Reply Obj. 1: The reply to the first object is clear, as it proceeds according to the first sense.

Reply Obj. 2: As the sophists say, exclusive diction immobilizes the term to which it is joined, by reason of an implicit negation. Whence “man alone is rational, so Socrates alone is rational” does not follow. For not everything that is other than Socrates is other than man. This is why the implicit negation in exclusive diction extends farther when it is joined to the proper than when it is joined to the common. But it is true that by reason of affirmation there can be a descent to the proper. Whence, because “God alone is God” has two interpretations—one affirmative, God is God, and one negative, anyone other than God is not God—a descent can occur under the affirmative, as when one says, “the Father is God,” but not under the negative, “anyone other than the Father is not God.”

Reply Obj. 3: As has been said in the body, this word “alone” takes away companionship. And although upon the existence of created things, companionship cannot be removed from God with respect to existence, nonetheless companionship can be removed with respect to his own proper activity—namely, creation—and with respect to his own proper nature. This is why, following Hilary, when one removes the distinction of persons, and also the existence of created things, God is said to be solitary. For although “God alone is” would not be true, still “God is alone,” that is, solitary, would be true.

Reply Obj. 1: “The Son alone is most high” should be distinguished just as the first one was, and in one sense it is true, and in another it is false. And further, you alone are the most high, Jesus Christ should be understood with the whole that follows it, with the Holy Spirit, in the glory of God the Father. And that the Son alone with the Father and the Holy Spirit is the most high is true absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2: “God alone is the Father,” interpreted as “God is the Father,” is convertible simply speaking as “the Father is God.” Likewise, the other interpretation, “no one other than God is the Father,” is convertible simply speaking, but its conversion is not “no one other than the Father is God,” since there is not the same thing in the subject and in the predicate. Rather, the conversion is more “the Father is no one other than God,” which is true in a certain way, as was said above in the body. And it does not follow from this that the Father alone is God.

Reply Obj. 3: When one says, “the Father alone,” the Son is being excluded if “alone” signifies the same thing as “not with another” in the masculine, but if it signifies the same thing as “not with another” in the neuter, he is not being excluded. And in this way one understands Augustine’s statement, as is clear from his saying that “because these three are one thing.”

Reply Obj. 4–5: And as regards what is objected about a part and a consequent, and about one being in the other, it is clear that this does not follow. For a part is not another supposit than its whole; indeed, it is included in the supposit of the whole. Likewise the consequent, which is animal, is not something other than the man in supposit. And therefore although the Father is in the Son through the unity of the essence and as regards the understanding of the relation, nonetheless the relation, insofar as it has the account of opposition, distinguishes the Father from the Son according to supposit.

Reply Obj. 1: This word “every” and the word “alone” are dispositions of the subject in diverse ways. For by the word “every,” by reason of its distribution, is indicated a certain division of the subject, and a multiplication, by reason of the things it contains. This is why it is incongruous to add it to things of which one cannot have a multitude of supposits, like terms for singulars. And on account of this, it cannot be placed on the side of the predicate, since a predicate is taken formally, and in a common form supposits are united, not distinguished. However, “alone” does not signify any division, but only removes companionship with respect to something that belongs to a subsisting thing. Whence, if some subsisting reality were predicated, “alone” can be fittingly added to it, as when the name “God” is predicated.

Reply Obj. 2: When this word “alone” on the side of the predicate comes after its substantive, it always implies solitude. For then companionship is being excluded simply speaking, and not merely with respect to something determinate, since nothing comes after it. And therefore, even though “the Trinity is God alone” be granted, still it should not be granted, properly speaking, that “the Trinity is an alone God.” And this happens by reason of the implied negation. Whence the judgment about the name “alone” and about the name “white” is not the same, for a negation placed after the term is different from one placed before it.

Reply Obj. 3: In the proposition, “the Trinity is God alone,” or “the true God alone,” the composition is understood in two ways: one is principal, which is indicated by the verb, and the other is understood in the name “God,” insofar as having Godhead is signified. Whence, by reason of this composition, an exclusion can arise, insofar as something is excluded from participating in the predicated form that belongs to the subsisting reality being predicated.

Reply Obj. 4: The name “God” does not predicate the divine nature merely through the mode of a form, like other substantial predicates, insofar as the divine nature is signified as that-by-which-he-exists; rather, it also predicates it as a subsisting reality, insofar as it is signified as that-which-exists. And in accordance with this, “alone” can be added to it. For it was said above¹ that the name “God” partly has the account of a common term, and partly the account of a singular term.

Reply Obj. 1: Insofar as the word “alone” excludes an extraneous supposit, and not merely an extraneous nature, the implicit negation extends to more things when one says, “the Father is God alone,” than when one says, “the Trinity is God alone.” For when one says, “the Father is God alone,” there is also excluded the supposits of the Son and the Holy Spirit. And therefore this is false insofar as “the Father is God alone” is understood, even though “the Trinity is God alone” is true. Nor is this by reason of an essential predication, but rather by reason of the negation excluding that supposit.

Reply Obj. 2: If the word “alone” is taken properly, that is not its meaning; but it would be more its meaning if “alone” were taken for “only.” And in this sense, it is granted.

Reply Obj. 3: If the word “alone” is taken properly, that argument proves not that “the Father is God alone” is true, but rather that “God alone is the Father” is true, and this according to the sense granted above. However, if it is assumed as “the Father is that God, besides which there is no other,” then this proposition is manifold. For this relative, “which,” can refer to the distinct supposit of the Father, such that the meaning is, “besides which Father there is no other.” And if it is understood as “there is no other God,” it is true, since the Son is not a God other than the Father.” However, if it is understood as “besides the Father there is no other who is God,” then it is false, since the Son is someone other than the Father, and yet he is God. But if the relative is referring to the supposit in an indistinct way, insofar as the name “God” supposes this, when one says, “God is one,” then it is true in every sense. And in this way it is clear that what was proposed does not conclude, except through the mode by which the aforesaid proposition was conceded in the distinction made above.

Reply Obj. 1: All those authorities that say God cannot be named intend to say that no name expresses God himself perfectly. This is signified in the Philosopher’s words when he says, tongues fall short of describing him;¹ and elsewhere he says, the first cause is higher than every description, and above everything that is named.²

Reply Obj. 2: If Augustine understands this as being about bodily form, then it is clear that God has no bodily form, nor is it needed for everything that is named to have a bodily form. However, if he understands this about form absolutely speaking, then he is said to escape every form, not because he is in himself not truly form, since he is pure act, and simple, and the first form, according to Boethius,¹ but because whatever form the intellect conceives, God escapes it by his eminence. For if our intellect apprehends wisdom, God himself, in his own wisdom, exceeds every wisdom understood by us. And therefore he concludes that he is impenetrable to our intellect, such that it cannot go into him perfectly, by comprehending him. On account of this Dionysius also says² that whatever we affirm of him can also be denied of him, for it does not befit him in the way we understand and signify it with a name, but rather in a more excellent way.

Reply Obj. 3: He can be signified by a noun, a pronoun, a verb, and a participle. For when one says that a noun signifies a substance with quality, “quality” and “substance” are not understood properly speaking, the way the logician takes them when distinguishing the categories. Rather, the grammarian takes “substance” according to its mode of signifying, and likewise “quality.” And this is why what is signified by a noun is signified as something subsisting, insofar as something can be predicated of it, even if in reality it is not subsisting; for example, the grammarian says that “whiteness” signifies a substance, as different from a verb, which does not signify as something subsisting. And because in every name one must consider that from which the name is imposed—which is, as it were, the principle of our coming to know—therefore in reference to this it has the mode of a quality, insofar as quality or form is the principle of making a thing known. This is why, according to the Philosopher,¹ in one way a substantial form is called a “quality.”

Reply Obj. 1: Since in a name there are two things, the mode of signifying and the very reality being signified, one can always deny either of God, or both of them. But a name cannot be said of God except according to one of these. And because for the truth and propriety of an affirmation it is required that the whole be affirmed, whereas for the propriety of a negation it is enough if only one of them is absent, therefore Dionysius says that the negations are true absolutely, but the affirmations are true only in a certain respect. For they are true only with respect to what is signified, and not with respect to the mode of signifying.

Reply Obj. 2: Although we name God only from created things, nonetheless we do not always name him from a perfection proper to the created thing according to its proper mode of participating in it. But we can also impose a name for the perfection itself, absolutely, without being concerned with any mode of signifying in the very thing being signified, which is, as it were, the object of the intellect—although it would be necessary, in what is consignified, always to receive the mode of the created thing, on the side of the intellect itself, which is naturally suited to receive from sensible realities the fitting mode of understanding. And these things are said of God properly, as was said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 3: Created wisdom differs more from uncreated wisdom as regards its existence, which consists in the mode of having it, than does the meadow’s bloom from a man’s laughter. But with respect to the account from which the name is imposed, they agree more, for that account is one according to analogy, being in God with priority and in created things with posteriority. And the truth and propriety of the speech is viewed more according to this account signified in the name than according to the mode of signifying, which is given as a consequence of being understood through a name.

Reply Obj. 4: Whenever a bodily condition is brought in by the principal signification, the name cannot be said of God except metaphorically; but the fact that some imperfection is brought in by the mode of signifying, which imperfection does not fit God, does not make the predication false or improper, but only imperfect. And on account of this, no name represents God perfectly.

Reply Obj. 1: This answer is clear, because even though there is unity in the essential reality, there is still plurality in the personal reality, and in the accounts by which the one essence can be signified in diverse ways, and in the intellect’s diverse ways of taking it. According to all of these things the divine names are multiplied.

Reply Obj. 2: The equivocal, analogical, and univocal are divided in diverse ways. For the equivocal is divided according to the realities being signified, and the univocal is divided according to diverse specific differences, but the analogical is divided according to diverse modes. Whence, since “being” is predicated of the ten genera analogically, the division in it is according to diverse modes. Whence a proper mode of predicating is owed to each genus. And because in the divine only two genera are preserved according to a common account of genus, that is, substance and toward-something,¹ therefore two modes of predicating are spoken in the divine. However, each genus is divided univocally into species contained under that genus, so a proper mode of predicating is not owed to the species. And on account of this, although certain things contained in the category of quality are said of God according to the account of the species, nonetheless they do not bring a new mode of predicating, even though they do bring a new account of signification. Whence, even though there are only the two modes of predicating in God, still there are many accounts of signification, according to which the divine names can be multiplied.

Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from things said above in the body, some names are said of God properly that, as regards what are being signified, are in God with priority, rather than in created things; examples are “goodness,” “wisdom,” and the like. And the diversity of these names is not drawn from reference to created things; rather, the converse is more the case. For because in God the account of wisdom differs from that of goodness, this is why goodness and wisdom are diverse in created things, not only in account, but even in reality. But it is true that the diversity of such names, insofar as they are predicated of God, make him known to us, due to their diversity in created things. In addition, some names are predicated of him metaphorically, that is, by way of transference, and are multiplied according to diverse created things, the names of which are transferred to God. Nevertheless there is no necessity that he be signified by all the names of created things, since some bring in a lack of form or defect, and God is not the author of such, especially not the defect that is a fault. Whence we cannot call God “sinner” or “devil,” which is the name of a depraved nature, even though he is called a “lion,” or a “lamb,” or even “angry.”

Reply Obj. 4: The names of the attributes differ according to account, yet not an account that is merely in the one thinking it; rather, it is an account that is preserved in the reality itself, according to the truth and propriety of the real thing. This is clear as follows. For all names of this sort are said of God and created things not equivocally, but analogically according to one account. Whence, since in what is created the account of wisdom is not the account of goodness, it is necessary that this is also true in God. But it differs in that in God they are the same in reality, whereas in created things they differ in reality, and not only in account. And how this can be so was explained above.¹

Reply Obj. 1: This name “Trinity,” although it does not explicitly signify something proper to one of the persons, still implicitly includes all things proper to all the persons, insofar as it is, as it were, collective of the persons. Similarly, even this name “person,” although it is not imposed from some specific personal property, still is imposed from personhood, which signifies property in a common way; and in a certain way, it even signifies substance, as will be clear below.¹

Reply Obj. 2: Every negation is caused by some affirmation. And thus even in the divine the account of negative names is founded upon the account of affirmative names; for example, the fact that he is called “incorporeal” is founded on the fact that he is simple existence. Whence it is clear that negative names are traced back either to the unity of the essence, for example “uncreated” and “unmeasurable,” or to the distinction of persons, for example “unbegotten.”

Reply Obj. 3: Names of this sort do not place something in God temporally, because those temporal relations are really in the created things, and in God only according to account. Nonetheless, insofar as they are born from God’s activities in created things, they help us understand something that is in God absolutely. For example, the relation of “Lord” helps us understand the power in God by which he governs the entirety of creation. Whence it is clear also that these names are traced back either to those that pertain to the unity of his majesty, such as “Creator,” “Lord,” and the like, or to the distinction of persons, such as “sent,” “incarnate,” and the like.

Reply Obj. 4: Damascene’s division looks only to one member of the aforesaid division, for all the things he presents pertain to the unity of the majesty. Now, the unity of the majesty can be named in two ways, as is clear from things said in the previous article: either according to what is in God, or according to the reception of the intellect, which receives him according to some comparison to what is created.¹ If God is named according to what is in him, there will be a triple diversity of names following the three things that are found in every reality whatsoever, namely, essence, power, and activity; in other things these are really different, but in him they are one in reality and distinct in account. And the name “he who is” is taken according to the essence; the ones that stand in the mode of things following on substance, like “just,” “wise,” and such, are taken according to power; and names of his activity, like “God,” are according to activity. However, if God is named through the intellect’s reception in comparison with what is created, this will be of two sorts: either inasmuch as the things that are created are removed from him—and these will be negative names—or insofar as there is indicated in the names a certain relation of causality toward the created thing, the conditions of which are removed from God—and these will be the names that indicate a relation to other things from which God is essentially distinguished.

Reply Obj. 5: Now, the division of the divine names that Dionysius presents, as is clear from things said in the body, is the same as Ambrose’s division, except that Dionysius multiplies the names beyond those pertaining to the unity of the majesty, according to the diverse processions experienced in created things; by these God is named by those perfections that exist in God with priority, such as “good,” “wise,” “being,” and the like.

Reply Obj. 1: “Particular” signifies the thing composed from a demonstrated matter and form, whereas “universal” in composite substances also signifies a composite of matter and form, but not demonstrated, like man, composed of soul, flesh, and bone, yet not from this flesh and these bones. Whence it is not necessary that “ousia” signify the same thing as the particular substance; rather, it is open to each of these. And therefore everything that is in the genus of substance can be called “ousia,” whether it is universal substance or particular substance.

Reply Obj. 2: To subsist signifies two things: to exist, and a determinate mode of existing. And to exist simply speaking belongs only to individuals, but the determination of existing is from the nature or whatness of the genus or species. And therefore, even though genera and species subsist only in individuals, nonetheless to subsist properly belongs to them, and they are called “subsistences,” although the particular is also called this, but in a posterior way, just as species are also called “substances.”

Reply Obj. 3: “Substance” is said insofar as it exists under (sub-est) an accident or a common nature, but something is said “to subsist” insofar as exists under its own existence, and does not have its existence in another as in a subject.

Reply Obj. 4: Among the Greeks this name “hypostasis” has one thing from what is proper to its signification, and something else from its usage. For from what is proper to its signification it signifies every particular substance, whereas from usage it has been accommodated to just the nobler substances. And this is why they themselves use the name “hypostasis” the same way we use the name “person.” But this usage is not found among us in the name “substance.”

Reply Obj. 5: Among us the name “substance” is used equivocally. For sometimes it is used in place of the essence, insofar as we say, “a definition signifies a thing’s substance.” But sometimes it is used in place of the supposit of substance, as when we say, “Socrates is a certain substance.” And therefore, in order to avoid a misunderstanding, the saints did not want to use the name “substance” for a supposit, as the Greeks use it; rather, they altered it and posited “subsistence” as corresponding to “hypostasis,” and left “substance” as corresponding to “ousia,” even though the converse is the case, according to the true signification. For they cared more about avoiding error than about the proper meaning of the names.

Reply Obj. 1: In the signification of a name two things must be considered: that from which the name is imposed for signification, and that for the signification of which it is imposed. Now, it happens sometimes that the substance of something is named from some accident that does not follow upon the entire nature of which the name is being said, just as the name “stone” (lapis) is said from the fact that it hurts the foot (laedit-pedem),¹ yet not everything that hurts the foot is a stone, or vice versa. And therefore the judgment about a name should not be according to that from which the name is imposed, but rather according to what it is imposed for signifying. Whence, even though the name “person” has been imposed from the aforesaid representation, still it has been imposed for signifying a complete substance, one subsisting in a rational nature. And this latter befits God, even though what the name was imposed from does not befit him.

Reply Obj. 2: Such composition befalls “person” outside its own account. For because “person” signifies something complete in an intellectual nature, and in human nature there is found completion only through the greatest composition, therefore it incidentally signifies a composition in the nature. However, if one were to find the intellectual perfection in a simple body, like in fire, it would be said to be a person. And therefore the divine simplicity is not repugnant to personhood.

Reply Obj. 3: In God nothing is placed under anything else in reality, but only according to a mode of understanding, insofar as he is understood as standing under a property, whether personal or essential. And according to this he is called a “substance,” and to be called a “subsistence” insofar as he exists under them. Nonetheless, because according to reality nothing is there under something else, thus Richard of Saint Victor, wishing to speak properly, says¹ that the divine persons do not subsist (sub-sistunt), but exist (ex-istunt), insofar as they are distinguished by properties of origin; according to these properties one person is from (ex) another person, and they are not placed under (sub) them after the manner of a subject. And therefore he says the divine persons are not subsistences, but existences.

Reply Obj. 4: Properly speaking, in the divine there is no particular. For a thing is called “particular” by the fact that in it the common nature is particularized, receiving a part of it according to power, whereby it can be in many—even though the particular receives its entire account. But the divine nature is in the Father according to its entire power, so it cannot be called a “particular,” except perhaps only according to the account of a numerical multitude, as was said above,¹ and as is clear from the words of Damascene.² Likewise also, the name “God” cannot be particular or singular, since it would be predicated of several supposits, and it lacks matter, which is the principle of singularity. Whence “person” will be said of God not according to the account of particularization or singularity, but according to the account of completion, insofar as it names something complete subsisting or existing in an intellectual nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is attending to the signification of “person” in reference to its mode of signifying, and not in reference to what it signifies. Therefore, even though relation is signified, still, because it is signified through the mode of substance, he therefore said that it signifies substance. And because moreover the substance in God is the same thing as the essence, it follows that it would signify the essence as well, insofar as the Father is God, and is even Godhead itself.

Reply Obj. 2: The response to this is clear from the definition of Boethius.

Reply Obj. 3: Likewise, although it signifies relation, still it does not signify through the mode of relation, and therefore it is not referred to another according to its name.

Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes “what” asks for the essence, as when one asks, “what is a man?” “A rational mortal animal.” But sometimes it asks for the supposit itself, as when one asks, “what swims in the sea?” and one answers, “fish.” And in this way too one was answering the heretics asking, “three what?” with “three persons.”

Reply Obj. 5: When “person” is said as though it were the “one through itself,” essential unity is not being signified, but more the unity of the person, which is due to what is proper to it. And therefore that argument is not relevant to the proposed matter.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is taking the adjective “three” in a broad sense to mean the number three, as does Hilary as well, saying¹ that by substance they are three, by consonance they are one, taking “substance” for hypostasis. Or it could be said that they are not three simply speaking, but three somethings, that is, three supposits.

Reply Obj. 2: In created things, a diversity of properties does not make several persons, since a property is not a subsisting person, whereas in the divine, the properties are the subsisting persons themselves. For the paternity is also the Father himself, and to be the Father is to be God; they are not different existences, for the Father’s existence is not something other than the Son’s existence. And therefore the number of the persons follows on the number of the personal properties.

Reply Obj. 3: The essential properties are also subsistent, but still one does not have a reason for being really distinct from the other—rather, they are distinct only according to account—whereas the relative properties do, by virtue of their opposition. Whence, just as the Father is something subsisting, so too he is good, but the Father and the Son are different subsistings, whereas the good and the wise is one and the same subsisting. This is why all such essential names are said of the individual persons, and therefore the essential properties do not make a number of persons; for number follows on distinction.

Reply Obj. 4: Substantive names do not receive plurality except due to a multiplication of the form from which they are imposed. And because the Godhead from which the name “God” is imposed is not multiple, therefore neither is the name that is imposed from this form. But the name “person” is imposed from the form of personhood, which expresses the account of the subsisting of this nature. Therefore, where there are several subsistings, there are several personhoods and several persons.

Reply Obj. 1: “One” is spoken of in two ways, for there is the one that is convertible with being, and the one that is the principle of number. When speaking of the one that is convertible with being, this is not determined to the genus of quantity; rather, it is found in all beings. And just as God is a being not by some existence that is not himself, so too he is one not by some unity that is not himself, but is so by his own essence; and therefore he is maximally one. However, when speaking about the one that is the principle of number, this cannot be transferred into divine predication as regards its genus, which is quantity, but only as regards its difference, which pertains to perfection, as indivisibility and the first account of measuring, or something of this sort.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Avicenna,¹ the unity and number that the arithmetician considers are not the unity and multitude that are found in all beings; rather, he considers unity and number only insofar as they are found in material things, insofar as plurality is caused by the division of the continuous. For due to this are found all those attributes that arithmeticians demonstrate in numbers, like multiplication, addition, and the like, which are founded on the infinite division of the continuous. This is why there is infinity in number, according to the Philosopher,² and therefore also every number is potentially a sort of unit. Nonetheless, one should understand that every number is indeed in God according to potency—not indeed by a passive potency, but by an active one, insofar as he, as the cause of all things, has within himself in advance the number of all things, according to Dionysius,³ insofar as all things are said to be in him as in an efficient and exemplar principle. But this is not how the objection proceeds.

Reply Obj. 3: God is something determinate in himself; otherwise the conditions of other beings could not be denied of him. Nor is he called a determinate being because he is bounded by some terminus, but rather because, through the excellence of his own existence, which is the most simple, not admitting of addition, he is distinct from all other things.

Reply Obj. 4: Although God and the created do not belong together in any one respect, according to any mode of belonging, nonetheless one must consider a commonness of analogy between God and the created, insofar as created things imitate him to the extent that they can. Whence in some way he can be counted along with other things, as when we say that God and the angel are two realities; yet this is not done simply speaking, and properly, the way that created things are counted with each other, which belong together in some univocally one aspect. And from this it does not follow that God is a part of something, or that God and the angel are something more than God, but only that they are several things.

Reply Obj. 1: Boethius is speaking about essential unity, and no number falls within the essence, but only in the persons, which number is not even a number absolutely speaking, but a sort of number.

Reply Obj. 2: Although division is not properly in God, nonetheless distinction is there in the persons, which is enough for the account of the sort of number that is posited to be in God.

Reply Obj. 3: Addition and such are attributes of number that follow on the division of the continuous, as Avicenna says.¹ And it is certain that this sort of number is not in God.

Reply Obj. 4: In absolute number, the plurality holds a certain composition and addition that is less precise than the one that is its principle; and therefore not merely as regards its concept, but even as regards its reality the measurability of such a multitude is through the unit. But in the number of the relations or persons, there is no order of precision or composition in the reality, so the number in God is not a measured multitude—except perhaps merely according to how it is taken by the intellect, which composes even things that are not composed, insofar as it understands things diverse from them; for it also forms affirmative propositions in the divine.

Reply Obj. 1: Negation is in a multitude insofar as one reality is distinguished from another through a negation; this is why in a multitude there is real negation or privation insofar as one reality is said not to be another. And the negation brought in by the account of unity negates such a distinction through negation. Whence I say that such negation wherein the account of unity is perfected is not but a negation of reason only. For every relation a being has toward negation or toward non-being is only a relation of reason. Whence the relation by which a being is referred to non-being is not but in reason only; likewise the privation whereby a non-being is negated of being is in reason only, as is a privation of a privation, or a negation of a negation. And thus it is clear that we do not assert distinction within the divine persons according to reason only, since we say that one person is really not the other.

Reply Obj. 2: As is clear from things said in the body, “one” does not bring in negation except in reason. Whence, according to reality, it stands closer to affirmation than does “multitude,” which brings in a real negation according to which reality is distinguished from reality. And therefore in the intellect the one is prior to multitude, even though according to sensation or imagination the opposite is the case, as the Philosopher says;¹ for in this latter way composite things are prior to simples, and the divided to the undivided. And therefore multitude does not fall within the definition of the one; rather, what is prior in concept to unity does. For the first thing that falls within the apprehension of the intellect is being and non-being, and this is enough for the definition of the one, insofar as we understand the one to be being, wherein there is not the distinction by being and non-being; and these latter, that is, things distinguished by being and non-being, do not have the account of multitude except after the intellect attributes to each of them the intention of unity. And thereby he defines multitude as what is from the ones, of which one is not the other. And in this way unity falls in the definition of multitude, but not vice versa.

Reply Obj. 3: This is the true definition of the one: the one is being that is not divided. However, Avicenna¹ endeavors to disprove this for the reason given above. For division is of two sorts, the first of which is division according to quantity; and such division follows on the account of multitude, in that the account of number, insofar as it is a species of quantity, follows the account of multitude commonly taken insofar as it adds the account of a measure. This is why the Philosopher says² that a number is a multitude measured by a one, and that the concept of the division of the continuous follows on the account of number. For an account of division, quantity, and measure, according to the Commentator³ is found in discrete quantity before being found in continuous quantity, and such division is not placed within the definition of the one that is convertible with being. But there is also another division, according to form or essence, insofar as one reality is divided from another through its form. And this division is found primarily in affirmation and negation, which, according to concept, precedes the account of the one, as was said.⁴ And thus it is clear that there will be no circular definition.

Reply Obj. 4: The “one” is said in two ways, what is the principle of number and what is convertible with being. When speaking of the one that is the principle of number, as was said in the body, it does assert something additional over and above the being that is called one, namely, it asserts the account of a measure. Whence this one can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it exists, or according to what follows on its concept, that is, a certain relation.

Reply Obj. 5: Numerical multitude, which is a species of quantity, asserts something within created things. Now, this is not transferred to the divine, except perhaps according to an account of distinction, which it has from the account of multitude simply speaking. However, the multitude that divides being does not add a positive accident over and above being, but only an account of distinction, insofar as one being is not another. And so it is even in the divine.

Reply Obj. 1: Expressions of this sort, according to the account that they add to the things of which they are said, do not assert a relation or anything at all. And therefore, according to the names that are imposed from such account, they are not referred to another. But as far as that about which the account is asserted, they can import both the absolute and the relative.

Reply Obj. 2: As was said,¹ plurality does not enter into the divine predication on the side of the multitude that is a species of quantity. And therefore that argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: The account of unity asserts undivided being simply speaking, whence it abstracts from every mode of distinction. This is why “one person” and “one essence” are said according to one common account, even though the account is not one in species. Whence it does not follow from this that “one” is being predicated equivocally.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as “being” said absolutely is understood of substance, so “one” said absolutely, when made substantive insofar as it is signified in the neuter gender, indicates unity absolutely and signifies the unity of the substance. But such unity does not constitute a number of persons, though it would constitute a number of essences, if there were such. On the other hand, “one” in the masculine gender does not signify the unity absolutely, but rather asserts unity of the term to which it is joined, since it is an adjective. Whence it indicates a unity befitting that term. And therefore when one says, “one God,” he signifies the essential unity, whereas when he says, “one Father,” he signifies the personal unity. And this latter unity constitutes the number of the persons, which pertains to relation.

Reply Obj. 1: The “one” in substance, insofar as it signifies essence, constitutes being the same; and likewise “multitude,” in the substance that is essence, constitutes the diverse. But when Hilary says that they are three in substance, he is taking “substance” for the hypostasis, and not for the essence.

Reply Obj. 2: Where there is number simply speaking, there is division, either by essence or by quantity. But such number is not present in the divine, but a sort of number, as has been said,¹ and a distinction of relations is enough for such a number.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the Son is indeed said to be other than the Father, still he is not called “alien,” since this rings of a foreignness of nature. For “alien” is denominated from an alienation of the nature, not from an alienation of the supposit.

Reply Obj. 4: A divine person cannot be properly called “singular,” since the singular is that whose essence is incommunicable. But the Father’s essence is not incommunicable.

Reply Obj. 5: For the reason said, God cannot be called “unique”; and if this way of speaking is found, then “unique” is being taken improperly for “one.” And thus, all authorities who speak this way should be glossed, in which something of the aforesaid is posited.

Reply Obj. 6: Discreteness is not preserved in the divine as regards the account of quantity, but only as regards the account of order.

Reply Obj. 7: The response is clear from what was already said.

Reply Obj. 1: As far as that for which the name is imposed for signifying, “Trinity” does not signify relation, but number; this is why, according to the name, it is not referred to another. But as far as that about which that number is being asserted, in the divine it does signify the relations themselves, which are counted only in the divine. And it does not add anything according to reality, except according to the account of negation, as has been said.¹ And that “Trinity” be toward-something befits it not as a trinity, but as the divine Trinity. Whence it holds relation implicitly.

Reply Obj. 2: “The Father is the Trinity” is false. For the name “Trinity,” on account of its mode of signifying, as signified in the abstract, signifies directly the unity of the essence, and obliquely the number of the persons, as regards the name’s etymology, inasmuch as “Trinity” says “unity of three.” Nonetheless, as regards the name’s imposition, the opposite is the case. For the name has been imposed for signification from the very number that is brought in with the name. This is why, as regards the true signification of the name, the same thing is being signified when one says “Trinity” as if one were saying, “three persons of one essence,” as the Master explains.¹ Whence it is clear that the Father cannot be called the Trinity. And likewise, when one says “God is threefold” one is signifying that he holds three persons in one essence; whence “God” supposes thereby either the essence or the indistinct supposit.

Reply Obj. 3: The name “Trinity” has a certain likeness with a collective noun, yet it is not truly a collective noun. For in a collective noun there are two things to consider: the multitude of the things collected, which are simply speaking divided in essence, and that in which they are being collected, which is the lowest unity. But in the name “Trinity” the opposite is the case. For that in which the three persons are being collected is the greatest unity, the unity of the divine essence, and the persons who are being collected have the least of the account of a real multitude; yet there is a certain likeness insofar as it is a certain number, and a certain unity for each of them; this is why the Master said earlier¹ that it is “as though” it were a collective noun.

Reply Obj. 1: The things placed in that definition can be considered in two ways: either strictly according to what is proper to the words—and in this way, as will become clear, it does not fit the divine persons, as the Master says—or broadly, and in this way it fits a person placed in whatever intellectual nature. And Boethius takes it in this latter way; this is why he even looks into the definition of person for the sake of showing how there is one person in Christ, in whom it is certain there is only the uncreated divine person.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Avicenna,¹ a definition can be considered in two ways: either according to what is signified through the definition, or according to the intention of definition.

Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from things said before,¹ an essence or nature can be signified in two ways: either as a part, as is signified in the name “humanity”—and in this way the nature or essence cannot be predicated directly of a person, just as “humanity” is not predicated of Socrates; or as a whole, as is signified in the name “man”—and in this way it is predicated of a person, for we do say that Socrates is a man. However, here the name is being taken according to the first mode, insofar as it is a principle of the difference, and not the difference itself—as is rationality, which is not placed directly in the definition of man, but only obliquely, as if one were to say that man is the animal possessing rationality, or something of this sort. However, the nature designated in composite realities holds also the real difference as regards “person,” namely, insofar as a certain addition is made to the nature as to the demonstrated matter, through which the common nature of the genus or difference is individuated. But in simple things, and especially in God, since no real addition can occur, there is no real difference of the nature as so signified as regards “person”; rather, addition is made only as regards the mode of signifying, on account of which it falls obliquely within the definition of a divine person.

Reply Obj. 4: “Rational” is said in two ways. For sometimes it is taken strictly and properly, insofar as “reason” signifies a certain darkening of the intellectual nature, as Isaac says¹ that “reason” arises within the shadow of intelligence. This is clear from the fact that the truth is not presented to it right away; rather, it finds it discursively through inquiry. And in this sense, “rational” is the difference of “animal,” and it does not fit God or angels. But sometimes it is taken for any condition of a power that is not impressed within matter, and in this way it does belong to God, angels, and man. So too Gregory names² an angel a “rational animal,” and even Dionysius says³ that the sensible and the rational are in angels more eminently than in us, and he even counts “reason” among the divine names.⁴ And this is how Boethius is taking it.

Reply Obj. 5: According to Boethius,¹ in one way “nature” is said as any specific difference informing anything whatsoever. And therefore the name “nature” does not name the essence absolutely, but insofar as it is determined to some genus or some species. And therefore, because “person” names a subsisting substance only in a determinate genus, that is, an intellectual nature, therefore he more appropriately put “nature” in the definition, rather than “essence.”

Reply Obj. 6: In individuation, insofar as it is in composite things, there are two things to consider: first, indeed, the cause of the individuation, which is matter—and in this respect it is not translatable to the divine; and second, the account of individuation, which is the account of incommunicability, insofar as something one and the same is not divided into many, nor is it predicated of many, nor is it divisible; and this does befit God. This is also why Richard, in place of “individual,” places “incommunicable.”¹

Reply Obj. 7: “Substance” is said in four ways. In one way, substance is the same thing as essence; and in this way substance is found in all genera, as is essence. This is being signified when one asks, “what is whiteness?” and one answers, “a color.” In another way it signifies an individual in the genus of substance, which is also called “first substance,” or “hypostasis.” In a third way, “second substance” is said. In a fourth way, “substance” is said commonly, insofar as it abstracts from first and second substance; and this is how it is being taken here. And by “individual,” as by a difference, it is being drawn to standing for first substance; this is just as, when one says “rational mortal animal,” “animal” signifies the nature of animal insofar as it is abstracted from all its species, and by the added difference it is drawn to a determinate species.

Reply Obj. 8: As is clear from things said in the body, “person” does not name an intention, but a reality to which that intention accrues. And therefore it does not name an accident, but rather a substance. Nor is “individual” the difference of substance, since the particular does not add any difference over and above the species. But nevertheless the particular becomes individual through some essential principle, which in composite things is indeed matter, and in divine things is the distinguishing relation. And because essential principles are unknown to us, we frequently place in definitions something accidental for the sake of signifying something essential. And thus, even the name “individual,” which is the name of an accident, is placed here to designate the substantial principle through which there is individuation.

Reply Obj. 1: Although according to the account of the name, “individual” brings in a certain negation, nonetheless this negation is founded on some reality—namely, on the definition of a certain distinguishing principle—wherein God and the creature are not spoken of univocally. Further, in the definition of “person” not only is the name “individual” placed, but so is “substance,” and others that cannot belong univocally to God and created things—unless perhaps one were to say that “person” is the name of the accident, that is, of the intention, and not the name of the reality, and that “substance” is placed in the definition of “person” as a subject is placed in the definition of an accident, like when one says, “the snub” is the “curved nose.” But this is contrary to Boethius’s intention, who is hunting for the difference of “person” through a division of substance.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher,¹ nothing prevents the accounts of certain things from not being univocal. Whence, just as the name “person” is not said univocally but analogically of God and created things, so too is its definition.

Reply Obj. 3: The name “person,” as regards the reality being signified, is with priority and more truly in God than it is in created things. But as regards the mode of signifying and the imposition of the name, it belongs to created things in a more familiar way.

Reply Sed Contra 5: The account of “person” brings in distinction in a common way, so it is abstracted from every mode of distinction. And therefore there can be analogically one account in things that are distinguished in diverse ways.

Reply Obj. 1: “Person” is not common by a community of reality, as with essence. And therefore although it does not differ from the essence according to reality, nonetheless it does not signify through the mode of essence. And likewise, when one says that the Father is distinguished from the Son “in person,” it is not understood that there is a distinction in the common account of “person,” but only in the specific account that is the account of the Father.

Reply Obj. 2: “Person” is not of the account of “Father,” if it is being taken properly. For in the divine there is no definition properly speaking, just as neither is there genus and species. Nonetheless, if one does not attend to the force of the word, then it should be said that person is of the account of “Father,” yet not according to a different existence in the Father and the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: Thereby the solution is clear.

Reply Obj. 4: Although a person is incommunicable, nothing prevents the intention of “person” being common. For example, Socrates is incommunicable, and yet the account or intention of the individual is common, just as, on the contrary, the intention of a genus is designated as particular when it is contracted to this genus. Likewise, the account of “person” as person, even though it does not name an intention, still is common inasmuch as it does not signify a specific account of distinction, but a general one; this is just as the vague individual, like “some man,” is in a certain way common, insofar as it does not signify this or another account of individuation, but individuation only in common.

Reply Obj. 1: The name “being” is in no way taken from any relation, but from the existence, which is simply absolute in the divine. And therefore it is not predicated in the plural due to its form, but due to the supposit, insofar as it is an adjective or participle. But the name “reality” is imposed from whatness or form, which can be both absolute and related, and therefore it can be predicated in the plural, even though according to the name it is not referred to another. For the absolute and the related are incidental to the account of a reality, just as being rational and irrational are incidental to animal.

Reply Obj. 2: Although there is one existence just as there is one Godhead, still “being” is adjectival and “God” is substantive, so the account is not the same. However, if by “whatness” is understood not only the absolute account, but the account or intention of whatever thing, whether substance or accident or relation, then in the divine, although there is one absolute whatness, yet there are many accounts of real relations. And in this way in a certain manner there are several whatnesses—although this cannot be conceded properly speaking, since whatness, essence, and definition are simply speaking only of substances, as the Philosopher proves.¹ And this is why the name “reality” can be predicated in the plural and the singular.

Reply Obj. 3: Although relation does not place anything absolute from that reference, still it really places the account of relation in God. And therefore due to this he can be called a “reality,” and from several opposite relations he can be called “several realities.”

Reply Obj. 4: Our response to Damascene’s statement is above.¹

Reply Obj. 1: The name corresponding to “hypostasis” in the Latin language, that is, “substance,” is said equivocally for the substance, the essence, and for first substance. Thus, lest there be occasion for deception, Jerome did not want to use the name “hypostasis” before its signification was noted and declared or made determinate; otherwise the simple heretics might argue from the distinction of hypostases to the distinction of essences.

Reply Obj. 2: According to reality, in the divine there is nothing under something else or standing under something else by way of an accident. But nonetheless something is understood “to stand under” according to the mode of signifying, insofar as Damascene also says¹ that in the divine some things signify what follows on substance, like goodness, wisdom, paternity, and such. And in this way the name “hypostasis” can be used here.

Reply Obj. 3: In God a hypostasis is also a reality of nature. For one needs to know that “individual substance” is said in two ways: either from its standing under a common nature or from its standing under accidents and properties. And in both ways it can be signified through a name of first intention or a name of second intention. Through a name of first imposition, it is signified as standing under the nature with the name “reality of nature,” whereas through a name of second imposition, it is signified by the name “supposit.” Likewise, insofar as it stands under a property it is signified with a name of first imposition that is the name “hypostasis” or “person,” whereas by a name of second imposition that is “singular,” as the individual. These latter are not properly speaking in the divine, since they express the determinate mode of distinction that occurs through matter; but in place of them one can say “incommunicable” there. Nonetheless it is not necessary that the nature be simpler than the very reality of the nature, since in simple things, according to Avicenna,¹ the whatness of the simple is the simple thing itself; but they differ as regards the mode of signifying, since the whatness is signified as a form, and the simple reality itself is signified as subsisting. And the real distinction of the nature is not from the side of the nature, but from the side of the relations of opposites subsisting in that nature.

Reply Obj. 4: As has been said,¹ in the divine, a person is not distinguished on the side of the nature, or on the side of the very existence, but only on the side of the properties. This is why those names that are said with reference to property, like “hypostasis” and “person,” are predicated in the plural—whereas names that are said with reference to existence, like “subsistence” and “essence,” are predicated in the singular. However, the name “subsistence,” in the usage of the saints, is taken for “hypostasis,” as was said before.² But there are some names that signify reference to the common nature that are predicated also in the plural, like “reality of nature,” and “supposit”; for although they do signify reference to a property through the mode of form, still insofar as they name something distinct under the common nature, in the divine they signify the relations as subsisting. However, “subsistence” and “essence” do not name the distinct; this is why they are also primarily in genera and species, rather than in the individuals, according to Boethius.³ And therefore if they are being taken properly, they are not predicated in the plural, as is done among the Greeks.

Reply Obj. 5: As was said in the body of the article, “hypostasis” in the divine signifies relation through the mode of substance. For just as, on account of his simplicity, in God the essence and the being are the same thing, so too in him the distinguishing relation and what is distinguished by the relation are the same thing. They differ only according to the mode of signifying, which is founded on the reality, since each name has its true signification in God; and therefore they differ even according to the mode of supposition, since when one is supposed the other is not. For just as we say that God generates and the Godhead does not generate, so we say that the hypostasis is distinguished and the relation distinguishes.

Reply Obj. 6: Just as the name “person” signifies something distinct in the divine, so does the name “hypostasis.” But the name “person” determines the specific mode of distinction, that is, through a noble property, which the name “hypostasis” does not determine. This is why they stand to each other as higher and lower, just as “some substance” is more common than “some man.” But this determination and non-determination, common and proper, in composite realities is traced back to the material and the formal according to reality; for the account of genus flows from matter and the account of difference from form, as has been said.¹ But in simple realities there is nothing corresponding in reality that is indeterminate, as though it were material, and would be made determinate by the arrival of form. Rather, it is only according to the mode of signifying, insofar as each of them is signified truly in the divine.

Reply Obj. 1: In the divine one can take both the absolute and the related, but a relation does not come to the absolute as distinguishing it, but rather through the total identity of the reality. But what is distinguished by the relation is the relation itself; and this latter can be signified through the mode of subsisting and hypostasis, as is clear from things said.

Reply Obj. 2: In created things hypostases are distinguished through matter, and diverse properties manifest the distinction. But in the divine, hypostases are not distinguished except through relation, since one cannot find there any real otherness besides what is according to relative opposition. Whence, just as in created things, if the intellect subtracts the division of matter and quantity, the hypostases do not remain distinct, so does it happen also in the divine, when it subtracts relative opposition.

Reply Obj. 3: “Hypostasis” is placed in the definition of “person” because “person” adds something over and above hypostasis—but not relation, since relation belongs to the concept of a divine hypostasis just as it belongs to the concept of a divine person. Rather, it adds a determinate account of relation, that is, one pertaining to dignity. And therefore when relation is removed, the concept of neither hypostasis nor person remains in the divine. For even from the very fact that a divine hypostasis is posited, so too is posited subsistence in a noble property. This is why the account of nobility, which “person” adds, is included in the fact that it is a divine hypostasis. Whence, just as “human hypostasis” says nothing less than “person,” neither does “divine hypostasis.”

Reply Obj. 4: By his paternity the Father has it that he is someone and that he is the Father, yet it does not follow that the Son is not someone. For that whereby the Father has paternity the Son has filiation, which is also a relation. Whence if relation is abstracted, neither the Father is someone nor is the Son someone; yet each is someone by his own relation, just as each is a person by his own personhood. And nevertheless, the personhood of one is not the personhood of the other; how this is the case is clear from things said before, on the commonness of “person.”¹

Reply Obj. 1: Boethius’s statement is understood of the toward-something insofar as it is toward what is other. And thus, it does not predicate anything within the reality of what it is said about, but rather asserts something outside it. Nonetheless some relations, as regards their existence, do assert something in the reality of the thing about which they are said.

Reply Obj. 2: In a relation of identity there are two things to consider: that in respect of which one is called identical, that is, the essence itself, like equality in respect of quantity; and that to which the identity belongs, what is being called the same according to the one essence, like the equal, which holds one quantity. And because the essence that the Father communicates to the Son is also numerically one, there is a likeness of these relations with a relation of identity as regards that with respect to which they are said. But this is not so as regards the things that are being referred to each other according to that respect. Whence the Son is not said to be the same as the Father in the masculine gender, but the same thing in the neuter.

Reply Obj. 3: Whenever something that belongs to a reality’s account is taken away, the reality itself is removed, just as with rational removed, man is destroyed. However, two things come together for the account of a relation that has a foundation in the reality: the foundation of the reality, which is quantity, which is the cause of the relation of equality; and even something else of its account, its respect to the other. And in each way it can happen that the relation is destroyed in real relations: either through the destruction of the quantity—whereby on this change of the quantity there follows, incidentally, the change of the relation; or even insofar as the respect to the other ceases, when that to which it was referred is removed, and thereby the relation ceases without any change made in it. Whence in those things wherein there is no relation except according to this respect, the relations accrue and withdraw without any change of that which is being referred.

Reply Obj. 4: The relation is really the same as the essence, but they differ only in account, as it is even with goodness and the essence. And due to that account relation makes the distinction within the divine, which does not belong to the essence.

Reply Obj. 5: The divine persons are also distinguished by their very selves, insofar as the persons, according to reality, are the relations themselves. But just as “person,” according to its mode of signifying, is not the same thing as a relation, so too they are not distinguished by their very selves, but by the relations. For example, God through his very self is God even though he is God by his Godhead, because he himself is his own Godhead.

Reply Obj. 1: Divine relation contains something as relation, and something else as divine. For insofar as it is divine it is the subsistent hypostasis, since nothing is an accident here, nor is there any inhering form that is not subsisting. Whence, although it does not distinguish the hypostasis from the fact that it is a relation, since then every relation would do this, still it does so insofar as it is a divine relation. For in this way it does not follow on substance, but in fact is substance itself.

Reply Obj. 2: The order of distinction can be considered in two ways: either according to the quantity of the distinction, or according to its dignity and causality. If considered according to the quantity of distinction, then the distinction of the divine hypostases is the least real distinction that can exist, as was said in the body. And therefore the least being—relation—befits such a distinction. But as regards the order of dignity and causality, that distinction exceeds all distinctions, as likewise does the relation that is the principle of the distinction exceed everything causing distinction within created things. This is not because it is a relation, but because it is a divine relation. It also excels by its causality, since from the procession of the divine persons it causes every procession and multiplication of created things, as was pointed out before.¹

Reply Obj. 3: Although its being a certain reality is not due to its being spoken of as toward-another, nonetheless it is a certain reality insofar as it has a foundation in that which is being related. And beyond this, because of this, insofar as it is divine, it is a hypostasis or substance. And therefore it makes a real distinction of hypostases. This is just as wisdom is not a substance just due to its being wisdom, and yet because divine wisdom is a substance, God is wise substantially.

Reply Obj. 4: Because a relation does not have a natural existence except due to its having a foundation in the real thing, it thereby is located in the genus; this is why essential differences of relations are taken from the differences of other beings. This is clear from the Philosopher, where he says¹ that some are founded on quantity, and some on action, and so on. This is why the order of relations is also according to the order of the things in which relations are founded. Therefore just as we see in things that are distinguished by their essence that the principles of the substance, like matter and form, do the distinguishing, and other incidental realities are signs manifesting the distinction, so it is in things that are distinguished through relation: relations founded on the nature of a real thing do the distinguishing, and the other relations are signs of the distinction. However, the relations that have a foundation in the nature of the reality are relations of origin, for paternity is founded in the communication of the nature. And therefore the saints assert that the Father and the Son are distinguished by paternity and filiation, but their equality and likeness demonstrate their distinction. This is why Hilary earlier² proved the distinction through the likeness of the divine persons.

Reply Obj. 1: Those relations that are signified in God from the orientation of created things to him place nothing really in God, as is clear from things said before.¹ And therefore it does not follow that, according to this, relations really existing in God will be multiplied into infinity.

Reply Obj. 2: Those relations according to which one attends to the distinction of the ideas are not founded in the divine existence, but in his intellect. Whence they do not really have existence in God, but are only understood by him—for example, the form of a donkey, the form of a horse, and such, and unlike the way goodness and wisdom have existence in him.

Reply Obj. 3: Equality and likeness do not add any real relation over and above paternity and filiation. The reason for this will be explained below.¹

Reply Obj. 4: The relations under which there is no real distinction in the reality which is being referred is not a real relation. Whence whenever some activity is reflected back into the acting supposit, no real relation is born from the real activity, but only a relation of reason. And therefore when one says that God or the soul understands itself, no real relation is being indicated there, but only a relation of reason.

Reply Obj. 5: “To be from something” does not signify a determinate mode of origin, and therefore it does not signify a specific notion; rather, it is preserved in two notions, “filiation” and “procession,” with which it does not add to their number another notion. Likewise neither does the common add to the proper notions that are contained under it; but “common spiration” does signify a determinate mode of origin, insofar as the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. And therefore it signifies a specific notion.

Reply Obj. 1: The opposition according to origin, is according to concept in the relations of origin prior to it being in the very persons that arise from each other. For the persons are opposed only insofar as they have such relations. And therefore opposed relations are distinct in their very selves, as are constitutive differences, but the persons are distinct by the relations, just as species are by their differences.

Reply Obj. 2: Some have said, as Avicenna says,¹ that numerically the same relation is in each of the extremes. But this cannot be, since one accident is not in two subjects. And therefore one should say that in each of the extremes there is one relation that differs from the other specifically in certain things, like in things named by diverse names on each side, such as paternity and filiation. But in certain others they do not differ specifically, but only numerically, such as when there is one name for each, such as in “likeness,” and “equality.” And then the relation that is in one of them as in a subject is in the other as in a terminus, and vice versa. And therefore relation, according to its own existence, insofar as it has its foundation in the reality, is not a middle, but an extreme, whereas according to its reference it is a middle. Whence it is clear that they are really distinguished.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the essential attributes are not multiple realities, so too neither are the properties belonging to one person. Rather, they are one reality, which is that person. Nevertheless, because relation remains in the divine even according to the common account of the genus, the distinction of relation as relation also remains. And therefore one can say that there are several relations, and one relation is not predicated of another.

Reply Obj. 4: “Word” and “son” are not distinct by a difference of relation, since each signifies the relation of the same one to the same one. And on account of this, two relations are not indicated by the names “word” and “son,” but only one; and likewise with the names “gift” and “love.” Rather, they are distinct only insofar as they have a foundation in the reality, inasmuch as one is founded on the emanation of nature, that is, “son,” and the other on the emanation of intellect, that is, “word”; in God these differ only in account. And therefore the Word and the Son differ only in account and not in relation. On the other hand, “unbegotten” and “father” are not said in reference to the same thing, and therefore it is certain that this is not one relation or notion.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as in things pertaining to the essence, the divine activity, God, and the Godhead are the same according to reality, but they are distinct only according to an account founded in the reality, so it is also in personal things. That is, the personal activity and the person and the property constituting the person are the same according to reality, but they differ only according to account and mode of signifying. Whence I say that the same account is signified by these three, “Father,” “paternity,” and “generation,” but “Father” signifies it through the mode of a hypostasis or person, “paternity” through the mode of a property, and “generation” through the mode of an activity.

Reply Obj. 1: When the Master says that the Father is the Father because he has begotten, he is taking generation not insofar as it is signified through the mode of an act, but insofar as it is signified through the mode of a property constituting the person. And in this way, according to concept it precedes the person so constituted and so distinguished. For in this way they put generation in the place of paternity, just as in the previous distinction.

Reply Obj. 2: As was said earlier,¹ the principle of generation in the divine cannot be merely the nature, nor again merely a property, but rather the divine nature insofar as the sort of property in the Father that is paternity. This is why Anselm does not say that it is the whole Trinity that is required as the principle of the generation. For so that we might include the whole, one must say that not merely because he is God does he generate, nor merely because he is the Father, but because God is the Father.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument follows for a relation according to the account of relation taken absolutely, but the relation that is paternity has something beyond this. Since it is divine, it constitutes a person, and it itself is the person so constituted; by reason of this it precedes the activity, according to concept.

Reply Obj. 4: There is not the same account for the Father and the Son, since the form proper to the generated is in no way the principle of active or passive generation, but a consequence, and as it were a terminus. Therefore filiation in no way precedes the understanding of birth; rather, the proper form of the generator is the principle of active generation, and therefore it must precede the understanding of generation.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the name “word” has been imposed from a bodily motion, which is the final part of our speech, nonetheless it was imposed for signifying everything that is said, whether exteriorly or interiorly. Whence, even though the name’s etymology does not befit God, still the reality signified by the name does, as frequently happens, as was said before about the name “person.”¹

Reply Obj. 2: For us, the word of the voice neither endures nor subsists, but the word of our heart does endure, though it does not subsist. And therefore it is clear that although a word does not endure or subsist just from the account of being a word, nonetheless it has diverse accounts of perfection insofar as it is found in diverse things. And therefore the divine Word, inasmuch as it is divine, has it that it endures and subsists, just as it is with the divine Love, as was said before.¹

Reply Obj. 3: Without a doubt, thought is not properly speaking in God, but Anselm used the name “thought” by way of a likeness. For just as in thought reason goes forth from one thing to another by bringing them together, so also the account of a word, as was said in the body of the article, is completed in a certain emanation and going forth from the intellect. Whence over and above the intellect’s simple beholding, “word” adds something akin to thought.

Reply Obj. 4: The divine intellect does not understand its own essence through any species essentially or really different from the essence itself. Nonetheless it understands its essence through its essence; whence the divine essence stands as what understands, and what is understood, and that by which it is understood. And insofar as it stands as what understands, thus truly and properly speaking is the account of intellect there; insofar as it stands as what is understood, the account of the understood is truly there; but insofar as it stands as that by which it is understood, the account of a word is there.

Reply Obj. 1: “Knowledge” does not signify the entire account of a word, since “knowledge” and “wisdom” are said through the mode of resting and remaining in what they belong to. And therefore they are only ever said essentially, although they can be appropriated, whereas “word” signifies a certain emanation of the intellect, and a going forth into a manifestation of it. And therefore, because “going forth” can be understood either according to a distinct reality, insofar as the Son goes forth from the Father, or according to one of reason only, insofar as understanding comes from the divine intellect, “word” is sometimes said essentially and sometimes personally, like with “love.”

Reply Obj. 2: Without understanding the distinction of the persons, the divine intellect can yet manifest its very self, both to itself and to another. It does this to another by creating a creature or inspiring knowledge of him within a creature. It does this to himself through the mode whereby someone turns over what he understands so that it might become manifest whether what he perceives in his intellect is true or not. For this is properly to speak within the heart. On account of this it holds something like thought. Yet without understanding the distinction of the persons, there would not be there a manifestation of the principle in something really distinct from it, and existing through the mode of intellect within the same nature.

Reply Obj. 3: We concede this.

Reply Obj. 4: In no way should one concede that the Father understands due to the Son, or that he understands in the Son as in an object or species whereby he is known. For this would assert that the Son has an account of principle relative to the Father. Nonetheless, one should concede that the Father understands in the Son both himself and others insofar as he sees the Son as his likeness, and the likeness of all other things, the way a principle is seen in that of which it is the principle, even though he is also seen in his very self. For I can see a man in his image, even though I might also see him through himself. So too, although the Father sees his very self and all other things in himself, still he can also see all things in the Son—and even his very self, just as also he can see himself in his creature, insofar as the creature represents him, albeit imperfectly.

Reply Sed Contra 5: To the fifth objection, which is to the contrary, one should say that Augustine is taking “word” insofar as it signifies a real going forth and distinction from the one speaking it, and not insofar as a distinction of reason is enough for the account of a word. And therefore he is taking “word” personally.

Reply Obj. 1: For the account of a word, there is required not only the ability to manifest, since then the effect of every cause would be a word, which can be said only metaphorically. Rather, a procession of the intellect must also be understood in that word, and this does not befit the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 2: The Holy Spirit proceeds from two, and therefore his procession is through the mode of the conformity of love, which is from the union of the will in the ones willing. And on account of this, he proceeds only through the mode of the will. But both the procession of the intellect and the procession of nature are from only one,¹ but not from the one insofar as it is united to the other, if it is a perfect agent, as is the divine agent. And therefore both modes of procession befit the person who is from only one.

Reply Obj. 3: A created thing cannot properly speaking be called a “word,” but more the “voice of the Word.” For just as a voice manifests a word, so too what is created manifests the divine art. And therefore the saints say that by one Word God has spoken everything created. Whence created things are, as it were, the voices that express the one divine Word. This is why Augustine says, all things cry out, ‘God has made me!’¹ But this is said only metaphorically.

Reply Obj. 1: Although within the Word is that whereby everything created comes to be, still the consideration of the Word and of him whose Word he is does not depend on the consideration of what is created. And therefore “Word” does not necessarily signify a reference to what is created.

Reply Obj. 2: The Word is called the active power of the Father in the manner of an art; whence, insofar as it is signified as an art, it is signified through a reference to what is created. But it is not necessarily so understood when it is signified as “Word,” as is clear of the Holy Spirit, who is himself the love by which the Father loves the Son. For this love is the paradigmatic reason¹ for the love that he has for what is created, which he draws into a likeness with his own love. And insofar as the love is signified absolutely with the name “love,” not by connoting any reference to what is created, but insofar as it is the reason for the things that he freely bestows on what is created, this love is signified with the name “gift,” which does indicate a reference to what is created. So it is with the name “Word” and the name “art”; for “Word” can be spoken of absolutely, but “art” is said in reference to the artwork.

Reply Obj. 3: By one and the same Word the Father has spoken himself and everything created. Yet there are different considerations of the Word insofar as through him the Father and created things are spoken. For an absolute knowledge of his very self is not lacking to God, nor even an absolute knowledge of created things, nor even a comparative knowledge such that he knows himself to be their cause; but these three cognitions do not differ really in him, but only by reason. And therefore a reference to what is created is not required for the understanding of the Word, insofar as by him the Father is understood to have spoken his very self. Rather, it is required insofar as by the Word the Father is understood to have spoken created things. And therefore the “Word” is understood both absolutely and with reference to what is created.

Reply Obj. 4: The artisan can turn to the species of the art within him in three ways. The first is insofar as it is the likeness of a reality that is to come to be through it; and in this way he turns absolutely to the real artwork, having no consideration of his art. The second way is by turning to the species itself, according to the existence it has within his soul; and in this way there is an absolute consideration of the species itself as some reality, and again he does not thereby consider the real artwork. Lastly, he can do so by comparing the one to the other, when he considers that the species within himself is the cause of the things that came to be from it. And so it is even for the divine intellect, insofar as it turns upon itself—either insofar as it is some reality, or insofar as it is only the likeness of the realities, or insofar as that reality that is the likeness is the cause of things that it makes like itself. However, such cognitions in God are simultaneous, and do not differ in reality.

Reply Sed Contra 5: “Word” does not signify a reference to what is actually created, but a reference that is, as it were, in habit, as does “gift.” And therefore both are eternal names.

Reply Obj. 1: An expression is said to assert something in two ways: either such that what it asserts is of its concept as something of its very essence, like “man” asserts “animal”; or because it presupposes something as that on which it is founded, even though it is not of its essence, like every accident asserts substance. Therefore I say that the name “unbegotten” does not assert anything that constitutes his concept; for this could only be if it were to assert some account of a principle, whether common or specific, whereas no other notion can befit the Father, and in whatever way it be said, “innascibility” will not add to the number of notions along with “paternity,” since the common and the proper do not make a number. Rather, it asserts something that it presupposes as that on which it is founded. And due to this, some have said that “unbegotten” asserts something, and others that it asserts nothing.

Reply Obj. 2: “Unbegotten” does not imply an absolute negation, but in a certain way a privation. For every negation that is in some determinate subject can be called a “privation.” Whence in the Metaphysics, it is said¹ that a privation is a negation in a subject or substance. Whence I say that this negation implied by “unbegotten” is understood as founded on the account of a principle insofar as it is a notion of the Father. And in this way it belongs to neither the essence nor the Holy Spirit, to either of which it does not belong to be the principle by origin of any divine person. Nor does it belong even to the Son, to whom the opposite affirmation belongs.

Reply Obj. 3: Something is contained in a genus in two ways: either through itself and properly, as a species, and things that admit of the predication of the genus; or through a reduction¹ to it, as are the principles of the genus, such as matter and form to substance, and the unity and the point to quantity, even though neither of these is a quantity. So too no negation or privation is in a genus through itself, since it has no “whatness” or being; rather, it is traced back to the genus of its affirmation, insofar as being is understood in non-being, and an affirmation in a negation, as the Philosopher says.² For every privation is known through possession, and removal through positing. And thus, even non-relation is in the genus of relation, even though the things about which this negation is said are not in that genus.

Reply Obj. 4: In his being called “unbegotten,” being from another is, simply speaking, thereby removed from the Father, and not only being from another in some determinate way. But the reason why he would be named through a negation of a specific procession, that is, generation, can be assigned in three ways. One is because the procession of the Holy Spirit according to the order of nature presupposes the generation of the Son. And therefore, since when one negates the prior, one thereby removes the posterior, on the removal of generation from the font principle, the removal of the procession through the mode of love follows. A second is that through his being called “unbegotten,” insofar as it is a notion of the Father, every mode of following on generation is thereby taken away; for it belongs to the Father as the principle of generation that in no way would he follow upon the generation. Now, something follows on the generation, according to the understanding, in three ways: either as the one begotten, as the Son, or as received through the generation, as the divine essence, or as the one proceeding from the one generated, as the Holy Spirit. Whence “unbegotten” in the way spoken of belongs to none of these. A third reason can be that the negation of “unbegotten” would be founded on the account of a principle, as was said in the body of the article. But although the Father is a principle of each divine procession, still only the account through which he is the principle of the generation is a personal property, one constituting the person of the Father, that is, paternity. And therefore also through the negation of generation this same person is more fittingly and more properly made known.

Reply Obj. 1: From the fact that it belongs to the Father alone, one can prove that it is a property of the Father—but one cannot thereby prove that it is a personal property, unless it were to constitute the person of the Father according to a likeness with a constitutive difference.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever a negation has of dignity, it has from the affirmation on which it is founded. And therefore innascibility, which is founded on such a paternity, pertains to dignity as the dignity of such paternity. And just as innascibility is not communicated to any creature, so too neither is such paternity—that is, one that is not from another principle—even though paternity absolutely speaking is communicated to created things.

Reply Obj. 3: Having removed paternity through one’s intellect, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain; and what is said in the text—that being unbegotten does remain—should be understood in reference to the common accounts of being unbegotten and being a Father. For these are found separately in diverse things, whereas the property of the Father is not posited in reference to each. Nevertheless, even with paternity removed, unbegotten does remain in God, but not as a personal property or notion of some person, but as an attribute of the essence, like immeasurable and uncreated.

Reply Obj. 4: Innascibility is not the principle of the generation in the Father as though it were the form eliciting this action, but only as though it were placing a certain condition on the generation. For just as we see in alterations that the first alteration is what the unaltered altering agent brings about, and from the fact that it is not altered the alteration that it accomplishes is the first, so too the first generation belongs to the ungenerated generator. Whence it has that condition—that it is the first generation—from the fact that the generator is ungenerated. But the formal principle that is, as it were, eliciting the generation is the form of the Father, which is paternity, just as heat is the principle of heating that is in what is hot.

Reply Obj. 1: The account of an image is not in the imitation of just any externals, but of those that are in some way the sign of the species and nature. And therefore he placed “species” here, rather than “quality.”

Reply Obj. 2: This definition is given through the cause. For the very species in which the imitation occurs is not that which is the image, properly speaking; rather, the non-difference of the species is the cause why it is called an “image.” Or it could be said that each of them can be called an “image”—both what is imitated and the imitation—but this is not said properly. And this is how Hilary is defining it.

Reply Obj. 3: Each thing attains the account of an image to the degree that it attains the account of non-difference; for insofar as it differs it is not an image. Yet one finds a certain gradation of perfection of an image. For sometimes one calls the “image” of something that wherein one finds some likeness to the quality of the other that designates and expresses its nature, even if that nature is not found in the one. For example, a stone is called the “image” of a man insofar as it has a like shape, but the nature, of which the shape is a sign, does not subsist in it. And in this way the image of God is in a creature, just as the image of the king is in the coin, as Augustine says.¹ And this is an imperfect mode of image.

Reply Obj. 4: When he says, is of a reality that it images, this is a circumlocution for the exemplar. Whence it is asserted in the force of one expression, and it is asserted fittingly in the definition of “image” as the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior, and not vice versa. For the exemplar is prior to the image. So there is no circle here.

Reply Obj. 5: By the “non-difference of species” is understood both likeness and equality, the sort required for an image. Whence these two definitions reduce to the same thing.

Reply Obj. 1–3: Thereby the solution to the objections is clear.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene is taking “image” broadly for any sort of likeness whatsoever.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the Holy Spirit does imitate the Father, still it is not because of the account of his own procession that he is called an “image”; and therefore he is not called an “image” just as he is not called a “son.”

Reply Obj. 3: The identity of the reality in the divine is not prejudicial to distinction according to the true account of the attributes. And therefore, although wisdom insofar as it is divine is the essence, nonetheless the proper account of wisdom remains here outside the account of essence; and likewise, the account of the will is outside the account of the nature and intellect. And on account of this, the distinction of the processions that are through the mode of will and intellect and nature remains, at least according to account. And the diversity of the accounts causes the diversity of the names. Whence those names never would come together in the same thing unless the accounts were founded in the same reality. And because the procession through the mode of the will and that of nature do not belong to the same thing in the divine, therefore neither do the names that demonstrate the proper accounts of the processions follow on each other.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the name “image” was imposed from the equality and likeness, still it was imposed for the sake of signifying the reality to which the likeness and equality belong from the mode of its production. And therefore it is not necessary that the Holy Spirit be called absolutely like and equal unless from the mode of his procession he is also properly and absolutely called an “image.”

Reply Obj. 1: Because the name “principle” has been imposed according to the way it is found in created things, where the principle is prior in some way to what comes from it, therefore it is imposed from priority. But nevertheless it is imposed for the sake of signifying that from which something is. Whence, even though as regards mode of signifying it does not fit the divine, just as is the case with all the other names that have been imposed by us, nonetheless as regards the reality being signified, the account of principle most properly fits there.

Reply Obj. 2: Even though the Father is called the “principle of the Son,” still he should not be called his cause, except improperly, the way Chrysostom uses the name “cause,” calling the Father the cause of the Son.¹ For “principle” is in more things than is “cause,” and “cause” is in more than “element,” as the Commentator says.² Whence every cause is a principle, but this cannot be converted.

Reply Obj. 3: Because making and production are always terminated at the existence of a reality, therefore the Son cannot be said to be made or produced by the Father, with whom he has one existence. Rather, he can only be said to be generated by him, on account of the origin of the person.

Reply Obj. 1: “Principle” is common with a commonness of analogy, not one of univocation.

Reply Obj. 2: In the division the Master is taking “principle” according to its common account, which is one, as was said in the body, and not according to the specific accounts, which differ.

Reply Sed Contra 3: Although nothing is univocal to the eternal and the temporal, nonetheless there is something common according to analogy, as has often been said.

Reply Sed Contra 4: That argument follows in reference to the specific accounts of origin, which do not cause an equivocation, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1, Sed Contra: And thereby the reply to each objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 1: In created things supposits are distinct through their existence, and therefore their properties are distinguished also according to their existence. But in the divine supposits there is one existence. Whence neither can a property be multiplied according to existence, but only according to the specific account of a property.

Reply Obj. 2: The same thing cannot be something uniting and distinguishing in reference to the same thing. Whence common spiration distinguishes the Father from the Holy Spirit, but it unites him with the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: According to Augustine,¹ equality and inequality are viewed according to the relations of origin. Therefore the Father is not said to be more one with the Son than with the Holy Spirit merely because the Father agrees with the Son in a certain notion, but only in having more.

Reply Obj. 4: A relative property, with respect to the existence that it has, stands more closely to its supposit than to that in reference to which it is spoken. Whence if a variation according to existence were there, it would have this from the supposits. But according to the account of relation, it is spoken of in reference to another, and therefore the specific account of relation is distinguished insofar as it is referred to different things.

Reply Obj. 1: This division—either they are the one that is the Father or the one that is not the Father—is not a contradiction, so both can be false. But this is true: they are not the one that is the Father only. Rather, they are the one that is the Father and the Son, just as they are also one God, who is the Father and the Son.

Reply Obj. 2: Although they are said to be one principle of the Holy Spirit, nonetheless they are not said to be one who is spirating, or one spirator.¹ For distinctions of this sort are imposed from the acts, which always signify adjectivally, and in such one does not attend to a plurality of the form being signified in the plural consignification, but only to the plurality of the supposits, as was said earlier.²

Reply Obj. 3: It is not commonly conceded that they are the same principle, since a unity of supposit is included in the account of the articulation of “same”; this is just as even above the Master says¹ that God has not begotten himself God, nor another God. Yet some say that the Son and the Father are the same God and are the same principle, in that “same” is an adjective and does not posit an absolute identity, but only one relative to that to which it is joined. And according to this it can be conceded that they are the same principle.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as such orientations do not assert that something really is in God, but that something is in him only according to reason, so too from the fact that they are newly said of God it does not follow that something comes to be in him according to a reality, but only according to reason. This is as is said in the Psalms: Lord, you have become our refuge (Ps 90 [89]:1).¹ Nevertheless, even if one concedes he has become something, like a refuge or such, according to reason only, still in no way should one say he has changed, since “change” is imposed for a removal of what a thing moves from, whereas “coming to be” is imposed for the attainment of what the motion ends at. Now, in no way is anything removed from God, even if some orientation accrues to him according to reason; whence, even if he is said to “become” something, one should not say he “changes” into that.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Master,¹ these things are being predicated incidentally, but not that they are in God, but that they are in the created things. Yet one should understand that in such names one should consider two things: the orientations themselves, and that upon which the orientation’s account is founded in God, just as the orientation of creation has the divine power as its foundation in God, to whom it belongs to lead things into existence out of nothing. Therefore, if one considers what they have for their foundation in the divine reality, it is certain that they are being spoken of through themselves; for the divine essence, power, and activity is from eternity. However, if one considers the orientation itself, then they are said of God incidentally in this respect.

Reply Obj. 3: This cannot properly speaking be called a predication by causality, unless perhaps it is understood that such names predicate the orientation of some cause.

Reply Obj. 4: This is clear from what was said to the second objection, since they are predicated in the same way necessarily as through themselves, and in the same way contingently as incidentally. Yet it does not follow that anything in God is contingent.

Reply Obj. 1: Names of this sort belong to God from time by reason of the orientation indicated, either principally or in a consequent way: principally as when he is called “Lord,” but in a consequent way when he is called “Creator.” And this orientation is not the divine essence, nor is it some reality in God; but such names belong to God from eternity, as it were, habitually, according to his essence, in which this orientation is founded.

Reply Obj. 2: God’s essence is not our patience or hope, nor is it being signified when one says, “God is our hope”; rather, what is being signified, in reference to the divine essence, is the orientation of a cause relative to such effect in us. Whence it is similar for both sorts of names.

Reply Obj. 3: “Sent,” “incarnate,” and such indicate two orientations, namely, that of a terminus and that of a principle. The former of them, the orientation of a principle, belongs to the entire Trinity; this is why we say that the entire Trinity sends or causes the Incarnation. But the latter belongs to a certain determinate person, on account of which such names are not said of the entire Trinity.

Reply Obj. 4: God is called “man,” insofar as a supposit of the divine nature, the Son, subsists in a human nature through union. Now, this union is a certain relation really existing in the assumed creation. Indeed, when considered according to the orientation to its terminus, it is terminated at the Son’s person, wherein the union has been accomplished; but according to the orientation to its principle, it is referred to the entire Trinity, which has accomplished the union.

Reply Obj. 1: The response is clear, because our understanding is neither empty nor pointless, since it has something corresponding to it in reality, although it does not correspond according to the mode by which it is in the account. This is just as even the understanding of mathematicians is not false or pointless, even though there is no line abstracted from matter in reality, as they consider them. Whence the Philosopher says, there is no lie in abstractions.¹

Reply Obj. 2: Even if there were no intellect, it would still be in God; whence he could be both called and understood truly to be Lord, that is, by his power of controlling things subject to him. But he would not be called or understood to be Lord in act.

Reply Obj. 3: One finds three sorts of diversity of relatives. There are some of which each indicates a relation not existing in the reality, but in reason alone; for example, when being is referred to non-being, or a relation is referred to a relation, or something like this, as was said above.¹ But there are some where each indicates a real relation, like with the Father and the Son.² And there are some where the one indicates a real relation and the other indicates a relation only of reason, like with knowledge and the knowable. And the reason for this diversity is that that on which the relation is founded is sometimes found in only one, and sometimes it is found in both, just as it is clear that the relation of knowledge to the knowable is founded on the apprehension according to the spiritual existence of the thing known. Now, this spiritual existence, on which is founded the relation of knowledge, is only in the knower, not in the knowable thing, for there reality’s form exists according to its natural existence; thus, a real relation is in the knowledge, but is not in the knowable. The contrary is the case for the lover and the beloved, since the relation of love is founded on the appetite for the good, but the good is something existing not only in the soul, but also in real things. This is why the Philosopher says³ that good and evil are in realities, but the true and the false are in the soul. And therefore Avicenna says⁴ that in the lover and the beloved one can find in each relative a disposition whereby it is referred to the other, but not in the knower and the knowable; and therefore the relation is real for each, just as it is with equality, which is immediately founded on quantity, which is in each of them. And all the relations of created things to God are founded on the mode in which they receive from God—which mode is not in God, since they do not reach the perfect mode according to which God acts on them—therefore to the relations that are in the created there corresponds no relation really in God. But to the relation that the Son receives from the Father, there does correspond a certain relation in the Father. For the Father gives and the Son receives the divine nature according to one and the same mode and account.

Reply Obj. 4: This is not relevant to the proposed matter. For about each of the relatives there are found certain things that indicate a real relation, and others that indicate a relation of reason. For example, the same thing indicates a relation of reason even though it is relative according to being; knowledge too indicates a real relation, even though it is a relative according to speech.

Reply Obj. 1: On the side of unity, taken universally, insofar as it is convertible with being, “equality” predicates something in a positive way neither in God nor in what is created. This is just as neither does “unity,” as was said earlier.¹ But because in created things the supposits of equality are absolute, therefore they are referred to each other through a real intermediate relation—which is not fitting in the divine.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the equality is according to account, yet the relation of the persons has something corresponding to it in the reality, by reason of which he who denies the equality is called a heretic. And this is the same as for one who might deny God to be the Lord, even though that relation asserts no reality in God.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as in created things equality is not one quantity of many things, but rather a relation including such a unity, so too equality in the divine is not the one essence, but a relation, according to its concept, following on the unity of the essence.

Reply Obj. 4: That relation cannot really be in God, and therefore it does not follow that it asserts something merely from the fact that it is spoken of relatively.

Reply Obj. 1: From the fact that any attribute belongs to all of them it is sufficiently proved that it is not proper to one person; yet it does not follow that it is not appropriated to one person. For this preposition “to” (ad), which enters into the composition of the word,¹ denotes an approach along with a certain distance. Whence, according to Augustine,² man, who so imitates God that there is always found a distance of unlikeness, is called both the “image” and “to the image” of God; on the other hand, the Son, who imitates the Father without any unlikeness, is called the “image” and not “to the image.” On account of this, because essential attributes of this sort approach, through a likeness, to the account of properties and remain distant from them because of their community, they are rightly called “appropriated.”

Reply Obj. 2: Although all of the essential attributes are one in reality, nonetheless they differ in account, and according to their account they have a likeness—either to the origin of the persons, like “power,” which is the principle of bringing things forth, or to the determinate mode of origin, like “goodness” to the procession of love, and “wisdom” to the procession of a word. And thus such can be appropriated to diverse persons. But “essence” from its own account signifies neither origin nor anything pertaining to the mode of an origin. And therefore it is not appropriated.

Reply Obj. 3: What is appropriated can be taken in two ways: either materially, that is, that which is being appropriated—and in this way that attribute does not follow on the account of the property; or formally, that is, insofar as it is being appropriated—and in this way it includes within its own proper account the account of the property.

Reply Obj. 4: By appropriating essential attributes to determinate persons, we do not exclude the other persons, nor do we establish a gradation of participation. Rather, we merely show a likeness in the account of what is appropriated to what is proper to the person, and no error follows from this.

Reply Obj. 1: There is a single and decisive reason for appropriation—the likeness to the property, as was said in the body; but there can be many consequent advantages, one of which Augustine is touching upon. Whence it cannot be concluded from this that something should be appropriated to the Father or the Son unless the decisive reason applies.

Reply Obj. 2: In equivocals that occur by luck or chance, like “dog,”¹ no likeness is attended to. But in equivocals that are said with respect to one principle, one does attend to a certain likeness of analogy or proportion. And such is the multiplicity of this name “principle”; this is why the Philosopher also teaches² one to trace back all such to one first principle.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing in that argument is valid.

Reply Obj. 4: Beauty does not have the account of the desirable except insofar as it takes on the account of the good; for in this way even the true is desirable. But according to its own proper account it does contain clarity and the things said, which have a likeness with things proper to the Son.

Reply Obj. 5: “Use,” as was said earlier,¹ is taken in two ways: commonly, insofar as to use is to draw something into the faculty of the will; and strictly, insofar as it signifies a relation to an end. And it is being taken in the first way here, whereby it contains within itself even enjoyment; hence, here it is said that happiness or beatitude pertains to use. Nonetheless it fits the proper sense as well insofar as it has the account of order, but not an order into an end but into an effect, wherein the divine goodness is poured out in abundance by the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 1: The united and the one are different, since the united is what is made one from many. Whence “union” indicates a certain relation of several things insofar as they come together in one. But the “one” is said in an absolute way. This is why it is said that “unity,” insofar as it is used for the union of the many in one love, is attributed to the Holy Spirit. However insofar as “unity” is taken absolutely, inasmuch as it is a principle, it has a likeness with what is proper to the Father, so it is appropriated to the Father.

Reply Obj. 2: The three notions in the Father are not three realities, but three accounts that make him known. Whence the plurality of notions does not impede “unity” being appropriated to him, and especially since the account of unity has a likeness with all his notions.

Reply Obj. 3: Equality is not unity, but a relation following on unity. And therefore “equality” is appropriated to the Son, who is equal to the Father, proceeding from him, even though “unity” is not appropriated to him.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as “equality” is appropriated to the Son, so too is “likeness.” But Augustine has proposed “equality” because, within the divine, equality includes likeness, and not vice versa. For because there is no quantity in the divine except that of power, which is founded in some form, it follows that whatever belongs to quantity of power belongs to form. And thus, if they are equal, then they are like. But this does not convert, since equality takes away excess, which likeness does not; this is why two things, one of which is whiter than the other, are alike in whiteness, but not equal.

Reply Obj. 5: The bond or binding of love is proper to the Holy Spirit. But when any things come together in something one, they can be said to be “bound” in it; therefore “binding,” when said in an absolute way, does not indicate anything but a certain coming together; and in this way it is not proper to the Holy Spirit, but only appropriated to him. Yet even if it be taken insofar as it is proper, it would be no great incongruity that the assignment is not simply speaking uniform. For such names are attributed to the persons to the degree that they are appropriated, and thus they approach toward the account of the proper names. This is why the proper and the appropriated, as appropriated, do not have the account of divergence in form.

Reply Obj. 1: When he says that all are one on account of the Father, the phrase “on account of” says not only the bearing of a principle through the mode of an efficient cause, but also through the mode of a form, insofar as unity of form, that is, the divine essence, by which all are one in the divine, follows the unity of the principle.

Reply Obj. 2: Created things are not a principle of God, even though God is spoken of in relation to them, on account of the fact that created things are referred to him; for such relations are not really in God. In the same way also it does not follow that the Son is a principle of the Father, since equality does not assert a real relation in God.

Reply Obj. 3: The reply to this is clear because all are said to be equal on account of the Son not as if the Son is the principle of equality in the Father, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: “To love,” insofar as it is taken essentially, is in all ways the same as “to be,” both with respect to the reality they signify and with respect to the mode of signifying, which in the divine is to signify absolutely. Whence taking “love” in this way, in no way does the Father love by the Holy Spirit. But if “to love” be taken notionally, it is not the same as “to be” for the Father according to the mode of signifying. For “to love” is said relatively, and “to be” is said absolutely, so it does not follow that he exists by the Holy Spirit, even though he loves by the Holy Spirit; this is just as he is the Father by paternity, but does not exist by paternity. But “to be wise” in the divine is never said except in reference to the essence, and therefore in no way can one say, “the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom.”

Reply Obj. 2: As was said in the body of the article, the personal love does not stand to the Father loving as a principle of the love, but rather as a denominating act. And therefore it is not construed with the bearing of any principle, nor with the bearing of a form insofar as a form is a principle, but only insofar as the form denominates the Father as loving, as when it is said, “that man is an agent by his action.” And therefore, since the propositions expressly indicate the bearing of a cause, the following is not so proper: “the Father loves the Son through the Holy Spirit,” as is this: “the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit.”¹ Although, even the former also can be conceded, insofar as it is a principle of denomination, but not simply speaking. However, “the Father loves from the Holy Spirit,” should in no way be conceded, since it signifies a principle through the mode of an efficient cause.

Reply Obj. 3: “Love” here does not signify an essential act, but a notional one. Nevertheless, one must know that two things are understood in the notional act which is loving: the act itself, and the act’s going out from the agent. And the act itself is the person of the Holy Spirit, but the emanation of the act from the agent is properly the notion, or the notional act, which is the procession. And therefore also the person of the Holy Spirit is not signified through an act designated by a verb (like “loving”), because a verb signifies an act as going out from an agent; rather, he is signified through an act designated by a noun that signifies the act absolutely, like “love” and “dilection.” However, “loving” properly signifies the notion, since “loving” is the same as “emitting love.” Whence in the verb “loving” is indicated both the act itself, who is a person—by reason of which according to that act the Father is denominated “loving” by the love who is the person of the Holy Spirit—and it also indicates the emission of the act, by reason of which it is notional. But this verb “to spirate” signifies the very emission of the act, and therefore the Father is not said to spirate by the Holy Spirit, but by the act or property of spiration. And it is similar with generation: for since “generation” signifies the emission of the generated, one does not say, “the Father generates by the Word.” But “to speak” signifies the emission of a word, and the word emitted, so one does say, “the Father speaks by the Word.” However, “word” names what is emitted, not the emission, so “word” is personal, as is “love”; and “to love” is notional, as is “to speak.”

Reply Obj. 4: “The Father and the Son are united by the Holy Spirit” is true, insofar as the Holy Spirit is the union itself, just as he is also the love by which they are formally united, as has been said,¹ as what proceeds from them, just as some persons are united in one act. Nevertheless it should not be simply conceded that the Spirit unites the Father and Son, since “to unite” signifies through the mode of something uniting effectively, which does not befit the Holy Spirit. Yet it can be conceded if “uniting” is understood formally, as whiteness is said to make something white.

Reply Obj. 1: This is understood of the notional act. But one should be aware that, since every such act indicates the account of a principle relative to the origin of a divine person, this happens in two ways: for sometimes it designates the account of a principle relative to that wherein the notional act reaches its terminus, as when one says, “the Father generates the Son.” For “to generate” indicates the bearing of a principle that is in the one generating relative to the one generated; and in such things no reciprocity can occur, such that one might say, “the Father generates himself”; for no person is a principle of his very self. But sometimes the bearing of a principle is not indicated relative to that into which the act passes; this is evident when one says, “the Father gives the essence to the Son”; for the Father is not being signified as the principle of the gift, which is the essence, but of the one to whom it is given. It is likewise with the word “to love,” which indicates the bearing of a principle—not of the one loving toward the beloved, but rather, of the one loving toward the love indicated in the word “loves.” And therefore in such things a reciprocity can occur, and this happens because the verb “to love” indicates not only the emission of love, but the emitted love itself. Whence, if one takes separately what pertains only to origin, there will be no conversion; for one cannot say, “the Father spirates himself.”

Reply Obj. 2: If there were no generation of the Son, the Father would not love himself by the Holy Spirit. For neither would he be the Father, since the person of the Father is constituted by paternity. Nevertheless, if, assuming the impossible, it were given that the person of the Father would remain, he would be able through himself to spirate personal love. Nevertheless the Son is not excluded from this, since every perfection of the Father is also that of the Son, in which they are not opposed according to relation of origin.

Reply Obj. 3: A gratuitous love, which reaches out to another, is not a private love. Nevertheless, it does also bend back upon the lover himself. For one should love out of charity not only one’s neighbor, but one ought to love out of charity even one’s very self, with respect to both soul and body. And so too the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 4: When one says, “the Holy Spirit loves himself by the Holy Spirit,” if it is understood of essential love, it is expressly true; for just as by his very self he is God, so by his very self he is essentially loving. However, if it is understood of the notional love, then in the verb “to love” is indicated an, as it were, double act: the very act of love, which signifies the person of the Holy Spirit and the emission of love. Whence “to love,” taken notionally, is nothing other than to spirate love. For by “to spirate” is signified the emission itself, but by “love” is signified the person of the Holy Spirit. So it is also if the Father were said to generate the Son. Whence just as to generate the Son does not befit the Son, so neither does to spirate love befit the Holy Spirit. Nor due to this is there some imperfection admitted in the Holy Spirit, or in the Son, as is clear from things said earlier.¹ And therefore, according to this sense it is not conceded that the Holy Spirit loves notionally.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said in the body of the article, it can be taken in either way. For if it is taken essentially, nothing unfitting follows; for the Holy Spirit will not designate a principle of those loving, but of those being loved. Whence then the bearing of the substantive ablative will be designated in the ablative itself, as Praepositinus says.¹ However, if it is taken notionally, the nominative will be able to connote an effect in what is created in the manner of an orientation toward a terminus, as was said above.²

Reply Obj. 2: In the production of works of art one can consider a dual process: first, that of the art itself from the artist, which comes forth from his own heart; and second, the process of the works of art out from the discovered art itself. In the same way, in the process of the will there are two things to consider: namely, the love’s going out from the lover, and second, the going out of the very reality given by love from the love. Whence, with respect to the first going out, the Holy Spirit stands, in the comparison of God to what is created, as an effect—that is, what is from a principle, as does the Word. But with respect to the second going out, both—that is, the Word and the love—stand as a principle, whereas what is created stands as the effect.

Reply Obj. 3: This verb “generates” indicates only the origin of a person, and does not indicate a person through the mode of act, whereas “to love” and “to speak” indicate both. And therefore the Father is not denominated as “generator” by the Son, but by the generation, whereas he is denominated “lover” by the Love who is the Holy Spirit. But the generation by which he regenerates us is not through the divine nature, but through his will; and therefore on our side as receiving it, the Holy Spirit is the reason for such a generation more than the Son, who proceeds through the mode of nature.

Reply Obj. 1: “The wisdom of the Father” is spoken of in two ways: namely, the wisdom that is within him, which is essential wisdom—and by this formally he is wise, just as anyone is denominated “wise” by the wisdom that is in him; and that is also called the “wisdom of the Father” that proceeds from the Father—and by this he is not denominated “wise,” just as neither is a man denominated “wise” by the wisdom that he produces in another by teaching him.

Reply Obj. 2: In that argument against the heretic, Augustine is talking about the essential wisdom, without which the Father would not be wise, according to which the Apostle has appropriated it to the Son: Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24). And wisdom in an appropriated account would not exist if the Son were not to exist. This is why the Son must be coeternal with the Father, as is also the wisdom appropriated to the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: “To see something in something” is spoken of in two ways. In one way, one receives knowledge of it in that, just as the intellect receives science in sensible things, or the potential intellect in the light of the agent intellect, or the student in the spoken or written word of the teacher. But in the other way, one beholds the reality being known represented in another, as the builder sees his own art in the house that he makes, or as someone sees what he knows in a book where it has been written. Therefore, in the first way, the Father sees nothing in the Son, since he does not receive knowledge from the Son. But in the second way he does, namely, since he himself has placed the reasons for all created things in his own Word by generating him.

Reply Obj. 4: Some say that, although the Father does see what is created within the Word, still he does not see himself there; on the contrary, in himself he sees himself. Nonetheless, I do not see a reason why—just as in the aforesaid way he sees what is created within the Word, which shines forth there—he would not much more see his very self, who is most perfectly represented in the Word. And in this way too it is not unfitting that in that mode he would see himself in what is created, which is representative of the divine goodness itself by an image or vestige. Nonetheless it does not follow that the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom.

Reply Obj. 1: Wisdom insofar as it supposes the divine essence cannot be called “unbegotten” or “begotten,” but insofar as it supposes a hypostasis it can. Nevertheless it always signifies the essence, just as even the name “God” does. And this is why the name “wisdom” can have such supposition more than the name “essence,” as was said earlier.¹ And then, even though it is the same essence that is the Father and the Son, yet it is not the same hypostasis. And in this way, it does not follow that the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom, but only the Son.

Reply Obj. 2: In things that are said through themselves, there is something receiving from the thing’s essence that is the principle of what is being predicated through itself: for example, “rational” said of a man. Nor is it necessary that the supposit itself, of which something is being said through itself, is the principle of it, except as the one possessing or acting, as when a certain action is said to be of a thing through itself. In this way it is not even necessary that the very hypostasis of the Son be the principle of its very self, but only that what his essence is, or what is of his essence, be a formal principle of his being wise. And this befits the Son, since through his own essence, which he holds in common with the Father, he is wise. And therefore he is wise through himself.

Reply Obj. 3: Thereby the reply to the third objection is clear.

To the first we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that the relations themselves are not the divine essence.

Reply Obj. 1: These relations are toward-something not only according to speech, but even according to being. But one should note that “being” is said in three ways. In one way, the very “whatness” or nature of a thing is said to be, just as it is said that a definition is a statement signifying what is to be; for a definition signifies the “whatness” of a thing. In another way, the very act of the essence is said to be; for example, to live, which is the being of living things, is the act of the soul—not the second act, which is its activity, but the first act. In a third way, what signifies the truth of the composition in propositions is said to be, insofar as “is” signifies the copula; and according to this, it exists in the intellect combining and dividing things as regards its completion, but it is founded in the being of reality that is the act of the essence, as was said above about “truth.”¹

Reply Obj. 2: If any two things are the same thing, insofar as they are the same whatever the one is found in, there one finds the other as well. However, the paternity and the divine essence are the same thing in being, and therefore just as the being of the essence is in the Son, so too the being of the paternity is in the Son, since in the divine there is only one being. But the paternity has something wherein it is not united with the essence—that is, the account of paternity, which is other than the account of the essence. Whence according to that account, a reference can be in the Father that is not in the Son, but it can distinguish the Father from the Son. Whence in the argument one falls into the fallacy of the accident.

Reply Obj. 3: That response is good, but one should note that “account,” or “reason,”¹ is taken in two ways. For sometimes “account” signifies what is in the one thinking it, that is, the very act of reason, or the power that is reason. But sometimes “account” is the name of the intention, either insofar as it signifies the definition of a thing, inasmuch as the account is the definition, or insofar as an argument is called an “account,” or “reason.” Therefore I say that when it is said that the account of paternity is other than the account of essence in the divine, “account” is not being taken insofar as it is only in the one thinking it, but insofar as it is the name of the intention, and it signifies the definition of the thing. For although in the divine there can be no definition, nor genus, nor difference, nor composition, nonetheless if one understands here the thing being defined, the definition of paternity will be other than the definition of the essence.

Reply Obj. 4: Those accounts of relations that are said of God from time do not have any real existence in God in which they are founded, as do the relations of the persons. And therefore there is no likeness for both.

Reply Obj. 5: Knowledge is not divided against substance except from its genus, insofar as it is a quality. Whence it is said that this is immediate: “no quality is a substance,” whereas this is mediated: “no knowledge is a substance.” And so it is for all the other genera. But it was said above¹ that no common account of any category remains in the divine except relation. And therefore what is said to be toward-something in the divine has an account different than the account of substance, and a different mode of predicating divided against substance—whereas knowledge, goodness, and such, which are in different genera and are said of God, do not have the account of a common genus whereby they are divided against substance; rather, in place of that common account of quality or quantity, the account of substance enters in.

Reply Obj. 1: The properties are the same in reality with the persons as regards being, but the persons are not distinguished according to their being. Whence it does not follow that the multitude of persons follows the multitude of the properties. For the distinction of the persons is only according to relative opposition; whence insofar as the relative opposition in the properties can vary, a distinction in the persons follows—and if one considers it carefully, this cannot come to a number greater than three. And therefore the opposed relations are the persons, and they are two persons just as they are two relations; but the non-opposed relations that are in the same person are indeed two relations, or properties, but they are not two persons, but rather one person.

Reply Obj. 2: Relations are signified through the mode of forms or qualities in the divine. But the number of the properties or forms does not put a number simply speaking in the realities themselves; rather, the number of the supposits does. For example, Socrates is not called “threefold” on account of the fact that he has three properties; and so too the Father is not called “threefold” on account of the three notions. But God is called “threefold” on account of the three person, or three supposits.

Reply Obj. 3: What Augustine said earlier has truth in both the divine and the created, but in diverse ways. For what is said to be toward-something in created things stands under this relation as a subject to its accident, and therefore they are different. But what is said to be toward-something in the divine is the relation itself, since in God the essence and what has the essence, which is the person, and the very property distinguishing the person are not different things in reality but only according to account.

Reply Obj. 4: A property is signified through the mode of form, and distinguishing belongs to form. Therefore the properties distinguish the persons. And this is with respect to the mode of signifying, which is founded in the true account of property. Therefore it cannot be concluded from this that there is any diversity according to reality.

Reply Obj. 5: In the divine, the abstract and the concrete do not differ according to any reality, but according to account, as was said in the body. Whence the property differs from the person the way Godhead differs from God, which is only according to account.

Reply Obj. 1: This response is clear, because the one is said to be in the other due to the fact that the properties are distinct in account and the same in reality with the essence and the persons.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever a relation is present in as in a supposit is itself referred, just as whatever thing whiteness is present in as in a supposit is itself white. Now, in the divine nature or divine essence the relative property is not present as in a supposit, but rather it is there through a total real identity with it. Whence the relation cannot be predicated concretely of the essence, so that one might say that the essence is referred, but it can be predicated with a predication designating identification, so that one might say that the essence is the relation. And therefore it is not necessary that the essence be distinguished. This is just as even in created things paternity is in Socrates as in a supposit, so Socrates is called a “father,” but his humanity is not predicated, even that whereby his paternity can be said to exist—not of course according to a real identity with him, as is the case with the divine, but according to its belonging in the one supposit, which is Socrates, wherein is both humanity and paternity.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that a relation follows on a motion happens to a relation insofar as it is not eternal; whence, if some relations are eternal, they do not follow on any motion. For example, if the world be asserted to be eternal, one can designate in the heavens some body equal to another, or double or according to some other proportion, and yet these relations do not follow on any motion or change, since in the heavens there is no motion with respect to quantity. And likewise, since the relations by which the persons are distinguished are from eternity, they must not follow on any motion; rather, in place of motion they follow in some way on the communication and reception of the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Hilary,¹ there is no comparison of earthly things with divine, so none of the modes the Philosopher enumerates suffices to explicate how, in the divine, something is said to be in something, and this is especially so for the mode by which the properties are said to be in the essence. For in created things one does not find things of diverse genera coming together in an identity of reality, as relation and substance come together in the divine, by reason of which the one is said to be in the other, that is, the paternity in the essence, as in something preexisting according to the understanding. And that manner wherein the non-personal properties are in the persons holds something like the mode wherein form is in matter, that is, an incidental form in its subject. But that manner wherein the personal properties are in the persons holds something similar with the mode wherein differences are in their species, or a common nature in what is under it. However, in all these things the dissimilarity is found to be greater than the likeness.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though they are the same according to reality, still they differ according to account. And therefore something can be said of the one that is not said properly of the other.

Reply Obj. 2: Those negative adjectives do not give the understanding of any determinate mode that pertains properly to the essence or the person. Rather, they signify conditions that can follow on either of them according to their mode of signifying.

Reply Obj. 3: The personal adjectives do not fit more with the properties than with the essentials, as regards the mode of signifying through a name, even though they do fit more as regards the account of the genus. For the personal adjectives and properties signify toward-something, so for the same reason they cannot be predicated of the properties, as not essential. Yet the essential adjectives are predicated more properly of the divine essence itself than are the personal adjectives of the properties; for a property is signified as a certain account of a person, so according to its mode of signifying it is more distant from the perfection of a supposit than is the essence, which signifies the entire existence of the supposit, although it is signified in a different mode. Yet the personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence wholly, on account of the distinction that they signify, which is opposed to the mode of essence.

Reply Obj. 4: “To beget” signifies the same thing in reality as “paternity,” but they differ in mode of signifying. For “to beget” signifies as going forth from the supposit, and because “paternity” is not signified as a supposit, “to generate” cannot be predicated of it.

Reply Obj. 1–3: And thereby the response to the objections is clear.

Reply Obj. 1: To beget and similar acts are attributed to the divine person according to the two modes of signifying whereby he is distinguished from the essence: both because they signify the relations distinguishing the persons, and because they signify through the mode of an act. Now, every act belongs to a subsisting and perfect reality. Therefore they cannot be attributed to the essence from the fact that they are attributed to the hypostasis; for they are attributed to the hypostasis according to that in which it is not the same as the essence. And therefore the argument of the objection falls into the fallacy of the accident.

Reply Obj. 2: It is impossible that one affirm and deny the same thing, of the same thing, in the same respect. But if in some respect the affirmations and the denials pertaining to that distinction are distinguished, they could both be true of it. For every distinction, whether of reality or of account, is founded on an affirmation and a denial, as is clear even with synonyms: for “clothing” and “vestment” signify the same reality, yet the names are diverse; so too of “outfit.” Whence affirmations and denials that pertain to the reality cannot both be true, such that one could say, “the clothing is white, but the outfit is not white.” But affirmations and denials that pertain to the names themselves can both be true, so that one could say, “‘outfit’ is grammatically neuter, but ‘vestment’ is not neuter.”

Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking, in the divine one thing is not under another; this is why, above,¹ Augustine does not accept the name “substance” in the divine, and even Richard of Saint Victor changed the name “subsistence” into the name “existence.” Whence neither is “supposit” said here properly, insofar as a supposition is referred to a reality. But we do use such names according to our understanding, which receives in the divine something corresponding to these two in created things, one of which stands under the other, as a reality existing through itself stands under a common simple form. And our intellect receives something simply in God that corresponds to form and something subsisting that is the same in reality with that simple thing. And therefore it names the subsisting reality in the divine the “supposit of the simple nature.”

Reply Obj. 4: The common is of two sorts. For something can be common according to account, and this, by the addition of something proper, is contracted and made determinate, as a genus through the addition of a difference, and a species is individuated through matter. But something can also be common in reality, which in fact remains undivided; whence it is not necessary that it be made determinate by any addition, as is the essence in the three persons. But it is true that it is necessary for the concept of a person that there be some account, that is, of relation, that is not of the concept of the essence; yet this relation does not in reality differ from the essence itself. Whence neither does it make a composition nor does it distinguish the person from the essence in anything real; rather, it distinguishes a person from a person.

Reply Obj. 5: The three persons are united in the essence, which is wholly the same in reality with each of them. Nevertheless it differs in account from each of them, insofar as “person” includes within itself the understanding of relation. Although compared to the essence, this relation differs from it only in account, yet compared to that to which it is opposed relatively, it makes a real distinction. For relation distinguishes really only according to the opposition of reference that it has. Now, that opposition is not toward that within which the relation has its existence, but toward that to which it refers. Therefore the relation is not distinguished really from the essence and the person that it is in, but from the other person to which it refers.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the essence and the person are the same in reality, still they differ in account, since the one is signified as the form of the other. And such a diversity is enough for the grammarian, who considers the modes of signifying through the name.

Reply Obj. 2: This is not wholly a construction according to identity, but one according to the orientation of a form, as was said in the body of the article. And because “God” is not signified as the form of the three persons, one cannot say, “the three persons are of one God.” For that construction could be understood only possessively. And likewise, for the same reason one says, “there is one essence of the three persons” but not that there is “one God of three persons,” for in the name “God” is indicated the orientation of a creating and governing principle.

Reply Obj. 3: These prepositions “due to” and “from” designate the orientation of something that stands to motion or activity as the beginning and not as the terminus. And therefore they designate the orientation of an efficient or material cause, not one of form or end, which are rather as the terminus of a motion. And therefore in no way can one say, “the three persons are due to the same essence” or “from the same essence.” But one can say, “they are in the same essence,” since the preposition “in” can denote the orientation of a formal cause containing them.

Reply Obj. 4: Those constructions that are in the designation of form require two genitives, one of which signifies the form itself, and the other the determination of the form, for example, when one says, “the column is of wondrous height.” Or else it requires one genitive that has the force of two genitives, as when one says, “a man of bloods,” that is, a man who is a shedder of much blood.¹ And this is why two genitives are needed in the proposed, one of which signifies the divine essence itself, and the other designates its simplicity, or unity, or some other aspect of the essence. Whence one can fittingly say, “the three persons are of one essence,” or “of the same essence,” or “of the uncreated essence”—but not, “they are of the essence,” simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 1: “Virtue” does not name power absolutely, but the perfection of power. Whence the Philosopher says¹ that virtue is the limit of power within a reality. Therefore in this way virtue can be considered in three ways: either insofar as it is rooted in power, and then it can be appropriated to the Father, as can power; or insofar as it is that through which a power goes forth into act, and then it is appropriated to the Son, through whom the Father is said to act—whence also the Son is called the “Father’s arm”: have you an arm like God? (Job 40:9), as Gregory interprets this;² or insofar as it imposes goodness on his works—whence it is said in Ethics 2³ that virtue is what makes the one who has it good, and renders his action good. And thus it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit just as goodness is.

Reply Obj. 2: Wisdom can be paired with the word in three ways: either as the same as it, or as prior to it, or as posterior, in divine things just as it is in human things. For when “word” indicates a certain conception of the intellect, this conception among us must follow on some intellectual light, at least the light of the agent intellect and of the first principles from which a conclusion is taken. Whence if among us wisdom be considered insofar as it consists in the knowledge of the conclusion that is received by the mind, then it is the same thing as the word of the mind. But if wisdom is considered insofar as it consists in the light of the agent intellect and the knowledge of the first principles, then it precedes the word that is the conception of the conclusion. Moreover, if the wisdom is taken that is engendered in the mind of the student through the word of the teacher, then it follows after the word.

Reply Obj. 3: A nature always has the account of a principle, for it is the principle of motion and rest in that wherein it is, through itself and not incidentally, as is said in Physics 2.¹ And therefore it cannot be appropriated to the Son, who is from a principle according to the origin of nature, and not a principle in that origin. But wisdom has not only the account of a principle, but also the account of what is from a principle, and this is more so insofar as wisdom and knowledge are properly about conclusions, even though wisdom is also of the principles, as is said in Ethics 6.² And therefore it can be appropriated to the Son.

Reply Obj. 4: The good is called “diffusive” through the mode of an end, insofar as it is said that the end moves the efficient cause. However, the Father is not the principle of the divinity in this way; rather, he is more a principle through the mode of an efficient cause, as was said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two things to consider in the knowledge of intellectual things: the contemplation’s principle and its terminus. The principle is of course from sensible things, but the terminus is in intelligible things, insofar as in natural cognition we receive universal intentions from the appearances received from sensation, through the light of the agent intellect. And therefore one should say that, as regards the terminus, one must turn to the intellectual day, but as regards the principle of contemplation, one must rise up from certain sensible appearances to the divine.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two sorts of likeness. For a certain likeness is through a participation of the same form, and there is no such likeness of bodily things with divine, as the objection proves. There is also a certain likeness of proportionality, which consists in the same relation of proportion, as when one says, eight is related to four just as six is to three, and as the consul stands to the city just as the pilot stands to the ship. And according to this sort of likeness there can be a metaphorical transference from bodily things to divine, so that if God be called a “fire” because fire stands to its melting things so that they to flow forth through its heat, so too God, through his goodness, diffuses perfections into all created things, or something like this.

Reply Obj. 3: The manifestation of truth should be done according to the proportion of those receiving it. And because for some, the manifestation of truth would be harmful more than it would be beneficial, when they might fight it, due to impiety, or they might make a mistake, due to simplicity, therefore the truth about divine things should be hidden, as is said in Matthew 7:6: do not give dogs what is holy.

Reply Obj. 4: There is a certain becoming-like according to an agreement in nature, and in this way our intellect becomes more like divine things than sensible things. But this is not the becoming-like that is required for knowledge. There is also a becoming-like through being internally formed, which is what is required for knowing, just as sight becomes like a color, by the species of which the pupil becomes internally formed. Now, this forming within cannot occur in our intellect, according to the path of nature, except through species that are abstracted from sensation. For, as the Philosopher says,¹ as color stands to sight, so do phantasms stand to the intellect. And therefore it is certain that in this way the intellect is more capable of becoming like sensible things than divine.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius,¹ nothing wholly lacks a participation in the divine goodness; therefore from all realities, however base, can be drawn certain fitting likenesses for divine things.

Reply Obj. 2: There are some names of created things that name not only what is created, but even a defect connected with fault, just as the name “devil” names a nature deformed by sin. And therefore we cannot use such names metaphorically extended to signify the divine.

Reply Obj. 3: In spiritual creatures we can consider two things. We can consider the very perfections of the divine goodness, taken according to their very selves; and God is named by such—not symbolically, but properly—as when he is called “wise” and “knowing” and such; so too in the Book of Causes it is said¹ that God is named with the name of his first effect, which is “intelligence.” Or we can consider the determinate mode itself of participating in such perfections, which mode pertains to the determinate nature or order of angels. Whence names expressing this mode cannot be properly said of God—not even metaphorically, since metaphor should be drawn from things that are manifest according to sensation. And therefore in Scripture we never find God called a “cherubim” or “seraphim” or the like, whereas we do find him called a “lion” or “bear” or the like.

Reply Obj. 4: In one reality diverse properties can be considered. And therefore it is not unfitting that from the same reality, according to its diverse properties, a metaphorical extension can be made to contrary things. For example, God is called a “lion” on account of his liberality or fortitude, or the like, and the devil too is called a “lion” on account of his cruelty. It also sometimes happens, as Dionysius says in the letter to Titus,¹ that the same name is extended to signify the one participating in something, the participation itself, and the principle of the participation; for example, “fire” might name a man who has charity, the charity itself, and God who infuses that charity. And one should interpret these according to all such manners, but in diverse ways.

Reply Obj. 1: Whenever knowledge or intellect or something that pertains to perfection is negated from God, one should understand that this is according to his exceeding it, not according to his lacking it. Whence Dionysius says, in God should be ordained being without mind and senseless, according to excess, and not according to a lack.¹ Therefore the name “intellect” to that extent is denied as belonging to God properly speaking, since he does not understand according to the mode of a creature, but more eminently.

Reply Obj. 2: There are three opinions about names that are said of God in this way. For some say that “knowledge,” “life,” and such names signify in God certain dispositions added to his essence. But this cannot be, since this would place composition within God, and possibility within his essence, relative to such dispositions—which is altogether absurd.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though knowledge, a knower, and the thing known are required for the account of knowledge, still it is not required that these three differ according to reality; this is even like how it is of the account of motion that there be both a mover and a thing moved, but that the thing moved is something other than the mover cannot be known except by demonstration, before the discovery of which many thought that something can move its very self.

Reply Obj. 4: All these words whereby we say knowledge is a becoming-like, or an apprehending, or impression, and so on come from a consideration of the potential intellect, which knows only through a reception of some species, with respect to which it is in potency, and through which it becomes like the reality outside the soul. Whence, where there is an intellect only in act, none of these things is said properly, but only according to our mode of understanding.

Reply Obj. 5: The things that are said of God should always be understood by way of eminence, having taken away everything that can belong to imperfection. Whence one must take away from knowledge, insofar as it is in God, the discursive character of reason when it inquires, and retain its rectitude about the reality known. But because knowledge properly speaking is about composite things, and understanding is properly about the “whatness” of a reality, therefore God is called a “knower” insofar as he knows his own existence, and is called “intelligent” insofar as he knows his own nature—which nonetheless is not other than his existence, nor is it more simple. And therefore in God, to understand and to know are not different things, except according to account. Moreover, “wisdom” does not assert something numerically different from “knowledge” and “understanding,” since all wisdom is knowledge—but not vice versa, since wisdom is only the knowledge that considers the highest causes, whereby all the subsequent things are ordered and known. Whence God is properly called “wise” insofar as he knows his very self, and “intelligent” and “knowing” insofar as he knows both himself and other things.

Reply Obj. 1: What is objected first, that the thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, is true of the first thing understood, but not for the second thing understood. For a stone, which is outside the soul, is not the perfection of the intellect, but the likeness of the stone, which is in the soul, is.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine intellect, if it were to understand base things, could become base in three ways: in one way, if it were formed by the likeness of that base thing; second, if it could not understand the noble simultaneously with that base thing; third, if it were to understand both the baser and the nobler by different activities. But all these are remote from him; whence his activity is most perfect, wherein, being one and the same, is such that he knows through it both his very self and all other things.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument holds for every intellect that knows diverse things through diverse species; and that is remote from God, who knows other things by knowing his own essence.

Reply Obj. 4: When many things are known that are known according to a single account of a medium, whether one in genus or in species, they are traced back to one general or specific science, like metaphysics and geometry. Whence, if many things known are traced back to one medium, the number of all those things will yield not but numerically one science. And therefore God’s knowledge of all realities is numerically one, since he knows all things through one most simple medium, which is his essence.

Reply Obj. 1: The divine existence is denied to be of the same account of existence with our existence not because it falls short of the account of our existence, but because it exceeds it. However, to whatever degree a medium of knowledge is more perfect, so far in it is the reality more perfectly known. And therefore to the degree that his existence exceeds ours, so far does his knowledge about the existence of a reality, which he knows through his own existence, exceed ours, which is about the existence of a reality taken from the reality itself.

Reply Obj. 2: There can be certitude in no knowledge except through a tracing back to their first principles. But the fact that the first principle in geometry is insufficient for the certain knowledge of the things that follow on it, is because it is not their entire cause. Whence it is necessary that, with all the other causes joined together, one comes to apprehend them. But God himself is the perfect cause of all the things that are from him, since nothing can be received that is not from him. And therefore he knows all things perfectly through his own essence.

Reply Obj. 3: It is impossible for the same thing to be proper to several things that participate in it in the same way, and wholly, and perfectly. But although all realities participate in the divine goodness, yet no created reality imitates it perfectly, but one reality becomes like it in a way in which some other does not become like it. And therefore he himself is the proper likeness of each and every reality. This is clear in the example brought in before,¹ about one who has a habit sufficient for many knowable things; for that habit is one likeness of each of the three habits that are found in diverse others, even insofar as one habit is distinguished from another. For it belongs with the grammatical art that through it grammatical things are known, and so on for the others. And thus it is clear that one reality can be the proper likeness of several things that do not perfectly imitate it, just as created things do not perfectly imitate the divine goodness.

Reply Obj. 4: The cause of the being of things is not only the divine existence, but also his knowledge and will, and from the latter one best concludes to the existence of a reality. For that which God wills to exist, because he has the power, and knows the thing, by the power of his essence proceeds into existence. However, these things are known to God, and so he has certain cognition about these realities.

Reply Obj. 1: A univocal effect is produced by what acts according to form only when the receiver is proportioned to receive the entire power of the agent, or according to its same account. And so, no created thing is proportioned to receiving knowledge from God in the mode in which it is in himself, just as neither can lower bodies receive heat from the sun univocally, even though it acts through its own form.

Reply Obj. 2: God’s knowledge is not a measure coequal with our knowledge, but rather one that exceeds it. And therefore it does not follow that it is of univocally the same account with our knowledge, but rather analogically.

Reply Obj. 3: More and less does not remove univocation or unity of species, but the things that cause the more and less can make a difference of species, and thereby remove univocation. And this happens when the more and less are caused not by a diverse participation of one nature, but from a gradation of diverse natures; for example, an angel is said to be more intellectual than a man.

Reply Obj. 4: The Commentator’s argument is not sufficient through itself except insofar as it is taken in a certain matter. For the knowledge that is a cause of realities the way the divine knowledge is cannot be univocal with a knowledge caused by realities, for the reason stated.

Reply Sed Contra 5: That should be understood in reference to existence, not to the reality’s intention which is predicated in common. For “body,” even insofar as this is said there, is predicated equivocally of the corruptible and the incorruptible, yet its account is the same in each, if it be considered according to the common intention of the word.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though the divine essence is the universal cause of realities, nonetheless it does not follow that something can be added to it whereby it becomes a proper and perfect cause. Rather, through its very self it is the sufficient and perfect cause of each and every reality. And therefore the cognition that is through such a cause is not knowing universally, but in the proper nature of each reality.

Reply Obj. 2: Even though God knows the proper nature of each and every reality, nonetheless he does not know them through something received from the reality. For, as Dionysius says,¹ the divine knowledge does not admit into itself individual realities that are being known, nor is there one knowledge whereby he knows himself and another whereby he knows realities. And therefore it cannot be called “particular,” since properly speaking knowledge is particular that is received from a reality through a particular medium.

Reply Obj. 3: God does not act through an intermediate activity, but his activity is his essence. Whence just as his knowledge is always in act and not in potency, so is his activity, even though its effect does not always exist; this happens on account of the order of the disposing wisdom. And yet God is not said to have made reality from eternity, as he has known it from eternity, because “activity” is signified as going out from the agent into the thing done or made. And therefore God cannot be said to be doing anything except when something comes to be. But knowing, although it is also of external things, is still about those things insofar as they are within the knower through their likeness; this is why, according to the condition of the knower, not that of the known, God is said to have known from eternity even things that did not exist from eternity.

Reply Obj. 4: “Power” names a perfect principle of activity, and therefore we can signify an active power in God; but “habit” is only the perfection of some potency that is incomplete as regards act, but not the ultimate perfection. Whence it asserts a double imperfection: both in the potency perfected by the habit, and in the habit that is perfected by the activity. And therefore the name “habit,” properly speaking, does not befit God. And if sometimes he is called “Lord from eternity,” not in act but in habit, this is more by way of a likeness than according to proper speech.¹

Reply Obj. 1: As is clear from the things said, the form through which the divine intellect understands is neither universal, since it does not admit of additions, nor singular, since it is unmarked by matter and its dispositions. But nonetheless it is the principle and perfect likeness of the whole that is in a reality, both of matter and of form, as was said. And therefore the statement—that what is universal when understood is particular when sensed—should be referred only to our knowledge, which is in the senses through a material form, and in the intellect through a universal form. And this is why we do not know particulars except through a power in which something exists as a particular, but God knows particulars neither universally nor as particulars, on the side of the knower, but he does know them universally and as particulars on the side of the reality that is known.

Reply Obj. 2: In universal causes that are not the entire cause of the reality, the particular cannot be known perfectly. But God is the universal cause of all things such that he is the perfect cause of each and every thing. And therefore by knowing himself, he knows all things perfectly.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in God there is nothing material, but his essence is only act, nonetheless that act is the cause of all things that are in reality, both of material and formal elements. Every reality and whatever is in reality imitates this act, as much as it can. And therefore the divine essence is the likeness not only of a reality’s formal elements but even of its material ones. And therefore through it, singulars, even as such, can be known.

Reply Obj. 4: All the examples that are applied from created things to God fall short, as Dionysius says in the same place.¹ For one does not find in created things any common cause that is the cause of all that is in a reality. For example, the seal is the cause of the shape in the wax, and not of the wax itself; and therefore through a knowledge of the seal one cannot know the impressed shape as this or that one, since it has this from matter.

Reply Obj. 1: The response to this is clear, because from the fact that the Commentator asserts that he knows nothing but his own essence, it follows that he does not know evils; hence in the same place he adds that he does not know that evils exist.¹ So in the same way that he knows things other than himself, he also knows their privations—not such that privations are the first thing known, since there can be no privation within his intellect, but they are things secondarily understood by him, as is clear from things said before.²

Reply Obj. 2: God’s knowledge is in no way caused by the reality, yet neither is it the cause of all the things that it knows; rather, it is the cause only of the things of which cognition through itself is possible—that is, of good things. However, he knows evils through the good, as was said in the body.

Reply Obj. 3: An evil is not known by God through its own likeness, but through its likeness to the good. For insofar as God knows his own essence, so does he know each and every reality, to the degree that it participates in his own goodness, and in what respect it falls short. And thus, he knows evil, since the account of evil consists in falling away.

Reply Obj. 4: To know through something else a thing that is naturally apt to be known through itself belongs to imperfect knowledge. But evil through itself neither has a cause nor does it hold the will or knowledge, but it does through the good, as Dionysius says.¹ And therefore this is perfect knowledge of evil: that it be known through the good.

Reply Obj. 1: Within God nothing is diverse from him, so even created things, insofar as they are in God, are not something other than God. For created things in God are the causal essence, as Anselm says, for they are in God through their likeness. However, the divine essence itself is the likeness of all things that are from God.

Reply Obj. 2: A created thing’s existence can be considered in four ways: in the first way, insofar as it exists in its own proper nature; in the second way, insofar as it exists in our knowledge; in the third way, insofar as it exists in God; in the fourth way, commonly, insofar as it abstracts from all of these.

Reply Obj. 3: A reality’s likeness in the soul is considered in two ways: either insofar as it is the likeness of a reality—and thus, nothing is attributed to it except what is found in the reality; or according to the existence that it has in the soul—and thus intelligibility and universality are attributed to it. This is also clear in a bodily image, to which being made of stone belongs, on the side of that in which the image exists, but not on the side of that of which it is a likeness. Likewise I say that it belongs to the likeness of the realities that is in God to be life and light, but not insofar as it is the likeness of a reality, but insofar as it is in God. It is called “life” insofar as it is the principle of activity as regards the existence of the realities, just as the Philosopher also says¹ that the motion of the heavens is like a certain life for all things existing by nature. But insofar as it is the principle of the cognition of the realities, it is called “light.”

Reply Obj. 4: To be and to live and to move are not attributed to the realities existing in God according to the existence that they have in him, but rather according to the existence that they have from God in their very selves, such that “to be” would pertain to essence, “to live” to power, and “to move” to activity—or “to live” to the soul, “to move” to the body, and “to be” to both. And in this way, realities existing in their own proper nature are said to be in God, insofar as their existence is contained by God; and likewise for the others, motion and life.

Reply Obj. 5: A reality’s likeness in God is not received from the reality; rather, it is the reality’s cause. Whence whatever exists in him through its likeness exists in him as in active and conservative principle. Now, the action and conservation of realities by God is completed through his will and goodness. For among the three, that is, knowledge, power, and will, the will is closest to the activity. And therefore “in him” is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through the mode of the will, and to whom goodness is appropriated; for the preposition “in” indicates the relation to what contains and conserves. But “through him” is appropriated to the Son because “through” denotes a formal cause, and art, through which an artist acts, as through a form, is appropriated to the Son. However, “from him,” on account of the relation of a principle that the preposition “from” implies, is appropriated to the Father, who is the principle without a principle.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Commentator says,¹ Plato and other ancient philosophers, as though coerced by the truth itself, stretched toward what Aristotle later said explicitly, even though they did not thoroughly reach it. And therefore Plato, asserting that there are ideas, stretched toward what Aristotle also asserted, namely, that they exist in the divine intellect. Whence the Philosopher does not intend to disprove this, but rather the mode in which Plato asserted natural forms exist through themselves without matter.

Reply Obj. 2: If God were to need to look to some exemplar outside himself, he would be an imperfect agent. But this does not happen if his own essence be asserted to be the exemplar of all realities. For by thus looking upon his own essence, he produces all things.