The Trinity
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Revisions II
C. 15On the Trinity, in fifteen booksAugustine began work on the De Trinitate around 400 and completed it inDe Trinitate, libri quindecimAugustine began work on the De Trinitate around 400 and completed it in the early
1. Libros De Trinitate, quae Deus est, quindecim scripsi per aliquot annos. Sed cum eorum duodecimum nondum perfecissem, et eos diutius tenerem quam possent sustinere qui vehementer illos habere cupiebant, subtracti sunt mihi minus emendati quam deberent ac possent, quando eos edere voluissem.
1. I wrote fifteen books over a number of years on The Trinity, who is God. But when I had not yet finished the twelfth of them, and was holding on to them longer than those who were eager to have them could bear, they were taken from me less corrected than they ought and were able to be, when I should have wished to publish them.
deTrin.1Quod posteaquam comperi, quia et alia eorum apud nos exemplaria remanserant, statueram eos iam ipse non edere sed sic habere, ut in alio aliquo opusculo meo quid mihi de his evenerit dicerem.
After I found this out—since other copies of them had also remained with us—I had decided that I myself would not now publish them, but would keep them so as to tell in some other little work of mine what had happened to me concerning them.
deTrin.1Urgentibus tamen fratribus, quibus resistere non valui, emendavi eos, quantum emendandos putavi et complevi et edidi, adiungens eis a capite epistolam quam scripsi ad venerabilem Aurelium episcopum Carthaginensis Ecclesiae, Letter 174. Aurelius, a long-time friend of Augustine and a person of great importance in the African church, was bishop of Carthage from the early 390s until his death in 430. quo tamquam prologo exposui et quid accidisset, et quid facere mea cogitatione voluissem, et quid fratrum caritate compellente fecissem. Fratrum caritate compellente: “out of a compelling love for the brothers.” Fratrum is translated here as an objective genitive, but it could also be translated as a subjective genitive, in which case it could be rendered “as a result of the brothers’ loving urging.”
Yet at the urging of the brothers, whom I had not the strength to resist, I corrected them as much as I thought they needed correcting, and I completed and published them, adding at the head a letter that I had written to the venerable Aurelius, bishop of the Church of Carthage, Letter 174. Aurelius, a long-time friend of Augustine and a person of great importance in the African church, was bishop of Carthage from the early 390s until his death in 430. in which, as in a kind of prologue, I set out both what had happened and what I had intended to do in my own design, and what I had done under the compelling love of the brothers. Fratrum caritate compellente: "out of a compelling love for the brothers." Fratrum is translated here as an objective genitive, but it could also be translated as a subjective genitive, in which case it could be rendered "as a result of the brothers' loving urging."
deTrin.12. In quorum libro undecimo, cum de corpore visibili agerem, dixi: quocirca id amare alienari est. On the Trinity 11.5.9. Quod secundum eum amorem dictum est, quo aliquid sic amatur, ut eo fruendo existimet beatum se esse qui hoc amat. Nam non est alienari in laudem Creatoris amare speciem corporalem, ut ipso Creatore fruens quisque vere beatus sit.
2. In the eleventh book of these works, when I was dealing with the visible body, I said: and so to love it is to become estranged. On the Trinity 11.5.9. This was said with reference to that love by which a thing is so loved that the one who loves it thinks himself blessed in enjoying it. For it is not to become estranged, but rather to praise the Creator, to love bodily form, so that anyone enjoying the Creator himself may be truly blessed.
deTrin.2Itemque in eodem ubi dixi: nec avem quadrupedem memini, quia non vidi, sed phantasiam talem facillime intueor, dum alicui formae volatili qualem vidi adiungo alios duos pedes, quales itidem vidi, On the Trinity 11.10.17. haec dicens non potui recolere volatilia quadrupedia quae lex commemorat. (Cf. Lev 11:20–23) Neque enim computat in pedibus duo posteriora crura quibus locustae saliunt, quas dicit mundas et ideo discernit ab immundis talibus volatilibus, quae non saliunt illis cruribus, sicut sunt scarabaei. Omnia quippe huiusmodi volatilia quadrupedia vocantur in lege.
Likewise, in the same book, where I said: nor do I remember a four-footed bird, because I have not seen one, but I picture such a thing very easily by adding to some winged form such as I have seen two other feet such as I have likewise seen, On the Trinity 11.10.17. in saying this I failed to recall the four-footed flying creatures that the law mentions. (See Lev 11:20–23) For it does not count among the feet the two hind legs by which locusts leap, which it calls clean and so distinguishes from those unclean flying creatures, such as beetles, that do not leap with such legs. Indeed all flying creatures of this kind are called four-footed in the law.
deTrin.23. In duodecimo, On the Trinity 12.10.15. velut expositio verborum Apostoli, ubi ait: ‘omne peccatum quodcumque fecerit homo extra corpus est,’ non mihi satisfacit; nec sic puto intellegendum quod dictum est: qui autem fornicatur in corpus proprium peccat, tamquam ille hoc faciat, qui propter adipiscenda ea quae per corpus sentiuntur, ut in his finem boni sui ponat, aliquid agit. Hoc enim longe plura peccata complectitur, quam illa fornicatio quae concubitu perpetratur illicito, Cf. Revisions 1.19.6; Homily 162. de qua locutum, cum hoc diceret, Apostolum apparet.
3. In the twelfth book, On the Trinity 12.10.15. the supposed exposition of the words of the Apostle, where he says: "every sin that a man commits is outside the body," does not satisfy me; nor do I think that what is said—but he who fornicates sins against his own body—is to be understood as if a person did this who does something in order to obtain what is perceived through the body, so as to set the goal of his good in these things. For this embraces far more sins than that fornication which is committed in unlawful intercourse, See Revisions 1.19.6; Homily 162. about which the Apostle clearly was speaking when he said this.
deTrin.3Hoc opus, excepta epistola quae postmodum ad eius caput adiuncta est, sic incipit: lecturus haec quae de Trinitate disserimus.
This work, apart from the letter that was afterward attached to its head, begins thus: whoever is going to read what we discuss concerning the Trinity.
deTrin.3Prologue
C
Domino beatissimo, et sincerissima caritate venerando, sancto fratri et consacerdoti papae Aurelio, The title “pope” was given widely to the bishops of the more important sees. The bishop of Carthage was the permanent president of the African synod. Augustinus, in Domino salutem.
To the most blessed lord, to be revered with the most sincere love, the holy brother and fellow priest Pope Aurelius, The title "pope" was given widely to the bishops of the more important sees. The bishop of Carthage was the permanent president of the African synod. Augustine sends greeting in the Lord.
deTrin.3De Trinitate quae Deus summus et verus est libros iuvenis inchoavi, senex edidi. Omiseram quippe hoc opus posteaquam comperi praereptos mihi esse sive subreptos antequam eos absolverem et retractatos ut mea dispositio fuerat expolirem. Non enim singillatim sed omnes simul edere ea ratione decreveram quoniam praecedentibus consequentes inquisitione proficiente nectuntur.
I began as a young man, and have published as an old man, the books on the Trinity, who is the supreme and true God. For I had laid this work aside after I found out that it had been snatched or stolen from me before I had completed it and had polished it by revising it as my plan had been. For I had decided to publish them not one by one but all together, for the reason that the later books are linked to the earlier ones by the progress of the inquiry.
deTrin.3Cum ergo per eos homines (qui priusquam vellem ad quosdam illorum pervenire potuerunt) dispositio mea nequivisset impleri, interruptam dictationem reliqueram cogitans hoc ipsum in aliquibus scriptis meis conqueri ut scirent qui possent non a me fuisse eosdem libros editos sed ablatos priusquam mihi editione mea digni viderentur.
Since, then, through those men—who were able to reach some of these books before I wished them to—my plan could not be carried out, I had left the dictation interrupted, thinking to make this very complaint in some writings of mine, so that those who could might know that the same books had not been published by me but had been taken away before they seemed to me worthy of my publication.
deTrin.3Verum multorum fratrum vehementissima postulatione et maxime tua iussione compulsus opus tam laboriosum adiuvante Domino terminare curavi, eosque emendatos non ut volui sed ut potui, ne ab illis qui subrepti iam in manus hominum exierant plurimum discreparent, Venerationi tuae per filium nostrum condiaconum Augustine, though a bishop, will usually address or refer to a presbyter as his fellow presbyter and a deacon as his fellow deacon, because his episcopal office was seen as including and sharing in their subordinate ministries. carissimum misi et cuicumque audiendos, describendos le legendosque permisi.
But compelled by the most vehement demand of many brothers, and above all by your command, I took care, with the Lord's help, to bring so laborious a work to its end; and having corrected them not as I wished but as I was able, lest they should differ too greatly from those that had already gone out into men's hands by stealth, I have sent them to Your Reverence through our most dear son, my fellow deacon, Augustine, though a bishop, will usually address or refer to a presbyter as his fellow presbyter and a deacon as his fellow deacon, because his episcopal office was seen as including and sharing in their subordinate ministries. and have permitted them to be heard, copied, and read by anyone.
deTrin.3In quibus si servari mea dispositio potuisset, essent profecto etsi easdem sententias habentes, multo tamen enodatiores atque planiores quantum rerum tantarum explicandarum difficultas et facultas nostra pateretur. Sunt autem qui primos quattuor vel potius quinque etiam sine prooemiis habent et duodecimum sine extrema parte non parva, sed si eis haec editio potuerit innotescere, omnia si voluerint et valuerint emendabunt. Peto sane ut hanc epistulam seorsum quidem sed tamen ad caput eorumdem librorum iubeas anteponi. Ora pro me.
In these books, had my plan been able to be preserved, they would surely—though holding the same opinions—have been much clearer and plainer, so far as the difficulty of explaining such great matters and my own ability would allow. But there are some who have the first four, or rather even five, without their prefaces, and the twelfth without a considerable final portion; yet if this edition can become known to them, they will correct everything, if they wish and are able. I ask, indeed, that you order this letter to be placed separately, yet at the head of these same books. Pray for me.
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1. Lecturus haec quae de Trinitate disserimus, prius oportet ut noverit, stilum nostrum adversus eorum vigilare calumnias, qui fidei contemnentes initium, (Cf. Sir 25:16) immaturo et perverso rationis amore falluntur. Quorum nonnulli ea quae de corporalibus rebus, sive per sensus corporeos experta notaverunt, Patrologia Latina (PL): noverunt, “what they know about.” sive quae natura humani ingenii et diligentiae vivacitate vel artis adiutorio perceperunt, ad res incorporeas et spirituales transferre conantur, ut ex his illas metiri atque opinari velint. Sunt item alii qui secundum humani animi naturam vel affectum de Deo sentiunt, si quid sentiunt; et ex hoc errore, cum de Deo disputant, sermoni sue distortas et fallaces regulas figunt. (Cf. Wis 14:21–30)
1. Whoever is going to read what we discuss concerning the Trinity ought first to know that our pen is on guard against the slanders of those who, despising the beginning of faith, (See Sir 25:16) are deceived by an immature and perverse love of reason. Some of them try to transfer what they have observed of bodily things, whether learned through the bodily senses, Patrologia Latina (PL): noverunt, "what they know about." or perceived by the nature of human talent and the keenness of diligence or with the help of skill, to incorporeal and spiritual things, wishing to measure and form opinions about the latter from the former. There are others, again, who think about God, if they think anything at all, according to the nature or disposition of the human mind; and from this error, when they argue about God, they fix distorted and deceptive rules upon their discourse. (See Wis 14:21–30)
deTrin.1.1Est item aliud hominum genus, eorum qui universam quidem creaturam, quae profecto mutabilis est, nituntur transcendere, ut ad incommutabilem substantiam quae Deus est, erigant intentionem: sed mortalitatis onere praegravati, cum et videri volunt scire quod nesciunt, et quod volunt scire non possunt; Cf. Wis 9:13–16; Jerome, On Hezekiah 13.42; Letters 53.9.2; 57.12.4; Cicero, Academica 2.23.74. praesumptiones opinionum suarum audacius affirmando, intercludunt sibimet intelligentiae vias, magis eligentes sententiam suam non corrigere perversam, quam mutare defensam.
There is, again, another kind of men, those who strive indeed to transcend the whole of creation, which is certainly changeable, so as to lift up their attention to the unchangeable substance which is God; but weighed down by the burden of mortality, since they both want to seem to know what they do not know, and cannot know what they want to know, See Wis 9:13–16; Jerome, On Hezekiah 13.42; Letters 53.9.2; 57.12.4; Cicero, Academica 2.23.74. by too boldly asserting the presumptions of their own opinions, they block for themselves the very ways of understanding, choosing rather not to correct their perverse view than to change the one they have defended.
deTrin.1.1Et hic quidem omnium morbus est trium generum quae proposui: Cf. Augustine, On the Happy Life 1.2–4; Sir 25:3. et eorum scilicet qui secundum corpus de Deo sapiunt; et eorum qui secundum spiritualem creaturam, sicuti est anima; et eorum qui neque secundum corpus, neque secundum spiritualem creaturam, et tamen de Deo falsa existimant, (Cf. Wis 14:30) eo remotiores a vero, quo id quod sapiunt, nec in corpore reperitur, nec in facto et condito spiritu, nec in ipso Creatore. Qui enim opinatur Deum, verbi gratia, candidum vel rutilum, fallitur; sed tamen haec inveniuntur in corpore. Rursus qui opinatur Deum nunc obliviscentem, nunc recordantem, vel si quid huiusmodi est, nihilominus in errore est; (Cf. Gen 6:7; Exod 20:5; Rom 9:14–18; Sir 25:16; Eccl 1:15, 6:9) sed tamen haec inveniuntur in animo. Qui autem putat eius esse potentiae Deum, ut seipsum ipse genuerit, eo plus errat, quod non solum Deus ita non est, sed nec spiritualis nec corporalis creatura: nulla enim omnino res est quae se ipsam gignat ut sit. Cf. Augustine, The Immortality of the Soul 8.14.
And this indeed is the disease common to all the three kinds I have set forth: See Augustine, On the Happy Life 1.2–4; Sir 25:3. namely, of those who think of God according to body; of those who do so according to the spiritual creation, such as the soul; and of those who think falsely of God according neither to body nor to the spiritual creation, (See Wis 14:30) the more remote from the truth in that what they think is found neither in body, nor in a made and created spirit, nor in the Creator himself. For whoever supposes God, for example, to be white or ruddy is deceived; yet these are nevertheless found in body. Again, whoever supposes God now to forget, now to remember, or anything of this kind, is no less in error; (See Gen 6:7; Exod 20:5; Rom 9:14–18; Sir 25:16; Eccl 1:15, 6:9) yet these are nevertheless found in the mind. But whoever thinks God to be of such power that he begot himself errs all the more, in that not only is God not so, but neither is the spiritual nor the bodily creation: for there is nothing whatever that begets itself so as to exist. See Augustine, The Immortality of the Soul 8.14.
deTrin.1.12. Ut ergo ab huiusmodi falsitatibus humanus animus purgaretur, Sancta Scriptura parvulis congruens, nullius generis rerum verba vitavit, ex quibus quasi gradatim ad divina atque sublimia noster intellectus velut nutritus assurgeret. Nam et verbis ex rebus corporalibus sumptis usa est, cum de Deo loqueretur; velut cum ait, sub umbraculo PL: in tegmine, “under cover.” alarum tuarum protege me. Et de spirituali creatura multa transtulit, quibus significaret illud quod ita non esset, sed ita dici opus esset; sicuti est, ego sum Deus zelans; et, poenitet me hominem fecisse.
2. Therefore, in order that the human mind might be purified of falsehoods of this kind, Holy Scripture, adapting itself to little ones, avoided the words of no kind of thing by which, as if step by step, our understanding might rise up, as though nourished, to divine and sublime things. For it used words taken from bodily things when it spoke of God; as when it says, under the shadow PL: in tegmine, "under cover." of your wings protect me (Ps 17:8 (16:8)). And from the spiritual creation it transferred many things, by which it might signify what was not so, but had to be spoken of as so; as it is, I am a jealous God (Exod 20:5); and, it repents me that I have made man (Gen 6:7).
deTrin.1.2De rebus autem quae omnino non sunt, non traxit aliqua vocabula, quibus vel figuraret locutiones, vel sirparet PL: spissaret, “pack.” aenigmata. Unde perniciosius et inanius evanescunt, qui tertio illo genere erroris a veritate secluduntur, hoc suspicando de Deo, quod neque in ipso, neque in ulla creatura inveniri potest. (Cf. Rom 1:19–21)
But from things that altogether do not exist it drew no terms by which either to figure its expressions or to compact PL: spissaret, "pack." its riddles. Hence the more perniciously and the more emptily do those vanish away who are cut off from the truth by that third kind of error, suspecting that of God which can be found neither in him nor in any creature. (See Rom 1:19–21)
deTrin.1.2Rebus enim quae in creatura inveniuntur, solet Scriptura divina velut infantilia oblectamenta formare, quibus infirmorum ad quaerenda superiora et inferiora deserenda, pro suo modulo tamquam passibus moveretur aspectus. PL: affectus, “inclinations.”
For from the things that are found in creation divine Scripture is wont to fashion, as it were, childlike delights, by which the gaze of the weak might be moved, according to its small measure, as though by steps, toward seeking higher things and abandoning lower ones. PL: affectus, "inclinations."
deTrin.1.2Quae vero proprie de Deo dicuntur, quaeque in nulla creatura inveniuntur, raro ponit Scriptura divina; sicut illud quod dictum est ad Moysen, ego sum qui sum; et, qui est, misit me ad vos. Cum enim esse aliquo modo dicatur et corpus et animus, nisi proprio quodam modo vellet intellegi, non id utique diceret.
But the things that are said properly of God, and that are found in no creature, divine Scripture sets down rarely; as that which was said to Moses, I am who am; and, he who is has sent me to you (Exod 3:14). For since both body and mind are in some way said to be, unless it wished to be understood in a certain proper way, it surely would not say this.
deTrin.1.2Et illud quod ait Apostolus, qui solus habet immortalitatem: cum et anima modo quodam immortalis esse dicatur et sit, non diceret, solus habet, nisi quia vera immortalitas incommutabilitas est, quam nulla potest habere creatura; quoniam solius est Creatoris. Hoc est Iacobus dicit: omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum, apud quem non est commutatio, nec momenti obumbratio. Hoc et David: mutabis ea, et mutabuntur; tu vero idem ipse es. (Cf. Heb 1:12)
And that which the Apostle says, who alone has immortality (1 Tim 6:16): since the soul too is said in a certain way to be immortal, and is so, he would not say alone has it, except that true immortality is unchangeableness, which no creature can have, since it belongs to the Creator alone. This is what James says: every good endowment and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change, nor shadow of a moment (Jas 1:17). This too David: you will change them, and they will be changed; but you are the same (Ps 102:26–27 (101:27–28); see Heb 1:12).
deTrin.1.23. Proinde substantiam Dei sine ulla sui commutatione mutabilia facientem, (Cf. Gen 1:21) et sine ullo suo temporali motu temporalia creantem, intueri et plene nosse difficile est: et ideo est necessaria purgatio mentis nostrae, qua illud ineffabile ineffabiliter videri possit; (Cf. Matt 5:8; Rom 12:2; Eph 4:23) qua nondum praediti, fide nutrimur, et per quaedam tolerabiliora, ut ad illud capiendum apti et habiles efficiamur, itinera ducimur.
3. Accordingly, it is difficult to behold and fully to know the substance of God, who makes changeable things without any change of himself, (See Gen 1:21) and who creates temporal things without any temporal movement of himself; and therefore a purification of our mind is necessary, by which that ineffable thing may ineffably be seen; (See Matt 5:8; Rom 12:2; Eph 4:23) and, not yet endowed with this, we are nourished by faith, and are led by certain more bearable paths, so that we may be made apt and fit to grasp it.
deTrin.1.3Unde Apostolus in Christo quidem dicit esse omnes thesauros sapientiae et scientiae absconditos; eum tamen quamvis iam gratia eius renatis, sed adhuc carnalibus et animalibus, tamquam parvulis in Christo, non ex divina virtute in qua aequalis est Patri, sed ex humana infirmitate ex qua crucifixus est, commendavit. (Cf. 1 Cor 1:13–23; John 3:3–5; 1 Pet 1:23; 2 Cor 13:4; Phil 2:6; Matt 28:5) Ait namque: neque enim iudicavi me scire aliquid in vobis, nisi Iesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum. Deinde secutus ait: et ego in infirmitate, et timore, et tremore multo fui apud vos. Et paulo post dicit eis: et ego, fratres, non potui loqui vobis quasi spiritualibus, sed quasi carnalibus. Quasi parvulis in Christo, lac potum dedi vobis, non escam; nondum enim poteratis; sed nec adhuc quidem potestis.
Hence the Apostle says that in Christ indeed are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; yet he commended him to those already reborn by his grace, but still carnal and animal, like little ones in Christ, not from the divine power in which he is equal to the Father, but from the human weakness by which he was crucified. (See 1 Cor 1:13–23; John 3:3–5; 1 Pet 1:23; 2 Cor 13:4; Phil 2:6; Matt 28:5) For he says: for I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ, and him crucified. Then he goes on to say: and I was with you in weakness and in fear and in much trembling. And a little later he says to them: and I, brothers, could not speak to you as to spiritual men, but as to carnal men. As to little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not solid food; for you were not yet able to receive it; nor indeed are you able even now.
deTrin.1.3Hoc cum dicitur quibusdam, irascuntur, et sibi contumeliose dici putant; et plerumque malunt credere eos potius, a quibus hoc audiunt, non habere quod dicant, quam se capere non posse quod dixerint. Et aliquando afferimus eis rationem, non quam petunt cum de Deo quaerunt; quia nec ipsi eam valent sumere, nec nos fortasse vel apprehendere vel proferre; sed qua demonstretur eis quam sint inhabiles minimeque idonei percipiendo quod exigunt. Sed quia non audiunt quod volunt, aut callide nos agere putant ut nostram occultemus imperitiam, aut malitiose quod eis invideamus peritiam; atque ita indignantes perturbatique discedunt.
When this is said to certain people, they grow angry, and think it is said to them insultingly; and for the most part they prefer to believe that those from whom they hear this have nothing to say, rather than that they themselves cannot grasp what has been said. And sometimes we offer them a reason—not the one they ask for when they inquire about God, since neither are they able to take it in, nor are we perhaps able even to apprehend or set it forth—but one by which it may be shown to them how unfit and least suited they are to perceive what they demand. But because they do not hear what they want, they think either that we are acting craftily so as to hide our own ignorance, or maliciously, because we begrudge them the knowledge; and so they go away indignant and disturbed.
deTrin.1.34. Quapropter adiuvante Domino Deo nostro suscipiemus et eam ipsam quam flagitant, quantum possumus, reddere rationem, quod Trinitas The word trinitas is more merely numerical in meaning than the English “Trinity,” which has come almost to demand a capital T. But the Latin word means no more than “threeness,” or more concretely, “threesome,” “a three.” sit unus et solus et verus Deus, et quam recte Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unius eiusdemque substantiae vel essentiae dicatur, credatur, intellegatur; (Cf. Isa 7:9)
4. Therefore, with the help of the Lord our God, we will undertake to render, as far as we can, the very reason they demand: that the Trinity The word trinitas is more merely numerical in meaning than the English "Trinity," which has come almost to demand a capital T. But the Latin word means no more than "threeness," or more concretely, "threesome," "a three." is the one and only and true God, and how rightly the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are said, believed, and understood to be of one and the same substance or essence; (See Isa 7:9)
deTrin.1.4ut non quasi nostris excusationibus illudantur, Cf. Augustine, Against the Academics 3.12.27; The Sermon on the Mount 1.3; Revisions 1.1.9. sed reipsa experiantur, et esse illud summum bonum quod purgatissimis mentibus cernitur, et a se propterea cerni comprehendique non posse, quia humanae mentis acies invalida in tam excellenti luce non figitur, nisi per iustitiam fidei (Cf. 1 Tim 6:16) nutrita vegetetur.
so that they may not be mocked, as it were, by our excuses, See Augustine, Against the Academics 3.12.27; The Sermon on the Mount 1.3; Revisions 1.1.9. but may experience in fact both that there is that supreme good which is discerned by the most purified minds, and that it cannot on that account be discerned and comprehended by them, because the human mind's vision, too weak, is not fixed upon so excellent a light unless it is nourished and invigorated by the righteousness of faith. (See 1 Tim 6:16)
deTrin.1.4Sed primum secundum auctoritatem Scripturarum Sanctarum, utrum ita se fides habeat, demonstrandum est. Deinde si voluerit et adiuverit Deus, istis garrulis ratiocinatoribus, elatioribus quam capacioribus, atque ideo morbo periculosiore laborantibus, sic fortasse serviemus, ut inveniant aliquid unde dubitare non possint, et ob hoc in eo quod invenire nequiverint, de suis mentibus potius quam de ipsa veritate, vel de nostris disputationibus conquerantur. (Cf. Sir 25:12–23)
But first it must be shown, on the authority of the Holy Scriptures, whether the faith is indeed so. Then, if God wills it and helps, we shall perhaps so serve these garrulous reasoners—more lofty than capacious, and therefore laboring under a more dangerous disease—that they may find something they cannot doubt, and on this account, in what they have been unable to find, may complain of their own minds rather than of the truth itself or of our discussions. (See Sir 25:12–23)
deTrin.1.4Atque ita si quid eis erga Deum vel amoris est vel timoris, ad initium fidei et ordinem redeant, iam sentientes quam salubriter in sancta Ecclesia medicina fidelium constituta sit, ut ad perceptionem incommutabilis veritatis imbecillem mentem observata pietas sanet, (Cf. Sir 25:14–16) ne in opinionem noxiae falsitatis temeritas inordinata praecipitet. (Cf. Titus 1:1) Nec pigebit autem me, sicubi haesito, quaerere; nec pudebit, sicubi erro, discere.
And so, if they have any love or fear toward God, let them return to the beginning and order of faith, now perceiving how healthfully the medicine of the faithful has been established in the holy Church, so that observed piety may heal the feeble mind for the perception of unchangeable truth, (See Sir 25:14–16) lest disordered rashness should cast it down into the opinion of harmful falsehood. (See Titus 1:1) It will not irk me, however, to inquire wherever I hesitate; nor will it shame me to learn wherever I err.
deTrin.1.45. Proinde quisquis haec legit, ubi pariter certus est, pergat mecum; ubi pariter haesitat, quaerat mecum; ubi errorem suum cognoscit, redeat ad me; ubi meum, revocet me. Ita ingrediamur simul caritatis viam, tendentes ad eum de quo dictum est, quaerite faciem eius semper. (Cf. 1 Chron 16:11) Et hoc placitum pium atque tutum coram Domino Deo nostro cum omnibus inierim, qui ea quae scribo legunt, et in omnibus scriptis meis, maximeque in his ubi quaeritur unitas Trinitatis, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti; quia nec periculosius alicubi erratur, nec laboriosius aliquid quaeritur, nec fructuosius aliquid invenitur. (Cf. Eccl 8:17)
5. Accordingly, whoever reads this, where he is equally certain, let him go on with me; where he equally hesitates, let him inquire with me; where he recognizes his own error, let him return to me; where mine, let him call me back. Thus let us together enter the way of love, reaching out toward him of whom it is said, seek his face always. (See 1 Chr 16:11) And this pious and safe agreement I would enter, before the Lord our God, with all who read what I write, both in all my writings and especially in these where the unity of the Trinity—of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit—is sought; for nowhere is error more dangerous, nor is anything sought with more labor, nor is anything found with more fruit. (See Eccl 8:17)
deTrin.1.5Quisquis ergo cum legit dicit, “Hoc non bene dictum est, quoniam non intellego,” locutionem meam reprehendit, non fidem; et forte vere potuit dici planius; verumtamen nullus hominum ita locutus est, ut in omnibus ab omnibus intellegeretur. Videat ergo cui hoc in sermone meo displicet, utrum alios in talibus rebus quaestionibusque versatos cum intellegat, cum me non intellegit; et si ita est, ponat librum meum, vel etiam, si hoc videtur, abiiciat, et eis potius quos intellegit operam et tempus impendat.
Whoever, then, when he reads, says, "This is not well stated, because I do not understand it," censures my manner of speaking, not the faith; and perhaps it truly could have been said more plainly; yet no one among men has ever spoken in such a way as to be understood in all things by all. Let him, then, who is displeased by this in my discourse see whether he understands others who are versed in such matters and questions, when he does not understand me; and if it is so, let him put down my book, or even, if it seems good, throw it away, and rather spend his labor and time on those whom he does understand.
deTrin.1.5Non tamen propterea patet me tacere debuisse, quia non tam expedite ac dilucide quam illi quos intellegit eloqui potui. Neque enim omnia quae ab omnibus conscribuntur, in omnium manus veniunt; et fieri potest ut nonnulli qui etiam haec nostra intellegere valent, illos planiores non inveniant libros, et in istos saltem incidant.
Yet it does not follow on that account that I ought to have kept silent, because I could not speak as readily and as lucidly as those whom he understands. For not all the things that are written by all come into the hands of all; and it may happen that some who are able to understand even these writings of ours do not find those plainer books, and at least fall upon these.
deTrin.1.5Ideoque utile est, plures a pluribus fieri diverso stilo, non diversa fide, etiam de quaestionibus eisdem, ut ad plurimos res ipsa perveniat; ad alios sic, ad alios autem sic. (Cf. 1 Cor 7:7) At si ille qui se ista non intellexisse conqueritur, nulla unquam de talibus rebus diligenter et acute disputata intellegere potuit; secum agat votis et studiis ut proficiat, non mecum querelis et conviciis ut taceam.
And therefore it is useful that many works be made by many writers in a different style, though not in a different faith, even on the same questions, so that the matter itself may reach the greatest number: some in this way, others in that. (See 1 Cor 7:7) But if the one who complains that he has not understood these things has never been able to understand anything carefully and acutely discussed about such matters, let him deal with himself by prayers and efforts so that he may make progress, not with me by complaints and reproaches so that I may keep silent.
deTrin.1.5Qui vero haec legens dicit, “intellego quidem quid dictum sit, sed non vere dictum est;” asserat, si placet, sententiam suam, et redarguat meam si potest. Quod si cum caritate et veritate fecerit, mihique etiam (si in hac vita maneo) cognoscendum facere curaverit, uberrimum fructum laboris huius mei cepero. Quod si mihi non potuerit, quibus id potuerit, me volente ac libente praestiterit.
But whoever, reading these things, says, "I do understand what has been said, but it is not stated truly," let him, if he pleases, assert his own opinion, and refute mine if he can. And if he does this with love and truth, and also takes care (if I remain in this life) to make it known to me, I shall reap the most abundant fruit of this labor of mine. And if he cannot do this for me, may he be willing and glad to do it for those for whom he can.
deTrin.1.5Ego tamen in lege Domini meditabor, si non die ac nocte, saltem quibus temporum particulis possum; et meditationes meas, ne oblivione fugiant, stilo alligo; sperans de misericordia Dei, quod in omnibus veris quae certa mihi sunt, perseverantem me faciet; si quid autem aliter sapio, id quoque mihi ipse revelabit, sive per occultas inspirationes atque admonitiones, sive per manifesta eloquia sua, sive per fraternas sermocinationes.
I, however, will meditate on the law of the Lord, if not day and night, at least in whatever little portions of time I can; and I bind my meditations to the pen, lest they flee away through forgetfulness; hoping in the mercy of God that he will make me persevere in all the true things that are certain to me; but if in anything I think otherwise, this too he himself will reveal to me, (Phil 3:15) whether through hidden inspirations and admonitions, or through his manifest utterances, or through the conversations of the brothers.
deTrin.1.5Hoc oro, et hoc depositum desideriumque meum penes ipsum habeo, qui mihi satis idoneus est custodire quae dedit, et reddere quae promisit. (Cf. John 17:12)
This I pray, and this my deposit and my desire I hold in his keeping, who is sufficiently able for me to guard what he has given, and to render what he has promised. (See John 17:12)
deTrin.1.56. Arbitror sane nonnullos tardiores, in quibusdam locis librorum meorum opinaturos me sensisse quod non sensi, aut non sensisse quod sensi. Quorum errorem mihi tribui non debere quis nesciat, si velut me sequentes neque apprehendentes deviaverint in aliquam falsitatem, dum cogor per quaedam densa et opaca viam carpere; quandoquidem nec ipsis sanctis divinorum Librorum auctoritatibus ullo modo quisquam recte tribuerit tam multos et varios errores haereticorum; cum omnes ex eisdem Scripturis falsas atque fallaces opiniones suas conentur defendere? (Cf. Eccl 25:2)
6. I think, indeed, that some of the slower will suppose, in certain passages of my books, that I meant what I did not mean, or did not mean what I meant. Who does not know that their error ought not to be charged to me, if, as though following me but not grasping me, they have strayed into some falsehood while I am forced to pick my way through certain dense and shadowy places—seeing that no one would rightly charge to the holy authorities of the divine Books themselves the many and varied errors of the heretics, when all of them try to defend their false and deceptive opinions out of these same Scriptures? (See Sir 25:2)
deTrin.1.6Admonet me plane ac mihi iubet suavissimo imperio lex Christi, hoc est caritas, (Cf. John 13:34; 1 John 5:3; 1 Tim 1:5) ut cum aliquid falsi in libris meis me sensisse homines putant quod ego non sensi, atque idipsum falsum alteri displicet, alteri placet, (Cf. 1 Cor 10:33; Gal 1:10) malim me reprehendi a reprehensore falsitatis, quam ab eius laudatore laudari. Ab illo enim quamvis ego non recte, qui hoc non senserim, error tamen ipse recte vituperatur; ab hoc autem nec ego recte laudor a quo existimor id sensisse quod vituperat veritas, nec ipsa sententia quam vituperat veritas. Ergo in nomine Domini susceptum opus aggrediamur.
Plainly the law of Christ—that is, love (See John 13:34; 1 John 5:3; 1 Tim 1:5)—admonishes me and commands me with its most gentle authority that, when men think I meant something false in my books which I did not mean, and that very falsehood displeases one and pleases another, (See 1 Cor 10:33; Gal 1:10) I should prefer to be censured by one who reproves the falsehood than to be praised by one who praises it. For by the former, although I am not rightly censured, since I did not mean this, the error itself is nevertheless rightly blamed; but by the latter neither am I rightly praised by one who reckons that I meant what the truth blames, nor is the very opinion that the truth blames. Therefore let us set about the work undertaken in the name of the Lord.
deTrin.1.6C. 2
deTrin.1.6
7. Omnes quos legere potui, qui ante me scripserunt de Trinitate, quae Deus est, divinorum Librorum veterum et novorum catholici tractatores, hoc intenderunt secundum Scripturas docere, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, unius eiusdemque substantiae inseparabili aequalitate divinam insinuent unitatem; ideoque non sint tres dii, sed unus Deus; quamvis Pater Filium genuerit, et ideo Filius non sit qui Pater est; Filiusque a Patre sit genitus, et ideo Pater non sit qui Filius est; Spiritusque Sanctus nec Pater sit nec Filius, sed tantum Patris et Filii Spiritus, Patri et Filio etiam ipse coaequalis, et ad Trinitatis pertinens unitatem. (Cf. Ps 2:7, 109:3; Acts 13:33; Heb 1:5, 5:5)
7. All those I have been able to read who have written before me about the Trinity, who is God—Catholic expounders of the divine Books, old and new—have intended to teach, according to the Scriptures, this: that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, of one and the same substance, suggest the divine unity in an inseparable equality; and therefore there are not three gods, but one God; although the Father begot the Son, and therefore the Son is not he who is the Father; and the Son was begotten of the Father, and therefore the Father is not he who is the Son; and the Holy Spirit is neither Father nor Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, himself also coequal with the Father and the Son, and belonging to the unity of the Trinity. (See Ps 2:7; 110:3 (109:3); Acts 13:33; Heb 1:5; 5:5)
deTrin.1.7Non tamen eamdem Trinitatem natam de Virgine Maria, et sub Pontio Pilato crucifixam et sepultam, tertio die resurrexisse et in coelum ascendisse, (Cf. Matt 10:20; Gal 4:6) sed tantummodo Filium. Nec eamdem Trinitatem descendisse in specie columbae super Iesum baptizatum; (Cf. Matt 3:16; Mark 1:9–10; Luke 3:21–22; John 1:32) aut die Pentecostes post ascensionem Domini, sonitu facto de coelo quasi ferretur flatus vehemens, et linguis divisis velut ignis, PL adds sedisse super unumquemque eorum, “settled on each of them,” a gloss in one manuscript completing the text of Acts 2:3. sed tantummodo Spiritum Sanctum. (Cf. Acts 2:2–4) Nec eamdem Trinitatem dixisse de coelo: tu es Filius meus, sive cum baptizatus est a Iohanne, sive in monte quando cum illo erant tres discipuli; aut quando sonuit vox, dicens. Et clarificavi, et iterum clarificabo: sed tantummodo Patris vocem fuisse ad Filium factam; quamvis Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, sicut inseparabiles sunt, ita inseparabiliter operentur. Cf. 1 John 5:7; Augustine, The Predestination of the Saints 8.13. Haec et mea fides est, quando haec est Catholica fides.
Yet it was not the same Trinity that was born of the Virgin Mary, and crucified and buried under Pontius Pilate, and rose on the third day and ascended into heaven, (See Matt 10:20; Gal 4:6) but only the Son. Nor was it the same Trinity that descended in the form of a dove upon Jesus when he was baptized; (See Matt 3:16; Mark 1:9–10; Luke 3:21–22; John 1:32) or that, on the day of Pentecost after the Lord's ascension, when a sound was made from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and there were divided tongues as of fire, PL adds sedisse super unumquemque eorum, "settled on each of them," a gloss in one manuscript completing the text of Acts 2:3. but only the Holy Spirit. (See Acts 2:2–4) Nor was it the same Trinity that said from heaven, you are my Son, whether when he was baptized by John, or on the mountain when the three disciples were with him; or when the voice sounded, saying, and I have glorified it, and will glorify it again: but it was only the Father's voice made to the Son; although the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, just as they are inseparable, so they work inseparably. See 1 John 5:7; Augustine, The Predestination of the Saints 8.13. This is also my faith, since this is the Catholic faith.
deTrin.1.78. Sed in ea nonnulli perturbantur, cum audiunt Deum Patrem, et Deum Filium, et Deum Spiritum Sanctum, et tamen hanc Trinitatem non tres deos, sed unum Deum; et quemadmodum id intellegant quaerunt; praesertim cum dicitur, inseparabiliter operari Trinitatem in omni re quam Deus operatur, et tamen quamdam vocem Patris sonuisse, (Cf. Matt 3:17; Mark 1:11, 9:6; Luke 3:22; John 1:32) quae vox Filii non sit; in carne autem natum, et passum, et resurrexisse, et ascendisse PL adds in caelum, “into heaven.” nonnisi Filium; in columbae autem specie venisse nonnisi Spiritum Sanctum. (Cf. Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10)
8. But in this some are troubled, when they hear of God the Father, and God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit, and yet that this Trinity is not three gods but one God; and they ask how they are to understand this; especially since it is said that the Trinity works inseparably in everything that God works, and yet that a certain voice of the Father sounded (See Matt 3:17; Mark 1:11; 9:6; Luke 3:22; John 1:32) which was not the voice of the Son; that it was only the Son who was born in the flesh, and suffered, and rose again, and ascended PL adds in caelum, "into heaven."; and that it was only the Holy Spirit who came in the form of a dove. (See Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10)
deTrin.1.8Intellegere volunt, quomodo et illam vocem, quae nonnisi Patris fuit, Trinitas fecerit; et illam carnem, in qua nonnisi Filius de Virgine natus est, (Cf. John 1:14; 1 John 4:2) eadem Trinitas creaverit; et illam columbae speciem, in qua nonnisi Spiritus Sanctus apparuit, illa ipsa Trinitas operata sit. Alioquin non inseparabiliter Trinitas operatur, sed alia Pater facit, alia Filius, alia Spiritus Sanctus; aut si quaedam simul faciunt, quaedam sine invicem, iam non inseparabilis est Trinitas.
They want to understand how the Trinity made both that voice which was the Father's alone, and how the same Trinity created that flesh in which the Son alone was born of the Virgin, (See John 1:14; 1 John 4:2) and how that very Trinity wrought that form of a dove in which the Holy Spirit alone appeared. Otherwise the Trinity does not work inseparably, but the Father does some things, the Son others, the Holy Spirit others; or if they do some things together, others separately, then the Trinity is no longer inseparable.
deTrin.1.8Movet etiam quomodo Spiritus Sanctus in Trinitate sit, quem nec Pater, nec Filius, nec ambo genuerint, cum sit Spiritus et Patris et Filii. Quia ergo quaerunt ista homines, et taedio nobis sunt; si quid hinc ex dono Dei sapit infirmitas nostra, edisseramus eis ut possumus, neque cum invidia tabescente iter habeamus.
It also troubles them how the Holy Spirit is in the Trinity, whom neither the Father nor the Son nor both begot, since he is the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son. Since, then, men inquire about these things, and they are wearisome to us, if our weakness has any taste of this from the gift of God, let us set it forth to them as we are able, and let us not journey with consuming envy.
deTrin.1.8Si dicimus nihil nos de talibus rebus cogitare solere, mentimur; si autem fatemur habitare ista in cogitationibus nostris, quoniam rapimur amore indagandae veritatis, flagitant iure caritatis ut eis indicemus quid hinc excogitare potuerimus.
If we say that we are not accustomed to think about such things, we lie; but if we confess that these things dwell in our thoughts, since we are carried away by the love of searching out the truth, they demand, by the right of love, that we tell them what we have been able to think out about this.
deTrin.1.8Non quia iam acceperim, aut iam perfectus sim (Cf. Phil 3:12) (nam si Paulus apostolus, quanto magis ego longe infra illius pedes iacens, non me arbitror apprehendisse?); (Cf. Phil 3:13) sed pro modulo meo, si ea quae retro sunt obliviscor, et in anteriora me extendo, et secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae vocationis, Augustine’s text reads secundum intentionem, which is a literal but inaccurate rendering of the Greek kata skopon. The Vulgate translates correctly ad destinatum, “to the goal.” quantum eiusdem viae peregerim, et quo pervenerim, unde mihi in finem reliquus cursus est, ut aperiam desideratur a me, illis desiderantibus quibus me servire cogit libera caritas.
Not that I have already obtained, or am already perfect (See Phil 3:12) (for if Paul the apostle was not, how much more do I, lying far below his feet, not think myself to have grasped it?); (See Phil 3:13) but according to my small measure, if I forget what lies behind, and strain forward to what lies ahead, and according to my aim press on to the prize of the upward call, Augustine's text reads secundum intentionem, which is a literal but inaccurate rendering of the Greek kata skopon. The Vulgate translates correctly ad destinatum, "to the goal." it is desired of me that I disclose how much of that same road I have traveled, and where I have arrived from which the remaining course is left for me to the end—it being desired by those whom free love compels me to serve.
deTrin.1.8Oportet autem, et donabit Deus, ut eis ministrando quae legant, ipse quoque proficiam; et eis cupiens respondere quaerentibus, ipse quoque inveniam quod quaerebam. (Cf. Matt 7:7–8; Luke 11:9–10) Ergo suscepi haec, iubente atque adiuvante Domino Deo nostro, non tam cognita cum auctoritate disserere, quam ea cum pietate disserendo cognoscere.
And it is fitting, and God will grant, that in ministering to them things for them to read, I myself may also make progress; and that, wishing to answer them as they ask, I myself may also find what I was seeking. (See Matt 7:7–8; Luke 11:9–10) Therefore I have undertaken these things, at the command and with the help of the Lord our God, not so much to discuss with authority what is known, as to come to know it by discussing it with piety.
deTrin.1.89. Qui dixerunt Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum non esse Deum, aut non esse verum Deum, aut non cum Patre unum et solum Deum, aut non vere immortalem, quia mutabilem, manifestissima divinorum testimoniorum et consona voce convicti sunt; unde sunt illa: in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum. Manifestum est enim quod Verbum Dei, Filium Dei unicum accipimus, de quo post dicit, et Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis, propter nativitatem incarnationis eius, quae facta est in tempore ex Virgine. In eo autem declarat, non tantum Deum esse, sed etiam eiusdem cum Patre substantiae, quia cum dixisset, et Deus erat Verbum: hoc erat, inquit, in principio apud Deum; omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Neque enim dicit, omnia; nisi quae facta sunt, id est omnem creaturam. Unde liquido apparet ipsum factum non esse per quem facta sunt omnia. Et si factus non est, creatura non est; si autem creatura non est, eiusdem cum Patre substantiae est. Omnis enim substantia quae Deus non est, creatura est; et quae creatura non est, Deus est. Et si non est Filius eiusdem substantiae cuius Pater; ergo facta substantia est; si facta substantia est, non omnia per ipsum facta sunt; at omnia per ipsum facta sunt; unius igitur eiusdemque cum Patre substantiae est. Et ideo non tantum Deus, sed et verus Deus. Quod idem Ioannes apertissime in Epistola sua dicit: scimus quod Filius Dei venerit, et dederit nobis intellectum ut cognoscamus verum Deum, et simus in vero Filio eius Iesu Christo. Hic est verus Deus, et vita aeterna.
9. Those who have said that our Lord Jesus Christ is not God, or is not true God, or is not one and the only God with the Father, or is not truly immortal because changeable, have been refuted by the most manifest and harmonious voice of the divine testimonies; whence come those words: in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. For it is manifest that we take the Word of God to be the only Son of God, of whom he says afterward, and the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, on account of the birth of his incarnation, which took place in time of the Virgin. But in this he declares that he is not only God, but also of the same substance as the Father, since, after he had said, and the Word was God, he says, this was in the beginning with God; all things were made through him, and without him was nothing made. For he says all things only of those that were made, that is, of the whole creation. Whence it clearly appears that he himself was not made, through whom all things were made. And if he was not made, he is not a creature; but if he is not a creature, he is of the same substance as the Father. For every substance that is not God is a creature; and what is not a creature is God. And if the Son is not of the same substance as the Father, then he is a made substance; if he is a made substance, then all things were not made through him; but all things were made through him; therefore he is of one and the same substance as the Father. And so he is not only God, but also true God. The same John says this most plainly in his Epistle: we know that the Son of God has come, and has given us understanding, to know the true God, and to be in his true Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life.
deTrin.1.910. Hinc etiam consequenter intellegitur non tantummodo de Patre dixisse apostolum Paulum: qui solus habet immortalitatem, Augustine’s discussion of this passage is a more or less direct refutation of the interpretation given by Tertullian (Against Praxeas 14 [PL 2:171A]) and Novatian (On the Trinity 18 [PL 3:946CD]). sed de uno et solo Deo, quod est ipsa Trinitas. Neque enim ipsa vita aeterna mortalis est secundum aliquam mutabilitatem; ac per hoc Filius Dei, quia vita aeterna est, cum Patre etiam ipse intellegitur, ubi dictum est, qui solus habet immortalitatem. Eius enim vitae aeternae et nos participes facti, pro modulo nostro immortales efficimur. Sed aliud est ipsa cuius participes efficimur, vita aeterna; aliud nos qui eius participatione vivemus in aeternum.
10. Hence it is also consequently understood that the apostle Paul said, who alone has immortality, Augustine's discussion of this passage is a more or less direct refutation of the interpretation given by Tertullian (Against Praxeas 14 [PL 2:171A]) and Novatian (On the Trinity 18 [PL 3:946CD]). not of the Father alone, but of the one and only God, who is the Trinity itself. For eternal life itself is not mortal according to any changeableness; and on this account the Son of God, since he is eternal life, is himself also understood together with the Father, where it is said, who alone has immortality. For made partakers of that eternal life, we too are made immortal according to our small measure. But it is one thing, the eternal life of which we are made partakers; another thing, we who shall live forever by partaking of it.
deTrin.1.10Si enim dixisset, quem temporibus propriis ostendit The PL, reading ostendet, follows the Vugate and the Greek: “will manifest.” Pater beatus et solus potens, Rex regum et Dominus dominantium, qui solus habet immortalitatem, nec sic inde separatum Filium oporteret intellegi.
For if he had said, which the blessed and only Sovereign, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who alone has immortality, the Father will manifest The PL, reading ostendet, follows the Vulgate and the Greek: "will manifest." in his own times, not even thus would it be right to understand the Son as separated from this.
deTrin.1.10Neque enim, quia ipse Filius alibi loquens voce Sapientiae (ipse est enim Dei Sapientia) ait, gyrum caeli circuivi sola, separavit a se Patrem; quanto magis ergo non est necesse ut tantummodo de Patre praeter Filium intellegatur, quod dictum est, qui solus habet immortalitatem, cum ita dictum sit: ut serves, inquit, mandatum sine macula, irreprehensibile, In the Latin, the adjectives qualify “the commandment”; in the Greek, they can equally qualify “you,” and are usually so translated. usque in adventum Domini nostri Iesu Christi; quem temporibus propriis ostendet beatus et solus potens, Rex regum et Dominus dominantium; qui solus habet immortalitatem, et lucem habitat inaccessibilem; quem nemo hominum vidit, nec videre potest; cui est honor et gloria in saecula saeculorum. Amen. In quibus verbis, nec Pater proprie nominatus est, nec Filius, nec Spiritus Sanctus; sed beatus et solus potens, Rex regum et Dominus dominantium, quod est unus et solus et verus Deus ipsa Trinitas.
For neither, because the Son himself, speaking elsewhere in the voice of Wisdom (for he is the Wisdom of God), says, I alone have gone round the circuit of heaven, did he separate the Father from himself; how much more, then, is it not necessary that what is said—who alone has immortality—be understood only of the Father apart from the Son, when it is said thus: that you keep, he says, the commandment unstained, free from reproach, In the Latin, the adjectives qualify "the commandment"; in the Greek, they can equally qualify "you," and are usually so translated. until the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ; which the blessed and only Sovereign will manifest in his own times, the King of kings and Lord of lords; who alone has immortality, and dwells in unapproachable light; whom no man has seen, nor can see; to whom be honor and glory forever and ever. Amen. In which words neither the Father is named properly, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit; but the blessed and only Sovereign, the King of kings and Lord of lords, which is the one and only and true God, the Trinity itself.
deTrin.1.1011. Nisi forte quae sequuntur, perturbabunt hunc intellectum, quia dixit, quem nemo hominum vidit, nec videre potest; cum hoc etiam ad Christum pertinere secundum eius divinitatem accipiatur, quam non viderunt Iudaei, qui tamen carnem viderunt et crucifixerunt. Videri autem divinitas humano visu nullo modo potest; sed eo visu videtur, quo iam qui vident, non homines, sed ultra homines sunt. Recte ergo ipse Deus Trinitatis intellegitur beatus et solus potens, ostendens adventum Domini nostri Iesu Christi temporibus propriis. Sic enim dictum est, solus habet immortalitatem; quomodo dictum est, qui facit mirabilia solus. Quod velim scire de quo dictum accipiant. Si de Patre tantum, quomodo ergo verum est, quod ipse Filius dicit, quaecumque enim Pater facit, haec eadem et Filius facit similiter? An quidquam est inter mirabilia mirabilius quam resuscitare et vivificare mortuos? Dicit autem idem Filius, sicut Pater suscitat mortuos et vivificat, sic et Filius quos vult vivificat. Quomodo ergo solus Pater facit mirabilia, cum haec verba nec Patrem tantum, nec Filium tantum permittant intellegi, sed utique Deum unum verum solum, id est, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum?
11. Unless perhaps what follows will trouble this understanding, because he said, whom no man has seen, nor can see; since this too is taken to pertain to Christ according to his divinity, which the Jews did not see, though they saw and crucified the flesh. But the divinity can in no way be seen by human sight; rather it is seen with that sight by which those who already see are not men, but beyond men. Rightly, therefore, is the very God of the Trinity understood as the blessed and only Sovereign, manifesting the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ in his own times. For it is said, alone has immortality, just as it is said, who alone does wondrous things. Of whom I would like to know of whom they take this to be said. If of the Father only, then how is it true that the Son himself says, for whatever the Father does, these same things the Son also does likewise? Or is there anything among wonders more wonderful than to raise and bring the dead to life? But the same Son says, as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom he will. How, then, does the Father alone do wondrous things, when these words allow us to understand neither the Father only, nor the Son only, but assuredly the one true and only God, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit?
deTrin.1.1112. Item cum dicit idem Apostolus, nobis unus Deus Pater, ex quo omnia, et nos in ipso; et unus Dominus Iesus Christus, per quem omnia, et nos per ipsum. Quis dubitet eum omnia quae creata sunt dicere, sicut Ioannes, omnia per ipsum facta sunt? Quaero itaque de quo dicit alio loco, quoniam ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia; ipsi gloria in saecula saeculorum. Amen.
12. Likewise, when the same Apostle says, for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him. Who doubts that by all things he means those that were created, just as John says, all things were made through him? I ask, therefore, of whom he speaks in another place, for from him, and through him, and in him are all things; to him be glory forever and ever. Amen.
deTrin.1.12Si enim de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, ut singulis personis singula tribuantur; ex ipso, ex Patre; per ipsum, per Filium; in ipso, in Spiritu Sancto; manifestum quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unus Deus est, quando singulariter intulit, ipsi gloria in saecula saeculorum.
For if it is of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, so that single things are attributed to single persons—from him, from the Father; through him, through the Son; in him, in the Holy Spirit—it is manifest that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, since he added in the singular, to him be glory forever and ever.
deTrin.1.12Unde enim coepit hunc sensum, non ait, o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Patris, aut Filii, aut Spiritus Sancti; sed, sapientiae et scientiae Dei! Quam inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius, et investigabiles viae eius! Quis enim cognovit mentem Domini? Aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? Aut quis prior dedit illi, ut retribuetur ei? Quoniam ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia; ipsi gloria in saecula saeculorum. Amen.
For where he began this sense, he did not say, O depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit; but, of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counselor? Or who has first given to him, that he should be repaid? For from him, and through him, and in him are all things; to him be glory forever and ever. Amen.
deTrin.1.12Si autem hoc de Patre tantummodo intellegi volunt, quomodo ergo omnia per Patrem sunt, sicut hic dicitur; et omnia per Filium, sicut ad Corinthios ubi ait, et unus Dominus Iesus Christus, per quem omnia; et sicut in Evangelio Ioannis, omnia per ipsum facta sunt? Si enim alia per Patrem, alia per Filium, iam non omnia per Patrem, nec omnia per Filium. Si autem omnia per Patrem, et omnia per Filium; eadem per Patrem, quae per Filium.
But if they want this to be understood of the Father only, then how are all things through the Father, as is said here; and all things through the Son, as in the letter to the Corinthians where he says, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things; and as in the Gospel of John, all things were made through him? For if some things are through the Father, others through the Son, then all things are not through the Father, nor all things through the Son. But if all things are through the Father, and all things through the Son, then the same things are through the Father which are through the Son.
deTrin.1.12Aequalis ergo est Patri Filius, et inseparabilis operatio est Patris et Filii. Quia si vel Filium fecit Pater quem non fecit ipse Filius, non omnia per Filium facta sunt; at omnia per Filium facta sunt. Ipse igitur factus non est, ut cum Patre faceret omnia quae facta sunt. Quamquam nec ab ipso verbo tacuerit Apostolus, et apertissime omnino dixerit, qui cum in Dei forma esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo, Since Augustine does not think the meaning of this text needs to be discussed, it had presumably escaped his notice or slipped his mind that Novatian takes it to prove the Son’s inequality (On the Trinity 22 [PL 3:958A]). hic Deum proprie Patrem appellans, sicut alibi, caput autem Christi, Deus.
The Son, therefore, is equal to the Father, and the working of the Father and of the Son is inseparable. For if the Father even made the Son, whom the Son himself did not make, then all things were not made through the Son; but all things were made through the Son. He himself, therefore, was not made, so that he might make together with the Father all things that were made. And yet the Apostle did not keep silent even about the word itself, but said most plainly of all, who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, Since Augustine does not think the meaning of this text needs to be discussed, it had presumably escaped his notice or slipped his mind that Novatian takes it to prove the Son's inequality (On the Trinity 22 [PL 3:958A]). here calling the Father properly God, as elsewhere, but the head of Christ is God.
deTrin.1.1213. Similiter et de Spiritu Sancto collecta sunt testimonia, quibus ante nos qui haec disputaverunt, abundantius usi sunt, quia et ipse Deus et non creatura. For example, Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto, 3.19.18 (PL 16); John Damascene, Epistle 2 (PL 13:351B). Quod si non creatura, non tantum Deus (nam et homines dicti sunt dii), sed etiam verus Deus. Ergo Patri et Filio prorsus aequalis, et in Trinitatis unitate consubstantialis et coaeternus. Maxime vero illo loco satis claret, quod Spiritus Sanctus non sit creatura, ubi iubemur non servire creaturae, sed Creatori, non eo modo quo iubemur per caritatem servire invicem, quod est graece δουλεύειν, sed eo modo quo tantum Deo servitur, quod est graece λατρεύειν. Unde idololatrae dicuntur qui simulacris eam servitutem exhibent quae debetur Deo. Secundum hanc enim servitutem dictum est, Dominum Deum tuum adorabis, et illi soli servies. (Cf. Deut 6:13, 10:20; Matt 4:10; Luke 4:8)
13. Likewise, testimonies have been gathered concerning the Holy Spirit, which those who discussed these things before us used more abundantly, because he too is God and not a creature. For example, Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto 3.19.18 (PL 16); John Damascene, Epistle 2 (PL 13:351B). And if not a creature, then not only God (for men too have been called gods), but also true God. Therefore he is wholly equal to the Father and the Son, and in the unity of the Trinity consubstantial and coeternal. But most of all it is clear enough that the Holy Spirit is not a creature in that place where we are commanded to serve not the creature but the Creator, not in the way in which we are commanded through love to serve one another, which in Greek is δουλεύειν, but in the way in which God alone is served, which in Greek is λατρεύειν. Hence those are called idolaters who render to images that service which is owed to God. For according to this service it was said, you shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve. (See Deut 6:13; 10:20; Matt 4:10; Luke 4:8)
deTrin.1.13Nam et hoc distinctius in graeca Scriptura invenitur, λατρεύσεις enim habet. Porro si tali servitute creaturae servire prohibemur, quandoquidem dictum est, Dominum Deum tuum adorabis, et illi soli servies—unde et Apostolus detestatur eos qui coluerunt et servierunt creaturae, potius quam Creatori; non est utique creatura Spiritus Sanctus, cui ab omnibus sanctis talis servitus exhibetur dicente Apostolo, nos enim sumus circumcisio, Spiritui Dei servientes, quod est in graeco, λατρεύοντες. Plures enim codices etiam latini sic habent: qui Spiritui Dei servimus; graeci autem omnes, aut paene omnes. In nonnullis autem exemplaribus latinis invenimus non: Spiritui Dei servimus; sed, spiritu Deo servimus. This reading represents a Greek variant where “God” is in apposition to “Spirit,” and both are in the dative, so that it should really mean “we who serve God the Spirit” and give even greater weight to Augustine’s case.
For this too is found more distinctly in the Greek Scripture, for it has λατρεύσεις. Now if by such service we are forbidden to serve the creature, since it was said, you shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve—whence also the Apostle detests those who worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator—then the Holy Spirit is certainly not a creature, to whom such service is rendered by all the saints, the Apostle saying, for we are the circumcision, serving the Spirit of God, which in Greek is λατρεύοντες. For many Latin codices also have it thus: who serve the Spirit of God; but all the Greek ones, or nearly all. In some Latin copies, however, we find not we serve the Spirit of God, but in the spirit we serve God. This reading represents a Greek variant where "God" is in apposition to "Spirit," and both are in the dative, so that it should really mean "we who serve God the Spirit" and give even greater weight to Augustine's case.
deTrin.1.13Sed qui in hoc errant, et auctoritati graviori cedere detractant, numquid et illud varium in codicibus reperiunt: nescitis quia corpora vestra templum in vobis est Spiritus Sancti, quem habetis a Deo? Quid autem insanius magisque sacrilegum est, quam ut quisquam dicere audeat membra Christi templum esse creaturae minoris secundum ipsos, “These people” refers to the Macedonians (that is, followers of Macedonius), whose error was condemned at the Council of Constantinople in 381. quam Christus est? Alio enim loco dicit, corpora vestra membra sunt Christi. Si autem quae membra sunt Christi, templum est Spiritus Sancti, non est creatura Spiritus Sanctus, quia cui corpus nostrum templum exhibemus, necesse est ut huic eam servitutem debeamus, qua non nisi Deo serviendum est, quae graece appellatur λατρεία. Unde consequenter dicit, glorificate ergo Deum in corpore vestro.
But those who err in this, and decline to yield to the weightier authority, do they not also find that other passage varying in the codices: do you not know that your bodies are a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom you have from God? But what is more insane and more sacrilegious than that anyone should dare to say that the members of Christ are the temple of a creature lesser, according to these people, "These people" refers to the Macedonians (that is, followers of Macedonius), whose error was condemned at the Council of Constantinople in 381. than Christ is? For in another place he says, your bodies are members of Christ. But if the things that are members of Christ are the temple of the Holy Spirit, then the Holy Spirit is not a creature, since to him to whom we render our body as a temple we must necessarily owe that service by which God alone is to be served, which in Greek is called λατρεία. Whence he consequently says, glorify God, therefore, in your body.
deTrin.1.13C. 3
deTrin.1.13
14. His et talibus divinarum Scripturarum testimoniis, quibus, ut dixi, priores nostri copiosius usi, expugnaverunt haereticorum tales calumnias vel errores, insinuatur fidei nostrae unitas et aequalitas Trinitatis. Sed quia multa in sanctis Libris propter incarnationem Verbi Dei, quae pro salute nostra reparanda facta est, ut mediator Dei et hominum esset homo Christus Iesus, ita dicuntur, ut maiorem Filio Patrem significent, vel etiam apertissime ostendant; erraverunt homines minus diligenter scrutantes vel intuentes universam seriem Scripturarum, et ea quae de Christo Iesu secundum hominem dicta sunt, ad eius substantiam quae ante incarnationem sempiterna erat, et sempiterna est, transferre conati sunt. Et illi quidem dicunt minorem Filium esse quam Pater est, quia scriptum est ipso Domino dicente, Pater maior me est. Cf. Hilary, De Synodis 11. Veritas autem ostendit secundum istum modum etiam se ipso minorem Filium. Quomodo enim non etiam se ipso minor factus est, qui semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens?
14. By these and similar testimonies of the divine Scriptures, which, as I said, our predecessors used more copiously when they overthrew such slanders or errors of the heretics, the unity and equality of the Trinity is suggested to our faith. But because many things are said in the holy Books on account of the incarnation of the Word of God—which took place for the restoring of our salvation, that the man Christ Jesus might be the mediator between God and men—in such a way as to signify, or even most plainly to show, that the Father is greater than the Son; men have erred who scrutinized or considered less diligently the whole series of the Scriptures, and have tried to transfer the things that were said of Christ Jesus according to the man to that substance of his which before the incarnation was everlasting, and is everlasting. And they indeed say that the Son is less than the Father is, because it is written, the Lord himself saying, the Father is greater than I. See Hilary, De Synodis 11. But the truth shows that according to this manner the Son is less even than himself. For how is he not made less even than himself, who emptied himself, taking the form of a servant?
deTrin.1.14Neque enim sic accepit formam servi, ut amitteret formam Dei, in qua erat aequalis Patri. Si ergo ita accepta est forma servi, ut non amitteretur forma Dei, cum et in forma servi et in forma Dei idem ipse sit Filius unigenitus Dei Patris, in forma Dei aequalis Patri, (Cf. Phil 2:6) in forma servi mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus; (Cf. 1 Tim 2:5) quis non intellegat quod in forma Dei etiam ipse se ipso maior est, in forma autem servi etiam se ipso minor est?
For he did not so take the form of a servant as to lose the form of God, in which he was equal to the Father. If, then, the form of a servant was so taken that the form of God was not lost—since in both the form of a servant and the form of God he is the same only-begotten Son of God the Father, in the form of God equal to the Father, (See Phil 2:6) in the form of a servant the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus (See 1 Tim 2:5)—who does not understand that in the form of God he is greater even than himself, but in the form of a servant he is less even than himself?
deTrin.1.14Non itaque immerito Scriptura utrumque dicit, et aequalem Patri Filium, et Patrem maiorem Filio. Illud enim propter formam Dei, hoc autem propter formam servi, sine ulla confusione intellegitur.
Not undeservedly, therefore, does Scripture say both: that the Son is equal to the Father, and that the Father is greater than the Son. For the one is understood on account of the form of God, the other on account of the form of a servant, without any confusion.
deTrin.1.14Et haec nobis regula per omnes sacras Scripturas dissolvendae huius quaestionis, ex uno capitulo Epistolae Pauli apostoli promitur, ubi manifestius ista distinctio commendatur. Ait enim: qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo; sed semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens, in similitudine PL: in similitudinem, “into the likeness.” hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo. Est ergo Dei Filius Deo Patri natura aequalis, habitu minor. In forma enim servi quam accepit, minor est Patre; in forma autem Dei in qua erat etiam antequam hanc accepisset, aequalis est Patri. In forma Dei, Verbum per quod facta sunt omnia; in forma autem servi, factus ex muliere, factus sub lege, ut eos qui sub lege erant, redimeret. Proinde in forma Dei fecit hominem; in forma servi factus est homo. Nam si Pater tantum sine Filio fecisset hominem, non scriptum esset, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. (Cf. Wis 2:23; Sir 17) Ergo quia forma Dei accepit formam servi, utrumque Deus et utrumque homo; sed utrumque Deus propter accipientem Deum, utrumque autem homo propter acceptum hominem. Neque enim illa susceptione alterum eorum in alterum conversum atque mutatum est; nec divinitas quippe in creaturam mutata est, ut desisteret esse divinitas; nec creatura in divinitatem, ut desisteret esse creatura. Cf. Cicero, De Partitionbus Oratoriae 7.23; De Oratore 3.45.177.
And this rule for resolving this question throughout all the sacred Scriptures is drawn from one little chapter of the Epistle of the apostle Paul, where this distinction is more plainly commended. For he says: who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped; but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness PL: in similitudinem, "into the likeness." of men, and found in fashion as a man. The Son of God, therefore, is equal to God the Father by nature, less in fashion. For in the form of a servant which he took, he is less than the Father; but in the form of God in which he was even before he took this, he is equal to the Father. In the form of God, the Word through whom all things were made; but in the form of a servant, made of a woman, made under the law, that he might redeem those who were under the law. Accordingly, in the form of God he made man; in the form of a servant he was made man. For if the Father only, without the Son, had made man, it would not have been written, let us make man to our image and likeness. (See Wis 2:23; Sir 17) Therefore, because the form of God took the form of a servant, he is both God and man; but he is both God on account of the God who takes, and both man on account of the man who is taken. For by that assumption neither of the two was turned and changed into the other; neither was the divinity changed into the creature, so as to cease to be divinity; nor the creature into the divinity, so as to cease to be a creature. See Cicero, De Partitionibus Oratoriae 7.23; De Oratore 3.45.177.
deTrin.1.1415. Illud autem quod dicit Apostolus, cum autem ei omnia subiecta fuerint, tunc et ipse Filius subiectus erit ei qui illi subiecit omnia; aut ideo dictum est, ne quisquam putaret habitum Christi, qui ex humana creatura susceptus est, conversum iri postea in ipsam divinitatem, vel, ut certius expresserim, deitatem, Deitas, a theological neologism on the model of the Greek theotes, more precisely means “Godness,” whereas divinitas often has a wider reference, and can mean “godlikeness.” See The City of God 7.1; also below, 4.29. quae non est creatura, sed est unitas Trinitatis incorporea et incommutabilis et sibimet consubstantialis et coaeterna natura.
15. But that which the Apostle says, when all things shall have been subjected to him, then the Son himself also will be subjected to him who subjected all things to him—either this was said lest anyone should think that the fashion of Christ, which was assumed from the human creature, will afterward be turned into the very divinity, or, that I may express it more surely, into the deity, Deitas, a theological neologism on the model of the Greek theotes, more precisely means "Godness," whereas divinitas often has a wider reference, and can mean "godlikeness." See The City of God 7.1; also below, 4.29. which is not a creature, but is the unity of the Trinity, an incorporeal and unchangeable nature, consubstantial with itself and coeternal.
deTrin.1.15Aut si quisquam contendit, Something like this view, not so crudely put, can be found in Gregory of Nyssa’s Adversus Apollinarem 53 (PG 45:1253B). ut aliqui senserunt, ita dictum, et ipse Filius subiectus erit ei qui illi subiecit omnia, ut ipsam subiectionem, commutationem et conversionem credat futuram creaturae in ipsam substantiam vel essentiam Creatoris, id est, ut quae fuerat substantia creaturae, fiat substantia Creatoris; certe vel hoc concedit, quod non habet ullam dubitationem, nondum hoc fuisse factum cum Dominus diceret, Pater maior me est. Dixit enim hoc non solum antequam ascendisset in coelum, verum etiam antequam passus resurrexisset a mortuis.
Or if anyone contends, Something like this view, not so crudely put, can be found in Gregory of Nyssa's Adversus Apollinarem 53 (PG 45:1253B). as some have held, that it was said—and the Son himself will be subjected to him who subjected all things to him—in such a way as to believe that this very subjection will be a changing and turning of the creature into the very substance or essence of the Creator, that is, so that what had been the substance of the creature becomes the substance of the Creator; he certainly grants at least this, which admits of no doubt, that this had not yet been done when the Lord said, the Father is greater than I. For he said this not only before he had ascended into heaven, but even before he had suffered and risen from the dead.
deTrin.1.15Illi autem qui putant humanam in eo naturam in deitatis substantiam mutari atque converti, et ita dictum, tunc et ipse Filius subiectus erit ei qui illi subiecit omnia, ac si diceretur, “tunc et ipse Filius hominis et a Verbo Dei suscepta humana natura commutabitur in eius naturam, qui ei subiecit omnia;” tunc futurum putant, cum post diem iudicii tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri. Ac per hoc etiam secundum istam opinionem adhuc Pater maior est, quam quae de Virgine servi forma accepta est. (Cf. Phil 2:7)
But those who think that the human nature in him is changed and turned into the substance of the deity, and that it was thus said—then the Son himself also will be subjected to him who subjected all things to him—as if it were said, "then the Son of man too, the human nature assumed by the Word of God, will be changed into the nature of him who subjected all things to him"; they think this will happen when, after the day of judgment, he delivers the kingdom to God and the Father. And on this account, even according to this opinion, the Father is still greater than that form of a servant which was taken of the Virgin. (See Phil 2:7)
deTrin.1.15Quod si aliqui et hoc affirmant, quod iam That is, before the last day. Gregory of Nyssa, in the work referred to, finds it ridiculous to think of Christ being corporeally present in heaven. fuerit in Dei substantiam mutatus homo Christus Iesus; illud certe negare non possunt, quod adhuc natura hominis manebat, quando ante passionem dicebat, quoniam Pater maior me est. Unde nulla cunctatio est secundum hoc dictum esse, quod forma servi maior est Pater, cui in forma Dei aequalis est Filius.
But if some affirm even this, that the man Christ Jesus has already That is, before the last day. Gregory of Nyssa, in the work referred to, finds it ridiculous to think of Christ being corporeally present in heaven. been changed into the substance of God, they certainly cannot deny that the nature of man still remained when, before the Passion, he said, for the Father is greater than I. Whence there is no hesitation that, according to this, it was said that the Father is greater than the form of a servant, to whom the Son is equal in the form of God.
deTrin.1.15Nec quisquam cum audierit quod ait Apostolus, cum autem dixerit, quia omnia subiecta sunt ei, manifestum quia praeter eum qui illi subiecit omnia, (Commenting on Ps 8:8) ita existimet de Patre intellegendum, quod subiecerit omnia Filio, ut ipsum Filium sibi omnia subiecisse non putet. Quod Apostolus ad Philippenses ostendit dicens: nostra autem conversatio in coelis est; unde et Salvatorem exspectamus Dominum Iesum Christum, qui transfigurabit corpus humilitatis nostrae, conforme ut fiat corpori gloriae suae, secundum operationem suam, qua possit etiam sibi subiicere omnia.
Nor let anyone, when he hears what the Apostle says, but when he says that all things are subjected to him, it is manifest that he is excepted who subjected all things to him, (Commenting on Ps 8:8 (8:7)) so think it is to be understood of the Father, that the Father subjected all things to the Son in such a way that he should not think the Son himself subjected all things to himself. This the Apostle shows to the Philippians, saying: but our commonwealth is in heaven; whence also we await the Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ, who will transform the body of our lowliness, that it may be made conformed to the body of his glory, according to his working by which he is able even to subject all things to himself.
deTrin.1.15Inseparabilis enim operatio est Patris et Filii. Alioquin nec ipse Pater sibi subiecit omnia, sed Filius ei subiecit, qui ei regnum tradit, et evacuat omnem principatum et omnem potestatem et virtutem.
For the working of the Father and of the Son is inseparable. Otherwise not even the Father himself subjected all things to himself, but the Son subjected them to him who delivers the kingdom to him, and abolishes every rule and every authority and power.
deTrin.1.15De Filio quippe ista dicta sunt: cum tradiderit, inquit, regnum Deo et Patri, cum evacuaverit omnem principatum et omnem potestatem et virtutem. Ipse enim subiicit, qui evacuat.
For these things were said of the Son: when he delivers, he says, the kingdom to God and the Father, when he abolishes every rule and every authority and power. For he himself subjects who abolishes.
deTrin.1.1516. Nec sic arbitremur Christum traditurum regnum Deo et Patri, ut adimat sibi. Nam et hoc quidam vaniloqui crediderunt. Cum enim dicitur, tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri, non separatur ipse; quia simul cum Patre unus Deus est.
16. Nor let us think that Christ will deliver the kingdom to God and the Father in such a way as to take it from himself. For some empty talkers have believed this too. For when it is said, he delivers the kingdom to God and the Father, he himself is not separated; since together with the Father he is one God.
deTrin.1.16Sed divinarum Scripturarum incuriosos et contentionum studiosos fallit verbum quod positum est, “donec.” Ita namque sequitur, oportet enim illum regnare, donec ponat omnes inimicos suos sub pedibus suis, tamquam cum posuerit, non sit regnaturus. Nec intellegunt ita dictum, sicuti est illud: confirmatum est cor eius; non commovebitur, donec videat super inimicos suos. Non enim cum viderit, iam commovebitur.
But the word that is placed there, "until," deceives those who are careless of the divine Scriptures and eager for contentions. For it follows thus, for he must reign until he puts all his enemies under his feet, as though, when he has put them there, he will not reign. Nor do they understand that it is said just as that is: his heart is steadfast; he will not be moved, until he looks down upon his enemies. For not when he has looked upon them will he then be moved.
deTrin.1.16Quid ergo est, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri, quasi modo non habeat regnum Deus et Pater? Sed quia omnes iustos, in quibus nunc regnat ex fide viventibus mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus, (Quoted in Rom 1:17 and Gal 3:11) perducturus est ad speciem, quam visionem dicit idem Apostolus, facie ad faciem; (Cf. 2 Cor 5:7) ita dictum est, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri, ac si diceretur, “Cum perduxerit credentes ad contemplationem Dei et Patris.”
What, then, is when he delivers the kingdom to God and the Father, as though God and the Father did not now have the kingdom? But because the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, (Quoted in Rom 1:17 and Gal 3:11) in whom he now reigns over all the just who live by faith, is going to bring them to the sight—which the same Apostle calls the vision face to face (See 2 Cor 5:7)—it was said, when he delivers the kingdom to God and the Father, as if it were said, "When he has brought believers to the contemplation of God and the Father."
deTrin.1.16Sic enim dicit: omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo; et nemo novit Filium, nisi Pater; et nemo novit Patrem, nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare. (Cf. Luke 10:22) Tunc revelabitur a Filio Pater, cum evacuaverit omnem principatum et omnem potestatem et virtutem; (Cf. Heb 1:14, 2:2) id est, ut necessaria non sit dispensatio similitudinum per angelicos principatus et potestates et virtutes.
For he says thus: all things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father; and no one knows the Father except the Son, and anyone to whom the Son wishes to reveal him. (See Luke 10:22) Then the Father will be revealed by the Son, when he abolishes every rule and every authority and power; (See Heb 1:14; 2:2) that is, so that the dispensation of likenesses through the angelic principalities and authorities and powers will no longer be necessary.
deTrin.1.16Ex quarum persona non inconvenienter intellegitur dici in Cantico canticorum ad sponsam: similitudines auri faciemus tibi cum distinctionibus argenti, quoadusque rex in recubitu suo est, id est, quoadusque Christus in secreto suo est; quia vita vestra abscondita est cum Christo in Deo. Cum Christus apparuerit vita vestra, tunc et vos cum ipso apparebitis in gloria. Quod antequam fiat, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, hoc est in similitudinibus; tunc autem, facie ad faciem.
In whose person it is not inappropriately understood to be said to the bride in the Song of Songs: we will make you likenesses of gold with markings of silver, while the king is on his couch, that is, while Christ is in his secret place; for your life is hidden with Christ in God. When Christ your life appears, then you too will appear with him in glory. Before this comes to pass, we now see through a mirror in an enigma, that is, in likenesses; but then, face to face.
deTrin.1.1617. Haec enim nobis contemplatio promittitur actionum omnium finis atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum. Filii enim Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quid erimus; scimus quia cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est.
17. For this contemplation is promised to us as the end of all actions and the eternal perfection of joys. For we are children of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that, when he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.
deTrin.1.17Quod enim dixit famulo suo Moysi: ego sum qui sum. Itaque PL omits itaque, “and so.” haec dices filiis Israel: qui est, misit me ad vos; hoc contemplabimur cum vivemus in aeternum. Ita quippe ait: haec autem est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te unum verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum.
For what he said to his servant Moses, I am who am. And so PL omits itaque, "and so." you shall say to the children of Israel: he who is has sent me to you; this we shall contemplate when we shall live forever. For he says thus: and this is eternal life, that they may know you, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.
deTrin.1.17Hoc fiet cum venerit Dominus, et illuminaverit occulta tenebrarum, cum tenebrae mortalitatis huius corruptionisque transierint. (Cf. 1 John 2:8; Rom 8:21) Tunc erit mane nostrum, de quo in Psalmo dicitur: mane astabo tibi, et contemplabor. De hac contemplatione intellego dictum, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri; id est, cum perduxerit iustos, in quibus nunc ex fide viventibus regnat mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus, ad contemplationem Dei et Patris. Si desipio hic, corrigat me qui melius sapit; mihi aliud non videtur.
This will come to pass when the Lord comes and illuminates the hidden things of darkness, when the darkness of this mortality and corruption shall have passed away. (See 1 John 2:8; Rom 8:21) Then will be our morning, of which it is said in the Psalm: in the morning I will stand before you, and I will contemplate. Of this contemplation I understand to be said, when he delivers the kingdom to God and the Father; that is, when he has brought the just—in whom, now living by faith, the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, reigns—to the contemplation of God and the Father. If I am foolish here, let him who is wiser correct me; to me nothing else seems true.
deTrin.1.17Neque enim quaeremus aliud, cum ad illius contemplationem pervenerimus, quae nunc non est, quamdiu gaudium nostrum in spe est. Spes autem quae videtur, non est spes; quod enim videt quis, quid sperat? Si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam exspectamus, quoadusque rex in recubitu suo est. Tunc erit quod scriptum est: adimplebis me laetitia cum vultu tuo. Illa laetitia nihil amplius requiretur; quia nec erit quod amplius requiratur. Ostendetur enim nobis Pater, et sufficiet nobis. Quod bene intellexerat Philippus, ut diceret, Domine, ostende nobis Patrem, et sufficit nobis. Sed nondum intellexerat, eo quoque modo idipsum se potuisse dicere: “Domine, ostende nobis te, et sufficit nobis.” Ut enim hoc intellegeret, responsum ei a Domino est, tanto tempore vobiscum sum, et non cognovistis me? Philippe, qui vidit me, vidit et Patrem. Sed quia volebat eum ex fide vivere antequam illud posset videre, secutus est, et ait: non credis quia ego in Patre, et Pater in me est? Quamdiu enim sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino. Per fidem enim ambulamus, non per speciem.
For we shall seek nothing else when we have arrived at the contemplation of him, which now is not, as long as our joy is in hope. But hope that is seen is not hope; for who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience, while the king is on his couch. Then will be what is written: you will fill me with gladness with your countenance. In that gladness nothing more will be required; for there will be nothing more to require. For the Father will be shown to us, and it will suffice us. This Philip had well understood, so as to say, Lord, show us the Father, and it suffices us. But he had not yet understood that in that same way he could have said the same thing: "Lord, show us yourself, and it suffices us." For, that he might understand this, it was answered him by the Lord, have I been with you so long, and you have not known me? Philip, he who has seen me has seen the Father also. But because he wanted him to live by faith before he could see that, he went on and said: do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? For as long as we are in the body, we are away from the Lord. For we walk by faith, not by sight.
deTrin.1.17Contemplatio quippe merces est fidei, cui mercedi per fidem corda mundantur; sicut scriptum est, mundans fide corda eorum. Probatur autem quod illi contemplationi corda mundentur, illa maxime sententia: beati mundicordes, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Et quia haec est vita aeterna, dicit Deus in Psalmo: longitudine dierum replebo eum, et ostendam illi salutare meum. Sive ergo audiamus, “ostende nobis Filium;” sive audiamus, ostende nobis Patrem; tantumdem valet, quia neuter sine altero potest ostendi. Unum quippe sunt, sicut et ipse ait: ego et Pater unum sumus. Denique propter ipsam inseparabilitatem sufficienter aliquando nominatur vel Pater solus, vel Filius solus adimpleturus nos laetitia cum vultu suo.
For contemplation is the reward of faith, for which reward hearts are cleansed through faith; as it is written, cleansing their hearts by faith. But that hearts are cleansed for that contemplation is proved especially by that sentence: blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. And because this is eternal life, God says in the Psalm: with length of days will I fill him, and I will show him my salvation. Whether, then, we hear, "show us the Son," or whether we hear, show us the Father, it amounts to the same; for neither can be shown without the other. For they are one, as he himself says: I and the Father are one. Finally, on account of this very inseparability, sometimes either the Father alone or the Son alone is sufficiently named as the one who will fill us with gladness with his countenance.
deTrin.1.1718. Nec inde separatur utriusque Spiritus, id est Patris et Filii Spiritus. Qui Spiritus Sanctus proprie dicitur Spiritus veritatis, quem hic mundus accipere non potest. Hoc est enim plenum gaudium nostrum, quo amplius non est, frui Trinitate Deo ad cuius imaginem facti sumus. (Cf. Gen 1:26, 9:6; Isa 47:8; Wis 2:23)
18. Nor is the Spirit of both separated from this—that is, the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. This Holy Spirit is properly called the Spirit of truth, whom this world cannot receive. For this is our full joy, than which there is nothing greater: to enjoy the Trinity, God, to whose image we were made. (See Gen 1:26; 9:6; Isa 47:8; Wis 2:23)
deTrin.1.18Propter hoc aliquando ita loquitur de Spiritu Sancto tamquam solus ipse sufficiat ad beatitudinem nostram; et ideo solus sufficit, quia separari a Patre et Filio non potest; sicut Pater solus sufficit, quia separari a Filio et Spiritu Sancto non potest; et Filius ideo sufficit solus, quia separari a Patre et Spiritu Sancto non potest.
On this account he sometimes speaks of the Holy Spirit as if he alone sufficed for our blessedness; and he alone suffices for this reason, that he cannot be separated from the Father and the Son; just as the Father alone suffices, because he cannot be separated from the Son and the Holy Spirit; and the Son alone suffices for this reason, that he cannot be separated from the Father and the Holy Spirit.
deTrin.1.18Quid enim sibi vult quod ait, si diligitis me, mandata mea servate; et ego rogabo Patrem, et alium advocatum dabit vobis, ut vobiscum sit in aeternum, Spiritum veritatis, quem hic mundus accipere non potest, id est, dilectores mundi? Animalis enim homo non percipit ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei.
For what does he mean when he says, if you love me, keep my commandments; and I will ask the Father, and he will give you another advocate, to be with you forever, the Spirit of truth, whom this world cannot receive—that is, the lovers of the world? For the animal man does not perceive the things that are of the Spirit of God.
deTrin.1.18Sed adhuc potest videri ideo dictum, et ego rogabo Patrem, et alium advocatum dabit vobis, (Cf. John 14:16) quasi non solus Filius sufficiat. Illo autem loco ita de illo dictum est tamquam solus omnino sufficiat: cum venerit ille Spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem. Numquid ergo separatur hinc Filius, tamquam ipse non doceat omnem veritatem, aut quasi hoc impleat Spiritus Sanctus quod minus potuit docere Filius? Dicant ergo, si placet, maiorem esse Filio Spiritum Sanctum, quem minorem illo solent dicere.
But it can still seem to have been said—and I will ask the Father, and he will give you another advocate (See John 14:16)—as if the Son alone did not suffice. But in that place it is said of him as though he alone wholly sufficed: when that Spirit of truth comes, he will teach you all truth. Is the Son, then, separated from this, as though he himself does not teach all truth, or as though the Holy Spirit fulfills what the Son was less able to teach? Let them say, then, if they please, that the Holy Spirit, whom they are wont to call less than the Son, is greater than the Son.
deTrin.1.18An quia non dictum est, “ipse solus,” aut, “nemo, nisi ipse, vos docebit omnem veritatem;” ideo permittunt ut cum illo docere credatur et Filius? Apostolus ergo Filium separavit ab sciendis iis quae Dei sunt, ubi ait: sic et quae Dei sunt, nemo scit, nisi Spiritus Dei. Ut iam isti perversi possint ex hoc dicere, quod et Filium non doceat quae Dei sunt nisi Spiritus Sanctus, tamquam maior minorem; cui Filius ipse tantum tribuit, ut diceret, quia haec locutus sum vobis, tristitia implevit cor vestrum. Sed ego veritatem dico: expedit vobis ut ego eam; nam si non abiero, advocatus non veniet ad vos.
Or is it because it was not said, "he alone," or, "no one but he, will teach you all truth," that they therefore allow it to be believed that the Son too teaches together with him? The Apostle, then, separated the Son from the knowing of those things that are of God, where he says: so also no one knows the things that are of God except the Spirit of God. So that now these perverse people can say from this that not even the Son knows the things that are of God except the Holy Spirit, as the greater the lesser; to whom the Son himself ascribed so much as to say, because I have said these things to you, sorrow has filled your heart. But I tell you the truth: it is expedient for you that I go; for if I do not go away, the advocate will not come to you.
deTrin.1.18Hoc autem dixit, non propter inaequalitatem Verbi Dei et Spiritus Sancti, sed tamquam impedimento esset praesentia Filii hominis apud eos, quominus veniret ille qui minor non esset, quia semetipsum non exinanivit, formam servi accipiens, sicut Filius.
But he said this, not on account of any inequality of the Word of God and the Holy Spirit, but as though the presence of the Son of man among them were an impediment to the coming of him who was not less, because he did not empty himself, taking the form of a servant, as the Son did.
deTrin.1.18Oportebat ergo ut auferretur ab oculis eorum forma servi, quam intuentes, hoc solum esse Christum putabant quod videbant. Inde est et illud quod ait, si diligeretis me, gauderetis utique, quoniam eo ad Patrem; quia Pater maior me est, id est, propterea me oportet ire ad Patrem, quia dum me ita videtis, ex hoc quod videtis, aestimatis quia minor sum Patre, atque ita circa creaturam susceptumque habitum occupati, aequalitatem quam cum Patre habeo non intellegitis.
It was necessary, therefore, that the form of a servant be taken from their eyes, since, gazing upon it, they thought Christ to be only what they saw. Hence too is that which he says, if you loved me, you would surely rejoice, because I go to the Father; for the Father is greater than I; that is, for this reason I must go to the Father, because, while you see me thus, from what you see you reckon that I am less than the Father, and so, occupied about the creature and the fashion I have assumed, you do not understand the equality I have with the Father.
deTrin.1.18Inde est et illud: noli me tangere; nondum enim ascendi ad Patrem. Tactus enim tamquam finem facit notionis. Ideoque nolebat in eo esse finem intenti cordis in se, ut hoc quod videbatur tantummodo putaretur. Ascensio autem ad Patrem erat ita videri, sicut aequalis est Patri, ut ibi esset finis visionis, quae sufficit nobis.
Hence too is that other saying: do not touch me; for I have not yet ascended to the Father. For touch, as it were, makes an end of acquaintance. And therefore he did not want there to be in him the end of the heart's straining toward him, so that he might be thought to be only what was seen. But the ascension to the Father was to be seen as he is equal to the Father, so that there might be the end of the vision which suffices us.
deTrin.1.18Aliquando item de Filio solo dicitur, quod ipse sufficiat, et in eius visione merces tota promittitur dilectionis et desiderii nostri. Sic enim ait: qui habet mandata mea et custodit ea, ille est qui diligit me. Qui autem me diligit, diligetur a Patre meo; et ego diligam eum, et ostendam me ipsum illi. Numquid hic, quia non dixit, “ostendam illi et Patrem,” ideo separavit Patrem? Sed quia verum est, ego et Pater unum sumus, cum Pater ostenditur, et Filius ostenditur qui in illo est; et cum Filius ostenditur, etiam Pater ostenditur qui in illo est.
Likewise, sometimes it is said of the Son alone that he himself suffices, and in his vision the whole reward of our love and desire is promised. For he says thus: he who has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me. And he who loves me will be loved by my Father; and I will love him, and will show myself to him. Did he here, because he did not say, "I will show him the Father also," therefore separate the Father? But because it is true, I and the Father are one, when the Father is shown, the Son too is shown, who is in him; and when the Son is shown, the Father too is shown, who is in him.
deTrin.1.18Sicut ergo cum ait, et ostendam me ipsum illi, intellegitur quia ostendit et Patrem; ita et in eo quod dicitur, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri, intellegitur quia non adimit sibi. Quoniam cum perducet credentes ad contemplationem Dei et Patris, profecto perducet ad contemplationem suam, qui dixit, et ostendam illi me ipsum. Et ideo consequenter, cum dixisset illi Iudas, Domine, quid factum est, quia ostensurus es te nobis, et non huic mundo? Respondit Iesus, et dixit illi: si quis me diligit, sermonem meum servabit; et Pater meus diliget illum, et ad eum veniemus, et mansionem apud eum faciemus. Ecce quia non solum se ipsum ostendit ei a quo diligitur, quia simul cum Patre venit ad eum, et mansionem facit apud eum.
As, therefore, when he says, and I will show myself to him, it is understood that he shows the Father also; so too in that which is said, when he delivers the kingdom to God and the Father, it is understood that he does not take it from himself. For when he brings believers to the contemplation of God and the Father, he assuredly brings them to his own contemplation, who said, and I will show myself to him. And therefore, consequently, when Judas had said to him, Lord, what has happened, that you are going to show yourself to us, and not to this world? Jesus answered and said to him: if anyone loves me, he will keep my word; and my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and will make our dwelling with him. Behold, he does not show only himself to the one by whom he is loved, since he comes to him together with the Father, and makes his dwelling with him.
deTrin.1.1819. An forte putabitur mansionem in dilectore suo facientibus Patre et Filio exclusus esse ab hac mansione Spiritus Sanctus? Quid est ergo quod superius ait de Spiritu Sancto: quem hic mundus accipere non potest, quoniam non videt illum; nostis illum vos, quia vobiscum manet, et in vobis est? Non itaque ab hac mansione separatus est, de quo dictum est, vobiscum manet et in vobis est. Nisi forte quisquam, sic absurdus est, ut arbitretur, cum Pater et Filius venerint ut mansionem apud dilectorem suum faciant, discessurum inde Spiritum Sanctum, et tamquam locum daturum esse maioribus. Sed huic carnali cogitationi occurrit Scriptura; paulo quippe superius ait, et ego rogabo Patrem, et alium advocatum dabit vobis ut, vobiscum sit in aeternum. Non ergo discedet Patre et Filio venientibus, sed in eadem mansione cum ipsis erit in aeternum; quia nec ille sine ipsis venit, nec illi sine ipso. Sed propter insinuationem Trinitatis, personis etiam singulis nominatis dicuntur quaedam; PL adds separatim, “said separately about.” non tamen aliis separatis intelleguntur, propter eiusdem Trinitatis unitatem unamque substantiam atque deitatem Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti.
19. Or will it perhaps be thought that, since the Father and the Son make their dwelling in the one who loves him, the Holy Spirit is excluded from this dwelling? What, then, is that which he says above of the Holy Spirit: whom this world cannot receive, because it does not see him; but you know him, because he abides with you, and is in you? He is not, therefore, separated from this dwelling, of whom it is said, he abides with you and is in you. Unless perhaps someone is so absurd as to think that, when the Father and the Son come to make their dwelling with the one who loves him, the Holy Spirit will depart thence, and as it were give place to the greater. But Scripture meets this carnal thought; for a little above it says, and I will ask the Father, and he will give you another advocate, to be with you forever. He will not, then, depart when the Father and the Son come, but will be in the same dwelling with them forever; for neither does he come without them, nor they without him. But on account of the suggestion of the Trinity, certain things are said with the single persons even named singly; PL adds separatim, "said separately about." yet they are not understood with the others separated, on account of the unity of the same Trinity and the one substance and deity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.
deTrin.1.1920. Tradet itaque regnum Deo et Patri Dominus noster Iesus Christus, non se inde separato, nec Spiritu Sancto, quoniam PL: quando, “when he brings.” perducet credentes ad contemplationem Dei, ubi est finis omnium bonarum actionum, et requies sempiterna, et gaudium quod numquam auferetur a nobis. Hoc enim signat in eo quod ait: iterum videbo vos, et gaudebit cor vestrum, et gaudium vestrum nemo auferet a vobis.
20. And so our Lord Jesus Christ will deliver the kingdom to God and the Father, without separating himself from it, nor the Holy Spirit, since PL: quando, "when he brings." he will bring believers to the contemplation of God, where is the end of all good actions, and everlasting rest, and the joy that will never be taken from us. For this he signifies in that which he says: I will see you again, and your heart will rejoice, and your joy no one will take from you.
deTrin.1.20Huius gaudii similitudinem praesignabat Maria sedens ad pedes Domini, et intenta in verbum eius; quieta scilicet ab omni actione, et intenta in veritatem secundum quemdam modum, cuius capax est ista vita, quo tamen praefiguraret illud quod futurum est in aeternum. Martha quippe sorore sua in necessitatis actione conversante, quamvis bona et utili, tamen, cum requies successerit, transitura, ipsa requiescebat in verbo Domini.
A likeness of this joy was prefigured by Mary sitting at the Lord's feet, and intent upon his word; resting, that is, from all action, and intent upon the truth according to a certain manner of which this life is capable, by which, nevertheless, she might prefigure that which is to be forever. For while her sister Martha was busy in the action of necessity—good and useful, yet, when rest succeeds, destined to pass away—she herself rested in the word of the Lord.
deTrin.1.20Et ideo Dominus conquerenti Marthae quod eam soror non adiuvaret, respondit: Maria optimam partem elegit, quae non auferetur ab ea. Non partem malam dixit quod agebat Martha, sed istam optimam quae non auferetur. Illa enim quae in ministerio indigentiae est, cum indigentia ipsa transierit, auferetur. Boni quippe operis transituri merces est requies permansura.
And therefore the Lord, when Martha complained that her sister did not help her, answered: Mary has chosen the best part, which will not be taken from her. He did not call what Martha was doing a bad part, but this best part which will not be taken away. For that which is in the ministry of need will be taken away when the need itself has passed. For the reward of a good work that is to pass away is rest that will abide.
deTrin.1.20In illa igitur contemplatione Deus erit omnia in omnibus, quia nihil ab illo aliud requiretur, sed solo ipso illustrari perfruique sufficiet. Ideoque ille in quo Spiritus interpellat gemitibus inenarrabilibus, unam, inquit, petii a Domino, hanc requiram, ut inhabitem in domo Domini per omnes dies vitae meae, ut contempler delectationem Domini.
In that contemplation, therefore, God will be all in all, because nothing else will be required of him, but it will suffice to be illumined by him alone and to enjoy him alone. And therefore he in whom the Spirit makes intercession with unutterable groanings says, one thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek: that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that I may contemplate the delight of the Lord.
deTrin.1.20Contemplabimur enim Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, cum mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri, (Cf. 1 Cor 15:24) ut iam non interpellet pro nobis mediator et sacerdos noster, (Cf. Rom 8:34; Heb 7:25, 8:6, 9:15, 12:24; Gal 3:20) Filius Dei et Filius hominis; sed et ipse in quantum sacerdos est assumpta propter nos servi forma, subiectus sit ei qui illi subiecit omnia, et cui subiecit omnia;
For we shall contemplate God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, when the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, delivers the kingdom to God and the Father, (See 1 Cor 15:24) so that our mediator and priest, (See Rom 8:34; Heb 7:25; 8:6; 9:15; 12:24; Gal 3:20) the Son of God and Son of man, may no longer intercede for us; but he himself too, insofar as he is priest by the form of a servant assumed for our sake, may be subjected to him who subjected all things to him, and to whom he subjected all things;
deTrin.1.20ut in quantum Deus est, cum illo nos subiectos habeat, in quantum sacerdos, nobiscum illi subiectus sit. Quapropter cum Filius sit et Deus et homo, alia substantia homo potius in Filio quam Filius in Patre; sicut caro animae meae, alia substantia est ad animam meam, quamvis in uno homine, quam anima alterius hominis ad animam meam.
so that, insofar as he is God, he may have us subjected together with himself, and, insofar as he is priest, he may be subjected with us to him. Wherefore, since the Son is both God and man, the man in the Son is a different substance rather than the Son in the Father; just as the flesh of my soul is a different substance with respect to my soul, though in one man, than the soul of another man is with respect to my soul.
deTrin.1.2021. Cum ergo tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri, id est, cum credentes et viventes ex fide, pro quibus nunc mediator interpellat, (Cf. Heb 7:25) perduxerit ad contemplationem, cui percipiendae suspiramus et gemimus, et cum transierit labor et gemitus, iam non interpellabit pro nobis tradito regno Deo et Patri. Hoc significans ait, haec vobiscum locutus sum in similitudinibus; veniet hora, quando iam non in similitudinibus loquar vobis, sed manifeste de Patre nuntiabo vobis, id est, iam non erunt similitudines, cum visio fuerit facie ad faciem.
21. When, therefore, he delivers the kingdom to God and the Father—that is, when he has brought believers and those who live by faith, for whom the mediator now intercedes, (See Heb 7:25) to the contemplation for the receiving of which we sigh and groan, and when the labor and the groaning have passed—he will no longer intercede for us, the kingdom having been delivered to God and the Father. Signifying this, he says, these things I have spoken to you in likenesses; the hour will come when I shall no longer speak to you in likenesses, but will tell you plainly of the Father; that is, there will no longer be likenesses, when the vision shall be face to face.
deTrin.1.21Hoc est enim quod ait, sed manifeste de Patre nuntiabo vobis; ac si diceret, “manifeste Patrem ostendam vobis.” Nuntiabo quippe ait, quia verbum eius est. Sequitur enim et dicit: illa die in nomine meo petetis, et non dico vobis quia ego rogabo Patrem; ipse enim Pater amat vos, quia vos me amatis, PL: amastis, “you have loved.” et credidistis quia a Deo exivi. Exivi a Patre, et veni in hunc mundum; iterum relinquo mundum, et vado ad Patrem.
For this is what he says, but I will tell you plainly of the Father; as if he said, "I will show you the Father plainly." For he says I will tell, because he is his Word. For he goes on and says: in that day you will ask in my name, and I do not tell you that I will ask the Father; for the Father himself loves you, because you love me, PL: amastis, "you have loved." and have believed that I came forth from God. I came forth from the Father, and have come into this world; again I leave the world, and go to the Father.
deTrin.1.21Quid est, a Patre exivi; nisi, “non in ea forma qua aequalis sum Patri, sed aliter, id est, in assumpta creatura minor apparui?” Et quid est, veni in hunc mundum; nisi, “formam servi, quam me exinaniens accepi, etiam peccatorum qui mundum istum diligunt, oculis demonstravi?” Et quid est, iterum relinquo mundum; nisi, “ab aspectu dilectorum mundi aufero quod viderunt?” Et quid est, vado ad Patrem; nisi, “doceo me sic intellegendum a fidelibus meis, quomodo aequalis sum Patri?”
What is I came forth from the Father, except, "not in that form in which I am equal to the Father, but otherwise, that is, in the assumed creature, I appeared less"? And what is I have come into this world, except, "the form of a servant, which I took in emptying myself, I showed even to the eyes of sinners who love this world"? And what is again I leave the world, except, "from the sight of the lovers of the world I take away what they saw"? And what is I go to the Father, except, "I teach that I am to be understood by my faithful as I am equal to the Father"?
deTrin.1.21Hoc qui credunt, digni habebuntur perduci a fide ad speciem, id est ad ipsam visionem, quo perducens dictus est tradere regnum Deo et Patri. Fideles quippe eius quos redemit sanguine suo, dicti sunt regnum eius, pro quibus nunc interpellat, tunc autem illic eos sibi faciens inhaerere, ubi aequalis est Patri, non iam rogabit Patrem pro eis. Ipse enim, inquit, Pater amat vos.
Those who believe this will be held worthy to be brought from faith to sight, that is, to the vision itself, to which, in bringing them, he is said to deliver the kingdom to God and the Father. For his faithful, whom he redeemed by his blood, are called his kingdom, for whom he now intercedes; but then, making them cleave to him there where he is equal to the Father, he will no longer ask the Father for them. For the Father himself, he says, loves you.
deTrin.1.21Ex hoc enim rogat, quo minor est Patre, quo vero aequalis est, exaudit cum Patre. Unde se ab eo quod dixit, ipse enim Pater amat vos, utique ipse non separat; sed secundum ea facit intellegi quae supra commemoravi, satisque insinuavi, plerumque ita nominari unamquamque in Trinitate personam, ut et aliae illic intellegantur. Sic itaque dictum est, ipse enim Pater amat vos, ut consequenter intellegatur et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus.
For he asks in that by which he is less than the Father; but in that by which he is equal, he hears together with the Father. Whence he certainly does not separate himself from what he said, for the Father himself loves you; but he makes it understood according to the things I recalled above and sufficiently suggested—that very often each person in the Trinity is so named that the others too are understood there. So, then, it was said, for the Father himself loves you, that consequently the Son too and the Holy Spirit may be understood.
deTrin.1.21Non quia modo nos non amat, qui proprio Filio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum; sed tales nos amat Deus, quales futuri sumus, non quales sumus. Quales enim amat, tales in aeternum conservat, quod tunc erit, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri, qui nunc interpellat pro nobis, ut iam non roget Patrem, quia ipse Pater amat nos.
Not that he does not now love us, who did not spare his own Son, but delivered him up for us all; but God loves us such as we shall be, not such as we are. For such as he loves, he preserves forever; which will then be, when he delivers the kingdom to God and the Father, who now intercedes for us, so that he no longer asks the Father, because the Father himself loves us.
deTrin.1.21Quo autem merito, nisi fidei, qua credimus antequam illud quod promittitur videamus? Per hanc enim perveniemus ad speciem, ut tales amet, quales amat ut simus; non quales odit quia sumus, et hortatur ac praestat ne tales esse semper velimus.
But by what merit, except that of faith, by which we believe before we see what is promised? For through this we shall arrive at sight, so that he may love us such as he loves us to be; not such as he hates because we are, and exhorts and grants that we may not always wish to be such.
deTrin.1.21C. 4
deTrin.1.21
22. Quapropter, cognita ista regula intellegendarum Scripturarum de Filio Dei, ut distinguamus quid in eis sonet secundum formam Dei, in qua est et PL omits est et, “in which he is equal to.” aequalis est Patri, et quid secundum formam servi quam accepit, et PL reads in qua instead of et: “which he took, in which he is less.” minor est Patre, non conturbabimur tamquam contrariis ac repugnantibus inter se Sanctorum Librorum sententiis.
22. Wherefore, this rule for understanding the Scriptures concerning the Son of God being known—so that we may distinguish what in them sounds according to the form of God, in which he is and PL omits est et, "in which he is equal to." is equal to the Father, and what according to the form of a servant which he took, and PL reads in qua instead of et: "which he took, in which he is less." is less than the Father—we shall not be disturbed, as though the sentences of the Holy Books were contrary to and at odds with one another.
deTrin.1.22Nam secundum formam Dei aequalis est Patri et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quia neuter eorum creatura est, sicut iam ostendimus.
For according to the form of God, both the Son and the Holy Spirit are equal to the Father, because neither of them is a creature, as we have already shown.
deTrin.1.22Secundum autem formam servi, minor est Patre, quia ipse dixit, Pater maior me est; minor est se ipso, quia de illo dictum est, semetipsum exinanivit; (Cf. Phil 2:7) minor est Spiritu Sancto, quia ipse ait: qui dixerit blasphemiam in Filium hominis, remittetur ei; qui autem dixerit in Spiritum Sanctum, non remittetur ei.
But according to the form of a servant, he is less than the Father, because he himself said, the Father is greater than I; he is less than himself, because it was said of him, he emptied himself; (See Phil 2:7) he is less than the Holy Spirit, because he himself says: whoever speaks a blasphemy against the Son of man, it will be forgiven him; but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him.
deTrin.1.22Et in ipso virtutes operatus est, dicens: si ego in spiritu Dei eicio daemonia, certe supervenit super vos regnum Dei.
And in him he worked miracles, saying: if I by the Spirit of God cast out demons, then surely the kingdom of God has come upon you.
deTrin.1.22Et apud Isaiam dicit, quam lectionem ipse in synagoga recitavit, et de se completam sine scrupulo dubitationis ostendit. Spiritus, inquit, Domini super me; propter quod unxit me, evangelizare pauperibus misit me, praedicare captivis remissionem, et cetera; ad quae facienda ideo dicit se missum, quia Spiritus Domini est super eum. (Cf. Isa 48:16; John 3:17, 5:23, 7:16, 10:36, 16:28; Gal 4:4; Luke 4:18)
And in Isaiah he says—a reading which he himself recited in the synagogue, and showed to be fulfilled in himself without a scruple of doubt—the Spirit, he says, of the Lord is upon me; because of this he has anointed me, he has sent me to preach good news to the poor, to proclaim release to the captives, and the rest; and he says that he was sent to do these things for this reason, because the Spirit of the Lord is upon him. (See Isa 48:16; John 3:17; 5:23; 7:16; 10:36; 16:28; Gal 4:4; Luke 4:18)
deTrin.1.22Secundum formam Dei, omnia per ipsum facta sunt; (Cf. Phil 2:6–7) secundum formam servi, ipse factus est ex muliere, factus sub Lege. Secundum formam Dei, ipse et Pater unum sunt; secundum formam servi, non venit facere voluntatem suam, sed voluntatem eius qui eum misit. Secundum formam Dei, sicut habet Pater vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio vitam habere in semetipso; secundum formam servi, tristis est anima eius usque ad mortem; et, Pater, inquit, si fieri potest, transeat PL adds a me, “from me.” iste calix. (Cf. Matt 26:38–39; Mark 14:36; Luke 22:42) Secundum formam Dei, ipse est verus Deus et vita aeterna; secundum formam servi, factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis.
According to the form of God, all things were made through him; (See Phil 2:6–7) according to the form of a servant, he himself was made of a woman, made under the Law. According to the form of God, he and the Father are one; according to the form of a servant, he came not to do his own will, but the will of him who sent him. According to the form of God, as the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son also to have life in himself; according to the form of a servant, his soul is sorrowful even unto death; and, Father, he says, if it can be, let PL adds a me, "from me." this cup pass. (See Matt 26:38–39; Mark 14:36; Luke 22:42) According to the form of God, he is the true God and eternal life; according to the form of a servant, he became obedient unto death, even death on a cross.
deTrin.1.2211. 23. Secundum formam Dei, omnia quae habet Pater, ipsius sunt; et, omnia mea tua sunt, inquit, et tua mea; secundum formam servi, non est doctrina ipsius, sed illius qui eum misit.
11. 23. According to the form of God, all that the Father has are his; and, all mine are yours, he says, and yours mine; according to the form of a servant, the teaching is not his own, but his who sent him.
deTrin.1.11.2312. 23. Et: de die et hora nemo scit, neque angeli in caelo, neque Filius nisi Pater. Hoc enim nescit, quod nescientes facit, id est, quod non ita sciebat ut tunc discipulis indicaret. Sicut dictum est ad Abraham, nunc cognovi quod timeas Deum, id est, “nunc feci ut cognosceres,” quia et ipse sibi in illa temptatione probatus innotuit.
12. 23. And: of the day and the hour no one knows, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father. For he does not know this in such a way as makes others know—that is, he did not know it in such a way as then to tell the disciples. Just as it was said to Abraham, now I know that you fear God, that is, "now I have made you know it," since he too became known to himself, proved in that trial.
deTrin.1.12.23Nam et illud utique dicturus erat discipulis tempore opportuno, de quo futuro tamquam praeterito loquens, ait, iam non dicam vos servos, sed amicos. Servus enim nescit voluntatem Domini sui; vos autem dixi amicos, quia omnia quaecumque audivi a Patre meo, nota vobis feci. Quod nondum fecerat, sed quia certo facturus erat, quasi iam fecisset locutus est. Ipsis enim ait: multa vobis habeo dicere, sed non potestis illa portare modo. Inter quae intellegitur et, de die et hora.
For he was certainly going to tell the disciples that too at an opportune time, of which, speaking of the future as though of the past, he says, I will no longer call you servants, but friends. For the servant does not know the will of his lord; but I have called you friends, because all that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you. This he had not yet done, but because he was certainly going to do it, he spoke as though he had already done it. For he says to them: I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. Among which is understood also, of the day and the hour.
deTrin.1.12.23Nam et Apostolus: neque enim iudicavi me, inquit, scire aliquid in vobis, nisi Christum Iesum, et hunc crucifixum. Eis enim loquebatur, qui capere altiora de Christi deitate non poterant. Quibus etiam paulo post dicit: non potui vobis loqui quasi spiritualibus, sed quasi carnalibus. Hoc ergo inter illos nesciebat, quod per illum scire non poterant. Et hoc solum se scire dicebat, quod eos per illum scire oportebat.
For the Apostle too says: for I decided to know nothing among you except Christ Jesus, and him crucified. For he was speaking to those who could not grasp the higher things concerning Christ's deity. To whom also a little later he says: I could not speak to you as to spiritual men, but as to carnal men. This, then, he did not know among them, because they could not know it through him. And this alone he said he knew, because they needed to know it through him.
deTrin.1.12.23Denique sciebat inter perfectos, quod inter parvulos nesciebat; ibi quippe ait, sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos. Eo namque genere locutionis nescire quisque dicitur quod occultat, quo dicitur fossa caeca quae occulta est. Cf. Statius, Thebaid 12.234; Columella, De Re Rustica 2.2.9; Palladius, Opus Agriculturae 6.3.1. The Latin saying is fossa caeca, “a blind ditch.” Neque enim aliquo genere loquuntur Scripturae, quod in consuetudine humana non inveniatur; quia utique hominibus loquuntur. (Cf. 1 Cor 14:6)
Finally, he knew among the perfect what he did not know among the little ones; for there he says, we speak wisdom among the perfect. For by that manner of speaking a person is said not to know what he conceals, just as a ditch is called blind which is hidden. See Statius, Thebaid 12.234; Columella, De Re Rustica 2.2.9; Palladius, Opus Agriculturae 6.3.1. The Latin saying is fossa caeca, "a blind ditch." For the Scriptures speak by no manner of speech that is not found in human custom; since they certainly speak to men. (See 1 Cor 14:6)
deTrin.1.12.2312. 24. Secundum formam Dei dictum est, ante omnes colles genuit me, id est, ante omnes altitudines creaturarum; et, ante luciferum genui te, id est, ante omnia tempora et temporalia; secundum formam autem servi dictum est, dominus creavit me in principio viarum suarum.
12. 24. According to the form of God it was said, before all the hills he begot me, that is, before all the heights of creatures; and, before the morning star I begot you, that is, before all times and temporal things; but according to the form of a servant it was said, the Lord created me in the beginning of his ways.
deTrin.1.12.24Quia secundum formam Dei dixit, ego sum veritas; et secundum formam servi, ego sum via. Quia enim ipse primogenitus a mortuis iter fecit Ecclesiae suae ad regnum Dei ad vitam aeternam, cui caput est ad immortalitatem etiam corporis, ideo creatus est in principio viarum Dei in opera eius.
For according to the form of God he said, I am the truth; and according to the form of a servant, I am the way. For because he himself, the firstborn from the dead, made a road for his Church to the kingdom of God, to eternal life—to which he is the head, even unto the immortality of the body—therefore he was created in the beginning of God's ways for his works.
deTrin.1.12.24Secundum formam enim Dei, principium est quod et loquitur nobis; in quo principio fecit Deus caelum et terram; secundum formam autem servi, sponsus procedens de thalamo suo.
For according to the form of God, he is the beginning who also speaks to us; in which beginning God made heaven and earth; but according to the form of a servant, he is a bridegroom coming forth from his chamber.
deTrin.1.12.24Secundum formam Dei, primogenitus omnis creaturae, et ipse ante omnes est, et omnia in illo constant; secundum formam servi, ipse est caput corporis Ecclesiae.
According to the form of God, he is the firstborn of all creation, and he is before all, and all things hold together in him; according to the form of a servant, he is the head of the body, the Church.
deTrin.1.12.24Secundum formam Dei, Dominus est gloriae. Unde manifestum est, quod ipse glorificet sanctos suos. Quos enim praedestinavit, ipsos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, ipsos et iustificavit; quos autem iustificavit, ipsos et glorificavit. De illo quippe dictum est quod iustificet impium; de illo dictum est quod sit iustus et iustificans. Si ergo quos iustificavit, ipsos et glorificavit, qui iustificat ipse et glorificat, qui est, ut dixi, Dominus gloriae. Secundum formam tamen servi satagentibus discipulis de glorificatione sua, respondit: sedere ad dexteram vel ad sinistram meam non est meum dare vobis, sed quibus paratum est a Patre meo.
According to the form of God, he is the Lord of glory. Whence it is manifest that he himself glorifies his saints. For those whom he predestined, them he also called; and those whom he called, them he also justified; and those whom he justified, them he also glorified. For of him it was said that he justifies the ungodly; of him it was said that he is just and the justifier. If, then, those whom he justified, them he also glorified, he who justifies himself also glorifies, who is, as I said, the Lord of glory. Yet according to the form of a servant, when the disciples were busy about his glorification, he answered: to sit at my right hand or at my left is not mine to give to you, but to those for whom it has been prepared by my Father.
deTrin.1.12.2412. 25. Quod autem paratum est a Patre eius, et ab ipso Filio paratum est, quia ipse et Pater unum sunt. Iam enim ostendimus in hac Trinitate per multos divinarum locutionum modos etiam de singulis dici quod omnium est, propter inseparabilem operationem unius eiusdemque substantiae. 1 John 5:7; 1 Cor 12:4–6; cf. Ambrose, De Fide 4.6.68; Augustine, The Predestination of the Saints 8.14; see also below, 1.18.
12. 25. But what was prepared by his Father was also prepared by the Son himself, because he and the Father are one. For we have already shown that in this Trinity, by many modes of the divine expressions, what belongs to all is said even of single persons, on account of the inseparable working of one and the same substance. 1 John 5:7; 1 Cor 12:4–6; see Ambrose, De Fide 4.6.68; Augustine, The Predestination of the Saints 8.14; see also below, 1.18.
deTrin.1.12.25Sicut et de Spiritu Sancto dicit, cum ego iero, mittam illum ad vos. Non dixit, “mittemus,” sed ita quasi tantum Filius eum missurus esset, et non Pater; cum alio loco dicat, haec locutus sum vobis apud vos manens; advocatus autem ille Spiritus Sanctus, quem mittet Pater in nomine meo, ille vobis declarabit omnia.
Just as he also says of the Holy Spirit, when I go, I will send him to you. He did not say, "we will send," but as though the Son alone were to send him, and not the Father; whereas in another place he says, these things I have spoken to you while abiding with you; but that advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will declare all things to you.
deTrin.1.12.25Hic rursus ita dictum est, quasi non eum missurus esset et Filius, sed tantum Pater. Sicut ergo ista, ita et illud quod ait, sed quibus paratum est a Patre meo, cum Patre se intellegi voluit parare sedes gloriae quibus vellet.
Here, again, it was said as though the Son too were not to send him, but only the Father. As, therefore, these sayings, so also that which he says, but to those for whom it has been prepared by my Father—he wished it to be understood that, together with the Father, he prepares the seats of glory for whom he would.
deTrin.1.12.25Sed dicit aliquis: “illic cum de Spiritu Sancto loqueretur, ita se missurum ait, ut non negaret Patrem missurum; et alio loco ita Patrem, ut non negaret se missurum. Hic vero aperte ait, non est meum dare, atque ita secutus, a Patre dixit ista praeparata.”
But someone says: "There, when he spoke of the Holy Spirit, he said that he would send him in such a way as not to deny that the Father would send him; and in another place he said the Father would, in such a way as not to deny that he himself would send him. But here he plainly says, it is not mine to give, and so going on, he said these things were prepared by the Father."
deTrin.1.12.25Sed hoc est quod praestruximus secundum formam servi dictum; ut ita intellegeremus, non est meum dare, ac si diceretur, “non est humanae potestatis hoc dare;” ut per illud intellegatur hoc dare, per quod Deus aequalis est Patri. Non est meum, inquit, dare, id est, “non humana potestate ista do,” sed quibus paratum est a Patre meo; “sed iam tu intellege, quia si omnia quae habet Pater, mea sunt, et hoc utique meum est, et cum Patre ista paravi.”
But this is what we laid down beforehand, that it was said according to the form of a servant; so that we should understand it is not mine to give as if it were said, "it is not in human power to give this"; so that through that by which God is equal to the Father, it may be understood that he gives this. It is not mine, he says, to give, that is, "I do not give these things by human power," but to those for whom it has been prepared by my Father; "but now do you understand that if all that the Father has are mine, this too is certainly mine, and I prepared these things together with the Father."
deTrin.1.12.2512. 26. Nam et illud quaero, quomodo dictum sit, si quis non audit verba mea, ego non iudicabo illum. Fortassis enim ita hic dixit, ego non iudicabo illum, quemadmodum ibi, non est meum dare.
12. 26. For I also inquire how it was said, if anyone does not hear my words, I will not judge him. For perhaps he said here, I will not judge him, in the same way as there, it is not mine to give.
deTrin.1.12.26Sed quid hic sequitur? Non enim veni, inquit, ut iudicem mundum, sed ut salvum faciam mundum; deinde adiungit et dicit, qui me spernit et non accipit verba mea, habet qui se iudicet. (Cf. Matt 20:23; John 12:47) Hic iam intellegeremus Patrem, nisi adiungeret et diceret: verbum quod locutus sum, ipsum iudicabit illum in novissimo die. Quid igitur, iam nec Filius iudicabit, quia dixit, ego non iudicabo illum, nec Pater, sed verbum quod locutus est Filius?
But what follows here? For I have not come, he says, to judge the world, but to save the world; then he adds and says, he who despises me and does not receive my words has one who judges him. (See Matt 20:23; John 12:47) Here we would now understand the Father, unless he added and said: the word that I have spoken, that will judge him on the last day. What then—will the Son not now judge, because he said, I will not judge him, nor the Father, but the word that the Son has spoken?
deTrin.1.12.26Immo audi adhuc quod sequitur: quia ego, inquit, non ex me locutus sum, sed qui me misit Pater, ille mandatum mihi dedit quid dicam, et quid loquar; et scio quia mandatum eius vita aeterna est. Quae ergo ego loquor, ita ut dixit mihi Pater, sic loquor.
Nay, hear still what follows: for I, he says, have not spoken of myself, but the Father who sent me, he gave me a commandment what I should say, and what I should speak; and I know that his commandment is eternal life. What I speak, therefore, as the Father has told me, so I speak.
deTrin.1.12.26Si ergo non iudicat Filius, sed verbum quod locutus est Filius; ideo autem iudicat verbum quod locutus est Filius, quia non ex se locutus est Filius, sed qui misit eum Pater mandatum dedit ei quid dicat, et quid loquatur; Pater utique iudicat, cuius verbum est quod locutus est Filius, atque ipsum Verbum Patris idem ipse est Filius. Non enim aliud est mandatum Patris, aliud Verbum Patris; nam et “verbum” hoc appellavit, et “mandatum.”
If, then, the Son does not judge, but the word that the Son has spoken; and the word that the Son has spoken judges for this reason, that the Son did not speak of himself, but the Father who sent him gave him a commandment what he should say and what he should speak; then the Father certainly judges, whose Word is that which the Son has spoken, and that very Word of the Father is the Son himself. For the commandment of the Father is not one thing and the Word of the Father another; for he called this both "word" and "commandment."
deTrin.1.12.26Videamus ergo ne forte quod ait, ego non ex me locutus sum, hoc intellegi voluerit, “ego non ex me natus sum.” Si enim verbum Patris loquitur, se ipsum loquitur, quia ipse est Verbum Patris. Plerumque enim dicit, dedit mihi Pater, in quo vult intellegi quod eum genuerit Pater; non ut tamquam iam existenti et non habenti dederit aliquid; sed ipsum dedisse ut haberet, genuisse est ut esset.
Let us see, then, whether perhaps what he says, I have not spoken of myself, he wished to be understood as, "I was not born of myself." For if he speaks the Word of the Father, he speaks himself, because he himself is the Word of the Father. For he often says, the Father has given to me, in which he wishes it to be understood that the Father begot him; not that he gave something to one as it were already existing and not having it; but that his very giving him to have was begetting him to exist.
deTrin.1.12.26Non enim sicut creatura, ita Dei Filius ante incarnationem et ante assumptam creaturam, unigenitus per quem facta sunt omnia, (Cf. John 1:14–18; 3:16–18; 1 John 4:9) aliud est, et aliud habet; sed hoc ipsum est, quod est id quod habet. Quod illo loco manifestius dicitur, si quis ad capiendum sit idoneus, ubi ait: sicut habet Pater vitam in semetipso, ita dedit Filio vitam habere in semetipso.
For the Son of God is not, like a creature, one thing before the incarnation and before the assumed creature—the only-begotten through whom all things were made (See John 1:14–18; 3:16–18; 1 John 4:9)—and another thing that he has; but this very thing is what is that which he has. This is said more plainly in that place, if anyone is fit to grasp it, where he says: as the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son to have life in himself.
deTrin.1.12.26Neque enim iam existenti et vitam non habenti dedit ut haberet vitam in semetipso, cum eo ipso quod est, vita sit. Hoc est ergo, dedit Filio vitam habere in semetipso, genuit Filium esse incommutabilem vitam, quod est vita aeterna.
For he did not give to one already existing and not having life that he should have life in himself, since by the very fact that he is, he is life. This, then, is, he gave to the Son to have life in himself: he begot the Son to be unchangeable life, which is eternal life.
deTrin.1.12.26Cum ergo Verbum Dei sit Filius Dei, et Filius Dei sit verus Deus et vita aeterna, sicut in Epistola sua dicit Ioannes; etiam hic quid aliud agnoscimus, cum dicit Dominus, Verbum quod locutus sum, ipsum iudicabit eum in novissimo die; et ipsum verbum, Patris verbum esse dicit et mandatum Patris, ipsumque mandatum vitam aeternam. Et scio, inquit, quia mandatum eius vita aeterna est.
Since, then, the Son of God is the Word of God, and the Son of God is the true God and eternal life, as John says in his Epistle; here too what else do we recognize, when the Lord says, the Word that I have spoken, that will judge him on the last day; and says that the word itself is the Father's word and the commandment of the Father, and that very commandment is eternal life. And I know, he says, that his commandment is eternal life.
deTrin.1.12.2612. 27. Quaero itaque quomodo intellegamus, ego non iudicabo, sed verbum quod locutus sum iudicabit, quod ex consequentibus apparet ita dictum, ac si diceret, “ego non iudicabo, sed Verbum Patris iudicabit.” Verbum autem Patris est ipse Filius Dei. Siccine intellegendum est, “ego non iudicabo, sed ego iudicabo?” Quomodo potest istud esse verum, nisi ita: “ego” scilicet “non iudicabo ex potestate humana, quia Filius hominis sum; sed ego iudicabo ex potestate Verbi, quoniam Filius Dei sum.”
12. 27. I inquire, therefore, how we are to understand, I will not judge, but the word that I have spoken will judge, which from what follows appears to be said as if he said, "I will not judge, but the Word of the Father will judge." But the Word of the Father is the Son of God himself. Is it thus to be understood, "I will not judge, but I will judge"? How can this be true, except thus: "I," that is, "will not judge by human power, because I am the Son of man; but I will judge by the power of the Word, since I am the Son of God"?
deTrin.1.12.27Aut si contraria et repugnantia videntur, “ego non iudicabo, sed ego iudicabo,” quid illic dicemus, ubi ait, mea doctrina non est mea? Quomodo mea, quomodo non mea? Non enim dixit, “ista doctrina non est mea,” sed, mea doctrina non est mea; quam dixit suam, eamdem dixit non suam. Quomodo istud verum est, nisi secundum aliud suam dixerit; secundum aliud, non suam; secundum formam Dei, suam; secundum formam servi, non suam? Cum enim dicit, non est mea, sed eius qui me misit, ad ipsum Verbum nos facit recurrere. Doctrina enim Patris est Verbum Patris, qui est unicus Filius.
Or if they seem contrary and at odds, "I will not judge, but I will judge," what shall we say there, where he says, my teaching is not mine? How is it mine, how is it not mine? For he did not say, "this teaching is not mine," but, my teaching is not mine; the same teaching that he called his, he called not his. How is this true, except that in one respect he called it his; in another, not his; according to the form of God, his; according to the form of a servant, not his? For when he says, it is not mine, but his who sent me, he makes us run back to the Word itself. For the teaching of the Father is the Word of the Father, who is the only Son.
deTrin.1.12.27Quid sibi et illud vult, qui in me credit, non in me credit? Quomodo in ipsum, quomodo non in ipsum? Quomodo tam contrarium sibique adversum potest intellegi—qui in me credit, inquit, non in me credit sed in eum qui me misit—nisi ita intellegas: “qui in me credit, non in hoc quod videt credit,” ne sit spes nostra in creatura; sed in illo qui suscepit creaturam, in qua humanis oculis appareret, ac sic ad se aequalem Patri contemplandum per fidem corda mundaret?
What too does this mean, he who believes in me does not believe in me? How is it in him, how is it not in him? How can a thing so contrary and adverse to itself be understood—he who believes in me, he says, does not believe in me but in him who sent me—unless you understand it thus: "he who believes in me does not believe in this which he sees," lest our hope be in a creature; but in him who assumed the creature, in which he might appear to human eyes, and so might cleanse hearts through faith to contemplate him equal to the Father?
deTrin.1.12.27Ideoque ad Patrem referens intentionem credentium, et dicens, non in me credit, sed in eum qui me misit, non utique se a Patre, id est ab illo qui eum misit, voluit separari; sed ut sic in eum crederetur, quomodo in Patrem cui est aequalis. Quod aperte alio loco dicit: credite in Deum, et in me credite; id est, sicut creditis in Deum, sic et in me, quia ego et Pater unus Deus.
And therefore, referring the attention of believers to the Father, and saying, he does not believe in me, but in him who sent me, he certainly did not wish to be separated from the Father, that is, from him who sent him; but rather that he be believed in just as the Father is, to whom he is equal. This he plainly says in another place: believe in God, and believe in me; that is, as you believe in God, so also in me, because I and the Father are one God.
deTrin.1.12.27Sicuti ergo hic, tamquam abstulit a se fidem hominum, et in Patrem transtulit, dicendo, non in me credit, sed in eum qui me misit, a quo tamen se utique non separavit; sic etiam quod ait, non est meum dare, sed quibus paratum est a Patre meo, puto clarere secundum quid utrumque accipiendum sit. Tale est enim et illud, ego non iudicabo; cum ipse iudicaturus sit vivos et mortuos, sed quia non ex potestate humana, propterea recurrens ad deitatem, sursum erigit corda In the Latin, sursum erigit corda is an allusion to the sursum corda of the Mass. But for Augustine, like all the ancients, the heart is the organ and symbol of deliberate thought rather than of feeling, which was situated in the viscera. hominum, propter quae sublevanda descendit.
As, therefore, here he as it were took men's faith away from himself and transferred it to the Father, by saying, he does not believe in me, but in him who sent me—from whom, nevertheless, he certainly did not separate himself—so too that which he says, it is not mine to give, but to those for whom it has been prepared by my Father, I think it is clear in what respect each is to be taken. For such too is that, I will not judge; though he himself is to judge the living and the dead, but because it is not by human power, therefore, running back to the deity, he lifts up the hearts In the Latin, sursum erigit corda is an allusion to the sursum corda of the Mass. But for Augustine, like all the ancients, the heart is the organ and symbol of deliberate thought rather than of feeling, which was situated in the viscera. of men, for the lifting of which he descended.
deTrin.1.12.2713. 28. Nisi tamen ipse idem esset Filius hominis propter formam servi quam accepit, qui est Filius Dei propter Dei formam in qua est; non diceret Paulus apostolus de principibus huius saeculi: si enim cognovissent, numquam Dominum gloriae crucifixissent. Ex forma enim servi crucifixus est, et tamen Dominus gloriae crucifixus est. Talis enim erat illa “susceptio,” quae Deum hominem faceret, et hominem Deum. Cf. Hilary, Ad Constantium, fragm. 6. Quid tamen propter quid, et quid secundum quid dicatur, adiuvante Domino prudens, et diligens, et pius lector intellegit.
13. 28. Unless, however, he who is the Son of God on account of the form of God in which he is were the same as the Son of man on account of the form of a servant which he took, the apostle Paul would not say of the rulers of this age: for if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. For he was crucified from the form of a servant, and yet the Lord of glory was crucified. For such was that "assumption" which made God man, and man God. See Hilary, Ad Constantium, fragm. 6. Yet what is said on account of what, and what is said in what respect, the prudent and diligent and pious reader, with the Lord's help, understands.
deTrin.1.13.28Nam ecce diximus Cf. The Trinity 1.24. quia secundum id quod Deus est, glorificat suos, secundum hoc utique quod Dominus gloriae est; et tamen Dominus gloriae crucifixus est, quia recte dicitur et Deus crucifixus, non ex virtute divinitatis, sed ex infirmitate carnis; Here Augustine very accurately anticipates the definition of the Council of Ephesus, 431, which ratified the title of Mary as Theotokos, mother of God—mother of him who is God, in virtue however of his being man. sicut dicimus, quia secundum id quod Deus est iudicat, hoc est ex potestate divina, non ex humana; et tamen ipse homo iudicaturus est, sicut Dominus gloriae crucifixus est.
For behold, we said See On the Trinity 1.24. that according to that which he is God, he glorifies his own, according to this very thing that he is Lord of glory; and yet the Lord of glory was crucified, because it is rightly said that even God was crucified, not from the power of the divinity, but from the weakness of the flesh; Here Augustine very accurately anticipates the definition of the Council of Ephesus, 431, which ratified the title of Mary as Theotokos, mother of God—mother of him who is God, in virtue however of his being man. just as we say that according to that which he is God he judges, that is, by divine power, not by human; and yet he himself, as man, is to judge, just as the Lord of glory was crucified.
deTrin.1.13.28Ita enim aperte dicit, cum venerit Filius hominis in gloria sua, et omnes Angeli cum eo, tunc congregabuntur ante eum omnes gentes; et caetera quae de futuro iudicio usque ad ultimam sententiam in eo loco praedicantur. Et Iudaei, quippe qui in malitia perseverantes, in illo iudicio puniendi sunt, sicut alibi scriptum est, videbunt in quem pupugerunt.
For he plainly says, when the Son of man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, then will be gathered before him all the nations; and the rest that is foretold of the future judgment in that place up to the final sentence. And the Jews, indeed, who persevering in malice are to be punished in that judgment, as is written elsewhere, will look on him whom they have pierced.
deTrin.1.13.28Cum enim et boni et mali visuri sint iudicem vivorum et mortuorum, (Cf. Acts 10:42; 2 Tim 4:1; 1 Pet 4:5) procul dubio eum videre mali non poterunt, nisi secundum formam qua Filius hominis est; sed tamen in claritate in qua iudicabit, non in humilitate in qua iudicatus est. Caeterum illam Dei formam in qua aequalis est Patri, procul dubio impii non videbunt. Non enim sunt mundicordes: beati enim mundicordes, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.
For since both the good and the wicked are to see the judge of the living and the dead, (See Acts 10:42; 2 Tim 4:1; 1 Pet 4:5) without doubt the wicked will not be able to see him except according to the form by which he is the Son of man; but yet in the splendor in which he will judge, not in the lowliness in which he was judged. Moreover, that form of God in which he is equal to the Father, without doubt the ungodly will not see. For they are not pure in heart: for blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.
deTrin.1.13.28Et ipsa visio est facie ad faciem, (Cf. Matt 6:1, 5:12; Luke 6:35) quae summum praemium promittitur iustis; et ipsa fiet, cum tradet regnum Deo et Patri; in quo et suae formae visionem vult intellegi, subiecta Deo universa creatura, et ipsa in qua Filius Dei Filius hominis factus est. Quia secundum hanc et ipse Filius tunc subiectus illi erit, qui ei subiecit omnia, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus.
And that vision is face to face, (See Matt 6:1; 5:12; Luke 6:35) which is promised to the just as the highest reward; and it will come to pass when he delivers the kingdom to God and the Father; in which he wishes the vision of his own form too to be understood, the whole creation being subjected to God, including that very creation in which the Son of God was made the Son of man. For according to this, the Son himself too will then be subjected to him who subjected all things to him, that God may be all in all.
deTrin.1.13.28Alioquin si Filius Dei iudex in forma in qua aequalis est Patri, etiam impiis cum iudicaturus est apparebit, quid est quod pro magno dilectori suo pollicetur dicens: et ego diligam eum, et ostendam me ipsum illi? Quapropter Filius hominis iudicaturus est, nec tamen ex humana potestate, sed ex ea qua Filius Dei est; et rursus Filius Dei iudicaturus est, nec tamen in ea forma apparens, in qua Deus est aequalis Patri, sed in ea qua Filius hominis est.
Otherwise, if the Son of God, as judge, in the form in which he is equal to the Father, will appear even to the ungodly when he is to judge, what is it that he promises as a great thing to the one who loves him, saying: and I will love him, and will show myself to him? Wherefore the Son of man is to judge, yet not by human power, but by that by which he is the Son of God; and again the Son of God is to judge, yet not appearing in that form in which he is God equal to the Father, but in that by which he is the Son of man.
deTrin.1.13.2813. 29. Itaque utrumque dici potest; et: “Filius hominis iudicabit,” et, “non Filius hominis iudicabit;” quia Filius hominis iudicabit, ut verum sit quod ait, cum venerit Filius hominis, tunc congregabuntur ante eum omnes gentes; et non Filius hominis iudicabit, ut verum sit quod ait, ego non iudicabo; et, ego non quaero gloriam meam; est qui quaerat, et iudicet. Nam secundum id quod in iudicio non forma Dei, sed forma filii hominis apparebit, nec ipse Pater iudicabit. Secundum hoc enim dictum est, Pater non iudicat quemquam, sed omne iudicium dedit Filio. Quod utrum ex illa locutione dictum sit, quam supra commemoravimus, ubi ait, sic dedit Filio habere vitam in semetipso, ut significaret quia sic genuit Filium; an ex illa qua loquitur Apostolus dicens, propter quod eum suscitavit, et donavit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen.
13. 29. And so both can be said: both "the Son of man will judge," and "the Son of man will not judge"; for the Son of man will judge, so that what he says is true, when the Son of man comes, then will be gathered before him all the nations; and the Son of man will not judge, so that what he says is true, I will not judge; and, I do not seek my own glory; there is one who seeks it and judges. For according to the fact that in the judgment not the form of God, but the form of the Son of man will appear, not even the Father himself will judge. For according to this it was said, the Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son. Whether this was said from that expression which we recalled above, where he says, so he gave to the Son to have life in himself, to signify that he thus begot the Son; or from that by which the Apostle speaks, saying, wherefore he raised him up, and gave him the name which is above every name.
deTrin.1.13.29Hoc enim de Filio hominis dictum est, secundum quem Dei Filius excitatus est a mortuis. Ille quippe in forma Dei aequalis est Patri, ex quo se exinanivit, formam servi accipiens, in ipsa forma servi et agit, et patitur, et accipit, quae consequenter contexit Apostolus: humiliavit se, factus obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis; propter quod et Deus illum exaltavit, et donavit ei nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur, caelestium, terrestrium et infernorum, et omnis lingua confiteatur quia Dominus Iesus Christus in gloria est Dei Patris.
For this was said of the Son of man, according to whom the Son of God was raised from the dead. For he who in the form of God is equal to the Father, from which he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, in that very form of a servant both acts, and suffers, and receives the things that the Apostle consequently weaves together: he humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even death on a cross; wherefore God also exalted him, and gave him the name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father.
deTrin.1.13.29Utrum ergo secundum illam, an secundum istam locutionem dictum sit, omne iudicium dedit Filio, satis hinc apparet, quia si secundum illud diceretur secundum quod dictum est, dedit Filio habere vitam in semetipso; non utique diceretur, Pater non iudicat quemquam. Secundum hoc enim quod aequalem Pater genuit Filium, iudicat cum illo. Secundum hoc ergo dictum est, quod in iudicio, non forma Dei, sed forma Filii hominis apparebit.
Whether, then, it was said from that or from this expression, he gave all judgment to the Son, sufficiently appears from this: that if it were said according to that by which it was said, he gave to the Son to have life in himself, it certainly would not be said, the Father judges no one. For according to that by which the Father begot the Son equal, he judges with him. According to this, therefore, it was said, that in the judgment, not the form of God, but the form of the Son of man will appear.
deTrin.1.13.29Non quia non iudicabit qui dedit omne iudicium Filio, cum de illo dicat Filius, est qui quaerat, et iudicet; sed ita est dictum, Pater non iudicat quemquam, sed omne iudicium dedit Filio; ac si diceretur, “Patrem nemo videbit in iudicio vivorum et mortuorum, sed omnes Filium;” quia et filius hominis est, ut possit et ab impiis videri, cum et illi videbunt in quem pupugerunt.
Not that he who gave all judgment to the Son will not judge, since the Son says of him, there is one who seeks it and judges; but it was said thus, the Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son, as if it were said, "No one will see the Father in the judgment of the living and the dead, but all will see the Son"; for he is also the Son of man, that he may be seen even by the ungodly, when they too will look on him whom they have pierced.
deTrin.1.13.2913. 30. Quod ne conicere potius quam aperte demonstrare videamur, proferamus eiusdem Domini certam manifestamque sententiam, qua ostendamus ipsam fuisse causam ut diceret, Pater non iudicat quemquam, sed omne iudicium dedit Filio, quia iudex in forma Filii hominis apparebit, quae forma non est Patris, sed Filii; nec ea Filii in qua aequalis est Patri, sed in qua minor est Patre; ut sit in iudicio conspicuus et bonis et malis.
13. 30. And lest we seem to conjecture rather than plainly to demonstrate this, let us bring forward a sure and manifest sentence of the same Lord, by which we may show that this was the very reason why he said, the Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son: because the judge will appear in the form of the Son of man, which form is not the Father's but the Son's; nor that of the Son in which he is equal to the Father, but that in which he is less than the Father; so that in the judgment he may be conspicuous both to the good and to the wicked.
deTrin.1.13.30Paulo post enim dicit: amen dico vobis, quia qui verbum meum audit et credit ei qui me misit, habet vitam aeternam, et in iudicium non veniet, sed transiet a morte in vitam. Haec vita aeterna est illa visio, quae non pertinet ad malos.
For a little later he says: amen I say to you, that he who hears my word and believes him who sent me has eternal life, and will not come into judgment, but will pass from death to life. This eternal life is that vision which does not pertain to the wicked.
deTrin.1.13.30Deinde sequitur: amen, amen dico vobis, quia veniet hora, et nunc est, cum mortui audient vocem Filii Dei, et qui audierint vivent. Et hoc proprium est piorum qui sic audiunt de incarnatione eius, ut credant, quia Filius Dei est; id est, sic eum propter se factum accipiunt minorem Patre in forma servi, ut credant quia aequalis est Patri in forma Dei.
Then it follows: amen, amen I say to you, that the hour is coming, and now is, when the dead will hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who hear will live. And this is proper to the pious, who so hear of his incarnation that they believe that he is the Son of God; that is, they so receive him as having been made for their sake less than the Father in the form of a servant, that they believe that he is equal to the Father in the form of God.
deTrin.1.13.30Et ideo sequitur et hoc ipsum commendans dicit: sicut enim habet Pater vitam in semetipso, ita dedit et Filio vitam habere in semetipso. Deinde venit ad visionem suae claritatis in qua venturus est ad iudicium, quae visio communis erit et impiis et iustis. Sequitur enim et dicit: et potestatem dedit ei et iudicium facere quoniam Filius hominis est.
And therefore it follows, and commending this very thing he says: for as the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son also to have life in himself. Then he comes to the vision of his splendor in which he is to come to judgment, which vision will be common both to the ungodly and to the just. For it follows and he says: and he gave him power also to execute judgment, because he is the Son of man.
deTrin.1.13.30Puto nihil esse manifestius. Nam quia Filius Dei est aequalis est Patri, non accipit hanc potestatem iudicii faciendi, sed habet illam cum Patre in occulto; accipit autem illam, ut boni et mali eum videant iudicantem, quia Filius hominis est. Visio quippe Filii hominis exhibebitur et malis; nam visio formae Dei non nisi mundis corde, quia ipsi Deum videbunt; id est, solis piis quorum dilectioni hoc ipsum promittit, quia se ipsum ostendet illis.
I think nothing is more manifest. For because he is the Son of God he is equal to the Father, he does not receive this power of executing judgment, but has it with the Father in secret; but he receives it so that the good and the wicked may see him judging, because he is the Son of man. For the vision of the Son of man will be granted even to the wicked; but the vision of the form of God only to the pure in heart, for they shall see God; that is, to the pious alone, to whose love he promises this very thing, that he will show himself to them.
deTrin.1.13.30Et ideo vide quid sequitur: nolite mirari hoc, (Cf. John 5:28) inquit. Quid nos prohibet mirari, nisi illud quod revera miratur omnis qui non intellegit, ut ideo diceret Patrem dedisse ei potestatem et iudicium facere, quia Filius hominis est, cum magis quasi hoc exspectaretur ut diceret, quoniam Filius Dei est?
And therefore see what follows: do not marvel at this, (See John 5:28) he says. What forbids us to marvel, except that at which everyone marvels who does not understand—so that he should say that the Father gave him power and to execute judgment, because he is the Son of man, when rather it would as it were be expected that he should say, because he is the Son of God?
deTrin.1.13.30Sed quia Filium Dei secundum id quod in forma Dei aequalis est Patri videre iniqui non possunt; oportet autem ut iudicem vivorum et mortuorum, cum coram iudicabuntur, et iusti videant et iniqui. Nolite, inquit, hoc mirari, quoniam veniet hora, in qua omnes qui in monumentis sunt, audient vocem eius; et prodient qui bona gesserunt, in resurrectionem vitae; qui autem mala gesserunt, in resurrectionem iudicii.
But because the wicked cannot see the Son of God according to that by which he is equal to the Father in the form of God; and yet it is necessary that, as the judge of the living and the dead, when they are judged before him, both the just and the wicked see him. Do not, he says, marvel at this, for the hour is coming in which all who are in the tombs will hear his voice; and those who have done good will come forth to the resurrection of life; but those who have done evil, to the resurrection of judgment.
deTrin.1.13.30Ad hoc ergo oportebat ut ideo acciperet illam potestatem, quia Filius hominis est, ut resurgentes omnes viderent eum in forma, in qua videri ab omnibus potest, sed alii ad damnationem, alii ad vitam aeternam. (Cf. Dan 12:2; Matt 25:46; John 5:29) Quae est autem vita aeterna nisi illa visio, quae non conceditur impiis? Ut cognoscant te, inquit, unum verum Deum, et quem misisti, Iesum Christum. Quomodo et ipsum Iesum Christum, nisi quemadmodum unum verum Deum, qui ostendet se ipsum illis, non quomodo se ostendet etiam puniendis in forma Filii hominis?
For this, then, it was necessary that he should receive that power, because he is the Son of man, so that all who rise might see him in the form in which he can be seen by all, but some to damnation, others to eternal life. (See Dan 12:2; Matt 25:46; John 5:29) But what is eternal life except that vision which is not granted to the ungodly? That they may know you, he says, the one true God, and him whom you have sent, Jesus Christ. How will they also know Jesus Christ himself, except as the one true God, who will show himself to them, not as he will show himself even to those to be punished in the form of the Son of man?
deTrin.1.13.3013. 31. Secundum illam visionem bonus est, secundum quam visionem Deus apparet mundis corde; quoniam, quam bonus Deus Israel rectis corde! Quando autem iudicem videbunt mali, non eis videbitur bonus; quia non ad eum gaudebunt corde, sed tunc se plangent omnes tribus terrae, in numero utique malorum omnium et infidelium. Propter hoc etiam illi qui eum dixerat magistrum bonum, quaerenti ab eo consilium consequendae vitae aeternae, respondit: quid me interrogas de bono? Nemo bonus, nisi unus Deus. Cum et hominem alio loco dicat bonum ipse Dominus: bonus homo, inquit, de bono thesauro cordis sui profert bona; et malus homo de malo thesauro cordis sui profert mala.
13. 31. According to that vision he is good, according to which vision God appears to the pure in heart; for, how good is the God of Israel to the upright in heart! But when the wicked see the judge, he will not seem good to them; for they will not rejoice in him with their heart, but then all the tribes of the earth will mourn for themselves, in the number, that is, of all the wicked and unbelievers. On account of this, to that man too who had called him a good teacher, when he asked of him counsel for attaining eternal life, he answered: why do you ask me about the good? No one is good but God alone. Although in another place the Lord himself calls even a man good: the good man, he says, out of the good treasure of his heart brings forth good things; and the evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart brings forth evil things.
deTrin.1.13.31Sed quia ille vitam aeternam quaerebat, vita autem aeterna est in illa contemplatione, qua non ad poenam videtur Deus, sed ad gaudium sempiternum; et non intellegebat cum quo loquebatur, quia tantummodo eum Filium hominis arbitrabatur: quid me interrogas, inquit, de bono? Id est, “istam formam quam vides, quid interrogas de bono, et vocas me secundum quod vides magistrum bonum? Haec forma Filii hominis est, haec forma accepta est, haec forma apparebit in iudicio, non tantum iustis, sed et impiis; et huius formae visio non erit in bonum eis qui male agunt. Est autem visio formae meae, in qua cum essem, non rapinam arbitratus sum esse aequalis Deo, sed ut hanc acciperem me ipsum exinanivi.”
But because that man was seeking eternal life, and eternal life is in that contemplation in which God is seen not unto punishment but unto everlasting joy; and he did not understand with whom he was speaking, since he reckoned him to be only the Son of man: why do you ask me, he says, about the good? That is, "this form which you see, why do you ask about the good, and call me, according to what you see, a good teacher? This is the form of the Son of man, this is the form that was assumed, this form will appear in the judgment, not only to the just but also to the ungodly; and the vision of this form will not be for good to those who act wickedly. But there is the vision of my form, in which, when I was in it, I did not count it robbery to be equal to God, but, that I might take this form, I emptied myself."
deTrin.1.13.31Ille ergo unus Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, qui non apparebit nisi ad gaudium quod non auferetur a iustis; cui gaudio futuro suspirat qui dicit, unam petii a domino, hanc requiram; ut inhabitem in domo Domini per omnes dies vitae meae, ut contempler delectationem Domini; unus ergo Deus ipse est solus bonus, ad hoc, quia nemo eum videt ad luctum et planctum, sed tantum ad salutem et laetitiam veram. “Secundum illam formam si me intellegis, bonus sum; si autem secundum hanc solam, quid me interrogas de bono si inter illos eris qui videbunt in quem pupugerunt; et ipsa visio malum eis erit, quia poenalis erit.”
That one God, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, therefore, will not appear except unto the joy which will not be taken from the just; for which future joy he sighs who says, one thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek: that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that I may contemplate the delight of the Lord; the one God, therefore, is himself the only good, in this respect, that no one sees him unto grief and mourning, but only unto salvation and true gladness. "If you understand me according to that form, I am good; but if according to this alone, why do you ask me about the good, if you will be among those who will look on him whom they have pierced; and that very vision will be an evil for them, because it will be penal."
deTrin.1.13.31Ex ista sententia dixisse Dominum, quid me interrogas de bono? Nemo bonus, nisi unus Deus, his documentis quae commemoravi probabile est, quia visio illa Dei qua contemplabimur incommutabilem atque humanis oculis invisibilem Dei substantiam, quae solis sanctis promittitur, quam dicit apostolus Paulus, facie ad faciem; et de qua dicit apostolus Ioannes, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est; et de qua dicitur, unam petii a Domino, ut contempler delectationem Domini; et de qua dicit ipse Dominus, et ego diligam eum, et ostendam me ipsum illi; et propter quam solam fide corda mundamus, ut simus beati mundi cordes, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt; et si qua alia de ista visione dicta sunt, quae copiosissime sparsa per omnes Scripturas invenit quisquis ad eam quaerendam oculum amoris intendit; sola est summum bonum nostrum, cuius adipiscendi causa praecipimur agere quidquid recte agimus.
That the Lord said, why do you ask me about the good? No one is good but God alone, from this consideration, is probable by the proofs I have recalled: namely, that that vision of God by which we shall contemplate the unchangeable substance of God, invisible to human eyes, which is promised to the saints alone, which the apostle Paul calls face to face; and of which the apostle John says, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is; and of which it is said, one thing I have asked of the Lord, that I may contemplate the delight of the Lord; and of which the Lord himself says, and I will love him, and will show myself to him; and for the sake of which alone we cleanse our hearts by faith, that we may be blessed pure in heart, for they shall see God; and whatever other things have been said of this vision, which anyone finds most abundantly scattered through all the Scriptures who bends the eye of love to seeking it; this alone is our supreme good, for the obtaining of which we are commanded to do whatever we rightly do.
deTrin.1.13.31Visio vero illa Filii hominis quae praenuntiata est, cum congregabuntur ante eum omnes gentes, et dicent ei, Domine, quando te vidimus esurientem et sitientem? et cetera, nec bonum erit impiis qui mittentur in ignem aeternum, nec summum bonum erit iustis. Adhuc enim vocat eos ad regnum, quod eis paratum est ab initio mundi. Sicut enim illis dicet, ite in ignem aeternum; ita istis, venite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete paratum vobis regnum. Et sicut ibunt illi in ambustionem aeternam; sic iusti in vitam aeternam.
But that vision of the Son of man which was foretold, when all the nations will be gathered before him, and they will say to him, Lord, when did we see you hungering and thirsting? and the rest, will be neither a good for the ungodly who will be sent into eternal fire, nor the supreme good for the just. For he still calls them to the kingdom, which has been prepared for them from the beginning of the world. For as he will say to those, go into eternal fire; so to these, come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you. And as those will go into eternal burning, so the just into eternal life.
deTrin.1.13.31Quid est autem vita aeterna, nisi, ut cognoscant te, inquit, unum verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum? Sed iam in ea claritate de qua dicit Patri, quam habui apud te, priusquam mundus fieret. Tunc enim tradet regnum Deo et Patri, ut intret servus bonus in gaudium Domini sui, et abscondat eos quos possidet Deus in abscondito vultus sui a conturbatione hominum, eorum scilicet qui tunc conturbabuntur audientes illam sententiam; a quo auditu malo iustus non timebit, si modo protegatur in tabernaculo, id est in fide recta catholicae Ecclesiae, a contradictione linguarum, id est a calumniis haereticorum.
But what is eternal life, except, that they may know you, he says, the one true God, and him whom you have sent, Jesus Christ? But now in that splendor of which he says to the Father, which I had with you before the world was made. For then he will deliver the kingdom to God and the Father, that the good servant may enter into the joy of his lord, and may hide those whom God possesses in the hiding of his countenance from the disturbance of men—of those, that is, who will then be disturbed when they hear that sentence; at which evil hearing the just man will not fear, if only he is protected in the tabernacle, that is, in the right faith of the Catholic Church, from the contradiction of tongues, that is, from the slanders of heretics.
deTrin.1.13.31Si vero est alius intellectus verborum Domini quibus ait, quid me interrogas de bono? Nemo bonus, nisi unus Deus; (Cf. Luke 18:19; Mark 10:18) dum tamen non ideo credatur maioris bonitatis esse Patris quam Filii substantia, secundum quam Verbum est per quod facta sunt omnia, nihilque abhorret a sana doctrina, securi utamur, non uno tantum, sed quotquot reperiri potuerint. Tanto enim fortius convincuntur haeretici, quanto plures exitus patent ad eorum laqueos evitandos.
But if there is another understanding of the words of the Lord by which he says, why do you ask me about the good? No one is good but God alone; (See Luke 18:19; Mark 10:18) provided, however, that it not be believed on this account that the substance of the Father is of greater goodness than that of the Son, according to which he is the Word through whom all things were made, and provided it does not recoil from sound doctrine, let us use it without anxiety—not one only, but as many as can be found. For heretics are convicted the more strongly, the more exits lie open for avoiding their snares.
deTrin.1.13.31Sed ea quae adhuc consideranda sunt ab alio iam petamus exordio.
But let us seek the things that are still to be considered now from another beginning.
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CTwo things in the error of men are most difficult to tolerate.Duo in errore hominum difficillime tolerantur
1. 1. Cum homines Deum quaerunt, et ad intellegentiam Trinitatis pro captu infirmitatis humanae animum intendunt; experti difficultates laboriosas, sive in ipsa acie mentis conantis intueri inaccessibilem lucem, sive in ipsa multiplici et multimoda locutione Litterarum Sacrarum, ubi mihi non videtur nisi atteri Adam, PL: animam, “the soul.” ut Christi gratia glorificata dilucescat: PL: dulcescat, “let his grace soothe it.” cum ad aliquid certum discussa omni ambiguitate pervenerint, facillime debent ignoscere errantibus in tanti pervestigatione secreti.
1. 1. When men seek God, and bend their mind toward the understanding of the Trinity according to the capacity of human weakness, having experienced the laborious difficulties—whether in the very edge of the mind striving to behold the unapproachable light, or in the very manifold and many-sided speech of the Sacred Letters, where it seems to me that nothing happens but that Adam PL: animam, "the soul." is worn down, so that the glorified grace of Christ may shine clear PL: dulcescat, "let his grace soothe it."—when, all ambiguity discussed away, they have arrived at something certain, they ought most readily to pardon those who err in the investigation of so great a secret.
deTrin.2.1.1Sed duo sunt quae in errore hominum difficillime tolerantur; praesumptio, priusquam veritas pateat; et, cum iam patuerit, praesumptae defensio falsitatis. (Cf. Rom 1:18–25) A quibus duobus vitiis nimis inimicis inventioni veritatis, et tractationi divinorum sanctorumque Librorum, si me, ut precor et spero, Deus defenderit atque munierit scuto bonae voluntatis suae et gratia misericordiae suae, non ero segnis ad inquirendam substantiam Dei, sive per Scripturam eius, sive per creaturam.
But there are two things that in the error of men are most difficult to tolerate: presumption, before the truth is clear; and, when it has already become clear, the defense of the presumed falsehood. (See Rom 1:18–25) From which two vices, exceedingly hostile to the finding of truth and to the handling of the divine and holy Books, if God, as I pray and hope, defends and fortifies me with the shield of his good will and the grace of his mercy, I shall not be slow to inquire into the substance of God, whether through his Scripture or through his creation.
deTrin.2.1.1Quae utraque nobis ad hoc proponitur intuenda, ut ipse quaeratur, ipse diligatur, qui et illam inspiravit, et istam creavit. (Cf. 2 Tim 3:16)
Both of which are set before us to be beheld for this end: that he himself be sought, that he himself be loved, who both inspired the one and created the other. (See 2 Tim 3:16)
deTrin.2.1.1Nec trepidus ero ad proferendam sententiam meam, in qua magis amabo inspici a rectis, quam timebo morderi a perversis. (Cf. Sir 22:22–23; 34:16; Mic 3:5) Gratanter enim suscipit oculum columbinum pulcherrima et modestissima caritas; dentem autem caninum vel evitat cautissima humilitas, vel retundit solidissima veritas.
Nor will I be fearful in bringing forth my opinion, in which I would rather be inspected by the upright than fear to be bitten by the perverse. (See Sir 22:22–23; 34:16; Mic 3:5) For the most beautiful and most modest love gladly accepts the dove's eye; but the dog's tooth either the most cautious humility avoids, or the most solid truth blunts.
deTrin.2.1.1Magisque optabo a quolibet reprehendi, quam sive ab errante, sive ab adulante laudari. Nullus enim reprehensor formidandus est amatori veritatis. Etenim aut inimicus reprehensurus est, aut amicus. Si ergo inimicus insultat, ferendus est; amicus autem si errat, docendus; si docet, audiendus. Laudator vero et errans confirmat errorem, et adulans illicit in errorem. Cf. Cicero, De Re Publica 4, fragments 10 & 12; De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.22.61; Augustine, The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 2.1.1. Emendabit ergo me iustus in misericordia, et arguet me; oleum autem peccatoris non impinguabit caput meum.
And I would rather be reproved by anyone than be praised either by one who errs or by one who flatters. For no reprover is to be feared by a lover of truth. For either an enemy will reprove, or a friend. If, then, an enemy insults, he must be borne; but if a friend errs, he must be taught; if he teaches, he must be heard. But a praiser who errs confirms the error, and one who flatters lures into error. See Cicero, De Re Publica 4, fragments 10 & 12; De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.22.61; Augustine, The Lord's Sermon on the Mount 2.1.1. The just man, therefore, will correct me in mercy, and will reprove me; but let not the oil of the sinner anoint my head.
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1. 2. Quamobrem, quamquam firmissime teneamus de Domino nostro Iesu Christo, et per Scripturas disseminatam, et a doctis catholicis earumdem Scripturarum tractatoribus demonstratam tamquam canonicam regulam, quomodo intellegatur Dei Filius et aequalis Patri secundum Dei formam in qua est, et minor Patre secundum servi formam quam accepit; in qua forma non solum Patre, sed etiam Spiritu Sancto, neque hoc tantum, sed etiam se ipso minor inventus est, non se ipso qui fuit, sed se ipso qui est; quia forma servi accepta, formam Dei non amisit, sicut Scripturarum, quae in superiore libro Cf. On the Trinity 1.7.14; 1.8.15; Phil 2:6–7. commemoravimus, testimonia docuerunt;
1. 2. Wherefore, although we hold most firmly, as a canonical rule disseminated through the Scriptures and demonstrated by the learned Catholic expounders of those same Scriptures, how the Son of God is to be understood as both equal to the Father according to the form of God in which he is, and less than the Father according to the form of a servant which he took; in which form he was found less not only than the Father, but even than the Holy Spirit, and not only this, but even than himself—not than himself who was, but than himself who is; because, having taken the form of a servant, he did not lose the form of God, as the testimonies of the Scriptures which we recalled in the previous book See On the Trinity 1.7.14; 1.8.15; Phil 2:6–7. have taught;
deTrin.2.1.2sunt tamen quaedam in divinis eloquiis ita posita, ut ambiguum sit ad quam potius regulam referantur; utrum ad eam qua intellegimus minorem Filium in assumpta creatura, an ad eam qua intellegimus, non quidem minorem esse Filium, sed aequalem Patri, tamen ab illo hunc esse Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine. Filium quippe dicimus Deum de Deo; Patrem autem, Deum tantum; non, “de Deo.” Unde manifestum est quod Filius habeat alium de quo sit, et cui Filius sit; Pater autem non Filium de quo sit habeat, sed tantum cui Pater sit. Omnis enim filius de patre est quod est, et patri filius est; nullus autem pater de filio est quod est, sed filio pater est.
there are nevertheless certain things in the divine utterances so placed that it is ambiguous to which rule they are rather to be referred: whether to that by which we understand the Son to be less in the assumed creature, or to that by which we understand that the Son is not indeed less, but equal to the Father, yet that he is from him, God of God, light of light. For we say that the Son is God of God; but the Father, God only; not, "of God." Whence it is manifest that the Son has another from whom he is, and to whom he is Son; but the Father does not have a Son from whom he is, but only one to whom he is Father. For every son is from a father what he is, and is son to a father; but no father is from a son what he is, but is father to a son.
deTrin.2.1.21. 3. Quaedam itaque ita ponuntur in Scripturis de Patre et Filio, ut indicent unitatem aequalitatemque substantiae, sicuti est, ego et Pater unum sumus; et, cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo; et quaecumque talia sunt.
1. 3. Some things, therefore, are so placed in the Scriptures concerning the Father and the Son as to indicate the unity and equality of substance, as it is, I and the Father are one; and, though he was in the form of God, he did not count it robbery to be equal to God; and whatever things are such.
deTrin.2.1.3Quaedam vero ita, ut minorem ostendant Filium propter formam servi, id est, propter assumptam creaturam mutabilis humanaeque substantiae, sicuti est quod ait, quoniam Pater maior me est, et, Pater non iudicat quemquam, sed omne iudicium dedit Filio. Nam paulo post consequenter ait, et potestatem dedit ei et iudicium facere, quoniam Filius hominis est.
But some are so placed as to show the Son to be less on account of the form of a servant, that is, on account of the assumed creature of changeable and human substance, as is that which he says, for the Father is greater than I, and, the Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son. For a little later he consequently says, and he gave him power also to execute judgment, because he is the Son of man.
deTrin.2.1.3Quaedam porro ita, ut nec minor nec aequalis tunc ostendatur, sed tantum quod de Patre sit intimetur, ut est illud, sicut habet Pater vitam in semetipso, sic dedit Filio vitam habere in semetipso; et illud, neque enim potest Filius a se facere quidquam, nisi quod viderit Patrem facientem. Quod si propterea dictum acceperimus, quia in forma accepta ex creatura minor est Filius, consequens erit ut prior Pater super aquas ambulaverit, aut alicuius alterius caeci nati de sputo et luto oculos aperuerit, et cetera quae Filius in carne apparens inter homines fecit, (Cf. Matt 14:25–26; Mark 6:48; John 9:6–7) ut possit ea facere qui dixit non posse Filium a se facere quidquam, nisi quod viderit Patrem facientem: (Cf. John 5:19) quis autem vel delirus ita sentiat?
But some, further, are so placed that the Son is then shown neither less nor equal, but only that he is from the Father is intimated, as is that, as the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son to have life in himself; and that, for the Son can do nothing of himself, except what he sees the Father doing. But if we take this to have been said because the Son is less in the form assumed from the creature, the consequence will be that the Father first walked upon the waters, or opened the eyes of some other man blind from birth with spittle and clay, and the rest that the Son, appearing in the flesh among men, did, (See Matt 14:25–26; Mark 6:48; John 9:6–7) so that he could do these things who said that the Son could not do anything of himself, except what he sees the Father doing: (See John 5:19) but who, even though delirious, would think so?
deTrin.2.1.3Restat ergo ut haec ideo dicta sint, quia incommutabilis est vita Filii sicut Patris, et tamen de Patre est; et inseparabilis est operatio Patris et Filii, sed tamen ita operari Filio de illo est, de quo ipse est, id est de Patre; et ita videt Filius Patrem, ut quo eum videt hoc ipso sit Filius. (Cf. John 6:46)
It remains, therefore, that these things were said for this reason: that the life of the Son is unchangeable, like the Father's, and yet is from the Father; and the working of the Father and of the Son is inseparable, but yet that the Son so works comes from him from whom he himself is, that is, from the Father; and the Son so sees the Father that, by the very fact by which he sees him, he is the Son. (See John 6:46)
deTrin.2.1.3Non enim aliud illi est esse de Patre, id est nasci de Patre, quam videre Patrem; aut aliud videre operantem, quam pariter operari; sed ideo non a se, quia non est a se. Et ideo quae viderit Patrem facientem, haec eadem facit et Filius similiter, quia de Patre est.
For to be from the Father, that is, to be born of the Father, is for him no other thing than to see the Father; nor is it another thing to see him working than to work along with him; but therefore not of himself, because he is not from himself. And therefore the things that he sees the Father doing, these same things the Son also does likewise, because he is from the Father.
deTrin.2.1.3Neque enim alia similiter, sicut pictor alias tabulas pingit, quemadmodum alias ab alio pictas vidit; nec eadem dissimiliter, sicut corpus easdem litteras exprimit, quas animus cogitavit; sed quaecumque, inquit, Pater facit, haec eadem et facit Filius similiter. Et, haec eadem dixit; et, similiter; ac per hoc inseparabilis et par est operatio Patri et Filio, sed a Patre est Filio. Ideo non potest Filius a se facere quidquam, nisi quod viderit Patrem facientem.
For neither does he do other things likewise, as a painter paints other panels in the way he saw others painted by another; nor the same things unlike, as the body forms the same letters that the mind thought; but whatever, he says, the Father does, these same things the Son also does likewise. And he said both, these same things, and, likewise; and on this account the working is inseparable and equal for the Father and the Son, but it is from the Father for the Son. Therefore the Son cannot do anything of himself, except what he sees the Father doing.
deTrin.2.1.3Ex hac ergo regula, qua ita loquuntur Scripturae, ut non alium alio minorem, sed tantum velint (The Arians, chiefly, but also “economic” theologians like Tertullian and Novatian) ostendere quis de quo sit, nonnulli eum sensum conceperunt, tamquam minor Filius diceretur.
From this rule, therefore, by which the Scriptures so speak as to wish to show, not the one less than the other, but only (The Arians, chiefly, but also "economic" theologians like Tertullian and Novatian) who is from whom, some have conceived the sense as though the Son were said to be less.
deTrin.2.1.3Quidam autem nostri indoctiores, et in his minime eruditi, dum haec secundum formam servi (Cf. Phil 2:7) conantur accipere, et eos rectus intellectus non sequitur, perturbantur.
But certain of our more unlearned brethren, and those least trained in these matters, while they try to take these things according to the form of a servant, (See Phil 2:7) and the right understanding does not follow them, are disturbed.
deTrin.2.1.3Quod ne accidat, tenenda est haec regula, qua non minor est Filius, sed quod de Patre sit intimatur: quibus verbis non inaequalitas, sed nativitas eius ostenditur. Cf. Hilary, On the Trinity 9.54–56.
Lest this happen, this rule must be held, by which the Son is not less, but it is intimated that he is from the Father: by which words not his inequality, but his birth, is shown. See Hilary, On the Trinity 9.54–56.
deTrin.2.1.32. 4. Sunt ergo quaedam in Sanctis Libris, ut dicere coeperam, ita posita, ut ambiguum sit quonam referenda sint; utrum ad illud quod propter assumptam creaturam minor est Filius; an ad illud, quod quamvis aequalis, tamen quia de Patre sit indicatur. Et mihi quidem videtur, si eo modo ambiguum est, ut explicari discernique non possit, ex utralibet regula sine periculo posse intellegi, sicut est quod ait, mea doctrina non est mea, sed eius qui me misit. Nam et ex forma servi potest accipi, sicut iam in libro superiore tractavimus; et ex forma Dei, in qua sic aequalis est Patri, ut tamen de Patre sit. Cf. On the Trinity 1.27. In Dei quippe forma, sicut non est aliud Filius, aliud vita eius, sed ipsa vita Filius est; ita non est aliud Filius, aliud doctrina eius, sed ipsa doctrina Filius est. (Cf. John 5:26, 11:25, 14:6; 1 John 5:11–20) Ac per hoc sicut id quod dictum est, dedit Filio vitam, non aliud intellegitur quam, “genuit Filium qui est vita;” sic etiam cum dicitur, “dedit Filio doctrinam,” bene intellegitur, “genuit Filium qui est doctrina;” ut quod dictum est, mea doctrina non est mea, sed eius qui me misit, sic intellegatur ac si dictum sit, “ego non sum a me ipso, sed ab illo qui me misit.”
2. 4. There are, then, certain things in the Holy Books, as I had begun to say, so placed that it is ambiguous to what they are to be referred: whether to that by which the Son is less on account of the assumed creature; or to that by which, though he is equal, yet it is indicated that he is from the Father. And it indeed seems to me that, if it is ambiguous in such a way that it cannot be explained and distinguished, it can be understood by either rule without danger, as is that which he says, my teaching is not mine, but his who sent me. For it can be taken from the form of a servant, as we have already treated in the previous book; and from the form of God, in which he is so equal to the Father that yet he is from the Father. See On the Trinity 1.27. For in the form of God, just as the Son is not one thing and his life another, but the Son is that very life; so the Son is not one thing and his teaching another, but the Son is that very teaching. (See John 5:26; 11:25; 14:6; 1 John 5:11–20) And on this account, as that which was said, he gave to the Son life, is understood as no other than, "he begot the Son who is life"; so too when it is said, "he gave to the Son teaching," it is rightly understood, "he begot the Son who is teaching"; so that what was said, my teaching is not mine, but his who sent me, may be understood as if it were said, "I am not from myself, but from him who sent me."
deTrin.2.2.43. 5. Nam et de Spiritu Sancto, de quo non dictum est, semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens; ait tamen ipse Dominus: cum autem venerit ille Spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem. Non enim loquetur a semetipso, sed quaecumque audiet loquetur, et quae ventura sunt annuntiabit vobis. Ille me clarificabit; quia de meo accipiet, et annuntiabit vobis. Post haec verba, nisi continuo secutus dixisset, omnia quaecumque habet Pater, mea sunt; propterea dixi, quia de meo accipiet, et annuntiabit vobis; crederetur fortasse ita natus de Christo Spiritus Sanctus, quemadmodum ille de Patre.
3. 5. For of the Holy Spirit too, of whom it was not said, he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, the Lord himself nevertheless says: but when that Spirit of truth comes, he will teach you all truth. For he will not speak of himself, but whatever he hears he will speak, and the things that are to come he will announce to you. He will glorify me; for he will receive of mine, and will announce it to you. After these words, unless he had immediately gone on to say, all things whatever the Father has are mine; therefore I said that he will receive of mine, and will announce it to you, it would perhaps be believed that the Holy Spirit was thus born of Christ, just as the Son of the Father.
deTrin.2.3.5De se quippe dixerat, mea doctrina non est mea, sed eius qui me misit; de Spiritu autem Sancto, non enim loquetur a semetipso, sed quaecumque audiet loquetur; et, quia de meo accipiet, et annuntiabit vobis. Sed quia reddidit causam cur dixerit, de meo accipiet; ait enim, omnia quaecumque habet Pater, mea sunt; propterea dixi, quia de meo accipiet; restat ut intellegatur etiam Spiritus Sanctus de Patris habere, sicut et Filius.
For of himself he had said, my teaching is not mine, but his who sent me; but of the Holy Spirit, for he will not speak of himself, but whatever he hears he will speak; and, for he will receive of mine, and will announce it to you. But because he gave the reason why he said, he will receive of mine—for he says, all things whatever the Father has are mine; therefore I said that he will receive of mine—it remains that the Holy Spirit too is understood to have from the Father, just as the Son also.
deTrin.2.3.5Quomodo, nisi secundum id quod supra (Possibly referring to 1.18–19, but a different point was being made there) diximus: cum autem venerit paracletus quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, Spiritum veritatis qui a Patre procedit, ille testimonium perhibebit de me? Procedendo itaque a Patre, dicitur non loqui a semetipso; et sicut non ex eo fit ut minor sit Filius quia dixit, non potest Filius a se facere quidquam, nisi quod viderit Patrem facientem (non enim hoc ex forma servi dixit, sed ex forma Dei, sicut iam ostendimus; haec autem verba non indicant quod minor sit, sed quod de Patre sit); ita non hinc efficitur ut minor sit Spiritus Sanctus, quia dictum est de illo, non enim loquetur a semetipso, sed quaecumque audiet, loquetur; secundum hoc enim dictum est quod de Patre procedit.
How, except according to that which we said above: (Possibly referring to 1.18–19, but a different point was being made there) but when the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness of me? By proceeding, therefore, from the Father, he is said not to speak of himself; and just as it does not follow from this that the Son is less because he said, the Son cannot do anything of himself, except what he sees the Father doing (for he did not say this from the form of a servant, but from the form of God, as we have already shown; and these words do not indicate that he is less, but that he is from the Father); so it is not thereby brought about that the Holy Spirit is less because it was said of him, for he will not speak of himself, but whatever he hears, he will speak; for this was said according to that by which he proceeds from the Father.
deTrin.2.3.5Cum vero et Filius de Patre sit, et Spiritus Sanctus a Patre procedat, cur non ambo Filii dicantur, nec ambo geniti, sed ille unus Filius unigenitus, hic autem Spiritus Sanctus nec Filius nec genitus, quia si genitus utique Filius, alio loco, si Deus donaverit, et quantum donaverit, disseremus.
But since both the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, why they are not both called Sons, nor both begotten, but that one is the only-begotten Son, while this one, the Holy Spirit, is neither Son nor begotten—because if begotten, then certainly Son—we shall discuss in another place, if God grants it, and as far as he grants.
deTrin.2.3.54. 6. Verumtamen hic evigilent, si possunt, qui hoc etiam sibi suffragari putaverunt, quasi ad demonstrandum Patrem Filio maiorem, quia dixit Filius, Pater, clarifica me. Ecce et Spiritus Sanctus clarificat eum; numquidnam et ipse maior est illo? Porro autem si propterea Spiritus Sanctus clarificat Filium quia de Filii accipiet, et ideo de eius accipiet quia omnia quae habet Pater ipsius sunt; manifestum est quia cum Spiritus Sanctus glorificat Filium, Pater glorificat Filium.
4. 6. But here let those wake up, if they can, who thought even this favored them, as though to demonstrate that the Father is greater than the Son, because the Son said, Father, glorify me. Behold, the Holy Spirit too glorifies him; is he then also greater than he? But further, if the Holy Spirit glorifies the Son for this reason, that he will receive of the Son's, and therefore receives of his because all that the Father has are his; it is manifest that when the Holy Spirit glorifies the Son, the Father glorifies the Son.
deTrin.2.4.6Unde cognoscitur quod omnia quae habet Pater non tantum Filii, sed etiam Spiritus Sancti sunt, quia potens est Spiritus Sanctus glorificare Filium, quem glorificat Pater. Quod si ille qui glorificat, eo quem glorificat maior est; sinant ut aequales sint qui se invicem glorificant. Scriptum est autem quod et Filius glorificet Patrem: ego te, inquit, glorificavi super terram. Sane caveant ne putetur Spiritus Sanctus maior ambobus, quia glorificat Filium quem glorificat Pater, The text indeed reads quem glorificat Pater, “whom the Father glorifies.” The translator amends this to qui glorificat Patrem for the sense. ipsum autem nec a Patre nec a Filio scriptum est glorificari. (Cf. John 12:23, 17:5–24)
Whence it is recognized that all that the Father has are not only the Son's, but also the Holy Spirit's, because the Holy Spirit is able to glorify the Son, whom the Father glorifies. But if the one who glorifies is greater than the one whom he glorifies, let them allow those to be equal who glorify one another. But it is written that the Son too glorifies the Father: I have glorified you, he says, upon the earth. Of course, let them beware lest the Holy Spirit be thought greater than both, because he glorifies the Son whom the Father glorifies, The text indeed reads quem glorificat Pater, "whom the Father glorifies." The translator amends this to qui glorificat Patrem for the sense. while it is written that he himself is glorified neither by the Father nor by the Son. (See John 12:23; 17:5–24)
deTrin.2.4.6C
deTrin.2.4.6
5. 7. Sed in his convicti, ad illud se convertunt ut dicant, “maior est qui mittit, quam qui mittitur;” proinde maior est Pater Filio, quia Filius a Patre se missum assidue commemorat; maior est et Spiritu Sancto, quia de illo dixit Iesus, quem mittet Pater in nomine meo. Et Spiritus Sanctus utroque minor est; quia et Pater eum mittit, sicut commemoravimus; et Filius, cum dicit, si autem abiero, mittam eum ad vos.
5. 7. But, convicted in these things, they turn to this, to say, "He who sends is greater than he who is sent"; accordingly the Father is greater than the Son, because the Son continually recalls that he was sent by the Father; he is greater than the Holy Spirit too, because Jesus said of him, whom the Father will send in my name. And the Holy Spirit is less than both; because both the Father sends him, as we have recalled, and the Son, when he says, but if I go away, I will send him to you.
deTrin.2.5.7Qua in quaestione primum quaero, unde et quo missus sit Filius. Ego, inquit, a Patre exii, et veni in hunc mundum. Ergo a Patre exire, et venire in hunc mundum, hoc est mitti. Quid igitur est quod de illo idem ipse Evangelista dicit, in hoc mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit? Deinde coniungit, in sua propria venit. Illuc utique missus est, quo venit: at si in hunc mundum missus est, quia exiit a Patre, et venit in hunc mundum, et in hoc mundo erat; illuc ergo missus est ubi erat.
In which question I first ask, from where and to where the Son was sent. I, he says, came forth from the Father, and have come into this world. To come forth from the Father, then, and to come into this world, this is to be sent. What then is it that the same Evangelist says of him, he was in this world, and the world was made through him, and the world did not know him? Then he adds, he came into his own. He was assuredly sent there, to where he came: but if he was sent into this world, because he came forth from the Father, and came into this world, and was in this world; he was therefore sent there where he was.
deTrin.2.5.7Nam et illud quod scriptum est in propheta Deum dicere, caelum et terram ego impleo; si de Filio dictum est (ipsum enim nonnulli This was almost the universal assumption from Justin right down to Augustine’s own day. He himself had his doubts about it. volunt intellegi vel Prophetis vel in Prophetis locutum), quo missus est, nisi illuc ubi erat? Ubique enim erat qui ait, caelum et terram ego impleo.
For that too which is written in the prophet, that God says, I fill heaven and earth; if it was said of the Son (for some This was almost the universal assumption from Justin right down to Augustine's own day. He himself had his doubts about it. want him to be understood as having spoken either to the Prophets or in the Prophets), to where was he sent, except there where he was? For he was everywhere who says, I fill heaven and earth.
deTrin.2.5.7Si autem de Patre dictum est, ubi esse potuit sine Verbo suo et sine Sapientia sua, quae pertendit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter? Sed neque sine Spiritu suo usquam esse potuit. Itaque si ubique est Deus, ubique est etiam Spiritus eius. Illuc ergo et Spiritus Sanctus missus est ubi erat.
But if it was said of the Father, where could he be without his Word and without his Wisdom, which reaches mightily from end to end, and orders all things sweetly? But neither could he be anywhere without his Spirit. And so if God is everywhere, his Spirit too is everywhere. Therefore the Holy Spirit too was sent there where he was.
deTrin.2.5.7Nam et ille qui non invenit locum quo iret a facie Dei et dicit, si ascendero in caelum, tu ibi es; si descendero in infernum, ades; ubique volens intelligi praesentem Deum, prius nominavit Spiritum eius. Nam sic ait: quo abibo ab Spiritu tuo? Et quo a facie tua fugiam?
For he too who finds no place to go from the face of God, and says, if I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I descend into hell, you are present, wishing God to be understood as present everywhere, first named his Spirit. For he says thus: where shall I go from your Spirit? And where shall I flee from your face?
deTrin.2.5.75. 8. Quocirca si et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus illuc mittitur ubi erat, quaerendum est quomodo intelligatur ista missio, sive Filii, sive Spiritus Sancti. Pater enim solus nusquam legitur missus. Et de Filio quidem ita scribit Apostolus: cum autem venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum, factum ex muliere, factum sub Lege, ut eos qui sub Lege erant redimeret. Misit, inquit, Filium suum factum ex muliere. Quo nomine quis Catholicus nesciat, non eum privationem virginitatis, sed differentiam sexus hebraeo loquendi more significare voluisse? In ordinary Latin usage, mulier forms a pair by contrast with virgo, somewhat like English “wife” and “maid.” Cum itaque ait, misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere, satis ostendit eo ipso missum Filium quo factus est ex muliere. Quod ergo de Deo natus est, in hoc mundo erat; quod autem de Maria natus est, in hunc mundum missus advenit. (Cf. John 3:6, 16:28; 1 John 5:4)
5. 8. Wherefore, if both the Son and the Holy Spirit are sent there where they were, we must inquire how this sending is to be understood, whether of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. For the Father alone is nowhere read to have been sent. And of the Son the Apostle writes thus: but when the fullness of time came, God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the Law, that he might redeem those who were under the Law. He sent, he says, his Son made of a woman. By which name what Catholic does not know that he wished to signify, not the privation of virginity, but the difference of sex, in the Hebrew manner of speaking? In ordinary Latin usage, mulier forms a pair by contrast with virgo, somewhat like English "wife" and "maid." Since, then, he says, God sent his Son made of a woman, he sufficiently shows that the Son was sent by that very thing by which he was made of a woman. In that, therefore, he was born of God, he was in this world; but in that he was born of Mary, he came sent into this world. (See John 3:6; 16:28; 1 John 5:4)
deTrin.2.5.8Proinde mitti a Patre sine Spiritu Sancto non potuit; non solum quia intelligitur Pater cum eum misit, id est, fecit ex femina, non utique sine Spiritu suo fecisse; verum etiam quod manifestissime atque apertissime in Evangelio dicitur Virgini Mariae quaerenti ab angelo, quomodo fiet istud? Spiritus Sanctus superveniet in te, et virtus Altissimi obumbrabit tibi; et Matthaeus dicit, inventa est in utero habens de Spiritu Sancto. Quamquam et apud Isaiam prophetam ipse Christus intelligitur de adventu suo futuro dicere, et nunc Dominus misit me, et Spiritus eius.
Accordingly, he could not be sent by the Father without the Holy Spirit; not only because the Father is understood, when he sent him—that is, made him of a woman—certainly not to have done so without his Spirit; but also because it is said most manifestly and most plainly in the Gospel to the Virgin Mary, when she asked of the angel, how shall this be? The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you; and Matthew says, she was found to be with child of the Holy Spirit. Although in the prophet Isaiah too, Christ himself is understood to speak of his future coming, and now the Lord has sent me, and his Spirit.
deTrin.2.5.85. 9. Fortasse aliquis cogat ut dicamus etiam a se ipso missum esse Filium; quia ille Mariae conceptus et partus operatio Trinitatis est, qua creante omnia creantur. “Et quomodo iam,” inquit, “Pater eum misit, si ipse se misit?” Cui primum respondeo, quaerens ut dicat, si potest, quomodo Pater eum sanctificavit, si se ipse sanctificavit? Utrumque enim idem Dominus ait: quem Pater, inquit, sanctificavit, et misit in hunc mundum, vos dicitis, ‘quia blasphemat’; PL: blasphemas, “you are blaspheming.” quoniam dixi, Filius Dei sum. Alio autem loco ait: et pro eis sanctifico me ipsum.
5. 9. Perhaps someone will press us to say that the Son was sent even by himself; because that conception and bringing forth by Mary is the working of the Trinity, by whose creating all things are created. "And how, then," he says, "did the Father send him, if he sent himself?" To whom I first answer, asking him to say, if he can, how the Father sanctified him, if he sanctified himself? For the same Lord says both: whom the Father, he says, sanctified and sent into this world, you say, "he blasphemes", PL: blasphemas, "you are blaspheming." because I said, I am the Son of God. But in another place he says: and for them I sanctify myself.
deTrin.2.5.9Item quaero quomodo eum Pater tradidit, si se ipse tradidit? Utrumque enim dicit Apostolus Paulus: qui Filio, inquit, proprio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum. Alibi autem de ipso Salvatore ait: qui me dilexit, et tradidit se ipsum pro me.
Likewise I ask how the Father delivered him up, if he delivered himself up? For the apostle Paul says both: who did not spare his own Son, he says, but delivered him up for us all. But elsewhere he says of the Savior himself: who loved me, and delivered himself up for me.
deTrin.2.5.9Credo respondebit, si haec probe sapit, quia una voluntas est Patris et Filii, et inseparabilis operatio. Sic ergo intelligat illam incarnationem et ex Virgine nativitatem, in qua Filius intelligitur missus, una eademque operatione Patris et Filii inseparabiliter esse factam, non utique inde separato Spiritu Sancto, de quo aperte dicitur, inventa est in utero habens de Spiritu Sancto.
I believe he will answer, if he is rightly wise, that the will of the Father and of the Son is one, and the working inseparable. So, then, let him understand that incarnation and birth from the Virgin, in which the Son is understood to have been sent, to have been done inseparably by one and the same working of the Father and of the Son, certainly not with the Holy Spirit separated from it, of whom it is plainly said, she was found to be with child of the Holy Spirit.
deTrin.2.5.9Nam etiam si ita quaeramus, enodatius fortassis quod dicimus apparebit: quomodo misit Deus Filium suum? Iussit ut veniret, atque ille iubenti obtemperans venit; an rogavit, an tantummodo admonuit?
For even if we inquire thus, what we say will perhaps appear more clearly: how did God send his Son? Did he command him to come, and he, obeying the one commanding, came; or did he ask him, or did he merely admonish him?
deTrin.2.5.9Sed quodlibet horum sit, verbo utique factum est, Dei autem Verbum ipse est Dei Filius. Quapropter cum eum Pater verbo misit, a Patre et Verbo eius factum est ut mitteretur. Ergo a Patre et Filio missus est idem Filius, quia Verbum Patris est ipse Filius.
But whichever of these it be, it was certainly done by a word, and the Word of God is the Son of God himself. Wherefore, when the Father sent him by a word, it was done by the Father and his Word that he should be sent. Therefore the same Son was sent by the Father and the Son, because the Son himself is the Word of the Father.
deTrin.2.5.9Quis enim se tam sacrilega induat opinione, ut putet temporale verbum a Patre factum esse, ut aeternus Filius mitteretur et in carne appareret ex tempore? Sed utique in ipso Dei Verbo quod erat in principio apud Deum et Deus erat, (Cf. John 1:1) in ipsa scilicet Sapientia Dei, sine tempore erat, quo tempore illam in carne apparere (Cf. 1 Cor 1:24; 1 John 4:2; Rom 8:3) oporteret. Itaque cum sine ullo initio temporis in principio esset Verbum, et Verbum esset apud Deum, et Deus esset Verbum; sine ullo tempore in ipso Verbo erat, quo tempore Verbum caro fieret, et habitaret in nobis.
For who would clothe himself in so sacrilegious an opinion as to think that a temporal word was made by the Father, so that the eternal Son might be sent and appear in the flesh in time? But certainly in the Word of God itself, which was in the beginning with God, and was God, (See John 1:1) that is, in the very Wisdom of God, the time at which it behooved her to appear in the flesh (See 1 Cor 1:24; 1 John 4:2; Rom 8:3) was without time. And so, since without any beginning of time the Word was in the beginning, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God; without any time, the time at which the Word should become flesh, and dwell among us was in the Word itself.
deTrin.2.5.9Quae plenitudo temporis cum venisset, misit Deus Filium suum, factum ex muliere, id est, factum in tempore, ut incarnatum Verbum hominibus appareret; quod in ipso Verbo sine tempore erat, in quo tempore fieret. Ordo quippe temporum in aeterna Dei Sapientia (Cf. Sir 1:3; Eccl 3:1–8) sine tempore est.
When this fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, made of a woman, that is, made in time, so that the incarnate Word might appear to men; the time at which it should be done was, in the Word itself, without time. For the order of times is, in the eternal Wisdom of God, (See Sir 1:3; Eccl 3:1–8) without time.
deTrin.2.5.9Cum itaque hoc a Patre et Filio factum esset, ut in carne Filius appareret, congruenter dictus est missus ille qui in ea carne apparuit; misisse autem ille qui in ea non apparuit. Quoniam illa quae coram corporeis oculis foris geruntur, ab interiore apparatu naturae spiritualis existunt, et propterea convenienter “missa” dicuntur. Forma porro illa suscepti hominis, Filii persona est, non etiam Patris.
Since, then, this was done by the Father and the Son, that the Son should appear in the flesh, he who appeared in that flesh is fittingly said to have been sent; but he who did not appear in it, to have sent. For the things that are done outwardly before bodily eyes arise from the inner apparatus of the spiritual nature, and on this account are fittingly said to be "sent." Moreover, that form of the man assumed is the person of the Son, not also of the Father.
deTrin.2.5.9Quapropter Pater invisibilis una cum Filio secum invisibili, eumdem Filium visibilem faciendo misisse eum dictus est; (Cf. Heb 11:3; Isa 48:16; John 3:17, 5:23–24, 7:16, 10:36, 16:28) qui si eo modo visibilis fieret, ut cum Patre invisibilis esse desisteret, id est, si substantia invisibilis Verbi in creaturam visibilem mutata et transiens verteretur, Cf. Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionbus Oratoriae 7.23. ita missus a Patre intelligeretur Filius, ut tantum missus, non etiam cum Patre mittens inveniretur.
Wherefore the invisible Father, together with the Son invisible along with him, by making the same Son visible, is said to have sent him; (See Heb 11:3; Isa 48:16; John 3:17; 5:23–24; 7:16; 10:36; 16:28) who, if he were made visible in such a way that he ceased to be invisible with the Father—that is, if the invisible substance of the Word were changed and, passing over, turned into a visible creature See Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionibus Oratoriae 7.23.—the Son would be understood to have been sent by the Father in such a way that he would be found only sent, and not also sending together with the Father.
deTrin.2.5.9Cum vero sic accepta est forma servi, ut maneret incommutabilis forma Dei, manifestum est quod a Patre et Filio non apparentibus factum sit quod appareret in Filio, id est, ut ab invisibili Patre cum invisibili Filio, idem ipse Filius visibilis mitteretur. Cur ergo ait, et a me ipso non veni? Iam hoc secundum formam servi dictum est, secundum quam dictum est, ego non iudico quemquam.
But since the form of a servant was so taken that the form of God remained unchangeable, it is manifest that what appeared in the Son was done by the Father and the Son not appearing—that is, that by the invisible Father, with the invisible Son, the same Son was sent visible. Why, then, does he say, and I did not come of myself? This was now said according to the form of a servant, according to which it was said, I judge no one.
deTrin.2.5.95. 10. Si ergo missus dicitur in quantum apparuit foris in creatura corporali, qui intus in natura spirituali oculis mortalium semper occultus est, iam in promptu est intelligere etiam de Spiritu Sancto cur missus et ipse dicatur. Facta est enim quaedam creaturae species ex tempore in qua visibiliter ostenderetur Spiritus Sanctus, sive cum in ipsum Dominum corporali specie velut columba descendit, sive cum decem diebus peractis post eius ascensionem, die Pentecostes factus est subito de caelo sonus quasi ferretur flatus vehemens, et visae sunt illis linguae divisae tamquam ignis, qui et insedit super unumquemque eorum. Haec operatio visibiliter expressa, et oculis oblata mortalibus, missio Spiritus Sancti dicta est; non ut appareret eius ipsa substantia, qua et ipse invisibilis et incommutabilis est, sicut Pater et Filius; sed ut exterioribus visis hominum corda commota, a temporali manifestatione venientis ad occultam aeternitatem semper praesentis converterentur.
5. 10. If, then, he is said to be sent insofar as he appeared outwardly in a corporeal creature, who inwardly in his spiritual nature is always hidden from mortal eyes, it is now easy to understand of the Holy Spirit also why he too is said to be sent. For a certain appearance of a creature was made in time, in which the Holy Spirit might be visibly shown, whether when he descended in a corporeal appearance like a dove upon the Lord himself, or when, ten days having passed after his ascension, on the day of Pentecost there suddenly came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and there appeared to them divided tongues as of fire, which also settled upon each one of them. This operation, visibly expressed and offered to mortal eyes, was called the sending of the Holy Spirit; not that his very substance should appear, by which he too is invisible and unchangeable, like the Father and the Son; but that, the hearts of men being moved by outward sights, they might be turned from the temporal manifestation of him who comes to the hidden eternity of him who is always present.
deTrin.2.5.106. 11. Ideo autem nusquam scriptum est, quod Deus Pater maior sit Spiritu Sancto, vel Spiritus Sanctus minor Deo Patre, quia non sic est assumpta creatura, in qua appareret Spiritus Sanctus, sicut assumptus est Filius hominis, in qua forma ipsius Verbi Dei persona praesentaretur; non ut haberet Verbum Dei, sicut alii sancti sapientes, sed prae participibus suis; (Cf. Heb 1:9) non utique quod amplius habebat Verbum, ut esset quam caeteri excellentiore sapientia, sed quod ipsum Verbum erat.
6. 11. But for this reason it is nowhere written that God the Father is greater than the Holy Spirit, or that the Holy Spirit is less than God the Father: because the creature in which the Holy Spirit appeared was not so assumed as the Son of man was assumed, in which form the person of the Word of God itself was presented; not that he should have the Word of God, like other holy wise men, but above his fellows; (See Heb 1:9) not, indeed, because he had more of the Word, so that he was wiser than the rest by a more excellent wisdom, but because he was the Word itself.
deTrin.2.6.11Aliud est enim Verbum in carne, aliud Verbum caro; id est, aliud est Verbum in homine, aliud Verbum homo. Caro enim pro “homine” posita est in eo quod ait, Verbum caro factum est; sicut et illud, et videbit omnis caro PL adds pariter, “together.” salutare Dei. Non enim sine anima vel sine mente; sed ita omnis caro, ac si diceretur, “omnis homo.”
For the Word in the flesh is one thing, the Word flesh another; that is, the Word in a man is one thing, the Word a man another. For flesh was put for "man" in that which he says, the Word was made flesh; just as also that, and all flesh shall see PL adds pariter, "together." the salvation of God. For not without soul or without mind; but all flesh thus, as if it were said, "all men."
deTrin.2.6.11Non ergo sic est assumpta creatura, in qua appareret Spiritus Sanctus, sicut assumpta est caro illa et humana illa forma ex Virgine Maria. Neque enim columbam beatificavit Spiritus, vel illum flatum, vel illum ignem, sibique et personae suae in unitatem habitumque coniunxit in aeternum; aut vero mutabilis et convertibilis est natura Spiritus Sancti, ut non haec ex creatura fierent, sed ipse in illud atque illud mutabiliter verteretur, sicut aqua in glaciem. Sed apparuerunt ista, sicut opportune apparere debuerunt, creatura serviente Creatori, et ad nutum eius (Cf. Rom 1:25; Job 26:11) incommutabiliter in se ipso permanentis, ad eum significandum et demonstrandum, sicut significari et demonstrari mortalibus oportebat, mutata atque conversa. Cf. Cicero, De Partitionbus Oratoriae 7.23; De Oratore 3.45.177.
The creature in which the Holy Spirit appeared, therefore, was not so assumed as that flesh and that human form was assumed from the Virgin Mary. For the Spirit did not beatify the dove, or that wind, or that fire, and join it to himself and to his person in unity and condition forever; nor indeed is the nature of the Holy Spirit changeable and convertible, so that these things were not made out of a creature, but he himself was changeably turned into this and that, like water into ice. But these things appeared, as they ought fittingly to appear, the creature serving the Creator, and, at his nod (See Rom 1:25; Job 26:11)—of him who unchangeably remains in himself—changed and converted to signify and demonstrate him, as it behooved him to be signified and demonstrated to mortals. See Cicero, De Partitionibus Oratoriae 7.23; De Oratore 3.45.177.
deTrin.2.6.11Proinde, quamquam illa columba Spiritus dicta sit, et de illo igne cum diceretur, visae sunt illis, inquit, linguae divisae velut ignis, qui et insedit super unumquemque eorum, et coeperunt linguis loqui, quemadmodum Spiritus dabat eis pronuntiare, ut ostenderet per illum ignem Spiritum demonstratum, sicut per columbam; non tamen ita possumus dicere Spiritum Sanctum et Deum et columbam, aut et Deum et ignem, sicut dicimus Filium et Deum et hominem; nec sicut dicimus Filium agnum Dei, non solum Ioanne Baptista dicente, Ecce Agnus Dei; sed etiam Ioanne evangelista vidente Agnum occisum in Apocalypsi. (Cf. Rev 5:6)
Accordingly, although that dove was called the Spirit, and although, when it was said of that fire, there appeared to them, he says, divided tongues as of fire, which also settled upon each one of them, and they began to speak in tongues, as the Spirit gave them to utter, so that he might show the Spirit demonstrated through that fire, as through the dove; yet we cannot in this way say that the Holy Spirit is both God and a dove, or both God and fire, as we say that the Son is both God and man; nor as we say that the Son is the Lamb of God, not only with John the Baptist saying, Behold the Lamb of God, but also with John the Evangelist seeing the Lamb slain in the Apocalypse. (See Rev 5:6)
deTrin.2.6.11Illa quippe visio prophetica non est exhibita oculis corporeis per formas corporeas, sed in spiritu per spirituales imagines corporum. Columbam vero illam et ignem oculis viderunt, (Cf. Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32–33) quicumque viderunt. Quamquam de igne disceptari potest, utrum oculis, an spiritu visus sit, propter verba sic posita. Non enim ait, “viderunt linguas divisas velut ignem;” sed, visae sunt eis. Non autem sub eadem significatione solemus dicere, visum est mihi, qua dicimus, vidi. Et in illis quidem spiritualibus visis imaginum corporalium solet dici, et, “visum est mihi;” et, vidi: in istis vero quae per expressam corporalem speciem oculis demonstrantur, non solet dici, “visum est mihi;” sed, vidi. De illo ergo igne potest esse quaestio, quomodo visus sit; utrum intus in spiritu tamquam foris, an vere foris coram oculis carnis. De illa vero columba quae dicta est corporali specie descendisse, nullus umquam dubitavit quod oculis visa sit.
For that prophetic vision was not presented to bodily eyes through bodily forms, but in the spirit through spiritual images of bodies. But that dove and fire they saw with their eyes, (See Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32–33) whoever saw them. Although concerning the fire it can be disputed whether it was seen with the eyes or in the spirit, on account of the words being placed thus. For he does not say, "they saw divided tongues as of fire"; but, there appeared to them. Now we are not accustomed to say, it appeared to me, under the same meaning as we say, I saw. And in those spiritual sights of bodily images it is customary to say both, "it appeared to me," and, I saw: but in those that are demonstrated to the eyes through an expressed bodily appearance, it is not customary to say, "it appeared to me," but, I saw. Of that fire, therefore, there can be a question how it was seen; whether inwardly in the spirit as if outwardly, or truly outwardly before the eyes of the flesh. But of that dove which was said to have descended in a corporeal appearance, no one ever doubted that it was seen with the eyes.
deTrin.2.6.11Nec sicut dicimus Filium petram (scriptum est enim, Petra autem erat Christus), ita possumus dicere Spiritum columbam vel ignem. Illa enim petra iam erat in creatura, et per actionis modum nuncupata est nomine Christi quem significabat; sicut lapis ille, quem Iacob positum ad caput etiam unctione, ad significandum Dominum assumpsit; (Cf. Gen 28:18–22) sicut Isaac Christus erat, cum ad se immolandum ligna portabat. (Cf. Gen 22:6) Accessit istis actio quaedam significativa iam existentibus; non autem, sicut illa columba et ignis, ad haec tantummodo significanda repente exstiterunt. Magis ista similia mihi videntur flammae illi quae in rubo apparuit Moysi, (Cf. Exod 3:2) et illi columnae quam populus in heremo sequebatur, (Cf. Exod 13:21–22; 14:19–24; 16:10–12) et fulguribus et tonitruis quae fiebant cum Lex daretur in monte. (Cf. Exod 19:16–19) Ad hoc enim illarum rerum corporalis exstitit species, ut aliquid significaret atque praeteriret.
Nor, as we say that the Son is a rock (for it is written, and the rock was Christ), can we in that way say that the Spirit is a dove or fire. For that rock already existed in creation, and by the mode of action was named with the name of Christ, whom it signified; just as that stone which Jacob set at his head, and even with an anointing, he took up to signify the Lord; (See Gen 28:18–22) just as Isaac was Christ, when he carried the wood for his own immolation. (See Gen 22:6) To these, already existing, a certain significative action was added; but they did not, like that dove and fire, suddenly come into being only to signify these things. These things seem to me rather like that flame which appeared in the bush to Moses, (See Exod 3:2) and that pillar which the people followed in the desert, (See Exod 13:21–22; 14:19–24; 16:10–12) and the lightnings and thunders that occurred when the Law was given on the mountain. (See Exod 19:16–19) For the bodily appearance of those things came into being for this, that it might signify something and pass away.
deTrin.2.6.11C
deTrin.2.6.11
7. 12. Propter has ergo corporales formas, quae ad eum significandum, et sicut humanis sensibus oportebat demonstrandum temporaliter exstiterunt, missus dicitur etiam Spiritus Sanctus; non tamen minor Patre dictus est, sicut Filius propter formam servi; quia illa forma servi inhaesit ad unitatem personae, illae vero species corporales ad demonstrandum quod opus fuit ad tempus apparuerunt, et esse postea destiterunt.
7. 12. On account, therefore, of these bodily forms, which came into being temporally to signify him and, as it behooved, to demonstrate him to human senses, the Holy Spirit too is said to be sent; yet he was not said to be less than the Father, as the Son was on account of the form of a servant; because that form of a servant clung to the unity of the person, but those bodily appearances appeared for a time to demonstrate what was needful, and afterward ceased to be.
deTrin.2.7.12Cur ergo non et Pater dicitur missus per illas species corporales, ignem rubi, (Cf. Exod 3:2) et columnam nubis (Cf. Exod 13:21) vel ignis, et fulgura in monte, (Cf. Exod 19:16) et si qua talia tunc apparuerunt, cum eum coram locutum Patribus, teste Scriptura didicimus, si per illos creaturae modos et formas corporaliter expressas et humanis aspectibus praesentatas ipse demonstrabatur?
Why, then, is the Father too not said to be sent through those bodily appearances—the fire of the bush, (See Exod 3:2) and the pillar of cloud (See Exod 13:21) or of fire, and the lightnings on the mountain, (See Exod 19:16) and any such things that appeared then, since we have learned, with Scripture as witness, that he spoke to the Fathers face to face—if he himself was demonstrated through those modes and forms of creation, bodily expressed and presented to human sight?
deTrin.2.7.12Si autem Filius per ea demonstrabatur, cur tanto post dicitur missus, cum ex femina factus est, sicut Apostolus dicit, cum autem venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere; quandoquidem et antea mittebatur, cum per illas creaturae mutabiles formas Patribus apparebat?
But if the Son was demonstrated through them, why is he said to be sent so long afterward, when he was made of a woman, as the Apostle says, but when the fullness of time came, God sent his Son made of a woman; since he was sent even before, when he appeared to the Fathers through those changeable forms of creation?
deTrin.2.7.12Aut si non recte posset dici missus, nisi cum Verbum caro factum est; cur missus dicitur Spiritus Sanctus, cuius nulla talis incorporatio facta est?
Or if he could not rightly be said to be sent except when the Word was made flesh; why is the Holy Spirit said to be sent, of whom no such incorporation was made?
deTrin.2.7.12Si vero per illa visibilia quae in Lege et Prophetis commendantur, nec Pater, nec Filius, sed Spiritus Sanctus ostendebatur; cur etiam ipse nunc dicitur missus, cum illis modis et antea mitteretur?
But if through those visible things that are commended in the Law and the Prophets, neither the Father nor the Son, but the Holy Spirit was shown; why is even he now said to be sent, since he was sent by those modes even before?
deTrin.2.7.127. 13. In huius perplexitate quaestionis, adiuvante Domino primum quaerendum est, utrum Pater, an Filius, an Spiritus Sanctus; an aliquando Pater, aliquando Filius, aliquando Spiritus Sanctus; an sine ulla distinctione personarum, sicut dicitur Deus unus et solus, (Cf. John 17:3) id est, ipsa Trinitas per illas creaturae formas Patribus apparuerit. Deinde, quodlibet horum inventum visumve fuerit, utrum ad hoc opus tantummodo creatura formata sit, in qua Deus, sicut tunc oportuisse iudicavit, humanis ostenderetur aspectibus; an angeli, qui iam erant, ita mittebantur, ut ex persona Dei loquerentur, assumentes corporalem speciem de creatura corporea, in usum ministerii sui, sicut cuique opus esset; aut ipsum corpus suum cui non subduntur, sed subditum regunt, in species quas vellent accommodatas atque aptas actionibus suis mutantes atque vertentes Cf. Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionbus Oratoriae 7.23. secundum attributam sibi a Creatore potentiam. Postremo videbimus id quod quaerere institueramus, utrum Filius et Spiritus Sanctus et antea mittebantur; et, si mittebantur, quid inter illam missionem, et eam quam in Evangelio legimus, (Cf. Isa 48:16; Gal 4:4; John 10:36, 14:26, 15:26, 16:7) distet; an missus non sit aliquis eorum, nisi cum vel Filius factus esset ex Maria Virgine, vel cum Spiritus Sanctus visibili specie sive in columba, sive in igneis linguis apparuit. (Cf. Acts 2:3)
7. 13. In the perplexity of this question, with the Lord's help, it must first be inquired whether it was the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit; or sometimes the Father, sometimes the Son, sometimes the Holy Spirit; or without any distinction of persons, as the one and only God is spoken of, (See John 17:3) that is, the Trinity itself, that appeared to the Fathers through those forms of creation. Then, whichever of these is found or seen, whether the creature was formed for this work alone, in which God, as he then judged it behooved, might be shown to human sight; or whether the angels, who already existed, were so sent that they spoke in the person of God, assuming a bodily appearance from corporeal creation, for the use of their ministry, as each was needful; or whether they changed and turned their own body, to which they are not subjected but which they rule as subjected, into the appearances they wished, accommodated and fitted to their actions, See Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionibus Oratoriae 7.23. according to the power attributed to them by the Creator. Finally, we shall see that which we had set out to inquire: whether the Son and the Holy Spirit were sent even before; and, if they were sent, what difference there is between that sending and the one we read of in the Gospel; (See Isa 48:16; Gal 4:4; John 10:36; 14:26; 15:26; 16:7) or whether none of them was sent except when either the Son was made of the Virgin Mary, or the Holy Spirit appeared in a visible form, whether in a dove or in tongues of fire. (See Acts 2:3)
deTrin.2.7.138. 14. Omittamus igitur eos qui nimis carnaliter naturam Verbi Dei atque Sapientiam, quae in se ipsa manens innovat omnia, quem unicum Dei Filium dicimus, non solum mutabilem, verum etiam visibilem esse putaverunt. Hi enim multum crassum cor (Cf. Isa 6:9–10; Matt 13:15; Acts 28:26–27) divinis rebus inquirendis audacius quam religiosius attulerunt. Anima quippe cum sit substantia spiritualis, cumque etiam ipsa facta sit, nec per alium fieri potuerit, nisi per quem facta sunt omnia, et sine quo factum est nihil, quamvis sit mutabilis, non est tamen visibilis; quod illi de Verbo ipso atque ipsa Dei Sapientia, per quam facta est anima, crediderunt; cum sit illa non invisibilis tantum, quod et anima est; sed etiam incommutabilis, quod anima non est. Eadem quippe incommutabilitas eius commemorata est ut diceretur, in se ipsa manens innovat omnia.
8. 14. Let us, then, pass over those who, too carnally, thought the nature of the Word of God and the Wisdom, which remaining in herself renews all things, whom we call the only Son of God, to be not only changeable but even visible. For these brought a very gross heart (See Isa 6:9–10; Matt 13:15; Acts 28:26–27) to inquiring into divine things, more boldly than reverently. For the soul, since it is a spiritual substance, and since it too was made—nor could it be made by another except by him through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made—although it is changeable, is nevertheless not visible; which they believed of the Word itself and the very Wisdom of God, through whom the soul was made; whereas she is not only invisible, which the soul also is, but also unchangeable, which the soul is not. For this very unchangeableness of hers was recalled in saying, remaining in herself she renews all things.
deTrin.2.8.14Et isti quidem ruinam erroris sui divinarum Scripturarum testimoniis quasi fulcire conantes, adhibent Pauli apostoli sententiam; et quod dictum est de uno solo Deo, in quo ipsa Trinitas intellegitur, tantum de Patre, non et de Filio et de Spiritu Sancto dictum accipiunt, Regi autem saeculorum immortali, invisibili, soli Deo honor et gloria in saecula saeculorum; et illud alterum, beatus et solus potens, Rex regum, et Dominus dominantium; qui solus habet immortalitatem, et lucem habitat inaccessibilem; quem nemo hominum vidit, nec videre potest. Haec quemadmodum intellegenda sint, iam satis nos disseruisse arbitror. Cf. On the Trinity 1.10.11.
And these, indeed, trying as it were to prop up the ruin of their error with testimonies of the divine Scriptures, bring forward a sentence of the apostle Paul; and what was said of the one and only God, in whom the Trinity itself is understood, they take as said only of the Father, and not also of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: now to the King of the ages, immortal, invisible, the only God, be honor and glory forever and ever; and that other passage, the blessed and only Sovereign, the King of kings, and Lord of lords; who alone has immortality, and dwells in unapproachable light; whom no man has seen, nor can see. How these are to be understood, I think we have already sufficiently discussed. See On the Trinity 1.10.11.
deTrin.2.8.149. 15. Verum illi qui ista non de Filio nec de Spiritu Sancto, sed tantum de Patre accipi volunt, dicunt visibilem Filium, non per carnem de Virgine assumptam, sed etiam antea per se ipsum. “Nam ipse,” inquiunt, “apparuit oculis Patrum.” Quibus si dixeris, “quomodo ergo visibilis per se ipsum Filius, ita et mortalis per se ipsum, ut constet vobis quod tantummodo de Patre vultis intelligi, quod dictum est, qui solus habet immortalitatem.
9. 15. But those who want these things to be taken not of the Son nor of the Holy Spirit, but only of the Father, say that the Son is visible, not through the flesh assumed from the Virgin, but even before, through himself. "For he himself," they say, "appeared to the eyes of the Fathers." To whom if you say, "how, then, is the Son visible through himself, so too mortal through himself, so that it may stand for you what you want to be understood only of the Father, that which was said, who alone has immortality?
deTrin.2.9.15Nam si propter carnem susceptam mortalis est Filius, propter hanc sinite ut sit et visibilis:” respondent, nec propter hanc se mortalem Filium dicere; sed sicut et ante visibilem, ita et ante mortalem.
For if the Son is mortal on account of the flesh assumed, allow that on account of this he is also visible": they answer that they do not call the Son mortal on account of this; but, just as he was visible before, so also mortal before.
deTrin.2.9.15Nam si propter carnem Filium dicunt esse mortalem, iam non Pater sine Filio solus habet immortalitatem; quia et Verbum eius, per quod facta sunt omnia, habet immortalitatem. Neque enim quia carnem assumpsit mortalem, ideo amisit immortalitatem suam; quandoquidem nec animae humanae hoc accidere potuit, ut cum corpore moreretur, dicente ipso Domino, nolite timere eos qui corpus occidunt, animam autem non possunt occidere.
For if they say that the Son is mortal on account of the flesh, then the Father without the Son no longer alone has immortality; because his Word too, through whom all things were made, has immortality. For he did not, because he assumed mortal flesh, therefore lose his immortality; since not even to the human soul could it happen that it should die with the body, the Lord himself saying, do not fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul.
deTrin.2.9.15Aut vero etiam Spiritus Sanctus carnem assumpsit, de quo utique sine dubio turbabuntur, si propter carnem mortalis est Filius, quomodo accipiant Patrem tantummodo sine Filio et sine Spiritu Sancto habere immortalitatem; quandoquidem Spiritus Sanctus non assumpsit carnem; qui si non habet immortalitatem, non ergo propter carnem mortalis est Filius; si autem habet Spiritus Sanctus immortalitatem, non de Patre tantummodo dictum est, quia PL: qui. The PL would read: “then the text ‘who alone has immortality’ is not said of the Father alone.” solus habet immortalitatem.
Or did the Holy Spirit too assume flesh? Concerning whom, certainly, they will without doubt be troubled, if the Son is mortal on account of the flesh, as to how they may take it that the Father alone, without the Son and without the Holy Spirit, has immortality; since the Holy Spirit did not assume flesh; who, if he does not have immortality, then the Son is not mortal on account of the flesh; but if the Holy Spirit has immortality, then it was not said of the Father alone, that PL: qui. The PL would read: "then the text 'who alone has immortality' is not said of the Father alone." he alone has immortality.
deTrin.2.9.15Quocirca ita se arbitrantur et ante incarnationem per se ipsum mortalem Filium posse convincere, quia ipsa mutabilitas non inconvenienter mortalitas dicitur, secundum quam et anima dicitur mori; non quia in corpus vel in aliquam alteram substantiam mutatur et vertitur; Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionbus Oratoriae 7.23. sed in ipsa sua substantia quidquid alio modo nunc est ac fuit, secundum id quod destitit esse quod erat, mortale deprehenditur.
Wherefore they think they can prove the Son to be mortal through himself even before the incarnation, because changeableness itself is not inappropriately called mortality, according to which the soul too is said to die; not because it is changed and turned into a body or into some other substance, Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionibus Oratoriae 7.23. but in its very own substance whatever now is in another mode than it was, according to that by which it ceased to be what it was, is found to be mortal.
deTrin.2.9.15“Quia itaque,” inquiunt, “antequam natus esset Filius Dei de Virgine Maria, ipse apparuit Patribus nostris, non in una eademque specie, sed multiformiter, aliter atque aliter, et visibilis est per se ipsum, quia nondum carne assumpta, substantia eius conspicua mortalibus oculis fuit; et mortalis, in quantum mutabilis. Ita et Spiritus Sanctus, qui alias columba, alias ignis apparuit.” (Cf. Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32) “Unde non Trinitati,” aiunt, “sed singulariter et proprie Patri tantummodo convenit quod dictum est, immortali, invisibili, soli Deo; et, qui solus habet immortalitatem, et lucem habitat inaccessibilem; quem nemo hominum vidit, nec videre potest.”
"Since, then," they say, "before the Son of God was born of the Virgin Mary, he himself appeared to our Fathers, not in one and the same appearance, but in manifold forms, in one way and another, he is both visible through himself, because, the flesh not yet assumed, his substance was conspicuous to mortal eyes; and mortal, insofar as he is changeable. So too the Holy Spirit, who appeared at one time as a dove, at another as fire." (See Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32) "Whence," they say, "it suits not the Trinity, but singularly and properly the Father alone, that which was said, to the immortal, invisible, the only God; and, who alone has immortality, and dwells in unapproachable light; whom no man has seen, nor can see."
deTrin.2.9.159. 16. Omissis ergo istis, qui nec animae substantiam invisibilem nosse potuerunt, unde longe remotum ab eis erat ut nossent unius et solius Dei, id est, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, non solum invisibilem, verum et incommutabilem permanere substantiam, ac per hoc in vera et sincera immortalitate consistere;
9. 16. Passing over, then, those who could not even know the invisible substance of the soul—whence it was far removed from them to know that the substance of the one and only God, that is, of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, remains not only invisible but also unchangeable, and on this account consists in true and sincere immortality;
deTrin.2.9.16nos qui numquam apparuisse corporeis oculis Deum nec Patrem, nec Filium, nec Spiritum Sanctum dicimus, nisi per subiectam suae potestati corpoream creaturam, in pace catholica pacifico studio requiramus, parati corrigi, si fraterne ac recte reprehendimur; parati etiamsi ab inimico, vera tamen dicente, mordemur;
let us, who say that God—neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit—has never appeared to bodily eyes except through a corporeal creature subjected to his power, in Catholic peace and with peaceful zeal seek out, prepared to be corrected if we are reproved in a brotherly and right way; prepared even if we are bitten by an enemy who nevertheless speaks the truth;
deTrin.2.9.16utrum indiscrete Deus apparuerit Patribus nostris antequam Christus veniret in carne, an aliqua ex Trinitate persona, an singillatim quasi per vices.
whether God appeared indiscriminately to our Fathers before Christ came in the flesh, or some one person of the Trinity, or each singly as it were by turns.
deTrin.2.9.16C
deTrin.2.9.16
10. 17. Ac primum, in eo quod in Genesi scriptum est, locutum Deum cum homine quem de limo finxerat, (Cf. Gen 3:8, 2:7; Tob 8:8) si excepta figurata significatione, ut rei gestae fides etiam ad litteram teneatur, ista tractamus, in specie hominis videtur Deus cum homine tunc locutus. Non quidem expresse hoc in libro positum est, sed circumstantia lectionis id resonat, maxime illo quod scriptum est, vocem Dei audivisse Adam deambulantis in paradiso ad vesperam, et abscondisse se in medio ligni quod erat in paradiso, deoque dicenti, Adam, ubi es? respondisse, audivi vocem tuam, et abscondi me a facie tua, quoniam nudus sum. Quomodo enim possit ad litteram intellegi talis Dei deambulatio et collocutio, nisi in specie humana, non video. Neque enim dici potest vocem solam factam ubi deambulasse dictus est Deus, aut eum qui deambulabat in loco non fuisse visibilem, cum et Adam dicat quod se absconderit a facie Dei. Quis erat ergo ille? Utrum Pater, an Filius, an Spiritus Sanctus? An omnino Deus indiscrete ipsa Trinitas, in forma hominis homini loquebatur?
10. 17. And first, in that which is written in Genesis, that God spoke with the man whom he had fashioned from the clay, (See Gen 3:8; 2:7; Tob 8:8) if, apart from the figurative signification—so that the truth of the deed may be held even to the letter—we treat these things, God seems then to have spoken with the man in the appearance of a man. Not indeed is this expressly placed in the book, but the circumstance of the reading echoes it, especially in that it is written that Adam heard the voice of God walking in paradise toward evening, and hid himself in the midst of the tree which was in paradise, and to God saying, Adam, where are you? answered, I heard your voice, and I hid myself from your face, because I am naked. For how such a walking and conversing of God could be understood to the letter, except in human appearance, I do not see. For it cannot be said that only a voice was made where God was said to have walked, or that he who was walking was not visible in the place, since Adam too says that he hid himself from the face of God. Who, then, was he? Whether the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit? Or was God altogether, the Trinity itself indiscriminately, speaking to the man in the form of a man?
deTrin.2.10.17Contextio quidem ipsa Scripturae nusquam transire sentitur a persona ad personam; sed ille videtur loqui ad primum hominem qui dicebat, fiat lux, et, fiat firmamentum, et cetera per illos singulos dies; quem Deum Patrem solemus accipere, dicentem ut fiat quidquid facere voluit. Omnia enim per Verbum suum fecit, quod Verbum eius unicum Filium eius secundum rectam fidei regulam novimus.
The very context of Scripture is nowhere felt to pass from person to person; but he seems to speak to the first man who said, let there be light, and, let there be a firmament, and the rest through those several days; whom we are accustomed to take as God the Father, saying that whatever he wished to make should be made. For he made all things through his Word, which Word we know, according to the right rule of faith, to be his only Son.
deTrin.2.10.17Si ergo Deus Pater locutus est ad primum hominem, et ipse deambulabat in paradiso ad vesperam, et ab eius facie se in medio ligni paradisi peccator absconderat; cur non iam ipse intelligatur apparuisse Abrahae et Moysi, et quibus voluit, quemadmodum voluit, per subiectam sibi commutabilem atque visibilem creaturam, cum ipse in se ipso atque in substantia sua qua est incommutabilis atque invisibilis maneat?
If, then, God the Father spoke to the first man, and he himself walked in paradise toward evening, and the sinner had hidden himself from his face in the midst of the tree of paradise; why should he not now be understood to have appeared to Abraham and to Moses, and to whom he would, as he would, through a changeable and visible creature subjected to himself, while he himself remains in himself and in his substance, by which he is unchangeable and invisible?
deTrin.2.10.17Sed fieri potuit ut a persona ad personam occulte Scriptura transiret, et cum Patrem dixisse narrasset, fiat lux, et cetera quae per Verbum fecisse commemoratur, iam Filium indicaret loqui ad primum hominem, non aperte hoc explicans, sed eis qui possent intelligendum intimans.
But it could be that Scripture passed secretly from person to person, and when it had narrated that the Father said, let there be light, and the rest that he is recalled to have made through the Word, it now indicated that the Son spoke to the first man—not explaining this openly, but intimating it to be understood by those who could.
deTrin.2.10.1710. 18. Qui ergo habet vires, quibus hoc secretum possit mentis acie penetrare, ut ei liquido appareat vel posse etiam Patrem, vel non posse nisi Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum, per creaturam visibilem humanis oculis apparere, pergat in haec scrutanda, si potest, etiam verbis enuntianda atque tractanda; res tamen, quantum ad hoc Scripturae testimonium attinet, ubi Deus cum homine locutus est, quantum existimo occulta est; quia etiam utrum soleret Adam corporeis oculis Deum videre, non evidenter apparet; cum praesertim magna sit quaestio, cuiusmodi oculi eis aperti fuerint, quando vetitum cibum gustaverunt; (Cf. Gen 3:5–7) hi enim, antequam gustassent, clausi erant.
10. 18. Whoever, then, has the strength by which he can penetrate this secret with the edge of his mind, so that it clearly appears to him either that the Father too can, or that only the Son and the Holy Spirit can, appear to human eyes through a visible creature, let him go on to scrutinize these things, if he can, and even to express them in words and treat of them; the matter, however, so far as concerns this testimony of Scripture, where God spoke with man, is, as I judge, hidden; because even whether Adam was accustomed to see God with bodily eyes does not evidently appear; especially since it is a great question of what kind the eyes were that were opened to them when they tasted the forbidden food; (See Gen 3:5–7) for these, before they tasted, were closed.
deTrin.2.10.18Illud tantum non temere dixerim, si paradisum corporalem quemdam locum illa Scriptura insinuat, deambulare ibi Deum nisi in aliqua corporea forma nullo modo potuisse. Nam et solas voces factas quas audiret homo, nec aliquam formam videret, dici potest; nec quia scriptum est, abscondit se Adam a facie Dei; continuo sequitur ut soleret faciem eius videre. Quid si enim non quidem videre ipse poterat, sed videri ipse metuebat ab eo cuius vocem audierat, et deambulantis praesentiam senserat? Nam et Cain dixit Deo, a facie tua abscondam me; nec ideo fateri cogimur, eum solere cernere faciem Dei corporeis oculis, in qualibet forma visibili, quamvis de facinore suo vocem interrogantis secumque loquentis audisset. (Cf. Gen 4:9)
This much only I would not rashly say: if that Scripture intimates paradise to be a certain bodily place, that God could in no way walk there except in some bodily form. For it can be said that only voices were made which the man might hear, while he saw no form; nor, because it is written, Adam hid himself from the face of God, does it immediately follow that he was accustomed to see his face. For what if he himself indeed could not see, but feared to be seen by him whose voice he had heard, and whose presence as he walked he had felt? For Cain too said to God, I will hide myself from your face; nor are we therefore compelled to confess that he was accustomed to discern the face of God with bodily eyes, in any visible form, although he had heard the voice of one questioning him about his crime and speaking with him. (See Gen 4:9)
deTrin.2.10.18Cuiusmodi autem loquela tunc Deus exterioribus hominum auribus insonaret, maxime ad primum hominem loquens, et invenire difficile est, et non hoc isto sermone suscepimus. Verumtamen si solae voces et sonitus fiebant, quibus quaedam sensibilis praesentia Dei primis illis hominibus praeberetur, cur ibi personam Dei Patris non intelligam nescio, quandoquidem persona eius ostenditur et in ea voce, cum Iesus in monte coram tribus discipulis praefulgens (Cf. Mark 9:1–2; Luke 9:28; Matt 17:1–5) apparuit; et in illa, quando super baptizatum columba descendit; (Cf. Luke 3:22) et in illa ubi ad Patrem de sua clarificatione clamavit, eique responsum est, et clarificavi, et iterum clarificabo. (Cf. John 12:28) Non quia fieri potuit vox sine opere Filii et Spiritus Sancti (Trinitas quippe inseparabiliter operatur); sed quia ea vox facta est, quae solius personam Patris ostenderet; sicut humanam illam formam ex Virgine Maria Trinitas operata est, sed solius Filii persona est; visibilem namque Filii solius personam, invisibilis Trinitas operata est.
But of what kind of speech God then sounded to the outer ears of men, especially speaking to the first man, is both difficult to find out and not what we have undertaken in this discourse. Nevertheless, if only voices and sounds were made, by which a certain sensible presence of God was offered to those first men, why I should not understand the person of God the Father there, I do not know; since his person is shown both in that voice, when Jesus shining before the three disciples on the mountain (See Mark 9:1–2; Luke 9:28; Matt 17:1–5) appeared; and in that, when upon the baptized one a dove descended; (See Luke 3:22) and in that where he cried to the Father about his glorification, and it was answered him, and I have glorified it, and will glorify it again. (See John 12:28) Not that the voice could be made without the work of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (for the Trinity works inseparably); but because that voice was made which would show the person of the Father alone; just as the Trinity wrought that human form from the Virgin Mary, but it is the person of the Son alone; for the invisible Trinity wrought the visible person of the Son alone.
deTrin.2.10.18Nec nos aliquid prohibet, illas voces factas ad Adam, non solum a Trinitate factas intelligere, sed etiam personam demonstrantes eiusdem Trinitatis accipere. Ibi enim cogimur, non nisi Patris accipere, ubi dictum est, hic est Filius meus dilectus. (Cf. Mark 1:11, 9:6; Luke 3:22, 9:35) Neque enim Iesus etiam Spiritus Sancti filius, aut etiam suus Filius credi aut intelligi potest.
Nor does anything forbid us to understand those voices made to Adam as not only made by the Trinity, but also to take them as demonstrating the person of the same Trinity. For there we are compelled to take it as the Father's alone, where it was said, this is my beloved Son. (See Mark 1:11; 9:6; Luke 3:22; 9:35) For Jesus can be neither believed nor understood to be also the son of the Holy Spirit, or even his own Son.
deTrin.2.10.18Et ubi sonuit, et clarificavi, et iterum clarificabo, non nisi Patris personam fatemur. Responsio quippe est ad illam Domini vocem qua dixerat, Pater, clarifica Filium tuum, quod non potuit dicere nisi Deo Patri tantum, non et Spiritui Sancto, cuius non est PL: erat, “was.” filius. Hic autem ubi scriptum est, et dixit Dominus Deus ad Adam, cur non ipsa Trinitas intelligatur, nihil dici potest.
And where it sounded, and I have glorified it, and will glorify it again, we confess the person of the Father alone. For it is a response to that voice of the Lord by which he had said, Father, glorify your Son, which he could not say except to God the Father only, not also to the Holy Spirit, whose son he is not. PL: erat, "was." But here, where it is written, and the Lord God said to Adam, why the Trinity itself should not be understood, nothing can be said.
deTrin.2.10.1810. 19. Similiter etiam quod scriptum est, et dixit Dominus ad Abraham: ‘exi de terra tua, et de cognatione tua, et de domo patris tui’, non est apertum, utrum sola vox facta sit ad aures Abrahae, an et aliquidet oculis eius apparuerit. Paulo post autem aliquanto apertius dictum est, et visus est Dominus Abrahae, et dixit illi: ‘semini tuo dabo terram hanc’. Sed nec ibi expressum est, in qua specie visus sit ei Dominus; aut utrum Pater, an Filius, an Spiritus Sanctus ei visus sit.
10. 19. Likewise also that which is written, and the Lord said to Abraham: "go out from your land, and from your kindred, and from your father's house", it is not open whether only a voice was made to the ears of Abraham, or whether something also appeared to his eyes. But a little later it is said somewhat more openly, and the Lord was seen by Abraham, and said to him: "to your seed I will give this land". But neither is it there expressed in what appearance the Lord was seen by him; or whether the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit was seen by him.
deTrin.2.10.19Nisi forte ideo putant Filium visum esse Abrahae, quia non scriptum est, “visus est ei Deus;” sed, Visus est ei Dominus. Tamquam enim proprie videtur Filius Dominus vocari, dicente Apostolo, nam et si sunt qui dicuntur dii sive in caelo sive in terra, sicuti sunt dii multi et Domini multi; nobis tamen unus Deus Pater, ex quo omnia, et nos in ipso; et unus Dominus Iesus Christus, per quem omnia, et nos per ipsum.
Unless perhaps they think the Son was seen by Abraham for this reason, that it is not written, "God was seen by him"; but, the Lord was seen by him. For the Son seems properly to be called Lord, the Apostle saying, for although there are those who are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth, as indeed there are many gods and many lords; yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him.
deTrin.2.10.19Sed cum et Deus Pater multis locis inveniatur dictus Dominus, sicut est illud, Dominus dixit ad me: filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te; et illud, dixit Dominus Domino meo: ‘sede ad dexteram meam’. (Cf. Heb 1:13)
But since God the Father too is found in many places called Lord, as is that, the Lord said to me: you are my Son, today I have begotten you; and that, the Lord said to my Lord: "sit at my right hand". (See Heb 1:13)
deTrin.2.10.19Cum etiam Spiritus Sanctus Dominus dictus inveniatur, ubi Apostolus ait, Dominus autem Spiritus est; Cf. John 4:24. It is clear that Augustine takes “Spirit” as subject and “Lord” as predicate, though he considers the opposite possibility in the next sentence. et ne quisquam arbitraretur Filium significatum, et ideo dictum Spiritum propter incorpoream substantiam, secutus contexuit, ubi autem Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas; Spiritum autem Domini Spiritum Sanctum esse nemo dubitaverit.
Since the Holy Spirit too is found called Lord, where the Apostle says, now the Lord is the Spirit; See John 4:24. It is clear that Augustine takes "Spirit" as subject and "Lord" as predicate, though he considers the opposite possibility in the next sentence. and lest anyone should think the Son signified, and therefore "Spirit" said on account of the incorporeal substance, he went on to add, but where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; and that the Spirit of the Lord is the Holy Spirit, no one would doubt.
deTrin.2.10.19Neque hic ergo evidenter apparet, utrum aliqua ex Trinitate Persona, an Deus ipse Trinitas, de quo uno Deo dictum est, Dominum Deum tuum adorabis, et illi soli servies, visus fuerit Abrahae. (The appearance to Abraham occurs in Gen 12:7 and Gen 18:1)
Neither here, then, does it evidently appear whether some one person of the Trinity, or God the Trinity himself, of which one God it was said, you shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve, was seen by Abraham. (The appearance to Abraham occurs in Gen 12:7 and Gen 18:1)
deTrin.2.10.19Sub ilice autem Mambre tres viros vidit, quibus et invitatis hospitioque susceptis et epulantibus ministravit. Sic tamen Scriptura illam rem gestam narrare coepit, ut non dicat, “visi sunt ei tres viri;” sed, visus est ei Dominus. Atque inde consequenter exponens quomodo ei visus sit Dominus, attexit narrationem de tribus viris, quos Abraham per pluralem numerum invitat, ut hospitio suscipiat; et postea singulariter sicut unum alloquitur; et sicut unus ei de Sara filium pollicetur, quem Dominum dicit Scriptura, sicut in eiusdem narrationis exordio, visus est, inquit, Dominus Abrahae. Invitat ergo, et pedes lavat, et deducit abeuntes tamquam homines; loquitur autem tamquam cum Domino Deo, sive cum ei promittitur filius, sive cum ei Sodomis imminens interitus indicatur.
But under the oak of Mamre he saw three men, whom, when they had been invited and received in hospitality and were feasting, he served. Yet Scripture thus began to narrate that deed, that it does not say, "three men were seen by him"; but, the Lord was seen by him. And from there, consequently explaining how the Lord was seen by him, it wove in the narration about the three men, whom Abraham invites in the plural number, to receive in hospitality; and afterward addresses singularly as one; and as one promises him a son by Sarah, whom Scripture calls Lord, just as in the beginning of the same narration, the Lord, he says, was seen by Abraham. He invites them, then, and washes their feet, and escorts them as they depart, as though they were men; but he speaks as though with the Lord God, whether when a son is promised him, or when the impending destruction of Sodom is announced to him.
deTrin.2.10.1911. 20. Non parvam neque transitoriam considerationem postulat iste Scripturae locus. Si enim vir unus visus fuisset, iam illi qui dicunt et priusquam de Virgine nasceretur per suam substantiam visibilem Filium, quid aliud quam ipsum esse clamarent? Quoniam “de Patre,” inquiunt, “dictum est, invisibili soli Deo.”
11. 20. This passage of Scripture demands no small nor passing consideration. For if one man had been seen, would not those who say that the Son was visible through his own substance even before he was born of the Virgin cry out that it was he himself? For "of the Father," they say, "it was said, to the invisible, the only God."
deTrin.2.11.20Et tamen possem adhuc quaerere, quomodo ante susceptam carnem, habitu est inventus ut homo; quandoquidem ei pedes loti sunt, et humanis epulis epulatus est? Quomodo istud fieri poterat, cum adhuc in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus esse aequalis Deo? Numquid enim iam semetipsum exinanierat, formam servi accipiens, in similitudine hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo? Cum hoc quando fecerit per partum Virginis noverimus? Quomodo igitur antequam hoc fecisset, ut vir unus apparuit Abrahae? An illa forma vera non erat?
And yet I could still ask, how before he assumed flesh was he found in fashion as a man; since his feet were washed, and he feasted on human food? How could this be done, while he was still in the form of God, not counting it robbery to be equal to God? For had he already emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, made in the likeness of men, and found in fashion as a man? Since we know that he did this through the Virgin's childbearing? How, then, before he had done this, did he appear to Abraham as one man? Or was that form not true?
deTrin.2.11.20Possem ista quaerere, si vir unus apparuisset Abrahae, idemque Dei Filius crederetur. Cum vero tres visi sunt, nec quisquam in eis vel forma, vel aetate, vel potestate maior ceteris dictus est; cur non hic accipiamus visibiliter insinuatam per creaturam visibilem Trinitatis aequalitatem, atque in tribus Personis unam eamdemque substantiam?
I could ask these things, if one man had appeared to Abraham, and he were believed to be the Son of God. But since three were seen, and none of them was said to be greater than the rest in form, or age, or power; why should we not here take the equality of the Trinity, visibly intimated through a visible creature, and in three persons one and the same substance?
deTrin.2.11.2011. 21. Nam ne quisquam putaret sic intimatum unum in tribus fuisse maiorem, et eum Dominum Dei Filium intelligendum, duos autem alios angelos eius, quia cum tres visi sint, uni Domino illic loquitur Abraham; Sancta Scriptura futuris talibus cogitationibus atque opinionibus contradicendo non praetermisit occurrere, quando paulo post duos Angelos dicit venisse ad Loth, in quibus et ille vir iustus qui de Sodomorum incendio meruit liberari, ad unum Dominum loquitur. (Cf. Gen 19:29) Sic enim sequitur Scriptura dicens: abiit autem Dominus postquam cessavit loquens ad Abraham, et Abraham reversus est ad locum suum.
11. 21. For lest anyone should think it thus intimated that one of the three was greater, and that he was to be understood as the Lord, the Son of God, but the other two as his angels—because, although three were seen, Abraham there speaks to one Lord—Holy Scripture, contradicting such future thoughts and opinions, did not fail to meet them, since a little later it says that two angels came to Lot, among whom that just man too, who deserved to be freed from the burning of Sodom, speaks to one Lord. (See Gen 19:29) For Scripture follows thus, saying: but the Lord went away after he ceased speaking to Abraham, and Abraham returned to his place.
deTrin.2.11.2112. 21. Venerunt autem duo angeli in Sodomis vespere. Hic attentius considerandum est, quod ostendere institui. Cum tribus certe loquebatur Abraham, et eum Dominum singulariter appellavit. “Forte,” inquit aliquis: “unum ex tribus agnoscebat Dominum; alios autem duos, angelos eius.” Quid sibi ergo vult, quod consequenter dicit Scriptura, abiit autem Dominus postquam cessavit loquens ad Abraham, et Abraham reversus est ad locum suum; venerunt autem duo angeli in Sodomis vespere? An forte ille unus abscesserat, qui Dominus agnoscebatur in tribus, et duos angelos qui cum illo erant ad consumenda miserat Sodoma? Ergo sequentia videamus. Venerunt, inquit, duo angeli in Sodomis vespere. Loth autem sedebat ad portam Sodomorum. Et cum vidisset eos Loth, surrexit in obviam illis, et adoravit in faciem super terram, et dixit: ‘ecce, domini, divertite in domum pueri vestri.’ Hic manifestum est, et duos angelos fuisse, et in hospitium pluraliter invitatos, et honorifice appellatos dominos, cum fortasse homines putarentur.
12. 21. But the two angels came to Sodom in the evening. Here must be considered more attentively what I set out to show. Abraham was certainly speaking with three, and called him Lord in the singular. "Perhaps," someone says, "he recognized one of the three as the Lord; but the other two, as his angels." What, then, does it mean that Scripture consequently says, but the Lord went away after he ceased speaking to Abraham, and Abraham returned to his place; but the two angels came to Sodom in the evening? Or had perhaps that one departed, who was recognized as the Lord among the three, and sent the two angels who were with him to destroy Sodom? Let us, then, see what follows. There came, it says, two angels to Sodom in the evening. But Lot was sitting at the gate of Sodom. And when Lot had seen them, he rose to meet them, and bowed with his face to the ground, and said: "behold, my lords, turn aside into the house of your servant." Here it is manifest both that there were two angels, and that they were invited in the plural into hospitality, and honorably addressed as lords, although perhaps they were thought to be men.
deTrin.2.12.2112. 22. Sed rursus movet, quia nisi angeli Dei cognoscerentur, non adoraret Loth in faciem super terram. Cur ergo tamquam tali humanitate indigentibus, et hospitium praebetur et victus?
12. 22. But again it troubles us, that unless they were recognized as angels of God, Lot would not have bowed with his face to the ground. Why, then, are both hospitality and food provided for them, as if they needed such human service?
deTrin.2.12.22Sed quodlibet hic lateat, illud nunc quod suscepimus exsequamur. Duo apparent, angeli ambo dicuntur, pluraliter invitantur, tamquam cum duobus pluraliter loquitur, donec exeatur a Sodomis.
But whatever lies hidden here, let us now pursue what we have undertaken. Two appear, both are called angels, they are invited in the plural, he speaks with them in the plural as with two, until they go out of Sodom.
deTrin.2.12.22Deinde sequitur Scriptura et dicit: et factum est postquam eduxerunt eos foras, dixerunt: ‘salvans salva animam tuam; ne respexeris retro, neque stes in hac universa regione; in montem vade, et ibi salvaberis, ne forte comprehendaris.’ Dixit autem Loth ad eos; ‘rogo, Domine, quoniam invenit puer tuus ante te misericordiam’, etc. Quid est hoc quod dixit ad eos, rogo, Domine, si iam ille discesserat qui Dominus erat, et angelos miserat? Cur dicitur, rogo, Domine, et non, “rogo, domini”?
Then Scripture follows and says: and it came to pass, after they had led them outside, they said: 'saving, save your soul; do not look back, nor stay in all this region; go to the mountain, and there you will be saved, lest perhaps you be caught.' But Lot said to them: 'I beg, Lord, since your servant has found mercy before you.' What is this, that he said to them, I beg, Lord, if he who was the Lord had already departed, and had sent the angels? Why is it said, I beg, Lord, and not, "I beg, lords"?
deTrin.2.12.22Aut si unum ex eis voluit appellare, cur ait Scriptura, dixit autem Loth ad eos: ‘rogo, Domine, quoniam invenit puer tuus ante te misericordiam’? An et hic intelligimus in plurali numero duas personas, cum autem idem duo tamquam unus compellantur, unius substantiae unum Dominum Deum? Sed quas duas personas hic intelligimus? Patris et Filii, an Patris et Spiritus Sancti, an Filii et Spiritus Sancti?
Or if he wished to address one of them, why does Scripture say, but Lot said to them: "I beg, Lord, since your servant has found mercy before you"? Or do we here too understand two persons in the plural number, but, when these same two are addressed as one, one Lord God of one substance? But which two persons do we here understand? Of the Father and the Son, or of the Father and the Holy Spirit, or of the Son and the Holy Spirit?
deTrin.2.12.22Hoc forte congruentius quod ultimum dixi. Missos enim se dixerunt, quod de Filio et de Spiritu Sancto dicimus. Nam Patrem missum nusquam Scripturarum nobis occurrit.
This last, which I said, is perhaps more fitting. For they said that they were sent, which we say of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. For nowhere in the Scriptures do we meet that the Father was sent.
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deTrin.2.12.22
13. 23. Moyses autem quando ad populum Israel ex Aegypto educendum missus est, sic ei Dominum apparuisse scriptum est: pascebat, inquit, oves Iethro soceri sui sacerdotis Madian, et egit oves in desertum et venit in montem Dei Horeb. Apparuit autem illi angelus Domini in flamma ignis de rubo. Et vidit quia in rubo arderet ignis, rubus vero non comburebatur. Et ait Moyses: ‘ibo, et videbo visum istud, quod tam magnum vidi, quoniam non comburitur rubus.’ Cum ergo vidit Dominus quia venit videre, clamavit eum Dominus de rubo dicens: ‘ego sum Deus patris tui, Deus Abraham, et Deus Isaac, et Deus Iacob.’
13. 23. But when Moses was sent to lead the people of Israel out of Egypt, it is written that the Lord appeared to him thus: he was pasturing, it says, the sheep of Jethro his father-in-law, the priest of Midian, and he drove the sheep into the desert and came to the mountain of God, Horeb. And the angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire from the bush. And he saw that the fire was burning in the bush, but the bush was not consumed. And Moses said: "I will go, and I will see this sight, which I have seen so great, that the bush is not consumed." When, then, the Lord saw that he came to see, the Lord called to him from the bush, saying: "I am the God of your father, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob."
deTrin.2.13.23Et hic primo angelus Domini dictus est, deinde Deus. Numquid ergo angelus est Deus Abraham, et Deus Isaac, et Deus Iacob? Potest ergo recte intelligi ipse Salvator, de quo dicit Apostolus: quorum Patres, et ex quibus Christus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Qui ergo super omnia est Deus benedictus in saecula, non absurde etiam hic ipse intelligitur Deus Abraham, et Deus Isaac, et Deus Iacob.
And here he was first called the angel of the Lord, then God. Is the angel, then, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? It can, then, rightly be understood as the Savior himself, of whom the Apostle says: whose are the Fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all, God blessed forever. He therefore who is over all, God blessed forever, is not absurdly understood here too to be himself the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.
deTrin.2.13.23Sed cur prius angelus Domini dictus est, cum de rubo in flamma ignis apparuit? Utrum quia unus ex multis angelis erat, sed per dispensationem personam Domini sui gerebat; an assumptum erat aliquid creaturae, quod ad praesens negotium visibiliter appareret, et unde voces sensibiliter ederentur, quibus praesentia Domini per subiectam creaturam corporeis etiam sensibus hominis, sicut oportebat, exhiberetur? Si enim unus ex angelis erat, quis facile affirmare possit utrum ei Filii persona nuntianda imposita fuerit, an Spiritus Sancti, an Dei Patris, an ipsius omnino Trinitatis, qui est unus et solus Deus, ut diceret, ego sum Deus Abraham, et Deus Isaac, et Deus Iacob?
But why was he first called the angel of the Lord, when he appeared from the bush in a flame of fire? Whether because he was one of the many angels, but by dispensation bore the person of his Lord; or whether something of creation was assumed, which might visibly appear for the present business, and from which voices might be sensibly uttered, by which the presence of the Lord, through a subjected creature, might be exhibited even to the bodily senses of man, as it behooved? For if he was one of the angels, who could easily affirm whether the person of the Son was imposed on him to announce, or of the Holy Spirit, or of God the Father, or of the Trinity itself altogether, which is the one and only God, so that he might say, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob?
deTrin.2.13.23Neque enim possumus dicere Deum Abraham, et Deum Isaac, et Deum Iacob, Filium Dei esse, et Patrem non esse. Aut Spiritum Sanctum, aut ipsam Trinitatem, quam credimus et intelligimus unum Deum, audebit aliquis negare Deum Abraham, et Deum Isaac, et Deum Iacob? Ille enim non est illorum patrum Deus, qui non est Deus.
For we cannot say that the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, is the Son of God, and is not the Father. Or will anyone dare to deny that the Holy Spirit, or the Trinity itself, which we believe and understand to be one God, is the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? For he is not the God of those Fathers who is not God.
deTrin.2.13.23Porro si non solum Pater Deus est, sicut omnes etiam haeretici concedunt; sed etiam Filius, quod, velint nolint, coguntur fateri, dicente Apostolo, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula; et Spiritus Sanctus, dicente ipso Apostolo, clarificate ergo Deum in corpore vestro; cum supra diceret, nescitis quia corpora vestra templum in vobis est Spiritus Sancti, quem habetis a Deo? Et hi tres unus Deus, sicut Catholica sanitas credit, non satis elucet quam in Trinitate personam, et utrum aliquam, an ipsius Trinitatis gerebat ille angelus, si unus ex ceteris angelis erat.
Moreover, if not only the Father is God, as all even the heretics concede; but also the Son, which, whether they will or not, they are compelled to confess, the Apostle saying, who is over all, God blessed forever; and the Holy Spirit, the same Apostle saying, glorify God, therefore, in your body; since above he had said, do you not know that your bodies are a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom you have from God? And these three are one God, as Catholic soundness believes—it does not sufficiently appear which person in the Trinity, and whether any, or that of the Trinity itself, that angel bore, if he was one of the other angels.
deTrin.2.13.23Si autem in usum rei praesentis assumpta creatura est, quae et humanis oculis appareret, et auribus insonaret, et appellaretur angelus Domini, et Dominus, et Deus; non potest hic Deus intelligi Pater, sed aut Filius, aut Spiritus Sanctus. Quamquam Spiritum Sanctum alicubi angelum dictum non recolam, sed ex opere possit intelligi; dictum enim de illo est, quae ventura sunt annuntiabit vobis; et utique “angelus” graece, latine “nuntius” interpretatur. De Domino autem Iesu Christo evidentissime legimus apud Prophetam, quod magni consilii angelus dictus sit; cum et Spiritus Sanctus et Dei Filius, sit Deus et Dominus angelorum.
But if for the use of the present matter a creature was assumed, which both appeared to human eyes and sounded to their ears, and was called the angel of the Lord, and Lord, and God; here God cannot be understood as the Father, but either the Son or the Holy Spirit. Although I do not recall the Holy Spirit anywhere called an angel, yet it can be understood from his work; for it was said of him, the things that are to come he will announce to you; and certainly "angel" in Greek is interpreted in Latin as "messenger." But of the Lord Jesus Christ we read most evidently in the Prophet, that he was called the angel of great counsel; though both the Holy Spirit and the Son of God are God and Lord of the angels.
deTrin.2.13.2314. 24. Item in exitu filiorum Israel de Aegypto (Cf. Ps 114:1; Exod 3:10, 12:41) scriptum est: Deus autem praeibat illos, die quidem in columna nubis, et ostendebat illis viam; nocte autem in columna ignis; et non deficiebat columna nubis die, et columna ignis nocte ante populum. Quis et hic dubitet per subiectam creaturam eamdemque corpoream, non per suam substantiam, Deum oculis apparuisse mortalium? Sed utrum Patrem, an Filium, an Spiritum Sanctum, an ipsam Trinitatem unum Deum, similiter non apparet. Nec ibi hoc distinguitur, quantum existimo, ubi scriptum est: et maiestas Domini apparuit in nube, et locutus est Dominus ad Moysen, dicens: ‘exaudivi murmur filiorum Israel,’ etc.
14. 24. Likewise in the departure of the children of Israel from Egypt (See Ps 114:1 (113:1); Exod 3:10; 12:41) it is written: but God went before them, by day indeed in a pillar of cloud, and showed them the way; but by night in a pillar of fire; and the pillar of cloud did not fail by day, nor the pillar of fire by night, before the people. Who would here too doubt that through a subjected and corporeal creature, not through his own substance, God appeared to the eyes of mortals? But whether the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, or the Trinity itself, the one God, likewise does not appear. Nor is this distinguished there, as I judge, where it is written: and the majesty of the Lord appeared in the cloud, and the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: 'I have heard the murmuring of the children of Israel.'
deTrin.2.14.2415. 25. Iam vero de nubibus, et vocibus, et fulguribus, et tuba, et fumo in monte Sina, cum diceretur: Sina autem mons fumabat totus, propterea quod descendisset Deus in eum in igne, et ascendebat fumus tamquam fumus fornacis; et mente confusus est omnis populus vehementer; fiebant autem voces tubae prodeuntes fortiter valde. Moyses loquebatur, et Deus respondebat ei voce.
15. 25. And now of the clouds, and voices, and lightnings, and trumpet, and smoke on Mount Sinai, when it was said: but Mount Sinai was all smoking, because God had descended upon it in fire, and the smoke went up as the smoke of a furnace; and all the people were exceedingly confounded in mind; and there came forth the sounds of the trumpet, growing very strong. Moses spoke, and God answered him with a voice.
deTrin.2.15.25Et paulo post data Lege in decem praeceptis, consequenter dicitur: et omnis populus videbat voces, et lampadas, et voces tubae, et montem fumantem.
And a little later, the Law having been given in the ten precepts, it is consequently said: and all the people saw the voices, and the lamps, and the sounds of the trumpet, and the smoking mountain.
deTrin.2.15.25Et paulo post: et stabat, inquit, omnis populus a longe; Moyses autem intravit in nebulam ubi erat Deus, et dixit Dominus ad Moysen, etc.
And a little later: and all the people, it says, stood afar off; but Moses entered into the mist where God was, and the Lord said to Moses.
deTrin.2.15.25Quid hinc dicam; nisi quod nemo tam vecors est, qui credat fumum, ignem, nubes, et nebulam, et si qua huiusmodi, Verbi et Sapientiae Dei quod est Christus, vel Spiritus Sancti esse substantiam? Nam de Patre Deo, nec Ariani hoc umquam ausi sunt dicere.
What shall I say of this, except that no one is so senseless as to believe that smoke, fire, clouds, and mist, and any such things, are the substance of the Word and Wisdom of God, which is Christ, or of the Holy Spirit? For of God the Father, not even the Arians ever dared to say this.
deTrin.2.15.25Ergo creatura serviente Creatori (Cf. Wis 16:24; Rom 1:25) facta sunt illa omnia, et humanis sensibus pro dispensatione congrua praesentata. Nisi forte, quia dictum est, Moyses autem intravit in nebulam ubi erat Deus, hoc arbitrabitur carnalis cogitatio, a populo quidem nebulam visam, intra nebulam vero Moysen oculis carneis vidisse Filium Dei, quem delirantes haeretici in sua substantia visum volunt.
Therefore, the creature serving the Creator, (See Wis 16:24; Rom 1:25) all those things were made, and presented to human senses by a fitting dispensation. Unless perhaps, because it was said, but Moses entered into the mist where God was, carnal thought will reckon this: that the mist indeed was seen by the people, but that within the mist Moses saw with carnal eyes the Son of God, whom the delirious heretics want to have been seen in his own substance.
deTrin.2.15.25Sane viderit eum Moyses oculis carneis, si oculis carneis potest videri, non modo Sapientia Dei quod est Christus, sed vel ipsa cuiuslibet hominis et qualiscumque sapientis; aut quia scriptum est de senioribus Israel, quia viderunt locum ubi steterat Deus Israel, et quia sub pedibus eius tamquam opus lapidis sapphiri, et tamquam aspectus firmamenti caeli, propterea credendum est Verbum et Sapientiam Dei per suam substantiam in spatio loci terreni stetisse, quae pertendit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter; et ita esse mutabile Verbum Dei, per quod facta sunt omnia, ut modo se contrahat, modo distendat? Mundet Dominus a talibus cogitationibus corda fidelium suorum.
Let Moses indeed have seen him with carnal eyes—if with carnal eyes there can be seen, not now the Wisdom of God which is Christ, but even the wisdom of any man whatever and of whatever kind he be; or because it is written of the elders of Israel, that they saw the place where the God of Israel had stood, and that under his feet was as it were a work of sapphire stone, and as the appearance of the firmament of heaven, must we therefore believe that the Word and Wisdom of God stood through his own substance in the space of an earthly place—she who reaches mightily from end to end, and orders all things sweetly; and that the Word of God, through whom all things were made, is so changeable that now it contracts itself, now stretches out? May the Lord cleanse the hearts of his faithful from such thoughts.
deTrin.2.15.25Sed per subiectam, ut saepe diximus, creaturam exhibentur haec omnia visibilia et sensibilia, ad significandum invisibilem atque intelligibilem Deum, non solum Patrem, sed et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia; (Cf. Heb 2:10) quamvis invisibilia Dei, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciantur, sempiterna quoque virtus eius ac divinitas.
But through a subjected creature, as we have often said, all these visible and sensible things are exhibited, to signify the invisible and intelligible God, not only the Father, but also the Son and the Holy Spirit, from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things; (See Heb 2:10) although the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made, his eternal power also and divinity.
deTrin.2.15.2515. 26. Sed quod attinet ad id quod nunc suscepimus, nec in monte Sina video quemadmodum appareat per illa omnia quae mortalium sensibus terribiliter ostendebantur, utrum Deus Trinitas, an Pater, an Filius, an Spiritus Sanctus proprie loquebatur. Verumtamen si quid hinc sine affirmandi temeritate modeste atque cunctanter coniectare conceditur, si una ex Trinitate persona potest intelligi, cur non Spiritum Sanctum potius intelligimus, quando et tabulis lapideis lex ipsa quae ibi data est, digito Dei scripta dicitur, (Cf. Exod 20; 1:17, 24:12, 31:18) quo nomine Spiritum Sanctum in Evangelio, significari novimus. (Cf. Luke 11:20; Matt 12:28)
15. 26. But as concerns what we have now undertaken, neither on Mount Sinai do I see how it appears, through all those things that were terribly shown to the senses of mortals, whether God the Trinity, or the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit was speaking properly. Nevertheless, if it is permitted here, without the rashness of asserting, to conjecture modestly and hesitatingly, if one person of the Trinity can be understood, why do we not rather understand the Holy Spirit, since the Law itself which was given there is said to have been written on the stone tablets by the finger of God, (See Exod 20; 8:19; 24:12; 31:18) by which name we know the Holy Spirit to be signified in the Gospel. (See Luke 11:20; Matt 12:28)
deTrin.2.15.26Et quinquaginta dies numerantur ab occisione agni et celebratione Paschae, usque ad diem quo haec fieri coepta sunt in monte sina; There is no biblical evidence for this reckoning; Exod 19:1 says “in the third month.” Augustine is really relying on a liturgical tradition of later Judaism, which came to regard Pentecost, the Feast of Weeks, as commemorating the giving of the law. sicut post Domini passionem ab eius resurrectione quinquaginta dies numerantur, et venit promissus a Filio Dei Spiritus Sanctus. Et in ipso eius adventu, quem in Apostolorum Actibus legimus, per divisionem linguarum ignis apparuit, qui et insedit super unumquemque eorum. Quod Exodo congruit, ubi scriptum est, Sina autem mons fumabat totus, propterea quod descendit in eum Deus in igne; et aliquanto post, aspectus, inquit, maiestatis Domini tamquam ignis ardens super verticem montis coram filiis Israel.
And fifty days are counted from the slaying of the lamb and the celebration of the Passover up to the day on which these things began to be done on Mount Sinai; There is no biblical evidence for this reckoning; Exod 19:1 says "in the third month." Augustine is really relying on a liturgical tradition of later Judaism, which came to regard Pentecost, the Feast of Weeks, as commemorating the giving of the law. just as after the Lord's passion, from his resurrection fifty days are counted, and the Holy Spirit, promised by the Son of God, came. And in his very coming, which we read of in the Acts of the Apostles, fire appeared through the division of tongues, which also settled upon each one of them. This agrees with Exodus, where it is written, but Mount Sinai was all smoking, because God descended upon it in fire; and somewhat later, the appearance, it says, of the majesty of the Lord was as burning fire upon the top of the mountain before the children of Israel.
deTrin.2.15.26Aut si haec ideo facta sunt, quia nec Pater, nec Filius illic eo modo praesentari poterant sine Spiritu Sancto, quo ipsam Legem scribi oportebat; Deum quidem, non per substantiam suam quae invisibilis et incommutabilis manet, sed per illam speciem creaturae illic apparuisse cognoscimus; sed aliquam ex Trinitate Personam signo quodam proprio, quantum ad mei sensus capacitatem pertinet, non videmus.
Or if these things were done for this reason, that neither the Father nor the Son could be presented there in that mode without the Holy Spirit, by which the Law itself had to be written; we know indeed that God appeared there, not through his own substance, which remains invisible and unchangeable, but through that appearance of a creature; but some one person of the Trinity, by a certain proper sign, so far as pertains to the capacity of my understanding, we do not see.
deTrin.2.15.2616. 27. Est etiam quo moveri plerique solent, quia scriptum est, et locutus est Dominus ad Moysen facie ad faciem, sicut quis loquitur ad amicum suum, cum paulo post dicat idem Moyses, si ergo inveni gratiam ante te, ostende mihi temetipsum manifeste, ut videam te; ut sim inveniens gratiam ante te, et ut sciam quia populus tuus est gens haec; et paulo post iterum dixit Moyses ad Dominum, ‘ostende mihi maiestatem tuam.’
16. 27. There is also that by which very many are wont to be moved, because it is written, and the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as one speaks to his friend, when a little later the same Moses says, if, then, I have found grace before you, show me yourself manifestly, that I may see you; that I may be one finding grace before you, and that I may know that this nation is your people; and a little later again Moses said to the Lord, "show me your majesty."
deTrin.2.16.27Quid est hoc, quod in omnibus quae supra fiebant, Deus videri per suam substantiam putabatur, unde a miseris creditus est, non per creaturam, sed per se ipsum visibilis Filius Dei; et quod intraverat in nebulam Moyses, ad hoc intrasse videbatur, ut oculis quidem populi ostenderetur caligo nebulosa, ille autem intus verba Dei tamquam eius faciem contemplatus audiret; et quomodo dictum est, locutus est Dominus ad Moysen facie ad faciem, sicut quis loquitur ad amicum suum; et ecce idem dicit, si inveni gratiam in conspectu tuo, PL: ante te, “before you.” ostende mihi temetipsum manifeste.
What is this, that in all the things that were done above, God was thought to be seen through his own substance—whence by wretched men the Son of God was believed visible, not through a creature, but through himself; and that, since Moses had entered into the mist, he was thought to have entered for this, that to the eyes of the people indeed a misty darkness might be shown, but that he within might hear the words of God as though contemplating his face; and how it was said, the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as one speaks to his friend; and behold the same Moses says, if I have found grace in your sight, PL: ante te, "before you." show me yourself manifestly?
deTrin.2.16.27Noverat utique quod corporaliter videbat, et veram visionem Dei spiritualiter requirebat. Locutio quippe illa quae fiebat in vocibus, sic modificabatur, tamquam esset amici loquentis ad amicum. Sed Deum Patrem quis corporeis oculis videt? Et quod in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, quis corporeis oculis videt? Et Spiritum Sapientiae quis corporeis oculis videt?
He certainly knew what he saw bodily, and was seeking the true vision of God spiritually. For that speech which was made in voices was so modified as though it were that of a friend speaking to a friend. But who sees God the Father with bodily eyes? And that which in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, through whom all things were made, who sees with bodily eyes? And the Spirit of Wisdom, who sees with bodily eyes?
deTrin.2.16.27Quid est autem, ostende mihi temetipsum manifeste, ut videam te; nisi, “ostende mihi substantiam tuam”? Hoc autem si non dixisset Moyses, utcumque ferendi essent stulti, qui putant per ea quae supra dicta vel gesta sunt, substantiam Dei oculis eius fuisse conspicuam; cum vero hic apertissime demonstretur, nec desideranti hoc fuisse concessum; In The Literal Meaning of Genesis 12.27.55, Augustine reverses this opinion to the extent of saying that Moses was granted what he calls at the beginning of this paragraph “a true spiritual vision of God.” quis audeat dicere per similes formas, quae huic quoque visibiliter apparuerant, non creaturam Deo servientem, sed hoc ipsum quod Deus est cuiusquam oculis apparuisse mortalium?
But what is, show me yourself manifestly, that I may see you; except, "show me your substance"? But if Moses had not said this, the fools who think that through the things said or done above the substance of God was conspicuous to his eyes would somehow have to be borne; but since here it is most plainly demonstrated that this was not granted even to one desiring it, In The Literal Meaning of Genesis 12.27.55, Augustine reverses this opinion to the extent of saying that Moses was granted what he calls at the beginning of this paragraph "a true spiritual vision of God." who would dare to say that through similar forms, which had appeared visibly to this man too, not a creature serving God, but that very thing which God is, appeared to the eyes of any mortal?
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16. 28. Et id quidem quod postea Dominus dicit ad Moysen, ‘non poteris videre faciem meam, et vivere; non enim videbit homo faciem meam et vivet.’ Et ait Dominus: ‘ecce locus penes me est, et stabis super petram, statim ut transiet mea maiestas, et ponam te in specula petrae; et tegam manu mea super te, donec transeam, et auferam manum meam, et tunc videbis posteriora mea; nam facies mea non apparebit tibi.’
16. 28. And that, indeed, which the Lord afterward says to Moses, "you cannot see my face, and live; for no man will see my face and live." And the Lord said: "behold, there is a place near me, and you will stand upon the rock, and as soon as my majesty passes by, I will set you in a cleft of the rock; and I will cover you with my hand over you, until I pass, and I will take away my hand, and then you will see my back parts; for my face will not appear to you."
deTrin.2.16.2817. 28. Non incongruenter ex persona Domini nostri Iesu Christi praefiguratum solet intelligi, ut posteriora eius accipiantur caro eius, in qua de Virgine natus est, et mortuus, et resurrexit; sive propter posterioritatem mortalitatis posteriora (Cf. Exod 33:23) dicta sint, sive quod eam prope in fine saeculi, hoc est, posterius suscipere dignatus est. Facies autem eius illa Dei forma, in qua non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo Patri, quam nemo utique potest videre et vivere; (Cf. 1 Tim 6:16; Exod 33:20)
17. 28. It is not incongruously wont to be understood as prefigured in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, that his back parts are taken to be his flesh, in which he was born of the Virgin, and died, and rose again; whether his back parts (See Exod 33:23) were so called on account of the posteriority of mortality, or because he deigned to assume it near the end of the age, that is, later. But his face is that form of God, in which he did not count it robbery to be equal to God the Father, which assuredly no one can see and live; (See 1 Tim 6:16; Exod 33:20)
deTrin.2.17.28sive quia post hanc vitam, in qua peregrinamur a Domino, et ubi corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam, videbimus facie ad faciem, sicut dicit Apostolus. De hac enim vita in Psalmis dicitur, verumtamen universa vanitas omnis homo vivens; et iterum, quoniam non iustificabitur coram te omnis vivens. In qua vita etiam, secundum Ioannem, nondum apparuit quid erimus. Scimus autem, inquit, quia cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus; quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est; quod utique post hanc vitam intelligi voluit, cum mortis debitum solverimus, et resurrectionis promissum receperimus.
whether because, after this life, in which we are away from the Lord, and where the body which is corrupted weighs down the soul, we shall see face to face, as the Apostle says. For of this life it is said in the Psalms, truly every living man is altogether vanity; and again, for no living man will be justified before you. In which life also, according to John, it has not yet appeared what we shall be. But we know, he says, that when he appears, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is; which he certainly wished to be understood after this life, when we have paid the debt of death, and have received the promise of resurrection.
deTrin.2.17.28Sive quod etiam nunc in quantum Dei Sapientiam per quam facta sunt omnia, (Cf. 1 Cor 1:24–21; Sir 1:3–4) spiritualiter intelligimus, in tantum carnalibus affectibus morimur, ut mortuum nobis hunc mundum deputantes, nos quoque ipsi huic mundo moriamur, et dicamus quod ait Apostolus, mundus mihi crucifixus est, et ego mundo.
Or because even now, insofar as we spiritually understand the Wisdom of God through whom all things were made, (See 1 Cor 1:24, 21; Sir 1:3–4) to that extent we die to carnal affections, so that, reckoning this world dead to us, we ourselves too die to this world, and say what the Apostle says, the world is crucified to me, and I to the world.
deTrin.2.17.28De hac enim morte item dixit, si autem mortui estis cum Christo, quid adhuc velut viventes de hoc mundo While Greek and Vulgate read in mundo, Augustine reads de hoc mundo, “on this world,” as one lives on capital or on rents. decernitis? Non ergo immerito nemo poterit faciem, id est, ipsam manifestationem Sapientiae Dei videre et vivere. (Cf. 1 Tim 6:16; Exod 33:20)
For of this death he likewise said, but if you have died with Christ, why do you still, as though living, make decrees about this world While Greek and Vulgate read in mundo, Augustine reads de hoc mundo, "on this world," as one lives on capital or on rents.? Not undeservedly, then, will no one be able to see the face, that is, the very manifestation of the Wisdom of God, and live. (See 1 Tim 6:16; Exod 33:20)
deTrin.2.17.28Ipsa est enim species, cui contemplandae suspirat omnis qui affectat Deum diligere ex toto corde, et ex tota anima, et ex tota mente; (Cf. Deut 6:5, 10:12, 11:13) ad quam contemplandam etiam proximum quantum potest aedificat, qui diligit et proximum sicut se ipsum; in quibus duobus praeceptis tota Lex pendet et prophetae.
For that is the form for the contemplating of which everyone sighs who strives to love God with his whole heart, and with his whole soul, and with his whole mind; (See Deut 6:5; 10:12; 11:13) for the contemplating of which he also builds up his neighbor as much as he can, who loves his neighbor too as himself; on which two precepts the whole Law hangs, and the prophets.
deTrin.2.17.28Quod significatur etiam in ipso Moyse. Nam cum dixisset, propter dilectionem Dei qua praecipue flagrabat, si inveni gratiam in conspectu tuo, ostende mihi temetipsum manifeste, ut sim inveniens gratiam ante te; continuo propter dilectionem etiam proximi subiecit atque ait, et ut sciam quia populus tuus est gens haec.
This is signified also in Moses himself. For when he had said, on account of the love of God by which he was especially aflame, if I have found grace in your sight, show me yourself manifestly, that I may be one finding grace before you; immediately, on account of the love of his neighbor too, he added and said, and that I may know that this nation is your people.
deTrin.2.17.28Illa est ergo species quae rapit omnem animam rationalem desiderio sui, tanto ardentiorem quanto mundiorem, et tanto mundiorem quanto ad spiritalia resurgentem; tanto autem ad spiritualia resurgentem, quanto a carnalibus morientem. Sed dum peregrinamur a Domino, et per fidem ambulamus, non per speciem, posteriora Christi, hoc est carnem, per ipsam fidem videre debemus, id est in solido fidei fundamento stantes, quod significat petra; et eam de tali tutissima specula intuentes, in catholica scilicet Ecclesia, de qua dictum est, et super hanc petram aedificabo Ecclesiam meam. Tanto enim certius diligimus, quam videre desideramus faciem Christi, quanto in posterioribus (That is, his flesh) eius agnoscimus quantum nos prior dilexerit Christus. (Cf. 1 John 4:10)
That, then, is the form which seizes every rational soul with desire of itself, the more ardent the purer it is, and the purer the more it rises again to spiritual things; but the more it rises again to spiritual things, the more it dies to carnal things. But while we are away from the Lord, and walk by faith, not by sight, we ought to see the back parts of Christ, that is, his flesh, through that very faith—that is, standing on the solid foundation of faith, which the rock signifies; and beholding it from such a most safe lookout, namely in the Catholic Church, of which it was said, and upon this rock I will build my Church. For we love the more surely than we desire to see the face of Christ, the more in his back parts (That is, his flesh) we recognize how much Christ first loved us. (See 1 John 4:10)
deTrin.2.17.2817. 29. Sed in ipsa carne fides resurrectionis eius salvos facit, atque iustificat. Si enim credideris, inquit, in corde tuo, quia Deus illum suscitavit a mortuis, salvus eris; et iterum, qui traditus est, inquit, propter delicta nostra, et resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram. Ideoque meritum fidei nostrae resurrectio corporis Domini est. Nam mortuam esse illam carnem in cruce passionis, etiam inimici eius credunt, sed resurrexisse non credunt. Quod firmissime nos credentes, tamquam de petrae soliditate contuemur; unde certa spe adoptionem exspectamus redemptionem corporis nostri; quia hoc in membris Christi speramus, quae nos ipsi sumus, quod perfectum esse in ipso tamquam in capite nostro fidei sanitate cognoscimus. Inde non vult, nisi cum transierit, videri posteriora sua, ut in eius resurrectionem credatur. Pascha enim hebraeum verbum dicitur, quod transitus interpretatur. Unde et Ioannes Evangelista dicit, ante diem festum Paschae, sciens Iesus quia venit hora eius, ut transeat de hoc mundo ad Patrem.
17. 29. But in that very flesh the faith of his resurrection makes us safe and justifies us. For if you believe, he says, in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved; and again, who was delivered up, he says, for our offenses, and rose again for our justification. And therefore the merit of our faith is the resurrection of the Lord's body. For that that flesh died on the cross of the passion, even his enemies believe, but that it rose again they do not believe. Which we, believing most firmly, behold as from the solidity of a rock; whence with sure hope we await the adoption, the redemption of our body; because we hope this in the members of Christ, which we ourselves are, which we know by the soundness of faith to be perfected in him as in our head. Hence he does not wish his back parts to be seen except when he has passed by, so that his resurrection may be believed. For "Pasch" is said to be a Hebrew word, which is interpreted "passage." Whence John the Evangelist too says, before the festal day of Pasch, Jesus knowing that his hour had come, that he should pass from this world to the Father.
deTrin.2.17.2917. 30. Hoc autem qui credunt, nec tamen in Catholica, sed in schismate aliquo aut in haeresi credunt, non de loco qui est penes eum vident posteriora Domini. Quid enim sibi vult quod ait Dominus, ecce locus est penes me, et stabis super petram?
17. 30. But those who believe this, and yet believe not in the Catholic Church, but in some schism or in a heresy, do not see the back parts of the Lord from the place that is near him. For what does the Lord mean when he says, behold, there is a place near me, and you will stand upon the rock?
deTrin.2.17.30Quis locus terrenus est penes Dominum, nisi hoc est penes eum quod eum spiritualiter attingit? Nam quis locus non est penes Dominum, qui attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter; et cuius dictum est caelum sedes, et terra scabellum pedum eius; et qui dixit, quam domum aedificabitis mihi? Aut quis locus quietis meae? Nonne manus mea fecit haec omnia?
What earthly place is near the Lord, except that that is near him which spiritually touches him? For what place is not near the Lord, who reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly; and of whom it was said that heaven is his seat, and earth the footstool of his feet; and who said, what house will you build me? Or what place of my rest? Has not my hand made all these things?
deTrin.2.17.30Sed videlicet intelligitur locus penes eum in quo statur super petram, ipsa Ecclesia Catholica, ubi salubriter videt Pascha Domini, id est transitum Domini, et posteriora eius, id est, corpus eius, qui credit in resurrectionem eius.
But clearly the place near him in which one stands upon the rock is understood to be the Catholic Church itself, where he healthfully sees the Pasch of the Lord, that is, the passage of the Lord, and his back parts, that is, his body, who believes in his resurrection.
deTrin.2.17.30Et stabis, inquit, super petram, statim ut transiet mea maiestas. Revera enim statim ut transiit maiestas Domini in clarificatione Domini qua resurgens ascendit ad Patrem, solidati sumus super petram.
And you will stand, he says, upon the rock, as soon as my majesty passes by. For indeed, as soon as the majesty of the Lord passed by, in the glorification of the Lord by which, rising, he ascended to the Father, we were made solid upon the rock.
deTrin.2.17.30Et ipse petrus tunc solidatus est, ut cum fiducia praedicaret, quem, priusquam esset solidatus, ter timore negaverat, (Cf. Matt 26:70–74) iam quidem praedestinatione positus in specula petrae, sed adhuc manu Domini sibi superposita ne videret. Posteriora enim eius visurus erat, et nondum ille transierat, utique a morte ad vitam; nondum resurrectione clarificatus erat.
And Peter himself was then made solid, so that he might preach with confidence him whom, before he was made solid, he had three times through fear denied, (See Matt 26:70–74) being already indeed by predestination set in the cleft of the rock, but still with the Lord's hand placed over him lest he see. For he was to see his back parts, and that one had not yet passed by, namely from death to life; he had not yet been glorified by the resurrection.
deTrin.2.17.3017. 31. Nam et quod sequitur in Exodo, et dicit, tegam manu mea super te, donec transeam; et auferam manum meam, et tunc videbis posteriora mea; multi Israelitae quorum tunc figura erat Moyses, post resurrectionem Domini crediderunt in eum, tamquam iam videntes posteriora eius, remota manu eius ab oculis suis. Unde et Isaiae talem prophetiam evangelista commemorat: incrassa cor populi huius, et aures eorum oppila, et oculos eorum grava.
17. 31. For that too which follows in Exodus, and he says, I will cover you with my hand over you, until I pass; and I will take away my hand, and then you will see my back parts; many Israelites, of whom Moses was then the figure, believed in him after the Lord's resurrection, as though now seeing his back parts, his hand removed from their eyes. Whence the evangelist too recalls such a prophecy of Isaiah: make gross the heart of this people, and stop their ears, and weigh down their eyes.
deTrin.2.17.31Denique in Psalmo non absurde intelligitur ex eorum persona dici, quoniam die ac nocte gravata est super me manus tua. Die fortasse, cum manifesta miracula faceret, nec ab eis agnosceretur; nocte autem, cum in passione moreretur, quando certius putaverunt, sicut quemlibet hominem, peremptum et exstinctum.
Finally, in the Psalm it is not absurdly understood to be said in their person, for day and night your hand was heavy upon me. By day perhaps, when he did manifest miracles, and was not recognized by them; but by night, when he died in the passion, when they thought more surely that, like any man whatever, he had been slain and extinguished.
deTrin.2.17.31Sed quoniam cum transisset ut eius posteriora viderentur, praedicante sibi apostolo Petro, quia oportebat Christum pati et resurgere, (Cf. Acts 17:3; John 20:9) compuncti sunt dolore poenitentiae, ut fieret in baptizatis quod in capite eius Psalmi dicitur, beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates, et quorum tecta sunt peccata.
But since, when he had passed by so that his back parts might be seen, the apostle Peter preaching to them that Christ had to suffer and rise again, (See Acts 17:3; John 20:9) they were pricked with the grief of repentance, so that there might come to pass in the baptized what is said at the head of that Psalm, blessed are those whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered.
deTrin.2.17.31Propterea cum dictum esset, gravata est super me manus tua, tamquam Domino transeunte, ut iam removeret manum, et viderentur posteriora eius, sequitur vox dolentis et confitentis, et ex fide resurrectionis Domini peccatorum remissionem accipientis: conversus sum, inquit, in aerumna mea, cum infigeretur mihi spina. Peccatum meum cognovi, et iniustitiam meam non operui. Dixi, ‘pronuntiabo adversum me iniustitiam meam Domino, et tu remisisti impietatem cordis mei.’
Therefore, when it had been said, your hand was heavy upon me, as though the Lord were passing by, that he might now remove his hand, and his back parts might be seen, there follows the voice of one grieving and confessing, and from faith in the Lord's resurrection receiving the forgiveness of sins: I was turned, he says, in my distress, while the thorn was being fixed in me. I acknowledged my sin, and I did not cover my injustice. I said, "I will declare against myself my injustice to the Lord, and you forgave the impiety of my heart."
deTrin.2.17.31Neque The first sentence of the translation in this paragraph is the translator’s own gloss “to bring out the run of Augustine’s thought.” enim tanto carnis nubilo debemus involvi, ut putemus faciem quidem Domini esse invisibilem, dorsum vero visibile; quandoquidem in forma servi utrumque visibiliter apparuit; in forma autem Dei absit ut tale aliquid cogitetur. Absit ut Verbum Dei et Sapientia Dei ex una parte habeat faciem, et ex alia dorsum, sicut corpus humanum, aut omnino ulla specie vel motione sive loco sive tempore commutetur.
For we ought not The first sentence of the translation in this paragraph is the translator's own gloss "to bring out the run of Augustine's thought." to be wrapped in so great a cloud of the flesh as to think that the face of the Lord is indeed invisible, but his back visible; since in the form of a servant both appeared visibly; but in the form of God, far be it that any such thing be thought. Far be it that the Word of God and the Wisdom of God should have a face on one side, and a back on the other, like a human body, or be changed at all by any appearance or motion, whether in place or in time.
deTrin.2.17.31C
deTrin.2.17.31
17. 32. Quapropter, si in illis vocibus quae fiebant in Exodo, et illis omnibus corporalibus demonstrationibus Dominus Iesus Christus ostendebatur; aut alias Christus, sicut loci huius consideratio persuadet; alias Spiritus Sanctus, sicut ea quae supra diximus admonent. Non hoc efficitur, ut Deus Pater numquam tali aliqua specie Patribus visus sit. Multa enim talia visa facta sunt illis temporibus, non evidenter nominato et designato in eis vel Patre, vel Filio, vel Spiritu Sancto; sed tamen per quasdam valde probabiles significationes nonnullis indiciis existentibus, ut nimis temerarium sit dicere, Deum Patrem numquam Patribus aut Prophetis per aliquas visibiles formas apparuisse.
17. 32. Wherefore, if in those voices which were made in Exodus, and in all those bodily demonstrations, the Lord Jesus Christ was shown; or at one time Christ, as the consideration of this passage persuades; at another the Holy Spirit, as the things we said above admonish: this does not bring it about that God the Father never appeared to the Fathers in any such appearance. For many such sights were made in those times, without the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit being evidently named and designated in them; but yet, with certain very probable significations existing as some indications, so that it is too rash to say that God the Father never appeared to the Fathers or the Prophets through any visible forms.
deTrin.2.17.32Hanc enim opinionem illi pepererunt, qui non potuerunt in unitate Trinitatis intelligere quod dictum est, regi autem saeculorum immortali, invisibili soli Deo; et, quem nemo hominum vidit, nec videre potest. Quod de ipsa substantia summa summeque divina et incommutabili, ubi et Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unus et solus Deus est, per sanam fidem intelligitur. Visiones autem illae per creaturam commutabilem Deo incommutabili subditam factae sunt, non proprie sicuti est, sed significative sicut pro rerum causis et temporibus oportuit ostendentes Deum.
For this opinion those begot who could not understand, in the unity of the Trinity, what was said, now to the King of the ages, immortal, invisible, the only God; and, whom no man has seen, nor can see. Which is understood, by sound faith, of that supreme and supremely divine and unchangeable substance, where both the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are the one and only God. But those visions were made through a changeable creature subjected to the unchangeable God, showing God not properly as he is, but significatively, as it behooved according to the causes of things and the times.
deTrin.2.17.3218. 33. Quamquam nescio quemadmodum isti intelligant quod Danieli apparuerit Antiquus dierum, a quo Filius hominis, quod propter nos esse dignatus est, accepisse intelligitur regnum, ab illo scilicet qui ei dicit in Psalmis, filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te; postula a me, et dabo tibi gentes haereditatem tuam; et qui omnia subiecit sub pedibus eius.
18. 33. Although I do not know how these people understand that to Daniel appeared the Ancient of days, from whom the Son of man—which he deigned to be for our sake—is understood to have received a kingdom: namely, from him who says to him in the Psalms, you are my Son, today I have begotten you; ask of me, and I will give you the nations as your inheritance; and who subjected all things under his feet.
deTrin.2.18.33Si ergo Danieli et Pater dans regnum, et Filius accipiens, apparuerunt in specie corporali; quomodo isti dicunt, Patrem numquam visum esse Prophetis, et ideo solum debere intelligi invisibilem quem nemo hominum vidit, nec videre potest?
If, then, both the Father giving the kingdom, and the Son receiving it, appeared to Daniel in a bodily appearance; how do these people say that the Father was never seen by the Prophets, and that therefore only he is to be understood as invisible whom no man has seen, nor can see?
deTrin.2.18.33Ita enim narravit Daniel: aspiciebam, inquit, donec throni positi sunt, et Vetustus dierum sedebat; et indumentum eius quasi nix album, et capillus capitis eius quasi lana munda; thronus eius flamma ignis, rotae eius ignis flagrans, et flumen ignis trahebat in conspectu eius. Et mille millia deserviebant ei, et dena millia denum milium assistebant ei. Et iudicium collocavit, et libri aperti sunt, etc.
For Daniel narrated thus: I beheld, he says, until thrones were set, and the Ancient of days was seated; and his garment was white as snow, and the hair of his head as clean wool; his throne was a flame of fire, its wheels burning fire, and a river of fire was drawn before his sight. And a thousand thousands served him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood by him. And the judgment was set, and the books were opened.
deTrin.2.18.33Et paulo post: aspiciebam, inquit, in visione noctis; et ecce cum caeli nubibus, quasi Filius hominis veniens erat, et usque ad Veterem dierum pervenit, et oblatus est ei. Et ipsi datus est principatus et honor et regnum; et omnes populi, tribus, linguae ipsi servient. Potestas eius, potestas aeterna, quae non praeteribit, et regnum eius non corrumpetur.
And a little later: I beheld, he says, in the vision of the night; and behold, with the clouds of heaven, one was coming as it were the Son of man, and he came even to the Ancient of days, and was presented to him. And to him was given the dominion and honor and kingdom; and all peoples, tribes, tongues will serve him. His power is an eternal power, which will not pass away, and his kingdom will not be corrupted.
deTrin.2.18.33Ecce Pater dans, et Filius accipiens regnum sempiternum, et sunt ambo in conspectu prophetantis visibili specie. Non ergo inconvenienter creditur etiam Pater Deus eo modo solere apparere mortalibus.
Behold the Father giving, and the Son receiving, an everlasting kingdom, and both are before the prophesying one in a visible appearance. It is not, then, incongruously believed that God the Father too is wont to appear to mortals in that mode.
deTrin.2.18.3318. 34. Nisi forte aliquis dicet, ideo non esse visibilem Patrem, quia in conspectu somniantis apparuit; ideo autem Filium visibilem et Spiritum Sanctum, quia Moyses illa omnia vigilans vidit. Quasi vero Verbum et Sapientiam Dei viderit Moyses carnalibus oculis, aut videri spiritus vel humanus possit qui carnem istam vivificat, vel ipse corporeus qui ventus dicitur; (Cf. John 6:64; 1 Cor 3:6; 1 Pet 3:18; Gen 2:7; Ez 37:9) quanto minus ille Spiritus Dei qui omnium hominum et angelorum mentes ineffabili excellentia divinae substantiae supergreditur.
18. 34. Unless perhaps someone will say that the Father is not visible for this reason, that he appeared before the sight of one dreaming; but that the Son and the Holy Spirit are visible, because Moses saw all those things awake. As though Moses saw the Word and the Wisdom of God with carnal eyes, or as though the spirit, even the human one which gives life to this flesh, can be seen, or even the corporeal one which is called wind; (See John 6:64; 1 Cor 3:6; 1 Pet 3:18; Gen 2:7; Ezek 37:9) how much less that Spirit of God who surpasses the minds of all men and angels by the ineffable excellence of the divine substance.
deTrin.2.18.34Aut quisquam tali praecipitetur errore, ut audeat dicere Filium et Spiritum Sanctum etiam vigilantibus hominibus esse visibilem, Patrem autem non nisi somniantibus? Quomodo ergo de Patre solo accipiunt, quem nemo hominum vidit, nec videre potest? An cum dormiunt homines, tunc non sunt homines?
Or would anyone be hurled into such an error as to dare to say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are visible even to waking men, but the Father only to those dreaming? How, then, do they take it of the Father alone, whom no man has seen, nor can see? Or, when men sleep, are they then not men?
deTrin.2.18.34Aut qui formare similitudinem corporis potest ad se significandum per visa somniantium, non potest formare ipsam corpoream creaturam ad se significandum oculis vigilantium? Cum eius ipsa substantia qua est ipse quod est, nulla corporis similitudine dormienti, nulla “corporea specie” vigilanti possit ostendi; sed non solum Patris, verum etiam Filii et Spiritus Sancti.
Or he who can form a likeness of a body to signify himself through the visions of those dreaming, can he not form the corporeal creature itself to signify himself to the eyes of the waking? Whereas his very substance, by which he is what he is, can be shown by no likeness of a body to one sleeping, by no "corporeal appearance" to one waking; and that not only of the Father, but also of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.
deTrin.2.18.34Et certe qui vigilantium visis moventur, ut non Patrem, sed tantum Filium vel Spiritum Sanctum credant corporalibus hominum apparuisse conspectibus; ut omittam tantam latitudinem sanctarum paginarum, et tam multiplicem earum intelligentiam, unde nemo sani capitis affirmare debet, nusquam personam Patris per aliquam speciem corporalem vigilantium oculis demonstratam;
And certainly those who are moved by the sights of waking men, to believe that not the Father, but only the Son or the Holy Spirit appeared to the bodily sight of men—to pass over the great breadth of the holy pages, and their so manifold understanding, from which no one of sound head ought to affirm that the person of the Father was nowhere demonstrated through any bodily appearance to the eyes of the waking;
deTrin.2.18.34sed ut hoc, ut dixi, omittam; quid dicunt de patre nostro Abraham, cui certe vigilanti et ministranti, cum Scriptura praemisisset dicens, visus est Dominus Abrahae, non unus aut duo, sed tres apparuerunt viri, quorum nullus excelsius aliis eminuisse dictus est, nullus honoratius effulsisse, nullus imperiosius egisse?
but to pass this over, as I said: what do they say of our father Abraham, to whom certainly, while he was awake and ministering, when Scripture had premised, saying, the Lord was seen by Abraham, not one or two, but three men appeared, of whom none was said to have stood out more loftily than the others, none to have shone more honorably, none to have acted more imperiously?
deTrin.2.18.3418. 35. Quapropter, quoniam in illa tripartita nostra distributione primum quaerere instituimus, utrum Pater, an Filius, an Spiritus Sanctus; an aliquando Pater, aliquando Filius, aliquando Spiritus Sanctus; an sine ulla distinctione personarum, sicut dicitur, Deus unus et solus; id est Trinitas ipsa, per illas creaturae formas Patribus apparuerit.
18. 35. Wherefore, since in that tripartite distribution of ours we set out first to inquire whether the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit; or sometimes the Father, sometimes the Son, sometimes the Holy Spirit; or without any distinction of persons, as he is called the one and only God—that is, the Trinity itself—appeared to the Fathers through those forms of creation.
deTrin.2.18.35Interrogatis quae potuimus, quantum sufficere visum est, sanctarum Scripturarum locis, (Cf. Gen 3:8, 12:7; Exod 3:1–2, 13:21–22, 14:19–24, 16:10–12, 19:16–19, 20:18–22, 33:9–23, 34:5) nihil aliud, quantum existimo, divinorum “sacramentorum” Sacramenta is the word Augustine uses here. He uses the word with a sense far wider than that to which it has since been restricted in Latin theology. It includes the sacraments of the Church, but over and above this it embraces all scriptural symbols, types, and figures. modesta et cauta consideratio persuadet, nisi ut temere non dicamus quaenam ex Trinitate persona cuilibet Patrum vel Prophetarum in aliquo corpore vel similitudine corporis apparuerit, nisi cum continentia lectionis aliqua probabilia circumponit indicia.
Having interrogated the passages of the holy Scriptures that we could, as far as seemed sufficient, (See Gen 3:8; 12:7; Exod 3:1–2; 13:21–22; 14:19–24; 16:10–12; 19:16–19; 20:18–22; 33:9–23; 34:5) nothing else, as I judge, does the modest and cautious consideration of the divine "mysteries" Sacramenta is the word Augustine uses here. He uses the word with a sense far wider than that to which it has since been restricted in Latin theology. It includes the sacraments of the Church, but over and above this it embraces all scriptural symbols, types, and figures. persuade, except that we should not rashly say which person of the Trinity appeared to any of the Fathers or Prophets in some body or likeness of a body, unless the connection of the reading sets around it some probable indications.
deTrin.2.18.35Ipsa enim natura, vel substantia, vel essentia, vel quolibet alio nomine appellandum est idipsum quod Deus est, quidquid illud est, corporaliter videri non potest; per subiectam vero creaturam, non solum Filium, vel Spiritum Sanctum, sed etiam Patrem corporali specie sive similitudine mortalibus sensibus significationem sui dare potuisse credendum est.
For the very nature, or substance, or essence, or by whatever other name that very thing which God is, whatever it is, is to be called, cannot be seen bodily; but through a subjected creature, it must be believed that not only the Son, or the Holy Spirit, but also the Father could give a signification of himself to mortal senses in a bodily appearance or likeness.
deTrin.2.18.35Quae cum ita sint, Cicero, In Catilinam 1.5.10. ne immoderatius progrediatur secundi huius voluminis longitudo, ea quae restant, in consequentibus videamus.
Since these things are so, Cicero, In Catilinam 1.5.10. lest the length of this second volume proceed too immoderately, let us see the things that remain in what follows.
deTrin.2.18.35Bk. 3
Bk.
CThe reason for Augustine's labor.Augustini laboris ratio.
1. 1. Credant, qui volunt, malle me legendo quam legenda dictando laborare. Qui autem hoc nolunt credere, experiri autem et possunt et volunt, dent quae legendo vel meis inquisitionibus respondeantur vel interrogationibus aliorum, quas pro mea persona quam in servitio Christi gero, et pro studio quo fidem nostram adversum errorem carnalium et animalium hominum muniri inardesco, necesse est me pati; (Cf. 1 Cor 3:1–2; 2:14) et videant quam facile ab isto labore me temperem, et quanto etiam gaudio stilum possim habere feriatum.
1. 1. Let those who wish believe that I would rather labor by reading than by dictating things for others to read. But those who do not wish to believe this, and yet both can and will test it, let them furnish things by which my inquiries may be answered in reading, or the questions of others, which, for the sake of the person I bear in the service of Christ, and for the zeal with which I burn to have our faith fortified against the error of carnal and animal men, it is necessary for me to endure; (See 1 Cor 3:1–2; 2:14) and let them see how easily I would refrain from this labor, and with how great joy I could keep my pen at rest.
deTrin.3.1.1Quod si ea quae legimus de his rebus, sufficienter edita in latino sermone aut non sunt, aut non inveniuntur, aut certe difficile a nobis inveniri queunt, graecae autem linguae non sit nobis tantus habitus, ut talium rerum libris legendis et intelligendis ullo modo reperiamur idonei, quo genere litterarum ex iis quae nobis pauca interpretata sunt, non dubito cuncta quae utiliter quaerere possumus contineri;
But if the things we read about these matters either have not been sufficiently published in the Latin tongue, or are not found, or at least can with difficulty be found by us; and if our command of the Greek language is not so great that we are found in any way fit for reading and understanding books on such matters—of which kind of literature I do not doubt that all the things we can usefully seek are contained in those few that have been translated for us;
deTrin.3.1.1fratribus autem non valeam resistere, iure quo eis servus factus sum flagitantibus, ut eorum in Christo laudabilibus studiis lingua ac stilo meo, quas bigas in me caritas agitat, maxime serviam, egoque ipse multa quae nesciebam, scribendo me didicisse confitear; non debet hic labor meus cuiquam pigro, aut multum docto videri superfluus, cum multis impigris multisque indoctis, inter quos etiam mihi, non parva ex parte sit necessarius.
but if I am unable to resist the brothers demanding, by the right by which I have been made their servant, that I serve their praiseworthy zeal in Christ especially with my tongue and pen—the team of two which love drives in me—and if I myself confess that I have learned by writing many things I did not know; this labor of mine ought not to seem superfluous to anyone lazy or very learned, since it is, in no small part, necessary to many who are diligent and many who are unlearned, among whom I too am.
deTrin.3.1.1Ex his igitur quae ab aliis de hac re scripta iam legimus, plurimum adminiculati et adiuti, ea quae de Trinitate, uno summo summeque bono Deo, pie quaeri et disseri posse arbitror, ipso exhortante quaerenda atque adiuvante disserenda suscepi. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.1.2; Augustine, Against the Academics 3.12.27; The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 1.3.10; Retractiones 1.1.9.
From the things, therefore, that we have already read written by others about this matter, very much supported and helped, I have undertaken to seek—with him himself exhorting—the things that I think can be piously sought and discussed concerning the Trinity, the one supreme and supremely good God, and to discuss them with his help. See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.1.2; Augustine, Against the Academics 3.12.27; The Lord's Sermon on the Mount 1.3.10; Revisions 1.1.9.
deTrin.3.1.1Ut si alia non sunt huiusmodi scripta, sit quod habeant, et legant qui voluerint et valuerint; si autem iam sunt, tanto facilius aliqua inveniantur, quanto talia plura esse potuerint.
So that, if there are no other writings of this kind, there may be something for those to have and read who wish and are able; but if there already are, the more such things there can be, the more easily may some be found.
deTrin.3.1.11. 2. Sane cum in omnibus litteris meis non solum pium lectorem, sed etiam liberum correctorem desiderem, multo maxime in his, ubi ipsa magnitudo quaestionis utinam tam multos inventores habere posset, quam multos contradictores habet. Verumtamen sicut lectorem meum nolo mihi esse deditum, ita correctorem nolo sibi. Ille me non amet amplius quam Catholicam fidem, iste se non amet amplius quam catholicam veritatem.
1. 2. Indeed, since in all my writings I desire not only a pious reader, but also a free corrector, much most of all in these, where the very greatness of the question—would that it could have as many discoverers as it has gainsayers! Nevertheless, just as I do not want my reader to be devoted to me, so I do not want my corrector to be devoted to himself. Let the former not love me more than the Catholic faith; let the latter not love himself more than the Catholic truth.
deTrin.3.1.2Sicut illi dico: “noli meis litteris quasi Scripturis canonicis in servire; sed in illis et quod non credebas, cum inveneris, incunctanter crede, in istis autem quod certum non habebas, nisi certum intellexeris, noli firmiter retinere.”
As I say to the former: "Do not be a slave to my writings as though to canonical Scriptures; but in the latter, when you have found even what you did not believe, believe it without hesitation; in the former, however, what you did not hold as certain, unless you have understood it as certain, do not firmly retain."
deTrin.3.1.2Ita illi dico: “noli meas litteras ex tua opinione vel contentione, sed ex divina lectione vel inconcussa ratione corrigere. Si quid in eis veri comprehenderis, existendo non est meum, at intelligendo et amando et tuum sit et meum; si quid autem falsi conviceris, errando fuerit meum, sed iam cavendo nec tuum sit nec meum.”
So I say to the latter: "Do not correct my writings from your own opinion or contention, but from divine reading or unshaken reason. If you grasp anything true in them, by existing it is not mine, but by understanding and loving it, let it be both yours and mine; but if you convict anything false, by erring it was mine, but now by guarding against it, let it be neither yours nor mine."
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1. 3. Hinc itaque tertius hic liber sumat exordium, quousque secundus pervenerat. Cum enim ad id ventum esset, ut vellemus ostendere non ideo minorem Patre Filium, quia ille misit, hic missus est, nec ideo minorem utroque Spiritum Sanctum, quia et ab illo et ab illo missus in Evangelio legitur; (Cf. John 14:26, 15:26, 16:7) suscepimus hoc quaerere, cum illuc missus sit Filius, ubi erat, quia in hunc mundum venit, et in hoc mundo erat; cum illuc etiam Spiritus Sanctus, ubi et ipse erat, quoniam Spiritus Domini replevit orbem terrarum, et hoc quod continet omnia scientiam habet vocis; utrum propterea missus sit Dominus, quia ex occulto in carne natus est, et de sinu Patris ad oculos hominum in forma servi tamquam egressus apparuit; (Cf. Gal 4:4; 1 John 4:2; John 1:18; Phil 2:7) ideo etiam Spiritus Sanctus, quia et ipse corporali specie quasi columba (Cf. Matt 3:16) visus est, et linguis divisis velut ignis; (Cf. Acts 2:3) ut hoc eis fuerit mitti, ad aspectum mortalium in aliqua forma corporea de spirituali secreto procedere; quod Pater quoniam non fecit, tantummodo misisse, non etiam missus esse dictus sit.
1. 3. Hence, then, let this third book take its beginning from where the second had arrived. For when it had come to this, that we wished to show that the Son is not less than the Father because the one sent and the other was sent, nor that the Holy Spirit is less than both because in the Gospel he is read to be sent both by the one and by the other; (See John 14:26; 15:26; 16:7) we undertook to inquire this: since the Son was sent there where he was, because he came into this world, and was in this world; since the Holy Spirit too was sent there where he himself also was, for the Spirit of the Lord has filled the world, and that which holds all things has knowledge of the voice; whether the Lord was sent for this reason, that he was born of the hidden in the flesh, and from the bosom of the Father to the eyes of men appeared, as it were going forth, in the form of a servant; (See Gal 4:4; 1 John 4:2; John 1:18; Phil 2:7) the Holy Spirit too for this reason, that he himself also was seen in a bodily appearance as a dove, (See Matt 3:16) and in divided tongues as of fire; (See Acts 2:3) so that for them to be sent was to proceed, from spiritual secrecy, to the sight of mortals in some bodily form; which, because the Father did not do it, he is said only to have sent, and not also to have been sent.
deTrin.3.1.3Deinde quaesitum est cur et Pater non aliquando dictus sit missus, si per illas species corporales quae oculis antiquorum apparuerunt ipse demonstrabatur.
Then it was inquired why the Father too was not at some time said to be sent, if through those bodily appearances which appeared to the eyes of the ancients he himself was demonstrated.
deTrin.3.1.3Si autem Filius tunc demonstrabatur, cur tanto post missus diceretur, cum plenitudo temporis venit, ut ex femina nasceretur; quandoquidem et antea mittebatur, cum in illis formis corporaliter apparebat.
But if the Son was then demonstrated, why was he said to be sent so long afterward, when the fullness of time came, that he should be born of a woman; since he was sent even before, when he appeared bodily in those forms.
deTrin.3.1.3Aut si non recte missus diceretur, nisi cum Verbum caro factum est; cur Spiritus Sanctus missus legatur, cuius incarnatio talis non facta est.
Or if he could not rightly be said to be sent except when the Word was made flesh; why is the Holy Spirit read to be sent, whose incarnation of this kind was not made.
deTrin.3.1.3Si vero per illas antiquas demonstrationes, nec Pater, nec Filius, sed Spiritus Sanctus ostendebatur; cur etiam ipse nunc diceretur missus, cum illis modis et antea mitteretur.
But if through those ancient demonstrations neither the Father nor the Son, but the Holy Spirit was shown; why was even he now said to be sent, since he was sent by those modes even before.
deTrin.3.1.3Deinde subdivisimus, ut haec diligentissime tractarentur, et tripartitam fecimus quaestionem, cuius una pars in secundo libro explicata est, duae sunt reliquae, de quibus deinceps disserere aggrediar. Cf. On the Trinity 2.7.13; 18.35.
Then we subdivided, that these things might be treated most diligently, and made the question threefold, of which one part was explained in the second book; two remain, of which I shall set about discussing in turn. See On the Trinity 2.7.13; 18.35.
deTrin.3.1.3Iam enim quaesitum atque tractatum est, in illis antiquis corporalibus formis et visis, non tantummodo Patrem, nec tantummodo Filium, nec tantummodo Spiritum Sanctum apparuisse, sed aut indifferenter Dominum Deum qui Trinitas ipsa intelligitur, aut quamlibet ex Trinitate Personam, quam lectionis textus indiciis circumstantibus significaret.
For it has already been inquired and treated that in those ancient bodily forms and sights, not the Father only, nor the Son only, nor the Holy Spirit only appeared, but either, indifferently, the Lord God who is understood as the Trinity itself, or any one person of the Trinity, which the text of the reading would signify by the surrounding indications.
deTrin.3.1.31. 4. Nunc ergo primum quaeramus quod sequitur. Nam secundo loco in illa distributione positum est, utrum ad hoc opus tantummodo creatura formata sit, in qua Deus, sicut tunc oportuisse iudicavit, humanis ostenderetur aspectibus; an Angeli, qui iam erant, ita mittebantur, ut ex persona Dei loquerentur, assumentes corporalem speciem de creatura corporea in usum ministerii sui; aut ipsum corpus suum, cui non subduntur, sed subditum regunt, mutantes atque vertentes Cf. Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionbus Oratoriae 7.23. in species quas vellent, accommodatas atque aptas actionibus suis, secundum attributam sibi a Creatore potentiam. Qua quaestionis parte, quantum Dominus dederit, pertractata, postremo videndum erit id quod institueramus inquirere, utrum Filius et Spiritus Sanctus et antea mittebantur; et si ita est, quid inter illam missionem et eam quam in Evangelio legimus distet; (Cf. Isa 48:16; John 10:36, 14:26, 15:26, 16:7; Gal 4:4) an missus non sit aliquis eorum, nisi cum vel Filius factus est ex Maria Virgine, vel cum Spiritus Sanctus visibili specie, sive in columba, sive in igneis linguis apparuit. (Cf. Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32; Acts 2:3)
1. 4. Now, then, let us first inquire into what follows. For in the second place in that distribution it was set down, whether for this work alone a creature was formed, in which God, as he then judged it behooved, might be shown to human sight; or whether angels, who already existed, were so sent that they spoke in the person of God, assuming a bodily appearance from corporeal creation for the use of their ministry; or whether they changed and turned their own body, to which they are not subjected but which they rule as subjected, See Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionibus Oratoriae 7.23. into the appearances they wished, accommodated and fitted to their actions, according to the power attributed to them by the Creator. This part of the question having been treated through, as far as the Lord shall grant, it will finally have to be seen—that which we had set out to inquire—whether the Son and the Holy Spirit were sent even before; and if it is so, what difference there is between that sending and the one we read of in the Gospel; (See Isa 48:16; John 10:36; 14:26; 15:26; 16:7; Gal 4:4) or whether none of them was sent except when either the Son was made of the Virgin Mary, or the Holy Spirit appeared in a visible form, whether in a dove or in tongues of fire. (See Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32; Acts 2:3)
deTrin.3.1.41. 5. Sed fateor excedere vires intentionis meae, utrum Angeli manente spirituali sui corporis qualitate per hanc occultius operantes, assumant ex inferioribus elementis corpulentioribus, quod sibi coaptatum, quasi aliquam vestem mutent et vertant in quaslibet species corporales, etiam ipsas veras, sicut aqua vera in verum vinum conversa est (Cf. John 2:9) a Domino; an ipsa propria corpora sua transforment in quod voluerint, accommodate ad id quod agunt.
1. 5. But I confess that it exceeds the powers of my attention, whether the angels—the spiritual quality of their own body remaining, while they work more secretly through it—assume from the lower, more corpulent elements something which, fitted to themselves, they change and turn, as it were some garment, into whatever bodily appearances, even those true ones, just as true water was turned into true wine (See John 2:9) by the Lord; or whether they transform their own proper bodies into what they will, accommodated to what they do.
deTrin.3.1.5Sed quodlibet horum sit, ad praesentem quaestionem non pertinet. Et quamvis haec, quoniam homo sum, nullo experimento possim comprehendere, sicut Angeli qui haec agunt, et magis ea norunt quam ego novi, quatenus mutetur corpus meum in affectu voluntatis meae, sive quod in me, sive quod ex aliis expertus sum; quid horum tamen ex divinarum Scripturarum auctoritatibus credam, nunc non opus est dicere, ne cogar probare, et fiat sermo longior de re qua non indiget praesens quaestio.
But whichever of these it be, it does not pertain to the present question. And although these things, since I am a man, I can grasp by no experiment, as can the angels who do these things, and know them better than I know—how far my body is changed at the disposition of my will, whether what I have experienced in myself, or what from others—yet which of these I should believe from the authorities of the divine Scriptures, there is now no need to say, lest I be compelled to prove it, and the discourse become longer about a matter which the present question does not need.
deTrin.3.1.51. 6. Illud nunc videndum est, utrum Angeli tunc agebant et illas corporum species apparentes oculis hominum, et illas voces insonantes auribus, cum ipsa sensibilis creatura ad nutum serviens Conditori, in quod opus erat pro tempore vertebatur, sicut in libro Sapientiae scriptum est: creatura enim tibi factori deserviens, extenditur in tormentum adversum iniustos, et lenior fit ad benefaciendum iis qui in te confidunt. Propter hoc et tunc in omnia se transfigurans, omnium nutrici gratiae tuae deserviebat ad voluntatem horum qui te desiderabant.
1. 6. This now must be seen: whether the angels were then producing both those appearances of bodies appearing to the eyes of men, and those voices sounding to their ears, when the sensible creature itself, serving the Creator at his nod, was turned for the time into the work that was needful, as it is written in the book of Wisdom: for the creature serving you its maker is stretched out for torment against the unjust, and becomes gentler for doing good to those who trust in you. On account of this, then too, transfiguring itself into all things, it served your all-nourishing grace, according to the will of those who desired you.
deTrin.3.1.6Pervenit enim potentia voluntatis Dei per creaturam spiritualem usque ad effectus visibiles atque sensibiles creaturae corporalis. Ubi enim non operatur quod vult Dei omnipotentis Sapientia, (Cf. 1 Cor 1:21–24; Sir 1:3–4) quae pertendit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter?
For the power of the will of God reaches, through the spiritual creature, even to the visible and sensible effects of the corporeal creature. For where does the Wisdom of God the omnipotent not work what it wills, (See 1 Cor 1:21–24; Sir 1:3–4) which reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly?
deTrin.3.1.62. 7. Sed alius est ordo naturalis in conversione et mutabilitate corporum, qui quamvis etiam ipse ad nutum Dei (Cf. Job 26:11) serviat, perseverantia tamen consuetudinis amisit admirationem; sicuti sunt quae vel brevissimis, vel certe non longis intervallis temporum, caelo, terra, marique mutantur, sive nascentibus, sive occidentibus rebus, sive alias aliter atque aliter apparentibus; alia vero quamvis ex ipso ordine venientia, tamen propter longiora intervalla temporum minus usitata. Quae licet multi stupeant, ab inquisitoribus huius saeculi comprehensa sunt, et progressu generationum quo saepius repetita, et a pluribus cognita, eo minus mira sunt. Sicuti sunt defectus luminarium, et raro existentes quaedam species siderum, et terrae motus, et monstruosi partus animantium, et quaecumque similia, quorum nihil fit nisi voluntate Dei, sed plerisque non apparet.
2. 7. But there is another natural order in the conversion and changeableness of bodies, which, although it too serves at the nod of God, (See Job 26:11) has nevertheless, by the persistence of custom, lost its wonder; such as are the things that are changed, at very short or at least not long intervals of time, in sky, earth, and sea, whether by things being born, or perishing, or appearing at various times in various ways; but others, although coming from the same order, are nevertheless less usual on account of the longer intervals of time. Which, although many are astonished at them, have been grasped by the investigators of this age, and, by the progress of generations in which they are more often repeated and known by more people, are the less wondered at. Such are the eclipses of luminaries, and certain rarely occurring appearances of stars, and earthquakes, and monstrous births of living things, and whatever similar things, of which nothing happens except by the will of God, but to most people this does not appear.
deTrin.3.2.7Itaque licuit vanitati philosophorum, etiam causis aliis ea tribuere, vel veris, sed proximis, cum omnino videre non possent superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, id est voluntatem Dei; vel falsis, et ne ab ipsa quidem pervestigatione corporalium rerum atque motionum, sed a sua suspicione et errore prolatis.
And so it was permitted to the vanity of the philosophers to attribute these things even to other causes, either true but proximate, since they could not see at all the cause superior to all others, that is, the will of God; or false, and brought forth not even from the very investigation of corporeal things and motions, but from their own suspicion and error.
deTrin.3.2.72. 8. Dicam si potero quiddam, exempli gratia, quo haec apertiora sint. Est certe in corpore humano quaedam moles carnis, et formae species, et ordo distinctioque membrorum, et temperatio valetudinis. Hoc corpus inspirata anima regit, eademque rationalis; et ideo quamvis mutabilis, tamen quae possit illius incommutabilis sapientiae particeps esse, ut sit participatio eius in idipsum, sicut in Psalmo scriptum est de omnibus sanctis, ex quibus tamquam lapidibus vivis aedificatur illa Ierusalem mater nostra aeterna in coelis. (Cf. 1 Pet 2:5; Eph 4:12) Ita enim canitur: Ierusalem, quae aedificatur ut civitas, cuius participatio eius in idipsum. Idipsum quippe hoc loco illud summum et incommutabile Bonum intelligitur, quod Deus est, atque sapientia voluntasque ipsius. Cui cantatur alio loco: mutabis ea, et mutabuntur; tu vero idem ipse es.
2. 8. I will say something, if I can, by way of example, by which these things may be more open. There is certainly in the human body a certain mass of flesh, and an appearance of form, and an order and distinction of members, and a tempering of health. This body the inbreathed soul rules, and the same soul is rational; and therefore, although changeable, it is yet such as can be a partaker of that unchangeable wisdom, so that there may be a partaking of it in the selfsame, as it is written in the Psalm of all the saints, of whom, as of living stones, that Jerusalem our mother eternal in heaven is built. (See 1 Pet 2:5; Eph 4:12) For it is sung thus: Jerusalem, which is built as a city, whose partaking is in the selfsame. For the selfsame in this place is understood to be that supreme and unchangeable Good which is God, and his wisdom and will. To whom it is sung in another place: you will change them, and they will be changed; but you are the same.
deTrin.3.2.83. 8. Constituamus ergo animo talem sapientem, cuius anima rationalis iam sit particeps incommutabilis aeternaeque veritatis, quam de omnibus suis actionibus consulat, This theme of participation by the rational soul in the eternal truth and goodness which is God will be developed at length in Book 8. nec aliquid omnino faciat, quod non in ea cognoverit esse faciendum, ut ei subditus eique obtemperans recte faciat.
3. 8. Let us, then, set up in our mind such a wise man, whose rational soul is already a partaker of the unchangeable and eternal truth, which it consults about all its actions, This theme of participation by the rational soul in the eternal truth and goodness which is God will be developed at length in Book 8. and does nothing at all that it has not recognized in it to be done, so that, subject to it and obeying it, it may act rightly.
deTrin.3.3.8Iste si consulta summa ratione divinae iustitiae, quam in secreto audiret aure cordis sui, eaque sibi iubente, in aliquo officio misericordiae corpus labore fatigaret, aegritudinemque contraheret, consultisque medicis ab alio diceretur causam morbi esse corporis siccitatem, ab alio autem humoris immoderationem; unus eorum veram causam diceret, alter erraret, uterque tamen de proximis causis, id est, corporalibus pronuntiaret. At si illius siccitatis causa quaereretur, et inveniretur voluntarius labor; iam ventum esset ad superiorem causam, quae ab anima proficisceretur ad afficiendum corpus quod regit; sed nec ipsa prima esset.
If this man, having consulted the supreme reason of divine justice, which he would hear in secret with the ear of his heart, and at its bidding, in some office of mercy wearied his body with labor and contracted an illness; and the physicians being consulted, by one it should be said that the cause of the disease was the dryness of the body, but by another the immoderation of humor; one of them would say the true cause, the other would err, yet both would pronounce about proximate causes, that is, bodily ones. But if the cause of that dryness were sought, and the voluntary labor were found; we would now have come to a higher cause, which would proceed from the soul to affect the body which it rules; but not even this would be the first.
deTrin.3.3.8Illa enim procul dubio superior erat in ipsa incommutabili Sapientia, cui hominis sapientis anima in caritate serviens, et ineffabiliter iubenti obediens, voluntarium laborem susceperat. Ita non nisi Dei voluntas causa prima illius aegritudinis veracissime reperiretur.
For that, without doubt, was higher, in the unchangeable Wisdom itself, which the soul of the wise man, serving in love and ineffably obeying its bidding, had undertaken the voluntary labor. And so nothing but the will of God would most truly be found to be the first cause of that illness.
deTrin.3.3.8Iam vero si in labore officioso et pio adhibuisset ille sapiens ministros collaborantes secum in opere bono, nec tamen eadem voluntate Deo servientes, sed ad carnalium cupiditatum suarum mercedem pervenire cupientes, vel incommoda carnalia devitantes; adhibuisset etiam iumenta, si hoc exigeret illius operis implendi procuratio, quae utique iumenta irrationalia essent animantia, nec ideo moverent membra sub sarcinis, quod aliquid de illo bono opere cogitarent, sed naturali appetitu suae voluptatis et devitatione molestiae; postremo adhibuisset etiam ipsa corpora omni sensu carentia, quae illi operi essent necessaria, frumentum scilicet, et vinum, et oleum, vestem, nummum, codicem, et si qua huiusmodi. In his certe omnibus in illo opere versantibus corporibus, sive animatis sive inanimis, quaecumque moverentur, attererentur, repararentur, exterminarentur, reformarentur, alio atque alio modo locis et temporibus affecta mutarentur; num alia esset istorum omnium visibilium et mutabilium factorum causa, nisi illa invisibilis et incommutabilis voluntas Dei per animam iustam, sicut sedem Sapientiae, cunctis utens, et malis et irrationalibus animis, et postremo corporibus, sive quae illis inspirarentur et animarentur, sive omni sensu carentibus, cum primitus uteretur ipsa bona anima et sancta, quam sibi ad pium et religiosum obsequium subdidisset?
But now if, in that dutiful and pious labor, that wise man had employed servants laboring with him in the good work, yet not serving God with the same will, but desiring to attain the reward of their carnal desires, or avoiding carnal discomforts; and had employed also beasts of burden, if the management of accomplishing that work required this—which beasts would certainly be irrational living things, nor would they on that account move their members under the burdens because they thought anything of that good work, but by the natural appetite of their own pleasure and the avoidance of trouble; and finally, had employed also those very bodies lacking all sense, which were necessary to that work, namely grain, and wine, and oil, clothing, money, a book, and any such things. In all these bodies, certainly, engaged in that work, whether animate or inanimate, whatever should be moved, worn down, repaired, destroyed, reformed, changed, affected in one way and another by places and times; would there be any other cause of all these visible and changeable deeds, except that invisible and unchangeable will of God, using, through the just soul as the seat of Wisdom, all things—both evil and irrational souls, and finally bodies, whether those breathed into and animated, or those lacking all sense—when it first used that very good and holy soul itself, which it had subjected to itself for pious and religious obedience?
deTrin.3.3.84. 9. Quod ergo de uno sapiente, quamvis adhuc mortale corpus gestante, quamvis ex parte vidente, (Cf. 2 Cor 5:6) posuimus exempli gratia; hoc de aliqua domo, ubi aliquorum talium societas est, hoc de civitate vel etiam de orbe terrarum licet cogitare, si penes sapientes sancteque ac perfecte Deo subditos sit principatus, et regimen rerum humanarum. Cf. Chrysippus, Fragments 35; Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 2.12.37; De Officiis 1.43.153; 2.2.5; Tusculanae Disputationes 4.26.57. Sed hoc quia nondum est (oportet enim nos in hac peregrinatione prius mortaliter exerceri, Mortaliter exerceri is a difficult phrase; perhaps he means that we need to be trained to accept our mortal condition in the spirit of the cross. et per vires mansuetudinis et patientiae in flagellis erudiri), illam ipsam “supernam” atque coelestem, unde peregrinamur, patriam cogitemus.
4. 9. What, then, we have set down by way of example concerning one wise man—though still wearing a mortal body, though seeing in part (See 2 Cor 5:6)—this it is permitted to think concerning some household, where there is a society of some such men, this concerning a city, or even concerning the whole world, if the headship and the rule of human affairs should be in the hands of the wise, who are holily and perfectly subject to God. See Chrysippus, Fragments 35; Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 2.12.37; De Officiis 1.43.153; 2.2.5; Tusculanae Disputationes 4.26.57. But because this is not yet (for it behooves us in this pilgrimage first to be exercised mortally, Mortaliter exerceri is a difficult phrase; perhaps he means that we need to be trained to accept our mortal condition in the spirit of the cross. and to be instructed through the strength of meekness and patience under scourges), let us think of that very "supernal" and heavenly country, from which we are on pilgrimage.
deTrin.3.4.9Illic enim Dei voluntas, qui facit angelos suos spiritus, et ministros suos ignem flagrantem, in spiritibus summa pace atque amicitia copulatis, et in unam voluntatem quodam spirituali caritatis igne conflatis, tamquam in excelsa et sancta et secreta sede praesidens, velut in domo sua et in templo suo, inde se, quibusdam ordinatissimis creaturae motibus, primo spiritualibus, deinde corporalibus, per cuncta diffundit, et utitur omnibus ad incommutabile arbitrium sententiae suae, sive incorporeis sive corporeis rebus, sive rationalibus sive irrationalibus spiritibus, sive bonis per eius gratiam sive malis per propriam voluntatem.
For there the will of God, who makes his angels spirits, and his ministers a flaming fire, presiding over the spirits joined in the highest peace and friendship, and fused into one will by a certain spiritual fire of love, as in a lofty and holy and secret seat, as in his own house and in his own temple, from there diffuses itself through all things by certain most ordered motions of the creature, first spiritual, then corporeal, and uses all things at the unchangeable disposition of its decree, whether incorporeal or corporeal things, whether rational or irrational spirits, whether good through his grace or evil through their own will.
deTrin.3.4.9Sed quemadmodum corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur; ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae, et spiritus vitae irrationalis per spiritum vitae rationalem, et spiritus vitae rationalis desertor atque peccator per spiritum vitae rationalem pium et iustum, et ille per ipsum Deum, ac sic universa creatura per Creatorem suum, ex quo et per quem et in quo etiam condita atque instituta est; ac per hoc voluntas Dei est prima et summa causa omnium corporalium specierum atque motionum.
But just as the grosser and lower bodies are ruled, in a certain order, through the subtler and more powerful; so all bodies are ruled through the spirit of life, and the spirit of irrational life through the spirit of rational life, and the spirit of rational life that is a deserter and a sinner through the spirit of rational life that is pious and just, and that through God himself, and so the whole creation through its Creator, from whom and through whom and in whom it was also founded and established; and on this account the will of God is the first and supreme cause of all bodily appearances and motions.
deTrin.3.4.9Nihil enim fit visibiliter et sensibiliter, quod non de interiore invisibili atque intelligibili aula summi Imperatoris, aut iubeatur, aut permittatur, secundum ineffabilem iustitiam praemiorum atque poenarum, gratiarum et retributionum, in ista totius creaturae amplissima quadam immensaque republica.
For nothing happens visibly and sensibly that is not either commanded or permitted from the inner, invisible, and intelligible court of the supreme Emperor, according to the ineffable justice of rewards and punishments, of favors and retributions, in that most ample and immense commonwealth, as it were, of the whole creation.
deTrin.3.4.94. 10. Si ergo Apostolus Paulus, quamvis adhuc portaret sarcinam corporis, quod corrumpitur et aggravat animam, quamvis adhuc ex parte atque in aenigmate videret, optans dissolvi et esse cum Christo, et in semetipso ingemiscens, adoptionem exspectans redemptionem corporis sui, potuit tamen significando praedicare Dominum Iesum Christum, (Cf. 1 Cor 1:23) aliter per linguam suam, aliter per epistolam, aliter per sacramentum corporis et sanguinis eius;
4. 10. If, then, the apostle Paul, although he still bore the burden of the body, which is corrupted and weighs down the soul, although he still saw in part and in an enigma, desiring to be dissolved and to be with Christ, and groaning within himself, awaiting the adoption, the redemption of his body, could nevertheless by signifying preach the Lord Jesus Christ (See 1 Cor 1:23)—in one way through his tongue, in another through a letter, in another through the sacrament of his body and blood;
deTrin.3.4.10nec linguam quippe eius, nec membranas, nec atramentum, nec significantes sonos lingua editos, nec signa litterarum conscripta pelliculis, corpus Christi et sanguinem dicimus; sed illud tantum quod ex fructibus terrae acceptum et prece mystica consecratum rite sumimus ad salutem spiritualem in memoriam pro nobis Dominicae passionis; (Cf. Luke 22:19; 1 Cor 11:24–25) quod cum per manus hominum ad illam visibilem speciem perducatur, non sanctificatur ut sit tam magnum sacramentum, nisi operante invisibiliter Spiritu Dei, cum haec omnia quae per corporales motus in illo opere fiunt, Deus operetur, movens primitus invisibilia ministrorum, sive animas hominum, sive occultorum spirituum sibi subditas servitutes;
for we call neither his tongue, nor the parchments, nor the ink, nor the signifying sounds uttered by the tongue, nor the signs of letters written on little skins, the body and blood of Christ; but only that which, taken from the fruits of the earth and consecrated by the mystical prayer, we duly receive for spiritual salvation in memory of the Lord's passion for us; (See Luke 22:19; 1 Cor 11:24–25) which, although it is brought by the hands of men to that visible appearance, is not sanctified so as to be so great a sacrament except by the Spirit of God working invisibly, since God works all these things that are done through bodily motions in that work, first moving the invisible things of the ministers, whether the souls of men, or the services of hidden spirits subjected to him;
deTrin.3.4.10quid mirum si etiam in creatura caeli et terrae, maris et aeris, facit Deus quae vult sensibilia atque visibilia, ad se ipsum in eis, sicut oportere ipse novit, significandum et demonstrandum, non ipsa sua qua est apparente substantia, quae omnino incommutabilis est, omnibusque spiritibus, quos creavit, interius secretiusque sublimior?
what wonder is it if, even in the creation of heaven and earth, of sea and air, God does the sensible and visible things he wills, to signify and demonstrate himself in them, as he himself knows it behooves, not with his own substance appearing—by which he is, which is altogether unchangeable, and more sublime, inwardly and more secretly, than all the spirits he created?
deTrin.3.4.105. 11. Vi enim divina totam spiritualem corporalemque administrante creaturam, omnium annorum certis diebus advocantur aquae maris, et effunduntur super faciem terrae. Sed cum hoc orante sancto Elia factum est, quia praecesserat tam continua et tam longa serenitas, ut deficerent fame homines, nec ea hora qua ille Dei servus oravit, aer ipse aliqua humida facie mox futurae pluviae signa praetulerat, consecutis tantis et tam velociter imbribus apparuit vis divina, quibus illud dabatur dispensabaturque miraculum. (Cf. 1 Kgs 18)
5. 11. For by the divine power administering the whole spiritual and corporeal creation, on certain days of every year the waters of the sea are summoned and poured out over the face of the earth. But when this was done at the prayer of holy Elijah—because there had preceded so continuous and so long a clear sky that men were failing from hunger, nor had the air itself, at the hour at which that servant of God prayed, shown by any moist appearance the signs of rain soon to come—the divine power appeared in the so great and so swiftly following rains, by which that miracle was given and dispensed. (See 1 Kgs 18)
deTrin.3.5.11Ita Deus operatur solemnia fulgura atque tonitrua. Sed quia in monte Sina inusitato modo fiebant, vocesque illae non strepitu confuso edebantur, sed eis quaedam signa dari certissimis indiciis apparebat, miracula erant. (Cf. Exod 19:16–19; 20:18)
So God produces the customary lightnings and thunders. But because on Mount Sinai they were happening in an unusual mode, and those voices were uttered not with a confused noise, but it appeared by the most certain indications that certain signs were being given by them, they were miracles. (See Exod 19:16–19; 20:18)
deTrin.3.5.11Quis attrahit humorem per radicem vitis ad botrum, et vinum facit, nisi Deus, qui et homine plantante et rigante incrementum dat? Sed cum ad nutum Domini aqua in vinum inusitata celeritate conversa est, (Cf. John 2:9) etiam stultis fatentibus vis divina declarata est.
Who draws the moisture through the root of the vine to the cluster, and makes wine, except God, who, with man planting and watering, gives the increase? But when, at the nod of the Lord, water was turned into wine with unusual swiftness, (See John 2:9) the divine power was declared even with the foolish confessing it.
deTrin.3.5.11Quis arbusta fronde ac flore vestit solemniter, nisi Deus? Verum cum floruit virga sacerdotis Aaron, collocuta est quodam modo cum dubitante humanitate divinitas. (Cf. Num 17:8) Et lignis certe omnibus et omnium animalium carnibus gignendis atque formandis communis est terrena materies; et quis ea facit, nisi qui dixit ut haec terra produceret, (Cf. Gen 1:24) et in eodem verbo suo quae creavit, regit atque agit?
Who clothes the shrubs with leaf and flower in the customary season, except God? But when the rod of the priest Aaron flowered, the divinity conversed in a certain way with doubting humanity. (See Num 17:8) And certainly for begetting and forming all woods and the flesh of all animals, the earthly matter is common; and who makes these, except him who said that this earth should bring forth, (See Gen 1:24) and in that same word of his rules and drives the things he created?
deTrin.3.5.11Sed cum eamdem materiam ex virga Moysi in carnem serpentis proxime ac velociter vertit, miraculum fuit, (Cf. Exod 4:3) rei quidem mutabilis, sed tamen inusitata mutatio. Quis autem animat quaeque viva nascentia, nisi qui et illum serpentem ad horam, sicut opus fuerat, animavit?
But when he turned that same matter from the rod of Moses into the flesh of a serpent, closely and swiftly, it was a miracle (See Exod 4:3)—of a changeable thing indeed, but yet an unusual change. But who animates each living thing being born, except him who animated that serpent for the hour, as was needful?
deTrin.3.5.115. 11. Et quis reddidit cadaveribus animas suas, cum resurgerent mortui, (Cf. 1 Kgs 17:17; 2 Kgs 4:8; 13:21; Ez 37:1–10, and other passages) nisi qui animat carnes in uteris matrum, ut oriantur morituri? Sed cum fiunt illa continuato quasi quodam fluvio labentium manantiumque rerum, et ex occulto, in promptum, atque ex prompto in occultum usitato itinere transeuntium, naturalia dicuntur; cum vero admonendis hominibus inusitata mutabilitate ingeruntur, magnalia nominantur.
5. 11. And who restored their souls to the corpses, when the dead rose, (See 1 Kgs 17:17; 2 Kgs 4:8; 13:21; Ezek 37:1–10, and other passages) except him who animates the flesh in the wombs of mothers, so that they are born to die? But when those things happen in a kind of continuous flow, as of things slipping and flowing on, and passing from the hidden into the open, and from the open into the hidden by a customary route, they are called natural; but when, for the admonishing of men, they are pressed upon us by an unusual changeableness, they are named mighty deeds.
deTrin.3.5.11C
deTrin.3.5.11
7. 12. Hic video quid infirmae cogitationi possit occurrere, cur scilicet ista miracula etiam magicis artibus fiant. Nam et magi Pharaonis similiter serpentes fecerunt, et alia similia. (Cf. Exod 7:11 and following) Sed illud amplius est admirandum, quomodo magorum illa potentia, quae serpentes facere potuit, ubi ad muscas minutissimas ventum est, omnino defecit. Scyniphes enim musculae sunt brevissimae, qua tertia plaga superbus populus Aegyptiorum caedebatur. (Cf. Exod 8:18) Ibi certe deficientes magi dixerunt: digitus Dei est hoc. Unde intelligi datur, ne ipsos quidem transgressores angelos et aereas potestates, in imam istam caliginem tamquam in sui generis carcerem, ab illius sublimis aethereae puritatis habitatione detrusas, per quas magicae artes possunt quidquid possunt, valere aliquid, nisi data desuper potestate.
7. 12. Here I see what may occur to weak thought, namely why these miracles are done even by magic arts. For the magi of Pharaoh likewise made serpents, and other similar things. (See Exod 7:11 and following) But this is the more to be wondered at: how that power of the magi, which could make serpents, when it came to the tiniest flies, failed altogether. For gnats are very tiny little flies, by which, as the third plague, the proud people of the Egyptians was struck. (See Exod 8:18) There certainly the magi, failing, said: this is the finger of God. Whence it is given to understand that not even those transgressor angels and aerial powers—thrust down into this lowest darkness as into a prison of their own kind, from the habitation of that sublime ethereal purity, through whom the magic arts can do whatever they can—are able to do anything except by power given from above.
deTrin.3.7.12Datur autem vel ad fallendos fallaces, sicut in Aegyptios, et in ipsos etiam magos data est, ut in eorum spirituum seductione viderentur admirandi a quibus fiebant, a Dei veritate damnandi; vel ad admonendos fideles, ne tale aliquid facere pro magno desiderent, propter quod etiam nobis Scripturae auctoritate sunt prodita; vel ad exercendam, probandam, manifestandamque iustorum patientiam. Neque enim parva visibilium miraculorum potentia, Iob cuncta quae habebat amisit, et filios et ipsam corporis sanitatem.
And it is given either to deceive the deceivers, as upon the Egyptians, and as it was given even upon the magi themselves, so that in the seduction of those spirits they might seem worthy of admiration to those by whom these things were done, but worthy of condemnation by the truth of God; or to admonish the faithful, lest they desire to do any such thing as a great matter, for which reason these things are also handed down to us by the authority of Scripture; or to exercise, prove, and manifest the patience of the just. For by no small power of visible miracles, Job lost all that he had, both his sons and the very health of his body.
deTrin.3.7.128. 13. Nec ideo putandum est istis transgressoribus angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum materiam, sed Deo potius, a quo haec potestas datur, quantum in sublimi et spirituali sede incommutabilis iudicat. Nam et damnatis iniquis etiam in metallo servit aqua et ignis et terra, ut faciant inde quod volunt, sed quantum sinitur.
8. 13. Nor on this account must it be thought that this matter of visible things serves these transgressor angels at their nod, but rather God, by whom this power is given, as far as, in his sublime and spiritual and unchangeable seat, he judges. For even to the condemned wicked in the mine, water and fire and earth serve, that they may make from them what they will, but as far as it is allowed.
deTrin.3.8.13Nec sane creatores illi mali angeli dicendi sunt, quia per illos magi resistentes famulo Dei ranas et serpentes fecerunt; non enim ipsi eas creaverunt. Omnium quippe rerum quae corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in istis corporeis mundi huius elementis latent. Alia sunt enim haec iam conspicua oculis nostris ex fructibus et animantibus; alia vero illa occulta istorum seminum semina, unde iubente Creatore produxit aqua prima natatilia et volatilia, terra autem prima sui generis germina, et prima sui generis animalia. (Cf. Gen 1:20–25) Neque enim tunc in huiuscemodi fetus ita producta sunt, ut in eis quae producta sunt vis illa consumpta sit; sed plerumque desunt congruae temperamentorum occasiones, quibus erumpant, et species suas peragant.
Nor indeed are those evil angels to be called creators, because through them the magi, resisting the servant of God, made frogs and serpents; for they themselves did not create them. For of all things that are born corporeally and visibly, certain hidden seeds lie concealed in these corporeal elements of this world. For these are one thing—the things now conspicuous to our eyes from fruits and living things; but another thing those hidden seeds of these seeds, from which, at the Creator's command, the first water brought forth swimming and flying things, but the first earth the first germinations of its kind, and the first animals of its kind. (See Gen 1:20–25) For they were not then so brought forth into offspring of this kind that in those that were brought forth that power was consumed; but for the most part there are lacking the fitting occasions of the temperings, by which they may burst forth and accomplish their kinds.
deTrin.3.8.13Ecce enim brevissimus surculus semen est; nam convenienter mandatus terrae arborem facit. Huius autem surculi subtilius semen aliquod eiusdem generis granum est, et huc usque nobis visibile. Iam vero huius etiam grani semen quamvis oculis videre nequeamus, ratione tamen coniicere possumus; quia nisi talis aliqua vis esset in istis elementis, non plerumque nascerentur ex terra quae ibi seminata non essent; nec animalia tam multa, nulla marium feminarumque commixtione praecedente, sive in terra, sive in aqua, quae tamen crescunt et coeundo alia pariunt, cum illa nullis coeuntibus parentibus orta sint.
For behold, the tiniest shoot is a seed; for, fittingly committed to the earth, it makes a tree. But the subtler seed of this shoot is some grain of the same kind, and this far visible to us. But now the seed even of this grain, although we cannot see it with our eyes, we can yet conjecture by reason; because, unless there were some such power in these elements, there would not for the most part be born from the earth things that had not been sown there; nor so many animals, with no commixture of males and females preceding, whether in earth or in water, which nevertheless grow and by coupling bring forth others, although they themselves arose with no parents coupling.
deTrin.3.8.13Et certe apes semina filiorum non coeundo concipiunt, sed tamquam sparsa per terras ore colligunt. Virgil, Georgics 4.201–204. Invisibilium enim seminum Creator, ipse Creator est omnium rerum, quoniam quaecumque nascendo ad oculos nostros exeunt, ex occultis seminibus accipiunt progrediendi primordia, et incrementa debitae magnitudinis distinctionesque formarum ab originalibus tamquam regulis sumunt.
And certainly bees conceive the seeds of their young not by coupling, but gather them as it were scattered through the lands with their mouths. Virgil, Georgics 4.201–204. For the Creator of the invisible seeds is himself the Creator of all things, since whatever things, by being born, come forth to our eyes, take the first beginnings of their advance from hidden seeds, and take their increases of due magnitude and the distinctions of their forms from the original, as it were, rules.
deTrin.3.8.13Sicut ergo nec parentes dicimus creatores hominum, nec agricolas creatores frugum, quamvis eorum extrinsecus adhibitis motibus ista creanda Dei virtus interius operetur; ita non solum malos, sed nec bonos angelos fas est putare creatores, si pro subtilitate sui sensus et corporis, semina rerum istarum nobis occultiora noverunt, et ea per congruas temperationes elementorum latenter spargunt, atque ita et gignendarum rerum et accelerandorum incrementorum praebent occasiones.
As, therefore, we call neither parents the creators of men, nor farmers the creators of crops, although the power of God works inwardly to create these things, with their motions applied from outside; so it is not lawful to think not only the evil, but even the good angels creators, if, by the subtlety of their sense and body, they know the seeds of these things, more hidden to us, and scatter them latently through fitting temperings of the elements, and so furnish the occasions both of things to be generated and of increases to be accelerated.
deTrin.3.8.13Sed nec boni haec, nisi quantum Deus iubet, nec mali haec iniuste faciunt, nisi quantum iuste ipse permittit. Nam iniqui malitia voluntatem suam habent iniustam; potestatem autem non nisi iuste accipit, sive ad poenam suam, sive ad aliorum, vel poenam malorum, vel laudem bonorum.
But neither do the good do these things except as far as God commands, nor do the evil do them unjustly except as far as he justly permits. For the wicked have their unjust will by malice; but they receive power only justly, whether for their own punishment, or for that of others, either the punishment of the evil or the praise of the good.
deTrin.3.8.138. 14. Itaque apostolus Paulus discernens interius Deum creantem atque formantem, ab operibus creaturae quae admoventur extrinsecus, et de agricultura similitudinem assumens ait: ego plantavi, Apollo rigavit; sed Deus incrementum dedit. Sicut ergo in ipsa vita nostra mentem iustificando formare non potest nisi Deus, praedicare autem Evangelium extrinsecus et homines possunt, non solum boni per veritatem, sed etiam mali per occasionem; ita creationem rerum visibilium Deus interius operatur; exteriores autem operationes sive bonorum sive malorum, vel angelorum vel hominum, sive etiam quorumcumque animalium, secundum imperium suum et a se impertitas distributiones potestatum et appetitiones commoditatum, ita rerum naturae adhibet in qua creat omnia, quemadmodum terrae agriculturam. Quapropter ita non possum dicere angelos malos magicis artibus evocatos, creatores fuisse ranarum atque serpentium; (Cf. Exod 7:11–12; 8:7) sicut non possum dicere homines malos creatores esse segetis, quam per eorum operam videro exortam. (Cf. Matt 13:25–26)
8. 14. And so the apostle Paul, distinguishing God creating and forming inwardly from the works of the creature which are applied from outside, and taking a likeness from agriculture, says: I planted, Apollos watered; but God gave the increase. As, therefore, in our very life, none but God can form the mind by justifying it, but men too can preach the Gospel outwardly, not only the good through truth, but also the evil through opportunity; so God works inwardly the creation of visible things; but the outward operations, whether of the good or of the evil, whether of angels or of men, or even of whatever animals, according to his command and the distributions of powers and the appetites of advantages imparted by him, he applies to the nature of things in which he creates all things, just as agriculture to the earth. Wherefore I can no more say that the evil angels, invoked by magic arts, were the creators of frogs and serpents, (See Exod 7:11–12; 8:7) than I can say that evil men are the creators of the crop which I see to have sprung up through their work. (See Matt 13:25–26)
deTrin.3.8.148. 15. Sicut nec Iacob creator colorum in pecoribus fuit, quia bibentibus in conceptu matribus variatas virgas quas intuerentur apposuit. Sed nec ipsae pecudes creatrices fuerunt varietatis prolis suae, quia inhaeserat animae illarum discolor phantasia ex contuitu variarum virgarum per oculos impressa, quae non potuit nisi corpus quod sic affecto spiritu animabatur, ex compassione commixtionis afficere, unde teneris fetuum primordiis colore tenus aspergeretur. (Cf. Gen 30:37–41)
8. 15. Just as neither was Jacob the creator of the colors in the flocks, because he set before the mothers, as they drank at conception, variegated rods for them to gaze upon. But neither were the flocks themselves the creators of the variegation of their offspring, because there had clung to their soul a particolored image, impressed through the eyes from the gazing on the variegated rods, which could only affect, from the sympathy of the commixture, the body that was animated by the spirit so affected, whence the tender beginnings of the offspring were tinged, so far as color goes. (See Gen 30:37–41)
deTrin.3.8.15Ut enim sic ex semetipsis afficiantur, vel anima ex corpore, vel corpus ex anima, congruentiae rationis PL: congruae rationes, “harmonious ideas.” id faciunt, quae incommutabiliter vivunt in ipsa summa Dei Sapientia, (Cf. Sir 1:3; 1 Cor 1:3–24) quam nulla spatia locorum capiunt; et cum ipsa sit incommutabilis, nihil eorum quae vel commutabiliter sunt deserit, quia nihil eorum nisi per ipsam creatum est.
For that they should be thus affected from themselves—either the soul from the body, or the body from the soul—the congruences of reason PL: congruae rationes, "harmonious ideas." bring about, which live unchangeably in that supreme Wisdom of God, (See Sir 1:3; 1 Cor 1:3–24) which no spaces of places contain; and since she herself is unchangeable, she deserts none of the things that exist even changeably, because nothing of them was created except through her.
deTrin.3.8.15Ut enim de pecoribus non virgae, sed pecora nascerentur, (Cf. Gen 30:37–41) fecit hoc incommutabilis et invisibilis ratio Sapientiae Dei, per quam creata sunt omnia; ut autem de varietate virgarum, pecorum conceptorum color aliquid duceret, fecit hoc anima gravidae pecudis per oculos affecta forinsecus, et interius secum pro suo modulo formandi “regulam” trahens, quam de intima potentia sui Creatoris accepit.
For that from the flocks not rods but flocks should be born, (See Gen 30:37–41) this the unchangeable and invisible reason of the Wisdom of God did, through whom all things were created; but that from the variegation of the rods the color of the conceived flocks should draw something, this the soul of the pregnant beast did, affected outwardly through the eyes, and inwardly drawing along with itself, according to its small measure, a "rule" of forming, which it received from the inmost power of its Creator.
deTrin.3.8.15Sed (This paragraph’s translation has been provided by the Aquinas Institute) quanta sit vis animae ad afficiendam atque mutandam materiam corporalem (cum tamen creatrix corporis dici non possit, quia omnis causa mutabilis sensibilisque substantiae, omnisque modus et numerus et pondus eius unde efficitur ut et sit, et natura ita vel ita sit, ab intelligibili et incommutabili vita, quae super omnia est, existit, et pervenit usque ad extrema atque terrena), multus sermo est, neque nunc necessarius. Verum propterea factum Iacob de pecoribus commemorandum arbitratus sum, ut intelligeretur, si homo qui virgas illas sic posuit, dici non potest creator colorum in agnis et haedis; nec ipsae matrum animae, quae conceptam per oculos corporis phantasiam varietatis, seminibus carne conceptis, quantum natura passa est, asperserunt; multo minus dici posse ranarum serpentiumque creatores angelos malos, per quos magi Pharaonis tunc illa fecerunt. (Cf. Exod 7:1–12; 8:7)
But (This paragraph's translation has been provided by the Aquinas Institute) how great is the power of the soul to affect and change corporeal matter (though it cannot be called the creator of the body, since every cause of changeable and sensible substance, and every measure and number and weight of it, whence it comes about that it both exists and that its nature is so or so, exists from the intelligible and unchangeable life which is above all things, and reaches even to the lowest and earthly things), is a long discourse, and not now necessary. But I judged that Jacob's deed concerning the flocks should be recalled for this reason: that it might be understood that, if the man who set out those rods so cannot be called the creator of the colors in the lambs and kids; nor the souls of the mothers themselves, which, so far as nature allowed, sprinkled upon the seeds conceived in the flesh the image of variegation conceived through the eyes of the body; much less can the evil angels, through whom the magi of Pharaoh then did those things, be called the creators of frogs and serpents. (See Exod 7:1–12; 8:7)
deTrin.3.8.159. 16. Aliud est enim ex intimo ac summo causarum cardine condere atque administrare creaturam, quod qui facit, solus Creator est Deus; aliud autem pro distributis ab illo viribus et facultatibus aliquam operationem forinsecus admovere, ut tunc vel tunc, sic vel sic exeat quod creatur. Ista quippe originaliter ac primordialiter in quadam textura elementorum cuncta iam creata sunt sed acceptis opportunitatibus prodeunt.
9. 16. For it is one thing to found and administer the creature from the inmost and supreme hinge of causes—which he who does, is God the only Creator; but another to apply, according to the powers and faculties distributed by him, some operation from outside, so that at this time or that, in this way or that, what is created may come forth. For these things have, originally and primordially, all been already created in a certain texture of the elements, but they come forth as opportunities are received.
deTrin.3.9.16Nam sicut matres gravidae sunt fetibus, sic ipse mundus gravidus est causis nascentium; quae in illo non creantur, nisi ab illa summa essentia, ubi nec oritur, nec moritur aliquid, nec incipit esse, nec desinit. Adhibere autem forinsecus accedentes causas, quae tametsi non sunt naturales, tamen secundum naturam adhibentur, ut ea quae secreto naturae sinu abdita continentur, erumpant et foris creentur quodam modo explicando mensuras et numeros et pondera sua quae in occulto acceperunt ab illo, qui omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuit; non solum mali angeli, sed etiam mali homines possunt, sicut exemplo agriculturae supra docui. Cf. On the Trinity 1.7; Matt 13:25–26.
For just as mothers are pregnant with offspring, so the world itself is pregnant with the causes of things that are born; which are not created in it except by that supreme essence, where nothing arises or dies, nor begins to be, nor ceases. But to apply causes coming from outside—which, although they are not natural, are yet applied according to nature, so that the things that are contained, hidden in the secret bosom of nature, may burst forth and be created outwardly, in a certain way unfolding the measures and numbers and weights they received in secret from him who disposed all things in measure and number and weight—not only evil angels, but even evil men can, as I taught above by the example of agriculture. See On the Trinity 1.7; Matt 13:25–26.
deTrin.3.9.169. 17. Sed ne de animalibus quasi diversa ratio moveat, quod habent spiritum vitae cum sensu appetendi quae secundum naturam sunt, vitandique contraria; etiam hoc est videre quam multi homines noverunt, ex quibus herbis, aut carnibus, aut quarumque rerum quibuslibet sucis aut humoribus, vel ita positis, vel ita obrutis, vel ita contritis, vel ita commixtis, quae animalia nasci soleant. Quorum se quis tam demens audeat dicere creatorem?
9. 17. But lest, as it were, a different reasoning move anyone concerning animals, because they have a spirit of life with the sense of seeking what is according to nature and avoiding the contrary; this too may be seen, how many men know from what herbs, or flesh, or whatever juices or humors of any things—whether so placed, or so buried, or so crushed, or so mixed—what animals are wont to be born. Of which who would be so insane as to call himself the creator?
deTrin.3.9.17Quid ergo mirum, si quemadmodum potest nosse quilibet nequissimus homo, unde illi vel illi vermes muscaeque nascantur; (Cf. Exod 7:11–12; 8:7) ita mali angeli pro subtilitate sui sensus in occultioribus elementorum seminibus norunt, unde ranae serpentesque nascantur, et haec per certas et notas temperationum opportunitates occultis motibus adhibendo faciunt creari, non creant?
What wonder, then, if, just as any most worthless man can know from what this or that worms and flies are born, (See Exod 7:11–12; 8:7) so the evil angels, by the subtlety of their sense, know in the more hidden seeds of the elements from what frogs and serpents are born, and, by applying these through fixed and known opportunities of temperings with hidden motions, cause them to be created—they do not create them?
deTrin.3.9.17Sed illa homines quae solent ab hominibus fieri, non mirantur. Quod si quisquam celeritates incrementorum forte miratur, quod illa animantia tam cito facta sunt; attendat quemadmodum et ista pro modulo facultatis humanae ab hominibus procurentur. Unde enim fit ut eadem corpora citius vermescant aestate quam hieme, citius in calidioribus quam in frigidioribus locis? Sed haec ab hominibus tanto difficilius adhibentur, quanto desunt sensuum subtilitates, et corporum mobilitates in membris terrenis et pigris. Unde qualibuscumque angelis vicinas causas ab elementis contrahere, quanto facilius est, tanto mirabiliores in huiusmodi operibus eorum existunt celeritates.
But men do not marvel at the things that are wont to be done by men. But if anyone perhaps marvels at the swiftnesses of increases, that those living things were made so quickly; let him attend to how these too are procured by men, according to the small measure of human faculty. For whence does it come that the same bodies grow worms more quickly in summer than in winter, more quickly in warmer than in colder places? But these things are applied by men with so much the more difficulty, as there are lacking the subtleties of the senses and the mobilities of bodies in their earthly and sluggish members. Whence for angels of whatever kind, by how much it is easier to draw the proximate causes from the elements, by so much the more wonderful do their swiftnesses in works of this kind appear.
deTrin.3.9.179. 18. Sed non est creator, nisi qui principaliter ista format. Nec quisquam hoc potest, nisi ille penes quem primitus sunt omnium quae sunt mensurae, numeri, et pondera; et ipse est unus creator Deus, ex cuius ineffabili potentatu fit etiam ut quod possent hi angeli si permitterentur, ideo non possint quia non permittuntur.
9. 18. But there is no creator except him who principally forms these things. Nor can anyone do this, except him with whom are, in the first place, the measures, numbers, and weights of all things that are; and he is the one creator God, from whose ineffable might it comes about even that what these angels could do if they were permitted, they therefore cannot, because they are not permitted.
deTrin.3.9.18Neque enim occurrit alia ratio cur non potuerint facere minutissimas muscas, qui ranas serpentesque fecerunt, nisi quia maior aderat dominatio prohibentis Dei per Spiritum Sanctum, quod etiam ipsi magi confessi sunt, dicentes: digitus Dei est hoc.
For no other reason occurs why those who made frogs and serpents could not make the tiniest flies, except that a greater dominion of God forbidding it was present through the Holy Spirit, which the magi themselves also confessed, saying: this is the finger of God.
deTrin.3.9.18Quid autem possint per naturam, nec possint per prohibitionem, et quid per ipsius naturae suae conditionem facere non sinantur; homini explorare difficile est, immo vero impossibile, nisi per illud donum Dei, (Cf. Acts 8:20; John 4:10) quod Apostolus commemorat dicens, alii diiudicatio spirituum.
But what they can do by nature, and cannot do because of prohibition, and what they are not permitted to do by the very condition of their nature, it is difficult for man to explore—nay, rather impossible, except through that gift of God (See Acts 8:20; John 4:10) which the Apostle recalls, saying, to another the discerning of spirits.
deTrin.3.9.18Novimus enim hominem posse ambulare, et neque hoc posse si non permittatur, volare autem non posse etiamsi permittatur. Sic et illi angeli quaedam possunt facere, si permittantur ab angelis potentioribus ex imperio Dei; quaedam vero non possunt, nec si ab eis permittantur; quia ille non permittit, a quo illis est talis naturae modus, qui etiam per angelos suos et illa plerumque non permittit, quae concessit ut possint.
For we know that a man can walk, and cannot do even this if he is not permitted, but cannot fly even if he is permitted. So too those angels can do certain things if they are permitted by more powerful angels at God's command; but certain things they cannot do, not even if they are permitted by them; because he does not permit, from whom they have such a measure of their nature—who, even through his angels, for the most part does not permit those things which he granted them the power to do.
deTrin.3.9.18C
deTrin.3.9.18
9. 19. Exceptis igitur illis, quae usitatissimo transcursu temporum in rerum naturae ordine corporaliter fiunt, sicuti sunt ortus occasusque siderum, generationes et mortes animalium, seminum et germinum innumerabiles diversitates, nebulae et nubes, nives et pluviae, fulgura et tonitrua, fulmina et grandines, venti et ignes, frigus et aestus, et omnia talia; exceptis etiam illis quae in eodem ordine rara sunt, sicut defectus luminum, et species inusitatae siderum, et monstra, et terrae motus, et similia; exceptis ergo istis omnibus, quorum quidem prima et summa causa non est nisi voluntas Dei; unde et in Psalmo, cum quaedam huius generis essent commemorata, ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus tempestatis; ne quis ea vel fortuitu, vel causis tantummodo corporalibus, vel etiam spiritualibus, tamen praeter voluntatem Dei existentibus agi crederet, continuo subiecit, quae faciunt verbum eius.
9. 19. Excepting, then, those things that happen corporeally in the order of the nature of things by the most customary running on of times—such as are the risings and settings of the stars, the births and deaths of animals, the innumerable diversities of seeds and germinations, mists and clouds, snows and rains, lightnings and thunders, thunderbolts and hails, winds and fires, cold and heat, and all such things; excepting also those that are rare in the same order, such as eclipses of the lights, and unusual appearances of the stars, and monsters, and earthquakes, and the like; excepting, then, all these, of which indeed the first and supreme cause is nothing but the will of God—whence in the Psalm too, when certain things of this kind had been recalled, fire, hail, snow, ice, the spirit of the tempest, lest anyone should believe them to be driven either by chance, or only by corporeal causes, or even by spiritual ones yet existing apart from the will of God, he immediately added, which do his word.
deTrin.3.9.1910. 19. Sed his, ut dicere coeperam, exceptis, alia sunt illa quae quamvis ex eadem materia corporali, ad aliquid tamen divinitus annuntiandum nostris sensibus admoventur, quae proprie miracula et signa dicuntur, nec in omnibus quae nobis a Domino Deo annuntiantur, ipsius Dei persona suscipitur. Cum autem suscipitur, aliquando in angelo demonstratur, aliquando in ea specie quae non est quod angelus, quamvis per angelum disposita ministretur; rursus cum in ea specie suscipitur quae non est quod angelus, aliquando iam erat ipsum corpus, et ad hoc demonstrandum in aliquam mutationem assumitur; aliquando ad hoc exoritur, et re peracta rursus absumitur.
10. 19. But these things, as I had begun to say, being excepted, there are others which, although from the same corporeal matter, are nevertheless applied to our senses to announce something divinely, which are properly called miracles and signs; nor in all the things that are announced to us by the Lord God is the person of God himself taken up. But when it is taken up, it is sometimes demonstrated in an angel, sometimes in that appearance which is not what an angel is, although it is administered, disposed through an angel; again, when it is taken up in that appearance which is not what an angel is, sometimes the body already existed, and is assumed into some change to demonstrate this; sometimes it arises for this, and, the thing being accomplished, is again taken away.
deTrin.3.10.19Sicut etiam cum homines annuntiant, aliquando ex sua persona verba Dei loquuntur, sicuti cum praemittitur, dixit dominus; (Cf. Isa 3:16) aut, haec dicit Dominus; (Cf. Jer 31:1–2) aut tale aliquid; aliquando autem nihil tale praemittentes, ipsam Dei personam in se suscipiunt, sicuti est, intellectum tibi dabo, et constituam te in via qua ingredieris. Sic non solum in dictis, verum etiam in factis, Dei persona significanda imponitur prophetae, ut eam gerat in ministerio prophetiae; sicut eius personam gerebat qui vestimentum suum divisit in duodecim partes, et ex eis decem servo regis Salomonis dedit, regi futuro Israel; (Cf. 1 Kgs 11:30) aliquando etiam res quae non erat quod propheta, et erat iam in terrenis rebus, in huiusmodi significationem assumpta est; sicut somnio viso Iacob evigilans fecit de lapide, quem dormiens habebat ad caput; (Cf. Gen 28:11–18) aliquando ad hoc fit eadem species, vel aliquantum mansura, sicut potuit serpens ille aeneus exaltatus in heremo, sicut possunt et litterae; (Cf. Num 21:9) vel peracto ministerio transitura, sicut panis ad hoc factus in accipiendo sacramento consumitur.
Just as also, when men announce, sometimes they speak the words of God in their own person, as when it is premised, the Lord said; (See Isa 3:16) or, thus says the Lord; (See Jer 31:1–2) or some such thing; but sometimes, premising nothing of the kind, they take the very person of God upon themselves, as it is, I will give you understanding, and will establish you in the way by which you shall go. So not only in words, but also in deeds, the person of God to be signified is imposed upon the prophet, that he may bear it in the ministry of prophecy; as he bore his person who divided his garment into twelve parts, and of them gave ten to the servant of King Solomon, the future king of Israel; (See 1 Kgs 11:30) sometimes also a thing which was not what the prophet was, and already existed among earthly things, was assumed into a signification of this kind; as Jacob, waking from the dream he had seen, made of the stone which, sleeping, he had at his head; (See Gen 28:11–18) sometimes the same appearance is made for this, either to remain for a while, as could that bronze serpent lifted up in the desert, as can letters too; (See Num 21:9) or, the ministry being accomplished, to pass away, as the bread made for this is consumed in the receiving of the sacrament.
deTrin.3.10.1910. 20. Sed quia haec hominibus nota sunt, quia per homines fiunt, honorem tamquam religiosa possunt habere, stuporem tamquam mira non possunt. Itaque illa quae per Angelos fiunt, quo difficiliora et ignotiora, eo mirabiliora sunt nobis; illis autem tamquam suae actiones notae atque faciles.
10. 20. But because these things are known to men, since they are done through men, they can be held in honor as religious acts, yet they cannot cause astonishment as marvels. And so the things that are done through angels, the more difficult and unfamiliar they are, the more wonderful they are to us; whereas to the angels themselves they are familiar and easy, like their own actions.
deTrin.3.10.20Loquitur ex persona Dei angelus homini, dicens, ego sum Deus Abraham, et Deus Isaac, et Deus Iacob; cum Scriptura praedixisset, visus est ei angelus Domini; loquitur et homo ex persona Dei, PL: Domini. dicens, audi, populus meus, et loquar; Israel, et testificabor tibi; Deus Deus tuus ego sum. Assumpta est virga ad significationem, et in serpentem angelica facultate mutata est; (Cf. Exod 4:3, 7:10) quae facultas cum desit homini, assumptus est tamen et ab homine lapis ad talem aliquam significationem. (Cf. Gen 28:18) Inter factum angeli et factum hominis plurimum distat. Illud et mirandum et intelligendum est, hoc autem tantummodo intelligendum. Quod ex utroque intelligitur, fortassis unum est; at illa ex quibus intelligitur, diversa sunt; tamquam si nomen Domini et auro et atramento scribatur. Illud est pretiosius, illud vilius; quod tamen utroque significatur, idipsum est.
An angel speaks to a man in the person of God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, though Scripture had said beforehand, an angel of the Lord appeared to him. A man too speaks in the person of God, PL: of the Lord. saying, Hear, O my people, and I will speak; O Israel, and I will testify to you; I am God, your God. A rod was taken up for a signification, and changed into a serpent by angelic power; (See Exod 4:3, 7:10) and although a man lacks that power, nonetheless a stone too was taken up by a man for some such signification. (See Gen 28:18) Between the deed of an angel and the deed of a man there is the greatest difference. The one is both to be wondered at and to be understood, but the other is only to be understood. What is understood from each is perhaps one and the same, but the things from which it is understood are different—as if the name of the Lord were written both in gold and in ink. The one is more precious, the other cheaper; yet what is signified by both is one and the same.
deTrin.3.10.20Et quamvis idem significaverit ex virga Moysi serpens, quod lapis Iacob; melius tamen aliquid lapis Iacob, quam serpentes magorum. (Cf. Exod 4:3, 7:10; Gen 28:18)
And although the serpent from Moses's rod signified the same thing as Jacob's stone, nonetheless Jacob's stone signified something better than the serpents of the magicians. (See Exod 4:3, 7:10; Gen 28:18)
deTrin.3.10.20Nam sicut unctio lapidis Christum in carne, in qua unctus est oleo exsultationis prae participibus suis; ita virga Moysi conversa in serpentem, (Cf. Exod 4:3) ipsum Christum factum obedientem usque ad mortem crucis. Unde ait, sicut exaltavit Moyses serpentem in heremo; sic oportet exaltari Filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in ipsum, non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam; sicut intuentes illum serpentem exaltatum in heremo, serpentum morsibus non peribant. Vetus enim homo noster confixus est cruci cum illo, ut evacuaretur corpus peccati.
For just as the anointing of the stone signified Christ in the flesh, in which he was anointed with the oil of gladness above his fellows, so Moses's rod turned into a serpent (See Exod 4:3) signified that same Christ made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Hence he says, as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whoever believes in him may not perish but have eternal life; just as those who looked upon that serpent lifted up in the wilderness did not perish from the serpents' bites. For our old man was nailed to the cross with him, that the body of sin might be done away with.
deTrin.3.10.20Per serpentem enim intelligitur mors, quae facta est a serpente in paradiso, modo locutionis per efficientem id quod efficitur demonstrante. (Cf. Gen 3:1–15) Ergo virga in serpentem, Christus in mortem; et serpens rursus in virgam, Christus in resurrectionem totus cum corpore suo, quod est Ecclesia, quod in fine temporis erit, quem serpentis cauda significat, quam Moyses tenuit, ut rediret in virgam.
For by the serpent is understood death, which was brought about by the serpent in paradise, by that mode of expression which indicates the thing effected by means of what effects it. (See Gen 3:1–15) Therefore the rod into a serpent means Christ into death, and the serpent again into a rod means Christ into resurrection, the whole of him together with his body, which is the Church—which will come about at the end of time, signified by the serpent's tail, which Moses held so that it might return into a rod.
deTrin.3.10.20Serpentes autem magorum tamquam mortui saeculi, nisi credentes in Christum tamquam devorati in corpus eius intraverint, resurgere in illo non poterunt. (As Aaron’s serpent devoured those of the wizards: Exod 7:12) Lapis ergo Iacob, ut dixi, melius aliquid significavit quam serpentes magorum; (Cf. Gen 28:18; Exod 7:11–12) at enim factum magorum multo mirabilius. Verum haec ita non praeiudicant rebus intelligendis, tamquam si hominis nomen scribatur auro, et Dei atramento.
But the serpents of the magicians, like the dead of this world, will not be able to rise again in Christ unless, believing in Christ, they enter as though devoured into his body. (As Aaron’s serpent devoured those of the wizards: Exod 7:12) So Jacob's stone, as I have said, signified something better than the serpents of the magicians; (See Gen 28:18; Exod 7:11–12) and yet the deed of the magicians was far more wonderful. But these considerations do not prejudge the things to be understood, any more than if a man's name were written in gold and God's in ink.
deTrin.3.10.2010. 21. Illas etiam nubes et ignes quomodo fecerint vel assumpserint angeli ad significandum quod annuntiabant, etiam si Dominus vel Spiritus Sanctus illis corporalibus formis ostendebatur, quis novit hominum? Sicut “infantes” The newly baptized were known as infantes; they were not instructed in the mystery of the Eucharist until after they had taken part in their first Mass during the Easter vigil. non noverunt quod in altari ponitur et peracta pietatis celebratione consumitur, unde vel quomodo conficiatur, unde in usum religionis assumatur.
10. 21. As for those clouds and fires, how did the angels make or take them up to signify what they were announcing—even if it was the Lord or the Holy Spirit who was shown in those corporeal forms—what man knows? Just as the "infants" The newly baptized were known as infantes; they were not instructed in the mystery of the Eucharist until after they had taken part in their first Mass during the Easter vigil. do not know what is placed upon the altar and consumed when the celebration of the rite of piety is completed, nor from what or in what way it is prepared, nor from what it is taken up for the use of religion.
deTrin.3.10.21Et si numquam discant experimento vel suo vel aliorum, et numquam illam speciem rerum videant, nisi inter celebrationes sacramentorum cum offertur et datur, dicaturque illis auctoritate gravissima, cuius corpus et sanguis sit, nihil aliud credent, nisi omnino in illa specie Dominum oculis apparuisse mortalium, et de latere tali percusso, liquorem illum omnino fluxisse. (Cf. John 19:34)
And if they should never learn by experience, whether their own or others', and never see that form of things except amid the celebrations of the sacraments when it is offered and given, and should be told on the gravest authority whose body and blood it is, they will believe nothing other than that the Lord appeared in that very form to the eyes of mortals and that from his side, struck in such a way, that liquid actually flowed. (See John 19:34)
deTrin.3.10.21Mihi autem omnino utile est ut meminerim virium mearum, fratresque meos admoneam ut et ipsi meminerint suarum, ne ultra quam tutum est humana progrediatur infirmitas. Quemadmodum enim haec faciant angeli, vel potius Deus quemadmodum haec faciat per angelos suos, (Cf. Heb 2:2) et quantum fieri velit etiam per angelos malos, sive sinendo, sive iubendo, sive cogendo, ex occulta sede altissimi imperii sui; nec oculorum acie penetrare, nec fiducia rationis enucleare, nec provectu mentis comprehendere valeo, ut tam certus hinc loquar ad omnia quae requiri de his rebus possunt, quam si essem angelus, aut propheta, aut apostolus.
But it is altogether useful for me to remember my own limits and to warn my brothers that they too should remember theirs, lest human weakness advance further than is safe. For how the angels do these things, or rather how God does these things through his angels, (See Heb 2:2) and how much he wills to be done even through evil angels—whether by permitting, or commanding, or compelling, from the hidden seat of his most exalted rule—I am able neither to penetrate with the keenness of my eyes, nor to lay bare by confidence of reason, nor to grasp by any advance of the mind, so as to speak with such certainty about all that may be asked concerning these matters as I would if I were an angel, or a prophet, or an apostle.
deTrin.3.10.21Cogitationes enim mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Corpus enim quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem. Et difficile aestimamus quae in terra sunt, et quae in perspectu sunt, invenimus cum labore. Quae in caelis sunt autem, quis investigavit? PL: investigabit. Sed quia sequitur et dicit, sensum autem tuum quis sciet, nisi tu dederis sapientiam, et miseris Spiritum Sanctum tuum de altissimis? Quae in caelis sunt quidem, non investigamus, quo rerum genere et corpora angelica secundum propriam dignitatem, et eorum quaedam corporalis actio continetur; secundum Spiritum tamen Dei missum nobis de altissimis et impertitam eius gratiam mentibus nostris, audeo fiducialiter dicere, nec Deum Patrem, nec Verbum eius, nec Spiritum eius, quod Deus unus est, (Cf. Mark 12:29; Gal 3:20) per id quod est, atque idipsum est, ullo modo esse mutabilem, ac per hoc multo minus esse visibilem. Quoniam sunt quaedam quamvis mutabilia, non tamen visibilia, sicut nostrae cogitationes, et memoriae, et voluntates, et omnis incorporea creatura; visibile autem quidquam non est, quod non sit mutabile.
For the thoughts of mortals are timid, and our foresight uncertain. For the body that is corruptible weighs down the soul, and the earthly dwelling presses down the mind that thinks on many things. And with difficulty do we estimate the things that are on earth, and the things that are within our sight we find with toil. But the things that are in the heavens, who has searched them out? PL: will search them out. But because it goes on to say, and who shall know your mind, unless you have given wisdom and sent your Holy Spirit from on high? The things that are in the heavens we do not indeed search out—the kind of thing that includes angelic bodies according to their proper dignity, and a certain corporeal activity belonging to them; yet according to the Spirit of God sent to us from on high and his grace imparted to our minds, I dare to say with confidence that neither God the Father, nor his Word, nor his Spirit—since God is one (See Mark 12:29; Gal 3:20)—in respect of that which he is, and which is one and the same, is in any way changeable, and therefore much less is visible. For there are some things which, though changeable, are nonetheless not visible—such as our thoughts, memories, and acts of will, and every incorporeal creation; but nothing is visible that is not changeable.
deTrin.3.10.2111. 21. Quapropter substantia, vel, si melius dicitur, essentia Dei, ubi pro modulo nostro ex quantulacumque particula intelligimus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, quandoquidem nullo modo mutabilis est, nullo modo potest ipsa per semetipsam esse visibilis.
11. 21. Therefore the substance, or, if it is better so called, the essence of God, in which according to our small measure we understand from however small a portion the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, since it is in no way changeable, can in no way be visible in itself through itself.
deTrin.3.11.21C
deTrin.3.11.21
11. 22. Proinde illa omnia quae Patribus visa sunt, cum Deus illis secundum suam dispensationem temporibus congruam praesentaretur, per creaturam facta esse manifestum est.
11. 22. Accordingly, it is clear that all those things which appeared to the fathers, when God was presented to them according to his dispensation suited to the times, were done through a creation.
deTrin.3.11.22Et si nos latet quomodo ea ministris Angelis fecerit, per Angelos tamen esse facta, non ex nostro sensu dicimus, ne cuiquam videamur plus sapere praeter quam oportet sapere; PL omits praeter quam oportet sapere, “than we ought to claim.” sed sapimus ad temperantiam, sicut Deus nobis partitus est mensuram fidei, et credimus, propter quod et loquimur.
And even if it is hidden from us how he did these things through his angelic ministers, nonetheless that they were done through angels we say not on our own judgment, lest we should seem to anyone to be wise beyond what we ought to be wise; PL omits praeter quam oportet sapere, “than we ought to claim.” but we are wise unto soberness, as God has apportioned to us the measure of faith, and we believe, and therefore we speak.
deTrin.3.11.22Exstat enim auctoritas divinarum Scripturarum, unde mens nostra deviare non debet, nec relicto solidamento divini eloquii per suspicionum suarum abrupta praecipitari, ubi nec sensus corporis regit, nec perspicua ratio veritatis elucet.
For the authority of the divine Scriptures stands forth, from which our mind must not deviate, nor, abandoning the firm ground of the divine utterance, be cast headlong over the precipices of its own conjectures, where neither bodily sense governs nor the clear reason of truth shines out.
deTrin.3.11.22Apertissime quippe scriptum est in Epistola ad Hebraeos, cum dispensatio Novi Testamenti a dispensatione Veteris Testamenti secundum congruentiam saeculorum ac temporum distingueretur, non tantum illa visibilia, sed ipsum etiam sermonem per angelos factum. Sic enim dicit: ad quem autem angelorum dixit aliquando: ‘sede ad dexteram meam, quo usque ponam inimicos tuos scabellum pedum tuorum? Nonne omnes sunt ministri spiritus, ad ministrationem missi, propter eos qui futuri sunt haereditate possidere salutem’?
For it is written most plainly in the Letter to the Hebrews, when the dispensation of the New Testament was being distinguished from the dispensation of the Old Testament according to the fitness of the ages and times, that not only those visible things, but the very utterance itself, was made through angels. For it says thus: But to which of the angels did he ever say, 'Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet'? Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for the sake of those who are to obtain salvation as an inheritance?
deTrin.3.11.22Hinc ostendit illa omnia non solum per angelos facta, sed etiam propter nos facta, id est, propter populum Dei, cui promittitur haereditas vitae aeternae. (Cf. 1 Pet 3:22) Sicut ad Corinthios etiam scriptum est: omnia haec in figura contingebant illis; scripta sunt autem ad correptionem nostram, in quos finis saeculorum obvenit.
Hence he shows that all those things were done not only through angels but also for our sake—that is, for the sake of the people of God, to whom is promised the inheritance of eternal life. (See 1 Pet 3:22) So too it is written to the Corinthians: all these things happened to them in figure; but they were written for our admonition, upon whom the end of the ages has come.
deTrin.3.11.22Deinde quia tunc per angelos, nunc autem per Filium sermo factus est, consequenter aperteque demonstrans: propterea, inquit, abundantius oportet attendere nos ea quae audivimus, ne forte defluamus. Si enim qui per Angelos dictus est, sermo factus est firmus, et omnis praevaricatio et inobedientia iustam accepit mercedis retributionem, quomodo nos effugiemus, tantam neglegentes salutem?
Then, because the utterance was made at that time through angels, but now through the Son, he goes on to demonstrate it openly and plainly: therefore, he says, we ought to give more abundant heed to the things we have heard, lest perhaps we drift away. For if the utterance spoken through angels was made firm, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward, how shall we escape if we neglect so great a salvation?
deTrin.3.11.22Et quasi quaereres quam salutem, ut ostenderet se de Novo Testamento iam dicere, id est, sermone qui non per angelos, sed per Dominum factus est: ‘quae cum initium accepisset,’ inquit, ‘ut enarraretur per Dominum, ab his qui audierunt, in nos confirmata est, contestante Deo signis et portentis, et variis virtutibus, et Spiritus Sancti divisionibus secundum suam voluntatem.’
And as though you were asking which salvation, in order to show that he is now speaking of the New Testament—that is, of the utterance made not through angels but through the Lord—he says, which, having taken its beginning to be declared through the Lord, was confirmed unto us by those who heard him, while God bore witness with signs and wonders and various mighty works and distributions of the Holy Spirit according to his will.
deTrin.3.11.2211. 23. “Sed,” ait aliquis, “cur ergo scriptum est, dixit Dominus ad Moysen, et non potius, dixit angelus ad Moysen?” Quia cum verba iudicis praeco pronuntiat, non scribitur in gestis, “ille praeco dixit;” sed, “ille iudex.” Sic etiam loquente propheta sancto, etsi dicamus, “propheta dixit,” nihil aliud quam “Dominum dixisse” intelligi volumus. Et si dicamus, Dominus dixit, prophetam non subtrahimus, sed quis per eum dixerit admonemus. Et illa quidem Scriptura saepe aperit angelum esse Dominum, quo loquente identidem dicitur, Dominus dixit, sicut iam demonstravimus. Cf. On the Trinity 2.23.
11. 23. "But," someone says, "why then is it written, the Lord said to Moses, and not rather, the angel said to Moses?" Because when a herald announces the words of a judge, it is not recorded in the proceedings, "that herald said," but "that judge said." So too, when a holy prophet speaks, even if we say, "the prophet said," we wish nothing else to be understood than that "the Lord said it." And if we say, the Lord said, we do not remove the prophet, but we point out who spoke through him. And indeed that Scripture often makes plain that the angel is the Lord, when, as he speaks, it is repeatedly said, the Lord said, as we have already shown. See On the Trinity 2.23.
deTrin.3.11.22Sed propter eos, qui cum Scriptura illic angelum nominat, ipsum per se ipsum Filium Dei volunt intelligi, quia propter annuntiationem paternae ac suae voluntatis a propheta dictus est angelus; propterea volui ex hac epistola manifestius testimonium dare, ubi non dictum est, “per angelum;” sed per angelos.
But on account of those who, when Scripture there names an angel, wish the Son of God himself in his own person to be understood—because on account of the announcement of the Father's will and his own he was called an angel by the prophet—on that account I wished to give clearer testimony from this letter, where it is not said "through an angel," but through angels.
deTrin.3.11.2211. 24. Nam et Stephanus in Actibus Apostolorum eo more narrat haec, quo etiam in Libris (Cf. Gen 12:1; Exod 2:15, 3:1–6) Veteribus conscripta sunt: viri fratres et patres, audite, inquit: Deus gloriae apparuit Abrahae patri nostro, cum esset in Mesopotamia. Ne quis autem arbitraretur tunc Deum gloriae, per id quod in se ipso est, cuiusquam oculis apparuisse mortalium, in consequentibus dicit, quod Moysi angelus apparuerit. Fugit, inquit, Moyses in verbo isto, et factus est inquilinus in terra Madian, ubi genuit filios duos. Et completis illic quadraginta annis, apparuit illi in deserto montis Sina Angelus Domini in flamma ignis in rubo. Moyses autem videns, mirabatur visum. Qui cum accederet considerare, facta est vox Domini dicens: ‘ego sum Deus patrum tuorum, Deus Abraham, et Deus Isaac, et Deus Iacob.’ Tremefactus autem Moyses, non audebat considerare. Dixitque illi Dominus, ‘solve calceamentum pedum tuorum,’ (Cf. Exod 2:15, 3:7) etc. Hic certe et Angelum et Dominum dicit, eumdemque Deum Abraham, et Deum Isaac, et Deum Iacob, sicut in Genesi scriptum est. (Cf. Gen 12:1)
11. 24. For Stephen too, in the Acts of the Apostles, recounts these things in the same manner in which they were written in the ancient books: (See Gen 12:1; Exod 2:15, 3:1–6) Brethren and fathers, listen, he says: the God of glory appeared to our father Abraham when he was in Mesopotamia. But lest anyone should suppose that the God of glory then appeared, in respect of that which he is in himself, to the eyes of any mortal, in what follows he says that an angel appeared to Moses. Moses fled, he says, at this saying, and became a sojourner in the land of Midian, where he begot two sons. And when forty years were completed there, an angel of the Lord appeared to him in the desert of Mount Sinai in a flame of fire in a bush. And Moses, seeing it, marveled at the sight. And as he drew near to consider it, the voice of the Lord came, saying, 'I am the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.' And Moses, trembling, did not dare to look. And the Lord said to him, 'Loose the sandal from your feet,' (See Exod 2:15, 3:7) and so forth. Here certainly he says both "an angel" and "the Lord," and the same one "the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," as it is written in Genesis. (See Gen 12:1)
deTrin.3.11.2411. 25. An forte quisquam dicturus est quod Moysi per angelum apparuit Dominus, Abrahae vero per se ipsum? At hoc a Stephano non quaeramus; ipsum librum unde Stephanus ista narravit, interrogemus. Numquid enim quia scriptum est, et dixit Dominus Deus ad Abraham; et paulo post, et visus est Dominus Deus Abrahae; propterea ista non per Angelos facta sunt? Cum alio loco similiter dicat, visus est autem ei Deus ad ilicem Mambre, sedenti ad ostium tabernaculi sui meridie; et tamen consequenter adiungat, respiciens autem oculis suis vidit, et ecce tres viri stabant super eum; de quibus iam diximus. Cf. On the Trinity 2.10. Quomodo enim poterunt isti, qui vel a verbis ad intellectum nolunt assurgere, vel facile se ab intellectu in verba praecipitant, quomodo poterunt explicare visum esse Deum in viris tribus, nisi eos, sicut etiam consequentia docent, angelos fuisse fateantur? (Cf. Gen 18:1–2; 19:1) An quia non dictum est, “angelus ei locutus est,” vel, “apparuit;” propterea dicere audebunt, Moysi quidem illam visionem ac vocem per angelum factam, quia ita scriptum est; Abrahae autem, quia commemoratio angeli non est facta, per substantiam suam Deum apparuisse atque sonuisse?
11. 25. But perhaps someone will say that the Lord appeared to Moses through an angel, but to Abraham through himself? Yet let us not seek this from Stephen; let us question the very book from which Stephen recounted these things. For is it the case that, because it is written, and the Lord God said to Abraham, and a little later, and the Lord God appeared to Abraham, therefore these things were not done through angels? Since in another place it likewise says, and God appeared to him at the oak of Mamre, as he sat at the door of his tent at midday, and yet consistently adds, and lifting up his eyes he looked, and behold, three men stood near him—of whom we have already spoken. See On the Trinity 2.10. For how will those people be able—who either are unwilling to rise from the words to the understanding, or easily cast themselves headlong from the understanding back into the words—how will they be able to explain that God was seen in three men, unless they confess that these men, as the sequel also teaches, were angels? (See Gen 18:1–2; 19:1) Or will they dare to say, because it is not said "an angel spoke to him" or "appeared," that in Moses's case that vision and voice were made through an angel, since it is so written, but in Abraham's case, because no mention of an angel was made, God appeared and sounded forth through his own substance?
deTrin.3.11.25Quid quod nec apud Abraham de angelo tacitum est? Nam ita legitur, cum immolandus filius eius praeciperetur: et factum est post haec verba, tentavit Deus Abraham, et dixit ad eum: ‘Abraham, Abraham.’ Et ille dixit: ‘ecce ego.’ Et dixit ei: ‘accipe filium tuum dilectum, quem diligis, Isaac, et vade in terram excelsam, et offer eum ibi in holocaustum super unum montium quem tibi dixero.’ Certe hic Deus, non angelus, commemoratus est. Paulo post vero ita se habet Scriptura: extendens autem Abraham manum suam, sumpsit gladium, occidere filium suum. Et vocavit eum angelus Domini de caelo, et dixit ei: ‘Abraham, Abraham.’ Et dixit: ‘ecce ego.’ Et dixit: ‘ne iniicias manum tuam super puerum, neque facias ei quidquam.’
What of the fact that even in Abraham's case there was no silence about an angel? For it is read thus, when his son was commanded to be sacrificed: and it came to pass after these words that God tested Abraham, and said to him, 'Abraham, Abraham.' And he said, 'Here I am.' And he said to him, 'Take your beloved son, whom you love, Isaac, and go into the high land, and offer him there as a holocaust upon one of the mountains that I will tell you.' Here certainly God, not an angel, is mentioned. But a little later Scripture has it thus: and Abraham, stretching out his hand, took the sword to kill his son. And an angel of the Lord called him from heaven, and said to him, 'Abraham, Abraham.' And he said, 'Here I am.' And he said, 'Do not lay your hand upon the boy, nor do anything to him.'
deTrin.3.11.25Quid ad hoc respondetur? An dicturi sunt Deum iussisse ut occideretur Isaac, et Angelum prohibuisse; (Cf. Gen 22:2) porro ipsum patrem adversus Dei praeceptum, qui iusserat ut occideret, obtemperasse angelo ut parceret? Ridendus et abiiciendus hic sensus est. Sed neque huic tam crasso et abiecto ullum locum Scriptura esse permittit, continuo subiungens: nunc enim cognovi quia times Deum tu, et non pepercisti filio tuo dilecto propter me. Quid est, propter me; nisi propter eum qui occidi iusserat? Idem igitur Deus Abrahae qui angelus, an potius per angelum Deus? Accipe sequentia; certe iam hic angelus manifestissime expressus est. Attende tamen quid contexatur: respiciens Abraham oculis suis vidit, et ecce aries unus tenebatur in arbore sabech cornibus; et abiit Abraham, et accepit arietem, et obtulit eum holocaustum pro Isaac filio suo. Et cognominavit Abraham nomen loci illius, Dominus vidit, ut dicant hodie quod in monte Dominus visus est.
What is to be answered to this? Will they say that God commanded Isaac to be killed, and an angel forbade it, (See Gen 22:2) and further that the father himself, against the precept of God who had commanded him to kill, obeyed the angel so as to spare him? This sense is to be laughed at and cast aside. But Scripture does not allow even this so gross and abject a sense any place, immediately adding: for now I know that you fear God, and have not spared your beloved son for my sake. What is, for my sake, but for the sake of him who had commanded that the boy be killed? Therefore the same one is God to Abraham who is the angel—or rather, is it God through an angel? Take what follows; here certainly the angel is now most plainly expressed. Yet notice what is woven in: Abraham, lifting up his eyes, looked, and behold, a ram was caught by its horns in a thicket; and Abraham went and took the ram and offered it as a holocaust in place of Isaac his son. And Abraham gave that place the name, 'The Lord saw,' so that they say today, 'On the mountain the Lord was seen.'
deTrin.3.11.25Sicut paulo ante quod dixit Deus per angelum, nunc enim cognovi quia times Deum; non quia tunc Deus cognovisse intelligendus est, sed egisse ut per Deum ipse Abraham cognosceret quantas haberet vires cordis ad obediendum Deo usque ad immolationem unici filii; illo modo locutionis quo significatur per efficientem id quod efficitur, sicut dicitur frigus pigrum, quod pigros facit; ut ideo cognovisse diceretur, quia ipsum Abraham cognoscere fecerat, quem poterat latere fidei suae firmitas, nisi tali experimento probaretur. Ita et hic cognominavit Abraham nomen loci illius, Dominus vidit; id est, quod videri se fecit. Nam continuo secutus ait, ut dicant hodie quod in monte Dominus visus est.
Just as a little before, what God said through an angel, for now I know that you fear God—not that God is then to be understood as having come to know, but as having brought it about that through God Abraham himself might come to know how great were the powers of his heart for obeying God even to the immolation of his only son; by that mode of expression in which the thing effected is signified by means of what effects it, as the cold is called sluggish because it makes men sluggish—so that he was said to have come to know because he had made Abraham himself come to know, from whom the firmness of his own faith might have been hidden, had it not been proved by such a trial. So here too Abraham gave that place the name, 'The Lord saw'; that is, that he caused himself to be seen. For he immediately goes on to say, so that they say today, 'On the mountain the Lord was seen.'
deTrin.3.11.25Ecce idem angelus Dominus dicitur; quare, nisi quia per angelum Dominus? Iam vero in eo quod sequitur, prophetice omnino loquitur angelus, et prorsus aperit quod per angelum Deus loquatur. Et vocavit, inquit, angelus Domini Abraham iterum de caelo, dicens: ‘per me iuravi, dicit Dominus, pro eo quod fecisti hoc verbum, et non pepercisti filio tuo dilecto propter me,’ etc.
Behold, the same angel is called Lord; why, unless because the Lord was present through an angel? And now in what follows, the angel speaks altogether prophetically, and plainly discloses that God speaks through an angel. And, he says, the angel of the Lord called Abraham again from heaven, saying, 'By myself I have sworn, says the Lord, because you have done this thing, and have not spared your beloved son for my sake,' and so forth.
deTrin.3.11.25Haec certe verba, ut dicat ille per quem loquitur Dominus, haec dicit Dominus, etiam Prophetae solent habere. An Filius Dei de Patre ait, dicit Dominus, et ipse est ille Angelus Patris?
These words certainly—so that the one through whom the Lord speaks may say, thus says the Lord—the prophets too are accustomed to have. Or does the Son of God say of the Father, says the Lord, and is he himself that angel of the Father?
deTrin.3.11.25Quid ergo de illis tribus viris nonne respiciunt quomodo urgeantur, qui visi sunt Abrahae, cum praedictum esset, visus est ei Dominus? An quia viri dicti sunt, non erant angeli? Danielem legant dicentem, ecce vir Gabriel.
What then of those three men—do they not see how they are pressed, those men who appeared to Abraham when it had been foretold, the Lord appeared to him? Or, because they were called men, were they not angels? Let them read Daniel saying, behold, the man Gabriel.
deTrin.3.11.2511. 26. Sed quid ultra differimus ora eorum evidentissimo atque gravissimo alio documento oppilare, ubi non angelus singulariter, nec viri pluraliter, sed omnino angeli dicuntur, per quos sermo non quilibet factus, sed lex ipsa data manifestissime ostenditur, (Cf. Gal 3:21; Acts 7:38) quam certe nullus fidelium dubitat Deum dedisse Moysi ad subiugandum populum Israel, sed tamen per angelos datam?
11. 26. But why do we delay any longer to stop their mouths with another most evident and most weighty document, where neither angel in the singular, nor men in the plural, but plainly angels are spoken of, through whom not some utterance or other was made, but the Law itself is most plainly shown to have been given (See Gal 3:21; Acts 7:38)—the Law which certainly no believer doubts that God gave to Moses to subjugate the people of Israel, yet which was nonetheless given through angels?
deTrin.3.11.26Ita Stephanus loquitur: dura cervice, inquit, et non circumcisi corde et auribus, vos semper Spiritui Sancto restitistis, sicut et patres vestri. Quem Prophetarum non persecuti sunt patres vestri? Et occiderunt eos qui praenuntiabant de adventu Iusti, cuius nunc vos proditores et interfectores fuistis, qui accepistis legem in edictis Angelorum, nec custodistis.
Thus Stephen speaks: you stiff-necked people, he says, uncircumcised in heart and ears, you always resist the Holy Spirit, as your fathers did. Which of the prophets did your fathers not persecute? And they killed those who foretold the coming of the Just One, of whom you have now been the betrayers and murderers—you who received the Law by the edicts of angels, and have not kept it.
deTrin.3.11.26Quid hoc evidentius? Quid tanta auctoritate robustius? In edictis quidem angelorum lex illi populo data est; sed Domini Iesu Christi per eam disponebatur et praenuntiabatur adventus; et ipse tamquam Verbum Dei miro et ineffabili modo erat in angelis, in quorum edictis lex dabatur. (Cf. 1 Cor 1:8; 1 Thess 3:13; Sir 1:5; Rev 19:13) Unde dicit in Evangelio, si crederetis Moysi, crederetis et mihi; de me enim ille scripsit.
What is more evident than this? What is stronger by so great an authority? The Law was indeed given to that people by the edicts of angels; but through it the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ was being arranged and foretold; and he himself, as the Word of God, was in a wonderful and ineffable way present in the angels by whose edicts the Law was being given. (See 1 Cor 1:8; 1 Thess 3:13; Sir 1:5; Rev 19:13) Hence he says in the Gospel, if you believed Moses, you would believe me also; for he wrote of me.
deTrin.3.11.26Per angelos ergo tunc Dominus loquebatur, per angelos Filius Dei, Mediator Dei et hominum (Cf. Heb 2:2; Matt 14:33, 16:16; Mark 1:1, 3:1–2; Luke 1:35, 4:41) futurus ex semine Abrahae suum disponebat adventum, ut inveniret a quibus reciperetur, confitentes se reos, quos lex non impleta fecerat transgressores.
Through angels, therefore, the Lord then spoke; through angels the Son of God, the Mediator of God and men, (See Heb 2:2; Matt 14:33, 16:16; Mark 1:1, 3:1–2; Luke 1:35, 4:41) who would come from the seed of Abraham, was arranging his own coming, so that he might find those by whom he would be received, confessing themselves guilty—those whom the unfulfilled Law had made transgressors.
deTrin.3.11.26Unde et Apostolus ad Galatas dicit, quid ergo Lex? Transgressionis gratia proposita est, donec veniret semen cui promissum est, dispositum per angelos in manu Mediatoris; hoc est dispositum per angelos in manu sua. Non enim natus est per conditionem, sed per potestatem.
Hence the Apostle also says to the Galatians, what then is the Law? It was set forth for the sake of transgression, until the seed should come to whom the promise was made, ordained through angels in the hand of a Mediator; that is, ordained through angels in his own hand. For he was born not by a created condition, but by power.
deTrin.3.11.26Quod autem non aliquem ex angelis dicit Mediatorem, sed ipsum Dominum Iesum Christum, in quantum homo fieri dignatus est, habes alio loco: unus, inquit, Deus, et unus Mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus.
But that he calls not some one of the angels the Mediator, but the Lord Jesus Christ himself, insofar as he deigned to become man, you have in another place: one, he says, God, and one Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.
deTrin.3.11.26Hinc illud Pascha in interfectione agni; (Cf. Exod 12:3) hinc illa omnia quae de Christo venturo in carne (Cf. 1 John 4:2; Rom 8:3) atque passuro, sed et resurrecturo in lege figurantur, quae data est in edictis angelorum, (Cf. Acts 7:53) in quibus Angelis erat utique et Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus; et aliquando Pater, aliquando Filius, aliquando Spiritus Sanctus, aliquando sine ulla distinctione personae Deus per illos figurabatur, etsi visibilibus et sensibilibus formis apparens, per creaturam tamen suam, non per substantiam, cui videndae corda mundantur per haec omnia quae oculis videntur et auribus audiuntur. (This idea will be elaborated in Book 13)
Hence that Passover in the slaying of the lamb; (See Exod 12:3) hence all those things which are prefigured in the Law concerning Christ to come in the flesh (See 1 John 4:2; Rom 8:3) and to suffer, but also to rise again—the Law which was given by the edicts of angels, (See Acts 7:53) among which angels were certainly the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and sometimes the Father, sometimes the Son, sometimes the Holy Spirit, and sometimes, without any distinction of person, God was prefigured through them, though appearing in visible and sensible forms—yet through his creation, not through his substance—to behold whom hearts are cleansed by all these things that are seen with the eyes and heard with the ears. (This idea will be elaborated in Book 13)
deTrin.3.11.2611. 27. Sed iam satis, quantum existimo, pro captu nostro disputatum et demonstratum est, quod in hoc libro susceperamus ostendere; Cf. On the Trinity 4.21. constititque et probabilitate rationis quantum homo vel potius quantum ego potui, et firmitate auctoritatis quantum de Scripturis sanctis divina eloquia patuerunt, quod antiquis patribus nostris ante Incarnationem Salvatoris, cum Deus apparere dicebatur, voces illae ac species corporales per angelos factae sunt; sive ipsis loquentibus vel agentibus aliquid ex persona Dei, sicut etiam Prophetas solere ostendimus; sive assumentibus ex creatura quod ipsi non essent, ubi Deus figurate demonstraretur hominibus; quod genus significationum nec prophetas omisisse, multis exemplis docet Scriptura.
11. 27. But now enough, as I think, has been argued and demonstrated for our capacity of what we had undertaken to show in this book; See On the Trinity 4.21. and it has been established, both by the probability of reason, as far as man, or rather as far as I, was able, and by the firmness of authority, as far as the divine utterances lay open from the holy Scriptures, that for our ancient fathers, before the Incarnation of the Savior, when God was said to appear, those voices and corporeal forms were made through angels—whether the angels themselves spoke or did something in the person of God, as we have shown the prophets too are wont to do, or took up from a creation what they themselves were not, where God was figuratively shown to men; and Scripture teaches by many examples that the prophets did not omit this kind of signification either.
deTrin.3.11.27Superest igitur iam ut videamus, cum et nato per Virginem Domino, et corporali specie sicut columba descendente Spiritu Sancto, (Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; John 1:32) visisque igneis linguis sonitu facto de caelo die Pentecostes post ascensionem Domini, (Cf. Acts 2:1–4) non ipsum Dei Verbum per substantiam suam qua Patri aequale atque coaeternum est, nec Spiritus Patris et Filii per suam substantiam qua et ipse utrisque aequalis atque coaeternus est, sed utique creatura quae illis modis formari et existere potuit corporeis atque mortalibus sensibus apparuerit, quid inter illas demonstrationes et has proprietates Filii Dei et Spiritus Sancti, quamvis per creaturam visibilem factas, intersit; quod ab alio volumine commodius ordiemur.
It remains, then, that we should see—now that the Lord has been born of the Virgin, and the Holy Spirit has descended in bodily form like a dove, (Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; John 1:32) and the tongues of fire have been seen with a sound made from heaven on the day of Pentecost after the Lord's ascension (See Acts 2:1–4)—that it was not the Word of God himself, in respect of his substance by which he is equal and coeternal with the Father, nor the Spirit of the Father and the Son, in respect of his substance by which he too is equal and coeternal with both, but rather a creation, which could be formed and exist in those modes, that appeared to corporeal and mortal senses; and we should see what difference there is between those manifestations and these properties of the Son of God and of the Holy Spirit, though made through a visible creation—which we shall more suitably begin in another volume.
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CThose are better who set knowing themselves above the knowledge of earthly and heavenly things. The essence of God has nMeliores sunt qui scientiae terrestrium caelestiumque rerum praeponunt nosse semetipsos. Dei essentia nihil mutabile hab
1. 1. Scientiam terrestrium caelestiumque rerum Cf. Chrysippus, Fragments 35; Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 2.12.37; De Officiis 1.43.153; 2.2.5; Tusculanae Disputationes 4.26.57; 5.3.7; De Oratore 1.49.212. magni aestimare solet genus humanum. In quo profecto meliores sunt qui huic scientiae praeponunt nosse semetipsos; Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.16.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52; De Legibus 1.22.58–23.61. laudabiliorque est animus cui nota est vel infirmitas sua, quam qui ea non respecta, vias siderum scrutatur etiam cogniturus, aut qui iam cognitas tenet, ignorans ipse qua ingrediatur (Cf. Ps 32:8) ad salutem ac firmitatem suam.
1. 1. The human race is wont to set great store by the knowledge of earthly and heavenly things. See Chrysippus, Fragments 35; Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 2.12.37; De Officiis 1.43.153; 2.2.5; Tusculanae Disputationes 4.26.57; 5.3.7; De Oratore 1.49.212. In which matter assuredly those are better who set knowing themselves above this knowledge; See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.16.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52; De Legibus 1.22.58–23.61. and more praiseworthy is the mind to which even its own weakness is known, than the one which, with no regard for that, scrutinizes the courses of the stars—even though it will come to know them—or which already holds them known, while itself ignorant of the way by which it should enter (See Ps 32:8 (31:8)) upon its own salvation and stability.
deTrin.4.1.1Qui vero iam evigilavit in Deum, Spiritus Sancti calore excitatus; atque in eius amore coram se viluit; ad eumque intrare volens nec valens, eoque sibi lucente attendit in se, invenitque se, suamque aegritudinem illius munditiae contemperari non posse cognovit; flere dulce habet, cumque deprecari, ut etiam atque etiam misereatur, donec exuat totam miseriam, et precari cum fiducia, iam accepto gratuito pignore salutis, per eius unicum Salvatorem hominis et illuminatorem;
But one who has now awakened toward God, roused by the warmth of the Holy Spirit, and in his love has become cheap in his own sight; who, wishing to enter to him yet unable, and with God shining upon him attends to himself, and finds himself, and recognizes that his own sickness cannot be reconciled to that purity; finds it sweet to weep, and to beseech him to have mercy again and again until he puts off all his misery, and to pray with confidence, having now received the free pledge of salvation through his only Savior and Enlightener of man;
deTrin.4.1.1hunc ita egentem PL: agentem, “acting.” et dolentem scientia non inflat, quia caritas aedificat, praeposuit enim scientiam scientiae; praeposuit scire infirmitatem suam, magis quam scire mundi moenia Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.73., fundamenta terrarum, et fastigia caelorum; et hanc apponendo scientiam, apposuit dolorem, dolorem peregrinationis suae ex desiderio patriae suae, et conditoris eius beati Dei sui. (Cf. Heb 11:10–16)
such a man, thus needy PL: agentem, “acting.” and grieving, knowledge does not puff up, because love builds up; for he has set one knowledge above another—he has set knowing his own weakness above knowing the walls of the world Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.73., the foundations of the earth, and the heights of the heavens; and by adding this knowledge, he has added sorrow—the sorrow of his pilgrimage, from the longing for his homeland and for its founder, his blessed God. (See Heb 11:10–16)
deTrin.4.1.1In hoc genere hominum, in familia Christi tui, (Cf. Ps 84:10) Domine Deus meus, si inter pauperes tuos gemo, da mihi de pane tuo respondere hominibus qui non esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, sed satiati sunt et abundant. Satiavit autem illos phantasma eorum, non veritas tua, quam repellendo resiliunt, et in suam vanitatem cadunt. Ego certe sentio quam multa figmenta pariat cor humanum. Et quid est cor meum, nisi cor humanum?
Among this kind of men, in the family of your Christ, (See Ps 84:10 (83:11)) O Lord my God, if I groan among your poor, grant me from your bread to answer the men who do not hunger and thirst for righteousness, but are sated and abound. For their own phantasm has sated them, not your truth, which by rejecting it they recoil from, and fall into their own emptiness. I, for my part, perceive how many fictions the human heart brings forth. And what is my heart but a human heart?
deTrin.4.1.1Sed hoc oro Deum cordis mei, ut nihil ex eis figmentis pro solido vero eructuem in has litteras, sed inde veniat in eas quidquid per me venire potuerit, unde mihi, quamvis proiecto a facie oculorum suorum, et de longinquo (A reference to the prodigal son) redire conanti, per viam quam stravit humanitate divinitatis Unigeniti sui, aura veritatis eius aspergitur. Quam in tantum licet mutabilis haurio, in quantum in ea nihil mutabile video, nec locis et temporibus, sicut corpora; nec solis temporibus et quasi locis, sicut spirituum nostrorum cogitationes; Spirituum, “spirits,” is here a semi-technical term, meaning a kind of vaporous substance which fills the nervous system. nec solis temporibus, et nulla vel imagine locorum, sicut quaedam nostrarum mentium ratiocinationes.
But this I pray of the God of my heart, that I may belch forth none of those fictions into these writings as though it were solid truth, but that whatever can come through me into them may come from that source whence, although cast off from before his eyes and trying to return from far away, (A reference to the prodigal son) by the way which he has paved with the humanity of the divinity of his Only-begotten, the breath of his truth is sprinkled upon me. This breath, changeable though I am, I drink in just so far as I see nothing changeable in it—neither by places and times, as with bodies; nor by times alone and as it were by places, as with the thoughts of our spirits; Spirituum, “spirits,” is here a semi-technical term, meaning a kind of vaporous substance which fills the nervous system. nor by times alone and by no image of places, as with certain reasonings of our minds.
deTrin.4.1.1Omnino enim Dei essentia, qua est, nihil habet, mutabile nec in aeternitate, nec in veritate, nec in voluntate; quia aeterna ibi est veritas, aeterna caritas; et vera ibi est caritas, vera aeternitas; et cara ibi est aeternitas, cara veritas. Cf. Augustine, Confessions 7.10.16; The City of God 11.28.
For the essence of God, by which he is, has nothing changeable, neither in eternity, nor in truth, nor in will; because there truth is eternal, love eternal; and there love is true, eternity true; and there eternity is dear, and truth dear. See Augustine, Confessions 7.10.16; The City of God 11.28.
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1. 2. Sed quoniam exsulavimus ab incommutabili gaudio, nec tamen inde praecisi atque abrupti sumus, ut non etiam in istis mutabilibus et temporalibus aeternitatem, veritatem, beatitatem quaereremus (nec mori enim, nec falli, nec perturbari volumus); missa sunt nobis divinitus visa congrua peregrinationi nostrae (These are the various Old Testament manifestations which were discussed in books 2 and 3) quibus admoneremur non hic esse quod quaerimus, sed illuc ab ista esse redeundum, unde nisi penderemus, hic ea non quaereremus. (Cf. Heb 11:13–15)
1. 2. But since we have gone into exile from unchangeable joy, and yet have not been so cut off and broken away from it that we should not seek even in these changeable and temporal things eternity, truth, and blessedness (for we wish neither to die, nor to be deceived, nor to be troubled), there were sent to us divinely the visions suited to our pilgrimage (These are the various Old Testament manifestations which were discussed in books 2 and 3) by which we might be warned that what we seek is not here, but that we must return from this place to there—from which, did we not hang upon it, we would not seek these things here. (See Heb 11:13–15)
deTrin.4.1.2Ac primum nobis persuadendum fuit, quantum nos diligeret Deus, ne desperatione non auderemus erigi in eum. (Cf. John 3:16; 1 John 3:1; Jer 48:26) Quales autem dilexerit, ostendi oportebat, ne tamquam de meritis nostris superbientes, magis ab eo resiliremus et in nostra fortitudine magis deficeremus; ac per hoc egit nobiscum, ut per eius fortitudinem potius proficeremus, atque ita in infirmitate humilitatis perficeretur virtus caritatis.
And first we had to be persuaded how much God loved us, lest out of despair we should not dare to be lifted up to him. (See John 3:16; 1 John 3:1; Jer 48:26) But it had to be shown what we were like when he loved us, lest, being proud as though over our own merits, we should recoil from him all the more and fail all the more in our own strength; and through this he dealt with us so that we might rather make progress through his strength, and so the power of love might be perfected in the weakness of humility.
deTrin.4.1.2Hoc significat in Psalmo, ubi ait: pluviam voluntariam segregans, Deus, haereditati tuae, et infirmata est; tu vero perfecisti eam. Pluviam quippe voluntariam nonnisi gratiam vult intellegi, non meritis redditam, sed gratis datam, unde et gratia nominatur; dedit enim eam, non quia digni eramus, sed quia voluit. Hoc cognoscentes, non fidentes in nobis erimus; et hoc est infirmari.
This he signifies in the Psalm, where he says: setting apart a voluntary rain, O God, for your inheritance, and it was weakened; but you made it perfect. By a voluntary rain he wishes nothing else to be understood than grace, not rendered for merits but given freely, whence it is also named grace; for he gave it, not because we were worthy, but because he willed it. Recognizing this, we will not be trusting in ourselves; and this is to be weakened.
deTrin.4.1.2Ipse vero perficit nos, qui etiam Paulo apostolo dixit: sufficit tibi gratia mea; nam virtus in infirmitate perficitur. Persuadendum ergo erat homini quantum nos dilexerit Deus, et quales dilexerit: quantum, ne desperaremus; quales, ne superbiremus.
But he himself perfects us, who also said to the apostle Paul: my grace is sufficient for you; for power is made perfect in weakness. Therefore man had to be persuaded how much God loved us, and what we were like when he loved us: how much, that we might not despair; what we were like, that we might not be proud.
deTrin.4.1.2Hunc locum Apostolus pernecessarium sic explicat: Commendat autem, inquit, suam caritatem Deus in nobis, quoniam cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est; multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius, salvi erimus ab ira per ipsum. Si enim cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius; multo magis reconciliati salvi erimus in vita ipsius. Item alio loco: quid ergo, inquit, dicemus ad haec? Si Deus pro nobis, quis contra nos? Qui proprio Filio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum, quomodo non et cum illo nobis omnia donavit? Quod autem factum nobis annuntiatur, hoc futurum ostendebatur et antiquis iustis, ut per eamdem fidem etiam ipsi humiliati infirmarentur, et infirmati perficerentur.
The Apostle explains this most necessary point thus: but God, he says, commends his love toward us, in that, while we were still sinners, Christ died for us; much more then, being now justified by his blood, shall we be saved from wrath through him. For if, while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by his life. Likewise in another place: what then, he says, shall we say to these things? If God is for us, who is against us? He who did not spare his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how has he not also with him given us all things? But what is announced to us as already done was shown to be future also to the righteous men of old, so that through the same faith they too, being humbled, might be made weak, and being made weak, might be made perfect.
deTrin.4.1.21. 3. Quia igitur unum Verbum Dei est, per quod facta sunt omnia, quod est incommutabilis veritas, ubi PL: ibi, “in it.” principaliter atque incommutabiliter sunt omnia simul; non solum quae nunc sunt in hac universa creatura, verum etiam quae “fuerunt” et quae “futura sunt.” Ibi autem nec fuerunt, nec futura sunt, sed tantummodo sunt; et omnia vita sunt, et omnia unum sunt, et magis “unum” est et una est vita. Sic enim omnia per ipsum facta sunt, ut quidquid factum est in his, in illo vita sit; et facta non sit, quia in principio non factum est Verbum, sed erat Verbum, et Verbum erat The PL, along with several manuscripts, omit et Verbum erat—a simple case of haplography. apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum, et omnia per ipsum facta sunt; nec per ipsum omnia facta essent, nisi ipsum esset ante omnia, factumque non esset.
1. 3. Since, therefore, there is one Word of God, through whom all things were made, which is unchangeable truth, where PL: ibi, “in it.” all things are principally and unchangeably together at once—not only those that now are in this whole creation, but also those that "have been" and those that "are to be." But there they have neither been nor are to be, but only are; and all things are life, and all things are one, and rather is it "one," and is one life. For all things were made through him in such a way that whatever was made in these things was life in him; and it was not made, because in the beginning the Word was not made, but the Word was, and the Word was The PL, along with several manuscripts, omit et Verbum erat—a simple case of haplography. with God, and the Word was God, and all things were made through him; nor would all things have been made through him, unless he himself were before all things and were not made.
deTrin.4.1.3In his autem quae per ipsum facta sunt, etiam corpus quod vita non est, per ipsum non fieret, nisi in illo, antequam fieret, vita esset. Quod enim factum est, iam in illo vita erat, et non qualiscumque vita. Nam et anima vita est corporis, sed et haec facta est, quia mutabilis est; et per quid facta est, nisi per Dei Verbum incommutabile? Omnia enim per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod ergo factum est, iam in illo vita erat, et non qualiscumque vita, sed vita erat lux hominum, lux utique rationalium mentium, per quas homines a pecoribus differunt, et ideo sunt homines. Cf. Varro, Antiquitates, quoted in Augustine, The City of God 7.23. Non ergo lux corporea, quae lux est carnium, sive de caelo fulgeat, sive terrenis ignibus accendatur, nec humanarum tantum carnium, sed etiam belluinarum Cf. Sallust, The War with Catiline 1.2. et usque ad minutissimos quosque vermiculos; omnia enim haec vident istam lucem. At illa vita lux hominum erat, nec longe posita ab unoquoque nostrum, in illa enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus.
But among the things that were made through him, even a body, which is not life, would not be made through him unless in him, before it was made, it were life. For what was made was already life in him, and not just any sort of life. For the soul too is the life of the body, but this also was made, because it is changeable; and through what was it made, except through the unchangeable Word of God? For all things were made through him, and without him was made nothing. What therefore was made was already life in him, and not just any sort of life, but the life was the light of men—the light, that is, of rational minds, by which men differ from beasts, and on that account are men. See Varro, Antiquitates, quoted in Augustine, The City of God 7.23. Not, then, corporeal light, which is the light of flesh, whether it shine from heaven or be kindled by earthly fires—and not only of human flesh, but also of the beasts' See Sallust, The War with Catiline 1.2. flesh, and down to the tiniest little worms; for all these see that light. But that life was the light of men, and not placed far from each one of us, for in it we live and move and have our being.
deTrin.4.1.32. 4. Sed lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. Tenebrae autem sunt stultae mentes hominum, prava cupiditate atque infidelitate caecatae.
2. 4. But the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it. Now the darkness is the foolish minds of men, blinded by depraved desire and unbelief.
deTrin.4.2.4Has ut curaret atque sanaret Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis. Illuminatio quippe nostra participatio Verbi est, illius scilicet vitae quae lux est hominum. Huic autem participationi prorsus inhabiles, et minus idonei eramus, propter immunditiam peccatorum. Mundandi ergo eramus. Porro iniquorum et superborum una mundatio est sanguis iusti, et humilitas Dei; ut ad contemplandum Deum quod natura non sumus, per eum mundaremur factum quod natura sumus, et quod peccato non sumus. Deus enim natura non sumus; homines natura sumus, iusti peccato non sumus. Deus itaque factus homo iustus, intercessit Deo pro homine peccatore. Non enim congruit peccator iusto, sed congruit homini homo. Adiungens ergo nobis similitudinem humanitatis suae, abstulit dissimilitudinem iniquitatis nostrae, et factus particeps mortalitatis nostrae, fecit participes divinitatis suae. Cf. 2 Pet 1:4; Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms 52.6. Merito quippe mors peccatoris veniens ex damnationis necessitate, soluta est per mortem iusti venientem ex misericordiae voluntate, dum simplum eius congruit duplo nostro.
That he might cure and heal these, the Word, through whom all things were made, was made flesh and dwelt among us. For our enlightenment is a participation in the Word, that is, in that life which is the light of men. But for this participation we were altogether unfit and insufficiently suited, because of the uncleanness of our sins. Therefore we had to be cleansed. Now there is one cleansing for the wicked and the proud: the blood of the Just One, and the humility of God; so that, to contemplate God, which by nature we are not, we might be cleansed through him who was made what by nature we are, and what by sin we are not. For by nature we are not God; by nature we are men, by sin we are not righteous. And so God, made a righteous man, interceded with God for sinful man. For a sinner is not in keeping with a righteous one, but a man is in keeping with a man. Joining to us, then, the likeness of his humanity, he took away the unlikeness of our iniquity, and made a partaker of our mortality, he made us partakers of his divinity. See 2 Pet 1:4; Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms 52.6. Rightly indeed the death of the sinner, coming from the necessity of condemnation, was loosed by the death of the Just One, coming from the will of mercy, while his single matches our double.
deTrin.4.2.4Haec enim congruentia, sive convenientia, vel concinentia, vel consonantia, vel si quid commodius dicitur, quod unum est ad duo, in omni compaginatione; vel, si melius dicitur, coaptatione Cf. The City of God, 22.24.4. creaturae, valet plurimum. Hanc enim coaptationem, sicut mihi nunc occurrit, dicere volui, quam Graeci ἁρμονία vocant. The primary meaning of the Greek word is not musical, as with the English word “harmony”; rather, its primary meaning is a joint, fastener, or clamp—a carpenter’s or shipwright’s word. Neque nunc locus est, ut ostendam quantum valeat consonantia simpli ad duplum, quae maxima in nobis reperitur, et sic nobis insita naturaliter (a quo utique, nisi ab eo qui nos creavit?), ut nec imperiti possint eam non sentire, sive ipsi cantantes, sive alios audientes. Per hanc quippe voces acutiores gravioresque concordant, ita ut quisquis ab ea dissonuerit, non scientiam, cuius expertes sunt plurimi, sed ipsum sensum auditus nostri vehementer offendat. Sed hoc ut demonstretur, longo sermone opus est; ipsis autem auribus exhiberi potest ab eo qui novit in regulari monochordo.
For this congruence, or fitting, or concord, or consonance, or whatever may be more suitably called the relation of one to two, has the greatest force in every joining—or, if it is better so called, in the fitting together See The City of God 22.24.4. of a creation. For I wished to call it this fitting together, as it now occurs to me, which the Greeks call ἁρμονία. The primary meaning of the Greek word is not musical, as with the English word “harmony”; rather, its primary meaning is a joint, fastener, or clamp—a carpenter’s or shipwright’s word. Nor is this now the place to show how much the consonance of the single to the double avails, which is found greatest in us, and is so naturally implanted in us (by whom, indeed, but by him who created us?) that even the untrained cannot fail to perceive it, whether singing themselves or hearing others. For through it the higher and lower notes are in concord, so that whoever sounds out of tune with it gravely offends, not knowledge, of which very many are without, but the very sense of our hearing. But to demonstrate this requires a long discourse; it can, however, be presented to the ears themselves by one who knows how, on a single regulated monochord.
deTrin.4.2.43. 5. Verum quod instat in praesentia, quantum donat Deus, edisserendum est quemadmodum simplum Domini et Salvatoris nostri Iesu Christi duplo nostro congruat, et quodam modo concinat ad salutem. Nos certe, quod nemo Christianus ambigit, et anima et corpore mortui sumus, anima propter peccatum; corpore, propter poenam peccati, ac per hoc et corpore propter peccatum. (Cf. Eph 2:1–5; 1 Pet 2:24) Utrique autem rei nostrae, id est, et animae et corpori, medicina et resurrectione opus erat, ut in melius renovaretur quod erat in deterius commutatum.
3. 5. But what presses upon us at present, so far as God grants, is to set forth how the single of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ corresponds to our double, and in a certain way chimes with it unto salvation. We certainly—as no Christian doubts—are dead both in soul and in body: in soul because of sin, in body because of the punishment of sin, and through this also in body because of sin. (See Eph 2:1–5; 1 Pet 2:24) But each of these things of ours, that is, both soul and body, had need of healing and of resurrection, so that what had been changed for the worse might be renewed for the better.
deTrin.4.3.5Mors autem animae impietas est, et mors corporis, corruptibilitas, per quam fit et animae a corpore abscessus. Sicut enim anima Deo deserente, sic corpus anima deserente moritur. Unde illa fit insipiens; hoc, exanime. Resuscitatur ergo anima per poenitentiam, et in corpore adhuc mortali renovatio vitae inchoatur a fide, qua creditur in eum qui iustificat impium, bonisque moribus augetur et roboratur de die in diem, cum magis magisque renovatur interior homo.
Now the death of the soul is ungodliness, and the death of the body is corruptibility, through which there comes also the soul's departure from the body. For just as the soul dies when God forsakes it, so the body dies when the soul forsakes it. Whence the one becomes foolish, the other lifeless. The soul, then, is raised again through repentance, and in the body, still mortal, the renewal of life is begun by faith, by which one believes in him who justifies the ungodly, and it is increased and strengthened by good conduct from day to day, as more and more the inner man is renewed.
deTrin.4.3.5Corpus vero tamquam homo exterior quanto est haec vita diuturnior, magis magisque corrumpitur, vel aetate, vel morbo vel variis afflictationibus, donec veniat ad ultimam quae ab omnibus mors vocatur. Eius autem resurrectio differtur in finem cum et ipsa iustificatio nostra perficietur ineffabiliter. (Cf. Rom 4:25) Tunc enim similes ei erimus quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. Nunc vero quamdiu corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam, et: vita humana super terram tota temptatio est, non iustificatur in conspectu eius omnis vivens in comparatione iustitiae qua aequabimur angelis et gloriae quae revelabitur in nobis.
But the body, as the outer man, the longer this life lasts, is more and more corrupted, whether by age, or by disease, or by various afflictions, until it comes to that last one which by all is called death. But its resurrection is deferred to the end, when our justification too will be perfected in an ineffable way. (See Rom 4:25) For then we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is. But now, as long as the body that is corruptible weighs down the soul, and: human life upon earth is wholly a trial, nor is any living man justified in his sight—in comparison with that righteousness by which we shall be made equal to the angels, and with that glory which shall be revealed in us.
deTrin.4.3.5De morte autem animae a morte corporis distinguenda, quid plura documenta commemorem; cum Dominus in una sententia Evangelica utramque mortem cuivis facile discernendam posuerit, ubi ait: sine mortuos sepelire mortuos suos? Sepeliendum quippe corpus mortuum erat; sepultores autem eius per infidelitatem impietatis PL: infidelitatis impietatem, “unbelieving godlessness.” in anima mortuos intellegi voluit; quales excitantur cum dicitur, surge, qui dormis, et exsurge a mortuis, et illuminabit te Christus. Detestatur autem quamdam mortem Apostolus, dicens de vidua, quae autem in deliciis agit, vivens mortua est. Anima igitur iam pia, quae fuit impia, propter iustitiam fidei dicitur ex morte revixisse atque vivere.
But as for distinguishing the death of the soul from the death of the body, why should I recall further proofs, when the Lord, in a single sentence of the Gospel, has set both deaths so that anyone may easily discern them, where he says: let the dead bury their dead? For the dead body was to be buried; but its buriers, through the unbelief of ungodliness, PL: infidelitatis impietatem, “unbelieving godlessness.” he wished to be understood as dead in soul—the kind who are roused when it is said, rise, you who sleep, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall enlighten you. But the Apostle detests a certain kind of death, saying of the widow, but she who lives in pleasures is dead while living. Therefore the soul that is now godly, which had been ungodly, is said, because of the righteousness of faith, to have come back to life from death and to live.
deTrin.4.3.5Corpus autem non tantum moriturum propter animae abscessum qui futurus est, sed propter tantam infirmitatem carnis et sanguinis, quodam loco in Scripturis etiam mortuum dicitur, loquente Apostolo, corpus quidem, inquit, mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem vita est propter iustitiam. Haec vita ex fide facta est, quoniam iustus ex fide vivit. (Cf. Heb 2:4, 10:38; Gal 3:11) Sed quid sequitur? Si autem Spiritus eius qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis, habitat in vobis, qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem Spiritum eius in vobis.
But the body, as destined to die not only because of the soul's departure that is to come, but because of the great weakness of flesh and blood, is in a certain place in the Scriptures even called dead, when the Apostle says, the body indeed, he says, is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness. This life is brought about by faith, since the righteous lives by faith. (See Heb 2:4, 10:38; Gal 3:11) But what follows? And if the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will give life also to your mortal bodies through his Spirit dwelling in you.
deTrin.4.3.53. 6. Huic ergo duplae morti nostrae Salvator noster impendit simplam suam, et ad faciendam utramque resuscitationem nostram, in sacramento et exemplo praeposuit et proposuit unam suam. Neque enim fuit peccator aut impius, ut ei tamquam spiritu mortuo in interiore homine renovari opus esset, (Cf. 2 Cor 4:16) et tamquam resipiscendo ad vitam iustitiae revocari; sed indutus carne mortali, et sola moriens, sola resurgens; ea sola nobis ad utrumque concinuit, cum in ea fieret interioris hominis sacramentum, exterioris exemplum.
3. 6. For this twofold death of ours, then, our Savior laid out his single one, and to bring about both our raisings, he set before us in sacrament and example his single one. For he was neither a sinner nor ungodly, that he should have need to be renewed in the inner man as though dead in spirit, (See 2 Cor 4:16) and as though by repenting to be recalled to the life of righteousness; but clothed in mortal flesh, and dying in that alone, rising again in that alone, in that alone he chimed with us for both, since in it there was made the sacrament of the inner man and the example of the outer.
deTrin.4.3.6Interioris enim hominis nostri sacramento data est illa vox, pertinens ad mortem animae nostrae significandam, non solum in Psalmo, verum etiam in cruce: Deus meus, Deus meus, ut quid me dereliquisti? Cui voci congruit Apostolus dicens, scientes quia vetus homo noster simul crucifixus est, ut evacuetur corpus peccati, ut ultra non serviamus peccato. Crucifixio quippe interioris hominis poenitentiae dolores intelleguntur, et continentiae quidam salubris cruciatus, per quam mortem mors impietatis perimitur, in qua nos non relinquit Deus.
For to the sacrament of our inner man was given that cry which pertains to signifying the death of our soul, not only in the Psalm but also on the cross: my God, my God, why have you forsaken me? With this cry the Apostle agrees, saying, knowing that our old man was crucified together with him, that the body of sin might be done away with, that we may no longer be slaves to sin. For by the crucifixion of the inner man are understood the pains of repentance, and a certain healthful torment of continence, by which death the death of ungodliness is destroyed, in which death God does not forsake us.
deTrin.4.3.6Et ideo per talem crucem evacuatur corpus peccati, ut iam non exhibeamus membra nostra arma iniquitatis peccato. Quia et interior homo si utique renovatur de die in diem, profecto vetus est antequam renovetur. Intus namque agitur quod idem Apostolus dicit, exuite vos veterem hominem, et induite novum. Quod ita consequenter exponit: quapropter deponentes mendacium, loquimini veritatem. Ubi autem deponitur mendacium, nisi intus, ut inhabitet in monte sancto Dei, qui loquitur veritatem in corde suo?
And therefore through such a cross the body of sin is done away with, so that we may no longer present our members as weapons of iniquity for sin. For the inner man too, if indeed he is renewed from day to day, is assuredly old before he is renewed. For within is done what the same Apostle says, put off the old man, and put on the new. Which he goes on to expound thus: wherefore, putting away falsehood, speak the truth. But where is falsehood put away, if not within, that he who speaks truth in his heart may dwell in God's holy mountain?
deTrin.4.3.6Resurrectio vero corporis Domini ad sacramentum interioris resurrectionis nostrae pertinere ostenditur, ubi postquam resurrexit, ait mulieri, noli me tangere, nondum enim ascendi ad Patrem meum. Cui mysterio congruit Apostolus dicens, si autem resurrexistis cum Christo, quae sursum sunt quaerite, ubi Christus est ad dexteram Dei sedens; quae sursum sunt sapite. Hoc est enim Christum non tangere, nisi cum ascenderit ad Patrem, non de Christo sapere carnaliter. (Cf. 2 Cor 1:12)
But the resurrection of the Lord's body is shown to pertain to the sacrament of our inner resurrection, where, after he had risen, he says to the woman, do not touch me, for I have not yet ascended to my Father. With this mystery the Apostle agrees, saying, but if you have risen with Christ, seek the things that are above, where Christ is, seated at the right hand of God; mind the things that are above. For this is not to touch Christ until he has ascended to the Father: not to be wise about Christ in a carnal way. (See 2 Cor 1:12)
deTrin.4.3.6Iam vero ad exemplum mortis exterioris hominis (Cf. 2 Cor 4:16) nostri Dominicae carnis mors pertinet, quia per talem passionem maxime hortatus est servos suos, ut non timeant eos qui corpus occidunt, animam autem non possunt occidere. Propter quod dicit Apostolus, ut suppleam quae desunt pressurarum Christi in carne mea. Et ad exemplum resurrectionis exterioris hominis nostri pertinere invenitur resurrectio corporis Domini, quia discipulis ait, palpate, et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Et unus ex discipulis etiam cicatrices eius contrectans, exclamavit dicens, Dominus meus, et Deus meus! Et cum illius carnis tota integritas appareret, demonstratum est in ea quod suos exhortans dixerat, capillus capitis vestri non peribit.
But now to the example of the death of our outer man (See 2 Cor 4:16) pertains the death of the Lord's flesh, because by such a passion he especially exhorted his servants not to fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. On account of which the Apostle says, that I may supply what is lacking of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh. And the resurrection of the Lord's body is found to pertain to the example of the resurrection of our outer man, because he says to the disciples, handle me and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones, as you see that I have. And one of the disciples, even touching his scars, cried out, saying, my Lord and my God! And since the whole integrity of that flesh appeared, there was demonstrated in it what he had said in exhorting his own, a hair of your head shall not perish.
deTrin.4.3.6Unde enim primo, noli me tangere, nondum enim ascendi ad Patrem meum, et unde antequam ascendat ad Patrem a discipulis tangitur, nisi quia illic insinuabatur interioris hominis sacramentum, hic praebebatur exterioris exemplum? An forte quisquam ita est absurdus atque aversus a vero, ut audeat dicere a viris eum tactum antequam ascenderet, a mulieribus autem, cum ascendisset? (Cf. John 20:17–27) Propter hoc exemplum futurae nostrae resurrectionis in corpore, quod praecessit in Domino, dicit Apostolus, initium Christus, deinde qui sunt Christi. De corporis enim resurrectione illo loco agebatur, propter quam etiam dicit, transfigurabit Several manuscripts here read transfigurabit, which the translation also follows. The PL has transfiguravit, “has transfigured.” But the whole sense of the passage shows that Augustine’s text of the epistle correctly rendered Paul’s future. The transcriptional error of writing -avit for -abit and vice versa is so common and so easy, that cases like this should be judged simply on the merits of the sense. corpus humilitatis nostrae conforme corpori gloriae suae.
For why at first, do not touch me, for I have not yet ascended to my Father, and why, before he ascends to the Father, is he touched by the disciples, unless because there the sacrament of the inner man was being intimated, and here the example of the outer was being offered? Or is anyone perhaps so absurd and so averse from the truth as to dare to say that he was touched by men before he ascended, but by women after he had ascended? (See John 20:17–27) On account of this example of our future resurrection in the body, which went before in the Lord, the Apostle says, Christ the beginning, then those who are Christ's. For in that passage he was treating of the resurrection of the body, on account of which he also says, he will transfigure Several manuscripts here read transfigurabit, which the translation also follows. The PL has transfiguravit, “has transfigured.” But the whole sense of the passage shows that Augustine’s text of the epistle correctly rendered Paul’s future. The transcriptional error of writing -avit for -abit and vice versa is so common and so easy, that cases like this should be judged simply on the merits of the sense. the body of our humility, conformed to the body of his glory.
deTrin.4.3.6Una ergo mors nostri salvatoris duabus mortibus nostris saluti fuit. Et una eius resurrectio duas nobis resurrectiones praestitit, cum corpus eius in utraque re, id est, et in morte et in resurrectione, et in sacramento interioris hominis nostri, et exemplo exterioris, medicinali quadam convenientia ministratum est.
Therefore the one death of our Savior was for the salvation of our two deaths. And his one resurrection bestowed on us two resurrections, since his body, in each matter—that is, both in death and in resurrection—was ministered, by a certain medicinal fittingness, both to the sacrament of our inner man and to the example of the outer.
deTrin.4.3.6C
deTrin.4.3.6
4. 7. Haec autem ratio simpli ad duplum oritur quidem a ternario numero; unum quippe ad duo, tria sunt. Sed hoc totum quod dixi, ad senarium pervenit; unum enim et duo et tria sex fiunt. Qui numerus propterea perfectus dicitur quia partibus suis completur; habet enim eas tres, sextam, tertiam, dimidiam; nec nulla pars alia, quae dici possit quota sit, invenitur in eo. Sexta ergo eius unum est; tertia, duo; dimidia, tria. Unum autem et duo et tria consummant eundem senarium. Cuius perfectionem nobis sancta Scriptura commendat, in eo maxime quod Deus sex diebus perfecit opera sua, (Cf. Gen 1:1–31; 2:1–2; Exod 20:11–31) et sexto die factus est homo ad imaginem Dei. (Cf. Gen 9:6, 5:1; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) Et sexta aetate generis humani, Filius Dei venit et factus est Filius hominis, ut nos reformaret ad imaginem Dei. (Cf. Gen 1:27) Ea quippe nunc aetas agitur, sive milleni anni singulis distribuantur aetatibus, sive in divinis Litteris memorabiles atque insignes quasi articulos temporum vestigemus, ut prima aetas inveniatur ab Adam usque ad Noe, inde secunda usque ad Abraham, et deinceps, sicut Mthaeus Evangelista distinxit, ab Abraham usque ad David, a David usque ad transmigrationem in Babyloniam, (Cf. Matt 1:17) atque inde usque ad Virginis partum. Quae tres aetates coniunctae illis duabus, quinque faciunt. Proinde sextam inchoavit nativitas Domini, quae nunc agitur usque ad occultum temporis finem.
4. 7. Now this ratio of the single to the double arises indeed from the number three; for one to two is three. But all this that I have said reaches as far as six; for one and two and three make six. This number is called perfect for the reason that it is completed by its own parts; for it has three of them—a sixth, a third, a half—and no other part can be found in it that could be said to be a fraction of it. Its sixth, then, is one; its third, two; its half, three. But one and two and three add up to that same six. Its perfection holy Scripture commends to us, especially in this, that God in six days perfected his works, (See Gen 1:1–31; 2:1–2; Exod 20:11–31) and on the sixth day man was made to the image of God. (See Gen 9:6, 5:1; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) And in the sixth age of the human race, the Son of God came and was made the Son of man, that he might reform us to the image of God. (See Gen 1:27) For it is this age that is now in course, whether we distribute a thousand years to each age, or trace in the divine writings memorable and notable points of the times as it were as joints, so that the first age is found from Adam to Noah, then the second to Abraham, and thereafter, as the Evangelist Matthew distinguished, from Abraham to David, from David to the deportation to Babylon, (See Matt 1:17) and from there to the Virgin's childbearing. These three ages, joined to those two, make five. Accordingly the birth of the Lord began the sixth, which is now in course until the hidden end of time.
deTrin.4.4.7Hunc senarium numerum quamdam temporis gerere figuram, etiam in illa ratione tripartitae distributionis agnoscimus, qua unum tempus computamus ante Legem; alterum, sub Lege; tertium, sub gratia. (Cf. Rom 5:13, 6:14) In quo tempore sacramentum renovationis accipimus; ut in fine temporis etiam resurrectione carnis omni ex parte renovati, ab universa, non solum animae, verum etiam corporis infirmitate sanemur. (Cf. Eph 4:23; 2 Cor 4:16) Unde intellegitur illa mulier in typo Ecclesiae a Domino sanata et erecta, quam curvaverat infirmitas alligante satana; (Cf. Luke 13:11–16) de talibus enim occultis hostibus plangit illa vox Psalmi, curvaverunt animam meam. Haec autem mulier decem et octo annos habebat in infirmitate, quod est ter seni. (Cf. Luke 13:16) Menses autem annorum decem et octo inveniuntur in numero solidi quadrati senarii, quod est sexies seni, et hoc sexies. Iuxta quippe est in eodem Evangelii loco, arbor quoque illa ficulnea, cuius miseram sterilitatem etiam tertius annus arguebat. Sed ita pro illa intercessum est, ut dimitteretur illo anno, ut si fructum ferret, bene; sin aliter, excideretur. (Cf. Luke 13:6–9) Nam et tres anni ad eamdem tripartitam distributionem pertinent, The same as the woman’s eighteen years. Augustine’s number symbolism may leave the reader skeptical; but there can be little doubt that Luke thought these numbers significant. In the same chapter, he mentions the eighteen men on whom the tower fell, and the three measures of flour which the woman mixes with leaven. et menses trium annorum quadratum senarium faciunt, quod est sexies seni.
That this number six bears a certain figure of time, we recognize also in that division into three parts, by which we reckon one time before the Law, another under the Law, a third under grace. (See Rom 5:13, 6:14) In this time we receive the sacrament of renewal, so that at the end of time, renewed in every part even by the resurrection of the flesh, we may be healed of every weakness, not only of soul but also of body. (See Eph 4:23; 2 Cor 4:16) Hence is understood that woman, as a type of the Church, healed and set upright by the Lord, whom an infirmity had bent over while Satan bound her; (See Luke 13:11–16) for it is of such hidden enemies that the voice of the Psalm laments, they have bent down my soul. Now this woman had been eighteen years in her infirmity, which is three sixes. (See Luke 13:16) But the months of eighteen years are found in the number of the solid square of six, which is six times six, and this six times. For nearby, in the same place of the Gospel, is also that fig tree, whose wretched barrenness even a third year reproached. But intercession was made for it, that it be left that year, so that if it bore fruit, well; but if not, that it be cut down. (See Luke 13:6–9) For the three years too pertain to the same threefold division, The same as the woman’s eighteen years. Augustine’s number symbolism may leave the reader skeptical; but there can be little doubt that Luke thought these numbers significant. In the same chapter, he mentions the eighteen men on whom the tower fell, and the three measures of flour which the woman mixes with leaven. and the months of three years make the square of six, which is six times six.
deTrin.4.4.74. 8. Annus etiam unus, si duodecim menses integri considerentur, quos triceni dies complent (talem quippe mensem veteres observaverunt, quem circuitus lunaris ostendit), senario numero pollet. Quod enim valent sex in primo ordine numerorum, qui constat ex unis ut perveniatur ad decem; hoc valent sexaginta in secundo ordine, qui constat ex denis ut perveniatur ad centum. Sexagenarius ergo numerus dierum, sexta pars anni est. Proinde per senarium primi versus multiplicatur, tamquam senarius secundi versus, et fiunt sexies sexageni, trecenti et sexaginta dies, qui sunt integri duodecim menses.
4. 8. A single year too, if its twelve whole months be considered, which thirty days complete (for the ancients observed such a month, which the lunar circuit shows), is strong in the number six. For what six avails in the first rank of numbers, which consists of units up to ten, that sixty avails in the second rank, which consists of tens up to a hundred. The number of sixty days, then, is a sixth part of the year. Accordingly it is multiplied by the six of the first row, as it were the six of the second row, and there come six times sixty, three hundred and sixty days, which are twelve whole months.
deTrin.4.4.8Sed quoniam sicut mensem circuitus lunae ostendit hominibus, sic annus circuitu solis animadversus est; restant autem quinque dies et quadrans diei, ut sol impleat cursum suum annumque concludat. Quattuor enim quadrantes faciunt unum diem, quem necesse est intercalari excurso quadriennio, quod bissextum vocant, (In the Roman calendar, the VI Kal. Mar. (Feb. 24) was repeated in a leap year; hence the name “bissextile.”) ne temporum ordo turbetur. Etiam ipsos dies quinque et quadrantem si consideremus, senarius numerus in eis plurimum valet. Primum, quia sicut fieri solet ut a parte totum computetur, non sunt iam dies quinque, sed potius sex, ut quadrans ille accipiatur pro die; deinde, quia in ipsis quinque diebus sexta pars mensis est, ipse autem quadrans sex horas habet. Totus enim dies, id est, cum sua nocte, viginti quattuor horae sunt, quarum pars quarta, quae est quadrans diei, sex horae inveniuntur. Ita in anni cursu senarius numerus plurimum valet.
But since, just as the circuit of the moon shows men the month, so the year is observed by the circuit of the sun, there remain five days and a quarter of a day for the sun to complete its course and conclude the year. For four quarters make one day, which must needs be intercalated when a four-year period has run out, which they call the bissextile, (In the Roman calendar, the VI Kal. Mar. (Feb. 24) was repeated in a leap year; hence the name “bissextile.”) lest the order of the seasons be disturbed. Even in those five days and a quarter themselves, if we consider them, the number six avails greatly. First, because, as it usually happens that the whole is reckoned from a part, they are now not five days but rather six, the quarter being taken for a day; next, because in those five days themselves there is a sixth part of a month, while the quarter itself has six hours. For a whole day, that is, with its night, is twenty-four hours, of which the fourth part, which is a quarter of a day, is found to be six hours. Thus in the course of a year the number six avails greatly.
deTrin.4.4.85. 9. Nec immerito in aedificatione corporis Dominici, in cuius figura templum a Iudaeis destructum triduo se resuscitaturum esse dicebat, numerus ipse senarius pro anno positus intellegitur. Dixerunt enim, quadraginta et sex annis aedificatum est templum. Et quadragies sexies seni, fiunt ducenti septuaginta sex. Qui numerus dierum complet novem menses et sex dies, qui tamquam decem menses parientibus feminis imputantur, non quia omnes ad sextum diem post nonum mensem perveniunt, sed quia ipsa perfectio corporis Domini tot diebus ad partum perducta comperitur, sicut a maioribus traditum suscipiens Ecclesiae custodit auctoritas. Octavo enim kalendas aprilis conceptus creditur, quo et passus. Ita monumento novo quo sepultus est, ubi nullus erat mortuorum positus, (Cf. John 19:41; Luke 23:53) nec ante, nec postea, congruit uterus virginis quo conceptus est, ubi nullus seminatus est mortalium. (Cf. Luke 1:31; Matt 1:21; Isa 7:14) Natus autem traditur octavo kalendas ianuarias. Ab illo ergo die usque ad istum computati, ducenti septuaginta et sex reperiuntur dies, qui senarium numerum quadragies sexies habet. Quo numero annorum templum aedificatum est, quia eo numero senariorum corpus Domini perfectum est, quod mortis passione destructum, triduo resuscitavit. Dicebat enim hoc de templo corporis sui, sicut evidentissimo et robustissimo Evangelii testimonio declaratur, quo ait, sicut fuit Ionas in ventre ceti tribus diebus, et tribus noctibus, sic erit Filius hominis in corde terrae tribus diebus, et tribus noctibus.
5. 9. And not without reason is the number six itself, set for a year, understood in the building of the Lord's body, in figure of which he said that the temple destroyed by the Jews he would raise up in three days. For they said, this temple was built in forty-six years. And forty-six times six make two hundred and seventy-six. This number of days completes nine months and six days, which are reckoned as ten months for women giving birth—not because all come to the sixth day after the ninth month, but because the very perfecting of the Lord's body is found to have been brought to birth in just so many days, as the authority of the Church, receiving it handed down by our forefathers, keeps. For he is believed to have been conceived on the eighth day before the Kalends of April, on which he also suffered. Thus to the new tomb in which he was buried, where no one of the dead had been laid (See John 19:41; Luke 23:53)—neither before nor afterward—corresponds the Virgin's womb in which he was conceived, where no one of mortals was sown. (See Luke 1:31; Matt 1:21; Isa 7:14) But he is recorded to have been born on the eighth day before the Kalends of January. Reckoned, then, from that day to this, two hundred and seventy-six days are found, which contain the number six forty-six times. By which number of years the temple was built, because by that number of sixes the body of the Lord was perfected, which, destroyed by the suffering of death, he raised up in three days. For he said this of the temple of his body, as is declared by the most evident and most robust testimony of the Gospel, in which he says, as Jonah was in the belly of the whale three days and three nights, so shall the Son of man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights.
deTrin.4.5.96. 10. The translator has moved several sentences—the Matt 12:40 quotation about Jonah—from the end of the last paragraph to the beginning of this one to make logical sense of a scribal error. Ipsum autem triduum non totum et plenum fuisse, Scriptura testis est. Sed primus dies a parte extrema totus annumeratus est, dies vero tertius a parte prima, et ipse totus; medius autem inter eos, id est, secundus dies absolute totus viginti quattuor horis suis, duodecim nocturnis et duodecim diurnis.
6. 10. The translator has moved several sentences—the Matt 12:40 quotation about Jonah—from the end of the last paragraph to the beginning of this one to make logical sense of a scribal error. But that those three days themselves were not whole and complete, Scripture is witness. But the first day was reckoned whole from its last part, while the third day was reckoned from its first part, and it too whole; the one in the middle between them, however, that is, the second day, was absolutely whole with its twenty-four hours, twelve nocturnal and twelve diurnal.
deTrin.4.5.9Crucifixus est enim primo Iudaeorum vocibus hora tertia, cum esset dies sexta Sabbati; (Cf. Mark 15:25) deinde in ipsa cruce suspensus est hora sexta, et spiritum tradidit hora nona; (Cf. Matt 27:46–50; Mark 15:34–37) sepultus est autem cum iam sero factum esset, (Cf. Mark 15:42–46) sicut sese habent verba Evangelii, quod intellegitur in fine diei.
For he was first crucified by the voices of the Jews at the third hour, when it was the sixth day of the week; (See Mark 15:25) then he was hung upon the cross itself at the sixth hour, and gave up his spirit at the ninth hour; (See Matt 27:46–50; Mark 15:34–37) but he was buried when it was already late, (See Mark 15:42–46) as the words of the Gospel have it, which is understood as at the end of the day.
deTrin.4.5.9Undelibet ergo incipias, etiam si alia ratio reddi potest, quomodo non sit contra Evangelium Ioannis, ut hora tertia ligno suspensus Cf. John 19:14. The difficulty about reconciling the Gospel narratives of the Passion in this respect is as follows: Mark 15:25 says it was the third hour and they crucified him; at the sixth hour there was darkness over the whole earth till the ninth hour (Mark 15:33); at the ninth hour Jesus cried out . . . and shortly afterward breathed his last (Mark 15:34–37). Matthew and Luke agree. But in John 19:14, Jesus is still before Pilate at the sixth hour, and is crucified shortly afterward. intellegatur, totum diem primum non comprehendis. Ergo a parte extrema totus computabitur, sicut tertius a parte prima. Nox enim usque ad diluculum, quo Domini Resurrectio declarata est, ad tertium diem pertinet; quia Deus qui dixit de tenebris lucem clarescere, ut per gratiam Novi Testamenti et participationem resurrectionis Christi audiremus: fuistis enim aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino; insinuat nobis quodam modo quod a nocte dies sumat initium.
Wherever, then, you may begin—even if another account can be given of how it is not against the Gospel of John, so that he be understood to have been hung on the wood at the third hour See John 19:14. The difficulty about reconciling the Gospel narratives of the Passion in this respect is as follows: Mark 15:25 says it was the third hour and they crucified him; at the sixth hour there was darkness over the whole earth till the ninth hour (Mark 15:33); at the ninth hour Jesus cried out . . . and shortly afterward breathed his last (Mark 15:34–37). Matthew and Luke agree. But in John 19:14, Jesus is still before Pilate at the sixth hour, and is crucified shortly afterward.—you do not include the whole first day. Therefore it will be reckoned whole from its last part, as the third from its first part. For the night up to the dawn, in which the Lord's resurrection was declared, pertains to the third day; because God, who said that light should shine out of darkness, that through the grace of the New Testament and a participation in Christ's resurrection we might hear, for you were once darkness, but now you are light in the Lord, intimates to us in a certain way that the day takes its beginning from night.
deTrin.4.5.9Sicut enim primi dies propter futurum hominis lapsum a luce in noctem (Cf. Gen 1:4–5) ita isti propter hominis reparationem a tenebris ad lucem computantur. Ab hora ergo mortis usque ad diluculum resurrectionis horae sunt quadraginta, ut etiam ipsa hora nona connumeretur. Cui numero congruit etiam vita eius super terram post resurrectionem in quadraginta diebus. Et est iste numerus frequentissimus in Scripturis ad insinuandum mysterium perfectionis in quadripertito mundo. Habent enim quandam perfectionem decem, et ea quater multiplicata faciunt quadraginta.
For just as the first days, on account of man's future fall, are reckoned from light to night, (See Gen 1:4–5) so these, on account of man's restoration, are reckoned from darkness to light. From the hour of his death, then, to the dawn of the resurrection there are forty hours, counting in that ninth hour itself. With which number agrees also his life upon earth after the resurrection, in forty days. And this number is most frequent in the Scriptures for intimating the mystery of perfection in the four-part world. For ten has a certain perfection, and multiplied four times it makes forty.
deTrin.4.5.9A vespere autem sepulturae usque ad diluculum resurrectionis triginta sex horae sunt, qui est quadratus senarius. Refertur autem ad illam rationem simpli ad duplum, ubi est “coaptationis” maxima consonantia. Duodecim enim ad viginti quattuor simplo ad duplum conveniunt, et fiunt triginta sex, nox tota cum die toto et nocte tota; neque hoc sine illo sacramento quod supra memoravi. On the Trinity 4.4–6. In this last application of the proportion, the two nights and a day in which our Lord’s body lay in the tomb represent the proportion of his body (one night) to our body and spirit (one night and one day) as model for the one and type or sacrament for the other. Non absurde quippe spiritum diei comparamus; corpus autem, nocti. Dominicum enim corpus in morte ac resurrectione, et spiritus nostri figuram, et corporis gerebat exemplum. Etiam sic ergo apparet illa ratio simpli ad duplum in horis triginta sex, cum duodecim conferuntur ad viginti quattuor.
But from the evening of the burial to the dawn of the resurrection there are thirty-six hours, which is the square of six. And it is referred to that ratio of the single to the double, where there is the greatest consonance of "fitting together." For twelve agrees with twenty-four as the single with the double, and they make thirty-six—a whole night with a whole day and a whole night; nor is this without that sacrament which I mentioned above. On the Trinity 4.4–6. In this last application of the proportion, the two nights and a day in which our Lord’s body lay in the tomb represent the proportion of his body (one night) to our body and spirit (one night and one day) as model for the one and type or sacrament for the other. For not absurdly do we compare the spirit to day, but the body to night. For the Lord's body in death and resurrection bore both a figure of our spirit and an example of our body. So in this way too that ratio of the single to the double appears in the thirty-six hours, when twelve are compared with twenty-four.
deTrin.4.5.9Et horum quidem numerorum causas, cur in Scripturis sanctis positi sint, potest alius alias indagare; vel quibus istae quas ego reddidi, praeponendae sint, vel aeque probabiles, vel istis etiam probabiliores. Frustra tamen eos esse in Scripturis positos, et nullas esse causas mysticas cur illic isti numeri commemorentur, nemo tam stultus ineptusque contenderit. Ego autem quas reddidi, vel ex Ecclesiae auctoritate a maioribus traditas, vel ex Divinarum testimonio Scripturarum, vel ex ratione numerorum similitudinumque collegi. Contra rationem nemo sobrius, contra Scripturas nemo Christianus, contra Ecclesiam nemo pacificus senserit.
And of these numbers, indeed, why they are set in the holy Scriptures, one person may trace out some causes, another others—causes either to be preferred to those I have given, or equally probable, or even more probable than these. Yet that they are set in the Scriptures in vain, and that there are no mystical causes why these numbers are recorded there, no one so foolish and inept would contend. But the causes I have given I have gathered either from the authority of the Church handed down by our forefathers, or from the testimony of the divine Scriptures, or from the rationale of the numbers and likenesses. Against reason let no sober person think, against the Scriptures let no Christian, against the Church let no peaceable person.
deTrin.4.5.97. 11. Hoc sacramentum, hoc sacrificium, hic sacerdos, hic Deus, antequam missus veniret, factus ex femina, omnia quae sacrate atque mystice patribus nostris per angelica miracula apparuerunt, sive quae per ipsos facta sunt, As, for example, Jacob anointing the stone at Bethel, or Abraham being ready to sacrifice Isaac at God’s command. similitudines huius fuerunt, ut omnis creatura factis quodam modo loqueretur unum futurum in quo esset salus universorum a morte reparandorum.
7. 11. This sacrament, this sacrifice, this priest, this God, before he came as one sent, made of a woman—all the things that appeared in a sacred and mystical way to our fathers through angelic miracles, or that were done through them, As, for example, Jacob anointing the stone at Bethel, or Abraham being ready to sacrifice Isaac at God’s command. were likenesses of him, so that every creature in a certain way spoke by its deeds of the one who was to come, in whom would be the salvation of all who were to be restored from death.
deTrin.4.7.11Quia enim ab uno vero Deo et summo per impietatis iniquitatem resilientes et dissonantes defluxeramus, et evanueramus in multa, discissi per multa et inhaerentes in multis. Oportebat nutu et imperio Dei miserantis, ut ipsa multa venturum conclamarent unum, et a multis conclamatus veniret unus, et multa contestarentur venisse unum, et a multis exonerati veniremus ad unum;
For because, recoiling and sounding out of tune through the iniquity of ungodliness, we had flowed away from the one true and most high God, and had vanished away into many things, torn asunder through many things and clinging to many things, it was fitting, by the nod and command of the merciful God, that the very many things should cry aloud the one who was to come, and that the one who was cried aloud by the many should come, and that the many should testify that the one had come, and that, unburdened of the many, we should come to the one;
deTrin.4.7.11et multis peccatis in anima mortui, et propter peccatum in carne morituri, amaremus sine peccato mortuum in carne pro nobis unum, et in resuscitatum credentes, et cum illo per fidem spiritu resurgentes, iustificaremur in uno iusto (Cf. Col 2:12) facti unum; nec in ipsa carne nos resurrecturos (Cf. 1 Cor 12:12) desperaremus, cum multa membra intueremur praecessisse nos caput unum, in quo nunc per fidem mundati, et tunc per speciem (Cf. Acts 15:9; 2 Cor 5:7) redintegrati, et per Mediatorem Deo reconciliati haereamus Uni, (Cf. Gal 3:20) fruamur Uno, permaneamus Unum.
and that we, dead in soul through many sins, and destined to die in flesh because of sin, might love the one who without sin died in the flesh for us, and, believing in him raised again, and rising again with him in spirit through faith, might be justified in the one righteous one, (See Col 2:12) made one; and might not despair of rising again in the flesh itself, (See 1 Cor 12:12) since we behold many members have gone before us as one head, in whom, now cleansed through faith, and then restored whole through sight, (See Acts 15:9; 2 Cor 5:7) and reconciled to God through the Mediator, we may cleave to the One, (See Gal 3:20) enjoy the One, remain One.
deTrin.4.7.118. 12. Sic ipse Filius Dei, Verbum Dei, et idem ipse Mediator Dei et hominum Filius hominis, aequalis Patris (Cf. 1 Tim 2:5) per divinitatis unitatem, et particeps noster per humanitatis susceptionem, Patrem interpellans pro nobis per id quod homo erat, nec tamen tacens quod Deus cum Patre unum erat, inter cetera ita loquitur: non pro his autem rogo, inquit, tantum, sed et pro eis qui credituri sunt per verbum eorum in me, ut omnes unum sint, sicut tu Pater in me, et ego in te, ut et ipsi in nobis unum sint; ut mundus credat, quia tu me misisti. Et ego claritatem quam dedisti mihi, dedi eis, ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus.
8. 12. Thus the Son of God himself, the Word of God, and the same one the Mediator of God and men, the Son of man, equal to the Father (See 1 Tim 2:5) through the unity of divinity, and our partner through the assumption of humanity, interceding with the Father for us through that by which he was man, yet not keeping silent about the fact that as God he was one with the Father, speaks among other things thus: but I pray not for these, he says, only, but also for those who will believe in me through their word, that they all may be one, as you, Father, are in me, and I in you, that they too may be one in us; that the world may believe that you sent me. And the glory which you gave me I have given them, that they may be one, as we also are one.
deTrin.4.8.129. 12. Non dixit: “ego et ipsi unum,” quamvis per id quod Ecclesiae caput est et corpus eius (Cf. Eph 5:23; Col 1:18) Ecclesia, posset dicere, “ego et ipsi,” non unum, sed “unus,” quia caput et corpus unus est Christus. (Cf. 1 Tim 2:5; 1 Cor 8:6, 12:20) Sed divinitatem suam consubstantialem Patri ostendens (propter quod et alio loco dicit, ego et Pater unum sumus), in suo genere, hoc est, in eiusdem naturae consubstantiali parilitate, vult esse suos unum, sed in ipso; quia in se ipsis non possent, dissociati ab invicem per diversas voluntates PL: voluptates, “pleasures.” et cupiditates et immunditiam peccatorum; unde mundantur per Mediatorem, ut sint in illo unum; non tantum per eamdem naturam qua omnes ex hominibus mortalibus aequales angelis fiunt, (Cf. Luke 20:36; Matt 22:30; Mark 12:25) sed etiam per eamdem in eamdem beatitudinem conspirantem concordissimam voluntatem, in unum spiritum quodam modo igne caritatis conflatam. Cf. On the Trinity 3.9.
9. 12. He did not say, "I and they are one," although, in respect of the fact that he is the head of the Church and the Church his body, (See Eph 5:23; Col 1:18) he could have said, "I and they," not "one thing," but "one person," because the head and the body are one Christ. (See 1 Tim 2:5; 1 Cor 8:6, 12:20) But showing his divinity consubstantial with the Father (on account of which he also says in another place, I and the Father are one), in its own kind, that is, in the consubstantial parity of the same nature, he wishes his own to be one, but in himself; because in themselves they could not be one, sundered from one another through diverse wills PL: voluptates, “pleasures.” and desires and the uncleanness of sins; whence they are cleansed through the Mediator, that they may be one in him; not only through the same nature by which all from mortal men are made equal to the angels, (See Luke 20:36; Matt 22:30; Mark 12:25) but also through the same will, conspiring most harmoniously toward the same blessedness, fused as it were into one spirit by the fire of love. See On the Trinity 3.9.
deTrin.4.9.12Ad hoc enim valet quod ait, ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus, ut quemadmodum Pater et Filius, non tantum aequalitate substantiae, sed etiam voluntate unum sunt; ita et hi inter quos et Deum Mediator est Filius, non tantum per id quod eiusdem naturae sunt, sed etiam per eamdem dilectionis societatem unum sint. Deinde idipsum quod Mediator est, per quem reconciliamur Deo, sic indicat, ego, inquit, in eis, et tu in me, ut sint consummati in unum.
For to this avails what he says, that they may be one, as we also are one: that just as the Father and the Son are one not only by equality of substance but also by will, so these too, between whom and God the Son is Mediator, may be one not only through the fact that they are of the same nature, but also through the same fellowship of love. Then that he himself is the Mediator through whom we are reconciled to God, he indicates thus: I, he says, in them, and you in me, that they may be perfected into one.
deTrin.4.9.12C
deTrin.4.9.12
10. 13. Haec est vera pax, et cum Creatore nostro nobis firma connexio, purgatis et reconciliatis per Mediatorem vitae, sicut maculati et alienati ab eo recesseramus per mediatorem mortis. Sicut enim diabolus superbus hominem superbientem perduxit ad mortem, ita Christus humilis hominem obedientem reduxit ad vitam. Quia sicut ille elatus cecidit, et deiecit consentientem; sic iste humiliatus surrexit, et erexit credentem. (Cf. Gen 3:1; Wis 2:24; Heb 2:14)
10. 13. This is true peace, and a firm connection with our Creator for us, purified and reconciled through the Mediator of life, just as, stained and estranged, we had withdrawn from him through the mediator of death. For just as the proud devil led proud man down to death, so the humble Christ led obedient man back to life. Because, just as that one, being exalted, fell and cast down the one who consented to him, so this one, being humbled, rose and raised up the one who believed. (See Gen 3:1; Wis 2:24; Heb 2:14)
deTrin.4.10.13Quia enim non pervenerat diabolus quo ipse perduxerat (mortem quippe spiritus in impietate gestabat, sed mortem carnis non subierat, quia nec indumentum susceperat); magnus homini videbatur princeps in legionibus daemonum, per quos fallaciarum regnum exercet. Sic hominem per elationis typhum, potentiae quam iustitiae cupidiorem, aut per falsam philosophiam magis inflans, aut per sacra sacrilega irretiens, in quibus etiam magicae fallaciae; curiosiores superbioresque animas deceptas illusasque praecipitans, subditum tenet; (The Latin syntax here is problematic)
For because the devil had not reached where he himself had led man (for he bore the death of the spirit in ungodliness, but had not undergone the death of the flesh, since he had not taken on any garment of flesh), he seemed to man a great prince among the legions of demons, through whom he wields his kingdom of deceptions. Thus, puffing man up the more through the smoke of self-exaltation—more eager for power than for righteousness—either through false philosophy, or ensnaring him through sacrilegious rites, in which there are also magical deceptions, casting headlong the more curious and proud souls, deceived and deluded, he holds him subject; (The Latin syntax here is problematic)
deTrin.4.10.13pollicens etiam purgationem animae, per eas quas τελεταί A technical term for mystic rites, particularly for the rites of initiation into the mysteries of Isis, for example, or Mithras, which were still very much in vogue. In The City of God 10.9.2, he describes the teletai as “theurgic (magical) consecrations.” appellant, transfigurando se in angelum lucis per multiformem machinationem in signis et prodigiis mendacii.
promising even a purification of the soul through what they call τελεταί, A technical term for mystic rites, particularly for the rites of initiation into the mysteries of Isis, for example, or Mithras, which were still very much in vogue. In The City of God 10.9.2, he describes the teletai as “theurgic (magical) consecrations.” by transfiguring himself into an angel of light through a manifold contrivance in lying signs and wonders.
deTrin.4.10.1311. 14. Facile est enim spiritibus nequissimis per aeria corpora facere multa, quae mirentur animae terrenis corporibus aggravatae, etiam melioris affectus. (Cf. Wis 9:15; 2 Cor 5:4) Si enim corpora ipsa terrena nonnullis artibus et exercitationibus modificata, in spectaculis theatricis tanta miracula hominibus exhibent, ut hi qui numquam viderunt talia, narrata vix credant. Quid magnum est diabolo et angelis eius, de corporeis elementis per aeria corpora facere quae caro miretur; aut etiam occultis inspirationibus ad illudendos humanos sensus phantasmata imaginum machinari, quibus vigilantes dormientesve decipiat, vel furentes exagitet?
11. 14. For it is easy for the most wicked spirits to do, through their airy bodies, many things that souls weighed down by earthly bodies marvel at, even souls of better disposition. (See Wis 9:15; 2 Cor 5:4) For if those very earthly bodies, modified by certain arts and exercises, exhibit to men in theatrical spectacles such marvels that those who have never seen such things scarcely believe them when told, what great matter is it for the devil and his angels, out of the corporeal elements through their airy bodies, to do things that the flesh marvels at, or even, by hidden inspirations, to contrive phantasms of images for deluding human senses, by which he may deceive men waking or sleeping, or drive the frenzied to and fro?
deTrin.4.11.14Sed sicut fieri potest ut homo vita ac moribus melior spectet nequissimos homines, vel in fune ambulantes, vel multimodis motibus corporum multa incredibilia facientes, nec ullo modo talia facere concupiscat, nec eos propterea sibi praeponendos existimet. Sic anima fidelis et pia, non solum si videat, verum etiam si propter fragilitatem carnis exhorreat miracula daemonum, non ideo tamen aut non se posse talia dolebit, aut ob hoc illos meliores esse iudicabit. Cum sit praesertim in societate sanctorum, qui per virtutem Dei cui cuncta subiecta sunt, et minime fallacia, et multo maiora fecerunt, sive homines, sive angeli boni. (Cf. 1 Cor 15:27–28)
But just as it can happen that a man better in life and conduct watches most wicked men walking on a rope, or doing many incredible things by manifold movements of their bodies, and in no way desires to do such things, nor on that account thinks them to be preferred to himself, so the faithful and godly soul, even if it sees, and even if, on account of the frailty of the flesh, it shudders at the miracles of demons, will not on that account either grieve that it cannot do such things, or judge them to be better on this account. Especially since it is in the fellowship of the saints, who through the power of God, to whom all things are subject, have done things in no way deceptive and far greater—whether men or good angels. (See 1 Cor 15:27–28)
deTrin.4.11.1412. 15. Nequaquam igitur per sacrilegas similitudines et impias curiositates et magicas consecrationes animae purgantur et reconciliantur Deo; quia falsus mediator non traicit ad superiora, sed potius obsidens intercludit viam per affectus, quos tanto maligniores, quanto superbiores suae societatis inspirat. Qui non possunt ad evolandum pinnas nutrire virtutum; sed potius ad demergendum pondera exaggerare vitiorum, tanto gravius animae ruiturae, quanto sibi videtur evecta sublimius.
12. 15. By no means, therefore, are souls purified and reconciled to God through sacrilegious likenesses and ungodly curiosities and magical consecrations; for the false mediator does not carry one across to the higher things, but rather, besieging, blocks the way through the affections, which he inspires the more malignant the prouder his fellowship is. These cannot nourish the wings of the virtues for flying up, but rather heap up the weights of the vices for sinking down, the more heavily as the soul, doomed to fall, seems to itself to be borne up the more loftily.
deTrin.4.12.15Proinde, sicut Magi fecerunt divinitus moniti, quos ad humilitatem Domini adorandam stella perduxit; ita et nos, non qua venimus, sed per aliam viam in patriam redire debemus, quam rex humilis docuit, et quam rex superbus humili regi adversarius obsidere non possit. Et nobis enim, ut adoremus humilem Christum, caeli enarraverunt gloriam Dei, cum in omnem terram exiit sonus eorum, et in fines orbis terrae verba eorum.
Accordingly, just as the Magi did when divinely warned—whom a star led to adore the humility of the Lord—so we too ought to return to our homeland not by the way we came, but by another way, which the humble King taught, and which the proud king, the adversary of the humble King, cannot besiege. For to us also, that we may adore the humble Christ, the heavens have declared the glory of God, when their sound went out into all the earth, and their words to the ends of the world.
deTrin.4.12.15Via nobis fuit ad mortem per peccatum in Adam; per unum quippe hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt. Huius viae mediator diabolus fuit, persuasor peccati, et praecipitator in mortem; (Cf. Gen 3:1; Wis 2:24; Heb 2:14) nam et ipse ad operandam duplam mortem nostram, simplam attulit suam. Per impietatem namque mortuus est in spiritu, carne utique mortuus non est; nobis autem et impietatem persuasit, et per hanc ut in mortem carnis venire mereremur effecit. Unum ergo appetivimus iniqua suasione, alterum nos secutum est iusta damnatione.
There was a way for us to death through sin in Adam; for through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all men, in whom all sinned. The mediator of this way was the devil, the persuader to sin and the one who casts headlong into death; (See Gen 3:1; Wis 2:24; Heb 2:14) for he too, to work our twofold death, brought his single one. For through ungodliness he died in spirit, though he certainly did not die in flesh; but to us he both persuaded ungodliness, and through this brought it about that we should deserve to come to the death of the flesh. The one, then, we sought through his wicked persuasion; the other followed us through just condemnation.
deTrin.4.12.15Propterea quippe scriptum est, Deus mortem non fecit; quia causa mortis ipse non fuit, sed tamen per eius retributionem iustissima mors irrogata est peccatori. Sicut supplicium iudex irrogat reo, causa tamen supplicii non est iustitia iudicis, sed meritum criminis. Quo ergo nos mediator mortis transmisit, et ipse non venit, id est, ad mortem carnis; ibi nobis Dominus Deus noster medicinam emendationis inseruit, quam ille non meruit, occulta et nimis arcana ordinatione divinae altaeque iustitiae.
For this reason indeed it is written, God did not make death; because he was not himself the cause of death, yet through his retribution a most just death was inflicted on the sinner. Just as a judge inflicts punishment on a guilty man, yet the cause of the punishment is not the justice of the judge, but the desert of the crime. Where, then, the mediator of death sent us across, and where he himself did not come—that is, to the death of the flesh—there the Lord our God inserted for us the medicine of amendment, which that one did not deserve, by a hidden and exceedingly secret ordering of divine and lofty justice.
deTrin.4.12.15Ut ergo sicut per unum hominem mors, ita per unum hominem fieret resurrectio mortuorum, quia magis vitabant homines quod evitare non poterant, mortem carnis, quam mortem spiritus; id est, magis poenam quam meritum poenae (nam non peccare, aut non curatur, aut parum curatur; non mori autem quamvis non obtineatur, vehementer satagitur); vitae Mediator ostendens, quam non sit mors timenda, quae per humanam conditionem iam evadi non potest, sed potius impietas, quae per fidem caveri potest, occurrit nobis ad finem quo venimus, sed non qua venimus. Nos enim ad mortem per peccatum venimus, ille, per iustitiam; et ideo cum sit mors nostra poena peccati, mors illius facta est hostia pro peccato. (Cf. Rom 5:12, 5:18, 5:21; Heb 10:12)
So that, just as through one man came death, so through one man might come the resurrection of the dead—because men shunned more what they could not escape, the death of the flesh, than the death of the spirit; that is, more the punishment than the desert of punishment (for not to sin is either not cared for, or little cared for, but not to die, though it cannot be obtained, is vehemently striven after)—the Mediator of life, showing how little death is to be feared, which through the human condition can now no longer be evaded, but rather ungodliness, which through faith can be guarded against, met us at the end to which we came, but not by the way we came. For we came to death through sin, he through righteousness; and therefore, since our death is the punishment of sin, his death was made a sacrifice for sin. (See Rom 5:12, 5:18, 5:21; Heb 10:12)
deTrin.4.12.1513. 16. Quapropter cum spiritus corpori praeponatur; morsque sit spiritus a Deo deseri, mors autem corporis ab spiritu deseri; eaque sit poena in morte corporis, ut spiritus quia volens deseruit Deum, deserat corpus invitus; ut cum spiritus Deum deseruerit quia voluit, deserat corpus etiamsi noluerit; nec deserat cum voluerit, nisi aliquam sibi vim, qua ipsum corpus perimatur, intulerit. Demonstravit spiritus Mediatoris, quam nulla poena peccati usque ad mortem carnis accesserit, quia non eam deseruit invitus, sed quia voluit, quando voluit, quomodo voluit.
13. 16. Wherefore, since the spirit is set above the body, and the death of the spirit is to be forsaken by God, but the death of the body is to be forsaken by the spirit, and this is the punishment in the death of the body, that the spirit, because it willingly forsook God, forsakes the body unwillingly; so that, when the spirit has forsaken God because it willed it, it forsakes the body even though it would not; and does not forsake it when it would, unless it has brought upon itself some force by which the body itself is destroyed—the spirit of the Mediator demonstrated how no punishment of sin reached him even to the death of the flesh, because he did not forsake it unwillingly, but because he willed it, when he willed it, in the way he willed it.
deTrin.4.13.16Quippe Dei Verbo ad unitatem commixtus The word commixtus, “compounded,” would be ruled out by Chalcedon. But Augustine certainly was no monophysite. hinc ait, potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam, et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam. Nemo tollit eam a me, sed ego pono eam a me, et iterum sumo eam. Et hoc maxime mirati sunt, sicut Evangelium loquitur, qui praesentes erant, cum post illam vocem, in qua figuram peccati nostri edidit, continuo tradidit spiritum. (Cf. Matt 27:50; Mark 15:37; Luke 23:46) Longa enim morte cruciabantur ligno suspensi. Unde latronibus, ut iam morerentur, et de ligno ante sabbatum deponerentur, crura confracta sunt. Ille autem quia mortuus inventus est, miraculo fuit. (Cf. John 19:30–33) Hoc etiam Pilatum legimus fuisse miratum, cum ab ipso sepeliendum corpus Domini peteretur. (Cf. Mark 15:43; Matt 27:58; Luke 23:52; John 19:38)
Indeed, compounded into unity with the Word of God, The word commixtus, “compounded,” would be ruled out by Chalcedon. But Augustine certainly was no monophysite. he says of this, I have power to lay down my soul, and I have power to take it up again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of myself, and I take it up again. And at this above all those who were present marveled, as the Gospel tells, when, after that cry in which he uttered the figure of our sin, he straightway gave up his spirit. (See Matt 27:50; Mark 15:37; Luke 23:46) For those hung upon the wood were tormented by a long death. Whence the legs of the thieves were broken, that they might now die and be taken down from the wood before the Sabbath. But he, because he was found already dead, was a marvel. (See John 19:30–33) This too we read that Pilate marveled at, when the body of the Lord was asked of him for burial. (See Mark 15:43; Matt 27:58; Luke 23:52; John 19:38)
deTrin.4.13.1613. 17. Ille itaque deceptor, qui fuit homini mediator ad mortem, falsoque se opponit ad vitam nomine purgationis per sacra et sacrificia sacrilega, quibus superbi seducuntur, quia nec participationem mortis nostrae habere potuit, nec resurrectionem suae, simplam quidem suam mortem ad duplam nostram potuit afferre: simplam vero resurrectionem, in qua et sacramentum esset renovationis nostrae, et eius quae in fine futura est evigilationis exemplum, non utique potuit. Ille proinde qui spiritu vivus carnem suam mortuam resuscitavit, verus vitae Mediator, illum spiritu mortuum et mortis mediatorem a spiritibus in se credentium foras misit, ut non regnaret intrinsecus, sed forinsecus oppugnaret, nec tamen expugnaret.
13. 17. That deceiver, then, who was man's mediator to death, and falsely sets himself against him for life under the name of purification through sacrilegious rites and sacrifices, by which the proud are seduced—because he could have neither a participation in our death nor a resurrection of his own—was able indeed to bring his single death against our double; but a single resurrection, in which there would be both a sacrament of our renewal and an example of that awakening which is to be at the end, this assuredly he could not. He, accordingly, who, living in spirit, raised up his own dead flesh, the true Mediator of life, cast that one, dead in spirit and the mediator of death, out from the spirits of those who believe in him, so that he might not reign within, but might assail from without, yet not overcome.
deTrin.4.13.17Cui se ipse quoque temptandum praebuit, ut ad superandas etiam temptationes eius Mediator esset, non solum per adiutorium, verum etiam per exemplum. At ille primitus ubi per omnes aditus ad interiora moliens irrepere, expulsus est, post baptisma in heremo completa omni temptatione illecebrosa, quia vivum spiritum, (Cf. Luke 4:1–13) spiritu mortuus non invasit, quoquo modo avidus mortis humanae convertit se ad faciendam mortem quam potuit, et permissus est in illud quod ex nobis mortale vivus Mediator acceperat. Et ubi potuit aliquid facere, ibi ex omni parte devictus est; et unde accepit exterius potestatem Dominicae carnis occidendae, inde interior eius potestas, qua nos tenebat, occisa est. (Cf. 2 Tim 2:26)
To whom he also offered himself to be tempted, that he might be Mediator for overcoming his temptations too, not only by help but also by example. But that one, when at first, striving to creep in through all the approaches to the interior, he was driven out, after the baptism, in the desert, when every alluring temptation had been completed—because, dead in spirit, he did not invade the living spirit (See Luke 4:1–13)—greedy in whatever way for human death, turned himself to bring about the death he could, and was permitted into that mortal which the living Mediator had taken from us. And where he could do something, there he was utterly vanquished on every side; and from where he received outwardly the power of killing the Lord's flesh, thence his inner power, by which he held us, was slain. (See 2 Tim 2:26)
deTrin.4.13.17Factum est enim ut vincula peccatorum multorum in multis mortibus, per unius unam mortem quam peccatum nullum praecesserat, solverentur. (Cf. 1 Pet 2:22; 2 Cor 5:21) Quam propterea Dominus pro nobis indebitam reddidit, ut nobis debita non noceret. Neque enim iure cuiusquam potestatis exutus est carne, sed ipse se exuit. Augustine, or his version of the text, treats the first word of this verse (in Greek, apekdusamenos) as reflexive, not as active with “principalities and powers” as its object, as do the Vulgate and all modern versions. Nam qui posset non mori si nollet, procul dubio quia voluit mortuus est: et ideo principatus et potestates exemplavit, fiducialiter triumphans eas in semetipso.
For it came about that the bonds of the many sins of many men in their many deaths were loosed through the one death of the one whom no sin had gone before. (See 1 Pet 2:22; 2 Cor 5:21) Which death the Lord on this account paid for us, though not owed, so that the death owed by us might not harm us. For he was not stripped of his flesh by the right of anyone's power, but he stripped himself. Augustine, or his version of the text, treats the first word of this verse (in Greek, apekdusamenos) as reflexive, not as active with “principalities and powers” as its object, as do the Vulgate and all modern versions. For he who could not die if he would not, beyond doubt died because he willed it; and therefore he made an example of the principalities and powers, confidently triumphing over them in himself.
deTrin.4.13.17Morte sua quippe uno verissimo sacrificio pro nobis oblato, quidquid culparum erat unde nos principatus et potestates ad luenda supplicia iure detinebant, purgavit, abolevit, exstinxit; et sua resurrectione in novam vitam nos praedestinatos vocavit, vocatos iustificavit, iustificatos glorificavit. (Cf. Rom 8:30)
For by his death, the one most true sacrifice offered for us, he purified, abolished, extinguished whatever faults there were on account of which the principalities and powers by right held us fast to pay the penalties; and by his resurrection he called us, predestined to a new life, and those whom he called he justified, and those whom he justified he glorified. (See Rom 8:30)
deTrin.4.13.17Ita diabolus hominem, quem per consensionem seductum, tamquam iure integro possidebat, et ipse nulla corruptione carnis et sanguinis septus, per istam corporis mortalis fragilitatem, nimis egeno et infirmo, tanto superbior, quanto velut ditior et fortior, quasi pannoso et aerumnoso dominabatur, in ipsa morte carnis amisit. Quo enim cadentem non secutus impulit peccatorem, illuc descendentem persecutus compulit Redemptorem.
Thus the devil lost, in the very death of the flesh, the man whom, seduced through consent, he possessed as though by full right—he who, himself hedged about by no corruption of flesh and blood, lorded it through this frailty of the mortal body over one exceedingly needy and weak, the prouder for being as it were richer and stronger, over one as it were ragged and wretched. For where he drove on the falling sinner whom he did not follow, thither he followed and compelled the descending Redeemer.
deTrin.4.13.17Sic in mortis consortio Filius Dei nobis fieri dignatus est amicus, quo non perveniendo meliorem se nobis atque maiorem putabat inimicus. Dicit enim Redemptor noster: maiorem dilectionem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat pro amicis suis. Quocirca etiam ipso Domino se credebat diabolus superiorem, in quantum illi Dominus in passionibus cessit; quia et de ipso intellectum est quod in Psalmo legitur, minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis: ut ab iniquo velut aequo iure adversum nos agente, ipse occisus innocens eum iure aequissimo superaret, atque ita captivitatem propter peccatum factam captivaret, nosque liberaret a captivitate propter peccatum iusta, suo iusto sanguine iniuste fuso mortis chirographum delens, et iustificandos redimens peccatores.
Thus in the fellowship of death the Son of God deigned to become our friend, where the enemy, by not arriving, thought himself better and greater than we. For our Redeemer says: greater love has no one than this, that he lay down his soul for his friends. Wherefore the devil believed himself superior even to the Lord himself, insofar as the Lord yielded to him in his sufferings; for of him too was understood what is read in the Psalm, you made him a little less than the angels: so that, while the wicked one acted against us as though by equal right, the innocent one, being slain, might overcome him by a most equitable right, and so might lead captive the captivity made on account of sin, and free us from the captivity that was just on account of sin, by his just blood unjustly shed blotting out the bond of death, and redeeming sinners to be justified.
deTrin.4.13.1713. 18. Hic etiam diabolus adhuc suos illudit, quibus se per sua sacra velut purgandis, et potius implicandis atque mergendis, falsus mediator opponit, quod superbis facillime persuadet irridere atque contemnere mortem Christi, a qua ipse quanto est alienior, tanto ab eis creditur sanctior atque divinior. Qui tamen apud eum paucissimi remanserunt, agnoscentibus gentibus et pia humilitate bibentibus pretium suum, eiusque fiducia deserentibus hostem suum, et concurrentibus ad Redemptorem suum.
13. 18. Here too the devil still deludes his own, to whom, as if to be purified—but rather to be entangled and submerged—the false mediator sets himself in opposition through his rites, in that he most easily persuades the proud to mock and despise the death of Christ, from which the more estranged he himself is, the more he is believed by them to be holy and divine. Yet very few have remained with him, since the nations now acknowledge and with godly humility drink their price, and in confidence in it forsake their enemy and run together to their Redeemer.
deTrin.4.13.18Nescit enim diabolus quomodo illo et insidiante et furente utatur ad salutem fidelium suorum excelsissima sapientia Dei, a fine superiore, quod est initium spiritalis creaturae, usque ad finem inferiorem, quod est mors corporis, pertendens fortiter et disponens omnia suaviter. Attingit enim ubique propter suam munditiam, et nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit. A morte autem carnis alieno diabolo, unde nimium superbus incedit, mors alterius generis praeparatur in aeterno igne Tartari, quo non solum cum terrenis, sed etiam cum aereis corporibus excruciari spiritus possint.
For the devil does not know how the most exalted wisdom of God uses him, both lying in wait and raging, for the salvation of his faithful, reaching mightily from the higher end, which is the beginning of spiritual creation, to the lower end, which is the death of the body, and ordering all things sweetly. For it attains everywhere because of its purity, and nothing defiled enters into it. But for the devil, estranged from the death of the flesh, on which account he walks exceedingly proud, a death of another kind is prepared in the eternal fire of Tartarus, by which spirits can be tormented not only with earthly but also with airy bodies.
deTrin.4.13.18Superbi autem homines, quibus Christus, quia mortuus est, viluit, ubi nos tam magno emit, (Cf. 1 Cor 6:20) et istam mortem reddunt cum hominibus conditioni aerumnosae naturae, quae trahitur a primo peccato, et in illam cum illo praecipitabuntur. Quem propterea Christo praeposuerunt, quia eos in istam deiecit, quo per distantem naturam ipse non cecidit, et quo propter eos per ingentem misericordiam ille descendit: et tamen se daemonibus esse meliores non dubitant credere, eosque maledictis omnibus insectari detestarique non cessant, quos certe alienos ab huius mortis passione noverunt, propter quam Christum contemnunt.
But proud men, to whom Christ has become cheap because he died—where he bought us at so great a price (See 1 Cor 6:20)—both render that death back, along with men, to the wretched condition of a nature that is drawn from the first sin, and will be cast headlong into that condition together with him. Him they have preferred to Christ for this reason, that he cast them down into this state, into which he himself, through his distant nature, did not fall, and into which Christ, on their account, through his immense mercy, descended; and yet they do not hesitate to believe that they are better than the demons, and they do not cease to assail and detest with every curse those whom they certainly know to be estranged from the suffering of this death—on account of which they despise Christ.
deTrin.4.13.18Nec sic volunt considerare, quam fieri potuerit ut in se manens, nec per se ipsum ex ulla parte mutabile Dei Verbum, per inferioris tamen naturae susceptionem aliquid inferius pati posset, quod immundus daemon, quia terrenum corpus non habet, pati non possit. Sic cum sint ipsi daemonibus meliores, tamen quia carnem portant, mori sic possunt, quemadmodum mori daemones, quia non eam portant, non utique possunt.
Nor are they willing to consider in this way how it could come about that the Word of God, remaining in itself and in no part changeable through itself, could nonetheless, through the assumption of a lower nature, suffer something lower, which an unclean demon, because it does not have an earthly body, cannot suffer. Thus, although they themselves are better than the demons, yet because they bear flesh, they can die in the way that demons, because they do not bear it, certainly cannot die.
deTrin.4.13.18Et cum de mortibus sacrificiorum suorum multum praesumant, quae se fallacibus superbisque spiritibus immolare non sentiunt, aut si iam sentiunt, aliquid sibi prodesse arbitrantur perfidorum et invidorum amicitiam, quorum intentionis nullum negotium est, nisi impeditio reditus nostri. This is Augustine’s hostile interpretation of the more sophisticated pagan religiosity of his day, an equivalent of modern theosophy. It was sometimes called “theurgy,” which literally means “working the gods.” He describes it in detail in The City of God 8, quoting Apuleius and Hermes Trismegistus.
And although they presume much upon the deaths of their sacrifices, which they do not perceive that they are immolating to deceitful and proud spirits—or if they now do perceive it, they suppose that the friendship of the treacherous and envious profits them something, whose intention has no business but the hindering of our return. This is Augustine’s hostile interpretation of the more sophisticated pagan religiosity of his day, an equivalent of modern theosophy. It was sometimes called “theurgy,” which literally means “working the gods.” He describes it in detail in The City of God 8, quoting Apuleius and Hermes Trismegistus.
deTrin.4.13.1814. 19. Non intellegunt ne ipsos quidem superbissimos spiritus honoribus sacrificiorum gaudere potuisse, nisi uni vero Deo pro quo coli volunt, verum sacrificium deberetur. Neque id posse rite offerri, nisi per sacerdotem sanctum et iustum: nec nisi ab eis accipiatur quod offertur, pro quibus offertur, atque id sine vitio sit, ut pro vitiosis mundandis possit offerri. Hoc certe omnes cupiunt, qui pro se offerri sacrificium Deo volunt.
14. 19. They do not understand that not even those most proud spirits themselves could have rejoiced in the honors of sacrifices, unless a true sacrifice were owed to the one true God, for whom they wish to be worshiped. Nor can it be duly offered except through a holy and righteous priest; nor unless what is offered be accepted from those for whom it is offered, and that without fault, so that it can be offered for the cleansing of the faulty. This certainly all desire who wish a sacrifice to be offered to God for themselves.
deTrin.4.14.19Quis ergo tam iustus et sanctus sacerdos, quam unicus Filius Dei, qui non opus haberet per sacrificium (Cf. Heb 7:27) sua purgare peccata, nec originalia, nec ex humana vita quae adduntur? Et quid tam congruenter ab hominibus sumeretur quod pro eis offerretur, quam humana caro? Et quid tam aptum huic immolationi, quam caro mortalis? Et quid tam mundum pro mundandis vitiis mortalium, quam sine ulla contagione carnalis concupiscentiae caro nata in utero et ex utero virginali? Et quid tam grate offerri et suscipi posset, quam caro sacrificii nostri, corpus effectum sacerdotis nostri? Ut quoniam quattuor considerantur in omni sacrificio; cui offeratur, a quo offeratur, quid offeratur, pro quibus offeratur; idem ipse unus verusque Mediator, per sacrificium pacis reconcilians nos Deo, (Cf. Gal 3:20; 1 Tim 2:5) unum cum illo maneret cui offerebat, unum in se faceret pro quibus offerebat, unus ipse esset qui offerebat, et quod offerebat.
Who, then, is so righteous and holy a priest as the only Son of God, who had no need to purify his own sins by sacrifice (See Heb 7:27)—neither original ones nor those that are added from human life? And what could be taken from men so fittingly to be offered for them as human flesh? And what is so apt for this immolation as mortal flesh? And what so clean for the cleansing of the faults of mortals as flesh, born in a virgin's womb and from a virgin's womb without any contagion of carnal desire? And what could be so gratefully offered and accepted as the flesh of our sacrifice, made the body of our priest? So that—since four things are considered in every sacrifice: to whom it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, for whom it is offered—the same one and true Mediator, reconciling us to God through a sacrifice of peace, (See Gal 3:20; 1 Tim 2:5) might remain one with him to whom he was offering, might make one in himself those for whom he was offering, might himself be one who was offering and what he was offering.
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15. 20. Sunt autem quidam qui se putant ad contemplandum Deum et inhaerendum Deo virtute propria posse purgari, quos ipsa superbia maxime maculat. Nullum enim vitium est cui magis Divina Lege resistitur, et in quod maius accipiat dominandi ius ille superbissimus spiritus, ad ima mediator, ad summa interclusor: nisi occulte insidians alia via devitetur; aut per “populum deficientem,” quod interpretatur Amalech, aperte saeviens, et ad terram promissionis repugnando transitum negans, per crucem Domini quae Moysi manibus extentis est praefigurata, superetur. (Cf. Exod 17:8–16)
15. 20. But there are some who think that they can be purified by their own power to contemplate God and to cleave to God, whom pride itself most stains. For there is no vice that is more resisted by the divine Law, and against which that most proud spirit—the mediator to the depths, the blocker to the heights—receives a greater right of lording it: unless either, secretly lying in wait, he be evaded by another way, or, through the "failing people," which is interpreted Amalek, openly raging and denying passage by fighting against the way to the land of promise, he be overcome through the cross of the Lord, which was prefigured by the outstretched hands of Moses. (See Exod 17:8–16)
deTrin.4.15.20Hinc enim sibi purgationem isti virtute propria pollicentur, quia nonnulli eorum potuerunt aciem mentis ultra omnem creaturam transmittere, et lucem incommutabilis veritatis quantulacumque ex parte contingere: quod christianos multos ex fide interim sola viventes, nondum potuisse derident. (Cf. Hab 2:4; Rom 1:17; Gal 3:11; Heb 10:38; 2 Cor 5:7) Sed quid prodest superbienti, et ob hoc erubescenti lignum conscendere, de longinquo prospicere patriam transmarinam? Cf. Augustine, The City of God 9.17; 10.29; Against the Academics 3.19.42; On the Happy Life 1.2; Homilies on the Gospel of John 2.2; Plotinus, Ennead 1.6; Ambrose, On Isaac and the Soul 8.78. Aut quid obest humili de tanto intervallo non eam videre, in illo ligno ad eam venienti, quo dedignatur ille portari?
For these promise themselves a purification by their own power because some of them have been able to send the edge of their mind beyond every creature, and to touch, in however small a part, the light of unchangeable truth; at which they deride the fact that many Christians, living for the time being by faith alone, have not yet been able to do so. (See Hab 2:4; Rom 1:17; Gal 3:11; Heb 10:38; 2 Cor 5:7) But what does it profit one who is proud, and on this account ashamed to mount the wood, to gaze from afar upon the homeland across the sea? See Augustine, The City of God 9.17; 10.29; Against the Academics 3.19.42; On the Happy Life 1.2; Homilies on the Gospel of John 2.2; Plotinus, Ennead 1.6; Ambrose, On Isaac and the Soul 8.78. Or what does it harm the humble man not to see it across so great an interval, when he comes to it on that wood by which the other disdains to be carried?
deTrin.4.15.2016. 21. Hi etiam resurrectionem carnis nos credere reprehendunt, sibique potius etiam de his rebus credi volunt; quasi vero, quia praecelsam incommutabilemque substantiam per illa quae facta sunt intellegere potuerunt, propterea de conversione rerum mutabilium, aut de contexto saeculorum ordine consulendi sunt. Numquid enim quia verissime disputant, et documentis certissimis persuadent, aeternis rationibus omnia temporalia fieri, propterea potuerunt in ipsis rationibus perspicere, vel ex ipsis colligere quot sint animalium genera, quae semina singulorum in exordiis, qui modus in incrementis, qui numeri per conceptus, per ortus, per aetates, per occasus, qui motus in appetendis quae secundum naturam sunt, fugiendisque contrariis? Nonne ista omnia, non per illam incommutabilem sapientiam, sed per locorum ac temporum historiam quaesierunt, et ab aliis experta atque conscripta crediderunt?
16. 21. These also reprehend us for believing the resurrection of the flesh, and wish themselves rather to be believed even about these matters; as though, because they were able to understand the most lofty and unchangeable substance through the things that were made, they were on that account to be consulted about the turning of changeable things, or about the interwoven order of the ages. For because they argue most truly, and persuade by most certain proofs, that all temporal things come to be by eternal reasons, were they on that account able to perceive in those very reasons, or to gather from them, how many kinds of animals there are, what the seeds of each are at their beginnings, what their measure in growth, what numbers run through conceptions, through births, through ages, through deaths, what motions there are in seeking the things that are according to nature and fleeing their contraries? Did they not seek out all these things, not through that unchangeable wisdom, but through the history of places and times, and believe them as experienced and recorded by others?
deTrin.4.16.21Quo minus mirandum est, nullo modo eos potuisse prolixiorum saeculorum seriem vestigare, et quamdam metam huius excursus, quo tamquam fluvio genus decurrit humanum, atque inde conversionem ad suum cuique debitum terminum.
So much the less is it to be wondered at that they were in no way able to trace out the series of the more extended ages, and a certain goal of this course by which, as by a river, the human race runs down, and then the turning of each to its own due end.
deTrin.4.16.21Ista enim nec historici scribere potuerunt longe futura et a nullo experta atque narrata. Nec isti philosophi ceteris meliores in illis summis aeternisque rationibus intellectu talia contemplati sunt: alioquin non eiusdem generis praeterita quae potuerunt historici inquirerent, sed potius et futura praenoscerent; quod qui potuerunt, ab eis vates, a nostris prophetae appellati sunt. Quamquam et Prophetarum nomen non omnino alienum est a litteris eorum.
For these things neither could the historians write—things far in the future and experienced and narrated by no one—nor did these philosophers, better than the rest, contemplate such things by understanding in those highest and eternal reasons; otherwise they would not inquire into past things of the same kind which the historians were able to, but would rather also foreknow future things; and those who could do this were called by them seers, by ours prophets. Although the name of prophets too is not altogether foreign to their writings.
deTrin.4.16.2117. 22. Sed plurimum interest, utrum experimento praeteritorum futura coniciantur; sicut medici multa praevidendo, etiam litteris mandaverunt, quae ipsi experta notaverant; sicut deniquae agricolae vel etiam nautae multa praenuntiant (talia enim si ex longis intervallis temporum fiant, divinationes putantur);
17. 22. But it makes a great difference whether future things are conjectured from experience of past ones—as physicians, by foreseeing many things, have even committed to writing what they themselves had noted from experience; as, in short, farmers or even sailors foretell many things (for such things, if they happen at long intervals of time, are thought to be divinations);
deTrin.4.17.22an vero iam ventura praecesserint, et longe visa venientia nuntientur pro acuto sensu videntium, quod cum faciunt aereae potestates divinare creduntur; tamquam si quisquam de montis vertice aliquem longe videat venientem, et proxime in campo habitantibus ante nuntiet;
or whether things now to come have gone before, and, seen from afar as coming, are announced according to the keen sense of those who see—which, when the airy powers do it, they are believed to divine; as if someone from a mountaintop should see someone coming from afar, and announce it beforehand to those dwelling nearby on the plain;
deTrin.4.17.22an ab angelis sanctis, quibus ea Deus per Verbum Sapientiamque suam indicat, ubi et futura et praeterita stant, vel quibusdam praenuntientur hominibus, vel ab eis audita rursus ad alios homines transmittantur;
or whether they are foretold by the holy angels, to whom God indicates them through his Word and Wisdom, where both future and past things stand—whether they be foretold to certain men, or, heard from the angels, be in turn passed on to other men;
deTrin.4.17.22an ipsorum hominum quorumdam mentes in tantum evehantur Spiritu Sancto, ut non per angelos, sed per se ipsas futurorum stantes causas in ipsa summa rerum arce conspiciant. Audiunt enim ista et aeriae potestates, sive Angelis ea nuntiantibus, sive hominibus; et tantum audiunt, quantum opus esse ille iudicat, cui subiecta sunt omnia.
or whether the minds of certain men themselves are so far raised up by the Holy Spirit that they behold, not through angels but through themselves, the standing causes of future things in the very highest citadel of things. For the airy powers also hear these things, whether the angels announce them, or men; and they hear only so much as he judges to be needful, to whom all things are subject.
deTrin.4.17.22Multa etiam praedicuntur instinctu quodam et impulso spiritu nescientium: sicut Caiphas, nescivit quid dixit, sed cum esset pontifex prophetavit.
Many things too are foretold by a certain instinct and impulse of spirit by those who do not know: as Caiaphas did not know what he said, but, being high priest, he prophesied.
deTrin.4.17.2217. 23. Ergo de successionibus saeculorum et de resurrectione mortuorum philosophos nec illos consulere debemus, qui Creatoris aeternitatem, in quo vivimus, movemur et sumus, quantum potuerunt intellexerunt, quia per ea quae facta sunt cognoscentes Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt, aut gratias egerunt, sed dicentes se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt.
17. 23. Therefore about the successions of the ages and about the resurrection of the dead we ought not to consult even those philosophers who understood, so far as they were able, the eternity of the Creator in whom we live, move, and have our being, because, knowing God through the things that were made, they did not glorify him as God, nor give thanks, but, saying that they were wise, they were made fools.
deTrin.4.17.23Et cum idonei non essent, in aeternitatem spiritalis incommutabilisque naturae aciem mentis tam constanter infigere, ut in ipsa sapientia Creatoris atque Rectoris universitatis viderent volumina saeculorum, quae ibi iam essent et semper essent, hic autem futura essent ut non essent; atque ut ibi viderent conversiones in melius, non solum animorum, sed etiam corporum humanorum usque ad sui modi perfectionem;
And since they were not fit to fix the edge of their mind so steadily upon the eternity of the spiritual and unchangeable nature as to see, in the very wisdom of the Creator and Ruler of the universe, the volumes of the ages, which were already there and always were, but here were future so as not yet to be; and as to see there the conversions to the better, not only of souls but also of human bodies, even to the perfection of their proper measure;
deTrin.4.17.23cum ergo ad haec ibi videnda nullo modo essent idonei, ne ad illud quidem digni habiti sunt, ut eis ista per sanctos angelos nuntiarentur; sive forinsecus per sensus corporis, sive interioribus revelationibus in spiritu expressis; sicut patribus nostris vera pietate praeditis haec demonstrata sunt, qui ea praedicentes, vel de praesentibus signis vel de proximis rebus, ita ut praedixerant, factis fidem facientes, auctoritatem cui de longe futuris usque in saeculi finem crederetur, habere meruerunt.
since, then, they were in no way fit to see these things there, they were not even held worthy that these things should be announced to them through the holy angels—whether outwardly through the senses of the body, or by inner revelations expressed in the spirit; as these things were demonstrated to our fathers, endowed with true piety, who, foretelling them, by making good faith—through present signs or through near things, which came to pass just as they had foretold—deserved to have authority for being believed about things far in the future, even to the end of the age.
deTrin.4.17.23Potestates autem aereae superbae atque fallaces, etiam si quaedam de societate et civitate sanctorum et de vero Mediatore a sanctis Prophetis vel angelis audita per suos vates dixisse reperiuntur, id egerunt, ut per haec aliena vera etiam fideles Dei, si possent, ad sua falsa traducerent. (Cf. Matt 24:24) Deus autem per nescientes id egit, ut veritas undique resonaret, fidelibus in adiutorium, impiis in testimonium.
But the proud and deceitful airy powers, even if they are found to have said through their seers certain things about the fellowship and city of the saints and about the true Mediator, heard from the holy prophets or angels, did this in order that, through these alien truths, they might lead astray, if they could, even the faithful of God to their own falsehoods. (See Matt 24:24) But God, through those who did not know, brought it about that the truth should resound on every side, for the help of the faithful, for the testimony against the ungodly.
deTrin.4.17.2318. 24. Quia igitur ad aeterna capessenda idonei non eramus, sordesque peccatorum nos praegravabant temporalium rerum amore contractae, et de propagine mortalitatis tamquam naturaliter inolitae, purgandi eramus. Purgari autem ut contemperaremur aeternis, non nisi per temporalia possemus, qualibus iam contemperati tenebamur. Sanitas enim a morbo plurimum distat: sed media curatio, nisi morbo congruat, non perducit ad sanitatem. Inutilia temporalia decipiunt aegrotos, utilia temporalia suscipiunt sanandos, et traiciunt ad aeterna sanatos.
18. 24. Since, therefore, we were not fit to lay hold of eternal things, and the filth of sins weighed us down—filth contracted by the love of temporal things, and as it were naturally ingrained from the propagation of mortality—we had to be purified. But we could not be purified, so as to be attuned to eternal things, except through temporal things, by which, attuned to them, we were already held. For health differs greatly from disease; but the intermediate cure, unless it accords with the disease, does not lead to health. Useless temporal things deceive the sick; useful temporal things take up those to be healed, and carry across to eternal things those who are healed.
deTrin.4.18.24Mens autem rationalis sicut purgata contemplationem debet rebus aeternis, sic purganda, temporalibus fidem. Dixit quidam et illorum qui quondam apud Graecos sapientes habiti sunt: quantum ad id quod ortum est aeternitas valet, tantum ad fidem veritas. Plato, Timaeus 29c; cf. Cicero, Timaeus 3.8; Augustine, Agreement of the Evangelists 1.35.53. Et profecto est vera sententia. Quod enim nos temporale dicimus, hoc ille quod ortum est appellavit. Ex quo genere etiam nos sumus, non tantum secundum corpus, sed etiam secundum animi mutabilitatem. Non enim proprie vocatur aeternum, quod aliqua ex parte mutatur. In quantum igitur mutabiles sumus, in tantum ab aeternitate distamus.
But the rational mind, just as, when purified, it owes contemplation to eternal things, so, when to be purified, it owes faith to temporal things. One even of those who once among the Greeks were held to be wise said: as much as eternity avails for that which has arisen, so much does truth avail for faith. Plato, Timaeus 29c; cf. Cicero, Timaeus 3.8; Augustine, Agreement of the Evangelists 1.35.53. And assuredly it is a true saying. For what we call temporal, he called that which has arisen. Of which kind we too are, not only according to the body, but also according to the changeableness of the mind. For that is not properly called eternal which is in some part changed. In so far, then, as we are changeable, in so far do we stand apart from eternity.
deTrin.4.18.24Promittitur autem nobis vita aeterna per veritatem, a cuius perspicuitate rursus tantum distat fides nostra, quantum ab aeternitate mortalitas. Nunc ergo adhibemus fidem rebus temporaliter gestis propter nos, et per ipsam mundamur; (Cf. Acts 15:9, a key text for Augustine’s conception of faith and its function) ut cum ad speciem venerimus, quemadmodum succedit fidei veritas, ita mortalitati succedat aeternitas. Quapropter quoniam fides nostra fiet veritas, cum ad id quod nobis credentibus promittitur pervenerimus: promittitur autem nobis vita aeterna; et dixit Veritas, non quae fiet sicut futura est fides nostra, sed quae semper est Veritas, quia ibi est aeternitas; dixit ergo Veritas, haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te unum verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum; cum fides nostra videndo fiet veritas, tunc mortalitatem nostram commutatam tenebit aeternitas. (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12; John 8:32)
But eternal life is promised us through truth, from whose clarity our faith again stands as far apart as mortality from eternity. Now, therefore, we apply faith to things done in time for our sake, and through it we are cleansed; (See Acts 15:9, a key text for Augustine’s conception of faith and its function) so that when we come to sight, just as truth succeeds to faith, so eternity may succeed to mortality. Wherefore, since our faith will become truth when we have come to that which is promised to us who believe—and eternal life is promised to us; and the Truth said, not that which will come to be as our faith is future, but which always is Truth, because there is eternity—the Truth, then, said, but this is eternal life, that they may know you the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent; when our faith, by seeing, becomes truth, then eternity will hold our mortality changed. (See 1 Cor 13:12; John 8:32)
deTrin.4.18.24Quod donec fiat, et ut fiat, quia rebus ortis accommodamus fidem credulitatis, sicut in aeternis speramus veritatem contemplationis, ne fides mortalis vitae dissonaret a veritate aeternae vitae, ipsa Veritas Patri coaeterna de terra orta est, cum Filius Dei sic venit ut fieret filius hominis, et ipse in se exciperet fidem nostram, qua nos perduceret ad veritatem suam, qui sic suscepit mortalitatem nostram, ut non amitteret aeternitatem suam. Quantum enim ad id quod ortum est aeternitas valet, tantum ad fidem veritas. Plato, Timaeus 29c.
Until this comes about, and that it may come about, since we accommodate the faith of believing to things that have arisen, just as in eternal things we hope for the truth of contemplation, lest the faith of mortal life should sound out of tune with the truth of eternal life, the very Truth, coeternal with the Father, arose from the earth, when the Son of God came so as to become the son of man, and himself took up into himself our faith, by which he might lead us to his truth—he who so took up our mortality that he did not lose his eternity. For as much as eternity avails for that which has arisen, so much does truth avail for faith. Plato, Timaeus 29c.
deTrin.4.18.24Ita ergo nos purgari oportebat, ut ille nobis fieret “ortus” qui maneret aeternus, ne alter nobis esset in fide, alter in veritate. Nec ab eo quod orti sumus ad aeterna transire possemus, nisi aeterno per ortum nostrum nobis sociato ad aeternitatem ipsius traiceremur.
Thus, then, we had to be purified in such a way that he should become for us "one who has arisen" who yet remained eternal, lest there be for us one in faith and another in truth. Nor could we pass from that by which we have arisen to eternal things, unless, the eternal one being joined to us through our arising, we were carried across to his eternity.
deTrin.4.18.24Nunc itaque illuc quodam modo secuta est fides nostra, quo ascendit in quem credidimus, “ortus,” mortuus, resuscitatus, assumptus. Horum quattuor, duo priora noveramus in nobis; scimus enim homines et oriri et mori: duo autem reliqua, id est resuscitari et assumi, iuste in nobis futura speramus, quia in illo facta credidimus. Itaque in illo quia et id quod ortum erat transiit ad aeternitatem, transiturum est et nostrum cum fides pervenerit ad veritatem.
Now, therefore, our faith has in a certain way followed thither, whither he ascended in whom we have believed: "arisen," dead, raised again, taken up. Of these four, the two former we knew in ourselves; for we know that men both arise and die: but the two remaining, that is, to be raised again and to be taken up, we justly hope will be in us, because we have believed they were done in him. And so, in him, because that which had arisen also passed over to eternity, our own will pass over too, when faith has reached truth.
deTrin.4.18.24Iam enim credentibus, ut in verbo fidei manerent, et inde ad veritatem, ac per hoc ad aeternitatem perducti a morte liberarentur, ita loquitur: si manseritis in verbo meo, vere discipuli mei estis. Cf. John 8:31. PL: eritis, “will be.” Et quasi quaererent, “quo fructu?” secutus ait: et cognoscetis veritatem. Et rursus quasi dicerent, “quid prodest mortalibus veritas?” Et veritas, inquit, liberabit vos. Unde, nisi a morte, a corruptione, a mutabilitate? Veritas quippe immortalis, incorrupta, incommutabilis permanet. Vera autem immortalitas, vera incorruptibilitas, vera incommutabilitas, ipsa est aeternitas. (Cf. Ps 117:2)
For to those now believing, that they might remain in the word of faith, and from there be led to truth, and through this to eternity, and be freed from death, he speaks thus: if you remain in my word, you are truly my disciples. See John 8:31. PL: eritis, “will be.” And as though they were asking, "with what fruit?" he goes on to say: and you shall know the truth. And again, as though they were saying, "what does truth profit mortals?" and the truth, he says, shall set you free. From what, if not from death, from corruption, from changeableness? For truth remains immortal, incorrupt, unchangeable. But true immortality, true incorruptibility, true unchangeableness, this is eternity itself. (See Ps 117:2 (116:2))
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deTrin.4.18.24
19. 25. Ecce ad quod missus est Filius Dei; immo vero ecce quid est missum esse Filium Dei? Quaecumque propter faciendam fidem, qua mundaremur ad contemplandam veritatem, in rebus “ortis” ab aeternitate prolatis et ad aeternitatem relatis temporaliter gesta sunt, aut testimonia missionis huius fuerunt, aut ipsa missio Filii Dei.
19. 25. Behold that for which the Son of God was sent; nay rather, behold what it is for the Son of God to have been sent. Whatever things, for the producing of the faith by which we might be cleansed to contemplate the truth, were done in time among things "arisen"—brought forth from eternity and referred back to eternity—were either testimonies of this mission, or the very mission of the Son of God.
deTrin.4.19.25Sed testimonia quaedam venturum praenuntiaverunt, quaedam venisse testata sunt. Factum quippe creaturam per quem facta est omnis creatura, omnem creaturam testem habere oportebat. Nisi enim multis missis praedicaretur unus, non multis dimissis teneretur unus. The Latin here is very obscure. The Spanish BAC translation renders the apodosis, “many would not have been set free, one remaining bound,” thus interpreting the second unus of the devil. In view of the way Augustine has throughout been identifying the “One” with the Word, the translator finds this quite unacceptable and takes the second unus to have the same reference as the first unus. Multis dimissis, however, could also mean, and probably does carry the overtone of meaning, “many sins having been forgiven.” But the translator prefers to interpret it as primarily signifying our liberation from enslavement to “the many.” Et nisi talia essent testimonia quae parvis magna esse viderentur, non crederetur, ut magnos faceret magnus, qui ad parvos missus est parvus.
But some testimonies foretold that he would come, some bore witness that he had come. For it was fitting that he through whom every creature was made, made a creature, should have every creature as witness. For unless the one were proclaimed by the sending of many, the one would not be held fast by the dismissing of many. The Latin here is very obscure. The Spanish BAC translation renders the apodosis, “many would not have been set free, one remaining bound,” thus interpreting the second unus of the devil. In view of the way Augustine has throughout been identifying the “One” with the Word, the translator finds this quite unacceptable and takes the second unus to have the same reference as the first unus. Multis dimissis, however, could also mean, and probably does carry the overtone of meaning, “many sins having been forgiven.” But the translator prefers to interpret it as primarily signifying our liberation from enslavement to “the many.” And unless the testimonies were such that to the little they would seem great, it would not be believed that the great one, sent little to the little, might make them great.
deTrin.4.19.25Incomparabiliter enim maiora Filii Dei facta sunt caelum et terra et omnia quae in eis sunt, quia omnia per ipsum facta sunt, quam signa et portenta quae in eius testimonium proruperunt. Sed tamen homines, ut haec magna per eum facta parvi crederent, illa parva tamquam magna tremuerunt.
For incomparably greater works of the Son of God are heaven and earth and all things that are in them, made, since all things were made through him, than the signs and wonders that burst forth in testimony of him. But yet men, that they might, being little, believe these great things to have been made through him, trembled at those little things as though they were great.
deTrin.4.19.2519. 26. Cum ergo venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere, factum sub Lege; usque adeo parvum, ut factum; eo itaque missum, quo factum. Si ergo maior mittit minorem, fatemur et nos factum minorem, et in tantum minorem in quantum factum, et in tantum factum in quantum missum. Misit enim Filium suum factum ex muliere, per quem tamen quia facta sunt omnia, non solum priusquam factus mitteretur, sed priusquam essent omnia, eumdem mittenti confitemur aequalem, quem dicimus missum minorem.
19. 26. When, therefore, the fullness of time came, God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the Law; so far little, that he was made; sent, therefore, in that he was made. If, then, the greater sends the lesser, we too confess that he was made lesser, and lesser in so far as he was made, and made in so far as he was sent. For he sent his Son made of a woman, through whom nonetheless, because all things were made, not only before he was sent as made, but before all things were, we confess the same one equal to the sender, whom we call lesser as sent.
deTrin.4.19.25Quomodo ergo ante istam plenitudinem temporis, qua eum mitti oportebat, priusquam missus esset videri a Patribus potuit, cum eis angelica quaedam visa demonstrarentur, (Cf. Acts 7:38; Exod 20) quando nec iam missus sicut aequalis est Patri videbatur?
How, then, before that fullness of time in which he had to be sent, before he was sent, could he be seen by the fathers, when certain angelic visions were shown to them, (See Acts 7:38; Exod 20) when not even, now sent, was he seen as he is equal to the Father?
deTrin.4.19.25Unde enim dicit Philippo, a quo utique sicut a ceteris, et ab ipsis a quibus crucifixus est in carne videbatur, tanto tempore vobiscum sum, et non cognovistis me? Philippe, qui me vidit, vidit et Patrem; nisi quia videbatur, et non videbatur? Videbatur sicut missus factus fuerat; non videbatur sicut per eum omnia facta erant.
For why does he say to Philip, by whom certainly, as by the rest, and by the very men by whom he was crucified, he was seen in the flesh, so long a time I am with you, and you have not known me? Philip, he who has seen me has seen the Father also—unless because he was seen, and was not seen? He was seen as he had been made, sent; he was not seen as all things were made through him.
deTrin.4.19.25Aut unde etiam illud dicit, qui habet mandata mea et servat ea, ipse est qui diligit me; et qui diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo, et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei me ipsum; cum esset manifestus ante oculos hominum: nisi quia carnem, quod Verbum in plenitudine temporis (Cf. Gal 4:4) factum erat, (Cf. John 1:14) suscipiendam nostrae fidei porrigebat; ipsum autem Verbum per quod omnia facta erant, purgatae per fidem menti contemplandum in aeternitate servabat?
Or why does he also say that, he who has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me; and he who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him—when he was manifest before the eyes of men—unless because he was holding out to our faith the flesh, which the Word had become in the fullness of time, (See Gal 4:4) to be taken up, (See John 1:14) but was keeping the Word himself, through whom all things were made, to be contemplated in eternity by the mind purified through faith?
deTrin.4.19.2520. 27. Si autem secundum hoc missus a Patre Filius dicitur, quia ille Pater est, ille Filius, nullo modo impedit ut credamus aequalem Patri esse Filium et consubstantialem et coaeternum, et tamen a Patre missum Filium. Non quia ille maior est, ille minor: sed quia ille Pater, ille Filius; ille Genitor, ille Genitus; ille a quo est qui mittitur, ille qui est ab eo qui mittit. Filius enim a Patre est, non Pater a Filio.
20. 27. But if the Son is said to be sent by the Father for this reason, that the one is the Father, the other the Son, it in no way hinders us from believing that the Son is equal to the Father and consubstantial and coeternal, and yet that the Son was sent by the Father. Not because the one is greater, the other lesser, but because the one is Father, the other Son; the one Begetter, the other Begotten; the one he from whom is he who is sent, the other he who is from him who sends. For the Son is from the Father, not the Father from the Son.
deTrin.4.20.27Secundum hoc iam potest intellegi, non tantum ideo dici missus Filius quia Verbum caro factum est, sed ideo missus ut Verbum caro fieret, et per praesentiam corporalem illa quae scripta sunt operaretur; id est, ut non tantum homo missus intellegatur quod Verbum factum est, sed et Verbum missum ut homo fieret: quia non secundum imparem potestatem vel substantiam vel aliquid quod in eo Patri non sit aequale missus est; sed secundum id quod Filius a Patre est, non Pater a Filio.
According to this it can now be understood that the Son is said to be sent not only because the Word was made flesh, but because he was sent that the Word might be made flesh, and through his bodily presence might work the things that are written; that is, that not only is the man understood to be sent, which the Word became, but also the Word sent that he might become man: because he was not sent according to an unequal power or substance, or anything in him that is not equal to the Father, but according to that by which the Son is from the Father, not the Father from the Son.
deTrin.4.20.27Verbum enim Patris est Filius, quod et Sapientia eius dicitur. Quid ergo mirum si mittitur, non quia inaequalis est Patri, sed quia est manatio quaedam claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera? Ibi autem quod manat et de quo manat unius eiusdemque substantiae est. Neque enim sicut aqua de foramine terrae aut lapidis manat; sed sicut lux de luce.
For the Son is the Word of the Father, who is also called his Wisdom. What wonder, then, if he is sent, not because he is unequal to the Father, but because he is a certain pure emanation of the glory of almighty God? But there what emanates and that from which it emanates is of one and the same substance. For it does not emanate as water from a hole in the earth or a rock, but as light from light.
deTrin.4.20.27Nam quod dictum est, Candor est enim lucis aeternae; quid aliud dictum est, quam, Lux est lucis aeternae? Candor quippe lucis, quid nisi lux est? Et ideo coaeterna luci, de qua lux est. Maluit autem dicere, Candor lucis, quam, “Lux lucis,” ne obscurior putaretur ista quae manat quam illa de qua manat. Cum enim auditur Candor eius esse ista, facilius est ut per hanc lucere illa, quam haec minus lucere credatur.
For what was said, for it is the brightness of eternal light—what else was said than, It is the light of eternal light? For the brightness of light, what is it but light? And therefore coeternal with the light of which it is the light. But he preferred to say, the brightness of light, rather than "Light of light," lest this that emanates be thought darker than that from which it emanates. For when one hears that this is its brightness, it is easier that through this one believe that to shine, than that this one shine less.
deTrin.4.20.27Sed quia cavendum non erat, ne minor lux illa putaretur quae istam genuit (hoc enim nullus umquam haereticus ausus est dicere, nec credendum est aliquem ausurum), illi cogitationi occurrit Scriptura, qua posset videri obscurior lux ista quae manat, quam illa de qua manat: quam suspicionem tulit, cum ait, Candor est illius, id est, lucis aeternae; atque ita ostendit aequalem. Si enim haec minor est, obscuritas illius est, non Candor illius. Si autem maior est, non ex ea manat: non enim vinceret de qua genita est. Quia ergo ex illa manat, non est maior quam illa: quia vero non obscuritas illius, sed Candor illius est, non est minor; aequalis est ergo.
But because there was no need to take care lest that light which begot this one be thought lesser (for this no heretic ever dared to say, nor is it to be believed that anyone will dare), Scripture met that thought by which this light that emanates might seem darker than that from which it emanates: which suspicion it removed when it said, it is the brightness of that, that is, of eternal light; and so it showed it to be equal. For if this is lesser, it is the darkness of that, not the brightness of that. But if it is greater, it does not emanate from that: for it would not surpass that from which it was begotten. Because, then, it emanates from that, it is not greater than that; but because it is not the darkness of that, but the brightness of that, it is not lesser; it is therefore equal.
deTrin.4.20.27Neque hoc movere debet, quia dicta est manatio quaedam claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera: tamquam ipsa non sit omnipotens, sed omnipotentis manatio. Mox enim de illa dicitur, et cum sit una, omnia potest. Quis est autem omnipotens, nisi qui omnia potest? Ab illo itaque mittitur, a quo emanat. Sic enim expetitur ab illo qui amabat eam et desiderabat. Emitte, inquit, illam de sanctis caelis tuis, et mitte illam a sede magnitudinis tuae, ut mecum sit, et mecum laboret, id est, “doceat me laborare, ne laborem.” It is a better pun in Latin than in English, but even in English one uses the word “labor” to mean “have difficulty” as in labored jokes or cars laboring as they go uphill. Labores enim eius virtutes sunt. Sed aliter mittitur ut sit cum homine, aliter missa est ut ipsa sit homo. In animas enim sanctas se transfert, atque amicos Dei et prophetas constituit, sicut etiam implet sanctos angelos, et omnia talibus ministeriis congrua per eos operatur. Cum autem venit plenitudo temporis missa est, non ut impleret angelos, nec ut esset angelus, nisi in quantum consilium Patris (Cf. Isa 9:6) annuntiabat, quod et ipsius erat; nec ut esset cum hominibus aut in hominibus, hoc enim et antea in Patribus et Prophetis; sed ut ipsum Verbum caro fieret, id est, homo fieret: in quo futuro revelato sacramento, etiam eorum sapientium atque sanctorum salus esset, qui priusquam ipse de Virgine nasceretur, de mulieribus nati sunt, et in quo facto atque praedicato salus sit omnium credentium, sperantium, diligentium. Hoc enim magnum pietatis est sacramentum, quod manifestatum est in carne, iustificatum est in spiritu, apparuit angelis, praedicatum est in gentibus, creditum est in mundo, assumptum est in gloria.
Nor ought this to disturb us, that it was called a certain pure emanation of the glory of almighty God: as though it were not itself almighty, but the emanation of the Almighty. For soon it is said of it, and being one, it can do all things. But who is almighty except him who can do all things? From him, therefore, it is sent, from whom it emanates. For thus it is sought from him by the one who loved it and desired it. Send it forth, he says, from your holy heavens, and send it from the seat of your greatness, that it may be with me and labor with me—that is, "let it teach me to labor, lest I labor." It is a better pun in Latin than in English, but even in English one uses the word “labor” to mean “have difficulty” as in labored jokes or cars laboring as they go uphill. For its labors are virtues. But it is sent in one way that it may be with man, in another it was sent that it may itself be man. For it transfers itself into holy souls, and makes them friends of God and prophets, just as it also fills the holy angels, and works through them all things suited to such ministries. But when the fullness of time came, it was sent, not to fill angels, nor to be an angel, except insofar as it announced the counsel of the Father, (See Isa 9:6) which was also its own; nor to be with men or in men, for this it had been even before in the fathers and prophets; but that the Word itself might become flesh, that is, might become man: in whom, this future sacrament being revealed, there should be salvation even of those wise and holy ones who, before he himself was born of the Virgin, were born of women; and in whom, this being done and proclaimed, there is salvation of all who believe, hope, and love. For this is the great sacrament of piety, which was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit, appeared to angels, preached among the nations, believed in the world, taken up in glory.
deTrin.4.20.2720. 28. Ab illo ergo mittitur Dei Verbum, cuius est Verbum; ab illo mittitur de quo natum est: mittit qui genuit, mittitur quod genitum est. Et tunc unicuique mittitur, cum a quoquam cognoscitur atque percipitur, quantum cognosci et percipi potest pro captu vel proficientis in Deum, vel perfectae in Deo animae rationalis. Non ergo eo ipso quo de Patre natus est, missus dicitur Filius: sed vel eo quod apparuit huic mundo Verbum caro factum; unde dicit, exivi a Patre, et veni in hunc mundum: vel eo quod ex tempore cuiusquam mente percipitur, sicut dictum est, mitte illam, ut mecum sit, et mecum laboret. Quod ergo natum est ab aeterno in The PL omits the preposition in, giving the sense: “what is born from eternity is eternal.” aeternum est: Candor est enim lucis aeternae. Quod autem mittitur ex tempore, a quoquam cognoscitur.
20. 28. By him, therefore, the Word of God is sent, whose Word it is; by him it is sent from whom it is born: he who begot sends, that which is begotten is sent. And it is sent to each one when it is known and perceived by anyone, as far as it can be known and perceived according to the capacity of the rational soul, whether making progress toward God or perfected in God. Not, then, by the very fact that he was born of the Father is the Son said to be sent; but either by the fact that the Word made flesh appeared to this world—whence he says, I came forth from the Father, and came into this world—or by the fact that he is perceived in time by anyone's mind, as it was said, send it, that it may be with me and labor with me. That, then, which is born from eternity is eternal: The PL omits the preposition in, giving the sense: “what is born from eternity is eternal.” for it is the brightness of eternal light. But that which is sent in time is known by someone.
deTrin.4.20.28Sed cum in carne manifestatus est Filius Dei, in hunc mundum missus est, in plenitudine temporis, factus ex femina. Quia enim in sapientia Dei non poterat mundus cognoscere per sapientiam Deum; quoniam lux lucet in tenebris, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt: placuit Deo per stultitiam praedicationis salvos facere credentes, ut Verbum caro fieret, et habitaret in nobis. Cum autem ex tempore cuiusque profectus mente percipitur, mitti quidem dicitur, sed non in hunc mundum: neque enim sensibiliter apparet, id est, corporeis sensibus praesto est. Quia et nos secundum quod mente aliquid aeternum, quantum possumus, capimus, non in hoc mundo sumus: et omnium iustorum spiritus, etiam adhuc in hac carne viventium, in quantum divina sapiunt, non sunt in hoc mundo.
But when the Son of God was manifested in the flesh, he was sent into this world, in the fullness of time, made of a woman. For because in the wisdom of God the world could not know God through wisdom, since the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it, it pleased God through the foolishness of preaching to save those who believe, that the Word might become flesh and dwell among us. But when, in time, he is perceived by the mind of someone making progress, he is indeed said to be sent, but not into this world: for he does not appear sensibly, that is, he is not present to the bodily senses. For we too, according as we grasp something eternal with the mind, as far as we can, are not in this world; and the spirits of all the righteous, even those still living in this flesh, insofar as they are wise about divine things, are not in this world.
deTrin.4.20.28Sed Pater cum ex tempore a quoquam cognoscitur, non dicitur missus: non enim habet de quo sit, aut ex quo procedat. Sapientia quippe dicit, ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi; et de Spiritu Sancto dicitur, a Patre procedit: Pater vero, a nullo.
But the Father, when he is known in time by anyone, is not said to be sent: for he has no one from whom he is, or from whom he proceeds. For Wisdom says, I came forth from the mouth of the Most High; and of the Holy Spirit it is said, he proceeds from the Father: but the Father from no one.
deTrin.4.20.2820. 29. Sicut ergo Pater genuit, Filius genitus est: ita Pater misit, Filius missus est. Sed quemadmodum qui Genuit et qui Genitus est, ita et qui Misit et qui Missus est unum sunt; quia Pater et Filius unum sunt. (Cf. John 10:30) Ita etiam Spiritus Sanctus unum cum eis est; quia haec tria unum sunt. The famous Johannine comma, thought to be an interpolation into the text that may have occurred not long before Augustine’s time. Sicut enim natum esse est Filio, a Patre esse; ita mitti est Filio, cognosci quod ab illo sit. Et sicut Spiritui Sancto donum Dei esse, est a Patre procedere; ita mitti, est cognosci quia ab illo procedat. Nec possumus dicere quod Spiritus Sanctus et a Filio non procedat: neque enim frustra idem Spiritus et Patris et Filii Spiritus dicitur. (Cf. Matt 10:20; Gal 4:6)
20. 29. As, therefore, the Father begot, the Son was begotten, so the Father sent, the Son was sent. But just as he who begot and he who was begotten, so also he who sent and he who was sent are one, because the Father and the Son are one. (See John 10:30) So too the Holy Spirit is one with them, because these three are one. The famous Johannine comma, thought to be an interpolation into the text that may have occurred not long before Augustine’s time. For just as, for the Son, to have been born is to be from the Father, so, for the Son, to be sent is to be known to be from him. And just as, for the Holy Spirit, to be the gift of God is to proceed from the Father, so to be sent is to be known to proceed from him. Nor can we say that the Holy Spirit does not also proceed from the Son: for not in vain is the same Spirit called the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son. (See Matt 10:20; Gal 4:6)
deTrin.4.20.29Nec video quid aliud significare voluerit, cum sufflans in faciem discipulorum ait: “accipite Spiritum Sanctum.” Neque enim flatus ille corporeus, cum sensu corporaliter tangendi procedens ex corpore, substantia Spiritus Sancti fuit; sed demonstratio per congruam significationem, non tantum a Patre, sed et a Filio procedere Spiritum Sanctum. Quis enim dementissimus dixerit, alium fuisse Spiritum quem sufflans dedit, et alium quem post ascensionem suam misit? Unus enim est Spiritus Dei, Spiritus Patris et Filii, Spiritus Sanctus, qui operatur omnia in omnibus. Sed quod bis datus est, dispensatio certe significationis fuit, de qua suo loco, quantum Dominus dederit, disseremus.
Nor do I see what else he meant to signify, when, breathing into the face of the disciples, he said: receive the Holy Spirit. For that corporeal breath, proceeding from the body with the sense of bodily touching, was not the substance of the Holy Spirit; but a demonstration, through a fitting signification, that the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father but also from the Son. For who would be so very mad as to say that the Spirit whom he gave by breathing was one, and the one whom he sent after his ascension another? For the Spirit of God is one, the Spirit of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit, who works all things in all. But that he was given twice was certainly a dispensation of signification, of which in its own place, so far as the Lord shall grant, we shall treat.
deTrin.4.20.29Quod ergo ait Dominus: quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, ostendit Spiritum et Patris et Filii. Quia etiam cum dixisset: quem mittet Pater, addidit, in nomine meo; non tamen dixit: “quem mittet Pater a me,” quemadmodum dixit: quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, videlicet ostendens quod totius divinitatis, vel, si melius dicitur, deitatis, principium Pater est. Qui ergo ex Patre procedit et Filio, ad eum refertur a quo natus est Filius.
What, then, the Lord says, whom I will send to you from the Father, shows the Spirit to be of both the Father and the Son. For also, when he had said, whom the Father will send, he added, in my name; yet he did not say, "whom the Father will send from me," as he said, whom I will send to you from the Father—evidently showing that the Father is the principle of the whole divinity, or, if it is better so called, the deity. He, then, who proceeds from the Father and the Son is referred to him from whom the Son was born.
deTrin.4.20.29Et quod dicit Evangelista: Spiritus nondum erat datus, quia Iesus nondum erat glorificatus: quomodo intellegitur, nisi quia certa illa Spiritus Sancti datio vel missio post clarificationem Christi futura erat, qualis numquam antea fuerat? Neque enim antea nulla erat, sed talis non fuerat. Si enim antea Spiritus Sanctus non dabatur, quo impleti Prophetae locuti sunt?
And what the Evangelist says, the Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified—how is it understood, except that that certain giving or sending of the Holy Spirit was to be after the glorification of Christ, such as had never been before? For it was not that there had been none before, but that there had not been such a one. For if the Holy Spirit was not given before, by whom, when filled, did the prophets speak?
deTrin.4.20.29Cum aperte Scriptura dicat, et multis locis ostendat, Spiritu Sancto eos locutos fuisse: cum et de Ioanne Baptista dictum sit, Spiritu Sancto replebitur iam inde ab utero matris suae; et Spiritu Sancto repletus Zacharias invenitur pater eius, ut de illo talia diceret; et Spiritu Sancto (Cf. Luke 1:67) Maria, ut talia de Domino quem gestabat utero, praedicaret; (Cf. Luke 1:41–79) Spiritu Sancto Simeon et Anna, ut magnitudinem Christi parvuli agnoscerent: (Cf. Luke 2:25–38)
Since Scripture says openly, and shows in many places, that they spoke by the Holy Spirit: since also of John the Baptist it was said, he shall be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb; and Zechariah his father is found filled with the Holy Spirit, that he might say such things of him; and Mary by the Holy Spirit, (See Luke 1:67) that she might proclaim such things of the Lord whom she bore in her womb; (See Luke 1:41–79) Simeon and Anna by the Holy Spirit, that they might recognize the greatness of the infant Christ: (See Luke 2:25–38)
deTrin.4.20.29quomodo ergo Spiritus nondum erat datus, quia Iesus nondum erat clarificatus; nisi quia illa datio, vel donatio, vel missio Spiritus Sancti habitura erat quamdam proprietatem suam in ipso adventu, qualis antea numquam fuit? Nusquam enim legimus, linguis quas non noverant homines locutos, veniente in se Spiritu Sancto, sicut tunc factum est, cum oporteret eius adventum signis sensibilibus demonstrari, ut ostenderetur totum orbem terrarum atque omnes gentes in linguis variis constitutas, credituras in Christum per donum Spiritus Sancti; ut impleretur quod in Psalmo canitur, non sunt loquelae neque sermones, quorum non audiantur voces eorum; in omnem terram exivit sonus eorum, et in fines orbis terrae verba eorum.
how, then, was the Spirit not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified, except that that giving, or bestowal, or sending of the Holy Spirit was to have a certain property of its own in his very coming, such as had never been before? For nowhere do we read that men spoke in tongues they did not know when the Holy Spirit came upon them, as happened then, when it was fitting that his coming be demonstrated by sensible signs, that it might be shown that the whole world and all the nations, set in their various tongues, would believe in Christ through the gift of the Holy Spirit; that there might be fulfilled what is sung in the Psalm, there are no utterances nor words whose voices are not heard; their sound went out into all the earth, and their words to the ends of the world.
deTrin.4.20.2920. 30. Verbo itaque Dei ad unitatem personae copulatus, et quodam modo commixtus est homo, cum veniente plenitudine temporis missus est in hunc mundum factus ex femina Filius Dei, ut esset et Filius hominis propter filios hominum. (Cf. John 3:17, 16:28; Matt 14:33, 16:16; Mark 1:1, 3:12; Luke 1:35, 4:41) Hanc personam angelica natura figurare antea potuit, ut praenuntiaret; non expropriare, ut ipsa esset.
20. 30. Man, therefore, was coupled to the Word of God into a unity of person, and in a certain way compounded with him, when, the fullness of time coming, the Son of God was sent into this world, made of a woman, that he might be also the Son of man on account of the sons of men. (See John 3:17, 16:28; Matt 14:33, 16:16; Mark 1:1, 3:12; Luke 1:35, 4:41) This person the angelic nature could before figure, so as to foretell it; not appropriate to itself, so as to be it.
deTrin.4.20.3021. 30. De sensibili autem demonstratione Spiritus Sancti, sive per columbae speciem, (Cf. Matt 3:16) sive per linguas igneas, (Cf. Acts 2:3) cum eius substantiam Patri et Filio coaeternam pariterque incommutabilem subdita et serviens creatura (Cf. Wis 16:24) temporalibus motibus et formis ostenderet, cum ad eius personae unitatem, sicut caro quod Verbum factum est, non copularetur, non audeo dicere nihil tale factum esse antea. Sed plane fidenter dixerim, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum unius eiusdemque substantiae, Deum creatorem, Trinitatem omnipotentem inseparabiliter operari: Cf. Augustine, The Predestination of the Saints 8.13; Ambrose, De Fide 4.6.68. sed ita non posse per longe imparem maximeque corpoream creaturam inseparabiliter demonstrari; sicut per voces nostras, quae utique corporaliter sonant, non possunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, nisi suis et propriis intervallis temporum certa separatione distinctis, quae sui cuiusque vocabuli syllabae occupant, nominari. In sua quippe substantia qua sunt, tria unum sunt, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, nullo temporali motu super omnem creaturam idipsum sine ullis intervallis temporum vel locorum, et simul unum atque idem ab aeternitate in aeternitatem, tamquam ipsa aeternitas quae sine veritate et caritate non est: in meis autem vocibus separati sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, nec simul dici potuerunt, et in litteris visibilibus sua separatim locorum spatia tenuerunt. Et quemadmodum cum memoriam meam et intellectum et voluntatem nomino, singula quidem nomina ad res singulas referuntur, sed tamen ab omnibus tribus singula facta sunt; nullum enim horum trium nominum est, quod non et memoria et intellectus et voluntas mea simul operata sint: ita Trinitas simul operata est et vocem Patris, et carnem Filii, et columbam Spiritus Sancti, cum ad personas singulas haec singula referantur. Qua similitudine utcumque cognoscitur inseparabilem in se ipsa Trinitatem per visibilis creaturae speciem separabiliter demonstrari, et inseparabilem Trinitatis operationem etiam in singulis esse rebus, quae vel ad Patrem, vel ad Filium, vel ad Spiritum Sanctum demonstrandum proprie pertinere dicuntur.
21. 30. But as for the sensible demonstration of the Holy Spirit, whether through the form of a dove (See Matt 3:16) or through the fiery tongues, (See Acts 2:3) when a subject and serving creature (See Wis 16:24) showed by temporal motions and forms his substance, coeternal with the Father and the Son and equally unchangeable—since to the unity of his person, as the flesh which the Word became, it was not coupled—I do not dare to say that nothing such had been done before. But plainly I would say with confidence that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, of one and the same substance, the creator God, the almighty Trinity, work inseparably; but that thus they cannot be inseparably demonstrated through a creature far unequal and especially corporeal; just as, through our voices, which certainly sound corporeally, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit cannot be named except by their own and proper intervals of time, distinguished by a fixed separation, which the syllables of each one's name occupy. For in their substance by which they are, the three are one, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, by no temporal motion above every creature, the selfsame without any intervals of times or places, and at once one and the same from eternity to eternity, as eternity itself, which is not without truth and love: but in my voices the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are separated, nor could they be said at once, and in visible letters they held separately their spaces of place. And just as, when I name my memory and understanding and will, the single names are indeed referred to single things, yet each was made by all three; for there is none of these three names which my memory and understanding and will did not together work: so the Trinity together worked the voice of the Father, and the flesh of the Son, and the dove of the Holy Spirit, although these single things are referred to the single persons. By which likeness it is somehow recognized that the Trinity, inseparable in itself, is separably demonstrated through the form of a visible creature, and that the inseparable working of the Trinity is also in single things which are said to pertain properly to demonstrating either the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit.
deTrin.4.21.3021. 31. Si ergo a me quaeritur, quomodo factae sint vel voces vel sensibiles formae atque species ante incarnationem Verbi Dei, quae hoc futurum praefigurarent: per angelos ea Deum operatum esse respondeo; quod etiam Scripturarum Sanctarum testimoniis, quantum existimo, satis ostendi. Cf. On the Trinity 2.7.12–13; 10.19–21. Si autem quaeritur ipsa incarnatio quomodo facta sit: ipsum Verbum Dei dico carnem factum, id est, hominem factum, This is a caution against the heresy of Apollinaris, who maintained that the Word took the place of a human soul in Christ. non tamen in hoc quod factum est conversum atque mutatum; Cf. Cicero, De Partitionbus Oratoriae 7.23; De Oratore 3.45.177. ita sane factum, ut ibi sit non tantum Verbum Dei et hominis caro, sed etiam rationalis hominis anima, atque hoc totum et Deus dicatur propter Deum et homo propter hominem. Quod si difficile intellegitur, mens fide purgetur, magis magisque abstinendo a peccatis, et bene operando, et orando cum gemitu desideriorum sanctorum, ut per divinum adiutorium proficiendo, et intellegat, et amet.
21. 31. If, then, it is asked of me how the voices or sensible forms and appearances were made before the incarnation of the Word of God, which prefigured this that was to come: I answer that God worked them through angels; which I have also shown sufficiently, as I think, by the testimonies of the holy Scriptures. See On the Trinity 2.7.12–13; 10.19–21. But if it is asked how the incarnation itself was made: I say that the Word of God itself was made flesh, that is, was made man, This is a caution against the heresy of Apollinaris, who maintained that the Word took the place of a human soul in Christ. yet not converted and changed into that which it was made; See Cicero, De Partitionibus Oratoriae 7.23; De Oratore 3.45.177. made so, indeed, that there be there not only the Word of God and the flesh of man, but also the rational soul of man, and this whole be called both God on account of God and man on account of man. But if this is hard to understand, let the mind be purified by faith, more and more abstaining from sins, and working well, and praying with the groaning of holy desires, that, making progress through divine help, it may both understand and love.
deTrin.4.21.31Si autem quaeritur, post incarnationem Verbi, quomodo facta sit vel vox Patris, vel species corporalis qua Spiritus Sanctus demonstratus est: per creaturam quidem facta ista non dubito; sed utrum tantummodo corporalem atque sensibilem, an adhibito spiritu etiam rationali vel intellectuali (hoc enim quibusdam placuit appellare, quod Graeci dicunt νοερός), non quidem ad unitatem personae (quis enim hoc dixerit, ut quidquid illud est creaturae per quod sonuit vox Patris, ita sit Deus Pater, aut quidquid illud est creaturae in quo per columbae speciem (Cf. Matt 3:16) vel per igneas linguas (Cf. Acts 2:3) Spiritus Sanctus demonstratus est, ita sit Spiritus Sanctus, sicut est Dei Filius homo ille qui ex Virgine factus est?) sed tantummodo ad ministerium peragendae significationis, sicut oportuisse Deus iudicavit: an aliquid aliud intellegendum sit, invenire difficile est, et temere affirmare non expedit. Quomodo tamen ista sine rationali vel intellectuali creatura potuerint fieri, non video. Neque adhuc locus est explicare cur ita sentiam, quantum vires Dominus dederit. Prius enim sunt discutienda et refellenda haereticorum argumenta, quae non ex divinis Libris, sed ex rationibus suis proferunt, quibus se vehementer cogere arbitrantur, testimonia Scripturarum quae de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto sunt, ita esse intellegenda ut ipsi volunt. (Augustine here refers to the Arians, to whom he will turn his attention in the next three books)
But if it is asked, after the incarnation of the Word, how the voice of the Father was made, or the corporeal form by which the Holy Spirit was demonstrated: that these were made through a creature I do not doubt; but whether through one only corporeal and sensible, or with a spirit also rational or intellectual applied (for some have been pleased so to call what the Greeks call νοερός)—not indeed to the unity of person (for who would say this, that whatever it is of creature through which the voice of the Father sounded is so God the Father, or whatever it is of creature in which through the form of a dove (See Matt 3:16) or through the fiery tongues (See Acts 2:3) the Holy Spirit was demonstrated is so the Holy Spirit, as the Son of God is that man who was made of the Virgin?), but only to the ministry of carrying through the signification, as God judged it should be—or whether something else is to be understood, is difficult to find, and to affirm rashly is not expedient. Yet how these things could have been done without a rational or intellectual creature, I do not see. Nor is this yet the place to explain why I think so, so far as the Lord shall give strength. For first the arguments of the heretics must be discussed and refuted, which they bring forth not from the divine books but from their own reasonings, by which they think they vehemently compel that the testimonies of the Scriptures which are about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit must be understood as they themselves wish. (Augustine here refers to the Arians, to whom he will turn his attention in the next three books)
deTrin.4.21.3121. 32. Nunc autem non ideo minorem Filium quia missus est a Patre, nec ideo minorem Spiritum Sanctum quia et Pater eum misit et Filius, sufficienter, quantum arbitror, demonstratum est.
21. 32. But now it has been sufficiently demonstrated, as I think, that the Son is not lesser because he was sent by the Father, nor the Holy Spirit lesser because both the Father and the Son sent him.
deTrin.4.21.32Sive enim propter visibilem creaturam, sive potius propter principii commendationem, non propter inaequalitatem vel imparilitatem vel dissimilitudinem substantiae in Scripturis haec posita intelleguntur: quia etiam si voluisset Deus Pater per subiectam creaturam visibiliter apparere, absurdissime tamen aut a Filio quem genuit, aut ab Spiritu Sancto qui de illo procedit, missus diceretur. (Cf. John 5:26)
For whether on account of the visible creature, or rather on account of the commendation of the principle, these things are understood to be set in the Scriptures not on account of inequality or disparity or unlikeness of substance: because, even if God the Father had willed to appear visibly through a subject creature, it would yet be most absurd to say that he was sent by the Son whom he begot, or by the Holy Spirit who proceeds from him. (See John 5:26)
deTrin.4.21.32Iste igitur sit huius voluminis modus: deinceps in ceteris, adiuvante Domino, illa haereticorum versutissima argumenta qualia sint, et quemadmodum redarguantur videbimus.
Let this, then, be the limit of this volume: hereafter, in the rest, with the Lord helping, we shall see what those most cunning arguments of the heretics are, and how they are refuted.
deTrin.4.21.32Bk. 5What Augustine asks of God, and what of his readers.Quid a Deo, quid a lectoribus Augustinus exposcat.
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1. 1. Hinc iam exordiens ea dicere, quae dici ut cogitantur vel ab homine aliquo, vel certe a nobis non omni modo possunt: quamvis et ipsa nostra cogitatio, cum de Deo Trinitate cogitamus, longe se illi de quo cogitat, imparem sentiat, neque ut est eum capiat, sed, ut scriptum est, etiam a tantis quantus Paulus apostolus hic erat, per speculum in aenigmate videatur, primum ab ipso Domino Deo nostro, de quo semper cogitare debemus, et de quo digne cogitare non possumus, cui laudando reddenda est omni tempore benedictio, (Cf. Ps 34:1) et cui enuntiando nulla competit dictio, et adiutorium ad intelligenda atque explicanda quae intendo, et veniam precor sicubi offendo. Memor sum enim, non solum voluntatis, verum etiam infirmitatis meae. Ab his etiam qui ista lecturi sunt, ut ignoscant peto, ubi me magis voluisse quam potuisse dicere adverterint, quod vel ipsi melius intelligunt, vel propter mei eloquii difficultatem non intelligunt; sicut ego eis ignosco, ubi propter suam tarditatem intelligere non possunt.
1. 1. Beginning now from here to say the things that cannot in every way be said as they are thought, whether by some man or at least by us—although our very thought, when we think of God the Trinity, feels itself far unequal to him of whom it thinks, nor grasps him as he is, but, as it is written, even by such great ones as the apostle Paul was here, he is seen through a glass in a riddle—first I pray of the Lord our God himself, of whom we ought always to think, and of whom we cannot worthily think, to whom in praising him blessing is to be rendered at all times, (See Ps 34:1 (33:2)) and for declaring whom no utterance is fitting, both help to understand and explain the things I intend, and pardon if anywhere I give offense. For I am mindful not only of my will but also of my weakness. Of these too who will read these things I ask, that they pardon where they perceive that I wished rather than was able to say what they themselves either understand better, or, on account of the difficulty of my speech, do not understand; just as I pardon them, where, on account of their slowness, they cannot understand.
deTrin.5.1.11. 2. Facilius autem nobis invicem ignoscimus, si noverimus, aut certe credendo firmum tenuerimus, ea quae de natura incommutabili et invisibili summeque vivente ac sibi sufficiente dicuntur, non ex consuetudine visibilium atque mutabilium et mortalium vel egenarum rerum esse metienda. Sed cum in his etiam quae nostris corporalibus adiacent sensibus, vel quod nos ipsi in interiore homine sumus, scientia comprehendendis laboremus, nec sufficiamus: non tamen impudenter in illa quae supra sunt divina et ineffabilia, pietas fidelis ardescit; non quam suarum virium inflat arrogantia, sed quam gratia ipsius Creatoris et Salvatoris inflammat.
1. 2. But we more easily pardon one another, if we know, or at least by believing hold firm, that the things that are said of the unchangeable and invisible and supremely living and self-sufficient nature are not to be measured by the habit of visible and changeable and mortal or needy things. But although even in those things that lie near our bodily senses, or that we ourselves are in the inner man, we labor and are not equal to comprehending them by knowledge, yet not impudently does faithful piety burn toward those divine and ineffable things that are above—not the piety that the arrogance of its own powers puffs up, but the piety that the grace of the Creator and Savior himself inflames.
deTrin.5.1.2Nam quo intellectu Deum capit homo, qui ipsum intellectum suum quo eum vult capere nondum capit? Si autem hunc iam capit, attendat diligenter nihil eo esse in sua natura melius, et videat utrum ibi videat ulla lineamenta formarum, nitores colorum, spatiosam granditatem, partium distantiam, molis distensionem, aliquas per locorum intervalla motiones, vel quid eiusmodi. Nihil certe istorum invenimus in eo, quo in natura nostra nihil melius invenimus, id est, in nostro intellectu, quo sapientiam capimus quantum capaces sumus.
For by what understanding does man grasp God, who does not yet grasp his own understanding by which he wishes to grasp him? But if he now grasps this, let him diligently attend that there is nothing in his nature better than it, and let him see whether there he sees any lineaments of forms, brightnesses of colors, spacious magnitude, distance of parts, extension of mass, any motions through intervals of places, or anything of the sort. Certainly we find none of these things in that than which we find nothing better in our nature, that is, in our understanding, by which we grasp wisdom as far as we are capable.
deTrin.5.1.2Quod ergo non invenimus in meliore nostro, non debemus in illo quaerere, quod longe melius est meliore nostro: ut sic intelligamus Deum, si possumus, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesidentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, Cf. Augustine, Confessions 1.3.3; On Free Choice of the Will 14.37.38; The Catholic Way of Life 1.11.19; Homilies on the Gospel of John 1.8.30–33; Answer to the Letter of Mani Known as “The Foundation” 15.20; Ambrose, De Fide 1.16.106; Jerome, Ephesians 1.2.13–14; Plotinus, Ennead 6.4; Origen, De Principiis 4.3.30; Basil, De Spiritu Sancto 9.22; Spiritus 2; John Chrysostom, On the Incomprehensible Nature of God 1.3; In Psalmis 138.2; Hilary, On the Trinity 2.6; In Psalmis 118.8; 129.3; 144.21. sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem, nihilque patientem. Quisquis Deum ita cogitat, etsi nondum potest omni modo invenire quid sit; pie tamen cavet, quantum potest, aliquid de eo sentire quod non sit. (Cf. Sir 43:34–37)
What, then, we do not find in what is better in us, we ought not to seek in him who is far better than what is better in us: so that we may understand God, if we can, as far as we can, good without quality, great without quantity, creator without need, presiding without position, containing all things without habit, wholly everywhere without place, See Augustine, Confessions 1.3.3; On Free Choice of the Will 14.37.38; The Catholic Way of Life 1.11.19; Homilies on the Gospel of John 1.8.30–33; Answer to the Letter of Mani Known as “The Foundation” 15.20; Ambrose, De Fide 1.16.106; Jerome, Ephesians 1.2.13–14; Plotinus, Ennead 6.4; Origen, De Principiis 4.3.30; Basil, De Spiritu Sancto 9.22; Spiritus 2; John Chrysostom, On the Incomprehensible Nature of God 1.3; In Psalmis 138.2; Hilary, On the Trinity 2.6; In Psalmis 118.8; 129.3; 144.21. sempiternal without time, making changeable things without any change of himself, and suffering nothing. Whoever thinks of God thus, even if he cannot yet in every way find what he is, yet piously takes care, as far as he can, to think nothing of him that he is not. (See Sir 43:34–37)
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2. 3. Est tamen sine dubitatione substantia, vel, si melius hoc appellatur, essentia, quam Graeci οὐσία vocant. Sicut enim ab eo quod est “sapere” dicta est “sapientia,” et ab eo quod est “scire” dicta est “scientia”; ita ab eo quod est “esse” dicta est “essentia.” Cf. Augustine, The City of God 12.2; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 2.14.2; Seneca, Epistle 58.6; Tertullian, Apology 21; Against Praxeas 2.26. Et quis magis est, quam ille qui dixit famulo suo Moysi, ego sum qui sum; et, dices filiis Israel: ‘qui est, misit me ad vos’? Sed aliae quae dicuntur essentiae sive substantiae, capiunt accidentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quantacumque mutatio: Deo autem aliquid eiusmodi accidere non potest; et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, qui Deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse, unde “essentia” nominata est, maxime ac verissime competit. Quod enim mutatur, non servat ipsum esse; et quod mutari potest, etiamsi non mutetur, potest quod fuerat non esse: ac per hoc illud solum quod non tantum non mutatur, verum etiam mutari omnino non potest, sine scrupulo occurrit quod verissime dicatur esse.
2. 3. Yet without doubt he is substance, or, if it is better so called, essence, which the Greeks call οὐσία. For just as from "to be wise" is named "wisdom," and from "to know" is named "knowledge," so from "to be" is named "essence." See Augustine, The City of God 12.2; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 2.14.2; Seneca, Epistle 58.6; Tertullian, Apology 21; Against Praxeas 2.26. And who more truly is than he who said to his servant Moses, I am who am; and, you shall say to the children of Israel: 'He who is has sent me to you'? But other things that are called essences or substances admit of accidents, by which in them there comes about a change, whether great or of whatever degree: but to God nothing of the sort can happen; and therefore he alone is the unchangeable substance or essence, who is God, to whom certainly being itself, from which "essence" is named, most of all and most truly belongs. For what is changed does not keep its very being; and what can be changed, even if it is not changed, can be such that what it had been is not: and through this that alone which not only is not changed, but also can in no way be changed, occurs without scruple as what may most truly be said to be.
deTrin.5.2.33. 4. Quamobrem ut iam etiam de his quae nec dicuntur ut cogitantur, nec cogitantur ut sunt, respondere incipiamus fidei nostrae adversariis: inter multa quae Ariani adversus Catholicam fidem solent disputare, hoc sibi maxime callidissimum machinamentum proponere videntur, cum dicunt: “quidquid de Deo dicitur vel intelligitur, non secundum accidens, sed secundum substantiam dicitur. Quapropter ingenitum esse Patri secundum substantiam est, et genitum esse Filio secundum substantiam est. Diversum est autem ingenitum esse, et genitum esse: diversa est ergo substantia Patris et Filii.” Cf. Pope Alexander I of Alexandria, Letter to Alexander of Constantinopole, PL 18:547–572; Ambrose, De Incarnatione 8.79; De Fide 4.8.81.
3. 4. Wherefore, that we may now begin to answer the adversaries of our faith even about those things which are neither said as they are thought, nor thought as they are: among the many things that the Arians are wont to argue against the Catholic faith, they seem to set before themselves this as their most cunning contrivance, when they say: "Whatever is said or understood of God is said not according to accident, but according to substance. Wherefore, to be unbegotten is for the Father according to substance, and to be begotten is for the Son according to substance. But to be unbegotten and to be begotten are different: therefore the substance of the Father and of the Son is different." See Pope Alexander I of Alexandria, Letter to Alexander of Constantinople, PL 18:547–572; Ambrose, De Incarnatione 8.79; De Fide 4.8.81.
deTrin.5.3.4Quibus respondemus: “si quidquid de Deo dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur; ergo quod dictum est, ego et Pater unum sumus, secundum substantiam dictum est.” Una est igitur substantia Patris et Filii. Aut si hoc non secundum substantiam dictum est, dicitur ergo aliquid de Deo non secundum substantiam; et ideo iam non cogimur secundum substantiam intelligere ingenitum et genitum. Item dictum est de Filio, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo: quaerimus secundum quid aequalis. Si enim non secundum substantiam dicitur aequalis, admittunt ut dicatur aliquid de Deo, non secundum substantiam; admittant ergo non secundum substantiam dici ingenitum et genitum. Quod si propterea non admittunt, quia omnia de Deo secundum substantiam dici volunt, secundum substantiam Filius aequalis est Patri.
To whom we answer: "If whatever is said of God is said according to substance, then what was said, I and the Father are one, was said according to substance." There is, therefore, one substance of the Father and the Son. Or if this was not said according to substance, then something is said of God not according to substance; and therefore we are no longer compelled to understand unbegotten and begotten according to substance. Likewise it was said of the Son, he did not think it robbery to be equal to God: we ask, equal according to what? For if he is not said to be equal according to substance, they admit that something is said of God not according to substance; let them admit, then, that unbegotten and begotten are said not according to substance. But if they do not admit this, because they wish all things to be said of God according to substance, then according to substance the Son is equal to the Father.
deTrin.5.3.44. 5. “Accidens” autem non solet dici, nisi quod aliqua mutatione eius rei cui accidit amitti potest. Nam etsi quaedam dicuntur accidentia inseparabilia, quae appellantur graece αχώριστο, sicuti est plumae corvi color niger; amittit eum tamen, non quidem quamdiu pluma est, sed quia non semper est pluma. Quapropter ipsa materies mutabilis est, et ex eo quod desinit esse illud animal vel illa pluma, totumque illud corpus in terram mutatur et vertitur, Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionbus Oratoriae 7.23. amittit utique etiam illum colorem. Quamvis et accidens quod separabile dicitur, non separatione, sed mutatione amittatur; sicuti est capillis hominum nigritudo, quoniam dum capilli sunt possunt albescere; separabile accidens dicitur: sed diligenter intuentibus satis apparet, non separatione quasi emigrare aliquid a capite dum canescit, ut nigritudo inde candore succedente discedat et aliquo eat, sed illam qualitatem coloris ibi verti atque mutari.
4. 5. But "accident" is not usually said except of what can be lost by some change of the thing to which it happens. For although certain accidents are called inseparable, which in Greek are called αχώριστα—as the black color of a raven's feather—yet it loses it, not indeed while it is a feather, but because it is not always a feather. Wherefore the matter itself is changeable, and from the fact that it ceases to be that animal or that feather, and that whole body is changed and turned into earth, Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionibus Oratoriae 7.23. it certainly loses that color too. Although even an accident that is called separable is lost not by separation but by change; as the blackness of human hair, since, while the hair remains, it can grow white, is called a separable accident: but to those who look carefully it sufficiently appears that nothing as it were migrates from the head by separation while it grows gray, so that the blackness departs from there, whiteness succeeding, and goes somewhere, but that that quality of color is there turned and changed.
deTrin.5.4.5Nihil itaque accidens in Deo, quia nihil mutabile aut amissibile. Quod si et illud dici accidens placet, quod licet non amittatur, minuitur tamen vel augetur, sicuti est animae vita: nam et quamdiu anima est, tamdiu vivit, et quia semper anima est, semper vivit; sed quia magis vivit cum sapit, minusque cum desipit, fit etiam hic aliqua mutatio, non ut desit vita, sicuti deest insipienti sapientia, sed ut minus sit; nec tale aliquid in Deo fit, quia omnino incommutabilis manet.
Nothing, then, is accidental in God, because nothing is changeable or able to be lost. But if it pleases anyone to call that too an accident which, although it is not lost, is yet diminished or increased—as is the life of the soul: for as long as the soul is, so long it lives, and because it is always a soul, it always lives; but because it lives more when it is wise, and less when it is foolish, here too some change comes about, not so that life is wanting, as wisdom is wanting to the foolish, but so that it is less—nothing of the sort comes about in God, because he remains altogether unchangeable.
deTrin.5.4.55. 6. Quamobrem nihil in eo secundum accidens dicitur, quia nihil ei accidit; nec tamen omne quod dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur. In rebus enim creatis atque mutabilibus quod non secundum substantiam dicitur, restat ut secundum accidens dicatur. Omnia enim accidunt eis, quae vel amitti possunt vel minui, et magnitudines et qualitates; et quod dicitur ad aliquid, sicut amicitiae, propinquitates, servitutes, similitudines, aequalitates, et si qua huiusmodi; et situs et habitus, et loca et tempora, et opera atque passiones. Cf. Aristotle, Categories 4.1b25; 2a3.
5. 6. Wherefore nothing is said of him according to accident, because nothing happens to him; nor yet is everything that is said said according to substance. For in created and changeable things, what is not said according to substance, it remains, is said according to accident. For all things happen to them that can either be lost or diminished, both magnitudes and qualities; and what is said in relation to something, as friendships, kinships, services, likenesses, equalities, and any such things; and position and habit, and places and times, and acts and passions. See Aristotle, Categories 4.1b25; 2a3.
deTrin.5.5.6In Deo autem nihil quidem secundum accidens dicitur, quia nihil in eo mutabile est; nec tamen omne quod dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur. Dicitur enim ad aliquid, Cf. Aristotle, Categories 7.6a36; 8b24; Pseudo-Augustine, Aristotle’s Ten Categories 11. sicut Pater ad Filium, et Filius ad Patrem, quod non est accidens: quia et ille semper Pater, et ille semper Filius; et non ita “semper” quasi ex quo natus est Filius, aut PL: ut, “so that the Father.” ex eo quod numquam desinat esse Filius, Pater esse non desinat Pater; sed ex eo quod semper natus est Filius, nec coepit umquam esse Filius. Quod si aliquando esse coepisset, aut aliquando esse desineret Filius, secundum accidens diceretur.
But in God nothing indeed is said according to accident, because nothing in him is changeable; nor yet is everything that is said said according to substance. For something is said in relation to something, See Aristotle, Categories 7.6a36; 8b24; Pseudo-Augustine, Aristotle’s Ten Categories 11. as the Father in relation to the Son, and the Son in relation to the Father, which is not an accident: because both that one is always Father, and that one always Son; and not "always" as though from the time the Son was born the Father does not cease to be Father (because the Son never ceases to be Son), but because the Son was always born, and never began to be Son. For if he had at some time begun to be, or at some time ceased to be Son, it would be said according to accident.
deTrin.5.5.6Si vero quod dicitur Pater, ad se ipsum diceretur, non ad Filium; et quod dicitur Filius, ad se ipsum diceretur, non ad Patrem; secundum substantiam diceretur et ille Pater, et ille Filius. Sed quia et Pater non dicitur Pater nisi ex eo quod est ei Filius, et Filius non dicitur nisi ex eo quod habet Patrem, non secundum substantiam haec dicuntur: quia non quisque eorum ad se ipsum, sed ad invicem atque ad alterutrum ista dicuntur; neque secundum accidens, quia et quod dicitur Pater, et quod dicitur Filius, aeternum atque incommutabile est eis.
But if what is called Father were said in relation to himself, not to the Son, and what is called Son were said in relation to himself, not to the Father, then both that one Father and that one Son would be said according to substance. But because the Father is not called Father except from the fact that he has a Son, and the Son is not so called except from the fact that he has a Father, these things are not said according to substance: because neither of them is said this in relation to himself, but in relation to one another and to each other; nor according to accident, because both what is called Father and what is called Son is eternal and unchangeable for them.
deTrin.5.5.6Quamobrem quamvis diversum sit Patrem esse et Filium esse, non est tamen diversa substantia: quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicuntur, sed secundum relativum; quod tamen relativum non est accidens, quia non est mutabile.
Wherefore, although to be Father and to be Son are different, yet the substance is not different: because these are said not according to substance, but according to relation; which relation, however, is not an accident, because it is not changeable.
deTrin.5.5.66. 7. Si autem huic sic putant resistendum esse sermoni, quod Pater quidem ad Filium dicitur et Filius ad Patrem, ingenitus tamen et genitus ad se ipsos dicuntur, non ad alterutrum: non enim hoc est dicere ingenitum, quod est Patrem dicere; quia et si Filium non genuisset, nihil prohiberet eum dicere ingenitum; et si gignat quisque filium, non ex eo ipse ingenitus est, quia geniti homines ex aliis hominibus, gignunt et ipsi alios; inquiunt ergo, “Pater ad Filium dicitur, et Filius ad Patrem, ingenitus autem ad se ipsum, et genitus ad se ipsum dicitur:
6. 7. But if they think this argument is to be resisted thus, that the Father indeed is said in relation to the Son, and the Son in relation to the Father, but unbegotten and begotten are said in relation to themselves, not to each other: for to say "unbegotten" is not the same as to say "Father"; because even if he had not begotten a Son, nothing would prevent him from being called unbegotten; and if anyone begets a son, he himself is not on that account unbegotten, because men who are begotten of other men themselves also beget others; they say, therefore, "Father is said in relation to the Son, and Son in relation to the Father, but unbegotten is said in relation to himself, and begotten in relation to himself:
deTrin.5.6.7Et ideo si quidquid ad se ipsum dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur, diversum est autem ingenitum esse et genitum esse; diversa igitur substantia est.”
and therefore, if whatever is said in relation to himself is said according to substance, but to be unbegotten and to be begotten are different, then the substance is different."
deTrin.5.6.7Hoc si dicunt, non intellegunt de “ingenito” quidem aliquid se dicere, quod diligentius pertractandum sit, quia nec ideo quisque pater quia ingenitus, nec ingenitus ideo quia Pater, et propterea non ad aliquid, sed ad se dici putatur ingenitus: genitum vero mira caecitate non advertunt dici non posse, nisi ad aliquid.
If they say this, they do not understand that about "unbegotten" they indeed say something that must be treated more carefully, because no one is a father because he is unbegotten, nor unbegotten because he is a father, and therefore "unbegotten" is thought to be said not in relation to something but in relation to himself: but "begotten," by a strange blindness, they do not notice cannot be said except in relation to something.
deTrin.5.6.7Ideo quippe filius quia genitus, et quia filius utique genitus. Sicut autem “filius” ad “patrem,” sic “genitus” ad “genitorem” refertur; et sicut pater ad filium, ita genitor ad genitum. Ideoque alia notio est qua intellegitur “genitor,” alia qua “ingenitus.” Nam quamvis de Patre Deo utrumque dicatur, illud tamen ad genitum, id est, ad Filium dicitur; quod nec illi negant; hoc autem quod “ingenitus” dicitur, ad se ipsum dici perhibent. Dicunt ergo: “si aliquid ad se ipsum dicitur Pater, quod ad se ipsum dici non potest Filius, et quidquid ad se ipsum dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur, et ad se ipsum dicitur ‘ingenitus,’ quod dici non potest Filius; ergo secundum substantiam dicitur ‘ingenitus,’ quod Filius quia dici non potest, non est eiusdem substantiae.” Cf. Basil, Against Eunomius 4.2.2.
For it is for this reason that he is a son, that he is begotten, and because he is a son he is certainly begotten. But as "son" is referred to "father," so "begotten" to "begetter"; and as father to son, so begetter to begotten. And therefore there is one notion by which "begetter" is understood, another by which "unbegotten." For although both are said of God the Father, that one is said in relation to the begotten, that is, to the Son; which not even they deny; but this that is called "unbegotten" they maintain is said in relation to himself. They say, therefore: "if something is said of the Father in relation to himself which cannot be said of the Son in relation to himself, and whatever is said in relation to himself is said according to substance, and 'unbegotten' is said in relation to himself, which cannot be said of the Son; then 'unbegotten' is said according to substance, which, because it cannot be said of the Son, the Son is not of the same substance." See Basil, Against Eunomius 4.2.2.
deTrin.5.6.7Cui versutiae respondetur ita, ut ipsi cogantur dicere secundum quid sit aequalis Patri Filius; utrum secundum id quod ad se dicitur, an secundum id quod ad Patrem dicitur. Non enim secundum id quod ad Patrem dicitur, quoniam ad patrem filius dicitur, ille autem non filius, sed pater est. Quia non sic ad se dicuntur pater et filius, quomodo amici aut vicini. Relative quippe amicus dicitur ad amicum; et si aequaliter se diligunt, eadem in utroque amicitia est; et relative vicinus dicitur ad vicinum; et quia aequaliter sibi vicini sunt (quantum enim iste illi, tantum et ille huic vicinatur), eadem in utroque vicinitas. Quia vero Filius non ad Filium relative dicitur, sed ad Patrem; non secundum hoc quod ad Patrem dicitur, aequalis est Filius Patri.
To which cunning it is answered thus, so that they themselves are compelled to say according to what the Son is equal to the Father: whether according to that which is said in relation to himself, or according to that which is said in relation to the Father. For not according to that which is said in relation to the Father, since the son is said in relation to the father, but that one is not a son, but a father. For father and son are not said in relation to themselves in the way that friends or neighbors are. For relatively a friend is said in relation to a friend; and if they love each other equally, the same friendship is in each; and relatively a neighbor is said in relation to a neighbor; and because they are equally neighbors to each other (for as much as this one is neighbor to that, so much is that one neighbor to this), the same neighborhood is in each. But because the Son is said relatively not in relation to a Son, but to the Father, it is not according to that which is said in relation to the Father that the Son is equal to the Father.
deTrin.5.6.7Restat ut secundum id aequalis sit, quod ad se dicitur. Quidquid autem ad se dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur: restat ergo ut secundum substantiam sit aequalis. Eadem est igitur utriusque substantia. Cum vero ingenitus dicitur Pater, non quid sit, sed quid non sit dicitur. Cum autem relativum negatur, non secundum substantiam negatur, quia ipsum relativum non secundum substantiam dicitur.
It remains that he is equal according to that which is said in relation to himself. But whatever is said in relation to himself is said according to substance: it remains, then, that he is equal according to substance. The substance of both is therefore the same. But when the Father is called unbegotten, it is said not what he is, but what he is not. And when a relative is denied, it is not denied according to substance, because the relative itself is not said according to substance.
deTrin.5.6.77. 8. Hoc exemplis planum faciendum est. Ac primum videndum est hoc significari cum dicitur genitus, quod significatur cum dicitur filius. Ideo enim filius, quia genitus; et quia filius, utique genitus. Quod ergo dicitur ingenitus, hoc ostenditur, quod non sit filius: sed genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur; “filius” autem latine dicitur, sed “infilius” ut dicatur non admittit loquendi consuetudo.
7. 8. This must be made plain by examples. And first it must be seen that this is signified when "begotten" is said, which is signified when "son" is said. For he is a son because he is begotten; and because he is a son, he is certainly begotten. What, then, is called "unbegotten" shows this, that he is not a son: but "begotten" and "unbegotten" are conveniently said; "son," however, is said in Latin, but the custom of speech does not admit that "non-son" be said.
deTrin.5.7.8Nihil tamen intellectui demitur, si dicatur “non filius,” quemadmodum etiam si dicatur “non genitus” pro eo quod dicitur “ingenitus,” nihil aliud dicitur. Sic enim et “vicinus” et “amicus” relative dicuntur, nec tamen potest “invicinus” dici, quomodo dicitur “inimicus.” The Latin instances are rather different than the English; Augustine remarks that while you can say inimicus to correspond with amicus, you cannot say invicinus to correspond with vicinus.
Yet nothing is taken from the understanding if "not son" be said, just as, if "not begotten" be said for what is called "unbegotten," nothing else is said. For thus both "neighbor" and "friend" are said relatively, yet "non-neighbor" cannot be said in the way that "enemy" is said. The Latin instances are rather different than the English; Augustine remarks that while you can say inimicus to correspond with amicus, you cannot say invicinus to correspond with vicinus.
deTrin.5.7.8Quamobrem non est in rebus considerandum quid vel sinat vel non sinat dici usus sermonis nostri, sed quis rerum ipsarum intellectus eluceat.
Wherefore in things it is not to be considered what the usage of our speech either permits or does not permit to be said, but what understanding of the things themselves shines forth.
deTrin.5.7.8Non ergo iam dicamus ingenitum, quamvis dici latine possit; sed pro eo dicamus non genitum, quod tantum valet. Num ergo aliud dicimus quam non filium? Negativa porro ista particula non id efficit, ut quod sine illa relative dicitur, eadem praeposita substantialiter dicatur; sed id tantum negatur, quod sine illa aiebatur, sicut in ceteris praedicamentis. Velut cum dicimus, “homo est,” substantiam designamus. Qui ergo dicit, “non homo est,” non aliud genus praedicamenti enuntiat, sed tantum illud negat. Sicut ergo secundum substantiam aio, “homo est,” sic secundum substantiam nego, cum dico, “non homo est.” Et cum quaeritur, quantus sit; et aio, “quadripedalis est,” id est, quattuor pedum, secundum qualitatem aio, qui dicit, “non quadripedalis est,” secundum quantitatem negat. “Candidus est,” secundum qualitatem aio; “non candidus est,” secundum qualitatem nego. “Propinquus est,” secundum relativum aio; “non propinquus est,” secundum relativum nego. Secundum situm aio, cum dico, “iacet”; secundum situm nego, cum dico, “non iacet.” Secundum habitum aio, cum dico, “armatus est”; secundum habitum nego, cum dico, “non armatus est.” Tantumdem autem valet si dicam, “inermis est.” Secundum tempus aio, cum dico, “hesternus est”; secundum tempus nego, cum dico, “non hesternus est.” Et cum dico, “Romae est,” secundum locum aio; et secundum locum nego, cum dico, “non Romae est.” Secundum id quod est facere aio, cum dico, “caedit”; si autem dicam, “non caedit,” secundum id quod est facere nego, ut ostendam non hoc facere. Et cum dico: “vapulat,” secundum praedicamentum aio quod pati vocatur: et secundum id nego, cum dico, “non vapulat.” Et omnino nullum praedicamenti genus est, secundum quod aliquid aiere volumus, nisi ut secundum idipsum praedicamentum negare convincamur, si praeponere negativam particulam voluerimus. Cf. Aristotle, Categories 4.1b25; 2a3.
Let us, then, no longer say "unbegotten," although it can be said in Latin; but for it let us say "not begotten," which is equivalent. Do we then say anything other than "not son"? Now this negative particle does not bring it about that what without it is said relatively is, when it is prefixed, said substantially; but only that is denied which without it was affirmed, as in the other predicaments. For instance, when we say, "he is a man," we designate substance. He, then, who says, "he is not a man," does not enunciate another kind of predicament, but only denies that one. As, then, according to substance I affirm, "he is a man," so according to substance I deny, when I say, "he is not a man." And when it is asked how large he is, and I say, "he is four feet," that is, of four feet, I affirm according to quality; he who says, "he is not four feet," denies according to quantity. "He is white," I affirm according to quality; "he is not white," I deny according to quality. "He is a relative," I affirm according to relation; "he is not a relative," I deny according to relation. According to position I affirm, when I say, "he is lying down"; according to position I deny, when I say, "he is not lying down." According to habit I affirm, when I say, "he is armed"; according to habit I deny, when I say, "he is not armed." But it amounts to the same thing if I say, "he is unarmed." According to time I affirm, when I say, "he is of yesterday"; according to time I deny, when I say, "he is not of yesterday." And when I say, "he is at Rome," I affirm according to place; and according to place I deny, when I say, "he is not at Rome." According to that which is to act I affirm, when I say, "he strikes"; but if I say, "he does not strike," according to that which is to act I deny, so as to show that he does not do this. And when I say, "he is beaten," I affirm according to the predicament that is called to be acted upon; and according to it I deny, when I say, "he is not beaten." And there is altogether no kind of predicament according to which we wish to affirm something, but that we are convicted of denying according to that same predicament, if we wish to prefix the negative particle. See Aristotle, Categories 4.1b25; 2a3.
deTrin.5.7.8Quae cum ita sint, Cicero, In Catilinam 1.5.10. si substantialiter aierem, dicendo, “filius”; substantialiter negarem, dicendo, “non filius.” Quia vero relative aio, cum dico, “filius est,” ad patrem enim refero: relative nego, si dicam, “non filius est”; ad parentem enim eamdem negationem refero, volens ostendere quod ei parens non sit. At si quantum valet quod dicitur “filius,” tantumdem valet quod dicitur “genitus,” sicut praelocuti sumus; tantumdem ergo valet quod dicitur “non genitus,” quantum valet quod dicitur “non filius.” Relative autem negamus dicendo, “non filius”; relative igitur negamus dicendo, “non genitus.” Ingenitus porro quid est, nisi non genitus? Non ergo receditur a relativo praedicamento, cum ingenitus dicitur. Sicut enim genitus non ad se ipsum dicitur, sed quod ex genitore sit: ita cum dicitur ingenitus, non ad se ipsum dicitur, sed quod ex genitore non sit ostenditur. In eodem tamen praedicamento, quod relativum vocatur, utraque significatio vertitur: quod autem relative pronuntiatur, non indicat substantiam: ita quamvis diversum sit genitus et ingenitus, non indicat diversam substantiam: quia sicut filius ad patrem et non filius ad non patrem refertur; ita genitus ad genitorem, et non genitus ad non genitorem referatur necesse est.
Since these things are so, Cicero, In Catilinam 1.5.10. if I affirmed substantially by saying "son," I would deny substantially by saying "not son." But because I affirm relatively when I say, "he is a son"—for I refer it to a father—I deny relatively if I say, "he is not a son"; for I refer the same negation to a parent, wishing to show that there is no parent of his. But if what is called "son" is equivalent to what is called "begotten," as we have said before, then what is called "not begotten" is equivalent to what is called "not son." But we deny relatively when we say, "not son"; relatively, therefore, we deny when we say, "not begotten." And what is unbegotten but not begotten? We do not, then, depart from the relative predicament when "unbegotten" is said. For just as "begotten" is said not in relation to itself, but that he is from a begetter, so when "unbegotten" is said, it is said not in relation to itself, but it is shown that he is not from a begetter. Yet within the same predicament, which is called relative, both significations are turned: but what is pronounced relatively does not indicate substance: thus, although begotten and unbegotten are different, it does not indicate a different substance: because, as son is referred to father and not-son to not-father, so begotten must be referred to begetter, and not-begotten to not-begetter.
deTrin.5.7.8C
deTrin.5.7.8
8. 9. Quapropter illud praecipue teneamus, quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas, substantialiter dici; quod autem ad aliquid, Cf. Aristotle, Categories 6.6a36; 8b24; Pseudo-Augustine, Aristotle’s Ten Categories 11. non substantialiter, sed relative; tantamque vim esse “eiusdem substantiae” in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, ut quidquid de singulis ad se ipsos dicitur, non pluraliter in summa, sed singulariter accipiatur.
8. 9. Wherefore let us hold this especially, that whatever that most excellent and divine sublimity is said in relation to itself is said substantially; but what in relation to something See Aristotle, Categories 6.6a36; 8b24; Pseudo-Augustine, Aristotle’s Ten Categories 11. is said not substantially but relatively; and that there is such force in "the same substance" in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, that whatever is said of the single ones in relation to themselves is taken not plurally in the sum, but singularly.
deTrin.5.8.9Quemadmodum enim Pater Deus est, et Filius Deus est, et Spiritus Sanctus Deus est, quod secundum substantiam dici nemo dubitat: non tamen tres deos, sed unum Deum dicimus eam ipsam praestantissimam Trinitatem.
For just as the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God—which no one doubts is said according to substance—yet we do not say three gods, but one God, that very most excellent Trinity.
deTrin.5.8.9Ita magnus Pater, magnus Filius, magnus et Spiritus Sanctus: non tamen tres magni, sed unus magnus. Non enim de Patre solo, sicut illi perverse sentiunt; sed de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto scriptum est, tu es solus Deus, magnus.
So the Father is great, the Son great, and the Holy Spirit great: yet not three great ones, but one great one. For it is written not of the Father alone, as they perversely think, but of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, you alone are God, the great one.
deTrin.5.8.9Et bonus Pater, bonus Filius, bonus et Spiritus Sanctus; nec tres boni, sed unus bonus, de quo dictum est, nemo bonus, nisi unus Deus. Etenim Dominus Iesus, ne ab illo qui dixerat, magister bone, tamquam hominem compellans, secundum hominem tantummodo intellegeretur, ideo non ait, “nemo bonus, nisi solus Pater”; sed, nemo bonus, nisi unus Deus. In “Patris” enim nomine, ipse per se Per se, not ad se; what is said of the Father in himself is said of him with reference to another. Pater pronuntiatur: in “Dei” vero, et ipse et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quia Trinitas unus Deus.
And the Father is good, the Son good, and the Holy Spirit good; and not three good ones, but one good, of whom it was said, no one is good but the one God. For the Lord Jesus, lest, by the one who had said good Teacher, as though addressing him as a man, he should be understood only according to man, therefore did not say, "no one is good but the Father alone"; but, no one is good but the one God. For in the name of "Father" the Father is pronounced by himself alone: but in "God," both he and the Son and the Holy Spirit, because the Trinity is one God.
deTrin.5.8.9Situs vero, et habitus, et loca, et tempora, non proprie, sed translate ac per similitudines dicuntur in Deo. Nam et sedere super cherubim (Cf. 1 Kgs 4:4; 2 Kgs 19:15; 1 Chron 13:6; Isa 37:16; Dan 3:55; Ps 99:1) dicitur, quod ad situm dicitur: et abyssum tamquam vestimentum amictus, quod ad habitum; et anni tui non deficient, (Cf. Heb 1:12) quod ad tempus; et si ascendero in caelum, tu ibi es, quod ad locum.
But position, and habit, and places, and times are said of God not properly but by transference and through likenesses. For he is said to sit upon the cherubim, (See 1 Kgs 4:4; 2 Kgs 19:15; 1 Chr 13:6; Isa 37:16; Dan 3:55; Ps 99:1 (98:1)) which is said according to position; and clothed with the deep as with a garment, which according to habit; and your years shall not fail, (See Heb 1:12) which according to time; and if I ascend into heaven, you are there, which according to place.
deTrin.5.8.9Quod autem ad faciendum attinet, fortassis de solo Deo verissime dicatur: solus enim Deus facit et ipse non fit, neque patitur quantum ad eius substantiam pertinet qua Deus est. Itaque omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus Sanctus: nec tamen tres omnipotentes, sed unus Omnipotens, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia; ipsi gloria. (Cf. 1 Cor 8:6)
But as for what pertains to acting, perhaps it may be said most truly of God alone: for God alone acts and is not himself made, nor is acted upon, as far as pertains to his substance by which he is God. And so the Father is almighty, the Son almighty, the Holy Spirit almighty: yet not three almighty ones, but one Almighty, from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things; to him be glory. (See 1 Cor 8:6)
deTrin.5.8.9Quidquid ergo ad se ipsum dicitur Deus, et de singulis Personis ter PL: singulariter, “singly.” dicitur, id est, de Patre, et Filio, et Spiritu Sancto, et simul de ipsa Trinitate, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicitur. Quoniam quippe non aliud est Deo esse, et aliud magnum esse, sed hoc idem illi est esse quod magnum esse: propterea sicut non dicimus tres essentias, sic non dicimus tres magnitudines, sed unam essentiam et unam magnitudinem. “Essentiam” dico, quae οὐσία graece dicitur, quam usitatius, substantiam vocamus.
Whatever, then, God is said in relation to himself, and is said of the single persons three times, PL: singulariter, “singly.” that is, of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and at once of the Trinity itself, is said not plurally but singularly. For since for God to be is not one thing and to be great another, but this same thing is for him to be that it is to be great: therefore, just as we do not say three essences, so we do not say three magnitudes, but one essence and one magnitude. "Essence" I say, which in Greek is called οὐσία, which more usually we call substance.
deTrin.5.8.98. 10. Dicunt quidem et illi υποστάσις; sed nescio quid volunt interesse inter οὐσία et υποστάσις: ita ut plerique nostri qui haec graeco tractant eloquio, dicere consuerint μία ουσία, τρεις υποστάσεις, quod est latine, unam essentiam, tres substantias. The words are etymologically identical, sub and hypo meaning “under,” -stance and -stasis coming from verbs meaning “stand.”
8. 10. They indeed also say υπόστασις; but I do not know what difference they wish there to be between οὐσία and υπόστασις: so that very many of ours who treat these things in Greek speech have been accustomed to say μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, which is in Latin one essence, three substances. The words are etymologically identical, sub and hypo meaning “under,” -stance and -stasis coming from verbs meaning “stand.”
deTrin.5.8.109. 10. Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo iam obtinuit, ut hoc intellegatur cum dicimus “essentiam,” quod intellegitur cum dicimus “substantiam”: non audemus dicere unam essentiam, tres substantias; sed unam essentiam, vel substantiam, tres autem personas; quemamodum multi Latini ista tractantes et digni auctoritate dixerunt, cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent, quo enuntiarent verbis quod sine verbis intellegebant. Revera enim cum Pater non sit Filius, et Filius non sit Pater, et Spiritus Sanctus ille qui etiam donum Dei vocatur, nec Pater sit nec Filius, tres utique sunt. Ideoque pluraliter dictum est, ego et Pater unum sumus. Non enim dixit, “unum est,” quod Sabelliani dicunt; Cf. Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 4.34–37. sed, “unum sumus.” Tamen cum quaeritur “quid tres,” magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen, “tres personae,” non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.
9. 10. But because our custom of speaking has now prevailed, that the same is understood when we say "essence" which is understood when we say "substance," we do not dare to say one essence, three substances; but one essence, or substance, and three persons; as many Latins, treating these things and worthy of authority, have said, when they could find no other more apt way by which to enunciate in words what without words they understood. For in truth, since the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father, and the Holy Spirit, he who is also called the gift of God, is neither Father nor Son, they are certainly three. And therefore it was said in the plural, I and the Father are one. For he did not say, "is one," as the Sabellians say; See Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 4.34–37. but, "we are one." Yet when it is asked "what three," human speech labors in great poverty. Still it has been said, "three persons," not that it might be said, but lest it be passed over in silence.
deTrin.5.9.1010. 11. Sicut ergo non dicimus tres essentias; ita non dicimus tres magnitudines, neque tres magnos. In rebus enim quae participatione magnitudinis magnae sunt, quibus aliud est esse, aliud magnas esse, sicut magna domus, et magnus mons, et magnus animus; in his ergo rebus aliud est magnitudo, aliud quod ab ea magnitudine magnum est, et prorsus non hoc est magnitudo quod est magna domus. Sed illa est vera magnitudo, qua non solum magna est domus quae magna est, et qua magnus est mons quisquis magnus est; sed etiam qua magnum est quidquid aliud magnum dicitur: ut aliud sit ipsa magnitudo, aliud ea quae ab illa magna dicuntur. Quae magnitudo utique primitus magna est, multoque excellentius quam ea quae participatione eius magna sunt. Deus autem quia non ea magnitudine magnus est quae non est quod ipse, ut quasi particeps eius sit Deus cum magnus est; alioquin illa erit maior magnitudo quam Deus, Deo autem non est aliquid maius; ea igitur magnitudine magnus est qua ipse est eadem magnitudo. Et ideo sicut non dicimus tres essentias, sic nec tres magnitudines: hoc est enim Deo esse, quod est magnum esse. Eadem causa nec magnos tres dicimus, sed unum magnum: quia non participatione magnitudinis Deus magnus est, sed se ipso magno magnus est; quia ipse sua est magnitudo. Hoc et de bonitate, et de aeternitate, et de omnipotentia Dei dictum sit, omnibusque omnino praedicamentis quae de Deo possunt pronuntiari, quod ad se ipsum dicitur, non translate ac per similitudinem, sed proprie: si tamen de illo proprie aliquid dici ore hominis potest.
10. 11. As, therefore, we do not say three essences, so we do not say three magnitudes, nor three great ones. For in things that are great by participation in magnitude, for which to be is one thing and to be great another—as a great house, and a great mountain, and a great mind—in these things, then, magnitude is one thing, and what is great from that magnitude is another, and a great house is by no means the same as magnitude. But that is true magnitude by which not only is the house great that is great, and by which the mountain is great that is great, but also by which whatever else is called great is great: so that magnitude itself is one thing, and the things that are called great from it are another. Which magnitude is certainly primarily great, and far more excellently than the things that are great by participation in it. But God, because he is great not by that magnitude which is not what he himself is, so that God should be as it were a participant in it when he is great (otherwise that will be a greater magnitude than God, but there is nothing greater than God), is therefore great by that magnitude by which he himself is that same magnitude. And therefore, just as we do not say three essences, so neither three magnitudes: for this is for God to be, which is to be great. For the same reason we do not say three great ones, but one great one: because God is great not by participation in magnitude, but he is great by himself, who is great; because he himself is his own magnitude. Let this be said also of the goodness, and of the eternity, and of the omnipotence of God, and of absolutely all the predicaments that can be pronounced of God, that what is said in relation to himself is said not by transference and through likeness, but properly: if, however, anything can be said of him properly by the mouth of man.
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11. 12. Quod autem proprie singula in eadem Trinitate dicuntur, nullo modo ad se ipsa, sed ad invicem, aut ad creaturam dicuntur; et ideo relative, non substantialiter ea dici manifestum est. Sicut enim Trinitas unus Deus dicitur, magnus, bonus, aeternus, omnipotens, idemque ipse sua sic dici potest deitas, ipse sua magnitudo, ipse sua bonitas, ipse sua aeternitas, ipse sua omnipotentia: non sic dici potest Trinitas Pater, nisi forte translate ad creaturam propter adoptionem filiorum. (Cf. Gal 4:5) Quod enim scriptum est, audi, Israel: Dominus Deus tuus, Dominus unus est, non utique excepto Filio, aut excepto Spiritu Sancto oportet intellegi, quem unum Dominum Deum nostrum recte dicimus etiam Patrem nostrum (Cf. Matt 6:9) per gratiam suam nos regenerantem.
11. 12. But that the single ones are properly said in the same Trinity, are said in no way in relation to themselves, but in relation to one another, or to the creature; and therefore it is manifest that they are said relatively, not substantially. For just as the Trinity is called one God, great, good, eternal, almighty, and the same can be called his own deity, his own magnitude, his own goodness, his own eternity, his own omnipotence: so the Trinity cannot be called Father, except perhaps by transference in relation to the creature, on account of the adoption of sons. (See Gal 4:5) For what is written, hear, O Israel: the Lord your God, the Lord is one, is certainly not to be understood with the Son excepted, or the Holy Spirit excepted, whom, our one Lord God, we rightly call also our Father, (See Matt 6:9) regenerating us through his grace.
deTrin.5.11.12Trinitas autem Filius nullo modo dici potest. (Cf. 1 Pet 1:3) Spiritus vero Sanctus secundum id quod scriptum est, quoniam Deus Spiritus est, potest quidem universaliter dici, quia et Pater spiritus et Filius spiritus, et Pater sanctus et Filius sanctus. Itaque Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, quoniam unus Deus, et utique Deus sanctus est, et Deus Spiritus est, potest appellari Trinitas et Spiritus et Sanctus. Cf. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto 3.18; De Fide 2.12. Sed tamen ille Spiritus Sanctus qui non Trinitas, sed in Trinitate intellegitur, in eo quod proprie dicitur Spiritus Sanctus, relative dicitur, cum et ad Patrem et ad Filium refertur, quia Spiritus Sanctus et Patris et Filii Spiritus est. (Cf. Matt 10:20; Gal 4:6)
But the Trinity can in no way be called Son. (See 1 Pet 1:3) The Holy Spirit, however, according to what is written, for God is Spirit, can indeed be said universally, because the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy. And so the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since they are one God, and certainly God is holy, and God is Spirit, the Trinity can be called both Spirit and Holy. See Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto 3.18; De Fide 2.12. But yet that Holy Spirit who is understood not as the Trinity but as in the Trinity, in that he is properly called Holy Spirit, is said relatively, since he is referred both to the Father and to the Son, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son. (See Matt 10:20; Gal 4:6)
deTrin.5.11.12Sed ipsa relatio non apparet in hoc nomine; apparet autem cum dicitur donum Dei: donum enim est Patris et Filii, quia et a Patre procedit, sicut Dominus dicit; et quod Apostolus ait, qui Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius, de ipso utique Spiritu Sancto ait. “Donum” ergo “donatoris,” et “donator doni,” cum dicimus, relative utrumque ad invicem dicimus.
But the relation itself does not appear in this name; but it appears when he is called the gift of God: for he is the gift of the Father and the Son, because he both proceeds from the Father, as the Lord says, and what the Apostle says, he who does not have the Spirit of Christ is none of his, he certainly says of the Holy Spirit himself. "Gift," then, "of a giver," and "giver of a gift," when we say it, we say each relatively in relation to the other.
deTrin.5.11.12Ergo Spiritus Sanctus ineffabilis quaedam Patris Filiique communio; et ideo fortasse sic appellatur, quia Patri et Filio potest eadem appellatio convenire. Nam hoc ipse proprie dicitur, quod illi communiter: quia et Pater spiritus et Filius spiritus, et Pater sanctus et Filius sanctus. Ut ergo ex nomine quod utrique convenit, utriusque communio significetur, vocatur donum amborum Spiritus Sanctus. Et haec Trinitas unus Deus, solus, bonus, magnus, aeternus, omnipotens; ipse sibi unitas, deitas, magnitudo, bonitas, aeternitas, omnipotentia.
Therefore the Holy Spirit is a certain ineffable communion of the Father and the Son; and therefore perhaps he is so called because the same appellation can fit the Father and the Son. For he himself is properly called what they are called in common: because the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy. That, then, by a name which fits both, the communion of both might be signified, the gift of both is called Holy Spirit. And this Trinity is one God, alone, good, great, eternal, almighty; himself his own unity, deity, magnitude, goodness, eternity, omnipotence.
deTrin.5.11.1212. 13. Nec movere debet, quoniam diximus relative dici Spiritum Sanctum (non ipsam Trinitatem, sed eum qui est in Trinitate) quia non ei videtur vicissim respondere vocabulum eius ad quem refertur. Non enim, sicut dicimus servum domini et dominum servi, filium patris et patrem filii, quoniam ista relative dicuntur, ita etiam hic possumus dicere. Dicimus enim Spiritum Sanctum Patris, (Cf. Matt 10:20) sed non vicissim dicimus Patrem Spiritus Sancti, ne filius eius intellegatur Spiritus Sanctus. Item dicimus Spiritum sanctum Filii, (Cf. Gal 4:6) sed non dicimus Filium Spiritus Sancti, ne pater eius intellegatur Spiritus Sanctus. In multis enim relativis hoc contingit, ut non inveniatur vocabulum, quo sibi vicissim respondeant quae ad se referuntur.
12. 13. Nor ought it to disturb us, since we have said that the Holy Spirit is said relatively (not the Trinity itself, but he who is in the Trinity), that there does not seem to correspond to him in turn the word of the one to whom he is referred. For not as we say servant of a master and master of a servant, son of a father and father of a son, since these are said relatively, can we say so here too. For we say the Spirit of the Father, (See Matt 10:20) but we do not in turn say the Father of the Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit be understood as his son. Likewise we say the Holy Spirit of the Son, (See Gal 4:6) but we do not say the Son of the Holy Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit be understood as his father. For in many relatives this happens, that no word is found by which the things referred to one another correspond to each other in turn.
deTrin.5.12.13Quid enim tam manifeste relative dicitur quam “pignus”? Ad id quippe refertur cuius est pignus, et semper pignus alicuius rei pignus est. Num ergo cum dicimus pignus Patris et Filii, (Cf. 2 Cor 1:22, 5:5; Eph 1:14) possumus vicissim dicere Patrem pignoris aut Filium pignoris? At vero cum dicimus donum Patris et Filii, non quidem dicere possumus Patrem doni, aut Filium doni; sed ut haec sibi vicissim respondeant, dicimus donum donatoris, et donatorem doni: quia hic potuit inveniri usitatum vocabulum, illic non potuit.
For what is so manifestly said relatively as "pledge"? For it is referred to that of which it is a pledge, and a pledge is always a pledge of some thing. When, then, we say the pledge of the Father and the Son, (See 2 Cor 1:22, 5:5; Eph 1:14) can we in turn say the Father of the pledge or the Son of the pledge? But when we say the gift of the Father and the Son, we cannot indeed say the Father of the gift, or the Son of the gift; but, that these may correspond to each other in turn, we say the gift of the giver, and the giver of the gift: because here a usual word could be found, there it could not.
deTrin.5.12.1313. 14. Dicitur ergo relative Pater, idemque relative dicitur principium, et si quid forte aliud: sed Pater ad Filium dicitur, principium vero ad omnia quae ab ipso sunt. Item dicitur relative Filius, relative dicitur et Verbum et Imago; et in omnibus his vocabulis ad Patrem refertur: nihil autem horum Pater dicitur.
13. 14. The Father, then, is said relatively, and the same is said relatively principle, and perhaps anything else: but Father is said in relation to the Son, while principle in relation to all things that are from him. Likewise the Son is said relatively, and is said relatively both Word and Image; and in all these words he is referred to the Father: but none of these is the Father said.
deTrin.5.13.14Et principium dicitur Filius: cum enim diceretur ei, tu quis es? respondit, principium, quia PL: qui, “who am also.” et loquor vobis. Sed numquid Patris principium? Creatorem se quippe ostendere voluit, cum se dixit esse principium; sicut et Pater principium est creaturae, eo quod ab ipso sunt omnia. Nam et Creator relative dicitur ad creaturam, sicut Dominus ad servum. Et ideo cum dicimus, et Patrem principium, (Cf. Rev 1:8, 21:6) et Filium principium, (Cf. John 8:25) non duo principia creaturae dicimus; quia et Pater et Filius simul ad creaturam unum principium est, sicut unus Creator, (Cf. Sir 1:8) sicut unus Deus.
And the Son is said principle: for when it was said to him, who are you? he answered, the principle, who also speak to you. But is he the principle of the Father? For he wished to show himself the creator when he said that he was the principle; just as the Father too is the principle of the creature, in that from him are all things. For "creator" too is said relatively in relation to the creature, as "master" in relation to a servant. And therefore, when we say both that the Father is principle (See Rev 1:8, 21:6) and that the Son is principle, (See John 8:25) we do not say two principles of the creature; because both the Father and the Son together are one principle in relation to the creature, as one Creator, (See Sir 1:8) as one God.
deTrin.5.13.14Si autem quidquid in se manet et gignit aliquid vel operatur, principium est ei rei quam gignit, vel ei quam operatur; non possumus negare etiam Spiritum Sanctum recte dici principium; quia non eum separamus ab appellatione Creatoris. Et scriptum est de illo quod operetur, (Cf. 1 Cor 12:11) et in se utique manens operatur; non enim in aliquid eorum quae operatur ipse mutatur et vertitur. Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177. Et quae operatur, vide: unicuique autem, inquit, datur manifestatio Spiritus ad utilitatem. Alii quidem datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae; alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem Spiritum; alteri autem fides in eodem Spiritu; alii donatio curationum in uno Spiritu; alii operatio virtutum; alii prophetia; alii diiudicatio spirituum; alteri genera linguarum. Omnia autem haec operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens propria unicuique prout vult, utique sicut Deus. Quis enim tanta illa potest operari nisi Deus? Idem autem Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus. Nam et singillatim si interrogemur de Spiritu Sancto, verissime respondemus quod Deus sit; et cum Patre et Filio simul unus Deus est. Cf. John 4:26; Tomus Damasi, anath. 24–25. Unum ergo principium ad creaturam dicitur Deus, non duo vel tria principia.
But if whatever remains in itself and begets something or works it is a principle to the thing it begets, or to the thing it works, we cannot deny that the Holy Spirit too is rightly called principle; because we do not separate him from the appellation of Creator. And it is written of him that he works, (See 1 Cor 12:11) and certainly, remaining in himself, he works; for he is not changed and turned into any of the things he works. Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177. And see what he works: but to each one, he says, is given the manifestation of the Spirit for profit. To one indeed is given through the Spirit the utterance of wisdom; to another the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit; to another faith in the same Spirit; to another the gift of healings in the one Spirit; to another the working of mighty deeds; to another prophecy; to another the discerning of spirits; to another kinds of tongues. But all these one and the same Spirit works, distributing to each his own as he wills—certainly as God. For who can work such great things but God? But it is the same God who works all things in all. For if we are questioned singly about the Holy Spirit, we answer most truly that he is God; and together with the Father and the Son he is one God. See John 4:26; Tomus Damasi, anath. 24–25. God, then, is said one principle in relation to the creature, not two or three principles.
deTrin.5.13.1414. 15. Ad se autem invicem in Trinitate, si gignens ad id quod gignit principium est, Pater ad Filium principium est, quia genuit eum. Utrum autem et ad Spiritum Sanctum principium sit Pater, quoniam dictum est, de Patre procedit, non parva quaestio est. Quia si ita est, non iam principium ei tantum rei erit quam gignit aut facit, sed etiam ei quam dat.
14. 15. But in relation to one another in the Trinity, if the begetter is principle to that which it begets, the Father is principle to the Son, because he begot him. But whether the Father is also principle to the Holy Spirit, since it is said, he proceeds from the Father, is no small question. Because if it is so, he will be principle not only to the thing he begets or makes, but also to the thing he gives.
deTrin.5.14.15Ubi et illud elucescit, ut potest, quod solet multos movere, cur non Filius sit etiam Spiritus Sanctus, cum et ipse a Patre exeat, sicut in Evangelio legitur. (Cf. John 15:26) Exit enim, non quomodo natus, sed quomodo datus; et ideo non dicitur Filius, quia neque natus est sicut Unigenitus, neque factus ut per Dei gratiam in adoptionem nasceretur, sicuti nos. (Cf. Gal 4:5; Eph 1:5; Rom 8:15–23; John 1:12) Quod enim de Patre natum est, ad Patrem solum refertur cum dicitur Filius, et ideo Filius Patris, non et noster: (Cf. John 7:39; Rom 5:5) quod autem datum est, et ad eum qui dedit refertur, et ad eos quibus dedit; itaque Spiritus Sanctus non tantum Patris et Filii qui dederunt, sed etiam noster dicitur qui accepimus: sicut dicitur, Domini salus (Cf. Ps 3:9) qui dat salutem, eadem etiam nostra salus (Cf. Rom 13:11) est qui accepimus.
Here too there shines out, as it can, that which is wont to disturb many, why the Holy Spirit is not also a Son, since he too comes forth from the Father, as is read in the Gospel. (See John 15:26) For he comes forth, not as one born, but as one given; and therefore he is not called Son, because he neither was born as the Only-begotten, nor was made so as to be born into adoption through the grace of God, as we are. (See Gal 4:5; Eph 1:5; Rom 8:15–23; John 1:12) For what was born of the Father is referred to the Father alone when he is called Son, and therefore he is the Son of the Father, not also ours: (See John 7:39; Rom 5:5) but what was given is referred both to him who gave and to those to whom he gave; and so the Holy Spirit is called not only of the Father and the Son who gave, but also ours who received: as it is said, the Lord's salvation, (See Ps 3:8 (3:9)) who gives salvation, and the same is also our salvation, (See Rom 13:11) who have received it.
deTrin.5.14.15Spiritus ergo et Dei qui dedit, et noster qui accepimus. Non ille spiritus noster quo sumus, quia ipse spiritus est hominis qui in ipso est: sed alio modo iste noster est, quo dicimus et, panem nostrum da nobis. Quamquam et illum spiritum qui hominis dicitur, utique accepimus. Quid enim habes, inquit, quod non accepisti?
The Spirit, then, is both of God who gave, and ours who received. Not that spirit of ours by which we are, because that is the spirit of man which is in him: but in another way this one is ours, in the way that we also say, give us our bread. Although that spirit too which is called man's we certainly received. For what have you, he says, that you did not receive?
deTrin.5.14.15Sed aliud est quod accepimus ut essemus, aliud quod accepimus ut sancti essemus. Unde scriptum est et de Ioanne, quod in spiritu et virtute Eliae veniret: dictus est Eliae spiritus, scilicet Spiritus Sanctus quem accepit Elias. Hoc et de Moyse intellegendum est, cum ait ei Dominus, tollam de spiritu tuo, et dabo eis: hoc est, “dabo illis de Spiritu Sancto, quem iam tibi dedi.”
But it is one thing that we received in order to be, another that we received in order to be holy. Whence it is written also of John, that he would come in the spirit and power of Elijah: the spirit of Elijah was so called, namely the Holy Spirit whom Elijah received. This is to be understood also of Moses, when the Lord says to him, I will take of your spirit, and will give to them: that is, "I will give them of the Holy Spirit, whom I have already given to you."
deTrin.5.14.15Si ergo et quod datur, principium habet eum a quo datur, quia non aliunde accepit illud quod ab ipso procedit; This clause could also be rendered, rather less probably, “because the recipient did not receive what proceeds from him from anywhere else.” fatendum est Patrem et Filium principium esse Spiritus Sancti, non duo principia: sed sicut Pater et Filius unus Deus, et ad creaturam relative unus Creator et unus Dominus, sic relative ad Spiritum Sanctum unum principium; ad creaturam vero Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unum principium, sicut unus Creator et unus Dominus.
If, then, even what is given has as its principle the one by whom it is given, because it received from nowhere else that which proceeds from him, This clause could also be rendered, rather less probably, “because the recipient did not receive what proceeds from him from anywhere else.” it must be confessed that the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, not two principles: but as the Father and the Son are one God, and in relation to the creature one Creator and one Lord, so in relation to the Holy Spirit they are one principle; but in relation to the creature the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one principle, as one Creator and one Lord.
deTrin.5.14.1515. 16. Interius PL: ulterius, “a further question.” autem quaeritur, utrum quemadmodum Filius non hoc tantum habet nascendo ut Filius sit, sed omnino ut sit; sic et Spiritus Sanctus eo quo datur habeat non tantum ut donum sit, sed omnino ut sit: utrum ergo erat antequam daretur, sed nondum erat donum, an eo ipso quo daturus erat eum Deus, iam donum erat et antequam daretur. Sed si non procedit nisi cum datur, nec procederet utique priusquam esset cui daretur; quomodo iam erat ipsa substantia, si non est nisi quia datur: sicut Filius non tantum ut sit Filius, quod relative dicitur, sed omnino ut sit ipsa substantiam nascendo habet?
15. 16. But a more inward question is asked, PL: ulterius, “a further question.” whether, just as the Son has by being born not only that he is Son, but altogether that he is; so the Holy Spirit too has by that whereby he is given not only that he is a gift, but altogether that he is: whether, then, he was before he was given, but was not yet a gift, or whether, by the very fact that God was going to give him, he was already a gift even before he was given. But if he does not proceed except when he is given, neither would he proceed before there was one to whom he might be given; how, then, was the substance itself already, if it is not except because it is given: as the Son, not only that he is Son, which is said relatively, but altogether that he is, has the substance itself by being born?
deTrin.5.15.16An semper procedit Spiritus Sanctus, et non ex tempore, sed ab aeternitate procedit; sed quia sic procedebat ut esset donabile; iam donum erat, et antequam esset cui daretur? (Cf. John 15:26) Aliter enim intellegitur cum dicitur donum, aliter cum dicitur donatum. Nam donum potest esse et antequam detur; donatum autem nisi datum fuerit nullo modo dici potest. Cf. John 7:39; Rom 5:5. The distinction is a little less artificial in Latin, between donum, “gift,” and donatum, meaning “that which has been given.” That is the sense in which we must here understand the English word “donation.”
Or does the Holy Spirit always proceed, and proceed not in time, but from eternity; but because he so proceeded as to be able to be given, he was already a gift even before there was one to whom he might be given? (See John 15:26) For it is understood in one way when he is called a gift, in another when he is called a thing given. For he can be a gift even before he is given; but a thing given cannot in any way be so called unless it has been given. See John 7:39; Rom 5:5. The distinction is a little less artificial in Latin, between donum, “gift,” and donatum, meaning “that which has been given.” That is the sense in which we must here understand the English word “donation.”
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16. 17. Nec moveat quod Spiritus Sanctus cum sit coaeternus Patri et Filio, dicitur tamen aliquid ex tempore, veluti hoc ipsum quod donatum diximus. Nam sempiterne Spiritus donum, temporaliter autem “Donatum.” (Cf. Acts 9:20; John 4:10, 7:39; Rom 5:5) Nam et si “Dominus” non dicitur, nisi cum habere incipit servum, etiam ista appellatio relativa ex tempore est Deo: non enim sempiterna creatura est, cuius est ille Dominus. Quomodo ergo obtinebimus nec ipsa relativa esse accidentia, quoniam nihil accidit Deo temporaliter, quia non est mutabilis, sicut in exordio huius disputationis tractavimus?
16. 17. Nor let it disturb us that the Holy Spirit, though he is coeternal with the Father and the Son, is yet said to be something in time, as this very thing which we have called a thing given. For he is the gift of the Spirit sempiternally, but a "thing given" in time. (See Acts 9:20; John 4:10, 7:39; Rom 5:5) For even "Lord" is not said except when he begins to have a servant, and this relative appellation too is for God in time: for the creature, of which he is Lord, is not sempiternal. How, then, shall we maintain that even relatives are not accidents, since nothing happens to God in time, because he is not changeable, as we treated at the beginning of this discussion?
deTrin.5.16.17Ecce Dominum esse non sempiternum habet, ne cogamur etiam sempiternam creaturam dicere, quia ille sempiterne non dominaretur, nisi etiam ista sempiterne famularetur. Sicut autem non potest esse servus, qui non habet dominum, sic nec dominus qui non habet servum.
Behold, to be Lord he does not have sempiternally, lest we be compelled to call the creature sempiternal too, because he would not rule sempiternally unless the creature also served sempiternally. But just as there cannot be a servant who has no master, so neither a master who has no servant.
deTrin.5.16.17Et quisquis exstiterit qui aeternum quidem Deum solum dicat, tempora autem non esse aeterna propter varietatem et mutabilitatem, sed tamen tempora non in tempore esse coepisse (non enim erat tempus antequam inciperent tempora, et ideo non in tempore accidit Deo ut Dominus esset, quia ipsorum temporum Dominus erat, quae utique non in tempore esse coeperunt); quid respondebit de homine, qui in tempore factus est, cuius utique Dominus non erat antequam esset cui esset? Certe vel ut Dominus hominis esset, ex tempore accidit Deo: et ut omnis auferri videatur controversia, certe ut tuus Dominus esset, aut meus, qui modo esse coepimus, ex tempore accidit Deo. Aut si et hoc propter obscuram quaestionem animae videtur incertum, quid ut esset Dominus populi Israel? Quia etsi iam erat animae natura, quam ille populus habebat, quomodo non quaerimus; tamen ille populus nondum erat, et quando esse coepit apparet. Postremo ut Dominus esset huius arboris et huius segetis, ex tempore accidit, quae modo esse coeperunt. Quia etsi materies ipsa iam erat, aliud est tamen dominum esse materiae, aliud esse dominum iam factae naturae. Alio enim tempore est etiam homo dominus ligni, et alio tempore est dominus arcae, quamvis ex ipso ligno fabricatae, quod utique non erat, cum ligni dominus iam esset.
And if anyone should arise who says that God indeed alone is eternal, but that times are not eternal on account of their variety and changeableness, yet that times did not begin to be in time (for there was no time before times began, and therefore it was not in time that it happened to God to be Lord, because he was Lord of the times themselves, which certainly did not begin to be in time): what will he answer about man, who was made in time, of whom certainly God was not Lord before there was one of whom he could be? At least, then, to be the Lord of man happened to God in time: and, that all controversy may seem to be removed, certainly to be your Lord, or mine, who only now began to be, happened to God in time. Or if even this seems uncertain on account of the obscure question of the soul, what about being Lord of the people of Israel? For although the nature of the soul which that people had already was—how, we do not ask—yet that people was not yet, and when it began to be is plain. Lastly, to be Lord of this tree and this crop happened in time, which only now began to be. For although the matter itself was already, yet it is one thing to be lord of the matter, another to be lord of a nature now made. For at one time a man is lord of wood, and at another time lord of a chest, though made from that very wood, which certainly did not exist when he was already lord of the wood.
deTrin.5.16.17Quomodo igitur obtinebimus nihil secundum accidens dici Deum, nisi quia ipsius naturae nihil accidit quo mutetur, ut ea sint accidentia relativa, quae cum aliqua mutatione rerum de quibus dicuntur, accidunt? Sicut amicus relative dicitur; neque enim esse incipit, nisi cum amare coeperit: fit ergo aliqua mutatio voluntatis, ut amicus dicatur.
How, then, shall we maintain that God is said nothing according to accident, except because nothing happens to his nature by which it is changed, so that those are relative accidents which happen with some change of the things of which they are said? As a friend is said relatively; for he does not begin to be unless he has begun to love: some change of will, then, comes about, that he be called a friend.
deTrin.5.16.17Nummus autem cum dicitur pretium, relative dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est cum esse coepit pretium: neque cum dicitur pignus, et si qua sunt similia. Si ergo nummus potest nulla sui mutatione totiens dici relative, ut neque cum incipit dici, neque cum desinit, aliquid in eius natura vel forma, qua nummus est, mutationis fiat; quanto facilius de illa incommutabili Dei substantia debemus accipere, ut ita dicatur relative aliquid ad creaturam, ut quamvis temporaliter incipiat dici, non tamen ipsi substantiae Dei accidisse intellegatur, sed illi creaturae ad quam dicitur? Domine, inquit, refugium factum es nobis.
But a coin, when it is called a price, is said relatively, yet it is not changed when it begins to be a price: nor when it is called a pledge, and any such things. If, then, a coin can, by no change of itself, be said relatively so often, that neither when it begins to be so called, nor when it ceases, does any change come about in its nature or form by which it is a coin; how much more easily ought we to take it of that unchangeable substance of God, that something is so said relatively in relation to the creature, that, although it begins to be said in time, yet it is understood not to have happened to the substance of God itself, but to that creature in relation to which it is said? Lord, he says, you have become a refuge for us.
deTrin.5.16.17Refugium ergo nostrum Deus relative dicitur, ad nos enim refertur; et tunc refugium nostrum fit, cum ad eum refugimus. Numquid tunc fit aliquid in eius natura, quod antequam ad eum refugeremus non erat? In nobis ergo fit aliqua mutatio; deteriores enim fuimus antequam ad eum refugeremus, et efficimur ad eum refugiendo meliores: in illo autem nulla. Sic et Pater noster esse incipit, cum per eius gratiam regeneramur, quoniam dedit nobis potestatem filios Dei fieri. (Cf. Gal 4:5; Eph 1:5; Rom 8:15–23) Substantia itaque nostra mutatur in melius, cum filii eius efficimur; simul ille Pater noster esse incipit, sed nulla commutatione suae substantiae.
God, then, is called our refuge relatively, for he is referred to us; and he becomes our refuge then, when we flee to him. Does anything then come about in his nature that was not there before we fled to him? In us, then, some change comes about; for we were worse before we fled to him, and by fleeing to him we are made better: but in him none. So too he begins to be our Father when we are regenerated through his grace, since he gave us power to become sons of God. (See Gal 4:5; Eph 1:5; Rom 8:15–23) And so our substance is changed for the better when we are made his sons; at the same time he begins to be our Father, but by no change of his substance.
deTrin.5.16.17Quod ergo temporaliter dici incipit Deus quod antea non dicebatur, manifestum est relative dici: non tamen secundum accidens Dei quod ei aliquid acciderit, sed plane secundum accidens eius ad quod dici aliquid Deus incipit relative. Et quod amicus Dei (Cf. Jdt 8:22; Jas 2:23) iustus esse incipit, ipse mutatur: Deus autem absit ut temporaliter aliquem diligat, quasi nova dilectione quae in illo ante non erat, apud quem nec praeterita transierunt, et futura iam facta sunt.
What, then, God begins in time to be called, which before he was not called, it is manifest is said relatively: yet not according to an accident of God, that something happened to him, but plainly according to an accident of that in relation to which God begins to be said something relatively. And that a friend of God (See Jdt 8:22; Jas 2:23) begins to be righteous, he himself is changed: but far be it that God should love anyone in time, as though by a new love which was not in him before, with whom neither have past things passed away, and future things are already done.
deTrin.5.16.17Itaque omnes sanctos suos ante mundi constitutionem dilexit, sicut praedestinavit; sed cum convertuntur et inveniunt illum, tunc incipere ab eo diligi dicuntur, ut eo modo dicatur quo potest humano affectu capi quod dicitur. Sic etiam cum iratus malis dicitur, et placidus bonis; illi mutantur, non ipse; sicut lux infirmis oculis aspera, firmis lenis est; ipsorum scilicet mutatione, non sua.
And so he loved all his saints before the foundation of the world, just as he predestined them; but when they are converted and find him, then they are said to begin to be loved by him, that it may be said in the way in which what is said can be grasped by human feeling. So too, when he is said to be angry with the wicked, and gentle with the good, they are changed, not he; as light is harsh to weak eyes, gentle to strong, by their change, namely, not its own.
deTrin.5.16.17Bk. 6Some argued against the Arians from the fact that it is written that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God.Nonnulli arguebant contra Arianos ex eo quod scriptum est: Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam.
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deTrin.5.16.17
1. 1. Aequalitatem Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti putant nonnulli ex hoc impediri quominus intellegatur, quia scriptum est, Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam: ut ideo non videatur aequalitas, quia non est Pater ipse virtus et sapientia, sed genitor virtutis et sapientiae. Et revera non mediocri intentione quaeri solet, quomodo dicatur Deus virtutis et sapientiae Pater. Ait enim Apostolus, Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam.
1. 1. Some think that the equality of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is hindered from being understood by the fact that it is written that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God: so that for this reason the equality does not seem to hold, because the Father is not himself power and wisdom, but the begetter of power and wisdom. And indeed it is wont to be asked, with no slight earnestness, how God is said to be the Father of power and wisdom. For the Apostle says, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.
deTrin.6.1.1Et hinc nonnulli nostri adversus Arianos hoc modo ratiocinati sunt, eos dumtaxat qui prius se adversus catholicam fidem extulerunt. Nam ipse Arius dixisse fertur: si filius est, natus est; si natus est, erat tempus quando non erat filius: Cf. Hilary, On the Trinity 1.34; Ambrose, De Fide 1.18.120; 1.19.123; 4.8.79; 4.9.96; The Arian and Catholic Professions 10.24; Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 5.17–19. non intellegens etiam natum esse Deo sempiternum esse, ut sit coaeternus Patri Filius, sicut splendor qui gignitur ab igne atque diffunditur, coaevus est illi, et esset coaeternus, si esset ignis aeternus. Unde quidem posteriores Ariani abiecerunt istam sententiam, fassique sunt, non ex tempore coepisse Filium Dei.
And hence some of ours have reasoned against the Arians in this way—those, at least, who first raised themselves up against the Catholic faith. For Arius himself is said to have said: if he is a son, he was born; if he was born, there was a time when the son was not: See Hilary, On the Trinity 1.34; Ambrose, De Fide 1.18.120; 1.19.123; 4.8.79; 4.9.96; The Arian and Catholic Professions 10.24; Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 5.17–19. not understanding that even to have been born is, for God, to be sempiternal, so that the Son is coeternal with the Father, just as the splendor that is begotten by fire and diffused is coeval with it, and would be coeternal if the fire were eternal. Whence indeed the later Arians cast off that opinion, and confessed that the Son of God did not begin in time.
deTrin.6.1.1Sed inter disputationes quas habebant nostri adversum eos qui dicebant, erat tempus quando non erat Filius, hanc etiam nonnulli ratiocinationem inserebant: “si Dei Filius virtus et sapientia Dei est, nec umquam Deus sine virtute et sapientia fuit, coaeternus est Deo Patri Filius: dicit autem Apostolus, Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam; et Deum aliquando non habuisse virtutem aut sapientiam, dementis est dicere: non igitur erat tempus quando non erat Filius.”
But among the disputations which ours had against those who said, there was a time when the Son was not, some inserted also this reasoning: "If the Son of God is the power and wisdom of God, and God never was without power and wisdom, the Son is coeternal with God the Father: but the Apostle says, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God; and to say that God at some time did not have power or wisdom is the part of a madman: therefore there was not a time when the Son was not."
deTrin.6.1.11. 2. Quae ratiocinatio ad id cogit, ut dicamus Deum Patrem non esse sapientem, nisi habendo sapientiam quam genuit, Cf. Augustine, Revisions 1.25; Sir 1:4. non exsistendo per se Pater ipsa sapientia. Deinde si ita est, Filius quoque ipse sicut dicitur Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, videndum est utrum possit sapientia de sapientia dici, si non est Deus Pater ipsa sapientia, sed tantum genitor sapientiae. Quod si tenemus, cur non et magnitudinis suae, et bonitatis, et aeternitatis, et omnipotentiae suae genitor sit, ut non ipse sit sua magnitudo, et sua bonitas, et sua aeternitas, et sua omnipotentia, sed ea magnitudine magnus sit quam genuit, et ea bonitate bonus, et ea aeternitate aeternus, et ea omnipotentia omnipotens quae de illo nata est, sicut non ipse sua sapientia est, sed ea sapientia sapiens est quae de illo nata est? (Cf. Sir 1:4)
1. 2. This reasoning compels us to say that God the Father is not wise except by having the wisdom which he begot, See Augustine, Revisions 1.25; Sir 1:4. not by existing through himself as the Father, wisdom itself. Then, if it is so, the Son too, as he is called God of God, light of light, it must be seen whether he can be called wisdom of wisdom, if God the Father is not wisdom itself, but only the begetter of wisdom. But if we hold this, why should he not be also the begetter of his own magnitude, and goodness, and eternity, and omnipotence, so that he himself is not his own magnitude, and his own goodness, and his own eternity, and his own omnipotence, but is great by that magnitude which he begot, and good by that goodness, and eternal by that eternity, and omnipotent by that omnipotence which was born of him, just as he is not himself his own wisdom, but is wise by that wisdom which was born of him? (See Sir 1:4)
deTrin.6.1.2Nam illud non est formidandum, ne cogamur multos filios Dei dicere, praeter adoptionem creaturae, coaeternos Patri, si magnitudinis suae genitor est, et bonitatis, et aeternitatis, et omnipotentiae. Huic enim calumniae facile respondetur, sic non effici, quia multa nominata sunt, ut ille multorum filiorum coaeternorum sit pater; quemadmodum non efficitur ut duorum sit, cum dicitur Christus Dei virtus et Dei sapientia. Eadem quippe virtus quae sapientia, et eadem sapientia quae virtus est: ita igitur etiam de ceteris, ut eadem sit magnitudo quae virtus, et si qua alia, quae vel supra commemorata sunt, vel commemorari adhuc possunt.
For that is not to be feared, that we should be compelled to say that there are many sons of God, besides the adoption of the creature, coeternal with the Father, if he is the begetter of his own magnitude, and goodness, and eternity, and omnipotence. For this calumny is easily answered: that it is not so brought about, because many things have been named, that he is the father of many coeternal sons; just as it is not brought about that he is the father of two, when it is said, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. For the same is the power which is the wisdom, and the same the wisdom which is the power: so therefore also of the rest, that the same is the magnitude which is the power, and whatever others there are, that have either been mentioned above, or can still be mentioned.
deTrin.6.1.22. 3. Sed si non dicitur in se ipso nisi quod ad Filium dicitur, id est, pater, vel genitor, vel principium eius; si etiam gignens ei quod de se gignit, consequenter principium est; quidquid autem aliud dicitur, cum Filio dicitur, vel potius in Filio, sive magnus ea magnitudine quam genuit, sive iustus ea iustitia quam genuit, sive bonus ea bonitate quam genuit, sive potens ea potentia vel virtute quam genuit, sive sapiens ea sapientia quam genuit: magnitudo autem ipsa non dicitur Pater, sed magnitudinis generator: Filius vero sicut in se ipso dicitur Filius, quod non cum Patre dicitur, sed ad Patrem, non sic et in se ipso magnus, sed cum Patre cuius ipse magnitudo est; sic et sapiens cum Patre dicitur, cuius ipse sapientia est; sicut ille sapiens cum Filio, quia ea sapientia sapiens est quam genuit; (Cf. Sir 1:4) quidquid ergo ad se dicuntur, non dicitur alter sine altero, id est, quidquid dicuntur quod substantiam eorum ostendat, ambo simul dicuntur.
2. 3. But if there is said in himself nothing except what is said in relation to the Son, that is, father, or begetter, or his principle; if also, as begetting that which he begets of himself, he is consequently principle to it; but whatever else is said, is said with the Son, or rather in the Son, whether great by that magnitude which he begot, or righteous by that righteousness which he begot, or good by that goodness which he begot, or powerful by that power or strength which he begot, or wise by that wisdom which he begot: but magnitude itself is not called Father, but the generator of magnitude: while the Son, just as in himself he is called Son, which is said not with the Father but in relation to the Father, so not in himself is he great, but with the Father whose magnitude he is; so too he is called wise with the Father, whose wisdom he is; just as the Father is wise with the Son, because he is wise by that wisdom which he begot; (See Sir 1:4) whatever, then, they are said in relation to themselves, is not said of the one without the other, that is, whatever they are said which shows their substance, both are said together.
deTrin.6.2.3Si haec ita sunt, iam ergo nec Deus est Pater sine Filio, nec Filius Deus sine Patre, sed ambo simul Deus. Et quod dictum est, in principio erat Verbum; in Patre erat Verbum, intellegitur: aut si in principio sic dictum est, ac si diceretur “ante omnia”; quod sequitur, et Verbum erat apud Deum, Verbum quidem solus Filius accipitur, non simul Pater et Filius, tamquam ambo unum Verbum (sic enim Verbum quomodo Imago, (Cf. Col 1:15) non autem Pater et Filius simul ambo imago, sed Filius solus Imago Patris, quemadmodum et Filius: non enim ambo simul Filius): quod vero adiungitur, et Verbum erat apud Deum; multum est ut sic intellegatur, Verbum, quod solus est Filius, erat apud Deum, quod non solus est Pater, sed Pater et Filius simul Deus.
If these things are so, then neither is the Father God without the Son, nor the Son God without the Father, but both together God. And what was said, in the beginning was the Word, is understood: in the Father was the Word. Or if in the beginning is said as if it were said "before all things"; what follows, and the Word was with God—the Word indeed is taken as the Son alone, not the Father and the Son together, as though both were one Word (for thus Word is as Image, (See Col 1:15) but the Father and the Son are not both together an image, but the Son alone is the Image of the Father, just as he is also the Son: for both are not together the Son): but what is added, and the Word was with God, it is much that it be so understood: the Word, which is the Son alone, was with God, which is not the Father alone, but the Father and the Son together God.
deTrin.6.2.3Sed quid mirum, si in duabus quibusdam rebus longe inter se diversis potest hoc dici? Quid enim tam diversum, quam animus et corpus? Potest tamen dici, “animus erat apud hominem,” id est, in homine: cum animus non sit corpus, homo autem animus simul et corpus sit. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 4.7.16; 5.12.34; Sallust, The War With Jugurtha 2.1; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 7.5.16. Ut etiam quod consequenter scriptum est, et Deus erat Verbum, sic intellegatur: “Verbum quod non est Pater, Deus erat simul cum Patre.”
But what wonder, if in two things far different from each other this can be said? For what is so different as mind and body? Yet it can be said, "the mind was with man," that is, in man: although the mind is not the body, while man is mind and body together. See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 4.7.16; 5.12.34; Sallust, The War With Jugurtha 2.1; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 7.5.16. So that even what is consequently written, and the Word was God, may be so understood: "the Word, which is not the Father, was God together with the Father."
deTrin.6.2.3Itane ergo dicimus, ut Pater sit generator magnitudinis, hoc est generator virtutis, vel generator sapientiae suae: Filius autem magnitudo, virtus, et sapientia: Deus vero magnus, omnipotens, sapiens, ambo simul? Quomodo ergo “Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine”? Non enim simul ambo Deus de Deo, sed solus Filius de Deo, scilicet Patre: nec ambo simul lumen de lumine, sed solus Filius de lumine Patre.
Do we then say it thus, that the Father is the generator of magnitude, that is, the generator of his power, or the generator of his wisdom: but the Son is magnitude, power, and wisdom: but God great, almighty, wise, both together? How, then, is it "God of God, light of light"? For not both together are God of God, but the Son alone is of God, namely the Father: nor are both together light of light, but the Son alone is of the light, the Father.
deTrin.6.2.3Nisi forte ad insinuandum et brevissime inculcandum quod coaeternus est Patri Filius, ita dictum est, “Deus de Deo, et lumen de lumine,” et si quid hoc modo dicitur, ac si diceretur, “hoc quod non est Filius sine Patre, de hoc quod non est Pater sine Filio, id est, hoc lumen quod lumen non est sine Patre, de hoc lumine Patre quod lumen non est sine Filio”: ut cum dicitur, “Deus,” quod non est Filius sine Patre, et “de Deo,” quod non est Pater sine Filio, perfecte intellegatur quod non praecessit genitor illud quod genuit.
Unless perhaps, to intimate and most briefly to impress that the Son is coeternal with the Father, it was so said, "God of God, and light of light," and anything said in this manner, as if it were said, "this which is not the Son without the Father, of this which is not the Father without the Son, that is, this light which is not light without the Father, of this light the Father which is not light without the Son": so that when it is said, "God," which is not the Son without the Father, and "of God," which is not the Father without the Son, it may be perfectly understood that the begetter did not precede that which he begot.
deTrin.6.2.3Quod si ita est, hoc solum de eis dici non potest, “illud de illo,” quod simul ambo non sunt. Sicut “Verbum de Verbo” dici non potest, quia non simul ambo Verbum, sed solus Filius; nec “Imago de Imagine,” quia non simul ambo imago; nec “Filius de Filio,” quia non simul ambo Filius, secundum quod dicitur, ego et Pater unum sumus. Unum sumus enim dictum est; “quod ille, hoc et ego secundum essentiam, non secundum relativum.”
But if it is so, this alone cannot be said of them, "this of that," in which both together are not. As "Word of Word" cannot be said, because both are not together Word, but the Son alone; nor "Image of Image," because both are not together image; nor "Son of Son," because both are not together Son, according to what is said, I and the Father are one. For we are one was said; "what he is, that am I too according to essence, not according to relation."
deTrin.6.2.33. 4. Et nescio utrum inveniatur in Scripturis dictum, “unum sunt,” quorum est diversa natura. Si autem et aliqua plura eiusdem naturae sint, et diversa sentiant, non sunt unum in quantum diversa sentiunt. Nam si iam unum essent ex eo quod homines erant, non diceret, ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum, cum suos discipulos Patri commendaret. At vero Paulus et Apollo, quia et ambo homines, et idem sentiebant: qui plantat, inquit, et qui rigat, unum sunt. Cum ergo sic dicitur unum, ut non addatur “quid unum,” et plura unum dicantur, eadem natura atque essentia, non dissidens neque dissentiens significatur.
3. 4. And I do not know whether it is found said in the Scriptures, "they are one," of things whose nature is different. But if several things of the same nature also think differently, they are not one insofar as they think differently. For if they were already one from the fact that they were men, he would not say, that they may be one, as we too are one, when he commended his disciples to the Father. But truly Paul and Apollos, because both were men, and thought the same: he who plants, he says, and he who waters, are one. When, therefore, one is so said that "what one" is not added, and several are called one, the same nature and essence, not disagreeing nor dissenting, is signified.
deTrin.6.3.4Cum vero additur “quid unum,” potest aliquid significari ex pluribus unum factum, quamvis diversis natura. Sicut anima et corpus non sunt utique unum (quid enim tam diversum?), nisi addatur aut subintellegatur quid unum, id est, unus homo, aut unum animal. Inde Apostolus: qui adhaeret meretrici, inquit, unum corpus est: non dixit, “unum sunt,” aut, “unum est”; sed addidit, “corpus,” tamquam ex duobus diversis masculino et feminino unum corpus adiunctione compositum. Et, qui adhaeret Domino, inquit, unus spiritus est: non dixit, “qui adhaeret Domino, unus est,” aut, “unum sunt”; sed addidit, spiritus. Diversum sunt enim natura, spiritus hominis et spiritus Dei; sed inhaerendo fit unus spiritus ex diversis duobus, ita ut sine humano spiritu beatus sit Dei spiritus atque perfectus, beatus autem hominis spiritus non nisi cum Deo. (Cf. 1 Cor 2:11–14; 3:16; Gen 1:2)
But when "what one" is added, something can be signified that is made one out of several, though different in nature. As soul and body are certainly not one (for what is so different?), unless there be added or understood what one, that is, one man, or one animal. Hence the Apostle: he who cleaves to a harlot, he says, is one body: he did not say, "they are one," or, "it is one"; but he added, "body," as one body composed by union out of two different things, male and female. And, he who cleaves to the Lord, he says, is one spirit: he did not say, "he who cleaves to the Lord is one," or, "they are one"; but he added, spirit. For the spirit of man and the Spirit of God are different in nature; but by cleaving there comes about one spirit out of two different ones, so that without the human spirit the Spirit of God is blessed and perfect, but the spirit of man is blessed only with God. (See 1 Cor 2:11–14; 3:16; Gen 1:2)
deTrin.6.3.4Nec frustra, ut existimo, cum tanta in Evangelio secundum Ioannem et totiens diceret Dominus de ipsa unitate, vel sua cum Patre, vel nostra invicem nobiscum; nusquam dixit, “ut nos et ipsi unum”: sed, ut unum sint, sicut et nos unum sumus. Pater ergo et Filius unum sunt, utique secundum unitatem substantiae, et unus Deus est, et unus magnus, et unus sapiens, sicut tractatum est.
And not in vain, as I think, when the Lord said so much and so often in the Gospel according to John about that unity—whether his own with the Father, or ours with one another—he nowhere said, "that we and they may be one": but, that they may be one, as we too are one. The Father, then, and the Son are one, certainly according to the unity of substance, and there is one God, and one great one, and one wise one, as has been treated.
deTrin.6.3.43. 5. Unde ergo maior Pater? (Cf. John 14:28) Si enim maior, magnitudine maior: cum autem magnitudo Filius eius sit, nec ille utique maior est eo qui se genuit, nec ille maior est ea magnitudine qua magnus est: ergo aequalis. Nam unde aequalis, si non eo quo est, cui non est aliud esse, et aliud magnum esse? Aut si aeternitate Pater maior est, non est aequalis Filius quacumque re. Unde enim aequalis? Si magnitudine dixeris, non est par magnitudo, quae minus aeterna est, atque ita cetera. An forte in virtute aequalis est, in sapientia vero non est aequalis? Sed quomodo est aequalis virtus quae minus sapit? An in sapientia aequalis est, in virtute autem non est aequalis? Sed quomodo aequalis est sapientia, quae minus potens est? Restat ergo ut si in ulla re aequalis non est, PL adds in omnibus. non sit aequalis. At Scriptura clamat, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo. Cogitur ergo quivis adversarius veritatis, qui modo tenetur Apostolica auctoritate, in qualibet vel una re aequalem Deo Filium confiteri. Eligat quam voluerit: hinc ei ostendetur in omnibus esse aequalem, quae de substantia eius dicuntur.
3. 5. Whence, then, is the Father greater? (See John 14:28) For if greater, greater by magnitude: but since the Son is his magnitude, neither is that one certainly greater than him whom he begot, nor is that one greater than the magnitude by which he is great: therefore equal. For whence is he equal, if not by that whereby he is, for whom to be is not one thing, and to be great another? Or if the Father is greater by eternity, the Son is not equal in any matter whatever. For whence is he equal? If you say by magnitude, that magnitude is not equal which is less eternal, and so with the rest. Or is he perhaps equal in power, but in wisdom not equal? But how is that power equal which is less wise? Or is he equal in wisdom, but in power not equal? But how is that wisdom equal which is less powerful? It remains, then, that if he is not equal in any one matter, he is not equal. But Scripture cries out, he did not think it robbery to be equal to God. Every adversary of the truth, then, who is at all held by apostolic authority, is compelled to confess the Son equal to God in some one matter whatever. Let him choose which he will: from this it will be shown to him that he is equal in all things that are said of his substance.
deTrin.6.3.54. 6. Si enim virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, quamvis alio atque alio modo singulae intellegantur, nullo modo tamen separantur ab invicem, ut quicumque fuerint aequales, verbi gratia, in fortitudine, aequales sint et prudentia, et temperantia, et iustitia. Si enim dixeris aequales esse istos fortitudine, sed illum praestare prudentia; sequitur ut huius fortitudo minus prudens sit, ac per hoc nec fortitudine aequales sunt, quando est illius fortitudo prudentior. Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem consideratione percurras. Non enim de viribus corporis agitur, sed de animi fortitudine.
4. 6. For if the virtues that are in the human mind, although each is understood in one way and another, are yet in no way separated from one another, so that whoever are equal, for example, in fortitude, are equal also in prudence, and temperance, and justice. For if you say that these are equal in fortitude, but that one excels in prudence; it follows that this one's fortitude is less prudent, and through this they are not even equal in fortitude, since that one's fortitude is more prudent. And so you will find with the other virtues, if you run through them all with the same consideration. For it is not a question of the strength of the body, but of the fortitude of the mind.
deTrin.6.4.6Quanto ergo magis in illa incommutabili aeternaque substantia incomparabiliter simpliciore quam est animus humanus, haec ita se habent? Humano quippe animo non hoc est esse quod est fortem esse, aut prudentem, aut iustum, aut temperantem; potest enim esse animus, et nullam istarum habere virtutem. Deo autem hoc est esse quod est fortem esse, aut iustum esse, aut sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate, vel multiplici simplicitate dixeris, quo substantia eius significetur.
How much more, then, in that unchangeable and eternal substance, incomparably simpler than the human mind, do these things so hold? For to the human mind to be is not the same as to be brave, or prudent, or just, or temperate; for the mind can be, and have none of these virtues. But to God to be is the same as to be brave, or to be just, or to be wise, and whatever you may say of that simple manifoldness, or manifold simplicity, by which his substance is signified.
deTrin.6.4.6Quamobrem, sive ita dicatur “Deus de Deo,” ut et singulis hoc nomen conveniat, non tamen ut ambo simul duo dii, sed unus Deus sit. Ita enim sibi cohaerent, quemadmodum et in distantibus diversisque substantiis fieri Apostolus testis est. Nam et solus Dominus spiritus est, et solus hominis spiritus (Cf. John 3:6, 4:24; 1 Cor 2:11) utique spiritus est, tamen si haereat Domino unus spiritus est: quanto magis ibi, ubi est omnino inseparabilis atque aeterna connexio, ne absurde dici videatur quasi Filius amborum, cum dicitur Filius Dei, Cf. Matt 14:33, 16:16; Mark 1:1, 3:12; Luke 1:35, 4:41; John 1:34–49, 6:70, 10:36, 20:31; 1 John 3:8, 4:15, 5:5. si id quod dicitur “Deus,” non nisi de ambobus dicitur simul: sive quidquid de Deo dicitur quod substantiam eius indicet, non nisi de ambobus simul, immo de ipsa simul Trinitate dicitur? Sive ergo hoc, sive illud sit, quod diligentius discutiendum est, nunc unde agitur satis est videre, nullo modo Filium aequalem esse Patri, si in aliquo scilicet quod pertinet ad significandam eius substantiam inaequalis invenitur, sicut iam ostendimus.
Wherefore, whether it be so said "God of God," that this name fits the single ones, yet not so that both together are two gods, but that there is one God. For they so cohere together, as the Apostle witnesses comes about even in distant and different substances. For both the Lord alone is spirit, and the spirit of man (See John 3:6, 4:24; 1 Cor 2:11) alone is certainly spirit, yet if it cleaves to the Lord it is one spirit: how much more there, where there is an altogether inseparable and eternal connection, lest it seem absurdly to be said as it were the Son of both, when he is called the Son of God, See Matt 14:33, 16:16; Mark 1:1, 3:12; Luke 1:35, 4:41; John 1:34–49, 6:70, 10:36, 20:31; 1 John 3:8, 4:15, 5:5. if that which is said "God" is said only of both together: or whether whatever is said of God that indicates his substance is said only of both together, indeed of the Trinity itself together? Whether, then, it be this or that, which is to be discussed more carefully, now, as far as the matter goes, it is enough to see that in no way is the Son equal to the Father, if, namely, in anything that pertains to signifying his substance he is found unequal, as we have already shown.
deTrin.6.4.6Apostolus autem dixit aequalem. In omnibus ergo aequalis est Patri Filius, (Cf. Phil 2:6) et est unius eiusdemque substantiae.
But the Apostle said he was equal. In all things, then, the Son is equal to the Father, (See Phil 2:6) and is of one and the same substance.
deTrin.6.4.65. 7. Quapropter etiam Spiritus Sanctus in eadem unitate substantiae et aequalitate consistit. Sive enim sit unitas amborum, sive sanctitas, sive caritas, sive ideo unitas quia caritas, et ideo caritas quia sanctitas, manifestum est quod non aliquis duorum est quo uterque coniungitur, quo genitus a gignente diligatur, generatoremque suum diligat, sintque non participatione, sed essentia sua, neque dono superioris alicuius, sed suo proprio servantes unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis.
5. 7. Wherefore the Holy Spirit too consists in the same unity and equality of substance. For whether he be the unity of both, or the holiness, or the love, or the unity because he is love, and the love because he is holiness, it is manifest that he is not one of the two by whom each is joined, by whom the begotten is loved by the begetter and loves his own generator, and that they are not by participation, but by their own essence, nor by the gift of any superior, but by their own proper gift, keeping the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.
deTrin.6.5.7Quod imitari per gratiam, et ad Deum, et ad nos ipsos iubemur, Cf. Deut 6:5, 10:12, 11:13; Matt 22:37–38; Mark 12:29–31; Luke 10, 27; John 13:34, 15:12–17; Lev 19:18; Rom 13:9; Gal 5:14; Jas 2:8. in quibus duobus praeceptis tota Lex pendet et Prophetae. Ita sunt illa tria, Deus unus, solus, magnus, sapiens, sanctus, beatus. Nos autem ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso beati; quia ipsius munere inter nos unum, cum illo autem unus spiritus, quia agglutinatur anima nostra post eum. Et nobis haerere Deo bonum est, quia perdet omnem qui fornicatur ab eo.
And this, by grace, we are commanded to imitate, both toward God and toward ourselves, See Deut 6:5, 10:12, 11:13; Matt 22:37–38; Mark 12:29–31; Luke 10:27; John 13:34, 15:12–17; Lev 19:18; Rom 13:9; Gal 5:14; Jas 2:8. on which two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets. So those three are God, one, alone, great, wise, holy, blessed. But we are blessed from him, and through him, and in him; because by his gift we are one among ourselves, but with him one spirit, because our soul is cleaved fast behind him. And for us it is good to cleave to God, because he will destroy everyone who fornicates away from him.
deTrin.6.5.7Spiritus ergo Sanctus commune aliquid est Patris et Filii, quidquid illud est. Aut ipsa communio, consubstantialis et coaeterna; quae si amicitia convenienter dici potest, dicatur; sed aptius dicitur caritas. Et haec quoque substantia, quia Deus substantia, et Deus caritas, sicut scriptum est. Sicut autem simul substantia cum Patre et Filio, ita simul magna, et simul bona, et simul sancta, et quidquid aliud ad se dicitur: quoniam non aliud est Deo esse, et aliud magnum esse vel bonum esse, et cetera, sicut supra ostendimus. Si enim minus magna est ibi caritas quam sapientia, minus quam est diligitur sapientia: aequalis est igitur, ut quanta est sapientia tantum diligatur: est autem Sapientia aequalis Patri, sicut supra disputavimus: aequalis est igitur etiam Spiritus Sanctus; et si aequalis, in omnibus aequalis propter summam simplicitatem quae in illa substantia est. Et ideo non amplius quam tria sunt; unus diligens eum qui de illo est, et unus diligens eum de quo est, et ipsa dilectio. Quae si nihil est, quomodo Deus dilectio est? Si non est substantia, quomodo Deus substantia est?
The Holy Spirit, then, is something common to the Father and the Son, whatever it is. Or it is the very communion, consubstantial and coeternal; which, if it can fittingly be called friendship, let it be so called; but it is more aptly called love. And this too is substance, because God is substance, and God is love, as it is written. But just as he is substance together with the Father and the Son, so he is great together, and good together, and holy together, and whatever else is said in relation to himself: since for God to be is not one thing, and to be great or to be good another, and the rest, as we showed above. For if love is there less great than wisdom, wisdom is loved less than it is: it is, therefore, equal, so that as great as wisdom is, so much is it loved: but Wisdom is equal to the Father, as we argued above: equal, therefore, is also the Holy Spirit; and if equal, equal in all things, on account of the supreme simplicity that is in that substance. And therefore there are not more than three: one loving him who is from him, and one loving him from whom he is, and the love itself. Which, if it is nothing, how is God love? If it is not substance, how is God substance?
deTrin.6.5.7C
deTrin.6.5.7
6. 8. Si autem quaeritur quomodo simplex et multiplex sit illa substantia; animadvertenda est primo creatura quare sit multiplex, nullo autem modo vere simplex. Et prius corpus universum utique partibus constat; ita ut sit ibi alia pars maior, alia minor, et maius sit universum, quam pars quaelibet aut quantalibet. Nam et caelum et terra partes sunt universae mundanae molis: et sola terra, et solum caelum innumerabilibus partibus constat, et in tertia sui parte minor est quam in cetera, et in dimidia minor quam in tota; et totum mundi corpus quod duabus plerumque partibus appellari solet, id est, caelum et terra, utique maius est quam solum caelum aut sola terra. Et in unoquoque corpore aliud est magnitudo, aliud color, aliud figura. Potest enim et deminuta magnitudine manere idem color et eadem figura, et colore mutato manere eadem figura et eadem magnitudo, et figura eadem non manente tam magnum esse et eodem modo coloratum: et quaecumque alia simul dicuntur de corpore, possunt et simul et plura sine ceteris commutari. Ac per hoc multiplex esse convincitur natura corporis, simplex autem nullo modo.
6. 8. But if it is asked how that substance is both simple and manifold, the creature must first be considered, why it is manifold, but in no way truly simple. And first the universal body certainly consists of parts; so that there is there one part greater, another lesser, and the whole is greater than any part however large. For both heaven and earth are parts of the universal mass of the world: and the earth alone, and heaven alone, consists of innumerable parts, and in a third of itself is less than in the rest, and in half less than in the whole; and the whole body of the world, which is generally wont to be called by two parts, that is, heaven and earth, is certainly greater than heaven alone or earth alone. And in each body magnitude is one thing, color another, figure another. For with magnitude diminished the same color and the same figure can remain, and with color changed the same figure and the same magnitude can remain, and with the same figure not remaining a thing can be just as large and colored in the same way: and whatever other things are said at once of a body can be changed both at once and severally without the rest. And through this the nature of body is convicted of being manifold, but in no way simple.
deTrin.6.6.8Creatura quoque spiritalis, sicut est anima, est quidem in corporis comparatione simplicior: sine comparatione autem corporis multiplex est, etiam ipsa non simplex. Nam ideo simplicior est corpore, quia non mole diffunditur per spatium loci, sed in unoquoque corpore, et in toto tota est, et in qualibet parte eius tota est; et ideo cum fit aliquid in quamvis exigua particula corporis quod sentiat anima, quamvis non fiat in toto corpore, illa tamen tota sentit, quia totam non latet: sed tamen etiam in anima cum aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem, aliud acutum, aliud memorem, aliud cupiditas, aliud timor, aliud laetitia, aliud tristitia; possintque et alia sine aliis, et alia magis, alia minus, innumerabilia et innumerabiliter in animae natura inveniri; manifestum est non simplicem, sed multiplicem esse naturam. Nihil enim simplex mutabile est; omnis autem creatura mutabilis.
The spiritual creature too, such as the soul, is indeed in comparison with body simpler: but without comparison with body it is manifold, itself too not simple. For it is simpler than body for this reason, that it is not diffused by mass through space of place, but in each body it is whole both in the whole and whole in any part of it; and therefore, when something comes about in however small a particle of body which the soul perceives, although it does not come about in the whole body, yet the whole soul perceives it, because it is not hidden from the whole: but yet even in the soul, since to be skilled is one thing, to be unskilled another, to be sharp one, to be retentive another, desire one, fear another, gladness one, sadness another; and since some of these can be without others, and some more, some less, innumerable things, and in innumerable ways, can be found in the nature of the soul; it is manifest that its nature is not simple but manifold. For nothing simple is changeable; but every creature is changeable.
deTrin.6.6.87. 8. Deus vero multipliciter quidem dicitur magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus, et quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur; sed eadem magnitudo eius est, quae sapientia (non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute), et eadem bonitas quae sapientia et magnitudo, et eadem veritas quae illa omnia; et non est ibi aliud beatum esse et aliud magnum, aut sapientem, aut verum, aut bonum esse, aut omnino ipsum esse.
7. 8. But God is indeed said in manifold ways to be great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatever else does not seem unworthily said; but the same is his magnitude which is his wisdom (for he is great not by mass, but by power), and the same goodness which is wisdom and magnitude, and the same truth which is all those things; and there to be blessed is not one thing and to be great, or wise, or true, or good, or altogether to be itself, another.
deTrin.6.7.87. 9. Nec quoniam Trinitas est, ideo triplex putandus est; alioquin minor erit Pater solus, aut Filius solus, quam simul Pater et Filius. Quamquam non invenitur quomodo dici possit, aut Pater solus, aut Filius solus; cum semper atque inseparabiliter et ille cum Filio sit, et ille cum Patre: non ut ambo sint Pater, aut ambo Filius; sed quia semper in invicem, neuter solus. Quia vero dicimus et Deum solum ipsam Trinitatem, quamvis semper sit cum spiritibus et animabus sanctis; sed solum dicimus quod Deus est, quia non et illi cum illo Deus sunt: ita solum Patrem dicimus Patrem, non quia separatur a Filio, sed quia non simul ambo Pater est.
7. 9. Nor, because he is a Trinity, is he therefore to be thought triple; otherwise the Father alone, or the Son alone, will be less than the Father and the Son together. Although it is not found how it can be said either the Father alone or the Son alone; since always and inseparably both that one is with the Son, and that one with the Father: not that both are the Father, or both the Son; but because they are always in one another, neither alone. But because we say that the Trinity itself is also God alone, although he is always with the spirits and holy souls; but we say "alone" what God is, because they are not also God with him: so we say that the Father alone is Father, not because he is separated from the Son, but because both together are not the Father.
deTrin.6.7.98. 9. Cum itaque tantus est solus Pater, vel solus Filius, vel solus Spiritus Sanctus, quantus est simul Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, nullo modo triplex dicendus est. Corpora quippe adiunctione sua crescunt. Quamvis enim qui adhaeret uxori suae, unum corpus sit; (Cf. Eph 5:31; Gen 2:24; 1 Cor 6:16) maius tamen corpus fit, quam si solius viri esset, aut solius uxoris.
8. 9. Since, therefore, the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone is as great as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together, he is in no way to be called triple. For bodies grow by their conjunction. For although he who cleaves to his wife is one body, (See Eph 5:31; Gen 2:24; 1 Cor 6:16) yet a greater body comes about than if it were of the man alone, or of the wife alone.
deTrin.6.8.9In rebus autem spiritalibus, cum minor maiori adhaeret, sicut creatura Creatori, illa fit maior quam erat, non ille. In his enim quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse quod est melius esse. Melior autem fit spiritus alicuius creaturae, cum adhaeret Creatori, quam si non adhaereat: et ideo etiam maior quia melior. Qui ergo adhaeret Domino, unus spiritus est, sed tamen Dominus non ideo fit maior, quamvis fiat ille qui adhaeret Domino.
But in spiritual things, when a lesser cleaves to a greater, as the creature to the Creator, that one becomes greater than it was, not this one. For in those things that are not great by mass, to be greater is to be better. But the spirit of any creature becomes better when it cleaves to the Creator than if it does not cleave: and therefore also greater, because better. He, then, who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit, but yet the Lord does not on that account become greater, although that one becomes so who cleaves to the Lord.
deTrin.6.8.9In ipso igitur Deo cum adhaeret aequali Patri Filius aequalis, aut Spiritus Sanctus Patri et Filio aequalis, non fit maior Deus quam singuli eorum; quia non est quo crescat illa perfectio. Perfectus autem sive Pater, sive Filius, sive Spiritus Sanctus, et perfectus Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus: et ideo Trinitas potius quam triplex.
In God himself, therefore, when the equal Son cleaves to the equal Father, or the Holy Spirit equal to the Father and the Son, God does not become greater than each of them; because there is nothing by which that perfection may grow. But perfect is the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, and perfect God is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: and therefore a Trinity rather than triple.
deTrin.6.8.99. 10. Et quoniam ostendimus quomodo possit dici “solus Pater,” quia non nisi ipse ibi Pater; consideranda est illa sententia qua dicitur, Deum verum solum non esse Patrem solum, sed Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. Si quis enim interroget, Pater solus utrum sit Deus: quomodo respondebitur non esse, nisi forte ita dicamus, esse quidem Patrem Deum, sed non eum esse solum Deum; esse autem solum Deum, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum? Sed quid agimus de illo testimonio Domini? Patri enim dicebat, et Patrem nominaverat ad quem loquebatur, cum ait: haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te unum verum Deum. (Here Augustine changes “only” to “one.” Greek and Vulgate read “only.”)
9. 10. And since we have shown how it can be said "the Father alone," because there is no Father there but he; that sentence must be considered by which it is said that the one true God is not the Father alone, but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For if anyone asks whether the Father alone is God: how will it be answered that he is not, unless perhaps we say thus, that the Father is indeed God, but that he is not God alone; but that God alone is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit? But what shall we do with that testimony of the Lord? For he was speaking to the Father, and had named the Father to whom he spoke, when he said: but this is eternal life, that they may know you the one true God. (Here Augustine changes “only” to “one.” Greek and Vulgate read “only.”)
deTrin.6.9.10Quod quidem Ariani sic solent accipere, quasi non sit Filius verus Deus. Cf. Tomus Damasi, anath. 12. Quibus exclusis videndum est an intellegere cogamur, cum dictum est Patri, ut cognoscant te unum a verum Deum; tamquam hoc insinuare voluerit, quia et solus Pater Deus verus est, ne non intellegeremus Deum, nisi ipsa tria simul, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. Num ergo ex Domini testimonio, et Patrem unum verum Deum dicimus, et Filium unum verum Deum, et Spiritum Sanctum unum verum Deum, et simul Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, id est, simul ipsam Trinitatem, non tres veros deos, sed unum verum Deum? Cf. Tomus Damasi, anath. 24–25. An quoniam addidit, et quem misisti Iesum Christum; subaudiendum est, “unum verum Deum”; et ordo verborum est, “ut te et quem misisti Iesum Christum, cognoscant unum verum Deum”?
Which indeed the Arians are wont to take thus, as if the Son were not the true God. See Tomus Damasi, anath. 12. These being excluded, it must be seen whether we are compelled to understand, when it was said to the Father, that they may know you the one true God, as though he wished to intimate this, that the Father alone too is the true God, lest we should understand God to be nothing but those three together, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Do we then, from the Lord's testimony, call both the Father one true God, and the Son one true God, and the Holy Spirit one true God, and at once the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, that is, at once the Trinity itself, not three true gods, but one true God? See Tomus Damasi, anath. 24–25. Or, since he added, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent, must "one true God" be understood, and is the order of the words, "that they may know you and Jesus Christ whom you have sent as one true God"?
deTrin.6.9.10Cur ergo tacuit de Spiritu Sancto? An quoniam consequens est ut ubicumque nominatur unum tanta pace uni adhaerens, ut per hanc utrumque unum sit, iam ex hoc intellegatur etiam ipsa pax, quamvis non commemoretur? Nam et illo loco Apostolus videtur quasi praetermittere Spiritum Sanctum, et tamen ibi intellegitur, ubi ait, omnia sunt vestra; vos autem, Christi; Christus autem, Dei; et iterum, caput mulieris, vir; caput viri, Christus; caput autem Christi, Deus.
Why, then, was he silent about the Holy Spirit? Is it because it is consequent that, wherever there is named one cleaving to another in such great peace that through it both are one, from this the very peace too is now understood, although it be not mentioned? For in that place too the Apostle seems as it were to pass over the Holy Spirit, and yet there he is understood, where he says, all things are yours; but you are Christ's; and Christ is God's; and again, the head of the woman is the man; the head of the man is Christ; but the head of Christ is God.
deTrin.6.9.10Sed rursus si Deus non nisi omnia simul tria, quomodo caput Christi Deus, id est, caput Christi Trinitas, cum in Trinitate sit Christus ut sit Trinitas? An quod est Pater cum Filio, caput est ei quod est solus Filius? Cum Filio enim Pater Deus, solus autem Filius Christus est: maxime quia iam Verbum caro factum loquitur, secundum quam humilitatem eius etiam maior est Pater, sicut dicit, quoniam Pater maior me est; ut hoc ipsum Deum esse, quod illi cum Patre unum est, caput sit hominis Mediatoris, quod ipse solus est. Si enim mentem recte dicimus principale hominis, id est, tamquam caput humanae substantiae, cum ipse homo cum mente sit homo; cur non multo congruentius, multoque magis Verbum cum Patre quod simul Deus est, caput est Christi, quamvis Christus homo (Cf. 1 Tim 2:5) nisi cum Verbo quod caro factum est, intellegi non possit?
But again, if God is nothing but all three together, how is the head of Christ God, that is, the head of Christ the Trinity, since in the Trinity is Christ, so as to be the Trinity? Or is that which is the Father with the Son the head to that which is the Son alone? For the Father is God with the Son, but the Son alone is Christ: especially because the Word now made flesh is speaking, according to whose humility the Father is even greater, as he says, because the Father is greater than I; so that this very being God, which to him is one with the Father, may be the head of the man the Mediator, which he alone is. For if we rightly call the mind the principal part of man, that is, as it were the head of the human substance, although man himself is man with the mind; why is not the Word with the Father, which together is God, much more fittingly and much more the head of Christ, although Christ as man (See 1 Tim 2:5) cannot be understood except with the Word which was made flesh?
deTrin.6.9.10Sed hoc, ut iam diximus, aliquanto diligentius postea considerabimus. Nunc autem aequalitas Trinitatis et una eademque substantia, quantum breviter potuimus, demonstrata est, ut quoquo modo se habeat ista quaestio, quam discutiendam acriore intentione distulimus, nihil impediat quominus fateamur, summam aequalitatem Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti.
But this, as we have already said, we shall consider somewhat more carefully later. But now the equality of the Trinity and the one and the same substance have been demonstrated, as briefly as we could, so that, however that question may stand, which we have deferred to discuss with keener attention, nothing may hinder us from confessing the supreme equality of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.
deTrin.6.9.1010. 11. Quidam cum vellet brevissime singularum in Trinitate Personarum insinuare propria, aeternitas, inquit, in Patre, species in Imagine, usus in Munere. Hilary, On the Trinity 2.1.1. Et quia non mediocris auctoritatis in tractatione Scripturarum, et assertione fidei vir exstitit; Hilarius enim hoc in libris suis posuit; horum verborum, id est, Patris, et Imaginis, et Muneris, aeternitatis, et speciei, et usus, abditam scrutatus intellegentiam quantum valeo, non eum secutum arbitror in aeternitatis vocabulo, nisi quod Pater non habet Patrem de quo sit, Filius autem de Patre est ut sit, atque ut illi coaeternus sit.
10. 11. A certain man, wishing most briefly to intimate the properties of the single persons in the Trinity, said, eternity in the Father, form in the Image, use in the Gift. Hilary, On the Trinity 2.1.1. And because he was a man of no slight authority in the treatment of the Scriptures and the assertion of the faith—for Hilary put this in his books—having scrutinized as far as I can the hidden meaning of these words, that is, of Father, and Image, and Gift, of eternity, and form, and use, I think that in the word eternity he followed nothing except that the Father has no Father from whom he is, but the Son is from the Father so as to be, and so as to be coeternal with him.
deTrin.6.10.11Imago enim si perfecte implet illud cuius imago est, ipsa coaequatur ei, non illud imagini suae. In qua imagine speciem nominavit, credo, propter pulchritudinem, ubi iam est tanta congruentia, et prima aequalitas, et prima similitudo, nulla in re dissidens, et nullo modo inaequalis, et nulla ex parte dissimilis, sed ad identidem respondens ei cuius imago est. Ubi est prima et summa vita, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud esse, sed idem et esse et vivere: et primus ac summus intellectus, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud intellegere, sed id quod est intellegere, hoc vivere, Cf. Marius Victorinus, Against Arius 4.16; 21; 22. hoc esse est, unum omnia: tamquam Verbum perfectum, cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium; et omnes unum in ea, sicut ipsa unum de uno, cum quo unum.
For an image, if it perfectly fulfills that of which it is the image, is itself made equal to it, not it to its image. In which image he named form, I believe, on account of beauty, where there is already such great congruence, and first equality, and first likeness, disagreeing in nothing, and in no way unequal, and in no part unlike, but answering exactly to him whose image it is. Where there is first and highest life, for which to live is not one thing and to be another, but the same to be and to live: and first and highest understanding, for which to live is not one thing and to understand another, but that which is to understand, this is to live, this is to be, See Marius Victorinus, Against Arius 4.16; 21; 22. one all things: as a perfect Word, to which nothing is lacking, and a certain art of the almighty and wise God, full of all the living unchangeable reasons; and all are one in it, as it is itself one from the One, with whom it is one.
deTrin.6.10.11Ibi novit omnia Deus quae fecit per ipsam, et ideo cum decedant et succedant tempora, non decedit aliquid vel succedit scientiae Dei. Non enim haec quae creata sunt, ideo sciuntur a Deo, quia facta sunt: ac non potius ideo facta sunt vel mutabilia, quia immutabiliter ab eo sciuntur.
There God knows all the things he made through it, and therefore, though times depart and succeed, nothing departs from or succeeds to the knowledge of God. For these things that were created are not known by God because they were made: but rather were made, or are changeable, because they are unchangeably known by him.
deTrin.6.10.11Ille igitur ineffabilis quidam complexus Patris et Imaginis non est sine perfruitione, sine caritate, sine gaudio. Illa ergo dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo, si tamen aliqua humana voce digne dicitur, usus ab illo appellatus est breviter, et est in Trinitate Spiritus Sanctus, non genitus, sed genitoris, genitique suavitas, ingenti largitate atque ubertate perfundens omnes creaturas pro captu earum, ut ordinem suum teneant et locis suis acquiescant.
That ineffable embrace, then, of the Father and the Image is not without enjoyment, without love, without joy. That love, therefore, that delight, that felicity or blessedness—if indeed it can be worthily said by any human voice—he briefly called use, and it is in the Trinity the Holy Spirit, not begotten, but the sweetness of the begetter and the begotten, with vast bounty and abundance flooding all creatures according to their capacity, that they may keep their order and rest in their places.
deTrin.6.10.1110. 12. Haec igitur omnia, quae arte divina facta sunt, et unitatem quamdam in se ostendunt, et speciem, et ordinem. Quidquid enim horum est, et unum aliquid est, sicut sunt naturae corporum, et ingenia animarum; et aliqua specie formatur, sicut sunt figurae vel qualitates corporum, ac doctrinae vel artes animarum; et ordinem aliquem petit aut tenet, sicut sunt pondera vel collocationes corporum, atque amores aut delectationes animarum.
10. 12. All these things, then, which were made by divine art, show in themselves both a certain unity, and form, and order. For whatever of these there is, is both some one thing, as are the natures of bodies and the dispositions of souls; and is formed by some form, as are the figures or qualities of bodies, and the teachings or arts of souls; and seeks or keeps some order, as are the weights or placings of bodies, and the loves or delights of souls.
deTrin.6.10.12Oportet igitur ut Creatorem, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspicientes, Trinitatem intellegamus, cuius in creatura, quomodo dignum est, apparet vestigium. (Cf. Sir 50:31) In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est rerum omnium, et perfectissima pulchritudo, et beatissima delectatio. Itaque illa tria, et a se invicem PL: ad se invicem, “with reference to each other.” determinari videntur, et in se infinita sunt.
It is fitting, therefore, that, seeing the things that are made, understood through the Creator, we understand the Trinity, of whom in the creature there appears, as is fitting, a trace. (See Sir 50:31) For in that Trinity is the highest origin of all things, and the most perfect beauty, and the most blessed delight. And so those three both seem to be determined by one another PL: ad se invicem, “with reference to each other.” and are infinite in themselves.
deTrin.6.10.12Sed hic in rebus corporeis, non tantum est res una quantum tres simul, et plus aliquid sunt duae quam una res: ceterum in illa summa Trinitate tantum est una quantum tres simul, nec plus aliquid sunt duae quam una. Et in se infinita sunt. Ita et singula sunt in singulis, et omnia in singulis, et singula in omnibus, et omnia in omnibus, et unum omnia. Qui videt hoc vel ex parte, vel per speculum in aenigmate, gaudeat cognoscens Deum, et sicut Deum honoret, et gratias agat: qui autem non videt, tendat per pietatem ad videndum; non per caecitatem ad calumniandum. Quoniam unus est Deus, sed tamen Trinitas.
But here in corporeal things, one thing is not as much as three together, and two things are something more than one: but in that highest Trinity one is as much as three together, nor are two something more than one. And they are infinite in themselves. So both the single ones are in the single ones, and all in the single ones, and the single ones in all, and all in all, and all one. Whoever sees this, whether in part, or through a glass in a riddle, let him rejoice in knowing God, and let him honor him as God, and give thanks: but whoever does not see, let him strive through piety toward seeing; not through blindness toward calumniating. For God is one, yet a Trinity.
deTrin.6.10.12Nec confuse accipiendum est, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quem omnia; nec diis multis, sed ipsi gloria in saecula saeculorum. Amen. (Cf. 1 Cor 8:6)
Nor is it to be taken confusedly, from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things; nor of many gods, but to him be glory forever and ever. Amen. (See 1 Cor 8:6)
deTrin.6.10.12Bk. 7Augustine returns to the question: whether any person of the Trinity is Wisdom in itself.Augustinus redit ad quaestionem: an qualibet Trinitatis persona per se sit Sapientia.
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deTrin.6.10.12
1. 1. Iam nunc quaeramus diligentius, quantum dat Deus, quod paulo ante distulimus: utrum et singula quaeque in Trinitate Persona possit et per se ipsam non cum ceteris duabus dici Deus, aut magnus, aut sapiens, aut verus, aut omnipotens, aut iustus, et si quid aliud dici de Deo potest, non relative, sed ad se ipsum; an vero non dicantur ista, nisi cum Trinitas intellegitur.
1. 1. Now let us inquire more carefully, as far as God grants, what we deferred a little before: whether each single person in the Trinity can also be called, in itself and not with the other two, God, or great, or wise, or true, or almighty, or just, and whatever else can be said of God, not relatively, but in relation to itself; or whether these things are not said except when the Trinity is understood.
deTrin.7.1.1Hoc enim quaestionem facit, quia scriptum est, Christum Dei virtutem, et Dei sapientiam; utrum ita sit pater sapientiae atque virtutis suae, ut hac sapientia sapiens sit quam genuit, et hac virtute potens quam genuit; et quia semper potens et sapiens, (Cf. Sir 1:3) semper genuit virtutem et sapientiam. Dixeramus enim si ita est, cur non et magnitudinis suae pater sit qua magnus est, et bonitatis qua bonus, et iustitiae qua iustus, et alia si qua sunt?
For this makes the question, because it is written, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God: whether he is so the father of his wisdom and power that he is wise by this wisdom which he begot, and powerful by this power which he begot; and because he is always powerful and wise, (See Sir 1:3) he always begot power and wisdom. For we had said, if it is so, why is he not also the father of his magnitude by which he is great, and of the goodness by which he is good, and of the justice by which he is just, and of others if there are any?
deTrin.7.1.1Aut si haec omnia pluribus vocabulis in eadem sapientia et virtute intelleguntur, ut ea sit magnitudo quae virtus, ea bonitas quae sapientia, et ea rursus sapientia quae virtus, sicut iam tractavimus; meminerimus, cum aliquid horum nomino, sic accipiendum esse, ac si omnia commemorem.
Or if all these are understood under several words in the same wisdom and power, so that the magnitude is that which is power, the goodness that which is wisdom, and again the wisdom that which is power, as we have already treated; let us remember that, when I name any one of these, it is to be so taken as if I mentioned them all.
deTrin.7.1.1Quaeritur ergo an Pater etiam singulus sit sapiens, atque ipsa sibi ipse sapientia, an ita sit sapiens quomodo dicens. Verbo enim quod genuit (Cf. Sir 1:4–5) dicens est; non verbo quod profertur, et sonat, et transit; sed Verbo quod erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum, et omnia per ipsum facta sunt: Verbo aequali sibi, quo semper atque incommutabiliter dicit se ipsum. Non est enim ipse verbum, sicut nec filius, nec imago. Dicens autem: exceptis illis temporalibus vocibus Dei, quae in creatura fiunt; nam sonant et transeunt: (Cf. Matt 3:17, 17:5; John 12:28) dicens ergo illo coaeterno Verbo, non singulus intellegitur, sed cum ipso Verbo, sine quo non est utique dicens.
It is asked, then, whether the Father even singly is wise, and is himself wisdom to himself, or whether he is wise in the way that he is speaking. For he is speaking by the Word which he begot; (See Sir 1:4–5) not by a word that is uttered, and sounds, and passes away; but by the Word which was with God, and the Word was God, and all things were made through him: by a Word equal to himself, by which he always and unchangeably speaks himself. For he is not himself the word, just as he is not the son, nor the image. But speaking: excepting those temporal voices of God which come about in the creature; for they sound and pass away: (See Matt 3:17, 17:5; John 12:28) speaking, then, by that coeternal Word, he is understood not singly, but with the Word itself, without which he is certainly not speaking.
deTrin.7.1.1Itane et sapiens sicut dicens, ut ita sit sapientia, sicut Verbum, et hoc sit Verbum esse quod est esse sapientiam; hoc etiam esse virtutem, ut virtus et sapientia et Verbum idem sit, et relative dicatur, sicut Filius et imago: atque ille non singulus potens, vel sapiens, sed cum ipsa virtute atque sapientia quam genuit; sicut non singulus dicens, sed eo Verbo, et cum eo Verbo quod genuit; atque ita magnus ea et cum ea magnitudine quam genuit?
Is he then also wise as he is speaking, so that he is wisdom in the way that he is the Word, and this is to be the Word which is to be wisdom; this is also to be power, so that power and wisdom and Word are the same, and it is said relatively, as Son and image: and he is not singly powerful or wise, but with the very power and wisdom which he begot; as he is not singly speaking, but by that Word, and with that Word which he begot; and so great by that and with that magnitude which he begot?
deTrin.7.1.1Et si non alio magnus, alio Deus, sed eo magnus quo Deus, quia non aliud illi est magnum esse, aliud Deum esse; consequens est ut nec Deus singulus, sed ea et cum ea deitate quam genuit, ut sic sit Filius deitas Patris, sicut sapientia et virtus Patris, et sicuti est Verbum et imago Patris. (Cf. Sir 1:3–5; 1 Cor 1:18–30; 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15; 1 Thess 2:13; Rev 19:13)
And if he is not great by one thing and God by another, but is great by that whereby he is God, because for him to be great is not one thing and to be God another; it is consequent that he is not God singly either, but by that and with that deity which he begot, so that the Son is the deity of the Father in the way that he is the wisdom and power of the Father, and as he is the Word and image of the Father. (See Sir 1:3–5; 1 Cor 1:18–30; 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15; 1 Thess 2:13; Rev 19:13)
deTrin.7.1.1Et quia non aliud illi est esse, aliud Deum esse, ita sit etiam essentia Patris Filius, sicuti est Verbum et imago eius. Ac per hoc etiam excepto eo quod Pater est, non sit aliquid Pater, nisi quia est ei Filius: ut non tantum id quod dicitur Pater, quod manifestum est eum non ad se ipsum, sed ad Filium relative dici, et ideo Patrem quia est ei Filius; sed omnino ut sit quod ad se ipsum est, ideo sit quia genuit essentiam suam. Sicut enim magnus est, non nisi ea quam genuit magnitudine; ita et est non nisi ea quam genuit essentia; quia non aliud est illi “esse,” aliud magnum esse.
And because for him to be is not one thing and to be God another, so the Son is also the essence of the Father, just as he is his Word and image. And through this, even excepting that which the Father is, the Father is not anything except because he has a Son: so that not only is that which is called Father (which is manifestly said of him not in relation to himself, but relatively to the Son, and therefore Father because he has a Son); but altogether, that he is what he is in relation to himself, he is for this reason, that he begot his own essence. For just as he is great only by that magnitude which he begot, so he also is only by that essence which he begot; because for him to "be" is not one thing, and to be great another.
deTrin.7.1.1Itane igitur pater est essentiae suae, sicut pater est magnitudinis suae, sicut pater est virtutis et sapientiae suae? Eadem quippe eius magnitudo quae virtus, et eadem essentia quae magnitudo.
Is he, then, the father of his own essence, as he is the father of his own magnitude, as he is the father of his own power and wisdom? For the same is his magnitude which is his power, and the same essence which is his magnitude.
deTrin.7.1.11. 2. Haec disputatio nata est ex eo quod scriptum est, Christum esse Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam.
1. 2. This discussion arose from what is written, that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God.
deTrin.7.1.2Quapropter in eas angustias sermo coartatur, cum ineffabilia fari cupimus, ut aut dicamus Christum non esse Dei virtutem, et Dei sapientiam, atque ita impudenter et impie resistamus Apostolo;
Wherefore our speech is constrained into these straits, when we desire to utter the unutterable, so that we must either say that Christ is not the power of God and the wisdom of God, and so impudently and impiously resist the Apostle;
deTrin.7.1.2aut Christum quidem Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam esse fateamur, sed eius Patrem non esse patrem virtutis et sapientiae suae, quod non minus impium est; sic enim nec Christi erit Pater, quia Christus Dei virtus et Dei sapientia est;
or confess that Christ is indeed the power of God and the wisdom of God, but that his Father is not the father of his own power and wisdom, which is no less impious; for thus he will not even be the Father of Christ, because Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God;
deTrin.7.1.2aut non esse Patrem virtute sua potentem, neque sapientia sua sapientem; quod quis audeat dicere?
or that the Father is not powerful by his own power, nor wise by his own wisdom; which who would dare to say?
deTrin.7.1.2aut aliud in Patre intellegi esse, aliud sapientem esse, ut non hoc ipso sit quo sapiens est; quod de anima intellegi solet, quae alias insipiens, alias sapiens est, velut natura mutabilis, et non summe perfecteque simplex;
or that in the Father to be is one thing and to be wise another, so that he is not by the very thing by which he is wise; which is wont to be understood of the soul, which is at one time unwise, at another wise, as a nature changeable, and not supremely and perfectly simple;
deTrin.7.1.2aut Patrem non esse aliquid ad se ipsum, et non solum quod Pater est, sed omnino quod est, ad Filium relative dici. Quomodo ergo eiusdem essentiae Filius cuius Pater, quandoquidem ad se ipsum, nec essentia est, nec omnino est ad se ipsum, sed etiam “esse” ad Filium illi est?
or that the Father is not anything in relation to himself, and that not only that which is the Father, but altogether that which he is, is said relatively to the Son. How, then, is the Son of the same essence of which the Father is, since, in relation to himself, the Father is neither essence, nor is at all in relation to himself, but even "to be" is for him in relation to the Son?
deTrin.7.1.2At enim multo magis unius eiusdemque essentiae, quia una eademque essentia Pater et Filius; quandoquidem Patri non ad se ipsum est ipsum “esse,” sed ad Filium, quam essentiam genuit, et qua essentia est quidquid est. Neuter ergo ad se est, et uterque ad invicem relative dicitur.
But rather much more of one and the same essence, because one and the same essence is the Father and the Son; since for the Father his very "being" is not in relation to himself, but in relation to the Son, whose essence he begot, and by which essence he is whatever he is. Neither, then, is in relation to himself, and each is said relatively in relation to the other.
deTrin.7.1.2An Pater solus non solum quod Pater dicitur, sed omnino quidquid dicitur relative ad Filium dicitur; ille autem dicitur et ad se? Et si ita est, quid dicitur ad se? An ipsa essentia? Sed Patris essentia est Filius, sicut Patris virtus et sapientia, sicut Verbum Patris et Imago Patris. (Cf. 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15)
Or is the Father alone said not only that which is called Father, but altogether whatever is said relatively in relation to the Son; while that one is said also in relation to himself? And if it is so, what is said in relation to himself? Is it the essence itself? But the essence of the Father is the Son, as the power and wisdom of the Father, as the Word of the Father and the Image of the Father. (See 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15)
deTrin.7.1.2Aut si essentia dicitur ad se Filius, Pater autem non est essentia, sed genitor essentiae, non est autem ad se ipsum, sed hac ipsa essentia quam genuit, sicut hac ipsa magnitudine magnus quam genuit; ergo et magnitudo dicitur ad se Filius, ergo et virtus, et sapientia, et Verbum, et Imago. Quid autem absurdius, quam imaginem ad se dici?
Or if the Son is said essence in relation to himself, but the Father is not essence, but the begetter of essence, and is not in relation to himself, but by that very essence which he begot, as he is great by that very magnitude which he begot; then the Son is also said magnitude in relation to himself, then also power, and wisdom, and Word, and Image. But what is more absurd than that an image be said in relation to itself?
deTrin.7.1.2Aut si non idipsum est Imago et Verbum, quod est virtus et sapientia, sed illa relative dicuntur, haec autem ad se, non ad aliud; incipit non ea sapientia quam genuit, sapiens esse Pater, quia non potest ipse ad eam relative dici, et illa ad eum relative non dici. Omnia enim quae relative dicuntur, ad invicem dicuntur.
Or if Image and Word are not the same as power and wisdom, but those are said relatively, while these in relation to himself, not to another; then the Father begins to be wise not by that wisdom which he begot, because he cannot be said relatively in relation to it, and it not be said relatively in relation to him. For all things that are said relatively are said in relation to one another.
deTrin.7.1.2Restat itaque ut etiam essentia Filius relative dicatur ad Patrem. Ex quo conficitur inopinatissimus sensus, ut ipsa essentia non sit essentia; vel certe cum dicitur essentia, non essentia, sed relativum indicetur. Quomodo cum dicitur dominus, non essentia indicatur, sed relativum quod refertur ad servum; cum autem homo dicitur, vel aliquid tale, quod ad se, non ad aliud dicitur, tunc indicatur essentia. Homo ergo cum dominus dicitur, ipse homo essentia est, dominus vero relative dicitur; homo enim ad se dicitur, dominus ad servum. Hoc autem unde agimus, si essentia ipsa relative dicitur, essentia ipsa non est essentia.
It remains, then, that the Son too be said essence relatively in relation to the Father. From which results a most unexpected sense, that the essence itself is not essence; or at least that when essence is said, not essence, but a relative is indicated. As when a master is said, not essence is indicated, but a relative which is referred to a servant; but when a man is said, or anything of the sort, which is said in relation to himself, not to another, then essence is indicated. A man, then, when he is called a master, the man himself is essence, but master is said relatively; for man is said in relation to himself, master in relation to a servant. But in the matter we are treating, if the essence itself is said relatively, the essence itself is not essence.
deTrin.7.1.2Huc accedit, quia omnis essentia quae relative dicitur, est etiam aliquid excepto relativo; sicut homo dominus, et homo servus, et equus iumentum, Jumentum, meaning a beast precisely as referred to its burden, or what it draws, by its jugum or yoke. et nummus arra; homo et equus et nummus ad se dicuntur, et substantiae sunt vel essentiae; dominus vero et servus et iumentum et arra, ad aliquid relative dicuntur.
There is added to this, that every essence that is said relatively is also something apart from the relative; as a man master, and a man servant, and a horse a beast of burden, Jumentum, meaning a beast precisely as referred to its burden, or what it draws, by its jugum or yoke. and a coin a pledge; man and horse and coin are said in relation to themselves, and are substances or essences; but master and servant and beast of burden and pledge are said relatively in relation to something.
deTrin.7.1.2Sed si non esset homo, id est aliqua substantia, non esset qui relative dominus diceretur: et si non esset equus quaedam essentia, non esset quod iumentum relative diceretur; ita si nummus non esset aliqua substantia, nec arra posset relative dici.
But if there were not a man, that is, some substance, there would not be one who might be called master relatively: and if a horse were not a certain essence, there would not be what might be called a beast of burden relatively; so if a coin were not some substance, neither could a pledge be said relatively.
deTrin.7.1.2Quapropter si et Pater non est aliquid ad se ipsum, non est omnino qui relative dicatur ad aliquid. Aristotle, Categories 7.6a36–8b24; Pseudo-Augustine, Aristotle’s Ten Categories 11.
Wherefore, if the Father too is not anything in relation to himself, there is altogether no one who might be said relatively in relation to something. Aristotle, Categories 7.6a36–8b24; Pseudo-Augustine, Aristotle’s Ten Categories 11.
deTrin.7.1.2Non enim, sicut ad aliquid coloratum refertur color eius, nec omnino ad se dicitur color, sed semper alicuius colorati est; illud autem cuius color est, etiam si eo quod coloratum dicitur, ad colorem refertur, tamen id quod corpus dicitur, ad se dicitur: ullo modo ita putandum est Patrem non dici aliquid ad se ipsum, sed quidquid dicitur ad Filium dici; eundem vero Filium et ad se ipsum dici, et ad Patrem, cum dicitur magnitudo magna et virtus potens, utique ad se ipsum, et magnitudo atque virtus magni et potentis Patris, qua Pater magnus et potens est. Non ergo ita, sed utrumque substantia, et utrumque una substantia.
For it is not as the color of a colored thing is referred to it, and color is not at all said in relation to itself, but is always of something colored; while that of which it is the color, even if, by being called colored, it is referred to the color, yet what is called body is said in relation to itself: in no way is it to be thought that the Father is said nothing in relation to himself, but that whatever is said is said in relation to the Son; while the same Son is said both in relation to himself and in relation to the Father, when he is called a great magnitude and a powerful power, certainly in relation to himself, and the magnitude and power of the great and powerful Father, by which the Father is great and powerful. Not so, then, but each is substance, and each is one substance.
deTrin.7.1.2Sicut autem absurdum est dicere, candidum non esse candorem; sic absurdum est dicere, sapientem non esse sapientiam; et sicut candor ad se ipsum candidus dicitur, ita et sapientia ad se ipsam dicitur sapiens. Sed candor corporis non est essentia; quoniam ipsum corpus essentia est, et illa eius qualitas: unde et ab ea dicitur candidum corpus, cui non hoc est esse quod candidum esse. Aliud enim ibi forma, et aliud color; et utrumque non in se ipso, sed in aliqua mole, quae moles nec forma, nec color est, sed formata atque colorata. Sapientia vero et sapiens est, et se ipsa sapiens est. Et quoniam quaecumque anima participatione sapientiae fit sapiens, si rursus desipiat, manet tamen in se sapientia, nec cum fuerit anima in stultitiam commutata, illa mutatur.
But just as it is absurd to say that a white thing is not whiteness, so it is absurd to say that a wise one is not wisdom; and just as whiteness is said white in relation to itself, so wisdom too is said wise in relation to itself. But the whiteness of a body is not essence; since the body itself is essence, and that its quality: whence also a body is called white from it, for which to be is not the same as to be white. For there form is one thing, and color another; and both are not in themselves, but in some mass, which mass is neither form nor color, but formed and colored. But wisdom is both wise, and is wise by itself. And since whatever soul becomes wise by participation in wisdom, if it again become unwise, yet wisdom remains in itself, nor, when the soul has been changed into folly, is it changed.
deTrin.7.1.2Non ita est in eo qui ex ea fit sapiens, quemadmodum candor in corpore quod ex illo candidum est. Cum enim corpus in alium colorem fuerit mutatum, non manebit candor ille, sed omnino esse desinet. Quod si et Pater qui genuit sapientiam, ex ea fit sapiens, (Cf. Sir 1:4) neque hoc est illi esse quod sapere, qualitas eius est Filius; non proles eius, et non ibi erit iam summa simplicitas. Sed absit ut ita sit; quia vere ibi est summe simplex essentia: hoc ergo est ibi esse quod sapere. Quod si hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, non per illam sapientiam quam genuit sapiens est Pater; alioquin non ipse illam, sed illa eum genuit.
It is not so in him who becomes wise from it, as whiteness in a body which is white from it. For when the body has been changed into another color, that whiteness will not remain, but will altogether cease to be. But if the Father too, who begot wisdom, becomes wise from it, (See Sir 1:4) and for him to be is not the same as to be wise, then the Son is his quality, not his offspring, and there will then not be there the highest simplicity. But far be it that it should be so; because there is truly there a supremely simple essence: this, then, is there to be which is to be wise. But if this is there to be which is to be wise, the Father is not wise by that wisdom which he begot; otherwise it is not he who begot it, but it that begot him.
deTrin.7.1.2Quid enim aliud dicimus, cum dicimus, hoc illi est esse quod sapere, nisi, eo est quo sapiens est? Quapropter quae causa illi est ut sapiens sit, ipsa illi causa est ut sit: proinde si sapientia quam genuit, causa illi est ut sapiens sit, etiam ut sit ipsa illi causa est. Quod fieri non potest, nisi gignendo eum aut faciendo. Sed neque genitricem, neque conditricem Patris ullo modo quisquam dixerit sapientiam. Quid enim est insanius?
For what else do we say, when we say, for him to be is the same as to be wise, except, he is by that whereby he is wise? Wherefore that which is the cause to him of being wise is itself the cause to him of being: accordingly, if the wisdom which he begot is the cause to him of being wise, it is also the cause to him of being. Which cannot come about except by begetting or making him. But neither begetter nor founder of the Father would anyone in any way call wisdom. For what is more insane?
deTrin.7.1.2Ergo et Pater ipse sapientia est: et ita dicitur Filius Sapientia Patris, quomodo dicitur Lumen Patris; (Cf. Sir 1:3–4, 50:31; 1 Cor 1:21, 24, 30; John 1:7–9) id est, ut quemadmodum lumen de lumine, et utrumque unum lumen; sic intellegatur sapientia de sapientia, et utrumque una sapientia: ergo et una essentia; quia hoc est ibi esse quod sapere. Quod enim est sapientiae sapere, et potentiae posse, aeternitati aeternam esse, iustitiae iustam esse, magnitudini magnam esse; hoc est essentiae ipsum esse. Et quia in illa simplicitate non est aliud sapere quam esse, eadem ibi sapientia quae essentia.
Therefore the Father himself too is wisdom: and the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father in the way that he is called the Light of the Father; (See Sir 1:3–4, 50:31; 1 Cor 1:21, 24, 30; John 1:7–9) that is, so that, as light of light, and both one light, so wisdom of wisdom is understood, and both one wisdom: therefore also one essence; because this is there to be which is to be wise. For what it is for wisdom to be wise, and for power to be able, for eternity to be eternal, for justice to be just, for magnitude to be great; this it is for essence to be itself. And because in that simplicity to be wise is not other than to be, the same there is the wisdom which is the essence.
deTrin.7.1.22. 3. Pater igitur et Filius simul una essentia, et una magnitudo, et una veritas, et una sapientia. Sed non Pater et Filius simul ambo unum Verbum, quia non simul ambo unus Filius. Sicut enim Filius ad Patrem refertur, non ad se ipsum dicitur; ita et Verbum ad eum cuius Verbum est refertur, cum dicitur Verbum. Eo quippe Filius quo Verbum, et eo Verbum quo Filius. Quoniam igitur Pater et Filius simul non utique unus Filius, consequens est ut Pater et Filius simul non ambo PL: amborum, “are not one Word of both.” unum Verbum.
2. 3. The Father, therefore, and the Son together are one essence, and one magnitude, and one truth, and one wisdom. But the Father and the Son together are not both one Word, because they are not together both one Son. For just as the Son is referred to the Father, and is not said in relation to himself; so the Word too is referred to him whose Word it is, when it is called Word. For he is Son by that whereby he is Word, and Word by that whereby he is Son. Since, therefore, the Father and the Son together are certainly not one Son, it is consequent that the Father and the Son together are not both one Word.
deTrin.7.2.3Et propterea non eo Verbum quo Sapientia; quia Verbum non ad se dicitur, sed tantum relative ad eum cuius Verbum est, sicut Filius ad Patrem: Sapientia vero eo quo essentia. Et ideo quia una essentia, una Sapientia. Quoniam vero et Verbum Sapientia est, sed non eo Verbum quo Sapientia (Verbum enim relative, Sapientia essentialiter intellegitur), id dici accipiamus cum dicitur Verbum, ac si dicatur, nata Sapientia, (Cf. Sir 1:4–9; 24:5–14) ut sit et Filius et Imago. (Cf. 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15)
And therefore he is not Word by that whereby he is Wisdom; because Word is said not in relation to himself, but only relatively in relation to him whose Word it is, as the Son in relation to the Father: but Wisdom by that whereby he is essence. And therefore, because there is one essence, there is one Wisdom. But since the Word too is Wisdom, yet not Word by that whereby Wisdom (for Word is understood relatively, Wisdom essentially), let us take it that what is said when Word is said is as if it were said, born Wisdom, (See Sir 1:4–9; 24:5–14) so that he is both Son and Image. (See 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15)
deTrin.7.2.3Et haec duo cum dicuntur, id est, nata Sapientia, in uno eorum eo quod est nata, et Verbum, et Imago, et Filius intellegatur, et in his omnibus nominibus non ostendatur essentia, quia relative dicuntur: at in altero quod est “Sapientia,” quoniam et ad se dicitur (se ipsa enim sapiens est), etiam essentia demonstretur, et hoc eius esse quod sapere. (Cf. Sir 1:4–9; 24:5–14; John 1:1–14; 1 Thess 2:13; Rev 19:13)
And when these two things are said, that is, born Wisdom, in one of them, by that which is born, both Word, and Image, and Son are understood, and in all these names essence is not shown, because they are said relatively: but in the other, which is "Wisdom," since it is also said in relation to itself (for it is wise by itself), essence too is demonstrated, and that for it to be is to be wise. (See Sir 1:4–9; 24:5–14; John 1:1–14; 1 Thess 2:13; Rev 19:13)
deTrin.7.2.3Unde Pater et Filius simul una sapientia, quia una essentia, et singillatim sapientia de sapientia, sicut essentia de essentia. Quapropter, non quia Pater non est Filius, et Filius non est Pater, aut ille ingenitus, ille autem genitus, ideo non una essentia: quia his nominibus relativa eorum ostenduntur. Uterque autem simul una sapientia, et una essentia, ubi hoc est esse quod sapere: non autem simul uterque Verbum aut Filius, quia non hoc est esse quod Verbum aut Filium esse: sicut iam satis ostendimus, ista relative dici.
Whence the Father and the Son together are one wisdom, because one essence, and singly wisdom of wisdom, as essence of essence. Wherefore, not because the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father, or that one is unbegotten and that one begotten, are they therefore not one essence: because by these names their relatives are shown. But each together is one wisdom and one essence, where to be is the same as to be wise: but not each together is Word or Son, because to be is not the same as to be Word or to be Son: as we have already sufficiently shown that these are said relatively.
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3. 4. Cur ergo in Scripturis nusquam fere de Sapientia quidquam dicitur, nisi ut ostendatur a Deo genita vel creata? (Cf. Prov 8:22; Sir 1:4–9; 24:5–14) Genita scilicet, per quam facta sunt omnia; (Cf. Sir 24:5) creata vero vel facta, sicut in hominibus, cum ad eam quae non creata et facta, sed genita est, convertuntur et illustrantur; in ipsis enim fit aliquid quod vocetur eorum sapientia; vel illud Scripturis praenuntiantibus aut narrantibus, quod Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis; hoc modo enim Christus facta sapientia (Cf. 1 Cor 1:30) est, quia factus est homo.
3. 4. Why, then, is nothing almost ever said in the Scriptures about Wisdom, except to show it begotten or created by God? (See Prov 8:22; Sir 1:4–9; 24:5–14) Begotten, namely, that through which all things were made; (See Sir 24:5) but created or made, as in men, when they are converted and illumined to that wisdom which is not created and made, but begotten; for in them there comes about something that may be called their wisdom; or that which the Scriptures foretell or narrate, that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us; for in this way Christ was made wisdom, (See 1 Cor 1:30) because he was made man.
deTrin.7.3.4An propterea non loquitur in illis Libris sapientia, vel de illa dicitur aliquid, nisi quod eam de Deo natam ostendat, aut factam, quamvis sit et Pater ipsa sapientia, quia illa nobis sapientia commendanda erat et imitanda, cuius imitatione formamur? (Cf. Sir 1:4–9; 24:5–14) Pater enim eam dicit, ut Verbum eius sit; non quomodo profertur ex ore verbum sonans, aut ante pronuntiationem cogitatur: spatiis enim temporum hoc completur, illud autem aeternum est, et illuminando dicit nobis et de se et de Patre, quod dicendum est hominibus.
Or is it for this reason that wisdom does not speak in those books, or that anything is said of it, except what shows it born of God, or made, although the Father too is wisdom itself, because that wisdom had to be commended and imitated by us, by whose imitation we are formed? (See Sir 1:4–9; 24:5–14) For the Father speaks it, so that it may be his Word; not as a sounding word is uttered from the mouth, or thought before its utterance: for that is completed in spaces of time, but this is eternal, and by illumining it tells us both of itself and of the Father, what must be told to men.
deTrin.7.3.4Ideoque ait, nemo novit Filium, nisi Pater; et nemo novit Patrem, nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare: quia per Filium revelat Pater, id est, per Verbum suum. Si enim hoc verbum quod nos proferimus temporale et transitorium, et se ipsum ostendit, et illud de quo loquimur; quanto magis Verbum Dei per quod facta sunt omnia? (Cf. Sir 1:5; 1 Thess 2:13; Rev 19:13)
And therefore he says, no one knows the Son but the Father; and no one knows the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall will to reveal him: because through the Son the Father reveals, that is, through his Word. For if this word which we utter, temporal and transitory, shows both itself and that of which we speak, how much more the Word of God through whom all things were made? (See Sir 1:5; 1 Thess 2:13; Rev 19:13)
deTrin.7.3.4Quod ita ostendit Patrem sicuti est Pater: quia et ipsum ita est, et hoc est quod Pater, secundum quod sapientia est et essentia. Nam secundum quod Verbum, non hoc est quod Pater: quia Verbum non est Pater, et Verbum relative dicitur, sicut Filius, quod utique non Pater.
Which so shows the Father as the Father is: because it too so is, and is that which the Father is, according as it is wisdom and essence. For according as it is Word, it is not that which the Father is: because the Word is not the Father, and Word is said relatively, as Son, which is certainly not the Father.
deTrin.7.3.4Et ideo Christus virtus et Sapientia Dei, quia de Patre virtute et Sapientia etiam ipse virtus et sapientia est, sicut lumen de Patre lumine, et fons vitae (Cf. Prov 13:14, 14:27) apud Deum Patrem, utique fontem vitae. Quoniam apud te, inquit, est fons vitae, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen: quia sicut Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit Filio habere vitam in semetipso; et erat lumen verum quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, et lumen hoc Verbum erat apud Deum; sed et Deus erat Verbum. Deus autem lumen est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae: lumen vero non corporale, sed spiritale: neque ita spiritale, ut illuminatione factum sit, quemadmodum dictum est apostolis, vos estis lumen mundi; sed lumen quod illuminat omnem hominem, ea ipsa et summa sapientia Deus, unde nunc agimus. (Cf. Sir 1:3–4; 1 Cor 1:21–30)
And therefore Christ is the power and Wisdom of God, because of the Father, who is power and Wisdom, he too is power and wisdom, as light of the Father, who is light, and the fountain of life (See Prov 13:14, 14:27) with God the Father, who is certainly the fountain of life. For with you, he says, is the fountain of life, in your light we shall see light: because, as the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son to have life in himself; and he was the true light that enlightens every man coming into this world, and this light was the Word with God; but the Word also was God. But God is light, and in him there is no darkness: light, however, not corporeal, but spiritual: nor so spiritual that it was made by illumination, as it was said to the apostles, you are the light of the world; but the light that enlightens every man, that very and supreme wisdom God, of which we now treat. (See Sir 1:3–4; 1 Cor 1:21–30)
deTrin.7.3.4Sapientia ergo Filius de Sapientia Patre sicut lumen de lumine, et Deus de Deo, ut et singulus Pater lumen, et singulus Filius lumen; et singulus Pater Deus, et singulus Filius Deus: ergo et singulus Pater Sapientia, et singulus Filius Sapientia. Et sicut utrumque simul unum lumen, et unus Deus, sic utrumque una Sapientia. Sed Filius factus est nobis sapientia a Deo et iustitia et sanctificatio, quia temporaliter nos ad eum convertimus, id est, ex aliquo tempore, ut cum illo maneamus in aeternum. Et ipse ex quodam tempore Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis.
The Son, then, is Wisdom of the Father, who is Wisdom, as light of light, and God of God, so that both the Father singly is light, and the Son singly is light; and the Father singly is God, and the Son singly is God: therefore both the Father singly is Wisdom, and the Son singly is Wisdom. And just as both together are one light, and one God, so both are one Wisdom. But the Son was made for us wisdom from God, and righteousness, and sanctification, because in time we are converted to him, that is, from some time, that we may remain with him forever. And he himself from some time was made flesh, the Word, and dwelt among us.
deTrin.7.3.43. 5. Propterea igitur cum pronuntiatur in Scripturis, aut enarratur aliquid de sapientia, sive dicente ipsa sive cum de illa dicitur, Filius nobis potissimum insinuatur. Cuius Imaginis exemplo et nos non discedamus a Deo, quia et nos imago Dei sumus: non quidem aequalis, facta quippe a Patre per Filium, non nata de Patre sicut illa;
3. 5. Therefore, when in the Scriptures anything is pronounced or narrated about wisdom, whether it itself speaks or something is said about it, the Son is chiefly intimated to us. By the example of whose Image let us too not depart from God, because we too are the image of God: not indeed equal, since it was made by the Father through the Son, not born of the Father as that one;
deTrin.7.3.5et nos, quia illuminamur lumine; illa vero, quia lumen illuminans: et ideo illa sine exemplo nobis exemplum est. Neque enim imitatur praecedentem aliquem ad Patrem a quo numquam est omnino separabilis, quia idipsum est quod ille de quo est.
and we, because we are enlightened by light; but it, because it is the enlightening light: and therefore it, without an example, is an example to us. For it does not imitate anyone going before it toward the Father, from whom it is never at all separable, because it is the very same as that one from whom it is.
deTrin.7.3.5Nos autem nitentes imitamur manentem, et sequimur stantem, et in ipso ambulantes tendimus ad ipsum: quia factus est nobis via temporalis per humilitatem, quae mansio nobis aeterna est per divinitatem. (Cf. Phil 2:6–7)
But we, striving, imitate the one remaining, and follow the one standing, and walking in him tend toward him: because he was made for us a temporal way through humility, who is for us an eternal dwelling through divinity. (See Phil 2:6–7)
deTrin.7.3.5Quoniam quippe spiritibus mundis intellectualibus, qui superbia non lapsi sunt, in forma Dei et Deo aequalis et Deus praebet exemplum: ut se idem exemplum redeundi etiam lapso praeberet homini, qui propter immunditiam peccatorum poenamque mortalitatis Deum videre non poterat, semetipsum exinanivit, non mutando divinitatem suam, sed nostram mutabilitatem assumendo; et formam servi accipiens, venit ad nos in hunc mundum, qui in hoc mundo erat, quia mundus per eum factus est; ut exemplum sursum videntibus Deum, exemplum deorsum mirantibus hominem, exemplum sanis ad permanendum, exemplum infirmis ad convalescendum, exemplum morituris ad non timendum, exemplum mortuis ad resurgendum esset, in omnibus ipse primatum tenens. Quia enim homo ad beatitudinem sequi non debebat nisi Deum, et sentire non poterat Deum; sequendo Deum hominem factum, sequeretur simul et quem sentire poterat, et quem sequi debebat.
For since to the pure intellectual spirits, who have not fallen through pride, he offers an example in the form of God and as equal to God and God: in order that he might offer the same example of returning even to fallen man, who, on account of the uncleanness of sins and the punishment of mortality, could not see God, he emptied himself, not by changing his divinity, but by assuming our changeableness; and taking the form of a servant, he came to us into this world, who was in this world, because the world was made through him; that he might be an example to those who look up and see God, an example to those who look down and marvel at man, an example to the sound for remaining, an example to the weak for recovering, an example to the dying for not fearing, an example to the dead for rising again, himself holding the primacy in all things. For because man ought to follow toward blessedness none but God, and could not perceive God, by following God made man, he would follow at once both him whom he could perceive and him whom he ought to follow.
deTrin.7.3.5Amemus ergo eum et inhaereamus illi, caritate diffusa in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Non igitur mirum, si propter exemplum quod nobis ut reformemur ad imaginem Dei praebet imago aequalis Patri, (Cf. 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15) cum de Sapientia Scriptura loquitur, de Filio loquitur, quem sequimur vivendo sapienter: quamvis et Pater sit sapientia, sicut lumen et Deus.
Let us, then, love him and cleave to him, with love poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. It is no wonder, then, if, on account of the example which the image equal to the Father (See 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15) offers us, that we may be reformed to the image of God, when Scripture speaks of Wisdom, it speaks of the Son, whom we follow by living wisely: although the Father too is wisdom, as he is light and God.
deTrin.7.3.53. 6. Spiritus quoque Sanctus sive sit summa caritas utrumque coniungens nosque subiungens, quod ideo non indigne dicitur quia scriptum est, Deus caritas est; quomodo non est etiam ipse sapientia; cum sit lumen, quoniam Deus lumen est? Sive alio modo essentia Spiritus Sancti singillatim ac proprie nominanda est: quoniam Deus est, utique lumen est: et quoniam lumen est, utique sapientia est. Deum autem esse Spiritum Sanctum, Scriptura clamat apud Apostolum qui dicit, nescitis quia templum Dei estis? Statimque subiecit, et Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis. Deus enim habitat in templo suo. (Cf. Ps 11:4; Hab 2:20) Non enim tamquam minister habitat Spiritus Dei in templo Dei, cum alio loco evidentius dicat: nescitis quia corpora vestra templum in vobis est Spiritus Sancti, quem habetis a Deo, et non estis vestri? Empti enim estis pretio magno: glorificate ergo Deum in corpore vestro.
3. 6. The Holy Spirit too, whether he be the supreme love joining both and subjoining us, which is not unworthily said because it is written, God is love; how is he not also himself wisdom, since he is light, because God is light? Or whether the essence of the Holy Spirit is to be named in another way, singly and properly: since he is God, he is certainly light: and since he is light, he is certainly wisdom. But that the Holy Spirit is God, Scripture cries out in the Apostle, who says, do you not know that you are the temple of God? And he straightway added, and the Spirit of God dwells in you. For God dwells in his temple. (See Ps 11:4 (10:5); Hab 2:20) For the Spirit of God does not dwell in the temple of God as a minister, since in another place he says more evidently: do you not know that your bodies are the temple within you of the Holy Spirit, whom you have from God, and you are not your own? For you were bought with a great price: glorify, then, God in your body.
deTrin.7.3.6Quid est autem sapientia nisi lumen spiritale et incommutabile? Est enim et sol iste lumen, sed corporale est; et spiritalis creatura lumen, sed non incommutabile. Lumen ergo Pater, lumen Filius, lumen Spiritus Sanctus: simul autem non tria lumina, sed unum Lumen. Et ideo sapientia Pater, sapientia Filius, sapientia Spiritus Sanctus; et simul non tres sapientiae, sed una Sapientia; et quia hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, una essentia Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Nec aliud est ibi esse quam Deum esse: unus ergo Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1.1.
But what is wisdom except spiritual and unchangeable light? For this sun too is light, but it is corporeal; and the spiritual creature is light, but not unchangeable. Light, then, is the Father, light the Son, light the Holy Spirit: but together not three lights, but one Light. And therefore wisdom the Father, wisdom the Son, wisdom the Holy Spirit; and together not three wisdoms, but one Wisdom; and because this is there to be which is to be wise, one essence is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Nor is to be there anything other than to be God: one God, then, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1.1.
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4. 7. Itaque loquendi causa de ineffabilibus, ut fari aliquo modo possemus, quod effari nullo modo possumus, dictum est a nostris Graecis una essentia, tres substantiae: a Latinis autem, una essentia vel substantia, tres Personae; Cf. Porphyry, History of Philosophy 4 ("The Life of Plato"), in Didymus the Blind, On the Trinity 2.26 (PG 39:759); and in Cyril of Alexandria, Against Julian 1.8; Basil, Epistles 38; 236; Tertullian, Apology 21; Against Praxeas 2.26; Jerome, Epistle 15.3–5. quia, sicut iam diximus, non aliter in sermone nostro, id est, latino, “essentia” quam “substantia” solet intellegi. Et dum intellegatur saltem in aenigmate (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) quod dicitur, placuit ita dici, ut diceretur aliquid cum quaereretur “quid tria” sint, quae tria esse fides vera pronuntiat, cum et Patrem non dicit esse Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum quod est donum Dei (Cf. Acts 8:20; John 4:10) nec Patrem dicit esse nec Filium.
4. 7. And so, for the sake of speaking about unutterable things, that we might in some way utter what we can in no way express, it was said by our Greeks one essence, three substances: but by the Latins, one essence or substance, three persons; See Porphyry, History of Philosophy 4 ("The Life of Plato"), in Didymus the Blind, On the Trinity 2.26 (PG 39:759); and in Cyril of Alexandria, Against Julian 1.8; Basil, Epistles 38; 236; Tertullian, Apology 21; Against Praxeas 2.26; Jerome, Epistle 15.3–5. because, as we have already said, in our speech, that is, Latin, "essence" is not wont to be understood otherwise than "substance." And provided that what is said be understood at least in a riddle, (See 1 Cor 13:12) it was thought good so to say, that something might be said when it was asked "what three" they are, which three the true faith pronounces to be, since it both says the Father is not the Son, and says that the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of God, (See Acts 8:20; John 4:10) is neither the Father nor the Son.
deTrin.7.4.7Cum ergo quaeritur quid tria, vel “quid tres,” conferimus nos ad inveniendum aliquod speciale vel generale nomen, quo complectamur haec tria, neque occurrit animo, quia excedit supereminentia divinitatis usitati eloquii facultatem. Cf. Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1:52. Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur.
When, then, it is asked what three, or "what three persons," we betake ourselves to finding some special or general name by which we may embrace these three, and none occurs to the mind, because the supereminence of the divinity exceeds the capacity of customary speech. See Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1:52. For God is more truly thought than spoken, and more truly is than thought.
deTrin.7.4.7Cum enim dicimus non eundem esse Iacob qui est Abraham, Isaac autem nec Abraham esse nec Iacob, tres esse utique fatemur, Abraham, Isaac et Iacob. Sed cum quaeritur “quid tres,” respondemus “tres homines,” nomine speciali eos pluraliter appellantes; generali autem, si dicamus “tria animalia”: homo enim, sicut veteres definierunt, animal est rationale, mortale; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 7.3.15; cf. Cicero, Academica 2.7.21; Plutarch, Ethica 450d; Augustine, On Order 2.11.31. Aristotle omitted “mortal,” because he did not include angels or gods in the genus “animal.” aut sicut Scripturae nostrae loqui solent, “tres animas,” cum a parte meliore totum appellari placet, id est, ab anima, et corpus et animam quod est totus homo. Ita quippe dictum est in Aegyptum descendisse cum Iacob animas septuaginta quinque, pro tot hominibus. (Cf. Acts 7:14–15; Gen 46:27; Exod 1:5; Deut 10:22)
For when we say that Jacob is not the same as Abraham, but that Isaac is neither Abraham nor Jacob, we certainly confess that there are three, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But when it is asked "what three," we answer "three men," calling them plurally by a special name; but by a general one, if we say "three animals": for man, as the ancients defined him, is a rational, mortal animal; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 7.3.15; cf. Cicero, Academica 2.7.21; Plutarch, Ethica 450d; Augustine, On Order 2.11.31. Aristotle omitted “mortal,” because he did not include angels or gods in the genus “animal.” or, as our Scriptures are wont to speak, "three souls," when it is pleasing to call the whole by the better part, that is, by the soul, both the body and the soul, which is the whole man. For so it was said that seventy-five souls went down into Egypt with Jacob, for so many men. (See Acts 7:14–15; Gen 46:27; Exod 1:5; Deut 10:22)
deTrin.7.4.7Item cum dicimus equum tuum non eum esse qui meus est, et tertium alicuius alterius nec meum esse nec tuum, fatemur tres esse: et interroganti “quid tres,” respondemus “tres equos” nomine speciali, generali autem “tria animalia.” Item cum dicimus bovem non esse equum, canem vero nec bovem esse nec equum, tria quaedam dicimus: et percontantibus “quid tria,” non iam speciali nomine dicimus tres equos, aut tres boves, aut tres canes, quia non eadem specie continentur; sed generali, tria animalia; sive superiore genere, tres substantias, vel tres creaturas, vel tres naturas.
Likewise, when we say that your horse is not the one that is mine, and that a third belonging to someone else is neither mine nor yours, we confess that there are three: and to one asking "what three," we answer "three horses" by a special name, but by a general one "three animals." Likewise, when we say that an ox is not a horse, but that a dog is neither an ox nor a horse, we say certain three things: and to those inquiring "what three," we do not now by a special name say three horses, or three oxen, or three dogs, because they are not contained under the same species; but by a general one, three animals; or by a higher genus, three substances, or three creatures, or three natures.
deTrin.7.4.7Quaecumque autem plurali numero enuntiantur specialiter uno nomine, etiam generaliter enuntiari possunt uno nomine. Non autem omnia quae generaliter nomine uno appellantur, etiam specialiter appellare uno nomine possumus. Nam tres equos, quod est nomen speciale, etiam animalia tria dicimus: equum vero et bovem et canem, animalia tria tantum dicimus vel substantias, quae sunt generalia nomina, et si quid aliud de his generaliter dici potest; tres vero equos, aut boves, aut canes, quae specialia vocabula sunt, non ea possumus dicere. Ea quippe uno nomine quamvis pluraliter enuntiamus quae communiter habent illud quod eo nomine significatur. Abraham quippe et Isaac et Iacob commune habent id quod est homo; itaque dicuntur tres homines: equus quoque et bos et canis, commune habent id quod est animal; dicuntur ergo tria animalia. Ita tres aliquas lauros, etiam tres arbores dicimus; laurum vero et myrtum et oleam, tantum tres arbores vel tres substantias, aut naturas: atque ita tres lapides, etiam tria corpora; lapidem vero et lignum et ferrum, tantum tria corpora, vel si quo etiam superiore generali nomine dici possunt.
But whatever things are enunciated plurally by one special name, can also be enunciated generally by one name. But not all things that are called generally by one name can we also call specially by one name. For three horses, which is a special name, we call also three animals: but a horse and an ox and a dog we call only three animals, or substances, which are general names, and whatever else can be said generally of them; but three horses, or oxen, or dogs, which are special words, these we cannot say. For we enunciate by one name, though plurally, those things that have in common that which is signified by that name. For Abraham and Isaac and Jacob have in common that which is man; and so they are called three men: a horse too and an ox and a dog have in common that which is animal; they are called, therefore, three animals. So three laurels we call also three trees; but a laurel and a myrtle and an olive, only three trees or three substances, or natures: and so three stones, also three bodies; but a stone and wood and iron, only three bodies, or if they can also be called by some higher general name.
deTrin.7.4.7Pater ergo et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quoniam tres sunt, (Cf. 1 John 5:7) quaeramus quid tres sint, quid commune habeant. Non enim commune illis est id quod Pater est, ut invicem sibi sint patres; sicut amici, cum relative ad alterutrum dicantur, possunt dici tres amici, quod invicem sibi sunt. Non autem hoc ibi, quia tantum Pater ibi pater; nec duorum pater, sed unici Filii. Nec tres filii, cum Pater ibi non sit Filius, nec Spiritus Sanctus. Nec tres spiritus sancti, quia et Spiritus Sanctus propria significatione qua etiam donum Dei (Cf. Acts 8:20; John 4:10) dicitur, nec Pater nec Filius. Quid igitur tres? Si enim tres Personae, commune est eis id quod persona est.
The Father, then, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since they are three, (See 1 John 5:7) let us ask what three they are, what they have in common. For that which is the Father is not common to them, so that they should be fathers to one another; as friends, since they are said relatively in relation to one another, can be called three friends, because they are so to one another. But not so there, because there only the Father is father; nor father of two, but of the only Son. Nor three sons, since the Father there is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit. Nor three holy spirits, because the Holy Spirit too, in the proper signification by which he is also called the gift of God, (See Acts 8:20; John 4:10) is neither Father nor Son. What, then, are the three? For if they are three persons, that which is person is common to them.
deTrin.7.4.7Ergo speciale hoc aut generale nomen est eis, si consuetudinem loquendi respicimus. Sed ubi est naturae nulla diversitas, ita generaliter enuntiantur aliqua plura, ut etiam specialiter enuntiari possint. Naturae enim differentia facit ut laurus et myrtus et olea, aut equus et bos et canis, non dicantur speciali nomine, istae, tres lauri; aut illi, tres boves: sed generali, et istae, tres arbores; et illa, tria animalia. Hic vero ubi nulla est essentiae diversitas, oportet et speciale nomen habeant haec tria, quod tamen non invenitur. Nam persona generale nomen est, in tantum ut etiam homo possit hoc dici, cum tantum intersit inter hominem et Deum.
Therefore this is a special or general name for them, if we regard the custom of speaking. But where there is no diversity of nature, several things are so enunciated generally that they can also be enunciated specially. For difference of nature makes it that a laurel and a myrtle and an olive, or a horse and an ox and a dog, are not called by a special name, these, three laurels; or those, three oxen: but by a general one, both these, three trees; and those, three animals. But here, where there is no diversity of essence, it is fitting that these three have also a special name, which nonetheless is not found. For person is a general name, so much so that even a man can be so called, though there is so great a difference between man and God.
deTrin.7.4.74. 8. Deinde in ipso generali vocabulo, si propterea dicimus tres Personas, quia commune est eis id quod persona est (alioquin nullo modo possunt ita dici, quemadmodum non dicuntur tres filii, quia non commune est eis id quod est filius); cur non etiam tres deos dicimus? Certe enim quia Pater persona, et Filius persona, et Spiritus Sanctus persona, ideo tres Personae: quia ergo Pater Deus, et Filius Deus, et Spiritus Sanctus Deus, cur non tres dii? Aut quoniam propter ineffabilem coniunctionem haec tria simul unus Deus; cur non etiam una persona, ut ita non possimus dicere tres personas, quamvis singulam quamque appellemus personam, quemadmodum non possumus dicere tres deos, quamvis quemque singulum appellemus Deum, sive Patrem, sive Filium, sive Spiritum Sanctum?
4. 8. Then, in the general word itself, if we say three persons because that which is person is common to them (otherwise they can in no way be so called, just as they are not called three sons, because that which is son is not common to them); why do we not also say three gods? For certainly, because the Father is a person, and the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a person, therefore three persons: because, then, the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, why not three gods? Or, since on account of the ineffable conjunction these three together are one God; why not also one person, so that we cannot say three persons, although we call each single one a person, just as we cannot say three gods, although we call each single one God, whether Father, or Son, or Holy Spirit?
deTrin.7.4.8An quia Scriptura non dicit tres deos? Sed nec tres personas alicubi Scripturam commemorare invenimus. An quia nec tres, nec unam personam Scriptura dicit haec tria (legimus enim personam Domini, non personam Dominum), propterea licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate tres personas dicere, non quia Scriptura dicit, sed quia Scriptura non contradicit: si autem diceremus tres deos, contradiceret Scriptura, dicens, audi, Israel: Dominus Deus tuus, Deus unus est?
Is it because Scripture does not say three gods? But neither do we find that Scripture anywhere mentions three persons. Is it because Scripture says these three to be neither three nor one person (for we read the person of the Lord, not the person the Lord), that therefore it was permitted, by the necessity of speaking and disputing, to say three persons, not because Scripture says it, but because Scripture does not contradict it: whereas, if we said three gods, Scripture would contradict, saying, hear, O Israel: the Lord your God is one God?
deTrin.7.4.8Cur ergo et tres essentias non licet dicere, quod similiter Scriptura, sicut non dicit, ita nec contradicit? Nam essentia si speciale nomen est commune tribus, cur non dicantur tres essentiae, sicut Abraham, Isaac, et Iacob, tres homines, quia homo speciale nomen est commune omnibus hominibus? Si autem speciale nomen non est essentia, sed generale, quia homo, et pecus, et arbor, et sidus, et angelus essentia dicitur; cur non dicuntur istae tres essentiae, sicut tres equi dicuntur tria animalia, et tres lauri dicuntur tres arbores, et tres lapides tria corpora? Aut si propter unitatem Trinitatis non dicuntur tres essentiae, sed una essentia; Cf. Augustine, The City of God 12.2.15. cur non propter eamdem unitatem Trinitatis non dicuntur tres substantiae vel tres personae, sed una substantia et una persona? Quam enim est illis commune nomen essentiae, ita ut singulus quisque dicatur essentia, tam illis commune est vel substantiae vel personae vocabulum. Quod enim de personis secundum nostram, hoc de substantiis secundum Graecorum consuetudinem, ea quae diximus, oportet intellegi. Sic enim dicunt illi tres substantias, unam essentiam, quemadmodum nos dicimus tres personas, unam essentiam vel substantiam.
Why, then, is it not also permitted to say three essences, which similarly Scripture, as it does not say, so neither contradicts? For if essence is a special name common to the three, why should they not be called three essences, as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are three men, because man is a special name common to all men? But if essence is not a special but a general name, because man, and beast, and tree, and star, and angel is called essence; why are these not called three essences, as three horses are called three animals, and three laurels are called three trees, and three stones three bodies? Or if, on account of the unity of the Trinity, they are not called three essences, but one essence; See Augustine, The City of God 12.2.15. why, on account of the same unity of the Trinity, are they not called not three substances or three persons, but one substance and one person? For as the name of essence is common to them, so that each single one is called essence, so common to them is the word substance or person. For what we have said of persons according to our custom, the same must be understood of substances according to the custom of the Greeks. For they say three substances, one essence, in the way that we say three persons, one essence or substance.
deTrin.7.4.84. 9. Quid igitur restat, nisi ut fateamur loquendi necessitate parta haec vocabula, cum opus esset copiosa disputatione adversum insidias vel errores haereticorum? Cf. Rufinus, Ecclesiastical History 1.29. Cum enim conaretur humana inopia loquendo proferre ad hominum sensus, quod in secretario mentis pro captu tenet de Domino Deo Creatore suo, sive per piam fidem, sive per qualemcumque intellegentiam, timuit dicere tres essentias, ne intellegeretur in illa summa aequalitate ulla diversitas.
4. 9. What, then, remains, except that we confess that these words were brought forth by the necessity of speaking, when there was need of copious disputation against the snares or errors of the heretics? See Rufinus, Ecclesiastical History 1.29. For when human poverty tried to bring forth in speech to the senses of men what it holds, according to its capacity, in the secret place of the mind concerning the Lord God its Creator, whether through pious faith or through whatever understanding, it feared to say three essences, lest in that supreme equality any diversity be understood.
deTrin.7.4.9Rursus non esse tria quaedam, non poterat dicere, quod Sabellius quia dixit, in haeresim lapsus est. Cf. Thomus Damasi, anathema 2. Certissime quippe et de Scripturis cognoscitur quod pie credendum est, et aspectu mentis indubitata perceptione perstringitur, et Patrem esse, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum; nec Filium esse eundem qui Pater est, nec Spiritum Sanctum eundem Patrem esse vel Filium.
Again, it could not say that there are not certain three things, which, because Sabellius said it, he fell into heresy. See Tomus Damasi, anathema 2. For it is most certainly known both from the Scriptures what must be piously believed, and is grasped by the gaze of the mind with undoubted perception, that there is both a Father, and a Son, and a Holy Spirit; and that the Son is not the same as the Father, nor the Holy Spirit the same as the Father or the Son.
deTrin.7.4.9Quaesivit quid tria diceret: et dixit substantias sive personas, quibus nominibus non diversitatem intellegi voluit, sed singularitatem noluit; ut non solum ibi unitas intellegatur ex eo quod dicitur una essentia, sed et Trinitas ex eo quod dicuntur tres substantiae vel personae. Compare with Thomas Aquinas, ST I.29.
It sought what to call the three: and it said substances or persons, by which names it wished not diversity to be understood, but singularity to be refused; so that not only may unity there be understood from the fact that one essence is said, but also Trinity from the fact that three substances or persons are said. Compare with Thomas Aquinas, ST I.29.
deTrin.7.4.9Nam si hoc est Deo esse quod subsistere, ita non erant dicendae tres substantiae, ut non dicuntur tres essentiae: quemadmodum quia hoc est Deo esse quod sapere, sicut non tres essentias, ita nec tres sapientias dicimus. Sic enim quia hoc illi est Deum esse quod est esse, tam tres essentias quam tres deos dici fas non est.
For if for God to be is the same as to subsist, three substances were no more to be said than three essences are said: just as, because for God to be is the same as to be wise, as we do not say three essences, so neither do we say three wisdoms. For thus, because for him to be God is the same as to be, it is not lawful to say either three essences or three gods.
deTrin.7.4.9Si autem aliud est Deo esse, aliud subsistere, sicut aliud Deo esse, aliud Patrem esse vel Dominum esse; quod enim est, ad se dicitur, Pater autem ad Filium et Dominus ad servientem creaturam dicitur: relative ergo subsistit, sicut relative gignit et relative dominatur. Ita iam substantia non erit substantia, quia relativum erit.
But if for God to be is one thing, to subsist another, as for God to be is one thing, to be Father or to be Lord another; for what he is, is said in relation to himself, but Father is said in relation to the Son and Lord in relation to the serving creature: then he subsists relatively, as he begets relatively and rules relatively. So now substance will not be substance, because it will be a relative.
deTrin.7.4.9Sicut enim ab eo quod est esse appellatur essentia, ita ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus. Absurdum est autem ut substantia relative dicatur: omnis enim res ad se ipsam subsistit; quanto magis Deus?
For just as from that which is to be, essence is named, so from that which is to subsist, we say substance. But it is absurd that substance be said relatively: for every thing subsists in relation to itself; how much more God?
deTrin.7.4.95. 10. Si tamen dignum est ut Deus dicatur subsistere: de his enim rebus recte intellegitur, in quibus subiectis sunt ea quae in aliquo subiecto esse dicuntur, sicut color aut forma in corpore. Corpus enim subsistit, et ideo substantia est: illa vero in subsistente atque subiecto corpore, quae non substantiae sunt, sed in substantia; et ideo si esse desinat, vel ille color, vel illa forma, non adimunt corpori esse corpus, quia non hoc ei est esse, quod illam vel illam formam coloremve retinere. Res ergo mutabiles neque simplices, proprie dicuntur substantiae. Deus autem si subsistit ut substantia proprie dici possit, inest in eo aliquid tamquam in subiecto, et non est simplex, cui hoc sit esse quod illi est quidquid aluid de illo ad illum dicitur, sicut magnus, omnipotens, bonus, et si quid huiusmodi de Deo non incongrue dicitur: nefas est autem dicere ut subsistat et subsit Deus bonitati suae, atque illa bonitas non substantia sit vel potius essentia, neque ipse Deus sit bonitas sua, sed in illo sit tamquam in subiecto: unde manifestum est Deum abusive substantiam vocari, ut nomine usitatiore intellegatur essentia, quod vere ac proprie dicitur; ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim vere solus, quia incommutabilis est, idque nomen suum famulo suo Moysi enuntiavit, cum ait, ego sum qui sum; et, dices ad eos: ‘qui est, misit me ad vos.’ Sed tamen sive essentia Cf. Augustine, The City of God 12.2. dicatur quod proprie dicitur, sive substantia Cf. Tertullian, Apology 21; Against Praxeas 2.26. quod abusive; utrumque ad se dicitur, non relative ad aliquid. Aristotle, Categories 7.6a36–8b24; Pseudo-Augustine, Aristotle’s Ten Categories 11. Unde hoc est Deo esse quod subsistere, et ideo si una essentia Trinitas, una etiam substantia.
5. 10. If indeed it is worthy that God be said to subsist: for it is rightly understood of those things in which, as subjects, are those that are said to be in some subject, as color or form in a body. For a body subsists, and therefore is a substance: but those things which are in a subsisting and subject body, which are not substances, but in a substance; and therefore, if either that color or that form cease to be, they do not take from the body its being a body, because for it to be is not the same as to retain this or that form or color. Changeable, then, and not simple things are properly called substances. But God, if he subsists so that he can properly be called substance, there is in him something as in a subject, and he is not simple, for whom to be is the same as whatever else is said of him in relation to himself, as great, almighty, good, and anything of the sort that is not incongruously said of God: but it is impious to say that God subsists under and is subject to his own goodness, and that goodness is not substance or rather essence, nor God himself his own goodness, but it is in him as in a subject: whence it is manifest that God is called substance improperly, so that by a more usual name essence be understood, which is truly and properly said; so that perhaps God alone ought to be called essence. For he alone truly is, because he is unchangeable, and this his name he declared to his servant Moses, when he said, I am who am; and, you shall say to them: 'He who is has sent me to you.' But whether essence See Augustine, The City of God 12.2. be said, which is properly said, or substance, See Tertullian, Apology 21; Against Praxeas 2.26. which is said improperly; each is said in relation to himself, not relatively in relation to something. Aristotle, Categories 7.6a36–8b24; Pseudo-Augustine, Aristotle’s Ten Categories 11. Whence for God to be is the same as to subsist, and therefore, if the Trinity is one essence, it is also one substance.
deTrin.7.5.106. 11. Fortassis igitur commodius dicuntur tres Personae, quam tres substantiae. Cf. Porphyry, History of Philosophy 4 (the life of Plato), in Didymus the Blind, On the Trinity 2.26 (PG 39:759); and in Cyril of Alexandria, Against Julian 1.8; Basil, Epistles 38; 236; Tertullian, Apology 21; Against Praxeas 2.26; Jerome, Epistle 15.3–5. The PL includes this sentence at the end of the preceding section. Sed ne nobis videatur PL: videar, “in case I should seem to be doing some special pleading.” suffragari, hoc quoque requiramus. Quamquam et illi, si vellent, sicut dicunt tres substantias, treis hypostaseis, possent dicere tres personas, tria prosopa. Illud autem maluerunt, quod forte secundum linguae suae consuetudinem aptius diceretur.
6. 11. Perhaps, then, three persons are more suitably said than three substances. See Porphyry, History of Philosophy 4 (the life of Plato), in Didymus the Blind, On the Trinity 2.26 (PG 39:759); and in Cyril of Alexandria, Against Julian 1.8; Basil, Epistles 38; 236; Tertullian, Apology 21; Against Praxeas 2.26; Jerome, Epistle 15.3–5. The PL includes this sentence at the end of the preceding section. But lest I should seem to be pleading our own case, let us inquire into this too. Although they too, if they wished, just as they say three substances, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, could say three persons, τρία πρόσωπα. But they preferred that other, which perhaps, according to the custom of their language, was more aptly said.
deTrin.7.6.11Nam et in personis eadem ratio est: non enim aliud est Deo esse, aliud personam esse, sed omnino idem. Nam si esse ad se dicitur, persona vero relative; sic dicamus tres personas, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, quemadmodum dicuntur aliqui tres amici, aut tres propinqui, aut tres vicini, quod sint ad invicem, non quod unusquisque eorum sit ad se ipsum. Quapropter quilibet ex eis amicus est duorum ceterorum, aut propinquus aut vicinus, quia haec nomina relativam significationem habent.
For in persons too the same reasoning holds: for to God to be is not one thing, and to be a person another, but altogether the same. For if to be is said in relation to himself, but person relatively; so we would say three persons, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, in the way that some are called three friends, or three kinsmen, or three neighbors, because they are so in relation to one another, not because each of them is so in relation to himself. Wherefore any one of them is the friend of the other two, or kinsman or neighbor, because these names have a relative signification.
deTrin.7.6.11Quid ergo? Num placet ut dicamus Patrem personam esse Filii et Spiritus Sancti, aut Filium personam esse Patris et Spiritus Sancti, aut Spiritum Sanctum personam esse Patris et Filii? Sed neque persona ita dici alicubi solet, neque in hac Trinitate cum dicimus personam Patris, aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris. Quocirca, ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est; ita et persona Patris, non aliud quam ipse Pater est: ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad Filium vel Spiritum Sanctum; sicut ad se dicitur Deus et magnus, et bonus, et iustus, et si quid aliud huiusmodi. Et quemadmodum hoc illi est esse quod Deum esse, quod magnum, quod bonum esse; ita hoc illi est esse, quod personam esse.
What then? Does it please us to say that the Father is the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit, or the Son the person of the Father and the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit the person of the Father and the Son? But neither is person wont to be so said anywhere, nor, in this Trinity, when we say the person of the Father, do we say anything other than the substance of the Father. Wherefore, just as the substance of the Father is the Father himself, not by that whereby he is Father, but by that whereby he is; so the person of the Father too is nothing other than the Father himself: for person is said in relation to himself, not in relation to the Son or the Holy Spirit; just as in relation to himself he is said God, and great, and good, and just, and anything else of the sort. And just as for him to be is the same as to be God, as to be great, as to be good; so for him to be is the same as to be a person.
deTrin.7.6.11Cur ergo non haec tria simul unam personam dicimus, sicut unam essentiam et unum Deum, sed tres dicimus Personas, cum tres deos aut tres essentias non dicamus; nisi quia volumus vel unum aliquod vocabulum servire huic significationi qua intellegitur Trinitas, ne omnino taceremus interrogati, quid tres, cum tres esse fateremur? Nam si genus est essentia, species autem substantia sive persona, ut nonnulli sentiunt, omitto illud quod iam dixi, oportere appellari tres essentias, ut appellantur tres substantiae vel personae, sicut appellantur tres equi, eademque animalia tria, cum sit species equus, animal genus. Neque enim species ibi pluraliter dicta est, et genus singulariter, tamquam diceretur tres equi unum animal: sed sicut tres equi speciali nomine, ita tria animalia generali nomine. Quod si dicunt substantiae vel personae nomine non speciem significari, sed aliquid singulare atque individuum; ut substantia vel persona non ita dicatur sicut dicitur homo, quod commune est omnibus hominibus, sed quomodo dicitur hic homo, velut Abraham, velut Isaac, velut Iacob, vel si quis alius qui etiam digito praesens demonstrari possit: sic quoque illos eadem ratio consequetur. Sicut enim dicuntur Abraham, Isaac et Iacob tria individua, ita tres homines, et tres animae. Cur ergo et Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, si secundum genus et speciem et individuum etiam ista disserimus, non ita dicuntur tres essentiae, ut tres substantiae seu personae? Sed hoc, ut dixi, omitto.
Why, then, do we not say these three together one person, as one essence and one God, but say three Persons, when we do not say three gods or three essences; unless because we wish some one word to serve this signification by which the Trinity is understood, lest we should be altogether silent when asked, what three, when we confessed that there were three? For if essence is a genus, but substance or person a species, as some think, I omit what I have already said, that there ought to be called three essences, as there are called three substances or persons, just as three horses are called, and the same three animals, since horse is a species, animal a genus. For there the species is not said plurally, and the genus singularly, as though it were said three horses one animal: but as three horses by a special name, so three animals by a general name. But if they say that by the name of substance or person not a species is signified, but something singular and individual; so that substance or person is not said as man is said, which is common to all men, but as this man is said, such as Abraham, such as Isaac, such as Jacob, or anyone else who can even be pointed out present with the finger: then the same reasoning will follow upon them too. For just as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are called three individuals, so three men, and three souls. Why, then, are not the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit too, if we discuss these matters according to genus and species and individual, so called three essences, as three substances or persons? But this, as I said, I omit.
deTrin.7.6.11Illud dico, si essentia genus est, una essentia iam non habet species; sicut quia genus est animal, unum animal iam non habet species. Non sunt ergo tres species unius essentiae, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Si autem species est essentia, sicut species est homo, tres vero illae quas appellamus substantias sive personas, sic eamdem speciem communiter habent, quemadmodum Abraham, Isaac et Iacob speciem quae homo dicitur, communiter habent; non sicut homo subdividitur in Abraham, Isaac et Iacob, ita unus homo et in aliquos singulos homines subdividi potest: omnino enim non potest, quia unus homo iam singulus homo est. Cur ergo una essentia in tres substantias, vel personas subdividitur? Nam si essentia species est sicut homo, sic est una essentia sicut unus homo:
This I say: if essence is a genus, one essence now has no species; just as, because animal is a genus, one animal now has no species. The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not, then, three species of one essence. But if essence is a species, as man is a species, while those three which we call substances or persons have the same species in common, in the way that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have in common the species which is called man; not as man is subdivided into Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, so can one man be subdivided also into several single men: for he altogether cannot, because one man is already a single man. Why, then, is one essence subdivided into three substances or persons? For if essence is a species, as man, then one essence is as one man:
deTrin.7.6.11an sicut dicimus aliquos tres homines eiusdem sexus, eiusdem temperationis corporis, eiusdemque animi, unam esse naturam; tres enim sunt homines, sed una natura: (That is, three men who are absolutely equal, to make the trinitarian comparison as exact as possible) sic etiam ibi dicimus tres substantias unam essentiam, aut tres personas unam substantiam vel essentiam? Hoc vero utcumque simile est, quia et veteres qui latine locuti sunt, antequam haberent ista nomina, quae non diu est ut in usum venerunt, id est essentiam vel substantiam, pro his naturam dicebant. Substantia and essentia were first used by Quintilian at the end of the first century AD. “The ancients” means the classical writers, chiefly Cicero and Lucretius. Non itaque secundum genus et species ista dicimus; sed quasi secundum communem eamdemque materiam. Sicut ex eodem auro si fierent tres statuae, diceremus tres statuas unum aurum, nec tamen genus diceremus aurum, species autem statuas; nec aurum speciem, statuas vero individua. Nulla quippe species individua sua transgreditur, ut aliquid extra comprehendat. Cum enim definiero quid sit homo, quod est nomen speciale, singuli quique homines quae sunt individua eadem definitione continentur, nec aliquid ad eam pertinet quod homo non sit. Cum vero aurum definiero, non solae statuae, si aureae fuerint, sed et anuli, et si quid aliud de auro fuerit, ad aurum pertinebit, etsi nihil inde fiat, aurum dicitur, quia etiamsi non sint aureae, non ideo non erunt statuae. Item nulla species excedit definitionem generis sui. Cum enim definiero animal, quoniam generis huius species est equus, omnis equus animal est, non autem statua omnis aurum est. Ideo quamvis in tribus statuis aureis, recte dicamus tres statuas unum aurum; non tamen ita dicimus, ut genus aurum, statuas vero species intellegamus.
or, as we say that some three men of the same sex, of the same constitution of body, and of the same mind, are one nature; for there are three men, but one nature: (That is, three men who are absolutely equal, to make the trinitarian comparison as exact as possible) so also there do we say three substances one essence, or three persons one substance or essence? This indeed is in some way similar, because the ancients too who spoke Latin, before they had those names, which it is not long since they came into use, that is, essence or substance, used to say "nature" for these. Substantia and essentia were first used by Quintilian at the end of the first century AD. “The ancients” means the classical writers, chiefly Cicero and Lucretius. We do not, then, say these things according to genus and species; but as it were according to a common and the same matter. As, if three statues were made from the same gold, we would say three statues one gold, yet we would not say gold a genus, and statues species; nor gold a species, and statues individuals. For no species transgresses its individuals, so as to comprehend something outside. For when I have defined what man is, which is a special name, all the single men, which are individuals, are contained in the same definition, nor does anything pertain to it which is not man. But when I have defined gold, not only statues, if they be golden, but rings too, and anything else made of gold, will pertain to gold, and even if nothing be made of it, it is called gold, because, even if they be not golden, they will not on that account not be statues. Likewise no species exceeds the definition of its genus. For when I have defined animal, since horse is a species of this genus, every horse is an animal; but not every statue is gold. Therefore, although in three golden statues we rightly say three statues one gold; yet we do not say it so as to understand gold a genus, but statues species.
deTrin.7.6.11Nec sic ergo Trinitatem dicimus tres Personas vel substantias, unam essentiam et unum Deum, tamquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant, etiamsi quidquid illud est, in his tribus explicatum sit. Non enim aliquid aliud eius essentiae est praeter istam Trinitatem: tamen tres Personas eiusdem essentiae, vel tres Personas unam essentiam dicimus: tres autem personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus, quasi aliud ibi sit quod essentia est, aliud quod persona; sicut tres statuas ex eodem auro possumus dicere; aliud enim est illuc esse aurum, aliud esse statuas. Et cum dicuntur tres homines una natura, vel tres homines eiusdem naturae, possunt etiam dici tres homines ex eadem natura, quia ex eadem natura et alii tres tales homines possunt exsistere; in illa vero essentia Trinitatis, nullo modo alia quaelibet persona ex eadem essentia potest exsistere. Deinde in his rebus non tantum est unus homo, quantum tres homines simul; et plus aliquid sunt homines duo, quam unus homo: et in statuis aequalibus plus auri est tres simul quam singulae, et minus auri est una quam duae. At in Deo non ita est: non enim maior essentia est Pater et Filius PL adds et Spiritus Sanctus. simul, quam solus Pater aut solus Filius; sed tres simul illae substantiae sive personae, si ita dicendae sunt, aequales sunt singulis: quod animalis homo non percipit. Non enim potest cogitare nisi moles et spatia, vel minuta vel grandia, volitantibus in animo eius phantasmatis tamquam imaginibus corporum.
Nor, then, do we so call the Trinity three Persons or substances, one essence and one God, as though three things subsisted out of one matter, even if whatever that is, be unfolded in these three. For there is nothing else of that essence besides this Trinity: yet we say three Persons of the same essence, or three Persons one essence: but we do not say three persons out of the same essence, as though there were one thing there which is essence, another which is person; as we can say three statues out of the same gold; for there to be gold is one thing, to be statues another. And when three men are said to be one nature, or three men of the same nature, they can also be said three men out of the same nature, because out of the same nature three other such men can also exist; but in that essence of the Trinity, in no way can any other person whatever exist out of the same essence. Then, in these things, one man is not as much as three men together; and two men are something more than one man: and in equal statues there is more gold in three together than in single ones, and less gold in one than in two. But in God it is not so: for the Father and the Son together are not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone; but those three substances or persons together, if they are so to be called, are equal to the single ones: which the animal man does not perceive. For he cannot think except masses and spaces, whether small or great, with phantasms as images of bodies flitting about in his mind.
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6. 12. Ex qua immunditia donec purgetur, credat in Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, unum Deum, solum, magnum, omnipotentem, bonum, iustum, misericordem, omnium visibilium et invisibilium conditorem, Cf. Augustine, Faith and the Creed 4.5; The Catholic Way of Life 2.7.9; Pelagius, Letter and Confession of Faith to Innocent I; Tertullian, Creed 3; Pseudo-Ambrose, Exhortatio ad neophytos. et quidquid de illo pro humana facultate digne vereque dici potest. Neque cum audierit Patrem solum Deum, separet inde Filium, aut Spiritum Sanctum: Cf. Tomus Damasi, anathema 25. cum eo quippe solus Deus, cum quo et unus Deus est, quia et Filium cum audimus solum Deum, sine ulla separatione Patris aut Spiritus Sancti oportet accipere. Atque ita dicat unam essentiam, ut non existimet aliud alio, vel maius, vel melius, vel aliqua ex parte diversum. Non tamen ut Pater ipse sit et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et quidquid aliud ad alterutrum singula dicuntur; sicut Verbum quod non dicitur nisi Filius, aut Donum quod non dicitur nisi Spiritus Sanctus: (Cf. Acts 8:20; John 1:1–14; 4:10; 1 Thess 2:13; Rev 19:13) propter quod etiam pluralem numerum admittunt, sicut in Evangelio scriptum est: ego et Pater unum sumus. Et unum dixit et sumus; unum, secundum essentiam, quod idem Deus; sumus, secundum relativum, quod ille Pater, hic Filius.
6. 12. Until he is purified from this uncleanness, let him believe in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, one God, alone, great, almighty, good, just, merciful, the maker of all things visible and invisible, See Augustine, Faith and the Creed 4.5; The Catholic Way of Life 2.7.9; Pelagius, Letter and Confession of Faith to Innocent I; Tertullian, Creed 3; Pseudo-Ambrose, Exhortatio ad neophytos. and whatever can be said of him worthily and truly according to human capacity. Nor, when he hears that the Father alone is God, let him separate from him the Son or the Holy Spirit: See Tomus Damasi, anathema 25. for with him he is the only God, with whom he is also one God, because, when we hear that the Son too is the only God, we must take it without any separation of the Father or the Holy Spirit. And so let him say one essence, so as not to suppose that one is greater than, or better than, or in any part diverse from, another. Yet not so that the Father himself be the Son and the Holy Spirit, and whatever else the single ones are said in relation to one another; as Word, which is said only of the Son, or Gift, which is said only of the Holy Spirit: (See Acts 8:20; John 1:1–14; 4:10; 1 Thess 2:13; Rev 19:13) on account of which they also admit the plural number, as it is written in the Gospel: I and the Father are one. And he said both one and we are; one, according to essence, because the same God; we are, according to relation, because that one is Father, this one Son.
deTrin.7.6.12Aliquando et tacetur unitas essentiae, et sola pluraliter relativa commemorantur: veniemus ad eum, ego et Pater, et habitabimus apud eum. Veniemus et habitabimus, pluralis numerus est, quia praedictum est, ego et Pater, id est, Filius et Pater, quae relative ad invicem dicuntur. Aliquando latenter omnino, sicut in Genesi: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Et faciamus, et nostram, pluraliter dictum est, et nisi ex relativis accipi non oportet. Non enim ut facerent dii, aut ad imaginem et similitudinem deorum; sed ut facerent Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, ad imaginem Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, ut subsisteret homo imago Dei. Deus autem Trinitas. Cf. Basil, Hexaemeron 4.6; Hilary, On the Trinity 5.8.
Sometimes the unity of essence is even passed over in silence, and the relatives alone are mentioned plurally: we will come to him, I and the Father, and will make our dwelling with him. We will come and will make our dwelling is a plural number, because it was said before, I and the Father, that is, the Son and the Father, which are said relatively in relation to one another. Sometimes altogether latently, as in Genesis: let us make man to our image and likeness. Both let us make and our were said plurally, and ought not to be taken except from relatives. For not that gods might make, or to the image and likeness of gods; but that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit might make, to the image of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, so that man might subsist as the image of God. But God is Trinity. See Basil, Hexaemeron 4.6; Hilary, On the Trinity 5.8.
deTrin.7.6.12Sed quia non omnimodo aequalis fiebat illa imago Dei, (Cf. 1 Cor 11:7) tamquam non ab illo nata, sed ab eo creata, huius rei significandae causa, ita imago est ut ad imaginem sit: id est, non aequatur parilitate, sed quadam similitudine accedit. (Cf. Gen 1:26) Non enim locorum intervallis, sed similitudine acceditur ad Deum, et dissimilitudine receditur ab eo. Sunt enim qui ita distinguunt, ut Imaginem velint esse Filium: hominem vero non imaginem, sed “ad imaginem.” Cf. Augustine, Miscellany of 83 Questions 51.4; Ambrose, On the Psalms 118.10.6; On Luke 10.49.
But because that image of God (See 1 Cor 11:7) was not made altogether equal, as not born of him but created by him, for the sake of signifying this, it is so an image that it is to the image: that is, it is not equated by parity, but approaches by a certain likeness. (See Gen 1:26) For not by intervals of places, but by likeness one approaches God, and by unlikeness one withdraws from him. For there are those who so distinguish that they wish the Image to be the Son, but man to be not an image, but "to the image." See Augustine, Miscellany of 83 Questions 51.4; Ambrose, On the Psalms 118.10.6; On Luke 10.49.
deTrin.7.6.12Refellit autem eos Apostolus dicens: vir quidem non debet velare caput, cum sit imago et gloria Dei. Non dixit, “ad imaginem”; sed imago. Quae tamen imago, cum alibi dicitur, “ad imaginem,” non quasi “ad Filium” dicitur, quae imago aequalis est Patri; (Cf. 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15) alioquin non diceret, ad imaginem nostram. Quomodo enim nostram, cum Filius solius Patris imago sit?
But the Apostle refutes them, saying: a man indeed ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God. He did not say, "to the image"; but image. Which image, however, when it is said elsewhere, "to the image," is not said as it were "to the Son," which image is equal to the Father; (See 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15) otherwise he would not say, to our image. For how our, when the Son is the image of the Father alone?
deTrin.7.6.12Sed propter imparem, ut diximus, similitudinem dictus est homo ad imaginem: et ideo nostram, ut imago Trinitatis esset homo; non Trinitati aequalis sicut Filius Patri, sed accedens, ut dictum est, quadam similitudine; sicut in distantibus significatur quaedam vicinitas, non loci, sed cuiusdam imitationis.
But on account of the unequal likeness, as we have said, man was said to be to the image: and therefore "our," so that man might be the image of the Trinity; not equal to the Trinity as the Son to the Father, but approaching, as has been said, by a certain likeness; as in distant things a certain nearness is signified, not of place, but of a certain imitation.
deTrin.7.6.12Ad hoc enim et dicitur, reformamini in novitate mentis vestrae: quibus item dicit, estote itaque imitatores Dei, sicut filii carissimi. Novo enim homini dicitur: qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum.
For to this end it is also said, be reformed in the newness of your mind: to whom likewise he says, be therefore imitators of God, as most dear sons. For to the new man it is said: who is renewed unto the knowledge of God, according to the image of him who created him.
deTrin.7.6.12Aut si iam placet propter disputandi necessitatem, etiam exceptis nominibus relativis, pluralem numerum admittere, ut uno nomine respondeatur, cum quaeritur, “quid tria,” et dicere tres substantias sive tres personas; nullae moles aut intervalla cogitentur, nulla distantia quantulaecumque dissimilitudinis, ubi PL: ut ibi. intellegatur aliud alio vel paulo minus, quocumque modo minus esse aliud alio potest: ut neque personarum sit confusio, nec talis distinctio qua sit impar aliquid.
Or if it now please, on account of the necessity of disputing, even apart from the relative names, to admit the plural number, so that one name may be answered when it is asked, "what three," and to say three substances or three persons; let no masses or intervals be thought of, no distance of however small an unlikeness, where one may be understood to be even a little less than another, in whatever way one can be less than another: so that there may be neither a confusion of the persons, nor such a distinction as that anything be unequal.
deTrin.7.6.12Quod si intellectu capi non potest, fide teneatur, donec illucescat in cordibus ille, (Cf. 2 Pet 1:19) qui ait per prophetam, nisi credideritis, non intellegetis.
But if it cannot be grasped by the understanding, let it be held by faith, until he shine in the hearts (See 2 Pet 1:19) who said through the prophet, unless you believe, you will not understand.
deTrin.7.6.12Bk. 8Proem. In the Trinity those things are said distinctly which are said relatively in relation to one another, but there iProemium In Trinitate dicuntur distincte quae relative dicuntur ad invicem, sed nulla diversitas essentiae.
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1. 1. Diximus alibi, Cf. On the Trinity 5.5. ea dici proprie in illa Trinitate distincte ad singulas Personas pertinentia, quae relative dicuntur ad invicem, sicut Pater et Filius et utriusque Donum (Cf. Acts 8:20; John 4:10) Spiritus Sanctus; non enim Pater Trinitas, aut Filius Trinitas, aut Trinitas Donum. Quod vero ad se dicuntur singuli, non dici pluraliter tres, sed unum ipsam Trinitatem: sicut Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus Sanctus; et bonus Pater, bonus Filius, bonus Spiritus Sanctus; et omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus Sanctus; nec tamen tres dii, aut tres boni, aut tres omnipotentes; sed unus Deus, bonus, omnipotens ipsa Trinitas; Cf. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto 3.16.109. et quidquid aliud non ad invicem relative, sed ad se singuli dicuntur.
1. 1. We have said elsewhere See On the Trinity 5.5. that those things are properly said in that Trinity, pertaining distinctly to the single persons, which are said relatively in relation to one another, as the Father and the Son and the Gift of both, (See Acts 8:20; John 4:10) the Holy Spirit; for the Father is not the Trinity, nor the Son the Trinity, nor the Gift the Trinity. But that which the single ones are said in relation to themselves, is said not plurally as three, but as one, the Trinity itself: as God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit; and good the Father, good the Son, good the Holy Spirit; and almighty the Father, almighty the Son, almighty the Holy Spirit; yet not three gods, or three good ones, or three almighty ones; but one God, good, almighty, the Trinity itself; See Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto 3.16.109. and whatever else is said of the single ones not relatively in relation to one another, but in relation to themselves.
deTrin.8.1.1Hoc enim secundum essentiam dicuntur, quia hoc est ibi esse, quod magnum esse, quod bonum esse, quod sapientem esse, et quidquid aliud ad se unaquaeque ibi persona, vel ipsa Trinitas dicitur. Ideoque dici tres personas, vel tres substantias, Cf. On the Trinity 5.2.8; 7.4–6. non ut aliqua intellegatur diversitas essentiae, sed ut vel uno aliquo vocabulo responderi possit cum dicitur “quid tres” vel “quid tria”; tantamque esse aequalitatem in ea Trinitate, ut non solum Pater non sit maior quam Filius, quod attinet ad divinitatem, sed nec Pater et Filius simul maius aliquid sint quam Spiritus Sanctus, aut singula quaeque Persona quaelibet trium minus aliquid sit quam ipsa Trinitas.
For these things are said according to essence, because this is there to be which is to be great, which is to be good, which is to be wise, and whatever else each single person there, or the Trinity itself, is said in relation to itself. And therefore three persons or three substances are said, See On the Trinity 5.2.8; 7.4–6. not that any diversity of essence be understood, but that some one word may be answered when it is said "what three" or "what three things"; and that there is such great equality in that Trinity, that not only is the Father not greater than the Son, as far as pertains to divinity, but neither are the Father and the Son together anything greater than the Holy Spirit, nor is any single one of the three persons whatever anything less than the Trinity itself.
deTrin.8.1.1Dicta sunt haec, et si saepius versando repetantur, familiarius quidem innotescunt: sed et modus aliquis adhibendus est, Deoque supplicandum devotissima pietate, ut intellectum aperiat, et studium contentionis absumat, quo possit mente cerni essentia veritatis, sine ulla mole, sine ulla mutabilitate. PL: mobilitate, “mobility.”
These things have been said, and if they be repeated by turning them over more often, they become known indeed more familiarly: but some measure too is to be applied, and God is to be entreated with most devout piety, that he may open the understanding, and take away the zeal of contention, by which the essence of truth may be discerned by the mind, without any mass, without any changeableness. PL: mobilitate, “mobility.”
deTrin.8.1.1Nunc itaque, in quantum ipse adiuvat Creator mire misericors, attendamus haec, quae modo interiore quam superiora tractabimus, cum sint eadem: servata illa regula, ut quod intellectui nostro nondum eluxerit, a firmitate fidei non dimittatur.
Now, therefore, insofar as the Creator, wonderfully merciful, himself helps, let us attend to these things, which we shall treat in a more inward manner than the foregoing, although they are the same: keeping that rule, that what has not yet shone out to our understanding may not be let go from the firmness of faith.
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1. 2. Dicimus enim non esse in hac Trinitate maius aliquid duas aut tres Personas quam unam earum: quod non capit consuetudo carnalis, (Cf. 1 Cor 2:14) non ob aliud, nisi quia vera quae creata sunt sentit ut potest; veritatem autem ipsam qua creata sunt non potest intueri: nam si posset, nullo modo esset lux ista corporea manifestior quam hoc quod diximus. In substantia quippe veritatis, quoniam sola vere est, non est maior aliqua, nisi quae verius est. Quidquid autem intellegibile atque incommutabile est, non aliud alio verius est, quia aeque incommutabiliter aeternum est: nec quod ibi magnum dicitur, aliunde magnum est, quam eo quo vere est. Quapropter ubi magnitudo ipsa veritas est, quidquid plus habet magnitudinis, necesse est plus habeat veritatis; quidquid ergo plus veritatis non habet, non habet etiam plus magnitudinis. Porro, quidquid plus habet veritatis, profecto verius est, sicut maius est quod plus habet magnitudinis: hoc ergo ibi est maius quod verius. Non autem verius est Pater et Filius simul, quam singulus Pater, aut singulus Filius. Non igitur maius aliquid utrumque simul, quam singulum eorum. Et quoniam aeque vere est etiam Spiritus Sanctus, nec Pater et Filius simul maius aliquid est quam ipse, quia nec verius. Pater quoque et Spiritus Sanctus simul, quoniam veritate non superant Filium; non enim verius sunt; nec magnitudine superant. Atque ita Filius et Spiritus Sanctus simul tam magnum aliquid sunt quam Pater solus, quia tam vere sunt. Sic et ipsa Trinitas tam magnum est, quam unaquaeque ibi Persona. Non enim ibi maior est, quae verior non est, ubi est ipsa veritas magnitudo. Quia in essentia veritatis, hoc est verum esse quod est esse; et hoc est esse quod est magnum esse: hoc ergo magnum esse, quod verum esse. Quod igitur ibi aeque verum est, etiam aeque magnum sit necesse est.
1. 2. For we say that in this Trinity two or three persons are not anything greater than one of them: which the carnal habit does not grasp, (See 1 Cor 2:14) for no other reason than that it perceives the true things that were created as it can, but the very truth by which they were created it cannot behold: for if it could, in no way would this corporeal light be more manifest than what we have said. For in the substance of truth, since it alone truly is, nothing is greater except what more truly is. But whatever is intelligible and unchangeable is not one thing truer than another, because it is equally unchangeably eternal: nor is what is there called great, great from anything other than that whereby it truly is. Wherefore, where magnitude itself is truth, whatever has more of magnitude must needs have more of truth; whatever, then, does not have more of truth, does not have more of magnitude either. Further, whatever has more of truth is assuredly truer, as that is greater which has more of magnitude: that, then, is there greater which is truer. But the Father and the Son together are not truer than the Father singly, or the Son singly. Not, therefore, are both together anything greater than each one of them. And since the Holy Spirit too equally truly is, the Father and the Son together are not anything greater than he, because they are not truer. The Father too and the Holy Spirit together, since they do not surpass the Son in truth (for they are not truer), do not surpass him in magnitude. And so the Son and the Holy Spirit together are as great a thing as the Father alone, because they as truly are. So too the Trinity itself is as great as each single person there. For there that is not greater which is not truer, where truth itself is magnitude. Because in the essence of truth, this is to be true which is to be; and this is to be which is to be great: this, then, to be great which is to be true. What, therefore, is there equally true, must needs be also equally great.
deTrin.8.1.22. 3. In corporibus autem fieri potest ut aeque verum sit hoc aurum atque illud, sed maius hoc sit quam illud, quia non eadem ibi est magnitudo quae veritas; aliudque illi est aurum esse, aliud magnum esse. Sic et in animi natura, secundum quod dicitur magnus animus, non secundum hoc dicitur verus animus. Animum enim verum habet etiam qui non est magnanimus; quandoquidem corporis et animi essentia, non est ipsius veritatis essentia, sicuti est Trinitas, Deus unus, solus, magnus, verus, verax, veritas. Quem si cogitare conamur, quantum sinit et donat, nullus cogitetur per locorum spatia contactus aut complexus, quasi trium corporum; nulla compago iuncturae, sicut tricorporem Geryonem fabulae ferunt; A mythical king of Erythia, slain by Hercules. Cf. Virgil, Aeneid 6.289; 8.202. sed quidquid animo tale occurrerit, ut maius sit in tribus quam in singulis, minusque in uno quam in duobus, sine ulla dubitatione respuatur: ita enim respuitur omne corporeum.
2. 3. In bodies, however, it can happen that this gold is just as truly gold as that, and yet this piece is larger than that, since the magnitude there is not the same thing as the truth; and it is one thing for it to be gold, another for it to be large. So too in the nature of the mind: a mind is not called true by the same standard by which it is called great. For even one who is not great-souled has a true mind, since the essence of body and of mind is not the essence of Truth itself, as is the Trinity, the one, sole, great, true, truthful God, Truth. If we try to think of him, so far as he allows and grants, let no contact or embrace through stretches of space be thought of, as of three bodies; no fitting together of joints, as the fables tell of three-bodied Geryon; A mythical king of Erythia, slain by Hercules. See Virgil, Aeneid 6.289; 8.202. rather, whatever of such a kind presents itself to the mind, so that it would be greater in three than in one, and less in one than in two, let it be rejected without any hesitation: for in this way everything bodily is rejected.
deTrin.8.2.3In spiritalibus autem omne mutabile quod occurrerit, non putetur Deus. Non enim parvae notitiae pars est, cum de profundo isto in illam summitatem respiramus, si antequam scire possimus quid sit Deus, possumus iam scire quid non sit. Non est enim certe nec terra, nec caelum, nec quasi terra et caelum, nec tale aliquid quale videmus in caelo, nec quidquid tale non videmus et est fortassis in caelo. Nec si augeas imaginatione cogitationis lucem solis, quantum potes, sive quo sit maior, sive quo sit clarior, millies tantum, aut innumerabiliter, neque hoc est Deus. Nec sicut cogitantur angeli mundi spiritus caelestia corpora “inspirantes,” atque ad arbitrium quo serviunt Deo mutantes atque versantes, Cf. Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177. neque si omnes, cum sint milia millium, in unum collati unus fiant, nec tale aliquid Deus est. Nec si eosdem spiritus sine corporibus cogites, quod quidem carnali cogitationi difficillimum est.
In spiritual things, on the other hand, let nothing changeable that presents itself be thought to be God. For it is no small part of knowledge, when we breathe up out of this depth toward that height, if before we can know what God is we can already know what he is not. For he is certainly neither earth nor heaven, nor anything like earth and heaven, nor anything such as we see in the sky, nor anything of that kind which we do not see and which is perhaps in the sky. Nor, if you increase in the imagination of your thought the light of the sun as much as you can, whether to make it greater or to make it brighter, a thousand times or beyond counting, is this God either. Nor is God anything like the way the angels are conceived—pure spirits “breathing into” the heavenly bodies, and changing and turning them at the will by which they serve God— See Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177. nor, even if all of them, since they are thousands upon thousands, were gathered into one and became one, is God anything of that sort. Nor even if you think of those same spirits without bodies—which is indeed most difficult for a carnal way of thinking.
deTrin.8.2.3Ecce vide, si potes, o anima praegravata corpore quod corrumpitur, et onusta terrenis cogitationibus multis et variis; ecce vide, si potes: Deus veritas est. Hoc enim scriptum est, quoniam Deus lux est; non quomodo isti oculi vident, sed quomodo videt cor, cum audit, PL: audis, “you hear.” “Veritas est.” Noli quaerere quid sit veritas; statim enim se opponent caligines imaginum corporalium et nubila phantasmatum, et perturbabunt serenitatem, quae primo ictu diluxit tibi, cum dicerem: “Veritas.” Ecce in ipso primo ictu quo velut coruscatione perstringeris, cum dicitur, “Veritas,” mane si potes: sed non potes; relaberis in ista solita atque terrena. Quo tandem pondere, quaeso, relaberis, nisi sordium contractarum cupiditatis visco et peregrinationis erroribus? Cf. Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.8; Ambrose, De bono mortis 2.5; 5.17; Cicero, De Re Publica 6.9.3.14; Heb 11:13–16.
Look, see if you can, O soul weighed down by the body that is corruptible, and burdened with earthly thoughts many and various; look, see if you can: God is truth. For this is written, that God is light; not as these eyes see, but as the heart sees, when it hears, PL: audis, “you hear.” “It is truth.” Do not ask what truth is; for at once the mists of bodily images and the clouds of phantasms will set themselves against you, and will disturb the serenity that shone upon you at the first stroke, when I said, “Truth.” See, in that very first stroke by which you are dazzled as by a flash, when it is said, “Truth,” remain there if you can: but you cannot; you slip back into these accustomed and earthly things. By what weight, I ask, do you slip back, if not by the birdlime of the desires you have contracted and by the wanderings of your pilgrimage? See Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.8; Ambrose, De bono mortis 2.5; 5.17; Cicero, De Re Publica 6.9.3.14; Heb 11:13–16.
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3. 4. Ecce iterum vide, si potes. Non amas certe nisi bonum, quia bona est terra altitudine montium et temperamento collium et planitie camporum, et bonum praedium amoenum ac fertile, et bona domus paribus membris disposita et ampla et lucida, et bona animalia animata corpora, et bonus aer modestus et salubris, et bonus cibus suavis atque aptus valetudini, et bona valetudo sine doloribus et lassitudine, et bona facies hominis dimensa pariliter et affecta hilariter et luculenter colorata, et bonus animus amici consensionis dulcedine et amoris fide, et bonus vir iustus, et bonae divitiae, quia facile expediunt, et bonum caelum cum sole et luna et stellis suis, et boni angeli sancta obedientia, et bona locutio suaviter docens et congruenter movens PL: monens, “advising.” audientem, et bonum carmen canorum numeris et sententiis grave.
3. 4. See again, if you can. You certainly love nothing but the good; for the earth is good with its lofty mountains and its temperate hills and its level plains, and a pleasant and fertile estate is good, and a house is good when its parts are well proportioned and it is spacious and full of light, and animals, living bodies, are good, and air is good when mild and healthful, and food is good when pleasant and suited to health, and health is good when free from pain and weariness, and a person’s face is good when evenly proportioned and cheerful in expression and bright in color, and the mind of a friend is good in the sweetness of agreement and the loyalty of love, and a just man is good, and riches are good because they readily serve our purposes, and the sky is good with its sun and moon and stars, and the angels are good in their holy obedience, and speech is good when it teaches pleasantly and moves PL: monens, “advising.” the hearer fittingly, and a song is good when melodious in its rhythms and weighty in its thoughts.
deTrin.8.3.4Quid plura et plura? Bonum hoc et bonum illud. Tolle hoc et illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes; ita Deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed Bonum omnis boni. Neque enim in his omnibus bonis, vel quae commemoravi, vel quae alia cernuntur sive cogitantur, diceremus aliud alio melius cum vere iudicamus, nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni, secundum quod et probaremus aliquid, et aliud alii praeponeremus. Cf. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will 2.16.44–17.45. Sic amandus est Deus, non hoc et illud bonum, sed ipsum Bonum. Quaerendum enim bonum animae, non cui supervolitet iudicando, sed cui haereat amando; et quid hoc, nisi Deus? Non bonus animus, aut bonus angelus, aut bonum caelum, sed bonum Bonum.
Why go on and on? This good and that good. Take away this and that, and see the good itself, if you can; so you will see God, good not by some other good, but the Good of every good. For among all these goods, whether those I have mentioned or others that are perceived or thought of, we would not, when we judge truly, call one better than another unless the notion of the good itself were impressed upon us, by which we both approve something and prefer one thing to another. See Augustine, On Free Will 2.16.44–17.45. Thus God is to be loved, not as this good or that good, but as the Good itself. For the good to be sought for the soul is not one over which it should fly in judging, but one to which it should cling in loving; and what is this but God? Not a good mind, or a good angel, or a good heaven, but the good Good.
deTrin.8.3.4Sic enim forte facilius advertitur quid velim dicere. Cum enim audio, verbi gratia, quod dicitur “animus bonus,” sicut duo verba sunt, ita ex eis verbis duo quaedam intellego; aliud quo animus est, aliud quo bonus. Et quidem ut animus esset, non egit ipse aliquid; non enim iam erat qui ageret PL: quod ageret, “there was not yet anything it could do.” ut esset: ut autem sit bonus animus, video agendum esse voluntate; non quia idipsum quo animus est, non est aliquid boni; nam unde iam dicitur, et verissime dicitur corpore melior? Sed ideo, nondum dicitur bonus animus, quoniam restat ei actio voluntatis, qua sit praestantior.
For perhaps in this way what I mean is more easily grasped. When I hear, for example, the words “a good mind,” just as there are two words, so from those words I understand two things: one by which it is a mind, another by which it is good. And indeed, that it might be a mind, it did nothing itself; for there was not yet anything that could act PL: quod ageret, “there was not yet anything it could do.” so that it might exist: but that it might be a good mind, I see that something must be done by the will; not because the very thing by which it is a mind is nothing good—for from what else is it already called, and most truly called, better than body?—but because it is not yet called a good mind for this reason, that there still remains for it the act of will by which it may become more excellent.
deTrin.8.3.4Quam si neglexerit, iure culpatur, recteque dicitur non bonus animus. Distat enim ab eo qui hoc agit; et quia ille laudabilis, profecto iste qui hoc non agit, vituperabilis est. Cum vero agit hoc studio, et fit bonus animus, nisi se ad aliquid convertat quod ipse non est, non potest hoc assequi. Quo se autem convertit ut fiat bonus animus, nisi ad bonum, cum hoc amat et appetit et adipiscitur? Unde se si rursus avertat, fiatque non bonus, hoc ipso quod se avertit a bono, nisi maneat in se illud bonum unde se avertit, non est quo se iterum, si voluerit emendare, convertat.
And if it neglects this, it is rightly blamed, and rightly said not to be a good mind. For it differs from one that does this; and because that one is praiseworthy, surely this one that does not do it is blameworthy. But when it does this with zeal and becomes a good mind, it cannot attain this unless it turns toward something that it is not itself. And toward what does it turn in order to become a good mind, if not toward the good, since it loves and seeks and obtains this? And if it turns away again, and becomes not good, then by this very fact, that it turns away from the good, unless that good from which it turns away remained in itself, there would be nothing to which it could turn again, should it wish to amend itself.
deTrin.8.3.43. 5. Quapropter nulla essent mutabilia bona, nisi esset incommutabile Bonum. Cum itaque audis bonum hoc et bonum illud, quae possunt alias dici etiam non bona, si potueris sine illis quae participatione Boni bona sunt, perspicere ipsum Bonum cuius participatione bona sunt; simul enim et ipsum intellegis, cum audis hoc aut illud bonum: si ergo potueris illis detractis per se ipsum perspicere bonum, perspexeris Deum. Et si amore inhaeseris, continuo beatificaberis. Pudeat autem, cum alia non amentur nisi quia bona sunt, eis inhaerendo non amare Bonum ipsum unde bona sunt.
3. 5. Therefore there would be no changeable goods unless there were the unchangeable Good. So when you hear of this good and that good, which can in other respects be called also not good, if you are able, setting aside those things that are good by participation in the Good, to behold the Good itself by participation in which they are good—for you understand the Good itself at the same time as you hear of this or that good—if then, with those things set aside, you are able to behold the good through itself, you will have beheld God. And if you cling to him in love, you will straightway be made blessed. But let it be a shame, when other things are loved only because they are good, by clinging to them not to love the Good itself from which they are good.
deTrin.8.3.5Illud etiam, quod animus, tantum quia est animus, etiam nondum eo modo bonus quo se convertit ad incommutabile Bonum; sed, ut dixi, tantum animus, cum ita nobis placet ut eum omni etiam luci corporeae cum bene intellegimus, praeferamus, non in se ipso nobis placet sed in illa arte qua factus est. Inde enim approbatur factus, ubi videtur fuisse faciendus. Haec est veritas, et simplex bonum; non enim est aliud aliquid quam ipsum Bonum, ac per hoc etiam summum Bonum. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.1.2; Augustine, Against the Academics 3.12.27; The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 1.3.10; Revisions 1.1.9. Non enim minui vel augeri bonum potest, nisi quod ex alio bono bonum est.
This too: that the mind, merely because it is a mind—even when it is not yet good in the way it becomes good by turning to the unchangeable Good, but, as I said, is merely a mind—is pleasing to us, when we understand rightly, so that we prefer it even to every bodily light; yet it is pleasing to us not in itself, but in that art by which it was made. For it is thereby approved as made, where it is seen that it ought to have been made. This is truth, and the simple good; for it is nothing other than the Good itself, and through this, the highest Good as well. See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.1.2; Augustine, Against the Academics 3.12.27; The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 1.3.10; Revisions 1.1.9. For the good cannot be diminished or increased except that which is good from another good.
deTrin.8.3.5Ad hoc se igitur animus convertit ut bonus sit, a quo habet ut animus sit. Tunc ergo voluntas naturae congruit ut perficiatur in bono animus, cum illud bonum diligitur conversione voluntatis, unde est et illud quod non amittitur nec aversione voluntatis. Avertendo enim se a summo Bono, amittit animus ut sit bonus animus; non autem amittit ut sit animus, cum et hoc iam bonum sit corpore melius: hoc ergo amittit voluntas, quod voluntas adipiscitur. Iam enim erat animus, qui converti ad id vellet a quo erat; qui autem vellet esse antequam esset nondum erat. Et hoc est bonum nostrum, ubi videmus utrum esse debuerit aut debeat, quidquid esse debuisse aut debere comprehendimus, et ubi videmus esse non potuisse nisi esse debuisset, quidquid etiam quomodo esse debuerit non comprehendimus. Hoc ergo bonum non longe positum est ab unoquoque nostrum: in illo enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus.
The mind, then, turns to become good toward that from which it has its being as a mind. The will agrees with nature so that the mind is perfected in good, when that good is loved by a turning of the will—the good from which comes also that which is not lost even by a turning away of the will. For by turning itself away from the highest Good, the mind loses its being a good mind; yet it does not lose its being a mind, since this too is already a good better than body: this, then, the will loses, which the will obtains. For there already existed a mind that could will to turn toward that from which it was; but one that might will to exist before it existed did not yet exist. And this is our good, where we see whether anything ought to have existed or ought to exist, when we grasp that it ought to have existed or ought to exist, and where we see that it could not have existed unless it ought to have existed, even when we do not grasp how it ought to have existed. This good, then, is not far from each one of us: for in him we live and move and have our being.
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4. 6. Sed dilectione standum est ad illud et inhaerendum illi, ut praesente perfruamur a quo sumus, quo absente nec esse possemus. Cum enim per fidem adhuc ambulamus, non per speciem, nondum utique videmus Deum, sicut idem ait, facie ad faciem. Quem tamen nisi nunc iam diligamus, numquam videbimus. Sed quis diligit quod ignorat? Sciri enim aliquid et non diligi potest: diligi autem quod nescitur, quaero utrum possit; quia si non potest, nemo diligit Deum antequam sciat. Et quid est Deum scire, nisi eum mente conspicere, firmeque percipere? Non enim corpus est, ut carneis oculis inquiratur.
4. 6. But we must stand fast by love toward that good and cling to it, so that we may fully enjoy his presence from whom we are, and without whom we could not even exist. For since we still walk by faith and not by sight, we certainly do not yet see God, as the same Apostle says, face to face. Yet unless we now already love him, we shall never see him. But who loves what he does not know? Something can indeed be known and not loved: but whether what is not known can be loved, this I ask; for if it cannot, no one loves God before he knows him. And what is it to know God, but to behold him with the mind and firmly to perceive him? For he is not a body, that he should be sought with the eyes of flesh.
deTrin.8.4.6Sed et priusquam valeamus conspicere atque percipere Deum, sicut conspici et percipi potest, quod mundis cordibus licet: beati enim mundicordes, quia ipsi Deum videbunt: nisi per fidem diligatur, The argument hangs on an allusion to Acts 15:9: purifying their hearts by faith. non poterit cor mundari, quo ad eum videndum sit aptum et idoneum. Ubi sunt enim illa tria, propter quae in animo aedificanda omnium divinorum Librorum machinamenta consurgunt, fides, spes, caritas; (Cf. 1 Cor 13:13) nisi in animo credente quod nondum videt, et sperante atque amante quod credit? Amatur ergo et quod ignoratur; PL: qui ignoratur, “someone . . . who.” sed tamen creditur. Nimirum autem cavendum est, ne credens animus id quod non videt, fingat sibi aliquid quod non est, et speret diligatque quod falsum est. Quod si fit, non erit caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, quae finis praecepti est, sicut idem Apostolus dicit.
But even before we are able to behold and perceive God, as he can be beheld and perceived, which is granted to the pure in heart—for blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God—unless he is loved through faith, The argument hangs on an allusion to Acts 15:9: purifying their hearts by faith. the heart cannot be purified so as to be fit and suited for seeing him. For where are those three things, for the sake of building which up in the soul all the structures of the divine Books rise, faith, hope, love, (See 1 Cor 13:13) if not in a soul that believes what it does not yet see, and hopes for and loves what it believes? So even what is unknown is loved; PL: qui ignoratur, “someone . . . who.” yet it is believed. But assuredly we must take care that the soul, believing what it does not see, does not fashion for itself something that is not, and hope for and love what is false. For if this happens, there will not be love from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned, which is the end of the commandment, as the same Apostle says.
deTrin.8.4.64. 7. Necesse est autem, cum aliqua corporalia lecta vel audita quae non vidimus, credimus, fingat sibi animus aliquid in lineamentis formisque corporum, sicut occurrerit cogitanti, quod aut verum non sit, aut etiam si verum est, quod rarissime potest accidere: non hoc tamen fide ut teneamus quidquam prodest, sed ad aliud aliquid utile, quod per hoc insinuatur.
4. 7. Now it is inevitable that, when we believe some bodily things that we have read or heard of but have not seen, the mind fashions for itself something in the lineaments and shapes of bodies, as it occurs to the one thinking—something that is either not true, or, even if it is true (which can happen very rarely), it is nevertheless of no profit to us to hold it by faith, but profitable for something else that is conveyed through it.
deTrin.8.4.7Quis enim legentium vel audientium quae scripsit apostolus Paulus, vel quae de illo scripta sunt, non fingat animo et ipsius Apostoli faciem, et omnium quorum ibi nomina commemorantur? Et cum in tanta hominum multitudine quibus illae Litterae notae sunt, alius aliter lineamenta figuramque illorum corporum cogitet, quis propinquius et similius cogitet, utique incertum est.
For who, among those who read or hear what the apostle Paul wrote, or what was written about him, does not fashion in his mind a face both for the Apostle himself and for all whose names are mentioned there? And since, among so great a multitude of people to whom those Letters are known, one thinks of the lineaments and shape of those bodies in one way and another in another, which one thinks more nearly and more like the truth is certainly uncertain.
deTrin.8.4.7Neque ibi occupatur fides nostra, qua facie corporis fuerint illi homine; sed tantum quia per Dei gratiam ita vixerunt, et ea gesserunt quae Scriptura illa testatur: hoc et utile est credere, et non desperandum, et appetendum. Nam et ipsius Dominicae facies carnis, innumerabilium cogitationum diversitate variatur et fingitur, quae tamen una erat, quaecumque erat.
Nor is our faith occupied there with what bodily face those people had; but only that, by the grace of God, they lived in such a way and did the things to which that Scripture bears witness: this it is both profitable to believe, and not to be despaired of, and to be sought after. For even the face of the Lord’s own flesh is varied and fashioned by the diversity of countless thoughts, though it was one, whatever it was.
deTrin.8.4.7Neque in fide nostra quam de Domino Iesu Christo habemus, illud salubre est quod sibi animus fingit, longe fortasse aliter quam res habet, sed illud quod secundum speciem de homine cogitamus: habemus enim quasi regulariter infixam humanae naturae notitiam, secundum quam quidquid tale aspicimus, statim hominem esse cognoscimus vel hominis formam.
Nor, in the faith we have concerning the Lord Jesus Christ, is what is salutary what the mind fashions for itself—perhaps far otherwise than the reality is—but what we think of him in accordance with the form of a human being: for we have, fixed in us as by a rule, the knowledge of human nature, in accordance with which, whenever we look upon anything of that kind, we at once recognize it to be a human being, or the form of a human being.
deTrin.8.4.75. 7. Secundum hanc notitiam cogitatio nostra informatur, cum credimus pro nobis Deum hominem factum, ad humilitatis exemplum, et ad demonstrandam erga nos dilectionem Dei. (Cf. Phil 2:6–8) Hoc enim nobis prodest credere, et firmum atque inconcussum corde retinere, humilitatem qua natus est Deus ex femina (Cf. Gal 4:4) et a mortalibus per tantas contumelias perductus ad mortem, summum esse medicamentum quo superbiae nostrae sanaretur tumor, et altum sacramentum quo peccati vinculum solveretur. Cf. On the Trinity 4.1; 4.4.
5. 7. In accordance with this knowledge our thought is shaped, when we believe that for our sake God became a human being, for an example of humility, and to show forth the love of God toward us. (See Phil 2:6–8) For it profits us to believe this, and to hold it in our heart firm and unshaken: that the humility by which God was born of a woman (See Gal 4:4) and led by mortals through so many insults to death is the supreme remedy by which the swelling of our pride might be healed, and a deep mystery by which the bond of sin might be loosed. See On the Trinity 4.1; 4.4.
deTrin.8.5.7Sic et virtutem miraculorum et ipsius resurrectionis eius, quoniam novimus quid sit omnipotentia, de omnipotente Deo credimus, et secundum species et genera rerum vel natura insita vel experientia collecta, de factis huiuscemodi cogitamus, ut non ficta sit fides nostra.
So too the power of his miracles and of his resurrection itself: since we know what omnipotence is, we believe it of the omnipotent God, and we think of deeds of this kind in accordance with the forms and kinds of things, whether implanted in us by nature or gathered from experience, so that our faith may not be feigned.
deTrin.8.5.7Neque enim novimus faciem Virginis Mariae, ex qua ille a viro intacta neque in ipso partu corrupta mirabiliter natus est. Nec quibus membrorum lineamentis fuerit Lazarus, nec Bethaniam, nec sepulcrum lapidemque illum quem removeri iussit cum eum resuscitaret, vidimus, (Cf. John 11:1–44) nec monumentum novum excisum in petra unde ipse resurrexit, (Cf. Matt 27:57; Mark 15:42; Luke 23:50; John 19:38) nec montem Oliveti unde ascendit in caelum: (Cf. Acts 1:9–12) neque omnino scimus, quicumque ista non vidimus, an ita sint ut ea cogitamus; immo vero probabilius existimamus ita non esse.
For we do not know the face of the Virgin Mary, from whom, untouched by a man and uncorrupted even in the very birth, he was wondrously born. Nor have we seen with what lineaments of limbs Lazarus was; nor Bethany; nor the tomb and that stone which he ordered to be rolled away when he raised him; (See John 11:1–44) nor the new tomb hewn in the rock from which he himself rose again; (See Matt 27:57; Mark 15:42; Luke 23:50; John 19:38) nor the Mount of Olives from which he ascended into heaven: (See Acts 1:9–12) nor do we at all know, any of us who have not seen these things, whether they are as we think them; rather, we judge it more probable that they are not so.
deTrin.8.5.7Namque cum alicuius facies vel loci vel hominis vel cuiuslibet corporis eadem occurrerit oculis nostris, quae occurrebat animo, cum eam priusquam videremus cogitabamus, non parvo miraculo movemur; ita raro et pene numquam accidit:
For when the same face of some place or person or any body whatever has met our eyes as met our mind when, before we saw it, we were thinking of it, we are moved by no small wonder; so rarely, and almost never, does this happen:
deTrin.8.5.7et tamen ea firmissime credimus, quia secundum specialem generalemque notitiam quae certa nobis est, cogitamus. Credimus enim Dominum Iesum Christum natum de Virgine quae Maria vocabatur. Quid sit autem virgo, et quid sit nasci, et quid sit nomen proprium non credimus, sed prorsus novimus. Utrum autem illa facies Mariae fuerit quae occurrerit animo cum ista loquimur aut recordamur, nec novimus omnino, nec credimus. Itaque hic salva fide licet dicere, “forte talem habebat faciem, forte non talem”; “forte” autem “de Virgine natus est Christus,” nemo salva fide Christiana dixerit.
and yet we believe these things most firmly, because we think in accordance with a special and general knowledge that is certain to us. For we believe that the Lord Jesus Christ was born of a virgin who was called Mary. But what a virgin is, and what it is to be born, and what a proper name is, we do not believe but simply know. Whether, however, that was the face of Mary which met our mind when we say or recall these things, we neither know at all nor believe. And so here, with our faith safe, we may say, “Perhaps she had such a face, perhaps not such a face”; but “Perhaps Christ was born of a virgin,” no one with the Christian faith safe would say.
deTrin.8.5.75. 8. Quamobrem quoniam Trinitatis aeternitatem, et aequalitatem, et unitatem, quantum datur, intellegere cupimus, prius autem quam intellegamus credere debemus, (Cf. Isa 7:9) vigilandumque nobis est, ne ficta sit fides nostra: (Cf. 1 Tim 1:5) eadem quippe Trinitate fruendum est, ut beate vivamus; Cf. Augustine, The Happy Life 4.34. si autem falsum de illa crediderimus, inanis erit spes, et non casta caritas: (Cf. 1 Cor 15:14–17; 1 Tim 1:5) quomodo igitur eam Trinitatem quam non novimus, credendo diligimus? An secundum specialem generalemve notitiam, secundum quam diligimus Apostolum Paulum? Qui etiam si non ea facie fuit quae nobis occurrit de illo cogitantibus, et hoc penitus ignoramus, novimus tamen quid sit homo. Ut enim longe non eamus, hoc sumus, et illum hoc fuisse, et animam eius corpori copulatam mortaliter vixisse manifestum est. Hoc ergo de illo credimus, quod invenimus in nobis, iuxta speciem vel genus, quo humana omnis natura pariter continetur.
5. 8. Therefore, since we desire to understand, so far as is granted us, the eternity and equality and unity of the Trinity, and since we must believe before we understand, (See Isa 7:9) and must be watchful lest our faith be feigned (See 1 Tim 1:5)—for it is that same Trinity that we must enjoy in order to live blessedly; See Augustine, The Happy Life 4.34. but if we believe something false about it, our hope will be empty and our love not chaste (See 1 Cor 15:14–17; 1 Tim 1:5)—how, then, do we, by believing, love that Trinity which we do not know? Is it in accordance with the special or general knowledge by which we love the Apostle Paul? Even if he did not have the face that comes to us when we think of him—and this we wholly do not know—yet we know what a human being is. For, not to go far afield, this is what we are, and it is plain that he was this, and that his soul, joined to a body, lived a mortal life. This, then, we believe of him, which we find in ourselves, according to the form or kind by which all human nature alike is comprised.
deTrin.8.5.8Quid igitur de illa excellentia Trinitatis sive specialiter sive generaliter novimus, quasi multae sint tales trinitates, quarum aliquas experti sumus, ut per regulam similitudinis impressam vel specialem vel generalem notitiam, illam quoque talem esse credamus; atque ita rem quam credimus et nondum novimus, ex parilitate rei quam novimus diligamus? Quod utique non ita est. An quemadmodum diligimus in Domino Iesu Christo, quod resurrexit a mortuis, quamvis inde neminem umquam resurrexisse viderimus, ita Trinitatem quam non videmus, et qualem nullam umquam vidimus, possumus credendo diligere? Sed quid sit mori, et quid sit vivere, utique scimus: quia et vivimus et mortuos ac morientes aliquando vidimus et experti sumus. Quid est autem aliud resurgere, nisi reviviscere, id est, ex morte ad vitam (Cf. John 5:24) redire? Cum ergo dicimus et credimus esse Trinitatem, novimus quid sit Trinitas, quia novimus quid sint tria; sed hoc non diligimus. Nam id ubi volumus, facile habemus, ut alia omittam, vel micando digitis tribus. An vero diligimus, non quod omnis trinitas, sed quod Trinitas, Deus? Hoc ergo diligimus in Trinitate, quod Deus est: sed Deum nullum alium vidimus, aut novimus, quia unus est Deus, (Cf. Rom 3:30) ille solus quem nondum vidimus, et credendo diligimus. Sed ex qua rerum notarum similitudine vel comparatione credamus, quo etiam nondum notum Deum diligamus, (Cf. Acts 17:23; John 1:18) hoc quaeritur.
What, then, do we know about that excellence of the Trinity, whether in a special or a general way—as if there were many such trinities, some of which we have experienced, so that by a rule of likeness, by an impressed knowledge either special or general, we might believe that one also to be of such a kind, and so might love a thing that we believe and do not yet know, from its parity with a thing we do know? This is certainly not so. Or is it that, just as we love in the Lord Jesus Christ the fact that he rose from the dead, although we have never seen anyone rise from there, so we can, by believing, love the Trinity which we do not see and the like of which we have never seen? But what it is to die, and what it is to live, we surely know: for we both live, and have at some time seen and experienced the dead and the dying. And what is it to rise again, but to come back to life, that is, to return from death to life? (See John 5:24) When, then, we say and believe that there is a Trinity, we know what a trinity is, because we know what three are; but this we do not love. For we easily have that whenever we wish—to pass over other examples—merely by flashing three fingers. Or rather do we love, not that it is any trinity, but that it is the Trinity, God? This, then, we love in the Trinity, that it is God: but we have seen or known no other God, for God is one, (See Rom 3:30) he alone whom we have not yet seen and yet, by believing, love. But from what likeness or comparison of known things we are to believe, so that we may love the as yet unknown God, (See Acts 17:23; John 1:18) this is the question.
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6. 9. Redi ergo mecum, et consideremus cur diligamus Apostolum. Numquidnam propter “humanam” speciem, quam notissimam habemus, eo quod credimus eum hominem fuisse? Non utique; alioquin nunc non est quem diligamus, quandoquidem homo ille iam non est; anima enim eius a corpore separata est. Sed id quod in illo amamus, etiam nunc vivere credimus: amamus enim animum iustum. Ex qua ergo generali aut speciali regula, nisi quia scimus et quid sit animus, et quid sit iustus?
6. 9. Come back with me, then, and let us consider why we love the Apostle. Is it on account of the “human” form, which we know very well, because we believe him to have been a man? Surely not; otherwise there is now no one for us to love, since that man no longer exists; for his soul has been separated from his body. But what we love in him we believe to be alive even now: for we love a just mind. By what general or special rule, then, except that we know both what a mind is and what a just person is?
deTrin.8.6.9Et animus quidem quid sit, non incongrue nos dicimus ideo nosse, quia et nos habemus animum. Neque enim umquam oculis vidimus, et ex similitudine visorum plurium notionem generalem specialemve percepimus; sed potius, ut dixi, quia et nos habemus. Quid enim tam intime scitur, seque ipsum esse sentit; quam id quo etiam cetera sentiuntur, id est, ipse animus? Nam et motus corporum, quibus praeter nos alios vivere sentimus, ex nostra similitudine agnoscimus: quia et nos ita movemus corpus vivendo, sicut illa corpora moveri advertimus.
And as for what a mind is, we say, not unfittingly, that we know it for this reason: that we ourselves also have a mind. For we have never seen it with our eyes, nor gathered a general or special notion from the likeness of many things seen; but rather, as I said, because we ourselves also have one. For what is known so intimately, and feels its own existence, as that by which all other things too are felt, that is, the mind itself? For the movements of bodies, by which we perceive that others besides ourselves are alive, we recognize from our own likeness: because we too move our body by living, just as we observe those bodies to be moved.
deTrin.8.6.9Neque enim cum corpus vivum movetur, aperitur ut ulla via oculis nostris ad videndum animum, rem quae oculis videri non potest: sed illi moli aliquid inesse sentimus, quale nobis inest ad movendam similiter molem nostram, quod est vita et anima. Neque quasi humanae prudentiae rationisque proprium est. Et bestiae quippe sentiunt vivere non tantum se ipsas, sed etiam invicem atque alterutrum, et nos ipsos. Nec animas nostras vident, sed ex motibus corporis, idque statim et facillime quadam conspiratione naturali. Animum igitur cuiuslibet ex nostro novimus, et ex nostro credimus quem non novimus. The phrase animum novimus should not be interpreted to signify the usual sense of the English phrase, which would indicate knowing what someone is thinking, but instead, it means knowing that they have a mind, and also knowing, as Augustine goes on to say, what any mind is. Non enim tantum sentimus animum, sed etiam scire possumus quid sit animus consideratione nostri: habemus enim animum.
For when a living body is moved, no way is opened for our eyes to see the mind, a thing that cannot be seen by the eyes: but we perceive that there is something in that mass such as is in us for the moving of our own mass in like manner, namely, life and soul. Nor is this, as it were, proper to human prudence and reason. For the beasts too perceive that not only they themselves are alive, but also one another, each the other, and ourselves as well. And they do not see our souls, but perceive them from the movements of the body, and that at once and most easily, by a kind of natural agreement. We know, then, the mind of anyone at all from our own, and from our own we believe in one we do not know. The phrase animum novimus should not be interpreted to signify the usual sense of the English phrase, which would indicate knowing what someone is thinking, but instead, it means knowing that they have a mind, and also knowing, as Augustine goes on to say, what any mind is. For we do not only perceive a mind, but can even know what a mind is by considering our own: for we have a mind.
deTrin.8.6.9Sed quid sit “iustus,” unde novimus? Dixeramus enim nos Apostolum non alia causa diligere, nisi quod sit “iustus” animus. Novimus ergo et quid sit iustus, sicut et quid sit animus. Sed quid sit animus, ut dictum est, novimus ex nobis: inest enim animus nobis. Quid autem sit “iustus” unde novimus, si iusti non sumus? Quod si nemo novit quid sit “iustus” nisi qui iustus est, nemo diligit iustum nisi iustus: non enim potest diligere quem iustum esse credit, ob hoc ipsum, quia iustum esse credit, si quid sit “iustus” ignorat; secundum quod superius demonstravimus, neminem diligere quod credit et non videt, nisi ex aliqua regula notitiae generalis sive specialis. Ac per hoc si non diligit iustum nisi iustus, quomodo volet quisque iustus esse qui nondum est? Non enim vult quisquam esse quod non diligit. Ut autem sit iustus qui nondum est, volet utique iustus esse: ut autem velit, diligit iustum. Diligit ergo iustum et qui nondum iustus est. Diligere autem iustum non potest, si quid sit “iustus,” ignorat. Proinde novit quid sit “iustus,” etiam qui nondum est.
But from where do we know what “just” is? For we had said that we love the Apostle for no other reason than that his mind is “just.” We know, then, also what just is, as we know what a mind is. But what a mind is, as has been said, we know from ourselves: for a mind is within us. From where, however, do we know what “just” is, if we are not just? But if no one knows what “just” is unless he is just, no one loves the just unless he is just: for he cannot love the one whom he believes to be just, for this very reason, that he believes him to be just, if he is ignorant of what “just” is; in accordance with what we showed above, that no one loves what he believes and does not see, except from some rule of general or special knowledge. And by this, if no one but the just loves the just, how will anyone who is not yet just wish to be just? For no one wishes to be what he does not love. But that he who is not yet just may become just, he will surely wish to be just: and that he may wish it, he loves the just. He loves the just, then, even though he is not yet just. But he cannot love the just if he is ignorant of what “just” is. He knows, therefore, what “just” is, even though he is not yet just.
deTrin.8.6.9Ubi ergo novit? Num oculis vidit? An ullum corpus iustum, velut album, aut nigrum, aut quadrum, aut rotundum? Quis hoc dixerit? At oculis non vidit nisi corpora. Iustus autem in homine non est, nisi animus: et cum homo iustus dicitur, ex animo dicitur, non ex corpore. Est enim quaedam pulchritudo animi iustitia, qua pulchri sunt homines, plerique etiam qui corpore distorti atque deformes sunt.
Where, then, does he know it? Has he seen it with his eyes? Or any body that is just, as it is white, or black, or square, or round? Who would say this? But with his eyes he has seen nothing but bodies. The just, however, is not in a person except the mind: and when a person is called just, it is said of the mind, not of the body. For justice is a certain beauty of the mind, by which people are beautiful, many even who are misshapen and deformed in body.
deTrin.8.6.9Sicut autem animus non videtur oculis, ita nec pulchritudo eius. Ubi ergo novit quid sit “iustus,” qui nondum est, atque ut sit diligit iustum? An signa quaedam per motum corporis emicant quibus ille aut ille homo esse iustus apparet? Sed unde novit illa signa esse animi iusti, nesciens quid omnino sit “iustus”? Novit ergo.
But as the mind is not seen with the eyes, so neither is its beauty. Where, then, does he who is not yet just know what “just” is, and love the just so that he may become just? Are there perhaps certain signs that flash out through the movement of the body, by which this or that person appears to be just? But from where does he know that those are the signs of a just mind, not knowing at all what “just” is? He knows it, therefore.
deTrin.8.6.9Sed ubi novimus quid sit “iustus,” etiam cum iusti nondum sumus? Si extra quam nos novimus, in corpore aliquo novimus. Sed non est ista res corporis. In nobis igitur novimus quid sit “iustus.” Non enim alibi hoc invenio, cum quaero ut hoc eloquar, nisi apud me ipsum: et si interrogem alium quid sit “iustus,” apud se ipsum quaerit quid respondeat; et quisquis hinc verum respondere potuit, apud se ipsum quid responderet invenit.
But where do we know what “just” is, even when we are not yet just? If it is outside ourselves that we know it, we know it in some body. But this is not a thing of the body. In ourselves, then, we know what “just” is. For I do not find this anywhere else, when I seek to express it, but with my own self: and if I ask another what “just” is, he seeks within himself what to answer; and whoever has been able to answer the truth on this matter has found within himself what he should answer.
deTrin.8.6.9Et Carthaginem quidem cum eloqui volo, apud me ipsum quaero ut eloquar, et apud me ipsum invenio phantasiam Carthaginis: sed eam per corpus accepi, id est per corporis sensum, quoniam praesens in ea corpore fui, et eam vidi atque sensi, memoriaque retinui, ut apud me invenirem de illa verbum, cum eam vellem dicere. Ipsa enim phantasia eius in memoria mea verbum eius, non sonus iste trisyllabus cum “Carthago” nominatur, vel etiam tacite nomen ipsum per spatia temporum cogitatur; sed illud quod in animo meo cerno, cum hoc trisyllabum voce profero, vel antequam proferam.
And when I wish to speak of Carthage, I seek within myself in order to speak, and within myself I find the image of Carthage: but I received it through the body, that is, through the sense of the body, since I was bodily present in it, and saw and perceived it, and held it in memory, so that I might find within myself the word for it, when I wished to speak of it. For the image of it in my memory is its word—not this sound of three syllables when “Carthage” is named, nor even the name itself thought of silently through stretches of time; but that which I discern in my mind when I utter this trisyllable with my voice, or even before I utter it.
deTrin.8.6.9Sic et Alexandriam cum eloqui volo, quam numquam vidi, praesto est apud me phantasma eius. Cum enim a multis audissem et credidissem magnam esse illam urbem, sicut mihi narrari potuit, finxi animo meo imaginem eius quam potui: et hoc est apud me verbum eius, cum eam volo dicere, antequam voce quinque syllabas proferam, quod nomen eius fere omnibus notum est. Quam tamen imaginem si ex animo meo proferre possem ad oculos hominum qui Alexandriam noverunt, profecto aut omnes dicerent, “non est ipsa”; aut si dicerent, “ipsa est,” multum mirarer, atque intuens in animo meo ipsam, id est imaginem quasi picturam eius, ipsam tamen esse nescirem, sed eis crederem qui visam tenerent.
So too when I wish to speak of Alexandria, which I have never seen, an image of it is ready at hand within me. For since I had heard from many, and believed, that it is a great city, in the way it could be described to me, I fashioned in my mind such an image of it as I could: and this is its word within me, when I wish to speak of it, before I utter with my voice the five syllables of its name, which is known to almost everyone. Yet if I could bring forth this image from my mind to the eyes of people who know Alexandria, surely either they would all say, “That is not it”; or, if they said, “That is it,” I would be greatly astonished, and gazing in my mind on that very image, that is, on its likeness as it were a picture, I would still not know that it was the city itself, but would believe those who held it from having seen it.
deTrin.8.6.9Non autem ita quaero quid sit “iustus,” nec ita invenio, nec ita intueor, cum id eloquor; nec ita probor, cum audior; nec ita probo, cum audio; quasi tale aliquid oculis viderim, aut ullo corporis sensu didicerim, aut ab eis qui ita didicissent audierim.
But it is not in this way that I seek what “just” is, nor in this way that I find it, nor in this way that I behold it when I express it; nor in this way am I approved when I am heard; nor in this way do I approve when I hear; as if I had seen some such thing with my eyes, or learned it through some sense of the body, or heard it from those who had so learned it.
deTrin.8.6.9Cum enim dico et sciens dico, “iustus est animus qui scientia atque ratione in vita ac moribus sua cuique distribuit,” Ambrose, De Officiis 1.24.115; Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160. non aliquam rem absentem cogito, sicut Carthaginem, aut fingo ut possum, sicut Alexandriam, sive ita sit, sive non ita; sed praesens quiddam cerno, et cerno apud me, etsi non sum ipse quod cerno, et multi si audiant approbabunt.
For when I say, and say knowingly, “A mind is just which by knowledge and reason, in life and conduct, renders to each his own,” Ambrose, De Officiis 1.24.115; Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160. I am not thinking of some absent thing, like Carthage, nor fashioning it as I can, like Alexandria, whether it be so or not; but I discern something present, and I discern it within myself, even though I am not myself what I discern, and many, if they hear, will approve.
deTrin.8.6.9Et quisquis me audit atque scienter approbat, apud se et ipse hoc idem cernit, etiamsi non sit et ipse quod cernit. Iustus vero cum id dicit, id quod ipse est cernit et dicit. Et ubi etiam ipse cernit, nisi apud se ipsum?
And whoever hears me and knowingly approves discerns this same thing within himself, even though he too is not himself what he discerns. But the just person, when he says it, discerns and says what he himself is. And where does he too discern it, except within himself?
deTrin.8.6.9Sed hoc mirum non est: ubi enim se ipsum cerneret, nisi apud se ipsum? Illud mirabile est ut apud se animus videat quod alibi nusquam vidit, et verum videat, et ipsum verum iustum animum videat, et sit ipse animus et non sit iustus animus, quem apud se ipsum videt. Num est alius animus iustus in animo nondum iusto? Aut si non est, quem ibi videt, cum videt et dicit quid sit animus iustus, nec alibi quam in se videt, cum ipse non sit animus iustus? An illud quod videt, veritas est interior praesens animo qui eam valet intueri? Neque omnes valent: et qui intueri valent, hoc etiam quod intuentur non omnes sunt, hoc est, non sunt etiam ipsi iusti animi, sicut possunt videre ac dicere quid sit iustus animus. Quod unde esse poterunt, nisi inhaerendo eidem ipsi formae quam intuentur, ut inde formentur et sint iusti animi; non tantum cernentes et dicentes iustum esse animum qui “scientia atque ratione in vita ac moribus sua cuique distribuit,” sed etiam ut ipsi iuste vivant iusteque morati sint, sua cuique distribuendo, ut nemini quidquam debeant, nisi ut invicem diligant? (Cf. John 13:34) Et unde inhaeretur illi forma, nisi amando? Cur ergo alium diligimus quem credimus iustum, et non diligimus ipsam formam ubi videmus quid sit iustus animus, ut et nos iusti esse possimus? An vero nisi et istam diligeremus, nullo modo eum diligeremus quem diligimus ex ista, sed dum iusti non sumus, minus eam diligimus quam ut iusti esse valeamus?
But this is no wonder: for where would he discern himself, except within himself? What is wonderful is that the mind should see within itself what it has nowhere else seen, and should see the truth, and should see the very true just mind, and yet be itself a mind and not be the just mind which it sees within itself. Is there another just mind in a mind not yet just? Or if there is not, what does it see there, when it sees and says what a just mind is, and sees it nowhere but in itself, when it is not itself a just mind? Or is that which it sees the inner truth, present to the mind that has the power to behold it? Not all have the power: and those who do have the power to behold it are not all also that which they behold, that is, they are not themselves just minds, even as they can see and say what a just mind is. And from where will they be able to be just, except by clinging to that very form which they behold, that from it they may be shaped and be just minds; not only discerning and saying that a mind is just which “by knowledge and reason, in life and conduct, renders to each his own,” but so that they themselves also may live justly and be just in their conduct, by rendering to each his own, owing no one anything except to love one another? (See John 13:34) And from where does one cling to that form, except by loving? Why, then, do we love another whom we believe to be just, and not love that very form where we see what a just mind is, so that we too may be able to be just? Or rather, unless we also loved that form, we would in no way love the one whom we love on account of it; but so long as we are not just, we love it less than is needed for us to be able to be just.
deTrin.8.6.9Homo ergo qui creditur iustus, ex ea forma et veritate diligitur, quam cernit et intellegit apud se ille qui diligit; ipsa vero forma et veritas non est quomodo aliunde diligatur.
A person, then, who is believed to be just is loved out of that form and truth which he who loves discerns and understands within himself; but that form and truth itself there is no way to love from any other source.
deTrin.8.6.9Neque enim invenimus aliquid tale praeter ipsam, ut eam, cum incognita est, credendo diligamus, ex eo quod iam tale aliquid novimus. Quidquid enim tale aspexeris, ipsa est: et non est quidquam tale, quoniam sola ipsa talis est, qualis ipsa est.
For we find nothing else of the kind besides it, so that we might, when it is unknown, by believing love it, on the ground that we already know some such thing. For whatever of the kind you behold, it is the form itself: and there is nothing of the kind, since it alone is such as it itself is.
deTrin.8.6.9Qui ergo amat homines, aut quia iusti sunt, aut ut iusti sint, amare debet. Sic enim et se ipsum amare debet, aut quia iustus est, aut ut iustus sit; sic enim diligit proximum tamquam se ipsum, sine ullo periculo.
Whoever, then, loves people ought to love them either because they are just, or that they may be just. For so too ought he to love himself, either because he is just, or that he may be just; for in this way he loves his neighbor as himself, without any danger.
deTrin.8.6.9Qui enim aliter se diligit, iniuste se diligit, quoniam se ad hoc diligit ut sit iniustus; ad hoc ergo ut sit malus, ac per hoc iam non se diligit; qui enim diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam.
For one who loves himself otherwise loves himself unjustly, since he loves himself to this end, that he may be unjust; therefore to this end, that he may be evil, and by this he no longer loves himself; for he who loves iniquity hates his own soul.
deTrin.8.6.9C
deTrin.8.6.9
7. 10. Quapropter non est praecipue videndum in hac quaestione, quae de Trinitate nobis est, et de cognoscendo Deo, nisi quid sit vera dilectio, immo vero quid sit dilectio. Ea quippe dilectio dicenda est, quae vera est; alioquin cupiditas est: atque ita cupidi abusive dicuntur diligere, quemadmodum cupere abusive dicuntur qui diligunt. Haec est autem vera dilectio, ut inhaerentes veritati iuste vivamus: (Cf. Titus 2:12) et ideo contemnamus omnia mortalia prae amore hominum, quo eos volumus iuste vivere. Ita enim et mori pro fratribus utiliter parati esse poterimus, quod nos Dominus Iesus Christus exemplo suo docuit. Cum enim duo praecepta sint in quibus tota Lex pendet et Prophetae, dilectio Dei, et dilectio proximi, non immerito plerumque Scriptura pro utroque unum ponit: sive tantum Dei, sicuti est illud, scimus quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum; et iterum, quisquis autem diligit Deum, hic cognitus est ab illo; et illud, quoniam caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis; et alia multa, quia et qui diligit Deum consequens est ut faciat quod praecepit Deus, et in tantum diligit in quantum facit; consequens ergo est ut et proximum diligat, quia hoc praecepit Deus. (Cf. Lev 19:18; Mark 12:31–33; Matt 5:43, 19:19, 22:39; Luke 10:27; John 13:14; Rom 13:9; Gal 5:14; Jas 2:8) Sive tantum proximi dilectionem Scriptura commemorat, sicut est illud, invicem onera vestra portate, et sic adimplebitis legem Christi; et illud, omnis enim Lex in uno sermone impletur, in eo quod scriptum est: diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum; et in Evangelio, omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines bona, haec Instead of bona, haec, PL reads ita: “all that you want men to do to you, so do yourselves to them.” et vos facite illis; haec est enim Lex et Prophetae. Et pleraque alia reperimus in Litteris Sanctis, in quibus sola dilectio proximi ad perfectionem praecipi videtur, et taceri de dilectione Dei; cum in utroque praecepto Lex pendeat et Prophetae. (Cf. Matt 22:40) Sed et hoc ideo, quia et qui proximum diligit, consequens est ut ipsam praecipue dilectionem diligat. Deus autem dilectio est, et qui manet in dilectione, in Deo manet. Consequens ergo est ut praecipue Deum diligat.
7. 10. Therefore, in this question of ours about the Trinity and about knowing God, there is nothing chiefly to be considered but what true love is, or rather what love is. For that is to be called love which is true; otherwise it is cupidity: and so the covetous are improperly said to love, just as those who love are improperly said to covet. But this is true love: that, clinging to the truth, we may live justly; (See Titus 2:12) and therefore that we may despise all mortal things for the love of human beings, by which we wish them to live justly. For so we shall be able to be profitably ready even to die for the brethren, which the Lord Jesus Christ taught us by his example. For since there are two commandments on which the whole Law hangs, and the Prophets, love of God and love of neighbor, not without reason does Scripture very often put one for both: whether of God alone, as in that passage, we know that all things work together for good for those who love God; and again, but whoever loves God, this one is known by him; and that, that the love of God is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who is given to us; and many others, because one who loves God consequently does what God commanded, and loves only insofar as he does it; it follows, then, that he loves his neighbor also, because God commanded this. (See Lev 19:18; Mark 12:31–33; Matt 5:43, 19:19, 22:39; Luke 10:27; John 13:14; Rom 13:9; Gal 5:14; Jas 2:8) Or Scripture mentions only the love of neighbor, as in that passage, bear one another’s burdens, and so you will fulfill the law of Christ; and that, for the whole Law is fulfilled in one word, in this that is written: you shall love your neighbor as yourself; and in the Gospel, all that you wish people to do for you that is good, this Instead of bona, haec, PL reads ita: “all that you want men to do to you, so do yourselves to them.” do you also to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets. And we find many other places in the Holy Writings in which love of neighbor alone seems to be enjoined unto perfection, and the love of God to be passed over in silence; though on both commandments hang the Law and the Prophets. (See Matt 22:40) But this too is for this reason, that one who loves his neighbor consequently loves love itself above all. And God is love, and whoever abides in love abides in God. It follows, then, that he chiefly loves God.
deTrin.8.7.107. 11. Quapropter qui quaerunt Deum (Cf. Acts 17:27) per istas potestates, quae mundo praesunt vel partibus mundi, auferuntur ab eo longeque iactantur; non intervallis locorum, sed diversitate affectuum: Cf. Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.8; Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6. exterius enim conantur ire, et interiora sua deserunt, quibus interior est Deus.
7. 11. Therefore those who seek God (See Acts 17:27) through those powers that rule the world or parts of the world are carried away from him and flung far off; not by intervals of space, but by a diversity of desires: See Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.8; Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6. for they try to go outward, and forsake their own inner depths, in which God is more inward than they.
deTrin.8.7.11Itaque etiamsi aliquam sanctam caelitem potestatem vel audierint, vel utcumque cogitaverint, facta magis eius appetunt quae humana miratur infirmitas, non imitantur pietatem qua divina requies comparatur. Malunt enim superbe hoc posse quod angelus, quam devote hoc esse quod angelus. Non enim sanctus quisquam potestate sua gaudet, sed eius a quo habet posse quidquid congruenter potest: et novit potentius esse coniungi Omnipotenti pia voluntate, quam propria PL adds potestate et. voluntate posse, quod contremiscant qui talia non possunt.
And so even if they have heard of, or somehow conceived of, some holy heavenly power, they desire its deeds rather, which human weakness marvels at; they do not imitate the piety by which divine rest is gained. For they would rather be able proudly to do what an angel does than devoutly to be what an angel is. For no holy being rejoices in its own power, but in his from whom it has the power to do whatever it fittingly can: and it knows that it is more powerful to be joined to the Almighty by a pious will than to be able by one’s own will to do what those who cannot do such things tremble at.
deTrin.8.7.11Itaque ipse Dominus Iesus Christus talia faciens, ut mirantes doceret ampliora, et temporalibus insolitis intentos atque suspensos ad aeterna atque interiora converteret, Venite, inquit, ad me, omnes qui laboratis et onerati estis, et reficiam vos; tollite iugum meum super vos. Et non dixit, “Discite a me quia quatriduanos mortuos suscito”; (Cf. John 11:39) sed ait, Discite a me quia mitis sum et humilis corde.
And so the Lord Jesus Christ himself, doing such things, in order that by them he might teach those who marveled greater things, and might turn those who were intent and held in suspense by unusual temporal things toward the eternal and inward things, said, Come to me, all you who labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you; take my yoke upon you. And he did not say, “Learn from me that I raise up the four-days-dead”; (See John 11:39) but he said, Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart.
deTrin.8.7.11Potentior est enim et tutior solidissima humilitas, quam ventosissima celsitudo. Et ideo sequitur dicens: et invenietis requiem animabus vestris. Dilectio enim non inflatur; et Deus dilectio est; et fideles in dilectione adquiescunt illi, revocati ab strepitu qui foris est ad gaudia silentia. Ecce Deus dilectio est: utquid imus et currimus in sublimia caelorum et ima terrarum, quaerentes eum qui est apud nos, si nos esse velimus apud eum? (Cf. Ps 139:8; Amos 9:2)
For most solid humility is more powerful and more secure than the most windy loftiness. And therefore he goes on to say, and you will find rest for your souls. For love is not puffed up; and God is love; and the faithful in love rest in him, called back from the noise that is outside to the silent joys. See, God is love: why do we go and run to the heights of the heavens and the depths of the earth, seeking him who is with us, if we would but be with him? (See Ps 139:8 (138:8); Amos 9:2)
deTrin.8.7.118. 12. Nemo dicat, “non novi quod diligam.” Diligat PL: diliget, “and he will love.” fratrem, et diligat eamdem dilectionem. Magis enim novit dilectionem qua diligit, quam fratrem quem diligit. Ecce iam potest notiorem Deum habere quam fratrem: plane notiorem, quia praesentiorem; notiorem, quia interiorem; notiorem, quia certiorem. Amplectere dilectionem Deum, et dilectione amplectere Deum. Ipsa est dilectio quae omnes bonos Angelos, et omnes Dei servos consociat vinculo sanctitatis, nosque et illos coniungit invicem nobis, et subiungit sibi. Quanto igitur saniores sumus a tumore superbiae, tanto sumus dilectione pleniores: et quo, nisi Deo plenus est, qui plenus est dilectione?
8. 12. Let no one say, “I do not know what I should love.” Let him love PL: diliget, “and he will love.” his brother, and let him love that same love. For he knows the love by which he loves better than the brother whom he loves. See, he can now have God better known than his brother: plainly better known, because more present; better known, because more inward; better known, because more certain. Embrace love, who is God, and embrace God with love. This is the love that binds together all the good angels and all the servants of God in the bond of holiness, and joins us and them mutually to one another, and subjects us to himself. The more healed, then, we are of the swelling of pride, the more full we are of love: and with what is one full who is full of love, if not with God?
deTrin.8.8.12“At enim caritatem video, et quantum possum eam mente conspicio, et credo Scripturae dicenti quoniam Deus caritas est, et qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet: sed cum illam video, non in ea video Trinitatem.” Immo vero vides Trinitatem, si caritatem vides. Sed commonebo, si potero, ut videre te videas: adsit tantum ipsa, ut moveamur caritate ad aliquod bonum. Quia cum diligimus caritatem, aliquid diligentem diligimus, propter hoc ipsum quia diligit aliquid. Ergo quid diligit caritas, ut possit etiam ipsa caritas diligi? Caritas enim non est, quae nihil diligit. Si autem se ipsam diligit, diligat aliquid oportet, ut caritatem se diligat. Sicut enim verbum indicat aliquid, indicat etiam se ipsum, sed non se verbum indicat, nisi se aliquid indicare indicet: sic et caritas diligit quidem se, sed nisi se aliquid diligentem diligat, non caritatem se diligit. Quid ergo diligit caritas, nisi quod caritate diligimus? Id autem, ut a proximo provehamur, frater est.
“But,” you say, “I see love, and as far as I can I behold it with my mind, and I believe the Scripture that says that God is love, and whoever abides in love abides in God: but when I see love, I do not see the Trinity in it.” On the contrary, you do see the Trinity if you see love. But I will remind you, if I can, so that you may see that you see: only let love herself be present, that we may be moved by love to some good. For when we love love, we love something that loves, on this very account that it loves something. Therefore what does love love, that love herself may also be loved? For it is not love that loves nothing. But if it loves itself, it must love something, in order to love itself as love. For just as a word indicates something, and also indicates itself, but does not indicate itself to be a word unless it indicates that it indicates something: so too love indeed loves itself, but unless it loves itself as loving something, it does not love itself as love. What, then, does love love, but what we love with love? But that, to begin from one nearest us, is our brother.
deTrin.8.8.12Dilectionem autem fraternam quantum commendet Ioannes apostolus, attendamus: qui diligit, inquit, fratrem suum, in lumine manet, et scandalum in eo non est. Manifestum est quod iustitiae perfectionem in fratris dilectione posuerit: nam in quo scandalum non est, utique perfectus est. Et tamen videtur dilectionem Dei tacuisse: quod numquam faceret, nisi quia in ipsa fraterna dilectione vult intellegi Deum. Apertissime enim in eadem Epistula paulo post ita dicit: dilectissimi, diligamus invicem, quia dilectio ex Deo est; et omnis qui diligit, ex Deo natus est, et cognovit Deum. Qui non diligit, non cognovit Deum; quia Deus dilectio est. Ista contextio satis aperteque declarat, eamdem ipsam fraternam dilectionem (nam fraterna dilectio est, qua diligimus invicem) non solum ex Deo, sed etiam Deum esse tanta auctoritate praedicari. Cum ergo de dilectione diligimus fratrem, de Deo diligimus fratrem: nec fieri potest ut eamdem dilectionem non praecipue diligamus, qua fratrem diligimus.
Let us attend to how greatly the apostle John commends brotherly love: whoever loves his brother, he says, abides in the light, and there is no stumbling-block in him. It is plain that he has placed the perfection of justice in the love of one’s brother: for one in whom there is no stumbling-block is surely perfect. And yet he seems to have passed over the love of God in silence: which he would never do, except that in that very brotherly love he wishes God to be understood. For most plainly, a little later in the same Epistle, he says thus: beloved, let us love one another, for love is from God; and everyone who loves is born of God and has known God. He who does not love has not known God; for God is love. This linking sufficiently and plainly declares that this same brotherly love—for brotherly love is that by which we love one another—is proclaimed by such great authority to be not only from God but also God. When, then, we love our brother out of love, we love our brother out of God: nor can it be that we do not chiefly love that same love by which we love our brother.
deTrin.8.8.12Unde colligitur, duo illa praecepta non posse sine invicem. Quoniam quippe Deus dilectio est; Deum certe diligit, qui diligit dilectionem; dilectionem autem necesse est diligat, qui diligit fratrem. Et ideo quod paulo post ait, non potest Deum diligere quem non videt, qui fratrem quem videt non diligit; quia haec illi causa est non videndi Deum, quod non diligit fratrem. Qui enim non diligit fratrem, non est in dilectione; et qui non est in dilectione, non est in Deo, quia Deus dilectio est. Porro qui non est in Deo, non est in lumine: quia Deus lumen est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. Qui ergo non est in lumine, quid mirum si non videt lumen, id est, non videt Deum, quia in tenebris est? Fratrem autem videt humano visu, quo videri Deus non potest. Sed si eum quem videt humano visu, spiritali caritate diligeret, videret Deum, qui est ipsa caritas, visu interiore quo videri potest. Itaque qui fratrem quem videt non diligit, Deum, quem propterea non videt, quia Deus dilectio est, qua caret qui fratrem non diligit, quomodo potest diligere? Nec illa iam quaestio moveat, quantum fratri caritatis debeamus impendere, quantum Deo: fratri autem The PL, among other editions, begins this clause with incomparabiliter plus quam nobis deo, “incomparably more on God than on ourselves; on our brother . . . .” The translator rejects this version, since it provides a trite answer to the question which we have just been told not to worry about. quantum nobis ipsis: nos autem ipsos tanto magis diligimus, quanto magis diligimus Deum. Ex una igitur eademque caritate Deum proximumque diligimus; sed Deum propter Deum, nos autem et proximum propter Deum. Cf. Augustine, Teaching Christianity 3.10.16.
From this it is gathered that those two commandments cannot be without each other. For since God is love, he certainly loves God who loves love; but it is necessary that he love love who loves his brother. And therefore, what he says a little later, he cannot love God whom he does not see, who does not love his brother whom he sees; because this is the reason for his not seeing God, that he does not love his brother. For one who does not love his brother is not in love; and one who is not in love is not in God, because God is love. Further, one who is not in God is not in the light: because God is light, and in him there is no darkness at all. He, then, who is not in the light, what wonder if he does not see the light, that is, does not see God, because he is in darkness? But he sees his brother with human sight, by which God cannot be seen. But if he loved with spiritual love the one whom he sees with human sight, he would see God, who is love itself, with that inner sight by which he can be seen. And so he who does not love his brother whom he sees, how can he love God, whom for this reason he does not see, because God is love, which he lacks who does not love his brother? And let not that question now move us, how much love we owe to spend upon our brother, how much upon God: upon God incomparably more than upon ourselves; upon our brother The PL, among other editions, begins this clause with incomparabiliter plus quam nobis deo, “incomparably more on God than on ourselves; on our brother . . . .” The translator rejects this version, since it provides a trite answer to the question which we have just been told not to worry about. as much as upon ourselves: but we love ourselves the more, the more we love God. From one and the same love, therefore, we love God and neighbor; but God for God’s sake, and ourselves and our neighbor for God’s sake. See Augustine, Teaching Christianity 3.10.16.
deTrin.8.8.129. 13. Quid enim est, quaeso, quod exardescimus, cum audimus et legimus: ecce nunc tempus acceptabile, ecce nunc dies salutis: nullam in quoquam dantes offensionem, ut non reprehendatur ministerium nostrum; sed in omnibus commendantes nosmetipsos ut Dei ministros, in multa patientia, in tribulationibus, in necessitatibus, in angustiis, in plagis, in carceribus, in seditionibus, in laboribus, in vigiliis, in ieiuniis, in castitate, in scientia, in longanimitate, in bonitate, in Spiritu Sancto, in caritate non ficta, in verbo veritatis, in virtute Dei; per arma iustitiae, a dextris et a sinistris, per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam; ut seductores, et veraces; ut qui ignoramur, et cognoscimur; quasi morientes, et ecce vivimus; ut coerciti, et non mortificati; ut tristes, semper autem gaudentes; sicut egeni, multos autem ditantes; tamquam nihil habentes, et omnia possidentes? Quid est quod accendimur in dilectione Pauli apostoli, cum ista legimus, nisi quod credimus eum ita vixisse? Vivendum tamen sic esse Dei ministris, non de aliquibus auditum credimus, sed intus apud nos, vel potius supra nos in ipsa veritate conspicimus. Cf. Augustine, Confessions 3.6.11. Illum ergo quem sic vixisse credimus, ex hoc quod videmus diligimus. Et nisi hanc formam, quam semper stabilem atque incommutabilem cernimus, praecipue diligeremus, non ideo diligeremus illum, quia eius vitam, cum in carne viveret, huic formae coaptatam et congruentem fuisse, fide retinemus.
9. 13. For what is it, I ask, that makes us burn when we hear and read: behold, now is the acceptable time, behold, now is the day of salvation: giving no offense in anything, that our ministry be not blamed; but in everything commending ourselves as ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulations, in necessities, in distresses, in beatings, in imprisonments, in tumults, in labors, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity, in knowledge, in long-suffering, in kindness, in the Holy Spirit, in love unfeigned, in the word of truth, in the power of God; through the weapons of justice on the right hand and on the left, through glory and dishonor, through ill repute and good repute; as deceivers, and yet truthful; as unknown, and yet recognized; as dying, and behold we live; as chastened, and not put to death; as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet enriching many; as having nothing, and possessing all things? What is it that kindles us with love for the apostle Paul, when we read these things, but that we believe he lived in this way? Yet that the ministers of God ought so to live, we do not believe from having heard it of certain men, but we behold it within ourselves, or rather above ourselves, in the truth itself. See Augustine, Confessions 3.6.11. Him, then, whom we believe to have lived in this way, we love from what we see. And unless we chiefly loved this form, which we discern as ever stable and unchangeable, we would not for that reason love him, that we hold by faith that his life, when he lived in the flesh, was fitted and conformed to this form.
deTrin.8.9.13Sed nescio quomodo amplius et in ipsius formae caritatem excitamur, per fidem qua credimus vixisse sic aliquem; et spem, qua nos quoque ita posse vivere, qui homines sumus, ex eo quod aliqui homines ita vixerunt, minime desperamus, ut hoc et desideremus ardentius, et fidentius precemur. Ita et ipsorum vitam facit a nobis diligi formae illius dilectio, secundum quam vixisse creduntur, et illorum vita credita in eamdem formam flagrantiorem excitat caritatem; ut quanto flagrantius diligimus Deum, tanto certius sereniusque videamus; quia in Deo conspicimus incommutabilem formam iustitiae, secundum quam hominem vivere oportere iudicamus. Valet ergo fides ad cognitionem et ad dilectionem Dei, non tamquam omnino incogniti, aut omnino non dilecti; sed quo cognoscatur manifestius, et quo firmius diligatur.
But somehow we are stirred more, and to a love of that very form, through the faith by which we believe that someone lived in this way; and through the hope by which we who are human beings, from the fact that some human beings have lived in this way, in no way despair that we too can so live, so that we both desire this more ardently and pray for it more confidently. Thus the love of that form, according to which they are believed to have lived, makes their life loved by us; and their life, when believed, kindles a more blazing love toward that same form; so that the more blazingly we love God, the more certainly and serenely we see him; because in God we behold the unchangeable form of justice, according to which we judge that a person ought to live. Faith, then, avails for the knowledge and for the love of God, not as of one wholly unknown or wholly unloved; but so that he may be known more clearly, and may be loved more firmly.
deTrin.8.9.1310. 14. Quid est autem dilectio vel caritas, quam tantopere Scriptura Divina laudat et praedicat, nisi amor boni? Amor autem alicuius amantis est, et amore aliquid amatur. Ecce tria sunt: amans, et quod amatur, et amor. Quid est ergo amor, nisi quaedam vita duo aliqua copulans, vel copulari appetens, amantem scilicet, et quod amatur? Et hoc etiam in extremis carnalibusque amoribus ita est: sed ut aliquid purius et liquidius hauriamus, calcata carne ascendamus ad animum. Quid amat animus in amico, nisi animum? Et illic igitur tria sunt: amans, et quod amatur, et amor.
10. 14. But what is love, or charity, which the Divine Scripture so greatly praises and proclaims, but the love of the good? Now love is of someone loving, and by love something is loved. See, there are three: the one who loves, and what is loved, and love. What, then, is love, but a certain life coupling, or seeking to couple, two things, namely the one who loves and what is loved? And this is so even in the lowest and carnal loves: but that we may draw something purer and clearer, let us tread the flesh underfoot and ascend to the mind. What does the mind love in a friend, but the mind? There too, then, there are three: the one who loves, and what is loved, and love.
deTrin.8.10.14Restat etiam hinc ascendere, et superius ista quaerere, quantum homini datur. (Cf. Matt 7:7; Luke 11:9, 14:10) Sed hic paululum requiescat intentio, non ut se iam existimet invenisse quod quaerit, sed sicut solet inveniri locus, ubi quaerendum est aliquid; (Cf. 1 Chron 16:11; Ps 69:33, 105:4; 1 Cor 8:2) nondum illud inventum est, sed iam inventum est ubi quaeratur: (Cf. Acts 17:27) ita hoc dixisse suffecerit, ut tamquam ab articulo alicuius exordii cetera contexamus.
It remains to ascend from here also, and to seek these things higher up, so far as is granted to a human being. (See Matt 7:7; Luke 11:9, 14:10) But here let our attention rest a little—not that it should now suppose it has found what it seeks, but as a place is usually found where something is to be sought; (See 1 Chr 16:11; Ps 69:33 (68:33), 105:4 (104:4); 1 Cor 8:2) that thing is not yet found, but it has now been found where it is to be sought: (See Acts 17:27) so let it suffice to have said this, that, as from the joint of some beginning, we may weave the rest.
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How the Trinity is to be inquired into.
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1. 1. Trinitatem certe quaerimus, non quamlibet, sed illam Trinitatem quae Deus est, verusque ac summus et solus Deus. Exspecta ergo, quisquis haec audis: adhuc enim quaerimus, et talia quaerentem nemo iuste reprehendit; si tamen in fide firmissimus quaerat, quod aut nosse aut eloqui difficillimum est.
1. 1. We are certainly seeking a trinity—not just any trinity, but that Trinity which is God, the true and highest and only God. Wait, then, whoever you are who hear this: for we are still seeking, and no one justly rebukes one who seeks such things, provided that he seeks, most firm in faith, what is most difficult either to know or to express.
deTrin.8.1.1Affirmantem vero cito iusteque reprehendit, quisquis melius vel videt vel docet. Quaerite, inquit, deum, et vivet anima vestra. Et ne quisquam se tamquam apprehendisse temere gaudeat: Quaerite, inquit, faciem eius semper. (Cf. 1 Chron 16:11)
But whoever either sees or teaches better quickly and justly rebukes one who makes assertions. Seek God, he says, and your soul shall live. And lest anyone rashly rejoice as though he had laid hold of him: Seek his face always, he says. (See 1 Chr 16:11)
deTrin.8.1.1Et Apostolus: si quis se, inquit, putat aliquid scire, nondum scit quemadmodum scire oporteat. Quisquis autem diligit Deum, hic cognitus est ab illo. Nec sic quidem dixit: “Cognovit illum”; quae periculosa praesumptio est: sed, cognitus est ab illo. Sic et alibi cum dixisset, Nunc autem cognoscentes Deum; statim corrigens: immo cogniti, inquit, a Deo:
And the Apostle: if anyone thinks, he says, that he knows something, he does not yet know as he ought to know. But whoever loves God, this one is known by him. He did not even say, “He has known him”—which is a dangerous presumption—but, is known by him. So too elsewhere, when he had said, But now, knowing God, he at once corrects himself: or rather, he says, being known by God:
deTrin.8.1.1maximeque illo loco, Fratres, inquit, ego me ipsum non arbitror apprehendisse: unum autem, quae retro oblitus, in ea quae ante sunt extentus, secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae vocationis Dei in Christo Iesu. Quotquot ergo perfecti hoc sapiamus. Perfectionem in hac vita dicit, non aliud quam ea quae retro sunt oblivisci, et in ea quae ante sunt extendi secundum intentionem. Cf. Plotinus, Ennead 3.7.11. Tutissima est enim quaerentis intentio, donec apprehendatur illud quo tendimus et quo extendimur. Sed ea recta intentio est, quae proficiscitur a fide. Certa enim fides utcumque inchoat cognitionem: cognitio vero certa non perficietur, nisi post hanc vitam, cum videbimus facie ad faciem.
and especially in that passage, Brethren, he says, I do not consider that I myself have laid hold of it: but one thing I do—forgetting what lies behind, and stretching out toward what lies ahead, I follow according to my intent toward the prize of the upward calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let as many of us, then, as are perfect be of this mind. He calls perfection in this life nothing other than to forget what lies behind and to stretch out, according to one’s intent, toward what lies ahead. See Plotinus, Ennead 3.7.11. For the intent of one seeking is most safe, until that toward which we tend and toward which we stretch is laid hold of. But that is a right intent which sets out from faith. For a certain faith somehow begins knowledge: but certain knowledge will not be perfected except after this life, when we shall see face to face.
deTrin.8.1.1Hoc ergo sapiamus, ut noverimus tutiorem esse affectum vera quaerendi, quam incognita pro cognitis praesumendi. Sic ergo quaeramus tamquam inventuri: et sic inveniamus, tamquam quaesituri. Cum enim consummaverit homo, tunc incipit.
Let us, then, be of this mind: to know that the disposition of seeking the true is safer than that of presuming things unknown to be known. So let us seek as though we were going to find: and let us find as though we were going to seek. For when a man has finished, then he is but beginning.
deTrin.8.1.1De credendis nulla infidelitate dubitemus, de intellegendis nulla temeritate affirmemus: in illis auctoritas tenenda est, in his veritas exquirenda. Quod ergo ad istam quaestionem attinet, credamus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum esse unum Deum, universae creaturae conditorem Cf. Pelagius, Letter and Confession of Faith to Innocent I; Augustine, Faith and the Creed 4.5; The Catholic Way of Life 2.7.9; Pseudo-Ambrose, Exhortatio ad neophytos; Tertullian, Creed 3. atque rectorem: nec Patrem esse Filium, nec Spiritum Sanctum vel Patrem esse vel Filium; sed Trinitatem relatarum ad invicem Personarum, et unitatem aequalis essentiae. Cf. Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1.52. Hoc autem quaeramus intellegere, ab eo ipso quem intellegere volumus, auxilium precantes, et quantum tribuitur PL: tribuit, “as far as he grants us.” quod intellegimus explicare tanta cura et sollicitudine pietatis, PL adds cupientes, which alters the whole run of the sentence beginning at et quantum, making it a second participial clause: “and desiring as far as he grants us to explain what we understand.” ut etiam si aliquid aliud pro alio dicimus, nihil tamen indignum dicamus.
Let us doubt with no unbelief about things to be believed, and assert with no rashness about things to be understood: in the former, authority is to be held fast; in the latter, the truth is to be searched out. As far, then, as this question is concerned, let us believe that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, the maker See Pelagius, Letter and Confession of Faith to Innocent I; Augustine, Faith and the Creed 4.5; The Catholic Way of Life 2.7.9; Pseudo-Ambrose, Exhortatio ad neophytos; Tertullian, Creed 3. and ruler of all creation: that the Father is not the Son, and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son; but that there is a Trinity of Persons related to one another, and a unity of equal essence. See Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1.52. And let us seek to understand this, praying for help from him whom we wish to understand, and, as far as is granted, PL: tribuit, “as far as he grants us.” seeking to unfold what we understand with such care and solicitude of devotion PL adds cupientes, which alters the whole run of the sentence beginning at et quantum, making it a second participial clause: “and desiring as far as he grants us to explain what we understand.” that, even if we say one thing for another, we may still say nothing unworthy.
deTrin.8.1.1Ut si quid, verbi gratia, de Patre dicimus, quod Patri proprie non conveniat, aut Filio conveniat, aut Spiritui Sancto, aut ipsi Trinitati: et si quid de Filio, quod Filio proprie non congruat, saltem congruat Patri, aut Spiritui Sancto, aut Trinitati: item si quid de Spiritu sancto, quod proprietatem Spiritus Sancti non doceat, PL: deceat, “befit,” following what is perhaps a correct, and certainly a shrewd, emendation by one copyist. non tamen alienum sit a Patre aut a Filio, aut ab uno Deo ipsa Trinitate. Veluti nunc cupimus videre utrum illa excellentissima caritas proprie Spiritus Sanctus sit: quod si non est, aut Pater est caritas, aut Filius, aut ipsa Trinitas; quoniam resistere non possumus certissimae fidei, et validissimae auctoritati Scripturae dicentis, Deus caritas est: non tamen debemus deviare sacrilego errore, ut aliquid de Trinitate dicamus quod non Creatori, sed creaturae potius (Cf. Rom 1:25) conveniat, aut inani cogitatione fingatur.
So that if, for example, we say something of the Father which does not properly belong to the Father, it may belong to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, or to the Trinity itself: and if we say something of the Son which is not properly fitting to the Son, it may at least be fitting to the Father, or to the Holy Spirit, or to the Trinity: likewise if we say something of the Holy Spirit which does not teach PL: deceat, “befit,” following what is perhaps a correct, and certainly a shrewd, emendation by one copyist. the property of the Holy Spirit, it may yet not be foreign to the Father or to the Son, or to the one God, the Trinity itself. For example, we now desire to see whether that most excellent love is properly the Holy Spirit: and if it is not, then either the Father is love, or the Son, or the Trinity itself; since we cannot resist the most certain faith and the most powerful authority of Scripture, which says, God is love: yet we ought not to deviate by a sacrilegious error, so as to say something of the Trinity that befits not the Creator but rather the creature, (See Rom 1:25) or that is fashioned by an empty thought.
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2. 2. Quae cum ita sint, Cicero, In Catilinam 1.5.10. attendamus ista tria, quae invenisse nobis videmur. Nondum de supernis loquimur, nondum de Deo Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto; sed de hac impari imagine, attamen imagine, id est homine: familiarius enim eam et facilius fortassis intuetur mentis nostrae infirmitas.
2. 2. Since these things are so, Cicero, In Catilinam 1.5.10. let us consider those three things which we seem to ourselves to have found. We are not yet speaking of things above, not yet of God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; but of this unequal image—an image nonetheless—that is, the human being: for the weakness of our mind perhaps beholds it more familiarly and more easily.
deTrin.8.2.2Ecce ego qui hoc quaero, cum aliquid amo tria sunt: ego et quod amo, et ipse amor. Non enim amo amorem, nisi amantem amem: nam non est amor, ubi nihil amatur.
See, I who seek this: when I love something, there are three—I, and what I love, and love itself. For I do not love love unless I love one who loves: for there is no love where nothing is loved.
deTrin.8.2.2Tria ergo sunt; amans, et quod amatur, et amor. Quid, si non amem nisi me ipsum? nonne duo erunt; quod amo, et amor? Amans enim et quod amatur, hoc idem est, quando se ipse amat: sicut amare et amari, eodem modo idipsum est, cum se quisque amat. Eadem quippe res bis dicitur, cum dicitur, Amat se, et amatur a se. Tunc enim non est aliud atque aliud, amare et amari; sicut non est alius atque alius, amans et amatus.
There are, then, three: the one who loves, and what is loved, and love. But what if I love nothing but myself? Will there not be two—what I love, and love? For the one who loves and what is loved are one and the same, when one loves oneself: just as to love and to be loved are in the same way one and the same, when one loves oneself. For the same thing is said twice, when it is said, He loves himself, and he is loved by himself. For then to love and to be loved are not one thing and another; just as the one loving and the one loved are not one and another.
deTrin.8.2.2At vero amor, et quod amatur, etiam sic duo sunt. Non enim quisquis se amat amor est nisi cum amatur ipse amor. Aliud est autem amare se, aliud amare amorem suum. Non enim amatur amor, nisi iam aliquid amans; quia ubi nihil amatur, nullus est amor. Duo ergo sunt, cum se quisque amat: amor, et quod amatur. Tunc enim amans et quod amatur unum est. Unde videtur non esse consequens ut ubicumque amor fuerit, iam tria intellegatur.
But love and what is loved are even so two. For whoever loves himself is not love unless love itself is loved. Now it is one thing to love oneself, another to love one’s love. For love is not loved unless it is already loving something; because where nothing is loved, there is no love. There are, then, two when one loves oneself: love, and what is loved. For then the one loving and what is loved are one. Hence it seems not to follow that wherever there is love, three things are thereby understood.
deTrin.8.2.2Auferamus enim ab hac consideratione cetera quae multa sunt, quibus homo constat; Cf. Augustine, Faith and the Creed 10.23. atque ut haec quae nunc requirimus, quantum in his rebus possumus, liquido reperiamus, de sola mente tractemus. Mens igitur cum amat se ipsam, duo quaedam ostendit, mentem, et amorem. Quid est autem amare se, nisi sibi praesto esse velle ad fruendum se? Et cum tantum se vult esse, quantum est, par menti voluntas est, et amanti amor aequalis. Et si aliqua substantia est amor, non est utique corpus, sed spiritus: nec mens corpus, sed spiritus est. Neque tamen amor et mens duo spiritus, sed unus spiritus; nec essentiae duae, sed una: et tamen duo quaedam unum sunt, amans et amor; sive sic dicas, quod amatur, et amor. Et haec quidem duo relative ad invicem dicuntur. Amans quippe ad amorem refertur, et amor ad amantem. Amans enim aliquo amore amat, et amor alicuius amantis est. Mens vero et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant. Non enim quia mens et spiritus alicuius hominis est, ideo mens et spiritus est. Retracto enim eo quod homo est, quod adiuncto corpore dicitur; retracto ergo corpore, mens et spiritus manet: retracto autem amante, nullus est amor; et retracto amore, nullus est amans. Ideoque quantum ad invicem referuntur, duo sunt: quod autem ad se ipsa dicuntur, et singula spiritus, et simul utrumque unus spiritus; et singula mens, et simul utrumque una mens. Ubi ergo trinitas? Attendamus quantum possumus, et invocemus lucem sempiternam, ut illuminet tenebras nostras, et videamus in nobis quantum sinimur, imaginem Dei. (Cf. Gen 1:26, 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1; Ps 18:29; John 1:9; 1 Cor 4:5)
For let us remove from this consideration the other things, which are many, of which a human being consists; See Augustine, Faith and the Creed 10.23. and that we may find clearly what we are now searching for, so far as we can in these matters, let us treat of the mind alone. The mind, then, when it loves itself, displays two things, the mind, and love. But what is it to love oneself, except to wish to be present to oneself for the enjoyment of oneself? And when it wishes to be just so much as it is, the will is equal to the mind, and the love equal to the one loving. And if love is some substance, it is surely not a body, but a spirit: nor is the mind a body, but a spirit. Yet love and mind are not two spirits, but one spirit; nor two essences, but one: and yet the two are one, the one loving and love; or, if you put it so, what is loved, and love. And these two are indeed said relatively to one another. For the one loving is referred to love, and love to the one loving. For the one loving loves by some love, and love is of some one loving. But mind and spirit are not said relatively, but indicate essence. For it is not because it is the mind and spirit of some person that it is a mind and spirit. For when that which is the human being is taken away—which is said by the joining of a body—when, then, the body is taken away, mind and spirit remain: but when the one loving is taken away, there is no love; and when love is taken away, there is no one loving. And therefore, insofar as they are referred to one another, they are two: but insofar as they are said of themselves, each is a spirit, and both together one spirit; each is a mind, and both together one mind. Where, then, is the trinity? Let us attend as much as we can, and let us call upon the eternal light, that it may illumine our darkness, and that we may see in ourselves, so far as we are permitted, the image of God. (See Gen 1:26, 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1; Ps 18:29 (17:29); John 1:9; 1 Cor 4:5)
deTrin.8.2.23. 3. Mens enim amare se ipsam non potest, nisi etiam se noverit: nam quomodo amat quod nescit? Aut si quisquam dicit ex notitia generali vel speciali mentem credere se esse talem, quales alias experta est, et ideo amare se ipsam, insipientissime loquitur. Unde enim mens aliquam mentem novit, si se non novit? Neque enim ut oculus corporis videt alios oculos, et se non videt; ita mens novit alias mentes, et ignorat semetipsam. Cf. Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.1; Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.27.67. Per oculos enim corporis corpora videmus, quia radios qui per eos emicant et quidquid cernimus tangunt, Cf. Plato, Timaeus 45b–d; Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 4.34. refringere ac retorquere in ipsos non possumus, nisi cum specula intuemur. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 46a.
3. 3. For the mind cannot love itself unless it also knows itself: for how does it love what it does not know? Or if anyone says that, from a general or special knowledge, the mind believes itself to be such as it has experienced others to be, and so loves itself, he speaks most foolishly. For from where does the mind know any mind, if it does not know itself? For it is not as the eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself; that the mind knows other minds and is ignorant of itself. See Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.1; Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.27.67. For through the eyes of the body we see bodies, because the rays that shine out through them and touch whatever we discern See Plato, Timaeus 45b–d; Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 4.34. we cannot bend back and turn upon themselves, except when we look into a mirror. See Plato, Timaeus 46a.
deTrin.8.3.3Quod subtilissime obscurissimeque disseritur, donec apertissime demonstretur, vel ita se rem habere, vel non ita. Cf. Aristotle, On Sense and Sensible Objects 431b; Plotinus, Ennead 4.5.2. Sed quoquo modo se habeat vis qua per oculos cernimus; ipsam certe vim, sive sint radii, sive aliud aliquid, oculis cernere non valemus; sed mente quaerimus, et si fieri potest, etiam hoc mente comprehendimus. Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et semetipsam per se ipsam, quoniam est incorporea. Cf. Porphyry, Sentences 43.2–4. Nam si non se novit, non se amat.
This is discussed most subtly and most obscurely, until it is most clearly demonstrated that the matter is either so or not so. See Aristotle, On Sense and Sensible Objects 431b; Plotinus, Ennead 4.5.2. But however it stands with the power by which we discern through the eyes, that power itself—whether they be rays or something else—we certainly cannot discern with the eyes; but we seek it with the mind, and, if it can be done, we even grasp this with the mind. The mind, then, just as it gathers the knowledge of bodily things through the senses of the body, so gathers the knowledge of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it knows itself also through itself, since it is incorporeal. See Porphyry, Sentences 43.2–4. For if it does not know itself, it does not love itself.
deTrin.8.3.34. 4. Sicut autem duo quaedam sunt, mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt, mens et notitia eius, cum se novit. Igitur ipsa mens et amor et notitia eius, tria quaedam sunt, et haec tria unum sunt; et cum perfecta sunt, aequalia sunt. Si enim minus se amat quam est, ut verbi gratia, tantum se amet hominis mens, quantum amandum est corpus hominis, cum plus sit ipsa quam corpus; peccat, et non est perfectus amor eius. Item si amplius se amet quam est, velut si tantum se amet, quantum amandus est Deus, cum incomparabiliter minus sit ipsa quam Deus; etiam sic nimium peccat, et non perfectum habet amorem sui. Maiore autem perversitate et iniquitate peccat, cum corpus tantum amat, quantum amandus est Deus.
4. 4. Now just as there are two things, the mind and its love, when it loves itself; so there are two things, the mind and its knowledge, when it knows itself. Therefore the mind itself and its love and its knowledge are a certain three, and these three are one; and when they are perfect, they are equal. For if it loves itself less than it is—as, for example, if the mind of a human being loves itself only as much as the body of a human being is to be loved, although the mind is more than the body—it sins, and its love is not perfect. Likewise, if it loves itself more than it is—as if it loved itself as much as God is to be loved, although it is incomparably less than God—even so it sins greatly, and does not have a perfect love of itself. But with greater perversity and iniquity it sins, when it loves the body as much as God is to be loved.
deTrin.8.4.4Item notitia si minor est, quam est illud quod noscitur, et plene nosci potest, perfecta non est. Si autem maior est, iam superior est natura quae novit, quam illa quae nota est: sicut maior est notitia corporis, quam ipsum corpus quod ea notitia notum est. Illa enim vita quaedam est in ratione cognoscentis: corpus autem non est vita. Et vita quaelibet quolibet corpore maior est, non mole, sed vi. Mens vero cum se ipsam cognoscit, non se superat notitia sua; quia ipsa cognoscit, ipsa cognoscitur. Cum ergo se totam cognoscit, neque secum quidquam aliud, par illi est cognitio sua: quia neque ex alia natura est eius cognitio, cum se ipsam cognoscit. Et cum se totam nihilque amplius percipit, nec minor nec maior est. Recte igitur diximus, haec tria cum perfecta sunt, esse consequenter aequalia.
Likewise, knowledge, if it is less than that which is known and can be fully known, is not perfect. But if it is greater, then the nature that knows is superior to that which is known: as the knowledge of a body is greater than the body itself which is known by that knowledge. For that knowledge is a certain life in the reason of the one knowing: but a body is not life. And any life whatever is greater than any body whatever, not in bulk, but in power. But the mind, when it knows itself, does not surpass itself by its knowledge; because the same thing knows and the same thing is known. When, therefore, it knows the whole of itself, and nothing else along with itself, its knowledge is equal to it: because its knowledge is not from another nature, when it knows itself. And when it perceives the whole of itself and nothing more, it is neither less nor greater. Rightly, therefore, we said that these three, when they are perfect, are consequently equal.
deTrin.8.4.44. 5. Simul etiam admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in anima existere, et tamquam involuta evolvi ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter, vel, ut ita dicam, essentialiter, non tamquam in subiecto, ut color, aut figura in corpore, aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas. Cf. Plotinus, Ennead 4.3.20. Quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subiectum in quo est. Non enim color iste aut figura huius corporis potest esse et alterius corporis. Mens autem amore quo se amat, potest amare et aliud praeter se.
4. 5. At the same time we are also reminded, if we can in any way see it, that these things exist in the soul, and, as it were folded up, are unfolded that they may be perceived and counted substantially—or, so to speak, essentially—not as in a subject, like color, or shape in a body, or any other quality or quantity. See Plotinus, Ennead 4.3.20. For whatever is of that kind does not exceed the subject in which it is. For this color or shape of this body cannot belong also to another body. But the mind, by the love with which it loves itself, can love also something besides itself.
deTrin.8.4.5Item non se solam cognoscit mens, sed et alia multa. Quamobrem non amor et cognitio tamquam in subiecto insunt menti; sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt, sicut ipsa mens: quia et si relative dicuntur ad invicem, in sua tamen sunt singula quaeque substantia. Non sicut color et coloratum relative ita dicuntur ad invicem, ut color in subiecto colorato sit, non habens in se ipso propriam substantiam; quoniam coloratum corpus substantia est, ille autem in substantia: sed sicut duo amici etiam duo sunt homines, quae sunt substantiae; cum homines non relative dicantur, amici autem relative.
Likewise the mind does not know itself alone, but also many other things. Wherefore love and knowledge are not in the mind as in a subject; but these too exist substantially, just as the mind itself: because, even if they are said relatively to one another, yet each is in its own substance. It is not as color and the colored are said relatively to one another, so that the color is in the colored subject, not having its own proper substance in itself—since the colored body is a substance, but the color is in a substance: rather it is as two friends are also two human beings, which are substances; since human beings are not said relatively, but friends relatively.
deTrin.8.4.54. 6. Sed item quamvis substantia sit amans vel sciens, substantia sit scientia, substantia sit amor, sed amans et amor, aut sciens et scientia relative ad se dicantur sicut amici; mens vero aut spiritus non sint relativa, sicut nec homines relativa sunt; non tamen sicut amici homines possunt seorsum esse ab invicem, sic amans et amor, aut sciens et scientia. Quamquam et amici corpore videntur separari posse, non animo, in quantum amici sunt, verumtamen fieri potest ut amicus amicum etiam odisse incipiat, et eo ipso amicus esse desinat, nesciente illo, et adhuc amante. Amor autem quo se mens amat, si esse desinat, simul et illa desinit esse amans.
4. 6. But again, although the one loving or the one knowing is a substance, knowledge a substance, love a substance, yet the one loving and love, or the one knowing and knowledge, are said relatively to one another, like friends; whereas mind or spirit are not relative terms, just as human beings are not relative; nevertheless, as friends who are human beings can exist apart from one another, the one loving and love, or the one knowing and knowledge, cannot. Although friends too seem able to be separated in body, not in soul, insofar as they are friends, yet it can happen that a friend begins even to hate his friend, and by that very fact ceases to be a friend, while the other does not know it and still loves him. But the love by which the mind loves itself, if it ceases to be, then the mind too ceases at the same time to be loving.
deTrin.8.4.6Item notitia qua se mens novit, si esse desinat, simul et illa nosse se desinet. Sicut caput capitati alicuius utique caput est, et relative ad se dicuntur, quamvis etiam substantiae sint: nam et caput corpus est, et capitatum; et si non sit corpus, nec capitatum erit. Sed haec praecisione ab invicem separari possunt, illa non possunt.
Likewise the knowledge by which the mind knows itself, if it ceases to be, then the mind too ceases at the same time to know itself. Just as the head of someone who has a head is surely a head, and they are said relatively to one another, although they are also substances—for the head is a body, and so is the one who has a head; and if it is not a body, neither will it have a head—but these can be separated from one another by cutting, whereas those cannot.
deTrin.8.4.64. 7. Quod si sunt aliqua corpora quae secari omnino et dividi nequeunt; tamen nisi partibus suis constarent, corpora non essent. Pars ergo ad totum relative dicitur; quia omnis pars alicuius totius pars est, et totum omnibus partibus totum est. Sed quoniam et pars corpus est, et totum; non tantum ista relative dicuntur, sed etiam substantialiter sunt. Fortassis ergo mens totum est, et eius quasi partes amor quo se amat, et scientia qua se novit, quibus duabus partibus illud totum constat? An tres sunt aequales partes, quibus totum unum completur? Sed nulla pars totum, cuius pars est, complectitur: mens vero cum se totam novit, hoc est perfecte novit, per totum eius est notitia eius; et cum se perfecte amat, totam se amat, et per totum eius est amor eius. Num ergo sicut ex vino et aqua et melle una fit potio, et singula per totum sunt, et tamen tria sunt (nulla enim pars est potionis, quae non habeat haec tria; non enim iuncta, velut si aqua et oleum essent, sed omnino commixta sunt; et substantiae sunt omnes, et totus ille liquor una quaedam est ex tribus confecta substantia); tale aliquid arbitrandum est esse simul haec tria, mentem, amorem, notitiam? Sed non unius substantiae sunt, aqua, vinum, et mel, quamvis ex eorum commixtione fiat una substantia potionis.
4. 7. But if there are some bodies that can in no way be cut and divided, yet unless they consisted of their parts they would not be bodies. A part, then, is said relatively to the whole; because every part is a part of some whole, and a whole is a whole by all its parts. But since both the part is a body, and the whole, these are not only said relatively, but also exist substantially. Perhaps, then, the mind is the whole, and as it were its parts are the love by which it loves itself, and the knowledge by which it knows itself, of which two parts that whole consists? Or are there three equal parts, by which the one whole is completed? But no part embraces the whole of which it is a part: whereas the mind, when it knows the whole of itself, that is, knows itself perfectly, its knowledge is through the whole of it; and when it loves itself perfectly, it loves the whole of itself, and its love is through the whole of it. Is it, then, as out of wine and water and honey one drink is made, and each is present throughout the whole, and yet they are three (for there is no part of the drink that does not have these three; for they are not joined, as if water and oil were, but altogether commingled; and they are all substances, and that whole liquid is a certain one substance compounded out of three)—is it some such thing that we must judge these three to be at once, mind, love, knowledge? But water, wine, and honey are not of one substance, although out of their commingling one substance of the drink is made.
deTrin.8.4.7Quomodo autem illa tria non sint eiusdem essentiae, PL: substantiae. non video; cum mens ipsa se amet, atque ipsa se noverit; atque ita sint haec tria, ut non alteri alicui rerum mens vel amata vel nota sit. Unius ergo eiusdemque essentiae necesse est haec tria sint: et ideo si tamquam commixtione confusa essent; nullo modo essent tria, nec referri ad invicem possent. Quemadmodum si ex uno eodemque auro tres anulos similes facias, quamvis connexos sibi, referuntur ad invicem, quod similes sunt; omnis enim similis alicui similis est; et trinitas anulorum est, et unum aurum: at si misceantur sibi, et per totam singuli massam suam conspergantur, intercidet illa trinitas, et omnino non erit; ac non solum unum aurum dicetur, sicut in illis tribus anulis dicebatur, sed iam nulla aurea tria.
But how those three are not of the same essence, PL: substantiae. I do not see; since the mind itself loves itself, and itself knows itself; and these three are so that the mind is neither loved nor known by some other thing. Of one and the same essence, therefore, these three must necessarily be: and so, if they were as it were confused by commingling, they would in no way be three, nor could they be referred to one another. Just as, if out of one and the same gold you make three similar rings, although connected to one another, they are referred to one another, because they are similar; for everything similar is similar to something; and there is a trinity of rings, and one gold: but if they are mingled with one another, and each scattered throughout the whole mass, that trinity will fall away, and will not exist at all; and not only will it be called one gold, as was said of those three rings, but there will now be no three golden things.
deTrin.8.4.75. 8. At in illis tribus, cum se novit mens et amat se, manet trinitas, mens, amor, notitia; et nulla commixtione confunditur: quamvis et singula sint in semetipsis, et invicem tota in totis, sive singula in binis, sive bina in singulis. Itaque omnia in omnibus. (Cf. 1 Cor 15:28)
5. 8. But in those three, when the mind knows itself and loves itself, there remains a trinity, mind, love, knowledge; and it is confused by no commingling: although each is in itself, and they are mutually wholes in wholes, whether each in the other two, or the two in each. And so all are in all. (See 1 Cor 15:28)
deTrin.8.5.8Nam et mens est utique in se ipsa, quoniam ad se ipsam mens dicitur: quamvis noscens, vel nota, vel noscibilis ad suam notitiam relative dicatur; amans quoque et amata vel amabilis ad amorem referatur, quo se amat. Et notitia quamvis referatur ad mentem cognoscentem vel cognitam, tamen et ad se ipsam nota et noscens dicitur: non enim sibi est incognita notitia, qua se mens ipsa cognoscit. Et amor quamvis referatur ad mentem amantem, cuius amor est; tamen et ad se ipsum est amor, ut sit etiam in se ipso: quia et amor amatur, nec alio nisi amore amari potest, id est se ipso. Ita sunt haec singula in se ipsis.
For the mind too is surely in itself, since it is called mind with reference to itself: although it is called knowing, or known, or knowable, relatively to its knowledge; and is referred also as loving and loved or lovable to the love by which it loves itself. And knowledge, although it is referred to the mind that knows or is known, is yet also said relatively to itself as known and knowing: for the knowledge by which the mind knows itself is not unknown to itself. And love, although it is referred to the mind that loves, whose love it is, is yet also love with reference to itself, so that it is also in itself: because love too is loved, nor can it be loved by anything but love, that is, by itself. Thus these are each in themselves.
deTrin.8.5.8In alternis autem ita sunt, quia et mens amans in amore est, et amor in amantis notitia, et notitia in mente noscente. Singula in binis ita sunt, quia mens quae se novit et amat, in amore et notitia sua est; et amor amantis mentis seseque scientis, in mente notitiaque eius est; et notitia mentis se scientis et amantis in mente atque in amore eius est, quia scientem se amat, et amantem se novit. Ac per hoc et bina in singulis, quia mens quae se novit et amat, cum sua notitia est in amore, et cum suo amore in notitia: amor quoque ipse et notitia simul sunt in mente, quae se amat et novit.
But in one another they are thus: because the mind that loves is in love, and love is in the knowledge of the one loving, and knowledge is in the mind that knows. Each is in two thus: because the mind that knows and loves itself is in its love and knowledge; and the love of the mind that loves and knows itself is in the mind and its knowledge; and the knowledge of the mind that knows and loves itself is in the mind and in its love, because it loves itself as knowing and knows itself as loving. And through this the two also are in each: because the mind that knows and loves itself is, with its knowledge, in its love, and, with its love, in its knowledge: love too and knowledge are at once in the mind, which loves and knows itself.
deTrin.8.5.8Tota vero in totis quemadmodum sint, iam supra ostendimus cum se totam mens amat, et totam novit, et totum amorem suum novit, totamque amat notitiam suam, quando tria ista ad se ipsa perfecta sunt. Miro itaque modo tria ista inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis, et tamen eorum singulum quidque substantia est, et simul omnia una substantia vel essentia, cum relative dicantur ad invicem.
But how they are wholes in wholes, we have already shown above, when the mind loves the whole of itself, and knows the whole of itself, and knows the whole of its love, and loves the whole of its knowledge, when these three are perfect with reference to themselves. In a wonderful way, then, these three are inseparable from themselves, and yet each one of them is a substance, and all together are one substance or essence, though they are said relatively to one another.
deTrin.8.5.8C
deTrin.8.5.8
6. 9. Sed cum se ipsam novit humana mens et amat se ipsam, non aliquid incommutabile novit et amat: aliterque unusquisque homo loquendo enuntiat mentem suam, quid in se ipso agatur attendens; aliter autem humanam mentem speciali aut generali cognitione definit. Itaque cum mihi de sua propria loquitur, utrum intellegat hoc aut illud, an non intellegat, et utrum velit, an nolit hoc aut illud, credo: cum vero de humana specialiter aut generaliter verum dicit, agnosco et approbo.
6. 9. But when the human mind knows itself and loves itself, it does not know and love something unchangeable: and each person speaks of his own mind in one way, attending to what goes on within himself; but in another way he defines the human mind by a special or general knowledge. And so, when he tells me about his own mind—whether he understands this or that, or does not understand it, and whether he wills, or does not will, this or that—I believe him: but when he says something true about the human mind in a special or general way, I recognize it and approve it.
deTrin.8.6.9Unde manifestum est, aliud unumquemque videre in se, quod sibi alius dicenti credat, non tamen videat; aliud autem in ipsa veritate, quod alius quoque possit intueri: quorum alterum mutari per tempora, alterum incommutabili aeternitate consistere. Neque enim oculis corporeis multas mentes videndo, per similitudinem colligimus generalem vel specialem mentis humanae notitiam: sed intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definiamus, non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat.
From this it is plain that one person sees one thing in himself, which another, when he speaks of it, may believe though he does not see it; but another thing in the truth itself, which another too can behold: of which the one is changed through time, the other stands fast in unchangeable eternity. For it is not by seeing many minds with our bodily eyes that we gather, through likeness, a general or special knowledge of the human mind: but we behold the inviolable truth, from which we may perfectly define, so far as we can, not what the mind of each particular person is, but what it ought to be by the eternal reasons.
deTrin.8.6.96. 10. Unde etiam phantasias rerum corporalium per corporis sensum haustas, et quodam modo infusas memoriae, ex quibus etiam ea quae non visa sunt, ficto phantasmate cogitantur, sive aliter quam sunt, sive fortuito sicuti sunt, aliis omnino regulis supra mentem nostram incommutabiliter manentibus, vel approbare apud nosmetipsos, vel improbare convincimur, cum recte aliquid approbamus aut improbamus.
6. 10. Hence also the images of bodily things, drawn in through the sense of the body and in a way poured into the memory—from which even things that have not been seen are thought of by a fashioned phantasm, whether otherwise than they are, or by chance just as they are—we are convinced that we either approve or disapprove within ourselves, when we rightly approve or disapprove of something, by other rules altogether, abiding unchangeably above our mind.
deTrin.8.6.10Nam et cum recolo Carthaginis moenia quae vidi, et cum fingo Alexandriae quae non vidi, easdemque imaginarias formas quasdam quibusdam praeferens, rationabiliter praefero; viget et claret desuper iudicium veritatis, ac sui iuris incorruptissimis regulis firmum est: et si corporalium imaginum quasi quodam nubilo subtexitur, non tamen involvitur atque confunditur.
For both when I recall the walls of Carthage which I have seen, and when I imagine those of Alexandria which I have not seen, and, preferring some of these same imaginary forms to others, I prefer them reasonably; the judgment of truth flourishes and shines from above, and is firm by its own most incorruptible rules: and even if it is overlaid, as it were, by a kind of cloud of bodily images, it is nevertheless not enveloped and confounded.
deTrin.8.6.106. 11. Sed interest utrum ego sub illa vel in illa caligine, tamquam a caelo perspicuo secludar; an sicut in altissimis montibus accidere solet, inter utrumque aere libero fruens, et serenissimam lucem supra, et densissimas nebulas subter aspiciam. Nam unde in me fraterni amoris inflammatur ardor, cum audio virum aliquem pro fidei pulchritudine et firmitate acriora tormenta tolerasse? Et si mihi digito ostendatur ipse homo, studeo mihi coniungere, notum facere, amicitia colligare. Itaque si facultas datur, accedo, alloquor, sermonem confero, affectum meum in illum quibus verbis possum exprimo, vicissimque in eo fieri quem in me habeat atque exprimi volo, spiritalemque complexum credendo molior, quia pervestigare tam cito et cernere penitus eius interiora non possum. Amo itaque fidelem ac fortem virum amore casto atque germano.
6. 11. But it makes a difference whether I am shut off, beneath that mist or in it, as it were from a clear sky; or whether, as is wont to happen on the highest mountains, enjoying the free air between the two, I behold both the most serene light above, and the densest clouds below. For from where is the ardor of brotherly love kindled in me, when I hear that some man has borne sharper torments for the beauty and firmness of faith? And if that very man is pointed out to me with a finger, I am eager to join myself to him, to make myself known, to bind myself to him in friendship. And so, if the opportunity is given, I approach, I address him, I converse with him, I express my affection toward him in what words I can, and I wish that there be brought about and expressed in him, in turn, the affection he has toward me, and I strive by believing for a spiritual embrace, since I cannot so quickly track down and discern thoroughly his inner depths. And so I love a faithful and brave man with a chaste and genuine love.
deTrin.8.6.11Quod si mihi inter nostras loquelas fateatur, aut incautus aliquo modo sese indicet, quod vel de Deo credat incongrua, atque in illo quoque aliquid carnale desideret, et pro tali errore illa pertulerit, vel speratae pecuniae cupiditate, vel inani aviditate laudis humanae; statim amor ille, quo in eum ferebar, offensus, et quasi repercussus, atque ab indigno homine ablatus, in ea forma permanet, ex qua eum talem credens amaveram. Nisi forte ad hoc amo iam, ut talis sit, cum talem non esse comperero.
But if, in the midst of our conversations, he should confess to me, or somehow incautiously reveal himself, that he believes things unfitting about God, and desires something carnal in him too, and bore those torments for such an error, whether out of desire for hoped-for money, or out of an empty greed for human praise; at once that love by which I was carried toward him, being offended and as it were struck back, and withdrawn from an unworthy man, abides in that form out of which, believing him to be such, I had loved him. Unless perhaps I now love him to this end, that he may become such, when I have found that he is not such.
deTrin.8.6.11At in illo homine nihil mutatum est: mutari tamen potest, ut fiat quod eum iam esse credideram. In mente autem mea mutata est utique ipsa existimatio, quae de illo aliter se habebat, et aliter habet: idemque amor ab intentione perfruendi ad intentionem consulendi, incommutabili desuper iustitia iubente deflexus est. Ipsa vero forma inconcussae ac stabilis veritatis, et in qua fruerer homine bonum eum credens, et in qua consulo ut bonus sit, eadem luce incorruptibilis sincerissimaeque rationis et meae mentis aspectum, et illam phantasiae nubem, quam desuper cerno, cum eumdem hominem quem videram cogito, imperturbabili aeternitate perfundit.
But in that man nothing has been changed: yet he can be changed, so that he may become what I had already believed him to be. In my mind, however, it is the very estimation that has been changed, which stood one way concerning him before and stands another way now: and the same love has been bent, by an unchangeable justice commanding from above, from the intention of enjoying to the intention of counseling. But the very form of unshaken and stable truth—both that in which I would enjoy the man, believing him good, and that in which I counsel that he be good—floods, with imperturbable eternity, by the same light of incorruptible and most sincere reason, both the gaze of my mind, and that cloud of phantasy which I behold from above, when I think of the same man whom I had seen.
deTrin.8.6.11Item cum arcum pulchre et aequabiliter intortum, quem vidi, verbi gratia, Carthagine, animo revolvo, res quaedam menti nuntiata per oculos, memoriaeque transfusa, imaginarium conspectum facit. Sed aliud mente conspicio, secundum quod mihi opus illud placet; unde etiam, si displiceret, corrigerem. Itaque de istis secundum illam iudicamus, et illam cernimus rationalis mentis intuitu.
Likewise, when I turn over in my mind an arch beautifully and evenly curved, which I saw, for example, at Carthage, a certain thing, reported to the mind through the eyes and transfused into the memory, makes an imaginary spectacle. But I behold with the mind something else, according to which that work pleases me; and from which, too, if it displeased me, I would correct it. And so we judge of these things according to that, and we discern that by the gaze of the rational mind.
deTrin.8.6.11Ista vero aut praesentia sensu corporis tangimus, aut imagines absentium fixas in memoria recordamur, aut ex earum similitudine talia fingimus, qualia nos ipsi, si vellemus atque possemus, etiam opere moliremur: aliter figurantes animo imagines corporum, aut per corpus corpora videntes; aliter autem rationes artemque ineffabiliter pulchram talium figurarum super aciem mentis simplici intellegentia capientes.
But those things either, when present, we touch by the sense of the body, or, when absent, we recall their images fixed in the memory, or from their likeness we fashion such things as we ourselves, if we wished and were able, would even build by our work: in one way shaping in our mind the images of bodies, or seeing bodies through the body; but in another way grasping the reasons and the ineffably beautiful art of such figures, above the edge of the mind, by simple understanding.
deTrin.8.6.117. 12. In illa igitur aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus, et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus: atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam, tamquam verbum apud nos habemus, et dicendo intus gignimus; nec a nobis nascendo discedit. Cum autem ad alios loquimur, verbo intus manenti ministerium vocis adhibemus, aut alicuius signi corporalis, ut per quandam commemorationem sensibilem tale aliquid fiat etiam in animo audientis, quale de loquentis animo non recedit. Nihil itaque agimus per membra corporis in factis dictisque nostris, quibus vel approbantur vel improbantur mores hominum, quod non verbo apud nos intus edito praevenimus. Nemo enim aliquid volens facit, quod non in corde suo prius dixerit.
7. 12. In that eternal truth, then, from which all temporal things were made, we behold with the gaze of the mind the form according to which we exist, and according to which we do anything, whether in ourselves or in bodies, by true and right reason: and thence we have with us a truthful knowledge of things, conceived as it were a word, and by speaking we beget it within; nor does it depart from us in being born. But when we speak to others, we apply to the word that abides within the ministry of the voice, or of some bodily sign, so that by a kind of sensible reminder something of the same kind may come about also in the soul of the hearer as does not recede from the soul of the speaker. So we do nothing through the members of the body, in our deeds and words by which the conduct of people is approved or disapproved, that we do not anticipate by a word uttered within us. For no one willingly does anything that he has not first said in his heart.
deTrin.8.7.127. 13. Quod verbum amore concipitur, sive creaturae, sive Creatoris, id est, aut naturae mutabilis, aut incommutabilis veritatis.
7. 13. This word is conceived by love, whether of the creature or of the Creator, that is, either of changeable nature or of unchangeable truth.
deTrin.8.7.138. 13. Ergo aut cupiditate aut caritate: non quo non sit amanda creatura; sed si ad Creatorem refertur ille amor, non iam cupiditas, sed caritas erit. Tunc enim est cupiditas, cum propter se amatur creatura. Tunc non utentem adiuvat, sed corrumpit fruentem.
8. 13. Therefore either by cupidity or by love: not that the creature is not to be loved; but if that love is referred to the Creator, it will no longer be cupidity, but love. For it is cupidity when the creature is loved for its own sake. Then it does not help the one who uses, but corrupts the one who enjoys.
deTrin.8.8.13Cum ergo aut par nobis, aut inferior creatura sit, inferiore utendum est ad Deum; pari autem fruendum, sed in Deo. Sicut enim te ipso, non in te ipso frui debes, sed in eo qui fecit te; sic etiam illo quem diligis tamquam te ipsum. Et nobis ergo et fratribus in Domino fruamur, et inde nos nec ad nosmetipsos remittere, et quasi relaxare deorsum versus audeamus. Nascitur autem verbum, (That is, the word conceived in love) cum excogitatum placet, aut ad peccandum, aut ad recte faciendum. Verbum ergo nostrum et mentem de qua gignitur, quasi medius amor coniungit, seque cum eis tertium complexu incorporeo, sine ulla confusione constringit.
Since, then, a creature is either equal to us or inferior, the inferior is to be used for the sake of God; but the equal is to be enjoyed, yet in God. For just as you ought to enjoy yourself, not in yourself, but in him who made you, so too the one whom you love as yourself. Let us, then, enjoy both ourselves and our brothers in the Lord, and from there let us not dare to send ourselves back, as it were, downward, and to slacken toward our lower selves. But the word is born (That is, the word conceived in love) when what has been thought out is pleasing, either for sinning or for doing rightly. Our word, then, and the mind from which it is begotten, are joined as by a love between them, and this love binds itself with them as a third, by an incorporeal embrace, without any confusion.
deTrin.8.8.139. 14. Conceptum autem verbum et natum idipsum est, cum voluntas in ipsa notitia conquiescit, quod fit in amore spiritalium. Qui enim, verbi gratia, perfecte novit, perfecteque amat iustitiam, iam iustus est, etiamsi nulla exsistat secundum eam forinsecus per membra corporis operandi necessitas. In amore autem carnalium temporaliumque rerum, sicut in ipsis animalium fetibus, alius est conceptus verbi, alius partus. Illic enim quod cupiendo concipitur, adipiscendo nascitur. Quoniam non sufficit avaritiae nosse et amare aurum, nisi et habeat; neque nosse et amare vesci, aut concumbere, nisi etiam id agat; neque nosse et amare honores et imperia, nisi proveniant.
9. 14. Now the word conceived and the word born are the same, when the will rests in the knowledge itself, which happens in the love of spiritual things. For one who, for example, perfectly knows and perfectly loves justice is already just, even if there exists no outward necessity of acting according to it through the members of the body. But in the love of carnal and temporal things, as in the very offspring of animals, the conceiving of the word is one thing, the bringing forth another. For there what is conceived by desiring is born by obtaining. Since it does not suffice avarice to know and love gold, unless it also have it; nor to know and love eating, or sexual union, unless it also do it; nor to know and love honors and offices, unless they come about.
deTrin.8.9.14Quae tamen omnia, nec adepta sufficiunt: Qui enim biberit ex hac, inquit, aqua, sitiet iterum. Ideoque et in Psalmis: Concepit, inquit, dolorem, et peperit iniquitatem.
Yet all these things, even when obtained, do not suffice: For whoever drinks of this water, he says, will thirst again. And therefore also in the Psalms: He conceived sorrow, and brought forth iniquity.
deTrin.8.9.14Dolorem vel laborem dicit concipi, cum ea concipiuntur quae nosse ac velle non sufficit, et inardescit atque aegrotat animus indigentia, donec ad ea perveniat, et quasi pariat ea. Unde eleganter in latina lingua parta dicuntur et reperta atque comperta, quae verba quasi a partu ducta resonant. Quia concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit peccatum.
He says that sorrow or toil is conceived, when those things are conceived which it does not suffice to know and to will, and the soul burns and sickens in want, until it comes to them, and as it were brings them forth. Hence elegantly in the Latin tongue things obtained are called parta, and things discovered reperta and comperta, words that sound as though drawn from giving birth (partus). Because desire, when it has conceived, brings forth sin.
deTrin.8.9.14Unde Dominus clamat: Venite ad me, omnes qui laboratis et onerati estis: et alio loco: Vae praegnantibus et mammantibus in illis diebus. (Cf. Mark 13:17; Luke 21:23) Cum itaque ad partum verbi referret omnia vel recte facta vel peccata, Ex ore, inquit, tuo iustificaberis, et ex ore tuo condemnaberis; os volens intellegi, non hoc visibile, sed interius invisibile cogitationis et cordis.
Hence the Lord cries out: Come to me, all you who labor and are burdened: and in another place: Woe to those who are pregnant and nursing in those days. (See Mark 13:17; Luke 21:23) And so, since he referred all things, whether deeds rightly done or sins, to the bringing forth of a word, he says, By your mouth you will be justified, and by your mouth you will be condemned; meaning by mouth not this visible one, but the inner, invisible one of thought and of the heart.
deTrin.8.9.1410. 15. Recte ergo quaeritur, utrum omnis notitia verbum, an tantum amata notitia. Novimus enim et ea quae odimus; sed nec concepta, nec parta dicenda sunt animo, quae nobis displicent. Non enim omnia quae quoquo modo tangunt, concipiuntur, ut tantum nota sint non tamen verba dicantur ista de quibus nunc agimus. The translator takes ista etc., as qualifying verba, because of what Augustine goes on to say; thus, ista is not taken as the subject of this clause, which, other things being equal, would be the more natural thing to do. The PL inserts a sicut immediately before ista. This alters the whole structure of the sentence, but supports the translator as taking the omnia (“everything”) of the main clause as subject of the subordinate clause. The PL would require the following translation: “Not everything that touches our mind in any way is conceived, so it may be known without being called a word, like the things we are now talking about.”
10. 15. Rightly, then, it is asked whether all knowledge is a word, or only known and loved knowledge. For we know also the things we hate; but the things that displease us are not to be called conceived or brought forth by the soul. For not all things that touch us in any way at all are conceived, so that they may only be known and yet not be called the words we are now dealing with. The translator takes ista etc., as qualifying verba, because of what Augustine goes on to say; thus, ista is not taken as the subject of this clause, which, other things being equal, would be the more natural thing to do. The PL inserts a sicut immediately before ista. This alters the whole structure of the sentence, but supports the translator as taking the omnia (“everything”) of the main clause as subject of the subordinate clause. The PL would require the following translation: “Not everything that touches our mind in any way is conceived, so it may be known without being called a word, like the things we are now talking about.”
deTrin.8.10.15Aliter enim dicuntur verba quae spatia temporum syllabis tenent, sive pronuntientur, sive cogitentur; aliter omne quod notum est, verbum dicitur animo impressum, quamdiu de memoria proferri et definiri potest, quamvis res ipsa displiceat; aliter cum placet quod mente concipitur.
For words are spoken of in one way which hold spaces of time by their syllables, whether they are uttered or thought; in another way everything that is known is called a word impressed on the soul, as long as it can be brought forth from the memory and defined, although the thing itself is displeasing; in another way when what is conceived in the mind is pleasing.
deTrin.8.10.15Secundum quod genus verbi accipiendum est quod ait Apostolus, Nemo dicit: ‘Dominus Iesus,’ nisi in Spiritu sancto: cum secundum aliam verbi notionem dicant hoc et illi, de quibus ipse Dominus ait, Non omnis qui mihi dicit, Domine, Domine, intrabit in regnum caelorum.
It is according to this kind of word that we must take what the Apostle says, No one says, ‘Jesus is Lord,’ except in the Holy Spirit: while, according to another notion of word, this is said also by those of whom the Lord himself says, Not everyone who says to me, Lord, Lord, will enter the kingdom of heaven.
deTrin.8.10.15Verumtamen cum et illa quae odimus, recte displicent, recteque improbantur, approbatur eorum improbatio, et placet, et verbum est. Neque vitiorum notitia nobis displicet, sed ipsa vitia. Nam placet mihi quod novi et definio quid sit intemperantia; et hoc est verbum eius. Sicuti sunt in arte nota vitia, et recte approbatur eorum notitia, cum discernit cognitor speciem privationemque virtutis, sicut aiere et negare, et esse et non esse; attamen virtute privari atque in vitium deficere, damnabile est.
Nevertheless, when even those things which we hate rightly displease us and are rightly disapproved, the disapproval of them is approved, and is pleasing, and is a word. Nor does the knowledge of vices displease us, but the vices themselves. For it pleases me that I know and define what intemperance is; and this is its word. Just as in an art the faults are known, and the knowledge of them is rightly approved, when one who knows discerns the form and the privation of a virtue, as to affirm and to deny, and to be and not to be; yet to be deprived of virtue and to fall away into vice is damnable.
deTrin.8.10.15Et definire intemperantiam, verbumque eius dicere, pertinet ad artem morum: esse autem intemperantem, ad id pertinet quod illa arte culpatur. Sicut nosse ac definire quid sit soloecismus, pertinet ad artem loquendi: facere autem, vitium est quod eadem arte reprehenditur. Verbum est igitur, quod nunc discernere et insinuare volumus, cum amore notitia. Cum itaque se mens novit et amat, iungitur ei amore verbum eius. Et quoniam amat notitiam et novit amorem, et verbum in amore est, et amor in verbo, et utrumque in amante atque dicente.
And to define intemperance, and to speak its word, belongs to the art of morals: but to be intemperate belongs to that which is blamed by that art. Just as to know and to define what a solecism is belongs to the art of speaking: but to commit one is the fault that is reproved by the same art. A word, then, is what we now wish to discern and to convey: knowledge with love. So when the mind knows itself and loves itself, its word is joined to it by love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, both the word is in love, and love is in the word, and both are in the one loving and speaking.
deTrin.8.10.1511. 16. Sed omnis secundum speciem notitia, similis est ei rei quam novit. Est enim alia notitia secundum privationem, quam cum improbamus, loquimur. Et haec privationis improbatio speciem laudat, ideoque approbatur. Habet ergo animus nonnullam speciei notae similitudinem, sive cum ea placet, sive cum eius privatio displicet. Quocirca in quantum Deum novimus, similes sumus: sed non ad aequalitatem similes, quia nec tantum eum novimus, quantum ipse se.
11. 16. But all knowledge according to a form is like the thing it knows. For there is another knowledge according to privation, which we voice when we disapprove. And this disapproval of a privation praises the form, and therefore is approved. The soul, then, has some likeness of the known form, whether when it is pleased with it, or when its privation displeases. Wherefore, insofar as we know God, we are like him: but not like to the point of equality, since we do not know him as much as he knows himself.
deTrin.8.11.16Et quemadmodum cum per sensum corporis discimus corpora, fit eorum aliqua similitudo in animo nostro, quae phantasia memoriae est: non enim omnino ipsa corpora in animo sunt, cum ea cogitamus; sed eorum similitudines: itaque cum eas pro illis approbamus, erramus; error namque est pro alio alterius approbatio: melior est tamen imaginatio corporis in animo, quam illa species corporis, in quantum haec in meliore natura est, id est, in substantia vitali, sicuti animus est: ita cum Deum novimus, quamvis meliores efficiamur quam eramus antequam nossemus, maximeque cum eadem notitia etiam placita digneque amata verbum est, fitque aliqua Dei similitudo illa notitia: tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, Creator autem Deus.
And just as when we learn bodies through the sense of the body, some likeness of them comes to be in our soul, which is the phantasy of the memory—for the bodies themselves are not in the soul at all, when we think of them, but their likenesses: and so when we approve these in place of the bodies, we err; for it is an error to approve one thing in place of another—yet the imagination of a body in the soul is better than that form of the body, insofar as the former is in a better nature, that is, in a living substance, such as the soul is: so when we know God, although we are made better than we were before we knew him—and most of all when that same knowledge, being also pleasing and worthily loved, is a word, and that knowledge becomes some likeness of God—yet it is inferior, because it is in an inferior nature; for the soul is a creature, but God is the Creator.
deTrin.8.11.16Ex quo colligitur, quia cum se mens ipsa novit atque approbat sic est eadem notitia verbum eius, ut ei sit par omnino et aequale, atque identidem: quia neque inferioris essentiae notitia est, sicut corporis; neque superioris sicut Dei. Et cum habeat notitia similitudinem ad eam rem quam novit, hoc est, cuius notitia est: haec habet perfectam et aequalem, qua mens ipsa, quae novit, est nota. Ideoque et imago et verbum est, quia de illa exprimitur, cum cognoscendo eidem coaequatur, et est gignenti aequale quod genitum est.
From which it is gathered that when the mind itself knows and approves itself, this same knowledge is so its word as to be altogether on a par with it and equal, and identical: because the knowledge is neither of an inferior essence, like that of a body; nor of a superior, like that of God. And since knowledge has a likeness to the thing it knows, that is, of which it is the knowledge, this knowledge has a perfect and equal likeness, by which the mind itself, which knows, is known. And therefore it is both an image and a word, because it is expressed from that mind, since in knowing it is made equal to it, and what is begotten is equal to the one begetting.
deTrin.8.11.16C
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12. 17. Quid ergo amor? non erit imago? non verbum? non genitus? Cur enim mens notitiam suam gignit, cum se novit; et amorem suum non gignit, cum se amat? Nam si propterea est notionis suae causa, quia noscibilis est; amoris etiam sui causa est, quia est amabilis. Cur itaque non utrumque genuerit, difficile est dicere. Haec enim quaestio etiam de ipsa summa Trinitate, omnipotentissimo creatore Deo, ad cuius imaginem homo factus est, solet movere homines, quos veritas Dei per humanam locutionem invitat ad fidem, cur non Spiritus quoque sanctus a Patre Deo genitus vel creditur vel intellegitur, ut filius etiam ipse dicatur?
12. 17. What, then, of love? Will it not be an image? not a word? not begotten? For why does the mind beget its knowledge when it knows itself, and not beget its love when it loves itself? For if it is the cause of its knowing because it is knowable, it is also the cause of its love because it is lovable. Why, then, it has not begotten both, is difficult to say. For this question is wont to trouble people even concerning the supreme Trinity itself, the most almighty creator God, in whose image the human being was made—people whom the truth of God invites to faith through human speech—why the Holy Spirit too is not believed or understood to be begotten by God the Father, so that he too may be called a son?
deTrin.8.12.17Quod nunc in mente humana utcumque investigare conamur, ut ex inferiore imagine, in qua nobis familiarius natura ipsa nostra, quasi interrogata respondet, exercitatiorem mentis aciem ab illuminata creatura ad lumen incommutabile dirigamus: si tamen veritas ipsa persuaserit, sicut Dei Verbum (Cf. Sir 1:5; 1 Thess 2:13; Rev 19:13) Filium esse nullus christianus dubitat, ita caritatem esse Spiritum Sanctum. Ergo ad imaginem illam, quae creatura est, hoc est, ad rationalem mentem diligentius de hac re interrogandam considerandamque redeamus, ubi temporaliter exsistens nonnullarum rerum notitia, quae antea non erat, et aliquarum rerum amor, quae antea non amabantur, distinctius nobis aperit quid dicamus: quia et ipsi locutioni temporaliter dirigendae, facilior est ad explicandum res quae in ordine temporum comprehenditur.
This we now try in some way to investigate in the human mind, so that from the inferior image, in which our very nature, as it were questioned, answers us more familiarly, we may direct the more practiced edge of the mind from the illumined creature to the unchangeable light: if, that is, the truth itself shall have persuaded us that, just as no Christian doubts that the Word of God (See Sir 1:5; 1 Thess 2:13; Rev 19:13) is the Son, so love is the Holy Spirit. Therefore let us return to that image which is a creature, that is, to the rational mind, to question and consider it more diligently on this matter, where the knowledge of certain things, coming to exist in time, which was not there before, and the love of certain things which were not before loved, opens to us more distinctly what we are saying: because for our speech too, which must be ordered in time, a thing that is comprised in the order of times is easier to unfold.
deTrin.8.12.1712. 18. Primo itaque manifestum sit, posse fieri ut sit aliquid scibile, id est, quod sciri possit, et tamen nesciatur: illud autem fieri non posse, ut sciatur quod scibile non fuerit. Unde liquido tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus, congenerat in nobis notitiam sui. Ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito. Cf. Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6.
12. 18. First, then, let it be plain that it can happen that something is knowable, that is, that can be known, and yet is not known: but that this cannot happen, that what was not knowable should be known. From which it is clearly to be held that every thing whatever we know begets in us a knowledge of itself. For knowledge is brought forth from both, from the one knowing and the one known. See Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6.
deTrin.8.12.18Itaque mens cum se ipsam cognoscit, sola parens est notitiae suae: et cognitum enim et cognitor ipsa est. Erat autem sibi ipsa noscibilis, et antequam se nosset: sed notitia sui non erat in ea, cum se ipsa non noverat. Quod ergo cognoscit se, parem sibi notitiam sui gignit: quia non minus se novit quam est, nec alterius essentiae est notitia eius, non solum quia ipsa novit, sed etiam quia se ipsam, sicut supra diximus.
And so the mind, when it knows itself, is the sole parent of its own knowledge: for it is itself both the known and the knower. But it was knowable to itself even before it knew itself: yet the knowledge of itself was not in it, when it did not know itself. In knowing itself, then, it begets a knowledge of itself equal to itself: because it knows itself no less than it is, nor is its knowledge of another essence, not only because it itself knows, but also because it knows itself, as we said above.
deTrin.8.12.18Quid ergo de amore dicendum est, cur non etiam cum se amat, ipsum quoque amorem sui genuisse videatur? Erat enim amabilis sibi, et antequam se amaret, quia poterat se amare; sicut erat sibi noscibilis, et antequam se nosset, quia se poterat nosse. Nam si non sibi esset noscibilis, numquam se nosse potuisset: ita si non sibi esset amabilis, numquam se amare potuisset. Cur itaque amando se non genuisse dicatur amorem suum; sicut cognoscendo se genuit notitiam suam? An eo quidem manifeste ostenditur hoc amoris esse principium, unde procedit: ab ipsa quippe mente procedit: quae sibi est amabilis antequam se amet; atque ita principium est amoris sui, quo se amat:
What, then, is to be said of love, why, even when it loves itself, it does not seem to have begotten its own love as well? For it was lovable to itself even before it loved itself, because it could love itself; just as it was knowable to itself even before it knew itself, because it could know itself. For if it were not knowable to itself, it could never have known itself: so if it were not lovable to itself, it could never have loved itself. Why, then, is it not said, by loving itself, to have begotten its love; just as, by knowing itself, it begot its knowledge? Or is this at least clearly shown thereby, that this is the principle of love, whence it proceeds: for it proceeds from the mind itself, which is lovable to itself before it loves itself; and so is the principle of the love by which it loves itself:
deTrin.8.12.18sed ideo non recte dicitur genitus ab ea, sicut notitia sui qua se novit, quia notitia iam inventum est, quod partum vel repertum dicitur, quod saepe praecedit inquisitio eo fine quietura? Nam inquisitio est appetitus inveniendi, quod idem valet si dicas, reperiendi.
but is it for this reason not rightly said to be begotten by it, as is the knowledge of itself by which it knows itself, because knowledge is what is already found, which is called brought forth or discovered, which inquiry often precedes with the end of coming to rest in it? For inquiry is the appetite of finding—which is the same if you say, of discovering.
deTrin.8.12.18Quae autem reperiuntur, quasi pariuntur: unde proli similia sunt; ubi, nisi in ipsa notitia? Ibi enim quasi expressa formantur. Nam etsi iam erant res quas quaerendo invenimus, notitia tamen ipsa non erat, quam sicut prolem nascentem deputamus.
But things discovered are, as it were, brought forth: hence they are like offspring; where, if not in the knowledge itself? For there they are formed, as it were expressed. For although the things we find by seeking already existed, yet the knowledge itself did not exist, which we count as offspring being born.
deTrin.8.12.18Porro appetitus ille, qui est in quaerendo, procedit a quaerente, et pendet quodam modo, neque requiescit fine quo intenditur, nisi id quod quaeritur inventum quaerenti copuletur. Qui appetitus, id est inquisitio, quamvis amor esse non videatur, quo id quod notum est, amatur; hoc enim adhuc ut cognoscatur agitur: tamen ex eodem genere quiddam est. Nam voluntas iam dici potest, quia omnis qui quaerit invenire vult; (Cf. Matt 7:7; Luke 11:9, 14:10) et si id quaeritur quod ad notitiam pertineat, omnis qui quaerit nosse vult. Quod si ardenter atque instanter vult, studere dicitur: quod maxime in assequendis atque adipiscendis quibusque doctrinis dici solet.
Further, that appetite which is in seeking proceeds from the one seeking, and in a way hangs in suspense, nor does it come to rest in the end toward which it is intent, unless that which is sought, being found, is coupled to the one seeking. This appetite, that is, inquiry, although it does not seem to be the love by which what is known is loved—for this is still going on in order that it may be known—yet is something of the same kind. For it can already be called will, since everyone who seeks wishes to find; (See Matt 7:7; Luke 11:9, 14:10) and if what is sought pertains to knowledge, everyone who seeks wishes to know. And if he wishes it ardently and insistently, he is said to be zealous: which is most often said in the case of attaining and acquiring various branches of learning.
deTrin.8.12.18Partum ergo mentis antecedit appetitus quidam, quo id quod nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniendo, nascitur proles ipsa notitia: ac per hoc appetitus ille quo concipitur pariturque notitia, partus et proles recte dici non potest; idemque appetitus quo inhiatur rei cognoscendae, fit amor cognitae, dum tenet atque amplectitur placitam prolem, id est, notitiam, gignentique coniungit.
The bringing forth of the mind, then, is preceded by a certain appetite, by which, in seeking and finding what we wish to know, the offspring, knowledge itself, is born: and through this, that appetite by which knowledge is conceived and brought forth cannot rightly be called the bringing forth and the offspring; and the same appetite by which one longs for the thing to be known becomes the love of the thing known, while it holds and embraces the pleasing offspring, that is, knowledge, and joins it to the one begetting.
deTrin.8.12.18Et est quaedam imago Trinitatis, ipsa mens, et notitia eius, quod est proles eius ac de se ipsa verbum eius, et amor tertius, et haec tria unum From the famous Johannine comma, a gloss that seems to have crept into certain Latin manuscripts toward the end of the fourth century; it is not found in any Greek manuscript of the New Testament before the ninth century, nor in the best manuscripts of the Vulgate. atque una substantia. Nec minor proles, dum tantam se novit mens quanta est: nec minor amor, dum tantum se diligit quantum novit et quanta est.
And there is a certain image of the Trinity: the mind itself, and its knowledge, which is its offspring and its word concerning itself, and love as a third, and these three are one From the famous Johannine comma, a gloss that seems to have crept into certain Latin manuscripts toward the end of the fourth century; it is not found in any Greek manuscript of the New Testament before the ninth century, nor in the best manuscripts of the Vulgate. and one substance. Nor is the offspring less, since the mind knows itself just as much as it is: nor is the love less, since it loves itself just as much as it knows and just as much as it is.
deTrin.8.12.18Bk. 10The love of a mind eager to learn is not love of a thing unknown.Amor studentis animi non est amor rei incognitae.
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1. 1. Nunc ad ea ipsa consequenter enodatius explicanda limatior accedat intentio. Ac primum, quia rem prorsus ignotam amare omnino nullus potest, diligenter intuendum est cuiusmodi sit amor studentium, id est, non iam scientium, sed adhuc scire cupientium quamque doctrinam. Et in his quippe rebus in quibus non usitate dicitur studium, solent exsistere amores ex auditu, dum cuiusque pulchritudinis fama ad videndum ac fruendum animus accenditur, quia generaliter novit corporum pulchritudines, ex eo quod plurimas vidit, et inest intrinsecus unde approbetur, cui forinsecus inhiatur. Quod cum fit, non rei penitus incognitae amor excitatur, cuius genus ita notum est. Cum autem virum bonum amamus, cuius faciem non vidimus, ex notitia virtutum amamus, quas novimus in ipsa veritate.
1. 1. Now let a more refined attention approach the unfolding of these very things, consequently and more clearly. And first, since no one can in any way love a thing wholly unknown, we must look carefully at the kind of love that learners have, that is, of those who do not yet know, but still desire to know, some branch of learning. For even in those matters in which the word “zeal” is not customarily used, there are wont to arise loves from hearsay, when the soul is kindled, by the fame of some beauty, to see it and enjoy it; because it generally knows the beauties of bodies, from the fact that it has seen very many, and there is within it something by which what is longed for outwardly is approved. And when this happens, it is not a love of a wholly unknown thing that is stirred, whose kind is thus known. But when we love a good man whose face we have not seen, we love him from the knowledge of the virtues which we know in the truth itself.
deTrin.10.1.1Ad doctrinas autem cognoscendas, plerumque nos laudantium atque praedicantium accendit auctoritas: et tamen nisi breviter impressam cuiusque doctrinae haberemus in animo notionem, nullo ad eam discendam studio flagraremus. Quis enim sciendae, verbi gratia, rhetoricae ullam curam et operam impenderet, nisi ante sciret eam dicendi esse scientiam? Aliquando etiam ipsarum doctrinarum fines auditos expertosve miramur, et ex hoc inardescimus facultatem comparare discendo, qua ad eos pervenire possimus.
But to come to know branches of learning, it is most often the authority of those who praise and commend them that kindles us: and yet, unless we had a briefly impressed notion of each branch of learning in our soul, we would burn with no zeal to learn it. For who, for example, would expend any care and labor on learning rhetoric, unless he first knew that it is the science of speaking? Sometimes too we marvel at the ends of these branches of learning, when we have heard of them or experienced them, and from this we burn to acquire by learning the ability by which we may be able to reach them.
deTrin.10.1.1Tamquam si litteras nescienti dicatur quandam esse doctrinam, qua quisque valeat, quamvis longe absenti, verba mittere manu facta in silentio, quae rursus ille cui mittuntur, non auribus, sed oculis colligat, idque fieri videat; nonne, dum concupiscit nosse quo id possit, omni studio circa illum finem movetur, quem iam notum tenet? Sic accenduntur studia discentium: nam quod quisque prorsus ignorat, amare nullo pacto potest.
As if to one who does not know letters it were said that there is a certain skill by which anyone is able, however far away, to send words made by the hand in silence, which in turn the one to whom they are sent gathers not with the ears, but with the eyes, and he sees that this is done; would he not, while he longs to know by what means he could do this, be moved with all zeal toward that end which he already holds as known? So are the zealous efforts of learners kindled: for what anyone wholly does not know, he can in no way love.
deTrin.10.1.11. 2. Ita etiam signum si quis audiat incognitum, veluti verbi alicuius sonum, quo quid significetur ignorat, cupit scire quidnam sit, id est, sonus ille cui rei commemorandae institutus sit: veluti audiat cum dicitur temetum, The Latin temetum, here translated as “metheglin,” is an obsolete word whose meaning is going to be explained in due course. et ignorans quid sit requirat. Iam itaque oportet ut noverit signum esse, id est, non esse inanem illam vocem, sed aliquid ea significari: alioquin iam notum est hoc trisyllabum, et articulatam speciem suam impressit animo per sensum aurium: quid amplius in eo requiratur, quo magis innotescat, cuius omnes litterae omniaque soni spatia nota sunt; nisi quia simul innotuit signum esse, movitque sciendi cupiditatem, cuius rei signum sit?
1. 2. So too, if anyone hears an unknown sign, such as the sound of some word, by which he does not know what is signified, he desires to know what it is, that is, what thing that sound was established to call to mind: as if he hears it said “metheglin,” The Latin temetum, here translated as “metheglin,” is an obsolete word whose meaning is going to be explained in due course. and, not knowing what it is, asks. Now then it is necessary that he already know it to be a sign, that is, that that utterance is not empty, but that something is signified by it: otherwise this trisyllable is already known, and has impressed its articulated form on the soul through the sense of the ears: what more would be sought in it, by which it might become better known, all of whose letters and all of whose spans of sound are known; unless because at the same time it became known to be a sign, and stirred the desire to know of what thing it is the sign?
deTrin.10.1.2Quo igitur amplius notum est, sed non plene notum est, eo cupit animus de illo nosse quod reliquum est. Si enim tantummodo esse istam vocem nosset, eamque alicuius rei signum esse non nosset, nihil iam quaereret, sensibili re, quantum poterat, sentiendo percepta. Quia vero non solum esse vocem, sed et signum esse iam novit, perfecte id nosse vult. Neque ullum perfecte signum noscitur, nisi cuius rei signum sit cognoscatur.
The more, then, it is known, but not fully known, the more the soul desires to know about it what remains. For if it knew only that this utterance exists, and did not know it to be the sign of some thing, it would now seek nothing further, having perceived the sensible thing, as far as it could, by sensing it. But because it now knows not only that it is an utterance, but also that it is a sign, it wishes to know it perfectly. And no sign is perfectly known, unless it is known of what thing it is the sign.
deTrin.10.1.2Hoc ergo qui ardenti cura quaerit ut noverit, studioque accensus insistit, num potest dici esse sine amore? Quid igitur amat? Certe enim amari aliquid nisi notum non potest. Neque enim ille istas tres syllabas amat, quas iam notas habet. Quod si iam hoc in eis amat, quia scit eas significare aliquid; non inde nunc agitur, non enim hoc nosse quaerit: sed in eo quod scire studet, quid amet inquirimus, quod profecto nondum novit: et propterea miramur cur amet, quoniam firmissime novimus amari nisi nota non posse.
One, then, who seeks with burning care to know this, and, kindled with zeal, presses on, can he be said to be without love? What, then, does he love? For surely nothing can be loved unless it is known. Nor does he love these three syllables, which he already holds as known. But if he already loves this in them, that he knows they signify something; that is not what is now in question, for he does not seek to know this: but in that which he is eager to know, we ask what he loves, which he surely does not yet know: and therefore we marvel why he loves, since we know most firmly that nothing can be loved unless it is known.
deTrin.10.1.2Quid ergo amat, nisi quia novit atque intuetur in rationibus rerum quae sit pulchritudo doctrinae, qua continentur notitiae signorum omnium; et quae sit utilitas in ea peritia, qua inter se humana societas sensa communicat, ne sibi hominum coetus deteriores sint quavis solitudine, si cogitationes suas colloquendo non misceant. Hanc ergo speciem decoram et utilem cernit anima, et novit, et amat; eamque in se perfici studet, quantum potest, quisquis vocum significantium quaecumque ignorat, inquirit. Aliud est enim quod eam in veritatis luce conspicit, aliud quod in sua facultate concupiscit.
What, then, does he love, except that he knows and beholds, in the reasons of things, what is the beauty of that branch of learning by which the knowledge of all signs is contained; and what is the usefulness in that skill by which human society shares its thoughts among itself, lest the gatherings of people be worse for them than any solitude, if they do not mingle their thoughts by conversing. The soul, then, discerns this becoming and useful form, and knows it, and loves it; and whoever inquires into any significant utterances he does not know is eager that it be perfected in himself, as far as he can. For it is one thing that he beholds it in the light of truth, another that he longs for it in his own ability.
deTrin.10.1.2Conspicit namque in luce veritatis quam magnum et quam bonum sit omnes omnium gentium linguas intellegere ac loqui, nullamque ut alienigena audire, et a nullo ita audiri. Cuius notitiae decus cogitatione iam cernitur, amaturque res nota; quae ita conspicitur, atque inflammat studia discentium, ut circa eam moveantur, eique inhient in omni opera quam impendunt consequendae tali facultati, ut etiam usu amplectantur quod ratione praenoscunt: atque ita quisque, cui facultati spe propinquat, ei ferventius amore inardescit. Eis doctrinis quippe studetur vehementius, quae capi posse non desperantur. Nam cuius rei adipiscendae spem quisque non gerit, aut tepide amat, aut omnino non amat, quamvis quam pulchra sit videat.
For he beholds in the light of truth how great and how good it is to understand and speak the tongues of all nations, and to hear none as a foreigner, and to be heard by none as such. The grace of this knowledge is already discerned by thought, and the known thing is loved; which is so beheld, and so inflames the zeal of learners, that they are moved about it, and long for it in all the labor they expend on attaining such an ability, so that they may even embrace by use what they foreknow by reason: and so each one, as he draws near in hope to that ability, burns the more fervently toward it with love. For those branches of learning are pursued the more eagerly which are not despaired of as capable of being grasped. For of a thing for the attaining of which one bears no hope, he either loves it tepidly, or does not love it at all, although he sees how beautiful it is.
deTrin.10.1.2Quocirca, quia omnium linguarum scientia fere ab omnibus desperatur, suae gentis quisque maxime studet, ut noverit. Quod si et illi ad perfectum percipiendae se non sufficere sentit, nemo tamen tam desidiosus est huius notitiae, qui non, cum audierit incognitum verbum, velit nosse quid illud sit, et si potest, quaerat ac discat.
Wherefore, since the knowledge of all tongues is despaired of by almost everyone, each one is most eager to know that of his own nation. And if he feels that he does not suffice even for that to the point of perfection, yet no one is so slothful in this knowledge that, when he has heard an unknown word, he does not wish to know what it is, and, if he can, seek it out and learn it.
deTrin.10.1.2Quod dum quaerit, utique in studio discendi est, et videtur amare rem incognitam; quod non ita est. Species namque illa tangit animum, quam novit et cogitat, in qua elucet decus consociandorum animorum in vocibus notis audiendis atque reddendis: eaque accendit studio quaerentem quidem quod ignorat, sed notam formam, quo id pertineat, intuentem et amantem.
And while he seeks this, he is surely in the zeal of learning, and seems to love an unknown thing; which is not so. For that form touches his soul, which it knows and thinks of, in which shines the grace of joining souls together in the hearing and rendering of known utterances: and this kindles with zeal one who indeed seeks what he does not know, but beholds and loves the known form to which it pertains.
deTrin.10.1.2Itaque si quaerenti, verbi gratia, quid sit temetum (hoc enim exempli causa posueram), dicatur, Quid ad te pertinet? respondebit, Ne forte audiam loquentem, et non intellegam, aut uspiam forte id legam, et quid scriptor senserit, nesciam. Quis tandem huic dicat, Noli intellegere quod audis, noli nosse quod legis? Omnibus enim fere animis rationalibus in promptu est ad videndum huius peritiae pulchritudo, qua hominum inter se cogitata, significantium vocum enuntiatione noscuntur: propter hoc notum decus, et ob hoc amatum quia notum, studiose quaeritur verbum illud ignotum.
And so if to one who seeks, for example, what “metheglin” is (for I had put this for the sake of example), it is said, What does it matter to you? he will answer, Lest perhaps I hear a speaker and not understand him, or perhaps somewhere read it and not know what the writer meant. Who, then, would say to this person, Do not understand what you hear, do not know what you read? For to almost all rational souls the beauty of this skill is ready at hand to be seen, by which the thoughts of people are made known to one another by the utterance of significant sounds: on account of this known grace, and loved because known, that unknown word is eagerly sought.
deTrin.10.1.2Itaque cum audierit atque cognoverit temetum a veteribus vinum appellatum, Cf. Plautus, Aulularia 355; Juvenal, Satires 15.25; Horace, Epistle 2.2; Cicero, De Re Publica 4, fragment 6.6. sed iam ex usu loquendi quem nunc habemus, hoc vocabulum emortuum, propter nonnullos fortasse veterum libros sibi necessarium deputabit. Si autem et illos supervacaneos habet, forte iam nec dignum quod memoriae commendet existimat, quia videt ad illam speciem doctrinae quam notam mente intuetur atque amat, minime pertinere.
And so when he has heard and learned that “metheglin” was called wine by the ancients, See Plautus, Aulularia 355; Juvenal, Satires 15.25; Horace, Epistle 2.2; Cicero, De Re Publica 4, fragment 6.6. but that, by the usage of speech which we now have, this word is dead, he will reckon it necessary to himself perhaps on account of certain books of the ancients. But if he holds even those to be superfluous, perhaps he now judges it not even worth committing to memory, because he sees that it pertains not at all to that form of learning which he beholds in his mind as known and loves.
deTrin.10.1.21. 3. Quamobrem omnis amor studentis animi, hoc est volentis scire quod nescit, non est amor eius rei quam nescit, sed eius quam scit, propter quam vult scire quod nescit. Cf. Jerome, In Hezekiah 13.42; Epistles 53.9.2; 57.12.4; Cicero, Academica 2.23.74. Aut si tam curiosus est, ut non propter causam aliam notam, sed solo amore rapiatur incognita sciendi; discernendus quidem est ab studiosi nomine iste curiosus, sed nec ipse amat incognita, immo congruentius dicitur, Odit incognita, quae nulla esse vult, dum vult omnia cognita.
1. 3. Wherefore all the love of a mind eager to learn, that is, of one wishing to know what it does not know, is not love of the thing it does not know, but of the thing it knows, on account of which it wishes to know what it does not know. See Jerome, In Hezekiah 13.42; Epistles 53.9.2; 57.12.4; Cicero, Academica 2.23.74. Or if he is so curious that he is seized, not on account of some other known cause, but by the love alone of knowing the unknown; this curious person is indeed to be distinguished from the name of the eager learner, but he too does not love the unknown—rather, it is more fittingly said, He hates the unknown, which he wishes were nothing, since he wishes all things to be known.
deTrin.10.1.3Sed ne quisquam nobis difficiliorem referat quaestionem, asserens tam non posse quemquam odisse quod nescit, quam non potest amare quod nescit, non resistimus veris: sed intellegendum est, non hoc idem dici cum dicitur, Amat scire incognita, ac si diceretur, Amat incognita. Illud enim fieri potest, ut amet quisque scire incognita: ut autem amet incognita, non potest. Non enim frustra ibi est positum scire: quoniam qui scire amat incognita, non ipsa incognita, sed ipsum scire amat.
But lest anyone bring back to us a harder question, asserting that one can as little hate what he does not know as he cannot love what he does not know, we do not resist the truth: but it must be understood that it is not the same thing to say, He loves to know the unknown, as if it were said, He loves the unknown. For this can happen, that one love to know the unknown: but that he love the unknown, cannot. For not in vain is “to know” put there: since one who loves to know the unknown loves, not the unknown itself, but knowing itself.
deTrin.10.1.3Quod nisi haberet cognitum, neque scire se quisquam posset fidenter dicere, neque nescire. Non solum enim qui dicit, Scio et verum dicit, necesse est ut quid sit scire sciat: sed etiam qui dicit, Nescio, idque fidenter et verum dicit, et scit verum se dicere, scit utique quid sit scire: quia et discernit ab sciente nescientem, cum veraciter se intuens dicit, Nescio; et cum id se scit verum dicere, unde sciret, si quid sit scire nesciret?
And unless he had this as known, no one could confidently say either that he knows, or that he does not know. For not only must one who says, I know, and says it truly, know what it is to know: but also one who says, I do not know, and says this confidently and truly, and knows that he says the truth, surely knows what it is to know: because he both distinguishes the one who does not know from the one who knows, when, truthfully beholding himself, he says, I do not know; and when he knows that he says this truly, from where would he know it, if he did not know what it is to know?
deTrin.10.1.32. 4. Quilibet igitur studiosus, quilibet curiosus non amat incognita, etiam cum ardentissimo appetitu instat scire quod nescit. Aut enim iam genere notum habet quod amat, idque nosse expetit, etiam in aliqua re singula, vel in singulis rebus, quae illi nondum notae forte laudantur, fingitque animo imaginariam formam qua excitetur in amorem.
2. 4. Every eager learner, then, every curious person, does not love the unknown, even when he presses with the most ardent appetite to know what he does not know. For either he already holds as known by its kind what he loves, and longs to know it also in some single thing, or in single things, which are perhaps praised to him though not yet known, and he fashions in his soul an imaginary form by which he is stirred to love.
deTrin.10.2.4Unde autem fingit, nisi ex his quae iam noverat? Cuius tamen formae animo figuratae atque in cogitatione notissimae, si eam quae laudabatur dissimilem invenerit, fortasse non amabit. Quod si amaverit, ex illo amare incipiet ex quo didicit. Paulo ante quippe alia erat quae amabatur, quam sibi animus formans exhibere consueverat. Si autem illi formae similem invenerit quam fama praedicaverat, cui vere possit dicere, Iam te amabam; nec tunc utique amabat incognitam, quam in illa similitudine noverat.
But from where does he fashion it, except from those things he already knew? Yet if he finds the thing that was praised to be unlike that form, fashioned in his soul and most well known in his thought, perhaps he will not love it. But if he loves it, he will begin to love it from the moment he learned of it. For a little before, what was loved was something other than what the soul, forming it for itself, had been wont to present. But if he finds it like that form which fame had proclaimed, to which he could truly say, I loved you already; not even then did he love something unknown, which he had known in that likeness.
deTrin.10.2.4Aut in specie sempiternae rationis videmus aliquid et ibi amamus, quod cum expressum in aliqua rei temporalis effigie, illis qui experti sunt laudantibus credimus, et amamus, non aliquid amamus incognitum, unde iam supra satis disseruimus:
Or in the form of the eternal reason we see something and there love it, which, when it is expressed in the likeness of some temporal thing, we believe on the word of those who have experienced it as they praise it, and love it; we do not love something unknown—of which we have already discoursed enough above:
deTrin.10.2.4aut aliquid notum amamus, propter quod ignotum aliquid quaerimus: cuius ignoti amor nequaquam nos tenet, sed illius cogniti, quo pertinere novimus, ut illud etiam quod adhuc ignotum quaerimus, noverimus; sicut de incognito verbo paulo ante locutus sum.
or we love something known, on account of which we seek something unknown: the love of which unknown thing does not in any way hold us, but that of the known thing, to which we know it pertains, that we may come to know that too which we still seek as unknown; as I spoke a little before of the unknown word.
deTrin.10.2.4Aut ipsum scire quisque amat, quod nulli scire aliquid cupienti esse incognitum potest. His causis videntur amare incognita, qui scire aliquid volunt quod nesciunt, et propter ardentiorem quaerendi appetitum sine amore esse dici non possunt.
Or each one loves knowing itself, which can be unknown to no one who desires to know anything. For these reasons those seem to love the unknown who wish to know something they do not know, and who, on account of their more ardent appetite for seeking, cannot be said to be without love.
deTrin.10.2.4Sed quam se res aliter habeat, neque omnino quidquam ametur incognitum, arbitror me persuasisse verum diligenter intuentibus. Sed quia exempla quae dedimus, eorum sunt, qui aliquid quod ipsi non sunt nosse cupiunt; videndum est ne forte aliquod novum genus appareat, cum se ipsa mens nosse desiderat. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.14.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52; De Legibus 1.22.58–23.61.
But how the matter stands otherwise, and that nothing unknown is loved at all, I think I have persuaded those who look carefully at the truth. But because the examples we have given are of those who desire to know something that they themselves are not, we must see whether perhaps some new kind appears, when the mind desires to know itself. See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.14.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52; De Legibus 1.22.58–23.61.
deTrin.10.2.4C
deTrin.10.2.4
3. 5. Quid ergo amat mens, cum ardenter se ipsam quaerit ut noverit, dum incognita sibi est? Ecce enim mens semetipsam quaerit ut noverit, et inflammatur hoc studio. Amat igitur: sed quid amat? Se ipsam? Quomodo, cum se nondum noverit, nec quisquam possit amare quod nescit? An ei fama praedicavit speciem suam, sicut de absentibus solemus audire? Forte ergo non se amat, sed quod de se fingit, hoc amat, longe fortasse aliud quam ipsa est:
3. 5. What, then, does the mind love, when it ardently seeks to know itself, while it is unknown to itself? For see, the mind seeks itself in order to know itself, and is inflamed with this zeal. It loves, then: but what does it love? Itself? How, since it does not yet know itself, and no one can love what he does not know? Or has fame proclaimed its appearance to it, as we are wont to hear of absent things? Perhaps, then, it does not love itself, but what it fashions of itself, this it loves, perhaps far other than it itself is:
deTrin.10.3.5aut si se mens sui similem fingit, et ideo cum hoc figmentum amat, se amat antequam noverit; quia id quod sui simile est intuetur: novit igitur alias mentes ex quibus se fingat, et genere ipso sibi nota est. Cur ergo cum alias mentes novit, se non novit, cum se ipsa nihil sibi possit esse praesentius?
or if the mind fashions for itself something like itself, and therefore, when it loves this figment, loves itself before it knows itself, because it beholds that which is like itself: it knows, then, other minds, from which it fashions itself, and is known to itself by its very kind. Why, then, when it knows other minds, does it not know itself, since nothing can be more present to it than it itself?
deTrin.10.3.5Quod si ut oculis corporis magis alii oculi noti sunt, quam ipsi sibi; non se ergo quaerat numquam inventura. Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.27.67. Numquam enim se oculi praeter specula videbunt: nec ullo modo putandum est etiam rebus incorporeis contemplandis tale aliquid adhiberi, ut mens tamquam in speculo se noverit. Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.30.73; Jas 1:23; 1 Cor 13:9–12.
But if, as with the eyes of the body, other eyes are better known than they are to themselves; then let it not seek itself, since it will never find itself. See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.27.67. For the eyes will never see themselves except in a mirror: nor is it in any way to be supposed that, even in the contemplation of incorporeal things, some such thing is employed, so that the mind might know itself as in a mirror. See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.30.73; Jas 1:23; 1 Cor 13:9–12.
deTrin.10.3.5An in ratione veritatis aeternae videt quam speciosum sit nosse semetipsam, et hoc amat quod videt, studetque in se fieri? quia quamvis sibi nota non sit, notum tamen ei est quam bonum sit, ut sibi nota sit. Et hoc quidem permirabile est, nondum se nosse, et quam sit pulchrum se nosse, iam nosse. An aliquem finem optimum, id est securitatem et beatitudinem suam videt, per quandam occultam memoriam, quae in longinqua eam progressam non deseruit, et credit ad eundem finem, nisi se ipsam cognoverit, se pervenire non posse? Cf. Plato, Phaedo 72; Luke 15:13. Ita dum illud amat, hoc quaerit: et notum amat illud, propter quod quaerit ignotum. Sed cur memoria beatitudinis suae potuit, et memoria sui cum ea perdurare non potuit, ut tam se nosset quae vult pervenire, quam novit illud quo vult pervenire?
Or does it see in the reason of eternal truth how beautiful it is to know oneself, and love this which it sees, and is eager that it come to be in itself? for although it is not known to itself, yet it is known to it how good it is, that it be known to itself. And this indeed is most wonderful, not yet to know itself, and yet already to know how beautiful it is to know itself. Or does it see some best end, that is, its own security and blessedness, through a certain hidden memory, which did not desert it when it had advanced into far regions, and does it believe that it cannot reach that same end unless it knows itself? See Plato, Phaedo 72; Luke 15:13. So, while it loves the one, it seeks the other: and it loves as known the one on account of which it seeks the unknown. But why was the memory of its blessedness able to last, and the memory of itself not able to last along with it, so that it would know itself, which wishes to arrive, as well as it knows that at which it wishes to arrive?
deTrin.10.3.5An cum se nosse Cf. Pythia of Apollo, the Delphic Oracle: Γνῶθι σεαυτόν; Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.14.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52; De Legibus 1.22.58–23.61. amat, non se quam nondum novit, sed ipsum nosse amat; acerbiusque tolerat se ipsam deesse scientiae suae, qua vult cuncta comprehendere? Novit autem quid sit nosse, et dum hoc amat quod novit, etiam se cupit nosse. Ubi ergo nosse suum novit, si se non novit? Cf. Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6. Nam novit quod alia noverit, Cf. Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.1. se autem non noverit: hinc enim novit et quid sit nosse.
Or, when it loves to know itself, See Pythia of Apollo, the Delphic Oracle: Γνῶθι σεαυτόν; Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.14.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52; De Legibus 1.22.58–23.61. does it love, not itself which it does not yet know, but knowing itself; and does it more bitterly bear that it itself is lacking to its own knowledge, by which it wishes to comprehend all things? It knows, however, what it is to know, and while it loves this which it knows, it desires also to know itself. Where, then, does it know its knowing, if it does not know itself? See Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6. For it knows that it knows other things, See Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.1. but does not know itself: for from this it knows also what it is to know.
deTrin.10.3.5Quo pacto igitur se aliquid scientem scit, quae se ipsam nescit? Neque enim alteram mentem scientem scit, sed se ipsam. Scit igitur se ipsam. Deinde cum se quaerit ut noverit, quaerentem se iam novit. Iam se ergo novit. Quapropter non potest omnino nescire se, quae dum se nescientem scit, se utique scit. Si autem se nescientem nesciat, non se quaeret ut sciat. Quapropter eo ipso quo se quaerit, magis se sibi notam quam ignotam esse convincitur. Novit enim se quaerentem atque nescientem, dum se quaerit ut noverit.
In what way, then, does it know itself to know something, which does not know itself? For it does not know another mind to be knowing, but itself. It knows itself, therefore. Then, when it seeks itself in order to know itself, it already knows itself seeking. It already knows itself, then. Wherefore it cannot at all not know itself, which, while it knows itself not knowing, surely knows itself. But if it did not know itself not knowing, it would not seek itself in order to know. Wherefore by the very fact that it seeks itself, it is convicted of being more known than unknown to itself. For it knows itself seeking and not knowing, while it seeks itself in order to know itself.
deTrin.10.3.54. 6. Quid ergo dicemus? Cf. Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.5. an quod ex parte se novit, ex parte non novit? (Cf. 1 Cor 13:9–12) Sed absurdum est dicere, non eam totam scire quod scit. Non dico, Totum scit; sed quod scit, tota scit. Cum itaque aliquid de se scit, quod nisi tota non potest, totam se scit. Scit autem se aliquid scientem, nec potest quidquam scire nisi tota. Scit se igitur totam.
4. 6. What, then, shall we say? See Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.5. that in part it knows itself, in part does not know itself? (See 1 Cor 13:9–12) But it is absurd to say that it does not know the whole of what it knows. I do not say, It knows the whole; but what it knows, it knows wholly. So when it knows something about itself, which it cannot do except as a whole, it knows the whole of itself. But it knows itself to be knowing something, and it cannot know anything except as a whole. It knows the whole of itself, therefore.
deTrin.10.4.6Deinde quid eius ei tam notum est, quam se vivere? Non potest autem et mens esse, et non vivere, quando habet etiam amplius ut intellegat: nam et animae bestiarum vivunt, sed non intellegunt. Sicut ergo mens tota mens est, sic tota vivit. Novit autem vivere se. Totam se igitur novit. Postremo cum se nosse Cf. Pythia of Apollo, the Delphic Oracle: Γνῶθι σεαυτόν; Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.14.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52; De Legibus 1.22.58–23.61. mens quaerit, mentem se esse iam novit: alioquin utrum se quaerat ignorat, et aliud pro alio forsitan quaerat. Fieri enim potest ut ipsa non sit mens, atque ita dum mentem nosse quaerit, non se ipsam quaerat. Quapropter, quoniam cum quaerit mens quid sit mens, novit quod se quaerat profecto novit quod ipsa sit mens. Porro si hoc in se novit quod mens est, et tota mens est, totam se novit.
Then, what of itself is so known to it as that it lives? But it cannot both be a mind and not live, since it has, moreover, the power to understand: for the souls of beasts also live, but do not understand. Just as, then, the whole mind is mind, so it lives wholly. But it knows that it lives. It knows the whole of itself, therefore. Finally, when the mind seeks to know itself, See Pythia of Apollo, the Delphic Oracle: Γνῶθι σεαυτόν; Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.14.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52; De Legibus 1.22.58–23.61. it already knows itself to be a mind: otherwise it does not know whether it is seeking itself, and perhaps seeks one thing for another. For it can happen that it is not itself a mind, and so, while it seeks to know the mind, it does not seek itself. Wherefore, since when the mind seeks what mind is, it knows that it seeks itself, it surely knows that it itself is a mind. Further, if it knows this about itself, that it is a mind, and is wholly a mind, it knows the whole of itself.
deTrin.10.4.6Sed ecce non se noverit esse mentem, cum autem se quaerit, hoc tantummodo noverit quod se quaerat. Potest enim etiam sic aliud pro alio quaerere, si hoc nescit: ut autem non quaerat aliud pro alio, procul dubio novit quid quaerat. At si novit quid quaerat, et se ipsam quaerit, se ipsam utique novit. Quid ergo adhuc quaerit? Quod si ex parte se novit, ex parte autem adhuc quaerit, (Cf. 1 Cor 13:9–12) non se ipsam, sed partem suam quaerit. Cum enim ea ipsa dicitur, tota dicitur.
But see, suppose it did not know itself to be a mind, and, when it seeks itself, knew only this much, that it seeks itself. For even so it can seek one thing for another, if it does not know this: but that it may not seek one thing for another, it without doubt knows what it seeks. And if it knows what it seeks, and seeks itself, it surely knows itself. What, then, does it still seek? But if in part it knows itself, and in part still seeks itself, (See 1 Cor 13:9–12) it seeks not itself, but a part of itself. For when it is called itself, the whole is meant.
deTrin.10.4.6Deinde quia novit nondum se a se inventam totam, novit quanta sit tota. Atque ita quaerit quod deest, quemadmodum solemus quaerere, ut veniat in mentem quod excidit, nec tamen penitus excidit; quia potest recognosci, cum venerit, hoc esse quod quaerebatur.
Then, since it knows that it has not yet found the whole of itself by itself, it knows how great the whole is. And so it seeks what is lacking, as we are wont to seek, so that what has slipped away may come into the mind, and yet has not entirely slipped away; because it can be recognized, when it comes, to be the very thing that was sought.
deTrin.10.4.6Sed quomodo mens veniat in mentem, quasi possit mens in mente non esse? Huc accedit, quia si parte inventa, non se totam quaerit, tamen tota se quaerit. Tota ergo sibi praesto est, et quid adhuc quaeratur non est: hoc enim deest quod quaeritur, non illa quae quaerit. Cum itaque tota se quaerit, nihil eius deest.
But how does the mind come into the mind, as if the mind could not be in the mind? Add to this, that if, a part having been found, it does not seek the whole of itself, yet it seeks itself as a whole. The whole, then, is present to itself, and there is nothing further to be sought: for it is what is sought that is lacking, not the one who seeks. So when it seeks the whole of itself, nothing of it is lacking.
deTrin.10.4.6Aut si non tota se quaerit, sed pars quae inventa est quaerit partem quae nondum inventa est; non se ergo mens quaerit, cuius se nulla pars quaerit. Pars enim quae inventa est, non se quaerit: pars autem quae nondum inventa est, nec ipsa se quaerit, quoniam ab ea quae iam inventa est parte quaeritur. Quocirca, quia nec tota se mens quaerit, nec pars eius ulla se quaerit, se mens omnino non quaerit.
Or if it does not seek the whole of itself, but the part that has been found seeks the part that has not yet been found; then the mind does not seek itself, no part of which seeks itself. For the part that has been found does not seek itself: and the part that has not yet been found does not seek itself either, since it is sought by the part that has already been found. Wherefore, since neither the whole mind seeks itself, nor any part of it seeks itself, the mind does not seek itself at all.
deTrin.10.4.65. 7. Utquid ergo ei praeceptum est, ut se ipsa cognoscat? Credo, ut se ipsam cogitet, et secundum naturam suam vivat, id est, ut secundum naturam suam ordinari appetat, sub eo scilicet cui subdenda est, supra ea quibus praeponenda est; sub illo a quo regi debet, supra ea quae regere debet. Multa enim per cupiditatem pravam, tamquam sui sit oblita, sic agit.
5. 7. Why, then, is it commanded that it know itself? I believe, that it may think of itself and live according to its nature, that is, that it may seek to be ordered according to its nature, namely, under him to whom it ought to be subjected, above those things to which it ought to be preferred; under him by whom it ought to be ruled, above those which it ought to rule. For it does many things through a depraved desire, as though it had forgotten itself.
deTrin.10.5.7Videt enim quaedam intrinsecus pulchra, in praestantiore natura quae Deus est: et cum stare debeat ut eis fruatur, volens ea sibi tribuere, et non ex illo similis illius, sed ex se ipsa esse quod ille est, avertitur ab eo, moveturque et labitur in minus et minus, quod putatur amplius et amplius; quia nec ipsa sibi, nec ei quidquam sufficit recedenti ab illo qui solus sufficit: Cf. Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6. ideoque per egestatem ac difficultatem fit nimis intenta in actiones suas et inquietas delectationes quas per eas colligit; atque ita cupiditate acquirendi notitias ex his quae foris sunt, quorum cognitum genus amat et sentit amitti posse, nisi impensa cura teneantur, perdit securitatem, tantoque se ipsam minus cogitat, quanto magis secura est quod se non possit amittere.
For it sees certain inwardly beautiful things, in that more excellent nature which is God: and whereas it ought to stand fast that it may enjoy them, wishing to attribute them to itself, and to be of itself what he is, not from him and like him, it turns away from him, and is moved and slips into less and less, which is thought to be more and more; because neither does it itself suffice for itself, nor does anything suffice for it when it withdraws from him who alone suffices: See Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6. and therefore, through want and difficulty, it becomes too intent on its own actions and the restless pleasures it gathers through them; and so, by the desire of acquiring knowledge from those things that are outside, whose known kind it loves and feels can be lost unless held by expended care, it loses its security, and thinks of itself the less, the more secure it is that it cannot lose itself.
deTrin.10.5.7Ita cum aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare (neque enim multarum doctrinarum peritum, ignorare grammaticam dicimus, cum eam non cogitat, quia de medicinae arte tunc cogitat): cum ergo aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare, tanta vis est amoris, ut ea quae cum amore diu cogitaverit, eisque curae glutino inhaeserit, attrahat secum etiam cum ad se cogitandam quodam modo redit.
Thus, since it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think of oneself (for we do not say that one skilled in many branches of learning is ignorant of grammar, when he is not thinking of it, because he is then thinking of the art of medicine): since, then, it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think of oneself, so great is the force of love, that the things which it has long thought of with love, and to which it has clung by the glue of care, it draws along with itself even when it returns, in a way, to thinking of itself.
deTrin.10.5.7Et quia illa corpora sunt, quae foris per sensus carnis adamavit, eorumque diuturna quadam familiaritate implicata est, nec secum potest introrsus tamquam in regionem incorporeae naturae ipsa corpora inferre, imagines eorum convolvit, et rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa. Dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae: servat autem aliquid quo libere de specie talium imaginum iudicet, et hoc est magis mens, id est rationalis intellegentia, quae servatur ut iudicet. Nam illas animae partes quae corporum similitudinibus informantur, etiam cum bestiis nos communes habere sentimus.
And because those things are bodies, which it fell in love with outside through the senses of the flesh, and has become entangled with by a kind of long-standing familiarity, and it cannot bring the bodies themselves inward with it, as it were into the region of incorporeal nature, it rolls together their images and seizes them, made within itself out of itself. For it gives something of its own substance to the forming of them: but it keeps something by which it may freely judge of the form of such images, and this is more properly the mind, that is, the rational understanding, which is kept that it may judge. For those parts of the soul which are formed by the likenesses of bodies, we feel that we have in common even with the beasts.
deTrin.10.5.7C
deTrin.10.5.7
6. 8. Errat autem mens, cum se istis imaginibus tanto amore coniungit, ut etiam se esse aliquid huiusmodi existimet. Ita enim conformatur eis quodam modo, non id existendo, sed putando: non quo se imaginem putet; sed omnino illud ipsum cuius imaginem se cum habet.
6. 8. But the mind errs when it joins itself to these images with so great a love that it even reckons itself to be something of this kind. For it is in a way conformed to them, not by existing as that, but by supposing it: not that it supposes itself to be the image; but that it is altogether that very thing of which it has the image within itself.
deTrin.10.6.8Viget quippe in ea iudicium discernendi corpus quod foris relinquit, ab imagine quam de illo secum gerit: nisi cum ita exprimuntur eaedem imagines tamquam foris sentiantur, non intus cogitentur, sicut dormientibus, aut furentibus, aut in aliqua ecstasi accidere solet.
For there flourishes in it the judgment of distinguishing the body it leaves outside from the image of it which it carries about with itself: except when these same images are so expressed as to be perceived as though outside, not thought of within, as is wont to happen to those who are asleep, or raving, or in some ecstasy.
deTrin.10.6.87. 9. Cum itaque se tale aliquid putat, corpus esse se putat. Et quia sibi bene conscia est principatus sui quo corpus regit; hinc factum est ut quidam quaererent Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.9.18–11.22. quid corporis amplius valeret in corpore, et hoc esse mentem, vel omnino totam animam existimarent. Cf. Chrysippus, Fragments 15; Plutarch, Lives 4.21. Itaque alii sanguinem, alii cerebrum, alii cor, non sicut Scriptura dicit, Confitebor tibi, Domine, in toto corde meo; (Cf. Ps 111:1, 138:1) et, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo: (Cf. Matt 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27) hoc enim abutendo vel transferendo vocabulum ducitur a corpore ad animum: sed ipsam omnino particulam corporis quam in visceribus dilaniatis videmus, eam esse putaverunt. Alii ex minutissimis individuisque corpusculis, quas atomos dicunt, Cf. Aristotle, De Anima 1.2.403b34. concurrentibus in se atque cohaerentibus, eam confici crediderunt. Alii aerem, alii ignem substantiam eius esse dixerunt. Alii eam nullam esse substantiam, quia nisi corpus nullam substantiam poterant cogitare, et eam corpus esse non inveniebant: sed ipsam temperationem corporis nostri vel compagem primordiorum, quibus ista caro tamquam connectitur, esse opinati sunt. Eoque hi omnes eam mortalem esse senserunt, quia sive corpus esset, sive aliqua compositio corporis, non posset utique immortaliter permanere. Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.9.18.
7. 9. So when it supposes itself to be some such thing, it supposes itself to be a body. And because it is well aware of its own primacy by which it rules the body, hence it came about that some inquired See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.9.18–11.22. what part of the body had the greatest power in the body, and reckoned this to be the mind, or indeed the whole soul. See Chrysippus, Fragments 15; Plutarch, Lives 4.21. And so some thought the blood, some the brain, some the heart—not as Scripture says, I will confess to you, Lord, with my whole heart; (See Ps 111 (110):1, 138 (137):1) and, You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart: (See Matt 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27) for this word is drawn, by misuse or transference, from the body to the mind—but they thought that the very particle of the body which we see among the entrails when they are torn apart was the mind. Others believed it to be put together out of the most minute and indivisible little bodies, which they call atoms, See Aristotle, De Anima 1.2.403b34. running together and cohering with one another. Others said its substance was air, others fire. Others said it was no substance, because they could conceive of no substance but body, and did not find it to be a body: but they supposed it to be the very tempering of our body or the framing-together of those first elements by which this flesh is, as it were, knit together. And so all these held it to be mortal, because, whether it were a body or some composition of body, it certainly could not abide immortally. See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.9.18.
deTrin.10.7.9Qui vero eius substantiam vitam quamdam nequaquam corpoream; quandoquidem vitam omne vivum corpus animantem ac vivificantem esse repererunt; consequenter et immortalem, quia vita carere vita non potest, ut quisque potuit, probare conati sunt. Cf. Aristotle, De caelo 1.2.269a; Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.16.38; Plato, Timaeus 30–37b. Nam de quinto illo nescio quo corpore, quod notissimis quattuor huius mundi elementis quidam coniungentes, hinc animam esse dixerunt, Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.27.66. hoc loco diu disserendum non puto. Aut enim hoc vocant corpus quod nos, cuius in loci spatio pars toto minor est, et in illis annumerandi sunt qui mentem corpoream esse crediderunt: aut si vel omnem substantiam, vel omnem mutabilem substantiam corpus appellant, cum sciant non omnem locorum spatiis aliqua longitudine et latitudine et altitudine contineri, non cum eis de vocabuli quaestione pugnandum est.
But those who held its substance to be a certain life by no means corporeal—since they found that life is what animates and gives life to every living body—tried, consequently, to prove that it is also immortal, because life cannot lack life, as each one was able. See Aristotle, De caelo 1.2.269a; Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.16.38; Plato, Timaeus 30–37b. For about that fifth body, I know not what, which some, joining it to the four most familiar elements of this world, said the soul to be from, See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.27.66. I do not think we need discourse at length in this place. For either they call that a body which we do, of which one part in a span of place is less than the whole, and they are to be numbered among those who believed the mind to be corporeal: or, if they call either all substance, or all changeable substance, a body, although they know that not all substance is contained in spans of place by some length and breadth and height, there is no need to contend with them about a question of words.
deTrin.10.7.97. 10. In his omnibus sententiis quisquis videt mentis naturam et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, id est, non minore sui parte minus occupare loci spatium, maiusque maiore; simul oportet videat eos qui opinantur esse corpoream, non ob hoc errare, quod mens desit eorum notitiae, sed quod adiungunt ea sine quibus nullam possunt cogitare naturam. Sine phantasiis enim corporum quidquid iussi fuerint cogitare, nihil omnino esse arbitrantur. Ideoque non se, tamquam sibi desit, mens requirat. Quid enim tam cognitioni adest, quam id quod menti adest? aut quid tam menti adest, quam ipsa mens?
7. 10. In all these opinions, whoever sees that the nature of the mind is both a substance and not corporeal—that is, that it does not occupy a smaller span of place with a smaller part of itself, and a greater with a greater—must at the same time see that those who hold it to be corporeal err, not because the mind is lacking to their knowledge, but because they add things without which they cannot conceive any nature. For without the phantasms of bodies, whatever they are bidden to think of, they reckon to be nothing at all. And therefore let not the mind seek itself as though it were lacking to itself. For what is so present to knowledge as that which is present to the mind? or what is so present to the mind as the mind itself?
deTrin.10.7.10Unde et ipsa quae appellatur inventio, si verbi originem retractemus, quid aliud resonat, nisi quia invenire est in id venire quod quaeritur? Propterea, quae quasi ultro in mentem veniunt, non usitate dicuntur inventa, quamvis cognita dici possint; quia non in ea quaerendo tendebamus, ut in ea veniremus, hoc est, ea inveniremus. Quapropter, sicut ea quae oculis aut ullo alio corporis sensu requiruntur, ipsa mens quaerit (ipsa enim etiam sensum carnis intendit, tunc autem invenit, cum in ea quae requiruntur idem sensus venit): sic alia quae non corporeo sensu internuntio, sed per se ipsam nosse debet, cum in ea venit, invenit; aut in superiore substantia, id est in Deo, aut in ceteris animae partibus, sicut de ipsis imaginibus corporum cum iudicat; intus enim in anima eas invenit per corpus impressas.
Hence too that which is called discovery (inventio), if we go back to the origin of the word, what else does it sound like but that to discover is to come upon (in ... venire) what is sought? Therefore the things that come, as it were, of their own accord into the mind are not usually called discoveries, although they can be called known; because we were not tending toward them by seeking, that we might come upon them, that is, discover them. Wherefore, just as the things sought with the eyes or with any other bodily sense, it is the mind itself that seeks them (for it is the mind that directs even the sense of the flesh, and it finds when that same sense comes upon the things sought): so other things which it ought to know, not through a bodily sense as go-between, but through itself, it discovers when it comes upon them; either in the higher substance, that is, in God, or in the other parts of the soul, as when it judges of the very images of bodies; for within, in the soul, it discovers them, impressed through the body.
deTrin.10.7.108. 11. Ergo se ipsam quemadmodum quaerat et inveniat, mirabilis quaestio est, quo tendat ut quaerat, aut quo veniat ut inveniat. Quid enim tam in mente quam mens est? Sed quia in his est quae cum amore cogitat, sensibilibus autem, id est corporalibus, cum amore assuefacta est, non valet sine imaginibus eorum esse in semetipsa.
8. 11. How, then, the mind seeks and finds itself is a wonderful question: where it tends in order to seek, or where it comes in order to find. For what is so in the mind as the mind is? But because it is among the things that it thinks of with love, and has grown accustomed, with love, to sensible, that is, bodily things, it is unable to be in itself without the images of them.
deTrin.10.8.11Hinc ei oboritur erroris dedecus, dum rerum sensarum imagines secernere a se non potest, ut se solam videat. Cohaeserunt enim mirabiliter glutino amoris: et haec est eius immunditia, quoniam dum se solam nititur cogitare, hoc se putat esse sine quo se non potest cogitare.
Hence arises in it the disgrace of error, while it cannot separate from itself the images of things sensed, so as to see itself alone. For they have wondrously clung to it by the glue of love: and this is its uncleanness, since, while it strives to think of itself alone, it supposes itself to be that without which it cannot think of itself.
deTrin.10.8.11Cum igitur ei praecipitur ut se ipsam cognoscat, non se tamquam sibi detracta sit quaerat; sed id quod sibi addidit detrahat. Cf. Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.9; 5.1.1; Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.16.38. Interior est enim ipsa, non solum quam ista sensibilia quae manifeste foris sunt, sed etiam quam imagines eorum quae in parte quadam sunt animae, quam habent et bestiae, quamvis intellegentia careant, quae mentis est propria.
When, therefore, it is commanded to know itself, let it not seek itself as though it had been withdrawn from itself; but let it withdraw that which it has added to itself. See Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.9; 5.1.1; Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.16.38. For it is itself more inward, not only than those sensible things which are manifestly outside, but even than the images of them which are in a certain part of the soul, which the beasts too have, although they lack the understanding which is proper to the mind.
deTrin.10.8.11Cum ergo sit mens interior, quodam modo exit a semetipsa, cum in haec quasi vestigia multarum intentionum exserit amoris affectum. Quae vestigia tamquam imprimuntur memoriae, quando haec quae foris sunt corporalia sentiuntur, ut etiam cum absunt ista, praesto sint tamen imagines eorum cogitantibus.
Since, then, the mind is inward, it in a way goes out from itself, when it puts forth the affection of love into these, as it were, traces of its many intentions. And these traces are, as it were, impressed on the memory, when the bodily things that are outside are sensed, so that even when these are absent, their images are nonetheless ready at hand to those thinking of them.
deTrin.10.8.11Cognoscat ergo semetipsam, Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.16.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.59; De legibus 1.22.58–23.61. nec quasi absentem se quaerat, sed intentionem voluntatis qua per alia vagabatur, statuat in semetipsam, et se cogitet.
Let it, then, know itself, See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.16.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.59; De legibus 1.22.58–23.61. and not seek itself as though absent, but set upon itself the intention of the will by which it was wandering through other things, and think of itself.
deTrin.10.8.11Ita videbit quod numquam se non amaverit, numquam nescierit: sed aliud secum amando cum eo se confudit et concrevit quodam modo; atque ita dum sicut unum diversa complectitur, unum putavit esse quae diversa sunt.
So it will see that it never did not love itself, never was ignorant of itself: but, by loving something else along with itself, it confused itself with that and in a way grew together with it; and so, while it embraces diverse things as though one, it supposed those things to be one which are diverse.
deTrin.10.8.119. 12. Non itaque velut absentem se quaerat cernere, sed praesentem se curet discernere. Nec se quasi non norit cognoscat, sed ab eo quod alterum novit dignoscat. Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52.
9. 12. Let it not, then, seek to discern itself as though absent, but take care to discern itself as present. Nor let it know itself as though it did not know itself, but distinguish itself from that which it knows to be other. See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52.
deTrin.10.9.12Ipsum enim quod audit, Cognosce te ipsam, (Cf. Pythia of Apollo, the Delphic Oracle: Γνῶθι σεαυτόν) quomodo agere curabit, si nescit, aut quid sit, Cognosce; aut quid sit, Te ipsam? Si autem utrumque novit, novit et se ipsam; quia non ita dicitur menti, Cognosce te ipsam, sicut dicitur, Cognosce Cherubim et Seraphim: de absentibus enim illis credimus, secundum quod caelestes quaedam potestates esse praedicantur. Neque sicut dicitur, Cognosce voluntatem illius hominis: quae nobis nec ad sentiendum ullo modo, nec ad intellegendum praesto est, nisi corporalibus signis editis; et hoc ita, ut magis credamus, quam intellegamus. (Cf. Isa 7:9) Neque ita ut dicitur homini, Vide faciem tuam: quod nisi in speculo fieri non potest. Nam et ipsa nostra facies absens ab aspectu nostro est, quia non ibi est quo ille dirigi potest. Sed cum dicitur menti, Cognosce te ipsam, Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.14.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52; De Legibus 1.22.58–23.61. eo ictu quo intellegit quod dictum est, Te ipsam, cognoscit se ipsam; nec ob aliud, quam eo quod sibi praesens est. Si autem quod dictum est non intellegit, non utique facit. Hoc igitur ei praecipitur ut faciat, quod cum praeceptum ipsum intellegit, facit.
For the very thing it hears, Know yourself, (See Pythia of Apollo, the Delphic Oracle: Γνῶθι σεαυτόν) how will it take care to do, if it does not know either what Know is, or what Yourself is? But if it knows both, it knows itself also; because it is not said to the mind, Know yourself, in the way it is said, Know the Cherubim and Seraphim: for of those, as absent, we believe according to what is proclaimed, that they are certain heavenly powers. Nor as it is said, Know the will of that man: which is in no way ready at hand for us either to perceive or to understand, except by bodily signs put forth; and that in such a way that we believe rather than understand. (See Isa 7:9) Nor as it is said to a man, See your face: which can be done only in a mirror. For our own face too is absent from our gaze, since it is not there where our gaze can be directed. But when it is said to the mind, Know yourself, See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.22.73; 5.14.44; Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.52; De Legibus 1.22.58–23.61. by that very stroke by which it understands what is said, Yourself, it knows itself; and for no other reason than that it is present to itself. But if it does not understand what is said, it surely does not do it. This, then, is commanded it to do, which, when it understands the command itself, it does.
deTrin.10.9.1210. 13. Non ergo adiungat aliud ad id quod se ipsam cognoscit, cum audit ut se ipsam cognoscat. Certe enim novit sibi dici, sibi scilicet quae est, et vivit, et intellegit. Sed est et cadaver, vivit et pecus: intellegit autem nec cadaver, nec pecus. Sic ergo se esse et vivere scit, quomodo est et vivit intellegentia. Cum ergo, verbi gratia, mens aerem se putat, aerem intellegere putat, se tamen intellegere scit: aerem autem se esse non scit, sed putat.
10. 13. Let it not, then, add anything to that by which it knows itself, when it hears that it should know itself. For it certainly knows that the command is spoken to it, namely to itself, which exists, and lives, and understands. But a corpse too exists, and a beast lives: a corpse, however, does not understand, nor does a beast. So, then, it knows that it exists and lives in the way that intelligence exists and lives. When, therefore, for example, the mind supposes itself to be air, it supposes that air understands, yet it knows that it itself understands: but that it is air it does not know, but supposes.
deTrin.10.10.13Secernat quod se putat, cernat quod scit: hoc ei remaneat, unde ne illi quidem dubitaverunt, qui aliud atque aliud corpus esse mentem putaverunt. Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.53. Neque enim omnis mens aerem se esse existimat, sed aliae ignem, aliae cerebrum, aliaeque aliud corpus, et aliud aliae, sicut supra commemoravi: omnes tamen se intellegere noverunt, et esse et vivere; sed intellegere ad quod intellegunt referunt, Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.29.70. esse autem et vivere ad se ipsas.
Let it separate what it supposes itself to be, let it discern what it knows itself to be: let there remain to it that of which not even those doubted who supposed the mind to be one body or another. See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.22.53. For not every mind reckons itself to be air, but some fire, some the brain, and others another body, and one another, as I mentioned above: yet all have known that they understand, and exist, and live; but they refer understanding to that which they understand, See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.29.70. while existing and living they refer to themselves.
deTrin.10.10.13Et nulli est dubium, nec quemquam intellegere qui non vivat, nec quemquam vivere qui non sit. Ergo consequenter et esse et vivere id quod intellegit, non sicuti est cadaver quod non vivit, nec sicuti vivit anima quae non intellegit, sed proprio quodam eodemque praestantiore modo.
And no one doubts that neither does anyone understand who does not live, nor does anyone live who does not exist. Therefore, consequently, that which understands also exists and lives, not as a corpse exists which does not live, nor as a soul lives which does not understand, but in a certain proper and likewise more excellent way.
deTrin.10.10.13Item velle se sciunt, neque hoc posse quemquam qui non sit et qui non vivat, pariter sciunt: itemque ipsam voluntatem referunt ad aliquid, quod ea voluntate volunt. Meminisse etiam se sciunt; simulque sciunt quod nemo meminisset, nisi esset ac viveret: sed et ipsam ad aliquid memoriam referimus, quod ea meminimus. Duobus igitur horum trium, memoria et intellegentia, multarum rerum notitia atque scientia continetur: voluntas autem adest, per quam fruamur eis vel utamur. Fruimur enim cognitis, in quibus voluntas ipsis propter se ipsa delectata conquiescit: utimur vero eis quae ad aliud referimus quo fruendum est. Nec est alia vita hominum vitiosa atque culpabilis, quam male utens et male fruens. De qua re non est nunc disserendi locus.
Likewise they know that they will, and they know equally that no one can do this who does not exist and who does not live: and likewise they refer the will itself to something which they will by that will. They know too that they remember; and at the same time they know that no one would remember unless he existed and lived: but we also refer memory itself to something which we remember by it. Of two of these three, then, memory and understanding, the knowledge and science of many things is comprised: will, however, is present, by which we may enjoy them or use them. For we enjoy things known, in which the will, delighted in them for their own sake, comes to rest: but we use those which we refer to something else that is to be enjoyed. Nor is there any other vicious and blameworthy life of human beings than one that uses badly and enjoys badly. But there is no place now for discoursing on this matter.
deTrin.10.10.1310. 14. Sed quoniam de natura mentis agitur, removeamus a consideratione nostra omnes notitias quae capiuntur extrinsecus per sensus corporis; et ea quae posuimus, omnes mentes de se ipsis nosse certasque esse, diligentius attendamus. Utrum enim aeris sit vis vivendi, reminiscendi, intellegendi, volendi, cogitandi, sciendi, iudicandi; an ignis, an cerebri, an sanguinis, an atomorum, an praeter usitata quattuor elementa quinti nescio cuius corporis, an ipsius carnis nostrae compago vel temperamentum haec efficere valeat, dubitaverunt homines: et alius hoc, alius illud affirmare conatus est. Vivere se tamen et meminisse, et intellegere, et velle, et cogitare, et scire, et iudicare quis dubitet? Quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit: si dubitat unde dubitet, meminit; si dubitat, dubitare se intellegit; si dubitat, certus esse vult; si dubitat, cogitat; si dubitat, scit se nescire; si dubitat, iudicat non se temere consentire oportere. Quisquis igitur alicunde dubitat, de his omnibus dubitare non debet: quae si non essent, de ulla re dubitare non posset.
10. 14. But since we are dealing with the nature of the mind, let us remove from our consideration all the knowledge that is taken in from without through the senses of the body; and let us attend more diligently to what we have laid down, that all minds know and are certain about themselves. For people have doubted whether the power of living, of remembering, of understanding, of willing, of thinking, of knowing, of judging belongs to air, or to fire, or to the brain, or to the blood, or to atoms, or to some fifth body, I know not what, besides the four familiar elements, or whether the framing-together or tempering of our very flesh has the power to bring these about: and one has tried to affirm this, another that. Yet who would doubt that he lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills, and thinks, and knows, and judges? Since, even if he doubts, he lives: if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wishes to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not rashly to assent. Whoever, then, doubts about anything else, ought not to doubt about all these things: which, if they were not, he could not doubt about anything.
deTrin.10.10.1410. 15. Haec omnia, qui vel corpus vel compositionem seu temperationem corporis esse mentem putant, in subiecto esse volunt videri, ut substantia sit aer, vel ignis, sive aliquod aliud corpus, quod mentem putant; intellegentia vero ita insit huic corpori, sicut qualitas eius: ut illud subiectum sit, haec in subiecto; subiectum scilicet mens quam corpus esse arbitrantur, in subiecto autem intellegentia, sive quid aliud eorum quae certa nobis esse commemoravimus. Iuxta opinantur etiam illi qui mentem ipsam negant esse corpus, sed compaginem aut temperationem corporis. Hoc enim interest, quod illi mentem ipsam dicunt esse substantiam, in quo subiecto sit intellegentia: isti autem ipsam mentem in subiecto esse dicunt, corpore scilicet cuius compositio vel temperatio est. Unde consequenter etiam intellegentiam quid aliud quam in eodem subiecto corpore existimant?
10. 15. All these things, those who suppose the mind to be either a body or the composition or tempering of a body wish to be seen as in a subject, so that the substance is air, or fire, or some other body which they suppose the mind to be; but understanding is in this body as its quality: so that the body is the subject, and understanding is in the subject; the subject, namely, being the mind which they reckon to be a body, but in the subject is understanding, or whatever else of those things which we mentioned to be certain to us. Those too hold a like opinion who deny that the mind itself is a body, but say it is the framing-together or tempering of a body. For there is this difference, that the former say that the mind itself is the substance in which subject understanding is: but the latter say that the mind itself is in a subject, namely the body, of which it is the composition or tempering. Whence consequently what else do they reckon understanding to be but in the same subject body?
deTrin.10.10.1510. 16. Qui omnes non advertunt, mentem nosse se etiam cum quaerit se, sicut iam ostendimus. Nullo modo autem recte dicitur sciri aliqua res, dum eius ignoratur substantia. Quapropter, cum se mens novit, substantiam suam novit; et cum de se certa est, de substantia sua certa est. Certa est autem de se, sicut convincunt ea quae supra dicta sunt. Nec omnino certa est, utrum aer, an ignis sit, an aliquod corpus, vel aliquid corporis. Non est igitur aliquid eorum:
10. 16. All of whom do not notice that the mind knows itself even when it seeks itself, as we have already shown. But in no way is a thing rightly said to be known while its substance is unknown. Wherefore, when the mind knows itself, it knows its own substance; and when it is certain about itself, it is certain about its own substance. But it is certain about itself, as the things said above prove. And it is in no way certain whether it is air, or fire, or some body, or something of a body. It is, therefore, none of those things:
deTrin.10.10.16totumque illud quod se iubetur ut noverit, ad hoc pertinet ut certa sit non se esse aliquid eorum de quibus incerta est, idque solum esse se certa sit, quod solum esse se certa est. Sic enim cogitat ignem aut aerem, et quidquid aliud corporis cogitat. Neque ullo modo fieri posset ut ita cogitaret id quod ipsa est, quemadmodum cogitat, id quod ipsa non est. Per phantasiam quippe imaginariam cogitat haec omnia, sive ignem, sive aerem, sive illud vel illud corpus, partemve illam, seu compaginem temperationemque corporis; nec utique ista omnia, sed aliquid horum esse dicitur.
and that whole which it is bidden to know about itself pertains to this, that it be certain that it is not any of those things about which it is uncertain, and that it be certain that it is that alone which alone it is certain that it is. For thus it thinks of fire or air, and whatever else of a body it thinks of. And it could in no way come about that it should think of that which it itself is in the way it thinks of that which it itself is not. For it thinks of all these things—fire, or air, or this or that body, or that part, or the framing-together and tempering of a body—by an imaginary phantasy; nor is it called all these things, but is said to be some one of them.
deTrin.10.10.16Si quid autem horum esset, aliter id quam cetera cogitaret, non scilicet per imaginale figmentum, sicut cogitantur absentia, quae sensu corporis tacta sunt, sive omnino ipsa, sive eiusdem generis aliqua; sed quadam interiore, non simulata, sed vera praesentia (non enim quidquam illi est se ipsa praesentius); sicut cogitat vivere se, et meminisse, et intellegere, et velle se.
But if it were any of these things, it would think of it otherwise than the rest, namely, not by an imaginary figment, as absent things are thought of which have been touched by the sense of the body, whether the things themselves, or some of the same kind; but by a certain inner presence, not feigned but true (for nothing is more present to it than it itself); as it thinks that it lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills.
deTrin.10.10.16Novit enim haec in se, nec imaginatur quasi extra se illa sensu tetigerit, sicut corporalia quaeque tanguntur. Ex quorum cogitationibus si nihil sibi affingat, ut tale aliquid esse se putet, quidquid ei de se remanet, hoc solum ipsa est.
For it knows these things in itself, and does not imagine them as though it had touched them by sense outside itself, as bodily things are touched. From the thinking of which, if it fashions nothing for itself so as to suppose itself to be some such thing, then whatever remains to it of itself, this alone is what it itself is.
deTrin.10.10.16C
deTrin.10.10.16
11. 17. Remotis igitur paulisper ceteris, quorum mens de se ipsa certa est, tria haec potissimum considerata tractemus, memoriam, intellegentiam, voluntatem. Cf. Augustine, Miscellany of 83 Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6; Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160. In his enim tribus inspici solent etiam ingenia parvulorum cuiusmodi praeferant indolem. Quanto quippe tenacius et facilius puer meminit, quantoque acrius intellegit, et studet ardentius, tanto est laudabilioris ingenii. Cum vero de cuiusque doctrina quaeritur, non quanta firmitate ac facilitate meminerit, vel quanto acumine intellegat; sed quid meminerit, et quid intellegat quaeritur. Et quia non tantum quam doctus sit, consideratur laudabilis animus, sed etiam quam bonus: non tantum quid meminerit et quid intellegat, verum etiam quid velit attenditur; non quanta flagrantia velit, sed quid velit prius, deinde quantum velit. Tunc enim laudandus est animus vehementer amans, cum id quod amat vehementer amandum est.
11. 17. Setting aside for a little, then, the other things of which the mind is certain about itself, let us consider and treat especially these three: memory, understanding, will. See Augustine, Miscellany of 83 Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6; Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160. For in these three it is usual to discern what kind of native talent even little children display. For the more tenaciously and easily a boy remembers, and the more keenly he understands, and the more ardently he applies himself, the more praiseworthy is his talent. But when one inquires about anyone’s learning, it is not asked with what firmness and ease he remembers, or with what acuteness he understands; but what he remembers, and what he understands. And because a praiseworthy soul is considered not only as to how learned it is, but also as to how good it is: not only what it remembers and what it understands, but also what it wills is attended to; not with what burning it wills, but what it wills first, then how much it wills. For then a soul vehemently loving is to be praised, when what it loves is vehemently to be loved.
deTrin.10.11.17Cum ergo dicuntur haec tria: ingenium, doctrina, usus, Cf. Protagoras, Fragment 3; Isocrates, Against the Sophists 13.17; Plato, Meno 70a; Phaedrus 269d; Cicero, De Oratore 2.39.162; 3.20.77; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 6.2.3. primum horum consideratur in illis tribus quid possit quisque memoria, intellegentia, voluntate. Secundum eorum consideratur, quid habeat quisque in memoria, et intellegentia, quo studiosa voluntate pervenerit. Iam vero usus tertius in voluntate est, pertractante illa quae memoria et intellegentia continentur, sive ad aliquid ea referat, sive eorum fine delectata conquiescat. Uti enim, est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis: frui est autem, uti cum gaudio, non adhuc spei, sed iam rei. Cf. Augustine, The City of God 19.1.27. Proinde omnis qui fruitur, utitur: assumit enim aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, cum fine delectationis: non autem omnis qui utitur, fruitur; si id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, non propter illud ipsum, sed propter aliud appetivit.
When, therefore, these three are spoken of—native talent, learning, use See Protagoras, Fragment 3; Isocrates, Against the Sophists 13.17; Plato, Meno 70a; Phaedrus 269d; Cicero, De Oratore 2.39.162; 3.20.77; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 6.2.3.—the first of these is considered in those three, what each one is capable of by memory, understanding, will. The second of them is considered, what each one has in memory and understanding, to which he has come by a zealous will. But the third, use, is in the will, which handles the things that are contained in memory and understanding, whether it refers them to something else, or rests, delighted in them as an end. For to use is to take up something into the power of the will: but to enjoy is to use with joy, no longer of hope, but now of the thing itself. See Augustine, The City of God 19.1.27. Accordingly, everyone who enjoys, uses: for he takes up something into the power of the will, with the end of delight: but not everyone who uses, enjoys; if he has sought what he takes up into the power of the will not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else.
deTrin.10.11.1711. 18. Haec igitur tria, memoria, intellegentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita; nec tres mentes, sed una mens: consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt, sed una substantia. Cf. On the Trinity 5.2.3; 8.9; 9.10; 7.4.8. Memoria quippe, quod vita et mens et substantia dicitur, ad se ipsam dicitur: quod vero memoria dicitur, ad aliquid relative dicitur. Hoc de intellegentia quoque et de voluntate dixerim: et intellegentia quippe et voluntas ad aliquid dicuntur. Vita est autem unaquaeque ad se ipsam, et mens, et essentia. Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum, (Cf. 1 John 5:7–8) quo una vita, una mens, una essentia: et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur, etiam simul, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicuntur. Eo vero tria, quo ad se invicem referuntur: quae si aequalia non essent, non solum singula singulis, sed etiam omnibus singula; non utique se invicem caperent. Neque enim tantum a singulis singula, verum etiam a singulis omnia capiuntur. Memini enim me habere memoriam, et intellegentiam, et voluntatem; et intellego me intellegere, et velle, atque meminisse; et volo me velle, et meminisse, et intellegere, totamque meam memoriam, et intellegentiam, et voluntatem simul memini. Cf. Augustine, Epistle 169.2.6. Quod enim memoriae meae non memini, non est in memoria mea. Nihil autem tam in memoria, quam ipsa memoria est. Totam igitur memini. Item quidquid intellego, intellegere me scio, et scio me velle quidquid volo: quidquid autem scio memini. Totam igitur intellegentiam, totamque voluntatem meam memini.
11. 18. These three, then, memory, understanding, will, since they are not three lives, but one life; nor three minds, but one mind: consequently they are surely not three substances, but one substance. See On the Trinity 5.2.3; 8.9; 9.10; 7.4.8. For memory, in that it is called life and mind and substance, is said with reference to itself: but in that it is called memory, it is said relatively to something. This I would say also of understanding and of will: for both understanding and will are said with reference to something. But each is life with reference to itself, and mind, and essence. Wherefore these three are one in this, that they are one life, one mind, one essence: and whatever else each is said with reference to itself, even taken together they are said not in the plural, but in the singular. But they are three in this, that they are referred to one another: and if they were not equal, not only each to each, but each to all, they would surely not contain one another. For not only is each contained by each, but all are contained by each. For I remember that I have memory, and understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand, and will, and remember; and I will that I will, and remember, and understand; and I remember together my whole memory, and understanding, and will. See Augustine, Epistle 169.2.6. For what of my memory I do not remember is not in my memory. But nothing is so in the memory as memory itself is. I remember the whole, therefore. Likewise, whatever I understand, I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will: but whatever I know, I remember. I remember, therefore, my whole understanding, and my whole will.
deTrin.10.11.18Similiter cum haec tria intellego, tota simul intellego. Neque enim quidquam intellegibilium non intellego, nisi quod ignoro. Quod autem ignoro, nec memini, nec volo. Quidquid itaque intellegibilium non intellego, consequenter etiam nec memini, nec volo. Quidquid autem intellegibilium memini et volo, consequenter intellego. Voluntas etiam mea totam intellegentiam totamque memoriam meam capit, dum toto utor quod intellego et memini. Quapropter quando invicem a singulis et tota et omnia capiuntur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis, et tota singula simul omnibus totis; et haec tria unum, (Cf. 1 John 5:7–8) una vita, una mens, una essentia.
Similarly, when I understand these three, I understand them all together. For there is nothing of intelligible things that I do not understand, except what I do not know. But what I do not know, I neither remember nor will. Whatever, then, of intelligible things I do not understand, consequently I neither remember nor will. But whatever of intelligible things I remember and will, I consequently understand. My will too embraces my whole understanding and my whole memory, while I use the whole of what I understand and remember. Wherefore, when by each both each and all are mutually contained, the wholes are each equal to the wholes each, and the wholes each at once to all the wholes; and these three are one, (See 1 John 5:7–8) one life, one mind, one essence.
deTrin.10.11.1812. 19. Iamne igitur ascendendum est qualibuscumque intentionis viribus ad illam summam et altissimam essentiam, cuius impar imago est humana mens, sed tamen imago? an adhuc eadem tria distinctius declaranda sunt in anima, per illa quae extrinsecus sensu corporis capimus, ubi temporaliter imprimitur rerum corporearum notitia? Mentem quippe ipsam in memoria et intellegentia et voluntate suimetipsius talem reperiebamus, ut quoniam semper se nosse semperque se ipsam velle comprehendebatur, simul etiam semper sui meminisse, semperque se ipsam intellegere et amare comprehenderetur; quamvis non semper se cogitare discretam ab eis quae non sunt, quod ipsa est:
12. 19. Is it, then, now time to ascend, with whatever powers of attention we may, to that supreme and highest essence, of which the human mind is an unequal image, but nonetheless an image? or are these same three still to be set forth more distinctly in the soul, through those things which we take in from without by the sense of the body, where the knowledge of bodily things is impressed in time? For we found the mind itself, in its memory and understanding and will of its own self, to be such that, since it was grasped to know itself always and always to will itself, it was at the same time grasped also always to remember itself, and always to understand and love itself; although it does not always think of itself as distinct from those things which it is not, which it itself is:
deTrin.10.12.19ac per hoc difficile in ea dignoscitur memoria sui, et intellegentia sui. Quasi enim non sint haec duo, sed unum duobus vocabulis appelletur, sic apparet in ea re ubi valde ista coniuncta sunt, et aliud alio nullo praeceditur tempore: amorque ipse non ita sentitur esse, cum eum non prodit indigentia, quoniam semper praesto est quod amatur. Quapropter etiam tardioribus dilucescere haec possunt, dum ea tractantur quae ad animum tempore accedunt et quae illi temporaliter accidunt, cum meminit quod antea non meminerat, et cum videt quod antea non videbat, et cum amat quod antea non amabat. Sed aliud haec tractatio iam poscit exordium, propter huius libelli modum.
and through this it is difficult to distinguish in it the memory of itself and the understanding of itself. For as though these were not two, but one called by two names, so it appears in that matter where these are very closely joined, and neither is preceded by the other in any time: and love itself is not felt to be there, when no want betrays it, since what is loved is always ready at hand. Wherefore even to the slower these things can become clear, while those are treated which come to the soul in time and which befall it in time, when it remembers what it did not remember before, and when it sees what it did not see before, and when it loves what it did not love before. But this treatment now demands another beginning, on account of the measure of this little book.
deTrin.10.12.19Bk. 11A trace of the Trinity even in the outer man.Vestigium Trinitatis etiam in exteriore homine.
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1. 1. Nemini dubium est, sicut interiorem hominem intellegentia, sic exteriorem sensu corporis praeditum. Nitamur igitur, si possumus, in hoc quoque exteriore indagare qualecumque vestigium Trinitatis, non quia et ipse eodem modo sit imago Dei. (Cf. Gen 1:26–27; 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) Manifesta est quippe Apostolica sententia, quae interiorem hominem renovari in Dei agnitionem PL: in Dei agnitione, “in recognition of God.” declarat secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum: cum et alio loco dicat, et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, tamen interior renovatur de die in diem.
1. 1. No one doubts that, just as the inner man is endowed with understanding, so the outer man is endowed with the sense of the body. Let us strive, then, if we can, to track down in this outer man too some trace of the Trinity, not because he too is in the same way the image of God. (See Gen 1:26–27; 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) For the Apostolic sentence is plain, which declares that the inner man is renewed unto the knowledge of God PL: in Dei agnitione, “in recognition of God.” according to the image of him who created him: while in another place he says, and though our outer man is corrupted, yet the inner is renewed from day to day.
deTrin.11.1.1In hoc ergo qui corrumpitur, quaeramus, quemadmodum possumus, quamdam Trinitatis effigiem, et si non expressiorem, tamen fortassis ad dignoscendum faciliorem. Neque enim frustra et iste homo dicitur, nisi quia inest ei nonnulla interioris similitudo. Et illo ipso ordine conditionis nostrae quo mortales atque carnales effecti sumus, facilius et quasi familiarius visibilia quam intellegibilia pertractamus: cum ista sint exterius, illa interius, et ista sensu corporis sentiamus, illa mente intellegamus; nosque ipsi animi non sensibiles simus, id est, corpora, sed intellegibiles, quoniam vita sumus;
In this one, then, which is corrupted, let us seek, as we can, a certain image of the Trinity—and if not a more expressive one, yet perhaps one easier to discern. For not in vain is this one too called a man, except that there is in him some likeness of the inner man. And by that very order of our condition by which we have been made mortal and carnal, we handle visible things more easily and, as it were, more familiarly than intelligible ones: since the former are outside, the latter within, and we sense the former by the sense of the body, the latter we understand by the mind; and we ourselves, as souls, are not sensible, that is, bodies, but intelligible, since we are life;
deTrin.11.1.1tamen, ut dixi, tanta facta est in corporibus consuetudo, et ita in haec miro modo relabens foras se nostra proicit intentio, ut cum ab incerto corporum ablata fuerit, ut in spiritu multo certiore ac stabiliore cognitione figatur, refugiat ad ista, et ibi appetat requiem unde traxit infirmitatem. Cuius aegritudini congruendum est: ut si quando interiora spiritualia accommodatius distinguere atque facilius insinuare conamur, de corporalibus exterioribus similitudinum documenta capiamus.
yet, as I said, so great has the custom with bodies become, and so does our attention, slipping back into these in a wondrous way, cast itself outward, that when it has been carried off from the uncertainty of bodies, that it might be fixed in the spirit by a far more certain and stable knowledge, it flees back to these, and there seeks rest where it drew its weakness. To which sickness we must accommodate ourselves: so that, if ever we try to distinguish inner spiritual things more fittingly and to convey them more easily, we may take proofs of likeness from outer bodily things.
deTrin.11.1.1Sensu igitur corporis exterior homo praeditus sentit corpora: et iste sensus, quod facile advertitur, quinquepertitus est; videndo, audiendo, olfaciendo, gustando, tangendo. Sed et multum est, et non necessarium, ut omnes hos quinque sensus id quod quaerimus interrogemus. Quod enim nobis unus eorum renuntiat, etiam in ceteris valet. Itaque potissimum testimonio utamur oculorum. Is enim sensus corporis maxime excellit, et est visioni mentis pro sui generis diversitate vicinior.
The outer man, then, endowed with the sense of the body, senses bodies: and this sense, as is easily noticed, is fivefold; in seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But it is both a great deal, and not necessary, that we question all these five senses about what we seek. For what one of them reports to us holds good in the rest as well. And so let us use chiefly the testimony of the eyes. For this sense of the body most excels, and is, in proportion to the difference of its kind, nearest to the vision of the mind.
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2. 2. Cum igitur aliquod corpus videmus, haec tria, quod facillimum est, consideranda sunt et dignoscenda. Primo, ipsa res quam videmus, sive lapidem, sive aliquam flammam, sive quid aliud quod videri oculis potest; quod utique iam esse poterat, et antequam videretur: deinde, visio, quae non erat priusquam rem illam obiectam sensui sentiremus: tertio, quod in ea re quae videtur, quamdiu videtur sensum detinet oculorum, id est, animi intentio. In his igitur tribus, non solum est manifesta distinctio, sed etiam discreta natura.
2. 2. When, therefore, we see some body, these three things—which is most easy—are to be considered and distinguished. First, the thing itself which we see, whether a stone, or some flame, or anything else that can be seen with the eyes; which surely could exist even before it was seen: next, the seeing, which was not there before we sensed the thing set before the sense: third, that which holds the sense of the eyes upon the thing that is seen, as long as it is seen, that is, the attention of the mind. In these three, then, there is not only a manifest distinction, but also a distinct nature.
deTrin.11.2.2Primum quippe illud corpus visibile longe alterius naturae est, quam sensus oculorum, quo sibimet incidente fit visio. Ipsaque visio quid aliud, quam sensus ex ea re quae sentitur informatus apparet? Quamvis re visibili detracta nulla sit, nec ulla omnino esse possit talis visio, si corpus non sit quod videri queat: nullo modo tamen eiusdem substantiae est corpus quo formatur sensus oculorum, cum idem corpus videtur, et ipsa forma quae ab eodem imprimitur sensui, quae visio vocatur. Corpus enim a visu Instead of a visu, PL reads visum: “the body seen is separable in its nature.” in sua natura separabile est: sensus autem qui iam erat in animante, etiam priusquam videret quod videre posset, cum in aliquid visibile incurreret, vel visio quae fit in sensu ex visibili corpore, cum iam coniunctum est et videtur; sensus ergo vel visio, id est sensus non formatus extrinsecus vel sensus The PL omits non formatus extrinsecus vel sensus, “not formed from without or the sense.” formatus extrinsecus ad animantis naturam pertinet, omnino aliam quam est illud corpus quod videndo sentimus, quo sensus non ita formatur ut sensus sit, sed ut visio sit. Nam sensus et ante obiectum rei sensibilis nisi esset in nobis, non distaremus a caecis, dum nihil videmus, sive in tenebris, sive clausis luminibus. Hoc autem distamus, quod nobis inest et non videntibus, quo videre possimus, qui sensus vocatur: illis vero non inest; nec aliunde, nisi quod eo carent, caeci appellantur.
For first, that visible body is of a far other nature than the sense of the eyes, by whose meeting with it the seeing comes about. And the seeing itself, what else does it appear to be but the sense informed by the thing that is sensed? Although, the visible thing being taken away, there is no such seeing, nor could any at all exist, if there were no body that could be seen: yet the body by which the sense of the eyes is informed, when that same body is seen, is in no way of the same substance as the very form which is impressed on the sense by it, which is called seeing. For the body is separable in its nature from the seeing: Instead of a visu, PL reads visum: “the body seen is separable in its nature.” but the sense which was already in the living being, even before it saw what it could see, when it ran upon something visible, or the seeing which comes to be in the sense from the visible body, when it is now joined and seen; the sense, then, or the seeing—that is, the sense not formed from without, or the sense The PL omits non formatus extrinsecus vel sensus, “not formed from without or the sense.” formed from without—belongs to the nature of the living being, altogether other than that body which we sense by seeing, by which the sense is formed not so as to be a sense, but so as to be a seeing. For if the sense were not in us even before the object of a sensible thing, we would not differ from the blind, while we see nothing, whether in the dark or with closed eyes. But in this we differ, that there is in us, even when we are not seeing, that by which we are able to see, which is called sense: but in them it is not; nor for any other reason than that they lack it are they called blind.
deTrin.11.2.2Itemque illa animi intentio, quae in ea re quam videmus sensum tenet, atque utrumque coniungit, non tantum ab ea re visibili natura differt; quandoquidem iste animus, illud corpus est: sed ab ipso quoque sensu atque visione: quoniam solius animi est haec intentio: sensus autem oculorum non ob aliud sensus corporis dicitur, nisi quia et ipsi oculi membra sunt corporis: et quamvis non sentiat corpus exanime, anima tamen commixta corpori per instrumentum sentit corporeum, et idem instrumentum sensus vocatur. Qui etiam passione corporis, cum quisque excaecatur, interceptus exstinguitur, cum idem maneat animus, et eius intentio, luminibus amissis, non habeat quidem sensum corporis quem videndo extrinsecus corpori adiungat atque in eo viso figat aspectum, nisu tamen ipso indicet se adempto corporis sensu, nec perire potuisse, nec minui. Manet enim quidam videndi appetitus integer, sive id possit fieri, sive non possit. Haec igitur tria, corpus quod videtur, et ipsa visio, et quae utrumque coniungit intentio, manifesta sunt ad dignoscendum, non solum propter propria singulorum, verum etiam propter differentiam naturarum.
Likewise that attention of the mind, which holds the sense upon the thing we see, and joins the two together, differs in nature not only from that visible thing—since this is mind, that is body—but also from the sense itself and the seeing: since this attention belongs to the mind alone: but the sense of the eyes is called the sense of the body for no other reason than that the eyes too are members of the body: and although a lifeless body does not sense, yet the soul, mingled with the body, senses through a bodily instrument, and that same instrument is called sense. And this, intercepted also by a bodily affliction, when someone is blinded, is extinguished, although the same mind remains, and its attention, the eyes having been lost, does not indeed have the sense of the body which by seeing it might join to a body outside and fix its gaze on that seen body, yet by the very effort it shows that, the sense of the body having been taken away, it could neither perish nor be diminished. For a certain appetite of seeing remains intact, whether this can come about or cannot. These three things, then, the body that is seen, and the seeing itself, and the attention that joins both, are manifest for distinguishing, not only on account of the properties of each, but also on account of the difference of their natures.
deTrin.11.2.22. 3. Atque in his cum sensus non procedat ex corpore illo quod videtur, sed ex corpore sentientis animantis, cui anima suo quodam miro modo contemperatur: tamen ex corpore quod videtur gignitur visio, id est, sensus ipse formatur; ut iam non tantum sensus qui etiam in tenebris esse integer potest, dum est incolumitas oculorum, sed etiam sensus informatus sit, quae visio vocatur. Gignitur ergo ex re visibili visio, sed non ex sola, nisi adsit et videns.
2. 3. And in these, although the sense does not proceed from that body which is seen, but from the body of the sensing living being, to which the soul is tempered in its own wondrous way: yet from the body that is seen the seeing is begotten, that is, the sense itself is formed; so that now there is not only the sense, which can be intact even in the dark, as long as the soundness of the eyes lasts, but also the sense formed, which is called seeing. The seeing, then, is begotten from the visible thing, but not from it alone, unless there be present also one who sees.
deTrin.11.2.3Quocirca ex visibili et vidente gignitur visio, ita sane ut ex vidente sit sensus oculorum, et aspicientis atque intuentis intentio: illa tamen informatio sensus, quae visio dicitur, a solo imprimatur corpore quod videtur, id est, a re aliqua visibili: qua detracta, nulla remanet forma quae inerat sensui, dum adesset illud quod videbatur: sensus tamen ipse remanet qui erat et priusquam aliquid sentiretur; velut in aqua vestigium tamdiu est, donec ipsum corpus quod imprimitur inest; quo ablato nullum erit, cum remaneat aqua, quae erat et antequam illam formam corporis caperet. Ideoque non possumus quidem dicere quod sensum gignat res visibilis: gignit tamen formam velut similitudinem suam, quae fit in sensu, cum aliquid videndo sentimus.
Wherefore the seeing is begotten from the visible and the one seeing, so indeed that from the one seeing comes the sense of the eyes, and the attention of the one looking and gazing: yet that informing of the sense, which is called seeing, is impressed by the body alone that is seen, that is, by some visible thing: which being taken away, no form remains that was in the sense, while that which was seen was present: yet the sense itself remains which was there even before anything was sensed; as in water there is an imprint as long as the body itself that is impressed is present; which being taken away, there will be none, while the water remains, which was there even before it took on that form of the body. And therefore we cannot indeed say that the visible thing begets the sense: yet it begets a form, as it were its own likeness, which comes to be in the sense, when by seeing we sense something.
deTrin.11.2.3Sed formam corporis quod videmus, et formam quae ab illa in sensu videntis fit, per eumdem sensum non discernimus; quoniam tanta coniunctio est, ut non pateat discernendi locus. Sed ratione colligimus nequaquam nos potuisse sentire, nisi fieret in sensu nostro, aliqua similitudo conspecti corporis. Neque enim cum anulus cerae imprimitur, ideo nulla imago facta est, quia non discernitur, nisi cum fuerit separata. Sed quoniam post ceram separatam manet quod factum est ut videri possit, propterea facile persuadetur, quod inerat iam cerae forma impressa ex anulo et antequam ab illa separaretur. Si autem liquido humori adiungeretur anulus, eo detracto nihil imaginis appareret:
But the form of the body which we see, and the form which comes to be from it in the sense of the one seeing, we do not distinguish by that same sense; since the conjunction is so close that there lies open no place for distinguishing. But by reason we gather that we could in no way have sensed, unless there came to be in our sense some likeness of the body beheld. For not because, when a ring is impressed on wax, no image is therefore made because it is not distinguished except when it has been separated. But since, after the wax is separated, there remains what was made so that it can be seen, therefore it is easily persuaded that the form impressed from the ring was already in the wax even before it was separated from it. But if the ring were applied to a liquid fluid, when it was withdrawn no image would appear:
deTrin.11.2.3nec ideo tamen discernere ratio non deberet, fuisse in illo humore, antequam detraheretur, anuli formam factam ex anulo, quae distinguenda est ab ea forma quae in anulo est, unde ista facta est quae detracto anulo non erit, quamvis illa in anulo maneat unde ista facta est. Sic sensus oculorum non ideo non habet imaginem corporis quod videtur quamdiu videtur, quia eo detracto non remanet. Ac per hoc tardioribus ingeniis difficillime persuaderi potest, formari in sensu nostro imaginem rei visibilis, cum eam videmus, et eamdem formam esse visionem.
nor, for that reason, ought reason not to distinguish that there was in that fluid, before it was withdrawn, the form of the ring made from the ring, which is to be distinguished from that form which is in the ring, whence this was made which will not be when the ring is withdrawn, although that remains in the ring whence this was made. So the sense of the eyes does not, for the reason that it does not remain when the body is withdrawn, therefore not have the image of the body that is seen as long as it is seen. And through this, to slower minds it can with the greatest difficulty be persuaded that an image of the visible thing is formed in our sense when we see it, and that this same form is the seeing.
deTrin.11.2.32. 4. Sed qui forte adverterunt quod commemorabo, non ita in hac inquisitione laborabunt. Plerumque cum diuscule attenderimus quaeque luminaria, et deinde oculos clauserimus, quasi versantur in conspectu quidam lucidi colores varie sese commutantes, et minus minusque fulgentes, donec omnino desistant: quas intellegendum est reliquias esse formae illius quae facta erat in sensu, cum corpus lucidum videretur, paulatimque et quodam modo gradatim deficiendo variari. Nam et insertarum fenestrarum cancelli, si eos forte intuebamur, saepe in illis apparuere coloribus: ut manifestum sit, hanc affectionem nostro sensui ex ea re quae videbatur impressam. Erat ergo etiam cum videremus, et illa erat clarior et expressior; sed multum coniuncta cum specie rei eius quae cernebatur, ut discerni omnino non posset; et ipsa erat visio.
2. 4. But those who have perhaps noticed what I shall mention will not labor so in this inquiry. Often, when we have looked rather long at some lights, and then have closed our eyes, there turn before our gaze, as it were, certain bright colors variously changing among themselves, and shining less and less, until they cease altogether: which we must understand to be the remnants of that form which had been made in the sense when the bright body was seen, varied by failing little by little and, as it were, by degrees. For even the lattices of inserted windows, if we happened to be looking at them, have often appeared among those colors: so that it is plain that this affection was impressed on our sense from the thing that was seen. It was there, then, even when we were seeing, and it was clearer and more expressed; but so closely joined with the appearance of the thing that was being discerned that it could not be distinguished at all; and it itself was the seeing.
deTrin.11.2.4Quin etiam cum lucernae flammula modo quodam divaricatis radiis oculorum quasi geminatur, duae visiones fiunt, Cf. On the Trinity 9.18. cum sit res una quae videtur. Singillatim quippe afficiuntur idem radii de suo quisque oculo emicantes, dum non sinuntur in illud corpus intuendum pariter coniuncteque concurrere, ut unus fiat ex utroque contuitus. Et ideo si unum oculum clauserimus, non geminum ignem, sed sicuti est unum videbimus. Cur autem sinistro clauso illa species desinit videri quae ad dextrum erat, vicissimque dextro clauso illa intermoritur quae ad sinistrum erat, et longum est et rei praesenti non necessarium modo quaerere atque disserere. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 45b-d; Aristotle, De sensu 431b; Plotinus, Ennead 4.5.2; Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 4.34; 12.16. Quod enim ad susceptam quaestionem satis est; nisi fieret in sensu nostro quaedam imago simillima rei eius quam cernimus, non secundum oculorum numerum flammae species geminaretur, cum quidam cernendi modus adhibitus fuerit, qui possit concursum separare radiorum. Ex uno quippe oculo quolibet modo deducto, aut impresso, aut intorto, si alter clausus est, dupliciter videri aliquid quod sit unum nullo pacto potest.
Indeed, when the little flame of a lamp is, as it were, doubled by a kind of divergence of the rays of the eyes, two seeings come about, See On the Trinity 9.18. though the thing that is seen is one. For those same rays, each shining out from its own eye, are affected separately, while they are not allowed to run together upon the body to be beheld equally and conjointly, so that one beholding may come to be out of both. And therefore, if we close one eye, we shall see not a doubled fire, but, as it is, one. But why, the left being closed, that appearance ceases to be seen which was toward the right, and in turn, the right being closed, that one dies away which was toward the left, is both long and not necessary to the present matter to inquire and discuss now. See Plato, Timaeus 45b-d; Aristotle, De sensu 431b; Plotinus, Ennead 4.5.2; Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 4.34; 12.16. For what suffices for the question undertaken: unless there came to be in our sense a certain image most like the thing we discern, the appearance of the flame would not be doubled according to the number of the eyes, when a certain manner of discerning has been employed which can separate the meeting of the rays. For from one eye, drawn aside, or pressed, or twisted in any way, if the other is closed, something that is one can in no way be seen doubly.
deTrin.11.2.42. 5. Quae cum ita sint, Cicero, In Catilinam 1.5.10. tria haec quamvis diversa natura, quemadmodum in quamdam unitatem contemperentur meminerimus; id est, species corporis quae videtur, et impressus eius imago sensui quod est visio sensusve formatus, et voluntas animi quae rei sensibili sensum admovet, in eoque ipsam visionem tenet.
2. 5. Since these things are so, Cicero, In Catilinam 1.5.10. let us remember how these three, though diverse in nature, are tempered into a certain unity; that is, the form of the body which is seen, and its image impressed on the sense, which is the seeing or the sense formed, and the will of the mind which applies the sense to the sensible thing, and holds the seeing itself upon it.
deTrin.11.2.5Horum primum, id est, res ipsa visibilis non pertinet ad animantis naturam, nisi cum corpus nostrum cernimus. Alterum autem ita pertinet, ut et in corpore fiat, et per corpus in anima: fit enim in sensu, qui neque sine corpore est, neque sine anima. Tertium vero solius animae est, quia voluntas est.
The first of these, that is, the visible thing itself, does not belong to the nature of the living being, except when we discern our own body. But the second so belongs that it comes to be both in the body, and through the body in the soul: for it comes to be in the sense, which is neither without body nor without soul. But the third belongs to the soul alone, because it is will.
deTrin.11.2.5Cum igitur horum trium tam diversae substantiae sint, tamen in tantam coeunt unitatem, ut duo priora vix intercedente iudice ratione discerni valeant, species videlicet corporis quod videtur, et imago eius quae fit in sensu, id est, visio. Voluntas autem tantam vim habet copulandi haec duo, ut et sensum formandum admoveat ei rei quae cernitur, et in ea formatum teneat. Et si tam violenta est, ut possit vocari amor, aut cupiditas, aut libido, etiam ceterum corpus animantis vehementer afficit: et ubi non resistit pigrior duriorque materies, in similem speciem coloremque commutat.
Since, then, the substances of these three are so diverse, yet they come together into so great a unity that the first two can scarcely be distinguished, even with reason intervening as judge, namely the form of the body which is seen, and its image which comes to be in the sense, that is, the seeing. But the will has so great a power of coupling these two that it both applies the sense to be formed to the thing that is discerned, and holds it, once formed, upon it. And if it is so violent that it can be called love, or cupidity, or lust, it vehemently affects also the rest of the body of the living being: and where a more sluggish and harder matter does not resist, it changes it into a like appearance and color.
deTrin.11.2.5Licet videre corpusculum chamaeleontis ad colores quos videt facillima conversione variari. Aliorum autem animalium quia non est ad conversionem facilis corpulentia, fetus plerumque produnt libidines matrum, quid cum magna delectatione conspexerint. Quam enim teneriora, atque, ut ita dixerim, formabiliora sunt primordia seminum, tam efficaciter et capaciter sequuntur intentionem maternae animae, et quae in ea facta est phantasiam per corpus quod cupide aspexit. Sunt exempla quae copiose commemorari possint: sed unum sufficit de fidelissimis Libris quod fecit Iacob, ut oves et caprae varios coloribus parerent, supponendo eis variata virgulta in canalibus aquarum, quae potantes intuerentur eo tempore quo conceperant. See On the Trinity 3.15.
One may see the little body of the chameleon varied, by a most easy turning, to the colors which it sees. But because the bodily bulk of other animals is not easy for turning, their offspring most often betray the lusts of the mothers, what they have beheld with great delight. For the more tender and, so to speak, more formable the first beginnings of the seeds are, so much the more effectively and capaciously do they follow the intention of the mother’s soul, and the phantasy that came to be in it through the body which it eagerly beheld. There are examples that could be abundantly recalled: but one suffices, from the most faithful Books, of what Jacob did, so that the sheep and goats brought forth offspring varied in colors, by setting before them varied rods in the channels of water, which they gazed upon as they drank at the time when they had conceived. See On the Trinity 3.15.
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3. 6. Sed anima rationalis deformiter vivit, cum secundum trinitatem exterioris hominis vivit; id est, cum ad ea quae forinsecus sensum corporis formant, non laudabilem voluntatem, qua haec ad utile aliquid referat, sed turpem cupiditatem qua his inhaerescat, accommodat. Quia etiam detracta specie corporis quae corporaliter sentiebatur, remanet in memoria similitudo eius, quo rursus voluntas convertat aciem, ut inde formetur intrinsecus, sicut ex corpore obiecto sensibili sensus extrinsecus formabatur. Atque ita fit illa trinitas ex memoria, et interna visione, et quae utrumque copulat voluntate. Quae tria cum in unum coguntur, ab ipso coactu cogitatio Cogitatio is from cogito, a frequentative form of cogo, itself a contraction of coago, “to push together.” dicitur.
3. 6. But the rational soul lives in a deformed way when it lives according to the trinity of the outer man; that is, when to those things which form the sense of the body from without it applies, not a praiseworthy will, by which it may refer these to something useful, but a base cupidity by which it clings to them. Because, even when the appearance of the body which was bodily sensed is taken away, there remains in the memory a likeness of it, to which the will may turn back its gaze, so as to be formed within from it, just as the sense was formed from without by the sensible body set before it. And so that trinity comes about out of memory, and inner seeing, and the will that couples both. And when these three are forced together into one, from that very forcing-together it is called thought Cogitatio is from cogito, a frequentative form of cogo, itself a contraction of coago, “to push together.” (cogitatio).
deTrin.11.3.6Nec iam in his tribus diversa substantia est. Neque enim aut corpus illud sensibile ibi est, quod omnino discretum est ab animantis natura, aut sensus corporis ibi formatur ut fiat visio, aut ipsa voluntas id agit ut formandum sensum sensibili corpori admoveat, in eoque formatum detineat: sed pro illa specie corporis quae sentiebatur extrinsecus, succedit memoria retinens illam speciem quam per corporis sensum combibit anima; proque illa visione quae foris erat cum sensus ex corpore sensibili formaretur, succedit intus similis visio, cum ex eo quod memoria tenet, formatur acies animi, et absentia corpora cogitantur: voluntasque ipsa quomodo foris corpori obiecto formandum sensum admovebat, formatumque iungebat, sic aciem recordantis animi convertit ad memoriam, ut ex eo quod illa retinuit, ista formetur, et sit in cogitatione similis visio.
Nor now is the substance diverse in these three. For neither is that sensible body there, which is altogether distinct from the nature of the living being, nor is the sense of the body there formed so as to become seeing, nor does the will itself act so as to apply the sense to be formed to a sensible body and hold it, once formed, upon it: but in place of that appearance of the body which was sensed from without, there succeeds the memory retaining that appearance which the soul drank in through the sense of the body; and in place of that seeing which was outside when the sense was formed from the sensible body, there succeeds within a like seeing, when from that which the memory holds the gaze of the mind is formed, and absent bodies are thought of: and the will itself, just as outside it applied the sense to be formed to the body set before it, and joined it once formed, so it turns the gaze of the remembering mind to the memory, so that from what that has retained this may be formed, and there may be in thought a like seeing.
deTrin.11.3.6Sicut autem ratione discernebatur species visibilis qua sensus corporis formabatur, et eius similitudo quae fiebat in sensu formato ut esset visio (alioquin ita erant coniunctae, ut omnino una eademque putaretur):
But just as by reason the visible appearance by which the sense of the body was formed was distinguished from its likeness which came to be in the formed sense so as to be seeing (otherwise they were so joined as to be supposed altogether one and the same):
deTrin.11.3.6sic illa phantasia, cum animus cogitat speciem visi corporis, cum constet ex corporis similitudine quam memoria tenet, et ex ea quae inde formatur in acie recordantis animi; tamen sic una et singularis apparet, ut duo quaedam esse non inveniantur nisi iudicante ratione, qua intellegimus aliud esse illud quod in memoria manet, etiam cum aliunde cogitamus, et aliud fieri cum recordamur, id est, ad memoriam redimus, et illic invenimus eamdem speciem.
so that phantasy, when the mind thinks of the appearance of a body it has seen, although it consists of the likeness of the body which the memory holds, and of that which is formed from it in the gaze of the remembering mind; yet it so appears one and single that two things are not found to be there except by the judgment of reason, by which we understand that it is one thing that remains in the memory, even when we are thinking of something else, and another that comes to be when we remember, that is, return to the memory, and there find the same appearance.
deTrin.11.3.6Quae si iam non ibi esset, ita oblitos nos esse diceremus, ut omnino recolere non possemus. Si autem acies recordantis non formaretur ex ea re quae erat in memoria, nullo modo fieret visio cogitantis; sed utriusque coniunctio, id est, eius quam memoria tenet, et eius quae inde exprimitur ut formetur acies recordantis, quia simillimae sunt, veluti unam facit apparere. Cum autem cogitantis acies aversa inde fuerit, atque id quod in memoria cernebatur destiterit intueri, nihil formae quae impressa erat in eadem acie remanebit: atque inde formabitur, quo rursus conversa fuerit ut alia cogitatio fiat. Manet tamen illud quod reliquit in memoria, quo rursus cum id recordamur convertatur, et conversa formetur, atque unum cum eo fiat unde formatur.
And if it were no longer there, we would say that we had so forgotten as to be unable to recall it at all. But if the gaze of the one remembering were not formed from that thing which was in the memory, the seeing of the one thinking would in no way come about; but the conjunction of both, that is, of that which the memory holds, and of that which is expressed from it so that the gaze of the one remembering may be formed, because they are most alike, makes it appear, as it were, one. But when the gaze of the one thinking has been turned away from there, and has ceased to behold that which was discerned in the memory, nothing of the form which had been impressed will remain in that gaze: and it will be formed from that to which it has again been turned, so that another thought may come about. Yet that remains which it left in the memory, to which it may again be turned when we remember it, and, once turned, be formed, and become one with that from which it is formed.
deTrin.11.3.64. 7. Voluntas vero illa quae hac atque illac fert et refert aciem formandam, coniungitque formatam, si ad interiorem phantasiam tota confluxerit, atque a praesentia corporum quae circumiacent sensibus, atque ab ipsis sensibus corporis, animi aciem omnino averterit, atque ad eam quae intus cernitur imaginem penitus converterit; tanta offunditur PL: offenditur, “so great a likeness is stumbled on.” similitudo speciei corporalis expressa ex memoria, ut nec ipsa ratio discernere sinatur, utrum foris corpus ipsum videatur, an intus tale aliquid cogitetur.
4. 7. But that will which carries the gaze hither and thither to be formed, and joins it once formed, if it has flowed together wholly into the inner phantasy, and has turned the gaze of the mind altogether away from the presence of the bodies that lie around the senses, and from the senses of the body themselves, and has turned it entirely to that image which is discerned within; so great a likeness of the bodily appearance, expressed from the memory, is poured over it PL: offenditur, “so great a likeness is stumbled on.” that not even reason itself is allowed to distinguish whether the body itself is seen outside, or something of the kind is thought of within.
deTrin.11.4.7Nam interdum homines nimia cogitatione rerum visibilium vel illecti, vel territi, etiam eiusmodi repente voces ediderunt, quasi revera in mediis talibus actionibus sive passionibus versarentur. Et memini me audisse a quodam, quod tam expressam et quasi solidam speciem feminei corporis in cogitando cernere soleret, ut ei se quasi misceri sentiens, etiam genitalibus flueret.
For sometimes people, either allured or terrified by excessive thinking of visible things, have suddenly uttered cries of such a kind, as though they were really in the midst of such actions or sufferings. And I remember hearing from someone that he used to discern in thinking so expressed and, as it were, solid an appearance of a female body, that, feeling himself as it were joined to it, he even had an emission in his genitals.
deTrin.11.4.7Tantum habet virium anima in corpus suum, et tantum valet ad indumenti qualitatem vertendam atque mutandam, Cf. Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionbus Oratoriae 7.23. quomodo afficiatur indutus, qui cohaeret indumento suo. Ex eodem genere affectionis etiam illud est, quod in somnis per imagines ludimur. Sed plurimum differt, utrum sopitis sensibus corporis, sicuti sunt dormientium, aut ab interiore compage turbatis, sicuti sunt furentium, aut alio quodam modo alienatis, sicuti sunt divinantium, vel prophetantium, animi intentio quadam necessitate incurrat in eas quae occurrunt imagines, sive ex memoria, sive alia aliqua occulta vi, per quasdam spirituales mixturas similiter spiritualis substantiae; an sicut sanis atque vigilantibus interdum contingit, ut cogitatione occupata se voluntas avertat a sensibus, atque ita formet animi aciem variis imaginibus sensibilium rerum, tamquam ipsa sensibilia sentiantur.
So great is the power the soul has over its own body, and so much is it able to turn and change the quality of its garment, See Cicero, De Oratore 3.45.177; De Partitionbus Oratoriae 7.23. how the one clothed is affected, who clings to his garment. Of the same kind of affection is also that by which in sleep we are deluded through images. But it makes a very great difference whether, the senses of the body being lulled, as they are in those who sleep, or disturbed from the inner framework, as they are in the raving, or alienated in some other way, as they are in those who divine or prophesy, the attention of the mind runs by a certain necessity upon the images that present themselves, whether from the memory or by some other hidden power, through certain spiritual minglings of a likewise spiritual substance; or whether, as sometimes happens to the sound and waking, the will, occupied by thought, turns itself away from the senses, and so forms the gaze of the mind with the various images of sensible things, as though the sensible things themselves were being sensed.
deTrin.11.4.7Non tantum autem cum appetendo in talia voluntas intenditur, fiunt istae impressiones imaginum; sed etiam cum devitandi et cavendi causa rapitur animus in ea contuenda quae fugiat. Unde non solum cupiendo, sed etiam metuendo, infertur vel sensus ipsis sensibilibus, vel acies animi formanda imaginibus sensibilium. Itaque aut metus aut cupiditas quanto vehementior fuerit, tanto expressius formatur acies, sive sentientis ex corpore quod in loco adiacet, sive cogitantis ex imagine corporis quae memoria continetur.
But these impressions of images come about not only when the will is intent on such things by desiring; but also when, for the sake of avoiding and guarding against them, the mind is hurried into beholding the things it would flee. Whence not only by desiring, but also by fearing, either the sense is brought upon the sensible things themselves, or the gaze of the mind is brought to be formed by the images of sensible things. And so the more vehement either fear or cupidity has been, the more expressly is the gaze formed, whether of the one sensing from the body that lies near in place, or of the one thinking from the image of the body that is contained in the memory.
deTrin.11.4.7Quod ergo est ad corporis sensum aliquod corpus in loco; hoc est ad animi aciem similitudo corporis in memoria: et quod est aspicientis visio ad eam speciem corporis ex qua sensus formatur; hoc est visio cogitantis ad imaginem corporis in memoria constitutam ex qua formatur acies animi: et quod est intentio voluntatis ad corpus visum visionemque copulandam, ut fiat ibi quaedam unitas trium, quamvis eorum sit diversa natura; hoc est eadem voluntatis intentio ad copulandam imaginem corporis quae est in memoria, et visionem cogitantis, id est, formam quam cepit acies animi rediens ad memoriam: ut fiat et hic quaedam unitas ex tribus, non iam naturae diversitate discretis, sed unius eiusdemque substantiae; quia hoc totum intus est, et totum unus animus.
What, then, some body in a place is to the sense of the body, this the likeness of the body in the memory is to the gaze of the mind: and what the seeing of the one looking is to that appearance of the body from which the sense is formed, this the seeing of the one thinking is to the image of the body established in the memory from which the gaze of the mind is formed: and what the intention of the will is for coupling the body seen and the seeing, so that there may come to be there a certain unity of three, although their nature is diverse; this the same intention of the will is for coupling the image of the body which is in the memory and the seeing of the one thinking, that is, the form which the gaze of the mind has taken on in returning to the memory: so that here too there may come to be a certain unity out of three, no longer distinct by diversity of nature, but of one and the same substance; because this whole is within, and the whole is one mind.
deTrin.11.4.75. 8. Sicut autem cum forma et species corporis interierit, non potest ad eam voluntas sensum revocare cernentis: ita cum imago quam memoria gerit, oblivione deleta est, non erit quo aciem animi formandam voluntas recordando retorqueat.
5. 8. But just as, when the form and appearance of a body has perished, the will cannot recall the sense of the one discerning to it: so, when the image which the memory carries has been deleted by forgetfulness, there will be nothing to which the will, by remembering, may turn back the gaze of the mind to be formed.
deTrin.11.5.8Sed quia praevalet animus, non solum oblita, verum etiam non sensa nec experta confingere, ea quae non exciderunt augendo, minuendo, commutando, et pro arbitrio componendo, saepe imaginatur quasi ita aliquid sit, quod aut scit non ita esse, aut nescit ita esse.
But because the mind prevails to fashion not only things forgotten, but even things not sensed nor experienced, by increasing, diminishing, changing, and composing at its pleasure the things that have not slipped away, it often imagines something to be so which it either knows not to be so, or does not know to be so.
deTrin.11.5.8In quo genere cavendum est, ne aut mentiatur ut decipiat, aut opinetur ut decipiatur. Quibus duobus malis evitatis, nihil ei obsunt imaginata phantasmata: sicut nihil obsunt experta sensibilia et retenta memoriter, si neque cupide appetantur si iuvant, neque turpiter fugiantur si offendunt. Cum autem in his voluntas relictis melioribus avida volutatur, immunda fit: atque ita et cum adsunt perniciose, et cum absunt perniciosius cogitantur.
In which kind we must take care lest it either lie so as to deceive, or hold an opinion so as to be deceived. These two evils being avoided, the imagined phantasms do it no harm: just as the experienced sensible things, retained in memory, do no harm, if they are neither eagerly desired when they please, nor basely fled when they offend. But when the will, leaving better things, wallows greedily in these, it becomes unclean: and so they are thought of both perniciously when present, and more perniciously when absent.
deTrin.11.5.8Male itaque vivitur et deformiter secundum trinitatem hominis exterioris: quia et illam trinitatem, quae licet interius imaginetur, exteriora tamen imaginatur, sensibilium corporaliumque utendorum causa peperit. Nullus enim eis uti posset etiam bene, nisi sensarum rerum imagines memoria tenerentur: et nisi pars maxima voluntatis in superioribus atque interioribus habitet, eaque ipsa quae commodatur, sive foris corporibus, sive intus imaginibus eorum, nisi quidquid in eis capit ad meliorem verioremque vitam referat, atque in eo fine cuius intuitu haec agenda iudicat, acquiescat, quid aliud facimus, nisi quod nos Apostolus facere prohibet, dicens, nolite conformari huic saeculo?
Badly, then, and deformedly does one live according to the trinity of the outer man: because that trinity too, although it imagines inwardly, yet imagines outer things, and brought them forth for the sake of sensible and bodily things to be used. For no one could use these even well, unless the images of sensed things were held in the memory: and unless the greatest part of the will dwells in higher and inner things, and unless those very things that are applied, whether bodies outside or their images within, unless whatever it takes in them it refers to a better and truer life, and rests in that end for the sake of which it judges these things are to be done—what else do we do but what the Apostle forbids us to do, saying, do not be conformed to this world?
deTrin.11.5.8Quapropter non est ista trinitas imago Dei: (Cf. Gen 1:26–27; 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) ex ultima quippe, id est corporea creatura, qua superior est anima, in ipsa anima fit per sensum corporis. Nec tamen est omnimodo dissimilis: quid enim non pro suo genere ac pro suo modulo habet similitudinem Dei, quandoquidem Deus fecit omnia bona valde, (Cf. Sir 39:21; Gen 1:31; Mark 7:37) non ob aliud nisi quia ipse summe bonus est? In quantum ergo bonum est quidquid est, in tantum scilicet, quamvis longe distantem, habet tamen nonnullam similitudinem summi boni; et si naturalem, utique rectam et ordinatam; si autem vitiosam, utique turpem atque perversam. Nam et animae in ipsis peccatis suis non nisi quamdam similitudinem Dei, superba et praepostera, et, ut ita dicam, servili libertate sectantur. (Cf. Gen 5:1, 1:26; Jas 3:9) Ita nec primis parentibus nostris persuaderi peccatum posset, nisi diceretur, eritis sicut dii. Non sane omne quod in creaturis aliquo modo simile est Deo, etiam eius imago dicenda est: sed illa sola qua superior ipse solus est. Ea quippe de illo prorsus exprimitur, inter quam et ipsum nulla interiecta natura est.
Wherefore this trinity is not the image of God: (See Gen 1:26–27; 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) for it comes about, from the lowest, that is, the bodily creature, than which the soul is higher, in the soul itself through the sense of the body. Nor yet is it altogether unlike: for what does not, according to its own kind and its own little measure, have a likeness of God, since God made all things very good, (See Sir 39:21; Gen 1:31; Mark 7:37) for no other reason than that he himself is supremely good? Insofar, then, as anything is good, to that extent, namely, although far distant, it nonetheless has some likeness of the highest good; and if a natural likeness, surely a right and ordered one; but if a vicious one, surely a base and perverse one. For souls even in their very sins pursue nothing but a certain likeness of God, by a proud and preposterous and, so to speak, slavish liberty. (See Gen 5:1, 1:26; Jas 3:9) So neither could sin have been persuaded upon our first parents, unless it had been said, you shall be as gods. Not indeed everything that in creatures is in some way like God is also to be called his image: but that alone above which he himself alone is. For that is expressed wholly from him, between which and him no nature is interposed.
deTrin.11.5.8C
deTrin.11.5.8
5. 9. Visionis igitur illius, id est formae quae fit in sensu cernentis, quasi parens est forma corporis ex qua fit. Sed parens illa non vera; unde nec ista vera proles est: neque enim omnino inde gignitur, quoniam aliquid aliud adhibetur corpori, ut ex illo formetur, id est sensus videntis. Quocirca id amare, alienari est. Cf. Augustine, Revisions 2.41.2.
5. 9. Of that seeing, then—that is, of the form which comes to be in the sense of the one discerning—the parent, as it were, is the form of the body from which it comes to be. But that parent is not a true one; whence neither is this a true offspring: for it is not begotten wholly from it, since something else is applied to the body, that it may be formed from it, namely the sense of the one seeing. Wherefore to love this is to be estranged. See Augustine, Revisions 2.41.2.
deTrin.11.5.9Itaque voluntas quae utrumque coniungit quasi parentem et quasi prolem, magis spiritalis est quam utrumlibet illorum. Nam corpus illud quod cernitur, omnino spirituale non est. Visio vero quae fit in sensu habet admixtum aliquid spirituale, quia sine anima fieri non potest. Sed non totum ita est: quoniam ille qui formatur, corporis sensus est.
And so the will which joins both, as it were the parent and the offspring, is more spiritual than either of them. For that body which is discerned is not spiritual at all. But the seeing which comes to be in the sense has something spiritual mixed in, because it cannot come about without a soul. But it is not wholly so: since that which is formed is the sense of the body.
deTrin.11.5.9Voluntas ergo quae utrumque coniungit, magis, ut dixi, spiritualis agnoscitur, et ideo tamquam personam Spiritus insinuare incipit in illa trinitate. Sed magis pertinet ad sensum formatum, quam ad illud corpus unde formatur. Sensus enim animantis et voluntas animae est, non lapidis aut alicuius corporis quod videtur. Non ergo ab illo quasi parente procedit; sed nec ab ista quasi prole, hoc est, visione ac forma quae in sensu est. Prius enim quam visio fieret, iam erat voluntas, quae formandum sensum cernendo corpori admovit: sed nondum erat placitum.
The will, then, which joins both, is recognized, as I said, as more spiritual, and therefore begins to suggest, as it were, the person of the Spirit in that trinity. But it belongs more to the formed sense than to that body from which the sense is formed. For the sense and the will belong to the living being’s soul, not to a stone or any body that is seen. It does not, then, proceed from that, as it were a parent; but neither from this, as it were an offspring, that is, from the seeing and the form which is in the sense. For before the seeing came to be, the will was already there, which by discerning applied the sense to be formed to the body: but there was not yet anything pleasing.
deTrin.11.5.9Quomodo enim placeret, quod nondum erat visum? Placitum autem quieta voluntas est. Ideoque nec quasi prolem visionis possumus dicere voluntatem, quia erat ante visionem; nec quasi parentem, quia non ex voluntate sed ex viso corpore formata et expressa est.
For how could that be pleasing which had not yet been seen? But a thing pleasing is the will at rest. And therefore we can call the will neither the offspring, as it were, of the seeing, because it was there before the seeing; nor its parent, as it were, because it was formed and expressed not from the will but from the body that was seen.
deTrin.11.5.96. 10. Finem fortasse voluntatis et requiem possumus recte dicere visionem, ad hoc dumtaxat unum. Neque enim propterea nihil aliud volet, quia videt aliquid quod volebat. Non itaque omnino ipsa voluntas hominis, cuius finis non est nisi beatitudo, Cf. Augustine, On the Happy Life 2.10; Against the Academics 1.2.5; On Free Choice of the Will 2.9.27; The Catholic Way of Life 1.3.4; Confessions 10.20.29–21.31; The City of God 10.1; Revisions 1.14; Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian 6.26; Epistle 104.4.12; Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 5.10.28. sed ad hoc unum interim voluntas videndi finem non habet nisi visionem, sive id referat ad aliud, sive non referat. Si enim non referat ad aliud visionem, sed tantum voluit ut videret; non est disputandum quomodo ostendatur finem voluntatis esse visionem: manifestum est enim. Si autem referat ad aliud, vult utique aliud, nec iam videndi voluntas erit: aut si videndi, non hoc videndi.
6. 10. We can perhaps rightly call the seeing the end and rest of the will, with regard to this one thing at least. For it will not, on that account, will nothing else, because it sees something it was willing. Not, then, the will of a human being altogether, whose end is nothing but blessedness; See Augustine, On the Happy Life 2.10; Against the Skeptics 1.2.5; On Free Will 2.9.27; The Catholic Way of Life 1.3.4; Confessions 10.20.29–21.31; The City of God 10.1; Revisions 1.14; Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian 6.26; Epistle 104.4.12; Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 5.10.28. but with regard to this one thing, for the time being, the will of seeing has no end but the seeing, whether it refers this to something else or does not refer it. For if it does not refer the seeing to something else, but only willed in order to see; there is no need to argue how it may be shown that the end of the will is the seeing: for it is plain. But if it refers it to something else, it surely wills something else, and it will no longer be the will of seeing: or if of seeing, not of seeing this.
deTrin.11.6.10Tamquam si velit quisque videre cicatricem, ut inde doceat vulnus fuisse; aut si velit videre fenestram, ut per fenestram videat transeuntes: omnes istae atque aliae tales voluntates suos proprios fines habent, qui referuntur ad finem illius voluntatis qua volumus beate vivere, Seneca, On the Happy Life 1.1. et ad eam pervenire vitam quae non referatur ad aliud, sed amanti per se ipsam sufficiat. Voluntas ergo videndi, finem habet visionem: et voluntas hanc rem videndi, finem habet huius rei visionem. Voluntas itaque videndi cicatricem, finem suum expetit, hoc est visionem cicatricis, et ad eam ultra non pertinet: voluntas enim probandi vulnus fuisse, alia voluntas est, quamvis ex illa religetur, cuius item finis est probatio vulneris. Et voluntas videndi fenestram, finem habet fenestrae visionem: altera est enim quae ex ista nectitur voluntas, per fenestram videndi transeuntes, cuius item finis est visio transeuntium.
As if someone wishes to see a scar, in order thereby to teach that there had been a wound; or wishes to see a window, in order through the window to see those passing by: all these and other such wills have their own proper ends, which are referred to the end of that will by which we wish to live blessedly, Seneca, On the Happy Life 1.1. and to come to that life which is not referred to anything else, but suffices, through itself, the one who loves it. The will of seeing, then, has the seeing as its end: and the will of seeing this thing has the seeing of this thing as its end. So the will of seeing the scar seeks its own end, that is, the seeing of the scar, and does not reach beyond it: for the will of proving that there had been a wound is another will, although bound to that one, whose end likewise is the proof of the wound. And the will of seeing the window has the seeing of the window as its end: for there is another will linked to this one, of seeing through the window those passing by, whose end likewise is the seeing of those passing by.
deTrin.11.6.10Rectae autem sunt voluntates et omnes sibimet religatae, si bona est illa quo cunctae referuntur: si autem prava est, pravae sunt omnes. Et ideo rectarum voluntatum connexio iter est quoddam ascendentium ad beatitudinem, quod certis velut passibus agitur: pravarum autem atque distortarum voluntatum implicatio, vinculum est quo alligabitur qui hoc agit, ut proiciatur in tenebras exteriores. (Cf. Matt 22:13, 25:30) Beati ergo qui factis et moribus cantant canticum graduum: (The title of the “gradual psalms,” Psalms 120–34) et vae his qui trahunt peccata, sicut restem longam.
But all wills are right, and all bound to one another, if that one to which they are all referred is good: but if it is depraved, they are all depraved. And therefore the connection of right wills is a certain road of those ascending to blessedness, traveled by sure steps as it were: but the entanglement of depraved and distorted wills is a chain by which one who acts thus will be bound, so that he may be cast into the outer darkness. (See Matt 22:13, 25:30) Blessed, then, are those who by their deeds and conduct sing the song of ascents: (The title of the “gradual psalms,” Psalms 120–34) and woe to those who draw sins along, as a long rope.
deTrin.11.6.10Sic est autem requies voluntatis quem dicimus finem, si adhuc refertur ad aliud, quemadmodum possumus dicere requiem pedis esse in ambulando, cum ponitur unde alius innitatur cum passibus pergitur. Si autem aliquid ita placet, ut in eo cum aliqua delectatione voluntas acquiescat; nondum est tamen illud quo tenditur, sed et hoc refertur ad aliud, ut deputetur non tamquam patria civis; sed tamquam refectio, vel etiam mansio viatoris.
But the rest of the will which we call the end is such, if it is still referred to something else, as we may call the rest of the foot in walking, when it is set down so that the other may press on from it as one proceeds with steps. But if something so pleases that the will rests in it with some delight; yet that is not yet that toward which it tends, but this too is referred to something else, so that it is reckoned not as the homeland to a citizen, but as a refreshment, or even a lodging, to a traveler.
deTrin.11.6.107. 11. Iam vero in alia trinitate, interiore quidem, quam est ista in sensibilibus et sensibus, sed tamen quae inde concepta est, cum iam non ex corpore sensus corporis, sed ex memoria formatur acies animi, cum in ipsa memoria species inhaeserit corporis quod forinsecus sensimus, illam speciem quae in memoria est, quasi parentem dicimus eius quae fit in phantasia cogitantis.
7. 11. But now, in the other trinity—an inner one, indeed, compared with this one in sensible things and the senses, but yet one conceived from it—when now the gaze of the mind is formed not from the body by the sense of the body, but from the memory, when the appearance of the body which we sensed from without has clung in the memory itself, we call that appearance which is in the memory the parent, as it were, of that which comes to be in the phantasy of the one thinking.
deTrin.11.7.11Erat enim in memoria et priusquam cogitaretur a nobis, sicut erat corpus in loco et priusquam sentiretur, ut visio fieret. Sed cum cogitatur, ex illa quam memoria tenet, exprimitur in acie cogitantis, et reminiscendo formatur ea species, quae quasi proles est eius quam memoria tenet.
For it was in the memory even before it was thought of by us, just as the body was in its place even before it was sensed, so that the seeing might come to be. But when it is thought of, from that which the memory holds it is expressed in the gaze of the one thinking, and by remembering that appearance is formed which is, as it were, the offspring of that which the memory holds.
deTrin.11.7.11Sed neque illa vera parens, neque ista vera proles est. Acies quippe animi quae formatur ex memoria cum recordando aliquid cogitamus, non ex ea specie procedit quam meminimus visam; quandoquidem eorum meminisse non possemus, nisi vidissemus: acies autem animi quae reminiscendo formatur, erat etiam priusquam corpus quod meminimus videremus; quanto magis priusquam id memoriae mandaremus? Quamquam itaque forma quae fit in acie recordantis, ex ea fiat quae inest memoriae; ipsa tamen acies non inde exsistit, sed erat ante istam. Consequens est autem, ut si non est illa vera parens, nec ista vera sit proles. Sed et illa quasi parens, et ista quasi proles aliquid insinuant, unde interiora atque veriora exercitatius certiusque videantur.
But neither is that a true parent, nor is this a true offspring. For the gaze of the mind which is formed from the memory when by remembering we think of something does not proceed from that appearance which we remember having seen; since we could not remember them unless we had seen them: but the gaze of the mind which is formed by remembering was there even before we saw the body which we remember; how much more before we committed it to memory? Although, then, the form which comes to be in the gaze of the one recalling comes to be from that which is in the memory; yet the gaze itself does not arise from it, but was there before this. It follows, however, that if that is not a true parent, neither is this a true offspring. But both that, as it were a parent, and this, as it were an offspring, suggest something, whence inner and truer things may be seen more practicedly and more certainly.
deTrin.11.7.117. 12. Difficilius iam plane discernitur, utrum voluntas quae memoriae copulat visionem, non sit alicuius eorum sive parens sive proles: et hanc discretionis difficultatem facit eiusdem naturae atque substantiae parilitas et aequalitas. Neque enim, sicut foris facile discernebatur formatus sensus a sensibili corpore, et voluntas ab utroque, propter naturae diversitatem quae inest ab invicem omnibus tribus, de qua satis supra disseruimus, ita et hic potest. Quamvis enim haec trinitas, de qua nunc quaeritur, forinsecus invecta est animo; intus tamen agitur, et non est quidquam eius praeter ipsius animi naturam. Quo igitur pacto demonstrari potest, voluntatem nec quasi parentem, nec quasi prolem esse, sive corporeae similitudinis quae memoria continetur, sive eius quae inde cum recordamur exprimitur, quando utrumque in cogitando ita copulat, ut tamquam unum singulariter appareat, et discerni nisi ratione non possit?
7. 12. It is now plainly more difficult to discern whether the will which couples the seeing to the memory is the parent or the offspring of either of them: and this difficulty of distinguishing is made by the parity and equality of one and the same nature and substance. For it cannot be done here as outside, where the formed sense was easily distinguished from the sensible body, and the will from both, on account of the diversity of nature which is in all three with respect to one another, of which we discoursed enough above. For although this trinity, of which we now inquire, was brought in from without to the mind; yet it is enacted within, and there is nothing of it besides the nature of the mind itself. In what way, then, can it be demonstrated that the will is neither the parent, as it were, nor the offspring, as it were, either of the bodily likeness which is contained in the memory, or of that which is expressed from it when we remember, since it so couples both in thinking that they appear singularly as one, and cannot be distinguished except by reason?
deTrin.11.7.12Atque illud primum videndum est, non esse posse voluntatem reminiscendi, nisi vel totum, vel aliquid rei eius quam reminisci volumus, in penetralibus memoriae teneamus. Quod enim omni modo et omni ex parte obliti fuerimus, nec reminiscendi voluntas exoritur: quoniam quidquid recordari volumus, recordati iam sumus in memoria nostra esse vel fuisse. Verbi gratia, si recordari volo quid heri coenaverim, aut recordatus iam sum coenasse me, aut si et hoc nondum, certe circa ipsum tempus aliquid recordatus sum, si nihil aliud, ipsum saltem hesternum diem, et eius eam partem qua coenari solet, et quid sit coenare. Nam si nihil tale recordatus essem, quid heri coenaverim, recordari velle non possem.
And this first must be seen, that there can be no will of remembering, unless we hold in the inmost parts of the memory either the whole, or something of the thing which we wish to remember. For what we have forgotten in every way and in every part, no will of remembering arises for: since whatever we wish to recall, we have already recalled to be or to have been in our memory. For example, if I wish to recall what I dined on yesterday, either I have already recalled that I dined, or, if not even this yet, surely I have recalled something about that very time, if nothing else, at least yesterday itself, and that part of it in which one is wont to dine, and what it is to dine. For if I had recalled nothing of the kind, I could not wish to recall what I dined on yesterday.
deTrin.11.7.12Unde intellegi potest, voluntatem reminiscendi ab his quidem rebus quae memoria continentur procedere, adiunctis simul eis quae inde per recordationem cernendo exprimuntur, id est, ex copulatione rei cuiusdam quam recordati sumus, et visionis quae inde facta est in acie cogitantis cum recordati sumus. Sed ipsa quae utrumque copulat voluntas, requirit et aliud quod quasi vicinum est atque contiguum recordanti. Tot igitur huius generis trinitates, quot recordationes, quia nulla est earum ubi non haec tria sint; illud quod in memoria reconditum est etiam antequam cogitetur, et illud quod fit in cogitatione cum cernitur, et voluntas utrumque coniungens, et ex utroque ac tertia se ipsa unum aliquid complens.
From which it can be understood that the will of remembering proceeds indeed from those things which are contained in the memory, with the addition at the same time of those which are expressed from there by discerning through recollection; that is, from the coupling of a certain thing which we have recalled, and of the seeing which came to be from it in the gaze of the one thinking when we recalled it. But the will itself, which couples both, requires also something else which is, as it were, near and contiguous to the one remembering. There are, then, as many trinities of this kind as there are recollections, because there is none of them in which these three are not present: that which is stored in the memory even before it is thought of, and that which comes to be in thought when it is discerned, and the will joining both, and out of both and itself as a third completing some one thing.
deTrin.11.7.12An potius ita cognoscitur una quaedam in hoc genere trinitas, ut unum aliquid generaliter dicamus quidquid corporalium specierum in memoria latet, et rursus unum aliquid generalem visionem animi talia recordantis atque cogitantis, quorum duorum copulationi tertia coniungitur copulatrix voluntas, ut sit hoc totum unum quiddam ex quibusdam tribus?
Or rather is a certain single trinity recognized in this kind, so that we may call generally one thing whatever of bodily appearances lies hidden in the memory, and again one thing the general seeing of the mind recalling and thinking of such things, to the coupling of which two a third, the coupling will, is joined, so that this whole may be some one thing out of a certain three?
deTrin.11.7.128. 12. Sed quoniam non potest acies animi simul omnia quae memoria tenet, uno aspectu contueri, alternant vicissim cedendo ac succedendo trinitates cogitationum, atque ita fit ista innumerabiliter numerosissima trinitas: nec tamen infinita, si numerus in memoria reconditarum rerum non excedatur. Ex quo enim coepit unusquisque sentire corpora quolibet corporis sensu, etiam si posset adiungere quorum oblitus est, certus ac determinatus profecto numerus foret, quamvis innumerabilis. Dicimus enim innumerabilia, non solum infinita, sed etiam quae ita finita sunt, ut facultatem numerantis excedant.
8. 12. But since the gaze of the mind cannot behold all the things that the memory holds at one glance together, the trinities of thoughts alternate by turns, yielding and succeeding, and so this trinity becomes innumerably most numerous: yet not infinite, if the number of things stored in the memory is not exceeded. For from the moment each one began to sense bodies by any bodily sense, even if one could add the things he has forgotten, the number would surely be sure and determinate, although innumerable. For we call innumerable not only the infinite, but also those things which are so finite as to exceed the capacity of one counting.
deTrin.11.8.128. 13. Sed hinc adverti aliquanto manifestius potest, aliud esse quod reconditum memoria tenet, et aliud quod inde in cogitatione recordantis exprimitur, quamvis cum fit utriusque copulatio, unum idemque videatur: quia meminisse non possumus corporum species, nisi tot quot sensimus, et quantas sensimus, et sicut sensimus: ex corporis enim sensu eas in memoria combibit animus: visiones tamen illae cogitantium ex his quidem rebus quae sunt in memoria, sed tamen innumerabiliter atque omnino infinite multiplicantur atque variantur.
8. 13. But from this it can be noticed somewhat more plainly that it is one thing which the memory holds stored, and another which is expressed from it in the thought of the one remembering, although, when the coupling of both comes about, it appears one and the same: because we cannot remember the appearances of bodies except as many as we sensed, and as great as we sensed, and just as we sensed: for the mind drinks them into the memory from the sense of the body: yet those seeings of those thinking, although from those things which are in the memory, are nonetheless multiplied and varied innumerably and altogether infinitely.
deTrin.11.8.13Unum quippe solem memini, quia sicuti est, unum vidi: si voluero autem, duos cogito, vel tres, vel quotquot volo; sed ex eadem memoria qua unum memini formatur acies multos cogitantis. Et tantum memini, quantum vidi. Si enim maiorem vel minorem memini, quam vidi, iam non memini quod vidi, et ideo nec memini. Quia vero memini, tantum memini quantum vidi, vel maiorem tamen pro voluntate cogito, vel minorem. Et ita memini ut vidi; cogito autem sicut volo currentem, et ubi volo stantem, unde volo et quo volo venientem. Quadrum etiam mihi cogitare, in promptu est, cum meminerim rotundum; et cuiuslibet coloris, cum solem viridem numquam viderim, et ideo non meminerim: atque ut solem, ita cetera.
For I remember one sun, because I saw one, as it is: but if I wish, I think of two, or three, or as many as I will; but the gaze of the one thinking of many is formed from the same memory by which I remember one. And I remember just so much as I saw. For if I remember it greater or smaller than I saw, I no longer remember what I saw, and therefore do not remember at all. But because I do remember, I remember just so much as I saw, yet I think it greater or smaller at will. And I remember it as I saw it; but I think of it running as I will, and standing where I will, coming from where I will and to where I will. It is ready to hand for me to think of it square too, when I remember it round; and of any color, although I have never seen a green sun, and therefore do not remember one: and as the sun, so the rest.
deTrin.11.8.13Hae autem rerum formae, quoniam corporales atque sensibiles sunt, errat quidem animus, cum eas opinatur eo modo foris esse, quomodo intus cogitat, vel cum iam interierunt foris, et adhuc in memoria retinentur, vel cum aliter etiam, quod meminimus, non recordandi fide, sed cogitandi varietate formatur.
But these forms of things, since they are bodily and sensible, the mind indeed errs when it supposes them to be outside in the same way it thinks them within, either when they have already perished outside and are still retained in the memory, or when even what we remember is formed otherwise, not by the faithfulness of recalling, but by the variety of thinking.
deTrin.11.8.138. 14. Quamquam saepissime credamus etiam vera narrantibus, quae ipsi sensibus perceperunt. Quae cum in ipso auditu quando narrantur cogitamus, non videtur ad memoriam retorqueri acies, ut fiant visiones cogitantium: neque enim ea nobis recordantibus, sed alio narrante cogitamus:
8. 14. Although very often we believe also those who truthfully narrate things which they themselves perceived by the senses. And when we think of these in the very hearing, when they are narrated, the gaze does not seem to be turned back to the memory so that seeings of those thinking may come to be: for we think of these things not when we ourselves remember, but when another narrates:
deTrin.11.8.14atque illa trinitas non hic videtur expleri, quae fit cum species in memoria latens et visio recordantis tertia voluntate copulantur. Non enim quod latebat in memoria mea, sed quod audio, cogito, cum aliquid mihi narratur.
and that trinity does not seem to be filled out here, which comes about when an appearance lying hidden in the memory and the seeing of the one remembering are coupled by the will as a third. For it is not what was hidden in my memory, but what I hear, that I think of, when something is narrated to me.
deTrin.11.8.14Non ipsas voces loquentis dico, ne quisquam putet in illam me exisse trinitatem, quae foris in sensibilibus et in sensibus agitur: sed eas cogito corporum species, quas narrans verbis sonisque significat; quas utique non reminiscens, sed audiens cogito.
I do not mean the very utterances of the speaker, lest anyone suppose that I have gone out into that trinity which is enacted outside in sensible things and the senses: but I think of those appearances of bodies which the narrator signifies by words and sounds; which I surely think of not by remembering, but by hearing.
deTrin.11.8.14Sed si diligentius consideremus, nec tunc exceditur memoriae modus. Neque enim vel intellegere possem narrantem, si ea quae dicit, et si contexta tunc primum audirem, non tamen generaliter singula meminissem. Qui enim mihi narrat, verbi gratia, aliquem montem silva exutum, et oleis indutum, ei narrat qui meminerim species et montium et silvarum et olearum; quas si oblitus essem, quid diceret omnino nescirem, et ideo narrationem illam cogitare non possem.
But if we consider more diligently, not even then is the measure of the memory exceeded. For I could not even understand the narrator, if, although I now heard for the first time the things he says, even strung together, I did not nonetheless remember the single things generally. For one who narrates to me, for example, some mountain stripped of forest and clothed with olive trees, narrates to one who remembers the appearances both of mountains and of forests and of olive trees; which, had I forgotten, I would not know at all what he was saying, and therefore could not think of that narration.
deTrin.11.8.14Ita fit ut omnis qui corporalia cogitat, sive ipse aliquid confingat, sive audiat, aut legat vel praeterita narrantem, vel futura praenuntiantem, Cf. Jerome, In Hezekiah 9.30.20–26. ad memoriam suam recurrat, et ibi reperiat modum atque mensuram omnium formarum quas cogitans intuetur. Nam neque colorem quem numquam vidit, neque figuram corporis, nec sonum quem numquam audivit, nec saporem quem numquam gustavit, nec odorem quem numquam olfecit, nec ullam contrectationem corporis quam numquam sensit, potest quisquam omnino cogitare. At si propterea nemo aliquid corporale cogitat nisi quod sensit, quia nemo meminit corporale aliquid nisi quod sensit, sicut in corporibus sentiendi, sic in memoria est cogitandi modus. Sensus enim accipit speciem ab eo corpore quod sentimus, et a sensu memoria, a memoria vero acies cogitantis.
So it comes about that everyone who thinks of bodily things, whether he himself fashions something, or hears, or reads either one narrating past things or one foretelling future things, See Jerome, In Hezekiah 9.30.20–26. runs back to his own memory, and there finds the manner and measure of all the forms which, thinking, he beholds. For no one can at all think either of a color he has never seen, or a shape of body, or a sound he has never heard, or a taste he has never tasted, or a smell he has never smelled, or any handling of body he has never sensed. But if no one thinks of anything bodily except what he has sensed, because no one remembers anything bodily except what he has sensed, then as the manner of sensing is in bodies, so the manner of thinking is in the memory. For the sense receives the appearance from the body we sense, and the memory from the sense, and the gaze of the one thinking from the memory.
deTrin.11.8.148. 15. Voluntas porro sicut adiungit sensum corpori, sic memoriam sensui, sic cogitantis aciem memoriae. Quae autem conciliat ista atque coniungit, ipsa etiam disiungit ac separat, id est, voluntas. Sed a sentiendis corporibus motu corporis separat corporis sensus, ne aliquid sentiamus, aut ut sentire desinamus: veluti cum oculos, ab eo quod videre nolumus, avertimus, vel claudimus: sic aures a sonis, sic nares ab odoribus. Ita etiam vel os claudendo, vel aliquid ex ore respuendo a saporibus aversamur. In tactu quoque vel subtrahimus corpus ne tangamus quod nolumus, vel si iam tangebamus, abicimus aut repellimus. Ita motu corporis agit voluntas, ne sensus corporis rebus sensibilibus copuletur. Et agit hoc quantum potest: nam cum in hac actione propter conditionem servilis mortalitatis difficultatem patitur, cruciatus est consequens, ut voluntati nihil reliqui fiat, nisi tolerantia.
8. 15. Now the will, just as it joins the sense to the body, so it joins the memory to the sense, so the gaze of the one thinking to the memory. But that which conciliates and joins these things, the same also disjoins and separates them, that is, the will. But it separates the sense of the body from sensible bodies by a motion of the body, lest we sense something, or that we may cease to sense: as when we turn our eyes away from what we do not wish to see, or close them: so the ears from sounds, so the nostrils from smells. So too, either by closing the mouth, or by spitting something out of the mouth, we turn away from tastes. In touch also we either withdraw the body lest we touch what we do not wish, or, if we were already touching, we throw it off or repel it. So by a motion of the body the will acts, lest the sense of the body be coupled to sensible things. And it does this as much as it can: for when in this action, on account of the condition of servile mortality, it suffers difficulty, torment follows, so that nothing is left to the will but endurance.
deTrin.11.8.15Memoriam vero a sensu voluntas avertit, cum in aliud intenta non ei sinit inhaerere praesentia. Quod animadvertere facile est, cum saepe coram loquentem nobis aliquem aliud cogitando non audisse nobis videmur. Falsum est autem: audivimus enim, sed non meminimus, subinde per aurium sensum labentibus vocibus alienato nutu voluntatis, per quem solent infigi memoriae. Verius itaque dixerimus, cum tale aliquid accidit. Non meminimus, quam, Non audivimus.
But the will turns the memory away from the sense, when, intent on something else, it does not allow it to cling to present things. This is easy to notice, when often, someone speaking in our presence, by thinking of something else we seem to ourselves not to have heard him. But it is false: for we did hear, but do not remember, the utterances slipping away through the sense of the ears moment by moment, the nod of the will being turned aside, by which they are wont to be fixed in the memory. So we would say more truly, when something of the kind happens, We do not remember, than, We did not hear.
deTrin.11.8.15Nam et legentibus evenit, et mihi saepissime, ut perlecta pagina vel epistula, nesciam quid legerim, et repetam. In aliud quippe intento nutu voluntatis, non sic est adhibita memoria sensui corporis, quomodo ipse sensus adhibitus est litteris.
For it happens to readers too, and to me very often, that having read through a page or a letter, I do not know what I have read, and read it again. For, the nod of the will being intent on something else, the memory was not applied to the sense of the body in the way the sense itself was applied to the letters.
deTrin.11.8.15Ita et ambulantes intenta in aliud voluntate, nesciunt qua transierint: quod si non vidissent, non ambulassent, aut maiore intentione palpando ambulassent, praesertim si per incognita pergerent: sed quia facile ambulaverunt, utique viderunt: quia vero non sicut sensus oculorum locis quacumque pergebant, ita ipsi sensui memoria iungebatur, nullo modo id quod viderunt etiam recentissimum meminisse potuerunt.
So too those walking, with the will intent on something else, do not know by what way they passed: which, if they had not seen it, they would not have walked, or would have walked with greater attention by groping, especially if they were going through unknown places: but because they walked easily, they surely saw: yet because the memory was not joined to that same sense in the way the sense of the eyes was joined to the places wherever they were going, they could in no way remember, even most recently, what they saw.
deTrin.11.8.15Iam porro ab eo quod in memoria est, animi aciem velle avertere, nihil est aliud quam non inde cogitare.
Now further, to wish to turn the gaze of the mind away from that which is in the memory is nothing else than not to think of it from there.
deTrin.11.8.159. 16. In hac igitur distributione cum incipimus a specie corporis, et pervenimus usque ad speciem quae fit in contuitu cogitantis, quattuor species reperiuntur quasi gradatim natae altera ex altera: secunda, de prima; tertia, de secunda; quarta, de tertia. A specie quippe corporis quod cernitur, exoritur ea quae fit in sensu cernentis; et ab hac, ea quae fit in memoria; et ab hac, ea quae fit in acie cogitantis.
9. 16. In this arrangement, then, when we begin from the appearance of the body, and arrive at the appearance which comes to be in the beholding of the one thinking, four appearances are found born, as it were, by degrees, one from another: the second from the first; the third from the second; the fourth from the third. For from the appearance of the body which is discerned arises that which comes to be in the sense of the one discerning; and from this, that which comes to be in the memory; and from this, that which comes to be in the gaze of the one thinking.
deTrin.11.9.16Quapropter voluntas quasi parentem cum prole ter copulat: primo speciem corporis cum ea quam gignit in corporis sensu; et ipsam rursus cum ea quae ex illa fit in memoria; atque istam quoque tertio cum ea quae ex illa paritur in cogitantis intuitu. Sed media copula quae secunda est, cum sit vicinior, non tam similis est primae quam tertia. Visiones enim duae sunt; una, sentientis, altera, cogitantis: ut autem possit esse visio cogitantis, ideo fit in memoria de visione sentientis simile aliquid, quo se ita convertat in cogitando acies animi, sicut se in cernendo convertit ad corpus acies oculorum.
Wherefore the will couples, as it were, the parent with the offspring three times: first the appearance of the body with that which it begets in the sense of the body; and this again with that which comes to be from it in the memory; and this also, thirdly, with that which is brought forth from it in the beholding of the one thinking. But the middle coupling, which is the second, although it is nearer, is not so like the first as the third is. For there are two seeings; one of the one sensing, the other of the one thinking: but that there may be a seeing of the one thinking, there comes to be in the memory, from the seeing of the one sensing, something like it, to which the gaze of the mind may so turn itself in thinking, as the gaze of the eyes turns itself to the body in discerning.
deTrin.11.9.16Propterea duas in hoc genere trinitates volui commendare: unam, cum visio sentientis formatur ex corpore; aliam, cum visio cogitantis formatur ex memoria. Mediam vero nolui, quia non ibi solet visio dici, cum memoriae commendatur forma, quae fit in sensu cernentis. Ubique tamen voluntas non apparet, nisi copulatrix quasi parentis et prolis. Et ideo undecumque procedat, nec parens nec proles dici potest.
For that reason I wished to commend two trinities in this kind: one, when the seeing of the one sensing is formed from the body; the other, when the seeing of the one thinking is formed from the memory. But the middle one I did not wish to, because it is not usually called a seeing there, when the form which comes to be in the sense of the one discerning is committed to the memory. Everywhere, however, the will does not appear except as the coupler, as it were, of parent and offspring. And therefore, from wherever it proceeds, it can be called neither parent nor offspring.
deTrin.11.9.16C
deTrin.11.9.16
10. 17. At enim si non meminimus nisi quod sensimus, neque cogitamus nisi quod meminimus; cur plerumque falsa cogitamus, cum ea quae sensimus non utique falso meminerimus: nisi quia voluntas illa quam coniunctricem ac separatricem huiuscemodi rerum iam quantum potui demonstrare curavi, formandam cogitantis aciem per abscondita memoriae ducit ut libitum est, et ad cogitanda ea quae non meminimus, ex eis quae meminimus, aliud hinc, aliud inde, ut sumat impellit;
10. 17. But if we remember nothing except what we have sensed, nor think of anything except what we remember; why do we very often think of false things, when we surely do not falsely remember the things we have sensed: except because that will, which I have already taken care to show, as far as I could, to be the joiner and separator of things of this kind, leads the gaze of the one thinking, to be formed, through the hidden places of the memory as it pleases, and, for thinking of things we do not remember, impels it to take from those things we do remember, one thing from here, another from there;
deTrin.11.10.17quae in unam visionem coeuntia faciunt aliquid quod ideo falsum dicatur, quia vel non est foris in rerum corporearum natura, vel non de memoria videtur expressum, cum tale nihil nos sensisse meminimus?
which, coming together into one seeing, make something that is therefore called false, because it either is not outside in the nature of bodily things, or does not seem to be expressed from the memory, since we remember having sensed nothing of the kind?
deTrin.11.10.17Quis enim vidit cycnum nigrum? et propterea nemo meminit: cogitare tamen quis non potest? Facile est enim illam figuram, quam videndo cognovimus, nigro colore perfundere, quem nihilominus in aliis corporibus vidimus: et quia utrumque sensimus, utrumque meminimus. Nec avem quadrupedem memini, quia non vidi: In Revisions 2.15, Augustine has a scruple about this, saying he had forgotten what the Law has to say about four-footed “birds,” volatilia: Lev 11:20. The reference is to winged insects. sed phantasiam talem facillime intueor, dum alicui formae volatili qualem vidi, adiungo alios duos pedes quales itidem vidi.
For who has seen a black swan? and therefore no one remembers one: yet who cannot think of one? For it is easy to flood with black color that shape which by seeing we have come to know, a color which we have nonetheless seen in other bodies: and because we have sensed both, we remember both. Nor do I remember a four-footed bird, because I have not seen one: In Revisions 2.15, Augustine has a scruple about this, saying he had forgotten what the Law has to say about four-footed “birds,” volatilia: Lev 11:20. The reference is to winged insects. but I behold such a phantasy most easily, when to some winged shape such as I have seen I add two other feet such as I have likewise seen.
deTrin.11.10.17Quapropter, dum coniuncta cogitamus, quae singillatim sensa meminimus, videmur non id quod meminimus cogitare; cum id agamus moderante memoria, unde sumimus omnia quae multipliciter ac varie pro nostra voluntate componimus.
Wherefore, while we think of things joined together which we remember having sensed singly, we seem to think of what we do not remember; though we do this with the memory governing, from which we take all the things that we compose in manifold and various ways according to our will.
deTrin.11.10.17Nam neque ipsas magnitudines corporum, quas numquam vidimus, sine ope memoriae cogitamus. Quantum enim spatii solet occupare per magnitudinem mundi noster obtutus, in tantum extendimus quaslibet corporum moles, cum eas maximas cogitamus. Et ratio quidem pergit in ampliora, sed phantasia non sequitur. Quippe cum infinitatem quoque numeri ratio renuntiet, quam nulla visio corporalia cogitantis apprehendit. Eadem ratio docet minutissima etiam corpuscula infinite dividi; cum tamen ad eas tenuitates vel minutias perventum fuerit, quas visas meminimus, exiliores minutioresque phantasias iam non possumus intueri, quamvis ratio non desinat persequi ac dividere. Ita nulla corporalia, nisi aut ea quae meminimus, aut ex his quae meminimus, cogitamus.
For not even the very magnitudes of bodies, which we have never seen, do we think of without the aid of the memory. For as great a span as our gaze is wont to occupy over the magnitude of the world, just so far do we extend any masses of bodies whatever, when we think of them as greatest. And reason indeed goes on to greater things, but phantasy does not follow. For reason reports the infinity of number too, which no seeing of one thinking of bodily things grasps. The same reason teaches that the most minute little bodies too are divided infinitely; yet when we have come to those thinnesses or minutenesses which we remember having seen, we can no longer behold slighter and more minute phantasies, although reason does not cease to pursue and divide. So we think of no bodily things except either those we remember, or those formed from what we remember.
deTrin.11.10.1711. 18. Sed quia numerose cogitari possunt quae singillatim sunt impressa memoriae, videtur ad memoriam mensura, ad visionem vero numerus pertinere. Quia licet innumerabilis sit multiplicitas talium visionum, singulis tamen in memoria praescriptus est intransgressibilis modus. Mensura igitur in memoria, in visionibus numerus apparet: sicut in ipsis corporibus visibilibus mensura quaedam est, cui numerosissime coaptatur sensus videntium, et ex uno visibili multorum cernentium formatur aspectus: ita ut etiam unus propter duorum oculorum numerum plerumque unam rem geminata specie videat, sicut supra docuimus. In his ergo rebus unde visiones exprimuntur, quaedam mensura est: in ipsis autem visionibus, numerus. Voluntas vero quae ista coniungit et ordinat, et quadam unitate copulat, nec sentiendi aut cogitandi appetitum nisi in his rebus unde visiones formantur, acquiescens collocat, ponderi similis est. Quapropter haec tria, mensuram, numerum, pondus, etiam in ceteris omnibus rebus animadvertenda praelibaverim.
11. 18. But because the things impressed singly on the memory can be thought of in manifold number, measure seems to pertain to the memory, but number to the seeing. For although the multiplicity of such seeings is innumerable, yet to each single thing in the memory there is prescribed an untransgressible measure. Measure, then, appears in the memory, number in the seeings: just as in the visible bodies themselves there is a certain measure, to which the sense of those seeing is most numerously fitted, and from one visible thing the gaze of many discerning is formed: so that even one person, on account of the number of his two eyes, very often sees one thing with a doubled appearance, as we taught above. In these things, then, from which seeings are expressed, there is a certain measure: but in the seeings themselves, number. But the will which joins and orders these, and couples them by a certain unity, and places the appetite of sensing or of thinking, resting, only in those things from which seeings are formed, is like a weight. Wherefore I would have given a foretaste that these three, measure, number, weight, are to be noticed in all other things as well.
deTrin.11.11.18Nunc interim voluntatem copulatricem rei visibilis atque visionis quasi parentis et prolis, sive in sentiendo, sive in cogitando, nec parentem nec prolem dici posse, quomodo valui et quibus valui demonstravi. Unde tempus admonet, hanc eamdem trinitatem in interiore homine requirere, atque ab isto de quo tamdiu locutus sum animali atque carnali, qui exterior dicitur, introrsus tendere. (Cf. 2 Cor 4:16) Ubi speramus invenire nos posse secundum trinitatem imaginem Dei, (Cf. Gen 1:27, 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) conatus nostros illo ipso adiuvante, quem omnia, sicut res ipsae indicant, ita etiam sancta Scriptura in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisse testatur.
Now for the time being I have demonstrated, as I could and to those to whom I could, that the will, the coupler of the visible thing and the seeing, as it were of parent and offspring, whether in sensing or in thinking, can be called neither parent nor offspring. Whence time admonishes us to seek this same trinity in the inner man, and from this animal and carnal one of which I have so long spoken, who is called the outer, to tend inward. (See 2 Cor 4:16) There we hope to be able to find, according to a trinity, the image of God, (See Gen 1:27, 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) with the help of him himself who, as the things themselves indicate, so holy Scripture too bears witness, has arranged all things in measure and number and weight.
deTrin.11.11.18Bk. 12What the outer and the inner man are.Homo exterior et interior qualis.
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deTrin.11.11.18
1. 1. Age nunc, videamus ubi sit quasi quoddam hominis exterioris interiorisque confinium. Quidquid enim habemus in animo commune cum pecore, recte adhuc dicitur ad exteriorem hominem pertinere. Non enim solum corpus homo exterior deputabitur, sed adiuncta quadam vita sua, qua compages corporis et omnes sensus vigent, quibus instructus est ad exteriora sentienda: quorum sensorum imagines infixae in memoria, cum recordando revisuntur, res adhuc agitur ad exteriorem hominem pertinens. Atque in his omnibus non distamus a pecore, nisi quod figura corporis non proni, sed erecti sumus. Cf. Sallust, The War with Catiline 1.1; Cicero, De Legibus 1.9.26; Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.84–86.
1. 1. Come now, let us see where there is, as it were, a certain boundary between the outer and the inner man. For whatever we have in our mind in common with the beast is rightly said still to pertain to the outer man. For the outer man will be reckoned to be not only the body, but with a certain life of its own joined to it, by which the framework of the body and all the senses flourish, with which it is equipped for sensing outer things: and when the images of these things sensed, fixed in the memory, are revisited by remembering, the matter still being enacted pertains to the outer man. And in all these things we do not differ from the beast, except that in the shape of body we are not prone but erect. See Sallust, The War with Catiline 1.1; Cicero, De Legibus 1.9.26; Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.84–86.
deTrin.12.1.1Qua in re admonemur ab eo qui nos fecit, ne meliore nostri parte, id est animo, similes pecoribus simus, a quibus corporis erectione distamus. Non ut in ea quae sublimia sunt in corporibus animum proiciamus; nam vel in talibus quietem voluntatis appetere, prosternere est animum. (Augustine is probably referring to the sin of astrology) Sed sicut corpus ad ea quae sunt excelsa corporum, id est, ad caelestia naturaliter erectum est; sic animus, quae substantia spiritualis est, ad ea quae sunt in spiritualibus excelsa erigendus est, non elatione superbiae sed pietate iustitiae.
In which matter we are admonished by him who made us, that we be not, in the better part of ourselves, that is, the mind, like the beasts, from which we differ by the erectness of the body. Not that we should cast the mind into those things which are lofty among bodies; for to seek the rest of the will even in such things is to lay the mind low. (Augustine is probably referring to the sin of astrology) But just as the body is naturally erect toward those things which are high among bodies, that is, toward the heavenly things; so the mind, which is a spiritual substance, is to be erected toward those things which are high among spiritual things, not by the elation of pride, but by the piety of justice.
deTrin.12.1.12. 2. Possunt autem et pecora et sentire per corporis sensus extrinsecus corporalia, et ea memoriae fixa reminisci, atque in eis appetere conducibilia, fugere incommoda: verum ea notare, ac non solum naturaliter rapta, sed etiam de industria memoriae commendata retinere, et in oblivionem iamiamque labentia recordando atque cogitando rursus imprimere; ut quemadmodum ex eo quod gerit memoria cogitatio formatur, sic et hoc ipsum quod in memoria est cogitatione firmetur: fictas etiam visiones, hinc atque inde recordata quaelibet sumendo et quasi assuendo, componere, inspicere, quemadmodum in hoc rerum genere quae verisimilia sunt discernantur a veris, non spiritualibus, sed ipsis corporalibus: haec atque huiusmodi quamvis in sensibilibus, atque in eis quae inde animus per sensum corporis traxit agantur atque versentur, non sunt tamen rationis expertia, nec hominibus pecoribusque communia.
2. 2. But beasts too can both sense bodily things from without through the senses of the body, and recall them, fixed in the memory, and in them seek what is useful, and flee what is harmful: but to note these things, and to retain not only what is naturally seized but also what is committed to memory on purpose, and to impress again, by remembering and thinking, things that are now and again slipping into forgetfulness; so that, just as thought is formed from what the memory carries, so this very thing that is in the memory may be strengthened by thought: to compose also feigned seeings by taking things recalled here and there and, as it were, stitching them together, and to inspect how, in this kind of thing, the verisimilar are distinguished from the true, not in spiritual things, but in the bodily things themselves: these and things of this kind, although they are enacted and engaged in among sensible things, and among those which the mind has drawn from them through the sense of the body, are nonetheless not devoid of reason, nor common to human beings and beasts.
deTrin.12.2.2Sed sublimioris rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas: quae nisi supra mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent; atque his nisi subiungeretur aliquid nostrum, non secundum eas possemus iudicare de corporalibus. Cf. Augustine, Miscellany of 83 Questions 66.2. Iudicamus autem de corporalibus ex ratione dimensionum atque figurarum, (We make such judgments when we are doing geometry) quam incommutabiliter manere mens novit.
But it is the part of a more sublime reason to judge of these bodily things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons: which, unless they were above the human mind, would surely not be unchangeable; and unless something of ours were joined to them, we could not judge of bodily things according to them. See Augustine, Miscellany of 83 Questions 66.2. But we judge of bodily things from the reason of dimensions and figures, (We make such judgments when we are doing geometry) which the mind knows to abide unchangeably.
deTrin.12.2.23. 3. Illud vero nostrum quod in actione corporalium atque temporalium tractandorum ita versatur, ut non sit nobis commune cum pecore, rationale est quidem, sed ex illa rationali nostrae mentis substantia, qua subhaeremus intellegibili atque incommutabili veritati, tamquam ductum et inferioribus tractandis gubernandisque deputatum est. Sicut enim in omnibus pecoribus non inventum est viro adiutorium simile illi, nisi de illo detractum in coniugium formaretur; (Cf. Gen 2:20) ita menti nostrae qua supernam et internam consulimus veritatem, nullum est ad usum rerum corporalium, quantum naturae hominis satis est, simile adiutorium ex animae partibus quas communes cum pecoribus habemus. Et ideo quiddam rationale nostrum, non ad unitatis divortium separatum, sed in auxilium societatis quasi derivatum, in sui operis dispertitur officium. Et sicut una caro est duorum in masculo et femina, sic intellectum nostrum et actionem, vel consilium et exsecutionem, vel rationem et appetitum rationalem, vel si quo alio modo significatius dici possunt, una mentis natura complectitur: ut quemadmodum de illis dictum est, erunt duo in carne una; (Cf. Gen 2:24; Matt 19:5; 1 Cor 6:16; Eph 5:31) sic de his dici possit: duo in mente una.
3. 3. But that part of ours which is so engaged in the action of handling bodily and temporal things that it is not common to us with the beast, is indeed rational, but is, as it were, drawn from that rational substance of our mind by which we cling beneath to the intelligible and unchangeable truth, and is deputed to handling and governing lower things. For just as in all the beasts there was not found for the man a helper like him, unless one were formed for marriage out of him, drawn from him; (See Gen 2:20) so for our mind, by which we consult the supernal and inner truth, there is no helper like it for the use of bodily things, as far as suffices for the nature of a human being, out of the parts of the soul which we have in common with the beasts. And therefore something rational of ours, not separated to the divorce of unity, but as it were derived in aid of fellowship, is set apart for the office of its own work. And just as the flesh of the two, in male and female, is one, so our understanding and action, or counsel and execution, or reason and rational appetite, or by whatever other way they can be more significantly expressed, one nature of the mind embraces: so that, as it was said of those, they shall be two in one flesh; (See Gen 2:24; Matt 19:5; 1 Cor 6:16; Eph 5:31) so of these it may be said: two in one mind.
deTrin.12.3.34. 4. Cum igitur disserimus de natura mentis humanae, de una quadam re disserimus, nec eam in haec duo quae commemoravi, nisi per officia geminamus. Itaque cum in ea quaerimus trinitatem, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem rationalem in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum, ut tertium aliquid iam quaeramus quo trinitas impleatur.
4. 4. When, therefore, we discourse on the nature of the human mind, we discourse on a certain one thing, nor do we double it into these two which I mentioned, except by reason of offices. And so when we seek a trinity in it, we seek it in the whole, not separating the rational action in temporal things from the contemplation of eternal things, so as to seek now some third thing by which the trinity may be filled out.
deTrin.12.4.4Sed in tota natura mentis ita trinitatem reperiri opus est, ut si desit actio temporalium, cui operi necessarium sit adiutorium, propter quod ad haec inferiora administranda derivetur aliquid mentis, in una nusquam dispertita mente trinitas inveniatur: et facta iam ista distributione, in eo solo quod ad contemplationem pertinet aeternorum, non solum trinitas, sed etiam imago Dei; (Cf. 1 Cor 11:7; Gen 1:26–27; 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) in hoc autem quod derivatum est in actione temporalium, etiamsi trinitas possit, non tamen imago Dei possit inveniri.
But the trinity must be found in the whole nature of the mind in such a way that, if the action of temporal things—for which work a helper is necessary, on account of which something of the mind is derived to administer these lower things—be lacking, the trinity may be found in the one mind, nowhere divided: and, this distribution being now made, in that alone which pertains to the contemplation of eternal things there may be found not only a trinity, but also the image of God; (See 1 Cor 11:7; Gen 1:26–27; 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) but in that which is derived into the action of temporal things, although a trinity can be found, yet the image of God cannot.
deTrin.12.4.4C
deTrin.12.4.4
5. 5. Proinde non mihi videntur probabilem afferre sententiam, qui sic arbitrantur trinitatem imaginis Dei in tribus personis, quod attinet ad humanam naturam, posse reperiri, ut in coniugio masculi et feminae atque in eorum prole compleatur: quod quasi vir ipse Patris personam intimet; Filii vero, quod de illo ita processit ut nasceretur; atque ita tertiam personam velut Spiritus dicunt esse mulierem, quae ita de viro processit, ut non ipsa esset filius aut filia, quamvis ea concipiente proles nasceretur. There is little evidence in written sources for this opinion. Victorinus Afer, in the middle of the fourth century, cautiously endorses calling the Holy Spirit “the mother” of Jesus, both as regards the eternal generation of the Son, and his birth in time (Adv. Arium 1.57.7–58.14). Irenaeus, in the second century, quotes some Gnostics as interpreting the Genesis story of Adam and Eve in a sense vaguely similar to the one outlined here by Augustine. It might have filtered through from Gnostic to more orthodox circles, whom Augustine is here refuting. See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1.30.1. Dixit enim Dominus de Spiritu Sancto, quod a Patre procedat, et tamen Filius non est.
5. 5. Accordingly, those do not seem to me to bring forward a probable opinion who think that the trinity of the image of God in three persons, as far as concerns human nature, can be found in such a way that it is filled out in the union of male and female and in their offspring: in that the man himself, as it were, intimates the person of the Father; and that of the Son, in that which so proceeded from him as to be born; and so they say the third person, as it were the Spirit, is the woman, who so proceeded from the man as not herself to be a son or a daughter, although by her conceiving the offspring was born. There is little evidence in written sources for this opinion. Victorinus Afer, in the middle of the fourth century, cautiously endorses calling the Holy Spirit “the mother” of Jesus, both as regards the eternal generation of the Son, and his birth in time (Adv. Arium 1.57.7–58.14). Irenaeus, in the second century, quotes some Gnostics as interpreting the Genesis story of Adam and Eve in a sense vaguely similar to the one outlined here by Augustine. It might have filtered through from Gnostic to more orthodox circles, whom Augustine is here refuting. See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1.30.1. For the Lord said of the Holy Spirit that he proceeds from the Father, and yet he is not a Son.
deTrin.12.5.5In huius igitur opinionis errore, hoc solum probabiliter affertur, quod in origine factae feminae, secundum sanctae Scripturae fidem satis ostenditur, non omne quod de aliqua persona ita exsistit, ut personam alteram faciat, filium posse dici; quandoquidem de viri persona exstitit persona mulieris, nec tamen eius filia dicta est. Cetera sane ita sunt absurda, immo vero ita falsa, ut facillime redarguantur.
In the error of this opinion, then, this alone is brought forward probably: that in the origin of the woman who was made, it is sufficiently shown, according to the faith of holy Scripture, that not everything which so comes to be from some person as to make another person can be called a son; since the person of the woman came to be from the person of the man, and yet she was not called his daughter. The rest indeed are so absurd, or rather so false, that they are most easily refuted.
deTrin.12.5.5Omitto enim quale sit, Spiritum Sanctum matrem Filii Dei putare et coniugem Patris: fortassis quippe respondeatur haec in carnalibus habere offensionem, dum corporei conceptus partusque cogitantur. Quamquam et haec ipsa castissime cogitent, quibus mundis omnia munda sunt: immundis autem et infidelibus, quorum polluta est et mens et conscientia, ita nihil est mundum, (Cf. Titus 1:15) ut quosdam eorum etiam de Virgine secundum carnem natus Christus offendat. (A reference, probably, to the Manichees)
For I pass over what kind of thing it is to think the Holy Spirit the mother of the Son of God and the consort of the Father: for perhaps it might be answered that these things have an offense in carnal matters, when bodily conceivings and births are thought of. Although even these things they would think most chastely, to whom to the pure all things are pure: but to the impure and unbelieving, whose mind and conscience are defiled, so nothing is pure, (See Titus 1:15) that Christ, born according to the flesh of a Virgin, offends some of them too. (A reference, probably, to the Manichees)
deTrin.12.5.5Sed tamen in spiritalibus illis summis, ubi non est aliquid violabile aut corruptibile, nec natum ex tempore, Ambrose, De Fide 4.9.99. nec ex informi formatum, si qua dicuntur talia, ad quorum similitudinem etiam ista inferioris creaturae genera, quamvis longe remotissime facta sunt, non debent cuiusquam sobriam perturbare prudentiam, ne cum vanum devitat horrorem, in perniciosum incurrat errorem.
But nevertheless, in those highest spiritual things, where there is nothing violable or corruptible, nor anything born in time, Ambrose, De Fide 4.9.99. nor formed from the formless, if any such things are spoken, to the likeness of which even these kinds of lower creation, although made far most remotely, were made, they ought not to disturb anyone’s sober prudence, lest, while he avoids an empty horror, he run into a pernicious error.
deTrin.12.5.5Assuescat in corporibus ita spiritalium reperire vestigia, ut cum inde sursum versus duce ratione ascendere coeperit, ut ad ipsam incommutabilem veritatem per quam facta sunt ista perveniat, non secum ad summa pertrahat quod contemnit in infimis.
Let it grow accustomed to find in bodies the traces of spiritual things in such a way that, when from there it begins to ascend upward, reason leading, so as to arrive at that unchangeable truth itself through which these things were made, it may not drag along with itself to the highest things what it despises in the lowest.
deTrin.12.5.5Nec enim erubuit quidam, uxorem sibi eligere sapientiam, (Cf. Wis 8:2) quia nomen uxoris in prole gignenda corruptibilem concubitum ingerit cogitanti: aut vero ipsa sapientia sexu femina est, quia feminini generis vocabulo et in graeca et in latina lingua enuntiatur.
For a certain man was not ashamed to choose wisdom as a wife for himself, (See Wis 8:2) because the name of wife suggests, to one thinking, the corruptible intercourse of begetting offspring: or, indeed, that wisdom itself is female in sex, because it is expressed by a word of the feminine gender both in the Greek and in the Latin tongue.
deTrin.12.5.56. 6. Non ergo propterea respuimus istam sententiam, quia timemus sanctam et inviolabilem atque incommutabilem caritatem, tamquam coniugem Dei Patris, de illo exsistentem, sed non sicut prolem ad gignendum Verbum per quod facta sunt omnia cogitare: sed quia eam falsam divina Scriptura evidenter ostendit. Dixit enim Deus, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram: paulo post autem dictum est, et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei. Nostram certe, quia pluralis est numerus, non recte diceretur, si homo ad unius personae imaginem fieret, sive Patris, sive Filii, sive Spiritus Sancti: sed quia fiebat ad imaginem Trinitatis, propterea dictum est, ad imaginem nostram. Rursus autem ne in Trinitate credendos arbitraremur tres deos, cum sit eadem Trinitas unus Deus, et fecit, inquit, Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei: pro eo ac si diceret, ad imaginem suam.
6. 6. We do not, then, reject that opinion for this reason, that we fear to think of the holy and inviolable and unchangeable love, as it were the consort of God the Father, coming to be from him, but not as offspring, for the begetting of the Word through whom all things were made: but because divine Scripture evidently shows it to be false. For God said, Let us make the human being to our image and likeness: but a little after it is said, and God made the human being to the image of God. Our certainly, since it is plural in number, would not be rightly said if the human being were made to the image of one person, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit: but because he was being made to the image of the Trinity, therefore it was said, to our image. But again, lest we should reckon that three gods are to be believed in the Trinity, since the same Trinity is one God, and God made, he says, the human being to the image of God: as if he said, to his own image.
deTrin.12.6.66. 7. Sunt enim tales usitatae in illis Litteris locutiones, quas nonnulli, etiamsi catholicam fidem asserunt, non tamen diligenter advertunt, ut putent ita dictum, fecit Deus ad imaginem Dei; quasi diceretur, Fecit Pater ad imaginem Filii: sic volentes asserere in Scripturis Sanctis Deum dictum etiam Filium, quasi desint alia verissima et manifestissima documenta, ubi non solum Deus, sed etiam verus Deus dictus est Filius. (Cf. 1 John 5:20; John 17:3)
6. 7. For there are such customary turns of speech in those Writings, which some, even if they assert the catholic faith, yet do not diligently notice, so that they suppose it was said, God made to the image of God, as if it were said, The Father made to the image of the Son: thus wishing to assert that in the holy Scriptures the Son too is called God, as if other most true and most manifest proofs were lacking, where the Son is called not only God, but even true God. (See 1 John 5:20; John 17:3)
deTrin.12.6.7In hoc enim testimonio dum aliud solvere intendunt, sic se implicant, ut expedire non possint. Si enim Pater fecit ad imaginem Filii, ita ut non sit homo imago Patris, sed Filii, dissimilis est Patri Filius.
For in this testimony, while they intend to solve one thing, they so entangle themselves that they cannot get free. For if the Father made to the image of the Son, so that the human being is the image not of the Father but of the Son, then the Son is unlike the Father.
deTrin.12.6.7Si autem pia fides docet, sicuti docet, Filium esse ad aequalitatem essentiae similem Patri, quod ad similitudinem Filii factum est, necesse est etiam ad similitudinem Patris factum sit.
But if pious faith teaches, as it does teach, that the Son is, to the equality of essence, like the Father, then what was made to the likeness of the Son must necessarily have been made also to the likeness of the Father.
deTrin.12.6.7Deinde, si hominem Pater non ad suam, sed ad Filii fecit imaginem, cur non ait, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem tuam, sed ait, nostram; (Cf. Gen 1:26) nisi quia Trinitatis imago fiebat in homine, ut hoc modo esset homo imago unius veri Dei, (Cf. 1 Cor 11:7; Gen 1:26–27; 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) quia ipsa Trinitas unus verus Deus est?
Then, if the Father made the human being not to his own image, but to the image of the Son, why did he not say, Let us make the human being to your image and likeness, but said, our; (See Gen 1:26) unless because the image of the Trinity was being made in the human being, so that in this way the human being might be the image of the one true God, (See 1 Cor 11:7; Gen 1:26–27; 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) because the Trinity itself is the one true God?
deTrin.12.6.7Locutiones autem sunt innumerabiles tales in Scripturis, As “God made to the image of God,” where either a noun occurs instead of a pronoun, or a different pronoun from what one would expect. sed has protulisse suffecerit. Est in Psalmis ita dictum, Domini est salus, et super populum tuum benedictio tua: quasi alteri dictum sit, non ei de quo dixerat, Domini est salus.
But there are innumerable such turns of speech in the Scriptures, As “God made to the image of God,” where either a noun occurs instead of a pronoun, or a different pronoun from what one would expect. but to have brought forward these will suffice. In the Psalms it is said thus, Salvation is the Lord’s, and your blessing is upon your people: as if it were said to another, not to him of whom he had said, Salvation is the Lord’s.
deTrin.12.6.7Et iterum, a te, inquit, eruar a temptatione, et in Deo meo sperans transgrediar murum: quasi alteri dixerit, a te eruar a temptatione.
And again, by you, he says, I shall be rescued from temptation, and in my God, hoping, I shall pass over the wall: as if he had said to another, by you I shall be rescued from temptation.
deTrin.12.6.7Et iterum, populi sub te cadent in corde inimicorum regis: ac si diceret, in corde inimicorum tuorum. Ei quippe regi dixerat, id est, Domino Iesu Christo, populi sub te cadent; quem regem intellegi voluit, cum diceret, in corde inimicorum regis.
And again, the peoples shall fall under you in the heart of the king’s enemies: as if he said, in the heart of your enemies. For he had said to that king, that is, to the Lord Jesus Christ, the peoples shall fall under you; whom he wished to be understood as king, when he said, in the heart of the king’s enemies.
deTrin.12.6.7Rarius ista in Novi Testamenti litteris inveniuntur. Sed tamen ad Romanos Apostolus, de Filio suo, inquit, qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem, qui praedestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute secundum Spiritum sanctificationis ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi Domini nostri: tamquam de alio supra diceret.
These turns of speech are found more rarely in the writings of the New Testament. But nonetheless the Apostle, to the Romans, says of his Son, who was made for him of the seed of David according to the flesh, who was predestined Son of God in power according to the Spirit of sanctification by the resurrection from the dead, Jesus Christ our Lord: as though he were speaking above of another.
deTrin.12.6.7Quid est enim Filius Dei praedestinatus ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi, nisi idem PL: eiusdem, which the translator rejects as untranslatable nonsense. Iesus Christus qui praedestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute? Ergo quomodo hic cum audimus, Filius Dei in virtute Iesu Christi, aut, Filius Dei secundum Spiritum sanctificationis Iesu Christi, aut: Filius Dei ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi; cum dici potuisset usitate, in virtute sua; aut, secundum Spiritum sanctificationis suae; aut, ex resurrectione mortuorum eius, vel mortuorum suorum: non cogimur intellegere aliam personam, sed unam eamdemque, scilicet Filii Dei Domini nostri Iesu Christi.
For what is the Son of God predestined by the resurrection from the dead of Jesus Christ, but that same PL: eiusdem, which the translator rejects as untranslatable nonsense. Jesus Christ who was predestined Son of God in power? Therefore, just as here, when we hear, the Son of God in the power of Jesus Christ, or, the Son of God according to the Spirit of sanctification of Jesus Christ, or, the Son of God by the resurrection from the dead of Jesus Christ; when it could have been said in the usual way, in his power; or, according to the Spirit of his sanctification; or, by the resurrection of his dead, or his dead: we are not compelled to understand another person, but one and the same, namely of the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ.
deTrin.12.6.7Ita cum audimus, fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei: quamvis posset usitatius dici, ad imaginem suam; (Cf. Sir 17:1) non tamen cogimur aliam personam intellegere in Trinitate, sed ipsam unam eamdemque Trinitatem, qui est unus Deus, ad cuius imaginem factus est homo. (Cf. Deut 6:4; Mal 2:10; Mark 12:29–32; John 17:3; Rom 3:30; Gal 3:20; Eph 4:6; 1 Tim 2:5; Jas 2:19)
So when we hear, God made the human being to the image of God: although it could have been said more in the usual way, to his own image; (See Sir 17:1) yet we are not compelled to understand another person in the Trinity, but that one and the same Trinity itself, which is one God, to whose image the human being was made. (See Deut 6:4; Mal 2:10; Mark 12:29–32; John 17:3; Rom 3:30; Gal 3:20; Eph 4:6; 1 Tim 2:5; Jas 2:19)
deTrin.12.6.76. 8. Quae cum ita sint, Cicero, In Catilinam 1.5.10. si eamdem Trinitatis imaginem, non in uno, sed in tribus hominibus acceperimus, patre et matre et filio, non erat ergo ad imaginem Dei factus homo (Cf. Gen 9:6) antequam uxor ei fieret, et antequam filium propagarent: quia nondum erat trinitas.
6. 8. Since these things are so, Cicero, In Catilinam 1.5.10. if we were to take that same image of the Trinity to be not in one, but in three human beings, father and mother and son, then the human being was not made to the image of God (See Gen 9:6) before a wife was made for him, and before they propagated a son: because there was not yet a trinity.
deTrin.12.6.8An dicit aliquis: Iam trinitas erat, quia etsi nondum forma propria, iam tamen originali natura et mulier erat in latere viri et filius in lumbis patris? Cur ergo, cum Scriptura dixisset, fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei; contexuit dicens, fecit Deus eum; masculum et feminam, fecit eos, et benedixit eos?
Or does someone say: There was already a trinity, because, even if not yet in its own proper form, yet already in original nature both the woman was in the side of the man and the son was in the loins of the father? Why, then, when Scripture had said, God made the human being to the image of God, did it continue, saying, God made him; male and female he made them, and blessed them?
deTrin.12.6.8Vel si ita distinguendum est, et fecit Deus hominem; ut deinde inferatur, ad imaginem Dei fecit eum; et tertia subiunctio sit, masculum et feminam fecit eos. Quidam enim timuerunt dicere, fecit eum masculum et feminam, ne quasi monstruosum aliquid intellegeretur, sicuti sunt quos hermaphroditos vocant: Cf. Marius Victorinus, Against Arius 1.64. cum etiam sic non mendaciter possit intellegi utrumque in numero singulari, propter id quod dictum est, duo in carne una. (Cf. Gen 2:24; Matt 19:5; 1 Cor 6:16; Eph 5:31)
Or if it is to be distinguished thus, and God made the human being; so that then is added, to the image of God he made him; and there is a third clause subjoined, male and female he made them. For some have feared to say, he made him male and female, lest something monstrous, as it were, be understood, such as those whom they call hermaphrodites: See Marius Victorinus, Against Arius 1.64. although even so both could be understood, without falsehood, in the singular number, on account of what was said, two in one flesh. (See Gen 2:24; Matt 19:5; 1 Cor 6:16; Eph 5:31)
deTrin.12.6.8Cur ergo, ut dicere coeperam, in natura hominis ad imaginem Dei facta, praeter masculum et feminam non commemorat Scriptura? Ad implendam quippe imaginem Trinitatis debuit addere et filium, quamvis adhuc in lumbis patris constitutum, sicut mulier erat in latere. (Cf. Gen 2:21–22) An forte iam facta erat et mulier, et Scriptura brevi complexione constrinxerat, quod postea quemadmodum sit factum, diligentius explicaret; et propterea filius commemorari non potuit, quia nondum erat natus? Quasi et hoc non poterat ea brevitate complecti Spiritus Sanctus, suo loco postea natum filium narraturus, sicut mulierem de viri latere assumptam suo postmodum loco narravit, et tamen hic eam nominare non praetermisit.
Why, then, as I had begun to say, in the nature of the human being made to the image of God, does Scripture mention nothing besides male and female? For to fill out the image of the Trinity it ought to have added also the son, although still set in the loins of the father, just as the woman was in the side. (See Gen 2:21–22) Or had the woman perhaps already been made, and Scripture had bound it up in a brief summary, so as later to explain more diligently how it was done; and therefore the son could not be mentioned, because he was not yet born? As if even this the Holy Spirit could not have bound up in that brevity, intending later, in its place, to narrate the son born, just as it afterward narrated, in its place, the woman taken from the side of the man, and yet did not here pass over naming her.
deTrin.12.6.87. 9. Non itaque ita debemus intellegere hominem factum ad imaginem summae Trinitatis, hoc est ad imaginem Dei, (Cf. Gen 1:26–27, 5:1, 9:6) ut eadem imago in tribus intellegatur hominibus: praesertim cum Apostolus virum dicat esse imaginem Dei, et propterea velamentum ei capitis demat, quod mulieri adhibendum monet, ita loquens: vir quidem non debet velare caput, cum sit imago et gloria Dei. Mulier autem gloria viri est. Quid ergo dicemus ad haec? Si pro sua persona mulier adimplet imaginem Trinitatis, cur ea detracta de latere viri adhuc ille imago dicitur? (Cf. Gen 2:21–22; 1 Cor 11:5–7) Aut si et una persona hominis ex tribus potest dici imago Dei, sicut in ipsa summa Trinitate, et unaquaeque persona Deus est, cur et mulier non est imago Dei? Nam propterea caput velare praecipitur, quod ille quia imago Dei est prohibetur.
7. 9. We ought not, then, to understand the human being made to the image of the supreme Trinity, that is, to the image of God, (See Gen 1:26–27, 5:1, 9:6) in such a way that the same image is understood in three human beings: especially since the Apostle says that the man is the image of God, and therefore takes from him the covering of the head, which he advises is to be applied to the woman, speaking thus: the man indeed ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God. But the woman is the glory of the man. What, then, shall we say to these things? If the woman, in her own person, fills out the image of the Trinity, why is the man, after she was drawn from his side, still called the image? (See Gen 2:21–22; 1 Cor 11:5–7) Or if even one person of the human being out of three can be called the image of God, as in the supreme Trinity itself each person too is God, why is the woman too not the image of God? For it is for this reason that she is commanded to veil her head, which he is forbidden because he is the image of God.
deTrin.12.7.9C
deTrin.12.7.9
7. 10. Sed videndum est quomodo non sit contrarium quod dicit Apostolus non mulierem, sed virum esse imaginem Dei, huic quod scriptum est in Genesi, fecit Deus hominem, ad imaginem Dei fecit eum; masculum et feminam fecit eos, et benedixit eos. Ad imaginem quippe Dei naturam ipsam humanam factam dicit, quae sexu utroque completur, nec ab intellegenda imagine Dei separat feminam. Dicto enim quod fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei, fecit eum, inquit, masculum et feminam: vel certe alia distinctione, masculum et feminam fecit eos.
7. 10. But we must see how it is not contrary, what the Apostle says, that not the woman, but the man is the image of God, to this which is written in Genesis, God made the human being, to the image of God he made him; male and female he made them, and blessed them. For he says that human nature itself was made to the image of God, which is completed in both sexes, nor does he separate the woman from the image of God to be understood. For having said that God made the human being to the image of God, he says, he made him male and female: or at least, by another distinction, male and female he made them.
deTrin.12.7.10Quomodo ergo per Apostolum audivimus virum esse imaginem Dei, unde caput velare prohibetur, mulierem autem non, et ideo ipsa hoc facere iubetur? (Cf. 1 Cor 11:4–10) nisi, credo, illud esse quod iam dixi, cum de natura humanae mentis agerem, mulierem cum viro suo esse imaginem Dei, (Cf. Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) ut una imago sit tota illa substantia: cum autem ad adiutorium distribuitur, quod ad eam ipsam solam attinet, non est imago Dei; quod autem ad virum solum attinet, imago Dei est, (Cf. 1 Cor 11:7) tam plena atque integra, quam in unum coniuncta muliere.
How, then, did we hear through the Apostle that the man is the image of God, whence he is forbidden to veil his head, but the woman is not, and therefore she is bidden to do this? (See 1 Cor 11:4–10) Unless, I believe, it be that which I have already said, when I was dealing with the nature of the human mind, that the woman together with her husband is the image of God, (See Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) so that that whole substance is one image: but when she is set apart as a helper, which pertains to her alone, she is not the image of God; whereas what pertains to the man alone is the image of God, (See 1 Cor 11:7) as full and whole as when the woman too is joined to him into one.
deTrin.12.7.10Sicut de natura humanae mentis diximus, quia et si tota contempletur veritatem, imago Dei est; et cum ex ea distribuitur aliquid, et quadam intentione derivatur ad actionem rerum temporalium, nihilominus ex qua parte conspectam consulit veritatem, imago Dei est; ex qua vero intenditur in agenda inferiora, non est imago Dei. Et quoniam quantumcumque se extenderit in id quod aeternum est, tanto magis inde formatur Cf. Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 3.20. ad imaginem Dei, et propterea non est cohibenda, ut se inde contineat ac temperet; ideo vir non debet velare caput.
As we said of the nature of the human mind, that both if as a whole it contemplates the truth, it is the image of God; and when something is set apart from it, and by a certain intention is derived to the action of temporal things, nonetheless from that part by which it consults the beheld truth, it is the image of God; but from that by which it is intent on doing lower things, it is not the image of God. And since, the more it extends itself toward that which is eternal, so much the more is it thence formed See Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 3.20. to the image of God, and therefore it is not to be restrained, so as to hold itself back from there and to temper itself; therefore the man ought not to veil his head.
deTrin.12.7.10Quia vero illi rationali actioni quae in rebus corporalibus temporalibusque versatur, periculosa est nimia in inferiora progressio; debet habere potestatem super caput, quod indicat velamentum quo significatur esse cohibenda. (Cf. 1 Cor 11:5) Grata est enim sanctis angelis sacrata et pia significatio.
But because for that rational action which is engaged in bodily and temporal things, too great a progress into lower things is dangerous; she ought to have a power upon her head, which the veil indicates, by which it is signified that she is to be restrained. (See 1 Cor 11:5) For a hallowed and pious signification is pleasing to the holy angels.
deTrin.12.7.10Nam Deus non ad tempus videt, nec aliquid novi fit in eius visione atque scientia, cum aliquid temporaliter ac transitorie geritur, sicut inde afficiuntur sensus vel carnales animalium et hominum, vel etiam caelestes angelorum.
For God does not see in time, nor does anything new come about in his seeing and knowledge, when something is done temporally and transitorily, as the senses of living beings are affected thereby, whether the carnal senses of animals and human beings, or even the heavenly senses of the angels.
deTrin.12.7.107. 11. In isto quippe manifesto sexu masculi et feminae apostolus Paulus occultioris cuiusdam rei figurasse mysterium, vel hinc intellegi potest, quod cum alio loco dicat, veram viduam esse desolatam, sine filiis et nepotibus, et tamen eam sperare debere in Dominum, et persistere in orationibus nocte et die, hic dicat mulierem seductam in praevaricatione factam, salvam fieri per filiorum generationem: et addidit, si permanserint in fide, et dilectione, et sanctificatione cum sobrietate. Quasi vero possit obesse bonae viduae, si vel filios non habuerit, vel hi quos habuerit, in bonis moribus PL: operibus, “works.” permanere noluerint. Sed quia ea quae dicuntur opera bona, tamquam filii sunt vitae nostrae, secundum quam quaeritur cuius vitae sit quisque, id est, quomodo agat haec temporalia, quam vitam Graeci non ζωή sed βίος vocant; et haec opera bona maxime in officiis misericordiae frequentari solent; opera vero misericordiae nihil prosunt, sive Paganis, sive Iudaeis qui Christo non credunt, sive quibusque haereticis vel schismaticis ubi fides et dilectio et sobria sanctificatio non invenitur: Cf. Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter 28. manifestum est quid Apostolus significare voluerit; ideo figurate ac mystice, quia de velando mulieris capite loquebatur, (Cf. 1 Cor 11:5) quod nisi ad aliquod secretum sacramenti referatur, inane remanebit.
7. 11. That the apostle Paul figured the mystery of a certain more hidden thing in this manifest sex of male and female can be understood even from this, that whereas in another place he says that a true widow is one left desolate, without sons and grandsons, and yet that she ought to hope in the Lord, and to persist in prayers night and day, here he says that the woman, seduced and made in transgression, is saved through the bearing of children: and he added, if they remain in faith, and love, and sanctification with sobriety. As if, indeed, it could harm a good widow if she either has not had children, or those whom she has had have refused to remain in good conduct. PL: operibus, “works.” But because the things that are called good works are, as it were, the children of our life, according to which it is asked of what life each one is, that is, how he carries on these temporal things, which life the Greeks call not ζωή but βίος; and these good works are wont to be performed especially in the offices of mercy; but works of mercy profit nothing, whether to Pagans, or to Jews who do not believe in Christ, or to any heretics or schismatics where faith and love and sober sanctification are not found: See Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter 28. it is plain what the Apostle wished to signify; and figuratively and mystically, because he was speaking of veiling the woman’s head, (See 1 Cor 11:5) which, unless it is referred to some secret of a mystery, will remain empty.
deTrin.12.7.117. 12. Sicut enim non solum veracissima ratio, sed etiam ipsius Apostoli declarat auctoritas, non secundum formam corporis homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, (Cf. Gen 1:26–27, 5:1, 9:6) sed secundum rationalem mentem. Cf. Origen, Homilies on Genesis 1.3; 13.4; Ambrose, Hexaemeron 6.7.40–8.45. Cogitatio quippe turpiter vana est, quae opinatur Deum membrorum corporalium lineamentis circumscribi atque finiri. Porro autem nonne idem beatus Apostolus dicit, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem, eum qui secundum Deum creatus est; et alibi apertius, exuentes vos, inquit, veterem hominem cum actibus eius, induite novum qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum? Si ergo spiritu mentis nostrae renovamur, et ipse est novus homo qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum; nulli dubium est, non secundum corpus, neque secundum quamlibet animi partem, sed secundum rationalem mentem, ubi potest esse agnitio Dei, hominem factum ad imaginem eius qui creavit eum.
7. 12. For just as not only most true reason, but also the authority of the Apostle himself, declares that the human being was made to the image of God (See Gen 1:26–27, 5:1, 9:6) not according to the form of the body, but according to the rational mind. See Origen, Homilies on Genesis 1.3; 13.4; Ambrose, Hexaemeron 6.7.40–8.45. For the thought is basely empty which supposes that God is circumscribed and bounded by the lineaments of bodily members. Now further, does not the same blessed Apostle say, be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who was created according to God; and elsewhere more plainly, putting off, he says, the old man with his deeds, put on the new who is renewed unto the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him? If, then, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and it is the new man who is renewed unto the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him; it is doubtful to no one that the human being was made to the image of him who created him not according to the body, nor according to any part of the soul, but according to the rational mind, where the knowledge of God can be.
deTrin.12.7.12Secundum hanc autem renovationem efficimur etiam filii Dei per baptismum Christi, et induentes novum hominem, Christum utique induimus per fidem. (Cf. Gal 3:26–27; Col 3:10) Quis est ergo qui ab hoc consortio feminas alienet, cum sint nobiscum gratiae cohaeredes; et alio loco idem Apostolus dicat, omnes enim filii Dei estis per fidem in Christo Iesu. Quicumque enim in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis. Non est Iudaeus neque Graecus, non est servus neque liber, non est masculus et femina: omnes enim vos unum estis in Christo Iesu?
But according to this renewal we are made also sons of God through the baptism of Christ, and, putting on the new man, we surely put on Christ through faith. (See Gal 3:26–27; Col 3:10) Who is there, then, who would estrange women from this fellowship, since they are coheirs of grace with us; and in another place the same Apostle says, for you are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus. For whoever of you were baptized in Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is not male and female: for you are all one in Christ Jesus?
deTrin.12.7.12Numquidnam igitur fideles feminae sexum corporis amiserunt? Sed quia ibi renovantur ad imaginem Dei, ubi sexus nullus est, ibi factus est homo ad imaginem Dei (Cf. Gen 9:6) ubi sexus nullus est, hoc est in spiritu mentis (Cf. Eph 4:23) suae.
Have faithful women, then, lost the sex of the body? But because there they are renewed to the image of God, where there is no sex, there the human being was made to the image of God (See Gen 9:6) where there is no sex, that is, in the spirit of his mind. (See Eph 4:23)
deTrin.12.7.12Cur ergo vir propterea non debet caput velare, quia imago est et gloria Dei; mulier autem debet, quia gloria viri est, quasi mulier non renovetur spiritu mentis suae, (Cf. Eph 4:23) qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum?
Why, then, ought the man not to veil his head, because he is the image and glory of God; but the woman ought to, because she is the glory of the man, as though the woman were not renewed in the spirit of her mind, (See Eph 4:23) which is renewed unto the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him?
deTrin.12.7.12Sed quia sexu corporis distat a viro, rite potuit in eius corporali velamento figurari pars illa rationis, quae ad temporalia gubernanda deflectitur; ut non maneat imago Dei, nisi ex parte mens hominis aeternis rationibus conspiciendis vel consulendis adhaerescit, quam non solum masculos, sed etiam feminas habere (Cf. 1 Cor 11:5–7) manifestum est.
But because she differs from the man in the sex of the body, that part of reason which is bent down to governing temporal things could fittingly be figured in her bodily veil; so that the image of God does not remain except in that part by which the mind of the human being clings to the eternal reasons to be beheld or consulted, which it is plain that not only males, but also females (See 1 Cor 11:5–7) have.
deTrin.12.7.128. 13. Ergo in eorum mentibus communis natura cognoscitur; in eorum vero corporibus ipsius unius mentis distributio figuratur.
8. 13. In their minds, then, a common nature is recognized; but in their bodies the distribution of that one mind is figured.
deTrin.12.8.13Ascendentibus itaque introrsus quibusdam gradibus considerationis per animae partes, unde incipit aliquid occurrere, quod non sit nobis commune cum bestiis, inde incipit ratio, ubi iam homo interior possit agnosci.
And so, as we ascend inward by certain steps of consideration through the parts of the soul, from where something begins to present itself that is not common to us with the beasts, there reason begins, where now the inner man can be recognized.
deTrin.12.8.13Qui etiam ipse si per illam rationem cui temporalium rerum administratio delegata est, immoderato progressu nimis in exteriora prolabitur, consentiente sibi capite suo, id est, non eam cohibente atque refrenante illa quae in specula consilii praesidet quasi virili portione, inveteratur inter inimicos suos (Cf. Ps 6:8) virtutis invidos daemones cum suo principe diabolo:
And if this very man, through that reason to which the administration of temporal things has been delegated, by an immoderate progress slips too far into outer things, his head consenting with him—that is, that part which presides on the watchtower of counsel, as the virile portion, not restraining and curbing him—he grows old among his enemies, (See Ps 6:8) the demons envious of virtue, with their prince the devil:
deTrin.12.8.13aeternorumque illa visio ab ipso etiam capite cum coniuge vetitum manducante subtrahitur, ut lumen oculorum eius non sit cum illo; (Cf. Ps 38:10) ac sic ab illa illustratione veritatis ambo nudati, atque apertis oculis conscientiae ad videndum quam inhonesti atque indecori remanserint, tamquam folia dulcium fructuum, sed sine ipsis fructibus, ita sine fructu boni operis bona verba contexunt, ut male viventes quasi bene loquendo contegant turpitudinem suam. (Cf. Gen 3)
and that vision of eternal things is withdrawn from the head itself too, eating, with its spouse, the forbidden thing, so that the light of his eyes is not with him; (See Ps 38 (37):10) and so, both stripped of that illumination of the truth, and with the eyes of conscience opened to see how dishonorable and unseemly they have remained, like the leaves of sweet fruits, but without the fruits themselves, so without the fruit of good work they weave together good words, so that, living badly, they may, as it were by speaking well, cover their baseness. (See Gen 3)
deTrin.12.8.139. 14. Potestatem quippe suam diligens anima, a communi universo ad privatam partem prolabitur: et apostatica illa superbia, quod initium peccati (Cf. Sir 10:12) dicitur, cum in universitate creaturae Deum rectorem secuta, legibus eius optime gubernari potuisset, plus aliquid universo appetens, atque id sua lege gubernare molita, quia nihil est amplius universitate, in curam partilem truditur, et sic aliquid amplius concupiscendo minuitur; unde et avaritia dicitur radix omnium malorum: (Cf. 1 Tim 6:10)
9. 14. For the soul, loving its own power, slips down from the common universe to a private part: and by that apostatic pride, which is called the beginning of sin (See Sir 10:12)—when, in the universe of creation, following God as ruler, it could have been governed most excellently by his laws, but, desiring something more than the universe, and striving to govern it by its own law, because there is nothing more than the universe—it is thrust into a partial care, and so, by desiring something more, is diminished; whence also avarice is called the root of all evils: (See 1 Tim 6:10)
deTrin.12.9.14totumque illud ubi aliquid proprium contra leges, quibus universitas administratur, agere nititur, per corpus proprium gerit, quod partiliter possidet; atque ita formis et motibus corporalibus delectata, quia intus ea secum non habet, cum eorum imaginibus, quas memoriae fixit, involvitur, et phantastica fornicatione turpiter inquinatur, omnia officia sua ad eos fines referens, quibus curiose corporalia ac temporalia per corporis sensus quaerit, aut tumido fastu aliis animis corporeis sensibus deditis esse affectat excelsior, aut coenoso gurgite carnalis voluptatis immergitur.
and all that wherein it strives to do something of its own against the laws by which the universe is administered, it carries on through its own body, which it possesses partially; and so, delighted with bodily forms and motions, because it does not have them with itself within, it is wrapped up in their images, which it has fixed in the memory, and is basely defiled by a phantastic fornication, referring all its offices to those ends by which it curiously seeks bodily and temporal things through the senses of the body; or, by a swollen haughtiness, it strives to be more exalted than other souls given over to bodily senses, or it is plunged into the muddy whirlpool of carnal pleasure.
deTrin.12.9.1410. 15. Cum ergo bona voluntate ad interiora ac superiora percipienda, quae non privatim, sed communiter ab omnibus qui talia diligunt, sine ulla angustia vel invidia casto possidentur amplexu, vel sibi vel aliis consulit; et si fallatur in aliquo per ignorantiam temporalium, quia et hoc temporaliter gerit, et modum agendi non teneat quem debebat, humana temptatio (Cf. 1 Cor 10:13) est. Et magnum est hanc vitam sic degere, quam velut viam redeuntes carpimus, ut temptatio nos non apprehendat nisi humana.
10. 15. When, therefore, with a good will it consults either for itself or for others toward perceiving inner and higher things, which are possessed not privately, but in common by all who love such things, in a chaste embrace without any straitness or envy; and if it is deceived in something through ignorance of temporal things, because it carries this on temporally too, and does not keep the manner of acting which it ought, this is a human temptation. (See 1 Cor 10:13) And it is a great thing to pass this life thus, which we travel as a road of those returning, so that temptation does not lay hold of us except a human one.
deTrin.12.10.15Hoc enim peccatum extra corpus est, (Cf. 1 Cor 6:18) nec fornicationi deputatur, et propterea facillime ignoscitur. Cum vero propter adipiscenda ea quae per corpus sentiuntur, propter experiendi vel excellendi vel contrectandi cupiditatem, ut in his finem boni sui ponat, aliquid agit, quidquid agit, turpiter agit; et fornicatur in corpus proprium peccans, et corporearum rerum fallacia simulacra introrsus rapiens et vana meditatione componens, ut ei nec divinum aliquid nisi tale, videatur, privatim avara fetatur erroribus, et privatim prodiga inanitur viribus. In Revisions 1.15.3, Augustine takes back this figurative interpretation, as St. Paul clearly means it literally. Nec ad tam turpem et miserabilem fornicationem semel ab exordio prosiliret; sed, sicut scriptum est, qui modica spernit, paulatim decidet.
For this sin is outside the body, (See 1 Cor 6:18) nor is it reckoned as fornication, and therefore it is most easily forgiven. But when, in order to obtain those things that are sensed through the body, on account of the desire of experiencing or excelling or handling, so as to set in them the end of its good, it does something—whatever it does, it does basely; and it fornicates, sinning against its own body, and, seizing inwardly the deceitful images of bodily things and composing them by empty meditation, so that nothing divine seems to it except such a thing, privately and avariciously it teems with errors, and privately and prodigally it is emptied of its strength. In Revisions 1.15.3, Augustine takes back this figurative interpretation, as St. Paul clearly means it literally. Nor would it leap forth at once, from the very outset, into so base and miserable a fornication; but, as it is written, he who despises small things falls little by little.
deTrin.12.10.1511. 16. Quomodo enim coluber non apertis passibus, sed squamarum minutissimis nisibus repit; sic lubricus deficiendi motus negligentes minutatim occupat, et incipiens a perverso appetitu similitudinis Dei, pervenit ad similitudinem pecorum. (Cf. Gen 3:5–6; Eccl 3:18; Ps 49:13) Inde est quod nudati stola prima, (Cf. Luke 15:22) pelliceas tunicas (Cf. Gen 3:21) mortalitate meruerunt. Cf. Porphyry, Ad Anebo; Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.7.4–9; Origen, Homilies on Leviticus 6.2. Honor enim hominis verus est imago et similitudo Dei, (Cf. Gen 1:26–27, 3:21, 5:1, 9:6) quae non custoditur nisi ad ipsum a quo imprimitur. Tanto magis itaque inhaeretur Deo, quanto minus diligitur proprium.
11. 16. For just as a serpent creeps not by open steps, but by the most minute efforts of its scales; so the slippery motion of falling away seizes the negligent little by little, and, beginning from a perverse appetite for the likeness of God, arrives at the likeness of the beasts. (See Gen 3:5–6; Eccl 3:18; Ps 49 (48):13) Hence it is that, stripped of the first robe, (See Luke 15:22) they earned garments of skin (See Gen 3:21) by mortality. See Porphyry, Ad Anebo; Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.7.4–9; Origen, Homilies on Leviticus 6.2. For the true honor of the human being is the image and likeness of God, (See Gen 1:26–27, 3:21, 5:1, 9:6) which is not kept except toward him by whom it is impressed. The more, therefore, one clings to God, the less is one’s own self loved.
deTrin.12.11.16Cupiditate vero experiendae potestatis suae, quodam nutu suo ad se ipsum tamquam ad medium proruit. Ita cum vult esse sicut ille sub nullo, et ab ipsa sui medietate poenaliter ad ima propellitur, id est, ad ea quibus pecora laetantur: atque ita cum sit honor eius similitudo Dei, dedecus autem eius similitudo pecoris, homo in honore positus non intellexit; comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est eis.
But by the desire of experiencing its own power, it rushes, by a certain nod of its own, upon itself as upon a middle. And so, when it wishes to be like him, under no one, it is driven, as a punishment, even from its own middle position down to the lowest things, that is, to those in which the beasts rejoice: and so, since its honor is the likeness of God, but its disgrace the likeness of the beast, the human being, set in honor, did not understand; he has been compared to the senseless beasts, and made like them.
deTrin.12.11.16Qua igitur tam longe transiret a summis ad infima, nisi per medium sui? Cum enim neglecta caritate sapientiae, quae semper eodem modo manet, concupiscitur scientia ex mutabilium temporaliumque experimento, inflat, non aedificat: (Cf. 1 Cor 8:1; Wis 9:15)
By what way, then, would it pass so far from the highest things to the lowest, except through its own middle? For when, the love of wisdom being neglected, which always abides in the same way, knowledge is desired from the experience of changeable and temporal things, it puffs up, it does not build up: (See 1 Cor 8:1; Wis 9:15)
deTrin.12.11.16ita praegravatus animus quasi pondere suo a beatitudine expellitur, et per illud suae medietatis experimentum poena sua discit, quid intersit inter bonum desertum malumque commissum, nec redire potest effusis ac perditis viribus, nisi gratia Conditoris sui ad poenitentiam vocantis et peccata donantis. Quis enim infelicem animam liberabit a corpore mortis huius, nisi gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum? De qua gratia suo loco, quantum ipse praestiterit, disseremus.
so the soul, weighed down as by its own weight, is expelled from blessedness, and through that experience of its own middle position it learns by its own punishment what difference there is between the good forsaken and the evil committed, nor can it return, its strength poured out and lost, except by the grace of its Maker, calling it to repentance and forgiving its sins. For who will free the unhappy soul from the body of this death, except the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord? Of which grace we shall discourse in its place, as far as he himself shall grant.
deTrin.12.11.1612. 17. Nunc de illa parte rationis ad quam pertinet scientia, id est, cognitio rerum temporalium atque mutabilium navandis vitae huius actionibus necessaria, susceptam considerationem, quantum Dominus adiuvat, peragamus. Sicut enim in illo manifesto coniugio duorum hominum qui primi facti sunt, non manducavit serpens de arbore vetita, sed tantummodo manducandum persuasit: mulier autem non manducavit sola, sed viro suo dedit, et simul manducaverunt; quamvis cum serpente sola locuta, et ab eo sola seducta sit: (Cf. Gen 3:1–6) ita et in hoc quod etiam in homine uno geritur et dignoscitur, occulto quodam secretoque coniugio carnalis, vel, ut ita dicam, qui in corporis sensus intenditur, sensualis animae motus, qui nobis pecoribusque communis est, seclusus est a ratione sapientiae.
12. 17. Now let us carry through the consideration we have undertaken, as far as the Lord helps, concerning that part of reason to which knowledge belongs, that is, the cognition of temporal and changeable things necessary for carrying on the actions of this life. For just as in that manifest marriage of the two human beings who were first made, the serpent did not eat of the forbidden tree, but only persuaded it to be eaten: but the woman did not eat alone, but gave to her husband, and they ate together; although it was she alone who spoke with the serpent, and was alone seduced by him: (See Gen 3:1–6) so too in this which is enacted and discerned even in one human being, by a certain hidden and secret marriage, the carnal—or, so to speak, the sensual—movement of the soul, which is intent upon the senses of the body, which we have in common with the beasts, is sequestered from the reason of wisdom.
deTrin.12.12.17Sensu quippe corporis corporalia sentiuntur: aeterna vero et incommutabilia spiritalia ratione sapientiae intelleguntur. Rationi autem scientiae appetitus vicinus est: quandoquidem de ipsis corporalibus quae sensu corporis sentiuntur, ratiocinatur ea quae scientia dicitur actionis; si bene, ut eam notitiam referat ad finem summi boni; si autem male, ut eis fruatur tamquam bonis talibus in quibus falsa beatitudine conquiescat. Cum ergo huic intentioni mentis, quae in rebus temporalibus et corporalibus propter actionis officium ratiocinandi vivacitate versatur, carnalis ille sensus vel animalis ingerit quamdam illecebram fruendi se, id est tamquam bono quodam privato et proprio, non tamquam publico atque communi quod est incommutabile bonum, tunc velut serpens alloquitur feminam. Huic autem illecebrae consentire, de ligno prohibito manducare est. Sed iste consensus si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, superioris vero auctoritate consilii ita membra retinentur, ut non exhibeantur iniquitatis arma peccato; sic habendum existimo velut cibum vetitum mulier sola comederit.
For by the sense of the body bodily things are sensed: but eternal and unchangeable things are understood by the reason of wisdom. But to the reason of knowledge appetite is near: since concerning the very bodily things which are sensed by the sense of the body, it reasons out that which is called the knowledge of action; if well, so that it refers that knowledge to the end of the highest good; but if badly, so that it enjoys them as such goods in which it rests in a false blessedness. When, therefore, to this intention of the mind, which is engaged, by liveliness of reasoning, in temporal and bodily things for the office of action, that carnal or animal sense brings in a certain allurement of enjoying itself, that is, as a certain private and proper good, not as a public and common one, which is the unchangeable good, then it is as though the serpent addresses the woman. But to consent to this allurement is to eat of the forbidden tree. But if this consent is content with the delight of thought alone, while by the authority of the higher counsel the members are so held that they are not presented as weapons of iniquity to sin; thus I reckon it must be held that the woman alone ate the forbidden food.
deTrin.12.12.17Si autem in consensione male utendi rebus quae per sensum corporis sentiuntur, ita decernitur quodcumque peccatum, ut si potestas sit, etiam corpore compleatur; intellegenda est illa mulier dedisse viro suo secum simul edendum illicitum cibum. Neque enim potest peccatum non solum cogitandum suaviter, verum etiam efficaciter perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi et illa mentis intentio, penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi, vel ab opere cohibendi, malae actioni cedat et serviat.
But if, in the consent of using badly the things that are sensed through the sense of the body, any sin is so decreed that, if there be power, it is even fulfilled in the body; then that woman is to be understood to have given to her husband the unlawful food to be eaten together with her. For a sin cannot be decreed in the mind, not only to be thought of sweetly, but even to be effectively perpetrated, unless that intention of the mind too, with which is the supreme power of moving the members to a work, or of restraining them from a work, yields and serves the evil action.
deTrin.12.12.1712. 18. Nec sane, cum sola cogitatione mens oblectatur illicitis, non quidem decernens esse facienda, tenens tamen et volvens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt animum respui debuerunt, negandum est esse peccatum, sed longe minus quam si et opere statuatur implendum. Et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda est, pectusque percutiendum, atque dicendum, dimitte nobis debita nostra: faciendumque quod sequitur, atque in oratione iungendum, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris.
12. 18. Nor indeed, when the mind is delighted by unlawful things in thought alone, not indeed decreeing that they are to be done, yet holding and willingly turning over things which ought to have been spurned as soon as they touched the mind, is it to be denied that there is sin, but far less than if it were also resolved to be fulfilled in deed. And therefore for such thoughts too pardon must be sought, and the breast struck, and it must be said, forgive us our debts: and what follows must be done, and joined in prayer, as we also forgive our debtors.
deTrin.12.12.18Neque enim sicut in illis duobus primis hominibus personam suam quisque portabat, et ideo si sola mulier cibum edisset illicitum, sola utique mortis supplicio plecteretur; ita dici potest in homine uno, si delectationibus illicitis, a quibus se continuo deberet avertere cogitatio, libenter sola pascatur, nec facienda decernantur mala, sed tantum suaviter in recordatione teneantur, quasi mulierem sine viro posse damnari: absit hoc credere. Haec quippe una persona est, unus homo est, totusque damnabitur, nisi haec quae sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate animum talibus oblectandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse peccata per Mediatoris gratiam remittantur.
For it is not as in those two first human beings, where each one bore his own person, and therefore, if the woman alone had eaten the unlawful food, she alone surely would have been struck with the punishment of death; so it can be said in one human being, if the thought alone is willingly fed on unlawful delights, from which it ought immediately to turn away, and evils are not decreed to be done, but only held sweetly in recollection, that the woman, as it were, can be condemned without the man: God forbid that we should believe this. For this is one person, it is one human being, and the whole will be condemned, unless these things which are felt to be the sins of thought alone—without the will of doing, yet with the will of delighting the mind in such things—are remitted through the grace of the Mediator.
deTrin.12.12.1812. 19. Haec itaque disputatio qua in mente uniuscuiusque hominis quaesivimus quoddam rationale coniugium contemplationis et actionis, officiis per quaedam singula distributis, tamen in utroque mentis unitate servata, salva illius veritatis historia, quam de duobus primis hominibus, viro scilicet eiusque muliere, de quibus propagatum est genus humanum, divina tradit auctoritas, ad hoc tantummodo audienda est, ut intellegatur Apostolus imaginem Dei viro tantum tribuendo, non etiam feminae, quamvis in diverso sexu duorum hominum, aliquid tamen significare voluisse quod in uno homine quaereretur. (Cf. 1 Cor 11:7)
12. 19. And so this discussion, in which we have sought, in the mind of each human being, a certain rational marriage of contemplation and action, with their offices distributed through certain particulars, yet the unity of the mind preserved in both—the history of that truth being kept safe, which divine authority hands down concerning the two first human beings, namely the man and his woman, from whom the human race was propagated—is to be heard only to this end, that it may be understood that the Apostle, by attributing the image of God to the man only, and not also to the woman, although in the different sex of two human beings, yet wished to signify something that was to be sought in one human being. (See 1 Cor 11:7)
deTrin.12.12.1913. 20. Nec me fugit, quosdam qui fuerunt ante nos egregii defensores catholicae fidei et divini eloquii tractatores, Cf. Tertullian, De Anima 18; Ambrose, Noah 92; Marius Victorinus, Against Arius 1.62. cum in homine uno, cuius universam animam bonam quemdam paradisum esse senserunt, duo ista requirerent, virum mentem, mulierem vero dixisse corporis sensum. Et secundum hanc distributionem qua vir ponitur mens, sensus vero corporis mulier, videntur apte omnia convenire, si considerata tractentur: nisi quod in omnibus bestiis et volatilibus scriptum est non esse inventum viro adiutorium simile illi, et tunc est ei mulier facta de latere.
13. 20. Nor does it escape me that certain men, who were before us distinguished defenders of the catholic faith and expositors of the divine eloquence, See Tertullian, De Anima 18; Ambrose, Noah 92; Marius Victorinus, Against Arius 1.62. when in one human being, whose whole good soul they held to be a certain paradise, they sought these two, called the man the mind, but the woman the sense of the body. And according to this distribution, by which the man is set as the mind, but the sense of the body as the woman, all things seem aptly to fit, if they are considered when handled: except that it is written, in all the beasts and birds, that there was not found for the man a helper like him, and then the woman was made for him from his side.
deTrin.12.13.20Propter quod ego non putavi pro muliere sensum corporis esse ponendum, quem videmus nobis et bestiis esse communem; sed aliquid volui quod bestiae non haberent: sensumque corporis magis pro serpente intellegendum existimavi, qui legitur sapientior omnibus pecoribus terrae. In eis quippe naturalibus bonis, quae nobis et irrationabilibus animantibus videmus esse communia, vivacitate quadam sensus excellit: non ille de quo scriptum est in Epistula quae est ad Hebraeos, ubi legitur, perfectorum esse solidum cibum, qui per habitum exercitatos habent sensus ad separandum bonum a malo; illi quippe sensus naturae rationalis sunt ad intellegentiam pertinentes: sed iste sensus qui est quinquepertitus in corpore, per quem non solum a nobis, verum etiam a bestiis corporalis species motusque sentitur.
For which reason I did not think the sense of the body, which we see to be common to us and the beasts, was to be set for the woman; but I wished something which the beasts did not have: and I reckoned the sense of the body rather to be understood by the serpent, which is read to be wiser than all the beasts of the earth. For in those natural goods which we see to be common to us and the irrational living beings, it excels by a certain liveliness of sense: not that sense of which it is written in the Epistle which is to the Hebrews, where it is read that solid food is for the perfect, who by habit have their senses exercised for separating good from evil; for those senses are of the rational nature, pertaining to understanding: but this sense which is fivefold in the body, through which not only by us, but also by the beasts, bodily appearance and motion is sensed.
deTrin.12.13.2013. 21. Sed sive isto, sive illo, sive aliquo alio modo accipiendum sit, quod Apostolus virum dixit imaginem et gloriam Dei, mulierem autem gloriam viri; (Cf. 1 Cor 11:7) apparet tamen cum secundum Deum vivimus, mentem nostram in invisibilia eius intentam, ex eius aeternitate, veritate, caritate, proficienter debere formari: quiddam vero rationalis intentionis nostrae, hoc est eiusdem mentis, in usum mutabilium corporaliumque rerum, sine quo haec vita non agitur, dirigendum; non ut conformetur huic saeculo, finem constituendo in bonis talibus, et in ea detorquendo beatitudinis appetitum; sed ut quidquid in usu temporalium rationabiliter facimus, aeternorum adipiscendorum contemplatione faciamus, per ista transeuntes, illis inhaerentes.
13. 21. But whether in this way, or in that, or in some other way it is to be taken, that the Apostle called the man the image and glory of God, but the woman the glory of the man; (See 1 Cor 11:7) yet it appears that, when we live according to God, our mind, intent on his invisible things, ought to be progressively formed from his eternity, truth, love: but something of our rational intention, that is, of the same mind, is to be directed to the use of changeable and bodily things, without which this life is not carried on; not that it be conformed to this world, by setting an end in such goods, and by twisting toward them the appetite of blessedness; but that whatever we reasonably do in the use of temporal things, we may do with a view to obtaining eternal things, passing through these, clinging to those.
deTrin.12.13.21C
deTrin.12.13.21
14. 21. Habet enim et scientia modum suum bonum, si quod in ea inflat vel inflare assolet, aeternorum caritate vincatur, quae non inflat, sed, ut scimus, aedificat. (Cf. 1 Cor 8:1) Sine scientia quippe nec virtutes ipsae, quibus recte vivitur, possunt haberi, per quas haec vita misera sic gubernetur, ut ad illam quae vere beata est, perveniatur aeternam.
14. 21. For knowledge too has its own good measure, if that in it which puffs up, or is wont to puff up, is conquered by the love of eternal things, which does not puff up, but, as we know, builds up. (See 1 Cor 8:1) For without knowledge not even the virtues themselves, by which one lives rightly, can be had, by which this miserable life is so governed that one may come to that which is truly blessed and eternal.
deTrin.12.14.2114. 22. Distat tamen ab aeternorum contemplatione actio qua bene utimur temporalibus rebus, et illa sapientiae, haec scientiae deputatur. Quamvis enim et illa quae sapientia est, possit scientia nuncupari, sicut et Apostolus loquitur, ubi dicit, nunc scio ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum; quam scientiam profecto contemplationis Dei vult intellegi, quod sanctorum summum erit praemium summum: tamen ubi dicit, alii quidem datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eumdem Spiritum; haec utique duo sine dubitatione distinguit, licet non ibi explicet quid intersit, et unde possit utrumque dignosci.
14. 22. Yet the action by which we use temporal things well differs from the contemplation of eternal things, and the latter is reckoned to wisdom, the former to knowledge. For although that which is wisdom can also be called knowledge, as the Apostle too speaks, where he says, now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known; which knowledge he surely wishes to be understood as the contemplation of God, which will be the highest reward of the saints: yet where he says, to one indeed is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit; he surely distinguishes these two without doubt, although he does not there explain what the difference is, and from where each can be recognized.
deTrin.12.14.22Verum Scripturarum Sanctarum multiplicem copiam scrutatus, invenio scriptum esse in libro Iob, eodem sancto viro loquente: ecce pietas est sapientia; abstinere autem a malis scientia est. In hac differentia intellegendum est ad contemplationem sapientiam, ad actionem scientiam pertinere. Pietatem quippe hoc loco posuit Dei cultum, quae graece dicitur θεοσέβεια. Nam hoc verbum habet ista sententia in codicibus graecis.
But searching the manifold abundance of the holy Scriptures, I find it written in the book of Job, the same holy man speaking: behold, piety is wisdom; but to abstain from evils is knowledge. In this difference it is to be understood that wisdom pertains to contemplation, knowledge to action. For he here set as piety the worship of God, which in Greek is called θεοσέβεια. For this sentence has this word in the Greek codices.
deTrin.12.14.22Et quid est in aeternis excellentius quam Deus, cuius solius immutabilis est natura? Et quis cultus eius, nisi amor eius, quo nunc desideramus eum videre, credimusque et speramus nos esse visuros; et quantum proficimus videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem in manifestatione? Hoc est enim quod ait apostolus Paulus, facie ad faciem: hoc etiam quod Iohannes, dilectissimi, nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quod erimus; The PL reads quid erimus, with the Vulgate and Greek. Augustine’s text turns an indirect question into a relative clause. The translator has found no evidence that Augustine ever used quod interrogatively, though perhaps the old Latin Bible sometimes did. scimus quia cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est.
And what is there among eternal things more excellent than God, whose nature alone is unchangeable? And what is his worship, except his love, by which we now desire to see him, and believe and hope that we shall see him; and, as far as we make progress, we see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then in manifestation? For this is what the apostle Paul says, face to face: this too what John says, beloved, now we are sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; The PL reads quid erimus, with the Vulgate and Greek. Augustine’s text turns an indirect question into a relative clause. The translator has found no evidence that Augustine ever used quod interrogatively, though perhaps the old Latin Bible sometimes did. we know that when he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.
deTrin.12.14.22De his atque huiusmodi sermo ipse mihi videtur esse sermo sapientiae. (Cf. 1 Cor 12:8) Abstinere autem a malis, (Cf. Job 28:28) quam Iob scientiam dixit esse, rerum procul dubio temporalium est. Quoniam secundum tempus in malis sumus, a quibus abstinere debemus, ut ad illa bona aeterna veniamus. Quamobrem quidquid prudenter, fortiter, temperanter et iuste agimus, ad eam pertinet scientiam sive disciplinam, qua in evitandis malis bonisque appetendis actio nostra versatur; et quidquid propter exempla vel cavenda, vel imitanda, et propter quarumque rerum quae nostris accommodata sunt usibus necessaria documenta, historica cognitione colligimus.
Of these and things of this kind the discourse itself seems to me to be the word of wisdom. (See 1 Cor 12:8) But to abstain from evils, (See Job 28:28) which Job said is knowledge, is without doubt of temporal things. Since according to time we are among the evils from which we ought to abstain, that we may come to those eternal goods. Wherefore whatever we do prudently, bravely, temperately, and justly pertains to that knowledge or discipline by which our action is engaged in avoiding evils and seeking goods; and whatever we gather by historical cognition for the sake of examples either to be guarded against or to be imitated, and for the sake of the necessary proofs of any matters that are suited to our uses.
deTrin.12.14.2214. 23. De his ergo sermo cum fit, eum scientiae sermonem puto, discernendum a sermone sapientiae, (Cf. 1 Cor 12:8) ad quam pertinent ea quae nec fuerunt, nec futura sunt, sed sunt, et propter eam aeternitatem in qua sunt, et fuisse et esse futura esse dicuntur, sine ulla mutabilitate temporum. Non enim sic fuerunt ut esse desinerent, aut sic futura sunt quasi nunc non sint: sed idipsum esse semper habuerunt, semper habitura sunt. Manent autem, non tamquam in spatiis locorum fixa veluti corpora: sed in natura incorporali sic intellegibilia praesto sunt mentis aspectibus, sicut ista in locis visibilia vel contrectabilia corporis sensibus.
14. 23. When, therefore, discourse is made about these things, I think that discourse of knowledge is to be distinguished from the discourse of wisdom, (See 1 Cor 12:8) to which belong those things which neither have been, nor will be, but are, and, on account of that eternity in which they are, are said both to have been and to be and to be about to be, without any changeableness of times. For they have not so been as to cease to be, nor are they so about to be as though they were not now: but they have always had that very being, and they will always have it. But they abide not as though fixed in spans of place, like bodies: but, in incorporeal nature, they are so present, intelligible, to the gaze of the mind, as those visible or touchable things in places are present to the senses of the body.
deTrin.12.14.23Non autem solum rerum sensibilium in locis positarum sine spatiis localibus manent intellegibiles incorporalesque rationes; verum etiam motionum in temporibus transeuntium sine temporali transitu stant etiam ipsae utique intellegibiles, non sensibiles. Ad quas mentis acie pervenire paucorum est; et cum pervenitur, quantum fieri potest, non in eis manet ipse perventor, sed veluti acies ipsa reverberata repellitur, et fit rei non transitoriae transitoria cogitatio.
And not only do the intelligible and incorporeal reasons of sensible things set in places abide without spans of place; but the reasons too of motions passing in times stand, themselves likewise intelligible, not sensible, without temporal passage. To reach these by the edge of the mind is the lot of few; and when one reaches them, as far as it can be done, the one who reaches does not abide in them, but, as it were, the very edge is beaten back and repelled, and there comes about a transitory thought of a non-transitory thing.
deTrin.12.14.23Quae tamen cogitatio transiens per disciplinas quibus eruditur animus, memoriae commendatur, ut sit quo redire possit, quae cogitur inde transire: quamvis si ad memoriam cogitatio non rediret, atque quod commendaverat ibi inveniret, velut rudis ad hoc sicut ducta fuerat duceretur, idque inveniret ubi primum invenerat, in illa scilicet incorporea veritate, unde rursus quasi descriptum in memoria figeretur.
Which transitory thought, nevertheless, passing through the disciplines by which the mind is taught, is committed to memory, so that there may be somewhere to which it can return, which is compelled to pass from there: although, if the thought did not return to memory, and find there what it had committed, it would be led, as untrained for this, just as it had been led before, and would find it where it had first found it, namely in that incorporeal truth, from which it would again be fixed, as it were copied, in the memory.
deTrin.12.14.23Neque enim sicut manet, verbi gratia, quadrati corporis incorporalis et incommutabilis ratio, sic in ea manet hominis cogitatio; si tamen ad eam sine phantasia spatii localis potuit pervenire. Aut si alicuius artificiosi et musici soni per moras temporis transeuntis numerositas comprehendatur, sine tempore stans in quodam secreto altoque silentio, Cf. Virgil, Aeneid 10.63; Horace, Satires 2.6; 58; Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.349; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 10.3.22. tamdiu saltem cogitari potest quamdiu potest ille cantus audiri: tamen quod inde rapuerit etsi transiens mentis aspectus, et quasi glutiens in ventrem ita in memoria reposuerit, poterit recordando quodam modo ruminare, et in disciplinam quod sic didicerit traicere. Quod si fuerit omnimoda oblivione deletum, rursus doctrina duce ad id venietur quod penitus exciderat, et sic invenietur ut erat.
For just as the incorporeal and unchangeable reason of a square body abides, for example, the thought of a human being does not so abide in it; if, that is, it could reach it without the phantasy of a span of place. Or if the numerousness of some artful and musical sound passing through the delays of time be grasped, standing without time in a certain secret and lofty silence, See Virgil, Aeneid 10.63; Horace, Satires 2.6; 58; Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.349; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 10.3.22. it can at least be thought of as long as that song can be heard: yet what the transitory gaze of the mind has snatched from there, and, as it were swallowing it into the belly, has laid up in the memory, it will be able in a way to chew over by remembering, and to carry over into a discipline what it has thus learned. But if this be deleted by complete forgetfulness, again, with doctrine for a guide, one will come to that which had utterly slipped away, and so it will be found as it was.
deTrin.12.14.2315. 24. Unde Plato ille philosophus nobilis persuadere conatus est vixisse hic animas hominum, et antequam ista corpora gererent: et hinc esse quod ea quae discuntur, reminiscuntur potius cognita, quam cognoscuntur nova. Cf. Augustine, Soliloquies 2.20.35; The Magnitude of the Soul 20.34; Epistle 7; Revisions 1.8.2. Retulit enim, puerum quemdam nescio quae de geometrica interrogatum, sic respondisse, tamquam esset illius peritissimus disciplinae. Gradatim quippe atque artificiose interrogatus, videbat quod videndum erat, dicebatque quod viderat. Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.24.57; Plato, Meno 81d–84; Phaedo 72e; Phaedrus 249c–250.
15. 24. Hence that noble philosopher Plato tried to persuade that the souls of human beings lived here even before they bore these bodies: and that hence it is that the things which are learned are recollected, as known, rather than known as new. See Augustine, Soliloquies 2.20.35; The Magnitude of the Soul 20.34; Epistle 7; Revisions 1.8.2. For he related that a certain boy, questioned about I know not what of geometry, answered as though he were most skilled in that discipline. For, questioned step by step and skillfully, he saw what was to be seen, and said what he had seen. See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1.24.57; Plato, Meno 81d–84; Phaedo 72e; Phaedrus 249c–250.
deTrin.12.15.24Sed si recordatio haec esset rerum antea cognitarum, non utique omnes vel pene omnes cum illo modo interrogarentur, hoc possent. Non enim omnes in priore vita geometrae fuerunt, cum tam rari sint in genere humano, ut vix possit aliquis inveniri: sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intellegibilibus naturali ordine, disponente Conditore, subiuncta sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea, quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce circumadiacent, cuius lucis capax eique congruens est creatus. Non enim et ipse ideo sine magistro alba et nigra discernit, quia ista iam noverat antequam in hac carne crearetur.
But if this were a recollection of things previously known, surely not all, or nearly all, could do this when questioned in that way. For not all were geometers in a former life, since they are so rare in the human race that scarcely anyone can be found: but rather it is to be believed that the nature of the intellectual mind is so constituted that, joined to intelligible things in the natural order, by the Maker’s disposing, it sees these things in a certain light of its own kind, incorporeal, just as the eye of the flesh sees the things that lie around in this bodily light, of which light it was created capable and to which it is suited. For neither does the eye itself, for this reason, distinguish white and black without a teacher, because it had already known these before it was created in this flesh.
deTrin.12.15.24Denique cur de solis rebus intellegibilibus id fieri potest, ut bene interrogatus quisque respondeat quod ad quamque pertinet disciplinam, etiamsi eius ignarus est? Cur hoc facere de rebus sensibilibus nullus potest, nisi quas isto vidit in corpore constitutus, aut eis qui noverant indicantibus credidit, seu litteris cuiusque, seu verbis? Non enim acquiescendum est eis qui Samium Pythagoram ferunt Cf. Empedocles, Fragment 129; Heraclea Pontica, in Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Philosophers 8.4. recordatum fuisse talia nonnulla quae fuerat expertus, cum hic alio iam fuisset in corpore: et alios nonnullos narrant alii, eiusmodi aliquid in sui mentibus passos:
In short, why can it come about, concerning intelligible things alone, that anyone well questioned answers what pertains to any discipline, even if he is ignorant of it? Why can no one do this concerning sensible things, except those which he has seen, set in this body, or has believed those who knew them as they indicated them, whether by anyone’s writings or words? For we must not acquiesce in those who report that Pythagoras of Samos See Empedocles, Fragment 129; Heraclea Pontica, in Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Philosophers 8.4. recollected certain such things which he had experienced when he had already been here in another body: and others narrate of certain others that they suffered something of this kind in their minds:
deTrin.12.15.24quas falsas fuisse memorias, quales plerumque experimur in somnis, quando nobis videmur reminisci quasi egerimus aut viderimus, quod nec egimus omnino nec vidimus; et eo modo affectas esse illorum mentes etiam vigilantium, instinctu spirituum malignorum atque fallacium, quibus curae est de revolutionibus animarum falsam opinionem ad decipiendos homines firmare vel serere, ex hoc coniici potest, quia si vere illa recordarentur quae hic in aliis antea positi corporibus viderant, multis ac pene omnibus id contingeret: quandoquidem ut de vivis mortuos, ita de mortuis vivos, tamquam de vigilantibus dormientes, et de dormientibus vigilantes, sine cessatione fieri suspicantur.
that these were false memories, such as we very often experience in dreams, when we seem to ourselves to remember as though we had done or seen something which we neither did at all nor saw; and that the minds of those people, even waking, were affected in that way by the instigation of malignant and deceitful spirits, whose care it is to confirm or sow a false opinion about the transmigrations of souls, in order to deceive human beings—this can be conjectured from the fact that, if they truly recollected those things which they had seen here, set before in other bodies, it would happen to many, and to nearly all: since they suppose that, just as the dead come from the living, so the living come from the dead, as the sleeping from the waking, and the waking from the sleeping, without ceasing.
deTrin.12.15.2415. 25. Si ergo haec est sapientiae et scientiae recta distinctio, ut ad sapientiam pertineat aeternarum rerum cognitio intellectualis; ad scientiam vero, temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis: quid cui praeponendum sive postponendum sit, non est difficile iudicare. Si autem alia est adhibenda discretio, qua dignoscantur haec duo, quae procul dubio distare Apostolus docet, dicens, alii datur quidem per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eumdem Spiritum; tamen etiam istorum duorum quae nos posuimus evidentissima differentia est, quod alia sit intellectualis cognitio aeternarum rerum, alia rationalis temporalium, et huic illam praeferendam esse ambigit nemo.
15. 25. If, then, this is the correct distinction between wisdom and knowledge—that the intellectual cognition of eternal things belongs to wisdom, while the rational cognition of temporal things belongs to knowledge—it is not difficult to judge which is to be set before the other and which after. But if some other distinction is to be applied by which these two are told apart, which the Apostle teaches beyond doubt to differ when he says, to one is given through the Spirit the utterance of wisdom, to another the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit (1 Cor 12:8), still even of the two we have set down the difference is most evident: that the one is the intellectual cognition of eternal things and the other the rational cognition of temporal things, and no one doubts that the former is to be preferred to the latter.
deTrin.12.15.25Relinquentibus itaque nobis ea quae exterioris sunt hominis, et ab eis quae communia cum pecoribus habemus introrsum ascendere cupientibus, antequam ad cognitionem rerum intellegebilium atque summarum quae sempiternae sunt veniremus, temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis occurrit. Etiam in hac igitur inveniamus, si possumus, aliquam trinitatem, sicut inveniebamus in sensibus corporis, et in his quae per eos in animam vel spiritum nostrum imaginaliter intraverunt; ut pro corporalibus rebus quas corporeo foris positas attingimus sensu, intus corporum similitudines haberemus impressas memoriae, ex quibus cogitatio formaretur, tertia voluntate utrumque iungente: sicut formabatur foris acies oculorum, quam voluntas, ut visio fieret, adhibebat rei visibili, et utrumque iungebat, etiam illic ipsa se admovens tertiam. Sed non est hoc coarctandum in hunc librum, ut in eo qui sequitur, si Deus adiuverit, convenienter possit inquiri, et quod inventum fuerit explicari.
And so, as we leave behind the things that belong to the outer man and desire to ascend inward from those things we have in common with the beasts, before we come to the cognition of intelligible and highest things, which are everlasting, the rational cognition of temporal things meets us. In this too, then, let us find, if we can, some trinity, just as we were finding one in the senses of the body and in those things that have entered through them, by way of images, into our soul or spirit—so that, in place of the corporeal things we touch from without by a bodily sense, we had within likenesses of bodies impressed upon the memory, from which thought was formed, with the will as a third joining the two: just as the gaze of the eyes was formed without, which the will, that seeing might come about, applied to the visible thing and joined the two, there too moving itself in as the third. But this is not to be crowded into this book, so that in the one that follows, if God will help, it may fittingly be inquired into, and what has been found may be set forth.
deTrin.12.15.25Bk. 13The Aim of This BookHuius libri propositum.
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deTrin.12.15.25
1. 1. In libro superiore huius operis duodecimo satis egimus discernere rationalis mentis officium in temporalibus rebus, ubi non sola cognitio, verum et actio nostra versatur, ab excellentiore eiusdem mentis officio, quod contemplandis aeternis rebus impenditur, ac sola cognitione finitur. Commodius autem fieri puto, ut de Scripturis Sanctis aliquid interseram, quo facilius possit utrumque dignosci.
1. 1. In the twelfth book of this work, above, we did enough to distinguish the office of the rational mind in temporal things, where not only our cognition but also our action is engaged, from the more excellent office of the same mind, which is devoted to the contemplation of eternal things and is bounded by cognition alone. But I think it more convenient to insert something from the Holy Scriptures, by which the two may more easily be told apart.
deTrin.13.1.11. 2. Evangelium suum Ioannes Evangelista sic exorsus est: in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum: hoc erat in principio apud Deum. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est: in ipso vita erat, et vita erat lux hominum, et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. Fuit homo missus a Deo, cui nomen erat Ioannes: hic venit in testimonium, ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine, ut omnes crederent per illum. Non erat ille lux, sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Erat lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. In mundo erat, et mundus per ipsum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. In propria venit, et sui eum non receperunt. Quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, iis qui credunt in nomine eius: qui non ex sanguinibus, neque ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex Deo nati sunt. Et verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis. Et vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis.
1. 2. The Evangelist John began his Gospel thus: in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God; the same was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing that was made; in him was life, and the life was the light of men, and the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it. There was a man sent from God, whose name was John; he came for a testimony, to bear witness to the light, that all might believe through him. He was not the light, but came to bear witness to the light. It was the true light that enlightens every man coming into this world. He was in the world, and the world was made through him, and the world did not know him. He came unto his own, and his own received him not. But to as many as received him he gave power to become sons of God, to those who believe in his name, who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us. And we saw his glory, glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth (John 1:1–14).
deTrin.13.1.2Hoc totum quod ex Evangelio posui, in praecedentibus suis partibus habet quod immutabile ac sempiternum est, cuius contemplatio nos beatos facit: in consequentibus vero permixta cum temporalibus commemorantur aeterna. Ac per hoc aliqua ibi ad scientiam pertinent, aliqua ad sapientiam, sicut in libro duodecimo nostra praecessit distinctio. Nam, in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum: hoc erat in principio apud Deum. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil: quod factum est in ipso vita erat, et vita erat lux hominum, et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt; contemplativam vitam requirit, et intellectuali mente cernendum est. Qua in re quanto magis quisque profecerit, tanto fiet sine dubitatione sapientior.
This whole passage that I have set down from the Gospel has, in its earlier parts, that which is unchangeable and everlasting, whose contemplation makes us blessed; but in what follows, eternal things are recalled mixed with temporal things. And through this some things there pertain to knowledge, some to wisdom, as our distinction laid out earlier in the twelfth book. For the words in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God; the same was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing; that which was made in him was life, and the life was the light of men, and the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it (John 1:1–5) call for the contemplative life, and must be discerned by the intellectual mind. And the more anyone advances in this matter, the wiser, without doubt, will he become.
deTrin.13.1.2Sed propter id quod ait, lux lucet in tenebris, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt; fide utique opus erat, qua crederetur quod non videretur. (Cf. John 20:29) Tenebras quippe intellegi voluit, aversa ab huiusmodi luce eamque minus idonea contueri corda mortalium: propter quod adiungit et dicit, fuit homo missus a Deo, cui nomen erat Ioannes: hic venit in testimonium, ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine, ut omnes crederent per illum.
But because of his saying, the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it (John 1:5), there was indeed need of faith, by which one might believe what one did not see. (See John 20:29) For by "darkness" he wished to be understood the hearts of mortals, turned away from such a light and less fit to behold it; on which account he adds and says, there was a man sent from God, whose name was John; he came for a testimony, to bear witness to the light, that all might believe through him (John 1:6–7).
deTrin.13.1.2Hoc iam temporaliter gestum est, et ad scientiam pertinet, quae cognitione historica continetur. Hominem autem Ioannem in phantasia cogitamus, quae de humanae naturae notitia impressa est nostrae memoriae. Et hoc eodem modo cogitant, sive qui ista non credunt, sive qui credunt. Utrisque enim notum est quid sit homo, cuius exteriorem partem, id est, corpus per corporis lumina didicerunt: interiorem vero, id est, animam in se ipsis, quia et ipsi homines sunt, et per humanam conversationem cognitam tenent: ut possint cogitare quod dicitur, fuit homo cui nomen erat Ioannes: quia et nomina sciunt loquendo et audiendo.
This was now done in time, and pertains to knowledge, which is contained in historical cognition. But we think of the man John in an image that has been impressed upon our memory from our acquaintance with human nature. And those who do not believe these things think of him in the very same way as those who do. For to both alike it is known what a man is, whose outer part, that is, the body, they have learned through the body's eyes, but whose inner part, that is, the soul, they hold known in themselves, since they too are men, and through human society—so that they can think of what is said, there was a man whose name was John (John 1:6); for they know names too by speaking and hearing.
deTrin.13.1.2Quod autem ibi est, missus a Deo; fide tenent qui tenent: et qui fide non tenent, aut dubitatione ambigunt, aut infidelitate derident. Utrique tamen, si non sunt ex numero nimis insipientium, qui dicunt in corde suo, non est Deus, haec audientes verba, utrumque cogitant, et quid sit Deus, et quid sit mitti a Deo; et si non sicut res se habent, at certe sicut valent.
But as for what is there, sent from God (John 1:6), those who hold it hold it by faith; and those who do not hold it by faith either waver in doubt or mock in unbelief. Yet both, if they are not of the number of those too foolish, who say in their heart, there is no God (Ps 14:1 (13:1)), when they hear these words think of both—both what God is and what it is to be sent by God; and if not as the things really are, at least as far as they are able.
deTrin.13.1.21. 3. Fidem porro ipsam quam videt quisque in corde suo esse, si credit, vel non esse, si non credit, aliter novimus: non sicut corpora quae videmus oculis corporeis, et per ipsorum imagines quas memoria tenemus, etiam absentia cogitamus; nec sicut ea quae non vidimus, et ex iis quae vidimus cogitatione utcumque formamus, et memoriae commendamus, quo recurramus cum voluerimus, ut illic ea, vel potius qualescumque imagines eorum quas ibi fiximus, similiter recordatione cernamus; nec sicut hominem vivum, cuius animam etiamsi non videmus, ex nostra conicimus, et ex motibus corporalibus hominem vivum, sicut videndo didicimus, intuemur etiam cogitando. Non sic videtur fides in corde, in quo est, ab eo cuius est: sed eam tenet certissima scientia, clamatque conscientia.
1. 3. Now faith itself, which each one sees to be in his heart if he believes, or not to be there if he does not believe, we know in another way: not as the bodies we see with the bodily eyes and, through their images that we hold in memory, think of even when they are absent; nor as those things that we have not seen and somehow form by thought out of the things we have seen, and commit to memory, so that we may return to them when we wish and there discern them—or rather, discern such images of them as we have fixed there—likewise by recollection; nor as a living man, whose soul, even though we do not see it, we infer from our own, and, from the movements of his body, behold the living man even in thought, as we have learned by seeing. Not thus is faith seen in the heart in which it is, by the one whose it is; rather, a most certain knowledge holds it, and the conscience cries it aloud.
deTrin.13.1.3Cum itaque propterea credere iubeamur, quia id quod credere iubemur, videre non possumus; ipsam tamen fidem quando inest in nobis, videmus in nobis: quia et rerum absentium praesens est fides, et rerum quae foris sunt intus est fides, et rerum quae non videntur videtur fides, et ipsa tamen temporaliter fit in cordibus hominum; (Cf. John 20:27) et si ex fidelibus, infideles fiunt, perit ab eis.
Therefore, although we are bidden to believe for this reason, that we cannot see what we are bidden to believe, yet faith itself, when it is in us, we see in ourselves: for faith is present with respect to absent things, and faith is within with respect to things that are without, and faith is seen with respect to things that are not seen, and yet it itself comes to be in the hearts of men in time; (See John 20:27) and if out of faithful men they become unbelieving, it perishes from them.
deTrin.13.1.3Aliquando autem et rebus falsis accommodatur fides: loquimur enim sic, ut dicamus “habita est ei fides, et decepit.” Qualis fides, si tamen et ipsa dicenda est fides, non culpabiliter de cordibus perit, quando eam inventa veritas pellit. Optabiliter autem rerum verarum in easdem res fides transit. Non enim dicendum est, “perit,” quando ea, quae credebantur, videntur. Numquid enim adhuc fides dicenda est, cum definita sit in Epistola ad Hebraeos fides, dictumque sit eam esse convictionem rerum quae non videntur?
But sometimes faith is also accommodated to false things: for we speak in such a way as to say, "faith was placed in him, and he deceived." Such faith—if indeed it too is to be called faith—perishes from hearts without blame when the truth, once found, drives it out. But desirably the faith concerning true things passes over into those very things. For it is not to be said "it perishes" when the things that were believed are seen. For is it still to be called faith, since faith has been defined in the Letter to the Hebrews, and it has been said that it is the conviction of things that are not seen (Heb 11:1)?
deTrin.13.1.31. 4. Deinde quod sequitur, hic venit in testimonium, ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine, ut omnes crederent per illum; actio, ut diximus, temporalis est. Temporaliter enim testimonium perhibetur etiam de re sempiterna, quod est intellegibile lumen. De quo ut testimonium perhiberet venit Ioannes, qui non erat lux, sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Adiungit enim: erat lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. In mundo erat, et mundus per ipsum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. In propria venit, et sui eum non receperunt. Haec verba omnia qui latinam linguam sciunt, ex rebus intellegunt quas noverunt.
1. 4. Then what follows, he came for a testimony, to bear witness to the light, that all might believe through him (John 1:7), is, as we said, a temporal action. For witness is borne in time even concerning an everlasting thing, which is the intelligible light. To bear witness of this John came, who was not the light, but came to bear witness to the light (John 1:8). For he adds: it was the true light that enlightens every man coming into this world. He was in the world, and the world was made through him, and the world did not know him. He came unto his own, and his own received him not (John 1:9–11). All these words those who know the Latin tongue understand from the things they have come to know.
deTrin.13.1.4Quarum aliquae nobis innotuerunt per corporis sensus, sicut homo, sicut ipse mundus, cuius tam evidentem magnitudinem cernimus, sicut eorumdem verborum soni; nam et auditus sensus est corporis: aliquae autem per animi rationem, sicut id quod dictum est, et sui eum non receperunt: intellegitur enim, “non in eum crediderunt,” quod quid sit, nullo corporis sensu, sed animi ratione cognovimus.
Of these things some have become known to us through the body's senses, such as a man, such as the world itself, whose magnitude we discern so plainly, such as the sounds of these very words—for hearing too is a sense of the body; but some through the mind's reason, such as what was said, and his own received him not (John 1:11); for it is understood "they did not believe in him," and what this is we have come to know by no sense of the body, but by the mind's reason.
deTrin.13.1.4Ipsorum etiam verborum, non sonos, sed significationes, partim per corporis sensum, partim per animi rationem didicimus. Nec ea verba nunc primum audivimus: sed quae iam audieramus; et non solum ipsa, verum etiam quae significarent, cognita memoria tenebamus, et hic agnovimus. Hoc enim nomen disyllabum cum dicitur, mundus, quoniam sonus est, res utique corporalis per corpus innotuit, id est, per aurem: sed etiam quod significat per corpus innotuit, id est, per oculos carnis.
Of the words themselves we have learned, not the sounds, but the significations, partly through the body's sense, partly through the mind's reason. Nor have we now heard these words for the first time; rather we had heard them already, and not only the words themselves but also what they signify we held known in memory, and here we recognized them. For when this two-syllable word is uttered, mundus ("world"), since it is a sound, it has become known as a corporeal thing through the body, that is, through the ear; but what it signifies has also become known through the body, that is, through the eyes of the flesh.
deTrin.13.1.4Mundus quippe in quantum notus est, videntibus notus est. At hoc verbum quattuor syllabarum quod est “crediderunt,” sono suo, quoniam corpus est, per aurem carnis illabitur: quod autem significat, nullo corporis sensu, sed animi ratione cognoscitur. Nisi enim quid sit, “crediderunt,” per animum nossemus, non intellegeremus quid non fecerint illi de quibus dictum est, et sui eum non receperunt. Sonus ergo verbi forinsecus instrepit auribus corporis, et attingit sensum qui vocatur auditus. Species quoque hominis et in nobis ipsis nobis nota est, et forinsecus in aliis adest corporis sensibus; oculis, cum videtur; auribus, cum auditur; tactui, cum tenetur et tangitur: habet etiam in memoria nostra imaginem suam, incorporalem quidem, sed corpori similem.
For the world, insofar as it is known, is known to those who see. But this word of four syllables, which is "crediderunt" ("they believed"), glides through the ear of the flesh by its sound, since it is a body; but what it signifies is known by no sense of the body, but by the mind's reason. For unless we knew through the mind what "they believed" is, we would not understand what those did not do of whom it was said, and his own received him not (John 1:11). The sound of the word, then, rings without upon the ears of the body, and reaches the sense that is called hearing. The form of a man, too, is known to us in our own selves, and is present without in others to the body's senses—to the eyes, when he is seen; to the ears, when he is heard; to the touch, when he is held and touched; it has also in our memory its own image, incorporeal indeed, but like a body.
deTrin.13.1.4Mundi denique ipsius mirabilis pulchritudo forinsecus praesto est, et aspectibus nostris, et ei sensui qui dicitur tactus, si quid eius attingimus: habet etiam ipse intus in memoria nostra imaginem suam, ad quam recurrimus, cum eum vel septi parietibus, vel etiam in tenebris cogitamus. Sed de his imaginibus rerum corporalium, incorporalibus quidem, habentibus tamen similitudines corporum, et ad vitam exterioris hominis pertinentibus, iam satis in undecimo libro locuti sumus. Nunc autem agimus de homine interiore, et eius scientia, ea quae rerum est temporalium et mutabilium: in cuius intentionem cum assumitur aliquid, etiam de rebus ad exteriorem hominem pertinentibus, ad hoc assumendum est ut aliquid inde doceatur quod rationalem adiuvet scientiam: ac per hoc rerum quas communes cum animantibus irrationalibus habemus, rationalis usus ad interiorem hominem pertinet; nec recte dici potest cum irrationalibus animantibus eum nobis esse communem.
The wonderful beauty of the world itself, finally, is at hand without, both to our gaze and to that sense which is called touch, if we touch any part of it; it too has within, in our memory, its own image, to which we return when we think of it whether shut in by walls or even in the dark. But of these images of corporeal things—incorporeal indeed, yet bearing the likenesses of bodies, and pertaining to the life of the outer man—we have already spoken enough in the eleventh book. But now we are dealing with the inner man and his knowledge, the knowledge that is of temporal and changeable things; and when, into the scope of this knowledge, something is taken up even from things pertaining to the outer man, it is to be taken up for this purpose, that something may thereby be taught which aids rational knowledge. And through this, the rational use of the things we have in common with the irrational animals pertains to the inner man; nor can it rightly be said that in this we have something in common with the irrational animals.
deTrin.13.1.42. 5. Fides vero de qua in hoc libro aliquanto diutius disputare certa dispositionis nostrae ratione compellimur, quam qui habent, fideles vocantur, et qui non habent, infideles, sicut ii qui venientem in propria Dei Filium non receperunt, quamvis ex auditu in nobis facta sit, non tamen ad eum sensum corporis pertinet qui appellatur auditus, quoniam non est sonus; nec ad oculos huius carnis, quoniam non est color aut corporis forma; nec ad eum qui dicitur tactus, quoniam corpulentiae nihil habet; nec ad ullum omnino sensum corporis, quoniam cordis est res ista, non corporis; nec foris est a nobis, sed in intimis nobis; nec eam quisquam hominum videt in alio, sed unusquisque in semetipso.
2. 5. But faith—about which, by a fixed plan of our arrangement, we are compelled to discuss somewhat at greater length in this book, faith which those who have it are called faithful, and those who do not have it unbelievers, like those who received not the Son of God coming unto his own (John 1:11)—although it has come to be in us from hearing (Rom 10:17), yet does not pertain to that sense of the body which is called hearing, since it is not a sound; nor to the eyes of this flesh, since it is not a color or bodily shape; nor to that which is called touch, since it has nothing of bulk; nor to any sense of the body at all, since this is a thing of the heart, not of the body; nor is it outside us, but in our innermost selves; nor does any man see it in another, but each one in himself.
deTrin.13.2.5Denique potest et simulatione confingi, et putari esse in quo non est. Suam igitur quisque fidem apud se ipsum videt: in altero autem credit esse eam, non videt; et tanto firmius credit, quanto fructus eius magis novit, quos operari solet fides per dilectionem.
Finally, it can even be feigned by pretense, and thought to be in one in whom it is not. Each one, therefore, sees his own faith within himself; but in another he believes it to be, he does not see it; and he believes the more firmly the more he comes to know its fruits, which faith working through love (Gal 5:6) is wont to produce.
deTrin.13.2.5Quamobrem omnibus de quibus Evangelista subiungit et dicit, quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, iis qui credunt in nomine eius, qui non ex sanguinibus, neque ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex Deo nati sunt, fides ista communis est: non sicut aliqua corporis forma communis est ad videndum omnium oculis quibus praesto est; ex ipsa quippe una omnium cernentium quodam modo informatur aspectus: sed sicut dici potest omnibus hominibus esse facies humana communis; nam hoc ita dicitur, ut tamen singuli suas habeant.
Wherefore to all of whom the Evangelist subjoins and says, but to as many as received him he gave power to become sons of God, to those who believe in his name, who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God (John 1:12–13), this faith is common: not as some bodily shape is common to the sight of all eyes to which it is present—for from that one shape the gaze of all who behold it is in a certain way informed—but as one may say that the human face is common to all men; for this is said in such a way that nevertheless each one has his own.
deTrin.13.2.5Ex una sane doctrina impressam fidem credentium cordibus singulorum qui hoc idem credunt verissime dicimus: sed aliud sunt ea quae creduntur, aliud fides qua creduntur. Illa quippe in rebus sunt quae vel esse vel fuisse vel futurae esse dicuntur: haec autem in animo credentis est, ei tantum conspicua cuius est; quamvis sit et in aliis, non ipsa, sed similis. Non enim numero est una, sed genere: propter similitudinem tamen et nullam diversitatem magis unam dicimus esse quam multas. Nam et duos homines simillimos cum videmus, unam faciem dicimus et miramur amborum.
We say most truly that the faith impressed from one teaching upon the hearts of the several believers who believe this same thing is one; but the things that are believed are one thing, and the faith by which they are believed another. For the former are in things that are said either to be, or to have been, or to be going to be; but the latter is in the mind of the believer, visible only to the one whose it is—though it is in others too, not the same faith, but a like one. For it is not one in number, but in kind; yet on account of the likeness and the absence of any diversity, we call it one rather than many. For when we see two men most alike, we speak of one face and marvel at it in both.
deTrin.13.2.5Facilius itaque dicitur multas animas fuisse singulas utique singulorum, de quibus legimus in Actibus Apostolorum quod eis fuerit anima una; (Cf. Acts 4:32) quam ubi dixit Apostolus, una fides, tot eas audet quisquam dicere quot fideles. Et tamen qui dicit, O mulier, magna est fides tua; et alteri, modicae fidei, quare dubitasti? suam cuique esse significat. (Cf. Eph 4:5)
It is therefore easier to say that there were many souls—each one, of course, belonging to each of those of whom we read in the Acts of the Apostles that there was in them one soul (See Acts 4:32)—than that, where the Apostle said one faith (Eph 4:5), anyone should dare to say there are as many faiths as there are faithful. And yet he who says, O woman, great is your faith (Matt 15:28), and to another, O you of little faith, why did you doubt (Matt 14:31), signifies that each one has his own.
deTrin.13.2.5Sed ita dicitur eadem credentium fides una, quemadmodum eadem volentium voluntas una: cum et in ipsis qui hoc idem volunt, sua voluntas sit cuique conspicua, alterius autem lateat, quamvis idem velit; Cf. Sallust, The War with Catiline 20.4. et si aliquibus signis sese indicet, creditur potius quam videtur. (Cf. Isa 7:9; John 20:29) Unusquisque autem sui animi conscius non credit utique hanc esse suam, sed plane pervidet voluntatem.
But the faith of believers is said to be one in the same way that the will of those who will is one: since even in those who will this same thing, the will of each is visible to himself, but hidden from another, although he wills the same; See Sallust, The War with Catiline 20.4. and if it shows itself by some signs, it is believed rather than seen. (See Isa 7:9; John 20:29) But each one, conscious of his own mind, does not merely believe this to be his own will, but plainly perceives it.
deTrin.13.2.5C
deTrin.13.2.5
3. 6. Est quaedam sane eiusdem naturae viventis et ratione utentis tanta conspiratio, ut cum lateat alterum quid alter velit, nonnullae tamen sint voluntates omnium etiam singulis notae: et cum quisque homo nesciat quid homo alius unus velit, in quibusdam rebus possit scire quid omnes velint.
3. 6. There is indeed a certain great agreement of the same nature that lives and uses reason, such that, although it is hidden from the one what the other wills, there are nevertheless some acts of will of all that are known even to the individuals; and although each man does not know what one other man wills, in certain matters he can know what all men will.
deTrin.13.3.6Unde illa cuiusdam mimi facetissima praedicatur urbanitas, qui cum se promisisset in theatro quid in animo haberent, et quid vellent omnes, aliis ludis esse dicturum, atque ad diem constitutum ingenti exspectatione maior multitudo conflueret, suspensis et silentibus omnibus, dixisse perhibetur: vili vultis emere, et caro vendere. In quo dicto levissimi scenici, omnes tamen conscientias invenerunt suas, eique vera ante oculos omnium constituta, et tamen improvisa dicenti, admirabili favore plauserunt.
Hence is celebrated that most witty pleasantry of a certain mime, who, when he had promised in the theater that he would tell at other shows what they all had in mind and what they all willed, and when on the appointed day, with great expectation, a larger crowd had flowed together, with all in suspense and silent, is reported to have said: you wish to buy cheap and to sell dear. In this saying of a most trifling stage-performer, all nevertheless found their own consciences, and applauded with wonderful favor him who set before the eyes of all things true, and yet unforeseen in the saying.
deTrin.13.3.6Cur autem tam magna exspectatio facta est illo promittente omnium voluntatem se esse dicturum, nisi quia latent hominem aliorum hominum voluntates? Sed numquid ista latuit istum? Numquid quemquam latet? Qua tandem causa, nisi quia sunt quaedam quae non inconvenienter in aliis de se quisque coniiciat, compatiente vel conspirante vitio seu natura? Sed aliud est videre voluntatem suam, aliud, quamvis certissima coniectura, conicere alienam. Nam conditam Romam tam certum habeo in rebus humanis quam Constantinopolim, cum Romam viderim oculis meis, de illa vero nihil noverim, nisi quod aliis testibus credidi.
But why was so great an expectation aroused at his promising that he would tell the will of all, except that the wills of other men are hidden from a man? But surely this was not hidden from him? Surely it is hidden from no one? And for what reason, finally, except that there are certain things that each one may not unfittingly conjecture about himself in others, by a sharing or an agreement of vice or of nature? But it is one thing to see one's own will, another to conjecture another's, however certain the conjecture. For I hold the founding of Rome to be as certain among human affairs as the founding of Constantinople, although I have seen Rome with my own eyes, while of the other I know nothing except what I have believed on the testimony of others.
deTrin.13.3.6Et mimus quidem ille vel se ipsum intuendo, vel alios quoque experiendo, vili velle emere, et caro vendere, omnibus id credidit esse commune. Sed quoniam revera vitium est, potest quisque adipisci eiusmodi iustitiam, vel alicuius alterius vitii quod huic contrarium est incurrere pestilentiam, qua huic resistat et vincat. Nam scio ipse hominem, cum venalis codex ei fuisset oblatus, pretiique eius ignarum et ideo quiddam exiguum poscentem cerneret venditorem, iustum pretium quod multo amplius erat, nec opinanti dedisse.
And that mime, indeed, whether by looking at himself or by also having experience of others, believed that to wish to buy cheap and to sell dear was common to all. But since it is in truth a vice, anyone can attain a righteousness of this kind, or fall in with the plague of some other vice contrary to this, by which he resists this one and overcomes it. For I myself know a man who, when a book for sale had been offered to him, and he perceived that the seller was ignorant of its value and was therefore asking some small sum, gave him the just price, which was much greater, when he was not expecting it.
deTrin.13.3.6Quid, si etiam sit quisquam nequitia tanta possessus, ut vili vendat quae dimiserunt parentes, et caro emat quae consumant libidines? Non est, ut opinor, incredibilis ista luxuries: et si quaerantur tales, reperiantur, aut etiam non quaesiti fortassis occurrant, qui nequitia majore quam theatrica, propositioni vel pronuniationi theatricae insultent, magno pretio stupra emendo, parvo autem rura vendendo. Largitionis etiam gratia novimus quosdam emisse frumenta carius, et vilius vendidisse suis civibus.
What if there is also someone possessed by so great a worthlessness that he sells cheap what his parents left and buys dear what his lusts may consume? This extravagance is not, I think, incredible; and if such men are sought, they may be found, or perhaps, even unsought, may turn up—men who, by a worthlessness greater than the stage's, would mock the stage's proposition or pronouncement, buying debaucheries at a great price but selling their estates at a small one. We have also known some who, for the sake of largess, bought grain dearer and sold it cheaper to their fellow citizens.
deTrin.13.3.6Illud etiam quod vetus poeta dixit Ennius: omnes mortales sese laudarier optant, A line from the Annals known only from Augustine’s quotation of it. profecto et de se ipso et de iis quos expertus fuerat, coniecit in aliis, et videtur pronuntiasse hominum omnium voluntates.
That too which the old poet Ennius said, all mortals wish themselves to be praised A line from the Annals known only from Augustine's quotation of it., he surely conjectured in others both from himself and from those of whom he had experience, and he seems to have pronounced the wills of all men.
deTrin.13.3.6Denique si et mimus ille dixisset, “laudari omnes vultis, nemo vestrum vult vituperari”; Cicero, De Re Publica 4, fragment 10.12 (Augustine, The City of God 2.9); De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.22.61; cf. Augustine, The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 2.1.1. similiter quod esset omnium voluntatis dixisse videretur. Sunt tamen qui vitia sua oderint, et in quibus sibi displicent ipsi, nec ab aliis se laudari velint, gratiasque agant obiurgantium benevolentiae, cum ideo vituperantur ut corrigantur.
Finally, if that mime too had said, "you all wish to be praised, none of you wishes to be blamed," Cicero, De Re Publica 4, fragment 10.12 (Augustine, The City of God 2.9); De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.22.61; see Augustine, The Lord's Sermon on the Mount 2.1.1. he would likewise have seemed to say something that was the will of all. Yet there are those who hate their own vices, and in the things in which they are displeased with themselves do not wish to be praised by others, and give thanks for the goodwill of those who rebuke them, since they are blamed in order that they may be corrected.
deTrin.13.3.6At si dixisset, “omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis”; Cicero, Hortensius, exord., fragm. 36; cf. Tusculanae Disputationes 5, 10.28; Augustine, Against the Academics 1.2.5; The Happy Life 2.10; On Free Choice of the Will 2.9.27. dixisset aliquid quod nullus in sua non agnosceret voluntate. Quidquid enim aliud quisquam latenter velit, ab hac voluntate quae omnibus et in omnibus hominibus satis nota est, non recedit.
But if he had said, "you all wish to be blessed, you do not wish to be wretched," Cicero, Hortensius, exord., fragm. 36; see Tusculanae Disputationes 5, 10.28; Augustine, Against the Skeptics 1.2.5; The Happy Life 2.10; On Free Will 2.9.27. he would have said something that no one would fail to recognize in his own will. For whatever else anyone may secretly will, he does not depart from this will, which is well enough known to all and in all men.
deTrin.13.3.64. 7. Mirum est autem cum capessendae atque retinendae beatitudinis voluntas una sit omnium, unde tanta existat de ipsa beatitudine rursus varietas atque diversitas voluntatum, Cf. Seneca, On the Happy Life 1.1; Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus (in Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Philosophers 10). non quod aliquis eam nolit, sed quod non omnes eam norint. Si enim omnes eam nossent, non ab aliis putaretur esse in virtute animi; aliis, in corporis voluptate; aliis, in utraque; et aliis atque aliis, alibi atque alibi. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum; Zeno; Epicurus. Ut enim eos quaeque res maxime delectavit, ita in ea constituerunt vitam beatam.
4. 7. But it is a wonder that, although the will to attain and keep blessedness is one in all, there should arise again so great a variety and diversity of wills about blessedness itself See Seneca, On the Happy Life 1.1; Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus (in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 10).—not that anyone does not want it, but that not all know it. For if all knew it, it would not be thought by some to lie in virtue of the mind; by others, in pleasure of the body; by others, in both; and by others and others, in this place and that. See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum; Zeno; Epicurus. For as each thing especially delighted them, so in it they set the blessed life.
deTrin.13.4.7Quomodo igitur ferventissime amant omnes, quod non omnes sciunt? Quis potest amare quod nescit? sicut iam de hac re in libris superioribus disputavi. See On the Trinity 8.6; 9.3; 10.1–5. Cur ergo beatitudo amatur ab omnibus, nec tamen scitur ab omnibus? An forte sciunt omnes ipsa quae sit, sed non omnes sciunt ubi sit, et inde contentio est? Quasi vero de aliquo mundi huius agatur loco, ubi debeat quisque velle vivere, qui vult beate vivere, ac non ita quaeratur ubi sit beatitudo, sicut quaeritur quae sit.
How, then, do all men so ardently love what not all men know? Who can love what he does not know? as I have already discussed this matter in the books above. See On the Trinity 8.6; 9.3; 10.1–5. Why, then, is blessedness loved by all, and yet not known by all? Or perhaps all know what it is, but not all know where it is, and from this comes the dispute? As though it were a matter of some place in this world, where each one who wishes to live blessedly ought to wish to live—and not rather that we should ask where blessedness is, just as we ask what it is.
deTrin.13.4.7Nam utique si in corporis voluptate est, ille beatus est qui fruitur corporis voluptate: si in virtute animi, ille qui hac fruitur: si in utraque, ille qui fruitur utraque. Cum itaque alius dicit, “beate vivere est voluptate corporis frui”; alius autem, “beate vivere est virtute animi frui”: nonne aut ambo nesciunt quae sit beata vita, aut non ambo sciunt? Quomodo ergo ambo amant eam, si nemo potest amare quod nescit?
For surely, if it is in pleasure of the body, he is blessed who enjoys pleasure of the body; if in virtue of the mind, he who enjoys this; if in both, he who enjoys both. And so, when one says, "to live blessedly is to enjoy pleasure of the body," but another, "to live blessedly is to enjoy virtue of the mind," do not either both not know what the blessed life is, or not both know it? How, then, do both love it, if no one can love what he does not know?
deTrin.13.4.7An forte falsum est quod pro verissimo certissimoque posuimus, beate vivere omnes homines velle? Seneca, On the Happy Life 1.1. Si enim beate vivere est, verbi gratia, secundum animi virtutem vivere; quomodo beate vivere vult, qui hoc non vult? Nonne verius dixerimus: “homo iste non vult beate vivere, quia non vult secundum virtutem vivere, quod solum est beate vivere”? Non igitur omnes beate vivere volunt, imo pauci hoc volunt, si non est beate vivere, nisi secundum virtutem animi vivere, quod multi nolunt. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.
Or perhaps it is false, what we have set down as most true and most certain, that all men wish to live blessedly Seneca, On the Happy Life 1.1.? For if to live blessedly is, for example, to live according to virtue of the mind, how does he wish to live blessedly who does not wish this? Should we not say more truly: "this man does not wish to live blessedly, because he does not wish to live according to virtue, which alone is to live blessedly"? Not all, then, wish to live blessedly; rather, few wish this, if there is no living blessedly except living according to virtue of the mind, which many do not wish. See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.
deTrin.13.4.7Itane falsum erit, unde nec ipse (cum Academicis omnia dubia sint) Academicus ille Cicero dubitavit, qui cum vellet in Hortensio dialogo ab aliqua re certa, de qua nullus ambigeret, sumere suae disputationis exordium, beati certe, inquit, omnes esse volumus? Cicero, Hortensius, exord., fragm. 36. Absit ut hoc falsum esse dicamus. Quid igitur? an dicendum est etiamsi nihil sit aliud beate vivere, quam secundum virtutem animi vivere, tamen et qui hoc non vult, beate vult vivere? Nimis quidem hoc videtur absurdum. Tale est enim ac si dicamus: “et qui non vult beate vivere, beate vult vivere.” Istam repugnantiam quis audiat, quis ferat? Et tamen ad hanc contrudit necessitas, si et omnes beate velle vivere verum est, et non omnes sic volunt vivere, quomodo solum beate vivitur.
Will it then be false—a thing of which not even that Academic Cicero himself doubted (though to the Academics all things are doubtful), who, when he wished in the dialogue Hortensius to take the beginning of his discussion from some certain thing about which no one would dispute, said, we certainly all wish to be blessed Cicero, Hortensius, exord., fragm. 36.? Far be it that we should call this false. What then? Must it be said that, even if to live blessedly is nothing other than to live according to virtue of the mind, yet he too who does not wish this wishes to live blessedly? This indeed seems too absurd. For it is as if we should say: "even he who does not wish to live blessedly wishes to live blessedly." Who would listen to this contradiction, who would bear it? And yet to this necessity drives us, if it is both true that all wish to live blessedly, and that not all wish to live in the way in which alone one lives blessedly.
deTrin.13.4.75. 8. An forte illud est quod nos ab his angustiis possit eruere, ut quoniam diximus ibi quosque posuisse beatam vitam quod eos maxime delectavit, ut voluptas Epicurum, Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus (in Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Philosophers 10). virtus Zenonem; sic alium aliquid aliud, nihil dicamus esse beate vivere, nisi vivere secundum delectationem suam, et ideo falsum non esse quod omnes beate vivere Seneca, On the Happy Life 1.1. velint, quia omnes ita volunt ut quemque delectat? Nam et hoc populo si pronuntiatum esset in theatro, omnes id in suis voluntatibus invenirent.
5. 8. Or perhaps this is what can rescue us from these straits: that, since we said that each one there set the blessed life in what most delighted him—as pleasure delighted Epicurus, Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus (in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 10). virtue Zeno; and so one man one thing, another another—we should say that to live blessedly is nothing other than to live according to one's own delight, and that therefore it is not false that all wish to live blessedly Seneca, On the Happy Life 1.1., since all so wish as each is delighted? For this too, if it had been pronounced to the people in the theater, all would find it in their own wills.
deTrin.13.5.8Sed hoc quoque Cicero cum sibi ex adverso proposuisset, ita redarguit, ut qui hoc sentiunt, erubescant. Ait enim: Ecce autem non philosophi quidem, sed prompti tamen ad disputandum, omnes aiunt esse beatos, qui vivant ut ipsi velint: Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 39. hoc est quod nos diximus: “ut quosque delectat.” Sed mox ille subiecit: falsum id quidem. Velle enim quod non deceat, idipsum miserrimum est: nec tam miserum est non adipisci quod velis, quam adipisci velle quod non oporteat.
But this too Cicero, when he had set it before himself from the opposite side, so refuted that those who hold this view should blush. For he says: but lo, not philosophers indeed, yet men ready to dispute, say that all are blessed who live as they themselves wish Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 39.: this is what we said, "as each is delighted." But presently he added: that indeed is false. For to will what is not fitting is itself the most wretched thing; nor is it so wretched not to attain what you will, as to will to attain what you ought not Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 39..
deTrin.13.5.8Praeclarissime omnino atque verissime. Quis namque ita sit mente caecus, et ab omni luce decoris alienus ac tenebris dedecoris involutus, ut eum qui nequiter vivit ac turpiter, et nullo prohibente, nullo ulciscente, et nullo saltem reprehendere audente, insuper et laudantibus plurimis, quoniam sicut ait Scriptura divina: laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae; et qui iniqua gerit, benedicetur, implet omnes suas facinorosissimas et flagitiosissimas voluntates, ideo beatum dicat, quia vivit ut vult: cum profecto quamvis et sic miser esset, minus tamen esset, si nihil eorum quae perperam voluisset, habere potuisset? Etiam mala enim voluntate vel sola quisque miser efficitur: sed miserior potestate, qua desiderium malae voluntatis impletur.
Most excellently and most truly said. For who would be so blind in mind, so alien from all light of seemliness and so wrapped in the darkness of disgrace, as to call blessed a man who lives wickedly and basely, with none forbidding, none avenging, and none even daring to rebuke—and on top of this with very many praising him, since, as the divine Scripture says, the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and he who does iniquity is blessed (Ps 10:3 (9:24))—who fulfills all his most criminal and most shameful wishes, blessed, then, because he lives as he wishes? When in truth, though even thus he would be wretched, he would yet be less so if he could have had none of the things he had wickedly willed. For by an evil will, even alone, a man is made wretched; but more wretched by the power through which the desire of the evil will is fulfilled.
deTrin.13.5.8Quapropter, quoniam verum est quod omnes homines esse beati velint, idque unum ardentissimo amore appetant, et propter hoc cetera quaecumque appetunt; nec quisquam potest amare quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit, nec potest nescire quid sit quod velle se scit; sequitur ut omnes beatam vitam sciant. Omnes autem beati habent quod volunt, quamvis non omnes qui habent quod volunt continuo sint beati: continuo autem miseri, qui vel non habent quod volunt, vel id habent quod non recte volunt. Beatus igitur non est, nisi qui et habet omnia quae vult, et nihil vult male.
Wherefore, since it is true that all men wish to be blessed, and seek this one thing with the most ardent love, and on account of it seek whatever else they seek; and since no one can love what he is wholly ignorant what or of what kind it is, nor can he be ignorant what that is which he knows that he wills—it follows that all men know the blessed life. But all who are blessed have what they will, although not all who have what they will are forthwith blessed; yet forthwith wretched are those who either do not have what they will, or have what they do not rightly will. No one, therefore, is blessed except he who both has all that he wills and wills nothing wrongly.
deTrin.13.5.86. 9. Cum ergo ex his duobus beata vita constet, atque omnibus nota, omnibus cara sit; quid putamus esse causae cur horum duorum, quando utrumque non possunt, magis eligant homines, ut omnia quae volunt habeant, quam ut omnia bene velint etiamsi non habeant?
6. 9. Since, then, the blessed life consists of these two things, and is known to all and dear to all, what do we suppose to be the cause why, of these two, when they cannot have both, men rather choose to have all that they will than to will all things well even if they do not have them?
deTrin.13.6.9An ipsa est pravitas generis humani, ut cum eos non lateat, nec illum beatum esse qui quod vult non habet, nec illum qui quod male vult habet; sed illum qui et habet quaecumque vult bona, et nulla vult mala, ex his duobus quibus beata vita perficitur, quando utrumque non datur, id eligatur potius, unde magis a beata vita receditur (longius quippe ab illa est quicumque adipiscitur male concupita, quam qui non adipiscitur concupita); cum potius eligi debuerit voluntas bona, atque praeponi, etiam non adepta quae appetit? Propinquat enim beato, qui bene vult quaecumque vult, et quae adeptus cum fuerit beatus erit.
Or is it the very perversity of the human race that, although it is not hidden from them that neither he is blessed who does not have what he wills, nor he who has what he wills wickedly, but rather he who both has whatever good things he wills and wills no evil ones—yet, of these two by which the blessed life is made complete, when both are not given, that is rather chosen by which one departs further from the blessed life (for whoever attains what he has wickedly desired is further from it than he who does not attain what he has desired); when rather a good will ought to be chosen and set first, even when it has not attained what it seeks? For he draws near to the blessed man who wills well whatever he wills, and who, when he has attained it, will be blessed.
deTrin.13.6.9Et utique non mala, sed bona beatum faciunt, quando faciunt: quorum bonorum habet aliquid iam, idque non parvi aestimandum, eam ipsam scilicet voluntatem bonam, qui de bonis quorum capax est humana natura, non de ullius mali perpetratione vel adeptione gaudere desiderat; et bona, qualia et in hac misera vita esse possunt, prudenti, temperanti, forti, et iusta mente sectatur, et quantum datur assequitur; ut etiam in malis sit bonus, et finitis malis omnibus atque impletis bonis omnibus sit beatus.
And surely it is not evil things, but good ones, that make a man blessed, when they do make him so; and of these good things he already has something, and that not to be lightly esteemed—namely, that very good will, who desires to rejoice in the good things of which human nature is capable, and not in the perpetration or attainment of any evil; and who, with a prudent, temperate, brave, and just mind, pursues good things such as can exist even in this wretched life, and attains them as far as is granted, so that even amid evils he is good, and, when all evils are ended and all good things fulfilled, he will be blessed.
deTrin.13.6.9C
deTrin.13.6.9
7. 10. Ac per hoc in ista mortali vita erroribus aerumnisque plenissima, praecipue fides est necessaria, qua in Deum creditur. Non enim quaecumque bona, maximeque illa quibus quisque fit bonus, et illa quibus fiet beatus, unde nisi a Deo in hominem veniant, et homini accedant, inveniri potest. Cum autem ex hac vita ab eo qui in his miseriis fidelis et bonus est, ventum fuerit ad beatam, tunc erit vere quod nunc esse nullo modo potest, ut sic homo vivat quomodo vult. Non enim volet male vivere in illa felicitate, aut volet aliquid quod deerit, aut deerit quod voluerit. Quidquid amabitur, aderit: nec desiderabitur quod non aderit. Omne quod ibi erit, bonum erit, et summus Deus summum Bonum Cf. Augustine, Against the Academics 3.12.27; The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 1.3; Revisions 1.1.9. erit, atque ad fruendum amantibus praesto erit; et quod est omnino beatissimum, ita semper fore certum erit.
7. 10. And through this, in this mortal life so full of errors and hardships, faith is especially necessary, by which one believes in God. For no good things—and above all those by which anyone becomes good, and those by which he will become blessed—can be found to come into a man or to accrue to him from any source but God. But when, out of this life, the man who in these miseries is faithful and good has come to the blessed life, then there will truly be what now can in no way be, that a man should live just as he wills. For he will not will to live wickedly in that happiness, nor will he will anything that will be lacking, nor will anything be lacking that he has willed. Whatever is loved will be present, nor will what is not present be desired. Everything that will be there will be good, and the most high God will be the highest Good See Augustine, Against the Skeptics 3.12.27; The Lord's Sermon on the Mount 1.3; Revisions 1.1.9., and will be at hand for the enjoyment of those who love him; and—what is altogether most blessed—it will be certain that it will be so forever.
deTrin.13.7.10Nunc vero fecerunt quidem sibi philosophi, sicut eorum cuique placuit, vitas beatas suas, ut quasi propria virtute possent, quod communi mortalium conditione non poterant, sic scilicet vivere ut vellent. Cf. Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 39. Sentiebant enim aliter beatum esse neminem posse, nisi habendo quod vellet, et nihil patiendo quod nollet.
But as it is, the philosophers have made for themselves, as it pleased each of them, their own blessed lives, that by their own virtue, as it were, they might be able to do what they could not do by the common condition of mortals—namely, to live as they willed. See Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 39. For they perceived that no one could be blessed otherwise than by having what he willed and suffering nothing that he did not will.
deTrin.13.7.10Quis autem non qualemcumque vitam qua delectatur, et ideo beatam vocat, vellet sic esse in sua potestate, ut eam posset habere perpetuam? Et tamen quis ita est? Quis vult pati molestias quas fortiter toleret, quamvis eas velit possitque tolerare si patitur? Quis velit in tormentis vivere, etiam qui potest in eis per patientiam tenendo iustitiam laudabiliter vivere? Transitura cogitaverunt haec mala, qui ea pertulerunt, vel cupiendo habere, vel timendo amittere quod amabant, sive nequiter sive laudabiliter. Nam multi per transitoria mala, ad bona permansura fortiter tetenderunt. Qui profecto spe beati sunt, etiam cum sunt in transitoriis malis, per quae ad bona non transitura perveniunt.
But who would not wish that whatever life he is delighted by, and therefore calls blessed, should be so in his own power that he could have it forever? And yet who is in such a state? Who wishes to suffer troubles, even though he wishes and is able to endure them bravely if he does suffer them? Who would wish to live amid torments, even one who is able to live amid them praiseworthily by holding to justice through patience? Those who endured these evils thought them transitory, whether by desiring to have, or by fearing to lose, what they loved, whether wickedly or praiseworthily. For many have through transitory evils striven bravely toward abiding goods. And these indeed are blessed in hope, even when they are amid transitory evils, through which they come to goods that are not transitory.
deTrin.13.7.10Sed qui spe beatus est, nondum beatus est: exspectat namque per patientiam beatitudinem quam nondum tenet. Qui vero sine ulla spe tali, sine ulla tali mercede cruciatur, quantamlibet adhibeat tolerantiam, non est beatus veraciter, sed miser fortiter. Neque enim propterea miser non est, quia miserior esset, si etiam impatienter miseriam sustineret.
But he who is blessed in hope is not yet blessed: for he awaits through patience a blessedness that he does not yet hold. But he who, without any such hope, without any such reward, is tortured, however great a tolerance he may bring to bear, is not truly blessed, but bravely wretched. For he is not for that reason not wretched, that he would be more wretched if he also bore his wretchedness impatiently.
deTrin.13.7.10Porro si ista non patitur, quae nollet pati in suo corpore, nec tunc quidem beatus habendus est, quoniam non vivit ut vult. Ut enim alia omittam, quae corpore illaeso ad animi pertinent offensiones, sine quibus vivere vellemus, et sunt innumerabilia; vellet utique si posset ita salvum atque incolume habere corpus, et nullas ex eo pati molestias, ut id haberet in potestate, aut in ipsius incorruptione corporis: quod quia non habet, ac pendet in incerto, profecto non vivit ut vult.
Moreover, if he does not suffer those things which he would not wish to suffer in his body, not even then is he to be held blessed, since he does not live as he wills. For—to pass over other things which, with the body unharmed, pertain to the mind's offenses, without which we would wish to live, and which are innumerable—he would surely wish, if he could, so to have his body safe and sound, and to suffer no troubles from it, as to have this in his power, or in the very incorruption of the body: and because he does not have this, but hangs in uncertainty, surely he does not live as he wills.
deTrin.13.7.10Quamvis enim per fortitudinem sit paratus excipere, et aequo ferre animo quidquid adversitatis acciderit; mavult tamen ut non accidat, et si possit facit; atque ita paratus est in utrumque, ut quantum in ipso est alterum optet, alterum vitet, et si quod vitat, incurrerit, ideo volens ferat, quia fieri non potuit quod volebat. Ne opprimatur ergo sustinet: sed premi nollet.
For although through fortitude he is prepared to receive, and to bear with an even mind, whatever adversity may befall, yet he prefers that it should not befall, and if he can, brings it about that it does not; and so he is prepared for either outcome, in such a way that, as far as in him lies, he chooses the one and avoids the other, and if he runs into what he avoids, he therefore bears it willingly, because what he willed could not come about. So that he may not be overwhelmed, then, he endures; but he would not wish to be pressed.
deTrin.13.7.10Quomodo ergo vivit ut vult? An quia volens fortis est ad ferenda quae nollet illata? Ideo igitur id vult quod potest, quoniam quod vult non potest. Haec est tota, utrum ridenda, an potius miseranda, superborum beatitudo mortalium, gloriantium se vivere ut volunt, quia volentes patienter ferunt quae accidere sibi nolunt. Hoc est enim, aiunt, quod sapienter dixit Terentius: quoniam non potest id fieri quod vis, id velis quod possis. Terence, Andria 2.1.5–6.
How, then, does he live as he wills? Is it because he is willingly brave to bear the things he would not wish to have inflicted? Therefore he wills what he can, precisely because he cannot do what he wills. This is the whole of that blessedness of proud mortals—whether to be laughed at or rather to be pitied—who boast that they live as they will, because they willingly and patiently bear the things they do not wish to befall them. For this, they say, is what Terence wisely said: since that which you wish cannot come about, wish for that which you can Terence, Andria 2.1.5–6..
deTrin.13.7.10Commode hoc dictum esse, quis negat? Sed consilium est datum misero, ne esset miserior. Beato autem, quales se esse omnes volunt, non recte nec vere dicitur, non potest fieri quod vis. Si enim beatus est, quidquid vult fieri potest; quia non vult quod fieri non potest. Sed non est mortalitatis huius haec vita, nec erit nisi quando et immortalitas erit. Quae si nullo modo dari homini posset, frustra etiam beatitudo quaereretur; quia sine immortalitate non potest esse.
Who denies that this was aptly said? But the counsel was given to a wretched man, lest he should be more wretched. But to the blessed man, such as all wish to be, it is neither rightly nor truly said, that which you wish cannot come about. For if he is blessed, whatever he wishes can come about; for he does not wish what cannot come about. But this life is not the life of this mortality, nor will it be except when there is also immortality. And if this could in no way be given to man, then blessedness too would be sought in vain; for without immortality it cannot exist.
deTrin.13.7.108. 11. Cum ergo beati esse omnes homines velint, Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus (in Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Philosophers 10). si verum volunt, PL: si vere volunt, “if they want it truly.” profecto et esse immortales volunt: aliter enim beati esse non possunt. Denique et de immortalitate interrogati, sicut et de beatitudine, omnes eam se velle respondent. Sed qualiscumque beatitudo, quae potius vocetur quam sit, in hac vita quaeritur, imo vero fingitur, dum immortalitas desperatur, sine qua vera beatitudo esse non potest. Ille quippe beate vivit, quod iam superius diximus, See On the Trinity 13.2.8–9. et astruendo satis fiximus, qui vivit ut vult, nec male aliquid vult.
8. 11. Since, then, all men wish to be blessed Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus (in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 10)., if they wish it truly, PL: si vere volunt, "if they want it truly." they surely wish also to be immortal: for otherwise they cannot be blessed. And indeed, asked about immortality too, as about blessedness, all answer that they wish for it. But a blessedness of some sort—one rather so called than really such—is sought in this life, or rather is feigned, while immortality is despaired of, without which true blessedness cannot exist. For he lives blessedly, as we said above See On the Trinity 13.2.8–9. and established firmly enough by argument, who lives as he wills and wills nothing evil.
deTrin.13.8.11Nemo autem male vult immortalitatem, si eius humana capax est Deo donante natura: cuius si non capax est, nec beatitudinis capax est. Ut enim homo beate vivat, oportet ut vivat. Quem porro morientem vita ipsa deserit, beata vita cum illo manere qui potest? Cum autem deserit, aut nolentem deserit procul dubio, aut volentem, aut neutrum. Si nolentem, quomodo beata vita est, quae ita est in voluntate, ut non sit in potestate? Cumque beatus nemo sit aliquid volendo nec habendo, quanto minus est beatus qui non honore, non possessione, non qualibet alia re, sed ipsa beata vita nolens deseritur, quando ei nulla vita erit?
But no one wills immortality wickedly, if human nature is capable of it by God's gift; and if it is not capable of this, neither is it capable of blessedness. For that a man may live blessedly, it is needful that he live. But the man whom, as he dies, life itself deserts—who can have the blessed life remain with him? And when it deserts him, it deserts him either unwilling, beyond doubt, or willing, or neither. If unwilling, how is it a blessed life, which is so far within the will that it is not within one's power? And since no one is blessed by willing or having anything, how much less is he blessed who is deserted, unwilling, not by honor, not by possession, not by any other thing, but by the very blessed life, when he will have no life at all?
deTrin.13.8.11Unde etsi nullus sensus relinquitur, quo sit misera (propterea enim beata vita discedit, quoniam tota vita discedit), miser est tamen, quamdiu sentit, quia scit se nolente consumi propter quod cetera et quod prae ceteris diligit. Non igitur potest vita et beata esse, et nolentem deserere: quia beatus nolens nemo fit; ac per hoc quanto magis nolentem deserendo miserum facit, quae si nolenti praesto esset miserum faceret? Si autem volentem deserit, etiam sic quomodo beata vita erat, quam perire voluit qui habebat?
Whence, even if no feeling is left by which he might be wretched (for the blessed life departs precisely because his whole life departs), he is nevertheless wretched as long as he feels, because he knows that, against his will, that is being consumed for the sake of which he loves the rest, and which he loves above the rest. The life, therefore, cannot both be blessed and desert one who is unwilling: because no one is made blessed unwillingly; and through this, how much more wretched does it make one by deserting him unwilling, if, were it present to one unwilling, it would make him wretched? But if it deserts one willing, even so, how was it a blessed life, which the one who had it wished to perish?
deTrin.13.8.11Restat ut dicant neutrum esse in animo beati; id est, eum deseri a beata vita, cum per mortem deserit tota vita, nec nolle nec velle, ad utrumque enim parato et aequo corde consistere. Sed nec ista beata est vita, quae talis est, ut quem beatum facit, amore eius indigna sit. Quomodo enim est beata vita, quam non amat beatus? Aut quomodo amatur, quod utrum vigeat, an pereat, indifferenter accipitur? Nisi forte virtutes, quas propter solam beatitudinem sic amamus, persuadere nobis audent, ut ipsam beatitudinem non amemus. Quod si faciunt, etiam ipsas utique amare desistimus, quando illam propter quam solam istas amavimus, non amamus.
It remains for them to say that neither is in the mind of the blessed man—that is, that when he is deserted by the blessed life, as through death his whole life deserts him, he neither wills it nor refuses it, but stands toward both with a prepared and even heart. But neither is that a blessed life which is of such a sort as to be unworthy of the love of him whom it makes blessed. For how is it a blessed life, which the blessed man does not love? Or how is that loved, whose flourishing or perishing is received with indifference? Unless perhaps the virtues, which we love thus for the sake of blessedness alone, dare to persuade us not to love blessedness itself. And if they do this, then surely we cease to love even them, when we do not love that for whose sake alone we loved them.
deTrin.13.8.11Deinde quomodo erit vera tam illa perspecta, tam examinata, tam eliquata, tam certa sententia, beatos esse omnes homines velle, si ipsi qui iam beati sunt, beati esse nec nolunt, nec volunt? Aut si volunt, ut veritas clamat, ut natura compellit, cui summe bonus et immutabiliter beatus Creator indidit hoc; si volunt, inquam, beati esse qui beati sunt, beati non esse utique nolunt. Si autem beati non esse nolunt, procul dubio nolunt consumi et perire quod beati sunt. Nec nisi viventes beati esse possunt: nolunt igitur perire quod vivunt. Immortales ergo esse volunt, quicumque vere beati vel sunt vel esse cupiunt. Non autem vivit beate, cui non adest quod vult: nullo modo igitur esse poterit vita veraciter beata, nisi fuerit sempiterna.
Then how will that opinion be true—so well examined, so tested, so refined, so certain—that all men wish to be blessed, if those who are already blessed neither refuse nor wish to be blessed? Or if they do wish it, as truth cries out, as nature compels—nature into which the supremely good and immutably blessed Creator has implanted this—if, I say, those who are blessed wish to be blessed, then surely they do not wish not to be blessed. But if they do not wish not to be blessed, then beyond doubt they do not wish that to be consumed and to perish whereby they are blessed. And they cannot be blessed except while living: they do not wish, therefore, that to perish whereby they live. They wish, therefore, to be immortal, whoever truly either are blessed or desire to be. But he does not live blessedly to whom what he wills is not present: in no way, therefore, will the life be able to be truly blessed, unless it be everlasting.
deTrin.13.8.119. 12. Hanc utrum capiat humana natura, quam tamen desiderabilem confitetur, non parva quaestio est. Sed si fides adsit, quae inest eis quibus dedit potestatem Iesus filios Dei fieri, nulla quaestio est.
9. 12. Whether human nature is capable of this—which nevertheless it confesses to be desirable—is no small question. But if faith be present, which is in those to whom Jesus gave power to become sons of God (John 1:12), there is no question at all.
deTrin.13.9.12Humanis quippe argumentationibus haec invenire conantes, vix pauci magno praediti ingenio, abundantes otio, doctrinisque subtilissimis eruditi, ad indagandam solius animae immortalitatem pervenire potuerunt. Cf. Cicero, De Oratore 1.1.22. Cui tamen animae beatam vitam non invenerunt stabilem, id est veram: ad miserias eam quippe vitae huius etiam post beatitudinem redire dixerunt. Et qui eorum de hac erubuerunt sententia, et animam purgatam in sempiterna beatitudine sine corpore collocandam putaverunt, talia de mundi retrorsus aeternitate sentiunt, ut hanc de anima sententiam suam ipsi redarguant: Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 249a; Phaedo 81e; Timaeus 42c; Plotinus, Ennead 3.4.2, 4.3.2. quod hic longum est demonstrare, sed in libro duodecimo De Civitate Dei, satis a nobis est, quantum arbitror, explicatum. Cf. Augustine, The City of God 12.20.
For of those trying to find these things out by human reasonings, scarcely a few, endowed with great talent, abounding in leisure, and learned in the most subtle doctrines, have been able to arrive at investigating the immortality of the soul alone. See Cicero, De Oratore 1.1.22. Yet even for this soul they did not find a stable, that is, a true, blessed life: for they said that it returns to the miseries of this life even after blessedness. And those of them who were ashamed of this opinion, and supposed that the purified soul was to be placed in everlasting blessedness without a body, hold such views about the backward eternity of the world that they themselves refute this opinion of theirs about the soul: See Plato, Phaedrus 249a; Phaedo 81e; Timaeus 42c; Plotinus, Ennead 3.4.2, 4.3.2. which it would be long to demonstrate here, but in the twelfth book of The City of God it has been set forth by us, I think, sufficiently. See Augustine, The City of God 12.20.
deTrin.13.9.12Fides autem ista totum hominem immortalem futurum, qui utique constat ex anima et corpore, Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.12.34; Sallust, The War With Jugurtha 2.1; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 7.5.16. et ob hoc vere beatum, non argumentatione humana, sed divina auctoritate promittit. Et ideo cum dictum esset in Evangelio, quod Iesus dederit potestatem filios Dei fieri iis qui eum receperunt; et quid sit recepisse eum, breviter fuisset expositum, dicendo, credentibus in nomine eius; quoque modo filii Dei fierent, esset adiunctum, quia PL: qui (as part of the quotation): “by adding, ‘who are born.’” non ex sanguinibus, neque ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex Deo nati sunt: ne ista hominum quam videmus et gestamus infirmitas tantam excellentiam desperaret, illico annexum est, et Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis; ut a contrario suaderetur quod incredibile videbatur. Si enim natura Dei Filius propter filios hominum misericordia factus est hominis filius; hoc est enim, Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis: The translator reads nobis with four manuscripts; the PL reads nobis hominibus, “amongst us men.” quanto est credibilius, natura filios hominis gratia Dei filios Dei fieri, et habitare in Deo, in quo solo et de quo solo esse possunt beati participes immortalitatis eius effecti; propter quod persuadendum Dei Filius particeps nostrae mortalitatis effectus est? (Cf. Dan 7:13; 2 Cor 1:19)
But this faith promises that the whole man will be immortal—the man who surely consists of soul and body See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.12.34; Sallust, The War with Jugurtha 2.1; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 7.5.16., and on this account truly blessed—not by human argument, but by divine authority. And therefore, when it had been said in the Gospel that Jesus gave power to become sons of God to those who received him (John 1:12), and what it is to have received him had been briefly set forth by saying to those who believe in his name (John 1:12), and in what way they became sons of God had been added, namely that PL: qui (as part of the quotation): "by adding, 'who are born.'" they were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God (John 1:13): lest this weakness of men, which we see and bear about, should despair of so great an excellence, there was at once annexed, and the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (John 1:14), so that by the contrary there might be persuaded what seemed incredible. For if the Son of God by nature became, for the sake of the sons of men, by mercy the son of man—for this is what the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (John 1:14) means—how much more credible is it that the sons of man by nature should become, by the grace of God, sons of God, and dwell in God, in whom alone and from whom alone they can be blessed, made partakers of his immortality—for the sake of persuading which the Son of God became a partaker of our mortality? (See Dan 7:13; 2 Cor 1:19)
deTrin.13.9.12C
deTrin.13.9.12
10. 13. Eos itaque qui dicunt, “itane defuit Deo modus alius quo liberaret homines a miseria mortalitatis huius ut unigenitum Filium Deum sibi coaeternum, hominem fieri vellet, induendo humanam animam et carnem, mortalemque factum mortem perpeti?” parum est sic refellere, ut istum modum quo nos per Mediatorem Dei et hominum hominem Christum Iesum Deus liberare dignatur, asseramus bonum et divinae congruum dignitati: verum etiam ut ostendamus non alium modum possibilem Deo defuisse, cuius potestati cuncta aequaliter subiacent; sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem modum alium non fuisse, nec esse oportuisse. Quid enim tam necessarium fuit ad erigendam spem nostram, mentesque mortalium conditione ipsius mortalitatis abiectas, ab immortalitatis desperatione liberandas, quam ut demonstraretur nobis quanti nos penderet Deus, quantumque diligeret? Cf. On the Trinity 4.1. This whole central section of book 13 is parallel to the main part of book 4.
10. 13. Those, therefore, who say, "Did God then lack some other way by which to free men from the misery of this mortality, that he should will his only-begotten Son, God coeternal with himself, to become man, by putting on a human soul and flesh, and, made mortal, to suffer death?"—it is too little so to refute them as to assert that this way, by which God deigns to free us through the Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim 2:5), is good and befitting the divine dignity: rather we must also show that no other way possible to God was lacking, to whose power all things equally are subject; but that there was not, and ought not to have been, any other way more fitting for healing our misery. For what was so necessary for raising up our hope, and for freeing the minds of mortals, cast down by the very condition of their mortality, from the despair of immortality, as that it should be shown us at what price God valued us and how greatly he loved us? See On the Trinity 4.1. This whole central section of book 13 is parallel to the main part of book 4.
deTrin.13.10.13Quid vero huius rei tanto isto indicio manifestius atque praeclarius, quam ut Dei Filius immutabiliter bonus, in se manens quod erat, et a nobis pro nobis accipiens quod non erat, praeter suae naturae detrimentum, nostrae dignatus inire consortium, prius sine ullo malo suo merito mala nostra perferret; ac sic iam credentibus quantum nos diligat Deus, et quod desperabamus iam sperantibus, dona in nos sua sine ullis bonis meritis nostris, imo praecedentibus et malis meritis nostris, indebita largitate conferret?
And what is more manifest and more splendid a sign of this thing than that the Son of God, immutably good, remaining in himself what he was, and receiving from us for us what he was not—without detriment to his own nature deigning to enter into fellowship with ours—should first, without any evil desert of his own, bear our evils; and so, to those now believing how greatly God loves us, and to those now hoping for what they had despaired of, confer his gifts upon us without any good deserts of ours—nay rather, with even our evil deserts going before—by an undue bounty?
deTrin.13.10.1310. 14. Quia et ea quae dicuntur merita nostra, dona sunt eius. Ut enim fides per dilectionem operetur, (Cf. Gal 5:6) caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis. Tunc est autem datus, quando est Iesus resurrectione clarificatus. Tunc enim eum se missurum esse promisit et misit: (Cf. John 7:39, 14:26, 16:7, 20:22) quia tunc, sicut de illo scriptum est, et ante praedictum, ascendit in altum, captivavit captivitatem, dedit dona hominibus.
10. 14. For even those things which are called our deserts are his gifts. For that faith may work through love, (See Gal 5:6) the love of God is poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5). But he was given then, when Jesus was glorified by the resurrection. For then he promised that he would send him, and sent him: (See John 7:39, 14:26, 16:7, 20:22) because then, as was written of him, and foretold beforehand, he ascended on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts to men (Eph 4:8; Ps 68:18 (67:19)).
deTrin.13.10.14Haec dona sunt merita nostra, quibus ad summum bonum immortalis beatitudinis pervenimus. Cf. Augustine, Against the Academics 3.12.27; The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 1.3.10; Revisions 1.1.9. Commendat autem, inquit Apostolus, caritatem suam Deus in nobis, quoniam cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius, salvi erimus ab ira per ipsum. Adhuc addit, et dicit, si enim cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius; multo magis reconciliati, salvi erimus in vita ipsius.
These gifts are our deserts, by which we come to the highest good of immortal blessedness. See Augustine, Against the Skeptics 3.12.27; The Lord's Sermon on the Mount 1.3.10; Revisions 1.1.9. But God, says the Apostle, commends his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more, then, being now justified in his blood, shall we be saved from wrath through him (Rom 5:8–9). He adds further, and says, for if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved in his life (Rom 5:10).
deTrin.13.10.14Quos peccatores dixit prius, hos posterius inimicos Dei; et quos prius iustificatos in sanguine Iesu Christi, eos posterius reconciliatos per mortem Filii Dei; et quos prius salvos ab ira per ipsum, eos postea salvos in vita ipsius. Non ergo ante istam gratiam quoquo modo peccatores, sed in talibus peccatis fuimus, ut inimici essemus Dei.
Those whom he called first sinners, these he afterward called enemies of God; and those whom he first called justified in the blood of Jesus Christ, these he afterward called reconciled through the death of the Son of God; and those whom he first called saved from wrath through him, these afterward saved in his life. Not, therefore, before this grace were we sinners in just any way, but we were in such sins that we were enemies of God.
deTrin.13.10.14Superius autem idem Apostolus nos peccatores et inimicos Dei, duobus identidem nominibus appellavit, uno velut mitissimo, alio plane atrocissimo, dicens, si enim Christus, cum infirmi essemus adhuc, iuxta tempus pro impiis mortuus est. Quos infirmos, eosdem impios nuncupavit. Leve aliquid videtur infirmitas; sed aliquando talis est, ut impietas nominetur. Nisi tamen infirmitas esset, medicum necessarium non haberet: qui est hebraice Iesus, “Jesus” means “Yahweh saves.” The idea of healing or health is contained in the Latin salus and the Greek soteria. graece Σωτήρ, nostra autem locutione salvator. Quod verbum latina lingua antea non habebat, sed habere poterat, sicut potuit quando voluit.
But above, the same Apostle called us, sinners and enemies of God, by two names again and again: by one as it were most gentle, by the other plainly most harsh, saying, for if Christ, while we were yet weak, in due time died for the ungodly (Rom 5:6). Those whom he called weak, the same he named ungodly. Weakness seems something slight; but sometimes it is such that it is named ungodliness. Yet unless it were weakness, it would not need a physician: who is, in Hebrew, Jesus, "Jesus" means "Yahweh saves." The idea of healing or health is contained in the Latin salus and the Greek soteria. in Greek Soter, but in our speech savior. This word the Latin tongue did not have before, but could have, just as it could have it when it wished.
deTrin.13.10.14Haec autem Apostoli sententia praecedens, ubi ait, adhuc cum infirmi essemus, iuxta tempus pro impiis mortuus est, cohaeret his duabus sequentibus, quarum in una dixit peccatores, in alia inimicos Dei, tamquam illis singulis reddiderit singula, peccatores ad infirmos, inimicos Dei referens ad impios.
But this preceding statement of the Apostle, where he says, while we were yet weak, in due time he died for the ungodly (Rom 5:6), coheres with these two following ones, in one of which he said sinners, in the other enemies of God, as though he had assigned to each of those single things—referring sinners to weak, and enemies of God to ungodly.
deTrin.13.10.1411. 15. Sed quid est, iustificati in sanguine ipsius? Quae vis est sanguinis huius, obsecro, ut in eo iustificentur credentes? Et quid est, reconciliati per mortem Filii eius? Itane vero, cum irasceretur nobis Deus Pater, vidit mortem Filii sui pro nobis, et placatus est nobis? Numquid ergo Filius eius usque adeo nobis iam placatus erat, ut pro nobis etiam dignaretur mori: Pater vero usque adeo adhuc irascebatur, ut nisi Filius pro nobis moreretur, non placaretur?
11. 15. But what is it, justified in his blood (Rom 5:9)? What power, I beg, is there in this blood, that believers should be justified in it? And what is it, reconciled through the death of his Son (Rom 5:10)? Was it really so, that when God the Father was angry with us, he saw the death of his Son for us, and was appeased toward us? Was his Son then already so far appeased toward us that he even deigned to die for us, while the Father was still so far angry that, unless the Son died for us, he would not be appeased?
deTrin.13.11.15Et quid est quod alio loco idem ipse doctor Gentium: quid, inquit, ergo dicemus ad haec? Si Deus pro nobis, quis contra nos? Qui proprio Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum; quomodo non etiam cum illo omnia nobis donavit? Numquid nisi iam placatus esset Pater, proprio Filio non parcens pro nobis eum traderet? Nonne videtur haec illi velut adversa esse sententia? In illa moritur pro nobis Filius, et reconciliatur nobis Pater per mortem eius: (Cf. Rom 5:6–10) in hac autem tamquam prior nos dilexerit Pater, ipse propter nos Filio non parcit, ipse pro nobis eum tradit ad mortem. (Cf. 1 John 4:10; Rom 8:32)
And what is it that, in another place, this same teacher of the Gentiles says: what then shall we say to these things? If God is for us, who is against us? He who did not spare his own Son, but gave him up for us all, how has he not with him also given us all things (Rom 8:31–32)? Surely, unless the Father were already appeased, he would not, not sparing his own Son, give him up for us? Does not this opinion seem, as it were, contrary to that one? In the one the Son dies for us, and the Father is reconciled to us through his death; (See Rom 5:6–10) but in this one, as though the Father first loved us (1 John 4:10), he himself, for our sake, does not spare the Son, he himself gives him up for us to death. (See 1 John 4:10; Rom 8:32)
deTrin.13.11.15Sed video quod et antea Pater dilexit nos, non solum antequam pro nobis Filius moreretur, sed antequam conderet mundum, (Cf. 1 Pet 1:20) ipso teste Apostolo qui dicit: sicut elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem. Nec Filius Patre sibi non parcente pro nobis velut invitus est traditus, quia et de ipso dictum est, qui me dilexit, et tradidit semetipsum pro me. Omnia ergo simul et Pater et Filius et amborum Spiritus pariter et concorditer operantur: tamen iustificati sumus in Christi sanguine, et reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius; (Cf. Rom 5:9–10) et quomodo id factum sit, ut potero, etiam hic quantum satis videbitur explicabo.
But I see that the Father loved us even before—not only before the Son died for us, but before he founded the world, (See 1 Pet 1:20) with the Apostle himself as witness, who says: as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world (Eph 1:4). Nor was the Son, while the Father did not spare him, given up for us as it were unwilling, since of him too it was said, who loved me, and gave himself up for me (Gal 2:20). All things, therefore, the Father and the Son and the Spirit of both work together, equally and in concord: yet we were justified in the blood of Christ, and reconciled to God through the death of his Son (See Rom 5:9–10); and how this was done, I will explain even here, as I can, as far as shall seem sufficient.
deTrin.13.11.1512. 16. Quadam iustitia Dei in potestatem diaboli traditum est genus humanum, peccato primi hominis in omnes utriusque sexus commixtione nascentes originaliter transeunte, et parentum primorum debito universos posteros obligante. Haec traditio prius in Genesi significata est, ubi cum serpenti dictum esset, terram manducabis; homini dictum est, terra es, et in terram ibis. Eo quod dictum est, in terram ibis; mors corporis praenuntiata est, quia nec ipsam fuerat experturus, si permansisset ut factus est rectus: quod vero viventi ait, terra es; ostendit totum hominem in deterius commutatum. Tale est enim, terra es; quale illud, non permanebit Spiritus meus in hominibus istis quoniam caro sunt. Tunc ergo demonstravit eum ei traditum, cui dictum fuerat, terram manducabis.
12. 16. By a certain justice of God the human race was handed over into the power of the devil, the sin of the first man passing over originally into all who are born by the mingling of both sexes, and binding all posterity by the debt of the first parents. This handing-over was first signified in Genesis, where, when it had been said to the serpent, you shall eat earth (Gen 3:14), it was said to the man, earth you are, and into the earth you shall go (Gen 3:19). By the words into the earth you shall go, the death of the body was foretold, since he would not have experienced even that, had he remained as he was made, upright; but by saying to him while living, earth you are, he showed that the whole man was changed for the worse. For earth you are is of the same sort as that other, my Spirit shall not remain in these men, since they are flesh (Gen 6:3). Then, therefore, he showed that he had been handed over to him to whom it had been said, you shall eat earth (Gen 3:14).
deTrin.13.12.16Apostolus autem apertius hoc praedicat, ubi dicit: et vos cum essetis mortui delictis et peccatis vestris, in quibus aliquando ambulastis secundum saeculum mundi huius, secundum principem potestatis aeris, spiritus huius qui nunc operatur in filiis diffidentiae, in quibus et nos omnes aliquando conversati sumus in desideriis carnis nostrae, facientes voluntates carnis et affectionum: et eramus natura filii irae, sicut et ceteri. Filii diffidentiae sunt infideles; et quis hoc non est antequam fidelis fiat? Quocirca omnes homines ab origine sub principe sunt potestatis aeris, qui operatur in filiis diffidentiae. Et quod dixi: “ab origine,” hoc est quod dicit Apostolus, natura et se fuisse sicut ceteros: natura scilicet ut est depravata peccato, non ut recta creata est ab initio.
But the Apostle proclaims this more openly, where he says: and you, when you were dead in your trespasses and sins, in which you once walked according to the age of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit who now works in the sons of unbelief, among whom we all also once conducted ourselves in the desires of our flesh, doing the wishes of the flesh and of the affections; and we were by nature children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:1–3). The sons of unbelief are the unbelievers; and who is not this before he becomes faithful? Wherefore all men, from their origin, are under the prince of the power of the air, who works in the sons of unbelief (Eph 2:2). And what I said, "from their origin," is what the Apostle says, that he too had been by nature like the rest: by nature, that is, as it is depraved by sin, not as it was created upright in the beginning.
deTrin.13.12.16Modus autem iste quo traditus est homo in diaboli potestatem, non ita debet intellegi, tamquam hoc Deus fecerit, aut fieri iusserit: sed quod tantum permiserit, iuste tamen. Illo enim deserente peccantem, peccati auctor illico invasit. Nec ita sane Deus deseruit creaturam suam, ut non se illi exhiberet Deum creantem et vivificantem, et inter poenalia mala etiam bona malis multa praestantem. Non enim continuit in ira sua miserationes suas.
But this manner by which man was handed over into the power of the devil ought not to be understood as though God did this, or commanded it to be done: but that he only permitted it, yet justly. For when he deserted the sinner, the author of sin at once invaded. Nor indeed did God so desert his creature that he did not show himself to it as God creating and giving life, and, amid penal evils, also bestowing many good things upon the evil. For he did not shut up his mercies in his anger (Ps 77:9 (76:10)).
deTrin.13.12.16Nec hominem a lege suae potestatis amisit, quando in diaboli potestate esse permisit: quia nec ipse diabolus a potestate Omnipotentis alienus est, sicut neque a bonitate. Nam et maligni angeli unde qualicumque subsisterent vita, nisi per eum qui vivificat omnia? Si ergo commissio peccatorum per iram Dei iustam hominem subdidit diabolo, profecto remissio peccatorum per reconciliationem Dei benignam eruit hominem a diabolo.
Nor did he let man go from the law of his power, when he permitted him to be in the power of the devil: since the devil himself is not alien from the power of the Almighty, just as neither from his goodness. For whence would even the malign angels have any sort of subsisting life, except through him who gives life to all things (1 Tim 6:13)? If, then, the committing of sins, through the just anger of God, subjected man to the devil, surely the remission of sins, through the kindly reconciliation of God, rescues man from the devil.
deTrin.13.12.1613. 17. Non autem diabolus potentia Dei, sed iustitia superandus fuit. Nam quid Omnipotente potentius? Aut cuius creaturae potestas potestati Creatoris comparari potest? Sed cum diabolus vitio perversitatis suae factus sit amator potentiae, et desertor oppugnatorque iustitiae; sic enim et homines eum tanto magis imitantur, quanto magis neglecta, vel etiam perosa iustitia, potentiae student, eiusque vel adeptione laetantur, vel inflammantur cupiditate: placuit Deo, ut propter eruendum hominem de diaboli potestate, non potentia diabolus, sed iustitia vinceretur; atque ita et homines imitantes Christum, iustitia quaererent diabolum vincere, non potentia. Non quod potentia quasi mali aliquid fugienda sit; sed ordo servandus est, quo prior est iustitia.
13. 17. But the devil was to be overcome not by the power of God, but by justice. For what is more powerful than the Almighty? Or what creature's power can be compared to the power of the Creator? But since the devil, by the vice of his own perversity, became a lover of power and a deserter and assailant of justice—for so men too imitate him the more, the more they, with justice neglected or even hated, are zealous for power, and either rejoice in attaining it or are inflamed with desire of it—it pleased God that, for the sake of rescuing man from the power of the devil, the devil should be conquered not by power, but by justice; and that so men too, imitating Christ, should seek to conquer the devil by justice, not by power. Not that power is to be shunned as though it were something evil; but the order is to be kept, by which justice is first.
deTrin.13.13.17Nam quanta potentia potest esse mortalium? Teneant ergo mortales iustitiam, potentia immortalibus dabitur. Cui comparata quantalibet eorum hominum qui potentes vocantur in terra, ridicula infirmitas invenitur, et ibi foditur peccatori fovea, ubi videntur mali plurimum posse. Cantat autem iustus et dicit: beatus homo quem tu erudieris, Domine, et de lege tua docueris eum: ut mitiges ei a diebus malignis, donec fodiatur peccatori fovea. Quoniam non repellet Dominus plebem suam, et haereditatem suam non derelinquet: quoadusque iustitia convertatur in iudicium, et qui habent eam, omnes recto sunt corde. Hoc ergo tempore quo differtur potentia populi Dei, non repellet Dominus plebem suam, et haereditatem suam non derelinquet; quantalibet acerba et indigna ipsa humilis atque infirma patiatur, quoadusque iustitia quam nunc habet infirmitas piorum, convertatur in iudicium, hoc est, iudicandi accipiat potestatem: quod iustis in finem servatur, cum praecedentem iustitiam ordine suo fuerit potentia subsecuta. Potentia quippe adiuncta iustitiae, vel iustitia accedente potentiae, iudiciariam potestatem facit. Pertinet autem iustitia ad voluntatem bonam: unde dictum est ab angelis nato Christo, gloria in excelsis Deo, et in terra pax hominibus bonae voluntatis. Potentia vero sequi debet iustitiam, non praeire:
For how great can the power of mortals be? Let mortals, then, hold to justice; power will be given to the immortals. Compared to which, however great the power of those men who are called powerful on earth, it is found to be a laughable weakness, and there a pit is dug for the sinner where the wicked seem to have very great power. But the just man sings and says: blessed is the man whom you instruct, O Lord, and teach out of your law: that you may give him rest from days of evil, until a pit be dug for the sinner. For the Lord will not cast off his people, and he will not forsake his inheritance, until justice be turned into judgment, and all who have it are upright in heart (Ps 94:12–15 (93:12–15)). In this time, then, in which the power of the people of God is deferred, the Lord will not cast off his people, and he will not forsake his inheritance, however bitter and unworthy the things which it, humble and weak, may suffer, until justice—which now the weakness of the pious has—be turned into judgment, that is, receive the power of judging: which is kept for the just in the end, when, in its own order, power shall have followed the justice that goes before. For power joined to justice, or justice approaching power, makes judiciary power. But justice belongs to the good will: whence it was said by the angels at Christ's birth, glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will (Luke 2:14). But power ought to follow justice, not to go before:
deTrin.13.13.17ideo et in rebus secundis ponitur, id est prosperis: secundae autem a sequendo sunt dictae. Cum enim beatum faciant, sicut superius disputavimus, On the Trinity 13.2.8.duae res, bene velle, et posse quod velis, non debet esse illa perversitas, quae in eadem disputatione notata est, ut ex duabus rebus quae faciunt beatum, posse quod velit homo eligat, et velle quod oportet negligat; cum prius debeat habere voluntatem bonam, magnam vero postea potestatem.
and therefore it is also placed among "second things," that is, prosperous things; for "second things" (secundae) are so called from "following" (sequendo). For since two things make a man blessed, as we discussed above On the Trinity 13.2.8.—to will well, and to be able to do what you will—there ought not to be that perversity which was noted in that same discussion, that, of the two things which make a man blessed, he should choose to be able to do what he wills and neglect to will what he ought; whereas he ought first to have a good will, but great power afterward.
deTrin.13.13.17Bona porro voluntas purganda est a vitiis, a quibus si vincitur homo, ad hoc vincitur ut male velit, et bona iam voluntas eius quomodo erit? Optandum est itaque ut potestas nunc detur, sed contra vitia, propter quae vincenda potentes nolunt esse homines, et volunt propter vincendos homines; utquid hoc, nisi ut vere victi falso vincant, nec sint veritate, sed opinione victores?
Moreover, a good will is to be purified from vices, by which, if a man is overcome, he is overcome to this end, that he will evilly; and how then will his will still be good? It is therefore to be wished that power be given now, but against the vices, for the conquering of which men do not wish to be powerful, but wish to be powerful for the conquering of men; and to what end this, except that, truly conquered themselves, they may falsely conquer, and be victors not in truth, but in opinion?
deTrin.13.13.17Velit homo prudens esse, velit fortis, velit temperans, velit iustus, atque ut haec veraciter possit, potentiam plane optet, atque appetat ut potens sit in seipso, et miro modo adversus se ipsum pro se ipso. Cetera vero quae bene vult, et tamen non potest, sicut est immortalitas, et vera ac plena felicitas, desiderare non cesset, et patienter exspectet.
Let a man wish to be prudent, wish to be brave, wish to be temperate, wish to be just; and that he may truly be able to be these, let him plainly wish for power, and seek to be powerful in himself, and, in a wonderful way, against himself for himself. But the other things which he wills well, and yet cannot have, such as immortality and true and full happiness, let him not cease to desire, and let him patiently await them.
deTrin.13.13.1714. 18. Quae est igitur iustitia, qua victus est diabolus? Quae, nisi iustitia Iesu Christi? Et quomodo victus est? Quia cum in eo nihil morte dignum inveniret, occidit eum tamen. Et utique iustum est ut debitores quos tenebat, liberi dimittantur, in eum credentes quem sine ullo debito occidit. Hoc est quod iustificari dicimur in Christi sanguine. (Cf. Rom 5:9) Sic quippe in remissionem peccatorum nostrorum innocens sanguis ille effusus est. (Cf. Col 1:14; Matt 26:28) Unde se dicit in Psalmis in mortuis liberum. Solus enim a debito mortis liber est mortuus. Hinc et in alio Psalmo dicit, quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam: rapinam volens intellegi peccatum, quia usurpatum est contra licitum. Unde per os etiam carnis suae, sicut in Evangelio legitur, dicit, ecce venit princeps mundi huius, et in me nihil invenit, id est, nullum peccatum: sed ut sciant omnes, inquit, quia voluntatem Patris mei facio, surgite, eamus hinc. Et pergit inde ad passionem, ut pro debitoribus nobis quod ipse non debebat exsolveret.
14. 18. What, then, is the justice by which the devil was overcome? What, if not the justice of Jesus Christ? And how was he overcome? Because, although he found in him nothing worthy of death, he yet killed him. And surely it is just that the debtors whom he held should be let go free, believing in him whom, without any debt, he killed. This is what we are said to be justified by, in the blood of Christ. (See Rom 5:9) For so that innocent blood was poured out unto the remission of our sins. (See Col 1:14; Matt 26:28) Whence he says of himself in the Psalms that he is free among the dead (Ps 88:5 (87:6)). For he alone among the dead is free from the debt of death. Hence too, in another Psalm, he says, what I did not seize, then I was paying back (Ps 69:4 (68:5)): wishing "seizure" to be understood as sin, since it is a usurping of what is unlawful. Whence, through the mouth of his own flesh as well, as is read in the Gospel, he says, behold, the prince of this world comes, and in me he finds nothing (John 14:30), that is, no sin; but that all may know, he says, that I do the will of my Father, arise, let us go hence (John 14:31). And from there he goes on to his Passion, that for us debtors he might pay back what he himself did not owe.
deTrin.13.14.18Numquid isto iure aequissimo diabolus vinceretur, si potentia Christus cum illo agere, non iustitia voluisset? Sed postposuit quod potuit, ut prius ageret quod oportuit. Ideo autem illum esse opus erat, et hominem, et Deum. Nisi enim homo esset, non posset occidi: nisi Deus esset, non crederetur noluisse quod potuit, sed non potuisse quod voluit; nec ab eo iustitiam potentiae praelatam fuisse, sed ei defuisse potentiam putaremus.
Would the devil have been overcome by this most just law, if Christ had wished to deal with him by power, not by justice? But he set aside what he could do, that he might first do what he ought. And for this reason it was needful that he be both man and God. For unless he were man, he could not be killed; unless he were God, we would not believe that he was unwilling to do what he could, but unable to do what he willed; nor that justice had been preferred by him to power, but rather we would suppose that power was lacking to him.
deTrin.13.14.18Nunc vero humana pro nobis passus est, quia homo erat; sed si noluisset, etiam hoc non pati potuisset, quia et Deus erat. Ideo gratior facta est in humilitate iustitia, quia posset si noluisset humilitatem non perpeti tanta in divinitate potentia: ac sic a moriente tam potente, nobis mortalibus impotentibus, et commendata est iustitia, et promissa potentia. Horum enim duorum unum fecit moriendo, alterum resurgendo. Quid enim iustius, quam usque ad mortem crucis (Cf. Phil 2:8) pro iustitia pervenire? et quid potentius, quam resurgere a mortuis, et in coelum cum ipsa carne in qua est occisus ascendere?
But as it is, he suffered human things for us, because he was man; but had he been unwilling, he could even have not suffered this, because he was also God. Therefore justice was made more pleasing in humility, because so great a power in his divinity could, had he been unwilling, have not undergone the humility; and so, by one dying who was so powerful, to us mortals who are powerless there was both commended justice and promised power. For of these two he did the one by dying, the other by rising again. For what is more just than to come even to the death of the cross (See Phil 2:8) for justice? And what is more powerful than to rise from the dead, and to ascend into heaven with the very flesh in which he was killed?
deTrin.13.14.18Et iustitia ergo prius, et potentia postea diabolum vicit: iustitia scilicet, quia nullum peccatum habuit, et ab illo iniustissime est occisus; potentia vero, quia revixit mortuus, numquam postea moriturus. (Cf. Rom 6:9) Sed potentia diabolum vicisset, etiamsi ab illo non potuisset occidi: quamvis maioris sit potentiae etiam ipsam mortem vincere resurgendo, quam vitare vivendo. Sed aliud est propter quod iustificamur in Christi sanguine, cum per remissionem peccatorum eruimur a diaboli potestate: hoc ad id pertinet, quod a Christo iustitia diabolus vincitur, non potentia. Ex infirmitate quippe quam suscepit in carne mortali, non ex immortali potentia crucifixus est Christus: (Cf. Matt 8:17; 1 Pet 2:24) de qua tamen infirmitate ait Apostolus, quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus.
And so justice first, and power afterward, overcame the devil: justice, namely, because he had no sin (See 2 Cor 5:21; 1 Pet 2:22) and was most unjustly killed by him; but power, because having been dead he lived again, never afterward to die (See Rom 6:9). But he would have overcome the devil by power, even if he could not have been killed by him: although it is of greater power to overcome death itself by rising again than to avoid it by living. But there is another reason why we are justified in the blood of Christ, when through the remission of sins we are rescued from the power of the devil: this belongs to the fact that the devil is conquered by Christ by justice, not by power. For Christ was crucified out of the weakness which he took on in mortal flesh, not out of immortal power: (See Matt 8:17; 1 Pet 2:24) of which weakness nevertheless the Apostle says, that which is weak of God is stronger than men (1 Cor 1:25).
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deTrin.13.14.18
15. 19. Non est itaque difficile videre diabolum victum, quando qui ab illo occisus est resurrexit. Illud est maius, et ad intellegendum profundius, videre diabolum victum, quando sibi vicisse videbatur, id est, quando Christus occisus est. Tunc enim sanguis ille, quoniam eius erat qui nullum habuit omnino peccatum, (Cf. 2 Cor 5:21; 1 Pet 2:22) ad remissionem nostrorum fusus est peccatorum, (Cf. Matt 26:28; Col 1:14) ut quia eos diabolus merito tenebat, quos peccati reos conditione mortis obstrinxit, hos per eum merito dimitteret, quem nullius peccati reum immerito poena mortis affecit. Hac iustitia victus, et hoc vinculo vinctus est fortis, ut vasa eius eriperentur, quae apud eum cum ipso et angelis eius fuerant vasa irae, et in vasa misericordiae verterentur. (Cf. Matt 12:29; Mark 3:27)
15. 19. It is therefore not difficult to see the devil overcome, when he who was killed by him rose again. That is the greater thing, and deeper for understanding: to see the devil overcome when he seemed to himself to have conquered, that is, when Christ was killed. For then that blood, since it was the blood of him who had no sin at all, (See 2 Cor 5:21; 1 Pet 2:22) was poured out unto the remission of our sins, (See Matt 26:28; Col 1:14) so that, because the devil deservedly held those whom he had bound, as guilty of sin, by the condition of death, he should deservedly let them go through him whom, guilty of no sin, he undeservedly afflicted with the penalty of death. Overcome by this justice, the strong one was bound with this bond, that his vessels might be snatched away—vessels which had been with him and his angels vessels of wrath, and were turned into vessels of mercy. (See Matt 12:29; Mark 3:27; Rom 9:22–23)
deTrin.13.15.19Haec quippe verba ipsius Domini nostri Iesu Christi de caelo ad se facta, cum primum vocatus est, narrat apostolus Paulus. (Cf. Acts 26:13–15) Nam inter cetera quae audivit, etiam hoc sibi dictum sic loquitur: ad hoc enim tibi apparui, ut constituam te ministrum et testem eorum quae a me vides, quibus etiam praeeo tibi, liberans te de populo et de gentibus, in quas ego mitto te aperire oculos caecorum, ut avertantur a tenebris, et a potestate satanae ad Deum, ut accipiant remissionem peccatorum, et sortem quae in sanctis, et fidem quae in me est.
For these very words of our Lord Jesus Christ, spoken from heaven to him when he was first called, the apostle Paul relates. (See Acts 26:13–15) For among the other things he heard, he speaks thus of what was said to him: for to this end I have appeared to you, to appoint you a minister and a witness of the things you see from me, and of those for which I will also appear to you, delivering you from the people and from the nations, to whom I send you to open the eyes of the blind, that they may be turned from darkness, and from the power of Satan to God, that they may receive remission of sins, and a lot among those who are sanctified, and the faith that is in me (Acts 26:16–18).
deTrin.13.15.19Unde et exhortans idem Apostolus credentes ad gratiarum actionem Deo Patri: qui eruit nos, inquit, de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii caritatis suae, in quo habemus redemptionem in remissionem peccatorum. In hac redemptione tamquam pretium pro nobis datus est sanguis Christi, quo accepto diabolus non ditatus est, sed ligatus: ut nos ab eius nexibus solveremur, nec quemquam secum eorum quos Christus ab omni debito liber indebite fuso suo sanguine redemisset, peccatorum retibus involutum traheret ad secundae ac sempiternae mortis exitium; (Cf. Rev 21:8) sed hactenus morerentur ad Christi gratiam pertinentes, praecogniti (Cf. 1 Pet 1:20) et praedestinati (Cf. Eph 1:5) et electi ante constitutionem mundi, (Cf. Eph 1:4) quatenus pro illis ipse mortuus est Christus, carnis tantum morte, non spiritus. Cf. Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter 24.40.
Whence the same Apostle too, exhorting believers to give thanks to God the Father, says: who has rescued us from the power of darkness, and has transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love, in whom we have redemption unto the remission of sins (Col 1:13–14). In this redemption the blood of Christ was given as it were a price for us, on receiving which the devil was not enriched but bound: that we might be loosed from his bonds, and that he might not drag any one of those whom Christ, free from all debt, redeemed by undeservedly pouring out his blood—entangled in the nets of sins—to the doom of the second and everlasting death; (See Rev 21:8) but that they should die only thus far, belonging to the grace of Christ, foreknown (See 1 Pet 1:20) and predestined (See Eph 1:5) and chosen before the foundation of the world (See Eph 1:4), insofar as Christ himself died for them, in the death of the flesh only, not of the spirit. See Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter 24.40.
deTrin.13.15.1916. 20. Quamvis enim et ipsa mors carnis de peccato primi hominis originaliter venerit, (Cf. Rom 5:12) tamen bonus eius usus gloriosissimos martyres fecit. Et ideo non solum ipsa, sed omnia saeculi huius mala, dolores laboresque hominum, quamquam de peccatorum, et maxime de peccati originalis meritis veniant, unde facta est et ipsa vita vinculo mortis obstricta, tamen et remissis peccatis remanere debuerunt, cum quibus homo pro veritate certaret, et unde exerceretur virtus fidelium: ut novus homo per testamentum novum, inter mala huius saeculi novo saeculo praepararetur, miseriam quam meruit vita ista damnata sapienter tolerans, et quia finietur prudenter gratulans; beatitudinem vero quam liberata vita futura sine fine habitura est, fideliter et patienter exspectans.
16. 20. For although even the death of the flesh itself came originally from the sin of the first man, (See Rom 5:12) yet its good use has made the most glorious martyrs. And therefore not only it, but all the evils of this age—the pains and labors of men—although they come from the deserts of sins, and especially of original sin, whence this very life too was made bound by the bond of death, yet, even when sins are remitted, they had to remain, that with them man might contend for the truth, and from them the virtue of the faithful might be exercised: so that the new man, through the new covenant, might be prepared, amid the evils of this age, for a new age, wisely tolerating the misery that this condemned life has deserved, and prudently rejoicing because it will be ended; but faithfully and patiently awaiting the blessedness which the liberated future life will have without end.
deTrin.13.16.20Diabolus enim a dominatu et a cordibus fidelium foras missus, in quorum damnatione atque infidelitate licet damnatus etiam ipse regnabat, tantum pro conditione mortalitatis huius adversari sinitur, quantum eis expedire novit, de quo Sacrae Litterae personant per os Apostolicum: fidelis Deus, qui non permittet vos temptari supra id quod potestis; sed faciet cum temptatione etiam exitum, ut possitis sustinere.
For the devil, cast out from his dominion and from the hearts of the faithful—in whose condemnation and unbelief, although himself condemned, he yet reigned—is allowed, for the condition of this mortality, to oppose only as far as he knows it to be expedient for them; of which the Sacred Writings sound forth through the apostolic mouth: God is faithful, who will not permit you to be tempted beyond what you are able; but with the temptation will also make a way out, that you may be able to bear it (1 Cor 10:13).
deTrin.13.16.20Prosunt autem ista mala quae fideles pie perferunt, vel ad emendanda peccata, vel ad exercendam probandamque iustitiam, vel ad demonstrandam vitae huius miseriam, ut illa ubi erit beatitudo vera atque perpetua, et desideretur ardentius, et instantius inquiratur. Sed circa eos ista servantur, de quibus Apostolus dicit: scimus quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, iis qui secundum propositum vocati sunt. PL adds sancti, “called to be saints.” Quoniam quos ante praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Quos autem praedestinavit, illos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, illos et iustificavit; quos autem iustificavit, ipsos et glorificavit. Horum praedestinatorum nemo cum diabolo perit; nemo usque ad mortem sub diaboli potestate remanebit. Deinde sequitur quod iam supra commemoravi: quid ergo dicemus ad haec? Si Deus pro nobis, quis contra nos? Qui Filio proprio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum; quomodo non et cum illo omnia nobis donavit.
But these evils, which the faithful piously endure, profit them either for amending sins, or for exercising and proving justice, or for demonstrating the misery of this life, so that that life where there will be true and perpetual blessedness may both be desired more ardently and sought more earnestly. But these things are kept around those of whom the Apostle says: we know that for those who love God all things work together unto good, for those who are called according to his purpose (Rom 8:28). PL adds sancti, "called to be saints." For those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he himself might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those whom he predestined, them he also called; and those whom he called, them he also justified; but those whom he justified, them he also glorified (Rom 8:29–30). Of these predestined ones none perishes with the devil; none will remain under the power of the devil unto death. Then follows what I have already mentioned above: what then shall we say to these things? If God is for us, who is against us? He who did not spare his own Son, but gave him up for us all, how has he not with him also given us all things (Rom 8:31–32)?
deTrin.13.16.2016. 21. Cur ergo non fieret mors Christi? Imo cur non praetermissis aliis innumerabilibus modis, quibus ad nos liberandos uti posset Omnipotens, ipsa potissimum eligeretur ut fieret; ubi nec de divinitate eius aliquid imminutum est aut mutatum, (Cf. Mal 3:6) et de humanitate suscepta tantum beneficii collatum est hominibus, ut a Dei Filio sempiterno eodemque hominis filio mors temporalis indebita redderetur, qua eos a sempiterna morte debita liberaret?
16. 21. Why, then, should not the death of Christ come about? Nay rather, why, with countless other ways set aside by which the Almighty could use to free us, should this one above all be chosen to come about—where nothing of his divinity was either diminished or changed, (See Mal 3:6) and from the humanity he took on so great a benefit was conferred upon men, that by the everlasting Son of God, who is likewise the son of man, an undue temporal death should be paid back, by which he might free them from the due everlasting death?
deTrin.13.16.21Peccata nostra diabolus tenebat, et per illa nos merito figebat in morte. Dimisit ea ille qui sua non habebat, et ab illo immerito est perductus ad mortem. Tanti valuit sanguis ille, ut neminem Christo indutum in aeterna morte debita detinere debuerit, qui Christum morte indebita vel ad tempus occidit. Commendat ergo caritatem suam Deus in nobis: quoniam cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius, salvi erimus ab ira per ipsum. Iustificati, inquit, in sanguine ipsius: iustificati plane in eo quod a peccatis omnibus liberati; liberati autem a peccatis omnibus, quoniam pro nobis est Dei Filius, qui nullum habebat, (Cf. 2 Cor 5:21; 1 Pet 2:22) occisus. Salvi ergo erimus ab ira per ipsum: (Cf. Rom 5:9) ab ira utique Dei, quae nihil est aliud quam iusta vindicta. (Cf. Rev 16:7, 19:2) Non enim sicut hominis, animi perturbatio est ira Dei: sed illius ira est, cui dicit alio loco Sancta Scriptura, tu autem, Domine virtutum, cum tranquillitate iudicas. Si ergo iusta divina vindicta tale nomen accepit, etiam reconciliatio Dei quae recte intellegitur, nisi cum talis ira finitur? (Cf. Sir 44:17; Rom 5:9–10)
The devil held our sins, and through them deservedly fixed us in death. He who had no sins of his own dismissed them, and was undeservedly led to death by the devil. So great was the worth of that blood, that he who killed Christ by an undue death, even for a time, ought to detain no one clothed with Christ in the due everlasting death. Therefore God commends his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more, then, being now justified in his blood, shall we be saved from wrath through him (Rom 5:8–9). Justified, he says, in his blood: justified plainly in this, that we were freed from all sins; but freed from all sins, since for us the Son of God, who had none, (See 2 Cor 5:21; 1 Pet 2:22) was killed. We shall therefore be saved from wrath through him: (See Rom 5:9) from the wrath, namely, of God, which is nothing other than just vengeance. (See Rev 16:7, 19:2) For the wrath of God is not, as that of man, a disturbance of the mind: but it is the wrath of him to whom the Holy Scripture says in another place, but you, O Lord of hosts, judge with tranquillity (Wis 12:18). If, then, the just divine vengeance has received such a name, what is rightly understood as the reconciliation of God, except when such wrath is ended? (See Sir 44:17; Rom 5:9–10)
deTrin.13.16.21Nec inimici eramus Deo, nisi quemadmodum iustitiae sunt inimica peccata, quibus remissis tales inimicitiae finiuntur, et reconciliantur iusto quos ipse iustificat. (Cf. Rom 5:10) Quos tamen etiam inimicos utique dilexit: quandoquidem proprio Filio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus, cum adhuc inimici essemus, tradidit eum. Recte ergo Apostolus secutus adiunxit, si enim cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius, per quam facta est illa remissio peccatorum; multo magis reconciliati salvi erimus in vita ipsius. In vita salvi, qui per mortem reconciliati. Quis enim dubitet daturum amicis vitam suam, pro quibus inimicis dedit mortem suam? Non solum autem, inquit, sed et gloriamur in Deo per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, per quem nunc reconciliationem accepimus. Non solum, ait, salvi erimus, sed et gloriamur: nec in nobis, sed in Deo; nec per nos, sed per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, per quem nunc reconciliationem accepimus, secundum ea quae superius disputata sunt.
Nor were we enemies of God except as sins are enemies of justice, which sins being remitted, such enmities are ended, and those whom he himself justifies are reconciled to the just one. (See Rom 5:10) Yet even as enemies he surely loved them: since he did not spare his own Son, but for us all, while we were yet enemies, gave him up. Rightly, then, the Apostle, continuing, added, for if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, by which that remission of sins was made, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved in his life (Rom 5:10). Saved in his life, who through his death were reconciled. For who would doubt that he will give his life for friends, for whom, while they were enemies, he gave his death? And not only so, he says, but we also glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received the reconciliation (Rom 5:11). Not only, he says, shall we be saved, but we also glory: and not in ourselves, but in God; and not through ourselves, but through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received the reconciliation, according to the things discussed above.
deTrin.13.16.21Deinde subiungit Apostolus: propter hoc sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt: et cetera, in quibus prolixius de duobus hominibus disputat; uno eodemque primo Adam, per cuius peccatum et mortem tamquam haereditariis malis posteri eius obligati sumus; altero autem secundo Adam, qui non homo tantum, sed etiam Deus est, quo pro nobis solvente quod non debebat, a debitis et paternis et propriis liberati sumus. (Cf. 1 Cor 15:45) Proinde quoniam propter unum illum tenebat diabolus omnes per eius vitiatam carnalem concupiscentiam generatos, iustum est ut propter hunc unum dimittat omnes per ipsius immaculatam gratiam spiritalem regeneratos.
Then the Apostle subjoins: for this reason, as through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death, and so death passed into all men, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12): and the rest, in which he discusses at greater length two men—the one and same first Adam, by whose sin and death, as by hereditary evils, we his posterity are bound; but the other the second Adam, who is not only man but also God, by whose paying for us what he did not owe we are freed from our debts, both ancestral and our own. (See 1 Cor 15:45) Accordingly, since on account of that one the devil held all who were begotten through his vitiated carnal concupiscence, it is just that on account of this one he should let go all who are spiritually regenerated through his own immaculate grace.
deTrin.13.16.2117. 22. Sunt et alia multa quae in Christi incarnatione, quae superbis displicet, salubriter intuenda atque cogitanda sunt. Quorum est unum, quod demonstratum est homini, quem locum haberet in rebus quas condidit Deus: quandoquidem sic Deo coniungi potuit humana natura, ut ex duabus substantiis fieret una persona, ac per hoc iam ex tribus, Deo, anima et carne: ut superbi illi maligni spiritus, qui se ad decipiendum quasi ad adiuvandum medios interponunt, non ideo se audeant homini praeponere, quia non habent carnem; et maxime quia et mori in eadem carne dignatus est, PL adds Filius Dei, “the Son of God.” ne ideo illi tamquam deos se coli persuadeant, quia videntur esse immortales.
17. 22. There are also many other things which, in the incarnation of Christ—which displeases the proud—are to be wholesomely looked upon and considered. Of these one is that it was shown to man what place he had among the things God founded: since human nature could be so joined to God that out of two substances one person should be made, and through this now out of three: God, soul, and flesh; so that those proud malign spirits, who interpose themselves as mediators for deceiving, as though for helping, should not dare to set themselves before man because they have no flesh; and especially because he deigned to die even in this same flesh, PL adds Filius Dei, "the Son of God." lest they should persuade men to worship them as gods because they seem to be immortal.
deTrin.13.17.22Deinde, ut gratia Dei nobis sine ullis praecedentibus meritis in homine Christo commendaretur: (Cf. 1 Tim 2:5) quia nec ipse ut tanta unitate Deo vero coniunctus una cum illo persona Filius Dei fieret, ullis est praecedentibus meritis assecutus; sed ex quo homo esse coepit, ex illo est et Deus: unde dictum est, Verbum caro factum est.
Then, that the grace of God might be commended to us, without any preceding deserts, in the man Christ: (See 1 Tim 2:5) since not even he himself, that he might, joined to the true God in so great a unity, become the Son of God, one person together with him, attained this by any preceding deserts; but from the time when he began to be man, from that time he is also God: whence it was said, the Word was made flesh (John 1:14).
deTrin.13.17.22Etiam illud est, ut superbia hominis quae maximo impedimento est ne inhaereatur Deo, per tantam Dei humilitatem redargui posset atque sanari. Discit quoque homo quam (Cf. Phil 2:8) longe recesserit a Deo, et quid illi valeat ad medicinalem dolorem, quando per talem Mediatorem redit, qui hominibus et Deus divinitate subvenit, et homo infirmitate convenit. (Cf. 1 Tim 2:5) Quod autem maius obedientiae nobis praeberetur exemplum, qui per inobedientiam perieramus, quam Deo Patri Deus Filius obediens usque ad mortem crucis? Quid, praemium ipsius obedientiae ubi ostenderetur melius, quam in carne tanti Mediatoris, quae ad vitam resurrexit aeternam? Pertinebat etiam ad iustitiam bonitatemque Creatoris, ut per eamdem rationalem creaturam superaretur diabolus, quam se superasse gaudebat, et de ipso genere venientem, quod genus origine vitiata per unum tenebat universum.
There is also this, that the pride of man, which is the greatest impediment to his cleaving to God, could, through so great a humility of God, be refuted and healed. Man learns too how (See Phil 2:8) far he has withdrawn from God, and what avails him toward a medicinal pain, when he returns through such a Mediator, who comes to the aid of men as God by his divinity, and meets them as man by his weakness. (See 1 Tim 2:5) And what greater example of obedience could be offered to us, who had perished through disobedience, than that the God the Son should be to God the Father obedient even unto the death of the cross (Phil 2:8)? And where could the reward of that obedience be better shown than in the flesh of so great a Mediator, which rose again to eternal life? It belonged also to the justice and goodness of the Creator, that the devil should be overcome by the same rational creature which he rejoiced to have overcome, and by one coming from that very race—the race which, with its origin vitiated, he held whole and entire through one man.
deTrin.13.17.2218. 23. Poterat enim utique Deus hominem aliunde suscipere, in quo esset Mediator Dei et hominum, non de genere illius Adam, qui peccato suo genus obligavit humanum; (Cf. Rom 5:12) sicut ipsum quem primum creavit, non de genere creavit alicuius. Poterat ergo vel sic, vel alio quo vellet modo creare unum alium de quo vinceretur victor prioris: sed melius iudicavit, et de ipso quod victum fuerat genere assumere hominem Deus, per quem generis humani vinceret inimicum; et tamen ex virgine, cuius conceptum spiritus, non caro: fides, non libido praevenit. (Cf. Luke 1:26–38) Nec interfuit carnis concupiscentia, per quam seminantur et concipiuntur ceteri, qui trahunt originale peccatum: sed ea penitus remotissima, credendo, non concumbendo sancta est fecundata virginitas; ut illud quod nascebatur ex propagine primi hominis, tantummodo generis, non etiam criminis originem duceret. Nascebatur namque non transgressionis contagione vitiata natura, sed omnium talium vitiorum sola medicina. Nascebatur homo, inquam, nullum habens, nullum habiturus omnino peccatum, per quem renascerentur liberandi a peccato, qui nasci non possent sine peccato.
18. 23. For surely God could have taken on a man from elsewhere, in whom he might be the Mediator of God and men (1 Tim 2:5), not from the race of that Adam who by his sin bound the human race; (See Rom 5:12) just as he created that very first man whom he created, not from the race of anyone. He could, then, either thus, or in any other way he wished, create one other by whom the conqueror of the former might be overcome: but he judged it better both to take on a man from the very race that had been overcome, through whom he might overcome the enemy of the human race; and yet from a virgin, whose conceiving the spirit, not the flesh, faith, not lust, went before. (See Luke 1:26–38) Nor was there present the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the rest are sown and conceived who draw original sin: but, with this utterly removed, holy virginity was made fruitful by believing, not by lying together; so that what was born from the offspring of the first man should draw only the origin of the race, not also of the crime. For there was born a nature not vitiated by the contagion of the transgression, but the sole medicine of all such vices. There was born, I say, a man having no sin, and going to have no sin at all, through whom should be reborn, to be freed from sin, those who could not be born without sin.
deTrin.13.18.23Quamvis enim carnali concupiscentia, quae inest genitalibus membris, bene utatur castitas coniugalis; habet tamen motus non voluntarios, quibus ostendit vel nullam se in paradiso ante peccatum esse potuisse, vel non talem fuisse si fuit, ut aliquando resisteret voluntati. Nunc autem illam talem esse sentimus, ut repugnans legi mentis, etiam si nulla est causa generandi, stimulos ingerat coeundi: ubi si ei ceditur, peccando satietur; si non ceditur, dissentiendo frenetur: quae duo aliena fuisse a paradiso ante peccatum, dubitare quis possit? Nam neque illa honestas faciebat aliquid indecorum, nec illa felicitas patiebatur aliquid impacatum.
For although conjugal chastity makes good use of the carnal concupiscence which is in the genital members, yet it has involuntary motions, by which it shows either that it could have been none at all in paradise before sin, or that, if it was, it was not such as sometimes to resist the will. But now we perceive it to be such that, fighting against the law of the mind, even if there is no cause of begetting, it brings on the goads of coupling: where, if it is yielded to, it is sated by sinning; if it is not yielded to, it is bridled by dissenting—which two things, who could doubt, were foreign to paradise before sin? For neither did that honorableness do anything unseemly, nor did that happiness suffer anything unquiet.
deTrin.13.18.23Oportebat itaque ut ista carnalis concupiscentia nulla ibi esset omnino, quando concipiebatur Virginis partus, in quo nihil dignum morte fuerat inventurus, et eum tamen occisurus auctor mortis, auctoris vitae morte vincendus: victor primi Adam et tenens genus humanum, victus a secundo Adam et amittens genus christianum, liberatum ex humano genere ab humano crimine, per eum qui non erat in crimine, quamvis esset ex genere; ut deceptor ille ab eo vinceretur genere, quod vicerat crimine.
It was fitting, therefore, that this carnal concupiscence should be there none at all, when the offspring of the Virgin was conceived, in whom the author of death was going to find nothing worthy of death, and yet was going to kill him—to be overcome by the death of the author of life (Acts 3:15): the conqueror of the first Adam and holder of the human race, conquered by the second Adam and losing the Christian race, freed out of the human race from the human crime, through him who was not in the crime, although he was of the race; so that that deceiver should be overcome by him from that race which he had overcome by the crime.
deTrin.13.18.23Et hoc ita gestum est, ut homo non extollatur; sed qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur. Qui enim victus est, homo tantum erat; et ideo victus est, quia superbe deus esse cupiebat: qui autem vicit, et homo erat et Deus; et ideo sic vicit natus ex virgine, quia Deus humiliter, non quomodo alios sanctos, regebat illum hominem, sed gerebat.
And this was so done that man might not be exalted; but he who glories, let him glory in the Lord (1 Cor 1:31; 2 Cor 10:17). For he who was overcome was only man; and therefore he was overcome, because he proudly desired to be a god: but he who overcame was both man and God; and therefore, born of a virgin, he overcame in this way, because God humbly ruled that man—not as he rules the other saints, but bore him.
deTrin.13.18.23Haec tanta Dei dona, et si qua alia sunt, quae de hac re nobis et quaerere nunc et disserere longum est, nisi Verbum caro (Cf. John 1:14) fieret, nulla essent.
These so great gifts of God, and whatever others there are which it would be long now to seek out and discuss concerning this matter, would be none at all, unless the Word became flesh (See John 1:14).
deTrin.13.18.23C
deTrin.13.18.23
19. 24. Haec autem omnia quae pro nobis Verbum caro factum temporaliter et localiter fecit et pertulit, secundum distinctionem quam demonstrare suscepimus, ad scientiam pertinent, non ad sapientiam. (Cf. 1 Cor 12:8; Col 2:3) Quod autem Verbum est sine tempore et sine loco, est Patri coaeternum et ubique totum; Cf. Augustine, Confessions 1.3.3; On Free Choice of the Will 2.14.37; The Catholic Way of Life 1.11.19; Homilies on the Gospel of John 1.8.30; 36.6.16; Answer to the Letter of Mani Known as “The Foundation” 15.20; Ambrose, De Fide 1.16.106; Jerome, Ephesians 1.2.13–14. de quo si quisquam potest, quantum potest, veracem proferre sermonem, sermo ille erit sapientiae: (Cf. 1 Cor 12:8) ac per hoc Verbum caro factum, quod est Christus Iesus, et sapientiae thesauros habet et scientiae. (Cf. John 1:14; Col 2:2–3)
19. 24. But all these things which, for us, the Word made flesh did and endured in time and in place, according to the distinction we have undertaken to demonstrate, pertain to knowledge, not to wisdom. (See 1 Cor 12:8; Col 2:3) But inasmuch as he is the Word without time and without place, he is coeternal with the Father and wholly everywhere; See Augustine, Confessions 1.3.3; On Free Will 2.14.37; The Catholic Way of Life 1.11.19; Homilies on the Gospel of John 1.8.30; 36.6.16; Answer to the Letter of Mani Known as "The Foundation" 15.20; Ambrose, De Fide 1.16.106; Jerome, Ephesians 1.2.13–14. of whom, if anyone can, so far as he can, bring forth a truthful discourse, that discourse will be the utterance of wisdom: (See 1 Cor 12:8) and through this the Word made flesh, which is Christ Jesus, has both the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge. (See John 1:14; Col 2:2–3)
deTrin.13.19.24Nam scribens Apostolus ad Colossenses: volo enim vos scire, inquit, quantum certamen habeam pro vobis, et pro iis qui sunt Laodiciae, et quicumque non viderunt faciem meam in carne; ut consolentur corda eorum, copulati in caritate et in omnibus divitiis plenitudinis intellectus, ad cognoscendum mysterium Dei, quod est Christus Iesus, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. Quatenus noverat Apostolus thesauros istos, quantum eorum penetraverat, et in eis ad quanta pervenerat, quis potest nosse?
For the Apostle, writing to the Colossians, says: for I want you to know what a struggle I have for you, and for those who are at Laodicea, and for whoever have not seen my face in the flesh; that their hearts may be comforted, being knit together in love and in all the riches of the fullness of understanding, unto the knowledge of the mystery of God, which is Christ Jesus, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col 2:1–3). To what extent the Apostle knew these treasures, how much of them he had penetrated, and to what great things in them he had attained, who can know?
deTrin.13.19.24Ego tamen secundum id quod scriptum est, unicuique autem nostrum datur manifestatio Spiritus ad utilitatem: alii quidem datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eumdem Spiritum, si ita inter se distant haec duo, ut sapientia divinis, scientia humanis attributa sit rebus, utrumque agnosco in Christo, et mecum omnis eius fidelis. Et cum lego, Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis; in Verbo intellego verum Dei Filium, (Cf. 2 Cor 1:19) in carne agnosco verum hominis filium, (Cf. Dan 7:13; Matt 9:6; Mark 2:10; Luke 5:24; John 5:27) et utrumque simul in unam personam Dei et hominis ineffabili gratiae largitate coniunctum. Propter quod sequitur et dicit, et vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Si gratiam referamus ad scientiam, veritatem ad sapientiam, (Cf. 1 Cor 12:8; Col 2:3) puto nos ab illa duarum istarum rerum distinctione, quam commendavimus, non abhorrere.
I, however, according to what is written, but to each one of us is given the manifestation of the Spirit for profit: to one indeed is given through the Spirit the utterance of wisdom, to another the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit (1 Cor 12:7–8), if these two are so far apart that wisdom is attributed to divine things and knowledge to human, recognize both in Christ, and so does, with me, every faithful one of his. And when I read, the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (John 1:14), in the Word I understand the true Son of God, (See 2 Cor 1:19) in the flesh I recognize the true son of man, (See Dan 7:13; Matt 9:6; Mark 2:10; Luke 5:24; John 5:27) and both together joined into one person of God and man by the ineffable bounty of grace. On account of which it follows and says, and we saw his glory, glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth (John 1:14). If we refer grace to knowledge, truth to wisdom, (See 1 Cor 12:8; Col 2:3) I think we do not depart from that distinction of these two things which we have commended.
deTrin.13.19.24In rebus enim per tempus ortis, illa summa gratia est, quod homo in unitate personae coniunctus est Deo: in rebus vero aeternis Cf. Plato, Timaeus 29c. summa veritas recte tribuitur Dei Verbo. Quod vero idem ipse est unigenitus a Patre plenus gratiae et veritatis, (Cf. John 1:14) id actum est ut idem ipse sit in rebus pro nobis temporaliter gestis, cui per eamdem fidem mundamur, ut eum stabiliter contemplemur in rebus aeternis. Illi autem praecipui gentium philosophi, qui invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspicere potuerunt, (Cf. Rom 1:20) tamen quia sine Mediatore, id est, sine homine Christo philosophati sunt, quem nec venturum prophetis, nec venisse apostolis crediderunt, veritatem detinuerunt, sicut de illis dictum est, in iniquitate.
For among things that arose in time, this is the highest grace, that man was joined to God in unity of person: but among eternal things See Plato, Timaeus 29c. the highest truth is rightly attributed to the Word of God. But that the same one is the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth (See John 1:14)—this was brought about so that the same one should be, in the things done for us in time, he by whom, through that same faith, we are cleansed, that we may steadfastly contemplate him in eternal things. But those foremost philosophers of the nations, who were able to behold the invisible things of God, understood through the things that were made (See Rom 1:20), yet, because they philosophized without the Mediator, that is, without the man Christ—whom they neither believed would come, with the prophets, nor had come, with the apostles—held the truth, as was said of them, in iniquity (Rom 1:18).
deTrin.13.19.24Non potuerunt enim in his rerum infimis constituti, nisi quaerere aliqua media per quae ad illa quae intellexerant sublimia pervenirent: atque ita in deceptores daemones inciderunt, per quos factum est ut immutarent gloriam incorruptibilis Dei, in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium. In talibus enim formis etiam idola instituerunt, sive coluerunt. (Cf. Rom 1:25)
For, set among these lowest things, they could not but seek certain means by which they might arrive at those sublime things which they had understood: and so they fell in with deceiving demons, through whom it came about that they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of an image of corruptible man and of birds and of four-footed beasts and of serpents (Rom 1:23). For in such forms they both set up and worshiped idols. (See Rom 1:25)
deTrin.13.19.24Scientia ergo nostra Christus est, sapientia quoque nostra idem Christus est. (Cf. 1 Cor 12:8; Col 2:3) Ipse nobis fidem de rebus temporalibus inserit, ipse de sempiternis exhibet veritatem. Per ipsum pergimus ad ipsum, tendimus per scientiam ad sapientiam: ab uno tamen eodemque Christo non recedimus, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. Sed nunc de scientia loquimur, post de sapientia, quantum ipse donaverit, locuturi. Nec ista duo sic accipiamus, quasi non liceat dicere, vel istam sapientiam quae in rebus humanis est, vel illam scientiam quae in divinis. Loquendi enim latiore consuetudine, utraque sapientia, utraque scientia dici potest. Nullo modo tamen scriptum esset apud Apostolum, alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae; nisi et proprie singulis nominibus haec singula vocarentur, de quorum distinctione nunc agimus.
Our knowledge, therefore, is Christ, and our wisdom too is the same Christ. (See 1 Cor 12:8; Col 2:3) He himself implants in us faith concerning temporal things, he himself exhibits the truth concerning everlasting things. Through him we go on to him, we tend through knowledge to wisdom: yet from the one and same Christ we do not depart, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col 2:3). But now we speak of knowledge, and afterward we shall speak of wisdom, as far as he himself shall grant. Nor should we so take these two as though it were not allowed to call either that wisdom which is in human things, or that knowledge which is in divine things. For by a broader usage of speaking, both can be called wisdom, both knowledge. Yet in no way would it have been written in the Apostle, to one is given the utterance of wisdom, to another the utterance of knowledge (1 Cor 12:8), unless these single things were also properly called by their single names, of whose distinction we now treat.
deTrin.13.19.2420. 25. Iam itaque videamus quid sermo iste prolixus effecerit, quid collegerit, quo pervenerit. Beatos esse se velle, Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus (in Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Philosophers 10); Cicero, Hortensius, exord., fragm. 36. omnium hominum est: nec tamen omnium est fides, qua cor mundante ad beatitudinem pervenitur. Ita fit ut per istam quam non omnes volunt, ad illam tendendum sit quam nemo potest esse qui nolit. Beatos esse se velle, omnes in corde suo vident, tantaque est in hac re naturae humanae conspiratio, ut non fallatur homo qui hoc ex animo suo de animo conicit alieno; denique omnes id velle nos novimus.
20. 25. Let us now, then, see what this lengthy discourse has accomplished, what it has gathered, where it has arrived. To wish to be blessed Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus (in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 10); Cicero, Hortensius, exord., fragm. 36. belongs to all men: yet faith—by which, with the heart cleansed, blessedness is reached—does not belong to all. So it comes about that through that faith which not all will, one must tend to that blessedness which there can be no one who does not will. To wish to be blessed, all see in their own heart; and so great is the agreement of human nature in this matter, that the man is not deceived who, from his own mind, conjectures this of another's mind; in short, we know that all will it.
deTrin.13.20.25Multi vero immortales se esse posse desperant, cum id quod omnes volunt, id est beatus, nullus esse aliter possit; volunt tamen etiam immortales esse, si possent: sed non credendo quod possint, non ita vivunt ut possint. Necessaria ergo est fides ut beatitudinem consequamur, omnibus humanae naturae bonis, id est, et animi et corporis. Hanc autem fidem in Christo esse definitam, qui in carne resurrexit a mortuis, non moriturus ulterius; (Cf. Rom 6:9) nec nisi per illum quemquam liberari a diaboli dominatu, per remissionem peccatorum: in cuius diaboli partibus necesse est miseram esse vitam, eamdemque perpetuam, quae mors est potius dicenda quam vita, eadem fides habet. De qua et in hoc libro, sicut potui, pro spatio temporis disputavi, cum iam et in quarto libro huius operis multa de hac re dixerim; sed ibi propter aliud, hic propter aliud: ibi scilicet ut ostenderem cur et quomodo Christus in plenitudine temporis a Patre sit missus, (Cf. Gal 4:4) propter eos qui dicunt, eum qui misit, et eum qui missus est, aequales natura esse non posse; hic autem, ad distinguendam activam scientiam a contemplativa sapientia. (Cf. 1 Cor 12:8; Col 2:3)
But many despair of being able to be immortal, although that which all will—that is, to be blessed—none can be otherwise; yet they would will to be immortal too, if they could: but by not believing that they can, they do not so live that they can. Faith, therefore, is necessary that we may attain blessedness in all the goods of human nature, that is, both of the mind and of the body. But that this faith is fixed in Christ, who in the flesh rose from the dead, to die no more (See Rom 6:9); and that no one is freed from the dominion of the devil except through him, through the remission of sins; and that in the devil's party the life must be wretched, and that same life perpetual—which is rather to be called death than life—this same faith holds. Of which, in this book too, I have discussed, as I could, according to the span of time, since I have already said much about this matter in the fourth book of this work; but there for one purpose, here for another: there, namely, to show why and how Christ was sent by the Father in the fullness of time, (See Gal 4:4) for the sake of those who say that he who sent and he who was sent cannot be equal in nature; but here, to distinguish active knowledge from contemplative wisdom. (See 1 Cor 12:8; Col 2:3)
deTrin.13.20.2520. 26. Placuit quippe velut gradatim ascendentibus in utraque requirere apud interiorem hominem quamdam sui cuiusque generis trinitatem, sicut prius apud exteriorem quaesivimus; ut ad illam Trinitatem quae Deus est, pro nostro modulo, si tamen vel hoc possumus, saltem in aenigmate et per speculum contuendam (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) exercitatiore in his inferioribus rebus mente veniamus.
20. 26. For it seemed good, as we ascend by steps as it were in both, to seek out in the inner man a certain trinity, each of its own kind, just as we first sought one in the outer man; that to that Trinity which is God we may, according to our small measure—if indeed we can do even this—come, to behold it at least in an enigma and through a mirror (See 1 Cor 13:12), with a mind more practiced in these lower things.
deTrin.13.20.26Huius igitur verba fidei quisquis in solis vocibus memoriae commendaverit, nesciens quid significent; sicut solent qui graece nesciunt, graeca verba tenere memoriter, vel latina similiter, vel cuiusque alterius linguae, qui eius ignari sunt: nonne habent PL: habet, “he has,” which does tidy up Augustine’s syntax. quamdam in suo animo trinitatem, quia et in memoria sunt illi verborum soni, etiam quando inde non cogitat; et inde formatur acies recordationis eius, quando de his cogitat; et voluntas recordantis atque cogitantis utrumque coniungit?
Whoever, therefore, commits the words of this faith to memory in their sounds alone, not knowing what they signify—as those who do not know Greek are wont to hold Greek words by heart, or Latin words likewise, or those of any other language of which they are ignorant—do they not have PL: habet, "he has," which does tidy up Augustine's syntax. a certain trinity in their mind, since the sounds of the words are in the memory even when one is not thinking of them; and from them the gaze of his recollection is formed, when he thinks of them; and the will of the one recollecting and thinking joins the two?
deTrin.13.20.26Nullo modo tamen dixerimus istum, cum hoc agit, secundum trinitatem interioris hominis agere, sed potius exterioris: quia id solum meminit, et quando vult, quantum vult intuetur, quod ad sensum corporis pertinet, qui vocatur auditus, nec aliud quam corporalium rerum, id est sonorum, tali cogitatione imagines versat.
Yet in no way would we say that this man, when he does this, acts according to the trinity of the inner man, but rather of the outer: because he remembers only that, and, when he wills, beholds as much as he wills, which pertains to the sense of the body that is called hearing, and in such thinking he turns over nothing other than the images of corporeal things, that is, of sounds.
deTrin.13.20.26Si autem quod verba illa significant, teneat et recolat; iam quidem aliquid interioris hominis agit: sed nondum dicendus vel putandus est vivere secundum interioris hominis trinitatem, si ea non diligat quae ibi praedicantur, praecipiuntur, promittuntur. Potest enim etiam ad hoc tenere atque cogitare, ut falsa esse existimans, conetur etiam redarguere. Voluntas ergo illa, quae ibi coniungit ea quae memoria tenebantur, et ea quae inde in acie cogitationis impressa sunt, implet quidem aliquam trinitatem, cum ipsa sit tertia: sed non secundum eam vivitur, quando illa quae cogitantur velut falsa non placent.
But if he holds and recalls what those words signify, he now indeed does something of the inner man: but he is not yet to be said or thought to live according to the trinity of the inner man, if he does not love those things which are there proclaimed, commanded, promised. For he can hold and think of them even to this end, that, esteeming them to be false, he may try even to refute them. That will, therefore, which there joins the things that were held in the memory and the things which from them are impressed on the gaze of thought, does indeed make up a certain trinity, since it is itself the third: but one does not live according to it, when the things that are thought of, as it were false, do not please.
deTrin.13.20.26Cum autem vera esse creduntur, et quae ibi diligenda sunt diliguntur, iam secundum trinitatem interioris hominis vivitur: secundum hoc enim vivit quisque quod diligit. Quomodo autem diligantur quae nesciuntur, sed tantum creduntur? Iam quaestio ista tractata est in superioribus libris, As a matter of fact, only in 8.3.3–8 and 8.5.13–14. In book 9 and 10 Augustine proves that you cannot love what you do not know, without bringing in faith. See 9.3, 10.1–4. et inventum neminem diligere quod penitus ignorat; ex iis autem quae nota sunt diligi, quando diligi dicuntur ignota.
But when they are believed to be true, and the things that are there to be loved are loved, one now lives according to the trinity of the inner man: for each one lives according to what he loves. But how are things loved which are not known, but only believed? This question has already been treated in the earlier books, As a matter of fact, only in 8.3.3–8 and 8.5.13–14. In books 9 and 10 Augustine proves that you cannot love what you do not know, without bringing in faith. See 9.3, 10.1–4. and it was found that no one loves what he is utterly ignorant of; but that things are loved out of those which are known, when unknown things are said to be loved.
deTrin.13.20.26Nunc librum istum ita claudimus, ut admoneamus quod iustus ex fide vivit; (Cf. Hab 2:4; Rom 1:17; Gal 3:11; Heb 10:38) quae fides per dilectionem operatur, ita ut virtutes quoque ipsae quibus prudenter, fortiter, temperanter, iusteque vivitur, omnes ad eamdem referantur fidem: non enim aliter poterunt verae esse virtutes. Quae tamen in hac vita non valent tantum, ut aliquando non sit hic necessaria qualiumcumque remissio peccatorum; quae non fit nisi per eum qui sanguine suo vicit principem peccatorum. Ex hac fide et tali vita quaecumque notiones sunt in animo fidelis hominis, cum memoria continentur, et recordatione inspiciuntur, et voluntati placent, reddunt quamdam sui generis trinitatem. Sed imago Dei, de qua in eius adiutorio post loquemur, nondum in ipsa est: quod tunc melius apparebit, cum demonstratum fuerit ubi sit: quod in futuro volumine lector exspectet.
Now we so close this book as to admonish that the just man lives by faith (See Hab 2:4; Rom 1:17; Gal 3:11; Heb 10:38); which faith works through love (Gal 5:6), in such a way that the very virtues too, by which one lives prudently, bravely, temperately, and justly, are all referred to that same faith: for otherwise they will not be able to be true virtues. Which virtues nevertheless avail not so much in this life that there is not sometimes need here for the remission of sins of whatever kind; which is not done except through him who by his blood overcame the prince of sins. From this faith and such a life, whatever notions are in the mind of a faithful man, when they are contained in the memory, and inspected by recollection, and please the will, render a certain trinity of their own kind. But the image of God, of which we shall speak afterward with his help, is not yet in it: which will then appear better, when it shall have been shown where it is; for which let the reader wait in a future volume.
deTrin.13.20.26Bk. 14The Worship of God Is WisdomDei cultus sapientia.
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deTrin.13.20.26
1. 1. Nunc de sapientia nobis est disserendum: non de illa Dei, quae procul dubio Deus est; nam Sapientia Dei Filius eius unigenitus dicitur: (Cf. Sir 24:5; 1 Cor 1:24) sed loquemur de hominis sapientia, vera tamen quae secundum Deum est, et verus ac praecipuus cultus eius est, quae uno nomine θεοσέβεια graece appellatur. Quod nomen nostri, sicut iam commemoravimus, volentes et ipsi uno nomine interpretari, pietatem dixerunt, cum pietas apud Graecos εὐσέβεια usitatius nuncupetur: θεοσέβεια vero quia uno verbo perfecte non potest, melius duobus interpretatur, ut dicatur potius Dei cultus. Hanc esse hominis sapientiam, quod et in duodecimo huius operis volumine iam posuimus, Cf. On the Trinity 12.14.22. Scripturae Sanctae auctoritate monstratur, in libro Dei servi Iob, ubi legitur Dei Sapientiam dixisse homini, ecce pietas est sapientia; abstinere autem a malis, scientia;
1. 1. Now we must discuss wisdom: not that wisdom of God, which beyond doubt is God—for the Wisdom of God is called his only-begotten Son (See Sir 24:5; 1 Cor 1:24)—but we shall speak of the wisdom of man, true wisdom nevertheless, which is according to God, and is his true and chief worship, which by one name is called in Greek theosebeia. This name our own writers, as we have already mentioned, wishing themselves too to render by one name, called "piety," although piety among the Greeks is more usually named eusebeia; but theosebeia, since it cannot be perfectly rendered by one word, is better rendered by two, so that it is rather called "the worship of God." That this is the wisdom of man—which we have already set down in the twelfth volume of this work See On the Trinity 12.14.22.—is shown by the authority of Holy Scripture, in the book of God's servant Job, where it is read that the Wisdom of God said to man, behold, piety is wisdom; but to abstain from evils is knowledge (Job 28:28);
deTrin.14.1.1sive etiam, ut non nulli de graeco ἐπιστήμη interpretati sunt, disciplina quae utique a discendo nomen accepit, unde et scientia dici potest. Ad hoc enim quaeque res discitur, ut sciatur. Cf. Augustine, Soliloquies 2.11.20. Quamvis alia notione, in iis quae pro peccatis suis mala quisque patitur ut corrigatur, dici soleat disciplina. Unde illud est in Epistola ad Hebraeos: quis enim est filius, cui non det disciplinam pater eius? et illud evidentius in eadem: omnis enim ad tempus disciplina non gaudii videtur esse, sed tristitiae: postea vero fructum pacificum iis qui per eam certarunt, reddet iustitiae.
or even, as some have rendered from the Greek episteme, discipline—which surely received its name from learning (discere), whence it can also be called knowledge. For to this end each thing is learned, that it may be known. See Augustine, Soliloquies 2.11.20. Although, in another notion, in the evils which each one suffers for his sins that he may be corrected, it is wont to be called discipline. Whence comes that passage in the Letter to the Hebrews: for what son is there to whom his father does not give discipline (Heb 12:7)? and that more evident one in the same: for all discipline for the time seems to be not of joy, but of sadness: but afterward it will render the peaceable fruit of justice to those who have contended through it (Heb 12:11).
deTrin.14.1.1Deus ergo ipse summa Sapientia, cultus autem Dei sapientia est hominis, de qua nunc loquimur. Nam sapientia huius mundi stultitia est apud Deum. Secundum hanc itaque sapientiam, quae Dei cultus est, (Cf. Job 28:28) ait Sancta Scriptura, multitudo sapientium sanitas est orbis terrarum.
God himself, therefore, is the highest Wisdom; but the worship of God is the wisdom of man, of which we now speak. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God (1 Cor 3:19). According to this wisdom, then, which is the worship of God, (See Job 28:28) the Holy Scripture says, a multitude of the wise is the health of the world (Wis 6:24 (6:26)).
deTrin.14.1.11. 2. Sed si de sapientia disputare sapientium est, Cf. Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 100; Augustine, Against the Academics 3.14.31. quid agemus? Numquidnam profiteri audebimus sapientiam, ne sit nostra de illa impudens disputatio? Nonne terrebimur exemplo Pythagorae? qui cum ausus non fuisset sapientem profiteri, philosophum potius, id est amatorem sapientiae se esse respondit: a quo id nomen exortum ita deinceps posteris placuit, ut quantalibet de rebus ad sapientiam pertinentibus doctrina quisque vel sibi vel aliis videretur excellere, non nisi philosophus vocaretur. Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 5.3.8; Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Philosophers 1.12.
1. 2. But if to discuss wisdom belongs to the wise, See Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 100; Augustine, Against the Skeptics 3.14.31. what shall we do? Shall we dare to profess wisdom, lest our discussion of it be impudent? Shall we not be deterred by the example of Pythagoras? who, when he had not dared to profess himself wise, answered rather that he was a philosopher, that is, a lover of wisdom: from whom that name arose, and so pleased posterity thereafter, that however great a doctrine anyone might seem, to himself or to others, to excel in concerning matters pertaining to wisdom, he was called nothing but a philosopher. See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 5.3.8; Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 1.12.
deTrin.14.1.2An ideo sapientem profiteri talium hominum nullus audebat, quia sine ullo peccato putabant esse sapientem? Hoc autem nostra Scriptura non dicit, quae dicit, argue sapientem, et amabit te. Profecto enim iudicat habere peccatum, quem censet arguendum. Sed ego nec sic quidem sapientem me audeo profiteri: satis est mihi, quod etiam ipsi negare non possunt, esse etiam philosophi, id est amatoris sapientiae, de sapientia disputare. Non enim hoc illi facere destiterunt, qui se amatores sapientiae potius quam sapientes esse professi sunt.
Or was it for this reason that none of such men dared to profess himself wise, that they thought the wise man to be without any sin? But our Scripture does not say this, which says, rebuke a wise man, and he will love you (Prov 9:8). For surely it judges him to have sin whom it deems to be in need of rebuke. But I, even so, do not dare to profess myself wise: it is enough for me—what even they themselves cannot deny—that it belongs even to a philosopher, that is, to a lover of wisdom, to discuss wisdom. For they did not cease to do this, who professed themselves to be lovers of wisdom rather than wise.
deTrin.14.1.21. 3. Disputantes autem de sapientia, definierunt eam dicentes: sapientia est rerum humanarum divinarumque scientia. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 2.12.37; De Officiis 1.43.153; 2.2.5; Tusculanae Disputationes 4.26.57; 5.3.7; De Oratore 1.49.212; Chrysippus, Fragments 35; Seneca, Epistle 84.9; cf. Augustine, Against the Academics 1.6.16; 1.8.23; Jerome, Ephesians 1.1.9. Unde ego quoque in libro superiore utrarumque rerum cognitionem, id est divinarum atque humanarum, et sapientiam et scientiam dici posse non tacui. Cf. On the Trinity 12.14.22. Verum secundum hanc distinctionem qua dixit Apostolus, alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae; ista definitio dividenda est, ut rerum divinarum scientia proprie sapientia nuncupetur, humanarum autem proprie scientiae nomen obtineat: de qua volumine tertio decimo disputavi, non utique quidquid sciri ab homine potest in rebus humanis, ubi plurimum supervacaneae vanitatis et noxiae curiositatis est, huic scientiae tribuens, sed illud tantummodo quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur: qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide plurimum.
1. 3. But discussing wisdom, they defined it, saying: wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 2.12.37; De Officiis 1.43.153; 2.2.5; Tusculanae Disputationes 4.26.57; 5.3.7; De Oratore 1.49.212; Chrysippus, Fragments 35; Seneca, Epistle 84.9; see Augustine, Against the Skeptics 1.6.16; 1.8.23; Jerome, Ephesians 1.1.9.. Whence I too, in the previous book, did not keep silent that the cognition of both kinds of things, that is, of divine and human things, can be called both wisdom and knowledge. See On the Trinity 12.14.22. But according to that distinction by which the Apostle said, to one is given the utterance of wisdom, to another the utterance of knowledge (1 Cor 12:8), this definition is to be divided, so that the knowledge of divine things is properly called wisdom, but that of human things properly holds the name of knowledge: of which I discussed in the thirteenth volume, attributing to this knowledge not, indeed, whatever can be known by man in human things—where there is very much superfluous vanity and harmful curiosity—but only that by which the most wholesome faith, which leads to true blessedness, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened: with which knowledge very many of the faithful are not strong, although they are very strong in faith itself.
deTrin.14.1.3Aliud est enim scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam, quae non nisi aeterna est: aliud autem, scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur, et contra impios defendatur, Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.18.162. quam proprio appellare vocabulo scientiam videtur Apostolus. (Cf. 1 Cor 12:8; Col 2:3) De qua prius cum loquerer, ipsam praecipue fidem commendare curavi, a temporalibus aeterna breviter ante distinguens, atque ibi de temporalibus disserens: aeterna vero in hunc librum differens, Cf. On the Trinity 13.1.1–19.24. etiam de rebus aeternis fidem temporalem quidem, et temporaliter in credentium cordibus habitare, necessariam tamen propter adipiscenda ipsa aeterna esse monstravi. Cf. On the Trinity 13.7.10–20.25.
For it is one thing to know only what a man ought to believe for the sake of attaining the blessed life, which is none other than eternal: but another to know in what way this very thing both aids the pious and is defended against the impious, See Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.18.162. which the Apostle seems to call by the proper word "knowledge." (See 1 Cor 12:8; Col 2:3) Of which, when I spoke before, I took care especially to commend faith itself, briefly distinguishing eternal things from temporal beforehand, and there discussing temporal things; but deferring eternal things to this book, See On the Trinity 13.1.1–19.24. I showed that, even concerning eternal things, a temporal faith—dwelling temporally in the hearts of believers—is nevertheless necessary for the attaining of those eternal things themselves. See On the Trinity 13.7.10–20.25.
deTrin.14.1.3Fidem quoque de temporalibus rebus, quas pro nobis aeternus fecit, et passus est in homine, quem temporaliter gessit, atque ad aeterna provexit, ad eamdem aeternorum adeptionem prodesse disserui: virtutesque ipsas, quibus in hac temporali mortalitate prudenter, fortiter, temperanter, et iuste vivitur, nisi ad eamdem, licet temporalem fidem, quae tamen ad aeterna perducit, referantur, veras non esse virtutes.
I also discussed that faith concerning temporal things—which the Eternal One did and suffered for us in the man whom he bore in time, and brought forward to eternal things—is profitable for the attaining of those same eternal things: and that the virtues themselves, by which one lives prudently, bravely, temperately, and justly in this temporal mortality, unless they are referred to that same faith, temporal though it be, which nevertheless leads to eternal things, are not true virtues.
deTrin.14.1.32. 4. Quapropter, quoniam sicut scriptum est, quamdiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; per fidem enim ambulamus, non per speciem; profecto quamdiu iustus ex fide vivit, (Cf. Rom 1:17; Hab 2:4; Gal 3:11; Heb 10:38) quamvis secundum hominem interiorem vivat, (Cf. Rom 7:22) licet per eamdem temporalem fidem ad veritatem nitatur et tendat aeternam, PL: nitatur et tendat ad aeterna, “strive by this . . . faith to the truth and struggle on to things eternal.” tamen in eiusdem fidei temporalis retentione, contemplatione, dilectione, nondum talis est trinitas, ut Dei iam imago dicenda sit: ne in rebus temporalibus constituta videatur, quae constituenda est in aeternis.
2. 4. Wherefore, since, as it is written, as long as we are in the body, we are away from the Lord; for we walk by faith, not by sight (2 Cor 5:6–7), surely, as long as the just man lives by faith (See Rom 1:17; Hab 2:4; Gal 3:11; Heb 10:38), although he lives according to the inner man, (See Rom 7:22) and though by that same temporal faith he strives and tends toward the eternal truth, PL: nitatur et tendat ad aeterna, "strive by this . . . faith to the truth and struggle on to things eternal." yet in the retaining, the contemplation, the love of that same temporal faith, there is not yet such a trinity as is to be called the image of God: lest it should seem to be set among temporal things, which is to be set among eternal things.
deTrin.14.2.4Mens quippe humana cum fidem suam videt, qua credit quod non videt, non aliquid sempiternum videt. Non enim semper hoc erit, quod utique non erit, quando ista peregrinatione finita, qua peregrinamur a Domino, ut per fidem ambulare necesse sit, species illa succedet, per quam videbimus facie ad faciem: (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) sicut modo non videntes, tamen quia credimus, videre merebimur, atque ad speciem nos per fidem perductos esse gaudebimus. (Cf. 2 Cor 5:6–7) Neque enim iam fides erit, qua credantur quae non videntur; sed species, qua videantur quae credebantur.
For the human mind, when it sees its own faith, by which it believes what it does not see, sees nothing everlasting. For this will not be forever, which surely will not be when, this pilgrimage being ended in which we are away from the Lord, so that we must needs walk by faith, that sight will succeed by which we shall see face to face (See 1 Cor 13:12): just as now, not seeing, yet because we believe, we shall deserve to see, and we shall rejoice that we have been led through faith to sight. (See 2 Cor 5:6–7) For it will no longer be faith, by which things not seen are believed; but sight, by which the things that were believed are seen.
deTrin.14.2.4Tunc ergo etsi vitae huius mortalis transactae meminerimus, et credidisse nos aliquando quae non videbamus, memoriter recoluerimus, in praeteritis atque transactis deputabitur fides ista, non in praesentibus rebus semperque manentibus: ac per hoc etiam trinitas ista quae nunc in eiusdem fidei praesentis ac manentis memoria, contuitu, dilectione consistit, tunc transacta et praeterita reperietur esse, non permanens.
Then, therefore, even if we remember this mortal life now passed, and recall by memory that we once believed what we did not see, this faith will be reckoned among things past and gone, not among present things ever remaining: and through this, even that trinity which now consists in the memory, beholding, and love of that same present and remaining faith, will then be found to be passed and gone, not abiding.
deTrin.14.2.4Ex quo colligitur, ut si iam imago Dei est ista trinitas, etiam ipsa non in eis quae semper sunt, sed in rebus sit habenda transeuntibus.
From which it is gathered that, if this trinity is already the image of God, then it too must be held to be not among the things that are always, but among things that pass away.
deTrin.14.2.43. 4. Absit autem ut cum animae natura sit immortalis, nec ab initio quo creata est, unquam deinceps esse desistat, id quo nihil melius habet, non cum eius immortalitate perduret. Quid vero melius in eius natura creatum est, quam quod ad sui Creatoris imaginem facta est? Gen 1:27; cf. Origen, Homilies on Genesis 1.3; 13.4; Ambrose, Hexaemeron 6.7.40–8.45. Non igitur in fidei retentione, contemplatione, dilectione, quae non erit semper, sed in eo quod semper erit, invenienda est quam dici oporteat imaginem Dei.
3. 4. But far be it that, since the nature of the soul is immortal, and from the beginning in which it was created never thereafter ceases to be, that which it has as nothing better should not endure together with its immortality. But what better was created in its nature than that it was made to the image of its Creator? Gen 1:27; see Origen, Homilies on Genesis 1.3; 13.4; Ambrose, Hexaemeron 6.7.40–8.45. Therefore not in the retaining, the contemplation, the love of faith, which will not be forever, but in that which will be forever, is to be found what ought to be called the image of God.
deTrin.14.3.43. 5. An adhuc utrum ita se res habeat, aliquanto diligentius atque abstrusius perscrutabimur? Dici enim potest, non perire istam trinitatem, etiam cum fides ipsa transierit: quia sicut nunc eam et memoria tenemus, et cogitatione cernimus, et voluntate diligimus; ita etiam tunc cum eam nos habuisse memoria tenebimus, et recolemus, et hoc utrumque tertia voluntate iungemus, eadem trinitas permanebit. Quoniam si nullum in nobis quasi vestigium transiens reliquerit, profecto nec in memoria nostra eius aliquid habebimus quo recurramus eam praeteritam recordantes, atque id utrumque intentione tertia copulantes, et quod erat scilicet in memoria, non inde cogitantibus nobis, et quod inde cogitatione formatur. Sed qui hoc dicit, non discernit aliam nunc esse trinitatem, quando praesentem fidem tenemus, videmus, amamus in nobis; aliam tunc futuram, quando non ipsam, sed eius velut imaginarium vestigium in memoria reconditum, recordatione contuebimur, et duo haec, id est, quod erat in memoria retinentis, et quod inde imprimitur in acie recordantis, tertia voluntate iungemus.
3. 5. Or shall we still search out, somewhat more diligently and more deeply, whether the matter stands thus? For it can be said that this trinity does not perish even when faith itself has passed away: because, just as now we both hold it in memory, and discern it by thought, and love it by will, so also then, when we shall hold in memory that we had it, and shall recall it, and shall join both these by a third will, the same trinity will abide. For if it leaves in us no trace, as it were, in passing, surely we shall have nothing of it in our memory to which we may return, recalling it as past, and joining both these by a third intention—both, namely, what was in the memory while we were not thinking of it, and what is formed from it by thought. But he who says this does not distinguish that there is one trinity now, when we hold, see, love a present faith in us; and another that will be then, when we shall behold by recollection, not faith itself, but as it were an imaginary trace of it stored up in the memory, and shall join these two—that is, what was in the memory of the one retaining it, and what is impressed from it on the gaze of the one recollecting—by a third will.
deTrin.14.3.5Quod ut possit intellegi, sumamus exemplum de corporalibus rebus, de quibus in libro undecimo satis locuti sumus. Cf. On the Trinity 11.2.24. Nempe ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendentes, vel ab exterioribus ad interiora ingredientes, primam reperimus trinitatem in corpore quod videtur, et acie videntis quae cum videt, inde formatur, et in voluntatis intentione quae utrumque coniungit.
That this may be understood, let us take an example from corporeal things, of which we spoke enough in the eleventh book. See On the Trinity 11.2.24. For surely, ascending from lower things to higher, or entering from outer to inner, we first find a trinity in the body that is seen, and in the gaze of the seer which, when it sees, is formed from it, and in the intention of the will which joins the two.
deTrin.14.3.5Huic trinitati similem constituamus, cum fides quae nunc inest nobis, tamquam corpus illud in loco, ita in nostra memoria constituta est, de qua informatur cogitatio recordantis, sicut ex illo corpore acies intuentis: quibus duobus, ut trinitas impleatur, annumeratur tertia voluntas, quae fidem in memoria constitutam et quamdam eius effigiem in contuitu recordationis impressam connectit et coniungit; sicut in illa corporalis trinitate visionis, formam corporis quod videtur, et conformationem quae fit in cernentis aspectu, coniungit intentio voluntatis.
Let us set up one like this trinity, when the faith which is now in us, just as that body in its place, is so set in our memory, from which the thought of the one recollecting is informed, as the gaze of the beholder is informed from that body: to which two, that the trinity may be completed, is reckoned a third, the will, which connects and joins the faith set in the memory and a certain effigy of it impressed on the beholding of recollection; just as, in that corporeal trinity of vision, the intention of the will joins the form of the body that is seen and the conformation that comes about in the gaze of the one discerning.
deTrin.14.3.5Faciamus ergo corpus illud quod cernebatur, interisse dilapsum, nec eius remansisse aliquid in ullo loco, ad quod videndum recurrat aspectus: numquid quia imago rei corporalis iam transactae atque praeteritae remanet in memoria, unde informetur cogitantis obtutus, atque id utrumque tertia voluntate iungatur, eadem trinitas esse dicenda est, quae fuerat quando species in loco positi corporis videbatur? Non utique, sed prorsus alia: nam praeter quod illa erat extrinsecus, haec intrinsecus; illam profecto faciebat species praesentis corporis; hanc, imago praeteriti.
Let us, then, suppose that body which was discerned to have perished, fallen away, and that nothing of it remained in any place to which the gaze might return for seeing: surely, because the image of the corporeal thing now passed and gone remains in the memory, from which the look of the one thinking is informed, and both these are joined by a third will, is the same trinity to be called which there was when the appearance of the body set in its place was seen? Surely not, but altogether another: for besides the fact that the former was outside, this is inside; the former, surely, the appearance of a present body made; this, the image of a past one.
deTrin.14.3.5Sic et in hac re, de qua nunc agimus, et propter quam putavimus adhibendum illud exemplum, fides quae nunc in animo nostro est, velut illud corpus in loco, dum tenetur, aspicitur, amatur, quamdam efficit trinitatem: sed non ipsa erit, quando fides haec in animo, sicut corpus illud in loco iam non erit.
So too in this matter of which we now treat, and for the sake of which we thought that example ought to be applied: the faith which is now in our mind, like that body in its place, while it is held, beheld, loved, makes a certain trinity: but it will not be the same one, when this faith will no longer be in the mind, as that body will no longer be in its place.
deTrin.14.3.5Quae vero tunc erit, quando eam recordabimur in nobis fuisse, non esse, alia profecto erit. Hanc enim quae nunc est, facit res ipsa praesens et animo credentis affixa: at illam quae tunc erit, faciet rei praeteritae imaginatio in recordantis memoria derelicta.
But that which will be then, when we shall recall that it was in us, but is not, will surely be another. For this one, which is now, the thing itself, present and fixed to the mind of the believer, makes; but that one, which will be then, the imagining of the past thing, left behind in the memory of the one recollecting, will make.
deTrin.14.3.54. 6. Nec illa igitur trinitas, quae nunc non est, imago Dei erit; nec ista imago Dei est, quae tunc non erit: sed ea est invenienda in anima hominis, id est rationali, sive intellectuali, imago Creatoris, quae immortaliter immortalitati eius est insita.
4. 6. Neither, therefore, will that trinity, which now is not, be the image of God; nor is this one the image of God, which then will not be: but it is to be found in the soul of man, that is, the rational or intellectual soul, an image of the Creator which is implanted immortally in its immortality.
deTrin.14.4.6C
deTrin.14.4.6
Nam sicut ipsa immortalitas animae secundum quemdam modum dicitur; habet quippe et anima mortem suam, cum vita beata caret, quae vere PL: vera, “which ought to be regarded as the soul’s true life.” animae vita dicenda est; sed immortalis ideo nuncupatur, quoniam qualicumque vita, etiam cum miserrima est, numquam desinit vivere: ita quamvis ratio vel intellectus nunc in ea sit sopitus, nunc parvus, nunc magnus appareat, numquam nisi rationalis et intellectualis est anima humana; ac per hoc si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem Dei Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6; cf. Origen, Homilies on Genesis 1.3, 13.4; Ambrose, Hexaemeron 6.7.40–8.45. quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intellegendum et conspiciendum Deum potest, profecto ab initio quo esse coepit ista tam magna et mira natura, sive ita obsoleta sit haec imago, ut pene nulla sit, sive obscura atque deformis, sive clara et pulchra sit, semper est.
For just as the immortality of the soul itself is spoken of according to a certain manner—for the soul too has its own death, when it lacks the blessed life, which is to be called the soul's true PL: vera, "which ought to be regarded as the soul's true life." life; but it is named immortal because, with a life of whatever kind, even when it is most wretched, it never ceases to live—so, although reason or intellect is now dormant in it, now appears small, now great, the human soul is never anything but rational and intellectual; and through this, if it was made to the image of God Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6; see Origen, Homilies on Genesis 1.3, 13.4; Ambrose, Hexaemeron 6.7.40–8.45. according to this, that it can use reason and intellect to understand and behold God, surely from the beginning in which this so great and wonderful nature began to be, whether this image be so worn away as to be almost none, or obscure and deformed, or clear and beautiful, it always is.
deTrin.14.4.6Denique deformitatem dignitatis eius miserans divina Scriptura, quamquam, inquit, in imagine ambulat homo, tamen vane conturbatur: thesaurizat, et nescit cui congregabit ea. Non itaque vanitatem imagini Dei tribueret, nisi deformem cerneret factam. Nec tantum valere illam deformitatem, ut auferat quod imago est, satis ostendit, dicendo, quamquam in imagine ambulat homo. Quapropter ex utraque parte veraciter pronuntiari potest ista sententia, ut quemadmodum dictum est, quamquam in imagine ambulat homo, tamen vane conturbatur; ita dicatur, “quamquam vane conturbatur homo, tamen in imagine ambulat.” Quamquam enim magna natura sit, tamen vitiari potuit, quia summa non est: et quamquam vitiari potuerit, quia summa non est, tamen quia summae naturae capax est, et esse particeps potest, magna natura est.
Finally, pitying the deformity of its dignity, the divine Scripture says, although man walks in an image, yet he is troubled in vain: he heaps up treasure, and knows not for whom he gathers it (Ps 39:6 (38:7)). It would not therefore attribute vanity to the image of God, unless it discerned that it had been made deformed. And that this deformity does not avail so much as to take away the fact that it is an image, it shows well enough by saying, although man walks in an image. Wherefore this sentence can be truly pronounced from both sides, so that, as it was said, although man walks in an image, yet he is troubled in vain, so it may be said, "although man is troubled in vain, yet he walks in an image." For although it is a great nature, yet it could be vitiated, because it is not the highest: and although it could be vitiated, because it is not the highest, yet because it is capable of the highest nature, and can be a partaker of it, it is a great nature.
deTrin.14.4.6Quaeramus igitur in hac imagine Dei quamdam sui generis trinitatem, adiuvante ipso qui nos fecit ad imaginem suam. (Cf. Sir 17:1; Gen 1:27) Non enim aliter possumus haec salubriter investigare, et secundum sapientiam quae ab illo est aliquid invenire: sed ea quae in superioribus libris, et maxime in decimo, de anima humana vel mente diximus, si lectoris vel memoria teneantur atque recolantur, vel diligentia in eisdem locis in quibus conscripta sunt, recenseantur, non hic desiderabit prolixiorem de rei tantae inquisitione sermonem.
Let us, then, seek in this image of God a certain trinity of its own kind, with the help of him who made us to his image. (See Sir 17:1; Gen 1:27) For not otherwise can we wholesomely investigate these things, and find something according to the wisdom which is from him: but if the things which, in the earlier books, and especially in the tenth, we said about the human soul or mind are either held and recalled by the reader's memory, or reviewed by his diligence in the very places in which they were written down, he will not here require a more lengthy discourse on the inquiry into so great a matter.
deTrin.14.4.64. 7. Inter cetera ergo in libro decimo diximus, hominis mentem nosse semetipsam. Cf. On the Trinity 10.7.10. Nihil enim tam novit mens, quam id quod sibi praesto est: nec menti magis quidquam praesto est, quam ipsa sibi. Et alia, quantum satis visum est, adhibuimus documenta, quibus hoc certissime probaretur.
4. 7. Among other things, then, in the tenth book we said that the mind of man knows itself. See On the Trinity 10.7.10. For nothing does the mind so know as that which is present to it: nor is anything more present to the mind than itself to itself. And we brought forward other proofs, as far as seemed sufficient, by which this might be most certainly demonstrated.
deTrin.14.4.75. 7. Quid itaque dicendum est de infantis mente, ita adhuc parvuli et in tam magna demersi rerum ignorantia, ut illius mentis tenebras mens hominis quae aliquid novit exhorreat? An etiam ipsa se nosse credenda est, sed intenta nimis in eas res quas per corporis sensus tanto maiore, quanto noviore coepit delectatione sentire, non ignorare se potest, sed cogitare se non potest?
5. 7. What, then, is to be said of the mind of an infant, still so little and sunk in so great an ignorance of things, that the mind of a man who knows something shudders at the darkness of that mind? Is it too to be believed to know itself, but, too intent on those things which it has begun to perceive through the body's senses with a delight all the greater the newer it is, able not to be ignorant of itself, but unable to think of itself?
deTrin.14.5.7Quanta porro intentione in ista quae foris sunt sensibilia feratur, vel hinc solum conici potest, quod lucis huius hauriendae sic avida est, ut si quisquam minus cautus aut nesciens quid inde possit accidere, nocturnum lumen posuerit ubi iacet infans, in ea parte ad quam iacentis oculi possint retorqueri, nec cervix possit inflecti, sic eius inde non removetur aspectus, ut nonnullos ex hoc etiam strabones fieri noverimus, eam formam tenentibus oculis, quam teneris et mollibus consuetudo quodam modo infixit.
Moreover, with how great an intention it is borne toward those sensible things which are without can be conjectured from this alone, that it is so greedy to drink in this light, that if anyone less cautious, or not knowing what may thence happen, has placed a night-light where the infant lies, in that part toward which the eyes of the one lying can be turned back, and the neck cannot be bent, his gaze is so not removed from it, that we have known some to become even cross-eyed from this, the eyes holding to that form which habit has in a certain way fixed in tender and soft members.
deTrin.14.5.7Ita et in alios corporis sensus, quantum sinit illa aetas, intentione se quasi coarctant animae parvulorum, ut quidquid per carnem offendit aut allicit, hoc solum abhorreant vehementer aut appetant: sua vero interiora non cogitent, nec possint admoneri ut hoc faciant; quia nondum admonentis signa noverunt, ubi praecipuum locum verba obtinent, quae sicut alia prorsus nesciunt. Quod autem aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare, iam in eodem volumine ostendimus. Cf. On the Trinity 10.5.7.
So too toward the other senses of the body, as far as that age allows, the souls of little ones, as it were, confine themselves by intention, so that whatever offends or allures through the flesh, this alone they vehemently abhor or seek: but their own inner things they do not think of, nor can they be admonished to do this; because they do not yet know the signs of the one admonishing, where words hold the chief place, which, like other things, they utterly do not know. But that it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think of oneself, we have already shown in that same volume. See On the Trinity 10.5.7.
deTrin.14.5.75. 8. Sed hanc aetatem omittamus, quae nec interrogari potest quid in se agatur, et nos ipsi eius valde obliti sumus. Hinc tantum certos nos esse suffecerit, quod cum homo de animi sui natura cogitare potuerit, atque invenire quod verum est, alibi non inveniet, quam penes se ipsum. Inveniet autem, non quod nesciebat, sed unde non cogitabat. Quid enim scimus, si quod est in nostra mente nescimus; cum omnia quae scimus, non nisi mente scire possimus?
5. 8. But let us pass over this age, which cannot be asked what goes on within it, and of which we ourselves have greatly forgotten. Let it suffice that we are certain of this alone: that when a man has been able to think of the nature of his own mind, and to find what is true, he will find it nowhere but with his own self. But he will find, not what he did not know, but that of which he was not thinking. For what do we know, if we do not know what is in our own mind, since everything we know we cannot know except by the mind?
deTrin.14.5.86. 8. Tanta est tamen cogitationis vis, ut nec ipsa mens quodam modo se in conspectu suo ponat, nisi quando se cogitat: ac per hoc ita nihil in conspectu mentis est, nisi unde cogitatur, ut nec ipsa mens, qua cogitatur quidquid cogitatur, aliter possit esse in conspectu suo, nisi se ipsam cogitando.
6. 8. So great, nevertheless, is the power of thought, that not even the mind itself in a certain way sets itself in its own sight, except when it thinks of itself: and through this, so far is nothing in the sight of the mind except that of which it thinks, that not even the mind itself, by which is thought whatever is thought, can be otherwise in its own sight, except by thinking of itself.
deTrin.14.6.8Quomodo autem, quando se non cogitat, in conspectu suo non sit, cum sine se ipsa nunquam esse possit, quasi aliud sit ipsa, aliud conspectus eius, invenire non possum. Hoc quippe de oculo corporis non absurde dicitur: ipse quippe oculus loco suo fixus est in corpore, aspectus autem eius in ea quae extra sunt tenditur, et usque in sidera extenditur. Nec est oculus in conspectu suo; quandoquidem non conspicit se ipsum, nisi speculo obiecto, unde iam locuti sumus: Cf. On the Trinity 9.3.3; 10.3.5. quod non fit utique quando se mens in suo conspectu sui cogitatione constituit. Numquid ergo alia sua parte aliam partem suam videt, cum se conspicit cogitando, sicut aliis membris nostris, qui sunt oculi, alia membra nostra conspicimus, quae in nostro possunt esse conspectu? Quid dici absurdius vel sentiri potest? Unde igitur aufertur mens, nisi a se ipsa? et ubi ponitur in conspectu suo, nisi ante se ipsam?
But how, when it does not think of itself, it is not in its own sight, since it can never be without itself, as though it were one thing and its sight another, I cannot find. For this is not absurdly said of the eye of the body: for the eye itself is fixed in its place in the body, but its gaze is directed to the things that are outside, and is extended even to the stars. Nor is the eye in its own sight; since it does not behold itself, except by a mirror set before it, of which we have already spoken: See On the Trinity 9.3.3; 10.3.5. which surely does not happen when the mind sets itself in its own sight by thinking of itself. Does the mind, then, see another part of itself by another part of itself, when it beholds itself by thinking, as by other members of ours, which are the eyes, we behold other members of ours, which can be in our sight? What more absurd can be said or thought? Whence, then, is the mind taken away, except from itself? And where is it set in its own sight, except before itself?
deTrin.14.6.8Non ergo ibi erit ubi erat, quando in conspectu suo non erat; quia hic posita, inde sublata est. Sed si conspicienda migravit, conspectura ubi manebit? An quasi geminatur, ut et illic sit et hic, id est, et ubi conspicere, et ubi conspici possit; ut in se sit conspiciens, ante se conspicua? Nihil horum nobis veritas consulta respondet: quoniam quando isto modo cogitamus, non nisi corporum fictas imagines cogitamus, quod mentem non esse paucis certissimum est mentibus, a quibus potest de hac re veritas consuli.
It will not, therefore, be there where it was, when it was not in its own sight; because, set here, it was taken away from there. But if it has migrated to be beheld, where will it abide to behold? Or is it as it were doubled, so that it is both there and here, that is, both where it can behold and where it can be beheld; so that in itself it is beholding, before itself beheld? None of these things does truth, when consulted, answer us: since when we think in this way, we think only of fictitious images of bodies, which the mind is not—a thing most certain to the few minds by which truth can be consulted about this matter.
deTrin.14.6.8Proinde restat ut aliquid pertinens ad eius naturam sit conspectus eius, et in eam, quando se cogitat, non quasi per loci spatium, sed incorporea conversione revocetur: Cf. Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6. cum vero non se cogitat, non sit quidem in conspectu suo, nec de illa suus formetur obtutus, sed tamen noverit se tamquam ipsa sit sibi memoria sui.
Accordingly, it remains that something pertaining to its nature is its sight, and into it, when it thinks of itself, it is recalled, not as it were through an interval of place, but by an incorporeal turning: See Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6. but when it does not think of itself, it is indeed not in its own sight, nor is its look formed from it, but yet it knows itself as though it were itself a memory of itself.
deTrin.14.6.8Sicut multarum disciplinarum peritus ea quae novit, eius memoria continentur, nec est inde aliquid in conspectu mentis eius, nisi unde cogitat; cetera in arcana quadam notitia sunt recondita, quae memoria nuncupatur. Ideo trinitatem sic commendabamus, ut illud unde formatur cogitantis obtutus, in memoria poneremus; ipsam vero conformationem, tamquam imaginem quae inde imprimitur; et illud quo utrumque coniungitur, amorem seu voluntatem.
Just as a man skilled in many disciplines—the things he knows are contained in his memory, nor is there anything thence in the sight of his mind, except that of which he thinks; the rest are stored up in a certain hidden acquaintance, which is called memory. Therefore we commended the trinity in such a way as to set in the memory that from which the look of the one thinking is formed; but the conformation itself, as it were an image which is impressed from it; and that by which both are joined, love or will.
deTrin.14.6.8Mens igitur quando cogitatione se conspicit, intellegit se et recognoscit: gignit ergo hunc intellectum et cognitionem suam. Res quippe incorporea intellecta conspicitur, et intellegendo cognoscitur. Nec ita sane gignit istam notitiam suam mens, quando cogitando intellectam se conspicit, tamquam sibi ante incognita fuerit: sed ita sibi nota erat, quemadmodum notae sunt res quae memoria continentur, etiamsi non cogitentur: quoniam dicimus hominem nosse litteras, etiam cum de aliis rebus, non de litteris cogitat. Haec autem duo, gignens et genitum, dilectione tertia copulantur, quae nihil est aliud quam voluntas fruendum aliquid appetens vel tenens. Ideoque etiam illis tribus nominibus insinuandam mentis putavimus trinitatem, memoria, intellegentia, voluntate. Cf. Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6.
The mind, therefore, when by thought it beholds itself, understands and recognizes itself: it begets, then, this understanding and cognition of itself. For an incorporeal thing is beheld when understood, and is known by being understood. Nor indeed does the mind so beget this acquaintance with itself, when by thinking it beholds itself understood, as though it had before been unknown to itself: but it was so known to itself as those things are known which are contained in the memory, even if they are not thought of: since we say that a man knows letters, even when he is thinking of other things, not of letters. But these two, the begetter and the begotten, are coupled by love as a third, which is nothing other than the will seeking or holding something to be enjoyed. And therefore we thought the trinity of the mind ought to be conveyed by those three names too: memory, understanding, will. See Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6.
deTrin.14.6.86. 9. Sed quoniam mentem semper sui meminisse, semperque se ipsam intellegere et amare, quamvis non semper se cogitare discretam ab eis quae non sunt quod ipsa est, circa eiusdem libri decimi finem diximus: Cf. On the Trinity 10.12.19. quaerendum est quonam modo ad cogitationem pertineat intellectus; notitia vero cuiusque rei, quae inest menti, etiam quando non de ipsa cogitatur, ad solam dicatur memoriam pertinere. Si enim hoc ita est, non habebat haec tria, ut et sui meminisset, et se intellegeret, et amaret: sed meminerat tantum sui, et postea cum cogitare se coepit, tunc se intellexit atque dilexit.
6. 9. But since, near the end of that same tenth book, we said that the mind always remembers itself, and always understands and loves itself, although it does not always think of itself as distinct from those things which are not what it is: See On the Trinity 10.12.19. it must be asked in what way understanding pertains to thought; but the acquaintance with each thing, which is in the mind even when one does not think of it, is said to pertain to memory alone. For if this is so, it did not have these three—to remember itself, to understand itself, and to love itself—but only remembered itself, and afterward, when it began to think of itself, then it understood and loved itself.
deTrin.14.6.97. 9. Quapropter diligentius illud consideremus exemplum, quod adhibuimus, ubi ostenderetur aliud esse rem quamque non nosse, aliud non cogitare; fierique posse ut noverit homo aliquid quod non cogitat, quando aliunde, non inde cogitat. Duarum ergo vel plurium disciplinarum peritus, quando unam cogitat, aliam vel alias etiam si non cogitat, novit tamen.
7. 9. Wherefore let us consider more diligently that example which we applied, where it was shown that it is one thing not to know any given thing, another not to think of it; and that it can happen that a man knows something of which he is not thinking, when he thinks of something else, not of it. He who is skilled, then, in two or more disciplines, when he thinks of one, even if he does not think of the other or the others, yet knows them.
deTrin.14.7.9Sed numquid recte possumus dicere, “iste musicus novit quidem musicam, sed nunc eam non intellegit, quia eam non cogitat; intellegit autem nunc geometricam, hanc enim nunc cogitat”? Absurda est, quantum apparet, ista sententia. Quid etiam illa, si dicamus, “iste musicus novit quidem musicam, sed nunc eam non amat, quando eam non cogitat; amat autem nunc geometricam, quoniam nunc ipsam cogitat”: nonne similiter absurda est?
But can we rightly say, "this musician indeed knows music, but now he does not understand it, because he does not think of it; he understands now geometry, for this he now thinks of"? That sentence is, so far as appears, absurd. What too of this, if we say, "this musician indeed knows music, but now he does not love it, since he does not think of it; he loves now geometry, since he now thinks of it"? Is it not similarly absurd?
deTrin.14.7.9Rectissime vero dicimus: “iste quem perspicis de geometrica disputantem, etiam perfectus est musicus; nam et meminit disciplinae eius, et intellegit eam et diligit: sed quamvis eam noverit et amet, nunc illam non cogitat, quoniam geometricam de qua disputat, cogitat.”
But most rightly we say: "this man whom you observe disputing about geometry is also a finished musician; for he both remembers that discipline, and understands it, and loves it: but although he knows and loves it, he does not now think of it, since he thinks of geometry, of which he disputes."
deTrin.14.7.9Hinc admonemur esse nobis in abdito mentis quarumdam rerum quasdam notitias, et tunc quodam modo procedere in medium, atque in conspectu mentis velut apertius constitui, quando cogitantur: tunc enim se ipsa mens, et meminisse, et intellegere, et amare invenit, etiam unde non cogitabat, quando aliud cogitabat. Sed unde diu non cogitaverimus, et unde cogitare nisi commoniti non valemus, id nos nescio quo eodemque miro modo, si potest dici, scire nescimus.
Hence we are admonished that there are in the secret place of the mind certain acquaintances with certain things, and that these in a certain way come forth into the open, and are set, as it were more openly, in the sight of the mind, when they are thought of: for then the mind finds that it both remembers, and understands, and loves itself, even in that of which it was not thinking, when it was thinking of something else. But that of which we have not thought for a long time, and of which we cannot think unless reminded, this, in some same wonderful way, if it can be said, we do not know that we know.
deTrin.14.7.9Denique recte ab eo qui commemorat, ei quem commemorat dicitur, “scis hoc, sed scire te nescis; commemorabo, et invenies te scientem quod te nescire putaveras.” Cf. Jerome, In Hezekiah 13.42; Epistles 53.9.2, 57.12.4; Cicero, Academica 2.23.74.
In short, rightly is it said by the one who reminds, to the one whom he reminds, "you know this, but you do not know that you know it; I will remind you, and you will find yourself knowing what you had thought you did not know." See Jerome, In Hezekiah 13.42; Epistles 53.9.2, 57.12.4; Cicero, Academica 2.23.74.
deTrin.14.7.9Id agunt et litterae, quae de his rebus conscriptae sunt, quas res duce ratione veras esse invenit lector: non quas veras esse credit ei qui scripsit, sicut legitur historia; sed quas veras esse etiam ipse invenit, sive apud se, sive in ipsa mentis duce veritate. PL: luce veritate, “in truth itself enlightening the mind”; the PL’s text is supported by six manuscripts, and is perhaps the better reading.
This too the writings do, which have been composed about those things which the reader, with reason as guide, finds to be true: not those which he believes to be true for the one who wrote them, as a history is read; but those which he himself too finds to be true, whether within himself, or in the very truth that guides the mind. PL: luce veritate, "in truth itself enlightening the mind"; the PL's text is supported by six manuscripts, and is perhaps the better reading.
deTrin.14.7.9Qui vero nec admonitus valet ista contueri, magna caecitate cordis, tenebris ignorantiae demersus est altius, et mirabiliore divina ope indiget, ut possit ad veram sapientiam pervenire.
But he who, even when reminded, is unable to behold these things, is sunk more deeply, by a great blindness of heart, in the darkness of ignorance, and needs a more wonderful divine help, that he may be able to come to true wisdom.
deTrin.14.7.97. 10. Propter hoc itaque volui de cogitatione adhibere qualecumque documentum, quo posset ostendi quomodo ex iis quae memoria continentur, recordantis acies informetur, et tale aliquid gignatur ubi homo cogitat, quale in illo erat ubi ante cogitationem meminerat: quia facilius dignoscitur, quod tempore accedit, et ubi parens prolem spatio temporis antecedit.
7. 10. For this reason, then, I wished to bring forward some proof concerning thought, by which it could be shown how, from those things contained in the memory, the gaze of the one recollecting is informed, and how something is begotten, when a man thinks, like that which was in him when, before thought, he remembered: because that is more easily discerned which comes in time, and where the parent precedes the offspring by an interval of time.
deTrin.14.7.10Nam si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit, et interiorem intellegentiam qua se intellegit, et interiorem voluntatem qua se diligit, ubi haec tria simul semper sunt, et semper simul fuerunt ex quo esse coeperunt, sive cogitarentur, sive non cogitarentur; videbitur quidem imago illius trinitatis et ad solam memoriam pertinere: sed quia ibi verbum esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus, etiam illo interiore verbo quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intellegentia, voluntate. Hanc autem nunc dico intellegentiam, qua intellegimus cogitantes, id est, quando eis repertis quae memoriae praesto fuerant, sed non cogitabantur, cogitatio nostra formatur; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem, vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit, et quodam modo utrisque communis est.
For if we refer ourselves to the inner memory of the mind, by which it remembers itself, and the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three are always together, and always have been together from the time when they began to be, whether they were thought of or not thought of, the image of that Trinity will indeed seem to pertain to memory alone: but because there a word cannot be without thought (for we think everything we say, even by that inner word which belongs to the language of no nation), this image is rather recognized in those three, namely, memory, understanding, will. But I now call understanding that by which we understand when thinking, that is, when, those things being found which were present to the memory but were not thought of, our thought is formed; and I call will, or love, or affection, that which joins this offspring and parent, and is in a certain way common to both.
deTrin.14.7.10Hinc factum est ut etiam per exteriora sensibilia quae per oculos carnis videntur, legentium ducerem tarditatem, in undecimo scilicet libro; Cf. On the Trinity 11.2.2–4. atque inde cum eis ingrederer ad hominis interioris eam potentiam qua ratiocinatur de temporalibus rebus, differens illam principaliter dominantem qua contemplatur aeterna: atque id duobus voluminibus egi, duodecimo utrumque discernens, quorum unum est superius, alterum inferius, quod superiori subditum esse debet; tertio decimo autem de munere inferioris, quo humanarum rerum scientia salubris continetur, ut in hac temporali vita id agamus quo consequamur aeternam, quanta potui veritate ac brevitate disserui: quandoquidem rem tam multiplicem atque copiosam, multorum atque magnorum disputationibus multis magnisque celebratam, uno strictim volumine inclusi, ostendens etiam in ipsa trinitatem, sed nondum quae Dei sit imago dicenda.
Hence it came about that, even through outward sensible things which are seen through the eyes of the flesh, I led on the slowness of readers, namely, in the eleventh book; See On the Trinity 11.2.2–4. and thence, when I entered with them into that power of the inner man by which it reasons about temporal things, distinguishing that principally dominant power by which it contemplates eternal things: and this I did in two volumes, in the twelfth distinguishing the two, of which the one is higher, the other lower, which ought to be subject to the higher; but in the thirteenth I discussed, with as much truth and brevity as I could, the function of the lower, in which is contained the wholesome knowledge of human things, that in this temporal life we may do that by which we attain the eternal: since a matter so manifold and copious, celebrated by many great disputations of many great men, I enclosed compactly in one volume, showing in it too a trinity, but not yet one to be called the image of God.
deTrin.14.7.10C
deTrin.14.7.10
8. 11. Nunc vero ad eam iam pervenimus disputationem, ubi principale mentis humanae, quo novit Deum vel potest nosse, considerandum suscepimus, ut in eo reperiamus imaginem Dei. (Cf. Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) Quamvis enim mens humana non sit illius naturae cuius est Deus: imago tamen naturae eius qua natura melior nulla est, ibi quaerenda et invenienda est in nobis, quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius. Sed prius mens in se ipsa consideranda est antequam sit particeps Dei, et in ea reperienda est imago eius. Diximus Cf. On the Trinity 14.4.6. enim eam etsi amissa Dei participatione obsoletam atque deformem, Dei tamen imaginem permanere. Eo quippe ipso imago eius est, quo eius capax est, eiusque particeps esse potest; quod tam magnum bonum, nisi per hoc quod imago eius est, non potest.
8. 11. But now we have come at last to that discussion where we have undertaken to consider the principal part of the human mind, by which it knows God or can know him, that in it we may find the image of God. (See Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) For although the human mind is not of that nature of which God is, yet the image of his nature—than which nature none is better—is to be sought and found in us in that by which even our nature has nothing better. But the mind is first to be considered in itself, before it is a partaker of God, and in it his image is to be found. For we said See On the Trinity 14.4.6. that, even when, the participation in God being lost, it is worn away and deformed, it nevertheless remains the image of God. For by the very fact that it is capable of him, and can be a partaker of him, it is his image; which so great a good it cannot be except through this, that it is his image.
deTrin.14.8.11Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intellegit se, diligit se: hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem; nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei. Non forinsecus accepit memoria quod teneret, nec foris invenit quod aspiceret intellectus, sicut corporis oculus: nec ista duo, velut formam corporis, et eam quae inde facta est in acie contuentis, voluntas foris iunxit; nec imaginem rei quae foris visa est, quodam modo raptam et in memoria reconditam cogitatio cum ad eam converteretur, invenit, et inde formatus est recordantis obtutus, iungente utrumque tertia voluntate; sicut in eis ostendebamus trinitatibus fieri, quae in rebus corporalibus reperiebantur, vel ex corporibus per sensum corporis introrsus quodam modo trahebantur; de quibus omnibus in libro undecimo disseruimus: Cf. On the Trinity 11.2.4.
Behold, then, the mind remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself: if we discern this, we discern a trinity; not yet God indeed, but already the image of God. The memory did not receive from without what it should hold, nor did the understanding find without what it should look upon, as the eye of the body does; nor did the will join from without these two—as it were the form of the body and that which is made from it in the gaze of the beholder; nor did thought, when it was turned to it, find the image of a thing seen without, as it were snatched and stored in the memory, and from it was the look of the one recollecting informed, with a third will joining the two; as we were showing happens in those trinities which were found in corporeal things, or were in a certain way drawn inward from bodies through the sense of the body, concerning all of which we discoursed in the eleventh book: See On the Trinity 11.2.4.
deTrin.14.8.11nec sicut fiebat vel apparebat, quando de illa scientia disserebamus, iam in hominis interioris opibus PL: operibus, “activities.” constituta, quae distinguenda fuit a sapientia; unde quae sciuntur, velut adventitia sunt in animo, sive cognitione historica illata, ut sunt facta et dicta, quae tempore peraguntur et transeunt, vel in natura rerum suis locis et regionibus constituta sunt, sive in ipso homine quae non erant oriuntur, aut aliis docentibus aut cogitationibus propriis, sicut fides, quam plurimum in libro tertio decimo commendavimus; Cf. On the Trinity 13.1.2. sicut virtutes, quibus, si verae sunt, in hac mortalitate ideo bene vivitur, ut beate in illa quae divinitus promittitur immortalitate vivatur.
nor as it was happening or appearing, when we were discoursing about that knowledge, now set among the riches PL: operibus, "activities." of the inner man, which had to be distinguished from wisdom; whence the things that are known are, as it were, adventitious in the mind—either brought in by historical cognition, as are deeds and sayings, which are carried out in time and pass away, or are set in their own places and regions in the nature of things; or in the man himself things arise which were not there, either by others teaching or by his own thoughts, such as faith, which we greatly commended in the thirteenth book; See On the Trinity 13.1.2. such as the virtues, by which, if they are true, one lives well in this mortality to this end, that one may live blessedly in that immortality which is divinely promised.
deTrin.14.8.11Haec atque huiusmodi habent in tempore ordinem suum, in quo nobis trinitas memoriae visionis et amoris facilius apparebat. Nam quaedam eorum praeveniunt cognitionem discentium. Sunt enim cognoscibilia, et antequam cognoscantur, suique cognitionem in discentibus gignant. Sunt autem vel in locis suis, vel quae tempore praeterierunt: quamvis quae praeterierunt, non ipsa sint, sed eorum quaedam signa praeteritorum, quibus visis vel auditis cognoscantur fuisse atque transisse. Quae signa vel in locis sita sunt, sicut monumenta mortuorum, et quaecumque similia; vel in litteris fide dignis, sicut est omnis gravis et approbandae auctoritatis historia; vel in animis eorum qui ea iam noverunt; eis quippe iam nota, et aliis utique sunt noscibilia, quorum scientiam praevenerunt, et qui ea nosse, illis quibus nota sunt docentibus, possunt.
These and such things have their own order in time, in which the trinity of memory, vision, and love appeared to us more easily. For some of them precede the cognition of those learning them. For they are knowable, and even before they are known, they beget a cognition of themselves in those who learn them. But they are either in their own places, or are things that have passed away in time: although the things that have passed away are not themselves, but certain signs of those past things, by seeing or hearing which they are known to have been and to have passed by. Which signs are either set in places, like the monuments of the dead, and whatever is similar; or in writings worthy of faith, as is all history of grave and approvable authority; or in the minds of those who already know them; for, already known to these, they are surely knowable to others as well, whose knowledge they have preceded, and who can know them, with those to whom they are known teaching them.
deTrin.14.8.11Quae omnia, et quando discuntur, quamdam faciunt trinitatem, specie sua quae noscibilis fuit etiam antequam nosceretur, eique adiuncta cognitione discentis quae tunc esse incipit quando discitur, ac tertia voluntate quae utrumque coniungit. Et cum cognita fuerint, alia trinitas, dum recoluntur, fit iam interius in ipso animo, ex iis imaginibus quae cum discerentur sunt impressae in memoria, et informatione cogitationis ad ea converso recordantis aspectu, et ex voluntate quae tertia duo ista coniungit.
All which things, when they are learned too, make a certain trinity: by their own appearance, which was knowable even before it was known, and the cognition of the learner joined to it, which then begins to be when it is learned, and a third, the will, which joins the two. And when they have been known, another trinity, while they are recalled, comes to be now within, in the mind itself, from those images which were impressed on the memory when they were learned, and from the informing of thought, the gaze of the one recollecting being turned to them, and from the will which joins these two as a third.
deTrin.14.8.11Ea vero quae oriuntur in animo ubi non fuerunt, sicut fides, et cetera huiusmodi, etsi adventitia videntur, cum doctrina inseruntur; non tamen foris posita vel foris peracta sunt, sicut illa quae creduntur; sed intus omnino in ipso animo esse coeperunt. Fides enim non est quod creditur, sed qua creditur: et illud creditur, illa conspicitur.
But those things which arise in the mind where they were not, such as faith and the rest of this kind, even if they seem adventitious when they are implanted by teaching, are nevertheless not set without or carried out without, like those things which are believed; but they began to be wholly within, in the mind itself. For faith is not that which is believed, but that by which it is believed: and the former is believed, the latter is beheld.
deTrin.14.8.11Tamen quia esse coepit in animo, qui iam erat animus antequam in illo ista esse coepisset, adventitium quiddam videtur, et in praeteritis habebitur, quando succedente specie iam esse destiterit: aliamque nunc trinitatem facit per suam praesentiam, retenta, conspecta, dilecta; aliam tunc faciet per quoddam sui vestigium, quod in memoria praeteriens de reliquerit, sicut iam supra dictum est. Cf. On the Trinity 13.20.25–26.
Yet because it began to be in the mind, which was already a mind before this began to be in it, it seems something adventitious, and will be held among things past, when, sight succeeding, it shall have ceased to be: and now it makes one trinity by its presence, being retained, beheld, loved; another it will then make through a certain trace of itself, which in passing it will leave behind in the memory, as has already been said above. See On the Trinity 13.20.25–26.
deTrin.14.8.119. 12. Utrum autem tunc etiam virtutes, quibus in hac mortalitate bene vivitur, quia et ipsae incipiunt esse in animo, qui cum sine illis prius esset, tamen animus erat, desinant esse cum ad aeterna perduxerint, nonnulla quaestio est. Quibusdam enim visum est desituras: et de tribus quidem, prudentia, fortitudine, temperantia, cum hoc dicitur, non nihil dici videtur; iustitia vero immortalis est, et magis tunc perficietur in nobis, quam esse cessabit. Cf. Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6. De omnibus tamen quatuor “magnus auctor eloquentiae Tullius” Lucan, Pharsalia 7.62–63; cf. Augustine, The City of God 10.1, 14.18; Teaching Christianity 4.3.4; Epistles 143.3, 258.1. in Hortensio dialogo disputans:
9. 12. But whether then even the virtues, by which one lives well in this mortality—since they too begin to be in the mind, which, when it was previously without them, was nevertheless a mind—will cease to be when they have led to eternal things, is some question. For to some it has seemed that they will cease: and concerning three of them indeed, prudence, fortitude, temperance, when this is said, something not nothing seems to be said; but justice is immortal, and will then be more perfected in us than it will cease to be. See Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6. Yet concerning all four "the great author of eloquence, Tully" Lucan, Pharsalia 7.62–63; see Augustine, The City of God 10.1, 14.18; Teaching Christianity 4.3.4; Epistles 143.3, 258.1. says, disputing in the dialogue Hortensius:
deTrin.14.9.12Si nobis, inquit, cum ex hac vita emigraverimus, in beatorum insulis immortale aevum, ut fabulae ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus esset eloquentia, cum iudicia nulla fierent; aut ipsis etiam virtutibus? Nec enim fortitudine egeremus, nullo proposito aut labore aut periculo; nec iustitia, cum esset nihil quod appeteretur alieni; nec temperantia, quae regeret eas quae nullae essent libidines; nec prudentia quidem egeremus, nullo delectu proposito bonorum et malorum.
If it were permitted us, when we have departed from this life, to pass an immortal age in the isles of the blessed, as the fables tell, what need would there be of eloquence, since no trials would take place; or even of the virtues themselves? For we would not need fortitude, with no toil or danger set before us; nor justice, since there would be nothing belonging to another that might be coveted; nor temperance, which governs the lusts that would be none; nor indeed would we need prudence, with no choice set before us of goods and evils Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 50..
deTrin.14.9.12Una igitur essemus beati cognitione naturae et scientia, qua sola etiam deorum est vita laudanda. Ex quo intellegi potest, cetera necessitatis esse, unum hoc voluntatis. Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 50.
We would therefore be blessed by the one cognition and knowledge of nature, by which alone even the life of the gods is praiseworthy. From which it can be understood that the rest are of necessity, this one alone of the will Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 50..
deTrin.14.9.12Ita ille tantus orator, cum philosophiam praedicaret, recolens ea quae a philosophis acceperat, et praeclare ac suaviter explicans, in hac tantum vita, quam videmus aerumnis et erroribus plenam, omnes quattuor necessarias dixit esse virtutes: nullam vero earum, cum ex hac vita emigrabimus, si liceat ibi vivere ubi vivitur beate; sed bonos animos sola beatos esse cognitione et scientia, hoc est contemplatione naturae qua nihil est melius et amabilius; ea est natura, quae creavit omnes ceteras, instituitque naturas. Cui regenti esse subditum, si iustitiae est, immortalis est omnino iustitia: nec in illa esse beatitudine desinet, sed talis ac tanta erit, ut perfectior et maior esse non possit.
So that so great an orator, when he was extolling philosophy, recalling the things he had received from the philosophers, and setting them forth splendidly and pleasantly, said that all four virtues are necessary only in this life, which we see to be full of hardships and errors: but none of them, when we shall have departed from this life, if it be permitted to live there where one lives blessedly; but that good minds are blessed by cognition and knowledge alone, that is, by the contemplation of that nature than which nothing is better or more lovable; that is the nature which created all the other natures and established them. To be subject to which, ruling, if it belongs to justice, then justice is altogether immortal: nor will it cease to be in that blessedness, but will be such and so great that it cannot be more perfect or greater.
deTrin.14.9.12Fortassis et aliae tres virtutes, prudentia sine ullo iam periculo erroris, fortitudo sine molestia tolerandorum malorum, temperantia sine repugnatione libidinum, erunt in illa felicitate: ut prudentiae sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel aequare; fortitudinis, ei firmissime cohaerere; temperantiae, nullo defectu noxio delectari. Nunc autem quod agit iustitia in subveniendo miseris, quod prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, quod fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, quod temperantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis, non ibi erit, ubi nihil omnino mali erit. Ac per hoc ista virtutum opera, quae huic mortali vitae sunt necessaria, sicut fides ad quam referenda sunt, in praeteritis habebuntur: et aliam nunc faciunt trinitatem, cum ea praesentia tenemus, aspicimus, amamus; aliam tunc factura sunt, cum ea non esse, sed fuisse, per quaedam eorum vestigia, quae praetereundo in memoria derelinquent, reperiemus; quia et tunc trinitas erit, cum illud qualecumque vestigium et memoriter retinebitur, et agnoscetur veraciter, et hoc utrumque tertia voluntate iungetur.
Perhaps the other three virtues too—prudence without any danger now of error, fortitude without the trouble of evils to be endured, temperance without the resistance of lusts—will be in that happiness: so that it belongs to prudence to set no good before God or equal to him; to fortitude, to cleave to him most firmly; to temperance, to be delighted by no harmful defect. But now what justice does in coming to the aid of the wretched, what prudence does in guarding against snares, what fortitude does in enduring troubles, what temperance does in restraining depraved delights, will not be there, where there will be no evil at all. And through this, those works of the virtues, which are necessary to this mortal life, like the faith to which they are to be referred, will be held among things past: and now they make one trinity, when we hold, look upon, love them as present; another they will then make, when we shall find that they are not, but were, through certain traces of them which in passing they will leave behind in the memory; because then too there will be a trinity, when that trace of whatever kind will be both retained by memory, and truly recognized, and these two joined by a third will.
deTrin.14.9.1210. 13. In omnium istarum, quas commemoravimus, temporalium rerum scientia, quaedam cognoscibilia cognitionem interpositione temporis antecedunt; sicut sunt ea sensibilia quae iam erant in rebus, antequam cognoscerentur; vel ea omnia quae per historiam cognoscuntur: quaedam vero simul esse incipiunt; velut si aliquid visibile, quod omnino non erat, ante nostros oculos oriatur, cognitionem nostram utique non praecedit; aut si aliquid sonet, ubi adest auditor, simul profecto incipiunt esse, simulque desinunt et sonus et eius auditus. Verumtamen sive tempore praecedentia, sive simul esse incipientia cognoscibilia cognitionem gignunt, non cognitione gignuntur. Cognitione vero facta, cum ea quae cognovimus, posita in memoria recordatione revisuntur; quis non videat priorem esse tempore in memoria retentionem, quam in recordatione visionem, et huius utriusque tertia voluntate iunctionem?
10. 13. In the knowledge of all those temporal things which we have mentioned, certain knowable things precede cognition by an interval of time; such as those sensible things which already were among things before they were known; or all those things which are known through history: but certain things begin to be at the same time; as, for instance, if something visible, which was not at all, should arise before our eyes, it surely does not precede our cognition; or if something sounds where a hearer is present, surely both the sound and the hearing of it begin to be at the same time, and at the same time cease. Nevertheless, whether preceding in time or beginning to be at the same time, knowable things beget cognition, are not begotten by cognition. But cognition having been made, when the things we have known, set in the memory, are revisited by recollection, who does not see that the retention in the memory is prior in time to the vision in recollection, and the joining of these two by a third will?
deTrin.14.10.13Porro autem in mente non sic est: neque enim adventitia sibi ipsa est, quasi ad se ipsam quae iam erat, venerit aliunde eadem ipsa quae non erat; aut non aliunde venerit, sed in se ipsa quae iam erat, nata sit ea ipsa quae non erat; sicut in mente quae iam erat, oritur fides quae non erat:
But in the mind it is not so: for neither is it adventitious to itself, as though to itself, which already was, the same self, which was not, had come from elsewhere; or had not come from elsewhere, but in itself, which already was, had been born that same self which was not; as in the mind which already was, faith which was not arises:
deTrin.14.10.13aut post cognitionem sui recordando se ipsam velut in memoria sua constitutam videt, quasi non ibi fuerit antequam se ipsam cognosceret; cum profecto ex quo esse coepit, numquam sui meminisse, numquam se intellegere, numquam se amare destiterit, sicut iam ostendimus.
or as if, after the cognition of itself, by recollecting it sees itself as it were set in its own memory, as though it had not been there before it knew itself; when surely, from the time it began to be, it has never ceased to remember itself, never to understand itself, never to love itself, as we have already shown.
deTrin.14.10.13Ac per hoc quando ad se ipsam cogitatione convertitur, fit trinitas, in qua iam et verbum possit intellegi: formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitatione, voluntate utrumque iungente. Ibi ergo magis agnoscenda est imago quam quaerimus.
And through this, when it is turned to itself by thought, a trinity comes to be, in which now even a word can be understood: for it is formed from that thought itself, the will joining the two. There, then, the image we seek is rather to be recognized.
deTrin.14.10.1311. 14. Sed dicet aliquis: “non est ista memoria, qua mens sui meminisse perhibetur, quae sibi semper est praesens. Memoria enim praeteritorum est, non praesentium”: nam quidam cum de virtutibus agerent, in quibus est etiam Tullius, Cf. Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6. in tria ista prudentiam diviserunt, memoriam, intellegentiam, providentiam: memoriam scilicet praeteritis, intellegentiam praesentibus, providentiam rebus tribuentes futuris, quam non habent certam nisi praescii futurorum; quod non est munus hominum, nisi detur desuper, ut prophetis. Unde Scriptura sapientiae de hominibus aiens: cogitationes, inquit, mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Memoria vero de praeteritis, et intellegentia de praesentibus certa est, sed praesentibus utique incorporalibus rebus: nam corporales corporalium praesentes sunt aspectibus oculorum.
11. 14. But someone will say: "this is not memory, by which the mind is said to remember itself, which is always present to itself. For memory is of past things, not of present ones": for some, when they treated of the virtues—among whom is also Tully See Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6.—divided prudence into these three: memory, understanding, foresight; attributing memory, namely, to past things, understanding to present, foresight to future things, which they do not have as certain unless they foreknow the future; which is not the gift of men, unless it be given from above, as to prophets. Whence Scripture, speaking of men in the book of Wisdom, says: the thoughts of mortals are timid, and our foresight uncertain (Wis 9:14). But memory is certain of past things, and understanding of present things, but of present incorporeal things, surely: for corporeal things, of corporeal things, are present to the gaze of the eyes.
deTrin.14.11.14Sed qui dicit memoriam non esse praesentium, attendat quemadmodum dictum sit in ipsis saecularibus litteris, ubi maioris fuit curae verborum integritas quam veritas rerum: nec talia passus Ulysses, oblitusve sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto. Virgil, Aeneid 3.628–629.
But let him who says that memory is not of present things attend to how it was said in those very secular writings, where there was greater care for the correctness of words than for the truth of things: nor did Ulysses, suffering such things, the Ithacan forget himself in so great a peril Virgil, Aeneid 3.628–629..
deTrin.14.11.14Virgilius enim cum sui non oblitum diceret Ulyssem, quid aliud intellegi voluit, nisi quod meminerit sui? Cum ergo sibi praesens esset, nullo modo sui meminisset, nisi ad res praesentes memoria pertineret. Quapropter sicut in rebus praeteritis ea memoria dicitur, qua fit ut valeant recoli et recordari: sic in re praesenti quod sibi est mens, memoria sine absurditate dicenda est, qua sibi praesto est ut sua cogitatione possit intellegi, et utrumque sui amore coniungi.
For when Virgil said that Ulysses did not forget himself, what else did he wish to be understood than that he remembered himself? Since, then, he was present to himself, he could in no way have remembered himself, unless memory pertained to present things. Wherefore, just as in past things that is called memory by which it comes about that they can be recalled and remembered, so in a present thing, which the mind is to itself, that may without absurdity be called memory by which it is present to itself, so that by its own thought it can be understood, and both joined by love of itself.
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12. 15. Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago, quia sui meminit mens, et intellegit ac diligit se: sed quia potest etiam meminisse, et intellegere, et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit, sapiens ipsa fit. Si autem non facit, etiam cum sui meminit, seque intellegit ac diligit, stulta est. Meminerit itaque Dei sui, ad cuius imaginem facta est, (Cf. Gen 1:26–27, 5:1, 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) eumque intellegat atque diligat. Quod ut brevius dicam, colat Deum non factum, cuius ab eo capax est facta, et cuius particeps esse potest; propter quod scriptum est: ecce Dei cultus est sapientia: et non sua luce, sed summae illius lucis participatione sapiens erit, atque ubi aeterna, ibi beata regnabit. Sic enim dicitur ista hominis sapientia, ut etiam Dei sit. Tunc enim vera est: nam si humana est, vana est. Verum non ita Dei qua sapiens est Deus. Neque enim participatione sui sapiens est, sicut mens participatione Dei.
12. 15. This trinity of the mind, then, is not the image of God for this reason, that the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves itself: but because it can also remember, and understand, and love him by whom it was made. And when it does this, it becomes itself wise. But if it does not, even when it remembers, and understands and loves itself, it is foolish. Let it then remember its God, to whose image it was made, (See Gen 1:26–27, 5:1, 9:6; Wis 2:23; Sir 17:1) and understand and love him. To say this more briefly: let it worship the uncreated God, of whom it was made capable by him, and of whom it can be a partaker; on account of which it is written: behold, the worship of God is wisdom (Job 28:28): and it will be wise not by its own light, but by participation in that highest light, and where there are eternal things, there it will reign blessed. For this wisdom of man is so called that it is also God's. For then it is true: for if it is human, it is vain. But not so God's, by which God is wise. For he is not wise by participation in himself, as the mind by participation in God.
deTrin.14.12.15Sed quemadmodum dicitur etiam iustitia Dei, non solum illa qua ipse iustus est, sed quam dat homini cum iustificat impium, quam commendans Apostolus ait de quibusdam, ignorantes enim Dei iustitiam, et suam iustitiam volentes constituere, iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti: sic enim dici etiam de quibusdam potest: “ignorantes Dei sapientiam, et suam volentes constituere, sapientiae Dei non sunt subiecti.”
But just as there is said to be also a justice of God—not only that by which he himself is just, but that which he gives to man when he justifies the ungodly, commending which the Apostle says of some, for being ignorant of the justice of God, and wishing to establish their own justice, they were not subject to the justice of God (Rom 10:3): so it can be said also of some: "being ignorant of the wisdom of God, and wishing to establish their own, they were not subject to the wisdom of God."
deTrin.14.12.1512. 16. Est igitur natura non facta, quae fecit omnes ceteras magnas parvasque naturas, eis quas fecit sine dubitatione praestantior, ac per hoc hac etiam de qua loquimur, rationali et intellectuali, quae hominis mens est, ad eius qui eam fecit imaginem facta. Illa autem ceteris natura praestantior Deus est. Et quidem non longe positus ab unoquoque nostrum, sicut Apostolus dicit; adiungens, in illo enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus. Quod si secundum corpus diceret, etiam de isto corporeo mundo posset intellegi. Nam et in illo secundum corpus vivimus, movemur, et sumus.
12. 16. There is, then, an uncreated nature, which made all the other natures, great and small, without doubt more excellent than those it made, and through this more excellent also than this one of which we speak, the rational and intellectual nature, which is the mind of man, made to the image of him who made it. But that nature more excellent than the rest is God. And indeed not set far from each one of us, as the Apostle says; adding, for in him we live, and move, and are (Acts 17:27–28). And if he said this according to the body, it could be understood even of this corporeal world. For in it too, according to the body, we live, move, and are.
deTrin.14.12.16Unde secundum mentem quae facta est ad eius imaginem, debet hoc accipi, excellentiore quodam, eodemque non visibili, sed intellegibili modo. Nam quid non est in ipso, de quo divine scriptum est, quoniam ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia? Proinde si in ipso sunt omnia, in quo tandem possunt vivere quae vivunt, et moveri quae moventur, nisi in quo sunt? (Cf. Acts 17:28) Non tamen omnes cum illo sunt eo modo quo ei dictum est, ego semper tecum. Nec ipse cum omnibus eo modo quo dicimus: “Dominus vobiscum.” (Cf. Ruth 2:4) Magna itaque hominis miseria est cum illo non esse, sine quo non potest esse. In quo enim est, procul dubio sine illo non est: et tamen si eius non meminit, eumque non intellegit, nec diligit, cum illo non est. Quod autem quisque penitus obliviscitur, nec commoneri eius utique potest.
Whence, according to the mind which was made to his image, this ought to be received in a certain more excellent, and that not visible but intelligible, manner. For what is not in him, of whom it is divinely written, since from him, and through him, and in him are all things (Rom 11:36)? Accordingly, if in him are all things, in what at last can the things that live, live, and the things that move, move, except in him in whom they are? (See Acts 17:28) Yet not all are with him in that manner in which it was said to him, I am always with you (Ps 73:23 (72:23)). Nor is he with all in that manner in which we say, "the Lord be with you." (See Ruth 2:4) Great, therefore, is the misery of man not to be with him without whom he cannot be. For in him in whom he is, beyond doubt he is not without him: and yet, if he does not remember him, and does not understand and love him, he is not with him. But that which anyone utterly forgets, he surely cannot even be reminded of.
deTrin.14.12.1613. 17. De visibilibus rebus ad hanc rem sumamus exemplum. Dicit tibi quispiam quem non recognoscis, “nosti me”; et ut commoneat, dicit ubi, quando, quomodo tibi innotuerit: omnibusque adhibitis signis quibus in memoriam revoceris, si non recognoscis, ita iam oblitus es, ut omnis illa notitia penitus deleta sit animo; nihilque aliud restat, nisi ut credas ei qui tibi hoc dicit, quod aliquando eum noveras; aut ne hoc quidem, si fide dignus tibi esse qui loquitur non videtur. Si autem reminisceris, profecto redis in memoriam tuam, et in ea invenis quod non fuerat penitus oblivione deletum.
13. 17. From visible things let us take an example for this matter. Someone whom you do not recognize says to you, "you know me"; and to remind you, he says where, when, how he became known to you: and, with all the signs applied by which you may be recalled to memory, if you do not recognize him, you have so forgotten that all that acquaintance has been utterly erased from your mind; and nothing else remains except that you believe him who says this to you, that you once knew him; or not even this, if the one who speaks does not seem to you to be worthy of faith. But if you remember, surely you return into your own memory, and in it you find what had not been utterly erased by oblivion.
deTrin.14.13.17Redeamus ad illud propter quod adhibuimus humanae conversationis exemplum. Inter cetera Psalmus nonus: convertantur, inquit, peccatores in infernum, omnes gentes quae obliviscuntur Deum. Porro autem vicesimus primus: (Augustine numbers the psalms in the style of the Septuagint) commemorabuntur, inquit, et convertentur ad Dominum universi fines terrae. Non igitur sic erant oblitae istae gentes Deum, ut eius nec commemoratae recordarentur. Obliviscendo autem Deum, tamquam obliviscendo vitam suam, conversae fuerant in mortem, hoc est, in infernum. Commemoratae vero convertuntur ad Dominum, tamquam reviviscentes reminiscendo vitam suam, cuius eas habebat oblivio. Item legitur in nonagesimo tertio: intellegite nunc, qui insipientes estis in populo; et stulti, aliquando sapite. Qui plantavit aurem non audiet? et cetera. Eis enim dictum est, qui Deum non intellegendo, de illo vana dixerunt.
Let us return to that for the sake of which we applied the example of human society. Among other things the ninth Psalm says: let the sinners be turned into hell, all the nations that forget God (Ps 9:17 (9:18)). But the twenty-first (Augustine numbers the psalms in the style of the Septuagint) says: all the ends of the earth shall remember, and shall be turned to the Lord (Ps 22:27 (21:28)). These nations, therefore, had not so forgotten God as not to remember him even when reminded. But by forgetting God, as it were by forgetting their own life, they had been turned into death, that is, into hell. But, reminded, they are turned to the Lord, as it were coming back to life by remembering their own life, of which oblivion had hold. Likewise it is read in the ninety-third: understand now, you who are unwise among the people; and you fools, be wise at last. He who planted the ear, shall he not hear (Ps 94:8–9 (93:8–9))? and the rest. For it was said to those who, by not understanding God, said vain things about him.
deTrin.14.13.1714. 18. De dilectione autem Dei plura reperiuntur in divinis eloquiis testimonia. Ibi enim et illa duo consequenter intelleguntur, quia nemo diligit cuius non meminit, et quod penitus nescit. Unde illud est notissimum praecipuumque praeceptum: diliges Dominum Deum tuum. (Matt 22:38; cf. Deut 6:5; Matt 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27)
14. 18. But of the love of God more testimonies are found in the divine eloquences. For there those two things too are consequently understood, that no one loves him whom he does not remember, and what he utterly does not know. Whence comes that most well-known and chief precept: you shall love the Lord your God (Matt 22:38; see Deut 6:5; Matt 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27).
deTrin.14.14.18Sic itaque condita est mens humana, ut numquam sui non meminerit, numquam se non intellegat, numquam se non diligat. Sed quoniam qui odit aliquem, nocere illi studet; non immerito et mens hominis, quando sibi nocet, odisse se dicitur. Nesciens enim sibi vult male, dum non putat sibi obesse quod vult: sed tamen male sibi vult, quando id vult quod obsit sibi, unde illud scriptum est, qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam.
The human mind, then, was so founded that it never does not remember itself, never does not understand itself, never does not love itself. But since he who hates someone is eager to harm him, not undeservedly is the mind of man, when it harms itself, said to hate itself. For unknowingly it wills evil to itself, while it does not think that what it wills is against itself: but yet it wills evil to itself, when it wills that which is against itself; whence it is written, he who loves iniquity hates his own soul (Ps 11:5 (10:6)).
deTrin.14.14.18Qui ergo se diligere novit, Deum diligit: Cf. Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6. qui vero non diligit Deum, etiam si se diligit, quod ei naturaliter inditum est, tamen non inconvenienter odisse se dicitur, cum id agit quod sibi adversatur, et se ipsum tamquam suus inimicus insequitur. Qui profecto est error horrendus, ut cum sibi omnes prodesse velint, multi non faciant nisi quod eis perniciosissimum sit. Similem morbum mutorum animalium cum poeta describeret: di, inquit, meliora piis, erroremque hostibus illum! Discissos nudis laniabant dentibus artus. Virgil, Georgics 3.513–514.
He, then, who knows how to love himself, loves God: See Porphyry, Sentences 40.5–6. but he who does not love God, even if he loves himself—which is naturally implanted in him—yet is not unfittingly said to hate himself, when he does that which is against himself, and pursues his own self as though he were his own enemy. Which is surely a horrendous error: that, although all wish to profit themselves, many do nothing but what is most pernicious to them. When the poet described a like disease of the dumb animals, he said: the gods grant better things to the pious, and that error to the enemy! With bared teeth they tore their own torn limbs Virgil, Georgics 3.513–514..
deTrin.14.14.18Cum morbus ille corporis fuerit, cur dixit errorem, nisi quia omne animal cum sibi natura conciliatum sit ut se custodiat quantum potest, talis ille erat morbus, ut ea quorum salutem appetebant, sua membra laniarent? Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.5.6–19.63.
Since that was a disease of the body, why did he call it an error, except that, since every animal is so reconciled to itself by nature that it guards itself as much as it can, that disease was such that they tore their own members, whose health they were seeking? See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.5.6–19.63.
deTrin.14.14.18Cum autem Deum diligit mens, et sicut dictum est, consequenter eius meminit, eumque intellegit, recte illi de proximo suo praecipitur, ut eum sicut se diligat. Iam enim se non diligit perverse, sed recte, cum Deum diligit, cuius participatione imago illa non solum est, verum etiam ex vetustate renovatur, ex deformitate reformatur, ex infelicitate beatificatur. Quamvis enim se ita diligat, ut si alterutrum proponatur, malit omnia quae infra se diligit perdere, quam perire: tamen superiorem deserendo, ad quem solum posset custodire fortitudinem suam, eoque frui lumine suo, cui canitur in Psalmo: fortitudinem meam ad te custodiam; et in alio, accedite ad eum, et illuminamini; sic infirma et tenebrosa facta est, ut a se quoque ipsa, in ea quae non sunt quod ipsa, et quibus superior est ipsa, infelicius laberetur per amores quos non valet vincere, et errores a quibus non videt qua redire. Cf. On the Trinity 10.7, 12.14.
But when the mind loves God, and, as was said, consequently remembers him, and understands him, it is rightly enjoined concerning its neighbor to love him as itself. For now it loves itself not perversely, but rightly, when it loves God, by participation in whom that image not only is, but also is renewed from its oldness, reformed from its deformity, made blessed from its unhappiness. For although it so loves itself that, if one or the other were set before it, it would rather lose all the things it loves below itself than perish: yet, by deserting the higher one—to whom alone it could keep its strength, and enjoy its own light, the one to whom it is sung in the Psalm, I will keep my strength to you (Ps 59:9 (58:10)); and in another, draw near to him, and be enlightened (Ps 34:5 (33:6))—it has been made so weak and dark that it slips, even from itself, more unhappily into the things that are not what it is, and over which it is itself higher, through loves which it cannot overcome, and errors from which it does not see by what way to return. See On the Trinity 10.7, 12.14.
deTrin.14.14.18Unde iam Deo miserante poenitens clamat in Psalmis: deseruit me fortitudo mea, et lumen oculorum meorum non est mecum.
Whence now, with God showing mercy, repenting it cries out in the Psalms: my strength has deserted me, and the light of my eyes, it too is not with me (Ps 38:10 (37:11)).
deTrin.14.14.1814. 19. Non tamen in his tantis infirmitatis et erroris malis amittere potuit naturalem memoriam, intellectum, et amorem sui: propter quod merito dici potuit quod supra commemoravi: Cf. On the Trinity 14.4.6. quamquam in imagine ambulat homo, tamen vane conturbatur. Thesaurizat, et nescit cui congregabit ea. Cur enim thesaurizat, nisi quia fortitudo eius deseruit eum, (Cf. Ps 38:11) per quam Deum habens, rei nullius indigeret? Et cur nescit cui congregabit ea, nisi quia lumen oculorum eius non est cum eo? Et ideo non videt quod Veritas ait: stulte, hac nocte animam tuam repetunt abs te; haec quae praeparasti cuius erunt?
14. 19. Yet amid these so great evils of weakness and error it could not lose the natural memory, understanding, and love of itself: on account of which it could deservedly be said what I mentioned above: See On the Trinity 14.4.6. although man walks in an image, yet he is troubled in vain. He heaps up treasure, and knows not for whom he gathers it (Ps 39:6 (38:7)). For why does he heap up treasure, except that his strength has deserted him, (See Ps 38:10 (37:11)) by which, having God, he would lack nothing? And why does he not know for whom he gathers it, except that the light of his eyes is not with him? And therefore he does not see what the Truth says: fool, this night they require your soul of you; these things which you have prepared, whose shall they be (Luke 12:20)?
deTrin.14.14.19Verumtamen, quia etiam talis in imagine ambulat homo, et habet memoriam, et intellectum, et amorem sui, hominis mens: si ei manifestaretur quod utrumque habere non posset, et unum e duobus permitteretur eligere, alterum perditurus, aut thesauros quos congregavit, aut mentem; quis usque adeo non habet mentem, ut thesauros mallet habere quam mentem? Thesauri enim mentem possunt plerumque subvertere: at mens quae non thesauris subvertitur sine ullis thesauris facilius et expeditius potest vivere. Quis vero ullos thesauros, nisi per mentem poterit possidere? Si enim puer infans, quamvis ditissimus natus, cum sit dominus omnium quae iure sunt eius, nihil possidet mente sopita; quonam tandem modo quisquam quidquam mente possidebit amissa? Sed de thesauris quid loquor, quod eis quilibet hominum, si talis optio proponatur, mavult carere quam mente; cum eos nemo praeponat, nemo comparet luminibus corporis, quibus non ut aurum rarus quisque homo, sed omnis homo possidet caelum: per lumina enim corporis quisque possidet quidquid libenter videt?
But nevertheless, since even such a man walks in an image, and the mind of man has memory, and understanding, and love of itself: if it were made plain to him that he could not have both, and he were permitted to choose one of two, about to lose the other—either the treasures he has gathered, or the mind—who is so far without a mind as to prefer to have the treasures rather than the mind? For treasures can often overturn the mind: but the mind which is not overturned by treasures can live more easily and freely without any treasures. But who will be able to possess any treasures except through the mind? For if an infant child, though born most wealthy, since he is the owner of all that is his by right, possesses nothing while his mind is dormant; in what way, finally, will anyone possess anything with his mind lost? But why do I speak of treasures, since, if such a choice were set before him, any man would rather lack them than his mind; while no one prefers them to, no one compares them with, the lights of the body, by which not, like gold, only this or that rare man, but every man possesses the sky—for through the lights of the body each one possesses whatever he gladly sees?
deTrin.14.14.19Quis ergo si tenere utrumque non possit, et alterutrum cogatur amittere, non thesauros quam oculos malit? Et tamen si ab eo simili conditione quaeratur, utrum oculos malit amittere, an mentem; quis mente non videat, eum oculos malle quam mentem? Mens quippe sine oculis carnis humana est, oculi autem carnis sine mente belluini sunt. Quis porro non hominem se malit esse etiam carne caecum, quam belluam videntem?
Who, then, if he could not keep both, and were forced to lose one or the other, would not rather lose his treasures than his eyes? And yet if he were asked, on a like condition, whether he would rather lose his eyes or his mind, who would not see with his mind that he would rather lose his eyes than his mind? For a mind without the eyes of the flesh is human, but the eyes of the flesh without a mind are bestial. And who would not rather be a man, even blind in the flesh, than a beast that sees?
deTrin.14.14.1914. 20. Haec dixi, ut etiam tardiores, quamvis breviter, commonerentur a me, in quorum oculos vel aures hae litterae venerint, quantum mens diligat se ipsam etiam infirma et errans, male diligendo atque sectando quae sunt infra ipsam. Diligere porro se ipsam non posset, si se omnino nesciret, id est, si sui non meminisset; nec se intellegeret: qua in se imagine Dei tam potens est, ut ei cuius imago est valeat inhaerere. Sic enim ordinata est naturarum ordine, non locorum, ut supra illam non sit nisi ille. Denique cum illi penitus adhaeserit, unus erit spiritus: cui rei attestatur Apostolus, dicens, qui autem adhaeret Domino, unus spiritus est: accedente quidem ista ad participationem naturae, veritatis, et beatitudinis illius, non tamen crescente illo in natura, veritate et beatitudine sua. In illa itaque natura, cum feliciter adhaeserit, immutabiliter vivet, et immutabile videbit omne quod viderit. Tunc, sicut ei divina Scriptura promittit, satiabitur in bonis desiderium eius, (Cf. Ps 103:5) bonis immutabilibus, ipsa Trinitate Deo suo cuius imago est: et ne uspiam deinceps violetur, erit in abscondito vultus eius, (Cf. Ps 31:21) tanta ubertate eius impleta, (Cf. Ps 36:8) ut eam numquam peccare delectet. Se ipsam vero nunc quando videt, non aliquid immutabile videt.
14. 20. I have said these things that even the slower ones, into whose eyes or ears these writings shall come, might be admonished by me, however briefly, how much the mind loves itself even when weak and erring, by loving and pursuing evilly the things that are below itself. But it could not love itself, if it were wholly ignorant of itself, that is, if it did not remember itself; nor would it understand itself: in which image of God in itself it is so powerful that it can cleave to him whose image it is. For it has been so ordered, by the order of natures, not of places, that above it there is none but he. Finally, when it has cleaved wholly to him, it will be one spirit: to which the Apostle bears witness, saying, but he who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit (1 Cor 6:17): this mind, indeed, coming to a participation in his nature, truth, and blessedness, yet he not growing in his own nature, truth, and blessedness. In that nature, then, when it has happily cleaved, it will live immutably, and will see immutable everything it sees. Then, as the divine Scripture promises it, its desire will be satisfied with good things, (See Ps 103:5 (102:5)) with immutable good things, with the very Trinity, its God, whose image it is: and lest it ever thereafter be violated, it will be in the hidden place of his face, (See Ps 31:20 (30:21)) filled with so great an abundance of him (See Ps 36:8 (35:9)) that it will never delight to sin. But now, when it sees itself, it sees nothing immutable.
deTrin.14.14.2015. 21. Quod ideo certe non dubitat, quoniam misera est, et beata esse desiderat: nec ob aliud fieri sperat hoc posse, nisi quia est mutabilis. Nam si mutabilis non esset, sicut ex beata misera, sic ex misera beata esse non posset. Et quid eam fecisset miseram sub omnipotente et bono Domino, nisi peccatum suum et iustitia Domini sui? Et quid eam faciet beatam, nisi meritum suum et praemium Domini sui? Sed et meritum eius gratia est illius, cuius praemium erit beatitudo eius. Cf. Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter 24.39; Rom 3:23–24. Iustitiam quippe dare sibi non potest quam perditam non habet. Hanc enim, cum homo conderetur, accepit; et peccando utique perdidit. Accipit ergo iustitiam, propter quam beatitudinem accipere mereatur. Unde veraciter ei dicitur ab Apostolo, quasi de suo bono superbire incipienti: quid enim habes quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis?
15. 21. This, certainly, it does not doubt, since it is wretched, and desires to be blessed: nor does it hope that this can come about for any other reason than that it is mutable. For if it were not mutable, just as it could not become wretched from blessed, so it could not become blessed from wretched. And what would have made it wretched, under an omnipotent and good Lord, except its own sin and the justice of its Lord? And what will make it blessed, except its own merit and the reward of its Lord? But even its merit is the grace of him whose reward will be its blessedness. See Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter 24.39; Rom 3:23–24. For it cannot give itself the justice which, lost, it does not have. For this it received when man was founded; and by sinning, surely, it lost it. It receives, then, justice, on account of which it may deserve to receive blessedness. Whence it is truly said to it by the Apostle, as it were beginning to be proud of its own good: for what do you have that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it (1 Cor 4:7)?
deTrin.14.15.21Quando autem bene recordatur Domini sui, Spiritu eius accepto, sentit omnino, quia hoc discit intimo magisterio, nonnisi eius gratuito effectu PL: affectu, “affection.” posse se surgere, nonnisi suo voluntario defectu cadere potuisse. Non sane reminiscitur beatitudinis suae: fuit quippe illa et non est, eiusque ista penitus oblita est; ideoque nec commemorari potest. Credit autem de illa fide dignis Litteris Dei sui, per eius prophetas The PL reads prophetam, “prophet,” that is, Moses. conscriptis, narrantibus de felicitate paradisi, atque illud primum et bonum hominis et malum historica traditione indicantibus. Domini autem Dei sui reminiscitur. (Cf. Deut 8:14) Ille quippe semper est, nec fuit et non est, nec est et non fuit: sed sicut numquam non erit, ita numquam non erat. Et ubique totus est: Cf. On the Trinity 5.1.2; 13.19.24. propter quod ista in illo et vivit, et movetur, et est: (Cf. Acts 17:28) et ideo reminisci eius potest.
But when it well remembers its Lord, his Spirit being received, it perceives wholly—for this it learns by an inmost teaching—that it can rise only by his gratuitous working, PL: affectu, "affection." and that it could fall only by its own voluntary defect. It does not, indeed, remember its blessedness: for that was and is not, and it has utterly forgotten it; and therefore it cannot even be reminded of it. But it believes about it on the strength of the writings of its God, worthy of faith, composed by his prophets, The PL reads prophetam, "prophet," that is, Moses. who tell of the happiness of paradise, and indicate by historical tradition that first good and evil of man. But of the Lord its God it remembers. (See Deut 8:14) For he always is, and was not and is not, nor is and was not: but as he will never not be, so he never was not. And he is wholly everywhere: See On the Trinity 5.1.2; 13.19.24. on account of which it both lives, and moves, and is in him; (See Acts 17:28) and therefore it can remember him.
deTrin.14.15.21Non quia hoc recordatur, quod eum noverat in Adam, aut alibi alicubi ante huius corporis vitam, aut cum primum facta est ut insereretur huic corpori: nihil enim horum omnino reminiscitur; quidquid horum est, oblivione deletum est. Sed commemoratur, ut convertatur ad Dominum, (Cf. Ps 22:27) tamquam ad eam lucem qua etiam cum ab illo averteretur quodam modo tangebatur. Nam hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem, et multa recte reprehendunt recteque laudant in hominum moribus. Cf. Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter 27.48; Expositions of the Psalms 57.1; The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 2.1.1; Cicero, De Re Publica 4, fragment 10.12; De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.22.61.
Not that it recalls this, that it knew him in Adam, or somewhere else before the life of this body, or when it was first made to be implanted in this body: for it remembers none of these things at all; whatever any of these is, has been erased by oblivion. But it is reminded, that it may be turned to the Lord, (See Ps 22:27 (21:28)) as to that light by which, even when it was turned away from him, it was in a certain way touched. For hence it is that even the impious think of eternity, and rightly blame and rightly praise many things in the manners of men. See Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter 27.48; Expositions of the Psalms 57.1; The Lord's Sermon on the Mount 2.1.1; Cicero, De Re Publica 4, fragment 10.12; De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.22.61.
deTrin.14.15.21Quibus ea tandem regulis iudicant, nisi in quibus vident quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat, etiamsi nec ipsi eodem modo vivant? Ubi eas vident? Neque enim in sua natura, cum procul dubio mente ista videantur, eorumque mentes constet esse mutabiles, has vero regulas immutabiles videat, quisquis in eis et hoc videre potuerit; nec in habitu suae mentis, cum illae regulae sint iustitiae, mentes vero eorum constet esse iniustas.
By what rules, then, do they judge, except those in which they see how each one ought to live, even if they themselves do not live in the same way? Where do they see them? For not in their own nature, since these things are surely seen by the mind, and it is agreed that their minds are mutable, but whoever has been able to see this too in them sees these rules to be immutable; nor in the habit of their own mind, since those rules are rules of justice, but it is agreed that their minds are unjust.
deTrin.14.15.21Ubinam sunt istae regulae scriptae, ubi quid sit iustum et iniustus agnoscit, ubi cernit habendum esse quod ipse non habet? Ubi ergo scriptae sunt, nisi in libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur? unde omnis lex iusta describitur, et in cor hominis qui operatur iustitiam, non migrando, sed tamquam imprimendo transfertur; sicut imago ex anulo et in ceram transit, et anulum non relinquit? Cf. On the Trinity 11.2.3.
Where, then, are these rules written, where the unjust man recognizes what is just, where he discerns that he ought to have what he himself does not have? Where, then, are they written, except in the book of that light which is called truth? whence every just law is copied, and is transferred into the heart of the man who works justice, not by migrating, but as it were by being impressed; as the image passes from a ring even into wax, and yet does not leave the ring? See On the Trinity 11.2.3.
deTrin.14.15.21Qui vero non operatur, et tamen videt quid operandum sit, ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur, a qua tamen tangitur. Qui autem nec videt quemadmodum sit vivendum, excusabilius quidem peccat, quia non est transgressor legis incognitae: PL: cognitae legis, “is not a transgressor of a law he knows.” sed etiam ipse splendore aliquoties ubique praesentis veritatis attingitur, quando admonitus confitetur. Cf. Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter 27.48; Expositions of the Psalms 57.1; Jerome, In Hezekiah 9.29; Rom 2:1–29, 4:5, 5:13; 1 Tim 1:13; Jas 2:11; Lev 4:2–28; Num 15:22–29.
But he who does not work justice, and yet sees what is to be done, he is the one who is turned away from that light, by which nevertheless he is touched. But he who does not even see how he ought to live, sins indeed more excusably, because he is not a transgressor of a law unknown to him: PL: cognitae legis, "is not a transgressor of a law he knows." but even he is sometimes touched by the splendor of the everywhere-present truth, when, admonished, he confesses. See Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter 27.48; Expositions of the Psalms 57.1; Jerome, In Hezekiah 9.29; Rom 2:1–29, 4:5, 5:13; 1 Tim 1:13; Jas 2:11; Lev 4:2–28; Num 15:22–29.
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deTrin.14.15.21
16. 22. Qui vero commemorati convertuntur ad Dominum ab ea deformitate, qua per cupiditates saeculares conformabantur huic saeculo, reformantur ex illo, audientes Apostolum dicentem, nolite conformari huic saeculo, sed reformamini in novitate mentis vestrae: ut incipiat illa imago ab illo reformari, a quo formata est. Non enim reformare se ipsam potest, sicut potuit deformare. Dicit etiam alibi, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem, eum qui secundum Deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis. Quod ait, secundum Deum creatum; hoc alio loco dicitur, ad imaginem Dei. (Cf. Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) Sed peccando, iustitiam et sanctitatem veritatis amisit; propter quod haec imago deformis et decolor facta est: hanc recipit, cum reformatur et renovatur.
16. 22. But those who, reminded, are turned to the Lord from that deformity by which, through worldly desires, they were conformed to this age, are reformed from it, hearing the Apostle saying, do not be conformed to this age, but be reformed in the newness of your mind (Rom 12:2): that that image may begin to be reformed by him by whom it was formed. For it cannot reform itself, as it could deform itself. He says also elsewhere, be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who was created according to God in the justice and holiness of truth (Eph 4:23–24). What he says, created according to God, is said in another place, to the image of God. (See Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) But by sinning, it lost the justice and holiness of truth; on account of which this image was made deformed and discolored: this it recovers when it is reformed and renewed.
deTrin.14.16.22Quod autem ait, spiritu mentis vestrae; (Cf. Eph 4:23) non ibi duas res intellegi voluit, quasi aliud sit mens, aliud spiritus mentis: sed quia omnis mens spiritus est, non autem omnis spiritus mens est. Cf. Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 12.7. Est enim Spiritus et Deus, (Cf. John 4:24) qui renovari non potest, quia nec veterascere potest.
But by saying, the spirit of your mind, (See Eph 4:23) he did not wish two things to be understood there, as though the mind were one thing, and the spirit of the mind another: but because every mind is a spirit, but not every spirit is a mind. See Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 12.7. For God too is Spirit, (See John 4:24) who cannot be renewed, because he cannot grow old.
deTrin.14.16.22Dicitur etiam spiritus in homine, qui mens non sit, ad quem pertinent imaginationes similes corporum: de quo dicit ad Corinthios, ubi dicit, si autem oravero lingua, spiritus meus orat, mens autem mea infructuosa est. Hoc enim ait, quando id quod dicitur, non intellegitur: quia nec dici potest, nisi corporalium vocum imagines sonum oris spiritus cogitatione praeveniant.
Spirit is also said of something in man which is not the mind, to which belong the imaginings like bodies: of which he speaks to the Corinthians, where he says, but if I pray in a tongue, my spirit prays, but my mind is unfruitful (1 Cor 14:14). For he says this when what is said is not understood: because it cannot even be said, unless images of corporeal voices precede, by the thought of the spirit, the sound of the mouth.
deTrin.14.16.22Dicitur et hominis anima spiritus: unde est in Evangelio, et inclinato capite tradidit spiritum; quo significata est mors corporis, anima exeunte.
The soul of man too is called spirit: whence it is in the Gospel, and bowing his head, he gave up the spirit (John 19:30); by which the death of the body was signified, the soul going out.
deTrin.14.16.22Dicitur spiritus etiam pecoris, quod in Ecclesiaste libro Salomonis apertissime scriptum est, ubi ait: quis scit spiritus filiorum hominum si ascendet ipse sursum, et spiritus pecoris si descendet ipse deorsum in terram? Scriptum est etiam in Genesi, ubi dicit diluvio mortuam universam carnem, quae habebat in se spiritum vitae.
Spirit is said also of a beast, which is most plainly written in the book of Ecclesiastes of Solomon, where he says: who knows the spirit of the sons of men, whether it goes upward, and the spirit of the beast, whether it goes downward into the earth (Eccl 3:21)? It is also written in Genesis, where it says that by the flood all flesh died which had in it the spirit of life (Gen 7:21–22).
deTrin.14.16.22Dicitur spiritus etiam ventus, res apertissime corporalis: unde illud est in Psalmis: ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus tempestatis.
Spirit is said also of the wind, a most plainly corporeal thing: whence comes that passage in the Psalms: fire, hail, snow, ice, the spirit of the tempest (Ps 148:8).
deTrin.14.16.22Quia ergo tot modis dicitur spiritus, spiritum mentis dicere voluit eum spiritum, quae mens vocatur. Sicut ait etiam idem Apostolus: in exspoliatione corporis carnis. Non duas utique res intellegi voluit, quasi aliud sit caro, aliud corpus carnis: sed quia corpus multarum rerum nomen est quarum nulla caro est (nam multa sunt excepta carne corpora caelestia, et corpora terrestria), corpus carnis dixit, corpus quae caro est. Sic itaque spiritum mentis eum spiritum quae mens est.
Since, then, spirit is said in so many ways, by the spirit of the mind he wished to mean that spirit which is called the mind. Just as the same Apostle also says: in the stripping off of the body of the flesh (Col 2:11). He did not, surely, wish two things to be understood, as though the flesh were one thing, the body of the flesh another: but because "body" is the name of many things, none of which is flesh (for there are many bodies besides flesh, both celestial bodies and terrestrial bodies), he said "the body of the flesh," the body which is flesh. So, then, he said "the spirit of the mind," that spirit which is the mind.
deTrin.14.16.22Alibi quoque apertius etiam imaginem nominavit, scilicet aliis verbis idipsum praecipiens: exspoliantes vos, inquit, veterem hominem cum actibus eius, induite novum hominem, qui renovatur in agnitione Dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum. Quod ergo ibi legitur, induite novum hominem qui secundum Deum creatus, est; hoc isto loco: induite novum hominem, qui renovatur secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum. (Cf. Col 3:9) Ibi autem ait, secundum Deum; hic vero, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum. Pro eo vero quod ibi posuit, in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis; hoc posuit hic, in agnitione Dei. Fit ergo ista renovatio reformatioque mentis secundum Deum, vel secundum imaginem Dei.
Elsewhere too he even more openly named the image, namely, enjoining the same thing in other words: stripping off, he says, the old man with his deeds, put on the new man, who is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him (Col 3:9–10). What, then, is read there, put on the new man, who was created according to God; is, in this place: put on the new man, who is renewed according to the image of him who created him. (See Col 3:9) But there he says, according to God; here, according to the image of him who created him. And for what he there set down, in the justice and holiness of truth; he set down here, in the knowledge of God. This renewal and reformation of the mind, then, comes about according to God, or according to the image of God.
deTrin.14.16.22Sed ideo dicitur secundum Deum, ne secundum aliam creaturam fieri putetur; ideo autem, secundum imaginem Dei, ut in ea re intellegatur fieri haec renovatio, ubi est imago Dei, id est in mente. Quemadmodum dicimus, “secundum corpus mortuum,” non secundum spiritum, eum qui de corpore fidelis et iustus abscedit. Quid enim dicimus secundum corpus mortuum, nisi corpore vel in corpore, non anima vel in anima mortuum? Aut si dicamus: “secundum corpus est pulcher”; aut: “secundum corpus fortis, non secundum animum”; quid est aliud, quam: “corpore, non animo pulcher aut fortis est”? Et innumerabiliter ita loquimur. Non itaque sic intellegamus, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum, quasi alia sit imago secundum quam renovatur, non ipsa quae renovatur.
But it is said according to God, lest it be thought to come about according to some other creature; and according to the image of God, that this renewal may be understood to come about in that thing where the image of God is, that is, in the mind. Just as we say, "dead according to the body," not according to the spirit, of one who, faithful and just, departs from the body. For what do we mean by "dead according to the body," except dead in body or in the body, not in soul or in the soul? Or if we say: "he is handsome according to the body"; or: "brave according to the body, not according to the mind"; what is this other than: "he is handsome or brave in body, not in mind"? And we speak thus in countless cases. Let us not, then, so understand according to the image of him who created him, as though the image according to which it is renewed were one thing, and not the very thing which is renewed.
deTrin.14.16.2217. 23. Sane ista renovatio non momento uno fit ipsius conversionis, sicut momento uno fit illa in Baptismo renovatio remissione omnium peccatorum: (Cf. Mark 1:4; Luke 3:3; Acts 2:38) neque enim vel unum quantulumcumque remanet quod non remittatur. Sed quemadmodum aliud est carere febribus, aliud ab infirmitate, quae febribus facta est, revalescere; itemque aliud est infixum telum de corpore demere, aliud vulnus quod eo factum est secunda curatione sanare: ita prima curatio est causam removere languoris, quod per omnium fit indulgentiam peccatorum; secunda ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit paulatim proficiendo in renovatione huius imaginis: quae duo demonstrantur in Psalmo, ubi legitur, qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis; quod fit in Baptismo; deinde sequitur, qui sanat omnes languores tuos; quod fit quotidianis accessibus, cum haec imago renovatur. De qua re Apostolus apertissime locutus est, dicens: et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, sed interior renovatur de die in diem. Renovatur autem in agnitione Dei, hoc est, in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis; sicut sese habent apostolica testimonia quae paulo ante commemoravi.
17. 23. Surely this renewal does not come about in the one moment of conversion itself, as that renewal in Baptism comes about in one moment by the remission of all sins: (See Mark 1:4; Luke 3:3; Acts 2:38) for there does not remain even one thing, however small, that is not remitted. But just as it is one thing to be free of fevers, another to recover from the weakness which the fevers have caused; and likewise it is one thing to draw out a weapon fixed in the body, another to heal by a second treatment the wound which it made: so the first treatment is to remove the cause of the languor, which comes about through the forgiveness of all sins; the second is to heal the languor itself, which comes about by advancing little by little in the renewal of this image: which two things are shown in the Psalm, where it is read, who is merciful to all your iniquities; which comes about in Baptism; then follows, who heals all your languors (Ps 103:3 (102:3)); which comes about by daily increments, when this image is renewed. Of which matter the Apostle has spoken most openly, saying: and though our outer man is corrupted, yet the inner is renewed from day to day (2 Cor 4:16). But it is renewed in the knowledge of God, that is, in the justice and holiness of truth; as the apostolic testimonies which I mentioned a little before have it.
deTrin.14.17.23In agnitione igitur Dei, iustitiaque et sanctitate veritatis, qui de die in diem proficiendo renovatur, transfert amorem a temporalibus ad aeterna, a visibilibus ad intellegibilia, a carnalibus ad spiritalia; atque ab istis cupiditatem frenare atque minuere, illisque se caritate alligare diligenter insistit. Tantum autem facit, quantum divinitus adiuvatur. Dei quippe sententia est, sine me nihil potestis facere. In quo profectu et accessu tenentem Mediatoris fidem cum dies vitae huius ultimus quemque compererit, perducendus ad Deum quem coluit, et ab eo perficiendus excipietur ab angelis sanctis, incorruptibile corpus in fine saeculi non ad poenam, sed ad gloriam recepturus.
In the knowledge of God, then, and the justice and holiness of truth, he who, advancing from day to day, is renewed, transfers his love from temporal things to eternal, from visible to intelligible, from carnal to spiritual; and diligently presses on to bridle and diminish desire for the former, and to bind himself to the latter by love. But he does as much as he is divinely aided. For it is God's sentence, without me you can do nothing (John 15:5). In which advance and increase, when the last day of this life shall find each one holding the faith of the Mediator, he, to be led to the God whom he worshiped, and to be perfected by him, will be received by the holy angels, about to receive at the end of the age an incorruptible body, not for punishment, but for glory.
deTrin.14.17.23In hac quippe imagine tunc perfecta erit Dei similitudo, (Cf. Gen 5:1; Jas 3:9) quando Dei perfecta erit visio. De qua dicit Apostolus Paulus: videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Item dicit, nos autem revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes, in eamdem imaginem transformamur de gloria in gloriam, tamquam a Domini spiritu: hoc est quod fit de die in diem bene proficientibus.
For in this image the likeness of God will then be perfect, (See Gen 5:1; Jas 3:9) when the vision of God will be perfect. Of which the Apostle Paul says: we now see through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face (1 Cor 13:12). Likewise he says, but we, beholding with unveiled face the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord (2 Cor 3:18): this is what comes about from day to day in those who advance well.
deTrin.14.17.2318. 24. Apostolus autem Ioannes, dilectissimi, inquit, nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit, quid erimus: scimus PL adds autem, “but we know.” quia cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est.
18. 24. But the Apostle John says, most beloved, now we are sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be: we know PL adds autem, "but we know." that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is (1 John 3:2).
deTrin.14.18.24Hinc apparet tunc in ista imagine Dei fieri eius plenam similitudinem, quando eius plenam perceperit visionem. Quamquam possit hoc a Ioanne apostolo etiam de immortalitate corporis dictum videri. (Cf. 1 John 3:2) Et in hac quippe similes erimus Deo, sed tantummodo Filio, quia solus in Trinitate corpus accepit, in quo mortuus resurrexit, atque id ad superna pervexit. Nam dicitur etiam ista imago Filii Dei, in qua sicut ille immortale corpus habebimus, conformes facti in hac parte, non Patris imaginis aut Spiritus Sancti, sed tantummodo Filii, quia de hoc solo legitur, et fide sanissima accipitur, Verbum caro factum est.
Hence it appears that the full likeness of God will then come to be in this image of God, when it shall have received the full vision of him. Although this may seem to have been said by the apostle John even of the immortality of the body. (See 1 John 3:2) For in this too we shall be like God, but only like the Son, because he alone in the Trinity received a body, in which, having died, he rose again, and carried it up to the heights. For this image too is called the image of the Son of God, in which we shall, like him, have an immortal body, made conformed in this part not to the image of the Father or of the Holy Spirit, but only of the Son, because of him alone it is read, and received by a most sound faith, the Word was made flesh (John 1:14).
deTrin.14.18.24Propter quod Apostolus, quos ante, inquit, praescivit et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Primogenitus utique a mortuis secundum eumdem Apostolum, qua morte seminata est caro eius in contumelia, resurrexit in gloria. Secundum hanc imaginem Filii, cui per immortalitatem conformamur in corpore, etiam illud agimus quod dicit idem Apostolus: sicut portavimus imaginem terreni, portemus et imaginem eius qui de caelo est: ut scilicet qui secundum Adam mortales fuimus, secundum Christum immortales nos futuros, fide vera et spe certa firmaque teneamus. Sic enim nunc eamdem imaginem portare possumus, nondum in visione, sed in fide; nondum in re, sed in spe. De corporis quippe resurrectione tunc loquebatur Apostolus, cum haec diceret. (Cf. 1 Cor 15:45–58)
On account of which the Apostle says, those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he himself might be the firstborn among many brothers (Rom 8:29). Firstborn, surely, from the dead (Col 1:18), according to the same Apostle, by which death his flesh was sown in dishonor, and rose again in glory. According to this image of the Son, to which we are conformed by immortality in the body, we also do that which the same Apostle says: as we have borne the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of him who is from heaven (1 Cor 15:49): namely, that we who were mortal according to Adam should hold, by true faith and sure and firm hope, that we shall be immortal according to Christ. For so now we can bear that same image, not yet in vision, but in faith; not yet in fact, but in hope. For the Apostle was speaking of the resurrection of the body, when he said these things. (See 1 Cor 15:45–58)
deTrin.14.18.2419. 25. At vero illa imago, de qua dictum est, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; quia non dictum est, “ad meam,” vel, “ad tuam”: ad imaginem Trinitatis factum hominem credimus, et quanta potuimus investigatione comprehendimus. Et ideo secundum hanc potius et illud intellegendum est quod ait Apostolus Ioannes, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est: quia et de illo dixit, de quo dixerat, filii Dei sumus.
19. 25. But that image, of which it was said, let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen 1:26)—since it was not said, "to my," or, "to your"—we believe man was made to the image of the Trinity, and have grasped this with as much investigation as we could. And therefore according to this rather is that too to be understood which the apostle John says, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is (1 John 3:2): because he said it of him of whom he had said, we are sons of God (1 John 3:2).
deTrin.14.19.25Et immortalitas carnis illo perficietur momento resurrectionis, de quo ait Apostolus Paulus, in ictu oculi, in novissima tuba, et mortui resurgent incorrupti; et nos immutabimur. In ipso namque ictu oculi ante iudicium resurget in virtute, in incorruptione, in gloria (Cf. 1 Cor 15:42–44) corpus spiritale, quod nunc seminatur in infirmitate, corruptione, contumelia corpus animale. Imago vero quae renovatur in spiritu mentis in agnitione Dei, (Cf. Eph 4:23; Col 3:10; 2 Cor 4:16) non exterius, sed interius de die in diem, ipsa perficietur visione, quae tunc erit post iudicium facie ad faciem, nunc autem proficit per speculum in aenigmate. (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12)
And the immortality of the flesh will be perfected in that moment of the resurrection of which the Apostle Paul says, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet, and the dead shall rise incorruptible; and we shall be changed (1 Cor 15:52). For in that very twinkling of an eye, before the judgment, the spiritual body, which is now sown in weakness, corruption, dishonor, an animal body, shall rise in power, in incorruption, in glory. (See 1 Cor 15:42–44) But the image which is renewed in the spirit of the mind in the knowledge of God, (See Eph 4:23; Col 3:10; 2 Cor 4:16) not outwardly but inwardly from day to day, will be perfected by that very vision, which will then be, after the judgment, face to face; but now it advances through a mirror in an enigma. (See 1 Cor 13:12)
deTrin.14.19.25Propter cuius perfectionem dictum intellegendum est, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. Hoc enim donum tunc nobis dabitur, cum dictum fuerit, venite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete paratum vobis regnum. Tunc quippe tolletur impius, ut non videat claritatem Domini, quando ibunt sinistri in supplicium aeternum, euntibus dextris in vitam aeternam. (Cf. Isa 26:10; Matt 25:46) Haec est autem, sicut ait Veritas, vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, inquit, unum verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum.
On account of the perfection of which that saying is to be understood, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is (1 John 3:2). For this gift will then be given to us, when it shall have been said, come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you (Matt 25:34). For then the impious one will be taken away, that he may not see the brightness of the Lord, when those on the left shall go into eternal punishment, those on the right going into eternal life. (See Isa 26:10; Matt 25:46) But this is, as the Truth says, eternal life, that they may know you, he says, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom you sent (John 17:3).
deTrin.14.19.2519. 26. Hanc contemplativam sapientiam, quam proprie puto in Litteris Sanctis a scientia distinctam sapientiam nuncupari, dumtaxat hominis, quae quidem illi non est, nisi ab illo cuius participatione vere sapiens fieri mens rationalis et intellectualis potest, Cicero commendans in fine dialogi Hortensii:
19. 26. This contemplative wisdom—which I think is, properly, the wisdom called in the Holy Writings as distinct from knowledge, the wisdom, at least, of man, which is not his except from him by participation in whom the rational and intellectual mind can become truly wise—Cicero, commending it at the end of the dialogue Hortensius, says:
deTrin.14.19.26Quae nobis, inquit, dies noctesque considerantibus, acuentibusque intellegentiam, quae est mentis acies, caventibusque ne quando illa hebescat, id est, in philosophia viventibus magna spes est, aut si hoc quod sentimus et sapimus mortale et caducum est, iucundum nobis perfunctis muneribus humanis occasum, neque molestam exstinctionem, et quasi quietem vitae fore: aut si, ut antiquis philosophis hisque maximis longeque clarissimis placuit, aeternos animos ac divinos habemus, sic existimandum est, quo magis hi fuerint semper in suo cursu, id est, in ratione et investigandi cupiditate, et quo minus se admiscuerint atque implicaverint hominum vitiis et erroribus, hoc his faciliorem ascensum et reditum in caelum fore. Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 97.
For us who consider these things day and night, and sharpen the understanding, which is the edge of the mind, and take care that it does not at any time grow dull—that is, for us who live in philosophy—there is great hope, that either, if this which we feel and taste is mortal and perishable, our setting, when we have discharged our human duties, will be pleasant, and our extinction not troublesome, and as it were a rest of life: or, if, as it pleased the ancient philosophers, and those the greatest and by far the most renowned, we have eternal and divine souls, then it must be thought that the more these have always been in their own course, that is, in reason and the desire of investigating, and the less they have mingled and entangled themselves in the vices and errors of men, the easier will their ascent and return to heaven be Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 97..
deTrin.14.19.26Deinde addens hanc ipsam clausulam, repetendoque sermonem finiens: quapropter, inquit, ut aliquando terminetur oratio, si aut exstingui tranquille volumus, cum in his artibus vixerimus, aut si ex hac in aliam haud paulo meliorem domum sine mora demigrare, in his studiis nobis omnis opera et cura ponenda est.
Then, adding this very conclusion, and ending his discourse by repeating it, he says: wherefore, that the speech may at length be brought to a close, if we wish either to be tranquilly extinguished, when we have lived amid these arts, or to migrate without delay from this home into another by no little better one, in these studies all our labor and care is to be placed Cicero, Hortensius, fragm. 97..
deTrin.14.19.26Hic miror hominem tanti ingenii, perfunctis muneribus humanis, hominibus in philosophia viventibus, quae contemplatione veritatis beatos facit, iucundum promittere occasum, “si hoc quod sentimus et sapimus mortale et caducum est”: quasi hoc moriatur et intercidat quod non diligebamus, vel potius quod atrociter oderamus, ut iucundus nobis sit eius occasus. Verum hoc non didicerat a philosophis, quos magnis laudibus praedicat; sed ex illa nova Academia, ubi ei dubitare etiam de rebus manifestissimis placuit, ista sententia redolebat.
Here I marvel that a man of so great a talent promises to men living in philosophy—which makes men blessed by the contemplation of truth—a pleasant setting, when they have discharged their human duties, "if this which we feel and taste is mortal and perishable": as though that should die and fall away which we did not love, or rather which we fiercely hated, so that its setting should be pleasant to us. But this he had not learned from the philosophers whom he extols with great praises; rather, this opinion smelled of that New Academy, where it pleased him to doubt even about the most manifest things.
deTrin.14.19.26A philosophis autem, sicut ipse confitetur, maximis longeque clarissimis, aeternos animos esse acceperat. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 42–43; Phaedrus 24; Republic 611a. Aeterni quippe animi non inconvenienter hac exhortatione excitantur, ut in suo cursu reperiantur, cum venerit vitae huius extremum, id est, in ratione et investigandi cupiditate, minusque se admisceant atque implicent hominum vitiis et erroribus, ut eis facilior sit regressus ad Deum. Sed iste cursus qui constituitur in amore atque investigatione veritatis, non sufficit miseris, id est, omnibus cum ista sola ratione mortalibus sine fide Mediatoris: quod in libris superioribus huius operis, maxime in quarto et tertio decimo, quantum potui, demonstrare curavi.
But from the philosophers, as he himself confesses, the greatest and by far the most renowned, he had received that souls are eternal. See Plato, Timaeus 42–43; Phaedrus 24; Republic 611a. For eternal souls are not unfittingly roused by this exhortation, that they may be found in their own course, when the end of this life shall have come, that is, in reason and the desire of investigating, and may less mingle and entangle themselves in the vices and errors of men, that their return to God may be easier for them. But this course, which is set in the love and investigation of truth, does not suffice for the wretched, that is, for all mortals who have this reason alone, without the faith of the Mediator: which, in the earlier books of this work, especially in the fourth and thirteenth, I have taken care, as far as I could, to demonstrate.
deTrin.14.19.26Bk. 15Augustine Wishes to Exercise the Reader in the Things That Have Been Made, That He May, If He Can, Understand the TrinitLectorem exercere vult Augustinus in rebus quae factae sunt, ut Trinitatem, si potest, ratione intellegat.
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1. 1. Volentes in rebus quae factae sunt ad cognoscendum eum a quo factae sunt, exercere lectorem, iam pervenimus ad eius imaginem, quod est homo, in eo quo ceteris animalibus antecellit, id est ratione vel intellegentia, et quidquid aliud de anima rationali vel intellectuali dici potest, quod pertineat ad eam rem quae mens vocatur vel animus. Cf. Varro, Antiquitates, in Augustine, The City of God 7.23; Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, 5.13.36. Quo nomine nonnulli auctores linguae latinae, id quod excellit in homine, et non est in pecore, ab anima quae inest et pecori, suo quodam loquendi more distinguunt. Cf. Cicero, De Oratore 3.18.67; De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, 5.12.34, 13.36; De Re Publica 6.9.9; Julius Caesar, The Gallic War 3.19.6, 6.5.1; Lucretius, De rerum natura 3.94; Sallust, The War With Jugurtha 11.8; Seneca, On the Happy Life 15.5; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 1.9.13. Supra hanc ergo naturam, si quaerimus aliquid, et verum quaerimus, Deus est, natura scilicet non creata, sed creatrix. Quae utrum sit Trinitas, non solum credentibus, Divinae Scripturae auctoritate; verum etiam intellegentibus, aliqua, si possumus, ratione iam demonstrare debemus. Cur autem “si possumus” dixerim, res ipsa cum quaeri disputando coeperit, melius indicabit.
1. 1. Wishing to exercise the reader in the things that have been made, toward knowing him by whom they were made, we have now come to his image, which is man, in that by which he excels the other animals, that is, reason or understanding, and whatever else can be said of the rational or intellectual soul, which pertains to that thing which is called the mind or animus. See Varro, Antiquitates, in Augustine, The City of God 7.23; Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.13.36. By which name some authors of the Latin tongue distinguish, by a certain manner of speaking of their own, that which excels in man, and is not in a beast, from the soul (anima) which is also in a beast. See Cicero, De Oratore 3.18.67; De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.12.34, 13.36; De Re Publica 6.9.9; Julius Caesar, The Gallic War 3.19.6, 6.5.1; Lucretius, De rerum natura 3.94; Sallust, The War with Jugurtha 11.8; Seneca, On the Happy Life 15.5; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 1.9.13. Above this nature, then, if we seek something, and seek the truth, it is God: a nature, namely, not created, but creating. Whether this is a Trinity, we ought now to demonstrate, not only to those who believe, by the authority of Divine Scripture, but also to those who understand, by some reason, if we can. But why I have said "if we can," the matter itself will better indicate when it has begun to be sought by discussion.
deTrin.15.1.12. 2. Deus quippe ipse quem quaerimus adiuvabit, ut spero, ne sit infructuosus labor noster, et intellegamus quemadmodum dictum sit in Psalmo sacro: laetetur cor quaerentium Dominum: quaerite Dominum, et confirmamini; quaerite faciem eius semper. Videtur enim, quod semper quaeritur, numquam inveniri: et quomodo iam laetabitur, et non potius contristabitur cor quaerentium, si non potuerint invenire quod quaerunt? Non enim ait: “laetetur cor invenientium”; sed, quaerentium Dominum. (Cf. 1 Chron 16:10) Et tamen Dominum Deum inveniri posse dum quaeritur, testatur Isaias propheta, dum dicit, quaerite Dominum, et mox ut inveneritis, invocate eum: et cum appropinquaverit vobis, derelinquat impius vias suas, et vir iniquus cogitationes suas.
2. 2. For God himself, whom we seek, will help, as I hope, that our labor be not fruitless, and that we may understand how it was said in the sacred Psalm: let the heart of those who seek the Lord rejoice: seek the Lord, and be strengthened; seek his face always (Ps 105:3–4 (104:3–4)). For it seems that what is always sought is never found: and how then will the heart of those who seek rejoice, and not rather be saddened, if they have not been able to find what they seek? For it does not say: "let the heart of those who find rejoice"; but, of those who seek the Lord. (See 1 Chr 16:10) And yet the prophet Isaiah testifies that the Lord God can be found while he is sought, when he says, seek the Lord, and as soon as you have found him, call upon him: and when he has drawn near to you, let the impious one forsake his ways, and the unjust man his thoughts (Isa 55:6–7).
deTrin.15.2.2Si ergo quaesitus inveniri potest, cur dictum est, quaerite faciem eius semper? (Cf. Ps 105:4) An et inventus forte quaerendus est? Sic enim sunt incomprehensibilia requirenda, ne se existimet nihil invenisse, qui quam sit incomprehensibile quod quaerebat, potuerit invenire.
If, then, he can be found when sought, why was it said, seek his face always (See Ps 105:4 (104:4))? Or is he perhaps to be sought even when found? For incomprehensible things are to be sought in such a way that he who has been able to find how incomprehensible was what he was seeking may not think he has found nothing.
deTrin.15.2.2Cur ergo sic quaerit, si incomprehensibile comprehendit esse quod quaerit, nisi quia cessandum non est, quamdiu in ipsa incomprehensibilium rerum inquisitione proficitur, et melior meliorque fit quaerens tam magnum bonum, quod et inveniendum quaeritur, et quaerendum invenitur? Nam et quaeritur ut inveniatur dulcius, et invenitur ut quaeratur avidius.
Why, then, does he so seek, if he comprehends that what he seeks is incomprehensible, except that he must not cease as long as he advances in the very inquiry into incomprehensible things, and the seeker becomes better and better, seeking so great a good, which is both sought to be found and found to be sought? For it is both sought that it may be found more sweetly, and found that it may be sought more eagerly.
deTrin.15.2.2Secundum hoc accipi potest, quod dictum est in libro Ecclesiastico dicere sapientiam: qui me manducant, adhuc esurient; et qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient. Manducant enim et bibunt, quia inveniunt; et quia esuriunt ac sitiunt, adhuc quaerunt. Fides quaerit, intellectus invenit: propter quod ait propheta, nisi credideritis, non intellegetis. Et rursus intellectus eum quem invenit adhuc quaerit: Deus enim respexit super filios hominum, sicut in Psalmo sacro canitur, ut videret si est intellegens, aut requirens Deum. Ad hoc ergo debet homo esse intellegens, ut requirat Deum.
According to this can be received what was said in the book of Ecclesiasticus, that wisdom says: those who eat me shall still hunger, and those who drink me shall still thirst (Sir 24:21 (24:29)). For they eat and drink, because they find; and because they hunger and thirst, they still seek. Faith seeks, understanding finds: on account of which the prophet says, unless you believe, you will not understand (Isa 7:9). And again, understanding still seeks him whom it has found: for God looked down upon the sons of men, as is sung in the sacred Psalm, to see if there is one who understands, or who seeks God (Ps 14:2 (13:2)). To this end, then, ought man to be understanding, that he may seek God.
deTrin.15.2.22. 3. Satis itaque remorati fuerimus in iis quae Deus fecit, (Cf. Wis 13:5) ut per ea cognosceretur ipse qui fecit: invisibilia enim eius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Unde arguuntur in libro Sapientiae, qui de iis quae videntur bona, non potuerunt scire eum qui est, neque operibus attendentes agnoverunt artificem; sed aut ignem, aut spiritum, aut citatum aerem, aut gyrum stellarum, aut violentiam aquarum, aut luminaria caeli, rectores orbis terrarum deos putaverunt: quorum quidem si specie delectati haec deos putaverunt, sciant quanto Dominator eorum melior est. Speciei enim generator ea creavit. Aut si virtutem et operationem eorum mirati sunt, intellegant ab his quanto qui haec constituit fortior est. A magnitudine enim speciei et creaturae cognoscibiliter poterit PL: poterat, “could.” horum Creator videri. Haec de libro Sapientiae propterea posui, ne me fidelium quispiam frustra et inaniter existimet in creatura prius per quasdam sui generis trinitates quodam modo gradatim, donec ad mentem hominis pervenirem, quaesisse indicia summae illius Trinitatis, quam quaerimus cum Deum quaerimus. (Cf. Acts 17:27; 1 Chron 16:11; Ps 69:33, 105:4; Isa 55:6)
2. 3. We shall, then, have lingered long enough in the things that God made, (See Wis 13:5) that through them he himself who made them might be known: for his invisible things, from the creation of the world, are beheld, understood through the things that have been made (Rom 1:20). Whence in the book of Wisdom are reproved those who from the good things that are seen could not know him who is, nor, attending to the works, recognize the craftsman; but thought either fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the violence of the waters, or the lights of heaven, to be the gods that govern the world: by whose beauty if, delighted, they thought these to be gods, let them know how much better is the Lord of them. For the begetter of beauty created these things. Or if they marveled at their power and working, let them understand from these how much stronger is he who established them. For from the greatness of the beauty and of the creature the Creator of these things can PL: poterat, "could." knowably be seen (Wis 13:1–5). I have set down these things from the book of Wisdom for this reason, lest any of the faithful should think that I have in vain and emptily sought, in creation, first through certain trinities of its own kind, in a certain way step by step, until I came to the mind of man, for signs of that highest Trinity which we seek when we seek God. (See Acts 17:27; 1 Chr 16:11; Ps 69:32 (68:33), 105:4 (104:4); Isa 55:6)
deTrin.15.2.3C
deTrin.15.2.3
3. 4. Sed quoniam disserendi et ratiocinandi necessitas per quattuordecim libros multa nos dicere compulit, quae cuncta simul aspicere non valemus, ut ad id quod apprehendere volumus, ea celeri cogitatione referamus; faciam quantum Domino adiuvante potuero, ut quidquid in singulis voluminibus ad cognitionem disputatione perduxi, remota disputatione breviter congeram, et tamquam sub uno mentis aspectu, non quemadmodum res quaeque persuasit, sed ipsa quae persuasa sunt ponam: ne tam longe sint a praecedentibus consequentia, ut oblivionem praecedentium faciat inspectio consequentium; aut certe si fecerit, cito possit quod exciderit relegendo recolligi.
3. 4. But since the necessity of discoursing and reasoning has compelled us through fourteen books to say many things which we cannot all behold at once, so that we may, by a swift thought, refer them to that which we wish to apprehend, I will do, as far as I can with the Lord's help, this: that whatever in the several volumes I brought by discussion to knowledge, I will, the discussion set aside, briefly gather together, and set down, as it were under one gaze of the mind, not how each thing was made convincing, but the very things that were made convincing: lest the things that follow be so far from those that precede that the inspection of what follows should cause forgetfulness of what precedes; or at least, if it should, what has slipped away may be quickly recovered by rereading.
deTrin.15.3.43. 5. In primo libro secundum Scripturas sacras unitas et aequalitas summae illius Trinitatis ostenditur. Cf. On the Trinity 1.4.7.
3. 5. In the first book, according to the sacred Scriptures, the unity and equality of that highest Trinity is shown. See On the Trinity 1.4.7.
deTrin.15.3.5In secundo et tertio et quarto, eadem: sed de Filii missione et Spiritus Sancti diligenter quaestio pertractata tres libros fecit; demonstratumque est non ideo minorem mittente qui missus est, quia ille misit, hic missus est, cum Trinitas quae per omnia aequalis est, pariter quoque in sua natura immutabilis et invisibilis et ubique praesens inseparabiliter operetur. Cf. On the Trinity 2.5, 3.10.19–21, 4.21.30.
In the second, third, and fourth, the same: but the question, diligently treated, of the mission of the Son and of the Holy Spirit made three books; and it was demonstrated that he who was sent is not for that reason less than he who sent, because the one sent and the other was sent, since the Trinity, which is in all things equal, likewise also, in its nature immutable and invisible and everywhere present, works inseparably. See On the Trinity 2.5, 3.10.19–21, 4.21.30.
deTrin.15.3.5In quinto, propter eos quibus ideo videtur non eamdem Patris et Filii esse substantiam, quia omne quod de Deo dicitur, secundum substantiam dici putant, et propterea gignere et gigni, vel genitum esse et ingenitum, quoniam diversa sunt, contendunt substantias esse diversas, Cf. On the Trinity 5.3.4.
In the fifth, on account of those to whom it therefore seems that the substance of the Father and of the Son is not the same, because they think that everything said of God is said according to substance, and therefore, since to beget and to be begotten, or the begotten and the unbegotten, are different, contend that the substances are different, See On the Trinity 5.3.4.
deTrin.15.3.5demonstratur non omne quod de Deo dicitur secundum substantiam dici, sicut secundum substantiam dicitur bonus et magnus, et si quid aliud ad se dicitur; sed dici etiam relative, id est non ad se, sed ad aliquid Cf. Aristotle, Categories 7.6a36–8b24; Pseudo-Augustine, Aristotle’s Ten Categories 11. quod ipse non est; sicut Pater ad Filium dicitur, vel Dominus ad creaturam sibi servientem; (Cf. Wis 16:24; Rom 1:25)
it is demonstrated that not everything said of God is said according to substance, as he is called good and great according to substance, and whatever else is said with reference to himself; but that some things are said also relatively, that is, not with reference to himself, but to something See Aristotle, Categories 7.6a36–8b24; Pseudo-Augustine, Aristotle's Ten Categories 11. that he himself is not; as the Father is said with reference to the Son, or the Lord with reference to the creature serving him; (See Wis 16:24; Rom 1:25)
deTrin.15.3.5ubi si quid relative, id est ad aliquid quod ipse non est, etiam ex tempore dicitur, sicuti est, Domine, refugium factus es nobis, nihil ei accidere quo mutetur, sed omnino ipsum in natura vel essentia sua immutabilem permanere. Cf. On the Trinity 5.5.6.
where, if anything is said relatively, that is, with reference to something that he himself is not, even from time, as is, Lord, you have become a refuge for us (Ps 90:1 (89:1)), nothing happens to him by which he is changed, but he himself remains altogether immutable in his nature or essence. See On the Trinity 5.5.6.
deTrin.15.3.5In sexto, quomodo dictus sit Christus ore Apostolico, Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, sic disputatur, ut differatur eadem quaestio diligentius retractanda: utrum a quo est genitus Christus, non sit ipse sapientia, sed tantum Sapientiae suae Pater, an sapientia Sapientiam genuerit. Cf. On the Trinity 6.1.1–3.
In the sixth, how Christ was called by the apostolic mouth the power of God and the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24) is so discussed that the same question is deferred to be more diligently treated again: whether he by whom Christ was begotten is not himself wisdom, but only the Father of his Wisdom, or whether wisdom begot Wisdom. See On the Trinity 6.1.1–3.
deTrin.15.3.5Sed quodlibet horum esset, etiam in hoc libro apparuit Trinitatis aequalitas, et non Deus triplex, sed Trinitas: nec quasi aliquid duplum esse Patrem et Filium ad simplum Spiritum Sanctum; ubi nec tria plus aliquid sunt quam unum horum. Cf. On the Trinity 6.3.4. Disputatum est etiam quomodo possit intellegi quod ait Hilarius episcopus: aeternitas in Patre, species in Imagine, usus in Munere. Hilary, On the Trinity 2.1.1; cf. On the Trinity 6.10.11–12.
But whichever of these it might be, even in this book the equality of the Trinity appeared, and that God is not threefold, but a Trinity: nor that the Father and the Son are as it were something double in relation to the single Holy Spirit; where neither are the three anything more than one of them. See On the Trinity 6.3.4. It was discussed also how can be understood what Bishop Hilary says: eternity in the Father, beauty in the Image, use in the Gift Hilary, On the Trinity 2.1.1; see On the Trinity 6.10.11–12..
deTrin.15.3.5In septimo, quaestio quae dilata fuerat, explicatur, ita ut Deus qui genuit Filium, non solum sit Pater virtutis et sapientiae suae, sed etiam ipse virtus atque sapientia; sic et Spiritus Sanctus: nec tamen simul tres sint virtutes aut tres sapientiae, sed una virtus et una sapientia, sicut unus Deus et una essentia. Cf. On the Trinity 7.1.1–3.6. Deinde quaesitum est, quomodo dicantur una essentia, tres personae, vel a quibusdam Graecis una essentia, tres substantiae: Plato, in Porphyry, History of Philosophy 4; Basil, Epistles 38, 236; Tertullian, Apology 21; Against Praxeas 2.26; Jerome, Epistle 15.3–5. et inventum est elocutionis necessitate dici, ut aliquo uno nomine enuntiarentur, cum quaeritur quid tres sint, quos tres esse veraciter confitemur, Patrem scilicet, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum. Cf. On the Trinity 7.4.7–9.
In the seventh, the question which had been deferred is set forth, in such a way that God who begot the Son is not only the Father of his power and wisdom, but also is himself power and wisdom; and so too the Holy Spirit: nor yet are there together three powers or three wisdoms, but one power and one wisdom, as one God and one essence. See On the Trinity 7.1.1–3.6. Then it was asked how they are said to be one essence, three persons, or, by some Greeks, one essence, three substances: Plato, in Porphyry, History of Philosophy 4; Basil, Epistles 38, 236; Tertullian, Apology 21; Against Praxeas 2.26; Jerome, Epistle 15.3–5. and it was found that this is said by the necessity of expression, so that they might be uttered by some one name, when it is asked what the three are, whom we truly confess to be three—namely, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. See On the Trinity 7.4.7–9.
deTrin.15.3.5In octavo, ratione etiam reddita intellegentibus clarum est, in substantia veritatis non solum Patrem Filio non esse maiorem, sed nec ambos simul aliquid maius esse quam solum Spiritum Sanctum, aut quoslibet duos in eadem Trinitate maius esse aliquid quam unum, aut omnes simul tres maius aliquid esse quam singulos. Deinde per veritatem quae intellecta conspicitur, et per bonum summum a quo est omne bonum, et per iustitiam propter quam diligitur animus iustus ab animo etiam nondum iusto, ut natura non solum incorporalis, verum etiam incommutabilis quod est Deus, quantum fieri potest, intellegeretur admonui: et per caritatem, quae in Scripturis Sanctis Deus dicta est, per quam coepit utcumque etiam Trinitas intellegentibus apparere, sicut sunt amans, et quod amatur, et amor. Cf. On the Trinity 8.3.4.
In the eighth, with reason rendered also to those who understand, it is clear that in the substance of truth not only is the Father not greater than the Son, but also the two together are not anything greater than the Holy Spirit alone, nor are any two in the same Trinity anything greater than one, nor are all three together anything greater than each one. Then, through the truth which is beheld when understood, and through the highest good from which is every good, and through the justice on account of which a just mind is loved by a mind not yet just, I admonished that the nature not only incorporeal but also incommutable, which is God, might, as far as can be, be understood: and through love, which in the Holy Scriptures is called God, through which the Trinity too began somehow to appear to those who understand, as there are the lover, and what is loved, and love. See On the Trinity 8.3.4.
deTrin.15.3.5In nono, ad imaginem Dei, quod est homo secundum mentem, pervenit disputatio: et in ea quaedam trinitas invenitur, id est, mens, et notitia qua se novit, et amor quo se notitiamque suam diligit; et haec tria aequalia inter se, et unius ostenduntur esse essentiae. Cf. On the Trinity 9.4.4.
In the ninth, the discussion came to the image of God, which is man according to the mind: and in it a certain trinity is found, that is, the mind, and the acquaintance by which it knows itself, and the love by which it loves itself and its acquaintance; and these three are shown to be equal among themselves, and of one essence. See On the Trinity 9.4.4.
deTrin.15.3.5In decimo hoc idem diligentius subtiliusque tractatum est, atque ad id perductum, ut inveniretur in mente evidentior trinitas eius, in memoria scilicet et intellegentia et voluntate. Cf. Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.60; Augustine, Miscellany of 83 Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6. Sed quoniam et hoc compertum est, quod mens numquam esse ita potuerit, ut non sui meminisset, non se intellegeret, et diligeret, quamvis non semper se cogitaret, cum autem cogitaret, non se a corporalibus rebus eadem cogitatione discerneret; dilata est de Trinitate, cuius haec imago est, disputatio, ut in ipsis etiam corporalibus visis inveniretur trinitas, et distinctius in ea lectoris exerceretur intentio. Cf. On the Trinity 10.11.17–12.19.
In the tenth, this same thing was treated more diligently and more subtly, and brought to this point, that in the mind was found a more evident trinity of it, namely, in memory and understanding and will. See Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6. But since this too was found, that the mind could never have been such as not to remember itself, not to understand and love itself, although it did not always think of itself, and when it did think of itself, did not distinguish itself by that same thought from corporeal things; the discussion of the Trinity, of which this is the image, was deferred, so that even in those corporeal sights a trinity might be found, and in it the reader's attention might be more distinctly exercised. See On the Trinity 10.11.17–12.19.
deTrin.15.3.5In undecimo ergo electus est sensus oculorum, in quo id quod inventum esset, etiam in ceteris quattuor sensibus corporis et non dictum posset agnosci: atque ita exterioris hominis trinitas, primo in iis quae cernuntur extrinsecus, ex corpore scilicet quod videtur, et forma quae inde in acie cernentis imprimitur, et utrumque copulantis intentione voluntatis, apparuit. Cf. On the Trinity 11.4.7. Sed haec tria non inter se aequalia, nec unius esse substantiae claruerunt. Deinde in ipso animo, ab iis quae extrinsecus sensa sunt velut introducta inventa est altera trinitas, ubi apparerent eadem tria unius esse substantiae, imaginatio corporis quae in memoria est, et inde informatio cum ad eam convertitur acies cogitantis, et utrumque coniungens intentio voluntatis. Sed ideo ista trinitas ad exteriorem hominem reperta est pertinere, quia de corporibus illata est quae sentiuntur extrinsecus.
In the eleventh, then, the sense of the eyes was chosen, in which what was found might be recognized, even though not stated, in the other four senses of the body as well: and so the trinity of the outer man appeared, first in those things which are discerned without—namely, from the body which is seen, and the form which is thence impressed on the gaze of the one discerning, and the intention of the will joining the two. See On the Trinity 11.4.7. But these three were made clear to be not equal among themselves, nor of one substance. Then in the mind itself, from those things which were sensed without, as it were brought in, another trinity was found, where the same three appeared to be of one substance: the imagination of the body which is in the memory, and the informing thence when the gaze of the one thinking is turned to it, and the intention of the will joining the two. But this trinity was found to pertain to the outer man, because it was brought in from the bodies which are sensed without.
deTrin.15.3.5In duodecimo discernenda visa est sapientia ab scientia, (Cf. Job 28:28; 1 Cor 12:8) et in ea quae proprie scientia nuncupatur, quia inferior est, prius quaedam sui generis trinitas inquirenda: quae licet ad interiorem hominem iam pertineat, nondum tamen imago Dei vel appellanda sit vel putanda. Cf. On the Trinity 12.14.21–23.
In the twelfth, it seemed good that wisdom should be distinguished from knowledge, (See Job 28:28; 1 Cor 12:8) and in that which is properly called knowledge, because it is lower, a certain trinity of its own kind was first to be sought: which, although it already pertains to the inner man, is nevertheless not yet to be called or thought the image of God. See On the Trinity 12.14.21–23.
deTrin.15.3.5Et hoc agitur in tertio decimo libro per commendationem fidei Christianae. Cf. On the Trinity 13.1.1–2.5, 13.19.24.
And this is done in the thirteenth book through the commendation of the Christian faith. See On the Trinity 13.1.1–2.5, 13.19.24.
deTrin.15.3.5In quarto decimo autem de sapientia hominis vera, id est, Dei munere in eius ipsius Dei participatione donata, quae ab scientia distincta est, disputatur: Cf. On the Trinity 14.1.1–19.25. et eo pervenit disputatio, ut trinitas appareat in imagine Dei, quod est homo secundum mentem, quae renovatur in agnitione Dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit hominem ad imaginem suam, (Cf. Gen 1:26–27; Sir 17:1) et sic percipit sapientiam ubi contemplatio est aeternorum.
But in the fourteenth there is discussed the true wisdom of man, that is, the wisdom given as a gift of God by a participation in that same God, which is distinct from knowledge: See On the Trinity 14.1.1–19.25. and the discussion came to this point, that a trinity appears in the image of God, which is man according to the mind, which is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created man to his image (See Gen 1:26–27; Sir 17:1), and so receives wisdom, where there is contemplation of eternal things.
deTrin.15.3.5C
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4. 6. Iam ergo in ipsis rebus aeternis, incorporalibus et incommutabilibus, in quarum perfecta contemplatione nobis beata, quae nonnisi aeterna est, vita (Cf. Titus 1:2; 1 John 2:25) promittitur, Trinitatem quae Deus est inquiramus. Neque enim Divinorum Librorum tantummodo auctoritas esse Deum praedicat, sed omnis quae nos circumstat, ad quam nos etiam pertinemus, universa ipsa rerum natura proclamat, habere se praestantissimum Conditorem, (Cf. Rom 1:20; Wis 13:5) qui nobis mentem rationemque naturalem dedit, qua viventia non viventibus, sensu praedita non sentientibus, intellegentia non intellegentibus, immortalia mortalibus, impotentibus potentia, iniustis iusta, speciosa deformibus, bona malis, incorruptibilia corruptibilibus, immutabilia mutabilibus, invisibilia visibilibus, incorporalia corporalibus, beata miseris praeferenda videamus. Ac per hoc quoniam rebus creatis Creatorem sine dubitatione praeponimus, oportet ut eum et summe vivere, et cuncta sentire atque intellegere; et mori, corrumpi, mutarique non posse; nec corpus esse, sed spiritum omnium potentissimum, iustissimum, speciosissimum, optimum, beatissimum fateamur.
4. 6. Now, then, in the very eternal things, incorporeal and incommutable, in the perfect contemplation of which the blessed life, which is none but eternal, (See Titus 1:2; 1 John 2:25) is promised us, let us seek the Trinity which is God. For not only the authority of the Divine Books proclaims that God is, but the whole nature of things itself, which surrounds us, to which we ourselves also belong, proclaims that it has a most excellent Founder, (See Rom 1:20; Wis 13:5) who gave us a mind and a natural reason by which we see that living things are to be preferred to non-living, things endowed with sense to those without sense, things with understanding to those without understanding, immortal things to mortal, powerful to powerless, just to unjust, beautiful to deformed, good to evil, incorruptible to corruptible, immutable to mutable, invisible to visible, incorporeal to corporeal, blessed to wretched. And through this, since without doubt we set the Creator before created things, it behooves us to confess that he both supremely lives, and perceives and understands all things; and cannot die, be corrupted, or be changed; and is not a body, but a spirit most powerful of all, most just, most beautiful, best, most blessed.
deTrin.15.4.65. 7. Sed haec omnia quae dixi, et quaecumque alia simili more locutionis humanae digne de Deo dici videntur, et universae Trinitati qui est unus Deus, et Personis singulis in eadem Trinitate conveniunt. Quis enim vel unum Deum, quod est ipsa Trinitas, vel Patrem, vel Filium, vel Spiritum Sanctum; audeat dicere, Cf. Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1.1. aut non viventem, aut nihil sentientem vel intellegentem, aut in ea natura qua inter se praedicantur aequales, Cf. Tomus Damasi, anathema 21. quemquam esse eorum mortalem sive corruptibilem, sive mutabilem, sive corporeum; aut quisquam ibi neget aliquem potentissimum, iustissimum, speciosissimum, optimum, beatissimum? Cf. Tomus Damasi, anathema 20. Si ergo haec atque huiusmodi omnia, et ipsa Trinitas, et in ea singuli dici possunt; ubi aut quomodo Trinitas apparebit?
5. 7. But all these things which I have said, and whatever else, in a like manner of human speech, seems worthily to be said of God, befit both the whole Trinity, which is one God, and the single Persons in that same Trinity. For who would dare to say See Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1.1. that either the one God, which is the Trinity itself, or the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, is either not living, or perceiving or understanding nothing; or that, in that nature according to which they are predicated equal among themselves, See Tomus Damasi, anathema 21. any one of them is mortal or corruptible, or mutable, or corporeal; or who would deny that there is anyone there most powerful, most just, most beautiful, best, most blessed? See Tomus Damasi, anathema 20. If, then, these and all such things can be said both of the Trinity itself and of the single Persons in it, where or how will the Trinity appear?
deTrin.15.5.7Redigamus itaque prius haec plurima ad aliquam paucitatem. Quae vita enim dicitur in Deo, ipsa est essentia eius atque natura. Non itaque Deus vivit nisi vita quod ipse sibi est. Haec autem vita non talis est qualis inest arbori, ubi nullus est intellectus, nullus est sensus. Nec talis qualis inest pecori: habet enim vita pecoris sensum quinquepartitum, sed intellectum habet nullum: at illa vita quae Deus est, sentit atque intellegit omnia; et sentit mente, non corpore, quia spiritus est Deus. (Cf. John 4:24) Non autem sicut animalia quae habent corpora, per corpus sentit Deus; non enim ex anima constat et corpore: Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.12.34; Sallust, The War With Jugurtha 2.1; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 7.5.16. ac per hoc simplex illa natura sicut intellegit sentit, sicut sentit intellegit; idemque sensus qui intellectus est illi.
Let us, then, first reduce these many things to a certain fewness. For what is called life in God is his very essence and nature. God, then, does not live except by a life which he himself is to himself. But this life is not such as is in a tree, where there is no understanding, no sense. Nor such as is in a beast: for the life of a beast has a fivefold sense, but has no understanding: but that life which is God perceives and understands all things; and perceives by the mind, not by the body, because God is a spirit. (See John 4:24) But not as the animals which have bodies, does God perceive through the body; for he does not consist of soul and body: See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.12.34; Sallust, The War with Jugurtha 2.1; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 7.5.16. and through this that simple nature, as it understands so it perceives, as it perceives so it understands; and sense is the same to it as understanding.
deTrin.15.5.7Nec ita ut aliquando esse desistat aut coeperit: immortalis est enim. Nec frustra de illo dictum est quod solus habeat immortalitatem: (Cf. 1 Tim 6:16) nam immortalitas eius vere immortalitas est, in cuius natura nulla est commutatio. Ipsa est etiam vera aeternitas qua est immutabilis Deus, sine initio, sine fine; consequenter et incorruptibilis. Una ergo eademque res dicitur, sive dicatur aeternus Deus, sive immortalis, sive incorruptibilis, sive immutabilis: itemque cum dicitur, vivens, et intellegens, quod est utique sapiens, hoc idem dicitur. Non enim percepit sapientiam qua esset sapiens, sed ipse Sapientia est. Et haec vita, eademque virtus sive potentia, eademque species, qua potens, atque speciosus dicitur. Quid enim potentius et speciosus Sapientia, quae attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter? Bonitas etiam atque iustitia, numquid inter se in natura Dei, sicut in eius operibus distant, tamquam duae diversae sint qualitates Dei; una, bonitas; alia, iustitia? Non utique: sed quae iustitia, ipsa bonitas; et quae bonitas, ipsa beatitudo. Incorporalis autem vel incorporeus ideo dicitur Deus, ut spiritus credatur vel intellegatur esse, (Cf. Isa 7:9) non corpus.
Nor in such a way that at some time it ceases to be or began to be: for it is immortal. Nor was it said in vain of him that he alone has immortality: (See 1 Tim 6:16) for his immortality is truly immortality, in whose nature there is no change. The same is also the true eternity by which God is immutable, without beginning, without end; consequently also incorruptible. One and the same thing, then, is said, whether God be called eternal, or immortal, or incorruptible, or immutable: likewise when he is called living, and understanding—which is surely wise—this same thing is said. For he did not acquire a wisdom by which to be wise, but is himself Wisdom. And this is life, and the same is virtue or power, and the same is beauty, by which he is called powerful and beautiful. For what is more powerful and more beautiful than Wisdom, which reaches mightily from end to end, and orders all things sweetly (Wis 8:1)? Goodness, too, and justice, are they distant from each other in the nature of God, as they are in his works, as though they were two diverse qualities of God, one goodness, the other justice? Surely not: but what is justice, that is goodness; and what is goodness, that is blessedness. But God is called incorporeal or bodiless for this reason, that he may be believed or understood to be a spirit, (See Isa 7:9) not a body.
deTrin.15.5.75. 8. Proinde si dicamus: “aeternus, immortalis, incorruptibilis, immutabilis, vivus, sapiens, potens, speciosus, iustus, bonus, beatus, spiritus”; horum omnium novissimum quod posui quasi tantummodo videtur significare substantiam, cetera vero huius substantiae qualitates: sed non ita est in illa ineffabili simplicique natura. Quidquid enim secundum qualitates illic dici videtur, secundum substantiam vel essentiam est intellegendum. Absit enim ut spiritus secundum substantiam dicatur Deus, et bonus secundum qualitatem: sed utrumque secundum substantiam. Sic omnia cetera quae commemoravimus, unde in superioribus libris multa iam diximus. See On the Trinity 5. De quattuor igitur primis quae modo a nobis enumerata atque digesta sunt, id est, aeternus, immortalis, incorruptibilis, immutabilis, unum aliquid eligamus; quia unum quattuor ista significant, sicut iam disserui; ne per multa distendatur intentio, et illud potius quod positum est prius, id est, “aeternus.” Hoc faciamus et de quattuor secundis, quae sunt, vivus, sapiens, potens, speciosus. Et quoniam vita qualiscumque inest et pecori, cui sapientia non inest; duo vero ista, sapientia scilicet atque potentia, ita sunt inter se in homine comparata, ut Sancta Scriptura diceret: melior est sapiens quam fortis; (Wis 6:1) speciosa porro etiam corpora dici solent: unum ex his quattuor quod eligimus, “sapiens” eligatur: quamvis haec quattuor in Deo non inaequalia dicenda sint; nomina enim quattuor, res autem una est. De tertiis vero ultimis quattuor, quamvis in Deo idem sit iustum esse quod bonum, quod beatum, idemque spiritum esse quod iustum et bonum et beatum esse; tamen quia in hominibus potest esse spiritus non beatus, potest et iustus et bonus nondum beatus; qui vero beatus est, profecto et iustus et bonus et spiritus est: hoc potius eligamus quod nec in hominibus esse sine illis tribus potest, quod est “beatus.”
5. 8. Accordingly, if we say: "eternal, immortal, incorruptible, immutable, living, wise, powerful, beautiful, just, good, blessed, spirit"; of all these, the last that I set down seems to signify, as it were, only the substance, but the rest the qualities of this substance: but it is not so in that ineffable and simple nature. For whatever seems to be said there according to qualities is to be understood according to substance or essence. Far be it that God should be called spirit according to substance, and good according to quality: but both according to substance. So all the rest that we have mentioned, of which we have already said much in the earlier books. See On the Trinity 5. Of the four first, then, which were just now enumerated and arranged by us, that is, eternal, immortal, incorruptible, immutable, let us choose some one; because these four signify one thing, as I have already discussed; lest the attention be distended through many; and let it rather be that which was set down first, that is, "eternal." Let us do this also with the four second, which are, living, wise, powerful, beautiful. And since a life of some kind is in a beast too, in which there is no wisdom; but these two, namely, wisdom and power, are so compared with each other in man that the Holy Scripture said: the wise man is better than the strong (Wis 6:1 (6:1)); and beautiful, moreover, even bodies are wont to be called: of these four which we choose, let "wise" be chosen: although these four in God are not to be called unequal; for there are four names, but the thing is one. But of the third and last four, although in God to be just is the same as to be good, as to be blessed, and to be a spirit is the same as to be just and good and blessed; yet because in men a spirit can be not blessed, and one can be just and good yet not blessed; but he who is blessed is surely also just and good and a spirit: let us rather choose that which in men too cannot be without those three, which is "blessed."
deTrin.15.5.86. 9. Num igitur cum dicimus: “aeternus, sapiens, beatus,” haec tria sunt Trinitas, quae appellatur Deus? Redigimus quidem illa duodecim in istam paucitatem trium: sed eo modo forsitan possumus et haec tria in unum aliquod horum. Nam si una eademque res in Dei natura potest esse sapientia et potentia, aut vita et sapientia; cur non una eademque res esse possit in Dei natura aeternitas et sapientia, aut beatitudo et sapientia? Ac per hoc sicut nihil intererat utrum illa duodecim, an ista tria diceremus, quando illa multa in istam redegimus paucitatem; ita nihil interest utrum tria ista dicamus, an illud unum in cuius singularitate duo cetera similiter redigi posse monstravimus.
6. 9. When, then, we say, "eternal, wise, blessed," are these three the Trinity which is called God? We reduce, indeed, those twelve to this fewness of three: but in that way perhaps we can also reduce these three to some one of them. For if one and the same thing in the nature of God can be wisdom and power, or life and wisdom; why can not one and the same thing in the nature of God be eternity and wisdom, or blessedness and wisdom? And through this, just as it made no difference whether we said those twelve or these three, when we reduced those many to this fewness; so it makes no difference whether we say these three, or that one in whose singularity we have shown the two others can likewise be reduced.
deTrin.15.6.9Quis itaque disputandi modus, quaenam tandem vis intellegendi atque potentia, quae vivacitas rationis, quae acies cogitationis ostendet, ut alia iam taceam, hoc unum quod “sapientia” dicitur Deus, quomodo sit Trinitas? Neque enim sicut nos de illo percipimus sapientiam, ita Deus de aliquo: sed sua est ipse Sapientia; quia non est aliud Sapientia eius, aliud essentia, cui hoc est esse quod sapientem esse. Dicitur quidem in Scripturis Sanctis Christus Dei virtus, et Dei Sapientia: (Cf. 1 Cor 1:24) sed quemadmodum sit intellegendum, ne Patrem Filius videatur facere sapientem, in libro septimo disputatum est; Cf. On the Trinity 7.3.4–6. et ad hoc ratio pervenit, ut sic sit Filius Sapientia de Sapientia, quemadmodum Lumen de Lumine, Deus de Deo. Nec aliud potuimus invenire Spiritum Sanctum, nisi et ipsum esse Sapientiam, et simul omnes unam Sapientiam, sicut unum Deum, unam essentiam. Cf. Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity. Hanc ergo Sapientiam quod est Deus, quomodo intellegimus esse Trinitatem? Non dixi: “quomodo credimus?” nam hoc inter fideles non debet habere quaestionem: sed si aliquo modo per intellegentiam possumus videre quod credimus, quis iste erit modus?
What manner of discussing, then, what force at last of understanding and power, what vivacity of reason, what edge of thought will show—to be silent now of the others—how this one thing which is called "wisdom," which is God, is a Trinity? For not as we acquire wisdom from him, so does God from someone: but he is himself his own Wisdom; because his Wisdom is not one thing and his essence another, to whom this is to be that is to be wise. It is said indeed in the Holy Scriptures that Christ is the power of God and the Wisdom of God: (See 1 Cor 1:24) but how this is to be understood, lest the Son should seem to make the Father wise, was discussed in the seventh book; See On the Trinity 7.3.4–6. and reason came to this, that the Son is so Wisdom of Wisdom, as Light of Light, God of God. Nor could we find the Holy Spirit to be anything else than that he too is Wisdom, and all together one Wisdom, as one God, one essence. See Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity. This Wisdom, then, which is God, how do we understand to be a Trinity? I did not say, "how do we believe?" for this ought not to be a question among the faithful: but if in some way, through understanding, we can see what we believe, what will that way be?
deTrin.15.6.96. 10. Si enim recolamus ubi nostro intellectui coeperit in his libris Trinitas apparere, octavus occurrit. Ibi quippe, ut potuimus, disputando erigere tentavimus mentis intentionem ad intellegendam illam praestantissimam immutabilemque naturam, quod nostra mens non est. Quam tamen sic intuebamur, ut nec longe a nobis esset, et supra nos esset, non loco, sed ipsa sui venerabili mirabilique praestantia, ita ut apud nos esse suo praesenti lumine videretur. In qua tamen nobis adhuc nulla Trinitas apparebat, quia non ad eam quaerendam in fulgore illo firmam mentis aciem tenebamus: tantum quia non erat aliqua moles, ubi credi oporteret magnitudinem duorum vel trium plus esse quam unius, cernebamus utcumque.
6. 10. For if we recall where, in these books, the Trinity began to appear to our understanding, the eighth meets us. For there, as we could, by discussing we tried to raise the attention of the mind to understanding that most excellent and immutable nature, which our mind is not. Which nevertheless we so beheld as that it was neither far from us, and was above us, not by place, but by its own venerable and wonderful excellence, so that it seemed to be with us by its present light. In which, nevertheless, no Trinity yet appeared to us, because we were not holding a firm gaze of the mind, in that brightness, to seek it: only, because there was no mass where it behooved to believe that the magnitude of two or three is more than that of one, we discerned this somehow.
deTrin.15.6.10Sed ubi ventum est ad caritatem, quae in Sancta Scriptura Deus dicta est, (Cf. 1 John 4:8–16) eluxit paululum Trinitas, id est, amans, et quod amatur, et amor. Cf. On the Trinity 8.10.14. Sed quia lux illa ineffabilis nostrum reverberabat obtutum, et ei nondum posse obtemperari nostrae mentis quodam modo convincebatur infirmitas, ad ipsius nostrae mentis, secundum quam factus est homo ad imaginem Dei, (Cf. Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) velut familiariorem considerationem, reficiendae laborantis intentionis causa, inter coeptum dispositumque refleximus: et inde in creatura, quod nos sumus, ut invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, conspicere intellecta possemus, (Cf. Wis 13:5; Rom 1:20) immorati sumus a nono usque ad quartum decimum librum.
But when we came to love, which in the Holy Scripture is called God, (See 1 John 4:8–16) the Trinity shone forth a little, that is, the lover, and what is loved, and love. See On the Trinity 8.10.14. But because that ineffable light beat back our gaze, and the weakness of our mind was in a certain way convicted that it could not yet be conformed to it, for the sake of restoring the laboring attention we turned aside, between the thing begun and the thing arranged, to the as it were more familiar consideration of our own mind, according to which man was made to the image of God (See Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6): and thence, in the creature which we are, that we might be able to behold the invisible things of God, understood through the things that have been made, (See Wis 13:5; Rom 1:20) we lingered from the ninth book to the fourteenth.
deTrin.15.6.10Et ecce iam quantum necesse fuerat, aut forte plus quam necesse fuerat, exercitata in inferioribus intellegentia, ad summam Trinitatem quae Deus est, conspiciendam nos erigere volumus, nec valemus. Num enim sicut certissimas videmus trinitates, sive quae forinsecus de rebus corporalibus fiunt, sive cum ea ipsa quae forinsecus sensa sunt cogitantur; sive cum illa quae oriuntur in animo, nec pertinent ad corporis sensus, sicut fides, sicut virtutes quae sunt artes agendae vitae, manifesta ratione cernuntur et scientia continentur; sive cum mens ipsa qua novimus quidquid nosse nos veraciter dicimus, sibi cognita est, vel se cogitat, sive cum aliquid quod ipsa non est, aeternum atque incommutabile conspicit: num ergo sicut in his omnibus certissimas videmus trinitates, quia in nobis fiunt vel in nobis sunt, cum ista meminimus, aspicimus, volumus, ita videmus etiam Trinitatem Deum, quia et illic intellegendo conspicimus tamquam dicentem, et Verbum eius, id est, Patrem et Filium, atque inde procedentem caritatem utrique communem, scilicet Spiritum Sanctum?
And behold, now—our understanding exercised in lower things as much as was necessary, or perhaps more than was necessary—we wish to raise ourselves to behold the highest Trinity which is God, and we cannot. For do we, just as we see most certain trinities, whether those which are made without from corporeal things, or when those very things which were sensed without are thought of; or when those things which arise in the mind, and do not pertain to the senses of the body, such as faith, such as the virtues which are the arts of the life to be lived, are discerned by manifest reason and contained in knowledge; or when the mind itself, by which we know whatever we truly say we know, is known to itself, or thinks of itself, or when it beholds something which it itself is not, eternal and incommutable—do we, then, just as in all these we see most certain trinities, because they are made in us or are in us, when we remember, look upon, will these things, so see also the Trinity God, because there too, by understanding, we behold as it were the one speaking, and his Word, that is, the Father and the Son, and the love proceeding thence, common to both, namely, the Holy Spirit?
deTrin.15.6.10An trinitates istas ad sensus nostros vel ad animum pertinentes videmus potius quam credimus, Deum vero esse Trinitatem credimus potius quam videmus? Quod si ita est, profecto aut invisibilia eius, per ea quae facta sunt, nulla intellecta conspicimus; (Cf. Rom 1:20) aut si ulla conspicimus; non in eis conspicimus Trinitatem, et est illic quod conspiciamus, est quod etiam non conspectum credere debeamus.
Or do we rather see those trinities pertaining to our senses or to our mind than believe them, but believe that God is a Trinity rather than see it? But if this is so, surely either we behold none of his invisible things, understood through the things that have been made; (See Rom 1:20) or, if we behold any, we do not behold the Trinity in them, and there is something there which we behold, there is something which, even though not beheld, we ought to believe.
deTrin.15.6.10Conspicere autem nos immutabile bonum, quod nos non sumus, liber octavus ostendit; Cf. On the Trinity 8.3.4. et quartus decimus, cum de sapientia quae homini ex Deo est loqueremur, admonuit. Cf. On the Trinity 14.19.25. Cur itaque ibi non agnoscimus Trinitatem? An haec sapientia quae Deus dicitur, non se intellegit, non se diligit? Quis hoc dixerit? Aut quis est qui non videat, ubi nulla scientia est, nullo modo esse sapientiam? Aut vero putandum est, Sapientiam quae Deus est, scire alia et nescire se ipsam, vel diligere alia nec diligere se ipsam? Quae si dici sive credi stultum et impium est; ecce ergo Trinitas, Sapientia scilicet, et notitia sui, et dilectio sui. Sic enim et in homine invenimus trinitatem, id est, mentem, et notitiam qua se novit, et dilectionem qua se diligit. Cf. On the Trinity 14.8.11.
But that we behold an immutable good, which we ourselves are not, the eighth book showed; See On the Trinity 8.3.4. and the fourteenth, when we spoke of the wisdom which man has from God, admonished. See On the Trinity 14.19.25. Why, then, do we not recognize the Trinity there? Does this wisdom which is called God not understand itself, not love itself? Who would say this? Or who is there who does not see that, where there is no knowledge, there is in no way wisdom? Or is it to be thought that the Wisdom which is God knows other things and does not know itself, or loves other things and does not love itself? Which, if it is foolish and impious to say or believe, behold then a Trinity: namely, Wisdom, and the acquaintance with itself, and the love of itself. For so too in man we find a trinity, that is, the mind, and the acquaintance by which it knows itself, and the love by which it loves itself. See On the Trinity 14.8.11.
deTrin.15.6.107. 11. Sed haec tria ita sunt in homine, ut non ipsa sint homo. Homo est enim, sicut veteres definierunt, animal rationale mortale. Cf. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 7.3.15; Cicero, Academica 2.7.21; Plutarch, Ethica 450d; Augustine, On Order 2.11.31; cf. On the Trinity 7.4.7–9. Illa ergo excellunt in homine, non ipsa sunt homo. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.13.36. Et una persona, id est singulus quisque homo, habet illa tria in mente vel mentem. PL omits vel mentem. Quod si etiam sic definiamus hominem, ut dicamus: “homo est substantia rationalis constans ex anima et corpore”; Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.12.34; Sallust, The War With Jugurtha 2.1; Lactentius, Institutio Oratoria 7.5.16. non est dubium hominem habere animam quae non est corpus, habere corpus quod non est anima. Ac per hoc illa tria non homo sunt, sed hominis sunt, vel in homine sunt. Detracto etiam corpore, si sola anima cogitetur, aliquid eius est mens, tamquam caput eius, vel oculus, vel facies: sed non haec ut corpora cogitanda sunt. Non igitur anima, sed quod excellit in anima mens vocatur. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.13.36. Numquid autem possumus dicere Trinitatem sic esse in Deo, ut aliquid Dei sit, nec ipsa sit Deus? Quapropter singulus quisque homo, qui non secundum omnia quae ad naturam pertinent eius, sed secundum solam mentem imago Dei dicitur, una persona est, et imago est Trinitatis in mente. Trinitas vero illa cuius imago est, nihil aliud est tota quam Deus, nihil est aliud tota quam Trinitas. Nec aliquid ad naturam Dei pertinet, quod ad illam non pertineat Trinitatem: et tres Personae sunt unius essentiae, Cf. On the Trinity 7.4.7–9. non sicut singulus quisque homo una persona.
7. 11. But these three are so in man that they themselves are not man. For man is, as the ancients defined, a rational mortal animal. See Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 7.3.15; Cicero, Academica 2.7.21; Plutarch, Ethica 450d; Augustine, On Order 2.11.31; see On the Trinity 7.4.7–9. Those things, then, excel in man, are not themselves man. See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.13.36. And one person, that is, each single man, has those three in the mind, or has a mind. PL omits vel mentem. But if we so define man as to say: "man is a rational substance consisting of soul and body"; See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.12.34; Sallust, The War with Jugurtha 2.1; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 7.5.16. there is no doubt that man has a soul which is not body, has a body which is not soul. And through this those three are not man, but are man's, or are in man. The body too being removed, if the soul alone is thought of, the mind is something of it, as it were its head, or eye, or face: but these are not to be thought of as bodies. Not the soul, then, but that which excels in the soul, is called the mind. See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.13.36. But can we say that the Trinity is so in God as to be something of God, and not itself be God? Wherefore each single man, who is called the image of God not according to all things that pertain to his nature, but according to the mind alone, is one person, and is the image of the Trinity in the mind. But that Trinity of which it is the image is nothing else, whole, than God, is nothing else, whole, than the Trinity. Nor does anything pertain to the nature of God which does not pertain to that Trinity: and the three Persons are of one essence, See On the Trinity 7.4.7–9. not as each single man is one person.
deTrin.15.7.117. 12. Itemque in hoc magna distantia est, quod sive mentem dicamus in homine, eiusque notitiam, et dilectionem, sive memoriam, intellegentiam, voluntatem, Cf. Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6. nihil mentis meminimus nisi per memoriam, nec intellegimus nisi per intellegentiam, nec amamus nisi per voluntatem. Cf. On the Trinity 14.7.9–10.
7. 12. Likewise, in this too there is a great difference, that whether we say in man the mind, and its acquaintance with itself, and its love; or memory, understanding, will, See Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6. we remember nothing of the mind except through memory, nor understand except through understanding, nor love except through will. See On the Trinity 14.7.9–10.
deTrin.15.7.12At vero in illa Trinitate quis audeat dicere Patrem, nec se ipsum, nec Filium, nec Spiritum Sanctum intellegere nisi per Filium, vel diligere nisi per Spiritum Sanctum, per se autem meminisse tantummodo vel sui vel Filii vel Spiritus Sancti; eodemque modo Filium nec sui nec Patris meminisse nisi per Patrem, nec diligere nisi per Spiritum Sanctum, per se autem non nisi intellegere et Patrem et se ipsum et Spiritum Sanctum; similiter et Spiritum Sanctum per Patrem meminisse et Patris et Filii et sui, et per Filium intellegere et Patrem et Filium et se ipsum, per se autem non nisi diligere et se et Patrem et Filium: tamquam memoria sit Pater et sua et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, Filius autem intellegentia et sua et Patris et Spiritus Sancti, Spiritus vero Sanctus caritas et sua et Patris et Filii?
But in that Trinity who would dare to say that the Father understands neither himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, except through the Son, or loves them except through the Holy Spirit, but through himself only remembers either himself or the Son or the Holy Spirit; and in the same way that the Son remembers neither himself nor the Father except through the Father, nor loves except through the Holy Spirit, but through himself only understands both the Father and himself and the Holy Spirit; similarly that the Holy Spirit through the Father remembers both the Father and the Son and himself, and through the Son understands both the Father and the Son and himself, but through himself only loves both himself and the Father and the Son: as though the Father were the memory both of himself and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, but the Son the understanding both of himself and of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit the love both of itself and of the Father and of the Son?
deTrin.15.7.12Quis haec in illa Trinitate opinari vel affirmare praesumat? Si enim solus ibi Filius intellegit, et sibi et Patri et Spiritui Sancto, ad illam reditur absurditatem, ut Pater non sit sapiens de se ipso, sed de Filio; nec Sapientia Sapientiam genuerit, sed ea sapientia Pater dicatur sapiens esse quam genuit. Ubi enim non est intellegentia, nec sapientia potest esse: ac per hoc si Pater non intellegit ipse sibi, sed Filius intellegit Patri, profecto Filius Patrem sapientem facit. Et si hoc est Deo esse quod sapere, et ea illi essentia est quae sapientia, non Filius a Patre, quod verum est; sed a Filio potius habet Pater essentiam, quod absurdissimum atque falsissimum est. Hanc absurditatem nos in libro septimo discussisse, convicisse, abiecisse certissimum est. Cf. On the Trinity 7.1.1–3.4.
Who would presume to think or affirm these things in that Trinity? For if there the Son alone understands, both for himself and for the Father and for the Holy Spirit, we return to that absurdity, that the Father is not wise of himself, but of the Son; nor did Wisdom beget Wisdom, but the Father is said to be wise by that wisdom which he begot. For where there is no understanding, neither can there be wisdom: and through this, if the Father does not himself understand for himself, but the Son understands for the Father, surely the Son makes the Father wise. And if for God to be is the same as to be wise, and his essence is the same as his wisdom, then not the Son from the Father, which is true; but rather the Father has essence from the Son, which is most absurd and most false. That we discussed, convicted, and rejected this absurdity in the seventh book is most certain. See On the Trinity 7.1.1–3.4.
deTrin.15.7.12Est ergo Deus Pater sapiens, ea qua ipse sua est Sapientia, et Filius Sapientia Patris de Sapientia quod est Pater, de quo genitus est Filius. Quocirca consequenter est et intellegens Pater ea qua ipse sua est intellegentia; neque enim esset sapiens qui non esset intellegens: Filius autem intellegentia Patris de intellegentia genitus quod est Pater.
God the Father is, then, wise by that Wisdom which he himself is to himself, and the Son is the Wisdom of the Father from the Wisdom which is the Father, of whom the Son was begotten. Wherefore consequently the Father is also understanding by that understanding which he himself is to himself; for he would not be wise who was not understanding: but the Son is the understanding of the Father, begotten of the understanding which is the Father.
deTrin.15.7.12Hoc et de memoria non inconvenienter dici potest. Quomodo est enim sapiens qui nihil meminit, vel sui non meminit? Proinde, quia Sapientia Pater, Sapientia Filius, (Cf. Sir 1:3–4; 1 Cor 1:21, 24, 30) sicut sui Pater, ita et Filius: et sicut sui et Filii meminit Pater, memoria non Filii, sed sua; ita sui et Patris meminit Filius, memoria non Patris, sed sua. Dilectio quoque ubi nulla est, quis ullam dicat esse sapientiam? Ex quo colligitur ita esse Patrem dilectionem suam, ut intellegentiam et memoriam suam.
This too can not unfittingly be said of memory. For how is he wise who remembers nothing, or does not remember himself? Accordingly, since the Father is Wisdom, the Son is Wisdom, (See Sir 1:3–4; 1 Cor 1:21, 24, 30) just as the Father is the Wisdom of himself, so too is the Son: and just as the Father remembers both himself and the Son, by a memory not of the Son, but his own; so the Son remembers both himself and the Father, by a memory not of the Father, but his own. And where there is no love, who would say there is any wisdom? From which it is gathered that the Father is his own love, just as he is his own understanding and memory.
deTrin.15.7.12Ecce ergo tria illa, id est, memoria, intellegentia, dilectio sive voluntas in illa summa et immutabili essentia quod est Deus, non Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt, sed Pater solus. Et quia Filius quoque sapientia est genita de sapientia, (Cf. Sir 1:4–9; 24:5–14) sicut nec Pater ei, nec Spiritus Sanctus ei intellegit, sed ipse sibi; ita nec Pater ei meminit, nec Spiritus Sanctus ei diligit, sed ipse sibi: sua enim est et ipse memoria, sua intellegentia, sua dilectio; sed ita se habere, de Patre illi est, de quo natus est. Spiritus etiam Sanctus quia Sapientia est procedens de Sapientia, (Cf. John 15:26) non Patrem habet memoriam, et Filium intellegentiam, et se dilectionem; neque enim Sapientia esset, si alius ei meminisset, eique alius intellegeret, ac tantummodo sibi ipse diligeret: sed ipse habet haec tria, et ea sic habet, ut haec ipsa ipse sit. Verumtamen ut ita sit, inde illi est unde procedit.
Behold, then, those three—that is, memory, understanding, love or will—in that highest and immutable essence which is God, are not the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but the Father alone. And because the Son too is Wisdom begotten of Wisdom, (See Sir 1:4–9; 24:5–14) just as neither the Father understands for him, nor the Holy Spirit for him, but he himself for himself; so neither does the Father remember for him, nor the Holy Spirit love for him, but he himself for himself: for he is himself his own memory, his own understanding, his own love; but that he is so, he has from the Father, of whom he was born. The Holy Spirit too, because it is Wisdom proceeding from Wisdom, (See John 15:26) does not have the Father as memory, and the Son as understanding, and itself as love; for it would not be Wisdom if another remembered for it, and another understood for it, and it itself only loved for itself: but it itself has these three, and so has them that these very things it itself is. Yet that it is so, it has thence whence it proceeds.
deTrin.15.7.127. 13. Quis ergo hominum potest istam Sapientiam qua novit Deus omnia, ita ut nec ea quae dicuntur praeterita, ibi praetereant, nec ea quae dicuntur futura, quasi desint exspectentur ut veniant, sed et praeterita et futura cum praesentibus sint cuncta praesentia; nec singula cogitentur, et ab aliis ad alia cogitando transeatur, sed in uno conspectu simul praesto sint universa: quis, inquam, hominum comprehendit istam Sapientiam, eamdemque prudentiam, eamdemque scientiam; quandoquidem a nobis nec nostra comprehenditur? Ea quippe quae vel sensibus vel intellegentiae nostrae adsunt, possumus utcumque conspicere: ea vero quae absunt, et tamen adfuerunt, per memoriam novimus, quae obliti non sumus. Nec ex futuris praeterita, sed futura ex praeteritis, non tamen firma cognitione conicimus. Nam quasdam cogitationes nostras, quas futuras velut manifestius atque certius proximas quasi prospicimus, memoria faciente id agimus, cum agere valemus quantum valemus, quae videtur non ad ea quae futura sunt, sed ad praeterita pertinere.
7. 13. What man, then, can comprehend that Wisdom by which God knows all things, in such a way that the things that are called past do not there pass away, nor the things that are called future are awaited as though absent, to come, but both past and future, with present things, are all present; nor are things thought of singly, nor is there a passing by thought from one to another, but in one gaze all are at once at hand: what man, I say, comprehends this Wisdom, which is likewise prudence, likewise knowledge; since by us not even our own is comprehended? For the things that are present to our senses or to our understanding we can somehow behold: but the things that are absent, and yet were present, we know through memory, which we have not forgotten. Nor do we conjecture past things from future, but future from past, yet not with firm cognition. For when we, as it were more plainly and certainly, foresee certain of our coming thoughts, as it were nearest, we do this by memory's working, when we are able to do it as much as we are able—which seems to pertain not to things that are future, but to past things.
deTrin.15.7.13Quod licet experiri in eis dictis vel canticis, quorum seriem memoriter reddimus. Nisi enim praevideremus cogitatione quod sequitur, non utique diceremus. Et tamen ut praevideamus, non providentia nos instruit, sed memoria. Nam donec finiatur omne quod dicimus, sive canimus, nihil est quod non provisum prospectumque proferatur. Et tamen cum id agimus, non dicimur providenter, sed memoriter canere vel dicere; et qui hoc in multis ita proferendis valent plurimum, non solet eorum providentia, sed memoria praedicari. Fieri ista in animo vel ab animo nostro novimus, et certissimi sumus: quomodo autem fiant, quanto attentius voluerimus advertere, tanto magis noster et sermo succumbit, et ipsa non perdurat intentio, ut ad liquidum aliquid nostra intellegentia, et si non lingua, perveniat.
This can be tested in those sayings or songs whose sequence we render from memory. For unless we foresaw by thought what follows, surely we would not say it. And yet, that we may foresee, it is not foresight that instructs us, but memory. For until all that we say or sing is finished, there is nothing that is not brought forth foreseen and looked ahead to. And yet when we do this, we are not said to sing or say with foresight, but from memory; and those who in bringing forth many such things have very great power are wont to have, not their foresight, but their memory praised. That these things come to be in our mind, or from our mind, we know, and are most certain: but how they come to be, the more attentively we wish to attend, the more both our speech fails, and the attention itself does not endure, so that our understanding, if not our tongue, may arrive at something clear.
deTrin.15.7.13Et putamus nos, utrum Dei providentia eadem sit quae memoria et intellegentia, qui non singula cogitando aspicit, sed una, aeterna et immutabili atque ineffabili visione complectitur cuncta quae novit, tanta mentis infirmitate posse comprehendere? In hac igitur difficultate et angustiis libet exclamare ad Deum vivum: “mirificata est scientia tua ex me; invaluit, et non potero ad illam. Ex me quippe intellego quam sit mirabilis et incomprehensibilis scientia tua, (Cf. Rom 11:33) qua me fecisti; quando nec me ipsum comprehendere valeo quem fecisti: et tamen in meditatione mea exardescit ignis, ut quaeram faciem tuam semper.” (Cf. 1 Chron 16:11; Ps 105:4)
And do we suppose that we can, with so great a weakness of mind, comprehend whether God's foresight is the same as his memory and understanding—he who beholds not by thinking of things singly, but embraces in one, eternal and immutable and ineffable vision all the things he knows? In this difficulty and these straits, then, it is good to cry out to the living God: "your knowledge has become wonderful from me; it has grown strong, and I shall not be able to reach it (Ps 139:6 (138:6)). For from myself I understand how wonderful and incomprehensible is your knowledge, (See Rom 11:33) by which you made me; since I cannot even comprehend myself whom you made: and yet in my meditation a fire blazes up (Ps 39:3 (38:4)), so that I may seek your face always." (See 1 Chr 16:11; Ps 105:4 (104:4))
deTrin.15.7.13C
deTrin.15.7.13
8. 14. Incorporalem substantiam scio esse sapientiam, et lumen esse in quo videntur quae oculis carnalibus non videntur: et tamen vir tantus tamque spiritalis, videmus nunc, inquit, per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Quale sit et quod sit hoc speculum si quaeramus, profecto illud occurrit, quod in speculo nisi imago non cernitur. Hoc ergo facere conati sumus, ut per imaginem hanc quod nos sumus, videremus utcumque a quo facti sumus, tamquam per speculum. Hoc significat etiam illud quod ait idem Apostolus, nos autem revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes, in eamdem imaginem transformamur de gloria in gloriam, tamquam a Domini Spiritu.
8. 14. I know that wisdom is an incorporeal substance, and is a light in which are seen the things that are not seen by carnal eyes: and yet so great and so spiritual a man says, we now see through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face (1 Cor 13:12). If we ask what sort of thing this mirror is, and what it is, surely this occurs, that in a mirror nothing but an image is discerned. This, then, we have tried to do: that through this image which we are, we might somehow see, as through a mirror, him by whom we were made. This is signified too by what the same Apostle says, but we, beholding with unveiled face the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord (2 Cor 3:18).
deTrin.15.8.14Speculantes dixit, per speculum videntes, non de specula prospicientes. Quod in graeca lingua non est ambiguum, unde in latinam translatae sunt Apostolicae Litterae. Ibi quippe speculum ubi apparent imagines rerum, a specula de cuius altitudine longius aliquid intuemur, etiam sono verbi distat omnino; satisque apparet Apostolum a speculo, non a specula dixisse, gloriam Domini speculantes.
He said speculantes, seeing through a mirror (speculum), not looking out from a watchtower (specula). Which in the Greek tongue, from which the Apostolic Writings were translated into Latin, is not ambiguous. For there speculum, where the images of things appear, differs altogether, even in the sound of the word, from specula, from whose height we behold something farther off; and it appears well enough that the Apostle said beholding the glory of the Lord from speculum, not from specula.
deTrin.15.8.14Quod vero ait: in eamdem imaginem transformamur: (Cf. Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) utique imaginem Dei vult intellegi, eamdem dicens, istam ipsam scilicet, id est, quam speculamur; quia eadem imago est et gloria Dei, sicut alibi dicit, vir quidem non debet velare caput suum, cum sit imago et gloria Dei: de quibus verbis iam in libro duodecimo disseruimus. Cf. On the Trinity 12.7.9–12.
But in that he says, we are transformed into the same image: (See Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) surely he wishes the image of God to be understood, saying "the same," namely this very one, that is, the one we behold; because the same is both the image and the glory of God, as he says elsewhere, a man indeed ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God (1 Cor 11:7): of which words we have already discoursed in the twelfth book. See On the Trinity 12.7.9–12.
deTrin.15.8.14Transformamur ergo dicit, de forma in formam mutamur, atque transimus de forma obscura in formam lucidam; quia et ipsa obscura, imago Dei est; et si imago, profecto etiam gloria, in qua homines creati sumus, praestantes ceteris animalibus. Cf. Sallust, The War with Catiline 1.1.
He says we are transformed, then, that is, we are changed from form to form, and pass from an obscure form into a luminous form; because even that obscure one is the image of God; and if image, surely also glory, in which we men were created, excelling the other animals. See Sallust, The War with Catiline 1.1.
deTrin.15.8.14De ipsa quippe natura humana dictum est: vir quidem non debet velare caput, cum sit imago et gloria Dei. (Cf. 1 Cor 11:7) Quae natura in rebus creatis excellentissima, cum a suo Creatore ab impietate iustificatur, a deformi forma formosam transformatur PL: transfertur, which is more likely to be correct in the translator’s opinion. in formam. Est quippe et in ipsa impietate, quanto magis damnabile vitium, tanto certius natura laudabilis. Et propter hoc addidit, de gloria in gloriam: de gloria creationis in gloriam iustificationis. Quamvis possit hoc et aliis modis intellegi, quod dictum est, de gloria in gloriam: de gloria fidei in gloriam speciei; de gloria qua filii Dei sumus, in gloriam qua similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. (Cf. 1 John 3:2)
For of human nature itself it was said: a man indeed ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God. (See 1 Cor 11:7) Which nature, most excellent among created things, when it is justified from impiety by its Creator, is transformed PL: transfertur, which is more likely to be correct in the translator's opinion. from a deformed form into a beautiful form. For even in its very impiety, the more damnable the vice, the more certainly is the nature praiseworthy. And on account of this he added, from glory to glory: from the glory of creation to the glory of justification. Although this can be understood in other ways too, what was said, from glory to glory: from the glory of faith to the glory of sight; from the glory by which we are sons of God, to the glory by which we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. (See 1 John 3:2)
deTrin.15.8.14Quod vero adiunxit, tamquam a Domini Spiritu; ostendit gratia Dei nobis conferri tam optabilis transformationis bonum.
But in that he added, as by the Spirit of the Lord; he shows that the good of so desirable a transformation is conferred upon us by the grace of God.
deTrin.15.8.149. 15. Haec dicta sunt propter quod ait Apostolus, nunc per speculum nos videre. Quia vero addidit, in aenigmate; multis hoc incognitum est qui eas litteras nesciunt, in quibus est doctrina quaedam de locutionum modis, quos Graeci “tropos” vocant, eoque graeco vocabulo etiam nos utimur pro latino. Sicut enim “schemata” usitatius dicimus quam “figuras,” ita usitatius dicimus “tropos” quam “modos.” Singulorum autem modorum sive troporum nomina, ut singula singulis referantur, difficillimum est et insolentissimum latine enuntiare. Unde quidam interpretes nostri, quod ait Apostolus, quae sunt in allegoria, nolentes graecum vocabulum ponere, circumloquendo interpretati sunt dicentes, quae sunt aliud ex alio significantia. Cf. Ambrosiaster, Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Galatians 4.24.
9. 15. These things were said on account of what the Apostle says, that now we see through a mirror. But because he added, in an enigma, this is unknown to many who do not know those writings in which there is a certain doctrine about the modes of expression, which the Greeks call "tropes," and we too use that Greek word for the Latin. For just as we say "schemata" more usually than "figures," so we say "tropes" more usually than "modes." But to express the names of the single modes or tropes in Latin, so that single ones may correspond to single ones, is most difficult and most unusual. Whence some of our translators, where the Apostle says, which are in allegory, not wishing to set down the Greek word, rendered it by a circumlocution, saying, which signify one thing by another. See Ambrosiaster, Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Galatians 4.24.
deTrin.15.9.15Huius autem tropi, id est allegoriae, plures sunt species, in quibus est etiam quod dicitur aenigma. Definitio autem ipsius nominis generalis, omnes etiam species complectatur necesse est. Ac per hoc sicut omnis equus animal est, non omne animal equus est: ita omne aenigma allegoria est, non omnis allegoria aenigma est. Quid ergo est allegoria, nisi tropus ubi ex alio aliud intellegitur, quale illud est ad Thessalonicenses: itaque non dormiamus sicut et ceteri: sed vigilemus, et sobrii simus. Nam qui dormiunt, nocte dormiunt; et qui inebriantur, nocte ebrii sunt: nos autem qui diei sumus, sobrii simus? Sed haec allegoria non est aenigma. Nam nisi multum tardis iste sensus in promptu est. Aenigma est autem, ut breviter explicem, obscura allegoria, Cf. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 8.6.52. sicuti est, sanguisugae erant tres filiae; et quaecumque similia. Sed ubi allegoriam nominavit Apostolus, non in verbis eam reperit, sed in facto, cum e duobus filiis Abrahae, uno de ancilla, altero de libera, quod non dictum, sed etiam factum fuit, duo Testamenta intellegenda monstravit; (Cf. Gal 4:22–24) quod antequam exponeret, obscurum fuit: proinde allegoria talis, quod est generale nomen, posset specialiter aenigma nominari.
But of this trope, that is, allegory, there are several species, among which is also that which is called an enigma. But the definition of the general name must of necessity embrace all the species too. And through this, just as every horse is an animal, but not every animal is a horse: so every enigma is an allegory, but not every allegory is an enigma. What, then, is allegory, except a trope where one thing is understood from another, such as that to the Thessalonians: therefore let us not sleep as do the rest: but let us watch, and be sober. For those who sleep, sleep by night; and those who are drunk, are drunk by night: but let us who are of the day be sober (1 Thess 5:6–8)? But this allegory is not an enigma. For except to the very slow, this sense is ready at hand. But an enigma is, to explain it briefly, an obscure allegory, See Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 8.6.52. such as is, the leech had three daughters (Prov 30:15); and whatever is similar. But where the Apostle named allegory, he found it not in words, but in a fact, when, of the two sons of Abraham, one of the slave-woman, the other of the free woman, which was not said but also done, he showed that two Testaments are to be understood; (See Gal 4:22–24) which, before he expounded it, was obscure: accordingly such an allegory, which is the general name, could specifically be named an enigma.
deTrin.15.9.159. 16. Sed quia non soli qui eas litteras nesciunt, quibus discuntur tropi, quaerunt quid dixerit Apostolus, nunc in aenigmate nos videre; verum etiam qui sciunt, tamen quod sit illud aenigma ubi nunc videmus, nosse desiderant: ex utroque invenienda una est sententia; et ex illo scilicet quod ait, videmus nunc per speculum; et ex isto quod addidit, in aenigmate. Una est enim cum tota sic dicitur, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate. Proinde, quantum mihi videtur, sicut nomine speculi imaginem voluit intellegi; ita nomine aenigmatis quamvis similitudinem, tamen obscuram, et ad perspiciendum difficilem. Cum igitur speculi et aenigmatis nomine quaecumque similitudines ab Apostolo significatae intellegi possint, quae accommodatae sunt ad intellegendum Deum, eo modo quo potest; nihil tamen est accommodatius quam id quod imago eius non frustra dicitur.
9. 16. But because not only those who do not know those writings by which the tropes are learned ask what the Apostle meant, that we now see in an enigma; but even those who know desire to know what that enigma is in which we now see: from both, one meaning is to be found; both from that which he says, we now see through a mirror; and from that which he added, in an enigma. For it is one, when the whole is said thus, we now see through a mirror in an enigma. Accordingly, as it seems to me, just as by the name of mirror he wished the image to be understood; so by the name of enigma a likeness, but an obscure one, and difficult to see through. Since, then, by the name of mirror and enigma any likenesses signified by the Apostle can be understood, which are suited to understanding God, in the way one can; yet nothing is more suited than that which is not in vain called his image.
deTrin.15.9.16Nemo itaque miretur etiam in isto modo videndi qui concessus est huic vitae, per speculum scilicet in aenigmate, laborare nos ut quomodocumque videamus. Nomen quippe hic non sonaret aenigmatis, si esset facilitas visionis. Et hoc est grandius aenigma, ut non videamus quod non videre non possumus. Quis enim non videt cogitationem suam? et quis videt cogitationem suam, non oculis carnalibus dico, sed ipso interiore conspectu? Quis non eam videt, et quis eam videt?
Let no one, then, marvel that even in this manner of seeing which has been granted to this life, namely through a mirror in an enigma, we labor that we may somehow see. For the name of enigma would not sound here, if there were ease of vision. And this is a greater enigma, that we do not see what we cannot but see. For who does not see his own thought? and who sees his own thought—I do not mean with the carnal eyes, but with that inner gaze itself? Who does not see it, and who sees it?
deTrin.15.9.16Quandoquidem cogitatio visio est animi quaedam, sive adsint ea quae oculis quoque corporalibus videantur, vel ceteris sentiantur sensibus, sive non adsint, et eorum similitudines cogitatione cernantur; sive nihil eorum, sed ea cogitentur quae nec corporalia sunt, nec corporalium similitudines, sicut virtutes et vitia, sicut ipsa denique cogitatio cogitatur; sive illa quae per disciplinas traduntur liberalesque doctrinas; sive istorum omnium causae superiores atque rationes in natura immutabili cogitentur; sive etiam mala et vana, ac falsa cogitemus, vel non consentiente sensu, vel errante consensu.
Since thought is a certain vision of the mind, whether the things that are also seen by the corporeal eyes, or perceived by the other senses, are present, or are not present, and their likenesses are discerned by thought; or whether none of these, but those things are thought of which are neither corporeal nor likenesses of corporeal things, such as the virtues and the vices, such as, finally, thought itself is thought of; or those things which are handed down through the disciplines and the liberal doctrines; or whether the higher causes and reasons of all these things are thought of in the immutable nature; or whether we even think of evil and vain and false things, either with the sense not consenting, or with the consent erring.
deTrin.15.9.1610. 17. Sed nunc de iis loquamur quae nota cogitamus, et habemus in notitia etiam si non cogitemus, sive ad contemplativam scientiam pertineant, quam proprie sapientiam, sive ad activam, quam proprie scientiam nuncupandam esse disserui. Simul enim utrumque mentis est unius, et imago Dei una. Cum vero de inferiore distinctius et seorsum agitur, tunc non est vocanda imago Dei, quamvis et tunc in ea nonnulla reperiatur similitudo illius Trinitatis; quod in tertio decimo volumine ostendimus. Cf. On the Trinity 12.4, 13.1.26.
10. 17. But now let us speak of those things which we think of as known, and have in our acquaintance even if we do not think of them, whether they pertain to contemplative knowledge, which I have discussed is properly to be called wisdom, or to active knowledge, which is properly to be called knowledge. For both at once are of one mind, and the image of God is one. But when the lower is treated more distinctly and separately, then it is not to be called the image of God, although even then there is found in it some likeness of that Trinity; which we showed in the thirteenth volume. See On the Trinity 12.4, 13.1.26.
deTrin.15.10.17Nunc ergo simul de universa scientia hominis loquimur, in qua nobis nota sunt quaecumque sunt nota: quae utique vera sunt, alioquin nota non essent. Nemo enim falsa novit, nisi cum falsa esse novit: quod si novit, verum novit; verum est enim quod illa falsa sint. De his ergo nunc disserimus quae nota cogitamus, et nota sunt nobis etiam si non cogitentur a nobis. Sed certe si ea dicere velimus, nisi cogitata non possumus. Nam etsi verba non sonent, in corde suo dicit utique qui cogitat.
Now, then, we speak at once of the whole knowledge of man, in which whatever things are known to us are known: which surely are true, otherwise they would not be known. For no one knows false things, except when he knows them to be false: and if he knows this, he knows something true; for it is true that those things are false. Of these things, then, we now discourse, which we think of as known, and which are known to us even if they are not thought of by us. But surely, if we wish to say them, we cannot except thought. For even if words do not sound, he who thinks surely says in his own heart.
deTrin.15.10.17Unde illud est in libro Sapientiae: dixerunt apud se cogitantes non recte. Exposuit enim quid sit: dixerunt apud se, cum addidit, cogitantes. Huic simile est in Evangelio, quod quidam Scribae cum audissent a Domino dictum paralytico, confide, fili, remittuntur tibi peccata tua; dixerunt intra se, ‘hic blasphemat.’ Quid est enim, dixerunt intra se, nisi cogitando? Denique sequitur, et cum vidisset Iesus cogitationes eorum, dixit: ‘utquid cogitatis mala in cordibus vestris?’ Sic Matthaeus. Lucas autem hoc idem ita narrat: coeperunt cogitare Scribae et Pharisaei, dicentes: ‘quis est hic qui loquitur blasphemias? Quis potest dimittere peccata, nisi solus Deus? Ut cognovit autem cogitationes eorum Iesus, respondens dixit ad illos: Quid cogitatis in cordibus vestris?’ Quale est in libro Sapientiae: dixerunt cogitantes; tale hic est: cogitaverunt dicentes. Et illic enim et hic ostenditur, intra se atque in corde suo dicere, id esse, The PL, with most manuscripts, reads est, giving the sense: “both places show this saying to oneself and in one’s heart, that is, saying by thinking.” cogitando dicere. Dixerunt quippe intra se, et dictum est eis: quid cogitatis? Et de illo divite cuius uberes fructus ager attulit, ait ipse Dominus, et cogitabat intra se, dicens.
Whence comes that passage in the book of Wisdom: they said within themselves, thinking not rightly (Wis 2:1). For he expounded what they said within themselves is, when he added, thinking. Like to this is, in the Gospel, that certain Scribes, when they had heard the Lord say to the paralytic, be of good cheer, son, your sins are forgiven you; said within themselves, "this man blasphemes." For what is they said within themselves, except by thinking? Then it follows, and when Jesus had seen their thoughts, he said: "why do you think evil in your hearts?" (Matt 9:2–4) So Matthew. But Luke narrates this same thing thus: the Scribes and Pharisees began to think, saying: "who is this who speaks blasphemies? Who can forgive sins, but God alone? But when Jesus knew their thoughts, answering he said to them: Why do you think in your hearts?" (Luke 5:21–22) Such as in the book of Wisdom is, they said, thinking; such is here, they thought, saying. And both there and here it is shown that to say within oneself and in one's heart is this, The PL, with most manuscripts, reads est, giving the sense: "both places show this saying to oneself and in one's heart, that is, saying by thinking." to say by thinking. For they said within themselves, and it was said to them: why do you think? And of that rich man whose field brought forth abundant fruits, the Lord himself says, and he thought within himself, saying (Luke 12:17).
deTrin.15.10.1710. 18. Quaedam ergo cogitationes locutiones sunt cordis, ubi et os esse Dominus ostendit, cum ait: non quod intrat in os coinquinat hominem; sed quod procedit ex ore, hoc coinquinat hominem. Una sententia duo quaedam hominis ora complexus est, unum corporis, alterum cordis. Nam utique unde illi hominem putaverant inquinari, in os intrat corporis: unde autem Dominus dixit inquinari hominem, de cordis ore procedit. (Cf. Matt 15:11, 17–18) Ita quippe exposuit ipse quod dixerat. Nam paulo post de hac re discipulis suis: adhuc et vos, inquit, sine intellectu estis? Non intellegitis quia omne quod in os intrat, in ventrem vadit, et in secessum emittitur? Hic certe apertissime demonstravit os corporis. At in eo quod sequitur os cordis ostendens: quae autem, inquit, procedunt de ore, de corde exeunt, et ea coinquinant hominem. De corde enim exeunt cogitationes malae, et cetera. Quid hac expositione lucidius?
10. 18. Certain thoughts, then, are speakings of the heart, where the Lord showed that there is also a mouth, when he says: not what enters into the mouth defiles a man; but what proceeds out of the mouth, this defiles a man (Matt 15:11). In one sentence he has embraced two certain mouths of man, one of the body, the other of the heart. For surely that from which they had thought a man is defiled enters the mouth of the body; but that from which the Lord said a man is defiled proceeds from the mouth of the heart. (See Matt 15:11, 17–18) For so he himself expounded what he had said. For a little after, of this matter he says to his disciples: are you still without understanding too? Do you not understand that everything which enters into the mouth goes into the belly, and is cast out into the privy? Here certainly he most plainly showed the mouth of the body. But in what follows, showing the mouth of the heart: but the things which proceed from the mouth come forth from the heart, and these defile a man. For from the heart come forth evil thoughts, and the rest. What is clearer than this exposition?
deTrin.15.10.18Nec tamen quia dicimus locutiones cordis esse cogitationes, ideo non sunt etiam visiones exortae de notitiae visionibus, quando verae sunt. Foris enim cum per corpus haec fiunt, aliud est locutio, aliud visio: intus autem cum cogitamus, utrumque unum est. Sicut auditio et visio duo quaedam sunt inter se distantia in sensibus corporis, in animo autem non est aliud atque aliud videre et audire: ac per hoc cum locutio foris non videatur, sed potius audiatur, locutiones tamen interiores, hoc est, cogitationes visas dixit a Domino sanctum Evangelium, non auditas: dixerunt, inquit, intra se, ‘hic blasphemat’; deinde subiunxit, et cum vidisset Iesus cogitationes eorum. Vidit ergo quae dixerunt. Vidit enim cogitatione sua cogitationes eorum, quas illi soli se putabant videre.
And yet, because we say that thoughts are speakings of the heart, they are not therefore not also visions arisen from the visions of acquaintance, when they are true. For without, when these come about through the body, speech is one thing, vision another: but within, when we think, both are one. Just as hearing and seeing are two certain things distant from each other in the senses of the body, but in the mind to see and to hear are not one thing and another: and through this, although speech without is not seen but rather heard, yet the holy Gospel said that interior speakings, that is, thoughts, were seen by the Lord, not heard: they said, it says, within themselves, "this man blasphemes"; then it subjoined, and when Jesus had seen their thoughts. He saw, then, what they said. For he saw by his own thought their thoughts, which they thought they alone saw.
deTrin.15.10.1810. 19. Quisquis igitur potest intellegere verbum, non solum antequam sonet, verum etiam antequam sonorum eius imagines cogitatione volvantur: hoc enim est quod ad nullam pertinet linguam, earum scilicet quae linguae appellantur gentium, quarum nostra latina est: quisquis, inquam, hoc intellegere potest, iam potest videre per hoc speculum atque in hoc aenigmate (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) aliquam Verbi illius similitudinem, de quo dictum est, in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum.
10. 19. Whoever, then, can understand the word, not only before it sounds, but even before the images of its sounds are turned over in thought—for this is what belongs to no language, namely those which are called the languages of the nations, of which ours is Latin: whoever, I say, can understand this, can already see, through this mirror and in this enigma (See 1 Cor 13:12), some likeness of that Word of which it was said, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God (John 1:1).
deTrin.15.10.19Necesse est enim cum verum loquimur, id est, quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa scientia quam memoria tenemus, nascatur verbum quod eiusmodi sit omnino, cuiusmodi est illa scientia de qua nascitur. Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus, verbum est quod in corde dicimus: quod nec graecum est, nec latinum, nec linguae alicuius alterius; sed cum id opus est in eorum quibus loquimur perferre notitiam, aliquod signum quo significetur assumitur. Et plerumque sonus, aliquando etiam nutus, ille auribus, ille oculis exhibetur, ut per signa corporalia etiam corporis sensibus verbum quod mente gerimus innotescat. Nam et innuere quid est, nisi quodam modo visibiliter dicere?
For it must needs be that, when we speak what is true, that is, speak what we know, from the very knowledge which we hold in the memory there is born a word that is altogether such as is that knowledge from which it is born. For thought formed from the thing which we know is the word which we say in the heart: which is neither Greek, nor Latin, nor of any other language; but when there is need to convey it to the acquaintance of those to whom we speak, some sign is taken up by which it may be signified. And most often a sound, sometimes also a nod—the one is presented to the ears, the other to the eyes—so that through corporeal signs the word which we carry in the mind may become known even to the senses of the body. For what is it to nod, except in a certain way to speak visibly?
deTrin.15.10.19Est in Scripturis Sanctis huius sententiae testimonium; nam in Evangelio secundum Ioannem ita legitur: amen, amen dico vobis, quia unus ex vobis tradet me. Aspiciebant ergo ad invicem discipuli, haesitantes de quo diceret. Erat ergo unus ex discipulis eius recumbens in sinu Iesu, quem diligebat Iesus: innuit ergo huic Simon Petrus, et dicit ei, ‘quis est de quo dicit?’ Ecce innuendo dixit, quod sonando dicere non audebat. Sed haec atque huiusmodi signa corporalia sive auribus sive oculis praesentibus quibus loquimur exhibemus; inventae sunt etiam PL: autem, “however.” litterae, per quas possemus et cum absentibus colloqui: sed ista signa sunt vocum, cum ipsae voces in sermone nostro earum quas cogitamus signa sint rerum. Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretion 1.
There is in the Holy Scriptures a testimony of this opinion; for in the Gospel according to John it is read thus: amen, amen, I say to you, that one of you will betray me. The disciples therefore looked at one another, doubting of whom he spoke. Now there was one of his disciples reclining on the bosom of Jesus, whom Jesus loved: to him therefore Simon Peter nodded, and says to him, "who is it of whom he speaks?" (John 13:21–24) Behold, by nodding he said what by sounding he did not dare to say. But these and such corporeal signs we present either to the ears or to the eyes of those present to whom we speak; letters were also invented, by which we might converse even with those absent: but these are signs of voices, while the voices themselves, in our speech, are signs of the things which we think. See Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.
deTrin.15.10.1911. 20. Proinde verbum quod foris sonat, signum est verbi quod intus lucet, cui magis “verbi” competit nomen.
11. 20. Accordingly the word which sounds without is a sign of the word which shines within, to which the name "word" more fittingly belongs.
deTrin.15.11.20Nam illud quod profertur carnis ore, vox “verbi” est: “verbumque” et ipsum dicitur, propter illud a quo ut foris appareret assumptum est. Ita enim verbum nostrum vox quodam modo corporis fit, assumendo eam in qua manifestetur sensibus hominum; sicut Verbum Dei caro factum est, (Cf. John 1:14) assumendo eam in qua et ipsum manifestaretur sensibus hominum. (Cf. 1 Tim 3:16) Et sicut verbum nostrum fit vox, nec mutatur in vocem; ita Verbum Dei caro quidem factum est, sed absit ut mutaretur in carnem. Assumendo quippe illam, non in eam se consumendo, et hoc nostrum vox fit, et illud caro factum est.
For that which is brought forth by the mouth of the flesh is the voice of the "word": and it too is called "word," on account of that from which it was taken up that it might appear without. For so our word in a certain way becomes a voice of the body, by taking up that in which it may be manifested to the senses of men; as the Word of God was made flesh, (See John 1:14) by taking up that in which it too might be manifested to the senses of men. (See 1 Tim 3:16) And just as our word becomes a voice, and is not changed into a voice; so the Word of God was indeed made flesh, but far be it that it should be changed into flesh. For by taking up that flesh, not by consuming itself into it, both this our word becomes a voice, and that Word was made flesh.
deTrin.15.11.20Quapropter qui cupit ad qualemcumque similitudinem Verbi Dei, quamvis per multa dissimilem, pervenire, non intueatur verbum nostrum quod sonat in auribus, nec quando voce profertur, nec quando silentio cogitatur. Omnium namque sonantium verba linguarum etiam in silentio cogitantur, et carmina percurruntur animo, tacente ore corporis: nec solum numeri syllabarum, verum etiam modi cantilenarum, cum sint corporales, et ad eum, qui vocatur auditus, sensum corporis pertinentes, per incorporeas quasdam imagines suas praesto sunt cogitantibus, et tacite cuncta ista volventibus.
Wherefore he who desires to come to some likeness of the Word of God, however unlike in many ways, let him not look at our word which sounds in the ears, neither when it is brought forth by the voice, nor when it is thought in silence. For the words of all sounding languages are thought even in silence, and songs are run through in the mind, while the mouth of the body is silent: nor only the numbers of syllables, but even the modes of the melodies, although they are corporeal and pertain to that sense of the body which is called hearing, are at hand, through certain incorporeal images of their own, to those who think and silently turn over all these things.
deTrin.15.11.20Sed transeunda sunt haec, ut ad illud perveniatur hominis verbum, per cuius qualemcumque similitudinem sicut in aenigmate (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) videatur utcumque Dei Verbum: non illud quod factum est ad illum vel illum prophetam, et de quo dictum est, Verbum autem Dei crescebat et multiplicabatur; et de quo iterum dictum est, igitur fides ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Christi; et iterum, cum accepissetis a nobis verbum auditus Dei, accepistis non ut verbum hominum, sed sicuti est vere verbum Dei.
But these things are to be passed over, that we may come to that word of man, through whose likeness of whatever kind, as in an enigma (See 1 Cor 13:12), the Word of God may somehow be seen: not that which was made to this or that prophet, and of which it was said, but the Word of God grew and was multiplied (Acts 6:7; 12:24); and of which again it was said, therefore faith is from hearing, but hearing through the word of Christ (Rom 10:17); and again, when you had received from us the word of the hearing of God, you received it not as the word of men, but as it truly is, the word of God (1 Thess 2:13).
deTrin.15.11.20Et innumerabilia similiter in Scripturis dicuntur de Dei verbo, quod in sonis multarum diversarumque linguarum per corda et ora disseminatur humana. Ideo autem verbum Dei dicitur, quia doctrina divina traditur, non humana. Sed illud Verbum Dei quaerimus qualitercumque per hanc similitudinem nunc videre, de quo dictum est: Deus erat Verbum; de quo dictum est: omnia per ipsum facta sunt; de quo dictum est: Verbum caro factum est; de quo dictum est: fons sapientiae Verbum Dei in excelsis.
And countless things are likewise said in the Scriptures about the word of God, which is disseminated through human hearts and mouths in the sounds of many and diverse languages. But it is called the word of God for this reason, that divine doctrine, not human, is handed down. But that Word of God we seek somehow now to see through this likeness, of which it was said: God was the Word (John 1:1); of which it was said: all things were made through him (John 1:3); of which it was said: the Word was made flesh (John 1:14); of which it was said: the fountain of wisdom is the Word of God in the highest (Sir 1:5).
deTrin.15.11.20Perveniendum est ergo ad illud verbum hominis, (Cf. 1 Thess 2:13) ad verbum rationalis animantis, Cf. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 7.3.15; Cicero, Academica 2.7.21; Augustine, On Order 2.11.31. ad verbum non de Deo natae, sed a Deo factae imaginis Dei, (Cf. Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) quod neque prolativum est in sono, neque cogitativum in similitudine soni, quod alicuius linguae esse necesse sit, sed quod omnia quibus significatur signa praecedit, et gignitur de scientia quae manet in animo, quando eadem scientia intus dicitur, sicuti est. Simillima est enim visio cogitationis, visioni scientiae. Nam quando per sonum dicitur, vel per aliquod corporale signum, non dicitur sicuti est, sed sicut potest videri audirive per corpus. Quando ergo quod in notitia est, hoc est in verbo, tunc est verum verbum, et veritas, qualis exspectatur ab homine, ut quod est in ista, hoc sit et in illo; quod non est in ista, non sit et in illo; hic agnoscitur: est, est; non, non. Sic accedit, quantum potest, ista similitudo imaginis factae ad illam similitudinem imaginis natae, qua Deus Filius Patri per omnia substantialiter similis praedicatur.
We must come, then, to that word of man, (See 1 Thess 2:13) to the word of the rational living being, See Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 7.3.15; Cicero, Academica 2.7.21; Augustine, On Order 2.11.31. to the word of the image of God, not born of God, but made by God, (See Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) which is neither uttered in sound, nor thought in the likeness of a sound, such as must belong to some language, but which precedes all the signs by which it is signified, and is begotten of the knowledge which abides in the mind, when that same knowledge is spoken within, just as it is. For the vision of thought is most like the vision of knowledge. For when it is spoken through a sound, or through some corporeal sign, it is not spoken just as it is, but as it can be seen or heard through the body. When, then, that which is in the acquaintance is in the word, then there is a true word, and truth, such as is expected of a man, so that what is in the former is also in the latter; what is not in the former is also not in the latter; here is recognized: yes, yes; no, no (Matt 5:37; Jas 5:12). So this likeness of the made image approaches, as far as it can, to that likeness of the born image, by which God the Son is proclaimed substantially like the Father in all things.
deTrin.15.11.20Animadvertenda est in hoc aenigmate etiam ista Verbi Dei similitudo, quod sicut de illo Verbo dictum est, omnia per ipsum facta sunt, ubi Deus per unigenitum Verbum suum praedicatur universa fecisse; ita hominis opera nulla sunt, quae non prius dicantur in corde: unde scriptum est, initium omnis operis verbum.
There is to be noted, in this enigma, also this likeness of the Word of God, that just as it was said of that Word, all things were made through him (John 1:3), where God is proclaimed to have made all things through his only-begotten Word; so there are no works of man which are not first spoken in the heart: whence it is written, the word is the beginning of every work (Sir 37:16).
deTrin.15.11.20Sed etiam hic cum verum verbum est, tunc est initium boni operis. Verum autem verbum est, cum de scientia bene operandi gignitur, ut etiam ibi servetur, est, est; non, non: (Cf. Matt 5:37; Jas 5:12) ut si est in ea scientia qua vivendum est, sit et in verbo per quod operandum est; si non, non: alioquin mendacium erit verbum tale, non veritas; et inde peccatum, non opus rectum.
But here too, when the word is true, then it is the beginning of a good work. And the word is true, when it is begotten of the knowledge of working well, so that there too may be kept, yes, yes; no, no: (See Matt 5:37; Jas 5:12) so that if yes is in that knowledge by which one is to live, it may be also in the word by which one is to work; if no, no: otherwise such a word will be a lie, not truth; and thence sin, not right work.
deTrin.15.11.20Est et haec in ista similitudine verbi nostri similitudo Verbi Dei, quia potest esse verbum nostrum quod non sequatur opus; opus autem esse non potest, nisi praecedat verbum: sicut Verbum Dei potuit esse nulla existente creatura; (Cf. Sir 1:5, 24:5) creatura vero nulla esse posset, nisi per ipsum per quod facta sunt omnia. (Cf. John 1:3) Ideoque non Deus Pater, non Spiritus Sanctus, non ipsa Trinitas, sed solus Filius, quod est Verbum Dei, caro factum est; (Cf. John 1:14) quamvis Trinitate faciente: ut sequente atque imitante verbo nostro eius exemplum, recte viveremus, hoc est, nullum habentes in verbi nostri vel contemplatione vel operatione mendacium. Verum haec huius imaginis est quandoque futura perfectio. Ad hanc consequendam nos erudit magister bonus (Cf. Mark 10:17) fide christiana pietatisque doctrina, ut revelata facie a Legis velamine quod est umbra futurorum, (Cf. 2 Cor 3:13–15) gloriam Domini speculantes, per speculum scilicet intuentes, For a smoother read, the translator omits the explanatory phrase per speculum scilicet intuentes from his translation. in eamdem imaginem transformemur de gloria in gloriam, tamquam a Domini Spiritu, (Cf. 2 Cor 3:18) secundum superiorem de his verbis disputationem. Cf. On the Trinity 14.17.23.
There is also in this likeness of our word a likeness of the Word of God, that our word can be such that no work follows it; but there can be no work unless a word precede: just as the Word of God could be with no creature existing; (See Sir 1:5, 24:5) but no creature could be except through him through whom all things were made. (See John 1:3) And therefore not God the Father, not the Holy Spirit, not the Trinity itself, but the Son alone, which is the Word of God, was made flesh; (See John 1:14) although with the Trinity acting: that, with our word following and imitating his example, we might live rightly, that is, having no lie either in the contemplation or in the working of our word. But this is the perfection of this image which will be at some time. To attain which, the good Master (See Mark 10:17) instructs us by the Christian faith and the doctrine of piety, that, with face unveiled from the veil of the Law, which is a shadow of things to come, (See 2 Cor 3:13–15) beholding the glory of the Lord, that is, gazing through a mirror, For a smoother read, the translator omits the explanatory phrase per speculum scilicet intuentes from his translation. we may be transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord (See 2 Cor 3:18), according to the earlier discussion of these words. See On the Trinity 14.17.23.
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deTrin.15.11.20
11. 21. Cum ergo hac transformatione ad perfectum fuerit (Cf. Heb 7:19) haec imago renovata, similes Deo erimus, quoniam videbimus eum, non per speculum, sed sicuti est: quod dicit Apostolus Paulus, facie ad faciem. Nunc vero in hoc speculo, in hoc aenigmate, in hac qualicumque similitudine, quanta sit etiam dissimilitudo, quis potest explicare? Attingam tamen aliqua, ut valeo, quibus id possit adverti.
11. 21. When, then, by this transformation this image shall have been renewed to perfection, (See Heb 7:19) we shall be like God, for we shall see him, not through a mirror, but as he is: which the Apostle Paul calls face to face. But now, in this mirror, in this enigma, in this likeness of whatever kind, how great also the unlikeness is, who can set forth? Yet I will touch on some things, as I am able, by which it can be noted.
deTrin.15.11.2112. 21. Primo ipsa scientia, de qua veraciter cogitatio nostra formatur, quando quae scimus loquimur, qualis aut quanta potest homini provenire, quamlibet peritissimo atque doctissimo? Exceptis enim quae in animum veniunt a sensibus corporis, in quibus tam multa aliter sunt quam videntur, ut eorum verisimilitudine nimium constipatus, sanus sibi esse videatur qui insanit; unde Academica philosophia sic invaluit, ut de omnibus dubitans multo miserius insaniret; Cf. Cicero, Academica 2.6.18; Augustine, Against the Academics 2.5.11.
12. 21. First, that knowledge itself, from which our thought is truly formed when we speak what we know, of what kind or how great can it come to a man, however most skilled and most learned? For, excepting the things that come into the mind from the senses of the body—in which so many things are otherwise than they seem, that one who is insane seems to himself sound, too crammed with their verisimilitude; whence the Academic philosophy so prevailed that, doubting of all things, it was insane far more wretchedly See Cicero, Academica 2.6.18; Augustine, Against the Skeptics 2.5.11.—
deTrin.15.12.21his ergo exceptis quae a corporis sensibus in animum veniunt, quantum rerum remanet quod ita sciamus, sicut nos vivere scimus? in quo prorsus non metuimus, ne aliqua verisimilitudine forte fallamur, Cf. Augustine, The City of God 11.26. quoniam certum est etiam eum qui fallitur vivere; nec in eis visis hoc habetur, quae obiiciuntur extrinsecus, ut in eo sic fallatur oculus, quemadmodum fallitur cum in aqua remus videtur infractus, Cf. Cicero, Academica 2.7.19; 25.79; Augustine, Against the Academics 3.11.26; True Religion 29.53. et navigantibus turres moveri, Cf. Augustine, Against the Academics 3.11.26. et alia sexcenta Cf. Augustine, Against the Academics 3.12.27. quae aliter sunt quam videntur; quia nec per oculum carnis hoc cernitur.
these things, then, being excepted, which come into the mind from the senses of the body, how much of things remains which we so know as we know that we live? in which we are by no means afraid lest we be perchance deceived by some verisimilitude, See Augustine, The City of God 11.26. since it is certain that even he who is deceived lives; nor is this counted among those sights which are presented from without, so that the eye is deceived in it, as it is deceived when an oar is seen broken in the water, See Cicero, Academica 2.7.19; 25.79; Augustine, Against the Skeptics 3.11.26; True Religion 29.53. and to those sailing the towers seem to move, See Augustine, Against the Skeptics 3.11.26. and six hundred other things See Augustine, Against the Skeptics 3.12.27. which are otherwise than they seem; because this is not discerned through the eye of the flesh.
deTrin.15.12.21Intima scientia est qua nos vivere scimus, ubi ne illud quidem Academicus dicere potest: “fortasse dormis, et nescis, et in somnis vides.” Visa quippe somniantium simillima esse visis vigilantium quis ignorat? Cf. Cicero, Academica 2.17.52–27.88. Sed qui certus est de vitae suae scientia, non in ea dicit, “scio me vigilare”; sed, “scio me vivere”: sive ergo dormiat, sive vigilet, vivit. Nec in ea scientia per somnia falli potest; quia et dormire et in somnis videre, viventis est.
It is an inmost knowledge by which we know that we live, where not even the Academic can say: "perhaps you are asleep, and do not know it, and see in dreams." For who is ignorant that the sights of those dreaming are most like the sights of those awake? See Cicero, Academica 2.17.52–27.88. But he who is certain of the knowledge of his own life does not say in it, "I know I am awake"; but, "I know I am alive": whether, then, he sleeps or is awake, he lives. Nor in that knowledge can he be deceived through dreams; because both to sleep and to see in dreams belongs to one who lives.
deTrin.15.12.21Nec illud potest Academicus adversus istam scientiam dicere, “furis fortassis et nescis”; quia sanorum visis simillima sunt etiam visa furentium: sed qui furit vivit. Cf. Cicero, Academica 2.16.49–17.53; Augustine, Against the Academics 3.11–12.28. Nec contra Academicos dicit, “scio me non furere”; sed, “scio me vivere.” Numquam ergo falli nec mentiri potest, qui se vivere dixerit scire. Mille itaque fallacium visorum genera obiciantur ei qui dicit, “scio me vivere”; nihil horum timebit, quando et qui fallitur vivit.
Nor can the Academic say this against that knowledge, "perhaps you are raving and do not know it"; because the sights of those raving are most like the sights of the sound: but he who raves lives. See Cicero, Academica 2.16.49–17.53; Augustine, Against the Skeptics 3.11–12.28. Nor does he say against the Academics, "I know I am not raving"; but, "I know I am alive." Never, then, can he be deceived nor lie who has said that he knows he is alive. Let a thousand kinds of deceptive sights, then, be presented to him who says, "I know I am alive"; he will fear none of these, since even he who is deceived lives.
deTrin.15.12.21Sed si talia sola pertinent ad humanam scientiam, perpauca sunt; nisi quia in unoquoque genere ita multiplicantur, ut non solum pauca non sint, verum etiam reperiantur per infinitum numerum tendere. Qui enim dicit, “scio me vivere,” unum aliquid scire se dicit; Cf. Augustine, The Happy Life 2.7. proinde si dicat: “scio me scire me vivere”; duo sunt iam; hoc vero quod scit haec duo, tertium scire est: sic potest addere et quartum, et quintum, et innumerabilia, si sufficiat. Sed quia innumerabilem numerum vel comprehendere singula addendo, vel dicere innumerabiliter non potest, hoc ipsum certissime comprehendit ac dicit, et verum hoc esse, et tam innumerabile, ut verbi The PL reads vere, a reasonable emendation of the veri of some six manuscripts: “so innumerable that he truly cannot comprehend . . . its infinite number.” eius infinitum numerum non possit comprehendere ac dicere.
But if such things alone pertain to human knowledge, they are very few; except that in each kind they are so multiplied that they are not only not few, but are even found to extend through an infinite number. For he who says, "I know I am alive," says that he knows some one thing; See Augustine, The Happy Life 2.7. accordingly, if he says: "I know that I know that I am alive"; there are now two; but that he knows these two is a third thing to know: so he can add a fourth, and a fifth, and innumerable ones, if he has the capacity. But because he cannot, by adding single ones, comprehend the innumerable number, or say it innumerable times, this very thing he most certainly comprehends and says: that this is both true, and so innumerable that he The PL reads vere, a reasonable emendation of the veri of some six manuscripts: "so innumerable that he truly cannot comprehend . . . its infinite number." cannot comprehend and say its infinite number.
deTrin.15.12.21Hoc et in voluntate certa similiter adverti potest. Quis est enim cui non impudenter respondeatur, “forte falleris,” dicenti, “volo beatus esse”? Et si dicat, “scio me hoc velle, et hoc me scire scio”; iam his duobus et tertium potest addere, quod haec duo sciat; et quartum, quod haec duo scire se sciat, et similiter in infinitum numerum pergere.
This can similarly be noted in a certain act of will. For who is there to whom it is not impudently answered, "perhaps you are deceived," when he says, "I want to be blessed"? And if he says, "I know that I want this, and I know that I know this"; now to these two he can add a third, that he knows these two; and a fourth, that he knows that he knows these two; and likewise go on into an infinite number.
deTrin.15.12.21Item si quispiam dicat, “errare nolo”; nonne sive erret sive non erret, errare tamen eum nolle verum erit? Quis est qui huic non impudentissime dicat, “forsitan falleris”? cum profecto ubicumque fallatur, falli se tamen nolle non fallitur. Et si hoc scire se dicat, addit quantum vult rerum numerum cognitarum, et numerum esse perspicit infinitum.
Likewise, if someone says, "I do not want to err"; will it not be true that, whether he errs or does not err, he nevertheless does not want to err? Who is there who would not most impudently say to him, "perhaps you are deceived"? when surely, wherever he is deceived, he is yet not deceived that he does not want to be deceived. And if he says that he knows this, he adds as great a number of known things as he wishes, and perceives the number to be infinite.
deTrin.15.12.21Qui enim dicit: “nolo me falli et hoc me nolle scio, et hoc me scire scio”; iam et si non commoda elocutione, potest hinc infinitum numerum ostendere: et alia reperiuntur, quae adversus Academicos valeant, qui nihil ab homine sciri posse contendunt.
For he who says: "I do not want to be deceived, and I know that I do not want this, and I know that I know this"; can thence, even if not with convenient expression, show an infinite number: and other things are found which avail against the Academics, who contend that nothing can be known by man.
deTrin.15.12.21Sed modus adhibendus est, praesertim quia in opere isto non hoc suscepimus. Sunt inde libri tres nostri, Against the Academics, the earliest of his surviving writings. primo nostrae conversionis tempore scripti, quos qui potuerit et voluerit legere lectosque intellexerit, nihil eum profecto quae ab eis contra perceptionem veritatis argumenta multa inventa sunt, permovebunt.
But a measure is to be applied, especially because in this work we did not undertake this. There are three books of ours on the subject, Against the Skeptics, the earliest of his surviving writings. written at the first time of our conversion, which whoever shall have been able and willing to read, and, having read them, shall have understood, will surely not be moved by any of the many arguments which were found by them against the perception of truth.
deTrin.15.12.21Cum enim duo sint genera rerum quae sciuntur, unum earum quae per sensus corporis percipit animus, alterum earum quae per se ipsum: multa illi philosophi garrierunt contra corporis sensus; animi autem quasdam firmissimas per se ipsum perceptiones rerum verarum, quale illud est quod dixi, “scio me vivere,” nequaquam in dubium vocare potuerunt.
For since there are two kinds of things that are known, one of those which the mind perceives through the senses of the body, the other of those which it perceives through itself: those philosophers babbled much against the senses of the body; but certain most firm perceptions, through itself, of true things which the mind has—such as is that which I said, "I know I am alive"—they could in no way call into doubt.
deTrin.15.12.21Sed absit a nobis ut ea quae per sensus corporis didicimus, vera esse dubitemus: per eos quippe didicimus caelum et terram, et ea qui in eis nota sunt nobis, quantum ille qui et nos et ipsa condidit, innotescere nobis voluit.
But far be it from us that we should doubt the things which we have learned through the senses of the body to be true: for through them we have learned the heaven and the earth, and the things in them which are known to us, as far as he who founded both us and them willed them to become known to us.
deTrin.15.12.21Absit etiam ut scire nos negemus, quae testimonio didicimus aliorum: alioquin esse nescimus Oceanum; (For the ancients, this was a proper name signifying the Atlantic) nescimus esse terras atque urbes, quas celeberrima fama commendat; nescimus fuisse homines et opera eorum, quae historica lectione didicimus; nescimus quae quotidie undecumque nuntiantur, et indiciis consonis constantibusque PL: contestantibus, “testificatory.” firmantur; postremo nescimus in quibus locis, vel ex quibus hominibus fuerimus exorti; quia haec omnia testimoniis credidimus aliorum.
Far be it also that we should deny that we know the things we have learned by the testimony of others: otherwise we do not know that there is an Ocean; (For the ancients, this was a proper name signifying the Atlantic) we do not know that there are lands and cities which most celebrated report commends; we do not know that there were men and their works, which we have learned by historical reading; we do not know the things which are daily reported from everywhere, and are confirmed by consonant and constant PL: contestantibus, "testificatory." evidences; finally, we do not know in what places, or from what men, we arose; because all these things we have believed on the testimony of others.
deTrin.15.12.21Quod si absurdissimum est dicere; non solum nostrorum, verum etiam et alienorum corporum sensus plurimum addidisse nostrae scientiae confitendum est.
And if it is most absurd to say this, it must be confessed that the senses, not only of our own bodies, but also of the bodies of others, have added very much to our knowledge.
deTrin.15.12.2112. 22. Haec igitur omnia, et quae per se ipsum, et quae per sensus sui corporis, et quae testimoniis aliorum percepta scit animus humanus, thesauro memoriae condita tenet, ex quibus gignitur verbum verum, quando quod scimus loquimur, sed verbum ante omnem sonum, ante omnem cogitationem soni. Tunc enim est verbum simillimum rei notae, de qua gignitur et imago eius, quoniam de visione scientiae visio cogitationis exoritur, quod est verbum linguae nullius, verbum verum de re vera, nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur. Nec interest quando id didicerit, qui quod scit loquitur; aliquando enim statim ut discit, hoc dicit; dum tamen verbum sit verum, id est, de notis rebus exortum.
12. 22. All these things, then—both those which it has perceived through itself, and those through the senses of its own body, and those by the testimonies of others—the human mind knows and holds stored in the treasury of memory; from which is begotten a true word, when we speak what we know, but a word before all sound, before all thought of sound. For then the word is most like the known thing from which it is begotten, and its image, since from the vision of knowledge the vision of thought arises—which is a word of no language, a true word from a true thing, having nothing of its own, but all from that knowledge from which it is born. Nor does it matter when he learned it who speaks what he knows; for sometimes, as soon as he learns, he says this; provided only that the word be true, that is, arisen from known things.
deTrin.15.12.2213. 22. Sed numquid Deus Pater, de quo natum est Verbum de Deo Deus; numquid ergo Deus Pater in illa sapientia quod est ipse sibi, alia didicit per sensum corporis sui, alia per se ipsum? Quis hoc dicat, qui non animal rationale, Cf. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 7.3.15; Cicero, Academica 2.7.21; Augustine, On Order 2.11.31. sed supra animam rationalem Deum cogitat; quantum ab eis cogitari potest, qui eum omnibus animalibus et omnibus animis praeferunt, quamvis per speculum et in aenigmate (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) coniciendo videant, nondum facie ad faciem sicuti est? (Cf. 1 John 3:2) Numquid Deus Pater ea ipsa, quae non per corpus, quod est ei nullum, sed per se ipsum scit, aliunde ab aliquo didicit, aut nuntiis vel testibus, ut ea sciret, indiguit? Non utique: ad omnia quippe scienda quae scit, sufficit sibi illa perfectio. Habet quidem nuntios, id est angelos, non tamen qui ei quae nescit annuntient; non enim sunt ulla quae nesciat: sed bonum eorum est de operibus suis eius consulere veritatem; et hoc est quod ei dicuntur nonnulla nuntiare, non ut ipse ab eis discat, sed ut ab illo ipsi per Verbum eius sine corporali sono. Nuntiant etiam quod voluerit, ab eo missi ad quos voluerit, totum ab illo per illud Verbum eius audientes; id est, in eius veritate invenientes quid sibi faciendum, quid, quibus, et quando nuntiandum sit.
13. 22. But does God the Father, of whom was born the Word, God of God; does God the Father, then, in that wisdom which he himself is to himself, learn some things through the sense of his body, and others through himself? Who would say this, who thinks of God, not as a rational living being, See Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 7.3.15; Cicero, Academica 2.7.21; Augustine, On Order 2.11.31. but above the rational soul; as far as he can be thought of by those who set him before all living beings and all souls, although they see, conjecturing through a mirror and in an enigma (See 1 Cor 13:12), not yet face to face as he is? (See 1 John 3:2) Does God the Father learn from elsewhere, from someone, the very things which he knows, not through a body, which he has none, but through himself, or did he need messengers or witnesses to know them? Surely not: for to know all the things he knows, that perfection suffices for him. He has indeed messengers, that is, angels, yet not such as announce to him things he does not know; for there are none which he does not know: but their good is to consult his truth about their own works; and this is what is meant when they are said to announce some things to him, not that he learns from them, but that they learn from him through his Word without bodily sound. They also announce what he has willed, sent by him to whom he willed, hearing all from him through that Word of his; that is, finding in his truth what they are to do, what, to whom, and when it is to be announced.
deTrin.15.13.22Nam et nos oramus eum, nec tamen necessitates nostras docemus eum. Novit enim, ait Verbum eius, Pater vester quid vobis necessarium sit, priusquam petatis ab eo. Nec ista ex aliquo tempore cognovit, ut nosset: sed futura omnia temporalia, atque in eis etiam quid et quando ab illo petituri fueramus, et quos et de quibus rebus vel exauditurus vel non exauditurus esset, sine initio ante praescivit. Universas autem creaturas suas, et spiritales et corporales, non quia sunt ideo novit; sed ideo sunt quia novit. Non enim nescivit quae fuerat creaturus. Quia ergo scivit, creavit; non quia creavit, scivit. Nec aliter ea scivit creata, quam creanda: non enim eius sapientiae aliquid accessit ex eis; sed illis exsistentibus sicut oportebat, et quando oportebat, illa mansit ut erat. Ita et scriptum est in libro Ecclesiastico: antequam crearentur, omnia nota sunt illi; sic et postquam consummata sunt. Sic, inquit, non aliter, et antequam crearentur, et postquam consummata sunt, sic ei nota sunt.
For we too pray to him, and yet do not teach him our necessities. For your Father knows, says his Word, what is necessary for you, before you ask him (Matt 6:8). Nor did he come to know these things from some time, that he might know them: but all future temporal things, and among them even what and when we were going to ask of him, and whom and concerning what things he was either going to hear or not to hear, he foreknew without beginning beforehand. But all his creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, he knows not because they are; rather they are because he knows them. For he was not ignorant of what he was going to create. Because, then, he knew, he created; not because he created, he knew. Nor did he know them otherwise as created than as to be created: for nothing was added to his wisdom from them; but, those things existing as was fitting, and when it was fitting, that wisdom remained as it was. So it is written too in the book of Ecclesiasticus: before they were created, all things were known to him; so also after they were finished (Sir 23:20 (23:29)). So, he says, not otherwise, both before they were created, and after they were finished, so are they known to him.
deTrin.15.13.22Longe est igitur huic scientiae scientia nostra dissimilis. Quae autem Scientia Dei est, ipsa et Sapientia; et quae Sapientia, ipsa essentia sive substantia. Quia in illius naturae simplicitate mirabili, non est aliud sapere, aliud esse; sed quod est sapere, hoc est et esse, sicut et in superioribus libris saepe iam diximus. Cf. On the Trinity 7.1.1. Nostra vero scientia in rebus plurimis propterea et amissibilis est et receptibilis, quia non hoc est nobis esse quod scire vel sapere: quoniam esse possumus, etiam si nesciamus, neque sapiamus ea quae aliunde didicimus. Propter hoc, sicut nostra scientia illi scientiae Dei, sic et nostrum verbum quod nascitur de nostra scientia, dissimile est illi Verbo Dei quod natum est de Patris essentia. Tale est autem ac si dicerem: “de Patris scientia, de Patris sapientia”; vel, quod est expressius: “de Patre Scientia, de Patre Sapientia.”
Far, then, is our knowledge unlike this knowledge. But what is the Knowledge of God, that same is also Wisdom; and what is Wisdom, that same is essence or substance. Because in the wonderful simplicity of that nature, to be wise is not one thing and to be another; but what it is to be wise, this it is also to be, as we have already often said in the earlier books too. See On the Trinity 7.1.1. But our knowledge, in very many things, is both losable and recoverable, because for us to be is not the same as to know or to be wise: since we can be, even if we do not know, nor are wise about, the things we have learned from elsewhere. On account of this, just as our knowledge is unlike that knowledge of God, so too our word, which is born of our knowledge, is unlike that Word of God which was born of the essence of the Father. But it is as if I said: "of the knowledge of the Father, of the wisdom of the Father"; or, what is more expressive: "Knowledge of the Father, Wisdom of the Father."
deTrin.15.13.2214. 23. Verbum ergo Dei Patris unigenitus Filius, per omnia Patri similis et aequalis, Deus de Deo, Lumen de Lumine, Sapientia de Sapientia, essentia de essentia; est hoc omnino quod Pater, non tamen Pater; quia iste Filius, ille Pater.
14. 23. The Word, then, of God the Father, the only-begotten Son, like and equal to the Father in all things, God of God, Light of Light, Wisdom of Wisdom, essence of essence; is altogether that which the Father is, yet not the Father; because this one is the Son, that one the Father.
deTrin.15.14.23Ac per hoc novit omnia quae novit Pater: sed ei nosse de Patre est, sicut esse. Nosse enim et esse ibi unum est. Et ideo Patri sicut esse non est a Filio, ita nec nosse. Proinde tamquam se ipsum dicens Pater genuit Verbum sibi aequale per omnia. Non enim se ipsum integre perfecteque dixisset, si aliquid minus aut amplius esset in eius Verbo quam in ipso. Ibi summe illud agnoscitur, est, est; non, non.
And through this he knows all that the Father knows: but to him, to know is from the Father, as to be. For to know and to be are there one. And therefore, just as to be is not to the Son from himself, so neither is to know. Accordingly, as it were speaking himself, the Father begot a Word equal to himself in all things. For he would not have spoken himself wholly and perfectly, if there were anything less or more in his Word than in himself. There that is supremely recognized, yes, yes; no, no (Matt 5:37; Jas 5:12).
deTrin.15.14.23Et ideo Verbum hoc vere veritas est: quoniam quidquid est in ea scientia de qua genitum est, et in ipso est; quod autem in ea non est, nec in ipso est. Et falsum habere aliquid hoc Verbum numquam potest: quia immutabiliter sic se habet, ut se habet de quo est. Non enim potest Filius a se facere quidquam, nisi quod viderit Patrem facientem. Potenter hoc non potest, nec est infirmitas ista, sed firmitas, qua falsa esse non potest veritas. Novit itaque omnia Deus Pater in se ipso, novit in Filio: sed in se ipso tamquam se ipsum, in Filio tamquam Verbum suum, quod est de his omnibus quae sunt in se ipso. Omnia similiter novit et Filius, in se scilicet, tamquam ea quae nata sunt de iis quae Pater novit in se ipso: in Patre autem, tamquam ea de quibus nata sunt, quae ipse Filius novit in se ipso.
And therefore this Word is truly truth: since whatever is in that knowledge from which it was begotten, is also in it; but what is not in it, is not in it either. And this Word can never have anything false: because it is immutably so disposed as is that from which it is. For the Son cannot do anything of himself, except what he sees the Father doing (John 5:19). He cannot do this powerfully, nor is this a weakness, but a firmness, by which truth cannot be false. So God the Father knows all things in himself, knows them in the Son: but in himself as himself, in the Son as his Word, which is of all these things that are in himself. The Son too knows all things likewise, in himself, namely, as those things which were born of those which the Father knows in himself: but in the Father, as those things of which were born the things which the Son himself knows in himself.
deTrin.15.14.23Sciunt ergo invicem Pater et Filius: sed ille gignendo, iste nascendo. Et omnia quae sunt in eorum scientia, in eorum sapientia, in eorum essentia, unusquisque eorum simul videt; non particulatim aut singillatim, velut alternante conspectu hinc illuc, et inde huc, et rursus inde vel inde in aliud atque aliud, ut aliqua videre non possit nisi non videns alia: sed, ut dixi, simul omnia videt, quorum nullum est quod non semper videt.
The Father and the Son, then, know each other: but the one by begetting, the other by being born. And all the things that are in their knowledge, in their wisdom, in their essence, each one of them sees at once; not piecemeal or singly, as though with an alternating gaze from here to there, and from there to here, and again from there or thence to one thing and another, so that he could not see some things except by not seeing others: but, as I said, he sees all things at once, of which there is none that he does not always see.
deTrin.15.14.2314. 24. Verbum autem nostrum illud quod non habet sonum neque cogitationem soni, sed eius rei quam videndo intus dicimus, et ideo nullius linguae est; atque inde utcumque simile est in hoc aenigmate (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) illi Verbo Dei, quod etiam Deus est, quoniam sic et hoc de nostra nascitur, quemadmodum et illud de scientia Patris natum est: nostrum ergo tale verbum, quod invenimus esse utcumque illi simile, quantum sit etiam dissimile sicut a nobis dici potuerit, non pigeat intueri.
14. 24. But that word of ours which has no sound nor thought of sound, but is of that thing which by seeing within we say, and therefore belongs to no language; and thence is somehow like, in this enigma, (See 1 Cor 13:12) that Word of God which is also God, since this too is so born of our knowledge as that too was born of the knowledge of the Father: our word, then, which we have found to be somehow like it, let it not be irksome to behold how unlike it also is, as far as could be said by us.
deTrin.15.14.2415. 24. Numquid verbum nostrum de sola scientia nostra nascitur? Nonne multa dicimus etiam quae nescimus? Nec dubitantes ea dicimus, sed vera esse arbitrantes: quae forte si vera sunt, in ipsis rebus de quibus loquimur, non in verbo nostro vera sunt; quia verbum verum non est, nisi quod de re quae scitur, gignitur. Falsum est ergo isto modo verbum nostrum, non cum mentimur, sed cum fallimur. Cum autem dubitamus, nondum est verbum de re de qua dubitamus, sed de ipsa dubitatione verbum est.
15. 24. Is our word born of our knowledge alone? Do we not say many things even which we do not know? And we say them not doubting, but supposing them to be true: which, if perchance they are true, are true in the very things of which we speak, not in our word; because a word is not true, except that which is begotten of a thing that is known. Our word, then, is false in this way, not when we lie, but when we are deceived. But when we doubt, there is not yet a word about the thing of which we doubt, but there is a word about the doubt itself.
deTrin.15.15.24Quamvis enim non noverimus an verum sit unde dubitamus, tamen dubitare nos novimus: ac per hoc cum hoc dicimus, verum verbum est; quoniam quod novimus dicimus. Quid, quod etiam mentiri possumus? Quod cum facimus, utique volentes et scientes falsum verbum habemus: ubi verum verbum est mentiri nos; hoc enim scimus. Et cum mentitos nos esse confitemur, verum dicimus: quod scimus enim dicimus; Cf. Cicero, Academica 2.29.95–30.96; Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 18.2.10. scimus namque nos esse mentitos. Verbum autem illud quod est Deus et potentius est nobis, hoc non potest. Non enim potest facere quidquam, nisi quod viderit Patrem facientem: et non a se ipso loquitur, sed a Patre illi est omne quod loquitur, cum ipsum Pater unice loquitur: (Cf. John 7:17; 8:26, 28, 38; 12:49–50; 14:10) et magna illius Verbi potentia est, non posse mentiri; quia non potest esse illic est et non, sed est, est; non, non. (Cf. Matt 5:37; Jas 5:12)
For although we do not know whether what we doubt about is true, yet we know that we doubt: and through this, when we say this, the word is true; since we say what we know. What of this, that we can even lie? When we do this, surely, willing and knowing, we have a false word: where the true word is that we lie; for this we know. And when we confess that we have lied, we speak truly: for we say what we know; See Cicero, Academica 2.29.95–30.96; Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 18.2.10. for we know that we have lied. But that Word which is God, and is more powerful than we, cannot do this. For he cannot do anything, except what he sees the Father doing (John 5:19): and he does not speak of himself, but from the Father is all that he speaks, since the Father uniquely speaks him: (See John 7:17; 8:26, 28, 38; 12:49–50; 14:10) and great is the power of that Word, that it cannot lie; because there cannot be there yes and no, but yes, yes; no, no. (See Matt 5:37; Jas 5:12)
deTrin.15.15.24At enim “nec verbum dicendum est, quod verum non est.” Si ita, libens assentior. Quid, cum verum est verbum nostrum, et ideo recte verbum vocatur, numquid sicut dici potest vel visio de visione, vel scientia de scientia, ita dici potest essentia de essentia, sicut illud Dei Verbum maxime dicitur (Cf. 1 Thess 2:13) maximeque dicendum est? Quid ita? quia non hoc est nobis esse, quod est nosse. Multa quippe novimus quae per memoriam quodam modo vivunt, ita et oblivione quodam modo moriuntur: (Cf. John 1:4) atque ideo cum illa iam non sint in notitia nostra, nos tamen sumus; et cum scientia nostra animo lapsa perierit a nobis, nos tamen vivimus.
But indeed "that is not to be called a word which is not true." If so, I gladly assent. What then, when our word is true, and therefore is rightly called a word: can it, as it can be called either vision of vision, or knowledge of knowledge, so be called essence of essence, as that Word of God is supremely called (See 1 Thess 2:13) and supremely is to be called? Why so? Because for us to be is not the same as to know. For we know many things which in a certain way live through memory, and in a certain way die through forgetfulness: (See John 1:4) and therefore, when those things are no longer in our acquaintance, we nevertheless are; and when our knowledge, having slipped from the mind, has perished from us, we nevertheless live.
deTrin.15.15.2415. 25. Illa etiam quae ita sciuntur, ut numquam excidere possint, quoniam praesentia sunt, et ad ipsius animi naturam pertinent, ut est illud quod nos vivere scimus (manet enim hoc quamdiu animus manet, et quia semper manet animus, et hoc semper manet): id ergo et si qua reperiuntur similia, in quibus imago Dei potius intuenda est, etiamsi semper sciuntur, tamen quia non semper etiam cogitantur, quomodo de his dicatur verbum sempiternum, cum verbum nostrum nostra cogitatione dicatur, invenire difficile est. Sempiternum est enim animo vivere, sempiternum est scire quod vivit: nec tamen sempiternum est cogitare vitam suam, vel cogitare scientiam vitae suae; quoniam cum aliud atque aliud coeperit, hoc desinet cogitare, quamvis non desinat scire. Ex quo fit, ut si potest esse in animo aliqua scientia sempiterna, et sempiterna esse non potest eiusdem scientiae cogitatio, et verbum verum nostrum intimum nisi nostra cogitatione non dicitur, solus Deus intellegatur habere Verbum sempiternum sibique coaeternum.
15. 25. Even those things which are so known that they can never slip away, since they are present, and pertain to the nature of the mind itself—such as is that which we know, that we live (for this remains as long as the mind remains, and because the mind always remains, this too always remains): this, then, and whatever like things are found, in which the image of God is rather to be beheld, although they are always known, yet because they are not always also thought of, how an everlasting word can be said of them, since our word is said by our thought, is difficult to find. For it is everlasting for the mind to live, everlasting to know that it lives: and yet it is not everlasting to think of its life, or to think of the knowledge of its life; since, when it begins to think of one thing and another, it will cease to think of this, although it does not cease to know it. From which it comes about that, if there can be in the mind some everlasting knowledge, and the thought of that same knowledge cannot be everlasting, and our true inmost word is not said except by our thought, God alone is understood to have a Word everlasting and coeternal with himself.
deTrin.15.15.25Nisi forte dicendum est, ipsam possibilitatem cogitationis, quoniam id quod scitur, etiam quando non cogitatur, potest tamen veraciter cogitari, verbum esse tam perpetuum, quam scientia ipsa perpetua est. Sed quomodo est verbum, quod nondum in cogitationis visione formatum est? Quomodo erit simile scientiae de qua nascitur, si eius non habet formam, et ideo iam vocatur verbum quia potest habere? Tale est enim ac si dicatur, ideo iam vocandum esse verbum quia potest esse verbum.
Unless perhaps it is to be said that the very possibility of thought—since that which is known, even when it is not thought of, can yet be truly thought of—is a word as perpetual as the knowledge itself is perpetual. But how is it a word, which is not yet formed in the vision of thought? How will it be like the knowledge from which it is born, if it does not have its form, and yet is already called a word because it can have one? For it is as if it were said that it is already to be called a word because it can be a word.
deTrin.15.15.25Sed quid est quod potest esse verbum, et ideo iam dignum est verbi nomine? Quid est, inquam, hoc formabile nondumque formatum, nisi quiddam mentis nostrae, quod hac atque hac volubili quadam motione iactamus, cum a nobis nunc hoc, nunc illud, sicut inventum fuerit vel occurrerit, cogitatur? Et tunc fit verum verbum, quando illud quod nos dixi volubili motione iactare, ad id quod scimus pervenit, atque inde formatur, eius omnimodam similitudinem capiens; ut quomodo res quaeque scitur, sic etiam cogitetur, id est, sine voce, sine vocis cogitatione, quae profecto alicuius linguae est, sic in corde dicatur. Ac per hoc etiam si concedamus, ne de controversia vocabuli laborare videamur, iam vocandum esse verbum quiddam illud mentis nostrae quod de nostra scientia formari potest, etiam priusquam formatum sit, quia iam, ut ita dicam, formabile est; quis non videat, quanta hic sit dissimilitudo ab illo Dei Verbo, quod in forma Dei sic est, (Cf. Phil 2:6) ut non antea fuerit formabile postque formatum, nec aliquando esse possit informe, sed sit forma simplex et simpliciter aequalis ei de quo est, et cui mirabiliter coaeterna est.
But what is that which can be a word, and therefore is already worthy of the name of word? What, I say, is this formable but not yet formed thing, except something of our mind, which we toss this way and that by a certain rolling motion, when now this, now that, is thought by us, as it has been found or occurred? And then a true word comes to be, when that which I said we toss by a rolling motion arrives at that which we know, and is formed from it, taking on its likeness in every way; so that, as each thing is known, so it is also thought of, that is, without voice, without thought of voice, which surely belongs to some language, so it is said in the heart. And through this, even if we concede—lest we seem to labor over a controversy of a word—that something of our mind which can be formed from our knowledge is already to be called a word, even before it is formed, because it is already, so to speak, formable; who does not see how great is the unlikeness here from that Word of God, which is so in the form of God (See Phil 2:6) that it was not first formable and afterward formed, nor can at any time be formless, but is a simple form, and simply equal to him of whom it is, and to whom it is wonderfully coeternal?
deTrin.15.15.2516. 25. Quapropter ita dicitur illud Dei Verbum, ut Dei cogitatio non dicatur, ne aliquid esse quasi volubile credatur in Deo, quod nunc accipiat, nunc recipiat formam, ut verbum sit, eamque possit amittere, atque informiter quodam modo volutari. Bene quippe noverat verba, et vim cogitationis inspexerat locutor egregius, qui dixit in carmine: secumque volutat eventus belli varios; Virgil, Aeneid 10.159–60. id est, cogitat.
16. 25. Wherefore that Word of God is so spoken of that the thought of God is not spoken of, lest something as it were rolling be believed to be in God, which now receives, now recovers a form, that it may be a word, and can lose it, and roll about in a certain formless way. For he had well known words, and had examined the force of thought, the excellent speaker who said in his poem: and he turns over within himself the varied outcomes of war Virgil, Aeneid 10.159–60.; that is, he thinks.
deTrin.15.16.25Non ergo ille Dei Filius cogitatio Dei, sed Verbum Dei dicitur. Cogitatio quippe nostra perveniens ad id quod scimus, atque inde formata, verbum nostrum verum est. Et ideo Verbum Dei sine cogitatione Dei debet intellegi, ut forma ipsa simplex intellegatur, non habens aliquid formabile quod esse etiam possit informe. Dicuntur quidem etiam in Scripturis Sanctis cogitationes Dei; (Cf. Mic 4:12; Isa 55:8) sed eo locutionis modo, quo ibi et oblivio Dei (Cf. Ps 13:1) dicitur, quae utique ad proprietatem in Deo nulla est.
That Son of God, then, is not called the thought of God, but the Word of God. For our thought, arriving at that which we know, and formed from it, is our true word. And therefore the Word of God ought to be understood without the thought of God, that the form itself may be understood as simple, not having anything formable which could also be formless. There are indeed in the Holy Scriptures said to be thoughts of God; (See Mic 4:12; Isa 55:8) but in that manner of speaking by which there is said there to be also a forgetfulness of God, (See Ps 13:1 (12:1)) which surely, in its proper sense, is none in God.
deTrin.15.16.2516. 26. Quamobrem cum tanta sit nunc in isto aenigmate dissimilitudo Dei et Verbi Dei, in qua tamen nonnulla similitudo comperta est; illud quoque fatendum est, quod etiam cum similes ei erimus, quando videbimus eum sicuti est (Cf. 1 John 3:2) (quod utique qui dixit, hanc procul dubio quae nunc est dissimilitudinem attendit), nec tunc natura illi erimus aequales. Semper enim natura minor est faciente, quae facta est. Cf. Porphyry, Sentences 13; Augustine, True Religion 18.35; The Immortality of the Soul 8.14. Et tunc quidem verbum nostrum non erit falsum, quia neque mentiemur, neque fallemur: fortassis etiam volubiles non erunt nostrae cogitationes ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes, (Cf. Ez 1:15, 2:1, 10:13) sed omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus: tamen cum et hoc fuerit, si et hoc fuerit, formata erit creatura quae formabilis fuit, ut nihil iam desit eius formae, ad quam pervenire deberet: sed tamen coaequanda non erit illi simplicitati, ubi non formabile aliquid formatum vel reformatum est, sed forma; neque informis, neque formata, ipsa ibi aeterna est immutabilisque substantia.
16. 26. Wherefore, since so great is now, in this enigma, the unlikeness of God and the Word of God, in which nevertheless some likeness has been found; this too must be confessed, that even when we shall be like him, when we shall see him as he is (See 1 John 3:2) (which surely he who said it, beyond doubt attended to this unlikeness which now is), not even then shall we be equal to him in nature. For always the nature which is made is less than the one making it. See Porphyry, Sentences 13; Augustine, True Religion 18.35; The Immortality of the Soul 8.14. And then indeed our word will not be false, because we shall neither lie nor be deceived: perhaps too our thoughts will not be rolling, going from one thing to another and returning, (See Ezek 1:15, 2:1, 10:13) but we shall see all our knowledge at once with one gaze: yet when this too shall have come about, if it shall have come about, the creature which was formable will be formed, so that nothing now is lacking to that form to which it ought to come: but yet it will not be to be made equal to that simplicity, where it is not something formable that has been formed or reformed, but form; and there, neither formless nor formed, the substance itself is eternal and immutable.
deTrin.15.16.26C
deTrin.15.16.26
17. 27. Satis de Patre et Filio, quantum per hoc speculum atque in hoc aenigmate (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) videre potuimus, locuti sumus. Nunc de Spiritu Sancto, quantum Deo donante videre conceditur, disserendum est. Qui Spiritus Sanctus secundum Scripturas Sanctas, nec Patris solius est, nec Filii solius, sed amborum: (Cf. Matt 10:20; Gal 4:6) et ideo communem, qua invicem se diligunt Pater et Filius, nobis insinuat caritatem.
17. 27. We have spoken enough of the Father and the Son, as far as through this mirror and in this enigma (See 1 Cor 13:12) we have been able to see. Now of the Holy Spirit we must discourse, as far as it is granted, by God's gift, to see. Which Holy Spirit, according to the Holy Scriptures, is neither of the Father alone, nor of the Son alone, but of both: (See Matt 10:20; Gal 4:6) and therefore conveys to us the common love by which the Father and the Son love each other.
deTrin.15.17.27Ut autem nos exerceret sermo divinus, non res in promptu sitas, sed in abdito scrutandas et ex abdito eruendas, maiore studio fecit inquiri. Non itaque dixit Scriptura, “Spiritus Sanctus caritas est”; quod si dixisset, non parvam partem quaestionis istius abstulisset: sed dixit, Deus caritas est; ut incertum sit, et ideo requirendum, utrum Deus Pater sit caritas, an Deus Filius, an Deus Spiritus Sanctus, an Deus ipsa Trinitas. Neque enim dicturi sumus, non propterea Deum dictum esse caritatem, quod ipsa caritas sit ulla substantia, quae Dei digna sit nomine; sed quod donum sit Dei, sicut dictum est Deo, quoniam tu es patientia mea: neque enim propterea dictum est, quia Dei substantia est nostra patientia; sed quod ab ipso nobis est, sicut alibi legitur, quoniam ab ipso est patientia mea. Hunc quippe sensum facile refellit Scripturarum ipsa locutio. Tale est enim, tu es patientia mea; quale est, tu es, Domine, spes mea; et, Deus meus misericordia mea, et multa similia. Non est autem dictum, “Domine caritas mea”; aut, “tu es caritas mea”; aut, “Deus caritas mea”: sed ita dictum est, Deus caritas est; sicut dictum est, Deus Spiritus est. Hoc qui non discernit, intellectum a Domino, non expositionem quaerat a nobis: non enim apertius quidquam possumus dicere.
But that the divine word might exercise us, it made not things set ready at hand, but things to be searched out in secret and drawn out from secret, to be sought with greater zeal. So Scripture did not say, "the Holy Spirit is love"; which, if it had said, it would have taken away no small part of this question: but it said, God is love (1 John 4:8); so that it is uncertain, and therefore to be sought, whether God the Father is love, or God the Son, or God the Holy Spirit, or God the Trinity itself. For we are not going to say that God was called love for the reason that love itself is some substance worthy of the name of God; but that it is a gift of God, as it was said to God, since you are my patience (Ps 71:5 (70:5)): for it was not said for the reason that our patience is God's substance; but that it is to us from him, as is read elsewhere, since from him is my patience (Ps 62:5 (61:6)). For this sense the very speech of the Scriptures easily refutes. For you are my patience is of the same sort as you are, O Lord, my hope (Ps 91:9 (90:9)); and my God, my mercy (Ps 59:17 (58:18)), and many like things. But it was not said, "O Lord my love"; or, "you are my love"; or, "God my love": but it was said thus, God is love; as it was said, God is a Spirit (John 4:24). He who does not discern this, let him seek understanding from the Lord, not exposition from us: for we cannot say anything more openly.
deTrin.15.17.2717. 28. Deus ergo caritas est: utrum autem Pater, an Filius, an Spiritus Sanctus, an ipsa Trinitas, quia et ipsa non tres dii, sed unus est Deus, hoc quaeritur. Sed iam in hoc libro superius disputavi, Cf. On the Trinity 15.7.11–13. non sic accipiendam esse Trinitatem quae Deus est, ex illis tribus quae in trinitate nostrae mentis ostendimus, ut tamquam memoria sit omnium trium Pater, et intellegentia omnium trium Filius, et caritas omnium trium Spiritus Sanctus,
17. 28. God, then, is love: but whether the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, or the Trinity itself, since it too is not three gods, but one God, this is asked. But I have already discussed above in this book See On the Trinity 15.7.11–13. that the Trinity which is God is not so to be received, from those three things which we showed in the trinity of our mind, as that the Father were, as it were, the memory of all three, and the Son the understanding of all three, and the Holy Spirit the love of all three,
deTrin.15.17.27quasi Pater nec intellegat sibi nec diligat, sed ei Filius intellegat, et Spiritus Sanctus ei diligat, ipse autem sibi et illis tantum meminerit;
as though the Father neither understood for himself nor loved, but the Son understood for him, and the Holy Spirit loved for him, while he himself only remembered for himself and for them;
deTrin.15.17.27et Filius nec meminerit nec diligat sibi, sed meminerit ei Pater, et diligat ei Spiritus Sanctus, ipse autem et sibi et illis tantummodo intellegat;
and that the Son neither remembered nor loved for himself, but the Father remembered for him, and the Holy Spirit loved for him, while he himself only understood both for himself and for them;
deTrin.15.17.27nemque Spiritus Sanctus nec meminerit nec intellegat sibi, sed meminerit ei Pater, et intellegat ei Filius, ipse autem et sibi et illis non nisi diligat: sed sic potius, ut omnia tria et omnes et singuli habeant in sua quisque natura.
and that the Holy Spirit neither remembered nor understood for himself, but the Father remembered for him, and the Son understood for him, while he himself only loved both for himself and for them: but rather thus, that all three, both all and each, have all three, each in his own nature.
deTrin.15.17.27Nec distent in eis ista, sicut in nobis aliud est memoria, aliud est intellegentia, aliud dilectio sive caritas: sed unum aliquid sit quod omnia valeat, sicut ipsa sapientia; et sic habetur in uniuscuiusque natura, ut qui habet, hoc sit quod habet, sicut immutabilis simplexque substantia.
Nor are these distant in them, as in us memory is one thing, understanding another, love or charity another: but let there be some one thing which avails for all, like wisdom itself; and it is so held in the nature of each one, that he who has it, is what he has, as an immutable and simple substance.
deTrin.15.17.27Si ergo haec intellecta sunt, et quantum nobis in rebus tantis videre vel coniectare concessum est, vera esse claruerunt; nescio cur non sicut sapientia et Pater dicitur et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et simul omnes non tres, sed una Sapientia; ita et caritas et Pater dicatur et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et simul omnes una caritas. Sic enim et Pater Deus, et Filius Deus, et Spiritus Sanctus Deus, et simul omnes unus Deus.
If, then, these things have been understood, and, as far as it has been granted us to see or conjecture in such great matters, have become clear to be true; I do not know why, just as wisdom is said to be both Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and all together not three, but one Wisdom; so love too should not be said to be both Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and all together one love. For so too the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and all together one God.
deTrin.15.17.2717. 29. Et tamen non frustra in hac Trinitate non dicitur Verbum Dei nisi Filius, nec Donum Dei nisi Spiritus Sanctus, (Cf. Sir 1:5; John 1:1–14; 4:10; Rev 19:13; Acts 8:20) nec de quo genitum est Verbum et de quo procedit principaliter Spiritus Sanctus nisi Deus Pater. (Cf. John 5:18, 6:27) Ideo autem addidi, “principaliter,” quia et de Filio Spiritus Sanctus procedere reperitur. Cf. On the Trinity 4.20.27–29, 5.14.15, 15.26.45. Sed hoc quoque illi Pater dedit, non iam exsistenti et nondum habenti: sed quidquid unigenito Verbo dedit, gignendo dedit. Sic ergo eum genuit, ut etiam de illo Donum commune procederet, et Spiritus Sanctus spiritus esset amborum.
17. 29. And yet not in vain, in this Trinity, is none called the Word of God but the Son, nor the Gift of God but the Holy Spirit, (See Sir 1:5; John 1:1–14; 4:10; Rev 19:13; Acts 8:20) nor he of whom the Word is begotten and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds but God the Father. (See John 5:18, 6:27) But I added "principally," because the Holy Spirit is found to proceed from the Son too. See On the Trinity 4.20.27–29, 5.14.15, 15.26.45. But this too the Father gave him—not to one already existing and not yet having: but whatever he gave to the only-begotten Word, he gave by begetting. So, then, he begot him that the common Gift should proceed also from him, and that the Holy Spirit should be the spirit of both.
deTrin.15.17.29Non est igitur accipienda transeunter, sed diligenter intuenda inseparabilis Trinitatis ista distinctio. Hinc enim factum est ut proprie Dei Verbum etiam Dei Sapientia diceretur, (Cf. Sir 1:5; John 1:1–14; 1 Cor 1:24; Rev 19:13) cum sit Sapientia et Pater et Spiritus Sanctus. Si ergo proprie aliquid horum trium caritas nuncupanda est, quid aptius quam ut hoc sit Spiritus Sanctus? Ut scilicet in illa simplici summaque natura, non sit aliud substantia et aliud caritas; sed substantia ipsa sit caritas, et caritas ipsa sit substantia, sive in Patre, sive in Filio, sive in Spiritu Sancto, et tamen proprie Spiritus Sanctus Caritas nuncupetur.
This distinction of the inseparable Trinity, then, is not to be received in passing, but to be diligently beheld. For hence it came about that the Word of God was also properly called the Wisdom of God, (See Sir 1:5; John 1:1–14; 1 Cor 1:24; Rev 19:13) although both the Father and the Holy Spirit are Wisdom. If, then, any one of these three is properly to be named love, what is more fitting than that this should be the Holy Spirit? namely, that in that simple and highest nature substance be not one thing and love another; but the substance itself be love, and love itself be substance, whether in the Father, or in the Son, or in the Holy Spirit; and yet that the Holy Spirit be properly named Love.
deTrin.15.17.2917. 30. Sicut Legis nomine aliquando simul omnia Veteris Instrumenti Sanctarum Scripturarum significantur eloquia. Nam ex propheta Isaia testimonium ponens Apostolus, ubi ait, in aliis linguis et in aliis labiis loquar populo huic; praemisit tamen, in Lege scriptum est. Et ipse Dominus, in Lege, inquit, eorum scriptum est, quia oderunt me gratis; cum hoc legatur in Psalmo. (Cf. Ps 35:19, 69:5)
17. 30. Just as by the name of the Law sometimes all the eloquences of the Holy Scriptures of the Old Instrument together are signified. For the Apostle, setting down a testimony from the prophet Isaiah, where he says, in other tongues and with other lips I will speak to this people, nevertheless premised, it is written in the Law (1 Cor 14:21; Isa 28:11–12). And the Lord himself says, it is written in their Law, that they hated me without cause (John 15:25); though this is read in a Psalm. (See Ps 35:19 (34:19), 69:4 (68:5))
deTrin.15.17.30Aliquando autem proprie vocatur Lex, quae data est per Moysen, (Cf. John 1:17) secundum quod dictum est, Lex et Prophetae usque ad Ioannem; et, in his duobus praeceptis tota Lex pendet et Prophetae. Hic utique proprie Lex appellata est, de monte Sina. Prophetarum autem nomine etiam Psalmi significati sunt: et tamen alio loco ipse Salvator, oportebat, inquit, impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in Lege, et Prophetis, et Psalmis de me. Hic rursus Prophetarum nomen, exceptis Psalmis, intellegi voluit.
But sometimes it is properly called the Law, which was given through Moses, (See John 1:17) according to what was said, the Law and the Prophets were until John (Luke 16:16; Matt 11:13); and, on these two precepts hangs the whole Law and the Prophets (Matt 22:40). Here surely it was properly called the Law, which was from Mount Sinai. But by the name of the Prophets the Psalms too were signified: and yet in another place the Savior himself says, it behooved that all things should be fulfilled which were written in the Law, and the Prophets, and the Psalms concerning me (Luke 24:44). Here again he wished the name of the Prophets to be understood, the Psalms being excepted.
deTrin.15.17.30Dicitur ergo Lex universaliter cum Prophetis et Psalmis, dicitur et proprie quae per Moysen data est. (Cf. John 1:17) Item dicuntur communiter Prophetae simul cum Psalmis, dicuntur et proprie praeter Psalmos.
The Law, then, is said universally, together with the Prophets and the Psalms, and is also said properly of that which was given through Moses. (See John 1:17) Likewise the Prophets are said commonly, together with the Psalms, and are said properly apart from the Psalms.
deTrin.15.17.30Et multis aliis exemplis doceri potest, multa rerum vocabula, et universaliter poni, et proprie quibusdam rebus adhiberi, nisi in re aperta vitanda sit longitudo sermonis. Hoc ideo dixi, ne quisquam propterea nos inconvenienter existimet Caritatem appellare Spiritum Sanctum, quia et Deus Pater et Deus Filius potest Caritas nuncupari.
And by many other examples it can be shown that many names of things are both set down universally, and applied properly to certain things, unless, in a matter that is plain, length of speech is to be avoided. I have said this for this reason, lest anyone should think that we unfittingly call the Holy Spirit Love, because both God the Father and God the Son can be named Love.
deTrin.15.17.3017. 31. Sicut ergo unicum Dei Verbum proprie vocamus nomine Sapientiae, cum sit universaliter et Spiritus PL adds Sanctus. et Pater ipse Sapientia; (Cf. Sir 1:5) ita Spiritus Sanctus proprie nuncupatur vocabulo Caritatis, cum sit universaliter Caritas et Pater et Filius.
17. 31. Just as, then, we properly call the only Word of God by the name of Wisdom, although universally both the Holy Spirit PL adds Sanctus. and the Father himself are Wisdom; (See Sir 1:5) so the Holy Spirit is properly named by the word Love, although universally both the Father and the Son are Love.
deTrin.15.17.31Sed Dei Verbum, id est, unigenitus Dei Filius aperte dictus est Dei sapientia, ore Apostolico, ubi ait, Christum Dei virtutem et Dei Sapientiam:
But the Word of God, that is, the only-begotten Son of God, was openly called the wisdom of God by the apostolic mouth, where he says, Christ the power of God and the Wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24):
deTrin.15.17.31Spiritus autem Sanctus ubi sit dictus caritas invenimus, si diligenter Ioannis Apostoli scrutemur eloquium; qui cum dixisset, dilectissimi, diligamus invicem, quia dilectio ex Deo est; secutus adiunxit, et omnis qui diligit, ex Deo natus est: qui non diligit, non cognovit Deum, quia Deus dilectio est. Hic manifestavit eam se dixisse dilectionem Deum, quam dixit ex Deo. Deus ergo ex Deo est dilectio.
but where the Holy Spirit is called love, we find, if we diligently search out the eloquence of the apostle John; who, when he had said, most beloved, let us love one another, because love is from God; following, added, and everyone who loves is born of God: he who does not love has not known God, because God is love (1 John 4:7–8). Here he made manifest that he had called that love God, which he said was from God. God, then, from God is love.
deTrin.15.17.31Sed quia et Filius ex Deo Patre natus est, et Spiritus Sanctus ex Deo Patre procedit, (Cf. John 15:26) quem potius eorum hic debeamus accipere dictum esse dilectionem Deum, merito quaeritur. Pater enim solus ita Deus est, ut non sit ex Deo: ac per hoc dilectio quae ita Deus est, ut ex Deo sit, aut Filius est, aut Spiritus Sanctus.
But because both the Son is born of God the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father, (See John 15:26) it is rightly asked which of them we ought rather to understand here to have been called love, God. For the Father alone is God in such a way as not to be from God: and through this the love which is God in such a way as to be from God is either the Son or the Holy Spirit.
deTrin.15.17.31Sed in consequentibus cum Dei dilectionem commemorasset, non qua nos eum, sed qua ipse dilexit nos, et misit Filium suum litatorem pro peccatis nostris; et hinc exhortatus esset ut et nos invicem diligamus, atque ita Deus in nobis maneat, quia utique dilectionem Deum dixerat, statim volens de hac re apertius aliquid eloqui, in hoc, inquit, cognoscimus quia in ipso manemus, et ipse in nobis, quia de Spiritu suo dedit nobis. Spiritus itaque Sanctus de quo dedit nobis, facit nos in Deo manere, et ipsum in nobis: hoc autem facit dilectio. Ipse est igitur Deus dilectio.
But in what follows, when he had mentioned the love of God, not by which we love him, but by which he himself loved us, and sent his Son as a propitiation for our sins; and had thence exhorted that we too should love one another, and that so God should remain in us, since he had surely called love God, immediately, wishing to say something more openly about this matter, in this, he says, we know that we remain in him, and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit (1 John 4:10–13). The Holy Spirit, then, of whom he has given us, makes us remain in God, and him in us: but this love does. He is therefore God, love.
deTrin.15.17.31Denique paulo post cum hoc ipsum repetisset atque dixisset, Deus dilectio est; continuo subiecit, et qui manet in dilectione, in Deo manet, et Deus manet in eo: unde supra dixerat, in hoc cognoscimus quia in ipso manemus, et ipse in nobis, quia de Spiritu suo dedit nobis. Ipse ergo significatur ubi legitur, Deus dilectio est. Deus igitur Spiritus Sanctus qui procedit ex Deo, cum datus fuerit homini, accendit eum in dilectionem Dei et proximi, et ipse dilectio est. (Cf. John 15:26; Rom 5:5) Non enim habet homo unde Deum diligat, nisi ex Deo.
Finally, a little after, when he had repeated this very thing and said, God is love; immediately he subjoined, and he who remains in love remains in God, and God remains in him (1 John 4:16): whence above he had said, in this we know that we remain in him, and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit. He himself, then, is signified where it is read, God is love. God the Holy Spirit, then, who proceeds from God, when he has been given to a man, kindles him to the love of God and of neighbor, and is himself love. (See John 15:26; Rom 5:5) For a man has nothing from which to love God, except from God.
deTrin.15.17.31Propter quod paulo post dicit: nos diligamus eum, quia ipse prior dilexit nos. Apostolus quoque Paulus: dilectio, inquit, Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris, per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis.
On account of which a little after he says: let us love him, because he first loved us (1 John 4:19). The apostle Paul too says, the love of God is poured out in our hearts, through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5).
deTrin.15.17.3118. 32. Nullum est isto Dei dono excellentius. (Cf. Acts 8:20; John 4:10) Solum est quod dividit inter filios regni aeterni (Cf. Matt 13:38; John 17:12) et filios perditionis aeternae. Dantur et alia per Spiritum PL adds Sanctum. munera, (Cf. 1 Cor 12:8) sed sine caritate nihil prosunt. (Cf. 1 Cor 13:3) Nisi ergo tantum impertiatur cuique Spiritus Sanctus, ut eum Dei et proximi faciat amatorem, a sinistra non transfertur ad dexteram. (Cf. John 3:5; Matt 25:33) Nec Spiritus proprie dicitur Donum, nisi propter dilectionem; quam qui non habuerit, si linguis hominum loquatur et angelorum, sonans aeramentum est et cymbalum tinniens: et si habuerit prophetiam, et scierit omnia sacramenta, et omnem scientiam, et si habuerit omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferat, nihil est: et si distribuerit omnem substantiam suam, et si tradiderit corpus suum ut ardeat, nihil ei prodest. (Cf. 1 Cor 13:1–3) Quantum ergo bonum est, sine quo ad aeternam vitam neminem bona tanta perducunt?
18. 32. There is nothing more excellent than this gift of God. (See Acts 8:20; John 4:10) It alone is what divides between the sons of the eternal kingdom (See Matt 13:38; John 17:12) and the sons of eternal perdition. Other gifts too are given through the Spirit, PL adds Sanctum. (See 1 Cor 12:8) but without love they profit nothing. (See 1 Cor 13:3) Unless, then, the Holy Spirit be so imparted to each one as to make him a lover of God and of neighbor, he is not transferred from the left to the right. (See John 3:5; Matt 25:33) Nor is the Spirit properly called the Gift, except on account of love; which he who does not have, if he speaks with the tongues of men and of angels, is sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal: and if he has prophecy, and knows all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if he has all faith, so as to remove mountains, he is nothing: and if he distributes all his substance, and if he gives up his body to be burned, it profits him nothing. (See 1 Cor 13:1–3) How great a good, then, is that without which goods so great lead no one to eternal life?
deTrin.15.18.32Ipsa vero dilectio sive caritas (nam unius rei est utrumque nomen), si habeat eam qui non loquitur linguis, nec habet prophetiam, nec omnia scit sacramenta omnemque scientiam, nec distribuit omnia sua pauperibus, vel non habendo quod distribuat, vel aliqua necessitate prohibitus, nec tradit corpus suum ut ardeat, si talis passionis nulla temptatio est, perducit ad regnum, ita ut ipsam fidem non faciat utilem nisi caritas. Sine caritate quippe fides potest quidem esse, sed non et prodesse. Propter quod et apostolus Paulus, in Christo, inquit, Iesu neque circumcisio, neque praeputium aliquid valet, sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur: sic eam discernens ab ea fide, qua et daemones credunt et contremiscunt. (Cf. Jas 2:19)
But love itself, or charity (for both are the name of one thing), if he has it who does not speak with tongues, nor has prophecy, nor knows all mysteries and all knowledge, nor distributes all his goods to the poor, either by not having what to distribute or being prevented by some necessity, nor gives up his body to be burned, if there is no temptation to such suffering, leads to the kingdom, so that faith itself is not made useful except by love. For without love faith can indeed exist, but cannot also profit. On account of which the apostle Paul too says, in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision avails anything, but faith which works through love (Gal 5:6): thus distinguishing it from that faith by which even the demons believe and tremble. (See Jas 2:19)
deTrin.15.18.32Dilectio igitur quae ex Deo est et Deus est, proprie Spiritus Sanctus est, per quem diffunditur in cordibus nostris Dei Caritas, per quam nos tota inhabitet Trinitas. (Cf. 1 John 4:7–8, 16; John 4:24; Rom 5:5) Quocirca rectissime Spiritus Sanctus, cum sit Deus, vocatur etiam Donum Dei. (Cf. Acts 8:20; John 4:10) Quod Donum proprie quid nisi Caritas intellegenda est, quae perducit ad Deum, et sine qua quodlibet aliud donum Dei non perducit ad Deum?
Love, then, which is from God and is God, is properly the Holy Spirit, through whom the Love of God is poured out in our hearts, through which the whole Trinity dwells in us. (See 1 John 4:7–8, 16; John 4:24; Rom 5:5) Wherefore most rightly the Holy Spirit, since he is God, is also called the Gift of God. (See Acts 8:20; John 4:10) And what is this Gift properly to be understood as, except Love, which leads to God, and without which any other gift of God whatever does not lead to God?
deTrin.15.18.3219. 33. An et hoc probandum est, Dei Donum dictum esse in Sacris Litteris Spiritum Sanctum? Si et hoc exspectatur, habemus in Evangelio secundum Ioannem Domini PL adds Iesu. verba dicentis, si quis sitit, veniat ad me, et bibat. Qui credit in me, sicut dicit Scriptura, flumina de ventre eius fluent aquae vivae. (Cf. John 7:37–38) Porro Evangelista secutus adiunxit: hoc autem dixit de Spiritu, quem accepturi erant credentes in eum. Unde dicit etiam Paulus Apostolus: et omnes unum Spiritum potavimus. Utrum autem donum Dei sit appellata aqua ista, quod est Spiritus Sanctus, hoc quaeritur. Sed sicut hic invenimus hanc aquam Spiritum Sanctum esse, ita invenimus alibi in ipso Evangelio hanc aquam Donum Dei appellatam. (Cf. John 4:10–14)
19. 33. Or is this too to be proved, that the Holy Spirit was called the Gift of God in the Sacred Writings? If this too is awaited, we have in the Gospel according to John the words of the Lord PL adds Iesu. saying, if anyone thirsts, let him come to me, and drink. He who believes in me, as the Scripture says, rivers of living water shall flow from his belly. (See John 7:37–38) Then the Evangelist, following, added: but this he said of the Spirit, which those believing in him were going to receive (John 7:39). Whence the apostle Paul too says: and we have all drunk of one Spirit (1 Cor 12:13). But whether this water, which is the Holy Spirit, was called the gift of God, this is asked. But as here we have found this water to be the Holy Spirit, so we find elsewhere, in the same Gospel, this water called the Gift of God. (See John 4:10–14)
deTrin.15.19.33Nam Dominus idem quando cum muliere Samaritana ad puteum loquebatur, cui dixerat, da mihi bibere; cum illa respondisset, quod Iudaei non couterentur Samaritanis; respondit Iesus, et dixit ei: si scires Donum Dei, et quis est qui dicit tibi, ‘da mihi bibere,’ tu forsitan petisses ab eo, et dedisset tibi aquam vivam. Dicit ei mulier: ‘Domine, neque in quo haurias habes, et puteus altus est; unde ergo habes aquam vivam?’ et cetera. Respondit Iesus, et dixit ei: ‘omnis qui biberit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum; qui autem biberit ex aqua quam ego dabo ei, non sitiet in aeternum: sed aqua quam ego dabo ei, fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam.’ Quia ergo haec aqua viva, sicut Evangelista exposuit, (Cf. John 4:10–11) Spiritus est Sanctus, procul dubio Spiritus Donum Dei est, (Cf. Acts 8:20; John 4:10) de quo hic Dominus ait: si scires Donum Dei, et quis est qui dicit tibi, ‘da mihi bibere’; tu forsitan petisses ab eo, et dedisset tibi aquam vivam. Nam quod ibi ait, flumina de ventre eius fluent aquae vivae; hoc isto loco, fiet in eo, inquit, fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam.
For the same Lord, when he was speaking with the Samaritan woman at the well, to whom he had said, give me to drink; when she had answered that the Jews did not associate with Samaritans; Jesus answered and said to her: if you knew the Gift of God, and who it is that says to you, "give me to drink," you would perhaps have asked of him, and he would have given you living water. The woman says to him: "Lord, you have nothing to draw with, and the well is deep; whence then have you living water?" and the rest. Jesus answered and said to her: "everyone who drinks of this water will thirst again; but he who drinks of the water which I will give him will not thirst forever: but the water which I will give him will become in him a fountain of water springing up into eternal life." (John 4:7–14) Since, then, this living water, as the Evangelist expounded, (See John 4:10–11) is the Holy Spirit, beyond doubt the Spirit is the Gift of God, (See Acts 8:20; John 4:10) of which here the Lord says: if you knew the Gift of God, and who it is that says to you, "give me to drink"; you would perhaps have asked of him, and he would have given you living water. For what he says there, rivers of living water shall flow from his belly; he says in this place, it will become in him a fountain of water springing up into eternal life.
deTrin.15.19.3319. 34. Paulus quoque Apostolus, unicuique, inquit, nostrum datur gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi; atque ut donationem Christi Spiritum Sanctum ostenderet, secutus adiunxit, propter quod dicit: ‘ascendit in altum, captivavit captivitatem, dedit dona hominibus.’ Notissimum est autem, Dominum Iesum, cum post resurrectionem a mortuis ascendisset in caelum, dedisse Spiritum Sanctum, quo impleti qui crediderant, linguis omnium gentium loquebantur. (Cf. Acts 2:2)
19. 34. The apostle Paul too says, to each one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ; and that he might show that the gift of Christ is the Holy Spirit, following, he added, on account of which it says: "he ascended on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts to men." (Eph 4:7–8) But it is most well-known that the Lord Jesus, when after the resurrection from the dead he had ascended into heaven, gave the Holy Spirit, filled with whom those who had believed spoke in the tongues of all the nations. (See Acts 2:2)
deTrin.15.19.34Nec moveat quod ait, dona; non, “Donum”: id enim testimonium de Psalmo posuit. Hoc autem in Psalmo ita legitur: ascendisti in altum, captivasti captivitatem, accepisti dona in hominibus. Sic enim plures codices habent, et maxime graeci, et ex hebraeo sic interpretatum habemus. Dona itaque dixit Apostolus, quemadmodum Propheta, non, “donum.” Sed cum Propheta dixerit, accepisti dona in hominibus; Apostolus maluit dicere, dedit dona hominibus; ut ex utroque scilicet verbo, uno prophetico, apostolico altero, quia in utroque est divini sermonis auctoritas, sensus plenissimus redderetur.
Nor let it disturb you that he says gifts, not "Gift": for he set down that testimony from a Psalm. But this in the Psalm is read thus: you ascended on high, you led captivity captive, you received gifts among men. For so many manuscripts have, and especially the Greek ones, and from the Hebrew we have it so rendered. The Apostle, then, said gifts, as the Prophet did, not "gift." But although the Prophet said, you received gifts among men; the Apostle preferred to say, he gave gifts to men; so that from both words—the one prophetic, the other apostolic, since in both is the authority of divine speech—the fullest sense might be rendered.
deTrin.15.19.34Utrumque enim verum est, et quia dedit hominibus, et quia accepit in hominibus. Dedit hominibus, tamquam caput membris suis: accepit in hominibus idem ipse utique membris suis, The translator emends the text to accepit in hominibus idem ipse utique membra sua in order to give a direct object to accepit. propter quae membra sua clamavit de coelo, Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris? et de quibus membris suis ait, quando uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis. Ipse ergo Christus, et dedit de caelo, et accepit in terra.
For both are true, both that he gave to men, and that he received among men. He gave to men, as the head to its members: he received among men—the same one, surely—in his members, The translator emends the text to accepit in hominibus idem ipse utique membra sua in order to give a direct object to accepit. on account of which members of his he cried from heaven, Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? and of which members of his he says, when you did it to one of the least of mine, you did it to me. He himself, then, Christ, both gave from heaven, and received on earth.
deTrin.15.19.34Porro autem dona ob hoc ambo dixerunt, et Propheta et Apostolus, quia per donum, quod est Spiritus Sanctus, in commune omnibus membris Christi multa dona, quae sunt quibusque propria, dividuntur. Non enim singuli quique habent omnia, sed hi illa, alii alia: quamvis ipsum donum a quo cuique propria dividuntur omnes habeant, id est, Spiritum Sanctum. (Cf. 1 Cor 12:7–12)
But for this reason both the Prophet and the Apostle said gifts, because through the gift, which is the Holy Spirit, many gifts, which are proper to each, are distributed in common to all the members of Christ. For not each one severally has all, but these have these, others others: although all have that very Gift from which the proper gifts are distributed to each, that is, the Holy Spirit. (See 1 Cor 12:7–12)
deTrin.15.19.34Nam et alibi cum multa dona commemorasset, omnia, inquit, haec operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens propria unicuique prout vult. Quod verbum et in Epistola quae ad Hebraeos est invenitur, ubi scriptum est, attestante Deo signis et ostentis, et variis virtutibus, et Spiritus Sancti divisionibus. Et hic cum dixisset: ascendit in altum, captivavit captivitatem, dedit dona hominibus; quod autem ascendit, ait, quid est, nisi quia et descendit in inferiores partes terrae? Qui descendit, ipse est et qui ascendit super omnes caelos, ut adimpleret omnia. Et ipse dedit quosdam quidem apostolos, quosdam autem prophetas, quosdam vero evangelistas, quosdam autem pastores et doctores.
For elsewhere too, when he had mentioned many gifts, all these, he says, works one and the same Spirit, distributing his own to each as he wills (1 Cor 12:11). Which word is found also in the Letter which is to the Hebrews, where it is written, God bearing witness with signs and wonders, and various powers, and distributions of the Holy Spirit (Heb 2:4). And here, when he had said: he ascended on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts to men; but that he ascended, he says, what is it, except that he also descended into the lower parts of the earth? He who descended is the same who also ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things. And he himself gave some indeed to be apostles, but some prophets, but some evangelists, but some pastors and teachers (Eph 4:8–11).
deTrin.15.19.34Ecce quare dicta sunt dona: quia, sicut alibi dicit: numquid omnes apostoli? numquid omnes prophetae? et cetera. Hic autem adiunxit, ad consummationem sanctorum in opus ministerii, in aedificationem corporis Christi. Haec est domus, quae, sicut Psalmus canit, aedificatur post captivitatem: (Cf. Ps 96:1) quoniam qui sunt a diabolo eruti, a quo captivi tenebantur, de his aedificatur domus Christi, quae corpus PL: domus, “the house.” appellatur Ecclesia. (Cf. Col 1:13–24; 2 Tim 2:26)
Behold why they were called gifts: because, as he says elsewhere: are all apostles? are all prophets? (1 Cor 12:29) and the rest. But here he added, for the perfecting of the saints, unto the work of ministry, unto the building up of the body of Christ (Eph 4:12). This is the house which, as the Psalm sings, is built after the captivity: (See Ps 96:1 (95:1)) since of those who are rescued from the devil, by whom they were held captive, of these is built the house of Christ, which body PL: domus, "the house." is called the Church. (See Col 1:13–24; 2 Tim 2:26)
deTrin.15.19.34Hanc autem captivitatem ipse captivavit, (Cf. Eph 4:8) qui diabolum vicit. Et ne illa quae futura erant sancti capitis membra in aeternum supplicium secum traheret, eum iustitiae prius, deinde potentiae vinculis alligavit. Ipse itaque diabolus est appellata captivitas, quam captivavit qui ascendit in altum, et dedit dona hominibus, (Cf. Eph 4:8; Ps 68:19) vel accepit in hominibus.
But this captivity he himself led captive, (See Eph 4:8) who overcame the devil. And lest he should drag with him into eternal punishment those who were going to be members of the holy head, he bound him first with the bonds of justice, then of power. The devil himself, then, is the captivity which was led captive by him who ascended on high, and gave gifts to men (See Eph 4:8; Ps 68:18 (67:19)), or received among men.
deTrin.15.19.3419. 35. Petrus autem apostolus, sicut in eo libro canonico legitur, ubi scripti sunt Actus Apostolorum, loquens de Christo, commotis corde Iudaeis et dicentibus, quid ergo faciemus, fratres? monstrate nobis; dixit ad eos: agite poenitentiam, et baptizetur unusquisque vestrum in nomine PL adds Domini, “the Lord.” Iesu Christi, in remissionem peccatorum; et accipietis donum Spiritus Sancti.
19. 35. But the apostle Peter, as is read in that canonical book where the Acts of the Apostles are written, speaking of Christ, when the Jews were moved in heart and said, what then shall we do, brothers? show us; said to them: do penance, and let each one of you be baptized in the name of PL adds Domini, "the Lord." Jesus Christ, unto the remission of sins; and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit (Acts 2:37–38).
deTrin.15.19.35Itemque in eodem libro legitur, Simonem Magum apostolis dare voluisse pecuniam, ut ab eis acciperet potestatem, qua per impositionem manus eius daretur Spiritus Sanctus. Cui Petrus idem: pecunia, inquit, tua tecum sit in perditionem, quia donum Dei aestimasti te per pecunias possidere.
Likewise in the same book it is read that Simon Magus wished to give money to the apostles, that he might receive from them the power by which, through the imposition of his hand, the Holy Spirit might be given. To whom the same Peter says: your money be with you unto perdition, because you have esteemed that you could possess the gift of God through money (Acts 8:20).
deTrin.15.19.35Et alio eiusdem libri loco, cum Petrus Cornelio et eis qui cum eo fuerant loqueretur, annuntians et praedicans Christum, ait Scriptura: adhuc loquente Petro verba haec, cecidit Spiritus Sanctus super omnes qui audiebant verbum, et obstupuerunt qui ex circumcisione fideles simul cum Petro venerant, quia et in nationes donum Spiritus Sancti effusum est. Audiebant enim illos loquentes linguis, et magnificantes Deum.
And in another place of the same book, when Peter was speaking to Cornelius and those who were with him, announcing and preaching Christ, the Scripture says: while Peter was still speaking these words, the Holy Spirit fell upon all who were hearing the word, and those of the circumcision who had come with Peter were astonished, because the gift of the Holy Spirit was poured out upon the nations too. For they heard them speaking with tongues, and magnifying God (Acts 10:44–46).
deTrin.15.19.35De quo facto suo quod incircumcisos baptizaverat, quia priusquam baptizarentur, ut nodum quaestionis huius auferret, in eos venerat Spiritus Sanctus, cum Petrus postea redderet rationem fratribus qui erant Hierosolymis, et hac re audita movebantur, ait post cetera, cum coepissem autem loqui ad illos, cecidit Spiritus Sanctus in illos, sicut et in nos in initio. Memoratusque sum verbi Domini, sicut dicebat: quia Ioannes quidem baptizavit aqua, vos autem baptizabimini Spiritu Sancto. Si igitur aequale donum dedit illis, sicut et nobis qui credidimus in Dominum Iesum Christum; ego quis eram, qui possem prohibere Deum non dare illis Spiritum Sanctum?
Of this deed of his, that he had baptized the uncircumcised, because before they were baptized—that he might remove the knot of this question—the Holy Spirit had come upon them, when Peter afterward rendered an account to the brothers who were at Jerusalem, and they, hearing this, were disturbed, he says, after the rest, but when I had begun to speak to them, the Holy Spirit fell upon them, as also upon us in the beginning. And I remembered the word of the Lord, as he said: John indeed baptized with water, but you shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit. If, then, God gave them an equal gift, as also to us who believed in the Lord Jesus Christ; who was I, that I could forbid God to give them the Holy Spirit (Acts 11:15–17)?
deTrin.15.19.35Et multa alia sunt testimonia Scripturarum, quae concorditer attestantur Donum Dei (Cf. Acts 8:20; John 4:10) esse Spiritum Sanctum, in quantum datur eis qui per eum diligunt Deum. Sed nimis longum est cuncta colligere. Et quid eis satis est, quibus haec quae diximus satis non sunt?
And there are many other testimonies of the Scriptures which concordantly attest that the Gift of God (See Acts 8:20; John 4:10) is the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is given to those who through him love God. But it is too long to gather all. And what is enough for those to whom the things we have said are not enough?
deTrin.15.19.3519. 36. Sane admonendi sunt, quandoquidem Donum Dei iam vident dictum Spiritum Sanctum, ut cum audiunt, donum Spiritus Sancti, (Cf. Acts 2:38, 10:45) illud genus locutionis agnoscant, quod dictum est, in exspoliatione corporis carnis. (Cf. Col 2:11) Sicut enim corpus carnis nihil est aliud quam caro; sic Donum Spiritus Sancti nihil est aliud quam Spiritus Sanctus. In tantum ergo Donum Dei est, in quantum datur eis quibus datur. Apud se autem Deus est, etsi nemini detur, quia Deus erat Patri et Filio coaeternus antequam cuiquam daretur. Nec quia illi dant, ipse datur, ideo minor est illis. Ita enim datur sicut Donum Dei, ut etiam se ipsum det sicut Deus. Non enim dici potest non esse suae potestatis, de quo dictum est, Spiritus ubi vult spirat; et apud Apostolum quod iam supra commemoravi, Cf. On the Trinity 15.19.34. omnia haec operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens propria unicuique prout vult. Non est illic conditio dati et dominatio dantium, sed concordia dati et dantium.
19. 36. They are surely to be admonished, since they now see that the Holy Spirit is called the Gift of God, that when they hear, the gift of the Holy Spirit, (See Acts 2:38, 10:45) they should recognize that manner of speaking which was said, in the stripping off of the body of the flesh. (See Col 2:11) For just as the body of the flesh is nothing other than flesh; so the Gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing other than the Holy Spirit. He is, then, the Gift of God insofar as he is given to those to whom he is given. But in himself he is God, even if he is given to no one, because God was coeternal with the Father and the Son before he was given to anyone. Nor, because they give him, is he given, therefore less than they. For he is so given as the Gift of God, that he also gives himself as God. For it cannot be said that he who is not within his own power, of whom it was said, the Spirit breathes where he wills (John 3:8); and, in the Apostle, what I have already mentioned above, See On the Trinity 15.19.34. all these works one and the same Spirit, distributing his own to each as he wills. There is there no condition of the given and dominion of the givers, but a concord of the given and of the givers.
deTrin.15.19.3619. 37. Quapropter si Sancta Scriptura proclamat: Deus Caritas est; (Cf. 1 John 4:8, 16) illaque ex Deo est, et in nobis id agit ut in Deo maneamus, et ipse in nobis, et hoc inde cognoscimus, quia de Spiritu suo dedit nobis, ipse Spiritus est Deus caritas. (Cf. 1 John 4:7, 13, 16) Deinde, si in donis Dei nihil maius est caritate, et nullum est maius donum Dei quam Spiritus Sanctus, quid consequentius quam ut ipse sit Caritas, qui dicitur et Deus et ex Deo? Et si Caritas qua Pater diligit Filium, et Patrem diligit Filius, ineffabiliter communionem demonstrat amborum; quid convenientius quam ut ille dicatur caritas proprie, qui Spiritus est communis ambobus? Hoc enim sanius creditur vel intellegitur, ut non solus Spiritus Sanctus Caritas sit in illa Trinitate, sed non frustra proprie caritas nuncupetur, propter illa quae dicta sunt. Sicut non solus est in illa Trinitate, vel spiritus vel sanctus, quia et Pater spiritus, et Filius spiritus, et Pater sanctus, et Filius sanctus, quod non ambigit pietas: Cf. On the Trinity 5.11.12; Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1.23. et tamen ipse non frustra proprie dicitur Spiritus Sanctus. Quia enim est communis ambobus, id vocatur ipse proprie quod ambo communiter.
19. 37. Wherefore, if the Holy Scripture proclaims, God is Love; (See 1 John 4:8, 16) and that Love is from God, and works in us that we may remain in God, and he in us, and we know this thence, because he has given us of his Spirit: he himself, the Spirit, is God, love. (See 1 John 4:7, 13, 16) Then, if among the gifts of God nothing is greater than love, and there is no greater gift of God than the Holy Spirit, what is more consistent than that he himself be the Love who is called both God and from God? And if the Love by which the Father loves the Son, and the Son loves the Father, ineffably demonstrates the communion of both; what is more fitting than that he should be called Love properly, who is the Spirit common to both? For this is more soundly believed or understood, that not the Holy Spirit alone is Love in that Trinity, but that he is not in vain properly named love, on account of the things that have been said. Just as he is not alone in that Trinity either spirit or holy, because both the Father is spirit, and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy, and the Son is holy, which piety does not doubt: See On the Trinity 5.11.12; Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1.23. and yet he himself is not in vain properly called the Holy Spirit. For because he is common to both, he is himself properly called that which both are in common.
deTrin.15.19.37Alioquin si in illa Trinitate solus Spiritus Sanctus est caritas, profecto et Filius non solius Patris, verum etiam Spiritus Sancti Filius invenitur. Ita enim locis innumerabilibus dicitur et legitur Filius unigenitus Dei Patris, ut tamen et illud verum sit quod Apostolus ait de Deo Patre: qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii caritatis suae. Non dixit, “filii sui”; quod si diceret, verissime diceret, quemadmodum quia saepe dixit, verissime dixit: sed ait, Filii caritatis suae. Filius ergo est etiam Spiritus Sancti, si non est in illa Trinitate caritas Dei nisi Spiritus Sanctus.
Otherwise, if in that Trinity the Holy Spirit alone is love, surely the Son too is found to be the Son not of the Father alone, but also of the Holy Spirit. For he is so called and read in countless places the only-begotten Son of God the Father, that yet that too is true which the Apostle says of God the Father: who rescued us from the power of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love (Col 1:13). He did not say, "of his Son"; which if he said, he would say most truly, just as, because he often said it, he said most truly: but he says, of the Son of his love. The Son, then, is also of the Holy Spirit, if there is not in that Trinity the love of God except the Holy Spirit.
deTrin.15.19.37Quod si absurdissimum est, restat ut non solus ibi sit caritas Spiritus Sanctus, sed propter illa de quibus satis disserui, proprie sic vocetur: quod autem dictum est, Filii caritatis suae, nihil aliud intellegatur, quam “Filii sui dilecti,” quam Filii postremo substantiae suae. Caritas quippe Patris quae in natura eius est ineffabiliter simplici, nihil est aliud quam eius ipsa natura atque substantia, ut saepe iam diximus, et saepe iterare non piget. Ac per hoc “Filius caritatis eius” nullus est alius, quam qui de substantia eius est genitus.
And if this is most absurd, it remains that the Holy Spirit is not alone there love, but, on account of the things of which I have discussed enough, is properly so called: but that which was said, of the Son of his love, is to be understood as nothing other than "of his beloved Son," or, finally, of the Son of his substance. For the love of the Father, which is in his nature ineffably simple, is nothing other than his very nature and substance, as we have already often said, and it is not irksome often to repeat. And through this "the Son of his love" is none other than he who is begotten of his substance.
deTrin.15.19.3720. 38. Quocirca ridenda est dialectica Eunomii, a quo Eunomiani haeretici exorti sunt: qui cum non potuisset intellegere, nec credere voluisset, (Cf. Isa 7:9) unigenitum Dei Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, Filium Dei esse natura, hoc est, de substantia Patris genitum; non naturae vel substantiae suae sive essentiae dixit esse Filium, sed filium voluntatis Dei, accidentem scilicet Deo volens asserere voluntatem qua gigneret Filium: Cf. Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 29.6; Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 10.11. videlicet ideo quia nos aliquid aliquando volumus, quod antea non volebamus; quasi non propter ista mutabilis intellegatur nostra natura, quod absit ut in Deo esse credamus. Neque enim ob aliud scriptum est, multae cogitationes in corde viri; consilium autem Domini manet in aeternum; nisi ut intellegamus sive credamus, (Cf. Isa 7:9) sicut aeternum Deum, ita in aeternum eius esse consilium, ac per hoc immutabile, sicut ipse est. Quod autem de cogitationibus, hoc etiam de voluntatibus verissime dici potest: “multae voluntates in corde viri; voluntas autem Domini manet in aeternum.” Quidam ne filium consilii vel voluntatis Dei dicerent unigenitum Verbum, ipsum consilium seu voluntatem Patris idem Verbum esse dixerunt. Sed melius, quantum existimo, dicitur consilium de consilio, et voluntas de voluntate, sicut substantia de substantia, sapientia de sapientia: ne absurditate illa quam iam refellimus, Filius dicatur Patrem facere sapientem vel volentem, si non habet Pater in substantia sua consilium vel voluntatem.
20. 38. Wherefore the dialectic of Eunomius, from whom the Eunomian heretics arose, is to be laughed at: who, since he could not understand, nor was willing to believe, (See Isa 7:9) that the only-begotten Word of God, through whom all things were made, is the Son of God by nature, that is, begotten of the substance of the Father; said that he is the Son not of his nature or substance or essence, but the son of the will of God, wishing, namely, to assert that there is accidental to God the will by which he begot the Son: See Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 29.6; Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 10.11. namely for this reason, that we at some time will something which before we did not will; as though our nature were not for this reason understood to be mutable, which far be it that we should believe to be in God. For it was not written for any other reason, many thoughts are in the heart of a man; but the counsel of the Lord remains forever (Prov 19:21); than that we may understand or believe (See Isa 7:9) that, just as God is eternal, so his counsel is forever, and through this immutable, as he himself is. But what is true of thoughts, this can most truly be said also of acts of will: "many acts of will are in the heart of a man; but the will of the Lord remains forever." Some, lest they should call the only-begotten Word the son of the counsel or will of God, said that the same Word is the very counsel or will of the Father. But better, as I judge, is it said counsel of counsel, and will of will, as substance of substance, wisdom of wisdom: lest, by that absurdity which we have already refuted, the Son should be said to make the Father wise or willing, if the Father does not have in his substance counsel or will.
deTrin.15.20.38Acute sane quidam respondit haeretico versutissime interroganti, utrum Deus Filium volens an nolens genuerit: ut si diceret, “nolens,” absurdissima Dei miseria sequeretur; si autem, “volens,” continuo quod intendebat velut invicta ratione concluderet, non naturae esse Filium, sed voluntatis. At ille vigilantissime vicissim quaesivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater volens an nolens sit Deus: ut si responderet, “nolens,” sequeretur illa miseria quam de Deo credere magna insania est; si autem diceret, “volens,” responderetur ei, “ergo et ipse Deus est sua voluntate, non natura.” Cf. Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 29.6; Augustine, Answer to an Arian Sermon 1.2; 2.3. Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret, et sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili vinculo se videret? Sed voluntas Dei si et proprie dicenda est aliqua in Trinitate persona, magis hoc nomen Spiritui Sancto competit, sicut caritas. Nam quid est aliud caritas, quam voluntas?
Acutely indeed did someone reply to a heretic most craftily asking whether God begot the Son willing or unwilling: so that if he said, "unwilling," a most absurd misery of God would follow; but if, "willing," he would at once conclude, as it were by an invincible reason, what he intended, that the Son is not of nature, but of will. But he, most vigilantly, asked of him in turn whether God the Father is God willing or unwilling: so that if he answered, "unwilling," that misery would follow which it is great insanity to believe of God; but if he said, "willing," it would be answered to him, "therefore he too is God by his will, not by his nature." See Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 29.6; Augustine, Answer to an Arian Sermon 1.2; 2.3. What, then, remained, except that he should fall silent, and see himself bound by his own question with an insoluble bond? But the will of God, if any person in the Trinity is also properly to be called it, this name befits the Holy Spirit rather, as does love. For what else is love than will?
deTrin.15.20.3820. 39. Video me de Spiritu Sancto in isto libro Cf. On the Trinity 15.17. secundum Scripturas Sanctas hoc disputasse, quod fidelibus sufficit scientibus iam Deum esse Spiritum Sanctum, (Cf. John 4:24) nec alterius substantiae, nec minorem quam est Pater et Filius, quod in superioribus libris secundum easdem Scripturas verum esse docuimus. Cf. On the Trinity 1.4–5.8.12; 2.3–4; 3.9; 4.20–21; 5.11.14–15; 6.5. De creatura etiam quam fecit Deus, quantum valuimus, admonuimus eos qui rationem de rebus talibus poscunt, ut invisibilia eius, per ea quae facta sunt, (Cf. Rom 1:20) sicut possent, intellecta conspicerent, et maxime per rationalem vel intellectualem creaturam, quae facta est ad imaginem Dei; (Cf. Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) per quod velut speculum, quantum possent, si possent, cernerent Trinitatem Deum, in nostra memoria, intellegentia, voluntate. Cf. Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of 83 Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6; cf. On the Trinity 10.11.17; 14.6.8; 15.7.11–13. Quae tria in sua mente naturaliter divinitus instituta quisquis vivaciter perspicit, et quam magnum sit in ea, unde potest etiam sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici, concupisci, reminiscitur per memoriam, intuetur per intellegentiam, amplectitur per dilectionem, profecto reperit illius summae Trinitatis imaginem. Ad quam summam Trinitatem reminiscendam, videndam, diligendam, ut eam recordetur, eam contempletur, ea delectetur, totum debet referre quod vivit. Verum ne hanc imaginem ab eadem Trinitate factam, et suo vitio in deterius commutatam, ita eidem comparet Trinitati, ut omni modo existimet similem; sed potius in qualicumque ista similitudine magnam quoque dissimilitudinem cernat, quantum esse satis videbatur, admonui.
20. 39. I see that I have discussed the Holy Spirit in this book, See On the Trinity 15.17. according to the Holy Scriptures, this much, which is enough for the faithful, who already know that the Holy Spirit is God, (See John 4:24) of no other substance, nor less than the Father and the Son, which in the earlier books we taught to be true according to those same Scriptures. See On the Trinity 1.4–5.8.12; 2.3–4; 3.9; 4.20–21; 5.11.14–15; 6.5. Of the creature too which God made, as far as we were able, we admonished those who demand a reason about such things, that they might behold his invisible things, through the things that have been made, (See Rom 1:20) as they could, understood, and especially through the rational or intellectual creature, which was made to the image of God; (See Gen 1:27, 5:1, 9:6) through which, as through a mirror, they might, as far as they could, if they could, discern the Trinity God, in our memory, understanding, will. See Cicero, De Inventione 2.53.160; Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions 31.1; Epistle 169.2.6; see On the Trinity 10.11.17; 14.6.8; 15.7.11–13. Which three, divinely established by nature in his own mind, whoever vividly perceives, and how great it is in it, whence even the everlasting and immutable nature can be recalled, beheld, desired—he remembers through memory, beholds through understanding, embraces through love—surely finds the image of that highest Trinity. To remembering, seeing, loving which highest Trinity, that he may recall it, contemplate it, be delighted in it, he ought to refer all that he lives. But lest he should so compare this image, made by that same Trinity and by its own fault changed for the worse, to that same Trinity, as to think it like in every way; but rather discern in this likeness of whatever kind also a great unlikeness, I have admonished as far as seemed sufficient.
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21. 40. Sane Deum Patrem, et Deum Filium, id est, Deum genitorem qui omnia quae substantialiter habet, in coaeterno sibi Verbo suo dixit quodam modo, et ipsum Verbum eius Deum, qui nec plus nec minus aliquid habet etiam ipse substantialiter, quam quod est in illo qui Verbum non mendaciter sed veraciter genuit; quemadmodum potui, non ut illud iam facie ad faciem, sed per hanc similitudinem in aenigmate quantulumcumque coniciendo videretur in memoria et intellegentia mentis nostrae, significare curavi: memoriae tribuens omne quod scimus, etiamsi non inde cogitemus, intellegentiae vero proprio modo quodam cogitationis informationem.
21. 40. I have taken care to signify, as I could—not that it might now be seen face to face, but through this likeness in an enigma, by conjecturing however little—God the Father and God the Son, that is, God the begetter, who in his Word coeternal with himself in a certain way spoke all things which he has substantially, and that same Word of his, God, who has neither more nor less anything, even he himself, substantially, than what is in him who begot the Word not falsely but truly: I have taken care to signify these, as I could, in the memory and understanding of our mind: attributing to memory all that we know, even if we do not think of it; but to understanding the informing of thought in a certain proper manner.
deTrin.15.21.40Cogitando enim quod verum invenerimus, hoc maxime intellegere dicimur, et hoc quidem in memoria rursus relinquimus. Sed illa est abstrusior profunditas nostrae memoriae, ubi hoc etiam primum cum cogitaremus invenimus, et gignitur intimum verbum, quod nullius linguae sit, tamquam scientia de scientia, et visio de visione, et intellegentia quae apparet in cogitatione, de intellegentia quae in memoria iam fuerat, sed latebat: quamquam et ipsa cogitatio quamdam suam memoriam nisi haberet, non reverteretur ad ea quae in memoria reliquerat, cum alia cogitaret.
For by thinking, what we find to be true, this we are especially said to understand, and this indeed we again leave in the memory. But that is the more hidden depth of our memory, where we first found this too when we thought of it, and where the inmost word is begotten, which is of no language, as it were knowledge of knowledge, and vision of vision, and understanding which appears in thought, of understanding which was already in the memory, but lay hidden: although thought itself too, unless it had a certain memory of its own, would not return to those things which it had left in the memory, when it thought of other things.
deTrin.15.21.4021. 41. De Spiritu autem Sancto nihil in hoc aenigmate quod ei simile videretur ostendi, nisi voluntatem nostram, vel amorem seu dilectionem quae valentior est voluntas: quoniam voluntas nostra quae nobis naturaliter inest, sicut ei res adiacuerint vel occurrerint, quibus allicimur aut offendimur, ita varias affectiones habet. Quid ergo, est? Numquid dicturi sumus voluntatem nostram, quando recta est, nescire quid appetat, quid evitet? Porro si scit, profecto inest ei sua quaedam scientia, quae sine memoria et intellegentia esse non possit. An vero audiendus est quispiam dicens, caritatem nescire quid agat, quae non agit perperam?
21. 41. But of the Holy Spirit I have shown nothing in this enigma that would seem like him, except our will, or love or affection, which is a more powerful will: since our will, which is naturally in us, has various affections, according as the things to which it is adjacent or which it meets, by which we are allured or offended, present themselves to it. What, then, is it? Are we going to say that our will, when it is right, does not know what it seeks, what it avoids? Moreover, if it knows, surely there is in it a certain knowledge of its own, which cannot be without memory and understanding. Or is anyone to be listened to who says that love, which does not act perversely (1 Cor 13:4–5), does not know what it does?
deTrin.15.21.41Sicut ergo inest intellegentia, inest dilectio illi memoriae principali, in qua invenimus paratum et reconditum ad quod cogitando possumus pervenire; quia et duo ista invenimus ibi, quando nos cogitando invenimus et intellegere aliquid et amare, quae ibi erant et quando inde non cogitabamus: et sicut inest memoria, inest dilectio huic intellegentiae quae cogitatione formatur; quod verbum verum sine ullius gentis lingua intus dicimus, quando quod novimus dicimus; nam nisi reminiscendo non redit ad aliquid, et nisi amando redire non curat nostrae cogitationis intuitus: ita dilectio quae visionem in memoria constitutam, et visionem cogitationis inde formatam quasi parentem prolemque coniungit, nisi haberet appetendi scientiam, quae sine memoria et intellegentia non potest esse, quid recte diligeret ignoraret.
As, then, there is understanding, there is love in that principal memory, in which we find ready and stored up that to which we can come by thinking; because we find both these things there, when by thinking we find that we both understand something and love it, which were there even when we were not thinking of them: and as there is memory, there is love in this understanding which is formed by thought; which true word, in the language of no nation, we say within, when we say what we know; for it does not return to anything except by recollecting, and the gaze of our thought does not care to return except by loving: so love, which joins the vision set in the memory, and the vision of thought formed from it, as it were parent and offspring, unless it had a knowledge of seeking, which cannot be without memory and understanding, would not know what it rightly loves.
deTrin.15.21.4122. 42. Verum haec quando in una sunt persona, sicut est homo, potest nobis quispiam dicere: “tria ista, memoria, intellectus, et amor, mea sunt, non sua; nec sibi, sed mihi agunt quod agunt, imo ego per illa. Ego enim memini per memoriam, intellego per intellegentiam, amo per amorem: et quando ad memoriam meam aciem cogitationis adverto, ac sic in corde meo dico quod scio, verbumque verum de scientia mea gignitur, utrumque meum est, et scientia utique et verbum. Ego enim scio, ego dico in meo corde quod scio. Et quando in memoria mea cogitando invenio iam me intellegere, iam me amare aliquid, qui intellectus et amor ibi erant et antequam inde cogitarem, intellectum meum et amorem meum invenio in memoria mea, quo ego intellego, ego amo, non ipsa. Item quando cogitatio memor est, et vult redire ad ea quae in memoria reliquerat, eaque intellecta conspicere (Cf. Rom 1:20) atque intus dicere, mea memoria memor est, et mea vult voluntate, non sua. Ipse quoque amor meus cum meminit atque intellegit quid appetere debeat, quid vitare, per meam, non per suam memoriam meminit; et per intellegentiam meam, non per suam, quidquid intellegenter amat, intellegit.”
22. 42. But these things, when they are in one person, as is man, someone can say to us: "these three, memory, understanding, and love, are mine, not their own; nor do they do what they do for themselves, but for me—nay, I do it through them. For I remember through memory, understand through understanding, love through love: and when I turn the gaze of thought to my memory, and so say in my heart what I know, and a true word is begotten of my knowledge, both are mine, both the knowledge surely and the word. For I know, I say in my heart what I know. And when in my memory by thinking I find that I already understand, already love something—which understanding and love were there even before I thought of them—I find my understanding and my love in my memory, by which I understand, I love, not they themselves. Likewise, when thought remembers, and wishes to return to those things which it had left in the memory, and to behold them, understood, (See Rom 1:20) and to say them within, it is my memory that remembers, and by my will, not its own, that it wills. My love itself too, when it remembers and understands what it ought to seek, what to avoid, remembers through my memory, not through its own; and through my understanding, not through its own, it understands whatever it understandingly loves."
deTrin.15.22.42Quod breviter dici potest: “ego per omnia illa tria memini, ego intellego, ego diligo, qui nec memoria sum, nec intellegentia, nec dilectio, sed haec habeo.” Ista ergo dici possunt ab una persona, quae habet haec tria, non ipsa est haec tria. In illius vero summae simplicitate naturae quae Deus est, quamvis unus sit Deus, tres tamen personae sunt, Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus.
Which can be said briefly: "I, through all those three, remember, I understand, I love, who am neither memory, nor understanding, nor love, but have these." These things, then, can be said by one person, who has these three, is not itself these three. But in the simplicity of that highest nature which is God, although there is one God, yet there are three persons, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
deTrin.15.22.4223. 43. Aliud est itaque Trinitas res ipsa, aliud imago Trinitatis in re alia, propter quam imaginem simul et illud in quo sunt haec tria, imago dicitur; sicut imago dicitur simul et tabula, et quod in ea pictum est; sed propter picturam quae in ea est, simul et tabula nomine imaginis appellatur.
23. 43. The Trinity itself, the thing, is one thing, then; the image of the Trinity in another thing is another; on account of which image both that in which these three are is at once called an image; as an image is at once called both the panel, and what is painted on it; but on account of the painting which is on it, the panel too is called by the name of image.
deTrin.15.23.43Verum in illa summa Trinitate, quae incomparabiliter rebus omnibus antecellit, tanta est inseparabilitas, ut cum trinitas hominum non possit dici unus homo; in illa unus Deus et dicatur et sit, nec in uno Deo sit illa Trinitas, sed unus Deus. Cf. Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1.11. Nec rursus quemadmodum ista imago quod est homo habens illa tria una persona est, ita est illa Trinitas: sed tres Personae sunt, Pater Filii, et Filius Patris, et Spiritus Patris et Filii. Quamvis enim memoria hominis, et maxime illa quam pecora non habent, id est, qua res intellegibiles ita continentur, ut non in eam per sensus corporis venerint, habeat pro modulo suo in hac imagine Trinitatis incomparabiliter quidem imparem, sed tamen qualemcumque similitudinem Patris; itemque intellegentia hominis, quae per intentionem cogitationis inde formatur, quando quod scitur dicitur, et nullius linguae cordis verbum est, habeat in sua magna disparitate nonnullam similitudinem Filii; et amor hominis de scientia procedens, et memoriam intellegentiamque coniungens, tamquam parenti prolique communis, unde nec parens intellegitur esse, nec proles, habeat in hac imagine aliquam, licet valde imparem, similitudinem Spiritus Sancti: non tamen, sicut in ista imagine Trinitatis non haec tria unus homo, sed unius hominis sunt, ita in ipsa summa Trinitate cuius haec imago est, unius Dei sunt illa tria, sed unus Deus est, et tres sunt illae, non una persona.
But in that highest Trinity, which incomparably excels all things, so great is the inseparability, that, whereas a trinity of men cannot be called one man, in that one there is both called and is one God; nor is that Trinity in one God, but it is one God. See Eusebius of Vercelli, On the Trinity 1.11. Nor again, just as this image which is man, having those three, is one person, is that Trinity so: but there are three Persons, the Father of the Son, and the Son of the Father, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son. For although the memory of man, and especially that which the beasts do not have, that is, by which intelligible things are so contained that they did not come into it through the senses of the body, has in its small measure, in this image of the Trinity, an incomparably unequal, but yet some sort of likeness of the Father; and likewise the understanding of man, which is formed thence by the intention of thought, when what is known is said, and is a word of the heart of no language, has in its great disparity some likeness of the Son; and the love of man, proceeding from knowledge, and joining memory and understanding, as it were common to parent and offspring, whence it is understood to be neither parent nor offspring, has in this image some, though far unequal, likeness of the Holy Spirit: yet not, just as in this image of the Trinity these three are not one man, but are of one man, so in that highest Trinity, of which this is the image, are those three of one God, but it is one God, and they are three, not one person.
deTrin.15.23.43Quod sane mirabiliter ineffabile est, vel ineffabiliter mirabile, cum sit una persona haec imago Trinitatis, ipsa vero summa Trinitas tres Personae sint, inseparabilior est illa Trinitas Personarum trium, quam haec unius. Illa quippe in natura divinitatis, sive id melius dicitur deitatis, quod est, hoc est, atque incommutabiliter inter se ac semper aequalis est: nec aliquando non fuit, aut aliter fuit; nec aliquando non erit, aut aliter erit. Ista vero tria quae sunt in impari imagine, etsi non locis quoniam non sunt corpora, tamen inter se nunc in ista vita “magnitudinibus” separantur.
Which surely is wonderfully ineffable, or ineffably wonderful, that, although this image of the Trinity is one person, but the highest Trinity itself is three Persons, that Trinity of three Persons is more inseparable than this of one. For that, in the nature of divinity—or, what is better said, of deity—is what it is, and is among themselves immutably and always equal: nor was it ever not, or otherwise; nor will it ever not be, or otherwise. But those three which are in the unequal image, even if not by places, since they are not bodies, yet among themselves now in this life are separated by "magnitudes."
deTrin.15.23.43Neque enim quia moles nullae ibi sunt, ideo non videmus in alio maiorem esse memoriam quam intellegentiam, in alio contra: in alio duo haec amoris magnitudine superari, sive sint ipsa duo inter se aequalia, sive non sint. He seems to contradict here what he said in earlier books about the essential equality of these three mental acts (9.4–8, 10.18). But there he was talking about perfect mental acts, here it seems about imperfect mental capacities. Atque ita a singulis bina, et a binis singula, et a singulis singula, a maioribus minora vincuntur. Et quando inter se aequalia fuerint ab omni languore sanata, nec tunc aequabitur rei natura immutabili ea res quae per gratiam non mutatur: quia non aequatur creatura Creatori, et quando ab omni languore sanabitur, mutabitur.
For not because there are no masses there, do we therefore not see in one person memory to be greater than understanding, in another the contrary: in another these two to be surpassed by the magnitude of love, whether the two themselves are equal among themselves, or are not. He seems to contradict here what he said in earlier books about the essential equality of these three mental acts (9.4–8, 10.18). But there he was talking about perfect mental acts, here it seems about imperfect mental capacities. And so by single ones two, and by two single ones, and by single ones single ones, the lesser are overcome by the greater. And when, healed of all languor, they shall be equal among themselves, not even then will that thing which through grace is not changed be made equal to the nature immutable: because the creature is not made equal to the Creator, and when it shall be healed of all languor, it will be changed.
deTrin.15.23.4323. 44. Sed hanc non solum incorporalem, verum etiam summo inseparabilem vereque immutabilem Trinitatem, cum venerit visio quae facie ad faciem repromittitur nobis, multo clarius certiusque videbimus, quam nunc eius imaginem quod nos sumus: per quod tamen speculum et in quo aenigmate (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) qui vident, sicut in hac vita videre concessum est, non illi sunt qui ea quae digessimus et commendavimus in sua mente conspiciunt; sed illi qui eam tamquam imaginem vident, ut possint ad eum cuius imago est, quomodocumque referre quod vident, et per imaginem quam conspiciendo vident, etiam illud videre coniciendo, quoniam nondum possunt facie ad faciem. Non enim ait Apostolus: “videmus nunc speculum”; sed, videmus PL adds nunc. per speculum.
23. 44. But this Trinity, which is not only incorporeal but also supremely inseparable and truly unchangeable, we shall see far more clearly and certainly when the vision promised to us face to face has come (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) than we now see its image, which we ourselves are. Yet those who, in this image, see through the mirror and in the riddle (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12) insofar as it is granted us to see in this life, are not those who behold in their own mind the things we have set out and commended; they are rather those who see the mind as an image, so that they can in some way refer what they see to him whose image it is, and through the image they see by beholding it, can also see him by conjecture, since they cannot yet see him face to face. For the Apostle does not say, we now see a mirror, but, we see through a mirror.
deTrin.15.23.4424. 44. Qui ergo vident suam mentem, quomodo videri potest, et in ea trinitatem istam de qua multis modis ut potui disputavi, nec tamen eam credunt vel intellegunt (Cf. Isa 7:9) esse imaginem Dei; speculum quidem vident, sed usque adeo non vident per speculum qui est per speculum nunc videndus, ut nec ipsum speculum quod vident sciant esse speculum, id est, imaginem.
24. 44. Those, then, who see their mind in the way it can be seen, and in it this trinity about which I have argued in many ways as best I could, yet do not believe or understand (Cf. Isa 7:9) it to be the image of God, do indeed see the mirror, but they so fail to see through the mirror the one who is now to be seen through the mirror that they do not even know that the very mirror they see is a mirror, that is, an image.
deTrin.15.24.44Quod si scirent, fortassis et eum cuius est hoc speculum, per hoc quaerendum et per hoc utcumque interim videndum esse sentirent, fide non ficta (Cf. 1 Tim 1:5) corda mundante, (Cf. Acts 15:9) ut facie ad faciem possit videri, qui per speculum nunc videtur. (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12)
But if they did know this, perhaps they would also perceive that the one whose mirror this is must be sought through it and in some way seen through it in the meantime, when the heart has been cleansed by faith unfeigned, (Cf. 1 Tim 1:5; Acts 15:9) so that he who is now seen through a mirror may be able to be seen face to face. (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12)
deTrin.15.24.44Qua fide cordium mundatrice contempta, quid agunt intellegendo quae de natura mentis humanae subtilissime disputantur, nisi ut ipsa quoque intellegentia sua teste damnentur? In qua utique non laborarent, et vix ad certum aliquid pervenirent, nisi poenalibus tenebris involuti et onerati corpore corruptibili quod aggravat animam. (Cf. Matt 11:28; Job 37:19; Wis 9:15) Quo tandem merito inflicto malo isto, nisi peccati?
When the faith that cleanses the heart is despised, what do they accomplish by understanding the things that are argued so subtly about the nature of the human mind, except that they are condemned by the witness of their own understanding? In this understanding they surely would not labor, and would scarcely reach anything certain, were they not wrapped in penal darkness and weighed down by the corruptible body that burdens the soul. (Cf. Wis 9:15; Matt 11:28; Job 37:19) And by what merit is this evil inflicted, except that of sin?
deTrin.15.24.44Unde tanti mali magnitudine admoniti, sequi deberent Agnum qui tollit peccatum mundi.
Admonished, therefore, by the greatness of so great an evil, they ought to follow the Lamb who takes away the sin of the world.
deTrin.15.24.4425. 44. Ad eum namque pertinentes etiam longe istis ingenio tardiores, quando fine huius vitae resolvuntur a corpore, ius in eis retinendis non habent invidae potestates. Quas ille Agnus sine ullo ab eis peccati debito occisus, non potentia potestatis priusquam iustitia sanguinis vicit. Cf. Rev 5:12; On the Trinity 13.17.
25. 44. For over those who belong to him, even those much slower in talent than these people, the envious powers have no right to retain them when at the end of this life they are released from the body. The Lamb conquered those powers, slain by them though he owed them no debt of sin, not by the might of power but by the justice of his blood. Cf. Rev 5:12; On the Trinity 13.17.
deTrin.15.25.44Proinde liberi a diaboli potestate, suscipiuntur ab angelis sanctis, a malis omnibus liberati per Mediatorem Dei et hominum hominem Iesum Christum: quoniam consonantibus Divinis Scripturis, et veteribus et novis, et per quas praenuntiatus et per quas annuntiatus est Christus, non est aliud nomen sub caelo, in quo oportet homines salvos fieri. Constituuntur autem purgati ab omni contagione corruptionis in placidis sedibus, donec recipiant corpora sua, sed iam incorruptibilia, quae ornent, non onerent. Hoc enim placuit optimo et sapientissimo Creatori, ut spiritus hominis Deo pie subditus, habeat feliciter subditum corpus, et sine fine permaneat ista felicitas.
Thus, freed from the power of the devil, they are received by the holy angels, delivered from all evils through the man Christ Jesus, the mediator of God and men; for since the divine Scriptures, both old and new, are in agreement—those through which Christ was foretold and those through which he was proclaimed—there is no other name under heaven by which men must be saved. And once cleansed from every contagion of corruption, they are established in peaceful dwellings until they receive back their bodies, but now incorruptible, bodies that will adorn them, not burden them. For it has pleased the best and wisest Creator that the spirit of man, devoutly subject to God, should have its body happily subject to it, and that this happiness should remain without end.
deTrin.15.25.4425. 45. Ibi veritatem sine ulla difficultate videbimus, eaque clarissima et certissima perfruemur. Nec aliquid quaeremus mente ratiocinante, sed contemplante cernemus quare non sit Filius Spiritus Sanctus, cum de Patre procedat.
25. 45. There we shall see the truth without any difficulty, and we shall enjoy it in its utmost clarity and certainty. Nor shall we seek anything by a mind that reasons, but by a mind that contemplates we shall discern why the Holy Spirit is not the Son, although he proceeds from the Father.
deTrin.15.25.45In illa luce nulla erit quaestio: hic vero ipsa experientia tam mihi apparuit esse difficilis, quod et illis qui haec diligenter atque intellegenter legent, procul dubio similiter apparebit, ut cum me in secundo huius operis libro alio loco inde dicturum esse promiserim, Cf. On the Trinity 2.3.5. quotiescumque in ea creatura quae nos sumus, aliquid illi rei simile ostendere volui, qualemcumque intellectum meum sufficiens elocutio mea secuta non fuerit: quamvis et in ipso intellectu conatum me senserim magis habuisse quam effectum.
In that light there will be no question; but here this very experience has appeared so difficult to me—and without doubt it will appear similarly difficult to those who read these things carefully and intelligently—that, although I had promised in another place in the second book of this work that I would speak of it, Cf. On the Trinity 2.3.5. whenever I wished to show something in the creation that we are which resembles that reality, my expression, such as it was, did not keep up with my understanding; though even in the understanding itself I felt that I had achieved more of an attempt than an effect.
deTrin.15.25.45Et in una quidem persona quod est homo invenisse imaginem summae illius Trinitatis, et in re mutabili tria illa ut facilius intellegi possint, etiam per temporalia intervalla maxime in libro nono monstrare voluisse. Cf. On the Trinity 9.7.9–10. Sed tria unius personae, non sicut humana poscit intentio, tribus illis personis convenire potuerunt, sicut in hoc libro quinto decimo demonstravimus.
And in the one person that man is, I did indeed wish to have found an image of that supreme Trinity, and to show, especially in the ninth book, those three things in a changeable thing so that they might be more easily understood, even through intervals of time. Cf. On the Trinity 9.7.9–10. But the three things of one person could not, as human reflection requires, be made to correspond to those three persons, as we have demonstrated in this fifteenth book.
deTrin.15.25.4526. 45. Deinde in illa summa Trinitate quae Deus est, intervalla temporum nulla sunt, per quae possit ostendi aut saltem requiri, utrum prius de Patre natus sit Filius, et postea de ambobus processerit Spiritus Sanctus. Quoniam Scriptura Sancta Spiritum eum dicit amborum. (Cf. Matt 10:20; Gal 4:6) Ipse est enim de quo dicit Apostolus, quoniam autem estis filii, misit Deus Spiritum Filii sui in corda nostra: PL: vestra, “your.” et ipse est de quo dicit idem Filius, non enim vos estis qui loquimini; sed Spiritus Patris vestri, qui loquitur in vobis.
26. 45. Then, in that supreme Trinity which is God, there are no intervals of time through which it could be shown, or even asked, whether the Son was first born of the Father and the Holy Spirit afterward proceeded from them both. For Holy Scripture calls him the Spirit of both. (Cf. Matt 10:20; Gal 4:6) For he is the one of whom the Apostle says, but because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts; PL: vestra, "your." and he is the one of whom the same Son says, for it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you.
deTrin.15.26.45Et multis aliis divinorum eloquiorum testimoniis comprobatur Patris et Filii esse Spiritum, qui proprie dicitur in Trinitate Spiritus Sanctus: de quo item dicit ipse Filius, quem ego mittam vobis a Patre; et alio loco, quem mittet Pater in nomine meo. De utroque autem procedere sic docetur; quia ipse Filius ait, de Patre procedit. Et cum resurrexisset a mortuis et apparuisset discipulis suis, insufflavit et ait, “accipite Spiritum Sanctum,” ut eum etiam de se procedere ostenderet. Et ipsa est virtus quae de illo exibat, sicut legitur in Evangelio, et sanabat omnes. (Cf. Luke 6:19)
And by many other testimonies of the divine words it is proved that the Spirit who is properly called in the Trinity the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. Of him the Son himself again says, whom I will send to you from the Father; and in another place, whom the Father will send in my name. That he proceeds from both is taught in this way: that the Son himself says, he proceeds from the Father. And when he had risen from the dead and appeared to his disciples, he breathed on them and said, receive the Holy Spirit, so as to show that the Spirit proceeds from him as well. And it is the power that went out from him, as we read in the Gospel, and healed all. (Cf. Luke 6:19)
deTrin.15.26.4526. 46. Quid vero fuerit causae, ut post resurrectionem suam, et in terra prius daret, (Cf. John 20:22) et de caelo postea mitteret Spiritum Sanctum; (Cf. Acts 2:4) hoc ego existimo, quia per ipsum donum diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, (Cf. Rom 5:5) qua diligimus Deum et proximum, secundum duo illa praecepta in quibus tota Lex pendet et Prophetae. (Cf. Matt 22:38–40) Hoc significans Dominus Iesus, bis dedit Spiritum Sanctum; semel in terra propter dilectionem proximi, et iterum de caelo propter dilectionem Dei. Et si forte alia ratio reddatur de Spiritu Sancto bis dato, eumdem tamen Spiritum PL adds Sanctum. datum, cum insufflasset Iesus, de quo mox ait, ite, baptizate PL adds omnes, “all.” gentes in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, ubi maxime commendatur haec Trinitas, ambigere non debemus. Cf. Gregory Baeticus, The Orthodox Faith, prologue. Ipse est igitur qui de caelo etiam datus est die Pentecostes, (Cf. Acts 2:4) id est, post dies decem quam Dominus ascendit in caelum.
26. 46. As to what the reason was that after his resurrection he first gave the Holy Spirit on earth (Cf. John 20:22) and afterward sent him from heaven, (Cf. Acts 2:4) I think it is this: that through this gift love is poured out in our hearts, (Cf. Rom 5:5) by which we love God and neighbor, according to those two commandments on which the whole Law and the Prophets depend. (Cf. Matt 22:38–40) Signifying this, the Lord Jesus gave the Holy Spirit twice: once on earth on account of the love of neighbor, and again from heaven on account of the love of God. And if perhaps some other reason is given for the Holy Spirit being given twice, we ought not to doubt that it was the same Spirit PL adds Sanctum. that was given when Jesus breathed on them, of whom he soon afterward said, go, baptize the PL adds omnes, "all." nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, where this Trinity is especially commended. Cf. Gregory Baeticus, The Orthodox Faith, prologue. He, then, is the one who was also given from heaven on the day of Pentecost, (Cf. Acts 2:4) that is, ten days after the Lord ascended into heaven.
deTrin.15.26.46Quomodo ergo Deus non est qui dat Spiritum Sanctum? Imo quantus Deus est qui dat Deum? Neque enim aliquis discipulorum eius dedit Spiritum Sanctum. Orabant quippe ut veniret in eos quibus manum imponebant, non ipsi eum dabant. Quem morem in suis praepositis etiam nunc servat Ecclesia. Denique et Simon Magus offerens apostolis pecuniam, non ait, date et mihi hanc potestatem, ut “dem Spiritum Sanctum”; sed, cuicumque, inquit, imposuero manus, accipiat Spiritum Sanctum. Quia neque Scriptura superius dixerat, “videns autem Simon quod apostoli darent Spiritum Sanctum”; sed dixerat, videns autem Simon quod per impositionem manuum apostolorum daretur Spiritus Sanctus.
How, then, is he not God who gives the Holy Spirit? Indeed, how great is the God who gives God? For none of his disciples gave the Holy Spirit. They prayed, of course, that he might come upon those on whom they laid hands; they did not themselves give him. This custom the Church preserves even now in its prelates. And so Simon Magus too, when he offered the apostles money, did not say, give me also this power, that "I may give the Holy Spirit," but, he said, that on whomever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Spirit. For Scripture had not said above, "Simon, seeing that the apostles gave the Holy Spirit," but had said, Simon, seeing that through the laying on of the apostles' hands the Holy Spirit was given.
deTrin.15.26.46Propter hoc et Dominus ipse Iesus Spiritum Sanctum non solum dedit ut Deus, sed etiam accepit ut homo; propterea dictus est plenus gratia. (Cf. Eph 4:8; Ps 68:19) Et manifestius de illo scriptum est in Actibus Apostolorum: quoniam unxit eum Deus Spiritu Sancto. Non utique oleo visibili, sed dono gratiae, quod visibili significatur unguento quo baptizatos ungit Ecclesia. Nec sane tunc unctus est Christus Spiritu Sancto, quando super eum baptizatum velut columba descendit: (Cf. Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32–33) tunc enim corpus suum, id est, Ecclesiam suam praefigurare dignatus est, in qua praecipue baptizati accipiunt Spiritum Sanctum. (Cf. Col 1:24)
For this reason the Lord Jesus himself not only gave the Holy Spirit as God, but also received him as man; and therefore he was said to be full of grace. (Cf. Eph 4:8; Ps 68:19 (67:19)) And it is written of him still more plainly in the Acts of the Apostles, that God anointed him with the Holy Spirit. Not, of course, with visible oil, but with the gift of grace, which is signified by the visible ointment with which the Church anoints the baptized. Nor indeed was Christ then anointed with the Holy Spirit when, after his baptism, the Spirit descended upon him like a dove; (Cf. Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32–33) for then he deigned to prefigure his body, that is, his Church, in which especially the baptized receive the Holy Spirit. (Cf. Col 1:24)
deTrin.15.26.46Sed ista mystica et invisibili unctione tunc intellegendus est unctus, quando Verbum Dei caro factum est; (Cf. John 1:14) id est, quando humana natura sine ullis praecedentibus bonorum operum meritis Deo Verbo est in utero virginis copulata, ita ut cum illo fieret una persona. Ob hoc eum confitemur natum de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine Maria. Absurdissimum est enim, ut credamus eum cum iam triginta esset annorum (eius enim aetatis a Ioanne baptizatus est), (Cf. Luke 3:21–23. This absurdity is the substance of the Adoptionist heresy) accepisse Spiritum Sanctum: sed venisse ad illud PL: illum ad, “he came to baptism.” baptisma, sicut sine ullo omnino peccato, ita non sine Spiritu Sancto.
But he is to be understood as anointed with that mystical and invisible anointing when the Word of God was made flesh; (Cf. John 1:14) that is, when human nature, without any preceding merits of good works, was joined to God the Word in the virgin's womb, so that with him it became one person. For this reason we confess him to have been born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. For it is utterly absurd that we should believe that he received the Holy Spirit when he was already thirty years old—for it was at that age that he was baptized by John (Cf. Luke 3:21–23. This absurdity is the substance of the Adoptionist heresy)—but rather that he came to that baptism PL: illum ad, "he came to baptism." as one altogether without sin, and likewise not without the Holy Spirit.
deTrin.15.26.46Si enim de famulo eius et praecursore ipso Ioanne scriptum est: Spiritu Sancto replebitur iam inde ab utero matris suae, quoniam quamvis seminatus a patre, tamen Spiritum Sanctum in utero formatus accepit; quid de homine Christo intellegendum est vel credendum, cuius carnis ipsa conceptio non carnalis, sed spiritalis fuit? Cf. On the Trinity 13.18.23. In eo etiam quod de illo scriptum est, quod acceperit a Patre promissionem Spiritus Sancti et effuderit, (Cf. Acts 2:33) utraque natura monstrata est, et humana scilicet et divina: accepit quippe ut homo, effudit ut Deus. Nos autem accipere quidem hoc donum possumus pro modulo nostro, effundere autem super alios non utique possumus; sed ut hoc fiat, Deum super eos, a quo hoc efficitur, invocamus.
For if it is written of John his servant and forerunner, he will be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb—because, although sown by his father, he nevertheless received the Holy Spirit while being formed in the womb—what is to be understood or believed of the man Christ, the very conception of whose flesh was not carnal but spiritual? Cf. On the Trinity 13.18.23. In that which is also written of him, that he received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit and poured it out, (Cf. Acts 2:33) both natures are shown, namely the human and the divine: for he received as man and poured out as God. We, however, can indeed receive this gift according to our small measure, but we certainly cannot pour it out upon others; rather, that this may be done, we call upon God over them, by whom it is brought about.
deTrin.15.26.4626. 47. Numquid ergo possumus quaerere utrum iam processerat de Patre Spiritus Sanctus quando natus est Filius, (Cf. John 15:26) an nondum processerat, et illo nato de utroque processit, ubi nulla sunt tempora; sicut potuimus quaerere ubi invenimus tempore, The translator reads tempore, following one manuscript, rather than the PL’s tempora. voluntatem prius de humana mente procedere, ut quaeratur quod inventum proles vocetur; qua iam parta seu genita, voluntas illa perficitur, eo fine requiescens, ut qui fuerat appetitus quaerentis, sit amor fruentis, qui iam de utroque, id est, de gignente mente et de genita notione tamquam de parente ac prole procedat? Non possunt prorsus ista ibi quaeri, ubi nihil ex tempore inchoatur, ut consequenti perficiatur in tempore.
26. 47. Can we, then, ask whether the Holy Spirit had already proceeded from the Father when the Son was born, (Cf. John 15:26) or whether he had not yet proceeded, and once the Son was born proceeded from both—where there are no times, just as we were able to ask, when we found in time The translator reads tempore, following one manuscript, rather than the PL's tempora. that the will proceeds first from the human mind so that what is found may be called offspring, and once this is brought forth or begotten, that will is perfected, coming to rest in this end, that what had been the seeking one's appetite becomes the enjoying one's love, a love that now proceeds from both, that is, from the begetting mind and the begotten notion, as from a parent and offspring? Such things cannot be asked at all there, where nothing is begun in time so as to be perfected by something following in time.
deTrin.15.26.47Quapropter, qui potest intellegere sine tempore generationem Filii de Patre, intellegat sine tempore processionem Spiritus Sancti de utroque.
Therefore, whoever can understand the generation of the Son from the Father without time, let him understand the procession of the Holy Spirit from both without time.
deTrin.15.26.47Et qui potest intellegere in eo quod ait Filius, sicut habet Pater vitam in semetipso, sic dedit Filio vitam habere in semetipso; non sine vita exsistenti iam Filio vitam Patrem dedisse, sed ita eum sine tempore genuisse, ut vita quam Pater Filio gignendo dedit, coaeterna sit vitae Patris qui dedit: intellegat sicut habet Pater in semetipso ut de illo procedat Spiritus Sanctus, sic dedisse Filio ut de illo procedat idem Spiritus Sanctus, et utrumque sine tempore;
And whoever can understand, in what the Son says, as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in himself, that the Father did not give life to the Son as one already existing without life, but begot him without time in such a way that the life which the Father gave to the Son by begetting him is coeternal with the life of the Father who gave it—let him understand that, just as the Father has it in himself that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him, so he has granted to the Son that the same Holy Spirit proceeds from him, and both without time;
deTrin.15.26.47atque ita dictum Spiritum Sanctum de Patre procedere, ut intellegatur, quod etiam procedit de Filio, de Patre esse Filio. Si enim quidquid habet, de Patre habet Filius; de Patre habet utique ut et de illo procedat Spiritus Sanctus. (Cf. John 15:26)
and that the Holy Spirit is thus said to proceed from the Father in such a way that it is understood that what he also proceeds from the Son, he has from the Father. For if the Son has whatever he has from the Father, then he certainly has from the Father that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from him. (Cf. John 15:26)
deTrin.15.26.47Sed nulla ibi tempora cogitentur, quae habent prius et posterius: quia omnino nulla ibi sunt.
But let no times be imagined there, times that have a before and an after; for there are absolutely none there.
deTrin.15.26.47Quomodo ergo non absurdissime filius diceretur amborum, cum sicut Filio praestat essentiam sine initio temporis, sine ulla mutabilitate naturae de Patre generatio; ita Spiritui Sancto praestet essentiam sine ullo initio temporis, sine ulla mutabilitate naturae de utroque processio? Ideo enim cum Spiritum Sanctum genitum non dicamus, dicere tamen non audemus ingenitum, ne in hoc vocabulo vel duos patres in illa Trinitate, vel duos qui non sunt de alio quispiam suspicetur.
How, then, would he not most absurdly be called the son of both, since, just as generation from the Father gives the Son his essence without any beginning of time and without any changeableness of nature, so procession from both gives the Holy Spirit his essence without any beginning of time and without any changeableness of nature? For this reason, although we do not call the Holy Spirit begotten, we nevertheless do not dare to call him unbegotten, lest by this word anyone should suspect either two fathers in that Trinity, or two who are not from another.
deTrin.15.26.47Pater enim solus non est de alio, ideo solus appellatur ingenitus, non quidem in Scripturis, sed in consuetudine disputantium, et de re tanta sermonem qualem valuerint proferentium. Cf. Ambrose, On the Incarnation 8.80. Filius autem de Patre natus est: et Spiritus Sanctus de Patre principaliter, et ipso sine ullo temporis intervallo dante, communiter de utroque procedit. (Cf. John 15:26) Diceretur autem filius Patris et Filii, si, quod abhorret ab omnium sanorum sensibus, cum ambo genuissent. Non igitur ab utroque est genitus, sed procedit ab utroque amborum Spiritus.
For the Father alone is not from another, and therefore he alone is called unbegotten—not indeed in the Scriptures, but in the customary usage of those who dispute and who bring forth such speech as they are able about so great a matter. Cf. Ambrose, On the Incarnation 8.80. The Son, however, is born of the Father; and the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father, and, since the Father gives this without any interval of time, proceeds in common from both. (Cf. John 15:26) Now he would be called the son of the Father and the Son if—what is abhorrent to the sense of all sound persons—both had begotten him. He is therefore not begotten by both, but the Spirit of both proceeds from both.
deTrin.15.26.4727. 48. Verum quia in illa coaeterna, et aequali, et incorporali, et ineffabiliter immutabili, atque inseparabili Trinitate difficillimum est generationem a processione distinguere, sufficiat interim eis qui extendi non valent amplius, id quod de hac re in sermone quodam proferendo ad aures populi Christiani diximus, dictumque conscripsimus. Inter cetera enim cum per Scripturarum Sanctarum testimonia docuissem de utroque procedere Spiritum Sanctum:
27. 48. But because in that coeternal, equal, incorporeal, ineffably unchangeable, and inseparable Trinity it is extremely difficult to distinguish generation from procession, let it suffice for the time being, for those who are not able to be stretched any further, to set before them what we said about this matter in a certain sermon delivered to the ears of the Christian people, and what, having said it, we wrote down. For among other things, when through the testimonies of the Holy Scriptures I had taught that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both:
deTrin.15.27.48Si ergo, inquam, et de Patre et de Filio procedit Spiritus Sanctus; cur Filius dixit, ‘de Patre procedit’? Cur, putas, nisi quemadmodum solet ad eum referre et quod ipsius est, de quo et ipse est? Unde et illud est quod ait, ‘mea doctrina non est mea, sed eius qui me misit’.
If, then, I said, the Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, why did the Son say, 'he proceeds from the Father'? Why, do you think, except in the way he is accustomed to refer to him even what is his own, namely the one from whom he himself also is? Hence too that saying of his, 'my teaching is not mine, but his who sent me.'
deTrin.15.27.48Si igitur hic intellegitur eius doctrina, quam tamen dixit non suam, sed Patris; quanto magis illic intellegendus est et de ipso procedere Spiritus Sanctus, ubi sic ait, ‘de Patre procedit,’ ut non diceret, ‘de me non procedit’? A quo autem habet Filius ut sit Deus (est enim de Deo Deus), ab illo habet utique ut de illo etiam procedat Spiritus Sanctus: ac per hoc Spiritus Sanctus ut etiam de Filio procedat, sicut procedit de Patre, ab ipso habet Patre.
If, therefore, what is here understood is his teaching, which he nonetheless said was not his own but the Father's, how much more is it to be understood there that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him as well, where he speaks thus, 'he proceeds from the Father,' in such a way that he did not say, 'he does not proceed from me'? Now from him from whom the Son has it that he is God—for he is God from God—from him he certainly has it that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from him; and through this the Holy Spirit has it from the Father himself that he proceeds also from the Son, just as he proceeds from the Father.
deTrin.15.27.48Hic utcumque etiam illud intellegitur, quantum a talibus quales nos sumus, intellegi potest, cur non dicatur natus esse, sed potius procedere Spiritus Sanctus: quoniam si et ipse Filius diceretur, amborum utique filius diceretur; quod absurdissimum est. Filius quippe nullus est duorum, nisi patris et matris. Absit autem ut inter Deum Patrem et Deum Filium aliquid tale suspicemur. Quia nec filius hominum simul et ex patre et ex matre procedit: sed cum in matrem procedit ex patre, non tunc procedit ex matre; et cum in hanc lucem procedit ex matre, non tunc procedit ex patre.
Here too, in some fashion—as far as it can be understood by such as we are—that also is understood: why the Holy Spirit is said not to be born, but rather to proceed; because if he too were called the Son, he would surely be called the son of both, which is utterly absurd. For no one is the son of two persons unless of a father and a mother. But far be it from us to suspect anything of the sort between God the Father and God the Son. For not even a son of men proceeds at the same time both from his father and from his mother; but when he proceeds from the father into the mother, he does not then proceed from the mother; and when he proceeds from the mother into this light, he does not then proceed from the father.
deTrin.15.27.48Spiritus autem Sanctus non de Patre procedit in Filium, et de Filio procedit ad sanctificandam creaturam; sed simul de utroque procedit: quamvis hoc Pater Filio dederit, ut quemadmodum de se, ita de illo quoque procedat. Neque enim possumus dicere quod non sit vita Spiritus Sanctus, cum vita Pater, vita sit Filius: ac per hoc sicut Pater cum habeat vitam in semetipso, dedit et Filio vitam habere in semetipso; sic ei dedit vitam procedere de illo, sicut et procedit de ipso. Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John 99.8–9.
The Holy Spirit, however, does not proceed from the Father into the Son, and from the Son proceed to sanctify the creation; rather, he proceeds from both at once, although the Father has granted the Son that, just as he proceeds from himself, so he should proceed from him also. For we cannot say that the Holy Spirit is not life, since the Father is life and the Son is life; and through this, just as the Father, having life in himself, granted the Son also to have life in himself, so he granted him that life should proceed from him, just as it also proceeds from the Father himself. Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John 99.8–9.
deTrin.15.27.48Haec de illo sermone in hunc librum transtuli, sed fidelibus, non infidelibus loquens. Cf. on the Trinity 1.1.
These things from that sermon I have transferred into this book, but speaking to the faithful, not to unbelievers. Cf. On the Trinity 1.1.
deTrin.15.27.4827. 49. Verum si ad hanc imaginem contuendam, et ad videnda ista quam vera sint, quae in eorum mente sunt, nec tria sic sunt ut tres Personae sint, sed omnia tria hominis sunt quae una persona est, minus idonei sunt: cur non de illa summa Trinitate, quae Deus est, credunt potius quod in Sacris Litteris invenitur, quam poscunt liquidissimam reddi sibi rationem, quae ab humana mente tarda scilicet infirmaque non capitur? Et certe cum inconcusse crediderint Scripturis Sanctis tamquam veracissimis testibus, agant orando et quaerendo et bene vivendo ut intellegant, id est, ut quantum videri potest, videatur mente quod tenetur fide. Quis hoc prohibeat? imo vero ad hoc quis non hortetur?
27. 49. But if some are less suited to contemplate this image, and to see how true these things are that are in their own mind—where there are not three things in such a way that they are three persons, but all three belong to the man, who is one person—why do they not rather believe, concerning that supreme Trinity which is God, what is found in the Sacred Writings, instead of demanding that a perfectly transparent account be rendered to them, an account that is not grasped by the human mind, slow and weak as it is? And surely, once they have unshakably believed the Holy Scriptures as most truthful witnesses, let them act by praying and seeking and living well, so that they may understand—that is, so that, as far as it can be seen, what is held by faith may be seen by the mind. Who would forbid this? Indeed, who would not rather urge it?
deTrin.15.27.49Si autem propterea negandum putant ista esse, quia ea non valent caecis mentibus cernere; debent et illi qui ex nativitate sua caeci sunt, esse solem negare. Lux ergo lucet in tenebris: quod si eam tenebrae non comprehendunt, (Cf. John 1:5) illuminentur Dei dono prius ut sint fideles, et incipiant esse lux in comparatione infidelium; atque hoc praemisso fundamento aedificentur ad videnda quae credunt, ut aliquando possint videre. Sunt enim quae ita creduntur, ut videri iam omnino non possint. Non enim Christus iterum in cruce videndus est: sed nisi hoc credatur quod ita factum atque visum est, ut futurum ac videndum iam non speretur, non pervenitur ad Christum, qualis sine fine videndus est.
But if they think these things must be denied because they cannot discern them with blind minds, then those who are blind from birth ought also to deny the sun. Therefore the light shines in the darkness; and if the darkness does not comprehend it, (Cf. John 1:5) let them first be enlightened by the gift of God so that they may be believers, and let them begin to be light in comparison with unbelievers; and once this foundation has been laid, let them be built up to see the things they believe, so that one day they may be able to see. For there are things that are believed in such a way that they can no longer be seen at all. For Christ is not to be seen again on the cross; but unless this is believed, which was so done and so seen that it is no longer hoped to come and to be seen, one does not arrive at the Christ as he is to be seen without end.
deTrin.15.27.49Quantum vero attinet ad illam summam, ineffabilem, incorporalem, immutabilemque naturam per intellegentiam utcumque cernendam, nusquam se melius, regente dumtaxat fidei regula, acies humanae mentis exercet, quam in eo quod ipse homo in sua natura melius ceteris animalibus, melius etiam ceteris animae suae partibus habet, quod est ipsa mens: cui quidam rerum invisibilium tributus est visus, et cui tamquam in loco superiore atque interiore honorabiliter praesidenti, iudicanda omnia nuntiant etiam corporis sensus; et qua non est superior, cui subdita regenda est, nisi Deus.
But as far as concerns that supreme, ineffable, incorporeal, and unchangeable nature, to be discerned in some fashion through the understanding, nowhere does the keen edge of the human mind exercise itself better—provided the rule of faith governs it—than in that which man himself has in his nature better than the other animals, and better even than the other parts of his own soul, namely the mind itself: to which a certain sight of invisible things has been granted, and to which—presiding honorably as in a higher and inner place—even the senses of the body report all things to be judged; and than which there is nothing higher to which it is subject for governance, except God.
deTrin.15.27.49Bk.
deTrin.15.27.49
27. 50. Verum inter haec quae multa iam dixi, et nihil illius summae Trinitatis ineffabilitate dignum me dixisse audeo profiteri, sed confiteri potius mirificatam scientiam eius ex me invaluisse, nec posse me ad illam; (Cf. Ps 139:6) o tu, anima mea, ubi te esse sentis, ubi iaces, ubi stas, donec ab eo qui propitius factus est omnibus iniquitatibus tuis, sanentur omnes languores tui? (Cf. Ps 103:3)
27. 50. But amid these many things I have now said, I dare to profess that I have said nothing worthy of the ineffability of that supreme Trinity; rather, I confess that the knowledge of it has grown too wonderful for me, and I cannot attain to it; (Cf. Ps 139:6 (138:6)) O you, my soul, where do you feel yourself to be, where do you lie, where do you stand, until all your weaknesses are healed by him who has become merciful to all your iniquities? (Cf. Ps 103:3 (102:3))
deTrin.15.27.50Agnoscis te certe in illo esse stabulo, quo Samaritanus ille perduxit eum quem reperit multis a latronibus inflictis vulneribus semivivum. (Cf. Luke 10:30–34) Et tamen multa vera vidisti, non his oculis quibus videntur corpora colorata, sed eis pro quibus orabat qui dicebat: oculi mei videant aequitatem.
You surely recognize that you are in that inn to which the Samaritan brought the one whom he found half dead, with many wounds inflicted on him by robbers. (Cf. Luke 10:30–34) And yet you have seen many true things, not with these eyes by which colored bodies are seen, but with those for which he was praying who said, let my eyes see equity.
deTrin.15.27.50Nempe ergo multa vera vidisti, eaque discrevisti ab illa luce qua tibi lucente vidisti: attolle oculos in ipsam lucem, et eos in eam fige, si potes. Sic enim videbis quid distet nativitas Verbi Dei a processione Doni Dei, propter quod Filius unigenitus non de Patre genitum, alioqui frater eius esset, sed procedere dixit Spiritum Sanctum. (Cf. John 15:26) Unde cum sit communio quaedam consubstantialis Patris et Filii amborum Spiritus, non amborum, quod absit, dictus est filius.
Surely, then, you have seen many true things, and you have distinguished them from that light by whose shining upon you you saw them: lift up your eyes to the light itself, and fix them upon it, if you can. For thus you will see how the birth of the Word of God differs from the procession of the Gift of God, on account of which the only-begotten Son said that the Holy Spirit is not begotten of the Father—otherwise he would be his brother—but proceeds. (Cf. John 15:26) Hence, since there is a certain consubstantial communion of the Father and the Son, the Spirit of both is called the Spirit of both, not—far be it—the son of both.
deTrin.15.27.50Sed ad hoc dilucide perspicueque cernendum, non potes ibi aciem figere; scio, non potes. Verum dico, mihi dico, quid non possim scio: ipsa tamen tibi ostendit in te tria illa, in quibus tu summae ipsius, quam fixis oculis contemplari nondum vales, imaginem Trinitatis agnosceres.
But to discern this clearly and plainly, you cannot fix your gaze there; I know, you cannot. I speak the truth, I speak to myself, I know what I cannot do: yet that light itself shows you in yourself those three things in which you may recognize the image of that supreme Trinity which you are not yet able to contemplate with fixed eyes.
deTrin.15.27.50Ipsa ostendit tibi verbum verum esse in te, quando de scientia tua gignitur, id est, quando quod scimus dicimus; quamvis nullius gentis lingua significantem vocem vel proferamus vel cogitemus, sed ex illo quod novimus cognitio nostra formetur; sitque in acie cognitionis imago simillima cognitionis PL reads cogitationis/cogitatione, “thought,” in all three places where cognitionis/cognitio is used above. eius quam memoria continebat, ista duo scilicet velut parentem ac prolem tertia voluntate sive dilectione iungente.
It shows you that a true word exists in you when it is begotten from your knowledge, that is, when we say what we know; even though we neither utter nor think a sound that means something in the language of any nation, but our cognition is formed from that which we know, and in the keen edge of cognition there is an image most like the cognition PL reads cogitationis/cogitatione, "thought," in all three places where cognitionis/cognitio is used above. that the memory contained—these two, namely, being joined by a third, the will or love, as a parent and offspring.
deTrin.15.27.50Quam quidem voluntatem de cognitione procedere (nemo enim vult quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit), non tamen esse cogitationis imaginem; et ideo quamdam in hac re intellegibili nativitatis et processionis insinuari distantiam, quoniam non hoc est cogitatione conspicere quod appetere, vel etiam perfrui voluntate, cernit discernitque qui potest.
This will, indeed, proceeds from cognition—for no one wills what he does not know at all, whether it exists or of what kind it is—yet it is not the image of thought; and therefore a certain distinction between birth and procession is suggested in this intelligible matter, since to behold by thought is not the same as to desire, or even to enjoy by the will, as anyone who can sees and distinguishes.
deTrin.15.27.50Potuisti et tu, quamvis non potueris neque possis explicare sufficienti eloquio, quod inter nubila similitudinum corporalium, quae cogitationibus humanis occursare non desinunt, vix vidisti.
You too have been able—though you have not been and are not able to set it forth in adequate speech—to see, with difficulty, amid the clouds of corporeal likenesses that do not cease to meet human thoughts, that which you barely saw.
deTrin.15.27.50Sed illa lux quae non est quod tu, et hoc tibi ostendit, aliud esse illas incorporeas similitudines corporum, et aliud esse verum, quod eis reprobatis intellegentia contuemur: haec et alia similiter certa oculis tuis interioribus lux illa monstravit. Quae igitur causa est cur acie fixa ipsam videre non possis, nisi utique infirmitas? Et quid tibi eam fecit, nisi iniquitas? Quis ergo sanat omnes languores tuos, nisi qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis? (Cf. Ps 103:3) Librum itaque istum iam tandem aliquando precatione melius quam disputatione concludam.
But that light, which is not what you are, showed you this also: that those incorporeal likenesses of bodies are one thing, and that the truth, which we behold by understanding once those likenesses are rejected, is another. This and other things equally certain that light showed to your inner eyes. What, then, is the reason why you cannot see that light itself with a fixed gaze, except weakness? And what has made you weak, except iniquity? Who, then, heals all your weaknesses, except he who becomes merciful to all your iniquities? (Cf. Ps 103:3 (102:3)) And so I shall now at last conclude this book better by prayer than by argument.
deTrin.15.27.5028. 51. Domine Deus noster, credimus in te Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum. Neque enim diceret Veritas, ite, baptizate PL adds omnes, “all.” gentes in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, nisi Trinitas esses. Nec baptizari nos iuberes, Domine Deus, in eius nomine qui non est Dominus Deus. Neque diceretur voce divina, audi, Israel; Dominus Deus tuus, Deus PL omits Deus. unus est; nisi Trinitas ita esses, ut unus Dominus Deus esses.
28. 51. Lord our God, we believe in you, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. For Truth would not say, go, baptize the PL adds omnes, "all." nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, unless you were Trinity. Nor would you command us to be baptized, Lord God, in the name of one who is not Lord God. Nor would it be said by the divine voice, hear, O Israel; the Lord your God is PL omits Deus. one God, unless you were Trinity in such a way that you were one Lord God.
deTrin.15.28.51Et si tu Deus Pater ipse esses, et Filius verbum tuum Iesus Christus ipse esses, et donum vestrum Spiritus Sanctus; non legeremus in Litteris Veritatis, misit Deus Filium suum: (Cf. John 3:17) nec tu, O Unigenite, diceres de Spiritu Sancto, quem mittet Pater in nomine meo; et, quem ego mittam vobis a Patre. Ad hanc regulam fidei dirigens intentionem meam, quantum potui, quantum me posse fecisti, quaesivi te, et desideravi intellectu videre quod credidi, et multum disputavi, et laboravi.
And if you, God the Father, were yourself also the Son, your Word, Jesus Christ, and were yourself also your gift, the Holy Spirit, we would not read in the Writings of Truth, God sent his Son; (Cf. John 3:17) nor would you, O Only-begotten, say of the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, and, whom I will send to you from the Father. Directing my intention to this rule of faith, as much as I could, as much as you made me able, I have sought you, and I have desired to see with my understanding what I have believed, and I have argued much, and labored.
deTrin.15.28.51Domine Deus meus, una spes mea, exaudi me, ne fatigatus nolim te quaerere, sed quaeram faciem tuam semper ardenter. (Cf. Ps 71:5, 91:9, 105:4; 1 Chron 16:11) Tu da quaerendi vires, qui inveniri te fecisti, et magis magisque inveniendi te spem dedisti. Coram te est firmitas et infirmitas mea: illam serva, istam sana. Coram te est scientia et ignorantia mea: ubi mihi aperuisti, suscipe intrantem; ubi clausisti, aperi pulsanti. (Cf. Rev 3:7; Matt 7:7)
Lord my God, my one hope, hear me, lest out of weariness I should be unwilling to seek you, but may I seek your face always and ardently. (Cf. Ps 105:4 (104:4); 1 Chr 16:11; Ps 71:5 (70:5); Ps 91:9 (90:9)) Give the strength to seek, you who have made yourself to be found, and have given an ever greater hope of finding you. Before you is my strength and my weakness: preserve the one, heal the other. Before you is my knowledge and my ignorance: where you have opened to me, receive me as I enter; where you have closed, open to me as I knock. (Cf. Rev 3:7; Matt 7:7)
deTrin.15.28.51Meminerim tui, intellegam te, diligam te. Auge in me ista, donec me reformes ad integrum.
May I remember you, understand you, love you. Increase these things in me, until you reform me to wholeness.
deTrin.15.28.51Scio scriptum esse, in multiloquio non effugies peccatum. Sed utinam praedicando verbum tuum, et laudando te tantummodo loquerer! non solum fugerem peccatum, sed meritum bonum acquirerem, quamlibet multum sic loquerer. Neque enim homo de te beatus, peccatum praeciperet germano in fide filio suo, cui scripsit dicens: praedica Verbum, insta opportune, importune. Numquid dicendum est istum non multum locutum, qui non solum opportune, verum etiam importune verbum tuum, Domine, non tacebat? Sed ideo non erat multum, quia tantum erat necessarium. Libera me, Deus meus, a multiloquio quod patior intus in anima mea, misera in conspectu tuo, et confugiente ad misericordiam tuam. Non enim cogitationibus taceo, etiam tacens vocibus. Et si quidem non cogitarem nisi quod placeret tibi, non utique rogarem ut me ab hoc multiloquio liberares. Sed multae sunt cogitationes meae, tales quales nosti, cogitationes hominum, quoniam vanae sunt. Dona mihi non eis consentire, et si quando me delectant, eas nihilominus improbare, nec in eis velut dormitando immorari. Nec in tantum valeant apud me, ut aliquid in opera mea procedat ex illis; sed ab eis mea saltem sit tuta sententia, tuta conscientia, te tuente. Sapiens quidam cum de te loqueretur in libro suo, qui Ecclesiasticus proprio nomine iam vocatur, multa, inquit, dicimus, et non pervenimus, et consummatio sermonum universa est ipse.
I know it is written, in much speaking you will not escape sin. But would that I spoke only by preaching your word and praising you! Then I would not only escape sin, but would acquire good merit, however much I spoke in this way. For a man made blessed by you would not have enjoined sin upon his true son in the faith, to whom he wrote, saying, preach the Word, be urgent in season, out of season. Is it to be said that he did not speak much, who not only in season but even out of season did not keep silent about your word, Lord? But it was not much, because it was only as much as was necessary. Free me, my God, from the much speaking that I suffer within, in my soul, which is wretched in your sight and takes refuge in your mercy. For I am not silent in my thoughts, even when I am silent in words. And if indeed I thought only what would please you, I certainly would not ask that you free me from this much speaking. But my thoughts are many, such as you know, the thoughts of men, for they are vain. Grant me not to consent to them, and, even if at times they delight me, nonetheless to reject them, and not to linger in them as if dozing. Nor let them so prevail with me that anything should pass from them into my deeds; but at least let my judgment be safe from them, my conscience safe, with you protecting me. A certain wise man, when he spoke of you in his book, which is now called by the proper name Ecclesiasticus, said, we say many things, and we do not attain, and the sum of our words is: he is all.
deTrin.15.28.51Cum ergo pervenerimus ad te, cessabunt multa ista quae dicimus, et non pervenimus; et manebis unus omnia in omnibus: (Cf. 1 Cor 15:28) et sine fine dicemus unum laudantes te in unum, et in te facti etiam nos unum.
When, therefore, we have arrived at you, these many things that we say, and do not attain, will cease; and you will remain, the one who is all in all; (Cf. 1 Cor 15:28) and without end we shall say one thing, praising you in unity, having ourselves also been made one in you.
deTrin.15.28.51Domine Deus une, Deus Trinitas, quaecumque dixi in his libris de tuo, agnoscant et tui: si qua de meo, et tu ignosce, et tui.
O Lord, one God, God the Trinity, whatever I have said in these books that is from you, may those who are yours acknowledge it; if anything is from myself, may you and those who are yours pardon it.
deTrin.15.28.51Amen.
Amen.
deTrin.15.28.51