanses or purges another, not indeed from the stain of fault, because there is none in them, but from ignorance, as he says in the seventh chapter of The Celestial Hierarchy.¹ For superior angels see God more clearly than inferiors, and are filled with a greater light from him for knowing more mysteries. Therefore purgation pertains to the removal of ignorance; illumination to the communication of light; perfection to the knowledge of those things that are known through light.

287. Whereas because, although superior substances are distinguished according to orders and hierarchies, nevertheless they come together in this: that they are called angels, consequently he expounds the ratio of this name, when he says, from which also boniformly.

About which it must be considered that just as the light of the sun in the sun itself cannot be seen by us on account of excellence of light, yet it is seen either in clouds or on mountains irradiated by the sun, and thus clouds or mountains manifest to us the clarity of the sun, so this goodness, as it is in the highest peak of things, cannot be perceived by us on account of excellence of clarity, but inasmuch as its likeness in angels is found to be nearer to us, there is manifested to us in them in a certain way the clarity of the divine goodness; and this is what he says: that from the divine goodness there is given to the supreme substances boniformly, that is, conformity to the divine goodness, and on account of this, there is manifest in them the hidden goodness of God. And therefore, in one mode, they manifest the divine goodness, according as the likeness of the divine goodness shines forth in them, and according to this they can be called manifestors of God.

288. But above this, they are called angels, that is, messengers, inasmuch as they manifest God through their proper action; and this in two ways:

first of all, through the mode of speaking; and this is what he says: as enunciative of the divine silence. For it is manifest that the conception of the heart or of the intellect without voice is with silence, but through sensible voices, that silence of the heart is enunciated. Yet just as exterior voices are more manifest to us and less simple than interior concepts of the heart, so whatever modes of manifestations are more known to us and less simple than the conception of the divine word. And therefore, while the angels manifest to us something of the divine wisdom, whether sensibly by speaking with us or according to a fitting apparition or according to an intelligible locution, because also they speak to one another, they are enunciators of the divine silence.

Whereas second, through the mode of illuminations; and this is what he adds: that the angelic substances are proposed to us as clear lights interpretative of that, namely of the divine light, which is in secret places, that is, hidden from us. Yet this is according to necessity: that after something is enunciated to someone, he should understand the enunciation. Therefore, in order that we should be able to grasp with our intellect those things that are enunciated though the angels, they help our intellect with the clarity of their light to grasp the hidden things of God.

289. Then when he says, but also after those clear and admirable minds, he posits how the divine goodness shines forth in rational souls, and he says that on account of the goodness of God which is above every goodness, souls and whatever things pertain to the soul have goodness, nevertheless by a second grade, after those holy and admirable minds of the angels; and he posits, first, three things that pertain to their natures, namely: that they are intellectual, and that they have substantial life, that is, so that they can subsist through themselves, and that their to be and to be able to be is unconsumable, inasmuch as they are immortal and incorruptible.

290. Second, he posits the order of these souls to the angels; and he posits three things, namely: that they are extended to angelic lives, namely inasmuch as they participate something from their likeness; and again, through those angels, as through certain good leaders, they are elevated to the highest prince of all goods: for thus subjects in human things are subordinated to imitating leaders and serving them, that through them they might be ordered to the highest prince; and thence, that is, from the angels, souls are made participators, according to their proportion, of illuminations emanating from God, just as also in human things, directions and precepts arrive from the king to the people through leaders.

291. Third, he touches on the order of souls to God; and he says that souls participate the deiform gift of grace, according to their proper virtue, and not only do souls have this from the divine goodness, but also whatever other things have been enumerated by us in our speech on the soul. For he made a book on the soul that we do not have.

How the Good Is Found in Other Corruptible Creatures

108. But also concerning those irrational souls or animals, if it were proper to say, whatever ones cut the air and whatever advance on the earth and whatever are extended on the earth and those having spent life in the water or ambiguously; and whatever live covered under the earth and those affected by dust and whatever have simply a sensible soul or life, and all of these are animated and vivified on account of the good;

109. and all plants have nutritive and motive life from the good;

110. and whatever inanimate and non-living substance is on account of the good and has obtained substantial habit on account of it.

§ 3. 111. Yet also if it is above all existing things, as indeed it is, good and lacking form it forms and in itself alone non-existing, an excess of substance, and non-living, exceeding life, and existing without mind, excelling wisdom, and whatever are in the good of things not formed of exceeding formation; and, if it is permissible to say, even the non-existing itself desires the good that is above all existing things and struggles in some way in the good and being itself, which is truly substantial, according to removal from all things.

§ 4. 112. But, what fled us in the middle running past, also the good is the cause of celestial principles and terminations, of the not augmentable and not diminishable and nevertheless invariable of this substance and without sound, if it is proper so to say, of the greatest convolution of motions of heaven, and of the ordinations and beauties and lights and gatherings of the stars and of the many transitive motions of certain stars and of the two luminaries, which the eloquences call great (Gen 1:16, Ps 136:7–9), of circular restitution from the same to the same, according to which days and nights are defined by us and months and years measured, they determine and number and order and contain the circular motions of time and of those things that are in time.

292. Having determined those things that rational creatures participate from the divine goodness, here he proceeds to irrational creatures; and first, he pursues those things that pertain to irrational animals, and he says, if it were proper to speak not only of noble creatures, but also of ignoble, as for example concerning irrational souls or animals, it must be known that certain of them cut the air by flying, as birds; whereas certain have motion on the earth, and this in two ways: for certain advance, that is, walk, as quadruped animals; whereas certain are extended on the earth, that is, are moved through the extension of their body, as reptiles; certain spend life in the water, as fish; or ambiguously, as certain animals that live now in the water, now on the land; whereas certain live under the earth, as moles; and those affected by dust, as certain worms that are found under the dust. Both those and whatever others universally have substance and sensible life, that they are and that they live thus, they have from the divine goodness.

293. Then when he says, and all plants have nutritive and motive life, he pursues concerning plants; and he says that all plants have life from the divine goodness, not indeed sensible life, but that which is considered to be increased and decreased according to nutrition and motion.

294. Then when he says, and whatever inanimate and non-living substance, he pursues concerning inanimate things; and he says that every substance inanimate and non-living has from the divine goodness that it should be and that it should obtain substantial habit, that is, that it should have itself as subsisting, through which it exceeds an accident.

295. Then when he says, yet if also it is above all existing things, he pursues concerning prime matter. About which it must be considered that Plato corrected the error of the ancient natural philosophers, who did not distinguish between matter and form in things generable and corruptible, positing that prime matter was some body in act, as fire or air or something of this sort. For Plato understood that there was matter under bodily form, which matter did not have any species in its essence; but nevertheless he did not distinguish matter from privation, as Aristotle says in the first book of the Physics.¹ Whence both he and his followers called matter non-being, on account of privation joined to it. And this mode of speaking Denys also uses, although according to Aristotle it is necessary to distinguish matter from privation, because matter sometimes is found under form, sometimes under privation; whence privation is joined to it accidentally.

296. Likewise it must be considered, according to the Platonists, that as much as some cause is higher, so much does its causality extend itself to more things. Whence it is necessary that what is the first subject in effects, that is, prime matter, should be the effect of only the first cause, which is the good, with the causality of second causes not reaching all the way to it. Yet everything caused is converted to its cause through desire, whence prime matter desires the good, according as desire seems to be nothing else than privation, and its order to act.

297. Again, it must be considered that just as prime matter is called unformed through a defect of form, so unformedness is attributed to the first good itself, not through defect, but through excess; and thus, according to a certain remote assimilation, the likeness of the first cause is found in prime matter.

298. According to this therefore Denys says that God, since he is above all existing things, forms things, inasmuch as he is good and lacking form through excess; and he manifests this through singulars: for in God himself alone is there found that he is excess of substance; because, I say, he subsists excellently; and this is called non-existing as other things; likewise, since he is exceeding life, he is called non-living; and, since he is excelling wisdom, he is called without mind, and likewise concerning all other things whatever are in the good, namely God, from the number of things not formed, said through negation, and thence they are of exceeding formation, because those forms in him are through excess; and, if it is permissible to say, that good that is above all existing things and non-existing, as has been said, the non-existing itself, that is, prime matter, desires, inasmuch as it desires form which is a likeness of the divine being and struggles in some way in the good, that is, so that it might be assimilated to the first good, which communication indeed is nothing else than its inclination to form; and it communicates so that it might be that, namely being and good, which truly, that is, essentially, is predicated of the substantial good, which is named according to removal from all things through negative names, not on account of defect, as prime matter, but on account of excess.

299. Then when he says, but, what fled us in the middle running past, he pursues concerning the celestial bodies, which he had avoided treating at first in the middle. For the sequence of order required that between incorruptible incorporeal substances and corruptible corporeal substances, there would be treated incorruptible corporeal substances, but on account of the union of souls to corruptible bodies, he passed over the aforementioned order.

300. Yet about the celestial bodies, first he posits the things that pertain to the celestial spheres themselves; and he posits three things:

first, their habitude to inferior things, for the celestial bodies are active principles with respect to the bodies of generable and corruptible things, and the distinguishing term of each of those is pre-fixed according to the celestial bodies; and this is what he says: that the divine good is the cause of celestial principles and terminations.

Second, he posits what pertains to the mode of their substance; about which it must be known that certain ancients, believing the celestial bodies to be of a fiery nature, posited that they were fed and nourished by vapors resolved from earth and water, and through this mode the celestial bodies were conserved, just as fire is conserved through the addition of wood; and to remove this, he says that the divine good is the cause of this, namely of a celestial body, not augmentable, namely through any addition, and not diminishable, through any consumption, and nevertheless invariable, because they cannot be altered according to their substance.

Third, he posits what pertains to their motion, out of which the Pythagoreans said that there come forth certain harmonic sounds. But excluding this, he says that the good is the cause of the greatest revolution of the motions of heaven, which is without sound, if it is proper so to say; for some men said the contrary.

301. Then he posits those things that pertain to the fixed stars, in which four things must be considered:

first, their ordinations to one another, according to distance and proximity and position, as diverse figures are constituted from them;

second, their beauty, which is through clarity, figure, and quantity;

third, their lights, according as through their rays they have an effect on those inferior things;

fourth, their gatherings, according as, in their sphere, they are fixed immobily.

302. Then he posits what pertains to the five planets, namely Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, and Venus, and he says that the divine good is the cause of the many transitive motions of these stars. Yet he calls the motion of these stars transitive, because they do not observe the same figure according to position either to one another or to the other fixed stars, but they cross over from figure into figure, since sometimes they are found in Aries, sometimes in Taurus or in some other sign. Yet he attributes to them a multitude of motions, because it is necessary that what appears sensibly from the motion of each of them should result from many motions; since sometimes they are seen sensibly to be moved more slowly; which the invariability of the celestial bodies does not endure.

303. Finally, he pursues concerning the luminaries, that is, concerning the sun and the moon; and he says that the divine good is the cause of the circular motion of the two luminaries, that is, of the sun and the moon, which Sacred Scripture calls great (Gen. 1:16), according as circular motions are restored from the same signs to the same. And according to these luminaries, days and nights are distinguished by us and years and months are measured; they determine, that is, distinguish, and number, that is, measure, and order according to before and after, and contain according to fixed illumination, the circular motions of time and of all things that are moved in time.

Yet he says circles of time, according as they return from morning to morning and from spring to spring. Yet it is manifest that, through the distinction of years and months and days and motions, we distinguish those things that are done in one time from these that are done in another, and through the same things we also know the quantity of time and of action, according as it lasts many or few days, months, and years. It is also known what is done before or after, from the fact that it was done on that day, month, or year. Also the principle and termination of each duration are distinguished, according to a set day and month and year, and through this they are said to contain all the things that are done in time.

113. What indeed should someone say of the solar ray itself, according to itself? For that light is from the good and is an image of goodness; on account of which also the good is praised by the naming of light, just as an archetype manifested in an image.

114. For just as the goodness of divinity existing above all things crosses over from the supreme and most advanced substances all the way to the last, and still it is above all things neither with superior things reaching to its excess nor with inferior things crossing over its periphery;

115. but it also illuminates all things prevailing to be illuminated and creates and vivifies and contains and perfects,

116. and it is the measure of existing things and the aevum and number and order and surrounding and cause and end;

117. thus indeed also the manifest image of the divine goodness, that great and wholly resplendent and always shining sun, according to great resonance of the good, both illuminates all of whatever things can participate it, and has super-extended light, extending to every visible world both upwards and downwards the splendors of its proper rays, and if something does not participate it, this is not of the infirmity or smallness of its distribution, but of the things not extended to the participation of light on account of the importunity of receiving light. If indeed many having themselves thus, the ray crossing over illuminates the things following, and there is nothing of visible things to which it does not reach, according to the exceeding magnitude of its proper splendor.

118. But it contributes to the generation of visible bodies and moves them to life and nourishes and grows and perfects and cleanses and renews;

119. and the light is the measure and number of these days and of all our time. For this is that light, although then it was unformedly, which the divine Moses said and which determined that first trinity of our days (Gen 1:3).

120. And thus goodness converts all things to itself and is the foremost congregatrix of dispersed things, just as a principal and vivifying deity;

121. and all things desire it as principle as containing as end: and the good is, as the eloquences say, that from which all things subsist and are, led out as from a perfect cause; and in which all things consist, guarded and contented as in an omnipotent planation; and to which all things are converted, just as singulars to their proper end (Rom 11:36, 1 Cor 8:6, Col 1:16).

122. And which all things desire, intellectual things indeed and rational things cognitively; yet sensible things sensibly; whereas things without sense, by the natural motion of vivifying desire; yet things lacking life and only existing, by aptitude to the sole participation of substance;

123. according to the same ratio of the manifest image the light both gathers and converts to itself all things seeing, that are moved, that are illuminated, that are heated, that totally are contained by its radiances; on account of which it is also called ilios, because it makes all things indestructible and gathers dispersed things and all sensible things desire it either as by desire to see or as by desire to move or as by desire to be illuminated and to be heated and to be contained totally by the light.¹

124. And I do not say, according to the ratio of antiquity, that the sun existing as a god and the creator of this universe properly procures the manifest world, but that the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are made conspicuous, understood through those things that are made, and its sempiternal virtue and divinity (Rom 1:20).

304. After he has pursued those things that pertain to the name of good, here he pursues those things that pertain to the name of light;

and first, he shows how the name of solar light is attributed metaphorically to God;

second, how intelligible light is attributed to him, at but this indeed in the Symbolic Theology.

305. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows that the name of solar light is attributed to God;

second, he manifests the likeness, at for just as the goodness of divinity;

third, he excludes an error, at and I do not say.

306. Therefore he says, first, that just as the aforementioned things have being and wellbeing from the divine goodness, so also the solar ray, considered through itself, is from the goodness of God and is a certain image, that is, an expressed likeness, of the divine goodness. Thence it is that the good itself, which is God, is praised by the naming of solar light, because the divine goodness is manifested in such light, as an archetype, that is, a principal figure or principal exemplar, in the impressed image. For it is said in Malachi 4:2: for you fearing my name, the sun of justice shall rise.

307. Then when he says, for just as the goodness of divinity, he manifests the aforementioned likeness;

and first, as regards the procession of things into being from the divine goodness;

second, as regards the order of things to the end, at and thus goodness converts all things.

308. First, therefore, he posits those things that pertain to the divine goodness, according as things proceed from it; and about this, he posits three things:

first of all, its universal causality, and he says that the goodness of divinity existing above all things crosses over, by causing, from supreme and most perfect substances all the way to the last. Yet someone could believe that it crossed over through all things as mixed with them and enclosed in them, and to exclude this, he adds that, although it crosses over through all things by handing on its likeness to things, nevertheless still it is above all things, through the singularity of its substance. Someone also could believe that, although it exceeds all substances, nevertheless the supreme substances reach all the way to it through the mode in which an inferior body reaches its superior; and to exclude this, he adds that superior substances do not reach to the excess of the divine goodness. Again someone could believe that certain things, which are lowest in things, are not created by God on account of their imperfection, as the Manicheans posited that corruptible bodies were not created by God, and to exclude this, he adds that inferior things do not cross over the periphery of its causality.

309. Second, at but it also illuminates all things, after he had posited that its causality extends itself to all substances, he shows how substances follow from the divine goodness; and he says that the divine goodness illuminates all things that can be illuminated, namely rational substances; yet universally it creates all substances, giving them being; and vivifies all things that live, and contains, that is, conserves; and perfects, giving them their perfections.

310. Third, at and it is the measure of existing things, he shows what habitude the divine goodness has to things already produced; and he says, first, that it has the habitude of measure. For it is the measure of existing things, because from this it can be known how much each of existing things has of the nobility of being: that it draws near to it or stands distant from it, just as if we should say that whiteness is the measure of all colors, because each color is so much more noble, as much nearer as it is to whiteness. Yet he descends specifically to certain special measures: yet the measure of the duration of motion and of mutable things is time; whereas the being of immobile things is not measured by time unless accidentally, by reason of motion joined to it, but the proper measure of being is the aevum; yet the duration of each being is pre-fixed and measured by God, and according to this God is called the aevum of all existing things. There is found also, among the species of quantity, a certain measure that is number, and this measure also is attributed to God who is the number of all things; and the determination of the multitude of these, which pertains to the ratio of number, proceeds from the divine wisdom. Yet order follows the ratio both of time and of number, because one species of number naturally is prior to another, and time is also the number of motions according to before and after. Whence consequently he says that God is the order of all things, inasmuch as all things that are from him are ordered. There is also among the species of quantity a certain measure that is place: place indeed measures a body locally by surrounding, and this also he attributes to God, who immediately surrounds all things. Yet not only does he have the habitude of measure to things produced, but also the habitude of agent cause and of end, and for this reason he adds, and cause and end.

311. Then when he says, thus indeed also the manifest image, he shows how the likeness of God is found as regards the aforementioned things;

and first as regards the universality of causing: and he says that, as the aforementioned things come together in the divine goodness, so that sensible sun, which is the greatest, transcending all celestial bodies according to quantity and wholly resplendent, not having any clouds as the moon, and always shining, in distinction to the moon whose light is increased and diminished and sometimes fails; and that sometimes it seems to be eclipsed is not on account of any defect of light in it, but when its light does not arrive at us on account of the interposition of the moon; that sun, I say, as the manifest image of the divine goodness, according to great resonance to the divine goodness, illuminates whatever things can participate its light, and nevertheless its light is super-extended, because nothing can arrive at the equality of its light, and it extends the splendors of its rays to that whole bodily and visible world, both upwards and downwards, because not only those inferior things but also superior celestial bodies are illuminated by it; and if there is something that does not participate its light, this is not on account of a debility or smallness of the illuminating power in it, just as in a candle that on account of the smallness or debility of its light illuminates only yet a tiny space, but that some things are not illuminated by the sun is on account of a defect of those things that cannot extend themselves to participating the light of the sun, on account of the fact that they are not opportune or apt to receive light. But nevertheless the solar ray, passing over the many such bodies not prevailing to be illuminated, illuminates the things following, just as passing over some cloud it illuminates the things that are under the cloud, and briefly there is nothing of visible things to which the causality of the sun does not reach, according to the exceeding magnitude of its proper splendor.

312. Second, when he says, but it contributes to the generation, he shows the likeness as regards the effects that God makes in all things. For it has been said that the divine goodness gives being to all things through creation, but in this the sun has some likeness of it, which sun gives being through generation. For it contributes to the generation of sensible bodies, just as a certain universal agent and non-univocal cause. It also has been said that God vivifies things, and in this the sun is assimilated to him, which moves inferior bodies to life. For it is manifest that from the rays of the sun living things are generated, not only those that are generated without seed, but the virtue of the sun also operates in those that are generated by seed. It also increases certain things that pertain to the act of life, namely nourishment and growth, which are caused from the power of the solar light, just as also other bodily motions. The solar ray also perfects sensible bodies, inasmuch as by its virtue they are led to the perfect state, and also if any things incur some corruption and aging through the withdrawal of the sun, by the sun’s nearness they are purged and renewed, just as trees and all plants sprout and thrive in the spring.

313. Third, at and the light is the measure and number, he shows a likeness as regards the ratio of measure, and he says that the sun is the measure and number of these and of the whole of the days of our time, which especially are measured and numbered through the motion of the sun. And lest anyone should cite the instance from the first three days that are read in Genesis 1, before the fourth day on which the sun is said to have been made, he adds that, since Moses said that on the first day God said, let there be light, and there was light (Gen. 1:3), and he divided the light from the darkness and called the darkness night and the light day (Gen 1:4–5), that light was the light of the sun, which light nevertheless was created first, but afterwards was formed and perfected on the fourth day, when the sun is read to have been made; and thus the solar ray determined and distinguished both the first three days and the days of our time.

314. Then when he says, and thus goodness converts all things, he expounds the aforementioned likeness as regards the order of things to the divine goodness;

and first, he posits what pertains to the divine goodness;

second, he shows the likeness of this in the sun, at according to the same ratio of the manifest image.

315. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows from what cause it happens that all things are ordered to God as to an end;

second, what is the ratio of the order, at and all things desire it as principle;

third, the mode of the order, at and which all things desire.

316. Yet he assigns the cause of this order, saying that the divine goodness converts all things to itself: for from it they have this very fact that they are ordered to God. For things are as though dispersed and segregated, according as they are ordered to diverse proper ends, but inasmuch as they communicate in the order to the ultimate end, thus they are gathered. Therefore the divine goodness, inasmuch as it converts all things to itself, is principally congregative of all dispersed things, just as a certain principally vivifying deity.

317. Then when he says, and all things desire it as principle, he assigns the ratio of the order: for all things are converted to it, inasmuch as all things desire it by a threefold ratio, namely: as active principle; and as containing, that is, conserving of things; and as end; this is the threefold ratio of desire. For we desire God as principle because the good comes forth to us from him; as containing because the good is conserved for us from him; as end which we intend to obtain.

And he manifests these three: for that he is a principle, is clear from the fact that, as Scripture says, all things subsist and are from him, led out from him as from a certain perfect cause. And that he is containing all things and conserving them, is clear through the fact that all things consist in him guarded from exterior harms and contented through the conservation of their proper virtue, as in a certain omnipotent plantation. For just as trees are conserved through the fact that they are planted in the earth, so all things are conserved in the fact that they are made firm in the omnipotent virtue of God. That all things also desire the divine goodness as the end, he shows consequently when he says that all things are converted to it, as singulars to their proper ends.

318. Then when he says, and which all things desire, he shows the mode of the order; and he says that intellectual things indeed desire the divine good, as angels and rational things, as men, cognitively; for these alone can know the good itself which is God. But sensible things desire it, inasmuch as they desire some sensible good that is a likeness of the highest good. But plants that are without sense desire the divine good by the natural motion of vital desire, because the good itself is also that to which they tend by natural inclination through the works of life unto some likeness of the highest good. Whereas those things that lack life, as inanimate bodies, which are only existing, desire the divine good through aptitude to participate subsistent being from God, so that this aptitude of theirs might be understood to be desire.

319. Then when he says, according to the same ratio of the manifest image, he shows how the likeness of the aforementioned things is found in the sun; and he says that, just as the aforementioned things befit the divine goodness, so not principally, but according to the ratio of image, the solar light gathers and converts all things to itself. For those things that see desire the light of the sun for seeing, and those things that are moved and that are illuminated and that are heated desire the light of the sun, as necessary for this; and likewise, wherever some things are contained, that is, depend upon or are caused by the radiances of the sun, and for this reason in Greek it is named helios, namely because it makes all bodies to be indestructible and gathers dispersed things, inasmuch as those things that are separated in themselves, desire it commonly: either so that they should see or so that they should be moved or so that they should be illuminated or so that they should be heated or so that they should be contained in whatever way by the virtue of light, they desire it.

320. Then when he says, and I do not say, he removes an error; and he says that he did not say the aforementioned things according to the opinion of the ancients who said that the sun was a god, that the sun was the creator of the whole sensible universe, and that it governs the whole sensible world, but according as the invisible things are manifested through those that are made, as the Apostle says in Romans 1:20.

§ 5. 125. But this indeed in the Symbolic Theology, yet now it befits us to praise the good’s intelligible naming of light.

126. And it must be said that the good is called intelligible light (Matt 19:17),¹ because indeed it fills every supercelestial mind with intelligible light,

127. yet it expels all ignorance and error from all the souls in which it is implanted, and it hands on holy light to all of them,

128. and it cleanses the intellectual eyes of these from the dregs placed around them out of ignorance and moves and opens those closed up by much heaviness of darkness;

129. and it hands on beforehand indeed a measured clarity, afterwards to those as tasting light and desiring more, it sends itself more and shines over them abundantly, because they have loved much, and it always extends them to earlier things, according to their proportion to looking.

§ 6. 130. Therefore the good is called intelligible light which is above every light, as fontal ray and super-emanating effusion of light, illuminating every super-mundane and circa-mundane and mundane mind from its fullness and renewing the whole of their intellectual virtues and exceeding all, because it is super-extended; and comprehending all, because it super-lies over them; and as principally shining and super-shining and co-assuming in itself and super-possessing and prepossessing simply every domination of illuminative virtue,

131. and gathering all intellectual and rational things and making them indestructible: for just as ignorance is divisive of those who have been led into error, so the presence of intelligible light is congregative and unitive of those who are illuminated, and perfective and still conversive to the truly existing, converting from many opinions and various visions, or, so that it might be said more properly, phantasms, to one, gathering true and mundane and uniform knowledge and filling with one and unitive light.

321. After he has shown how the name of sensible light is transferred into divine predication through a certain likeness, now he shows how intelligible light is attributed to him;

and first he connects himself to the preceding things;

second, he pursues his intention, at and it must be said that the good.

322. Therefore he says, first, that these things that have been said of God through the predication of sensible light and that have been said of its likeness to him, have been said in the book on Symbolic Theology, but now it is necessary to consider how the divine good is praised by the name of intelligible light. For it is not the intention of this book to treat concerning the names of sensible things translated onto God, but of intelligible names.

323. Then when he says, and it must be said that the good, he pursues his intention, namely concerning intelligible light, which signifies in God the causality of intelligible light; whence about this, he does three things:

first he touches on the causality of light;

second, he shows how God has himself to those things in which light is caused, at therefore the good is called intelligible light;

third, he shows what is the end of the diffusion of this light, at and gathering all intellectual and rational things.

324. About the first, he does two things:

first, he touches on the causality of intelligible light in the angels;

second, in rational souls, at yet it expels all ignorance.

325. Therefore he says, first, that God, who is good through his essence, is named intelligible light: I am the light of the world (John 8:12), because, indeed, he fills every supercelestial mind, that is, the angelic, with intelligible light, which is nothing else than the knowledge of truth. Yet in what he says: fills, he designates the perfect knowledge of truth, given to the angels by God.

326. Then when he says, yet it expels all ignorance, he shows the causality of light in souls;

and first, he posits two things that the divine light makes in souls;

second, he assigns the mode of each, at and it cleanses the intellectual eyes.

327. Yet of the two things that the divine light makes in souls,

the first is: that from all the souls in which it is born, it expels all ignorance and error. Ignorance pertains to the removal of truth, but error to the adhesion of falsity; yet he says, implanted, in order to allude to what is said in 2 Peter 1:19: until the day begins to dawn and the morning star arises in your hearts. Whence it is clear that he does not say this of the angels, in whom ignorance and error have no place, although in them there is unawareness of some things, from which they are purged, as Denys says in the seventh chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy.¹ For not every unawareness can be called ignorance, but only the unawareness of those things unto which someone is born and which he ought to know.

The second is: that it hands on holy light; and note that he says, holy light, both because it is sent forth by God, and because it orders us to know God. And it must be noted that he did not use a word of filling, but of simple handing on, to show that the knowledge of truth is imperfect in souls in comparison to that fullness that the angels possess from God.

328. Then when he says, and it cleanses the intellectual eyes, he expounds the mode of each;

and first, of the first;

second, of the second, at and it hands on beforehand indeed.

329. About the first, it must be considered that bodily darkness does three things in bodies:

for first it renders them squalid and sordid from the fact that things that are in darkness are not zealously purged;

second, darkness renders animals immobile, whence for most animals it is natural that they should rest at night and be moved in the day, because through light they are directed in motion, seeing where they go;

third, bodily darkness closes up, as in darkness someone cannot prepare himself to do something, and it naturally inflicts some sloth.

And these three things spiritual darkness, that is, ignorance of truth, also does:

for first, things are made sordid from it not only of errors in the intellect, but also of depraved affections in affect and inordination of actions in act, while the evil things of which man is ignorant he neither shuns nor purges;

second, darkness renders men idle, who, while they have ignorance of the good that is the end and of the way by which it is arrived at, do not move themselves to pursuing the end;

third, it renders them closed up, because while they do not know the good, their affection is not opened through desire to grasping it within themselves.

But these three things intelligible light, that is, the knowledge of truth, removes:

and as regards the first, he says that intelligible light cleanses the intellectual eyes of these, namely souls, from the dregs, that is, the uncleanness, placed around them, that is, supervening on them, out of ignorance;

as regards the second, he says, and moves, namely to acting well;

and as regards the third, he says, and opens, that is, it renders open to receiving through desire, the closed up, that is, those who were closed up with darkness oppressing them, that is, inflicting a certain slowness to the good. Therefore because they were closed up, they needed an opening; because they were oppressed, they needed motion.

330. Then when he says, and it hands on beforehand indeed, he shows the mode and order in which intellectual light is handed on to holy souls; and he says, first, that intelligible light indeed is handed on to each according to a determinate measure, according to Ephesians 4:7: grace is given to each, according to the measure of the donation of Christ; and because spiritual tastes excite desire, which before when unknown were spurned, after the first reception of light, once the knowledge of the light of truth already has been tasted, it is desired more, and to those desiring more it is sent more: for the effects of divine grace are multiplied according to the multiplication of desire and of love, according to Luke 7:47: many sins have been dismissed for her, because she has loved much; for thus a certain circularity is considered, while from light there grows a desire of light and from desire increased there grows light. Yet circularity according to its nature is perpetual, and thus the divine light always extends souls to earlier things through progress, nevertheless not equally in all, but according to their proportion to looking at the light: for certain ones look more diligently at the light sent, who desire more and advance more.

331. Then when he says, therefore the good is called intelligible light, he shows how God has himself toward those things in which he causes intelligible light; and he posits three habitudes, namely: of diffusion and of excess and of comprehension.

As regards the first, therefore, he says that the supersubstantial good, although it is above every light both sensible and intelligible, nevertheless is named intelligible light, inasmuch as it is a certain ray and font of every intellectual light: and lest font should be understood as consisting in itself alone, he adds that it is effusion of light flowing from above; and in order that it might be known to whom it flows, he adds that from its fullness it illuminates every super-mundane mind, as regards the assisting angels, and circa-mundane, as regards the ministering angels, by whose ministry that world is governed, and mundane, as regards souls; and not only from the beginning does it illuminate minds, by granting to them natural knowledge, but also it renews all their intellectual virtues, by super-pouring the new light of grace and glory and new revelations.

Second, he posits what pertains to excess, and he says that the divine light exceeds all minds, although it is diffused into them, because it is always a super-excess through its substance.

Third, he posits what pertains to comprehension, and he says that God comprehends all things that are in the aforementioned minds, inasmuch as he super-lies over them, as a superior cause prepossesses in itself what is found in inferior effects; whence, to expound this, he adds that God himself, universally, has every domination, or power, of illuminative virtue, that is, whatever pertains to the knowledge of whatever thing or to whatever virtue of teaching, just as we know colors by sight and sounds by hearing, but according to one virtue he knows all things; and he super-possesses, because he knows each thing more excellently than it is known by anyone; and he prepossesses, because he does not acquire the knowledge of virtue or the virtue of teaching from another, but all from him; and this applies to him, inasmuch as he is the principal shining, as the principle of light and inasmuch as he is shining over all things.

332. Then when he says, and gathering all intellectual and rational things, he shows the end and fruit of the causality of light; and he says that through illumination it gathers all intellectual things, that is, angels, and rational things, that is, men, and it makes them indestructible, because while they are united in truth, they are conserved in it. And this, consequently, he expounds from the opposite: for just as ignorance is divisive of those who are led into error, so the presence of intellectual light, through which the truth is known, gathers those who are illuminated to one another and unites them in one known truth; for it is manifest that to speak the truth about one thing does not happen unless by one mode, but to err from the truth happens in many modes. And for this reason those who know the truth come together in one judgment, but those who are ignorant of it are divided through diverse errors. The presence of light is also perfective, inasmuch as it constitutes in the end of the thing known, which is the truth, and it is also conversive, that is, calling back to truth, converting men from many opinions that do not have the firmness of truth; and not only does it transfer them from opinion to fixed science, but also from truth to uniformity; and this is what he adds: that it gathers various visions, or, so that it might be said more properly, phantasms, to one true knowledge, through the opposition of falsity. And not only does it convert to the light of truth, but it also fills by this very light of truth, which in itself is one and unitive of other things.

§ 7. 132. This good is praised by the holy theologians as beautiful and as beauty and as love and as lovable and whatever others are befitting namings of the beautifying and graciously had beauty.

133. Yet beautiful and beauty must not be divided in the cause that comprehends the whole of things in one.

134. For these in existing things, dividing in participations and participatings: we say that beautiful indeed is that which participates beauty, yet we say that beauty is the participation of the beautiful cause making the whole of things beautiful.

135. Whereas the supersubstantial beautiful is called beauty indeed on account of the beauty handed on by it to all existing things, according to the propriety of each, and as the cause of the consonance and clarity of the whole of things, unto the likeness of light, with radiance sending into all things the beautifying handings on of its fontal ray, and as calling all things to itself, whence also it is called kalos, and as gathering the whole of things in the whole of things.¹

136. Yet beautiful as most beautiful and simultaneously super-beautiful;

137. and always existing according to the same things and likewise beautiful, and neither made nor destroyed nor increased nor diminished; nor beautiful in some part indeed, yet ugly in another; nor at some time, yet at some time not; nor indeed beautiful unto this, yet ugly unto that; nor here, yet not there, as indeed to certain ones existing as beautiful, yet to certain ones as not beautiful; but as it according to itself with itself uniformly and always existing as beautiful,¹

138. and as prepossessing in itself the font and beauty of every beautiful thing; for by the simple and supernatural nature of the whole of beautiful things, every beauty and every beautiful thing uniformly preexists according to cause.

139. From that beautiful, for all existing things according to proper ratio singulars are beautiful and on account of the beautiful the concords of all and the friendships and communions and all things are united by the beautiful;

140. and it is the principle of all beautiful things, as effective cause and moving the whole of things and containing by love of its proper beauty; and the end of all as final cause, for for the sake of the beautiful all things are made; and exemplar, because according to it all things are determined;

141. on account of which also the beautiful is the same as the good, because all things desire the good and the beautiful according to every cause and there is not anything of existing things that does not participate the beautiful and the good; yet the speech shall dare also to say this: that even non-existing participates the beautiful and the good; for then also this beautiful and good, when in God according to the removal of all things, is supersubstantially praised.

333. After Denys has treated of light, now he treats of the beautiful, for the understanding of which light is prerequisite; and about this, he does two things:

first, he sets out that the beautiful is attributed to God;

second, he shows the mode in which it is attributed to him, at yet beautiful as most beautiful.

334. Therefore he says, first, that this supersubstantial good which is God is praised by the holy theologians in Sacred Scripture as beautiful: lo you are beautiful, my beloved (Song 1:14); and as beauty: confession and beauty in your countenance (Ps. 95:6); and as love: God is charity (1 John 4:8); and as lovable, as introduced in the authority of the canticles; and whatever others are befitting namings of God, pertaining to beauty: whether through the causality of beauty, which he says on account of the beautiful and beauty; or according as beauty is had graciously, which he says on account of love and the lovable.

335. Then when he says, yet beautiful as most beautiful, he shows how it is attributed to God; and about this, he does three things:

first, he sets out that beautiful and beauty are attributed differently to God and to creatures;

second, how it is attributed to creatures, at for these in existing things;

third, how it is attributed to God, at whereas the supersubstantial beautiful.

336. Therefore he says, first, that in the first cause, namely God, beautiful and beauty must not be divided, as though beautiful and beauty were other in it; and this because the first cause alone on account of its simplicity and perfection comprehends the whole of things, that is, all things, in one, whence although in creatures beautiful and beauty differ, nevertheless in God he comprehends both in himself according to one and the same thing.

337. Then when he says, for these in existing things, he shows how they are attributed to creatures; and he says that in existing things, beautiful and beauty are distinguished according to participating and participated, such that beautiful is said for that which participates beauty; yet beauty for the participation of the first cause that makes all things beautiful: for the beauty of a creature is nothing other than a likeness of the divine beauty participated in things.

338. Then when he says, whereas the supersubstantial beautiful, he shows how the aforementioned are attributed to God:

and first, how beauty is attributed to him;

second, how beautiful is attributed to him, at yet beautiful as most beautiful.

339. Therefore he says, first, that God who is the supersubstantial beautiful, is called beauty because he gives beauty to all created beings, according to the propriety of each: for beauty of spirit is one thing and beauty of the body another, and the beauty of this body is one thing and of that body another. And he shows in what the ratio of beauty consists, adding that God so hands on beauty, inasmuch as he is the cause of the consonance and clarity in all things: for thus we call a man beautiful, on account of seemly proportion in quantity and position and on account of the fact that he has clear and shining color. Whence it must be received proportionally in the rest of things, that each is called beautiful according as it has clarity of its kind, whether spiritual or bodily, and according as it is constituted in due proportion.

340. Yet he shows how God is the cause of clarity, adding that God sends into all creatures, with a certain radiance, the handing on of his own luminous ray, which is the font of all light; which radiant handings on indeed of the divine ray, must be understood according to the participation of likeness, and those handings on are beautifying, that is, making beauty in things. Again he expounds another member, namely that God is the cause of consonance in things; yet there is a twofold consonance in things: first of all, according to the order of creatures to God, and he touches on this when he says that God is the cause of consonance, as calling all things to itself, inasmuch as he converts all things to himself as to an end, as has been said above, and on account of this beauty in Greek is called kalos, which is taken from calling; yet there is a second consonance in things, according to their ordering to one another; and he touches on this when he adds that he gathers all things in all things, unto the same. And this can be understood, according to the opinion of the Platonists, such that superior things are in inferiors according to participation, whereas inferiors are in superiors through a certain excellence, and thus all things are in all things; and from the fact that all things are found in all things by a certain order, it follows that all things are ordered to the same ultimate thing.

341. Then when he says, yet beautiful as most beautiful, he shows how beautiful is said of God;

and first he shows that it is said according to excess;

second, that it is said through cause, at from that beautiful, for all existing things.

342. About the first, he does two things:

first, he proposes excess;

second, he expounds it, at and always existing according to the same things.

343. Yet excess is twofold: one in the genus, which is signified through the comparative or the superlative; the other outside the genus, which is signified through the addition of this preposition: super; for example, if we should say that fire exceeds in heat by excess in the genus, whence it is called hottest; yet the sun exceeds by excess outside the genus, whence it is not called hottest but super-hot, because heat is not in it, in the same mode, but more excellently. And although this twofold excess does not come together simultaneously in things caused, nevertheless in God is it said simultaneously that he is both most beautiful and super-beautiful; not that he is in the genus, but that all things that are of whatever genus are attributed to him.

344. Then when he says, and always existing according to the same things, he expounds what he had said;

and first, he expounds why God is called most beautiful;

second, why he is called super-beautiful, at and as prepossessing in itself the font.

345. For just as something is called whiter because it is less mixed with black, so something is called more beautiful through the removal of a defect of beauty. Yet there is a twofold defect of beauty in creatures:

one, that there are certain things that have variable beauty, as is apparent from corruptible things, and this defect he excludes first from God, saying that God always is beautiful according to the same thing and in the same mode, and thus alteration of beauty is excluded; and again, in him there is not generation or corruption of beauty, nor again increase or diminishment of it, as is apparent in bodily things.

Yet the second defect of beauty is that all creatures have in some mode a particulated beauty just as also a particulated nature; he excludes this defect from God, as regards every mode of particulation: and he says that God is not beautiful in some part and ugly in another, as sometimes happens in particulated things; nor also is he in some time and not in another, as happens in these things whose beauty falls under time; nor again is he beautiful as regards one thing and not as regards another, as happens in all things that are determined to one determinate use or end: for if they should be applied to another, consonance shall not be conserved, whence neither beauty; nor again is he beautiful in some place and not beautiful in another place, which indeed happens in some things on account of the fact that to certain ones they seem beautiful and to certain ones they do not seem beautiful, but God is beautiful to all and simply.

346. And he assigns the reason for all the aforementioned things, when he adds that he is beautiful according to itself; through which it is excluded that he is beautiful not according to one part only, nor in some time only, nor in some place only; for what befits something according to itself and first, befits it whole and always and everywhere. Again, God is beautiful in himself, not through respect to something determinate, and for this reason it cannot be said that he is beautiful unto something and not beautiful unto something, and neither beautiful to certain men and not beautiful to certain men. Again, he is always and uniformly beautiful, through which there is excluded the first defect of beauty, namely variability.

347. Then when he says, and as prepossessing in itself the font, he shows by what ratio God is called super-beautiful, inasmuch as he has in himself excellently and before all other things the font of the whole of beauty. For in this simple and supernatural nature of all beautiful things derived from it there preexist every beauty and every beautiful thing, not indeed divided, but uniformly, through the mode in which manifold effects preexist in a cause.

348. Then when he says, from that beautiful, for all existing things, he shows how beautiful is said of God according to cause;

and first he posits the causality of the beautiful;

second, he expounds it, at and it is the principle of all beautiful things.

349. Therefore he says, first, that from that beautiful there comes forth being for all existing things: for clarity is of the consideration of beauty, as has been said; yet every form, through which a thing has being, is a certain participation of divine clarity; and this is what he adds: that singulars are beautiful according to their proper ratio, that is, according to their proper form; whence it is clear that from the divine beauty the being of all things is derived. Likewise also it has been said that consonance is of the ratio of beauty, whence all things that pertain in whatever way to consonance proceed from the divine beauty; and this is what he adds: that on account of the divine beauty are the concords of all rational creatures, as regards the intellect; for those concord who come together in the same judgment; and the friendships, as regards affection; and communions, as regards act or whatever extrinsic thing; and universally all creatures, whatever union they have, have it from the virtue of the beautiful.

350. Then when he says, and it is the principle of all beautiful things, he expounds what he had said first concerning the causality of the beautiful;

and first, as regards the ratio of causing;

second, as regards the diversity of things caused, at this one, the good and the beautiful singularly.

351. About the first, he does two things:

first, he assigns according to what ratio the beautiful is called a cause;

second, he infers a certain corollary from the things said, at on account of which also the beautiful.

352. Therefore he says, first, that the beautiful indeed is the principle of all things as effective cause giving being; and as moving cause and as containing cause, that is, conserving all things; for these three seem to pertain to the ratio of an efficient cause: to give being, to move, and to conserve. But an agent cause does certain things from the desire of the end, which belongs to an imperfect agent, not yet having what it desires; but it belongs to a perfect agent that it should act through love of that which it has, and on account of this he adds that the beautiful, which is God, is an effective and motive and containing cause, by love of its proper beauty. For because he has his proper beauty, he wills to multiply it, as is possible, namely through communication of its likeness.

353. Second, he says that the beautiful which is God is the end of all as final cause of all things. For all things are made in order that they might imitate the divine beauty in whatever way.

354. Third, he is the exemplar cause, because all things are distinguished according to the divine beauty, and a sign of this is that no one cares to portray or represent, except unto the beautiful.

355. Then when he says, on account of which also the beautiful, he infers a certain corollary from the things said; and he says that, because the beautiful is the cause of all things in so many modes, thence it is that the good and the beautiful are the same, because all things desire the beautiful and the good, as cause in all modes; and because there is nothing that does not participate the beautiful and the good, since each thing is beautiful and good according to its proper form; and further also boldly we will be able to say this: that non-existing, that is, prime matter, participates the beautiful and the good, since the first being non-being has a certain likeness with the divine beautiful and good: because the beautiful and the good is praised in God through the removal of all things; but in prime matter, removal is considered through defect, yet in God through excess, inasmuch as he exists supersubstantially.

356. Yet although the beautiful and the good are the same in subject, because both clarity and consonance are contained under the ratio of the good, nevertheless they differ by ratio: for the beautiful adds over and above the good that it should be an order to a cognitive power of this sort.

142. This one, the good and the beautiful singularly, is the cause of all the many beautiful and good things.

143. From this, all the substantial essences of existing things;

144. unitions, discretions; identities, alterities; likenesses, unlikenesses; communions of contraries; unmixings of things united;

145. providences of superiors, alternate habitudes of coordinates, conversions of those having less; conservative and unchangeable dwellings and gatherings of all the same things; and again communions of all things according to the propriety of each and adaptations and unconfused friendships; and harmonies of each thing, in everything concretions; indissoluble containings of existing things, unfailing successions of those that are made;

146. all stations and motions that are of minds, that are of souls, that are of bodies: for that is station and motion for all things which is above every station and every motion, gathering each in its ratio and moving to the divine motion.

357. After Denys has expounded according to what ratio the beautiful is a cause, here he shows of what it is the cause; and about this he does two things:

first, he proposes in general;

second, he pursues by distinguishing through singulars, at from this, all the substantial essences.

358. Therefore he says, first, that the good and the beautiful, although it is one being, nevertheless is the cause of all good and beautiful things, which are many.

359. Then when he says, from this, all the substantial essences, he pursues through singulars, about those things of which the beautiful is the cause;

and first, as regards being itself;

second, as regards the one, at unitions, discretions; identities, alterities;

third, as regards order, at providences of superiors;

fourth, as regards motion and rest, at all stations and motions.

360. Therefore he says that from the beautiful are caused all substantial essences of beings. For every essence either is a simple form or has a complement through form; yet form is a certain irradiation coming forth from the first clarity; yet clarity is of the ratio of beauty, as has been said.

361. Then when he adds, unitions, discretions; identities, alterities, he posits those things that pertain to the consideration of the one. Where it must be considered that over and above the ratio of being, one adds indivision: for one is undivided being; whence distinction or discretion is opposed to unity; and for this reason, first, he posits that unitions and discretions of things are caused by the divine beauty. Yet one in substance makes the same, yet distinction in substance makes diversity, and for this reason he adds, identities and alterities, that is, diversities. Yet from one in quality there is caused the like, yet from discretion the unlike, and for this reason he adds, likenesses, unlikenesses. Yet likewise, one in quantity causes equality and discretion inequality, but of these he does not make mention, because they pertain to the commensuration of things, about which he will treat afterwards. Yet this is observed in things: that even unlike things come together in something: as contraries, in genus and matter; and things that are united according to something remain distinct: as parts in a whole; and for this reason he adds, communions of contraries, as regards the first; and unmixings of things united, as regards the second. Yet these things are reduced to the causality of the beautiful, because they pertain to consonance, which is of the ratio of beauty, as has been said above.

362. Then when he says, providences of superiors, he enumerates those things that pertain to the order of things;

and first, as regards action, as superior things provide for inferiors, which he touches on when he says, alternate habitudes of coordinates, that is, of equals; and as inferiors are converted to receiving perfection and rule from superiors; and this is what he says: conversions of those having less.

363. Second, he touches on those things that pertain to the existence of things in themselves; and this is what he adds: that from the beautiful are conservative dwellings of the same things, that is, of any things in themselves. For something is conserved from the fact that it remains within the limits of its nature; for if it were to flow totally outside itself, it would perish; but he adds, and unchangeable gatherings, that is, foundations; for just as from the fact that something remains in itself, it is conserved, so from the fact that something has a firmness in itself upon which it is founded, it is unchangeable.

364. Third, he posits those things that pertain to the dwelling of one thing in another. Whence it must be known that, when it is necessary that something is constituted from any things,

first of all there is required that parts should come together: just as many stones come together with one another from which a house is constituted, and likewise all the parts of the universe come together in the ratio of existing; and he says this because not only from the beautiful are there dwellings of things in themselves, but also communions of all things in all according to the propriety of each; for all things are not in all in one mode, but superior things indeed in inferiors by participation, whereas inferiors in superiors excellently, and nevertheless all things have something common with all.

Second, there is required in the parts that even in that they are diverse, they should be able to be fit together; for a house would not be made from cement and stone, unless they were to be fit together, and likewise the parts of the universe are fit together, inasmuch as they can fall under one order; and this is what he says: and adaptations.

Third, there is required that one part should be helped by the others: as a wall and a roof are supported by the foundation, and the roof covers the wall and the foundation, and likewise in the universe superior things give perfection to inferiors and in inferiors a superior virtue is manifested; and this is what he says: and unconfused friendships, because mutual aid is without prejudice to the distinction of things.

Fourth, there is required due proportion in the parts, namely so that the foundation might be such that it accords with the other parts; and this is what he says: and harmonies of each thing, that is, of all the parts of the universe. For harmony is caused in sounds from the due proportion of numbers. Therefore with parts so disposed, there follows their composition in a whole, according as from all the parts of the universe there is constituted one whole universe of things; and this is what he adds: in everything, that is, in the universe, concretions.

365. Yet this concretion of parts in the universe is considered in two ways:

first of all, through the mode of local containing, according as superior things are in beings, in some mode, the place of inferior things either spiritual or bodily; and this is what he adds: indissoluble containings of existing things, namely according as superior things contain inferiors, by an indissoluble order.

Second, as regards the succession of time, but nevertheless in generable and corruptible things, in which posterior things succeed prior ones; and this is what he adds: unfailing successions of those that are made. Yet the successions of things are called unfailing, not because genera endure in perpetuity, but because without interpolation certain things succeed other things, as long as this course of the world endures. Yet he says that all these things are caused from beauty, inasmuch as they pertain to the ratio of consonance, which is of the ratio of beauty.

366. Then when he says, all stations and motions, he pursues concerning rest and motion, which also, inasmuch as they import some habitude of one to another, pertain to the ratio of consonance and beauty; and about this, he does three things:

first, he proposes the causality of the beautiful, with respect to rest and motion;

second, he expounds certain motions that seemed not to be motions, at and the divine minds are said to be moved;

third, he concludes the proposition, at therefore, of those and of the three sensible motions.

367. Therefore he says, first, that from the divine beauty are caused all stations, that is, rests, and motions, whether they be of minds or of souls or of bodies. And he says this because that generally which is above every rest and motion is the cause for all rests and motions, inasmuch as it gathers each in its proper ratio in which a thing has its station, and inasmuch as it moves all things to the divine motion, because the motions of all things are ordered to the motion by which they are moved to God, just as motions that are to second ends are ordered to the motion that is to the final end. Yet form, upon which the proper ratio of a thing depends, pertains to clarity; yet order to the end, to consonance; and thus motion and rest are reduced to the causality of the beautiful.

How Are the Motions of Divine Minds and Souls

§8. 147. And the divine minds are said to be moved circularly, indeed, unitedly without beginnings and interminable illuminations of the beautiful and the good; yet in a direct line, when they proceed unto the providence of their subjects, crossing over all things rightly; yet obliquely, when also providing for those having less they remain inegressibly in identity around the cause of identity, the beautiful and the good, acting unceasingly around the choir.

§ 9. 148. Yet the circular motion of a soul indeed is an entrance into itself from exterior things and a uniform convolution of its intellectual virtues, just as in a certain circle, lavishing upon it not to err and converting it from many exterior things and gathering it: first, into itself; then, thus made uniform, uniting unitively by united virtues, and thus leading by the hand unto the beautiful and the good which is above all existing things and one and the same and without beginning and interminable.

149. Yet the soul is moved obliquely, inasmuch as, according to its propriety, it is illuminated by divine cognitions, not intellectually and singularly, but reasonably and diffusely and as commixed and transitive operations.

150. Yet in a direct line when not having entered into itself and moved by a singular intellectuality: for this is, as I have said, according to the circular, but it goes forth unto those things that are around it and from exterior things as from certain varied and manifold signs it is driven upwards unto simple and united contemplations.

368. Because Denys had made mention of the motions of minds and of souls, which seem immobile, here he expounds how are their motions;

and first, how are the motions of the angelic minds;

second, how are the motions of rational minds, at yet the circular motion of a soul.

369. Yet it must be considered that, as the Philosopher says in the third book of the De Anima, motion is twofold:¹ one that is the act of the imperfect, that is, of an existing thing in potency, and such is the motion of bodily things that are said to be moved according to this: either according to substance or according to quantity or according to quality or according to place, inasmuch as they go out of potency into act; yet the other is the motion of the perfect, according as the very operation of a thing existing in act, remaining in the one operating himself, is called motion, as to sense, to understand, and to will.

370. Therefore receiving motion thus, he distinguishes the motion of angelic minds into three unto the likeness of local motion, which is the most perfect among bodily motions, namely into the circular, the right, and the oblique.

371. Yet there are two things to consider in circular motion: one, namely, that it is uniform; whereas the other, that circular motion is without beginning and end. Therefore the intellectual operation by which angelic minds contemplate God is compared to circular motion, because they have themselves uniformly in the contemplation of God, and God himself is without beginning and end; and for this reason he says that angelic minds, which are uniform by divine participation, are said to be moved circularly by understanding God, inasmuch as they are moved unitedly, that is, uniformly, through illuminations proceeding from the beautiful and the good, which are without beginning and without term.

372. Yet concerning the propriety of right motion there is the fact that there is found in it beginning and end and that there is in it order and difformity according to proximity to the beginning and the end; whence right motion is said in them, according as they intend toward providing for inferior things: of which providence indeed the beginning is made by the angel itself providing, yet the term is in that to which the providence reaches last. And in this motion there is not found uniformity, because they first provide perfective things for those nearer; and this is what he says: that they are moved in a direct line through the fact that they proceed to providing for inferiors: for their providence crosses over through all inferior things, in the mode of a certain straight line.

373. Yet concerning the propriety of oblique motion there is that it is a middle between the circular and the right, having something of each; and this motion befits the angels, inasmuch as they regularly are moved to providing for inferiors (which pertains to right motion) from the contemplation of God itself (which pertains to circular motion); and this is what he says: that angelic minds are moved obliquely through the fact that, while they provide for inferiors, they do not depart from the uniformity of their motion; which uniformity or identity indeed befits them from the fact that they go around unceasingly, as though whirling dancers, through uniform contemplation, around the cause of the whole of identity, which is the divine beautiful and good.

374. Then when he says, yet the circular motion of a soul, he expounds the motion of a soul:

and first, of its circular motion;

second, oblique motion, at yet the soul is moved obliquely;

third, right motion, at yet in a direct line.

375. Yet it must be considered that it is necessary to expound the circular motion of a soul otherwise than that of an angel; for since the motion of an angel and of a soul is its operation, yet circularity of motion expresses the ratio of uniformity, it is necessary to attribute circular motion to an angel and to a soul in that mode, inasmuch as uniformity of intellectual operation applies to them. Yet an angel understands, not indeed by receiving from things, but by receiving light from the first simple one, namely God; whence most of all in the intellectual operation of an angel it must be considered according as it is illuminated by God himself, and for this reason he said above that the divine minds are moved circularly, by illuminations of the beautiful and the good. Yet it is connatural to the soul that it should understand by receiving from exterior things that are multiform and divided, whence in this reception the circularity of its motion cannot be considered, but rather in the fact that it is called back from exterior things: first of all, converted into itself; second, elevated unto the consideration of the angelic virtues; yet third, even unto God himself.

376. Therefore this is what he says: that the circular motion of a soul is according as from exterior things it enters into itself and there uniformly is rolled around, as in a certain circle, according to its intellectual virtues; which convolution indeed directs the virtue of the soul so that it might not err: for it is manifest that the soul, by running off from one thing to another as from effect to cause or from one like thing to another or from contrary to contrary, reasons manifoldly; but every such ratiocination is decided through resolution into first principles, in which erring does not happen, from which the soul is defended against error, because the first principles themselves are known by simple understanding without discursus, and for this reason the consideration of them, on account of its uniformity, is named circular convolution.

Through this convolution, therefore, first it is gathered into itself, considering what it has in its nature to know; then, thus made uniform, it is united through a convolution of this sort, by united virtues, namely angelic, inasmuch as through the likeness of this uniform apprehension, it considers the uniformity of the angels in some mode; and further through that convolution, it is led by the hand unto the beautiful and the good, that is, God, which is above all existing things and is most of all one and the same and is without beginning and interminable, which pertain to the ratio of a circle, as has been said; and for this reason the circularity of the motion of the soul is completed in this: that it leads unto God.

377. Then when he says, yet the soul is moved obliquely, he describes the oblique motion of souls, which also is received otherwise in a soul and in the angels. For in the operation of an angel, there is no difformity according as it understands; but according as it provides for inferiors, its provision is varied through diverse things; and for this reason oblique motion, which is composed from the right and the circular, having in itself something of uniformity and of difformity, is considered as one in the angels, according as they so provide for inferiors that nevertheless they remain in the uniform consideration of God; but the soul in its natural knowledge has difformity, inasmuch as it is born not to know unless by running around through diverse things; yet uniformity is in it according as it is subject to a uniform principle from which it receives.

And therefore oblique motion, composed from uniformity and difformity, is considered in the soul according as it receives the uniform illuminations of God not uniformly, but differently according to its mode. Therefore this is what he says: that the soul is moved obliquely inasmuch as it is illuminated by divine cognitions according to its propriety not indeed intellectually and singularly, that is, simply as the angels, but reasonably and diffusely, that is, discursively and by diffusing itself through diverse things; and he expounds this, adding, as by commixed operations, for in a certain mode it commixes itself with things, inasmuch as it diffuses itself to knowing diverse things; and transitive, which is referred to the fact that he said reasonably: for it is proper to reason to cross over or to run around from one thing to another.

378. Then when he says yet in a direct line, he expounds the right motion of a soul, which of its ratio has difformity. Yet difformity in the operation of an angel was considered according to the provision of inferiors, but in the soul according to the various and multiform apprehension of diverse things, from which it grasps the cognitions of simple and uniform things. Therefore he says that the soul is moved in a direct line, when it does not enter into itself such that it operates by a certain singular, that is, simple, intellectuality, because this pertains to its circular motion as has been said, but when it goes forth unto exterior things, which are around it, by which as by certain various and manifold signs it is elevated unto contemplating things simple and united.

379. Yet this sufficiency and the distinction of these motions of the soul is clear, because the soul either goes forth from its own uniformity into superior things more uniform, and thus there is its whole uniform circular motion; or from the influence of a uniform illumination it receives various and multiform knowledge, and thus there is its oblique motion; or conversely from multiform and various things it advances into simple knowledge, and thus there is its right motion.

§10. 151. Therefore, of those and of the three sensible motions in this everything, and of the dwellings and stations and gatherings of each, the beautiful and the good is the much prior cause both contentive and final, which is above every station and motion, on account of which every station and motion and from which and in which and unto which and for the sake of which.

152. For from it and through it substance and every life both of mind and of soul; and of every nature smallnesses and equalities, magnitudes, all measures, proportions of existing things and harmonies and concretions, parts of the totality; every one and multitude, conjunctions of parts, unitions of every multitude, perfections of totalities; how, how much, how many, infinite, comparisons, discretions; every infinity, every end, all definitions, orders, excesses, elements, forms; every substance, every virtue, every operation, every habit, every sense, every word, every deed, every touch, every science, every unition;

153. and simply every existing thing is from the beautiful and the good and in the beautiful and the good and is converted to the beautiful and the good; and all things whatever are and are made, are and are made on account of the beautiful and the good; and all things look to it and are moved by it and are contained both for its sake and on account of it;

154. and in it every exemplar principle, final, efficient, formal, elemental,

155. and simply, every principle, every containing, every end or, so that I might say it comprehensively, all existing things from the beautiful and the good and all non-existing things supersubstantially in the beautiful and the good; and it is the principle and end of all things, super-principal and super-perfect; because from it and through it and in it and unto it all things, as the holy word says (Rom 11:36, Col 1:16–17).

380. Having expounded the motions of an angel and a soul, here he concludes the causality of the beautiful and the good with respect to the motions and rests both of these and of all other things;

and first, he manifests the causality of the beautiful and the good about the differences of motions and rests;

second, about the differences of all things, at For from it and through it substance.

381. Therefore he says, first, that the beautiful and the good is the cause of these motions of minds and souls, concerning which it already has been said, and also of the three sensible motions that are in this universe: because also in sensible things there is found circular motion, as in the celestial bodies; and right motion, as in heavy things and light things; and oblique motion, as in animals; and since immobile and restful things are prior according to nature to those that are moved, since the first of whatever motion is from something immobile, the beautiful and the good is the much prior cause of the dwellings of each, which indeed is considered according as one thing is said to be in another, and of stations, according as one thing rests in another, and of gatherings, according as one through is conserved and confirmed through another.

382. Yet of these, the divine beautiful and good which is over every station and motion of creatures, is not only the productive cause, but also the contentive, that is, conservative, and the final cause and unto which and for the sake of which, as to a final cause: for we are moved to attaining the end and we operate for the sake of it; whence what he says: unto which, pertains to that naming of end; yet what he says: for the sake of which, respects the intention according as, willing one thing, we tend to it as to an end.

383. Then when he says, For from it and through it substance, he gathers the whole causality of the beautiful and the good, about all the differences of things:

and first, he posits the differences of things that are caused from the beautiful and the good;

second, the diverse modes of causing that are attributed to the beautiful and the good, at and simply every existing thing.

384. About the first: first, he posits substantial differences, saying; for this reason it is necessary that every station and motion be caused from the beautiful and the good: because from it are caused all the differences of things: for from it, as from an active cause, and through it, as through an exemplar cause, secondarily is every substance of whatever is of a species, and every life whether it be of an angelic mind that so lives that it does not vivify a body or of a soul that vivifies a body.

385. Then he descends to bodily things: in which, first, there are considered the differences pertaining to continuous quantity; and he says that by it are caused all smallnesses, equalities, magnitudes of the things of every bodily nature. Yet the differences of quantity are the great and the small, of which the middle is the equal, as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics.¹ Yet these signify indeterminate quantity; but there are certain other things that signify determinate quantity, as two cubits, three cubits; and to express things of this sort, he adds, all measures. Yet from the determination of quantity there arises proportion, which is the habitude of one quantity to another; and for this reason he adds, proportions of existing things. Yet there are certain proportions befitting according to the nature and condition of things and certain ones not befitting; yet proportions in sounds are called harmonies and, through a certain likeness, the befitting proportions of whatever things are called harmonies; whence he adds, and harmonies. Yet in continuous quantity the very ratio of continuity is to be considered; to which there pertains what he adds: and concretions. Yet it is of the ratio of the continuous that it is divided; yet division constitutes the ratio of whole and of part, because a part is that into which a whole is divided; and for this reason he adds, parts of the totality.

386. Then he comes to discrete quantity, which is number, of which the principle is one; whence he adds, every one and multitude. Yet in this multitude a certain unity is considered, according as from many one is constituted according to either continuation or contact of parts, to which there pertains what he adds: and conjunctions of parts, or in whatever mode; to which there pertains: unitions of every multitude. Yet from the unition of parts there results form, which is the perfection of the whole; whence he adds, perfections of totalities.

387. Then he comes to the differences of diverse genera; whence he adds, how, as regards the genus of quality; how much, according to the genus of quantity; how many, as he calls an order according to genus position, or how many, as regards discrete quantity according as it imports number; and he adds, infinite, which befits continuous quantity indeed according to division; whereas discrete according to apposition; and he adds, comparisons, as regards the genus of relation, and discretions, that is, differences. As regards the same therefore comparison pertains to a relation of fittingness: as same, equal, like; whereas discretion, to a relation of difference: as diverse, unequal, dissimilar. And because he posited infinite and relation, as though following upon quantity and quality, about each he considers certain differences: and first of all, about the infinite he considers infinity itself, when he says, every infinity, every end; and what is effective of the end, when he says, all definitions: for he calls something infinite according as it is indeterminate. Then he posits the diversities of comparisons: yet something is compared to something else according to before and after, and as regards this he says, orders; and according to more and less, and as regards this he says, excesses; and as regards cause and caused, and thus he says, elements, on account of material causes; and forms, on account of formal causes.

388. Further, he proceeds to actions: and first he posits division according to substance and virtue and operation; then he speaks of the process of operation in man: in which, first, there is a habit of the soul; second, sense, that is, cognition or apprehension; third, word; fourth, exterior deed; again, he distinguishes making thus: for in bodies it is action through contact, and as regards this he says, every touch; yet in the intellect through science, which is a certain contact of the intellect; whereas in the will through unition, which is also a certain touch of the will, whence he adds, every science, every unition.

389. Then when he says, and simply every existing thing, he shows the diverse modes of causing that befit the beautiful and the good; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows how the beautiful and the good is the cause of things in diverse modes;

second, that every causality of things preexists in it, at and in it every exemplar principle;

third, he shows how every causality is derived from it, at and simply, every principle.

390. Therefore he says, first, by speaking universally: everything that is, is from the beautiful and the good which is God, as from an effective principle; and is in the beautiful and the good, as in a contentive or conservative principle; and is converted to the beautiful and the good, desiring it, as to an end, and not only is it the end as desired, but also inasmuch as all substances and actions are ordered to it, as to an end; and this is what he adds: and all things whatever are and are made, are and are made on account of the beautiful and the good, and all things look to it, as to an exemplar cause, which they have as the rule of their operation; and are moved by it, as by a moving cause; and are contained and conserved in its motion and action. Yet it does not move things on account of some extraneous end, but for its own sake, as regards its intention, and on account of it being attained by things.

391. Then when he says, and in it every exemplar principle, he shows that every causality of other causes preexists in it; and he says that in it is every principle both exemplar and final, efficient, formal, and elemental, that is, material, as effects are in the virtue of their cause.

392. Then when he says, and simply, every principle, he shows how they are derived from it; and he says that universally every principle productive of things and every conservative principle and every containing and every end and, so that I might say it briefly, all existing things, are from the beautiful and the good, and all non-existing things supersubstantially, namely because the negations of all things befit God through his excess. Yet what he says: that God is the principle and end of all things, is above the mode of other principles, and the perfection of this is above the perfection of others.

393. Yet this universal causality of the beautiful and the good, he confirms through the authority of Scripture, adding, because from it, as from an effective principle; and through it, as through an exemplar principle; and in it, as in a contentive principle; and unto it, as unto an end, are all things, as the holy word of the Apostle says in Romans 11:36. Yet how every causality is attributed to the beautiful and the good can be had from the things said above.

156. Therefore for all things the beautiful and the good is desirable and lovable and cherishable;

157. and on account of it and for its sake lessers love betters by converting themselves to them, and ordered things coordinated things communicatively, and betters lessers providingly, and these singulars themselves contentively;

158. and all things desiring the beautiful and the good do and will all things whatever they do and will.

159. Yet the true man is confident also to say by this word that it the cause of all things, on account of excess of goodness, loves all things, makes all things, perfects all things, contains all things, converts all things, and is the divine love good of the good on account of the good. For this love working the good of existing things, preexisting in the good according to excess, does not dismiss itself to remain in itself without sprout. Yet it moves itself to operating, according to the excess generative of all things.

§11. 160. And let not anyone opine that we commend the naming of love beyond the eloquences. For it is irrational indeed and depraved, as I reckon, not to intend to the virtue of intention, but to sayings; and this is not proper to those wishing to understand divine things, but to those receiving light sounds and those as far as the ears, to those containing them intransible outside and not wishing to see what indeed such a saying as this signifies; yet how it is necessary to explain this both through other equivalent and more manifest sayings; but also to those sympathetic with the elements and not intelligible lines and syllables and unknown sayings not crossing over to their intellectual soul, but resounding outside around their lips and hearing; as though it should not be possible to signify the number four through twice two, and rectilinear through having right lines, or maternal only through paternal, or anything else of those signifying the same thing, by many parts of speech.

161. Yet it is necessary to see according to right reason, that we use elements and sayings and syllables and lines and speeches on account of sense; as when our soul is moved by intellectual operations to intelligible things, the senses of sensible things are indeed superfluous; as also the intellectual virtues, when the soul made deiform, through unition of the unknown, sends itself to the rays of inaccessible light, not by the sendings of eyes.

162. Yet when the mind strives to be moved through sensible things to contemplative understandings, the more manifest partitions of the senses are altogether more precious, as plainer speeches the plainer of visible things; as when not plain things are set before the senses neither could those present well the sensible things to the mind.

163. But so that we might not seem to say those things; as perverting the divine eloquences, let those that accuse the naming of love hear: love her, it says, and she shall serve you; embrace her and she shall exalt you, honor her so that she may comprehend you (Prov 4:6–8); and whatever others are praised in the amative theologies.

§12. 164. Although it seemed to certain of our men saying holy speeches, that the name of love is more divine than the name of charity. Yet also the divine Ignatius writes, my love is crucified. And in the introductions of the eloquences you shall find a certain man saying of the divine wisdom: I was made a lover of her beauty (Wis 8:2). Wherefore indeed let us not fear this name of love nor let any doubting speech disturb us concerning this;

165. for the theologians seem to me indeed to regard the name of charity and of love commonly;

166. yet that true love rather is applied to divine things on account of this: on account of the unfitting receiving of such men. For, as befits God, with true love praised not only by us, but by the eloquences themselves, the multitudes not grasping the uniform of the amative naming of God, according to their familiarity, lapsed to the divisible and what befits a body and the divided; which is not true love, but an idol or rather a fall from true love. For the unitive of the divine and one love does not prevail to be grasped by the multitude; on account of which also just as the name appearing more troublesome to many in the divine wisdom is ordered to their action upwards and the rousing to the knowledge of true love and so that they might be absolved from the trouble that is in it. Yet among us again it would be unfitting that this and anything would be opined to be earthy zeals, according as it seems more famous. Your charity, a certain man said, fell upon me, as the charity of women (2 Sam 1:26).

167. Yet by those hearing divine things rightly in the same virtue, rightly is the name of charity and of love ordered by the holy theologians, according to the divine manifestations; and this is of unitive and conjunctive and differently concretive virtue in the beautiful and the good, preexisting on account of the beautiful and the good, and out of the beautiful and the good on account of the beautiful and the good divided and containing coordinates, according to another communicative habitude, yet moving the first to the providence of the subjects and gathering those having less in the superiors through conversion.

394. After Denys has determined about the beautiful and the good that incite to loving, here he determines about love itself;

and first, through his own proper words;

second, through the words of Hierotheus, at these also our noble perfector of sanctity.

395. About the first, he does two things:

first, he determines about divine love;

second, he shows how God is called both love and lovable, at yet why did the theologians.

396. About the first, he does three things:

first, he determines about love itself;

second, about ecstasy, which is an effect of love, at yet the divine love is also making ecstasy;

third, about zeal, which is a certain species of love, at on account of which those who are mighty.

397. About the first, he does two things:

first, he determines about love;

second, he excludes a certain objection, at and let not anyone opine.

398. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows how God is an object of love;

second, how God loves, at yet the true man is confident.

399. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows what is the object of love;

second, how singulars have love with respect to singulars, at and on account of it and for its sake;

third, what love does in lovers, at and all things desiring the beautiful and the good.

400. Therefore he says, first, that, from the fact that the beautiful and the good is the end of all things, the consequence is that the beautiful and the good is lovable by all, desirable and cherishable, because the beautiful and the good is an object of desire and love.

401. Yet for the evidence of those things that are said here, it must be considered that love pertains to the appetite. Yet there is a first love and common root of all appetitive operations; which is clear to one inspecting through singulars: for nothing is desired except what is loved; nor does anyone rejoice concerning a thing had, except because he loves it; nor is anyone saddened from something, except because it is contrary to what is loved. And for this reason it is necessary that the ratio of love should be received from the fact that it is the common object of appetite. Yet this is the good. Therefore something is said to be loved from the fact that the appetite of a lover has itself to it as to its good. Therefore the very habitude or fitness of the appetite to something as to its good is called love. Yet everything that is ordered to something as to its good, has that thing in some mode present to it and united according to a certain likeness, at least of proportion, as form in a certain mode is in matter inasmuch as it has an aptitude and order to it. But nevertheless it happens that the good loved is totally absent from the lover, and thus there is caused in the lover the desire of the thing loved; yet sometimes it is totally present to him, and thus there is caused in him delight or joy concerning the thing loved; and contrarily, from its absence there is caused fear or sadness concerning it, and consequently the other affections that are derived from these.

402. And therefore it is clear in what regard what he said: desirable and lovable, differ; for desire is a certain effect of love. Yet what he says: cherishable, determines a certain mode of love: for since love pertains to the appetite, the order of loves is according to the order of appetites. Yet there is the most imperfect of the appetites, the natural appetite without knowledge, which imports nothing else than natural inclination. Yet above this is the sensible appetite, which follows knowledge, but is without free choice. Yet the supreme appetite is that which is with knowledge and free choice: for this appetite in a certain way moves itself, whence also the love pertaining to this is the most perfect and is called charity, inasmuch as by free choice there is discerned what is to be loved.

403. Then when he says, and on account of it and for its sake, he shows how love befits singulars, with respect to singulars.

404. Whence it must be considered that, since love imports the habitude of the appetite to the good of the lover, that something should be loved happens in so many ways, as the ways in which it happens that something should be the good of another. Which indeed, first, happens in two ways; for good is said in two ways, as also being: for being is said in one way properly and truly of what subsists, as a stone and as a man; in another way of what does not subsist, but by it something is, as whiteness does not subsist, but by it something is white. And therefore good is said in two ways: in one way, as something subsisting in goodness; in another way, as the goodness of another, namely by which it is well for that thing. And therefore something is loved in two ways: in one way, under the ratio of a subsisting good, and this truly and properly is loved, namely since we will that good should be to it; and this love is called by many the love of benevolence or of friendship; in another way, through the mode of goodness inhering, according as something is said to be loved, not inasmuch as we will that good should be to it, but inasmuch as we will that which is good to someone else, as we say that we love science or health.

405. Nor is it unfitting if also in this way we should love some things that subsist per se, not indeed by reason of their substance, but by reason of some perfection that we attain from them; as we say that we love wine, not on account of the substance of wine so that it might be well for it, but so that through wine it might be well for us, either inasmuch as we are delighted by its taste or inasmuch as we are sustained by its humor. Yet everything that is accidental is reduced to what is per se. And therefore this very fact that we love something so that it might be well for something else, is included in the love of that which we love so that it might be well for it. For something must not be loved for something else through what is accidental, but through what is per se; and for this reason indeed it is necessary to receive the diversity of loves according to those things that we love such that we will good to them.

406. And because we love each thing inasmuch as it is our good, it is necessary that love should be varied in so many ways, as the ways that it happens that something is the good of another. Which indeed happens in four ways: in one way, according as something is good of itself, and thus something loves itself; in another way, according as through a certain likeness something is as though one with another, and thus something loves what is equally coordinated with it in some order, as a man loves another man of his same species and as a citizen loves a fellow citizen and as a relative a relative; in another way, something is the good of another because it is something of his, as a hand is something of a man and universally a part is something of a whole; whereas in another way, according as, conversely, the whole is the good of the part: for a part is not perfect unless in a whole, whence naturally a part loves the whole and a part is exposed spontaneously for the health of the whole. For what is superior in beings is compared to the inferior as part to whole, inasmuch as the superior perfectly and totally has what is had imperfectly and particularly by the inferior, and inasmuch as the supreme contains in itself many inferiors.

407. Whence also Denys here posits four modes of love: and the first is according as an inferior loves its superior; and this is what he says: that on account of the good and the beautiful and for its sake, lessers, that is, inferiors, love betters, that is, superiors, by converting themselves to them, because in them they have their perfection; second, he posits the mode in which equals love equals; and he says that ordered things, that is, those that are of one order, love coordinated things, that is, equals, communicatively, that is, inasmuch as they share with them either in species or in whatever order; third, he posits the mode in which superiors love inferiors; and he says that betters, that is, superiors, love lessers, that is, inferiors, providingly, that is, inasmuch as they provide for them as contained under themselves; fourth, he posits the mode in which any things love themselves, and he says that these singulars love themselves contentively, that is, inasmuch as each is contained in itself.

408. Then when he says, and all things desiring the beautiful and the good, he shows what love does in the lover. For because love is the common root of appetite, it is necessary that every operation of the appetite should be caused from love, as has been said. And because every operation of each thing is caused from appetite, it follows that every action of whatever thing is caused from love; and this is what he says: that all things from the desire of the beautiful and the good do and will whatever they do and will. And here he receives desire for love, because it is its effect, as has been said.

409. Then when he says, yet the true man is confident, he shows how God loves; and he says that we can say confidently that God who is the cause of all things, on account of the excess of his goodness, loves all things; and out of love he makes all things, giving them being; and he perfects all things, by filling each thing with its proper perfections; and he contains all things, by conserving them in being; and he converts all things, that is, orders to himself as to an end; and thus we say: the divine love is good and is of the good, that is, of God as lover, and is on account of the good as on account of the object; for God loves nothing except on account of his goodness.

And to expound what he had said, he adds that the love by which God loves existing things is operative of goodness in them; and on account of this he says that the good itself, because it causally preexists in the good, that is, in God, according to excess, as all things pertaining to perfection that are in creatures are more excellently in God, and for this reason he had said that the divine love is of the good; this divine love, I say, does not permit it to remain in itself without sprout, that is, without the production of creatures, but love moves it to operating, according to the most excellent mode of operation inasmuch as it produced all things into being. For from the love of its goodness there proceeded that it willed to diffuse its goodness and to communicate it to others, according as was possible, namely through the mode of likeness, and that its goodness would remain not only in itself, but would flow out to others.

410. And let not anyone opine. Here he excludes a certain objection: for it could seem to someone that the name of love always signifies a natural passion, and that for this reason it must not be used in divine things.

Yet first of all he excludes this objection through reason;

second, through authority, at but so that we might not seem to say those things.

411. About the first, he does two things:

first, he says that the objection is irrational;

second, he applies reason, at yet it is necessary to see according to right reason.

412. Therefore he says, first, that no one ought to opine that we commend in God the name of love beyond the custom and fittingness of the Sacred Scriptures. For it is irrational and depraved, as I reckon, that a man should not attend to the virtue of the intention, that is, to what someone intends to signify through a name, but to the sayings themselves; and this does not pertain to those who wish to understand divine things, but to those who look to the sayings themselves or to the sounds themselves lightly by not pondering their signification, and who also contain the sounds outside only, namely as far as the ears, such that they do not cross beyond as far as the intellect; who do not wish to see what such a saying signifies and how it happens to expound one saying through other more manifest sayings, signifying the same thing.

But such men suffer something from these elements, that is, letters, syllables, and lines, that is, sensible and not intelligible written figures, because the sounds themselves of the sayings do not cross over to the intelligible part of the soul, but are delayed around the lips of the speakers and around the hearing of the hearers, as though it should not be possible that the number four should be signified through twice two, or what I say: rectilinear, should be signified through having right lines, or maternal only should be signified through paternal. And it is similar concerning whatever other things in which it happens that one intention is signified by diverse parts of speech. Yet those men are said to be sympathetic with the letters and the vocal and not intellectual sayings, who receive any sayings because they are affected to the voices themselves and do not attend to their sense.

413. Then when he says, yet it is necessary to see according to right reason, he assigns the reason for the aforementioned things;

and first, that it is not necessary to attend to voices, when it is evident from the senses;

second, that plainer voices must be used, at yet when the mind strives to be moved.

414. Therefore he says, first, that it is necessary to see, according to right reason, that we use elements, namely voices, and syllables and lines and speeches, written or spoken, on account of the senses themselves, namely on account of hearing and vision. But when our soul is moved by intelligible operation to participating intelligible things, then the senses of exterior sensible things are superfluous, because sensible things are preambles to intelligible things; yet when we arrive at the end, we recede from the way, and so when it already is agreed about the intention understood through voices, the office of voices by which they are signified ceases. And for this reason this must not be disputed. And he posits an example from the fact that the intellectual virtues of our natural reason also are superfluous when our soul conformed to God sends itself to divine things, not by the sending of the bodily eyes, but by the sending of faith, namely through the fact that the unknown and inaccessible divine light unites and communicates itself to us. For while we consider those things that are of faith, we do not adjudicate them through natural reason; and likewise, when we wish to understand something, it is not necessary to adjudicate through voices.

415. Then when he says, yet when the mind strives to be moved, he shows that more manifest voices must rather be used; and he says that when our mind strives to be moved to intellective contemplation through sensible things, then those sensible species are more precious, that is, more useful, which more manifestly carry or convey intellectual intentions, as plainer speeches convey more manifest visible things. But when those things that are not manifest in sensible things are represented by the senses, then neither can those senses represent well the sensible things to the mind, namely such that from these sensible things intelligible things might be grasped. And for this reason, because the name of love is plainer and more common than the name of charity, it ought rather to be used to signify the intellectual intention.

416. Then when he says, but so that we might not seem to say those things, he manifests the same through authorities of Scripture; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows how Sacred Scripture uses the name of love in divine things;

second, how certain men reckon it more fitting to use the name of love than the name of charity, at although it seemed to certain of our men;

third, he shows that both must be used indifferently, at yet by those hearing divine things rightly.

417. Therefore he says, first, that, so that he might not seem to introduce the aforementioned arguments as though wishing to pervert the Sacred Scriptures, against those who accuse the name of love in divine things, he introduces these authorities: love her and she shall serve you (Prov. 4:6), according to another translation; yet our translation has: cherish her, that is, wisdom, and she shall serve you . . . snatch her and she shall exalt you, and you shall be glorified by her, when you shall have embraced her (Prov. 4:6–8). And many other things are said to the praise of love in the Scriptures, as is clear in the amatorious theologies, that is, in the Canticle of Canticles.

418. Then when he says, although it seemed to certain of our men, he shows that certain men thought that this name of love must rather be used in divine things; and about this, he does three things:

first, he posits the opinion of others;

second, he shows how it seems to him, at for the theologians seem to me;

third, he assigns the reason for the opinion of the others, at yet that true love rather is applied.

419. Therefore he says, first, that to certain of the doctors who have treated the holy speeches, although they did not fashion the canonical Scriptures, it seemed that the name of love was more fitting for divine things than the name of charity. Whence Ignatius Martyr writes of Christ, saying, my love, that is, Christ in whom is my whole love, is crucified. Philo says in the book that he made introducing to the sacred eloquences, On Divine Wisdom: I was made a lover of her beauty (Wis. 8:2). From which it is clear that the book of Wisdom was not yet had among the canonical Scriptures. Whence it is concluded that we ought not fear to use the name of love, nor from this ought any objection call us back, intending to inflict doubt upon this.

420. Then when he says, for the theologians seem to me, he shows how it seems to him; and he says that it seems to him that the fashioners of Sacred Scripture used the name of charity and of love commonly and indifferently.

421. Then when he says, yet that true love rather is applied, he assigns the reason why certain men say that the name of love must rather be used in divine things; and he says that on account of this it seems that the name of love is applied to divine things: so that there might be excluded the receiving of those who unfittingly use the name of love; because since in God, as befits him, true love is praised not only by us who expound the Sacred Scriptures, but also by the Scriptures themselves, multitudes of foolish men who cannot grasp the uniformity that the name of divine love signifies, have lapsed according to their custom to the love that is found in bodily things, which is dissimilar and divided: because such love does not find in one thing the whole that suffices for it, and for this reason it is divided through diverse things; and if through some time it should satisfy itself in one thing, nevertheless it does not endure in this, but is born to seek what is pleasing to it in diverse things. And this happens for bodily things because they are dissimilar and divided.

Yet this love is not true love, as neither is the good divided with the divisible the true and perfect good, but the indivisible good, which is most of all one; for good and one come together in the same, as Boethius proves in the book The Consolation of Philosophy.¹

422. Yet this bodily love is a certain idol, that is, a likeness of true love or rather a certain defect or a fall from true love. Yet for this reason the multitudes shall lapse to this love: because they are not able to grasp the uniformity of the divine love; and for this reason this name is disposed in the divine wisdom, as appearing more troublesome to many, that is, more unfitting, unto this: so that they might be elevated and excited upwards, as though reclining in inferior places, to the knowledge of true love, and so that they might also be freed from the difficulty that they suffer about this name; just as also in the other namings of God, frequently the lowest bodily things are attributed more, so that the mind might be forced not to remain in them, but to understand God above all things, as is said in the second chapter of the Angelic Hierarchy.¹ And for this reason Scripture uses the name of love in divine things, because we use this name more for the lowest and carnal love.

423. Again, I say, it would be unfitting that it should be opined by us that earthly zeals, that is, loves, should be in divine things, which zeals seem to be expressed through the name of charity, according as appears from the plain mode of Scripture. For a certain man, namely David, says in 2 Kings 1:26, according to another translation: your charity fell upon me, as the charity of women; whereas our translation has: I grieve over you, my brother Jonathan, exceedingly beautiful, and lovable above the love of women.

424. Then when he says, yet by those hearing divine things rightly, he shows how the name of charity and of love is received according to the Scriptures; and he says that by those who rightly hear the divine things this is sanctioned: that in the same virtue and signification the name of charity and of love is received from the holy theologians who produced the canonical Scriptures, according to those things that have been manifested to them by God or that they have manifested concerning God. For both names are significative of a certain unitive virtue, inasmuch as it unites the lover to the beloved, as both desire the same; and conjunctive, as both are joined to the fittingness of the other according to inclination, according to which the two lovers have themselves to one another; and differently concretive, according as in such a joining there is preserved the difference of each of the lovers, of whom sometimes one is superior and the other inferior; and this virtue indeed preexists in the beautiful and the good, namely in God, who loves both himself and other things on account of his beauty and goodness.

425. And again this virtue is attributed to created things by God, who is the beautiful and the good, on account of the beautiful and the good, which is the proper object of love. For nothing is loved, except according as it has the ratio of the beautiful and the good. And this virtue indeed contains coordinates, that is, equals, according as they have themselves to one another such that alternately they communicate what is theirs to one another. The virtue of love also moves superiors to provide for inferiors, and it gathers those having less, that is, inferiors, in superiors, inasmuch as it converts these to those as to the proper good that they have in them. And these things have been expounded above.

§13. 168. Yet the divine love is also making ecstasy, not dismissing that the lovers should be of themselves, but of the beloved.

169. And indeed they show superiors made of the providence of those having less and coordinates of the containing of one another and subjects of the more divine conversion to first things.

170. On account of which also Paul the great, made in the containing of divine love, and participating its virtue making ecstasy, with a divine mouth: I live, he says, no longer I, yet Christ lives in me (Gal 2:20); as a true lover and suffering ecstasy, as he says, living for God and not by his own life (2 Cor 5:13, 15), but by that of the beloved, as exceedingly lovable.

171. Yet one must dare to say even this for truth: that even he the cause of all things, by the beautiful and the good, by the love of all things, through an abundance of amative goodness is made outside himself, providing for all existing things, and as he is drawn by goodness and charity and love, and is pulled down from that which is over all things and segregated from all things, to this which is in all things, according to supersubstantial virtue making ecstasy, inegressible from his own self.

172. On account of which those who are mighty in divine things call him a zealot (Ex 20:5), as much in good love for existing things and as exciting to the zeal of his amative desire and as demonstrating himself a zealot, through which also the things desired are zealable and as these provided-for zealable existing things, and the lovable and love totally of the beautiful and the good and in the beautiful and in the good is pre-gathered and on account of the beautiful and the good is and is begotten.

426. After Denys has determined about love, here he determines about ecstasy which is an effect of love, and about this, he does three things:

first, he proposes that ecstasy is an effect of love;

second, he manifests this in creatures, at and indeed they show superiors;

third, he manifests this in God, at yet one must dare to say even this.

427. About the first, it must be considered that this is the difference between the cognitive and the appetitive power: that the act of the cognitive power is according as things known are in the knower, yet the act of the appetitive power is according to the inclination that the one desiring has to the thing that is desired. Yet the first operation of the appetite is love, as was said above, whence love imports the first inclination of the appetite to the thing according as it has the ratio of the good, which is the object of the appetite.

428. Yet just as being is said in two ways, namely of what subsists per se and of what is in another, so also good: in one way, it is said of a subsisting thing that has goodness, as a man is called good; in another way, of what is in something, making it good, as virtue is called a good of man, because by it a man is good; for likewise whiteness is called being, not because it is subsisting in its own being, but because by it something is white. Therefore love tends to something in two ways: in one way, as to a substantial good, which indeed is done while we love something such that we will good to it, as we love a man when willing his good; in another way, love tends to something as to an accidental good, as we love virtue, not indeed by the ratio that we will it to be good, but by the ratio that through it we should be good. Yet the first mode of love certain men name love of friendship; yet the second, love of concupiscence.

429. Yet it happens, sometimes, that we love even some subsisting goods by this second mode of love, because we do not love them according to themselves, but according to some accident of theirs; as we love wine, willing to acquire its sweetness; and likewise, when a man is loved on account of delight or utility, he is not loved according to himself, but accidentally.

430. Therefore in both modes of love, the affection of the lover is drawn through a certain inclination to the thing loved, but in different ways: for in the second mode of love, the affection of the lover is drawn to the thing loved through an act of the will, but through intention, the affection recurs on itself; for while I desire justice or wine, my affection indeed is inclined to another of these, but nevertheless it recurs on itself, because it is so borne unto the aforementioned things that through them the good should be to it; whence such love does not place the lover outside himself, as regards the end of the intention. But when something is loved in the first mode of love, the affection so is borne unto the thing loved that it does not recur on itself, because it wills the good to the thing loved itself, not by the ratio that thence something should befall it. And therefore such a love makes ecstasy, because it places the lover outside himself.

431. But this happens in three ways; for that substantial good, unto which the affection is borne, can have itself in three ways:

in one way, such that that good is more perfect than the lover himself, and through this the lover is compared to it as part to whole, because things that are totally in the perfect are partially in the imperfect; whence according to this, the lover is something of the thing loved.

In another way, such that the good loved is of the same order with the lover.

In a third way, that the lover is more perfect than the thing loved, and thus the love of the lover is borne unto the thing loved as unto something of its own.

432. And therefore, when the affection of a lover is borne unto a superior thing loved, of which the lover himself is something, the lover orders his own good to the thing loved; as if a hand were to love a man, it would order this very what-it-is-itself to the whole, whence it would be placed totally outside itself, because in no way would anything of it be left for itself, but it would order the whole to the thing loved. Yet it is not such when something loves what is equal to itself or what is below it: for one hand, if it were to love the other, would not order its whole self to the other, nor does a man loving his hand order his whole good to the good of his hand. Therefore someone ought to love God, such that nothing of him is left for himself, but is ordered to God. Yet when he loves equals or inferiors, it suffices that he should be going outside himself to them only to such an extent that he does not intend to himself alone, but to others; nor is it necessary that he should totally order himself to them.

433. And therefore divine love can be received here in two ways: in one way, the love by which God is loved, and thus this letter must be expounded: that divine love makes ecstasy, that is, places the lover outside himself, that is, orders him to God such that it does not permit those lovers to be of themselves, but of the divine things that are loved, because they leave nothing of themselves for themselves, but order it to God. In another way, there can be understood the divine love that is derived from God, not only to God, but also to other things, namely equals or inferiors, and thus there must be understood: not dismissing that the lovers should be of themselves only, but of the beloved, that is, of the things that are loved, because loves makes it that they should not only intend to themselves, but also to others.

434. Then when he says, and indeed they show superiors, he manifests what he had said, in creatures;

and first, through induction;

second, through authority, at on account of which also Paul.

435. Therefore he says, first, that superiors demonstrate the aforementioned effect of love through the providence that they enact concerning inferiors; for in a certain way they are placed outside themselves, in the fact that they intend to others; and likewise, they show coordinates, that is, equals, through the containing by which they contain one another, namely as one is helped and cherished by another; and they show also inferiors through the fact that divinely they are converted to their superiors, as those in which their good exists. For in all these things it is apparent that something goes outside itself, while it is converted to another. Yet here he uses genitives for ablatives, because the Greeks lack ablatives.

436. Then when he says, on account of which also Paul, he shows the same through authority; he says that on account of the fact that love does not permit the lover to be of himself, but of the thing loved, Paul the great, constituted in divine love as in a certain container and with the virtue of divine love making him to go totally outside himself, as though speaking with a divine mouth, says, I live, no longer I, yet Christ lives in me (Gal. 2:20), namely because going out from himself he threw the whole of himself into God, not seeking what is his own, but what is God’s, as a true lover and suffering ecstasy, living for God and not living by his own life, but by the life of Christ as the beloved, which life was exceedingly lovable for him.

437. Then when he says, yet one must dare to say even this, he says that the aforementioned operation of love even is found in God, saying that this boldly must be said for truth, that is, for the one boldly making this truth; or for truth, that is, for asserting this true thing: that he who is the cause of all things, through his beautiful and good love by which he loves all things, according to the abundance of his goodness by which he loves things, is made outside himself, inasmuch as he provides for all existing things through his goodness and love or charity and in a certain way is drawn and pulled down in a certain way from his excellence, according as he exists above all things and is segregated from all things, to this: that he should be in all things, through the effect of his goodness, according to a certain ecstasy, which nevertheless so makes him to be in inferior things, that his supersubstantial virtue does not go out from him. For he so fills all things that in none is he emptied of his virtue. Which indeed he adds, so that through what he had said: is pulled down, there might not be understood any diminishing, but only this: that he betakes himself to inferiors on account of the participation of his goodness.

438. Then when he says, on account of which those who are mighty, he determines about zeal, which imports a certain intensity of love; and he says that, because the operation of love is found most excellently in God, on account of this those who are excellent in the knowledge of divine things name God a zealot, as is clear in Exodus 20:5: I the Lord your God a zealot, because he has much of good love for the existence of creatures. Yet zeal imports intensity of love; which intensity indeed happens sometimes in men, because man wishing to possess what he loves singularly, does not suffer that it should be loved by another, and according to this certain men define zeal, saying, zeal is an intense love not suffering company in the beloved. But he excludes this from divine zeal, when he adds that he excites all things to the zeal of his amative desire; for he makes it that that indeed which he loves, also should be loved by others.

439. There also is found another condition in human zeal and love through which it differs from the divine: for love in us and likewise zeal is caused from beauty and goodness; for something is beautiful not for the reason that we love it, but for the reason that it is beautiful and good it is loved by us; for our will is not the cause of things, but is moved by things; yet the will of God is the cause of things, and for this reason his love makes the things that he loves good, and not conversely; because his goodness moves itself in itself, which ours does not do; and this is what he says: that God is called a zealot, as that through which there are made zealable, that is, intensely lovable, those things that are willed or desired by him or by whatever others.

440. Yet it happens sometimes that even we make certain things lovable that are from our work, but nevertheless not all the things that we work are lovable; for sometimes we make evil and defective works; yet all the things that God makes from this very fact are good and lovable; and this is what he adds: that God is called a zealot, as for all the things that come forth through his providence, for zealable, that is, intensely lovable, existing things.

441. And therefore, having finished what he intended to say about the good and the beautiful and love, he adds, as though gathering from the things set forth, that the lovable and love is totally of the beautiful and the good. Thus love also preexists in the beautiful and the good as in a subject, although the first beautiful and good, namely God, cannot properly be called the subject of anything; and again, on account of the beautiful and the good, love and the lovable are made and preexist in things, as on account of a cause.

How God Is Called Both Love and Lovable

§14. 173. Yet why did the theologians willing totally sometimes indeed call him love and charity, yet sometimes lovable and cherishable?

174. For he is the cause of this indeed both as sender and as progenitor; yet this he is. And this indeed is moved, yet that moves, or because he is leading and moving of his own self and to his own self.

175. Thus indeed they call him cherishable and lovable, as the beautiful and the good;

176. yet love again and charity, as moving simultaneously, as what is virtue acting upwards to itself, which alone is the beautiful and the good itself and as what is a manifestation of itself through itself;

177. and good procession of segregated unition and amative motion, simple per se mobile and per se operating;

178. preexisting in the good and from the good emanating to existing things and again converted unto the good; in which both interminable of its own self and not having a principle, divine love shows differently, as a certain eternal circle, on account of the good from the good in the good and unto the good, circumambulating in convolution not erring and in the same and according to the same and proceeding and remaining always and restored.

442. After Denys has determined about love and about these things that follow upon love, here he solves a certain doubt;

and first, a question is posed;

second, the solution, at for he is the cause of this indeed;

third, the manifestation of the solution is posed, at thus indeed they call him cherishable.

443. Therefore he asks, first, what the editors of Sacred Scripture, whom he calls theologians, wished to signify, when sometimes indeed they named God charity and love, as is clear in 1 John 4:16: God is charity; whereas sometimes they name him lovable and cherishable: young women have cherished you exceedingly (Song 1:2).

444. Then when he says, for he is the cause of this indeed, he poses two solutions to the aforementioned question:

the first of which is that God is called love and charity causally, namely because he is the cause of love, inasmuch as he sends love to others and in a certain way generates love in them according to a certain likeness; yet he is called lovable and cherishable essentially, because he is that which is lovable and cherishable. And he assigns the ratio of this solution, because love signifies some motion by which some lover is moved, but cherishable is that which moves by such a motion; yet it pertains to God that he should move and cause motion in others, and for this reason it seems to pertain to him that he is lovable, creating love in other things.

The second solution is that God is called love and lovable because he loves by the motion of his own self and leads himself to himself; for to will is a certain motion. For God wills his good, and according to this, as he is his own goodness that in a certain way moves his will, he is also said to be cherishable and lovable by himself. Whereas inasmuch as his willing, by which he wills his own good, is his being and his substance, God is his own love. And therefore the first solution was received according to the love by which all things love God; yet this one according to the love by which God loves himself.

445. Then when he says, thus indeed they call him cherishable, he manifests the solution posed;

and first, as regards the fact that God is called lovable;

second, inasmuch as God is called love, at yet love again and charity.

446. Therefore he says, first, that God is cherishable and lovable, inasmuch as he is the beautiful and the good itself; for in this there is imported the object of love.

447. Then when he says, yet love again and charity, he manifests how God is called love; and about this, he does three things:

first, he posits the effects of love that are attributed to God;

second, the properties of love, at and good procession of segregated unition;

third, the procession of love, at preexisting in the good and from the good.

448. Yet there is a threefold effect of love: first of all that it moves the lover to some operation; the second effect is that it converts the works of the lover through intention to the thing loved; the third effect is that every love is manifestive of itself through the signs and effects of love, and through this the lover seeks not only to love, but also to be loved. And these three things he attributes to God; whence he says that God is called love and charity inasmuch as he moves both himself and others through love to working something, as regards the first; and simultaneously with this God is called love elevating other things to itself who also according to itself is the beautiful and the good as though a certain essence of beauty and of goodness, and this as regards the second; and God is called love also according as it is manifestive of itself through itself, that is, by his proper virtue.

449. Then when he says, and good procession of segregated unition, he posits five properties of love:

the first of which is grasped according to its cause which indeed is some unition of the lover and the beloved inasmuch as it is a being which naturally loves itself, inasmuch as each thing naturally desires its good, and from the fact that something is one with it, it follows that it loves it, and for this reason those things that are more joined to us we love more; and this is what he says: that love is attributed to God as a certain good procession of a certain segregated, that is, excellent, unition, because as much as love is more perfect, so much also is the union from which it proceeds greater.

The second property is taken on the part of the object: for the proper object of love is that it should make the lover to tend to the beloved, through which love is distinguished from knowledge, which does not draw the knower to the thing known, but conversely; and this is what he says: and amative motion.

The third property is what he says: simple; for it is necessary that the first in whatever genus should be simple, whence since the first motion of the appetite is love, it is necessary that it should be simple; and through this love differs from anger which is a motion composed of sadness provoking and desire of vengeance.

Its fourth condition is that it is per se mobile, which applies to it inasmuch as it is the first motion of the appetite, because in whatever genus what is per se is prior to what is through another; and through this love and sadness differ, for sadness is as a violent motion coming forth from outside, yet love is as a natural motion simultaneously proceeding from the inmost.

The fifth property is that it is per se operating, which also applies to it by reason of its priority; and in this it differs from hope, for he who works on account of the hope of another, works on account of the other; yet he who works something from love, works it through himself, as pleasing to himself.

450. Then when he says, preexisting in the good and from the good, he shows the procession of love; and he says that this love, first, is in the good itself which is God, and from that good it emanated into existing things and, again, as participated in existing things it converts itself to its principle which is the good; and as regards this which is the divine love he demonstrates differently beyond others its interminability and its lack of a principle that pertain to the ratio of a circle: for a certain circularity appears in love according as it is from the good and unto the good, and this circularity befits the eternity of divine love, because only a circular motion can be perpetual; and this is what he says: that love is as a certain eternal circle, inasmuch as it is on account of the good as an object; and from the good, as from a cause; and in the good persevering; and tending unto attaining the good, and thus the good circles around by a certain convolution not erring, on account of uniformity. For tortuous and difform ways are the cause of error; uniformity of way preserves from error; and he calls this uniformity in the way of love when he adds that love is in the same and according to the same, that is, in the good and proceeds according to the good, as in a cause; and it remains always, inasmuch as it retains the form of the good, as of its proper object; and it is restored unto the same, as unto an end.

The Words of Hierotheus on Love

179. These also our noble perfector of sanctity, moved by God, recited in amative hymns, which it is not unfitting to remember and to set upon this speech concerning love as a certain holy chapter.

§15. 180. Love, whether we should call it divine or angelic or intellectual or animal or natural, we understand a certain unitive and concretive virtue, moving superiors indeed unto the providence of those having less, yet coordinates again to an alternating communicative habitude for those in need, subjects to a conversion of those better and super-posited.

§16. 181. Because from one we order many loves, consequently we shall say that such indeed are knowledge and virtues of mundane and super-mundane loves, from which there exceed according to the assigned intention of intellectual and intelligible loves both orders and adornments. After which per se intelligible and divine loves truly are preeminent there over existing beautiful loves, and they are properly praised by us.

182. Now again resuming all to one and concluded love, we both enfold the father of all these simultaneously and gather from many, first collecting it to two amative virtues universally, from which the incomprehensible cause of all overcomes and it is ruled altogether, from that which is over all things and to which total love is extended according to the nature of each for all existing things.

§17. 183. Come, gathering those also to one again, we say there is one certain simple virtue per se motive to a certain unitive concretion from the good, even to the extreme of existing things, and from it again consequently through all things unto the good, from the same and through the same and in the same reflecting itself and always revolved unto the same in the same mode.

451. After Denys has treated love, here to the confirmation of the things said above he introduces the words of Hierotheus on love;

and first he says what he intends;

second he posits those words, at love, whether we should call it divine or angelic.

452. Therefore he says, first, that these which are posited below and are fitting to the things said above, our Hierotheus recited, who was a perfector, that is, a master in these things that pertain to sanctity, in certain divine praises that he made about love, inspired by God; which hymns indeed it is not unfitting to commemorate here, so that it might be set upon our treatise concerning love, as a certain holy chapter, that is, as a certain rule and a certain principle for confirming what has been said above about love.

453. Then when he says, love, whether we should call it divine or angelic, he posits the words of Hierotheus on love, and about this he does three things:

first, there are posited the words containing the division and definition of love;

second, the words demonstrating the order of loves proceeding from one love, at because from one we order many loves;

third, the words demonstrating the reducing of all loves to one love, at now again resuming all to one.

454. He distinguishes, first, five loves: the first of which is divine love; second angelic love; third intellectual love, namely by which men love according to the intellective part; the fourth is animal love which pertains to the sensitive part whether in men or in animals; the fifth is natural which pertains to natural appetite, whether in animals as regards the nutritive part or in plants or even in inanimate things. For since it has been said that love imports the first motion of will and of appetite, in whatever things it happens that there is will and appetite, it happens that there is love.

455. Yet a certain common notification of love is fitting for all the aforementioned loves; whence he adds that, whichever of the aforementioned loves we name, we understand through the name of love a certain unitive and concretive virtue. But virtue here is not received either for passion or for habit, since love is not a passion or an act, but is received commonly, as everything that has efficacy to produce something can be called virtue or virtuous, whence it would be plainer if he had said virtuous unition and concretion, but he preferred to say virtue, speaking emphatically, to show the efficacy of love. Yet unition differs from concretion; for love is unition according as lover and beloved come together in some one thing, whether that is the substance of both, as when someone loves himself; or is the species, as animals that are of the same species love one another; or is the fatherland, as compatriots love one another; or is whatever else. Yet concretion pertains to love, according as those things that are united thus as regards something remain distinct, namely as regards the division of lover and beloved.

456. Yet this unition or concretion is found in diverse ways in diverse loves. For in knowers this unition or concretion is from the apprehension of the lover who reckons the beloved in some way to be one with him, and from this he is moved to it through affection by loving, as also to himself; and on account of this, according to the diverse rationes of apprehensible things, diverse loves are distinguished: for the ratio of divine knowledge is different from that of angelic knowledge and of human knowledge, according to intellect; and of all animals, according to sense. But unition and concretion in natural love is from a certain natural fittingness, from which there arises that something is inclined to another, as fitting to itself, and such an inclination is called natural love. Yet he shows to what the virtue of love extends itself, adding that it moves superiors to providing for inferiors; equals to communicating fitting things to one another alternatively; and inferiors that they should be converted to their superiors, by subjecting themselves to them and by attending to them, as to their causes, and by desiring them, as those upon whom their goods depend.

457. Then when he says, because from one we order many loves, he posits the words of Hierotheus showing the order of the many loves derived from divine love; and they seem to be words as though recapitulating some things said above. Therefore Hierotheus says, because we order many loves from one, that is, we show that from the one divine love many loves come forth ordered, also consequently we shall say that such are knowledge and virtues of mundane and super-mundane loves, that is, somehow mundane and super-mundane loves can be known, as well as what is the efficacy of each of those loves. From which it is given to be understood that he divided all loves into mundane and super-mundane: naming mundane loves those by which goods of the sensible world are loved by whatever love, yet especially by animal love; yet super-mundane loves those by which intelligible and true goods are loved.

And among those loves he assigns the order that he consequently touches on: from which, namely from mundane and super-mundane loves, there exceed, according to the assigned ratio, super-mundane loves that are divided into two orders: the inferior of which and nearer to mundane love is the order and adornment of intellectual, that is, human, and intelligible, that is, super-mundane, loves. For above he called the intellectual human. Yet he says, intellectual, on the part of the lovers; yet intelligible on the part of those things that are loved. Yet that over orders he adds adornments, he shows in intellectual loves that there is not only order, but also the fittingness of the order, which adorns the order and makes it beautiful. But, ascending from mundane loves, after intellectual human loves, there surpass and there were praised by Hierotheus angelic loves, which he calls per se intelligible, because they love intelligible things without the communion of earthly affection. And he calls them divine, because they are especially assimilated to the divine love; because in the angels truly there exist beautiful loves, without the admixture of any ugliness.

458. Then when he says, now again resuming all to one, having set forth the order of many loves, now he reduces them all to one love;

and first he reduces them all to two;

second, he further reduces those two to one love, at come, gathering those also.

459. Yet it must be considered that superior construction depends even upon this, as though he should say, because we have said the aforementioned things, now again resuming all loves, we enfold and gather them, that is, we unite them by a certain revolution and we reduce them to the divine love which is one and concluded in itself, because all the rationes of love are concluded in it and it is as the father, that is, the principle pouring forth, through a certain likeness, all loves. And in this is the reduction: that first we should gather all love to two universal amative virtues, because everything that is loved either is loved on account of a created good or on account of the uncreated good; for the ratio of love is the good that is either the ultimate end or a proximate end. Yet between these amative virtues, the incomprehensible cause of all love exceeds, which is the uncreated good; and this is what he adds: which cause of love indeed is from him who is over all things and to which cause every love extends itself from all beings, nevertheless in different ways according to the nature of each, because all things are converted to God himself, as has been said. Nor only does he say that the love having God for its cause exceeds, but also that it is ruled, because the love that depends on a created good, is regulated by the love that depends on the uncreated good.

460. Then when he says, come, gathering those also, he further reduces the aforementioned two modes of love to one first; and he says that again he gathers the aforementioned two virtues of love into one first love, namely the divine by which God indeed, one certain simple virtue, loves; which moves per se all things that love to a certain unitive concretion, proceeding from the first good that is God; and it comes through the mode of a certain derivation even to the lowest of the number of existing things, and through a certain conversion to the end, again going back from it, namely from the last of existing things, consequently ascending through all things, it returns to the first good through the mode of a certain circling, reflecting itself and always revolved in the same mode, proceeding from that first virtue and through the same; because all second virtues are derived from the first through a certain likeness, and return into the same, by the same cause: because not only through causes, but also through effects, the likeness of the first virtue is found, and thus love always remains in that virtue and further always is revolved unto the same as unto an end.

Doubts

§18. 184. And indeed someone should say: if for all things the good and the beautiful is and lovable and desirable and cherishable, for even that which is not desires it, as has been said, and struggles in some way to be in it; and it is what forms unformed things; and in it also non-existing supersubstantially is said and is;

185. how does the multitude of demons not desire the beautiful and the good; yet inclined to matter and lapsed from angelic identity about the desire of the good, there is effected the cause of all evils both for themselves and for others, whatever evils are said to be made? Yet how, totally led out from the good, is the tribe of demons not boniform? Or how can good, made from the good, be varied? And what is that which made evil?

186. And totally what is evil and from what principle does it consist and in what of existing things is it? And how did the good will it to proceed; yet, willing, how could it? And if evil is from another cause, what other cause is there for existing things besides the good? Yet how also with providence existing is evil either totally made or not destroyed? And how does anything of existing things desire it beyond the good?

461. After Denys has determined about the good and about those things that pertain to the good, here he determines about evil;

and first, he raises a doubt;

second, he determines the truth, at therefore perhaps such a doubting speech.

462. About the first, he does two things:

first, he repeats the things that have been said about the good, on the occasion of the doubt;

second, he raises the doubt, at how does the multitude of demons.

463. Yet about those things that have been said above, he resumes that the beautiful and the good is lovable and desirable and cherishable for all things, and that not only those things that are desire the good, but even that which is not, namely prime matter, as has been said above, desires the good and in its way struggles unto this: that it should be in the good, namely inasmuch as it has an inclination to it, according as it is in potency to it; and the good which forms those things that are formed and that is called non-existing is said of the highest good and is also in it, not indeed through defect, as it is said of prime matter and of pure negation or privation, but supersubstantially. For God is called non-existing, not because he fails of existing, but because he is above all existing things.

464. Then when he says, how does the multitude of demons, he raises doubts concerning evil;

and first, as regards the demons;

second, commonly for all things, at and totally what is evil.

465. Yet about the evil of demons, he poses four questions:

the first of which is: since all things desire the good, as has been said, how does the multitude of demons not desire the beautiful and the good? But they are inclined to desiring material things, as honors exhibited by men and fumes of sacrifices and other material things of this sort; and through the fact that they have lapsed from the uniformity of desire which the angels have about the highest good, there is effected the cause of all evils, not only for themselves, but for others, whatever evils are said to be made, as regards men, because by the envy of the devil death entered into the whole world, as is said in Wisdom 2:24.

466. The second question is: how is the multitude of demons, since it was produced by the good God, not conformed to him in goodness, since each thing is born to make like things?

And because someone could say that the demons were made good, but they turned to malice, he formulates a third question: how could that which was naturally good, as caused from the good, be varied? For those things that are natural remain always.

And because everything that is made, is made by another, he poses a fourth question: what was that which made the demon evil?

467. Then when he says, and totally what is evil, he raises doubts about evil in common, and he poses four questions,

the first of which is: what is evil universally?

The second question is: from what principle does evil proceed? And there the order of the questions is apparent: for first it must be asked what evil is and afterwards whence evil has arisen, as Augustine says.¹

The third question is: in what of existing things is evil found?

468. Yet having proposed these three questions, he multiplies the second in a twofold way:

first: what is it; because, either the cause of evil is God or something else. If it should be given that it is God, two doubts arise together,

the first of which is: how did God, since he is good, will to produce evil? For it is not of the good that it should will to make evil.

The second question is: if he willed to make evil, how could it? For heat cannot chill and likewise neither can good make evil.

Whereas if evil should be from another cause than from God, this seems impossible; because there is no other cause of being except the highest good which is God.

The second deduction is that, since it belongs to providence to impede or exclude evil, it seems doubtful, since God has providence concerning all things, how evil could be made in the world or once made not destroyed at once.

The fourth question is: how could anything desire evil, passing over the desire of the good?

The First Question Is Solved: Whether Evil Is Something

§19. 187. Therefore perhaps such a doubting speech might indeed say these things. Yet we shall ask it to look to the truth of things.

188. And first of all we are confident to say this: evil is not from the good, and if it is from the good, it is not evil; for neither is it of fire to chill nor of the good to produce not good things. And if all existing things are from the good—for nature for the good is: to produce and to conserve; yet for evil: to corrupt and to destroy—nothing of existing things is from evil; and neither shall there be a thing that evil is, if evil also should be through itself. And if not this, that which is evil is not altogether evil, but has a certain part of good, according to which it totally is.

189. And if existing things desire the beautiful and the good and do all whatever they do on account of the fact that it seems good and the intention of all existing things has the good as its principle and end—for nothing does what it does looking to the nature of evil—how shall there be evil in existing things or totally existing segregated from such a good appetite?

190. And if all existing things are from the good and the good is above existing things, it is indeed in the good and non-existing; yet evil is not existing, otherwise it would not be altogether evil, nor non-existing: for nothing is universally non-existing, unless it should be said in the good, according to the supersubstantial. Therefore the good indeed shall be both above the simply existing and non-existing, gathered much before. Yet evil sits neither in existing things nor in non-existing things, withdrawing and alien more from this non-existing thing than from the good and more not a substance.

469. Having set forth questions about evil, here he begins to solve them;

and first, questions that pertain to evil simply;

second, questions that pertain to evil, according as it is found in demons, at therefore evil is not existing.

470. Yet the first part is divided into two:

in the first, he solves three principal questions that he had formulated about evil in common;

in the second, he proceeds to solve other secondary questions, which are posed to explicate more the question of the cause of evil, at yet there is gathered to say.

471. The first part yet is divided into three:

in the first, he solves the first question by which it was asked what evil is;

in the second, he solves the second by which it was asked from what principle evil consists, at whence therefore is evil?;

in the third, he solves the third question by which it was asked in what of existing things was evil, at but neither is evil in existing things.

472. About the first, he does two things:

first, he connects himself to the preceding;

second, he shows the proposition, at and first of all we are confident.

473. Therefore he says, first, that those things that have been said, perhaps someone could say by doubting. But we ask him to look to the truth of things and thus he could find the solution of the questions; in which he renders the listener both attentive and benevolent.

474. Then when he says, and first of all we are confident, he shows the proposition, namely that evil is not anything subsisting that is evil through its nature; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows that evil is not anything existing according to its nature;

second, that evil through itself is not anything existing, at and if all existing things are from the good.

475. He shows the first by two arguments; the first of which is thus: every existing thing either has a cause or is itself the cause of another; but evil does not have a cause nor is it the cause of another; therefore evil is not anything existing. Yet the truth of the first proposition is manifest per se, because every existing thing according to its existence is in act; yet each thing acts according as it is in act. If therefore the essence of anything should be pure act, it shall be a cause only; yet if it should have something of potency mixed in, it could be both a cause and caused.

Yet that evil does not have a cause he proves thus: evil cannot be from the good and if it were from the good it would not be evil; for one of two contraries is not the cause of the other, for it does not pertain to fire to chill, nor does it pertain to the good to produce things that are not good, but each thing produces something like itself. Likewise also it cannot be said that evil is a cause productive of anything; for what is of the ratio of the good, cannot befit evil. But to produce and to conserve is natural for the good and of its ratio, because generation and conservation are good; likewise to corrupt and to destroy pertain to the ratio of evil. From which it follows that only the good is a cause of existing things and that evil is the cause of no existing thing. Whence it follows, if evil is not from the good as from a cause, that it does not have a cause and that it is not caused.

476. But it must be considered that the argument by which he has proven that the good is not the cause of evil, proves that the good is not the cause of evil per se, yet not that it is not the cause of evil accidentally; because thus also heat accidentally can be the cause of cold, as a greater flame by consuming the matter of a lesser thing accidentally introduces cold. But this is not against the intention of Denys; for it is necessary that everything that has an essence, should be born to have a cause per se and not accidentally. Whence if evil does not have a cause per se, but only accidentally, it only follows that evil does not have an essence; and this is what, as though concluding, he adds: that neither is evil itself anything, if evil should be received according to itself, as something subsisting in the nature of evil. Yet everything that is totally some way is essentially that way, as if something is totally good it is the essence of goodness; for if it participates the good, it is necessary that there should be divided into participating and participated. Therefore if nothing is evil essentially, that which is evil is not totally evil, but has some part of good, and according to that part is the whole being of that which is called evil. And therefore through this he manifested what evil is. For evil cannot be any subsisting essence, as the good is the very essence of goodness, but whatever evil thing, through its essence, is good; yet a thing is evil, according as it fails of some good that it ought to have and does not have.

477. He posits a second argument, at and if existing things desire the beautiful, which is thus: all existing things desire the beautiful and the good, as is likewise clear from the things said above, and do all whatever they do on account of that which is good or at least on account of that which seems good; and thus every intention of whatever existing things has good for its principle and end, because the desire of the good moves, as a certain principle, to willing those things that are on account of the end; and again the will itself of those things that are unto the end, we refer to the good as to an end. And he manifests this through the fact that no one does those things that he does, looking to the ratio of evil, although sometimes that to which one looks is evil, just as someone does something in order that he might fornicate, not by looking to fornication inasmuch as it is evil, but inasmuch as it is delightful. From which it is clear that no existing thing desires evil unless accidentally, and that every existing thing desires the good. But if something were evil through its essence it could not desire the good, since a contrary does not desire its contrary, because it is destructive of it, but it would desire per se evil as like and conformed to itself. Whence it remains that evil received essentially neither is any part of an existing thing nor is it universally existing.

478. Then when he says, and if all existing things are from the good, he shows that there cannot be anything evil through itself such that it is non-existing, and to prove this he introduces that if all existing things are from the highest good, and that highest good is above all existing things, it remains that in this highest good there is found that which is non-existing. For it is necessary that what is above all existing things should be non-existing, as what is above all bodily things is non-bodily. But this cannot be said of evil: that the very thing that is called evil is non-existing. For it is not existing, because it would not be totally evil, since the fact that it is existing is a certain good; nor again is it non-existing totally, because nothing is totally non-existing except according as non-existing is said of the highest good, according to its supersubstantiality. But it cannot be said thus of evil, because exceeding every substance is the best.

Whence it remains that the good is gathered much higher both over the substantially existing and over the non-existing according as it is found in things. But evil neither is in existing things as though it should be of the number of existing things or some part or property of any existing things; nor again is it of the number of non-existing things, but it is withdrawing, that is, receding or distancing, more from non-existing than from the good and is more alien from it, because evil is in the good at least as in a subject, but non-being simply is not evil. And again evil is rather without subject than non-being, because non-being can be understood to be not in anything, but it is necessary that evil should be understood as in the good.

479. But against what is said here, it is objected in two ways:

first of all, because evil is a privation of the good, yet privation is non-being;

second, because since existing and non-existing are opposed contradictorily, there cannot be some middle between them, whence if evil is not existing, it follows that it is non-existing.

480. But it must be said that he is speaking here of evil according as evil is said as an evil thing. Yet evil is not a certain existing thing namely which is evil through its essence, nor again is evil totally a non-existing thing, but evil is a thing that partly is good and from that part exists and is called evil because it fails of some being.

The Second Question Is Posed: Whence Is Evil

191. Whence therefore is evil? Someone might say; for if there is not evil, virtue and malice are the same and all to the whole and particular to the proportional or neither shall evil be repugnant to virtue. And indeed contraries are chastity and impurity and justice and injustice; and I do not say according to the just and the unjust man and him who is pure and him who is impure. But even before the apparent outer distance of one having virtue to his opposite, in the soul itself prior universally malices stand away from virtues,

192. and the passions are repugnant to reason and from these it is necessary to grant a certain evil contrary to the good; for the good is not contrary to itself, but as from one principle and begotten from one cause, by communion and unity and friendship it rejoices; and neither is the less good contrary to the greater nor is the less hot or cold contrary to what is more so. Therefore evil is in existing things and is existing and is opposed to the good.

193. And if it is the corruption of existing things, that does not exclude evil from an essence, but it shall be both itself existing and generative of existing things. Or does not the corruption of a certain thing many times become generative of another? And evil through itself shall be contributing to the completion of everything and lavishing upon the whole that it should not be imperfect.

481. After Denys has shown that evil does not have an essence and that it is neither a cause nor caused, now he inquires whence evil arises in things;

and first, he raises a doubt;

second, he solves it, at yet true speech says to these things.

482. Yet he raises a twofold doubt;

and first of all, from the repugnance or contrariety that is found in things;

second, from the concomitance of generation and corruption, at and if it is the corruption of existing things.

483. About he first he does two things:

first, he raises a doubt from those things in which the contrariety of good and evil is manifestly apparent;

second, from those things in which it is not so manifestly apparent, at and the passions are repugnant to reason.

484. Therefore he says, first, that if evil does not have existence nor is it a cause nor caused, as has been shown above, someone by objecting might say: whence therefore is evil found in things? For if you should respond that there is no evil in things, two unfitting things follow:

the first of which is that virtue and malice are the same and all to the whole, that is, virtue in general, malice in general; and particular to the proportional, that is, special virtue to special malice by proportionality to itself responding to contraries, as justice to injustice, because both malice in general is contrary to virtue and special malice to special virtue. The virtue of this deduction consists in this: that, with the differences by which any things differ from one another removed, it follows that they are the same. Yet the differences by which virtue and malice differ are good and evil; for virtue is a good quality of mind, yet malice an evil quality of mind. Therefore with the difference of good and evil removed, if evil should not be in things, it follows that virtue and malice are the same in the universal and in the special.

485. The second unfitting thing is that even if virtue and malice should differ, it follows that evil is not contrary nor repugnant to virtue, because what is not cannot be contrary or repugnant. For it is necessary that both of two contraries should be something and a manifest nature. Yet the contrariety of virtue to evil is through the fact that chastity and impurity are contrary and justice and injustice. And because someone could say that that contrariety is only according as men are contrary to one another, one of whom has virtue and the other of whom does not, he excludes this: and I do not say, he says, that chastity and impurity and justice and injustice are contraries only according as a just man and an unjust man and a pure man and an impure man are contrary to one another, but through a prior order of nature before the distance and contrariety that are exteriorly apparent between him who has a virtue and him who has the opposed vice, those vices or malices universally differ from virtues in the soul itself. For chastity and impurity are not contrary on account of the contrariety of the chaste and the unchaste man, but rather conversely.

486. Therefore first he poses a doubt concerning the contrariety of virtue and justice, because evil is of the ratio of that which is contrary to virtue, nor is there found in any genus that any species are distinguished through the difference of good and evil, unless in the vicious and virtuous habits of the soul. The ratio of this is that the virtues and vices pertain to the will, the object of which is good and evil.

487. Then when he says, and the passions are repugnant to reason, he poses a doubt concerning those things that do not have of their ratio that they should be contrary to the good, as the passions that are repugnant to reason. Yet passions are said to be motions of the sensitive appetite which is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible power. Yet it is not of the ratio of these powers that they should be contrary to virtue, because to desire and to rejoice and to be angry and to have other passions of this sort happens also according to virtue, but they are contrary to virtue according as they are inordinate. Yet everything inordinate is not of the ratio of things. Therefore passions of this sort are repugnant to reason, because just as sensitive apprehension is of that which is here and now, so the sensitive appetite following apprehension of this sort is of that which is good here and now, and according to this the good simply is not what the ratio considers. Therefore when it happens that what is good here and now is not good simply, it follows that the passion is repugnant to reason, and from these passions repugnant to reason, it is necessary to grant that something evil is contrary to the good, although evil is not of the ratio of the passions, as it was of the principle of malices. And for this reason it was necessary for him to prove that from repugnant things of this sort, there follows the contrariety of evil to good. For it is manifest that the good is not contrary to its own self, but every good as proceeding from one principle, and as begotten from one cause, rejoices by mutual communion and friendship and unity.

488. Nor also can it be said that the less good should be contrary to the greater good, as neither the less hot or cold is contrary to the more hot or cold. Which indeed must be understood on that part by which both are hot or cold; but inasmuch as something less hot has something of the cold mixed in or more approaches to it, thus what is less hot is contrary to the more hot, as the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Physics, but this is secundum quid, not simply.¹ Yet Denys here is speaking of contraries also simply.

489. Therefore, it being established that good is in no way contrary to good, there remains that what is contrary to the good and repugnant to it is evil. And therefore, not only from the passions that are repugnant to reason, but from whatever other contraries and repugnant things, it seems to follow that evil should be in the number of existing things and that it should be something existing and that it should be contrary to the good.

490. Then when he says, and if it is the corruption of existing things, he proceeds to show the same by another way, namely from the concomitance of generation and corruption; and he says that if evil is the corruption of existing things, that does not exclude it from having an essence, but rather it is proven through this that it is existing and that it is generative of existing things. For the corruption of one is the generation of another, whence what is corruptive of existing things is also generative of existing things. Yet everything that is generative of existing things contributes to the perfection of the universe; therefore it follows that evil is contributing to the completion of everything, that is, of the universe, and that it is lavished upon the whole, that is, the universe, that it should not be imperfect; and this through itself, which is unfitting; because that evil contributes accidentally to the beauty and perfection of the universe is not unfitting, inasmuch as from evils goods follow accidentally, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion.¹

The Solution of the Second Principal Question

§ 20. 194. Yet true speech says to these things that evil, according as it is evil, makes no substance or generation; yet evil only makes and corrupts the substance of existing things, as much as is in it. Yet if someone should say that it is operative of generation and that by the corruption of this it gives the generation of another, it must be responded truly that corruption does not give generation, but both corruption indeed and evil corrupts and makes only evil; yet generation and substance are made on account of the good, and it shall be corruption on account of itself, yet generative on account of the good; and indeed according as it is evil, it is neither existing nor effective of existing things; yet on account of the good, existing and effective of good things.

195. Yet more: for neither shall both good and evil be the same according to the same nor shall the corruption and generation of the same according to the same be the same virtue, neither virtue per se nor corruption per se.

196. Therefore, evil itself indeed is neither existing nor good nor operative of generation nor effective of existing things nor of good things;

197. yet the good makes perfect and unmixed and integral the good things in which indeed it is generated perfectly; yet those that participate it less and are imperfect goods and mixed on account of a defect of the good. And universally evil is not nor good nor making good, but what approaches more and less to the good proportionally shall be good.

198. Because perfect goodness, going through all things, does not proceed only as far as the most holy substances which are around it, but it is extended as far as the lowest; totally present to these indeed, yet to those subjectly, yet to others extremely, as each of existing things can participate it. And these altogether participate the good, yet those are deprived more and less; yet others have a more obscure participation of the good and to others the good is present according to the last resonance.

199. For if the good were not present proportionally to each, there would be the most divine and the most stretched of the extremes having order; yet how would it be possible to participate the good uniformly, since not all existing things are opportune in the same way to the perfect participation of this?

200. Yet now this is the excellent magnitude of the virtue of the good which makes firm both the thing deprived and its privation of this according to the total participation of this. And, if it is necessary confidently to say true things, those opposed to this, by virtue of this both are and can be opposed.

201. Yet more: so that comprehending I might speak, inasmuch as they are they are both good and from the good; yet inasmuch as they are deprived of the good, they are neither good nor existing. For in other habits indeed, as heat or cold, the things heated are, even with heat itself leaving, and many of existing things are lacking life and mind, and God is segregated from substance and is supersubstantial. And simply indeed in all other things, with a habit both departing and altogether not being begotten, they are existing and can subsist. Yet what, according to every mode, is deprived of the good, neither was nor is nor shall be nor can be, in any way at any time.

202. As the impure man, although he is deprived of the good, according to irrational concupiscence, in this indeed neither is nor desires existing things; yet he participates the good, according to this obscure resonance of unition and friendship. And fury indeed participates the good according to this: to be moved and desirously to reduce and to convert apparent evils into apparent beauty. And he desiring the worst life and that appearing best to him, according to this: to desire and to look to the best life, participates the good. And if you should remove the good altogether, there shall be neither substance nor life nor desire nor motion nor anything else.

203. Why also that generation should be made from corruption is not the virtue of evil, but by the presence of a lesser good, inasmuch as sickness too is a defect of order, not every; for if this should be made, neither does sickness itself subsist. Yet sickness remains and is having as substance a minimal order and subsisting in it. For that which is altogether lacking of the good neither is existing nor in existing things; yet that which is mixed, on account of the good is in existing things, and according to this existing in existing things, according as it participates this.

204. Yet more: all existing things shall be more and less so much: inasmuch as they participate the good. For in being itself, this which in no way ever exists, cannot be nor shall it be. Yet what according to some part indeed is, yet according to some is not, inasmuch indeed as it falls from what is always existing is not, yet inasmuch as it participates being, so much is it; and, totally, the non-existing of this is held to be and is conserved. And evil, which indeed altogether has fallen from the good, shall be neither in more nor in less good things; yet that which according to some part indeed is good, yet according to another not good, is opposed indeed to a certain good, yet not to the whole good; yet this too is held by the participation of the good, and the good substantifies the privation of this totally by the participation of it. For with the good altogether departing, neither shall anything be universally good nor mixed nor evil itself. For if evil is imperfect good, with the perfect absence of the good both the imperfect and the perfect good shall be absent, and then only shall there be and seem to be evil, when there is evil indeed for those things to which it is opposed, yet it is segregated from them as good. For that the same things should be opposed to one another according to the same things in all things is impossible. Therefore evil is not existing.

491. Having set forth the doubts about the existence and cause of evil, here he begins to solve them;

and first, he solves particularly what was objected concerning the concomitance of generation and corruption;

second, universally, all things that were opposed above, investigating the root of truth.

492. Therefore he says, first, that to the aforementioned things true speech responds that evil, according as it is evil, makes no substance nor generation, but, speaking per se, it causes only evil and the corruption of existing things. And if someone should object that evil is operative of generation through the fact that from the corruption of one there is given the generation of another, it must be responded according to the truth that corruption does not give generation, but corruption only corrupts and evil only does evilly, speaking per se; but generation and substance are made on account of the good. Which indeed is clear both in natural things and in moral matters. For it is manifest that fire generates fire and corrupts air; for in fire there is joined the form of fire, which pertains to the good, and the privation of the form of air, which pertains to evil. Yet that fire generates fire is not from the fact that it lacks the form of air, but from the fact that it has the form of fire. Otherwise that which lacked the form of air would make fire, which is false, but it corrupts air inasmuch as from necessity to the form of fire there is joined the privation of the form of air.

Likewise in moral matters, adultery corrupts virtue inasmuch as it lacks due order, which pertains to the ratio of evil; but according as it is delightful, which pertains to the ratio of the good, it delights and makes many other good things. And therefore it is apparent that evil according to itself is corruptive, but generative only accidentally, namely on account of the good. And further it follows that according as it is evil it is neither existing nor effective of existing things, but accidentally, namely on account of the good joined, it is existing and effective of good things.

493. Then when he says, yet more: for neither shall both good and evil, here Denys manifests the aforementioned solution and investigates the virtue of the whole doubt more profoundly; and about this, he does three things:

for first, he shows the difference of evil and good;

second, the universal virtue of the good in being, at yet more: so that comprehending I might speak;

third, the universal virtue of the good in the fact that it can make more or less good things and more or less existing things, at yet more: all existing things shall be more and less.

494. About the first, he does three things:

first, he distinguishes evil from good;

second, he shows what befits evil, at therefore, evil itself indeed;

third, what befits the good, at yet the good makes perfect.

495. Yet he had said above that evil does not generate, inasmuch as it is evil, but inasmuch as it is good. Yet lest anyone were to believe that good and evil were the same according to the same, he adds that the same according to the same is not both good and evil. Whence when it is said that evil does not generate inasmuch as it is evil, but inasmuch as it is good, this is not only a distinction according to reason, namely as though the same thing according to one ratio should be good and according to another evil; but somehow according to the thing, namely according as one and the same thing, inasmuch as it has being, is good; whereas as regards the fact that it is deprived of due perfection, is evil.

And likewise, generation and corruption is not the same virtue of the same and according to the same. For the same evil according to the same is not generated and corrupted. And because he had said that good and evil are not the same nor generation and corruption, and someone could believe that evil is found existing per se separately from the good and corruption separately from generation, consequently he removes this, saying that there is no virtue existing per se, but it is in the good as in a subject, such that the same subject is good and evil, according to different things. And likewise neither is corruption existing per se without generation, but generation and corruption are in a subject simultaneously, but not according to the same, because the generation of one is with the corruption of another.

496. Yet what he says: yet more, is the same that is transferred in the books of Aristotle: yet greater, and it signifies the addition of reason upon reason.

497. Then when he says, therefore, evil itself indeed, he concludes from the things set forth what pertains to evil. For if evil is not a virtue per se, it follows that evil itself, such that this itself is posited in place of the article and evil is received for the essence of evil, evil I say thus received is neither existing nor good nor does it work generation nor is it effective of existing things and of good things; but a thing that is evil, inasmuch as it has something of good, is existing and operative of generation and effective of existing and good things.

498. Then when he says, yet the good makes perfect, he shows what pertains to the good; and about this, he does two things:

for first, he shows that the good is the universal cause of all good things;

second, he shows how the causality of the good extends itself even to evil things, at yet now this is the excellent magnitude.

499. About the first, he does three things:

first, he proposes that through the good there are made certain good perfect things and certain imperfect things;

second, he assigns the mode through which this is done, at because perfect goodness, going through all things;

third, he proves it, by assigning the ratio of the aforementioned things, at for if the good were not present.

500. Therefore he says, first, that since evil is not operative of good things, the good is that indeed which makes those things formally speaking good, in which interiorly the good is generated perfectly concerning what is through its essence: perfect, indeed according to the participation of goodness; unmixed, according to the removal of evil; and integral, according to the removal of corruption. But those things that participate the good less are imperfect goods and have some mixture of evil on account of a defect of the good that is not perfectly participated in them. And thus universally evil is not existing nor is it good nor does it make good; but also what approaches more and less to what is good through its essence, namely to God, is good according to that proportion of the good; yet on account of the distance from the first good, this is called evil, not as though it is universally deprived of good, but inasmuch as there is some defect of the good in it.

501. Then when he says, because perfect goodness, going through all things, he assigns the mode of the aforementioned things, namely how the good is found in things more and less; and he says that this is because perfect goodness, namely the divine, going through all things, namely inasmuch as it communicates itself to all things through the likeness of its goodness, does not proceed only as far as the most holy substances of the angels which are near to God, but it extends itself by diffusing through goodness as far as the lowest substances. For to those most holy substances of the angels the divine goodness is totally present, as perfectly participated by them according to the mode possible to a creature; yet to others it is present subjectly, that is, in a lower mode, namely by whom it is participated, but not so perfectly as by the angels, which can be referred to human souls; whereas to others it is present extremely, that is, in the lowest mode, as to irrational creatures; and this indeed happens according to the possibility of each to participate the divine goodness.

For certain things participate the divine goodness altogether perfectly according to the mode possible to a creature, on account of which he says that to them the divine goodness is totally present. Whereas other things are deprived of that perfect participation, by receding from it according to more and less, as is clear in the diverse grades of beings and especially in living creatures. Whereas others have a more obscure participation of the good, as bodily creatures and especially non-living ones, in which in a certain way the clarity of the divine goodness is obscured, on account of their materiality and corruption; whence their obscurity is considered in the fact that they are not intelligible actually, but according to potency only. Whereas to certain things the good is present according to the last resonance, namely to those that hold the last grade in goodness, as are corrupted things and those that are called evil. And he speaks unto the likeness of what happens in sounds. For those who are near hear the whole sound, and according as they are more distant, they hear less of the sound, such that at the end they do not hear this sound, but only a certain resonance or reverberation.

502. Then when he says, for if the good were not present, he assigns two reasons for the aforementioned diversity. For the evidence of which is must be considered that the reason for diversity is assigned otherwise in effects of a cause through the necessity of the nature of the agent than in effects of an agent cause through will. For in those that act through necessity of nature, the whole reason for diversity is from the diverse proportion of matter. For a reason cannot be assigned why fire liquifies wax and hardens clay, except on account of the diverse disposition of the receiving matter, because a natural agent, as far as is of itself, always is born to do one thing. But in those that act through will, a twofold reason for the diversity of effects is assigned: first of all on the part of the end; second, from the diverse disposition of the matter. As a builder in one way makes foundations and in another way walls and in another way a roof on account of a certain end, namely on account of the completion of the house that receives this diversity; second, so that there can be this diversity in parts, he seeks matter disposed in different ways or he even disposes it in diverse ways for fashioning the diversity of parts.

503. And likewise he assigns a twofold reason for the diversity of divine effects:

first of all, as much as is on the part of the end which is the completion of the whole, which would not be if there were only one grade of goodness in all equal beings; and this is what he says: if the good were not present to each according to its proportion in different ways, but all things were equal, it would follow that those that are nearest to God in things and most perfect would be in the grade and order of the extremes, that is, of the lower, and thus the whole would not be complete.

He assigns a second reason from the diverse capacity of things, which diversity nevertheless is foreseen by God on account of the end, whence he says, yet how would it be possible that all things uniformly would participate the good, since not all existing things are disposed in the same way to the perfect participation of this?

504. Yet having assigned these reasons, he further stretches the virtue of the good even unto evil; and he says that the excellent virtue of the good is apparent in this: that not only does it produce good things, but it even makes firm and establishes those things that are deprived of the good and even its privation of this, and this is done according to the total participation of this, that is, according to the ratio of its universal participation, because it is necessary, in whatever mode something is, that it should participate the good, and thus it is necessary that the subject of privation participates the good, since it is a certain being, and consequently this privation is made firm through the good, inasmuch as it cannot be except in a subject. And not only through the virtue of the good are both the thing deprived and the privation made firm, but also, if it is necessary confidently to say the truth, those things that are opposed to the good, by virtue of this good both are and can be opposed, because this very fact that they act by opposing is from the virtue of the good.

505. Then when he says, yet more: so that comprehending I might speak, he shows the universality of the good in being, which prevails for the manifestation of what he had said: that the thing deprived and the privation are made firm through the good; and about this he does three things:

first, he proposes a proposition;

second, he manifests the proposition through examples, at as the impure man, although he is deprived;

third, he adapts it to a solution, by way of distinction, at why also that generation should be made.

506. Therefore he says, first, that not only is the good found in each grade of existing things, but, so that I might speak by comprehending universally, all beings, inasmuch as they are, are both good and from the good; but inasmuch as they are deprived of the good, not only are they not good, but nor existing; for it is not such concerning the good, as concerning other particular habits and privations. For it is clear in heat and cold that the substance that is heated remains existing after it is totally deserted by heat, and many things are in beings that lack life and mind, that is, intellect; and even God is without substance, as though existing above every substance; and universally in all other forms and perfections it is found that some things both are and also can subsist, with perfection receding and by not having such perfection. But what is altogether deprived of the good, in no place, in no way, in no time either is or can be.

507. Then when he says, as the impure man, although he is deprived, he manifests how those things that are called evil in morals have something of the good;

and first, he manifests this in the evil of impurity which is according to concupiscible corruption. For the impure man is deprived of the good, inasmuch as his concupiscence is deprived of the order of reason, and as regards this he is not; for to be deprived of the order of reason does not posit that something is, but that something is not; and thus also as regards this he does not desire existing things, but he desires inordinate things that, inasmuch as they are inordinate, are not existing; but nevertheless the impure man participates the good according to a certain obscure and defective resonance of unition and friendship, which above we said befits the good.

Second, he shows the same in the evil of anger, which is according to irascible inordinance; and he says that inordinate fury, that is, anger, participates the good, according to this fact that it is moved to a certain thing that appears good and just to it, namely to vindicate an offense, and inasmuch as it desires those things that seem evil according to themselves, as to reduce and convert injuries of a neighbor into some apparent good, and beautiful; for it is proper to anger always to struggle for this: that it should seem to inflict vengeance justly. Whence also the Philosopher says, in the eighth book of the Ethics, that the angry man is likened to him who hears certain laws, as regards the fact that sins are to be vindicated, but he is moved at once before he hears the whole, namely by whom and how and how much the inflicted offense ought to be vindicated.¹

Third, he shows the same in him who sins from malice, not through passion, but acting through evil choice; and he says that he who desires the worst life that nevertheless seems best to him, as is said, participates the good, as regards this motion of desire and as regards the fact that he looks to the best life, because he chooses an evil life inasmuch as it appears good to him. And universally he comprehends that, if the good should be altogether removed, there shall be neither substance nor life nor any desire nor motion nor anything else.

508. Then when he says, why also that generation should be made, he applies the aforementioned truth to the solution of the provoked doubt; and he says, while it is such that, since nothing, whatever should seem evil, is totally deprived of the good, this very fact that through the corruption of one, which is appropriated to evil, there is made the generation of another, is not on the part of evil, but from the presence of an imperfect good: just as a sickness that corrupts nature is indeed a defect of some order, namely of the proportion of the humors in which health consists, nevertheless it is not a defect of whatever order; because, if every order should be removed, neither shall sickness itself remain, with the humors totally receding from one another; but order remains and this illness has for substance or essence that there should be a certain minimal, that is, imperfect, order. And as regards this order some illness is and can corrupt, as through excessive heat or something of this sort. For that which is altogether lacking of the good neither is existing nor is in existing things; but that which is mixed, that is, having part from the good and part from evil, according to what it has from the good, is numbered among existing things and is in some way existing.

509. Then when he says, yet more: all existing things shall be more and less, he shows that the diversity of grades in beings is from the good, and he applies this to the solution. He says, therefore, that all existing things participate more and less from being so much: inasmuch as they more and less participate the good; because being inasmuch as it is being is good. It is likewise concerning the good as also concerning being; because if something in no way exists participating in being itself, it follows that in no way shall it be. Yet that which according to some part is and according to some part is not, as a blind man who is a certain man, but is not seeing, inasmuch indeed as he fails of what is always and perfectly existing, is not; yet inasmuch as it participates being, so much is it; and, so that we might speak universally, the non-existing itself is held to be and is conserved through itself; for so long does blindness remain: as long as the man remains.

So also it is likewise concerning evil: because if there should be some evil that totally recedes from the good, in no way can that be, neither among those things that are more nor less good. But that which is according to some part good, whereas according to some part not good, is contrary indeed not to the universal good, because it does not fail universally of the good, but to some good of which it fails, as the evil of blindness is opposed to the good of sight. But this evil which is opposed to a particular good is retained through participation of the good, namely inasmuch as a subject of privation participates some good and that good gives the subject of some good, inasmuch as the good universally is participated in all beings. Nor is it unfitting that the good, universally speaking, should be the subject of the privation of some particular good, as what is the subject of some particular being is contained under common being.

Yet with the good altogether receding, neither shall anything be totally good, nor shall there be some good mixed with evil, nor shall there be evil itself, because with the subject subtracted the privation also is subtracted. For if evil is in some imperfect good, it is manifest that if the good should be totally subtracted, there will be totally removed also the imperfect good and the perfect good, and consequently evil will be removed. Then therefore evil only can be when there is evil with respect to certain goods to which it is opposed, but it is distinguished from other goods as good from good. For it is not possible that any things should be opposed to one another according to everything, because it is at least necessary that they should accord in being. And therefore since evil is not totally deprived of the good, but of some particular good, it remains that this very thing that evil is, is not some thing existing per se.

The Third Question Is Solved: In What Evil Is Situated, Both in General and in Specific and First That It Cannot Be in God

§21. 205. But neither is evil in existing things. For if all existing things are from the good and the good is in all existing things and contains all things, either there shall not be evil in existing things, or it shall be in the good. And indeed it shall not be in the good: for neither is cold in fire nor is evil made in that which makes even evil good. Yet if evil shall be in the good, it seems to fail here how it shall be. If indeed from it, unfitting and impossible: for, as the truth of the eloquences says, a good tree cannot make evil fruits nor indeed conversely (Matt 7:18). Yet if not from it, it is manifest that it is from another principle and cause: for either evil shall be from the good or good from evil; or if this is not possible, good and evil shall be from another principle and cause. For every binary is not a principle; yet unity shall be the principle of every binary. For it is unfitting that two perfectly contrary things should proceed and be from one and the same and that this principle should not be simple and singular, but divisible and biform and contrary to its own self and varied.

206. And indeed, neither is it possible that there are two contrary principles of existing things, and those opposed to one another and in all things. For if this should be granted, even God shall not be without injury nor beyond trouble, if there should be something opposed to him: afterwards all things shall be inordinate and always fighting.

207. And indeed, the good grants from friendship to all existing things and is praised by the holy theologians as peace per se and the giver of peace (Ps 29:11, 1 Thess 5:23, 2 Cor 13:11, Rom 15:33, Phil 4:9, Heb 13:20). On account of which all good things are friendly and fitting and sprouts of one life and ordered to one good and mild and alike and helping one another. Wherefore there is not evil in God and evil is not a thing moved by God.

208. But neither is evil from God; for either he is not good or he makes good things and produces good things.

209. And not sometimes indeed and certain things, yet sometimes not and not all. For in this he would suffer change and variation about himself which is the most divine of all according to cause. Yet if in God the good is essence, God shall be changing from the good, sometimes indeed existing sometimes not existing. Yet if he has the good by participation, he both shall have it from another and sometimes indeed he shall have it yet sometimes not have it. Therefore evil is not from God nor in God, neither simply nor according to time.

510. After Denys has shown that evil is not something existing through itself, here he begins to show that evil is not something in existing things, as a part or an accident, as color in a body;

and first, he shows this in general;

second, in specific, at and indeed, neither is it possible.

511. Yet that evil is not in existing things, as something inhering, thus he proves by a common ratio: all existing things are caused from the good, as is clear from what has been set forth, but an effect is likened to its cause; therefore the good is found in whatever existing thing. Yet everything that is found in something as good is contained under it, as everything in which animal is found is contained under animal. Therefore everything subsisting is contained under the good, as a good existing thing. Either therefore it is necessary that evil should not be something in some existing thing or it is necessary that it should be in the good; but this is impossible; therefore it is impossible that evil should be in an existing thing.

512. Yet that evil should not be in the good, he proves in two ways:

first, thus: none of contraries is in its contrary, as cold is not in fire; but if evil is something that is contrary to good, evil cannot come together with the good, since the good even makes good from evil.

Second, he proves it thus: if evil is something in the good, as in a subject, since every accident is caused either from its subject or from some other extrinsic thing, it will be necessary that evil should be caused from this good or from some other cause. But it is unfitting and impossible that evil should be caused from the good by a natural outflow, as natural accidents are caused by their subjects, because, as the Lord says in Matthew 7:18, a good tree cannot make evil fruits nor conversely. If it should be said that evil which is posited as an accident of the good is not caused from this good, it is manifest that it is necessary that it should be caused from some other principle and cause: for every accident, since it is not from the being of the subject, is caused from some cause in the subject.

Yet likewise it is necessary that the good, which is posited as the subject of evil, should be caused, since it is good through participation yet not through essence. Therefore it is necessary to posit one of two things: one of which is that evil is from the good; the second is that the good is from evil; or, if those two are impossible, as is clear through the authority introduced, it is necessary to posit a third, namely that both good and evil are caused from a certain principle and cause of the good. For a fourth cannot be posited, namely that neither good nor evil is caused, because the binary cannot be a principle, but the principle of every binary is unity, and thus it is necessary that two contraries either have themselves such that one is the cause of the other or they are caused by one cause. Yet just as the first two are impossible, so also the third: for it is unfitting that from one and the same principle there should proceed and be any things that totally are contrary things, as good and evil.

513. And because someone could say that the same thing according to diverse things makes contraries, to exclude this he adds that it is impossible to say that this first principle should not be simple and singular, that is, uniform, but divisible, biform, and contrary to its own self and varied from itself. For it is necessary, if the same thing should cause contraries according to one thing and another, that it should be composed from contraries, and thus it shall not be the first principle, which it is necessary should be simple. Therefore it is clear that evil is not in an existing thing.

514. Then when he says, and indeed, neither is it possible, he shows through singulars that evil is not anything in existing things; and first, that it cannot be in God; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows that evil is not some first principle contrary to God;

second, that evil is not in God, at and indeed, the good grants from friendship;

third, that evil is not from God, at but neither is evil from God.

515. He shows the first by two arguments, the first of which is thus: if evil were some first principle contrary to God, which is to posit two principles of existing things contrary and totally opposed to one another, since everything to which its contrary can be opposed can be injured and troubled by it, it would follow that God, who is the good itself, would not be without injury and trouble. But this is impossible: for he would not be the highest good nor the most blessed, if he were to be injured and troubled. Therefore there are not two contrary first principles: good and evil.

The second argument is thus: effects follow the condition of causes and principles. Therefore, if the first principles are contrary and opposed to one another, it would follow that all things in effects would fight against each other and one would not be ordered to another, which is impossible and contrary to what is apparent concerning the order of the universe. Therefore there are not two contrary first principles.

516. Then when he says, and indeed, the good grants from friendship, he shows that evil is not in God; and indeed this is evidently apparent from the fact that God is the good itself and evil cannot be in the good itself, as neither cold in fire. But because this argument was touched on above, he shows by another argument taken from the effect: for the good itself, which is God, is praised as peace: he is our peace (Eph. 2:14); and as giver of peace, according to 1 Corinthians 14:33: for he is not God of dissension, but of peace, inasmuch as he gives from friendship to all beings; and from this it follows that all good things are friendly to one another and come together, as generated from one uniting first principle.

And again, just as things proceeding are from one first principle, so they are ordered to one ultimate good. And although as regards some proper things they disagree, nevertheless all things mildly and without impediment have themselves to one another in order to that one good, and in this all things are made alike and help one another. Yet that peace and fittingness would not be in things from God and through comparison with God, if there were in God any contrariety of good and evil. Whence it is manifest that in God there is not anything evil; and further also, that evil is not some thing that is subjected to divine motion, because all things that are moved by God accord in one end, at least the ultimate end, as has been said.

517. Then when he says, but neither is evil from God, he shows that evil is not from God;

and first, that it is not from him simply;

second, that it is not from him at any time, at and not sometimes indeed and certain things.

518. He shows the first in this way: the good is not productive of evil, as is clear from what has been said; therefore either it is necessary to say that God is not good or that he makes and produces good things and not evil ones.

519. Then when he says, and not sometimes indeed and certain things, he shows that God does not produce evil at any time; and he says that it cannot be said that God sometimes produces certain evils, yet sometimes not and not all: because, since evil cannot be produced by the good, if God were sometimes to produce evil, it would follow that he would be changed from his goodness and varied, according to himself, which it is clear is doubly impossible:

first of all, because that which is most divine, that is, best and the cause of every goodness, cannot be changed from goodness, as neither fire from heat.

Second, because God either is good through his essence or through participation. If through essence, it will be the same for God to recede from goodness and to recede from essence and to become totally not existing; yet if he is good participatively it is necessary that he should have a cause of his goodness, and in this way he could sometimes be good and sometimes not good. But this is against the fact that we understand through this name God some first good and cause of every goodness. And therefore it is clear that evil is neither simply in God or from God nor according to any time.

Evil Is Not in the Good Angels

§22. 210. But neither in angels is there evil. For if a boniform angel should enunciate the divine goodness, that existing according to participation secondarily, which has been enunciated first according to cause, the angel is the image of God, the manifestation of hidden light;

211. a pure mirror, most clear, uncontaminated, unpolluted, immaculate, receiving the whole, if it is fitting to say, beauty of the boniform deiformity;

212. and making cleanly to be resplendent in itself, as is possible, the goodness of silence which is in secret places. No, therefore, neither in angels is there evil.

213. But by the fact that they punish sinners, are they evil? Therefore by this ratio also castigators of sinners are evil, and priests who expel the unclean from the divine mysteries. And indeed neither is it evil to be punished, but to become worthy of punishment; nor according to dignity to be expelled from holy things, but to become stained and not holy and not suitable for uncontaminated things.

520. After Denys has shown that evil is not in God, he begins to show that evil is not something in creatures; and first, he shows concerning the good angels that in them in no way is there evil; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows the truth;

second, he excludes an objection, at but by the fact that they punish sinners.

521. About he first, he does two things:

first, he posits an exposition of the angelic name;

second, from that exposition he receives the definition of angel, at a pure mirror, most clear.

522. About the first, it must be known that angel is interpreted as messenger. Therefore one conformed to the divine goodness is said to announce the divine goodness, inasmuch as in the angels secondarily through participation there exists that which first is enunciated from God, not according to participation, but according to cause; as if I were to say that the illuminated air announces the clarity of the sun, inasmuch as secondarily and participatively it is in the air and first and causally it is in the sun. And because what has something participatively and secondarily is the image of what has it first and causally, and the act of an image is to manifest that of which it is the image, consequently he concludes a certain notification of a good angel, the manifestation of the divine light which is hidden for us on account of its excellence and simplicity.

523. Yet consequently he manifests this notification;

and first, he manifests how an angel is the image of God;

second, how it is the manifestation of hidden light, at and making cleanly to be resplendent.

524. Yet that an angel is the image of God, he manifests through a certain sensible example. For we see sensibly that in a mirror there is represented the image of the seer. Yet in a mirror there are two things to be considered: first of all the substance of the mirror itself, whence through a certain likeness, he calls an angel according to its nature a mirror. Yet there is required in a mirror a certain opportuneness for receiving the image of some thing; which opportuneness indeed is found in an angel: which indeed is called a pure mirror, on account of the simplicity and immateriality of its nature; yet most clear on account of the most perfect participation of intellectual light; yet uncontaminated inasmuch as nothing in an angel is repugnant to its rectitude, which pertains to sanctity, for holy things properly are said to be contaminated; yet it is called unpolluted, inasmuch as nothing in the angel is repugnant to purity of nature; and immaculate, inasmuch as nothing in it is repugnant to clarity of intellect.

525. Yet having described the opportuneness of this mirror, he expounds the reception of likeness, according to which it is called an image; and he says that it receives the whole beauty of boniform deiformity, that is, of the likeness compared to the goodness of God, because if the nature of an angel has been optimally disposed, it is necessary that it should receive perfectly the aforementioned likeness.

But it must be considered that he does not say that it receives the whole beauty of the deity, but of deiformity, because it is impossible that in any created mirror there should be received the whole beauty of God; but in some created mirror, on account of its purity and clarity, there is received perfectly the whole beauty that is possible to be in a creature through assimilation to God. And because the deiformity of a creature always is of the part and not the whole, on account of this he tempered it, adding, if it is fitting to say.

526. Therefore having shown how an angel is an image, consequently he shows how it manifests the divine good; and he says that from this very fact that it perfectly receives the likeness of divine beauty, consequently there is made this which is in a certain way resplendent in it, as is possible for a creature: the goodness of silence which is in secret places, that is, in the hidden things of God, who cannot be expressed on account of the fact that he is hidden to the created intellect. Yet he says making not actively, but dispositively, as if he were to say that a mirror makes an image of some body to be resplendent in it from the fact that it is disposed to receiving its likeness. Therefore because an angel is such a perfect image of divine goodness, yet the divine goodness suffers no evil with another, it follows that neither in angels is there evil.

527. Then when he says, but by the fact that they punish sinners, he excludes an objection;

and first, he posits it: for someone could say that in the fact itself that angels punish sinners, they are evil. And that they should punish sinners expressly is had in Matthew 13:41, that they drive out all scandals from the kingdom. Therefore there is a question: whether because they punish they are evil.

Second, he shows that they cannot be called evil on account of this, because according to the same argument those also who castigate evil men by punishing them would be evil, as judges and masters; and likewise it would follow that any priests who exclude the unclean, that is, the sinner, from the divine mysteries by excommunicating him would be evil, which is against the Apostle who commands this in 1 Corinthians 5:3–5.

But because to multiply the unfitting is not to solve, for this reason, third, he solves all the things set forth; and he says that to be punished is not evil simply and according to itself, but according to itself it is good, since it is just; but it is evil secundum quid, inasmuch as it deprives some good of something. But to become a sinner, this is simply evil; and for this reason he who punishes a sinner is not evil, but he who sins is evil. By the same ratio, it is not evil according to itself to be excluded from holy things according to justice, but according to itself it is evil that someone should be stained through sin and should depart from sanctity and through this should become not suitable for divine things, which are uncontaminated according to themselves. And he who excommunicates does not sin, but he sins who does something whence he is made worthy of excommunication.

Demons Are Not Naturally Evil, and How Evil Is Found in Them

§23. 214. But neither are demons evil by nature; for if evil by nature, neither would they be from the good nor in existing things nor indeed changed from good, existing by nature and always as evil. Therefore afterwards: are they evil to their own selves or to others? If to their own selves indeed they also corrupt themselves; yet if to others, corrupting how or corrupting what? Substance or virtue or operation? If substance indeed, first of all not beyond nature; for by nature they do not corrupt incorruptible things, but things susceptible of corruption. Afterwards: neither this to all things and altogether evil. But neither is anything of existing things corrupted, according as it is substance and nature; but by defect of the ordination that is according to nature, the ratio of harmony and commensuration is made infirm, having to remain similarly. Yet the infirmity is not perfect; for perfect it would destroy both the corruption and the subject and there shall be such corruption and corruption of itself. Such as which is not evil, but failing good; for what is altogether lacking in good neither is in existing things. And there is the same argument concerning the corruption of virtue and operation.

215. Then: how are the demons made by God evil? For the good produces and makes good things to subsist.

216. And indeed they are called evil, someone should say, but not according as they are, for they are from the good and by the good have obtained substance, but according as they are not, existing as infirm, as the eloquences say, to preserve their own principate (Jude 1:6). For in what, tell me, do we say that the demons are made evil, except in the lack of the habit and operation of divine goods?

217. And otherwise: if the demons are evil by nature, they are always evil; and indeed evil is unstable; therefore if they have themselves always in the same way, they are not evil. For that it is always the same is proper to the good. Yet if they are not always evil, they are not evil by nature, but by defect of angelic goods.

218. And not altogether lacking in the good, according as they are and live and understand and totally there is a certain motion of desire in them.

219. Yet they are called evil on account of the fact that they are made infirm about the operation according to nature. Therefore aversion is evil for them and excess of things befitting them and not attainment and imperfection and impotence and infirmity and flight and falling of the virtue conserving their perfection.

220. And otherwise: what is evil in the demons? Irrational fury, demented concupiscence, shameless fantasy. But these, if they are also in the demons, not altogether nor in all nor evil according to themselves. For in other animals not the having of these but their removal is the corruption of the animal and evil. Yet having them preserves and makes to be the nature of the animal having them. Therefore the tribe of demons is not evil according to what is according to nature, but according to what is not.

221. And the whole good given to them was not varied, but they fell from the whole good given; and in no way do we say that the angelic gifts given to them were changed, but they are both integral and most splendid; although they do not see, closing their virtues inspective of the good. Wherefore that they are and are from the good and of the good and desire the beautiful and the good, desiring to be and to live and to understand, which are existing things; and by privation and recession and falling from the good things befitting them, they are called evil and are evil according as they are not and, desiring the non-existing, they desire evil.

528. After Denys has shown that evil is not in the angels, here he shows that it is not in the demons; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows that demons are not naturally evil;

second, how they are evil, at then: how are the demons made.

529. About the first, he posits four arguments:

the first of which is thus: from the good there is not caused anything naturally evil. But all things that are in the world are caused by God who is the first good itself; among which are demons. Therefore demons are not naturally evil.

The second argument is thus: it has been shown that evil neither is existing, nor is in existing things. If therefore demons were naturally evil, they would not be of the number of existing things.

The third argument is thus: that which naturally befits something always comes together with it. If therefore demons were naturally evil, they would always have been evil and would not have been changed from good to evil, as the Catholic faith confesses.

The fourth argument is thus: that if the demons are naturally evil either they are naturally evil to their own selves or to others. If to their own selves, since it is of the ratio of evil that it should harm and corrupt, it follows that they should corrupt themselves, which is impossible, for nothing is corruptive of its own self according to nature. Yet if they are naturally evil to others, therefore they naturally corrupt others.

530. Therefore it is asked what they naturally corrupt or how they corrupt, whether substance or virtue or operation, which three are found in all things. If it should be granted that they are naturally evil because they corrupt the substance of something, against this he objects with three arguments,

the first of which is thus: nothing that is corruptive of another according to the order of nature is evil naturally, because this very thing which is to conserve the order of nature is the good of nature. But if evil should corrupt substance it does not do this beyond the order of nature: for it does not corrupt incorruptible things, but those that are susceptible to corruption. Therefore it shall not be evil according to nature.

The second argument is thus: that which is naturally such, is such simply and with respect to whatever; just as that which is naturally hot, is hot simply and with respect to whatever, as fire. If therefore something naturally is evil, it shall be simply evil and with respect to whatever and with respect to its own self; which is impossible, as has been said.

The third argument is thus: none of existing things is corrupted through evil as regards the substance itself or nature of the thing that is called evil; just as in an evil man the substance and nature of man remain; but something is called evil through the fact that the ratio, that is, the proportion, of harmony and commensuration that is according to nature, is made infirm through some defect of order, nevertheless such that it is not totally removed, but to some degree remains. Yet this infirmity, by which such a proportion is made infirm, is not perfect, because if it were perfect it would destroy the subject itself and consequently the corruption that is in the subject, and thus such corruption corrupts itself. Therefore that which is infirm, not simply, but secundum quid, is not naturally evil, but good with a defect; because that which altogether is lacking the good cannot be found among existing things.

There is the same argument concerning the corruption of natural virtue; because if it were always to remain in a thing that is called evil or corrupted through evil, it would be corrupted through evil. Therefore it remains that nothing is evil according to nature.

531. Then when he says, then: how are the demons made, he shows how evil is in the demons;

and first, he poses a question;

second, he solves it, at and indeed they are called evil.

Therefore first it is asked how the demons, since they were made by God, are evil. For it belongs to the good to produce and conserve good things.

532. Then when he says, and indeed they are called evil, he solves the proposed question, and about this he does two things:

first, he shows that the demons are called evil, not according to any nature, but according to a defect of the good;

second, he shows that this defect in them is not from a variation of the good itself, but from their will, at and the whole good given to them.

533. Yet that the demons are not evil naturally, but according as they lack some good, he shows in three ways:

first of all through the authority of Sacred Scripture; and he says that thus someone ought to say that the demons are called evil, not inasmuch as they are because from the good, namely because their being is caused by God, and by the same they have obtained good essence, but they are called evil inasmuch as they are not, namely as they are infirm to preserve their own principate, as the eloquences of Sacred Scripture say. And this is received from the canonical letter of Jude, where it is said, whereas the angels who do not preserve their principate . . . he has held back by eternal chains (1:6). Yet they are said not to preserve their principate either because they do not preserve their innocence, in which from the beginning they were established, or because they have turned away from God, who is their principle. And to this exposition there accords what he adds: for we do not say that the demons are made evil except in the fact that they lack the habit and operation through which they ought to have been ordered to divine goods.

534. Second, when he adds, and otherwise: if the demons are evil, he adds the same through argument; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows that the demons are not naturally evil, but through a defect of some good;

second, that they do not totally lack the good, at and not altogether lacking in the good;

third, he shows of what good a defect is in them, at yet they are called evil.

535. About the first, he posits such an argument: if the demons were naturally evil, they would always be evil, because what naturally is in something always is in it. But if they are always evil, they are not naturally evil, which he proves thus: because everything unstable is a certain evil and to be always the same is proper to the good; whence we see that all desire sempiternity, as much as is possible. And thus it is apparent that if they have themselves always in the same way, they are not naturally evil; therefore from first to last, if they are naturally evil, they are not naturally evil, which is impossible. And therefore it is clear that if they are not always evil, because this is proper to the good, they will not be naturally evil, but through a defect of some goods that are due to the angels.

536. Then when he says, and not altogether lacking in the good, he shows that they are not totally deprived of the good; and he says that they are not altogether lacking in the good, for they participate the good, inasmuch as they are and live and understand and inasmuch as there is in them some motion of desire, which does not tend except to the true or apparent good.

537. Then when he says, yet they are called evil, he shows according to the defect of what good they are called evil; and he says that they are called evil on account of the fact that they have themselves defectively in the operation that applies to their nature. And consequently he shows by what order this happens, saying, therefore aversion is evil for them.

Where it must be considered that everything that is naturally subject to another has its good in that to which it is subjected, as a good appetite of sensible things in man is that which is regulated by reason. Yet every will both of an angel and of man is naturally subjected to God. Therefore aversion from the rule of the divine will is evil in demons. Yet every appetite failing of its rule tends to its object beyond what is right, as the concupiscible tends to the delightful according to sense more than is due, when it is not regulated by reason. And therefore the will of the demons, averse from the rule of the divine will, tends more than is due to the appetite of its good; and this is what he adds: and excess of things befitting them; namely because they desire something for themselves that exceeds their condition.

Yet everything that is born to attain some end through a determinate mode, if it should recede from that mode, cannot attain the end. Yet the mode in which the angels are born to attain the ultimate end of their will is through a will moderated according to the divine rule. If therefore they exceed that mode, they do not attain the end; and this is what he adds: and not attainment. Yet everything that does not attain its perfection remains imperfect, whence there is added: and imperfection. Yet an imperfect thing inasmuch as it is of this sort is impotent, whence there is added: and impotence.

And because virtue is the perfection of a power, there follows around virtue, which could have conserved their perfection, infirmity and flight and falling. And he posits these three according to those things that befall men: for if someone should be infirm for resisting something or for attaining something, he flees from it, and fleeing on account of infirmity he falls. And likewise the demons, infirm about the attaining of the divine end, flee from it and fall headlong into sin.

538. Then when he says, and otherwise: what is evil, he shows, in a third way, that the demons are not called evil according to nature, but according to a defect of some good; and this according to the opinion of others. For certain men posited that the demons are animals with an airy body, a rational mind, a passive intellect, eternal time, as Apuleius says and Augustine introduces in the ninth book of the City of God.¹ Therefore according to the opinion of these men, in the demons there is a sensible power and a passive appetite, which is the sensitive and is divided into irascible and concupiscible.

Yet this was not the opinion of Denys, which is clear from the fact that above he called the angels immaterial and incorruptible. Yet here he says that the demons are evil through a defect of angelic goods. Whence it is manifest that he did not think that the demons are bodily and consequently sensitive or passive in mind. But because he intends to show that the demons are not naturally evil, after he had shown this according to his own proper opinion, namely if the demons are of the angelic nature, consequently he shows that the same thing follows if it be posited that they have a sensitive nature; for then there will be the same judgment about the evil of the demons and about the evil of man.

539. Yet in us evil is through the fact that the sensitive part is not regulated by reason; and this as regards three things, namely: as regards the irascible which, while it is not regulated by reason, irrationally rages or gets angry; and as regards the concupiscible which, while it is not regulated by reason, desires stupidly; and as regards the fantastic or the imaginative which, while it is not regulated by reason, is shameless against the truth. Therefore according to the aforementioned opinion, evil in the demons is not other than irrational fury and demented concupiscence and shameless fantasy. Yet he says, demented concupiscence, irrational fury, because concupiscence pays no attention to reason; yet fury attends to it, but imperfectly, as has been said above.

540. If therefore these three are in the demons according to the opinion of others, nevertheless not altogether, because they are not shameless against whatever truth, nor is every concupiscence of theirs demented. For naturally they desire the good and the best; nor is it also in all the demons in the same way; nor also are those three, namely fury and concupiscence and fantasy, evil according to themselves, but according as they lack the order of reason and their due object. Whence we see that in irrational animals to have these is not evil, but to have these conserves them and makes it that animal nature should be had. Whereas if Denys is speaking here according to his own proper opinion, it must be said that he is speaking metaphorically: for thus passions of the soul of this sort are attributed to the angels in the Scriptures, as Augustine says in the City of God.¹ And therefore he concludes that the genus of demons is not evil according to what is in its nature, but according to what is not; that is, according as it is deprived of some good.

541. Then when he says, and the whole good given to them, he shows whence a defect of the good arises in the demons. For someone could believe that, just as a defect of the infirmity of a natural operation arises in men from the variation of nature itself, which growing old deteriorates and thus natural operations are debilitated, so also from the change of some good, a defect of a good operation arises in the demons. But he excludes this both as regards the universal good that is God from whom they have turned away, and as regards the participated goods which are natural goods given to the angels.

Therefore he says that the universal good, namely the divine, which is given to them inasmuch as somehow they are made participators of it, is not varied in any way. Whence they were not made evil on account of the variation of the good, but because they fell from the universal good given to them; and likewise in no way do we say that the angelic gifts pertaining to the angelic nature, which were given to them in the beginning, were changed, so that from their change evil should be effected, but they endure still integral, that is, without the corruption of nature, and most splendid, that is, without the diminishing of natural intellectual light.

But that they do not see, this arises from the fact that through free choice they closed their virtues inspective of the good, that is, they voluntarily turned their intellect away not from the consideration of the true, but from the inspection of the good, inasmuch as it is good, namely because they refuse to follow it. Whence it is clear that inasmuch as they are and have a good cause, they both are good according to their nature and desire the good, namely to be, to live, and to understand; but inasmuch as they are deprived of this through voluntary recession, by which recession indeed made infirm they fall from the good things that befitted them according to the order of their nature, they are called and are evil inasmuch as they are not; that is, inasmuch as some good is lacking for them; and likewise when they desire evil, they desire the non-existing. For they are said to desire evil, inasmuch as they desire some good with a defect of due mode and order.

How Evil Is in Souls

§24. 222. But someone should say that souls are evil. If for this reason indeed: that they stand together with evil men providingly and savingly; yet this is not evil, but good and from the good which even makes evil good.

223. Yet if we say that souls are made evil, in what are they made evil, except in a defect of good habits and operations, and on account of their proper infirmity not attainment and lapse? For also air which is above us we say is darkened by a defect and absence of light; yet light itself is what also illuminates the darkness.

224. Therefore neither in demons nor in us is there evil as existing, but it is as a defect and desert of the perfection of proper goods.

§25. 225. But neither is evil in irrational animals; for if you should remove fury and concupiscence and whatever other things are called and are not simply evil of their nature: for a lion, when it loses the animus and the proud, neither shall it be a lion; yet made meek to all a dog shall not be a dog: if indeed it is of a dog to guard and to draw near indeed to the familiar, yet to drive out the alien. Wherefore that which does not corrupt nature is not evil. Yet the corruption of nature is a defect and infirmity of natural habitudes and virtues and operations; and if all things through generation in time have the perfect, neither the imperfect altogether beyond all nature.

542. After Denys has shown how evil is in the demons, here he shows how it is in souls;

and first, he excludes a false mode;

second, he posits the true mode, at yet if we say that souls are made evil;

third, he concludes the proposition, at therefore neither in demons nor in us.

543. Therefore he says, first, that perhaps someone says that human souls are evil, which indeed is true of some; but it must be inquired how they are called evil. Yet if someone should say that they are called evil for this reason: because they stand with evil men for whom they provide and whom they intend to save, as some good man lives together with evil men in order to save them, or even as the soul itself communicates and shares in the corruption of the body and the inordinate passions of the soul and intending to reduce things of this sort to order, this is not evil, but is good and is derived from the first good, by whose virtue also evils are made good, either inasmuch as evils are changed and become goods, or inasmuch goods are elicited as from evils by divine ordination.

544. Then when he says, yet if we say that souls are made evil, he posits the true mode; and he says that if we say that souls are made evil, this cannot be except inasmuch as they fail of the good, both as regards habit and as regards act, and thus made infirm from a defect of the good they cannot attain the due end, but lapse into some contrary of the end; as also air which is above us we say is darkened through a defect and absence of light. But light is what also illuminates the darkness; that is, makes luminous what was previously dark, and thus does the good make good from evil.

545. Then when he says, therefore neither in demons nor in us, he concludes the proposition, namely that neither in demons nor in men is there evil, as something positively existing, but as a defect and as though a certain desert of the perfection of proper goods. And therefore he intends to show that in existing things there is not evil; because in certain ones indeed in no way is there evil, as in God or in the angels; whereas in certain ones there is evil, but as privation and defect, not as something existing.

546. Then when he says, but neither is evil in irrational animals, he shows that it is not naturally in irrational souls; and he excludes two things according to which it could seem that evil was naturally in them, namely the passions and a defect of passion. For someone seeing fury and concupiscence that are called evil in men naturally in brute animals, could reckon that animals of this sort naturally are evil. But he excludes this, saying that if you should remove from animals of this sort fury and concupiscence and other passions of this sort, which are called evil by some and nevertheless are not evil simply of their nature, if, I say, these should be removed, their nature is then destroyed.

For when a lion loses animosity and pride, then it shall not be a lion; and likewise a dog, when it loses fury, made meek to all, shall not be a dog. And this is apparent in the utility that it has in human affairs, in which the office of a dog is to guard a house or other things of this sort; and it does this by drawing near to the familiar and by driving out the alien. Yet it is manifest that those things through which nature is preserved lest it should be corrupted are not evil, but the corruption of this nature is infirmity and whatever other defect of natural habits and virtues and operations, and this is evil, as has been said above. Whence it is clear that the aforementioned passions, which when they are destroyed the nature of brute animals is destroyed, are not evil in them, but good.

547. Yet someone could say that from the fact that they are imperfect by reason of lacking according to their nature, animals of this sort are naturally evil; but he excludes this, saying, for whatever things are generated do not arrive at their perfection except after a determinate time; from which it is clear that to be imperfect before that time is natural and according to nature; from which it is clear that not every imperfection is beyond nature, but only that imperfection through which due perfection according to that time is removed, is evil.

How Evil Is in Natural Things

§26. 226. But neither in the whole nature is there evil. For if all natural rationes are from universal nature, nothing is contrary to it.

227. Yet for particular this indeed shall be according to nature, yet that not according to nature: for of one thing something is beyond nature and for another thing this is according to nature, yet that is beyond nature. Yet for nature malice is this which is beyond nature, namely the privation of the order of natural things. Wherefore nature is not evil, but this is evil for nature: to be impotent to perfect those things that are of proper nature.

§27. 228. But neither in a body is there evil: for ugliness and infirmity is a defect of form and a privation of order; yet this is not altogether evil, but less good. For if there should be made the perfect dissolution of beauty and form and order, the body itself shall also perish.

229. Yet that neither is the body the cause of the malice of the soul, is manifest from the fact that there can also be malice without the body, as in the demons.

230. For this is evil for minds and souls and bodies: the infirmity and falling of the having of proper goods.

§28. 231. But neither—very vulgar—in matter is there evil, as they say, according as it is matter:

232. for it has the participation of adornment and of beauty and of form. Yet if outside this there is matter existing according to itself without quality and without form, how does matter make anything, which neither has that it can suffer according to itself?

233. And otherwise: how is there evil for matter? For if indeed it in no way is ever, it is neither good nor evil: yet if existing, yet all existing things are from the good and it is made from the good. And either the good is effective of evil or evil, as existing from the good, is good; or evil is effective of the good or the good, as existing from evil, is evil; or again two principles, and these segregated from another one vertex.

234. Yet if they should call matter necessary for the completion of all the world, how is matter evil? For evil is one thing and the necessary another. Yet how does the good lead out certain things from evil to generation? Or how is there evil which is necessary for the good? For evil flees the nature of the good. Yet how does matter existing as evil beget and nourish nature? For evil, according as it is evil, is generative or nutritive or totally effective or conservative of nothing.

235. Yet if they should say that this indeed does not make malice in souls, yet that it attracts them, how shall this be true? For many of them gaze to the good. And indeed, how has this been done, with matter altogether attracting them to evil? Wherefore, evil is not in souls from matter, but from the inordinate and sinning motion. Yet if they also call this being of matter altogether consequent, and unstable matter is necessary for these things that cannot be gathered in themselves, how is evil necessary or the necessary evil?

§29. 236. But neither is that which we call privation, according to its proper virtue, opposed to the good. For perfect privation is universally impotent; yet particular privation has virtue not according to the fact that it is privation, but according to the fact that it is not perfect privation. For with there existing the privation of a particular good, it is not yet evil; and with it receding, the nature of evil also goes away.

548. After Denys has shown that, in these things that act through knowledge, evil is not anything existing, he shows the same in natural things;

and first, in nature itself;

second, in a natural body, at but neither in a body is there evil;

third, that neither in matter, at but neither—very vulgar—in matter;

fourth, he shows how privation has itself to evil, at but neither is that which we call privation.

549. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows that evil is not in universal nature;

second, how evil is in particular nature, at yet for particular this indeed.

550. About the first, it must be known that universal nature means the universal cause of all things that naturally are made. Yet God is the universal cause of all things that naturally are made; whence also certain men name him naturing nature. But it is better that universal nature should be understood as the universal cause of those things that naturally are made in the genus of natural things. Therefore certain men posited that universal nature is something separated, having itself commonly to all natural things, as separated man, according to the Platonists, commonly has itself to singular men. But because the species of things are not separated, but the very forms existing in matter are the principles of actions, as is proven in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, it must better be said that universal nature means the active power of the first body, which is first in the genus of natural causes.¹

551. In this universal nature, therefore, there cannot be evil: for evil in whatever nature is a recession from the order of that nature, as an eye is sick when it is not in its natural disposition. Yet granted that something can be beyond the order of some particular nature, nevertheless nothing can be contrary to universal nature: for it is not departed from the order of some nature, unless by something acting to the contrary, for example from the order of health, which is the natural good of the human body, it is departed through the action of heat or of cold. Yet all natural actions, which are active virtues, depend upon universal nature, and thus nothing can act to the contrary of the whole of universal nature. Whence it is clear that in universal nature, there cannot be evil.

552. Then when he says, yet for particular this indeed, he shows how evil is in particular nature; and particular nature means the principle of the motion of some determinate thing. Therefore he says that for any particular nature there is something according to nature and something not according to nature: as for fire it is according to nature to be moved upwards; yet to be moved downwards is not according to nature. Nor is the same thing beyond nature for all things; but one and the same thing can be according to nature for one thing and beyond nature for another: as to be moved downwards is beyond nature for fire, and according to nature for earth. Yet nothing is an evil for nature except to be beyond nature, which is to be deprived of something natural. From which it is clear that this nature is not evil, but this is evil for nature: not to be able to attain to those things that pertain to the perfection of proper nature.

553. Then when he says, but neither in a body is there evil, he shows how evil is in a body; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows what is called the evil of a body;

second, he excludes a certain objection, at yet that neither is the body;

third, he universally gathers what is evil in all things that are called evil, at for this is evil for minds.

554. Therefore he says, first, that, as it has been said that in the demons and in souls there is not evil as something existing, so also neither in a body is there evil as though something existing. For the evil of a body is said to be either ugliness or infirmity, and each of these is a defect of some form or a privation of some order. For there is required for beauty and clarity form and the commensuration that pertains to order. Yet with whichever of these deprived, ugliness follows. Nor nevertheless is evil in a body such that it is altogether deprived of form and order, because if there were to be totally removed every form and every order and consequently the whole thing that is in beauty, neither could the body itself remain and consequently neither the ugliness of the body. Whence it is clear that what is called ugly is not totally evil, retaining nothing of the good, but is a good diminished from due perfection.

555. Then when he says, yet that neither is the body, he excludes a certain objection: for someone could say: this body is evil from the very fact that it is the cause of the malice of the soul. But he excludes this, saying that the cause of the malice of the soul is not the body. For with a per se cause removed, the effect is removed; yet with the body removed, malice in spiritual nature is not removed, as is clear in the demons who are incorporeal and nevertheless evil. Therefore there remains that the cause of the malice of the soul is not the body. But in actual sin, it is manifest that the malice of the soul is from free will, in the fact that it uses bodily things badly; yet in original sin, the very infection of the body has attracted this stain, according to which it infects the soul united to it and first from the soul of the first parent.

556. Then when he says, for this is evil for minds, he gathers universally what evil is in all things that are called evil; and he says that both in the minds of demons, and in souls, and even in bodies, evil is not something existing; but weakly and feebly to have the proper goods that befit them or totally to fall from having them, this is called evil in singulars.

557. Then when he says, but neither—very vulgar—in matter, he shows how evil is attributed to matter;

and first, he shows the truth;

second, he excludes an objection, at yet if they should call matter necessary.

558. About the first, he does two things:

first, he proposes the truth;

second, he proves it, at for it has the participation of adornment.

559. About the first, it must be known that among many of the ancients it was said vulgarly that matter is evil according to itself, and this because they did not distinguish between privation and matter; yet privation is non-being and evil. Whence, as Plato, they said that matter is non-being and thus indeed that matter is evil according to itself. But Aristotle in the first book of the Physics says that matter is not non-being or evil, except accidentally, that is, by reason of the privation that befalls it;¹ and this is also what Denys says here: that there is not evil in matter, according as it is matter; and he proves this by three arguments.

560. The first of which is taken through comparison to form, which is thus: matter can be considered in two ways: in one way, as existing under form, and thus it has the participation of form as regards substantial being and of beauty as regards commensuration and loveliness, unto which intrinsic accidents also work, and also of adornment as regards the exterior things that stand around it.

In another way matter can be received as it is understood according to itself, beyond the aforementioned, as though lacking quality and every form. And if someone should say that matter thus received is the first evil, this cannot be: because they call the first evil what makes all evils. Yet matter existing according to itself without quality and form cannot make anything, because the principle of acting is the form through which something is actual; yet each thing acts according as it is actual. Likewise also neither can it suffer per se, according as to suffer is in casting off something from substance, as one contrary is said to suffer by the other contrary; but according as to suffer means to receive only, thus it befits matter to suffer according to itself; therefore it is manifest that matter according to itself is not evil as the first evil.

561. He poses the second argument at, and otherwise: how is there evil, which is taken from comparison to cause; which is thus: either matter in no way is or it is. If it is not, neither in any place nor through any mode; yet what is not is neither good nor evil. Therefore it follows that matter neither is good nor is it evil. Whereas if matter is, since all existing things are from the good, it follows that matter is from the good. Yet what is from the good is not evil according to itself; therefore matter is not evil according to itself.

562. Yet to show this, he introduces the division of five members; for about the causality of things it is necessary to say one of these five things:

the first of which is that the good is the cause of evil, of permanent evil;

the second member is that evil, from the fact that it proceeds from the good, is good;

the third member is that conversely evil is effective of good, of permanent good;

the fourth member is that the good, by the very fact that it proceeds from evil, is evil.

And these four are impossible: because to say that the good is effective of evil or evil of the good, is to posit that one of two opposites is the cause of the other; whereas to say that evil is good, or conversely, is to say that opposites are simultaneous.

The fifth member is that if there are two principles, good and evil, thus it is necessary to say that these two, which in themselves are distinct, proceed from one first principle, because before every multitude there is unity. Yet it is necessary that that first principle should be good or evil, and thus there shall return again the first four unfitting members. If it should be said that the good is something and evil is something, it is necessary therefore to say that the good is first; and everything that is something existing is good as caused from the good principle; and thus prime matter, if it is existing, is good according to itself as caused from the good.

563. He poses the third argument at, yet if they should call matter necessary, which is taken from the utility of matter, and this argument has as it were three middle terms, according to the three utilities of matter:

the first of which is that matter is completive of the universe; for the universe of beings would not be complete, if being in potency were removed. And he touches on this middle term, saying that if any men should concede that matter is necessary for the completion of the whole world, how can it be that matter should be evil according to itself? For the necessary is different from the evil: for something is called necessary from the fact that it has an order to the good and from it has the ratio of the good.

564. The second utility of matter is with respect to the particular beings that are generated from matter. And he touches on this middle term, saying, how does the good, namely God, lead out certain beings to generation from evil? Which seems unfitting: for just as heat does not make anything from coldness itself, so neither does the good make anything from evil itself, and nevertheless this would follow if matter were evil according to itself. Or again, how can there be evil which is necessary for the generation of the good? For this pertains to the ratio of evil: that it should flee the nature of the good and not lead to it. Yet he says that certain things are led out to generation from matter, on account of immaterial substances that do not have matter.

565. The third utility of matter is that it nourishes by sustaining form, whence Plato compared matter to a nurse. And he touches on this when he says, how can matter, since it is evil according to itself, beget and nourish the nature of the thing generated by receiving and retaining its form? For evil, inasmuch as it is of this sort, is not generative or nutritive of another or, so that we might speak more universally, it is not effective or conservative of another. For the effective contains under itself the generative as the less common, and likewise the conservative contains under itself the nutritive. Yet to effect and to conserve pertain to the ratio of the good, whence they cannot come together with evil, inasmuch as they are of this sort.

566. Then when he says, yet if they should say that this indeed, he removes a certain objection: for he had said above that a body cannot be called evil as though it should be the cause of the very malice of the soul. Yet someone could say that although a body does not make malice in souls, nevertheless bodily matter attracts souls to malice, by alluring them. But he says that this is not true. For if matter were the cause attracting souls to malice, it would follow that it does this of necessity: for with the cause posited, the effect follows of necessity, unless someone should impede it. But we see that this is false: for many of the souls look to the good, which could not be if matter were to draw them totally to evil. Whence it is manifest that evil is not in souls from matter, but from the inordinate motion of free will; which is sin itself.

567. Yet if someone should impute this very thing to bodily matter, inasmuch as existing exteriorly it in some way allures and conjoined to the soul it inclines, granted not of necessity, not on account of this is there removed that matter is good according to itself; because something can be an occasion of some evil, which nevertheless according to itself is good.

568. Therefore this is what he says: that if some men say that this very thing is from matter: that the soul is moved to evil, nonetheless it is necessary to say that matter, granted it is unstable, nevertheless is altogether consequent, that is, having consequence and order in the universe, and is necessary for forms, which could not be made firm in themselves. Yet how can evil be necessary or how can what is necessary be evil according to itself? And it must be noted that significantly matter is called unstable, because to be inclined to matter seems to be evil so much: inasmuch as, having forsaken the immutable good, it adheres to the mutable good. Yet the principle of mutability is matter, inasmuch as it is in potency to diverse things. Nor nevertheless does the fact that it is in potency to diverse things show it to be evil; nay rather, through this very thing it has an order to diverse goods, that is, to diverse forms, which are made firm in it.

569. Then when he says, but neither is that which we call privation, he shows how privation has itself to the ratio of evil; and he says that neither is privation itself opposed to the good by acting against it according to its proper virtue, but according to the virtue of the good; because, if it should be perfect privation, that is, that which removes the whole altogether, it excludes every potency, and thus it shall not be capable for acting against the good. Yet if it should be particular privation, excluding one form and not another, it has the virtue of acting not from the fact that it is privation, but from the fact that it is not perfect privation, that is, from the conjoined form, of which it is not deprived. But if the good should be deprived particularly, it is not yet totally evil, and if particular privation should recede either because something is not deprived or because it is totally removed, it follows that the nature of evil should perish.

Certain Secondary Questions Are Solved, and First Whether Evil Is Caused from the Good or from Some Other Cause

§30. 237. Yet there is gathered to say: the good is from one and a whole cause; yet evil from many and particular defects.

238. God sees evil as good and before him the causes of evils are virtues making good.

239. Yet if evil is eternal and creates and can be and is and makes, whence is this for it? Either from the good or the good from evil or both from another cause.

240. Everything that is according to nature is generated from a determinate cause. But evil is without cause and the indefinite is not according to nature: for neither is that in nature, which is against nature; nor is the ratio of the inartificial in art.

241. Whether the soul is the cause of evils in the way in which fire is of heating, and all things to which it approaches, it fills with malice? The nature of the soul is indeed good; yet sometimes by operations it has thus, yet sometimes not thus. If indeed its nature and being is evil and whence does it have being except from the good creative cause of all things? But if from this, how according to substance is it evil? For all good things are begotten from this. Yet if by operations, neither is this unchangeable. Otherwise whence are the virtues and those things made boniformly? Therefore it remains that evil is an infirmity and defect of the good.

§31. 242. The cause of good things is one. If evil is contrary to the good, evil causes are many. Not indeed that rationes and virtues are what effects evils, but impotence and infirmity and an unlike mix, not commensurable. Nor are evils immobile and always having in the same mode, but infinite and unbounded and borne in others and those infinite.

243. The principle and end of all things, even evils, shall be the good: for all things are for the sake of the good, whatever good and whatever contraries. For we make those, desiring the good; for no one looking to evil makes that which he makes; on account of which neither does evil have subsistence, but the privation of substance, made for the sake of the good and not of its own self.

§32. 244. For evil, being must be posited according to an accident and on account of another and not from a proper principle. Wherefore because what is done appears indeed to be right, because it is done for the sake of the good; yet in fact is not right, therefore we think what is not good is good. It must be demonstrated that one thing is desired and another is done. Therefore evil is beyond way and beyond intention and beyond nature and beyond cause and beyond principle and beyond end and beyond definition and beyond will, and beyond substance.

245. Therefore evil is a privation and defect and infirmity and incommensuration and sin and without intention and without beauty and without life and without mind and without reason and imperfect and not gathered and without cause and indefinite and without sprout and empty and not operating inordinate and unlike and infinite and obscure and without substance and itself nothing in any way ever existing.

246. As evil totally can do something by mixture to the good: for what is altogether lacking in the good neither is anything nor can do anything. For if the good is existing and desired by the will and powerful and active; how could that which is contrary to the good, which is deprived of substance and will and operation, do anything?

247. Not all things evil to all and the same altogether evil according to the same. The evil of a demon is to be beyond boniform intellect; of a soul beyond reason; of a body beyond nature.

570. Having treated the principal questions that he had posed above concerning evil, namely whether evil is something; and whence is evil; and in what is evil, here he pursues other connected questions;

and first, that by which it is asked: whether evil is caused from the good or from some other cause;

second, by which it is asked: how providence suffers evil, at yet how totally are evil things;

third, the question where it is asked: how anything of existing things desires evil, at therefore evil is not existing.

571. About the first, he does two things:

first, he sets forth certain considerations about the cause of evil through which the aforementioned question is solved;

second, he manifests them, at everything that is according to nature.

572. Therefore he posits three considerations: the first of which is that from all things it can be gathered that the good proceeds from one and a perfect cause, yet evil proceeds from many particular defects. And this is apparent both in natural things, and in moral things. For health and beauty are caused through the fact that the body, as regards all its parts, is well proportioned, but in order for there to be ugliness or sickness, it suffices that due proportion should be lacking in whatever part. And for this reason to be sick or ugly happens in many ways, but to be healthy and beautiful in one way. Likewise, for an act it is required that it should be commensurate according to all its due circumstances, with whatever of which removed, the act is made vicious. And for this reason the Philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics that the good happens in one way, whereas evil in many ways.¹

573. Then when he says, God sees evil as good, he posits a second consideration which is thus: whatever is in the world, whether good or evil, is seen thus by God; yet everything seen, inasmuch as it is seen, is in the seer; and because the noblest mode of seeing befits God, which is to see something through its cause, it is manifest that in God, who sees good and evil things, there are causes both of good things and of evil. But the causes of evils, which are before God, are the very virtues that make good: for it is the same virtue that makes good, inasmuch as it is perfect, and that makes evil, inasmuch as it is deficient: as is clear concerning free will, which is a cause of good and of evil, and, universally, everything that is a cause of evil is also a cause of some good.

574. Then when he says, yet if evil is eternal, he posits a third consideration, which is against this: that evil is not a first principle: because if evil should be from eternity not caused, but rather causing other things, if it should have the power of making other things and have existence and have causality, while it makes any things, there remains to be asked whence it has this: for whenever some one thing befits many, it is necessary that of that one there should be some one cause: for a cause is not more multiple than its effect, namely so that the effect should be one and the causes be many. If therefore eternity and creation and being and making commonly befit good and evil, it is necessary that this should proceed from one cause. Either therefore evil has this from the good or good from evil or both from some prior cause; and which of these is truer afterwards will be shown.

575. Then when he says, everything that is according to nature, he manifests the three considerations set forth;

and first, the first;

second, the second, at the principle and end of all things;

third, the third, at as evil totally can do something.

576. The first consideration, namely that evil is not from any determinate cause, he proves by three arguments,

the first of which is thus: for we see that everything that has a determinate cause either is from nature or is from art: for everything that is according to nature is generated from some determinate cause; and likewise what is according to art. But evil is not according to nature nor according to art: because everything that is according to nature is in some way in nature, just as effects are in their causes; nor is it according to art: because everything that is according to art has some ratio in art. Yet evil in natural things is to be against nature and in artificial things evil is also to be inartificial. Yet it cannot be said that what is against nature is in nature nor that the ratio of what is inartificial is in art. And thus evil is not from nature, nor from art. From which it follows that evil is without cause and indeterminate, as not coming forth from any determinate cause.

577. Yet he posits the second argument at whether the soul is the cause of evils, for it especially seems that the soul through free will is a cause of evil. Whence if the soul should not be a per se cause of evil, it seems that nothing else is a per se cause of evil. Therefore he asks whether the soul is a per se cause of evils such that it fills all things to which it is joined with malice, as fire heats all things to which it approaches, because it is a per se cause of heating.

578. And for the solution of this question, he proposes two things:

the first of which is that the nature of the soul is good;

the second is that the soul according to its operations sometimes is good, sometimes evil.

He proves the first of these thus: for if it should be given that the nature of the soul is evil, and its being is evil, this seems impossible, because the soul does not have its being except from the creative cause of all things which it is necessary should be good; because to produce the good pertains to the ratio of the good. Yet whatever things are created from a good cause are good. In no way, therefore, can it be that the soul, according to its substance and nature, should be evil.

Yet if it should be given according to member, namely that the soul is evil on account of its operation, this is not as though an operation evil necessarily and unchangeably by the soul should be the per se cause of an evil operation: for there could not be in the soul virtues and virtuous acts, unless it were conformed to the good.

And therefore the soul is not a determinate per se cause of evil. Whence it remains that evil is rather from a certain debility of cause and defect of the good.

579. He posits the third argument at, the cause of good things is one, which is thus: the cause of good things is one; but just as evil is opposed to the good, so also multitude to one: therefore the causes of evil are many and indeterminate. Not indeed that evils are effected through some rationes and virtues (and he says rationes as regards those things that are made through art, and virtues as regards those that are made through nature), but the cause of evils is a defect of the whole, by reason of which it is called an impotence or a debility of a power which is called infirmity, or also this: that something unlike is joined to another without due commensuration; just as if heat is added to cold without due commensuration, there would follow sickness. Yet that some things persevere immovably and in the same mode happens from the strength of the cause impressing and conserving. Therefore because evils come forth from the subtraction of a power or its debility, it follows that they are not immobile nor always having themselves in the same mode, but that they have infinite varieties and that they are indeterminate; because what comes forth from debility of cause, sometimes happens one way, sometimes another, on account of the fact that a debilitated cause cannot conserve the same order in causing. And because there are certain debilities, it is necessary that they should be borne in others, that is, sustained as privations in subjects, and that they should have determinate subjects just as they have determinate causes.

580. Then when he says, the principle and end of all things, he manifests the second consideration, namely that the causes of evils are virtues making good; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows that the good is the principle of evil;

second, he shows through what mode, at for evil, being must be posited.

581. Yet that the good is the principle of evil he shows thus: the end always corresponds to the active principle; for each thing operates unto what is befitting to its nature, as fire acts unto the generation of fire. But the end of all evils is the good. Therefore also the principle of all evils is the good. Yet that the end of evils is the good, he proves thus: for the end of anything is that on account of which it is made; but whatever makes something whether good or evil, makes it on account of the good, and he manifests this in those things that make evils, concerning which it seems less; for we do not make evils, except from the desire of some good; for no one makes those things which he makes, looking through intention to evil: as he who commits adultery is not allured by the inordinateness on account of which adultery is evil, but by delight which is a good. Therefore the end of evils is the good; and thus it follows that the good is also the principle of evils. Yet everything that has some substance has a principle and an end befitting its substance: which cannot be said of evil, as has been shown. Therefore it remains that evil does not have substance, but that it is a privation of substance, since it is made for the sake of the good and not for the sake of its own self, as has been shown.

582. But if he who makes evil intends unto the good, as he says here, it seems that he does not sin, because sin depends especially upon intention. But it must be said that if the other evil joined to the good were unknown, as joined to it, rarely and in fewer cases would the intention that is borne to the good be evil. But when the joined evil is not hidden, as always joined to this good to which the intention is borne, in some mode it is also borne to evil, although not principally. For from the fact that he does not refuse that good on account of the joined evil, it follows that he more wills that evil than to lack the good and that he wills less the greater good, of which he is deprived through that evil, than the lesser good to which the evil is joined.

583. Then when he says, for evil, being must be posited, he shows how the good is a principle of evil; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows the proposition;

second, he infers a conclusion from the things said, at therefore evil is a privation.

584. Therefore because he had shown above that the good is a principle of evil, lest anyone should believe that the good is a per se principle of it, to exclude this he says that being must be assigned to evil accidentally and on account of another and not as though from a proper and per se principle; which he proves thus: whenever there is one thing done and another desired, that which is done has a cause accidentally: as if someone digging a grave should find gold, we say that the finding of gold came about accidentally. But when someone does evil, what is done is one thing and what is desired or intended is something else: because it appears that what is done is good; which is altogether necessary, because everything that is done is done for the sake of the good, as has been shown; but according to the truth of the thing it is not good, because it happens that someone thinks that what is not good is good. Therefore it remains that evil does not have a principle except accidentally.

585. And thence he concludes further that evil is beyond way because the motion that is the way to non-being is not per se terminated at evil; and again it is beyond the intention of the mover, because every intention of an agent is borne unto the good; and again it is beyond nature, because it does not progress from the agent according to the fittingness of its nature, since every agent acts in virtue of the good; and further it is also beyond cause, because it does not have a cause per se, but only accidentally, whether there is understood through cause an effective principle or a final cause; and just as it is beyond nature, so also is it beyond art. It is also beyond definition of reason which directs in operations of art and beyond will which remains in them; and likewise it is beyond substance subsisting, because it does not have form through which it subsists, but is a privation of form.

586. If anyone should object that what some sinner does appears good to him, and thus every sinner seems to sin from ignorance and so to be excused from sin, it must be said that an error of this sort, on account of which it is thought that what is not good is good, is according to the ignorance of choice by which that is ignored in the particular which is known in the universal. For he who knows that adultery is evil in the universal, in the particular judges it to be good to commit adultery now, inasmuch as in his will the delightful good outweighs the bonum honestum, to which the evil joined to the delight is opposed. Whence ignorance of this more is from the inordinateness of the will than it is the cause of an inordinate will. And on account of this the Philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics that the ignorant man sins indeed, but not from ignorance.¹ Whence he is not excused, either in whole or in part.

587. Then when he says, therefore evil is a privation, he infers a conclusion from the things said, in which he multiplies the rationes of evil. Since therefore evil is a privation of the good, it can be varied in two ways: either on the part of the privation, because it happens that something is deprived in many ways; or on the part of the good, because the good happens to be deprived in many ways.

588. Therefore he concludes that because evil does not have subsistence, that it is a privation totally depriving some particular good, as blindness is evil because it totally deprives sight; and again evil is a defect, namely when something is not totally removed, but is had deficiently, as is clear in him who sees obscurely; and it is also infirmity, namely when the good is not had firmly, even if it is had intensely: as if anyone should see acutely and nevertheless should not have firm sight, but his sight is easily destroyed. These three therefore are received on the part of privation.

589. But on the part of what is deprived through evil, first there must be received the ratio of the good in common, to which three things pertain: namely, the commensuration of any things from which something is compounded, as health is the commensuration of humors and beauty the commensuration of members and, through the opposite, evil is incommensuration, as sickness and ugliness.

The second thing that pertains to the ratio of the good is that an act should arrive at its due end, and, through the opposite, he says that evil is sin: for sin is said in nature and in art and in the will, when an act does not arrive at its due end: as when nature produces a monstrous part and when a writer does not make a good writing and when the will does not make a virtuous act.

And it is also of the ratio of the good that it should be intent, because the good is what all things desire and, through the opposite, he says that evil is without intention.

And these three can be reduced to mode, species, and order, which Augustine posits: for incommensuration is through privation of mode; sin, through privation of species; yet what he says: without intention, through privation of order.

590. Then he posits those things that follow the common ratio of the good; and first he says, without beauty, because the beautiful is converted with the good, as has been said above. And afterwards he posits certain particular goods that are deprived through evil; and he says that it is without life and without mind, that is, intellect, and without reason; and it is imperfect, for perfection pertains to the ratio of the good; and it is not gathered, that is, not firm in anything, for to be firm in something is of the ratio of the good; and it is without cause, for order to a cause is a certain good; and it is indefinite, as it is not proceeding by a proper cause; and it is without sprout, as though not having a proper and per se effect; and it is empty, that is, without fullness; and it is not operating, because operation itself is also a certain good and perfection of the operator; and it is inordinate, because order also pertains to the ratio of the good; and it is unlike, because likeness also is a certain order pertaining to the ratio of the good; and it is infinite, because the end is the good and perfection of each thing; and it is obscure, that is, without clarity; and briefly without every substance and it is not existing in any way nor in any time nor is evil anything inasmuch as it is evil.

591. Then when he says, as evil totally can do something, he proceeds to manifest the third consideration posited above, namely that evil is not a certain eternal and causative first principle; and he proves this in two ways;

first thus: for evil, in the way in which anything can make something, can do this through the good joined to it, because that which is altogether lacking in the good neither is anything nor can do anything. And he proves this thus: for if it is such that to exist and to be desired through the will and to be powerful and to be effective pertain to the ratio of the good, how could that which is contrary to the good, namely evil, which is without substance and operation and will, as has been said above, do anything by its own proper virtue? As though he were to say: in no way. If therefore evil can do nothing through itself, but only in virtue of the good, it is manifest that evil is not a causative first principle.

592. Second, at not all things evil to all, he proves the same thus: we see that not all things are evil to all, nor are the same altogether evil to all according to the same; for the evil of each thing is opposed to its proper good: for the evil of a demon is to be an intellect not conformed to the divine goodness and the evil of a soul is to be beyond reason and the evil of a body is to be beyond its natural disposition. Therefore there is not something evil that is the same evil for all things. Yet this would be necessary, if there were some first evil something causative of all evils, as the first thing causative of all goods is good for all things. Therefore it is clear that evil is not a causative first principle.

Second, How There Can Be Evil Things, with Divine Providence Existing; Third, On the Desire of Evil

§33. 248. Yet how totally are evil things with providence also existing? Evil is not, according as it is evil, neither existing nor in existing things, and nothing of existing things is unprovided for: for nor is evil conspicacious subsisting by the good. And if nothing of existing things, evil is not a participator of the good, yet a defect of the good, yet nothing of existing things is deprived universally of the good, in all existing things there is divine providence, and nothing of existing things is not provided for.

249. But also providence kindly uses evil deeds either to either the proper or the common utility of those or others:

250. and properly it provides for each of existing things. On account of which also we shall not receive the vain argument of the many who say that it is necessary that divine providence should drive us to virtue even when unwilling: for to corrupt nature is not of providence. Whence, as providence is preservative of the nature of each thing, it provides for per se mobile things as per se mobile, and for wholes and particulars according to the propriety of the whole and of each, inasmuch as the nature of the things provided for receives the providing goodnesses of the whole of most lavish providence attributed proportionally to each.

§34. 251. Therefore evil is not existing, nor is evil in existing things. For evil never is, according as it is evil, and to be made evil is not according to virtue, but on account of infirmity.

252. And for the demons, that indeed which they are is both from the good and good; yet they have evil, from the fall from their proper goods, and variation which is about identity and habitude; infirmity of what befits them, of the perfection befitting angels.

253. And they desire the good, inasmuch as they desire being and living and understanding; they desire non-existing as good and this is not the desired, but the sin of what exists as desired.

§35. 254. Yet the eloquences call sinners in knowledge (Rom 14:23, Luke 12:47) those existing as infirm about the knowledge of the good not forgettable or action and knowing the will and not doing it; who indeed have heard, yet are made infirm about faith or the operation of the good; and that they refuse indeed to understand in order to act well, according to aversion or infirmity of will. And what is totally evil, as we have said many times, is infirmity and impotence and defect either of knowledge or of faith or of desire or of the operation of the good.

255. And indeed someone should say: infirmity must not be punished, but on the contrary condoned. If indeed there were not ability, the speech has itself well; yet if ability from the good, which gives, according to the eloquences, to all simply the things befitting them (Jas 1:5), sin of the having of proper goods from the good and aversion and fight and fall is not laudable. But these indeed have been said by us sufficiently according to virtue in these works that are On Justice and the Observance of Divine Justice. In which holy business the truth of the eloquences has crushed those speaking sophistic things and injustice and lies against God, as foolish arguments.

256. Yet now sufficiently as according to us the good has been praised, as truly lovable, as the principle and end of all things, as the circuit of existing things, as informing things not existing, as the cause of all good things, as not the cause of evils, as providence, as the perfect giver of the good, and surpassing things existing and not existing, and driving evils according to their privation back to the good, for all desirable and lovable and cherishable, and whatever other things true speech has demonstrated in the preceding.

593. Having solved the first question concerning the cause of evil, here he solves the second concerning providence, namely how evil can be, with divine providence existing; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows that it does not fall under providence, as though caused from providence;

second, he shows that it falls under providence, because ordered by providence, at but also providence kindly uses evil deeds;

third, that evil ought not be totally impeded through providence, at and properly it provides for each.

594. Therefore he says, first, that evil, inasmuch as it is evil, is not existing nor in existing things, as has been proven above; and since nothing of existing things is unprovided for, that is, not caused from divine providence, evil is not intended or caused from divine providence. Yet that all existing things are caused from divine providence and no evil is, he proves thus: for none of existing things is unless in some way it participates the good; but it is of the ratio of evil that it should be a defect of the good. Yet none of existing things universally is deprived or fails of the good; yet the proper effect of providence seems to be the good: for whoever providing intends this: that his providence should establish in a good state those things for which he provides. Therefore it remains that divine providence extends itself to all existing things and nothing of existing things is not provided for by God; but evil is not caused through divine providence so much: inasmuch as it is not existing.

595. Then when he says, but also providence kindly uses evil deeds, he shows how evils fall under providence, as ordered by providence; and he says that divine providence uses evils well, sometimes indeed to the utility of those in which the evils are; as bodily and even spiritual infirmities, with God doing this, yield to the utility of those who suffer them; whereas sometimes to the utility of others, and this in two ways: sometimes indeed to the proper utility of something, as it is when from the punishment of one, another is emended; whereas sometimes to the common utility, as when the punishment of evildoers is ordered to the peace of the city.

596. Then when he says, and properly it provides for each, he shows that evil ought not be totally impeded through divine providence; and he says that divine providence provides for each of existing things properly, that is, according to the propriety and condition of its nature. And for this reason there must not be received the vain objections of the many, who say that divine providence ought to induce us to virtue even when unwilling. For it does not pertain to providence that it should corrupt the nature of things, but that it should preserve them; whence, in that way, providence is conservative of the nature of each thing; but it provides for those things that are mobile through their nature, as though mobile per se, that is, not removing from them that they should be able to be moved per se; and likewise, for those things that are whole and universal and perfect and those things that are particular it provides according to the natural propriety of the whole and of each particular: and this inasmuch as the nature of those things for which God provides, receives proportionally to itself the goodnesses given by the most lavish and universal providence of God. And because the rational creature is defectable according to its nature and can defect through free will, it does not pertain to divine providence to impede its mobility; and likewise, it does not pertain to the providence of God to attribute such great goodness to one particular being as to the universal whole, or to a thing that is in an inferior grade as to a thing that is in a superior.

597. Therefore evil is not existing. Here he solves the third question concerning the desire of evil; and about this he does two things:

first, he shows how evil happens to be in desire;

second, how sinning happens in knowledge, at yet the eloquences call sinners in knowledge.

598. About the first, first he resumes certain things that are in evil in common, concluding from the things said that evil neither is existing per se nor in existing things. For it is shown that evil, according as it is evil, never is, that is, is not anything existing in anything; and again it has been shown that the fact that something is said to be made evil does not happen from any active virtue, but on account of the infirmity and defect of virtue.

599. Second, at and for the demons, he resumes what has been said specifically concerning the evil of demons, and he says that in the demons this very what-they-are is good and they have it from the good, namely God; but evil is found in them from the fact that they fell from their proper goods, that is, to which they had been ordered according to the order of their nature; and again variation, by which they withdrew from that identity in which the good angels are and from having those things that they have; which is nothing other than a certain infirmity of the perfection befitting them naturally, as befits the angels.

600. Third, at and they desire the good, he shows how desire has itself to good and evil; and he says that the demons desire the good inasmuch as they desire the natural good which is being, living, and understanding; but inasmuch as they do not desire the good, but evil, they desire non-existing: because evil, inasmuch as it is evil, is non-existing; and to desire this very thing, as non-existing, is not of the perfection of desire, but is a certain infirmity and sin about desire: for just as to think the false is from an infirmity of the intellect, so to desire evil is from a defect of desiderative virtue.

601. Then when he says, yet the eloquences call sinners in knowledge, he shows how sin happens to be in knowledge; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows a proposition;

second, he excludes an objection, at and indeed someone should say: infirmity must not be punished;

third, he offers an epilogue for the things that have been said in this chapter, at yet now sufficiently as according to us.

602. Therefore he says, first, that just as to sin in desire is a certain infirmity of desire, so to sin in knowledge, according to the sacred eloquences, is said to be infirm about two things: first of all, about the knowledge of the good which one is held to know and which is forgotten; for if someone were made infirm in the knowledge of what he is not held to know, it is not sin.

Second, about the action of the good which someone knows; and as regards this second mode, there are reproached those knowing the will of their Lord and not doing it, as is had in Luke 12:47. And these who hear indeed also cannot excuse themselves from ignorance; but they are infirm for believing or for working the good.

Whereas as regards the first, there are reproached in Psalm 34 those who refuse to understand in order to act well: which indeed is done according as the will is turned away or has itself infirmly to the knowledge of the good.

And, so that we might speak universally, evil, as has been said many times, is a certain infirmity, that is, debility of power or totally impotence and whatever defect of power either about knowledge or about faith or about desire or about the operation of the good. And he is speaking here concerning the evil of fault, which it is necessary should be about one of these four.

603. Then when he says, and indeed someone should say: infirmity must not be punished, he poses a certain objection: for someone by objecting can say that infirmity must not be imputed, but condoned. For infirmity, as it seems, must be pardoned. If therefore sin is infirmity about any of the aforementioned, it seems that sin must not be punished.

604. But someone responds to this that such an objection would proceed well, if ability for the good were altogether lacking to the sinner. But because each has the ability to act well from the good, that is, from the help of God, who gives affluently to all the things befitting them, as is said in James 1:5, sin is not laudable, that is, excusable, which is aversion and flight and fall from the having of proper goods, which arise from the good, namely God. For man turns himself away from the help of God prepared for him, and it is imputed to him indeed unto the fault of sin; just as if someone infirm were to fall while he was refusing to use the help of one extending his hand.

But he says that he has said these things sufficiently according to his virtue in a certain book that he made On Justice, which has not come down to us: in which indeed according to the truth of Sacred Scripture he reproved the sophistic arguments of those who speak unjustly and dishonestly against divine justice.

605. Then when he says, yet now sufficiently as according to us, he offers an epilogue for those things that have been said in this chapter; and he says that now in this chapter he has praised sufficiently, according to his ability, the good as truly lovable, where he has treated about love; and as the principle and end of all things, in the beginning, where he spoke of the effect of the good: in which there is manifested as though a certain circle in existing things, while they have the same principle and end, namely the good; and he has shown also there that God informs things not existing in act but in potency; and that God is the cause of all good things; and that he is not the cause of evils; and that his providence is the perfect giver of every good; and that he surpasses both things existing and not existing; and that evils that are said according to privation, he orders to the good which is desirable for all and cherishable; and whatever other things have been demonstrated, according to the truth in the preceding things, are true.

Certain Things Having Been Set Forth Necessary for the Proposed Intention, He Pursues the Causality of the First Being

C. V, § 1. 257. Yet it must be crossed over now to the truly existing theological praising of the truly existing God. Yet only we shall remember that the intention of the speech is not to manifest the supersubstantial substance, according as it is supersubstantial, for this is ineffable and unknown and perfectly not manifestable and exceeding unition itself, but to praise the substantified procession of the thearchic substance of the principate to all existing things. For the naming of God of the good, manifesting all the processions of the cause of all things, is extended both to existing things and to non-existing things and is above existing things; yet that of life is extended to all living things and is above living things; whereas that of wisdom is extended to all intellectual and rational and sensible things and is above them all. Therefore this speech desires to praise those namings of God manifestive of providence, for it does not promise to narrate the per se substantial goodness and deity, and the substance and life and wisdom of the per se substantial divinity that is above all goodness and deity and substance and life and wisdom super-gathered in hidden places, as the eloquences say; but it praises the goodness manifested and the exceedingly beneficent providence and the cause of all good things, and existing and life and wisdom, which makes substance and vivifies and is wisdom the giver the cause for those things that participate substance and life and reason and sense.

258. Yet it does not say that the good is one thing and existing another and life or wisdom another, nor that there are many causes and other deities productive of other things, exceeding and subject, but that of one there are all the good processions and namings of God praised by us; and that this indeed is perfectly manifestive of the providence of the one God, yet certain ones of the more universal of the same and of the more particular.

§3. 259. And indeed, someone should say: why, with existing exceeding life and life wisdom, living things indeed existing things, yet sensible things living things, yet reasonable them and minds excel reasonable things, and why are they about God and why do they approach more to him? And indeed, it is necessary that those that participate greater gifts from God both should be better and should excel the rest.

260. But if someone were to suppose that those things indeed that are intellectual are not subsisting and not living, well indeed would the speech have itself; yet if the divine minds both are above the rest of existing things and live above the rest of living things and understand and know above sense and reason and more than all existing things desire the beautiful and the good and participate it, those more are around the good abundantly participating this and possessing more and greater gifts from it, as also reasonable things excel sensible things, possessing more than them by an abundance of reason, and certain ones by sense and others by life. And this is, as I reckon, true: that those more participating the one and the God of infinite gift, of the image are nearer to him and more divine than the derelict.

§4. 261. Yet because also concerning those things we have said, come, let us praise the good as truly existing (Ex 3:14) and substantifying of the whole of existing things,

262. Which of the whole of being according to supersubstantial virtue is the substantifier cause and causer of the existing, of mind, of person, of substance, of nature; the principle and measure of the ages and what makes time to be and the aevum of existing things, the time of those things that are made, being for things existing in whatever mode, generation for things generated in whatever mode. From the existing both the aevum and substance and the existing and time and generation and things to be generated and those things that are in existing things and that, in whatever mode, inhere in them and stand under them.

263. For God is not existing in a certain mode, but simply and uncircumscribedly, who receives and pre-receives the whole of being in himself; on account of which also he is called King of the Ages (1 Tim 1:17), as in himself and around himself, with the being of all things for existing things both substantifying and existing.

264. And he neither was nor shall be nor was made nor is begotten nor shall be begotten; yet more nor is he, but he is being for existing things; and not only existing things, but the being itself of existing things is from the existing before the ages: for he is the aevum of aevums, who is before the ages (Gen 21:33, Rom 16:26).

§ 5. 265. Therefore resuming we say that for all existing things and ages there is being from the preexisting, and every aevum and time indeed is from him. Yet of every age and time and everything existing in whatever mode, the preexisting is the principle and cause, and all things participate him, and he recedes from none of existing things, and he is before all things, and all things consist in him (Col 1:17); and simply, if something is in whatever mode, it is and is understood and is preserved in the preexisting;

266. And before his other participations, being is proposed, and being itself according to itself is older than that which is to be per se life and that which is to be per se wisdom and that which is to be per se divine likeness; and whatever other participating existing things, before all those participate being; yet more, all those things which existing things participate according to themselves, participate being itself according to itself, and nothing is existing, of which being itself is not the substance and aevum. Therefore fittingly is God praised as existing more principally than by all the others, from the worthier of his other gifts.

267. For prepossessing and super-possessing pre-being and super-being, from that which is, I say, he made being itself according to itself to preexist, and through being itself he made everything existing in whatever mode to subsist. And indeed, all the principles of existing things participate being and are and are principles, and are first, afterwards they are principles; and, if you wish to call the principle of living things as living per se life; and of like things as like per se likeness; and of united things as united per se unition; and of ordered things as ordered per se ordination; and of whatever other things participate this or this or both or many, you shall find that this or this or both or many participated things, per se participations, are first those participating things and existing first by being itself, afterwards existing as the principles of this or this, and that both existing things and participated things participate being. Yet if these are by the participation of being, much more indeed those that participate them first. Per se goodness proposing, therefore, the first gift of per se being, is praised by the more worthy first participation.

268. And there is, from this and in this, being itself and the principles of existing things and all existing things and what are contained by being in whatever mode; and this incomprehensibly and jointly and singularly.

269. For in unity every number uniformly preexists, and unity has every number singularly in itself; and every number is united indeed in unity, yet inasmuch as it proceeds from unity, so much is it discerned and driven in multitude.

270. And in the center all lines of a circle according to one unition coexist and the sign has all lines in itself uniformly united both to one another and to the one principle from which they proceed; and in this center indeed they are united perfectly, yet little distant from it, they also are discerned little; yet more distant they also are discerned more; and simply, inasmuch as they are nearer to the center, so much also are they united to this and to one another; and inasmuch as they proceed from it, so much are they discerned from one another.

§ 7. 271. But also in the whole nature of the whole of things, all the rationes of each nature are gathered according to one unconfused unition.

272. And in the soul uniformly the virtues of all the particulars of the whole body providingly.

273. Therefore nothing is unfitting, ascending from obscure images to the cause of all things, to contemplate with super-mundane eyes, all things in the cause of all things and things contrary to one another uniformly and unitedly.

274. For he is the principle of existing things from which are both being itself and all things existing in whatever mode: every principle, every end, every life, every immortality, every wisdom, every order, every harmony, every virtue, every protection, every gathering, every distribution, every intellect, every speech, every sense, every habit, every station, every motion, every unition, every concretion, every friendship, every concordance, every discretion, every definition, and whatever other things, existing through being, figure all existing things.

606. After Denys has treated the good in chapter 4, here in chapter 5 he determines about being; about which he determines first after the good, because the good in a certain way extends itself to more things, as the Platonists said: for even what is not existing actually, which is being in potency, from the very fact that it has an order to the good, has the ratio of the good; but it participates the causality of being when it is made a being actually. And because certain men posited that things are made in act according to some example of some preexisting form, for this reason in the chapter about being, he determines also about the examples unto which beings are, as is clear from the title.

607. Yet this chapter is divided into two parts:

in the first, he sets forth certain things that are necessary for the proposed intention;

in the second, he pursues the causality of the first being, at yet because also concerning those things.

608. About the first, he does three things:

first, he manifests his intention;

second, he excludes an error, at yet it does not say that the good;

third, he responds to a certain objection, at and indeed, someone should say.

609. Therefore he says, first, that from the consideration of the good it must be crossed over now to the true praise of God according as he is named by the holy theologians as truly existing. But it is necessary to know before this that there is not in the present speech the intention that the very supersubstantial substance of God, according as he exists supersubstantially in his own self, should be manifested, that is, in order that the essence of God should be known, for this cannot be explicated by speech nor grasped by our knowledge: for whatever our intellect apprehends is less than the essence of God, and whatever our tongue speaks is less than the divine being, nor can the divine essence be manifested perfectly to each created intellect such that it should comprehend it; but it exceeds the unition itself of the intellects of the blessed, who see the essence of God through the unition of their intellects to the very essence of God: for although they see this very what-God-is, nevertheless the perfection of vision is not as great as is the perfection of divine being itself and as is the perfection of the vision by which God sees himself.

610. Therefore it is not of the present intention that the very essence of God should be manifested, through which all things are substantified, according as it is in itself, but that there should be praised the procession of being from the divine principle into all existing things. For by whatever divine name, there is manifested some procession of some perfection from God into existing things, and according as it is said of God it is above all beings. Just as the name of the good manifests all the processions of the universal essence of things and extends itself both to existing things and to non-existing things, inasmuch as non-existing things have something of the good, as they are in potency to being.

Whereas the name of being designates the procession of being from God into all beings, and according as it is said of God it is above all existing things.

Whereas the name of life is extended to all living things, and according as it is said of God it is above all living things.

Whereas the name of wisdom signifies the procession which is extended to all intellectual and rational and sensible things, because even sense itself, inasmuch as it is a certain knowledge, is a participation of the divine wisdom, although nevertheless the divine wisdom is above them all.

611. Therefore this speech tends to this: that it should expound the names of God according as they are manifestive of divine providence, through which perfections are attributed to things. For this speech does not promise that it should narrate the very supersubstantial goodness and substance and life and wisdom of God, according as he exists supersubstantially in himself above all things that are found in creatures; whence concerning the wisdom of God it is said in Job 28:21 that it is hidden from the eyes of all living things. Therefore the intention of the present speech is to praise God by the name of the good, according as he is the cause of all good things; and by the name of existing, according as he makes every substance; and by the name of life, according as he vivifies all things; and by the name of wisdom, according as he gives wisdom.

612. Then when he says, yet it does not say that the good, he excludes an error of certain Platonists who reduced universal effects to more intelligible causes. And because they saw that the effect of the good is the most universal, they said that its cause is the good itself which pours out goodness into all things, and under it they placed another cause that gives life and thus concerning the others, and they called principles of this sort gods.

613. Therefore Denys himself excludes this, saying that the present speech does not say that the good itself is one principle and existing itself another and life another and wisdom another. Nor does the present speech say that there are many causes and diverse deities productive of diverse things, of which certain are exceeding and certain inferior, according to all processions of perfections in creatures. And all the names that are expounded here, the present speech says are of one principle, and there is some name that manifests the whole providence of God, universally, namely the name of the good; whereas certain names manifest divine providence as regards some determinate effects either more universal or more particular, as being, living, and wise, and things of this sort.

614. Then when he says, and indeed, someone should say, he solves a certain objection;

and first, he poses it, which is thus: since being itself exceeds life and life exceeds wisdom, whence is it that living things excel existing things and sentient things living things and reasonable things sentient things, and minds, that is, angelic intellects, reasonable creatures, that is, men, and more are about God and as though more assimilated to him and more approach him according to dignity of nature, although nevertheless it is necessary that those that participate greater gifts from God should be better and should excel others that participate lesser gifts?

615. Second, at but if someone were to suppose, he solves the objection set forth; and he says that the speech of the aforementioned objection would have itself rightly, if someone were to suppose that those things that are intellectual are not existing or are not living; for then just as being excels life and life wisdom, so existing things would excel living things and living things wise things. But the divine minds of the angels do not lack being, nay rather they have it more excellently above other existing created things and have life above other living things and understand and know above the knowledge of the sense of animals and of human reason; and as regards the order to the good, above all existing things they desire the beautiful and the good; and not only do they desire more, as though more perfectly ordered to it, but they participate it more, having more perfect goodness actually.

616. For in these two modes, the good is found in creatures: either according to actual participation of the good or according to order to the good, as it has been said above in chapter 4 that the good extends itself even to non-being actually. Whence reasonably the angelic substances more are around the divine good through a certain approaching to it, as though more abundantly participating this divine good, as though possessing more and greater goods from it than others: more indeed, because they have intelligence that many do not have; whereas greater, because the being itself and living that other things have are possessed more perfectly by the angels.

617. And likewise also rational things, namely men, excel sensible things, that is, brute animals, because they exceed them in reason that they possess before them; and certain ones, as brute animals, excel others, as plants, in the sensible; and others, namely plants, excel the rest of inanimate bodies in life. And universally this truth can be said: that those things that more participate the one itself, which is God, and the God of infinite gift who is giving affluently to all, as is had in James 1:5, are nearer to God and more similar to him than the derelict, that is, those that are exceeded.

618. Yet because also concerning those things. Having set forth certain things that were necessary for the present intention, here Denys proceeds to expound the name of being, according as it is said of God. And because, as he has said already, it is not of his intention to manifest the ineffable essence of God according as it is in itself, but according as the name of being, said of God, manifests the procession of being from God into creatures; for this reason, first, he shows the universal procession of being into all things; second, he shows that from the divine being there flow out also singulars in particular, at and from the same cause of all things.

619. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows that all existing things universally are from God;

second, he shows that all things are in him, at and there is from this and in this.

620. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows that there is divine universal causality in respect of all existing things;

second, he shows that from being itself, God properly is named more, at and before his other participations.

621. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows what his intention is concerning;

second, he pursues the proposition, at which of the whole of being;

third, he offers an epilogue, at therefore resuming we say.

622. Therefore he says, first: because it has been said concerning what has been set forth, the knowledge of which was necessary beforehand for the present intention, we ought to praise the good itself, which is God, as truly existing in himself and as making the substance of all existing things.

623. Then when he says, which of the whole of being, he pursues the proposition, and about this he does three things:

first, he shows that God is the cause of all things that pertain to being;

second, that all things befit him in a certain way, at for God is not existing in a certain mode;

third, that all things are removed from him, at and he neither was nor shall be.

624. Therefore he says, first, that the good itself which is God, according to his supereminent virtue, is the substantifier cause of all substances, and creator of all existing things, namely because he does not produce substances from anything preexisting, but every existing thing comes forth simply from his virtue.

625. Then, he enumerates those things that seem to pertain to being: and first, he posits two universals: namely the existing and mind, that is, intellect. For mind is comprehensive of the whole of being. But because mind, that is, intellect, is not made intelligent actually except through the participation of an intelligible thing that is itself existing, the Platonists posited that the existing itself, which they posited as separated, is above the first created intellect, as the intelligible is before the intelligent and the participated before the participating. And on account of this, Denys said here that God is the creator cause of the existing itself and of mind itself.

626. Then, he posits those things that pertain specially to the substances themselves of existing things; in which three things can be considered:

one of which is the singular itself, which in itself embraces principles and universals and individuals as Socrates or Plato; and as regards this, he says, person.

Whereas the second is species or genus, as man or animal, in which there are comprehended universal principles in act, yet singulars in potency: for man is said of him who has humanity, without the precision of individual principles; and as regards this he says, substance.

Whereas the third is the essence of genus or species, as the ratio of the species is signified by the name of humanity (in which indeed only the principles are comprehended by the name): for none of the individual principles pertains to the ratio of humanity, unless it signifies precisely the fact that man is man. Yet none of the individual principles is of this sort; whence in the name of humanity, no individual principle is included either actually or potentially; and as regards this he says, nature.

627. Yet to the ratio of being there pertains first of all the substance of a thing, about which it already has been said, whereas second the measure itself of the duration of things; and as regards this he adds that God is the principle and measure of the ages. Yet the measure of the duration of each thing is called an age. Whence the time that one generation of men can last or that the memory of human deeds commonly is accustomed to last is called one age; whence by certain men the space of one thousand years is called an age. Yet it is manifest that the measure of the duration of each thing is prefigured by God, and for this reason he says that the principle in whatever genus is the measure of those things that are in that genus, as the unit of numbers and tone in melodies. Therefore the divine being itself is the measure of all ages, not indeed equal, but exceeding.

And consequently he expounds in particular how it is the principle of the ages. For some existing things have duration in two ways: for the being of certain things is subject to change; and the duration of these is measured by time, and as regards this he says, and what makes time to be. Whereas the being of certain things is not subject to change, and the duration of these is measured by the aevum; and as regards this he says, and he makes the aevum of existing things. For just as time has itself to motion, so the aevum has itself to being itself; and for this reason he adds that God causally is the time of those things that are made and he is being causally for all things existing in whatever mode; in which he excludes the opinion of the Platonists who posited that both time and being itself subsist as though separated under God.

628. Third, to the ratio of being there pertains generation which is change unto being; and for this reason he adds that God is the generation causally for all things generated in whatever mode, because he grants generation to all things, as is said in Isaiah 66:9.

And thus it is clear that from the first existing itself, which is God, there is caused both the aevum that is the measure of being; and substance which is per se existing; and everything existing in whatever mode; and again, from God there is caused that there is the measure of motion and generation itself and what is generated, and not only are existing things themselves caused by God, but even whatever are in existing things, as parts and natural properties and those things that in whatever mode either inhere in them, as accidents, or stand under them, as substances.

629. Then when he says, for God is not existing in a certain mode, he shows that all things befit God, in a certain way. For the evidence of which it must be considered that every form, received in anything, is limited and bounded according to the capacity of the receiver; whence, this white body does not have the whole of whiteness according to the whole ability of whiteness. But if there were separated whiteness, nothing would be lacking to it which pertains to the virtue of whiteness. Yet all other things, as has been said above, have received and participated being, and for this reason they do not have being according to the whole virtue of being, but God alone, who is subsisting being itself, has being according to the whole virtue of being; and this is what he says: that for this reason God can be the cause of being for all things, because he is not existing in a certain mode, that is, according to any finite and limited mode, but universally and infinitely he receives in himself the whole of being and pre-receives it, because in him it preexists as in a cause and from him it is derived to other things. And for this reason he is called in 1 Timothy 1:17: King of the Ages, because in himself he has the whole of being and every substance and all existing things, and again just as around him, inasmuch as they are derived from him.

630. Then when he says, and he neither was nor shall be, he shows that all things are removed from him, as regards that mode in which they befit creatures; and he says that he was not, as though something of his being should have lapsed in the past; nor shall be, as though something of his being should be expected in the future; and this because he was not made, yet only the being of those things that happen to be made is varied through past and future; nor also does it happen to him that he should be generated in the present or in the future unto the mode of temporal generation; and what is more, nor is he, namely according as present time is signified, because his being is not measured by time, but he is being for existing things, not indeed such that God himself should be the formal being of existing things, but he uses that mode of speaking that the Platonists used who said that there was a separated being of existing things, inasmuch as composite things are participated through the participation of abstract things. And that this must be understood causally is apparent through the fact that he adds that not only existing things are from God, but also the being itself of existing things is from God, who is before the ages; and he is said to be before the ages because he is the aevum of aevums, that is, the measure of all dimensions.

631. Then when he says, therefore resuming we say, he gathers those things that have been said, and he says by resuming that all existing things and the measures of being have being from the preexisting; and every aevum and time, which are durations, are from him and he is the effective principle and final cause of every age and time and of whatever thing existing in whatever mode; and again all things participate him, as the first exemplar form; and not only is he the cause as regards the becoming of things, but also as regards the whole of being and duration, which he manifests when he says, and he recedes from none of existing things; for with the builder receding, the house remains, because he is the cause of the house as regards becoming and not as regards being, but if God were to recede from his effect, the effect would not remain, because he is the cause of being itself. And because a cause surpasses its effects, he is before all things and all things consist in him (Col. 1:17), as effects preexist virtually in a cause; and universally, whatever is in whatever mode, preexists in the first being, namely God, both as regards the being that it has in the intellect and as regards the conservation of its being.

632. Then when he says, and before his other participations, he shows that being, said of God, signifies the procession of existing things from God; and he shows that this name being, or He Who Is, is said most fittingly of God. Yet he shows this by two arguments, the second of which begins at for prepossessing and super-possessing.

633. The first argument is thus: if any cause should be named from its effect, it is named most fittingly from the principal and most worthy of its effects. Yet being itself among the other effects of God is more principal and worthy. Therefore God, who cannot be named by us except through his effects, most fittingly is named by the name of being. Therefore this is what he says: that being itself has been proposed to creatures for participating before the other participations of God. For whatever perfection a creature should have, it is made through this in the participation of God, who as it were is proposed and offered to all for participating; but first he is participated as regards being itself, before whatever other perfection: and per se being itself is older, that is, first and more worthy, than that which is to be per se life and that which is to be per se wisdom and that which is to be per se divine likeness.

634. Yet here it occurs to be considered, that here there is said per se being or per se life and things of this sort.

For the evidence of which it must be known that the Platonists, whom Denys imitates much in this work, before all things participating composition, posited separated per se existing things, which are participated by composite things; as before singular men who participate humanity, they composed separated man existing without matter, by the participation of which singular men are said. And likewise they said that, before those composite living things, there was a certain separated life, by the participation of which all living things live, which they called per se life; and likewise per se wisdom and per se being. Yet they posited these separated principles diverse from one another from the first principle that they named per se good and per se one.

Yet Denys consents to them in something and dissents in something; he consents indeed with them in the fact that he posits life existing per se separated and likewise wisdom and being and other things of this sort; yet he dissents from them in the fact that he does not say that these separated principles are diverse, but one principle which is God, as has been said above.

Therefore when there is said per se life, according to the thought of Denys, this can be understood in two ways: in one way, according as the per se imports discretion or real separation, and thus per se life is God himself. In another way, according as it imports discretion or separation only according to reason, and thus per se life is what is in living things, which is not distinguished from living things according to the thing, but according to reason only. And there is the same ratio concerning per se wisdom and thus concerning the others; and he posits that exposition below in chapter 6.

Yet here he receives per se life for the life that is in living things: for he is speaking here about participations, yet life existing per se is not a participation.

635. Yet that per se being is first and more worthy than per se life and per se wisdom, he shows in two ways: first of all, through the fact that whatever things participate other participations first participate being itself: for first something is understood as being before one, living, or wise.

Second, that being itself is compared to life, and other things of this sort, as participated to participating: for even life itself is a certain being, and thus being is prior and simpler than life and other things of this sort, and is compared to them as their act. And for this reason he says that not only do those things that participate other participations first participate being itself, but, what is more, all things that are named per se, as per se life, per se wisdom, and others of this sort, which existing things participate, participate per se being itself: because nothing is existing of which per se being itself is not the substance and aevum, that is, the form participated for subsisting and enduring. Whence since life is a certain existing thing, life also participates being itself.

Therefore from this he concludes the principle proposition, namely that God fittingly, more principally before all other names, is praised as existing, as though from the worthier of his gifts. And that he is praised thus more principally is clear in Exodus 3:14, where it is said, He Who Is has sent me to you.

636. Then when he says, for prepossessing and super-possessing, he posits a second argument which is thus: if another cause should be named from its effect, it is necessary that it should be named more principally from the first effect through which it made them all; yet being is of this sort; therefore God is named more principally through being itself. Therefore this is what he says: that God himself prepossesses and super-possesses pre-being and super-being.

637. Therefore here it must be considered that one thing can be preferred to another in two ways, namely: as regards the fact that it is had and as regards the mode of having, as one man who has greater knowledge than another is preferred to him as regards the quantity of what is had. But an angel is preferred to a man in wisdom, not only as regards the quantity of wisdom, but also as regards the mode of having, because the man has rationally, whereas the angel intellectually, and thus it exceeds in both ways, namely both as regards what it has and as regards the mode of having.

638. Yet as regards what it has, it exceeds in two ways, namely: according to order, because it has being first, and on account of this he says, pre-being, and as regards dignity, because it has being more excellently, and on account of this he says, super-being. And likewise as regards the mode of having, there can be understood the ratio of order and dignity, and for this reason he says, prepossessing and super-possessing. And therefore God, having being more eminently from himself, through a certain likeness among his other effects, first made what is to be, that is, being itself according to itself, and through being itself he made all things whatever are to subsist: for through this each thing is caused by God: through its being from God, and not only do other existing caused things participate being, but also those principles of existing things participate being, inasmuch as they are and are principles. And first being according to itself applies to them and afterwards that they should be principles of other things.

639. For if someone should wish to say, according to the opinion of the Platonists, that per se life, that is, a certain separated life under God, is the principle of living things, inasmuch as they are living, and of like things, per se likeness, and likewise concerning all other participating things, whatever things participate this or that or both or many, you shall always find that things of this sort, although they be participated by others, nevertheless themselves also participate being itself, and first they are understood as participating being, before that they should be principles of other things, through the fact that they are participated by other things. Yet this also can be understood according as per se life is understood as the life itself which is in living things, which is the formal principle for living things, and likewise concerning the others. Therefore if these that are principles of other things are not except through the participation of being, much more are not those that participate them except through the participation of being itself. And thus it is clear that God causes all things through being itself. From which he concludes the principle intention, and he says that God, who is per se goodness and first proposing, that is, granting, to created things this gift that is per se being, is praised by this name, which is as it were from the more worthy and first of his participations.

640. and there is from this and in this. After Denys has shown that all existing things universally are from God, here he intends to show that all things universally are in him; and about this he does two things:

first, he proposes what he intends;

second, he manifests the proposition, at for in unity every number uniformly preexists.

641. Therefore he says, first, that not only from this goodness of God, but also in this is per se being itself, which is the participation of God, and all principles of existing things and all existing things, both substances and accidents, and all in whatever mode are contained under being, as imperfect beings, as being in potency and motion and other things of this sort. And lest anyone were to believe that these are in God in the same mode as in themselves, consequently he excludes this. For in themselves all things caused are finite, yet in God they are infinite, because in God they are the divine essence itself; and for this reason he says, and this incomprehensibly. Again, in themselves they have opposition and diversity, yet in God they are joined together simultaneously; and for this reason he says, and jointly. Again, in themselves they have multitude, yet in God they are one; and for this reason he adds, and singularly, that is, unitedly.

642. Then when he says, for in unity every number uniformly preexists, he proves the proposition;

and first, through examples;

second, through reason, at for he is the principle of existing things.

643. About the first, he does two things:

first, he proposes examples;

second, he argues through example, at therefore nothing is unfitting.

644. About the first, he proposes four examples:

the first of which is concerning unity and number; and he says that number uniformly preexists in unity, because unity virtually is every number, as Boethius says in the Arithmetic.¹ Yet he says, uniformly, because everything that is in another is in it through the mode of that in which it is; whence number in unity is existing in it through the mode of unity, and this is what he says: uniformly. Again he says, unity has in itself every number, because all the properties of all numbers in some way are found in unity: for whether I should receive numbers squared or cubed or whatever other figures of numbers, in whatever disposition of numbers, unity is found first. And again, it must be considered that every number in unity itself is one, but as much more as it recedes from unity, so much more is it distinguished and led away into multitude.

645. He posits a second example concerning a center, and he says that in the center all lines that are led out to the circumference exist simultaneously as in a common principle; and that sign, that is, the point that is called the center, has in itself uniformly all lines conjoined both to one another and to the principle from which they proceed, because just as from one they are produced into multitude, so their multitude is terminated at the center, as at a term.

And it must be considered that the lines that in this center are united perfectly, receding little from the center, are little distant from each other; and this simply must be said: that inasmuch as they are nearer to the center, so much more are they united both to this center and to one another; whereas as much more as they are distant from the center, so much more also are they distant from one another, just as also it is concerning number that, as much more as it recedes from unity, so much more is it multiplied.

646. He posits a third example concerning universal nature, which, according to Plato, is some separated substance; whereas according to Aristotle, is some virtue of the first natural body. Yet in whichever mode universal nature should be received, it is manifest that in the universal nature of all natural things there are united the rationes of whatever particular nature, not through the mode of confusion, as stones are united in a heap, but through the mode of a certain unition: just as if we should say that the rationes of generable things virtually consist in the sun and all the rationes of members virtually exist in the seed.

647. He posits a fourth example concerning the soul, which is the cause of the body both as efficient and as form and as end, as is said in the second book of the De Anima;¹ and thus in the soul, as in a common cause, there preexist all the virtues of the parts of an animal, by which it is provided for the whole body. For all the virtues are rooted in the soul as in a common root.

648. Therefore from these examples, he concludes further that, from the things set forth as from certain obscure likenesses, that is, failing of the divine representation, we can ascend to the universal cause of all things through the likeness of particular causes, so that thus, by transcending all mundane things with the eyes of the mind, we might contemplate all things to be simply in God, who is the cause of all things, and that those things that are contrary to one another, as they are in their natures, preexist simply and unitedly in God. For what is the proportion of a particular cause to its effects, the same is the proportion of the universal cause to all things.

649. Then when he says, for he is the principle of existing things, he proves the same through reason, through which the abovesaid proof is confirmed. For all the many things that are from one principle preexist unitedly in the first principle. And therefore it is clear that all things are unitedly in God, since he is the principle of all things.

650. Yet in this causality of God, first he posits those things that pertain to being itself; and he says that there is from God the being itself of things and all things existing, in whatever mode they are. Yet there pertains to being both the principle of being and the end, because they are found in all existing things; and for this reason he says that from him is every principle and every end.

Second, he posits those things that pertain to life; and he says that there is from God every life and immortality, which is the unfailingness of life.

Third, he posits those things that pertain to wisdom; and he says that there is from God every wisdom. And because it belongs to the wise man to order, he adds, and every order and every harmony, which is the fittingness of order.

Fourth, he posits those things that pertain to virtue; and he says that from God there is every virtue. Yet it pertains to virtue that someone should be preserved from harms, and as regards this he says, every protection; and that someone should be made firm in those things that befit him, and as regards this he says, every gathering; and that someone should pour forth those things that he has, and as regards this he says, every distribution.

Fifth, he posits those things that pertain specially to knowledge; whence he says, every intellect as regards the angels; every speech, that is, reason, as regards men; every sense as regards animals; every habit by which the cognitive or appetitive reason is perfected.

Sixth, he posits those things that pertain to bodily things; and he says, every station, that is, rest; and every motion.

Seventh, he posits those things that pertain to one; and he says, every unition, universally; every concretion, as regards the union of bodies; every friendship, as regards the union of affections; every concordance, as regards the union of conceptions and opinions.

Last, he posits those things that pertain to multitude; and he says, every discretion, that is, distinction; and every definition, that is, the determination of each thing: for each thing is determined in itself through the fact that it is distinct from others. And not only are those from God, but whatever other things pertain to being by which beings are informed.

That God Is the Cause of All Particular Beings According as They Are in Their Proper Natures

§ 8. 275. And from the same cause of all things are the both intelligible and intellectual substances of the deiform angels and of souls and of every nature of the world and in whatever mode things said to be in others or to be according to thought.

276. And indeed, the most holy and most advanced virtues existing and gathered as in vestibules of the supersubstantial Trinity, from this and in this have both being and being deiformly; and after those, subjectly and extremely as to the angels, yet as to us super-mundanely.

277. And souls and all other existing things according to the same ratio have both being and wellbeing and are and are well from the preexisting being and having wellbeing; and in this are both existing things and well-existing things; and from this beginning and in this guarded and unto this terminated.

278. And indeed he distributes certain dignities of being to superior substances that the eloquences even call eternal; yet being itself is not in any way forsaken by all existing things.

279. Yet being itself also is from the preexisting and being is of this and this is not being and being is in this and this is not in that which is being and being has this and this does not have being and this is the aevum of being and principle and measure existing before substance and before what exists and before the aevum and the substantifier of all things and principle and middle and end.

280. And on account of this, from the eloquences, he who truly preexists according to the intention of all existing things is multiplied and properly is praised as what was in him and is and shall be and has been made and is made and shall be made: for as it befits God for intelligent things, all those signify that he is according to every intention supersubstantially and is the cause of existing things everywhere. For he is not this indeed, yet is not this; nor is he somewhere indeed, yet is not somewhere; but he is all things, as the cause of all things, and every principle is in him, the cause of the whole of things comprehending and prepossessing all terminations of all things and he is above all things, as supersubstantially super-existing before all things; on account of which also all things both simultaneously are predicated of him and he is nothing of all things: of every figure, of every form, without form, without beauty; pre-receiving in himself incomprehensibly and excellently principles and middles and ends of existing things and being for all things, according to one and super-united cause, super-pouring out by shining immaculately.

281. For if our sun, the substances and qualities of sensible things and indeed many and different existing things, nevertheless this, existing as one and uniformly, light by shining and super-pouring, renews and nourishes and guards and perfects and discerns and unites and makes to flourish again and makes to be germinable and increases and changes and gathers and from plants makes to go forth and moves upwards and vivifies all things, and each of the whole of things according to its propriety by one and the same sun participates and the one sun pre-receives uniformly in itself the causes of many participating things, much more in the cause of all things must it be conceded that the exemplars both of this and of all existing things preexist according to one supersubstantial unition, because it produces substances also according to an excess from substance.

651. After Denys has shown that God is the universal cause of the being of all things, here he shows that he is the cause of all particular beings, according as they are in their proper natures; and it is divided into three parts:

in the first, he shows the proposition;

in the second, he determines about exemplars, at yet we say that exemplars are the substantifying rationes;

in the third, he offers an epilogue for the things that have been said above, at therefore all existing things must be attributed to him.

652. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows that the proper natures of things are from God;

second, he infers a corollary from the things said, at and on account of this, from the eloquences;

third, he manifests through an example, at for if our sun.

653. About the first, he does two things:

first, he posits that all grades of beings are from God;

second, that even common being itself is from God, at And indeed he distributes certain dignities.

654. About the first, he does three things:

first, he distinguishes the grades of beings, saying that they are from God;

second, he adds the grades of the supreme beings, at and indeed, the most holy and most advanced virtues;

third, he distinguishes the grades of inferior beings, at and souls and all other existing things.

655. Therefore he says, first, that from the universal cause of all things, which is God, are the substances of the angels like God, which are intelligible, inasmuch as they are immaterial, and are intellectual, inasmuch as they have the virtue of understanding themselves and other things, and this is the first grade of substances, which are neither bodies nor united to bodies.

The second grade is of substances that are not bodies, but are united to bodies; and as regards this he says, and of souls.

The third grade is of bodily substances; and as regards this he says, and of every nature of the world.

In the fourth grade of beings are accidents, which are in nine genera.

The fifth grade is of those things that are not in the nature of things, but only in thought, which are called beings of reason, as genus, species, opinion, and things of this sort; and as regards these two grades he says that they are from God in whatever mode any things are said to be in others, as accidents, or to be according to thought, as beings of reason.

656. Then when he says, and indeed, the most holy and most advanced virtues, he distinguishes the grades of the supreme beings, that is, of the angels, which are distinguished into three parts. Therefore as regards the angels of the supreme hierarchy, he says that from this universal cause of all things and also in this the virtues of the supreme angelic hierarchy have both being and conformity to God, which are most holy on account of perfect union to God, and most advanced on account of the height by which they excel other things, and are gathered as though in vestibules of the supersubstantial divine Trinity: for it is the opinion of Denys, as is clear in the eighth chapter of the Angelic Hierarchy, that the angels of the supreme hierarchy are not sent to exterior things, and thus established in the hiddenness of most high divine contemplation they are said always to assist, unto the likeness of ministers who dwell always with the king, keeping watch in his houses.¹

Whereas as regards the angels of the second hierarchy, he says that the virtues of the middle angelic hierarchy, which are subjected to the aforementioned virtues, subjectly, that is, in an inferior mode, have being from God.

Whereas as regards the angels of the lowest hierarchy, the angelic virtues have being from God extremely, that is, in the lowest mode.

But extreme and lowest are said in angels through comparison to superiors, but through comparison to us, they are super-mundane, and they participate the goodness of God above the mode of mundane things.

657. Then when he says, and souls and all other existing things, he distinguishes certain grades in inferior things, namely in souls and in bodily substances; and this in two ways:

first, according to the order that is between being and wellbeing; and this is what he says: that souls and all other existing things, below souls, have being and wellbeing and are denominated existing things and well-existing things, inasmuch as they have being and wellbeing from the first being, and inasmuch as both beings and well-beings are in the first being; and this according to the same ratio according to which these are said of the angels.

Second, he shows the grade in them as regards the progress of being: for things of this sort begin to be from this first being, as from a first principle; and in this first being they are guarded, that is, conserved, as in a first principle which is the cause not only making, but also conserving in being, and unto this first being all things are terminated as unto a last end. Yet grades of this sort are attributed to inferior substances inasmuch as they are subject to change, through which they begin to be and are made better, according to the procession from being to wellbeing.

658. Then when he says, and indeed he distributes certain dignities, he shows that God is the cause of common being itself; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows that being itself is common to all things;

second, he shows how common being itself has itself to God, at yet being itself also is from the preexisting.

659. Therefore he says, first, that God distributes to superior substances certain more noble proprieties of being, through which superior substances are called eternal, as though always existing, according to that line of the Psalmist: arise, eternal gates (23:7). Yet they are called eternal because, as regards something, they participate eternity: because they were not always, but because, from when they were, they never cease to be. And although dignities of being of this sort befit superior substances only, nevertheless this very thing that is being is not forsaken by all existing things, because nothing can be called existing unless it has being.

660. Then when he says, yet being itself also is from the preexisting, he shows how being has itself to God; and he says that common being itself is from the first being, which is God, and from this it follows that common being has itself otherwise to God than to other existing things, as regards three things:

first of all, as regards the fact that other existing things depend upon common being, yet God does not, but rather common being depends upon God; and this is what he says: that common being itself is of God himself as depending upon him, and God himself is not of being, that is, of common being itself, as depending upon it.

Second, as regards the fact that all existing things are contained under common being itself, yet God is not, but rather common being is contained under his virtue, because the divine virtue is extended more than created being itself; and this is what he says: that common being is in God himself as the contained in the containing and not conversely is God himself in that which is being.

Third, as regards the fact that all other existing things participate that which is being, yet God does not, but rather created being itself is a certain participation of God and a likeness of him; and this is what he says: that common being has this, namely God, as participating his likeness, yet God himself does not have being, as though participating being itself. And from this it is clear that God himself is the aevum of created being itself and its duration (this is the ratio of duration) and is also its principle and measure; nevertheless such that he is existing before every substance and before every being and before every aevum, and not only is he before by duration and order, but also by causality, because he is the substantifier of all things, as the cause of subsisting for all things, is the principle of being for all things, and the middle, according as the duration and procession of all things is from him, and he is also the end to which all things tend.

661. Then when he says, and on account of this, from the eloquences, he infers a conclusion from the things said; and he says that, on account of this: that God is the principle of all things, in Sacred Scripture God himself who truly preexists all things is praised in many ways according to every ratio of existing things. For there is said of him what was and is and shall be, through which there is understood what has been made, that is, the past; and what is made, that is, the present; and what shall be made, that is, the future.

Which indeed must not be understood as though the divine being should be subject to time, but through this there is signified, for those who can understand divine things, that it is befits according to God, that every being, according to whatever ratio of being, supersubstantially exists in him, who is the cause of all existing things: for his being is not finite through any nature determined to genus or species, so that it should be able to be said that he is this and is not that, as are even spiritual determinate substances; nor also through place, so that it should be able to be said that he is here and is not there, as happens in bodies, but he is all things as the cause of all things, that is, he prepossesses every being in himself, and in him there are comprehended and prepossessed the principles of all beings and ends; nevertheless not in the same mode as in things themselves, but he is above all things, supereminently existing before all things.

And because in him, in a certain way, are all things, as though comprehending all things in himself, simultaneously all things are predicated of him and simultaneously all things are removed from him, because he is nothing of all things, but above all things; as it is said that he is of every figure, inasmuch as all preexist in him, and nevertheless he is without figure, because he does not have that he should be figured unto the mode of things; and by the same ratio he is of every beauty and nevertheless without beauty, namely inasmuch as he pre-receives in himself incomprehensibly and excellently principles, middles, and ends, not according to any corruption, but from the fact that he, according to one unity, pours being into all things, by super-shining upon them without stain of himself: for altering he is not altered, as happens in bodies.

662. Then when he says, for if our sun, he manifests what he had said through a sensible example; and he says that our sensible sun, existing as one and uniformly, light by infusing all things, all sensible things both as regards substances and as regards qualities, it renews, by generating other things anew when certain things have corrupted, as is apparent in plants and in vines stricken by frost; and nourishes all living things; and guards, that is, conserves all things universally, both living and non-living; and perfects, that is, leads to life and due perfection; and discerns, that is, distinguishes the diversity of sensible things; and unites, by establishing one from many; and makes plants in the winter dried up through cold to flourish again, even enclosed under covers, and makes them to seed, and by its virtue plants and animals are generated; and changes those things that are changed in the nature of things; and gathers, that is, makes each thing firmly to be and to thrive in its place or even in its principles; again, from plants it makes to go forth fruits and seeds and other plants; and moves food upwards from the root of the plants to their heights; and vivifies all things that live; and each of all natural bodies, according to its propriety, participates the virtue of one and the same sun.

From which it is clear that one and the same sun in itself causally pre-receives uniformly, that is, according to its virtue, those things that are participated by diverse things: for effects would not participate a cause, unless the cause were to prepossess in itself causally those things that are effects.

Yet the proportion of a particular cause to its particular effects is the same as that of a universal cause to its effects; nay rather, a universal cause influences its effects more than a particular cause. If therefore in the sun according to its one virtue there preexist uniformly all its effects, much more in God, who is the cause both of this sun and of all existing things, must it be conceded that the exemplar rationes of all beings preexist according to a supersubstantial unity, namely which altogether exceeds the unities of substances. For thus all things preexist in God, as he is productive of all things; yet he produces all substances according to a virtue that exceeds all substances; whence it follows that all things preexist in God, according to a virtue substantially one.

–282. Yet we say that exemplars are the substantifying rationes of existing things in God, and singularly preexisting, which theology calls predefinitions and divine and good wills, pre-determinative of existing things and effective, according to which substantial essence has predefined and produced all things (Rom 8:29–30, 1 Cor 2:7, Eph 1:5).

§ 9. 283. Yet if the philosopher Clement proves that also to anything the more principal among existing things are called exemplars, that speech proceeds indeed not through proper and perfect and simple names. Yet even those conceding that this is said rightly must remember theology, saying that I shall not demonstrate to you those so that you might go after them, but so that through the proportional knowledge of them we might be driven upwards, as we can, to the cause of all things (Wis 13:5, Rom 1:20) .

284. Therefore all existing things must be attributed to him according to one segregated unition of all things; because beginning from the essence of substantifying procession and goodness and going through all things and fulfilling all things from essence itself and exulting in all existing things, he indeed prepossesses all things in himself according to one excess of simplicity, refuting every duplicity; yet he contains all things in the same mode, according to his super-simplifying infinity, and he is participated singularly by all things, in which way also voice existing as one and the same is participated by many hearers as one. Therefore he is the principle of all existing things and the end that preexists: principle indeed as cause; yet end as that for the sake of which and the term of all things and the infinity of every infinity and the end, exceedingly, as of opposites. For in one, as has been said many times, he both prepossesses all existing things and makes them to subsist, present to all things and everywhere and according to one and the same and according to every same and proceeding to all things and remaining in himself and standing and moved and neither standing nor moved nor having principle or middle or end nor in any of existing things nor existing as anything of existing things; and neither does anything of eternally existing things or of temporally subsisting things totally befit him, but from time and the aevum and those things that are in the aevum and all those that are in time he is segregated. On account of which also the aevum itself and existing things and the measures of existing things and things measured are through him and from him.

663. After Denys has shown that God is the cause of all beings according to their proper natures, here he determines about the exemplars of things according to which whatever things seem to be produced in their proper natures; and about this, he does two things:

for first he shows what the exemplars of things are;

second, he excludes an error, at yet if the philosopher Clement.

664. About the first, it must be considered that the Platonists, positing that God is the cause of the whole of being, because they believed that the same thing could not be the cause of many things according to their proprieties in which they differ, but only according to what is common to all, posited certain second causes through which things are determined to their proper natures and which commonly receive being from God, and they called these causes the exemplars of things, as they called a certain separate man the exemplar of man, which would be the cause of humanity for all singular men; and likewise concerning other things. But Denys, just as he had said that God is the cause of the whole of common being, so had said that he is the cause of the propriety of each thing, whence it followed that in God himself were the exemplars of all beings.

665. Which indeed it is necessary should be understood in this way: for God, although he is one in his essence, nevertheless by understanding his unity and virtue, knows whatever exists in him virtually. And therefore he knows that diverse things can proceed from him; therefore things of this sort that he knows can go forth from himself are called understood rationes. Yet not all rationes of this sort can be called exemplars: for an exemplar is that unto the imitation of which another is made; yet not all things that God knows can go forth from himself, does he will to produce in the nature of things; therefore only those rationes understood by God can be called exemplars, unto whose imitation he wills to produce things in being, as an artist produces artefacts unto the imitation of the forms of art that he conceives by his mind, which also can be called exemplars of artificial things.

666. Therefore this is what he says: that we say that exemplars are not any things outside of God, but certain understood rationes of existing things in the divine intellect itself, which are factive of substances, and preexist in God singularly, that is, unitedly and not according to any diversity; and Sacred Scripture calls rationes of this sort predefinitions or predestinations, according to Romans 8:30: whom he has predestined, these he also has called, and he calls them also divine and good wills, according to Psalm 110:2: great are the works of the Lord, exquisite in all his wills. Which predefinitions and wills indeed are distinctive of beings and effective of them, because also according to rationes of this sort, the supersubstantial essence of God has predetermined and produced all things.

667. Then when he says, yet if the philosopher Clement, he excludes the contrary error of those positing that the exemplars of things are certain separated supreme beings, and he imputes this error to a certain philosopher Clement; and he says that if that philosopher approves that as regards anything those things that are more principal in existing things are called the exemplars of inferior things, his argument does not proceed through proper and perfect and simple names: for an exemplar is that according to which something else is made so that thus it might imitate the exemplar; yet things are not made unto this: that they should imitate some superior beings, but unto this: that there should be fulfilled in them what the divine wisdom has ordained; whence whatever principles of things are not properly the exemplars of things. Likewise also they are not perfect exemplars, since they also need other exemplars. They also are not simple, because they are simultaneously exemplars and exemplated.

668. But if it also should be conceded that this rightly can be said: that superior things are the exemplars of inferior things inasmuch as inferior things imitate superior things according as they can, nevertheless there must be remembered the judgment of Sacred Scripture that says, I shall not show to you those, namely superior beings, so that you might go after them, but so that by knowing those we might be elevated according to our proportion, as we can, to knowing the cause of all things.

And therefore it can be conceded that they are exemplars, not indeed so that we might finally be conformed to them, but so that through the consideration of them we might tend to God, to whom we ought to be conformed. Yet that judgment of Sacred Scripture is taken from what is said in Deuteronomy 4:19: lest perhaps (it says), with eyes raised to heaven, you should see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven and, deceived by error, should adore them.

669. Then when he says, therefore all existing things must be attributed to him, he offers an epilogue for the things that have been said above, showing how God has universal habitude for all things. Therefore he concludes first from the things set forth that all things must be attributed to him, not indeed according to any composition, but according to a simple unity. And this because God himself begins to communicate his perfection to other things from the very procession of being through which things are substantified and from the very procession of goodness; for these are found first among the things that proceed from God into creatures: being and the good; for life and wisdom are posterior to these, and a procession of being and of goodness of this sort goes through all beings, because all things are beings and good; not all things are living or wise; and thus all things are fulfilled from the participation of being itself, and thus in all existing things he exults through a certain existence.

Therefore because the divine essence so lavishes being upon all things, he prepossesses all things in himself, not indeed according to any composition, but according to a most simple unity, refuting every plurality. And therefore the first universal habitude is that the divine essence prepossesses all things in itself.

670. The second is that it contains and conserves all things in being according to its simple infinite unity.

671. The third universal habitude is that existing as singular and one it is participated by all things, as also voice, existing as one and the same, is participated by many hearers: for voice is one according to principle, whereas manifold according to diffusion.

672. Yet from these things he concludes a fourth universal habitude, namely that the divine essence is the principle and end of all existing things, not indeed that it should be generated through existing things, as health is generated through medicine, but as him who preexists existing things: the principle indeed of all things, as the cause factive of things; whereas the end as that for the sake of which all things are made; and he is also the term of all things: for the termination of whatever motion is unto the divine essence and from its infinity there is derived every infinity and every end as from an exceeding cause that produces opposites; because to neither is it appropriated as limited to one of them.

The reason why he can be the cause of all things is this: because he prepossesses all existing things in his unity; and because from the fact that he has each thing and causes something unto his likeness, it follows that he who has all things in himself makes all things to subsist, present to all things and everywhere, not according to diverse parts of himself, but according to one and the same and according to the same he is all things, inasmuch as in his simple essence all things virtually preexist; and likewise according to the same he proceeds to all things causatively and nevertheless he remains in himself, existing as immutable in causing, and he is standing inasmuch as he is not changed and moved inasmuch as he diffuses his likeness to other things.

673. And all those things that we affirm of God can also be denied of him, because they do not so befit him as they are found in created things and as they are understood and signified by us.

Whence, although it has been well said that he is the principle and end of all things, nevertheless he has neither principle nor middle nor end.

And although it has been said that he is present to all things and everywhere, nevertheless he is not in any of existing things in that mode in which one created thing is said to be in another.

And although it has been said that he is every existing thing, nevertheless he is not anything existing from the number of existing creatures.

And universally anything from the number of creatures or of eternally existing things, that is, above time, or also of temporally subsisting things, does not befit him, but he is separated through a certain eminence both from time which measures motion and mutable things and from the aevum that measures being itself and those things that exist immutably; and he is also separated from those things that are in the aevum and time through a certain eminence. And for this reason the aevum itself and those things that are and whatever other measures of beings and those things that are measured by measures of this sort, are through him, because they have the likeness of him as of a first exemplar, and from him as from a first active principle.

285. But concerning those indeed let it have been said more opportunely in other works.

C. VI. § 1. Yet now we must praise eternal life, from which is per se life and every life and from which to live is disseminated to all things participating life in whatever mode according to the propriety of each.

286. And indeed, the life and immortality of the immortal angels and that not destructive of sempiternal angelic motion, from this and on account of this they both are and subsist; on account of which they are called both always living and immortal; and not immortal again, because they do not have it to be immortal and to live eternally from themselves, but from the vivifying cause effective and contentive of all life.

287. And as in existing we said that also of this itself which is per se being there is the aevum, so also here again, that also of per se life itself, the super-living divine life is vivifying and substantifying, and every life and vivifying motion is from the life that is above every life and every principle of every life.

288. From this also souls have the not destructible, and all animals and plants, according to the last resonance of life, have it to live. With which destroyed, according to the eloquence, every life fails, and to which also those things that have failed to participate this, converted again, again animals are made (Ps 104:29–30).

§2. 289. And indeed it gives first to per se life to be life and to every and particular life to be properly each thing that has being naturally. And to supercelestial lives indeed immaterial and deiform and invariable immortality and strong and indeclinable sempiternal motion, super-extended on account of the abundance of goodness even to the life of demons; for neither does that have being from another cause, but from this one also being has both life and permanence.

674. After Denys has determined about existing, here he determines about life, because the procession of life is less common than the procession of being itself, and about this he does two things:

first, he proposes how, by the name of life, there is shown in God the causality of every life;

second, he manifests the causality of the divine life, at and indeed, the life and immortality.

675. Therefore he says, first, that concerning those things that pertain to being, it has been said more diffusely and more diligently in other books: for he made many books that we do not have. But now God must be praised through what is said: eternal life, according to 1 John 5:20: this is true God and true life; as that from which there is per se life itself, that is, common life itself, and every particular life, and to live is disseminated, that is, distributed, from the divine life to all things that participate life, in whatever mode according to the propriety of each, as though he were to say that God is called eternal life inasmuch as he is the cause of common and particular life and of all living things.

676. Then when he says, and indeed, the life and immortality, he manifests the causality of the divine life; and about this he does three things:

first, he manifests the universal causality of God with respect to life;

second, he shows his causality with respect to whatever propriety of living, at and indeed it gives first to per se life;

third, he shows how is the comparison of whatever life to the first life, at and whether you should say intellectual or rational.

677. About the first, he does three things:

first, he manifests the causality of God with respect to the supreme life that is of the angels;

second, with respect to common life, at and as in existing we said;

third, as regards the lowest life, at from this also souls have the not destructible.

678. About the first, it must be considered that those things properly are called living in bodily things that have motion from themselves, not moved extrinsically by another, as animals and plants. And because whatever operation in a certain way is a motion, whatever things have operation from themselves, not actualized or moved to acting by other exterior things, these are called living. And because the operation of a thing follows its existence, in the name of life two things are understood, namely: the being itself of a living thing, and that it might be such that there applies to it to operate through itself on account of the fact that the operation or motion of a living thing is in it through itself.

679. Therefore as regards the first of these, he says that from this divine life, as from a first active principle, and on account of this, as on account of an end, the life and immortality of the angels, of immortally living things, has not only being, but also persisting.

Whereas as regards the second, he says that the existence of life is the very incorruptibility of sempiternal angelic motion, that is, of the operation of the angels enduring in perpetuity. And because they can always live and operate, they can be called immortal; but this very fact that they are immoral and live in perpetuity, they do not have from themselves, but from a first cause that is effective and conservative of all life. Yet that properly and truly is immortal, which does not require anything extrinsic in order that it should live always, but has it to live always from itself, and thus God alone is called immortal, according to 1 Timothy 1:17: to the King of Ages immortal and invisible, God alone, be honor and glory.

680. Then when he says, and as in existing we said, he manifests the divine causality with respect to common life; and he says that, as it has been said above that first being itself is the aevum, that is, the measure and cause of that which is per se being, that is, of common being itself, so here it must be said that the divine life, which is supereminently living, is the factive and conservative cause of per se life itself, that is, of common life; and consequently, every particular life and every vital motion and every principle of whatever life, proceeds from the divine life which is above every life.

681. Then when he says, from this also souls have the not destructible, he manifests the divine causality with respect to inferior life, and he says that from the divine life human souls also have it to live incorruptibly, and from the divine life there are those animals that live by sensitive life, and all plants that have life according to the last resonance, that is, according to the extreme and lowest participation of life, because life does not proceed beyond plants. Yet with the life participated in creatures destroyed, every life is destroyed, according to the doctrine of Sacred Scripture, where it is said in Psalm 103:29: remove their spirit and they shall fail and be returned into their dust. But inasmuch as those things that, through infirmity of nature, fail of the participation of life again are converted to life, again animals or whatever living things are made, as is clear in plants and animals generated from putrefaction; and on account of this in the same place there is added: send out thy spirit and they shall be created and thou shalt renew the face of the earth (Ps. 103:30).

682. Then when he says, and indeed it gives first to per se life, he manifests the causality of the divine life as regards the proprieties of whatever life; and this on account of certain men who said that God is the cause of common life, nevertheless the particular proprieties of living are from proper causes, through which the effects of the common cause are determined to their proper species; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows the causality of the divine life as regards the proprieties of living that are in the supreme living things, namely in the angels and in demons;

second, as regards the proprieties of living that are in men, at yet giving also to men as commixed;

third, as regards the proprieties of living that are in the lowest living things, namely animals and plants, at from this both all animals and plants.

683. Therefore he says, first, that God not only gives to common life that it should be life, but also to whatever particular life he gives that it should be properly that which applies to it according to nature; as to the supercelestial lives of the angels, as regards indeed the being of living things, it gives immortal life:

first of all immaterial, because they do not have life joined to matter;

second, deiform life, because they are conformed to the divine life from this very fact that they live without matter;

third, it follows that they have invariable life, because the subject of variation and motion is matter.

684. Also as regards the operation of life, he posits three things contrary to those that are in us.

For in us intellectual operation first of all is infirm for the comprehension of truth, and against this he says that they have strong motion, that is, intellectual operation;

second, intellectual operation in us can be perverted into false opinion, and against this he says that they have indeclinable motion;

third, intellectual operation in us cannot be continuous because we cannot always and continuously meditate; and against this he says that they have sempiternal motion.

685. And because those proprieties are manifestly apparent in the blessed angels, lest anyone should wish to exclude the life of demons from the causality of the divine life, he adds that the divine life is super-extended through the mode of influence and causality, and by abundance of its goodness, even to the life of demons, which could not be conserved by another cause except by the divine life, from which it has that it should be life and should remain conserved in being.

290. Yet giving also to men as commixed, contingent life unto the form of the angels;

291. and the super-emanation of goodness, and converting us, receding, and calling back to itself.

292. And that indeed is more divine, that it promises that it will transfer us whole, I say souls and bodies joined, to perfect life and immortality. The thing indeed apparent to antiquity equally beyond nature, yet to me and to you and to truth both divine and above nature: yet I say seeming above nature according to us, not according to the omnipotent of the divine life. For to this, as to the existing nature of all lives, and especially of the divine, no life is beyond nature or above nature. Wherefore concerning this let the contradictory words of the stupidity of Simon be expelled far from the divine chorus and your holy soul: for it was hidden from him, as I reckon, that he was thought to be wise in those things, that it is not necessary that one knowing well should use the manifest ratio of sense, fighting against the hidden cause of all things, and this must be said to say beyond nature for this. For to this nothing is contrary.

§3. 293. From this both all animals and plants are vivified and circum-flourish.

294. And whether you should say intellectual or rational or sensible and augmentative or whatever sort of life or principle of life or substance of life, from this they both live and vivify, which is above every life, and in it, according to cause, they uniformly preexist.

295. For the super-living and foremost life of life is the cause of every life and generative of life and fulfilling and divisive of life and must be praised from every life, according to the great fecundity of all lives, as most lavish and comprehended and praised by the contemplation of every life;

296. and as not needy, yet rather super-full of life, per se living and as above every life vivifying and super-living, or how someone should praise the life super-living and humanly ineffable.

686. Here Denys manifests the divine causality as regards the propriety of human life;

and first, as regards the life of nature;

second, as regards the life of grace, when he says, and the super-emanation of goodness;

third, as regards the life of glory, which shall be in those rising, at and that indeed is more divine.

687. Yet natural life in men in something is conformed to angelic life, as it is intellectual, and in something it differs from it, inasmuch as it is life joined to matter; and for this reason he says that the divine life gives to men, as though to those commixed from spiritual and bodily nature, life unto the likeness of the angels, not perfectly, but as befits them.

688. Then, as regards the life of grace, he says that the divine life, through the super-emanation of its goodness, converts us, even when receding from it through sin, and calls us back to itself, according to Lamentations 5:21: convert us, O Lord, to thyself, and we shall be converted.

689. Whereas as regards the life of glory of those rising, he adds that the divine life promises that it transfers us whole, that is, souls and the same bodies that now are joined to our souls, to perfect, that is, blessed and immortal, life; and this he says is more divine, because it is more an indication of divine virtue.

690. And these things indeed commonly were apparent to the ancients beyond nature, namely that dead bodies would rise, but to me and to you, that is, to all the faithful, according to the truth of the faith, there is apparent a certain something divine and above nature, namely, that is known by us in those particular things, yet not above the omnipotent nature of the divine life, because for the divine life, which is the natural principle of all lives and especially of divine lives of which it is the immediate principle, no life is beyond nature or above nature, because it is under its virtue to give life to whom it should will.

Whence the most stupid words of Simon, which contradict the resurrection, must be repelled far off from the divine Church and from your holy soul, namely lest you should acquiesce to them in any way. For although he was reputed to be wise in those sensible and natural things, nevertheless it was hidden from him that it is not necessary that he who has the science of these sensible things that are apparent, should use the ratio that is taken from things apparent according to sense, to impugn the universal cause of all things, which on account of its excellence is hidden; because the virtue of the universal cause cannot be comprehended or measured through those things that are apparent in the senses. And it must be said to Simon that when something is said to be against nature, this is understood: namely that it is against the most manifest ratio of sense, but to this hidden and universal cause of all things, nothing can be contrary, because all things whatsoever are derived from this.

691. Then when he says, from this both all animals and plants, he shows the causality of the divine life with respect to inferior living things, namely animals and plants; and he says that from the divine life both all animals and also plants are vivified interiorly and circum-flourish exteriorly. For whatever is exteriorly apparent in them pertaining to the adornment of life, the whole is derived from the divine life.

692. Then when he says, and whether you should say intellectual or rational, he shows the habitude of the divine life to all lives.

And first, he posits two habitudes of the divine life to all lives;

of which the first is: God is the cause of every life; and this is what he says: that whether you should say intellectual life, as is in the angels, or rational, as is in men, or sensible, as is in animals, and augmentative, as is in plants, or whatever sort of life, even if there were other modes of living; and not only every life, but also every principle of life and every substance having life, living substances have from the divine life which is above every life that they should live and principles of life that they should vivify.

The second habitude is that every life preexists in the divine life; and this is what he says: that all of the aforementioned lives preexist causally in this divine life, not indeed according to any composition, but uniformly according to the unity and simplicity of the divine life.

693. Second, at for the super-living and foremost life, he manifests the two aforementioned habitudes, and he says to manifest the first habitude that the divine life, which is above every life and which rules over every life, is the cause of every life, as regards the first origin of life; and is generative of life, because this very fact that one living thing can be generated from another living thing is from the divine life; and is fulfilling of life, because that a living thing is led from the imperfect to the perfect is from the divine life; and is divisive of life, because the diversities of living things proceed from the virtue of the divine life.

Yet to manifest the second habitude, namely that every life exists in it, he adds that the divine life is praised from every life on account of its fecundity by which it produces all lives. And this indeed applies to the divine life, inasmuch as it is most lavish, as though not restricted to any species of life, but having the comprehensive amplitude of every life, and thence it is that it is comprehended and praised from the contemplation of every life.

694. Third, at and as not needy, yet rather super-full, he posits the conditions of the divine life, through which it differs from others:

and first of all there is found our life, needing many things for the conservation of life, as food and other things of this sort; and to remove this he says that the divine life is not needy, but rather is superabundantly full.

Whereas second, that which lives in those inferior things does not live per se, but the body lives through the soul. But the divine life is per se living, because there is not anything else vivifying in God; and supereminently living or however someone could praise with human words the divine life, supereminently living and ineffable.

How Wisdom Is Received in God

C. VII. §1. 297. Yet come, if you will, let us praise the good and eternal life both as wise and as per se wisdom; yet more as substantifying of every wisdom and above every wisdom and as super-existing prudence.

298. For not only is God super-full with wisdom and of his prudence there is no number (Ps 147:5), but he is super-gathered above every reason and mind and wisdom.

299. And supernaturally intending this, the truly divine man, the common sun of us and of our leader, says that what is stupid for God is most wise for men (1 Cor 1:25);

300. Not only because every human deliberation is a certain error, judged against the stable and remaining intellect of divine and most perfect things, but because it is the custom for the theologians to say those things that are of privation in God by a contrary passion. Thus also the eloquences call the most clear light invisible (Col 1:15, 1 Tim 1:17, Heb 11:27); and the very laudable and very nameable, ineffable and unnameable; and the one present to all things and found from all things, incomprehensible and uninvestigable. In this way therefore now also the divine Apostle is said to praise the stupidity of God, which appears in those things as beyond reason and unfitting, driving upwards unto the truth ineffable and before every reason.

301. But, which I have said in other works, receiving those things that are above us according to our propriety and fastened to reason co-nourished by the senses and comparing divine things to our own, we are deceived, pursuing the divine and ineffable reason according to the apparent.

302. Yet it is necessary to see that our mind indeed has virtue for understanding through which it inspects intelligible things, yet unition exceeding the nature of mind through which it is joined to those things that are above it. According to this therefore it is necessary to understand divine things, not according to ourselves, but our whole selves established outside ourselves and wholly deified.

303. For it is better to be of God and not of ourselves. For such divine things shall be given to those made with God.

695. After Denys has determined about being and life, here he determines about wisdom and those things pertaining to knowledge that are joined to wisdom; and about this, he does three things:

first, he determines about wisdom and mind;

second, about reason, at yet God is praised as reason;

third, about truth and faith, at this reason is the simple and existing truth.

696. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows how wisdom is received in God;

second, he manifests what he had said, at for not only is God super-full.

697. Yet it must be considered that prior things always are preserved in posterior things. Yet the good, according to what has been said before, as regards causality is prior to being, because the good extends its causality even to non-beings; yet being extends itself to more things than life and life than wisdom, because there are certain things that do not live, and certain things live that do not know. And this Denys subtly insinuates: for he names the divine life good, because according to intellect it presupposes goodness; whereas he names it eternal, because it presupposes immutable being. But because no wisdom is lacking to this life, he praises it from wisdom, and this in three ways:

first of all, because the divine life is wise; and so that you might not understand that it is wise participatively, he adds that it is per se wisdom, for just as God is his own life, so also his own wisdom.

Second, that the divine life is the cause producing every wisdom in being.

Whereas third, because the divine life is above every wisdom, which pertains to speculation; and above every prudence, which pertains to action.

698. Then when he says, for not only is God super-full, he manifests the three aforementioned things; and about this, he does three things:

first, he manifests that the divine wisdom is above every wisdom;

second, that it is the cause of every wisdom, at therefore praising exceedingly this irrational;

third, he manifests how God is wise by knowing other things, at yet thus God himself who is super-wise wisdom.

699. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows the excess of the divine wisdom;

second, he shows how we ought to have ourselves to the exceeding divine wisdom itself, at but, which I have said in other works.

700. About the first, he does three things:

first he proposes what he intends, namely that God not only is called superabundantly full of every wisdom, and that he has infinite prudence, but also he is said to be made firm above everything that seems to pertain to knowledge, namely above reason and above mind, that is, intellect, and above wisdom that is the perfection of the intellect;

second, at and intending this supernaturally, he proves the excess of divine wisdom through authority, and he says that Paul, understanding an excess of the divine wisdom of this sort in a supernatural way, who was a divine man from participation of the divine wisdom and was the sun, that is, the illuminator for magisterium, both of Denys and of his leader, that is, Hierotheus who was his master, says in 1 Corinthians 1:25: what is stupid for God, is most wise for men;

third, at not only because every human deliberation, he expounds on the authority introduced.

701. Where it must be considered that a twofold mode is found in the Scriptures for signifying the excellence of divine things.

For because those things that pertain to privation and defect are attributed to created things according to comparison to the divine excellence, just as if we should say that every justice of man is uncleanness in comparison to the justice of God; and likewise we can say that every human deliberation and knowledge is reputed to be a certain error in comparison to the stability and permanence of the divine and perfect knowledge, which it names plurally on account of knowing plurality.

702. In another way, it is the custom in divine Scripture that those things that it says privatively are attributed to God on account of his excess; just as if God who is most clear light is called invisible; and who is laudable and nameable by all things is called ineffable and unnameable; and who is present to all things is called incomprehensible as though he should be absent to all things; and who can be found from all things is called not investigable: and the whole of this on account of his excess. And therefore, the Apostle also praises stupidity in God on account of that which appears in the wisdom of God, beyond our reason, and which seems unfitting to us, while we cannot comprehend the wisdom of God; and through this he elevates us unto the divine truth, which is ineffable to us and which exceeds our every reason.

703. Then when he says, but, which I have said in other works, he says how we ought to have ourselves to the excellence of the divine wisdom; and about this, he does three things:

704. First, he shows how we are deceived in the contemplation of the divine wisdom; and he says that, as he has said in his other books, while we wish to receive divine things that are above us according to our mode; and while we lean on our reason which is co-nourished by the senses from the beginning, namely gathering truth from sensible things; and while we wish to compare divine things to our own, namely those that are known to us, by this also we are deceived, wishing to scrutinize the reason divine and ineffable to us, according to what is apparent to us through reason and through sense.

705. Second, at yet it is necessary to see, he shows how to avoid this deception; and he says that it is necessary to consider that our mind has two ways to know intelligible things: first, that it has natural virtue, that is, intelligence, through which it can inspect intelligible things proportionate to itself; whereas second, it has a certain unition to divine things through grace, which exceeds the nature of our mind, through which unition men are joined through faith or whatever knowledge to those things that are above the natural virtue of the mind. Therefore it is necessary that we should understand divine things according to this unition of grace, as though not by drawing divine things to those that are according to us, but rather establishing our whole selves outside ourselves into God, such that through the aforementioned unition we might be totally deified.

706. And because someone could say that this would be harmful to us, if we should desert our own selves, for this reason, third, he excludes this, at for it is better to be of God, and he says that, since God is better than us, it is better for us that we should be of God through the unition of grace that that we should be of our own selves, that is, leaning on our natural things. For thus, with us made with God, that is, when we will have been united to God, divine gifts will be present to us that we cannot perceive, if neglecting the unition of God, we should adhere to our own selves.

That the Divine Wisdom is the Cause of Every Wisdom

304. Therefore praising exceedingly this irrational and out-of-its-mind and stupid wisdom, we say that it is the cause of every mind and reason and of every wisdom and prudence, and this is every counsel and from this is all knowledge and prudence, and in this are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge (Col 2:3). For according to the consequence of the things already said above, the super-wise and all-wise cause is the substantifier of per se wisdom itself and of the whole and of the particular;

§2. 305. From this the intelligible and intellectual virtues of angelic minds have simple and blessed and good intellects;

306. Not gathering divine knowledge in divisible things or from divisible things or senses or diffuse speeches, nor driven from some common things to those simultaneously. Yet existing as cleansed from all material multitude, intellectually and immaterially uniformly they understand the intelligibles of divine things;

307. And there is for those intellectual virtue and operation cleansed and immaculate, resplendent with purity and conspicacious of divine intellects by simplicity and immateriality and heavenly unition figured to the divine super-wise both mind and reason, as is possible.

308. On account of the divine wisdom also souls have the rational, diffusively indeed and by a circle going around the truth of existing things, and failing of the unitive minds by the divisible and the most lavish of variety. Yet by the convolution of many things to one also considered worthy of the equal angels, inasmuch as is proper and possible for souls.

309. But also someone should not sin from intention, saying that those senses are the resonance of wisdom.

310. And indeed even the mind of demons, according as it is mind, is from this; yet inasmuch as the mind is of depraved reason, neither knowing how nor willing to obtain that which it desires, it is necessary to call this more properly a fall from wisdom.

311. According to which indeed it has been said that the divine wisdom is the principle and cause and substantifier and perfection and guard and end, of every wisdom itself and of every mind and of reason and of every sense.

312. Yet thus God himself who is super-wise wisdom and mind and reason and knower is praised.

707. After Denys has shown the excess of the divine wisdom, here he shows its causality;

and first, in general;

second, in particular, at from this the intelligible and intellectual virtues.

708. Therefore first he recollects the excess of the divine wisdom, saying that the divine wisdom is praised excellently as irrational, inasmuch as it exceeds reason; and as out of its mind, inasmuch as it exceeds mind or intellect; and as stupid, inasmuch as it exceeds the habit of the mind, namely wisdom; and he joins the causality of the divine wisdom, positing three conditions of this cause:

first of all its causality, saying that the divine wisdom is a cause through some participation of its likeness, of powers both practical and speculative, namely of mind, that is, intellect; and of reason, which is of practical and speculative understandings and habits; of wisdom, which is a contemplative habit of the mind; and of prudence, which is right reason in things to be done.

The second condition of this cause is that effects are said from it: for this is every counsel and nevertheless from this is all knowledge and prudence.

The third condition of this cause is that effects exist in it: for in this wisdom of God, which is Christ, are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge, as the Apostle says in Colossians 2:3. And the third condition of this sort is the cause of the second: for God is named from his effects for this reason: because effects preexist supereminently in him. Whence as regards the abundance of wisdom and knowledge in God, he uses the name of treasures; whereas as regards the eminence of the divine knowledge, as it exceeds our intellect, he attributes hiddenness to treasure of this sort.

And indeed he manifests this universal causality of the divine wisdom through the likeness of the things set forth, namely of goodness; of essence; and of life; and he says, as is said in the aforementioned, consequently also here it must be said that God, who is the supereminently and abundantly wise cause, as having every wisdom, is the cause giving even to per se wisdom itself, as this is understood as a formal something, whether it should be understood in the universal or in particular, as he introduces the wisdom of this or of that.

709. Then when he says, from this the intelligible and intellectual virtues, he shows the causality of the divine wisdom in particular with respect to singulars;

and first, as regards the angels;

second, as regards the rational soul, at on account of the divine wisdom;

third, as regards the senses, at but also someone should not sin;

fourth, as regards the demons, not inasmuch as there is the depravation of knowledge, but inasmuch as is from their nature, in which there is a certain knowing science.

710. About the first, he does three things:

first, he posits the procession of angelic knowledge from God, and he says that from the divine wisdom virtues of angelic minds, which are intelligible inasmuch as they are immaterial and are intellectual inasmuch as they can understand, according to a certain participation of the divine likeness, have indeed simple intellects, according to the propriety of their nature; and blessed, according to unition to God; and good, according to the propriety of their science, to direct speech to God.

711. Second, at not gathering divine knowledge in divisible things, he manifests the simplicity of the angelic intellect through the removal of those things that introduce composition in our intellect. Yet it must be considered that in us there is a twofold composition of intellect: one indeed which pertains to the finding of truth, whereas the other which pertains to judgment; by finding, indeed, we proceed as though gathering from many to one, whether many be said for diverse sensible things through the experience of which we receive universal knowledge, or many be said for the diverse signs from which we arrive by reasoning to such a truth. Yet not only do we proceed by many and divisible things of this sort to one intelligible truth when we first acquire science, but also already having science, in those many and divisible things through a certain application we consider what we hold in universal knowledge.

Whereas in judgment, we proceed from some common principle to the aforementioned many and divisible things or particulars and signs of its effect.

Yet excluding both of those from the angels, he says that the intellects of angels do not gather, as we do, divine knowledge, considering in divisible diverse things what they already know or acquiring science from divisible things of this sort: divisible things I say or senses, as regards sensible things, or diffuse speeches, that is, reasons, as another translation has;¹ for logos in Greek signifies reason and speech; and there is said diffuse reason, on account of the procession from one to another. For also the aforementioned intellectual virtues, similarly as in us, are driven from some common thing to those many and divided things, but since they are pure from all matter, through which they differ from senses and sensible things, and multitude, through which they differ from diffuse reasons, they understand the intelligibles of divine things not sensibly nor rationally, but intellectually; but and immaterially unto the difference of sense and uniformly unto the difference of reason.

712. Third, at and there is for those intellectual virtue, he assigns the cause of so excellent a knowledge in the angels:

and first of all on the part of their nature; and he says that for those angels there is virtue and intellectual operation resplendent with purity cleansed and immaculate: cleansed indeed through the removal of interior uncleanness; immaculate through the removal of exterior staining; and this purity arrives in them from two sources:

first of all from a certain natural simplicity and immateriality, and this befits these angelic intellects, which he calls divine, on account of their nearness and likeness to God; and from this simplicity and immateriality they are returned conspicacious, that is, understanding acutely.

Second also purity is resplendent in them from a heavenly gift given to them through which they are united to God; through which gift indeed, according to their ability, they tend to the divine, that is, to this very what-God-is itself, to the divine mind and reason, which exceeds every wisdom.

Therefore there is in them purity of intellect and splendor, both from their simplicity, and from the gift of divine grace.

713. Then when he says, on account of the divine wisdom, he shows how the rationality of souls is derived from the divine wisdom; and he says that on account of the divine wisdom also human souls have that they should be rational.

And to expound according to what they are called rational souls, he adds that they go around the truth of existing things, diffusively and by a circle. For the truth of existing things radically consists in the apprehension of the quiddity of things, which quiddity rational souls cannot apprehend at once through itself, but they diffuse themselves through properties and effects that stand around the essence of the thing, while from properties and effects they find causes and from causes they judge concerning effects. And because the angelic minds inspect the truth according to a united and simple consideration, souls fail of them inasmuch as, through the division and multitude of various things, they are diffused unto the knowledge of truth.

But nevertheless, in this very fact that they can roll many things together in one, just as from many effects and properties they arrive at knowing the essence of a thing, to this degree souls are held worthy that men should have intellects in a certain way equal to the angels, namely according to the propriety and possibility of souls: for the investigation of reason is terminated at the simple understanding of truth, just as it begins from the simple understanding of truth that is considered in first principles; and for this reason, in the procession of reason there is a certain convolution as a circle, while reason, beginning from one, proceeding through many, is terminated at one.

714. Then when he says, but also someone should not sin, he posits that even sensitive knowledge is derived from the divine wisdom; and he says that someone will not sin, as though diverting from the intention proposed according to which we intend to assign the procession of the divine wisdom, if he should have said that even those senses are a certain resonance of the divine wisdom. For the lowest of whatever procession is named resonance unto the likeness of that which cannot be sensed from sound on account of distance: for just as the ultimate of life is in plants, so the lowest of knowledge is in sense. For the divine wisdom is above all knowledge: the first effect of which is the knowledge of the angelic intellect, the whole of which consists in uniformity; the second effect is the knowledge of reason, which rolls many things together into one; yet the third effect is sensitive knowledge, which is diffused around many things, but does not prevail to know uniformity.

715. Then when he says, and indeed even the mind of demons, he shows that even the knowledge of demons is derived from the divine wisdom; and he posits the knowledge of demons last, because it is depraved knowledge, although, according to the order of nature, it is higher than the knowledge of reason and of sense; and he says that the mind of demons, as much as it retains of the nature and virtue of mind, proceeds from the divine wisdom; but inasmuch as it has knowledge depraved through an evil will, while the highest good, which it naturally desires, it neither knows how nor wills to obtain by that mode in which it is necessary, in this it rather falls from the divine wisdom; which fall indeed they do not have from God, but from free will.

716. Yet last he recapitulates what he had said; and he says that it has been said that the divine wisdom is the principle from which the whole emanation of knowledge begins, and the cause pouring it forth, and the substantifier, inasmuch as it makes wisdom to be in each thing; and the perfection, inasmuch as it leads knowledge unto the perfect; and the guard, that is, conservation; and the end, because in this all knowledge is terminated: that God should be known. Therefore the divine wisdom is both principle and cause of wisdom itself according to itself received in common; and of every mind, that is, intellect, as regards the angels; and of every reason, as regards men; and of every sense, as regards animals.

How God Knows Through the Divine Wisdom

313. For how shall he understand anything of intelligible things, not having intellectual operations? Or how shall he know sensible things, gathered above every sense? And indeed the eloquences say that he knows all things and that nothing escapes the divine knowledge.

314. But, what I have said many times, it is fitting to understand divine things as befits God: for without mind and not sensible, according to excess, not according to defect, it must be ordered in God; just as we impose the irrational upon him who is above reason; and imperfection upon him who is super-perfect and pre-perfect; and impalpable and invisible darkness upon the light inaccessible according to the excess of visible light.

315. Wherefore the divine mind contains all things, by knowledge segregated from all things, according to the cause of all things, pre-receiving the science of all things in itself. Before the angels were made, knowing and producing the angels and all other things, within and from the principle itself, so that I might speak thus, knowing and driving unto substance.

316. And this I reckon the eloquence hands on, when it says, he who knows all things before they are made (Dan 13:42). For the divine mind knows not by learning existing things from existing things, but from itself and in itself according to cause it prepossesses and pre-receives the science and knowledge and substance of all things, not according to vision by sending itself to singulars, but according to one continence of cause, knowing and containing all things; just as also light according to cause through its own self pre-receives the vision of darkness, not seeing darkness from elsewhere than from light.

317. Therefore the divine wisdom knowing itself knows all things, immaterially, material things; and indivisibly, divisible things; and many things unitively, in this one knowing and producing all things. For if according to one cause God has handed on being to all existing things, according to the same cause he shall know all things, just as from him are existing things which also preexisted in him; and not from existing things shall he assume the knowledge of those, but he shall be the lavisher of the knowledge of those to singulars themselves and of other things to other things.

318. Therefore God does not have proper knowledge of his own self, yet another common knowledge comprehending all existing things: for the very cause of all things knowing itself is empty somewhere, if it should not know those things that are from it and of which it is the cause.

319. Therefore God knows existing things thus, not by knowledge that is of existing things, but that is of his own self: for the eloquences say that even the angels know those things that are on earth, not according to senses, thus knowing sensible existing things indeed but according to the proper virtue and nature of deiform mind.

717. After Denys has manifested the eminence and causality of the divine wisdom, here he shows how God knows through the divine wisdom; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows how God knows;

second, how he is known, at thereafter, it is necessary to inquire.

718. About the first, he does three things:

first, he raises a doubt;

second, he solves it, at but, what I have said many times;

third, from the solution posited, he infers certain conclusions, at therefore the divine wisdom knowing itself.

719. Therefore he says, first, that, although God is above all wisdom, nevertheless he is praised in Scripture as mind and as reason and as knower. For there is a doubt: how could he understand intelligible things, since he does not have intellectual operations; and how could he know sensible things, since he does not have sense, but is above every sense; since nevertheless the sacred eloquences hand on that he knows all things and that nothing escapes the divine knowledge, according to Hebrews 4:13: all things are bare and opened to his eyes, and there is not any creature invisible in his sight.

720. Then when he says, but, what I have said many times, he solves the proposed doubt; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows how sense and intellect are removed from God;

second, how knowledge befits him, at wherefore the divine mind contains all things;

third, he proves this through authority, at and this I reckon the eloquence hands on.

721. Therefore he says, first, that, as has been said many times, it is fitting that divine things should be understood as befits God. For what is said: that God is without intellect and without sense, must not be received according to defect, as though God should be inferior to those things that have sense or intellect, but it ought to be received according to excess, namely because he exceeds all intelligible things. Thus also we attribute to him the irrational, inasmuch as he is above reason; and we attribute to him imperfection, inasmuch as he is perfect above all things and before all things; and we attribute to him that he is impalpable and invisible darkness, inasmuch as he is light inaccessible, exceeding every light that can be seen by us either through sense or through intellect.

722. Then when he says, wherefore the divine mind contains all things, he concludes from the things set forth that the divine mind contains all things by knowing through knowledge separated from all things, namely because his knowledge is above the knowledge of intellect and above the knowledge of sense, inasmuch as he knows all things through the first cause of all things itself, having in himself all science first, before all things have being; just as he had notice of the angels before the angels were made and even before, within his own disposition he produced the angels and all other things, before they were in their proper natures, as though knowing all things, so that I might speak thus, from the primordial principle of things itself; and through his science, he leads all things to this: that they subsist.

723. Then when he says, and this I reckon the eloquence hands on, he proves what he had said through the authority of Scripture; and he says that it is signified in Sacred Scripture when it is said that God knows all things before they are made (Wis. 8:8); and there can be received Sirach 23:29, where it is said: for the Lord God, before they were created, recognized all things. And he expounds this, saying that what he says: that the divine mind knows all things, is not through this: that it acquires the science of things from things, but from itself and in itself it prepossesses, through the mode of cause, the science and knowledge and substance of all things. And he says, substance, because, as has been said above in the chapter on being, in the divine being itself there preexists every being: for through his essence he could not know all things otherwise, unless all things were in him causally. And because he knows all things through his essence, it follows that he knows all things and contains them by knowing, not through the fact that he sends himself separately to singulars by dividing, as we apply our intellect separately to diverse things, but through one continence of cause, namely because by knowing one cause containing all things he knows all things; just as also light, if it were knowing, would know darkness through its very self, not receiving the knowledge of darkness from elsewhere than from itself. Yet God is compared to creatures as light to darkness, on account of the deficiency of creatures from the divine light.

724. Then when he says, therefore the divine wisdom knowing itself, he infers three conclusions from the things set forth. For it is manifest that all knowledge is according to the mode of that by which something is known, as every operation is according to the mode of the form by which someone operates. Since therefore the divine wisdom knows all things through the fact that it knows itself, as has been said, yet this is immaterial and indivisible and one, it follows that it knows material things immaterially and divisible things indivisibly and many things unitively, namely inasmuch as it knows and produces all things through one thing which is its essence. For if effects can be known through the cause, it follows that if he hands on being to all things according to one cause which is his essence, that also according to the same cause he knows all things, as those that proceeded from him which also preexisted in God himself, before they were in their proper natures. And thus it is manifest that God does not assume the knowledge of things from those things themselves, but rather he gives to those knowing that they can know themselves and that other things can be known by other things.

725. He infers the second conclusion at therefore God does not have proper knowledge. For if God by knowing himself knows all things, it follows that there is not one knowledge in him by which he knows himself and another by which commonly he comprehends all things. For if it were such that by knowing himself he did not know all things, it would follow that his causality would be empty somewhere, namely such that there would be some things not caused by him. Therefore just as it is impossible that anything should not be caused by God, so it is impossible that anything should not be known by God.

726. He infers the third conclusion at therefore God knows existing things thus. For if the mode of knowledge follows the principle of knowledge, from which God does not receive the knowledge of things from things, it follows that he knows existing things not through the knowledge that is unto the mode of existing things, but through the knowledge that is unto the mode of his own self; which Scripture also says of the angels: that they know those things that are on earth, nevertheless not that they know sensible things through senses, but through their proper virtue and the nature of their mind, as they are assimilated to God who knows all things through his essence, not only universals, but also singulars. For the virtue of a superior nature is greater and can know more through one, which the inferior knows through many. Therefore God, and even the angels through assimilation to God, knows through mind not only universals, but also singulars; although man knows universals by intellect, whereas singulars by sense.

How God Is Known

§3. 320. Thereafter, it is necessary to inquire how we know God neither intelligible nor sensible nor anything existing of universally existing things.

321. Therefore can it possibly be true to say that we know God, not from his nature? For this is unknown and exceeding every reason and mind; but from the order of the whole of all things, as proposed from him, having both certain images and assimilations of his divine exemplars, we ascend to that which is above all things by way and order according to virtue, in the removal of all things and by excess and in the cause of all things;

322. on account of which God is known both in all things and without all things; and God is known through knowledge and through ignorance; and there is of him intellect and speech and science and touch and sense and opinion and fantasy and name and all other things; and neither is he understood nor said nor named; and he is not anything of existing things, nor in any of existing things is he known, and he is all things in all things and nothing in any, and he is known in all things and from none of any.

323. For also we say this rightly of God and he is praised by the universe of existing things according to the proportion of all things whose cause he is; and again the most divine knowledge of God is that which is known through ignorance, according to unition above mind, when mind, receding from all other things, afterwards also dismissing itself, is united to the super-resplendent rays; thence also there illuminated by the inscrutable depth of wisdom;

324. and indeed from all things, which I have said, this must be known. For this is, according to the eloquence, what is the cause effective of all things and always concording all things, the cause both of the indissoluble concordance of all things and of their order, and always joining the ends of the first things to the principles of the second things, and beautifully operating one conspiration and harmony of all things.

727. After Denys has shown how God knows, here he shows how he is known; and about this, he does three things:

first, he raises a doubt;

second, he solves it, at therefore can it possibly be true;

third, he infers a conclusion from the things said, at on account of which God is known.

728. Therefore he says, first, that, since it has been said that God knows all things through his essence which is above intellect and sense and above all existing things, it remains to be asked how we can know God, since he is not intelligible, but above intelligible things; nor sensible, but above sensible things; nor is he anything from the number of existing things, but above all existing things: yet all our knowledge is through intellect and sense, nor do we know except existing things.

729. Then when he says, therefore can it possibly be true, he solves the proposed doubt; and because the question is thus, he infers the solution under interrogation. This therefore is the solution: that we know God, not through his nature, as though seeing his essence: for his essence is unknown to a creature and exceeds not only sense, but also every human reason and even every angelic mind, as regards the natural virtue of reason and mind; whence it cannot come to anyone otherwise, unless from a gift of grace. Therefore we do not know God, seeing his essence, but we know him from the order of the whole universe. For the universe of creatures itself is proposed to us by God in order that through it we might know God, inasmuch as the ordered universe has certain imperfect images and assimilations of divine things which are compared to them as exemplary principles to images.

And therefore from the order of the universe, just as by a certain way and order, we ascend through intellect according to our virtue to God, who is above all things; and this in three ways:

first of all and principally in the removal of all things, namely inasmuch as nothing of these things that we see in the order of creatures do we reckon God or befitting God;

whereas secondarily through excess: for we do not remove from God the perfections of creatures such as life, wisdom, and things of this sort, on account of a defect of God, but on account of the fact that he exceeds every perfection of a creature, therefore we remove wisdom from him, because he exceeds every wisdom;

third, according to the causality of all things, while we consider that whatever is in creatures proceeds from God as from a cause. And therefore our knowledge has itself in a mode contrary to the knowledge of God: for God indeed knows creatures through his nature, yet we know God through creatures.

730. Then when he says, on account of which God is known, he infers a conclusion from the things said; and about this, he does three things:

first, he infers a conclusion;

second, he shows how the conclusion follows from the premises, at for also we say this rightly;

third, he manifests a certain thing that he had presupposed, at and indeed from all things.

731. Therefore he says, first, that, because we ascend from creatures to God and in the removal of all things and by excess and in the cause of all things, therefore God is known in all things, as in effects, and without all things, as removed from all things and exceeding all things; and on account of this also God is known through our knowledge, because whatever falls in our knowledge, we receive as adduced by him; and again he is known through our ignorance, namely inasmuch as to know this very what-God-is, because we know that we do not know of God what he is.

And what he had said in general knowledge, he explicates through parts, adding that of God himself there is intellect and speech or better reason, as another translation has, and science which is the conjunction of intellect and reason; and as regards sensitive knowledge he adds, and touch, which is the sense common to all animals; and he adds what is common, when he adds, and sense; and he adds concerning those things that import deficient knowledge, when he says, and opinion, which fails of science; and fantasy, which fails of the certitude of sense. And he adds those things that pertain to the manifestation of knowledge, and he says, and name, which is a sign of intellect; and whatever other things pertain to knowledge or signification. And contrarily, neither is he understood, nor sensed nor said or named.

And how he is each of all those things, he manifests, adding, For God is not anything of existing things, but above all existing things, and for this reason, since existing things are known through intellect and the other aforementioned things, God is known by none of the aforementioned things through the knowledge of any of existing things. Again, God is all things in all things causally, although nevertheless he is nothing of those things that are in things essentially: and for this reason, whatever existing in things is known either by intellect or by sense or by whatever of the aforementioned modes, in all those things known in a certain way God is known, as cause, although nevertheless from none is he known as he is.

732. Then when he says, for also we say this rightly, he shows how the conclusion introduced follows from the premises; and he says that we say this rightly of God according as he is known and not known: for from all beings he is known and praised according as they have proportion to him, as whose cause he is. Yet again the other knowledge of God is the most perfect, namely through removal, by which we know God through ignorance, through a certain unition to divine things above the nature of mind, namely when our mind, receding from all other things and afterwards even dismissing itself, is united to the super-resplendent rays of the deity, namely inasmuch as it knows God to be not only above all things that are below it, but also above it and above all things that can be comprehended by it. And knowing God thus, in such a state of knowledge, it is illuminated by the very profundity of the divine wisdom, which we cannot scrutinize. That we also understand that God is above all things not only that are, but also that we can apprehend, comes forth to us from the incomprehensible profundity of the divine wisdom.

733. Then when he says, and indeed from all things, he manifests a certain thing that he had said, namely that God is known from all things; and he says that this is because the divine wisdom itself is the effective cause of all things, inasmuch as it produces things in being, and not only does it give being to things, but also being with order in things, inasmuch as things unite themselves to one another into the order to the ultimate end; and further, it is the indissoluble cause of this concordance and of this order, which always remain, however things may be changed. Yet he adds the mode of this order, because it always joins the ends of the first things, that is, the lowest of the supreme things, to the principles of the second things, that is, to the supreme of the lowest things, unto the mode in which it unites the supreme of bodily creation, namely the human body, to the lowest of intellectual nature, namely the rational soul; and it is similar to see in other things; and thus it operates the beauty of the universe through one conspiration, that is, concordance, and harmony, that is, due order and proportion, of all things.

§4. 325. Yet God is praised as reason (Wis 18:15) by the holy eloquences not only because he is the lavisher of reason and of mind and of wisdom, but because he pre-receives the causes of all things uniformly in himself, and because he goes through all things, reaching, as the eloquences say, even unto the end of all things (Wis 7:24); and before this, because the divine reason is simplified above every simplicity and is absolute from all things above all things according to the supersubstantial.

326. This reason is the simple and existing truth of the existing, around which just as cleansed and not erroneous knowledge of the whole of things, is divine faith which is the remaining gathering of believers, which gathers them in the truth and the truth in them, by unchangeable identity, for believers having the simple knowledge of truth.

327. For just as knowledge is unitive of those who know, yet ignorance is always the cause of change and of division for the ignorant, from himself; according to the holy speech, nothing shall move the believer in truth from the cause that is according to true faith, in which he shall have immobile and unchangeable permanence of identity.

328. For he who is united to the truth knows well how well he has it; although many reproach him as suffering ecstasy. Indeed he hides those from error, as is fitting, through true faith suffering ecstasy united to truth. For he knows himself, not according as they say, mad, but freed from unstable and variable partition, around the most lavish variety of error, through the simple and always according to the same and in the same way having the truth.

329. And therefore the princes and leaders of our wisdom are put to death for the truth all the day, testifying, as is fitting, by every word and work and the true knowledge of God unitive of Christians that this is both more divine and simpler than all; yet rather, that this is the only true and one and simple knowledge of God.

734. After Denys has determined about wisdom, here he determines about those things that are joined to wisdom;

and first, about reason;

second, about truth and faith, at this reason is the simple and existing truth.

735. Therefore he says, first, that God is praised in Sacred Scripture as reason, which especially can be received from the Sacred Scriptures in that God is called Word, according to John 1:1: and the Word was God. For logos in Greek, as Augustine says, signifies both reason and word.¹

Yet from the name of reason, four things are understood:

first of all it is said to be a certain knowing virtue; and thus God is called reason causally, inasmuch as he is the lavisher of all knowledge, namely of reason and of mind and of wisdom and of all things of this sort.

In another way, it is posited for the cause, as when it is said, by what reason have you done this? (Gen. 3:13) That is, by what cause? And God is called reason thus, not only because he is the cause of all things, but also because he pre-receives all second causes in himself, nevertheless not through the mode of composition, but through the mode of uniformity and simplicity.

In a third way, computation also is called reason, as is had in Matthew 18:23, that he began to pose a reason with his servants. And thus God is called reason, because he is the highest disposition of things that goes through all things, reaching, as is said in Wisdom 8:1, from end even unto end of all things, disposing all things strongly and sweetly.

In a fourth way, anything simple abstracted from many is called reason, as the reason of man is said for what is abstracted from singulars through consideration, pertaining to the nature of men. And as regards this he says that, above all of these, God is reason more properly, because the divine reason is simpler above every simplicity and is absolute, that is, separated or abstracted from all things, inasmuch as according to its supersubstantiality it is above all things.

736. Then when he says, this reason is the simple and existing truth, he treats of truth and faith;

and first, he proposes what he intends;

second, he manifests the proposition, at for just as knowledge is unitive.

737. Therefore he says, first, that, just as some faith is caused from human reason, so also that divine reason is a certain simple truth of the whole of being; around which reason or truth, just as pure and not erroneous knowledge of all things, faith consists: which divine faith indeed is a certain permanent gathering of believers, namely inasmuch as it places them firmly in the truth and the truth in them, as believers have a simple knowledge of truth without doubt and investigation, according to a certain unchangeable identity, namely because in the same way and unchangeably, they remain in the truth. And on account of this firmness of faith, the Apostle called faith substance (Heb. 11:1), as though a certain foundation and gathering.

738. Then when he says, for just as knowledge is unitive, he proves the aforementioned firmness of faith, in three ways:

first of all, through the ratio of knowledge: because knowledge is mutually unitive of those who know, not only from the fact that all knowing the truth are united in one knowledge of the truth, but also because he who knows the truth remains always in the same way in one and the same truth; whereas ignorance, on the contrary, is the cause that the ignorant should be changed from himself, opining that in this way, such that he is divided from others, because different of ignorant men opine different things; and for this reason, according to the speech of Sacred Scripture, nothing can remove from the true faith him who believes in the truth of divine faith, inasmuch as he has impermutable permanence: for the Apostle says in Romans 8:28, I am certain that neither death nor life nor anything else can separate me from the love of God.

739. Second, at for he who is united to the truth, he proves the same from the judgment of believers. For he who is united to the truth through faith knows well how well it is for him, by adhering thus to the truth of faith; although many blame him as suffering ecstasy, that is, as foolish and alienated from himself; for he hides those blaming from their error, because without doubt through true faith he is suffering the ecstasy of truth, as though placed outside of sense and joined to supernatural truth, because believing he knows of himself that he is not mad, as they say, but he has been freed through simple truth and always having himself in the same way, lest he should be borne about through the unstable and variable winds of diverse errors.

740. Third, at and therefore the princes and leaders, he proves the same by the example of the apostles, who are the princes and leaders of Christian wisdom and are put to death for the truth all the day, contesting, as is fitting, not only by word, but also by work and through true knowledge of God which is unitive of Christians, because the very knowledge of God in which Christians are united is simpler and more divine than whatever knowledge of God that is had by men in this world; nay rather, so that we might speak more truly, this alone is true and one and simple knowledge of God. For whatever other knowledge of God is discordant with the common knowledge of Christians, which is named the Catholic faith, must be called error rather than knowledge of God.

How Virtue Is Received in God and On His Infinity

C. VIII, § I. 330. But because the theologians praise the divine truth and super-wise wisdom as virtue and as justice and as salvation and as liberation, come, let us open up also those namings of God, as is possible for us.

331. And that the thearchy indeed is segregated from and surpasses every virtue in whatever way both existing and thought, I do not reckon that anyone of those versed in the divine eloquences is ignorant: for many times theology has been handed on determining domination both to it and also of those celestial virtues. How therefore do the theologians praise it also as virtue segregated from every virtue, or how should we receive the naming of virtue in it?

§2. 332. Therefore we say that God is virtue as prepossessing and super-possessing every virtue in himself and as the cause of every virtue; and producing all things, according to virtue indeclinable and incircumfinite; and as existing as the cause of this very what-it-is-to-be-virtue either whole or particular;

333. and as of infinite virtue not only because it produces every virtue, but also because it is above every and per se virtue itself; and because it super-can produce also infinitely infinite ones other than the existing virtues; and because never can virtues infinite and produced unto the infinite blunt the super-infinite action of this virtue-making virtue; and because its virtue exceeding all things is ineffable and unknown and unthinkable;

334. which on account of the abundance of the possible both makes infirmity firm and contains and strongly holds the last of its resonances; in which way also in possible things according to sense we see that super-resplendent lights arrive even unto blunted visions and great sounds speak unto hearings not very easily receiving sounds to enter. For what is altogether not hearing neither hears; and what universally is not seeing neither sees.

§3. Therefore this distribution of the infinite-virtue of God goes to all existing things, and nothing is of existing things from which having a certain virtue is perfectly removed, but it has either intellectual or rational or sensible or vivifying or substantial virtue, and even being itself, if it is permissible to say, has virtue from the supersubstantial virtue unto this: that it should be.

741. After Denys has determined about the wisdom of God, here he determines about virtue and justice. For just as the procession of wisdom extends itself less than the procession of life, because not all living things have knowledge, so the procession of virtue and of justice fails of the procession of wisdom. About this therefore he does two things:

first, he says what his intention is about;

second, he pursues the proposition, at and that the thearchy indeed is segregated.

742. Therefore he says, first, that, because truth and wisdom existing above all wisdom are praised in Sacred Scripture as virtue and as justice and as salvation and as liberation, that is, as the cause of salvation and of liberation, we shall expound those namings of God also, as is possible for us.

743. Then when he says, and that the thearchy indeed is segregated, he pursues the proposition:

and first, he determines about virtue;

second, about justice which is a species of virtue, at yet God again is praised as justice;