Obj. 1: For temptation is for the sake of gaining experience of something unknown. But God is ignorant of nothing. Therefore, it does not belong to him to tempt.

Obj. 2: Again, it seems that neither does it belong to a demon to tempt. For the intention of a demon is to deceive. But it does not belong to a tempter precisely as a tempter to deceive, but rather to test. Therefore, to tempt is not properly the office of a demon.

Obj. 3: Again, it seems that neither does it befit the flesh. For flesh cannot have a share in knowledge. But to test or tempt does not pertain to something that does not know. Therefore, no one is properly tempted to sin by the flesh.

Obj. 4: Again, it seems that it neither befits the world. For no one tempts someone whom he regards as lowly, since temptation is applied in doubtful matters. But the world regards the saints as lowly. Therefore, the world does not tempt them.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is said: for fear that somehow the tempter had tempted you (1 Thess 3:5), referring to the devil, whose office it is to tempt. Therefore, it seems that neither the world, nor the flesh, nor God tempts.

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that temptation from the enemy is also a sin.

Obj. 1: For a lesser power cannot repel the intention of a greater power. But the power of a demon is greater than the power of a man, as is said: there is no power upon earth that can be compared with him (Job 41:33).¹ Therefore, since the intention of a demon is to lead men to sin, it seems that man always sins when he is tempted by a demon.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, since violence excuses from sin, where there is greater violence, there is less sin. But, as it says in the text,¹ temptation from the flesh is graver than that from the enemy. Therefore, since temptation from the flesh is a sin, as it says in the text, all the more will that which is from the enemy be a sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what cannot be avoided is not our sin. But as long as we live in this mortal life, we cannot altogether avoid temptation of the flesh. Therefore, it is not in our power, yet it is still a sin. Therefore, temptation from the enemy, even though it is not in our power, will be a sin, since it tends to the same illicit object.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the devil can only tempt by making an impression on man. But since he is the father of iniquity and of lies: he is a liar and the father of lies (John 8:44), an impression from him can only be a sin. Therefore, it seems that whenever he tempts, he imprints a sin on man.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the motion of the concupiscible power tending to the illicit is the temptation of the flesh, which is called a “sin” in the text.¹ But the concupiscible power, since it is attached to a bodily organ, can be compelled and changed through changing the organ. Therefore, it seems that by tempting us a demon can make us sin. Thus, temptation that is only from the enemy will be a sin.

Furthermore, as Augustine says: no one sins in what he cannot avoid.¹ But man can in no way avoid being tempted by the enemy. Therefore, temptation from the enemy is not a sin.

To the third we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that temptation should be desired.

Obj. 1: First, this is through the fact that it is said: count it all joy, my brethren, when you meet various trials (Jas 1:2). But that which we should rejoice over when we have it is what we should desire when we do not have it. Therefore, temptation should be desired.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that in which someone’s good is made manifest should be desired. But the virtue of the mind is shown forth in temptations and in a certain way flourishes in them. Therefore, temptation should be desired.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is the matter and organ of virtue is to be desired. But, as Augustine says, temptation that is not consented to is matter for exercising virtue.¹ Therefore, it should be desired.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that without which we cannot arrive at the kingdom should be desired with the greatest zeal. But temptation is such a thing. For only one who has legitimately competed will be crowned (2 Tim 2:5). But there is no spiritual combat without temptation. Therefore, temptation should be desired.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as it is written (2 Cor 12:7–8), Paul prayed for the thorn in his flesh, whereby we understand the temptation of the flesh, to be removed. But on that passage a Gloss says that in so praying he did not know what he was praying for.¹ Therefore, it seems that we should not desire to be outside temptation.

Furthermore, just as our will should be conformed to the divine will, so also should it be out of harmony with the enemy’s will. But the enemy wills and seeks to tempt us, as is related: behold Satan demanded to have you, that he might sift you like wheat (Luke 22:31). Therefore, we should not will temptation.

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the stages of temptation were not as they are described in the text.¹

Obj. 1: For envy is with respect to a superior. Hence it is said: envy slays the little one (Job 5:2).¹ But Adam was not superior to the demon, at least in the demon’s own estimation, since he was exceedingly prideful. Therefore, there is no motive to temptation due to envy.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the first state the soul had command altogether over the body. Therefore, the differences on the part of the body in no way overflowed into the soul. But woman differed from man in disposition of body. Hence the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 10¹ says that male and female differ by material differences. Therefore, there was at that time no necessity that the woman be less wise or strong than the man. Thus, there seems to be no reason why the devil would have proceeded in tempting the man through the woman.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, temptation is a resemblance to the good in order to deceive, as Cassiodorus says in On the Psalms.¹ Therefore, if that iniquitous persuader arranged to tempt man, he should have assumed the form of a good persuader, namely, an angel.

Obj. 4: One might say that he was not permitted to do so lest man be deceived, violently as it were.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, actually considering the precept withdraws one from sin, and in this way impedes the effect of temptation. Therefore, if the tempter came for the purpose of leading into sin, it seems unfitting that he quoted the precept to the woman, recalling it to her memory.

Furthermore, as Augustine says, the order of internal temptation that now exists in us represents the order of temptation found in our first parents. But in us temptation begins from sensuality and is led to higher reason through lower reason. Therefore, since sensuality represents the serpent, lower reason the woman, and higher reason the man, it seems that such an order of temptation in the first sin was most appropriate, so that in it a likeness of the sins to follow might be shown.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that the sin of Adam was graver than all other sins.

Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says in the City of God: one who has great ease in not sinning has great iniquity in sinning.¹ But Adam was more easily able to avoid sin than anyone who followed him. Therefore, he sinned more gravely.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says that something is evil due to the fact that it takes away from the good.¹ But the sin of the first man took away more from the good than any subsequent sins have, by corrupting the whole of human nature. Therefore, it was worse than the rest.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a greater fault is due a greater punishment. But Adam’s sin was punished most severely by God, since the punishment extends to all his descendants. Therefore, it was graver than the rest.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that it was even unforgivable. For the good of grace exceeds the good of nature. Now, the angels fell through sin from a state of natural endowments alone, according to the opinion of those who say that they were only created in a state of natural endowments, whereas man fell even from the state of grace. Therefore, since the higher the level the graver the fall, it seems that Adam’s sin was even more unforgivable than that of the demons.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, good is more potent than evil. But Adam corrupted the whole of human nature through sin, since it was in him as its origin. Therefore, if he could have repented and in this way obtained a remedy for his sin, it seems that he could have reintegrated the whole of human nature. But this is false, since only the Son of God could do this. Therefore, the same follows as before.

Furthermore, a sin out of certain malice is more grave than a sin through ignorance. But man’s first sin was in a certain way through ignorance, as will be clear below.¹ Therefore, it seems that there are many other sins graver than it, which are carried out due to a definite malice.

To the third we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that in the first state Adam could have sinned venially.

Obj. 1: For disposition precedes perfection. But a venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Therefore, it seems that he sinned venially prior to sinning mortally.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, free decision stands in relation to opposites, especially if it is not confirmed. But in the first state man’s free decision was not confirmed. Therefore, just as he was able not to sin venially, so also he was able to sin venially.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever can do what is greater can do what is less. But it is greater to sin mortally than to sin venially. Therefore, since he was able to sin mortally, he could also sin venially.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, mortal sin is more opposed to uprightness and grace than venial sin. But the uprightness of innocence did not impede his being able to sin mortally. Therefore, all the less did it impede his ability to sin venially as well.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is impossible for one to believe or esteem something of whose contrary he is certain. But Adam, as Augustine says,¹ believed that the sin he would commit was venial. Therefore, he himself did not know that he was unable to sin venially. But if he had been unable, he would have known that he was unable. For this belonged to his nobility, and it is incongruous for us to possess the most noble habits and they would be hidden to us, as the Philosopher says in the Posterior Analytics 2.² Therefore, Adam was able to sin venially.

Obj. 6: It might be said that he was not able to sin venially because the lower powers would not have been able to be turned away if higher reason had not first been turned away.

Furthermore, a small motive does not move great virtue. But venial sin has a small motive, one in which the appetite does not rest as in an end. Therefore, since human virtue in the first state was quite strong, it seems that it could not have been moved through venial sin.

To the first we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that pride was not man’s first sin.

Obj. 1: For to disbelieve the words of God is the sin of infidelity. But man’s sin seems to have proceeded from the fact that he disbelieved God’s words or was doubtful of them, as has been said above.¹ Therefore, man’s first sin was infidelity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the spiritual edifice, the first foundation is faith (Heb 11:10). But what is opposed to faith is infidelity. Therefore, too, in the process of man’s perdition the first sin was infidelity, not pride.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is said: by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners (Rom 5:19), speaking there of the first sin of man. For through sin death entered into the world. Therefore, the first sin is disobedience.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the species of sin is determined by the motive for sinning. But the woman was moved to sin by delight with respect to taste. Hence it is said: the woman saw that the tree was good for food, etc. (Gen 3:6). Therefore, since gluttony concerns what is delightful with regard to eating, it seems that man’s first sin was gluttony.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it was the demon’s promise that incited the woman to sin. But the demon promised the perfection of knowledge. Therefore, she sinned out of a desire for knowledge. But the immoderate desire to know is curiosity. Therefore, the first sin is curiosity.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever does not do what he is bound to do sins by a sin of omission. But in temptation man was bound to give consideration to the precept enjoined on him, since if he had given due consideration to it, he would not have sinned. Therefore, it seems that he first sinned by a sin of omission.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, man’s first sin was the root and origin of the sins that followed. But, as it is said: cupidity is the root of all evils (1 Tim 6:10).¹ Therefore, it seems that the first sin was cupidity, not pride or self-exaltation, as it says in the text.²

Furthermore, by tempting man, the devil tried to make him into an imitator of himself. But the demon sinned through pride, as has been said above.¹ Therefore, so did man.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that man’s sin was not that he desired to be just like² God.

Obj. 1: For a prudent person cannot have a complete will for what is impossible, especially what does not fall within apprehension. But it is impossible for a created thing to be just like God, and this cannot even be grasped by the intellect. Therefore, since he had prudence and the rest of the virtues, he did not desire in this way, as the Master says below.

Obj. 2: One might say that he did not desire to be just like God by way of equality, but instead by way of likeness.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is obvious that God does not know evil through experience. But the knowledge of good and evil is understood to mean evil by experience, which was previously through knowledge alone. Therefore, it seems that from the fact that he desired knowledge of good and evil, he did not aspire to likeness to God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10¹ that we should draw ourselves up into the things of God as much as we are able. For he does not begrudge us what is divine, as a certain poet lied. Now, Dionysius² and Augustine³ say that one approaches God not in place but in likeness. Therefore, since we should approach him—as it is said, come to him and be enlightened (Ps 34:5 [33:6])—⁴it seems that he did not sin in desiring likeness to God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one sins in desiring what he naturally desires. But all men, as the Philosopher says, by nature desire to know.¹ Therefore, since he desired the divine likeness only in knowledge, as the serpent’s words show, it seems that in desiring likeness to God he did not sin.

To the third we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that the woman did not sin more gravely than the man.

Obj. 1: For both sinned by the vice of self-exaltation. But that self-exaltation was only in this, that they perversely desired likeness to God. Therefore, it seems that both desired the same thing and sinned equally.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, weakness excuses from sin. But the woman was weaker than the man, for which reason the devil, as was said above, first approached her. Therefore, it seems that she sinned less.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the reason why the demon’s sin is judged graver than man’s sin is that it had more eminent knowledge about God. But the man was more endowed with a spiritual mind than the woman, as it says in the text. Therefore, it seems that he sinned more gravely.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the governance of the woman pertained to the man. Hence it is also said above that the precept was given to the woman through the man. Therefore, it seems that even the woman’s sin should be imputed to the man and reckoned graver.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, to sin with regard to the divine mercy seems to be the sin of presumption, which is a species of sin against the Holy Spirit, which is most grave. Therefore, since the man sinned by thinking of God’s mercy, as it says in the text,¹ it seems that he sinned more gravely than the woman.

Furthermore, the citations in the text make the same point.¹

To the first we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that ignorance is not a sin.

Obj. 1: For every sin, as Augustine says, is within the will.¹ But ignorance is in the intellect. Therefore, it is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sin is either original or actual. But ignorance is not original sin, but rather concupiscence is, as will be said below. Neither is it actual sin, since it is not a word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God. Therefore, ignorance is no sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every sin consists in the defect of an act, not in the defect of a habit. Otherwise someone would sin while sleeping. But ignorance is more opposed to habit than to act. Therefore, the same follows as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one who is ignorant remains continuously in his ignorance. Therefore, if it were a sin for him to be ignorant, it seems that he would be continuously sinning. For there is no apparent reason why it is more a sin now than before. But this seems to be a serious charge. Therefore, it seems that ignorance is not a sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says that every sin is voluntary.¹ But ignorance is not something voluntary, since knowledge is naturally desired by all, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, it is not a sin.

Furthermore, it is said: therefore, my people go into exile for want of knowledge (Isa 5:13). But punishment is only due to fault. Therefore, to lack knowledge is a fault.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that ignorance does not excuse sin.

Obj. 1: This is, first, through the fact that Ambrose’s Gloss on Romans 2 says: if he is ignorant he sins most gravely.¹ But what aggravates a sin does not excuse it. Therefore, ignorance does not excuse sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one who kills a man through drunkenness obviously sins through ignorance. But, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 3,¹ such a person deserves double the curses. Therefore, ignorance does not excuse sin, but rather aggravates it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a sin added to a sin does not excuse it, but aggravates it. But ignorance is a sin, as was said above. Therefore, it does not excuse sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what follows on every sin cannot excuse or alleviate sin. For in this case it would excuse every single sin. But ignorance follows on every sin, since every wicked person is ignorant, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 3.¹ Therefore, the same follows as before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as Bede says,¹ there are four penalties we suffer from the sin of the first man: ignorance, weakness, concupiscence, and malice. But malice does not excuse sin, but rather aggravates it, as does concupiscence. Therefore, it seems that neither ignorance nor weakness excuse sin.

Furthermore, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine.¹ Therefore, what takes away or diminishes the account of the voluntary excuses or alleviates sin. But ignorance is such a thing, since ignorance causes involuntariness, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3.² Therefore, ignorance either excuses or alleviates sin.

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that a natural inability to sin could have been conferred on a created nature.

Obj. 1: This is first because of what Augustine says in the text,¹ namely, that the nature that cannot sin is that of the holy angels, while the nature that can sin is that of men. Nor can it be said that this belongs to the angelic nature through grace, since in this respect they would not differ from man, to whom this also belongs through grace. Therefore, it seems that the angels possess the property of not being able to sin through the constitution of their nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, spiritual nature is more noble than bodily nature. But there is a bodily nature in which sin or error can in no way occur, even according to the constitution of its nature, namely, the heavenly nature. Therefore, all the more is there a spiritual nature in which sin can in no way occur according to the condition of its nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Damascene says,¹ from the fact that a created thing is made from nothing, two kinds of variability follow in different things. One is with respect to being, as in the case of things that are corrupted. The other is with respect to choice, as in the case of those that sin. But being invariable as regards being is conferred on some natures, as in the case of spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore, the property of being invariable as regards choice can be conferred on some nature according to its natural condition.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is obvious that the divine naturally has the property of being unable to sin. Therefore, since he is supremely good and supremely powerful, it seems that he has conferred or could have conferred his likeness on a creature in such a way that by its nature it would not be able to sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is obvious that the inability to sin is conferred on a creature through grace. But God could have made it so that the habit of grace that creates confirmation in the good would be an essential part of some nature or even something more perfect than this habit. Therefore, it seems that if there were such a nature, then according to its natural principle it would possess confirmation in the good. Therefore, it seems that he could have conferred the inability to sin on a creature.

Furthermore, confirmation in the good seems to follow from perfect adherence to the end. But the end to which uprightness of the will is ordered exceeds the power, intellect, and desire of anything created. Therefore, it seems impossible for there to be a creature that naturally has the property of being unable to sin.

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that God should not have permitted man to sin or to be tempted.

Obj. 1: For it is characteristic of a wise artisan to make each thing, to whatever extent he is able, adequate for its end. But man was made for beatitude as for an end. Therefore, since he would have been made more adequate for beatitude without sin, it seems that God should not have permitted him to fall into sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to those to whom the same end is given, the same faculty to arrive at the end should be given. But man and the angels were created for a single end, namely, to participate in beatitude, as has been said.¹ Therefore, since God made an angelic nature that could not sin, as it says in the text, it seems that he should have made such a human nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it pertains to the providence of one who is wise that he remove impediments to his work. Therefore, because man was impeded from his uprightness through the demon’s temptation, and divine providence oversees all created things, especially rational ones, it seems that he should not have permitted man to be tempted.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the more efficient something becomes, the more sure and good it is. Hence between two points a straight line is the shortest of all. But for man not to have sinned was a more efficient way to arrive at beatitude than for man after sin to be transferred from sin to beatitude. Therefore, it seems that God should not have permitted man to sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a lesser evil should be permitted in place of a greater evil. But the lessening of some praise is less evil than sin itself, since it is opposed to a lesser good. Therefore, it seems that the reason for the divine permission that is assigned in the text¹ was insufficient, namely, that it is more glorious not to consent than not to be able to be tempted.

Furthermore, every good is more powerful in its goodness than evil in its malice. Therefore, it is not fitting that an evil should be impeded in such a way that a good is thereby taken away. But if God did not permit man to sin, free decision would be taken away, since it undergoes no compulsion. Therefore, man was fittingly permitted to sin.

To the first we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that Adam saw God in his essence.

Obj. 1: For the vision of God in his essence is called the “immediate vision of God.” But Adam in his first state saw God without a medium, as the Master says.¹ Therefore, it seems that he saw God in his essence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says that between our mind and God there is no medium according to the nature of mind.¹ But every medium of knowing is a medium between the knower and the known. Therefore, it seems that since man existed in the integrity of his nature in the first state, he saw God immediately and in his essence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Apostle says: for now we see through a glass in an enigma, but then face to face (1 Cor 13:12). But in his first state Adam did not see in an enigma, since there was no obscurity in him. Therefore, it seems that at that time he saw face to face.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever does not have what he desires is afflicted. But there was not any affliction in the first state, since punishment could not precede fault. Therefore, since man naturally desired the vision of the divine essence, it seems that he saw God in his essence.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is naturally ordered to something only lacks it by being impeded by something, as a stone is naturally ordered to go down. But man’s intellect was naturally ordered to see God in his essence. Therefore, since there was no impediment there because there was neither fault nor punishment, it seems that he saw God in his essence.

Furthermore, as Augustine says, the vision of the Godhead in its essence is the whole reward.¹ But it is obvious that man in the state of innocence did not possess the reward of beatitude. Therefore, he also did not see God in his essence.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that Adam did not have perfect knowledge of things from creation.

Obj. 1: For, according to Anselm,¹ Adam would have generated children such as he himself was in the first state. But it was said above that children would not have been born perfect in knowledge, according to one opinion, to which the Master seemed to assent.² Therefore, neither would Adam have been made perfect in knowledge.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says¹ that Adam was placed in paradise to work in order that he might experience the natures of things. But experience is the principle of receiving knowledge from sensible things and by discovery. Therefore, it seems that he would not have had perfect knowledge of things from the very beginning.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 3,¹ before it understands, the intellect is not actually any of the things that exist. But it cannot understand without a phantasm, as is said in the same place, just as sight cannot see without color. Therefore, since it is not any of the things that exist except as actually perfected and possessing the species of a thing existing in nature, it seems that he would have received knowledge from sensible things by the mediation of the senses and imagination. And so, he would not have been immediately perfect in knowledge.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher,¹ and as the Master also said above,² the soul was infused into the body so that in it the soul might be perfected in knowledge and virtues. This is the purpose for which the senses and members were given to it. But this would be in vain if the intellect did not acquire perfection through the activity of the senses. Therefore, because nothing is vain in the works of nature, especially in the composition of the human body, it seems that man would have received knowledge of things from sensible things as he does now and would not have immediately had perfect knowledge.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, one who is perfect in knowledge has no need to be perfected by another who illuminates him. But in his first state Adam would also have been illuminated through the angels. Otherwise the natural order of created things, in accord with which the angelic nature is placed between the divine and the human, receiving from one and pouring down into the other, as Dionysius says,¹ would be lost. Therefore, he would not have been perfect in knowledge.

Furthermore, the more noble something is, the less becoming it is for there to be a defect in it. But in Adam’s body there was no imperfection in the state of innocence. Therefore, much less was there imperfection in his intellect.

To the third we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that man in the first state could be deceived.

Obj. 1: For, as the Apostle says (1 Tim 2:14), the woman was seduced. But Adam, though he was not seduced in the same way as the woman, was in a way seduced, in that he believed that what was deadly would be venial, as was said in the preceding distinction. Therefore, in the state of innocence he was able to be deceived.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Master said above¹ that the woman was not frightened by the serpent because she knew that it was created by God and believed that it had also received the power of speech from him. But this was false, since speaking only belongs properly to one who is intelligent. Therefore, it seems that she was able to be deceived.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is obvious that Adam in the first state could not have known the secrets of another man’s heart, since not even the angels know this, but rather God alone. But it could have happened that someone would say that he thought what he did not think, and Adam would not have believed that he was lying, since he would not have known this with certainty. Therefore, it seems that he would have been deceived.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the senses sometimes declare something in a way other than it is, as when something appears smaller when seen from farther away. But he would have had knowledge from sensible things through the senses. Therefore, it seems that in that case he could have been deceived in a certain way, since to be deceived is nothing other than to think what is false is true.

Furthermore, there is no deception without ignorance. But ignorance, as Hugh of Saint Victor says,¹ is both a fault and a punishment. But this could not have existed in the first state. Therefore, neither was there any deception.

To the first we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that free decision is a habit.

Obj. 1: This is first through the fact that Bernard says that free decision is a habit of the spirit with freedom over itself.¹ Thus, it seems to be a habit and not a power.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a power does not become easy to actualize except from a habit. But in the text¹ it says that free decision is a faculty of the will and reason. Therefore, since “faculty” names a certain aptitude, it seems that free decision is a habit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as is said below, philosophers define free decision as free judgment of the will. But judgment names not a power, but rather a habit. Therefore, it seems that it is not a power.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine says¹ that man, by making bad use of his free decision, lost both it and himself. But no natural power is taken away through sin. Therefore, free decision is not a power, but a habit.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no power admits of greater or lesser degree. But free decision can be intensified and lessened. Hence, it was said above¹ that the good angels have more freedom of decision after their confirmation than they have before. Therefore, free decision is not a power, but a habit.

Furthermore, a habit cannot be the subject of another habit. But free decision is the subject of grace, which is compared to it as rider to horse, as Augustine says.¹ Therefore, free decision is not a habit.

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that free decision indicates not a single power, but more than one.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says: when we speak of free decision, we speak not of a particular part, but rather of the whole soul.¹ But the totality of the soul consists in a plurality of powers. Therefore, free decision combines more than one power.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, reason and will are different powers. But free decision is a faculty of will and reason, as it says in the text. Therefore, it combines in itself more than one power.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, powers are distinguished on the basis of acts, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2.¹ But free decision extends to the acts of more than one power. For, as Damascene says,² free decision seeks, disposes, and so forth. Therefore, it seems that it combines more than one power.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, choice is nothing other than to prefer one of two proposed objects to the other. But this belongs to any given power, since any power desires what befits it and resists what is harmful to it. Therefore, choosing belongs to any power. But in the text,¹ choosing is assigned as the proper act of free decision. Therefore, it seems that free decision is not a determinate power.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, virtue and vice can only exist in free decision. But they are found in all the powers of the soul: temperance in the concupiscible part, fortitude in the irascible part, and the opposed vices. Therefore, it seems that “free decision” does not name a determinate power, but instead several.

Furthermore, nothing that is one simply in a nature consists of more than one element, unless it or one of the other elements is transmuted from the nature of the thing. Therefore, if free decision is produced out of more than one power, either it will not be one single thing, or this thing will be one with the corruption of certain of the soul’s powers. Both of these are unfitting. Therefore, free decision does not combine different powers.

To the third we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that free decision is a power distinct from will and reason.

Obj. 1: For the act of any given power is named after that power, as willing is named after the will and intellection after the intellect. But choosing is named after neither will nor reason. Therefore, since there is an act of free decision, it seems that free decision is a power distinguished from both.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, free decision implies judgment and freedom. But both of these at the same time is not befitting to the will, to which judging does not belong; nor to reason, which is compelled by the violence of argument. Therefore, free decision is a power distinguished from both.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3,¹ the will is for the end, whereas choice is not of the end, but of what is directed toward the end. Therefore, since choosing belongs to free decision, free decision is a different power than the will.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says,¹ the end stands in practical matters as the principle stands in speculative matters. But principles and conclusions do not pertain to the same power in speculative matters, since understanding pertains to principles and science to conclusions. Therefore, neither in practical matters do the end and what is directed toward the end pertain to the same power. Thus, the will, whose object is the end, and free decision, which chooses what is directed toward the end, are not a single power.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the power that has judgment of the acts of other powers is distinguished from them, as the common sense is from particular senses. But free decision has judgment of the acts of all powers, as even the name indicates, being imposed from “judging,” as well as over the act of the will itself, since philosophers define free decision as free judgment of the will. Therefore, it seems that free decision is a power distinguished from the will and from the other powers.

Furthermore, the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 11¹ that separated substances are divided only into will and intellect. But it is obvious that there is free decision in separated substances, as in God and the angels. Therefore, free decision is not a separate power from will and reason or intellect.

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that Adam in the first state could not have avoided sin through free decision.

Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says in On True Innocence, even if human nature had remained in that integrity in which it was created, it would in no way have preserved itself without the help of the Creator.¹ But it was by God’s preservation that Adam was able to remain without sin. Therefore, it seems that he could not avoid sin through free decision.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, free decision, as it says in the text, is that by which evil is chosen when grace ceases. But Adam in the first state did not have grace. Otherwise, he could have progressed to the merit of life. Therefore, it seems that he would have to have chosen evil.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a crown is due to one who overcomes. But to resist temptation is to overcome temptation. Therefore, if he could have resisted temptation through free decision, it seems that he could have merited a crown through free decision, which is false and is denied in the text.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to avoid sin is a praiseworthy work. But a praiseworthy work leads to the merit of life, since a praiseworthy work is an act of virtue. Therefore, if he could have avoided sin by himself, he could also have progressed to the merit of life, which is denied in the text.

Furthermore, in natural things a specific form is given to the thing generated together with the power of preserving itself in specific being. But the works of God are more perfect than the works of nature. Therefore, since he gave man uprightness of will, it seems that he gave him the power to preserve himself in that uprightness. But he could only do this by avoiding sin. Therefore, it seems that he could have avoided sin through free decision.

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that sensuality is unfittingly defined in the text.¹

Obj. 1: For sensuality differs from reason, as it says in the text.¹ But the lower portion of reason is a kind of power from which the appetite for things pertaining to the body proceeds. For it is intent on the administration of temporal things, as it says in the text.² Therefore, sensuality is unfittingly described through these.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as it says in the text,¹ whatever we have in common with the beasts pertains to sensuality. But sensitive apprehensive powers are common to us and dumb animals. Therefore, they pertain to sensuality. But appetite and motion do not proceed from apprehensive powers. Therefore, sensuality is unfittingly described through these.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in Sophistical Refutations 2,¹ the account of a reality and of the one reality is the same. But sensuality is not one power of the soul. For if it combines apprehensive and appetitive powers, it is obvious that it is more than one. The same is true even if it combines appetitive powers only, since the sensible appetite, which is common to us and dumb animals, is divided into two, namely, into desire and spirit, as it says in On the Soul 3,² or into the irascible and concupiscible, which is the same thing. Therefore, it seems unfitting for the text to say that sensuality is a certain power of the soul.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a single power has a single act. But he attributes two acts to sensuality, that is, appetite and motion. Therefore, he unfittingly describes it as a kind of single power.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if sensuality is a single power, it can only be a sensible appetite. But an appetite does not come from an appetite. Therefore, it seems that he unfittingly says that sensuality is that which gives rise to the appetite for things pertaining to the body.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that higher and lower reason are not a single power but instead different powers.

Obj. 1: For in the parts of the soul, “higher” and “lower” in the soul are not taken with reference to location, but with reference to dignity. But among the parts of the intellective soul we find that one part has greater dignity than another. For the agent intellect is more noble than the potential, as it says in On the Soul 3,¹ and these are different powers, as was said above. Therefore, it seems that what is higher in reason and what is lower are different powers.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “eternal” and “necessary” seem to be the same, as do “contingent” and “temporal.” But the Philosopher says¹ that the scientific part of the soul concerns necessary things, whereas the reasoning part concerns contingent things worked by us. Therefore, it seems that the scientific is the same as the higher reason, which perceives eternal things, and the reasoning is the same as the lower reason, which adheres to temporal things, as it says in the text.² But the reasoning and the scientific, as it says in the same place, are different powers. Therefore, it seems that higher and lower reason are also different powers.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the image of deity is in the higher part of the soul, as was said in Book I.¹ But the higher part of the soul is the higher part of reason. Therefore, the image is in the higher reason. But the image combines three powers: memory, intelligence, and will. Therefore, higher and lower reason indicate not one particular power, but several.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, ruling and ruled, commanding and commanded, cannot be the same thing, as neither can agent and patient. But higher reason is related to lower as ruling to ruled. Therefore, they cannot be a single power.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, powers are distinguished on the basis of acts. But the office names the act, as Cicero says.¹ Therefore, it seems that since higher and lower reason are distinguished as two on the basis of different offices, they are different powers.

Furthermore, a power is not differentiated through different habits. But reason is called “higher” as perfected by the gift of wisdom, and “lower” as perfected by the gift of knowledge, as it says in the text.¹ Therefore, it seems that higher and lower reason are not different powers.

To the third we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that synderesis² is a power, not a habit.

Obj. 1: For things that fall in the same classification seem to have a single account. But synderesis is classified alongside other powers of the soul, namely, alongside the rational, concupiscible, and irascible, as is clear from Jerome’s gloss on Ezekiel 1.¹ Therefore, it seems that it is a power.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, on the passage: keep your spirit (Mal 2:16),¹ Jerome says that spirit refers, not to the animal part, which does not perceive the things of God, but to the rational part.² This is what he calls synderesis. But the rational part names a power. Therefore, it seems that it is a power.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a habit is ascribed only to a power. But Augustine says¹ that the universal precepts of the law are written in a natural faculty of judgment, which is synderesis. Therefore, since there is a given habit of the universal matters of the law, it seems that synderesis, to which it is ascribed, is a certain power.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, from an identity of acts we can gather that there is an identity of powers. But, as is clear from the authority adduced, judgment pertains to synderesis. Therefore, since free decision is named after judging, it seems that synderesis is the same as free decision. But free decision is a power. Therefore, so is synderesis.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a habit is lost through being forgotten or in another way. But synderesis always remains, since even after death it murmurs against sin, and this murmur is called its “worm.” Therefore, synderesis names a power, not a habit.

Furthermore, opposites are traced back to the same genus. But the fomes¹ is opposed to synderesis. For just as the fomes always incites one to evil, so also synderesis always tends to the good. Therefore, since the fomes is a certain habit, as it says in the text,² it seems that “synderesis” also names a habit.

To the fourth we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that conscience is not an act.

Obj. 1: For Origen says¹ that conscience is the corrector of the spirit and pedagogue of the soul, given to the soul that it may be separated from evils and cling to goods. But “spirit” names either a power or even the very essence of the soul. Therefore, it seems that conscience is not an act.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, conscience, as described by some, is a dictate of reason by which it judges and binds one to do or not do something. But a judgment about doing or not doing this given thing, as has been said,¹ pertains to free decision. Therefore, conscience is free decision. But free decision is not an act. Therefore, neither is conscience.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in a gloss on Ezekiel 1, after speaking about synderesis, Jerome says: but sometimes we observe that this conscience is troubled.¹ Therefore, it seems that conscience is the same as synderesis. But synderesis names not an act, but a power or habit. Therefore, it seems that neither does conscience name an act.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, conscience is a kind of science. But science names a habit. Therefore, so too does conscience.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Damascene says¹ that conscience is a law of our intellect. But the law of the intellect is the natural law itself, which is the habit of the principles of law. Therefore, it seems that conscience is a habit, not an act.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, every act either generates a habit or at least is governed by some habit. Therefore, if conscience is a certain act, a habit, which is called “conscience,” would have to be generated from these repeated acts, or at least such acts would have to proceed from some habit, which amounts to the same thing.

Furthermore, as has been said,¹ some call conscience the “dictate of reason.” But “dictate” names a certain act insofar as reason judges about something to be done. Therefore, it seems that conscience names an act.

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that in the text¹ the motion of sensuality and of lower and higher reason are insufficiently and unfittingly distinguished.

Obj. 1: For every power is naturally moved to its object. But the generative and nutritive power is a natural power. Therefore, it has a natural motion to the act of generation and nourishment. Thus, we must posit a natural motion besides the motion of sensuality and reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, motion is specified by reference to the term, and act by reference to the object. But some acts of sin are acts of the generative power, and the object of some acts of sin is the object of the generative and nutritive power. Therefore, the motion to this object pertains to the generative power, not to sensuality and reason. Thus, the motions of the soul are insufficiently distinguished.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, different powers have different associated delights, just as they have different activities. For delight follows on activity, as it says in the Ethics 10.¹ But sensuality and lower reason are different powers. Therefore, they do not possess delight with reference to the same thing. Thus, lower reason is unfittingly held to delight in the same thing as sensuality does.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as was said above,¹ higher and lower reason are not essentially different powers. Rather, they are engaged with respect to the same object by way of different means. Therefore, if delight concerning sensible things is attributed to lower reason due to the fact that it is engaged with sensible things through civic principles and those drawn from created things, it seems that some delight concerning sensible things can be ascribed to higher reason as well, because it attends to the divine principles, in order to take counsel from it, as has been said.²

Obj. 5: Furthermore, consent pertains to one to whom judgment belongs. But both judging and ruling are in the purview of the same person. Therefore, since higher reason is the rule of lower reason, it seems that consent to delight pertains not to lower reason, but to higher reason.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, there are not different acts of the same power. But lower reason is a single power. Therefore, it seems that two motions, namely, to delight and to consent to the delight, are unfittingly assigned to it.

To the second we proceed thus.¹ It seems that there cannot be sin in sensuality.

Obj. 1: For sensuality is common to us and beasts, as was said above.¹ But there is no sin in beasts in the sense we are speaking of. Therefore, neither does sin belong to us on the basis of sensuality.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sin is in the will, according to Augustine.¹ But sensuality is separate from the will, since the will is within the reason, according to the Philosopher.² Therefore, there is no sin in sensuality.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, virtue and vice, since they are contraries, exist in the same thing. But sensuality, since it belongs to perpetual corruption in accord with the state of the present life, cannot be the subject of virtue. Therefore, neither can sin exist in it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing is imputed to someone as a fault that is not in his power. But the motion of sensuality is not in our power, since it precedes the deliberation of reason. Therefore, it cannot be a sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a proper and natural act cannot be a sin. But to be moved to what is delightful according to the flesh is the proper and natural act of sensuality, since it is the motion of a power to its proper object. Therefore, there can be no sin in this.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, sin remains in the soul even after death. But sensuality does not remain. For the intellect alone is separated, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2 and the Metaphysics 12.¹ Therefore, there is no sin in sensuality.

To the third we proceed thus.¹ It seems that there cannot be sin in reason.

Obj. 1: For “reason” is the name of the cognitive power. But sin pertains to the affect. Therefore, there is no sin in reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in On the Soul 3,¹ the Philosopher says that the intellect is always right. But where there is perpetual rectitude, there cannot be the crookedness of sin. Therefore, sin cannot exist in reason, which pertains to the intellect.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Dionysius says¹ that sin is contrary to reason. Therefore, if there were sin in reason, something contrary to reason would exist in reason, which is impossible. Therefore, the initial premise is also impossible, namely, that sin is in reason.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the act of the higher reason is to cling to the contemplation of eternal things, as was said above.¹ But one does not sin by clinging to what is eternal. Therefore, in reason, at least in higher reason, there cannot be sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, among the parts of the soul, we find one possessed of perpetual corruption, namely, sensuality. We also find one in which there can be both the crookedness of sin and the rectitude of virtue. Therefore, for the perfection of the soul’s powers there must be one possessed of perpetual rectitude. But this cannot be ascribed to any more appropriately than to higher reason. Therefore, there cannot be sin in it.

Furthermore, as speculative reason is to what is knowable, practical reason is to what is practical. But in the case of what is knowable, there can be sin in speculative reason by someone not rightly reasoning. Therefore, it seems that in the case of what is practical, too, there can be sin in reason by someone not rightly choosing.

To the fourth we proceed thus.¹ It seems that there is not mortal sin in lower reason’s delight.

Obj. 1: For one can sin mortally only if he attends to the aspect of a divine precept, since mortal sin is determined by the fact that it is contrary to the divine law. But to attend to a divine precept belongs not to lower reason but to higher reason, which takes counsel from eternal principles. Therefore, mortal sin cannot be in lower reason but only in higher reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as is commonly said, no circumstance aggravates a sin to infinity, since the quantity left behind by an accident cannot be greater than the sin’s essential quantity. But lower reason’s delight, if it is not held to for a long time, is a venial sin, as it says in the text.¹ Therefore, it does not become a mortal sin even through the fact of being held to for a long time.

Obj. 3: One might say that delight is not called “drawn out” or “morose” from the passage of time, but from the arrival of consent.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what is not prohibited by divine law is not mortal. But to consent to such delights, as long as consent is not given to the work, is not forbidden by divine law. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the sin of homicide is greater than that of fornication. But if someone thinks about the slayings of many, takes delight in the thought, and consents to the delight, he does not seem to sin mortally. Therefore, it seems that neither does he sin mortally even if he consents to the delight of the flesh, as long as he does not consent to the act.

Furthermore, in the coming-together of our first parents, just as the man was able to sin mortally, so also was the woman. But lower reason expresses the figure of the woman. Therefore, there can be mortal sin in it, but not with respect to sudden delight. Therefore, it is mortal with respect to morose delight.

To the fifth we proceed thus.¹ It seems that there cannot be venial sin in the higher part of reason.

Obj. 1: For higher reason can only sin by being turned away from eternal principles. But one can only be turned away from these principles through mortal sin. Therefore, in higher reason there will be no sin but mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, contempt makes a sin mortal. But it cannot be the case that someone consents, after deliberation, to an act of sin without contempt. Therefore, since higher reason does not sin without deliberation, it seems that in it, sin is always mortal.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, consent to an act of mortal sin is always a mortal sin. But the motion of the higher part of reason is said to be the consent to the act. Therefore, at least in the genus of mortal sin higher reason never sins venially.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, among the parts of the soul we find something in which there can be only venial sin, namely, sensuality. We also find something in which there can be both venial and mortal sin, namely, lower reason. Therefore, for the sake of completion among the parts of the soul, there should be something in which there can be only mortal sin. Now, this is not synderesis, since there is no sin in that. Therefore, it remains that this is higher reason.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, venial sin arises from the corruption of the flesh, since, as was proved above,¹ Adam was not able to sin venially in the first state. But higher reason is at the utmost point of being removed from the flesh. Therefore, in it, sin cannot be venial.

Furthermore, as in the case of other sins there can be sudden motions that come on unexpectedly, so also there can be sudden motions of infidelity. But we should not say that such motions are mortal sins. Therefore, since they are motions only of the higher part of reason, to which it belongs to perceive what is divine, it seems that there can be venial sin in it.

To the sixth we proceed thus.¹ It seems that venial sin can become mortal.

Obj. 1: For Augustine, on 1 John, speaking of venial sins, says: do not neglect these light sins. If you dismiss them as trivial when you weigh them out, tremble in fear when you count them up. Many light sins will make one massive sin. Many drops fill a river; many grains make a pile.¹ But a sin is not called “massive” unless it is mortal. Therefore, one mortal sin is made from many venial sins.

Obj. 2: Again, Augustine says in On the Ten Chords: do not dismiss venial sins as trivial because they are the least. Rather, be afraid, for they are many. For it often happens that many tiny beasts kill. If anyone is cast into a place full of fleas, does he not die there? And grains of sand are the smallest, yet if enough sand is thrown onto a ship, it sinks it and the ship is lost. How small are raindrops! Yet do they not fill rivers and ruin houses?¹ And so, we must fear the ruin that comes from multitude, even if we do not fear ruin from magnitude.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything finite is capable of proportion to everything finite. But the contentment whereby someone in mortal sin turns toward a changeable good is finite. Therefore, it is proportional to the contentment whereby someone in venial sin turns toward to a changeable good. Therefore, venial sin, when multiplied, makes one mortal sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, delight before the deliberation of reason is a venial sin. But after deliberate consent it becomes mortal. Therefore, venial sin can become mortal.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as it says in the Physics 5,¹ motion that is continuous is one. But it happens that a continuous inordinate motion, though it does not take place in its first portion to the point of contempt of God (and so it is venial), it then later on reaches the point of contempt of God and so will be mortal. Therefore, what was at first venial can become mortal.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, disposition becomes habit, as the Philosopher says in Categories.¹ But venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Therefore, venial sin can become mortal sin.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, there is the same distance from mortal to venial as from venial to mortal. But mortal sin becomes venial through confession, as Ambrose says.¹ Therefore, venial sin can also become mortal in some way.

Obj. 8: What it says in the text is also to this effect,¹ that certain sins are only damning if they are done frequently or the determination is made that they ought to be done frequently, as in the case of idle words and such things. But damnation is only through mortal sin. Therefore, if an idle word is repeated frequently it will be a mortal sin.

Furthermore, repetition of an act does not make it a different species. But venial and mortal are different genera of sins. Therefore, a venial sin will not become mortal through the fact of its being multiplied.

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that there is not free decision in God.

Obj. 1: For, as the Philosopher says in On Sleep and Sleeplessness,¹ the one who has the potency has the act and vice versa. But the act of free decision, which is to choose, does not befit God, since choice follows on counsel, as it says in the Ethics 3.² But counsel is a kind of inquiry with a certain discursive process of reason, which does not belong to God. Therefore, it seems that in God there is no free decision.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in things that are naturally determined to one direction there is not free decision. For we do not say that a stone tends downward by free decision. But God always wills the good from the condition of his nature. Therefore, it seems that he lacks free decision.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that neither is there free decision in any creatures. For it pertains to the freedom of free decision that one be master of his own act. But in the case of any agent whose act is caused by a prior agent, that agent is not the master of his own act. Therefore, since the act of anything created is traced back to a prior cause, which is God himself, who works all our works in us, as Isaiah 26:12 says, it seems that free decision is not found in any creature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that at least there is not free will in the blessed. For choice is of what is directed toward the end. But when the end comes, what is directed toward the end ceases. Therefore, since the blessed are joined to the last end, it seems that choice does not pertain to them and, consequently, that neither does free decision.

Obj. 5: Again, it seems that neither is it in those journeying on this earthly path. For their choice of what is directed toward the end is drawn from the account of the end. But, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3,¹ as each man is, so the end seems to him. But someone’s quality is determined by his nature. Therefore, it seems that the choice of what is directed toward the end is determined for someone by his nature. Therefore, it seems that men do not possess free decision to choose what pertains to them.

Furthermore (7), free decision consists in choosing what is fitting and declining what is harmful. But other animals flee what is harmful and pursue what is fitting. Therefore, it seems that they have free decision, especially since they do this spontaneously.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that free decision can be compelled.

Obj. 1: For what is changed by an agent is compelled by it. But, as a Gloss on Romans says, God can change the will of men to whatever he wishes.¹ Therefore, it seems that the will can be compelled by God, and so also the free decision.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every agent that cannot work otherwise than determined for it by another is compelled by that other. But free decision cannot work otherwise than God has foreknown or predestined. Therefore, it seems that free decision is compelled by God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a higher power can compel a lower power. But in the order of the universe there are some powers higher than free decision. Therefore, they are able to compel it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the intellect is a higher power than the will. But the intellect is compelled in demonstrations, as is apparent from the Metaphysics 5.¹ Therefore, it seems that the will and the free decision can be compelled as well.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, lower motions are regulated according to higher motions. For everything that is not uniform is regulated by something that is uniform. But the motions of free decision are supremely non-uniform. Therefore, it seems that they need to be regulated by uniform activities. Now, there are no such motions in nature except the motions of the heavens. Therefore, the works of free decision are regulated by the motions of the stars and can be compelled by their power. This is clear from the fact that, by way of the course of the stars, astronomers announce in advance certain matters pertaining to the activities subject to free decision.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, everything that is overcome by another is compelled by it. But the incontinent, who are led by passions, are so overcome, as is clear from the Ethics 7.¹ Therefore, it seems that free decision can be compelled.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, it is more difficult to deprive someone of his act altogether than to change his act. But the use of free decision can be impeded by violence, as is clear in the case of the insane. Therefore, it also seems that it can be compelled to do something by violence.

Furthermore, whatever is compelled does not have mastery of its own act. But we speak of free decision in ourselves precisely from the fact that we are the masters of our own acts. Therefore, it seems that it is contrary to the account of free decision that it be compelled.

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that free decision does not extend to all human works.

Obj. 1: For, as we have said, free decision cannot be compelled. But some human works can be compelled. For by violence a human being is prevented from moving. Therefore, not all human works belong to free decision.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the Ethics 1¹ it says that some human works are ends. But a choice is not for the end, as it says in the Ethics 3.² Therefore, since choosing is an act of free decision, it seems that free decision does not belong to all human acts.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, all the acts of free decision are in our power. But there are some acts in us that are not within our power, such as the acts of the generative, nutritive, and augmentative parts. Therefore, not all our acts belong to free decision.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a determinate power is to determinate acts. Therefore, if free decision were to belong to all human acts, it would be not a determinate but a universal power, which we said above is false.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is outside the will is also outside free decision, since free decision is a faculty of will and reason, as was said above.¹ But, as Dionysius says,² evil is outside the will. Therefore, men’s free decision does not extend to evil works.

Furthermore, as was said above, free decision is the will. But all human acts are voluntary. Therefore, they also belong to free decision.

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that the freedom of decision is neither increased nor diminished.

Obj. 1: For what pertains to the account of a power is not varied by acts or habits, since what is prior is not varied by what is posterior, but the latter are subject to the former. But freedom pertains to the account of the power that is called “free decision.” Therefore, it cannot be increased or diminished by acts or habits of virtue or vice.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what follows on a given nature is found equally in all that have that nature. But free decision follows on intellective nature, as was said.¹ Therefore, it is neither increased nor diminished in them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, free decision takes its name from the fact that it cannot be compelled. But negations do not admit of more and less. Therefore free decision is not spoken of in terms of more and less in diverse matters or in the same one in reference to diverse states.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the stronger is not overcome or reduced to servitude by the weaker. But free decision is stronger than the passions of sin, since it can resist them and make them subject to itself. Therefore, it seems that free decision is not diminished by the servitude of sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in a matter that anyone is capable of through himself, one is not more free than another. But anyone is capable of evil through himself and without grace. Therefore, it seems that the free decision of one is not more free for evil than another’s. Thus, it seems that free decision is not increased or diminished.

Furthermore, only that which was in servitude is redeemed. But we have been redeemed from sin by the blood of Christ, as it is said in 1 Peter 1:18–19. Therefore, we are drawn into servitude through sin, and thus, freedom is diminished.

To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that three kinds of free decision are unfittingly distinguished.¹

Obj. 1: For the will’s freedom is varied in accord with different states. But four states of man are assigned in the text.¹ Therefore, four freedoms of decision should be distinguished as well.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sin differs more from justice than sin does from misery, since the first two are opposites and the latter two are related as cause and effect. Therefore, if different freedoms from sin and from misery are assigned, much more should we also distinguish different freedoms from sin and from justice.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Anselm says that to be able to sin is neither freedom nor part of freedom.¹ But freedom from justice regards precisely the ability to sin. Therefore, it seems that he unfittingly assigns such a freedom.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as sin and justice differ, so do glory and misery. Therefore, if he posits freedom from sin over and against freedom from justice, it seems that he should also posit freedom from glory over and against freedom from misery.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, necessity is a kind of misery. But the part should not be contradistinguished from the whole. Therefore, freedom from necessity is unfittingly contradistinguished from freedom from misery.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Bernard distinguishes three kinds of freedom: freedom of decision, freedom of counsel, and that of liking.¹ Therefore, since the Master makes no mention of these, he seems insufficient in how he distinguishes freedom.

To the first we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that grace entails nothing created in the soul.²

Obj. 1: For grace entails a kind of reception¹ in the one who is said to have grace, namely, his being receptive to the one in whose good graces he is.² But the fact that someone is said to be receptive to someone else does not entail anything in the one who is received, but instead in the one receiving. Therefore, man’s being said to have the grace of God does not entail anything in man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Wisdom 11:24 says, God loves all things that exist. But grace signifies nothing other than the reception of love. Therefore, if the fact that man is said to have grace entails something in him above his natural endowments, it seems that the fact that all created things are said to be loved by God must entail something in them above their natural endowments.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more perfect a nature is, the more expeditiously it can obtain its end. But human nature is the most perfect among the other created things, at least lower ones. Therefore, if other created things can obtain their proper end by God’s providence without anything superadded to their natural endowments, it seems that all the more can the rational creature do this. Therefore, it needs nothing superadded to its natural endowments that can be called “grace.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to the one to whom it belongs to create, it belongs also to re-create. But only God himself created the soul without a medium. Therefore, re-creation is his alone. Therefore, if grace is said to re-create, it seems that “grace” does not indicate anything created.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as the soul is the life of the body, so also God is the life of the soul. But the soul vivifies the body without any intermediary. Therefore, grace is not something created in the soul because souls are said to live by grace.

Furthermore, no one is said to be pleasing to someone else—if the person does not err in loving the other—unless there is some good in him. But God does not err in loving. Therefore, the fact that someone is said to have the grace of God signifies something in him in distinction from others.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that grace is not an accident.

Obj. 1: For an accident does not pass from subject to subject since it possesses individuation from the subject. But grace passes from subject to subject, as it is said: I will take some of the spirit which is upon you and put it upon them (Num 11:17). And again: the spirit of Elijah rests on Elisha (2 Kgs 2:15). Therefore, it seems that grace is not an accident.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every accident has some subject of which it is the accident through itself, since everything accidental (or incidental) is traced back to what is essential. But in the case of grace we cannot assign a subject through itself, since every accident through itself is caused by the principles of the subject, but in the case of grace nothing caused is its cause, but only God alone. Therefore, it seems that grace is not an accident.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no accident is of greater worth than its subject. But grace is of greater worth than the soul itself, since it is through grace that the soul is joined to the highest good. Therefore, it seems that grace is not an accident.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no accident acts on the subject in which it is, even if it acts externally on another. But grace acts on the soul itself by making it pleasing¹ and moving it to work. Therefore, it seems that grace is not an accident.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, every accident that can be lost can also be corrupted. But grace can be lost yet cannot be corrupted, since it is a more express likeness to God than even the soul’s natural likeness, by reason of which the soul is called “incorruptible.” Therefore, it seems that grace is not an accident.

Furthermore, everything that is rendered more or less intense is an accident, since a substance does not admit of greater or lesser degree, as it says in the Categories.¹ But grace is such a thing, as is clear in the text.² For it merits to be increased so that, once increased, it may also merit to be perfected.³ Therefore, it is an accident.

To the third we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that grace is in a power of the soul as in a subject.

Obj. 1: For that which is superadded to natural endowments does not fall as a mean between natural cause and effect. But grace is superadded to natural endowments. Therefore, since a power is a natural effect of the essence itself, it seems that grace does not fall as a mean between the essence and the power. Thus, it is not in the essence as in a subject, but rather in a power.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that which is the immediate principle of an act is a power. For as a power proceeds from the essence, so also activity proceeds from the power. But grace orders one immediately to act, as is clear from its definition. For “grace” indicates a gratuitous gift of God that makes one who has it good and renders his work good.¹ Therefore, it seems that grace is in a power as in a subject.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says in the text that grace prepares the will, but only as an accident prepares the subject.¹ Elsewhere, too, he says that grace is related to free decision as a rider to a horse.² Therefore, since the will or free decision is a power, it seems that grace is in a power as in a subject.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, grace is opposed to fault. But every vice, at least actual vice, is in a power as in a subject. Therefore, since opposites concern the same thing, it seems that grace is also in a power of the soul as in a subject.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, infused and acquired habits differ only according to their efficient principle. For it is obvious that they are ordered to the same acts specifically. But acquired habits are more primarily in a power than in the essence. For they are only in the essence by the mediation of the power. Therefore, so are infused habits. Thus, grace is not in the soul’s essence as in a subject but rather in a power.

Furthermore, no accident extends in acting beyond the action of its subject, since it is not the accident that is properly called the “agent,” but rather the accident’s subject. But grace is not determined to a given act, since every human act can be meritorious, and this can only be the result of grace, which causes good merits in us, as it says in the text.¹ Therefore, since every power is related to determinate acts, it seems that grace is not in a power of the soul as in a subject.

To the fourth we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that grace is a virtue.

Obj. 1: For since it is in the genus of accident, it can only be traced back to the genus of quality, and among the species of quality, only to the first, as is clear by going through them individually. Therefore, grace will be either a science or a virtue, for it is not reckoned among bodily habits or dispositions. But it is obvious that grace is not a science. Therefore, it is necessarily a virtue.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says¹ that virtue is nothing other than the disposition of the perfected to the best. But this especially belongs to grace, which disposes the soul that it perfects to what is best: namely, to the last end. Therefore, grace is a virtue.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the Ethics 2,¹ the Philosopher says that the virtue of each is that which makes the one who has it good and renders his work good. But grace makes the soul and its work good, since it makes both of them pleasing, and something can only be rendered received by God through being good. Therefore, it seems that grace is a virtue.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine is quoted in the text as saying that prevenient grace is faith working through love.¹ But faith is a virtue. Therefore, so is grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, charity is said to be the form and mother of all the virtues. Therefore, since the virtues are informed by grace, by which works are rendered meritorious, it seems that grace is the same as charity. But charity is a virtue. Therefore, so is grace.

Furthermore, that in which specifically different things agree, and that in which these same are distinguished, cannot be essentially the same. But all the virtues agree in rendering works meritorious, while they are distinguished in eliciting determinate acts. Therefore, that which is the principle of meriting is essentially different from that which is the principle of the distinction of acts. But the principle of meriting is grace, as it says in the text,¹ whereas the principle of distinction in an act is the determinate species of virtue. For, as the virtue is, so also are the habits it yields. Therefore, grace and virtue are essentially different.

To the fifth we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that grace is unfittingly distinguished into operating and cooperating.

Obj. 1: For, as has been said,¹ grace does not regard action through itself. But each thing should be distinguished in accord with what befits it through itself, as is said in the Metaphysics 7.² Therefore, it seems that since we speak of operating and cooperating with respect to action, grace is unfittingly distinguished by way of these two.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if grace is operating, it must work something in the soul. Therefore, it will either work itself or something else. But it does not make itself, since nothing is the cause of itself, and yet we cannot identify anything else that it works in the soul. Therefore, it seems unfitting for there to be any grace called “operating.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no work belongs so much to grace that it does not also belong to free decision. Therefore, if cooperating grace is so called through the fact that it works together with free decision, it seems that any grace should be called “cooperating.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that which cooperates with something does not exist as the principal in the activity. But in every activity in which free decision and grace come together, grace holds the principal place. Therefore, cooperating grace is unfittingly named.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says in On Nature and Grace that grace comes before that we may live piously and follows after that we may always live with him. It now comes before that we may be called and then follows after that we may be glorified.¹ He says that prevenient grace regards the state of the present life and subsequent grace the state of glory. Therefore, since operating and cooperating grace pertain to the present life, it seems that operating and cooperating grace are not the same as prevenient and subsequent grace, as the Master suggests.²

To the sixth we proceed as follows. It seems that grace in the soul is multiplied.

Obj. 1: For there are divisions of graces, as is said in 1 Corinthians 12:4. But division is the cause of number and multitude. Hence, according to Isidore, “number” is said as if indicating nutus memeris, the command of division.¹ Therefore, it seems that in one soul many graces are found.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, prior and posterior, preceding and subsequent, cannot be the same. Therefore, since in one man prevenient and subsequent grace are found, it seems that there must be more than one grace in one and the same man.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every form is multiplied on the basis of the difference among the things it informs, since different things have different forms. But grace is the form of the virtues. Therefore, it seems that since the virtues are different, grace must be multiplied.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that differ in genus are not traced back to the same principle. But the virtues differ from the gifts in genus, and differ likewise from sacramental graces. Therefore, it seems that they originate from different graces.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, grace is given in the different sacraments, and the grace that one sacrament has, another does not. But whatever things exist such that there is one without the other must be numbered and distinguished. Therefore, it seems that grace does not remain only one, but is essentially multiplied.

Furthermore, what befits different things for the same reason must proceed from one principle. But the reason for meriting is the same in all meritorious acts. Therefore, since grace is the principle of meriting, it seems that grace is only one, not multiplied.

To the first we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that virtue is not a habit.

Obj. 1: For the utmost of a thing is not placed in a genus other than the thing itself. But, as the Philosopher says in On the Heavens 1,¹ virtue is the utmost of power in a thing. Therefore, it is not in the genus of habit, but in the genus of power.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, natural powers are not more perfect than rational powers. But natural powers are capable of their acts without the mean of habits, as is clear in what is hard and soft. Therefore, all the more are rational powers capable of this. Therefore, virtue is either a power or an act.

Obj. 3: One might say that habits are required in rational powers in order for the powers to be determined to one thing.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, reward corresponds to merit. But merit is the good act of the free decision itself. Therefore, since a reward is due virtue and grace, it seems that virtue or grace is an act.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the mean belongs to the same genus as the extremes. But virtue is the mean between passions, as is clear in the Ethics 2.¹ Therefore, it seems that virtue is not in the genus of habit, but in the genus of passion or act, for the soul’s actions are also called “passions,” as it says in the Book of Six Principles.²

Furthermore, we are good by virtues. But we do not have gratuitous goodness from acts. Therefore, virtue and grace are not acts.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that Augustine unfittingly defines virtue.²

Obj. 1: For, as is said in the Topics 2,¹ no genus is predicated denominatively of its species.² But goodness is the genus of virtue. For as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 1,³ virtue is that by which one is good and that which renders work good. Therefore, virtue is unfittingly called a “good quality.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that which transcends genus should not be given as the difference of a genus. But “good” transcends the genus of quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore, it is unfittingly given as the difference of quality when it is said that virtue is a good quality of mind.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a subject included in the definition of an accident should be convertible with it. But “mind” is not related to “virtue” in this way. For not every virtue is in the mind as in a subject. Rather, some are in the concupiscible part, some in the irascible, and so forth for the others. Therefore, “mind” is unfittingly given as the common subject of virtue in its definition.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that which is proper to a given species should not be included in the definition of the genus. But justice appropriates rectitude to itself. Hence Anselm says that justice is the rectitude of the will kept for its own sake.¹ Therefore, it is unfitting to include the following in the definition of virtue in general: whereby one lives rightly.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, whoever is proud of a thing makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtues. For, as Augustine says in his rule, pride ensnares even good works to their ruin.¹ Therefore, it is false to say: of which no one makes bad use.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever lives rightly does not make bad use. Therefore, since Augustine said that virtue is that whereby one lives rightly, it was superfluous for him to add: of which no one makes bad use.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, Augustine says: he who created you without you will not justify you without you.¹ But justification happens only through virtue. Therefore, what follows is false: which God works in us without us.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, what is defined befits whatever the definition befits. But grace is not virtue, as was said above, and yet this sort of definition befits it. Therefore, this is not the definition of virtue.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, a single thing should have a single definition, just as it has a single being. Therefore, if certain other definitions are assigned to virtue, and if these are fitting, then it seems that this definition is inappropriate.

To the third we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that one cannot merit eternal life condignly through an act of virtue.

Obj. 1: This seems to be, first, from what is said in Romans 8:18: the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us. But the saints merit greatly through the sufferings they endure. Therefore, it seems that no one merits eternal life condignly.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “condign” implies equality of dignity. But it is impossible for a human act to be equal in dignity with the reward of eternal life, which is God himself. Therefore, it seems that no one can merit eternal life condignly.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, he who pays back what he owes merits no further reward. But a man working well pays back what he owes, as is said in Luke 17:10: when you have done all that is commanded you, say, ‘we are unworthy servants; we have only done what was our duty.’ Therefore, it seems that no one by living rightly merits eternal life condignly.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, he from whom anyone merits something becomes a debtor to him. For a reward is due to merit. But God cannot become a debtor. Therefore, before him we can merit nothing condignly.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one merits a reward before someone who is neither helped nor can be helped by his work. But God is not helped by our good works, since he has no need of our goods, as it is said (Ps 16 [15]:2). Therefore, it seems that before him we cannot merit.

Furthermore, the work of virtue is to glory as fault is to punishment. But fault merits eternal punishment condignly. Therefore, the act of virtue also merits eternal life condignly.

To the fourth we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that one can merit grace.

Obj. 1: For justification only occurs through grace. But in the text it says that faith merits justification.¹ Therefore, one merits grace through an act of faith.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one who makes good use of a temporal thing that he received from some lord merits the thing previously received, such as a horse or some other such thing. But the use of grace is not less efficacious in meriting than the use of a temporal thing. Therefore, one who makes good use of the grace he has received merits it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the prayer whereby one prays for himself and about what is expedient for salvation merits being heard favorably by God, as Augustine says.¹ But if someone in the state of grace prays for grace to be restored to him if he should fall from grace, he is asking for something most expedient for salvation. Therefore, he merits the recovery of grace.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if God gives someone grace, he either gives it to one who is worthy or to one who is unworthy. If he gives it to one who is unworthy, then this is foolish and unjust, which is impossible. Therefore, he gives it to one who is worthy. But no one is worthy of having anything unless he has merited it. Therefore, whoever receives grace has previously merited it.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, before God the order of justice in distributing grace is not less than in distributing natural goods. But Plato says that the forms are only given by the giver according to the merits of nature. Therefore, grace too is only infused according to the merits of those who receive it.

Furthermore, that which is the principle of all merit does not fall under merit. But grace is such a thing. Therefore, and so on.

To the fifth we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that one cannot merit an increase of grace.

Obj. 1: For we consider efficacy for meriting with reference to the quantity of the root. But if one merits a greater grace through an act of less grace, then the efficacy for meriting would exceed the root of grace. Therefore, it is not the case that one merits an increase of grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, any meritorious act merits what falls under merit. So if it is the case that one merits an increase of grace, it follows that grace will be increased by any meritorious act, which is false.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is from the same principles whereby something is engendered that it grows. Therefore, since the principle of grace does not fall under merit, it seems that neither does its growth.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one merits what is in his power. But it is in the power of one possessing grace not only to persist in it, but also to make better progress in it. Therefore, it is not the case that one merits progress in grace itself.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, an act that has received remuneration looks for no further reward. But if it were the case that one merits an increase of grace, then that increased grace would be that act remunerated. Therefore, it would be due no further reward, which is unfitting.

Furthermore, it is more for grace to be perfected than for grace to be increased. But glory falls under merit, which is nothing other than grace perfected. Therefore, the increase of grace, too, falls under merit.

To the sixth we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that one cannot merit the first grace for another.

Obj. 1: For an accident does not extend beyond its own subject. But grace, which is the principle of meriting, is an accident. Therefore, the efficacy for meriting does not pass to another, that is, in such a way that one can merit grace for another.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the merit of Christ was most perfect. Therefore, if grace is acquired for someone through the merit of another, much more will this be the case through Christ’s merit. Therefore, since Christ’s merit is most sufficient, it seems that for those for whom grace is not acquired through Christ’s merit, grace is not acquired by anyone’s merits, especially because he suffered for all and wills that all men be saved.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, among other acts, prayer seems to be most meritorious. But one condition for prayer that Augustine lays down is that a man pray for himself.¹ Therefore, it seems that merit only has force for the one meriting.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a man’s act profits the one who does it more than others. But a man cannot merit the first grace for himself. Therefore, much less can he do so for others.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if something would happen whether something else is added or removed, then the latter is not the cause of the former. But if a person is prepared for grace he will obtain it, and if he is not prepared he will not have it, whether someone else merits it or not. Therefore, it seems that the good act of one is not the meritorious cause of another’s grace.

Furthermore, James 5:16 says, pray for one another, that you may be saved.¹ But salvation is not without grace. Therefore, since the Church’s prayer cannot be useless, it seems that one can merit grace for another.

To the first we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that man without grace can do no good.

Obj. 1: For, as Christ says to his disciples: without me you can do nothing (John 15:5). But God only dwells in us through grace. Therefore, it seems that without grace man can do nothing good.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, thinking of the good precedes carrying it out in practice. But it is said: not that we are competent of ourselves to think of anything as coming from us; our competence is from God (2 Cor 3:5).¹ Therefore, it seems that much less can we carry out the good in practice without grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Augustine says to Pope Boniface, there is no good that man can will unless helped by God, who cannot will evil.¹ But the help of him who cannot will evil, namely, God, is his grace. Therefore, man without grace can neither will nor do the good.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, man cannot be just and good without grace. But it is in his doing good and just works that we take note of a man’s justice and goodness. Therefore, man without grace cannot do any good.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, nothing is capable of an effect that is beyond its perfection. But good acts exceed the goodness of natural powers. For they are reckoned among great goods while powers are reckoned among middle goods. Therefore, through natural powers without the addition of grace, man is not capable of good activity.

Furthermore, according to Damascene, no thing is bereft of its proper activity.¹ But man’s good activity is what is proper to him, that is, ordered according to reason, just as it is evil for man to be contrary to reason, as Dionysius says.² Therefore, man by himself without added grace is capable of good activity.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that without grace man cannot avoid sin.

Obj. 1: First, through what the Master said above,¹ that man before the reparation of grace through free decision cannot not sin, even mortally. Therefore, without grace man cannot avoid sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, through sin the freedom of decision has been changed in some regard. But man in the first state had the property of being able to do the good, though not the meritorious good in the state of natural endowments. Therefore, free decision has also been changed at least in this regard: that man cannot avoid sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says¹ that a proud nature has the necessity of envying another. Now, for the same reason, someone who is in one sin has the necessity of falling into another sin. But as regards the present state, any given man is either in sin or in the state of grace. Therefore, it seems that if he is not in grace, he cannot avoid sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one who has a lame foot can only walk by limping. But sin is like a kind of warping of the will. Therefore, a man in the state of sin cannot not sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, death resulted from sin, as is said in Romans 5:12. Therefore, where there is a necessity of dying, there is a necessity of sinning. But in this state there is in us a necessity of dying. Therefore, there is also a necessity of sinning.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever resists temptation conquers the tempter. But to the one who conquers, an eternal reward is promised (Rev 2–3). Therefore, since no one can come to the eternal reward without grace, it seems that without it neither can anyone resist temptation by avoiding sin.

Furthermore, wherever there is the necessity of acting, there is an active power determined to a single thing. But this is contrary to the account of free decision. Therefore, man in sin does not have the necessity of sinning, but can avoid sin.

To the third we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that without grace man cannot fulfill God’s precepts.

Obj. 1: For one who keeps the commandments of God merits eternal life, as it is said: do this, and you will live (Luke 10:28). But without grace man is not able to do this. Therefore, neither can he fulfill the commandments of the law.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, charity cannot be had without grace. But the love of charity is a matter of precept (Matt 22:37–38). Therefore, the precepts cannot be fulfilled without grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Augustine showed above,¹ God alone works virtues in us. But the acts of the virtues are a matter of precept. Therefore, we cannot fulfill the precepts by ourselves.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, this seems to be expressly indicated when it says: you make trial of God by putting a yoke upon the neck . . . which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear (Acts 15:10). But the precepts of the law are this burden. Therefore, man by himself cannot fulfill the precepts of the law.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one is damned except for a sin of omission or transgression. But no one who fulfills the law’s precepts sins by omission. Therefore, if man can fulfill the precepts of the law without grace—since, as we have said, he can avoid mortal sin without grace—it seems that man can completely avoid damnation without grace. But whoever is not damned is in glory. Therefore, man without grace will be able to reach glory, which is totally heretical.

Furthermore, God is not more cruel than man. But we would regard it as cruelty in the case of a man if he were to oblige someone by a precept to what that person could not fulfill. Therefore, we must in no way form this estimation of God. Thus, without grace man by himself can fulfill the law’s precepts.

To the fourth we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that without some grace man cannot prepare himself for grace.

Obj. 1: This is, first, because of what is said in Jeremiah 10:23: the way of man is not in himself . . . it is not in man who walks to direct his steps. But no one is prepared for grace unless his steps are directed and he seeks the way of salvation. Therefore, it is not in man’s power to prepare himself for grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is not necessary for a man to ask from another for what is in his power. But a man must ask from God to be prepared for grace, as is clear in the passage: conduct me, O Lord, in your way (Ps 86 [85]:11).¹ Therefore, preparation for grace is not in man’s power.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what has been done visibly in some who have obtained grace is probably also done in others at least invisibly, since one and all have the same account. But some, since they used even to resist grace, were prepared for grace by a special gift of grace, as is clear in the conversion of Paul. Therefore, others, too, cannot be prepared for grace without grace, at least grace freely given.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Hebrews 11:6: whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists. But faith can only be had through grace: it is the gift of God, as is said in Ephesians 2:8. Therefore, since no one prepares himself for grace except by coming to God, it seems that without the gift of grace man cannot prepare himself for grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says that servile fear introduces charity as the bristle does the thread.¹ But servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, through grace freely given man is prepared for sanctifying grace.

Furthermore, Anselm says: that one does not have grace is not from God’s not willing to give it, but because man does not wish to receive it.¹ Therefore, if man wishes to receive grace, God will give it. But what is established in man’s will is in the power of free decision. Therefore, it is in the power of free decision that man prepare himself for grace.

To the fifth we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that without grace man can know nothing true.

Obj. 1: This is, first, because of what is said in 1 Corinthians 12:3: no man can say, ‘Jesus is Lord,’ except by the Holy Spirit. Commenting on this, Ambrose says that every truth, no matter who says it, is from the Holy Spirit.¹ But the Holy Spirit only dwells in us through grace. Therefore, no truth can be spoken or known without grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, divine revelation only occurs through the infusion of a light freely given. But Romans 1:19–20 says that God revealed to philosophers even what they knew by natural reason. Therefore, there can be no knowledge of the truth without an infused light of grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the easier way to know something is through teaching rather than discovery. But, as Augustine says in On the Teacher,¹ no one can learn externally unless God teaches internally. Hence it is clear that man can only have knowledge of the truth through teaching by the help of grace working inwardly. Therefore, much less could he have this knowledge through discovery without the help of grace. Thus, man cannot in any way have knowledge without the help of grace, since everything that anyone knows is known either by learning or by discovering it, as the Philosopher says.²

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as bodily light is to sight, spiritual light is to the intellect. But nothing can be seen in a bodily way except through an influx of bodily light, especially of what sheds light most of all, which is the sun. Therefore, nothing can be understood except through the influx of spiritual light from God, and this is grace. Therefore, no truth can be known without grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, all the things in a given genus are traced back to a single first thing, the greatest in that genus, as to a cause. But the first in the genus of intellective things is God himself. Therefore, he is the most intelligent and the cause of understanding for all intelligent things. But he causes nothing in us except by having some influence. Therefore, we cannot understand any truth without the infusion of some grace.

Furthermore, the intellect is not less powerful in understanding than the senses are in sensing. But the senses can sense sensible objects without grace. Therefore, the intellect, too, can understand intelligible objects without grace.

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that man in the state of innocence did not need grace.

Obj. 1: For grace is given to men that they may be received by God. But when human nature was integral, without any corruption of sin, man was received by God from natural goodness. For every good, especially one not mixed with evil, is received by God. Therefore, he did not need a superadded grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, grace is divided into operating and cooperating. But man did not need operating grace in that state because he was not ungodly, since the effect of operating grace is to make a godly person out of an ungodly one. Again, he did not need cooperating grace because he suffered no difficulty in doing good, but cooperating grace is given that man may be able to accomplish the good. Therefore, he did not need any grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as is said in Deuteronomy 32:4: his works are perfect. But there would not be perfection in the divine works if there were some possible degree of nobility that were not established by God. Therefore, every degree of goodness possible in created things is found in reality. But God was able to create a nature such as could merit eternal life through its proper natural endowments, since otherwise he would not be omnipotent. Therefore, since no other creature seems more to possess this property than man or the angels, it seems that this befits them. Thus, if human nature were pure, as it was in the first state, man would not need grace to merit eternal life.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, punishment never precedes fault, since it is its effect. But lack of the vision of God is the punishment of original fault. Therefore, if there had not been fault in human nature, there would not have been in it the lack of the vision of God. But man in the state of innocence was able to lack all fault without grace. Therefore, he also did not need grace to arrive at the vision of God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, grace is given to man that through it he may be configured and likened to God. But man was made according to the image and likeness of God from the condition of his nature. Therefore, if nature remained integral in this, it would need no other grace.

Furthermore, sin has not changed human nature. Rather, it remains the same before and after. But the merit of eternal life exceeds the power of nature after sin. Therefore, it also exceeded its strength before sin. Therefore, it needed grace through which to merit eternal life.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that man before sin did not have grace.

Obj. 1: For whoever has grace can progress to the merit of life by the fact that through grace one merits an increase of grace and its consummation. But, as the Master said above,¹ man in the first state did not have that whereby he could progress to the merit of life. Therefore, he did not have grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, grace has greater power than nature. But the greater a sinner’s power, the more grave his sin. Therefore, if man had fallen from a state of grace, since the angels did not possess grace before their fall, as many say, it seems that man’s sin would have been more grave than the sin of a demon, which was denied above.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, grace has more in common with glory than with nature. But in man grace preceded glory in time. Therefore, much more did nature precede grace. And so, in the first state man did not have grace.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in and of itself, grace moves man toward God. Therefore, since in man before the state of sin there was nothing drawing him downward, it seems that if he had had grace he would never have sinned. But he did sin. Therefore, he did not have grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what man lost through the first sin has not been restored to him, such as impassibility, and so forth. Therefore, if he had had grace in the state of innocence, he would not have recovered it through penitence when it was lost through sin. But this is false, since in this case the whole human race would perish. Therefore, he did not have grace in the first state.

Furthermore, charity is never formless. But in the text¹ it is proved that Adam had charity in the first state. Therefore, he also had grace, without which there is no charity.

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that in the first state man would not have had as much grace as after sin.

Obj. 1: For, as the Philosopher says,¹ it is ridiculous to posit temperance and fortitude in the gods, since in them the passions are not innate nor enter in, concerning which fortitude and temperance partake in a mean. But in the first state Adam would have lacked passions of this sort. Therefore, he consequently would have lacked these virtues, which man had after sin. Therefore, man would not have had as many graces before sin as he had after sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, perseverance is a kind of virtue, which many possess after the state of sin. But Adam lacked this, as his fall shows. Thus, he did not have as many virtues as men born in sin have. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, God gives more to one who needs more. For mercy attends to misery, as Bernard says.¹ But man needs the help of grace more after sin than before, since he is more weakened in natural endowments. Therefore, God confers more grace on man after sin than he would have conferred before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, since he is good to the utmost, as Augustine says,¹ God would not permit evils to exist unless he were so powerful that he could draw good from evils. But the divine goodness would not be perfectly shown unless the good that God draws out from evil exceeded the good that suffers deprivation through the evil. Therefore, man’s good, which God draws from his sin, exceeds the good that existed before sin and afterwards suffered deprivation through sin. And so, grace is greater after sin than before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the whole fullness of the human race’s grace proceeds from the power of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion. Hence it is said: from his fullness we have all received (John 1:16). But if Adam had not sinned, Christ would not have been incarnate, as some say, or at least he would not have suffered, as all say. Therefore, there would not have been as great a fullness of grace in the human race before sin as there is after.

Furthermore, no one gains an advantage from sin. But if man had greater grace after sin than before, he would gain an advantage from evil. Therefore, and so on.

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that after sin man’s works would have been more efficacious for meriting than before sin.

Obj. 1: For in the first state, just as man had nothing impelling him to evil, so also he had nothing drawing him away from the good. But the Master said above¹ that the first man would not have merited by resisting temptation because there was nothing to impel him to evil. Therefore, by doing the good he likewise would have merited either nothing or very little, since there was nothing to impede him from the good.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Apostle says: an athlete is not crowned unless he competes according to the rules (2 Tim 2:5). But man in the first state was not fought against as he was after sin. Therefore, neither did he merit a crown as efficaciously.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2,¹ virtue concerns what is difficult. But it is more difficult for man to do good works after sin than before. Therefore, since efficacy for merit proceeds from virtue, it seems that before sin man’s acts were less efficacious for meriting than they are after.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, man in the first state was, as it were, in the middle between the state of the angels and our own state, as is clear from what was said in Distinction 23.¹ But angelic activities are not as efficacious for meriting, just as man’s activities. This is clear from the fact that a lower angel cannot merit the rank of a higher one, but man can merit to rise to the highest order of angels, as is clear from what Gregory says.² Therefore, man in the first state, too, had works less efficacious for meriting than after sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as the Master said in Book II, Distinction 1,¹ man was made to repair the ruin of the angels. But some angels fell from every order, as was said above.² Therefore, however human nature may go, whether in the state of innocence or in the state of sin, some men must be transferred to each of the orders of the angels. Therefore, since this only happens by virtue of merit, it seems that man’s works at least did not have greater efficacy for meriting in the state of innocence than after sin.

Furthermore, the more prompt the will is to work, the more man merits: if the readiness is there, it is acceptable according to what a man has, not according to what he has not (2 Cor 8:12). But in the first state the will was more prompt to act well because it was less impeded. Therefore, man’s works were more efficacious for meriting.

To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that man’s punishment for the sin of the first transgression is unfittingly determined in the text.¹

Obj. 1: For what was made for the sake of man should be of service to some man. But the earthly paradise was made for man’s sake, as were the other creatures. Therefore, since it is of no service to man after he has been cast out, it seems that he should not have been expelled from there.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, on account of man’s sin, all of nature, which was made for man’s sake, has fallen into decline, as a Gloss on Romans 8 says.¹ Therefore, much more should that place in which the sin was committed, namely, the earthly paradise, have been spoiled. But spoiled man is due a spoiled place. Therefore, after sin he should not have been expelled from the earthly paradise.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Master said above,¹ the earthly paradise is of itself an inaccessible place. Therefore, in vain are the guards stationed there to prevent man’s approaching it, since even without them he would not be able to reach it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, after sin, man was immediately afflicted with the necessity of death. But from his having the necessity of dying, he was not able not to die. Therefore, in vain did the Lord say: lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever (Gen 3:22).

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the tree of life would not have had a greater effect in man after sin than before. But man ate of the tree of life before sin, as it says in the text,¹ yet he did not live forever. Therefore, even if he had eaten of it after sin, he would not have lived forever.

Obj. 6: One might say that the tree of life only had this effect when eaten from frequently.

Furthermore, the empyrean heaven, in which the angels were created, was a more proper place to them than the earthly paradise, wherein man was placed after being created outside of it, was to him. But after sin, angels were cast out of the empyrean heaven. Therefore, man, too, should have been expelled from the earthly paradise after sin.

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the deficiencies we experience are not inflicted on us as a punishment for the sin of the first man.

Obj. 1: For as Seneca says: death is man’s nature, not his punishment.¹ But among all deficiencies, death is the greatest. Hence the Philosopher calls it even the end of things feared, in the Ethics 3.² Therefore, neither should other deficiencies that follow on human nature be called “punishments.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is found in things created from the same principles is found in them in accord with a single account, since the unity of a thing depends on the unity of principles. But death, hunger, thirst, and other such things are found in man from the same principles as in other animals, namely, from the struggle of the contrary elements of which the body is composed. Therefore, since in other animals they do not exist under the account of punishment, neither will they exist in man as punishments.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, man did not sin more than the angels. In fact, he sinned less, as was said above.¹ But through sin the angels lost nothing of the natural goods conferred on them, as Dionysius says.² Therefore, neither did man. Therefore, if it pertained to man’s nature that his body would be incorruptible and impassible, this would not have been lost through sin. Therefore, since man did lose this, it seems that it belonged not to nature, but to grace. Therefore, too, the privation of these properties follows on nature not as a punishment, but as a natural deficiency.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every natural power tends to its object. But the object of the concupiscible power is what is delightful to the senses. Therefore, for the concupiscible power to be moved to this is not a punishment, but man’s nature. The case is likewise for the irascible power and the other powers. But the fact that each power is moved to its own object causes a struggle of the lower powers against the higher. Therefore, it seems that this sort of struggle is natural to man and not his punishment, as is said.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is not said to be anyone’s punishment if he does not attain that which exceeds the powers of his own nature; for example, that man cannot fly is not a punishment. But to attain to seeing God in his essence exceeds all the powers of human nature, for otherwise man could come to it by his natural endowments. Therefore, neither should the lack of the vision of God be called “man’s punishment.” Thus, none of the things that are said to be the punishment for the first sin seems to have the account of a punishment.

Furthermore (7), as the Philosopher says in Physics 2 and On the Soul 1,¹ a proper act comes about in its proper matter. Hence a perfection must be proportionate to what is perfectible. But the rational soul, which is the perfection of the human body, is by its nature incorruptible. Therefore, the human body, too, is naturally incorruptible. Therefore, if it is corrupted, this will be through a deficiency of nature, and thus, it will be a punishment.

Furthermore (8), the more powerful is not overcome by the less powerful. For the agent is more noble than the patient, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3.¹ But the human body is more noble than other inanimate bodies. Therefore, since it suffers from them, this will be through the infirmity of its nature. But the infirmity and deficiency of the body that is in man by nature is a punishment. Therefore, the ability to suffer from such bodies is in man as a punishment.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that no deficiency that comes to us through our origin can have the account of a fault.

Obj. 1: For something blameworthy is worthy of rebuke, if it is evil, from the fact that it is in the power of the one who is blamed for it. For we are only rebuked on the basis of what is in us, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3.¹ But what is contracted by origin cannot be in the power of the one who contracts it by his origin. Therefore, it is impossible for something contracted by origin to have the account of a fault.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine,¹ every sin is voluntary, to the point that if it is not voluntary, it is not a sin. But what is contracted by origin cannot be voluntary because the act of the will does not precede the origin of the one willing. Therefore, it is impossible for something contracted by origin to be a sin or fault.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no accident can be passed down unless its subject is passed down. But the subject of fault is the rational soul, and since it does not exist from being passed down, as was proved above,¹ it seems that neither can something contracted by origin have the account of a fault.

Obj. 4: One might say that sin is passed down through the transmission of seed.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the more noble does not suffer from the less noble. But the soul is more noble than the body. Therefore, the body cannot act on the soul by infecting it.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, it is unjust that the fault of a father should redound to the son, and that the son should be punished for the father. But if from the fact that Adam sinned, fault redounded to all by origin, then it would follow that the son is punished for the father’s transgression. Therefore, this does not belong to divine justice.

Furthermore, as Anselm says,¹ if man had remained steadfast, the original justice in which he was created would have come down to his children. But as a just man is to just children, a sinful man is to sinful children. Therefore, because he sinned, he also transfused his fault to others by generation.

To the third we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that original sin is not concupiscence, as it says in the text.²

Obj. 1: For nothing is the cause of itself. But original sin is the cause of concupiscence, as is clear from the words of the Apostle: but sin, finding opportunity in the commandment, wrought in me all kinds of concupiscence (Rom 7:8). Therefore, original sin is not concupiscence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing of what is natural can be called a “sin” or an “evil.” But the concupiscible power in man is a natural power. Therefore, it cannot be called “original sin.” But original sin is that through which man is apt for concupiscible desiring. Therefore, the concupiscence whereby we are apt for concupiscible desiring is not original sin, as it says in the text.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as the judgment of reason is disturbed by the motion of the concupiscible part, so it is also by the motion of the irascible part. But original sin consists in the disordering of the soul itself, insofar as what is lower does not obey what is higher. Therefore, not only concupiscence, but for like reason irascibility should be called “original sin.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a deficiency contracted by origin does not have the account of a fault, as has been said,¹ except insofar is it follows on the will of one who has the nature. But many bodily deficiencies follow from that will, such as the necessity of dying and so forth. Therefore, not only concupiscence, but any of these should be called “original sin.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, among the other things that man lost through sin, he was also deprived of that knowledge in which he was so strong in the first state. But deficiency of knowledge is called “ignorance.” Therefore, ignorance and not only concupiscence should be called “original sin.”

Furthermore, as actual concupiscence is to actual sin, original concupiscence is to original sin. But actual concupiscence is actual sin itself. Therefore, too, the concupiscence that is contracted by origin is original sin.

To the first we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that food does not pass over into true human nature.

Obj. 1: For anything eaten that is cast out does not pertain to true human nature, which always remains the same. But everything taken by mouth goes to the belly and is cast out into the latrine, as it is said (Matt 15:17). Therefore, the nourishment taken by mouth does not pass over into true human nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the truth of each thing is in that which is according to its species. Now, that which comes in the manner of nourishment exists in the manner of matter, as it says in On Generation and Corruption 2.¹ But flesh according to matter does not become flesh according to species, as is clear from On Generation and Corruption.² Therefore, nourishment does not pass over into true human nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, that in which the converting heat is rooted pertains to true human nature; this is the root moisture. But as doctors say, once this kind of moisture is consumed, it is not restored, as is seen among those who suffer from the third species of hectic fever, which is incurable because this moisture is not restored. Therefore, since everything into which food is converted can be restored after its consumption, it seems that nourishment is not changed into what properly pertains to true human nature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that food is converted into is also broken down through the continuous agency of heat, such that the forward and backward flows would be judged the same. But it cannot be the case that the entirety of what is in the body flows in both directions, as will be proved. Therefore, there must be something remaining in the body that food is not converted into. Now, this especially pertains to true human nature. Therefore, food is not changed into what pertains through itself to true human nature. Proof of the middle premise: if there were nothing permanent and fixed in the human body, then it would be the case that every part of it could vanish with some other substituted in its place. By the same reasoning, what could happen for any part could happen to the whole. Therefore, it could happen that none of the matter that was first in the body of a given man would remain in the end. But the unity of the individual is from the unity of his matter. Therefore, a man would not be numerically the same at the end of life and at the beginning, which is absurd.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no natural power is weakened by the multiplication of matter suited to it, but only through the admixture of something extraneous. But the restorative power in man is weakened at the end of life, for otherwise a man could grow and live to infinity. Therefore, it occurs through the admixture of something extraneous. But nothing is mixed into the matter in which the restorative power was previously founded except what is produced from food. Therefore, what is produced from food is extraneous to that in which the truth of the nature is founded. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, nature does each thing in the easiest way possible. But God works in an even more ordered way than does nature. Therefore, since the easier way of increasing something is through the multiplication of matter, rather than through the conversion of something else into what is being increased, it seems that the former mode belongs to divine providence, namely, that the human body grow without the passage of anything external into it, but only by the multiplication of its matter. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, things of the same species are brought to completion in the same way. But some infants that died will in the resurrection be brought to their full stature, not through a multiplication of food, but through a multiplication of their matter. Therefore, other men, too, will be brought to their full stature in this way. And so, the same follows as before.

Furthermore, at the beginning what nourishes is unlike the one nourished, but is like at the end, since nothing is nourished and fostered except by its like. But those things are similar that share in the same form. Therefore, since the truth of nature is from the form, it seems that what nourishes is, in the end, brought to the truth of the nature of what was nourished.

To the second we proceed as follows.¹ It seems that seed is not extracted from what has been additionally generated from food.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says¹ that we were all in Adam according to bodily substance and even according to seedlike principle, except for Christ, who was in him only according to bodily substance. But our bodily substance only comes from our parents by means of seed. Therefore, the seed that is transmitted from one’s first parent is not extracted from what was converted from food, but from what he himself had received from his own parent, such that in this way, the bodily substance of our body is found to be extracted from our first parent.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Damascene,¹ generation is a work of nature, producing what is generated from the substance of the begetter. But the excess of one’s nourishment does not belong to the begetter’s substance. Therefore, if generation took place in men from this alone, it would not be true generation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one’s weakening does not follow from the subtraction of any excess, but rather his relief. But the begetter is weakened by the emission of seed. Therefore, seed is extracted not from an excess of nourishment, but from the root moisture itself.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a son becomes like to his father more than to another man because he is generated from the seed transmitted by him. But sometimes a son is likened not only to his father, but also to his grandfather or great-grandfather, even going back many generations, as the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 15.¹ Therefore, the seed must come not only from the father, but also from the grandfather and great-grandfather. But the moisture of nourishment was only ever in the father. Therefore, seed is not extracted from this moisture, but rather from the root moisture that the father drew from the grandfather, and the grandfather from the great-grandfather.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what pertains to the substance of a given thing is closer to it than what is from a foreign substance. But what is converted from food did not at root pertain to the substance of the one who generated, but pertained, rather, to the root substance of some animal, whose flesh was eaten, such as a cow or a pig. Therefore, there will be a greater affinity and likeness to the cow or pig than to one’s father. But this is unfitting. Therefore, seed is not extracted from the moisture of nourishment.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, suppose someone were to feed only on human flesh, and let us also suppose (to make the question more serious), that of the embryos he generated, there was one also nourished in the same way. On this basis, I argue as follows. The root moisture of any man is that which he has drawn from his parents. Therefore, if the seed from which this offspring is conceived is from the moisture of nourishment, his root moisture must be from the substance of the others whose flesh was eaten. Therefore, if, according to Augustine,¹ flesh eaten by someone will rise again in the one in whom it first existed, then the whole root moisture will rise again in those whose flesh was eaten by his father. Likewise, the moisture of nourishment is from the flesh of those whom he himself eats. Therefore, nothing of this person will rise again. In this case there would not be a resurrection of all, which is contrary to our faith. Therefore, it is impossible for the seed to be extracted from the moisture of nourishment. Thus, it does not seem to be excess of one’s nourishment.

Furthermore, even granting that a natural body could be divided to infinity like a mathematical one, this could not occur with the same quantity but instead with the same proportion. For in the case of any finite body, if a part were removed from it, no matter how small that part is, then when taken repeatedly it reaches the measure of the whole and even exceeds it. Hence when this kind of part is taken through division, the whole bodily object eventually has to be used up. However, if something is taken from a size always keeping the same proportion (for example, first cutting off a third of the whole size, and then a third not from the whole size, but from what is left, and so forth) the dividing to infinity will never cease. But then what is taken in the second cutting must be less in quantity than what was taken away in the first. For the first piece subtracted was a third of the whole, whereas the second is a third of part of it, and so forth. Hence if this is the way the extraction of the radical moisture—from which the seed is extracted in their opinion—takes place, there must be less radical moisture that pertained to true nature in the seed from which the son is generated than in the seed from which the father was generated. Thus, the son’s seed will not be able to generate offspring in as great a quantity as the father’s seed was able, since every natural power is divided when the subject is divided, so that in less size there is less power. Thus, it would follow that the son would always have less quantity than the father. Hence human beings would already have reached the minimum quantity, even if the first human beings had been enormous. It would also follow that children would always be weaker than their parents, since the less one has of what pertains to the truth of his own nature, the weaker he is.