Ad 1. It should be said that virtue, like power, is understood in two ways. In one way, materially, as when we say that what we can do is our power or strength; and thus Augustine calls the good use of free will a virtue. Second, essentially, and thus neither power nor virtue is an act.

Ad 2. It should be said that to deserve or merit is taken in two ways. First, properly, and thus it is nothing other than the performance of some action by which one justly acquires a reward for himself. Second, improperly, and thus any condition that makes a man in any way worthy is called merit, as when we say that the mien of Priam merits command since it was worthy of command. So a reward ought to follow on merit, and is in a way owed to the habitual quality by which one is made worthy of reward, and thus it is owed to baptized infants. It is also owed to actual merit, and thus it is not owed to virtue but to the act of virtue. Yet even to little ones it is given as by reason of actual merit, insofar as by the merit of Christ the sacrament has the efficacy, by which one is regenerated to life.

Ad 3. It should be said that Augustine says that the virtues are the highest goods, not absolutely, but of their kind, just as fire is said to be the most subtle body. Hence, it does not follow that there is nothing in us better than these virtues but that they are numbered among things that are the highest goods of their kind.

Ad 4. It should be said that just as in life there is a habitual perfection which is a virtue, and the actual perfection which is the act of virtue, so too in heaven happiness is actual perfection, proceeding from some consummate habit. Hence, the Philosopher too in Ethics 1 says that happiness is an activity in accord with perfect virtue.

Ad 5. It should be said that vicious acts directly remove the act of virtue because of contrariety, but they remove the habit of virtue only incidentally insofar as it is separated from the cause of infused virtue, namely, from God. Hence, in Isaiah 59:2: “But your iniquities have divided between you and your God.” That is why acquired virtues are not taken away by one vicious act.

Ad 6. It should be said that that definition of the Philosopher can be understood in two ways. In one way, materially, such that by virtue we understand that of which the virtue is capable, which is the utmost of which the power is capable, as the virtue of one who can carry a hundred pounds is his insofar as he can carry a hundred pounds, not sixty. Second, it can be understood essentially, and thus virtue means the utmost reach of the power because it signifies the completion or fulfillment of the power, whether or not what completes the power is other than it.

Ad 7. It should be said that sensitive and rational powers do not get the same account.

Ad 8. It should be said that a disposition for something is that through which something is moved to achieve something. But motion sometimes has its term in the same genus, as quality in the case of alteration as such; hence the disposition to that term is always of the same genus as the term. Sometimes, however, it has a term in another genus, as when the term of alteration is a substantial form, and thus the disposition is not always of the same genus as that to which it disposes, as heat is a disposition to the substantial form of heat.

Ad 9. It should be said that disposition is said in three ways. First, as heat is the disposition for the form of fire. Second, as that by which an agent is disposed to act, as speed is the disposition to run. Third, disposition means the ordering of things to one another, and Augustine takes disp6sition in this sense. Disposition in the first sense is contrasted with habit, whereas in the second sense, virtue itself is a disposition.

Ad 10. It should be said that nothing is so stable that it is not immediately undone when its cause is removed. It is no wonder then that if union with God is taken away by mortal sin, infused virtue should go. Nor does this impugn its stability, which can only be understood in terms of its cause remaining.

Ad 11. It should be said that we need habit for both operations. For natural operations for the three reasons given above; for meritorious acts too, in order that the natural power can be elevated by the infused habit to that which is above nature. Nor is this affected by the fact that God works in us, because he so acts in us that we too act, hence we need a habit whereby we can act sufficiently.

Ad 12. It should be said that every form is received in its subject in the manner of the one receiving. But it is proper to the rational power that it is capable of opposites and has dominion over its act. Hence, the rational power is not forced to do the same thing by the habitual form acquired, but it can act or not act.

Ad 13. It should be said that what is a matter of choice alone can easily come about in one way or another, but it is no easy matter for it to come about as it should, that is, expeditiously, firmly, pleasantly. For that we need the habits of the virtues.

Ad 14. It should be said that any motion, whether of man or beast, that begins from scratch is produced by some mover, and depends on something that exists prior, and thus a habit does not elicit an act from itself except insofar as it is stirred by some agent.

Ad 15. It should be said that virtue is a mean between passions, not as if it were some middle passion, but as an action that brings about a mean between passions.

Ad 1. It should be said that just as accidents are called beings, not because they subsist, but because by them something is, so virtue is not called good because it itself is good, but because by it something else is good. That is why virtue need not be good by another goodness, as if it were informed by another goodness.

Ad 2. It should be said that the good that is convertible with being is not put in the definition of virtue, but the good that is specific to the moral act.

Ad 3. It should be said that acts are distinguished according to the form of the agent, as heating and freezing are. But good and evil are, as it were, the form and object of will: The agent always impresses its form on what it acts upon, as does the mover on the moved. Therefore, moral acts, which have will as their principle, are distinguished specifically into the good and bad. But the principle of natural activities is form, not the end, and that is why natural activities are not distinguished into good and bad as species, though that is how it is in moral acts.

Ad 4. It should be said that moral goodness is not included in the understanding of quality, so the argument is not relevant.

Ad 5. It should be said that evil does not constitute a species by reason of privation, but by reason of that which sustains the privation, because it is incompatible with the notion of good, and from this it takes its species.

Ad 6. It should be said that this objection proceeds from the good of nature, not from the good of morals, which is put in the definition of virtue.

Ad 7. It should be said that goodness does not imply another goodness than that of virtue itself, as is clear from the foregoing. In its essence virtue is a quality; hence, it is obvious that good and quality do not indicate different acts, but one.

Ad 8. It should be said that this does not obtain in transcendentals which apply to every being, for essence is being and goodness is good and unity is one, but we cannot say that whiteness is white. The reason is that anything the intellect grasps falls under the notion of being, and consequently under the good and one. Hence, essence and goodness cannot be understood otherwise than under the notes of good and one and being, which is why goodness is said to be good and unity one.

Ad 9. It should be said that difference, like genus, is predicated of species essentially, not denominatively. Therefore, if the species is subsistent and compositive, it is not predicated of the difference abstractly, but concretely. The concrete names of composite substances signify the composites, and these are properly put into a category, as species and genera, for example, man and animal. Therefore, if the difference must be predicated of such a species essentially, it should be signified concretely; otherwise it would not be said of the whole species. But if the species is a simple form—think of accidents, the concrete names of which, like ‘white’ and ‘black,’ are not placed in a category as species or genera, save by way of reduction, but only as abstractly signified, e.g., whiteness, music, justice, and, generally, virtue—then either the genus or difference abstractly signified is predicated of them, and that is why, just as virtue is essentially a quality, so it is essentially the goodness of reason or of the moral.

Ad 10. It should be said that the moral good is said of the act, of the habit, and of the object. Similarly, moral evil is said of a bad act which is a sin and of a bad habit which is a vice. Hence, virtue is that which makes the one having it good and makes his act good with moral goodness; similarly vice is what makes the one having it evil and makes his act evil with moral badness. Therefore, moral evil is not the same as vice, since vice names a habit, whereas moral evil is said of habit and act and object. By parity of reasoning the moral good is not identical with virtue, since moral goodness is said of the act as well. — Three things can be considered in virtue. — First, that which the essence of virtue directly implies, and thus virtue implies a certain disposition whereby a thing is well and fittingly disposed given its nature. Hence, the Philosopher says in Physics 7 that “virtue is a disposition that perfects for the best, and I mean the perfected which is disposed according to nature.” In this way, vice is opposed to virtue because it implies a disposition by which a thing is disposed to that which does not befit its nature. Hence, Augustine says in On free will 3: “When you see something that is lacking to the perfection of a nature, call it a vice, because the vice of a thing seems to be that by which it is indisposed to that which befits its nature.” — Second, is that which follows on its essence which virtue signifies by way of consequence; in this way, virtue implies a goodness that makes the one having it good. For a thing’s good consists in this, that it is appropriately disposed with respect to its nature. This is what virtue brings about, as has been said, which is why it is an ordered, that is, a good action. For virtue is ordered by reason to the good or fitting act. Hence, virtue is the perfection of a power with reference to act and not only makes the one having it good but makes his act good as well. In this way, virtue is opposed to sin, which properly signifies an inordinate act. — From this it is clear that the vicious habit, evil, and sin can be called the evil of morals, and every virtue the good of morals, and not the reverse.

Ad 11. It should be said that mind is taken here to stand for the rational powers and thus means both intellect and will: will is essentially a rational power. Virtues are found both in intellect and in the affective part. Intellectual virtues give the capacity of acting well but not the good use of that capacity, whereas moral virtues, which are virtues simply speaking, give to the affective both the capacity of acting well and its good use, bringing it about that one uses the capacity well and rightly. For example, justice not only gives one the capacity to perform just acts but also makes one act justly. Grammar, on the other hand, only gives the capacity to speak correctly and well, but does not bring it about that a man always speaks well. One well versed in grammar can make grammatical mistakes, for example, solecisms. From which it is clear that virtue refers both to the appetitive and the intellective powers, since both are included in mind.

Ad 12. It should be said that mind means a type of power which is the principle of the acts over which man has dominion, and these are properly called human acts. Reason and will are such powers, for they are what first move and command the act over which man has dominion, and they are said to be essentially rational. But the irascible and concupiscible are principles of human acts insofar as they participate in reason, but as moved movers. For they are moved by the higher appetite insofar as they obey it, and thus, insofar as they participate in reason and are so fashioned as to obey this, it is clear that reason and will are the first principle of the human act as moving and commanding, and sensitive appetite is a secondary principle as a moved mover, and such powers are meant by mind and can be the subject of virtue. — Again, mind implies a power that is rational either essentially or by way of participation. The irascible and concupiscible are rational powers by way of participation, and can be the subject of virtue insofar as they participate in mind.

Ad 13. It should be said that mind signifies what is highest in the soul’s power. Hence, since the divine image is found in that which is highest in us, it must be said that image does not pertain to soul in its essence but only according to mind which names its highest power. Thus, insofar as it is image mind names a power of the soul and not its essence; thus mind includes those powers which in their acts recede from matter and the conditions of matter. In mind are included intelligence, will, and memory, not as accidents of a subject, but as parts of a whole.

Ad 14. It should be said that rectitude is of two kinds. There is one which is special and is constitutive with reference to external things which come into man’s use and are the proper matter of justice. There is another that is general and implies an order to the fitting end and to divine law, and this is common to every virtue and enters into the definition of virtue.

Ad 15. It should be said that “to live” is taken in two ways. In one way for the existence of the living thing, and thus it pertains to the essence of the soul which is the principle of being in living things. Hence, the Philosopher in On the Soul 2 says that for living things to exist is for them to live. In that sense, ‘live’ does not enter into the definition of virtue. It is taken in another sense for the activity of the living thing, insofar as understanding and sensing are ways of being alive. Hence, it is that the activity that is most pleasurable and most occupies one is called his life, and the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 1 that the human race lives by art and reasoning, that is, acts. It is in this sense that life is put in the definition of virtue, which by virtue a man rightly acts.

Ad 16. It should be said that badly using virtue can mean two things. First, when it is taken as an object, and then one can badly use it when he thinks ill of virtue or hates or takes pride in it. Second, as the elicitive principle of bad use, such that a bad act is elicited by virtue, and in this sense one cannot use virtue badly. For virtue is a habit always inclining to the good, since every virtue gives the capacity of acting well and also give good use and not just the capacity and insure that one uses the capacity well. Of this kind are the virtues of the appetitive power, as justice not only makes a man ready to do just things but brings it about that he acts justly.

Ad 17. It should be said that only the greatest goods are such that one cannot use them badly as objects since they are of themselves desirable and can be hated by no one. But virtues, which are not the greatest goods, one can use badly as objects, as was said above; but they cannot be used badly as being the elicitive principle. It is not necessary that what one cannot use badly as an elicitive principle should be the highest good. It can also be said, according to Augustine, that virtue is numbered among the highest goods insofar as through it man is ordered to the highest good, which is God, and for this reason no one uses virtue badly.

Ad 18. It should be said that just as acquired virtues increase and are nourished by the acts that caused them, so infused virtues are increased by the act of God by whom they are caused. Our acts dispose for an increase of charity and the infused virtues, as a man at the outset, by doing what is natural to him, prepares and disposes himself to receive charity from God. Subsequent acts can merit an increase in charity because they presuppose charity, which is the principle of merit. But no one can merit that he might receive charity in the first place, because there can be no merit without charity. From which it is clear that charity and the other infused virtues are not actively increased by acts, but only as disposing and meriting; they are actively increased by the action of God who perfects and conserves the charity that he first infused.

Ad 19. It should be said that sin is what prevents virtue. Free will without the action of God is not of itself sufficient to remove sin, because God alone effectively wipes away iniquity and rids of sin. The Holy Spirit moving the mind of man more or less according to his own will provides any disposition or preparation or effort of free will that precedes charity. For the remission of sin is not without grace, and thus in Romans 3:24, we read, “They are justified freely by his grace.”

Ad 20. It should be said that infused virtue is caused in us by God without our doing anything but not without our consent; thus, God does not justify us unless we are consenting because it is by an act of free will that we consent to God’s justice when we are justified. That movement is not formally the cause of justifying grace, but its effect, such that the whole operation pertains to grace and to God, which effectively justifies by infusing grace. The things done by us of which we are the cause God causes in us but not without our acting, for he acts in every will and nature.

Ad 21. It should be said that the definition of virtue, properly understood, does not apply to grace, for grace is an instance of the first species of quality. It is not a habit like virtue, nor is it immediately ordered to activity; rather, it is like a relation which confers a kind of spiritual and divine existence On the Soul and is presupposed by the infused virtues as their cause and root. Grace is to the essence of soul as health is to the body. That is why Chrysostom in a homily said that grace is the health of mind. It is not counted among the sciences or virtues or the other qualities that philosophers have enumerated because they only knew those accidents of the soul which are ordered to acts proportioned to human nature. — Virtue, therefore, is essentially a habit, but grace is not a habit but rather a supernatural participation in the divine nature according to which we become consorts of the divine nature, as is said in 1 Peter 2, by the reception of which we are said to be reborn as the sons of God. Hence, just as the natural light of reason is root and cause of acquired virtue, so the light of grace, which is the participation in the divine nature in the very essence of the soul by means of a kind of indwelling, is the root and cause of infused virtue. — Again, virtue is a good quality which makes the one having it good: For this goodness which virtue confers on the one having it is the goodness of perfection in relation to activity of which it is the immediate principle. But the goodness that grace confers On the Soul is the goodness of perfection not immediately in relation to activity but to a certain spiritual and divine existence, thanks to which those having grace are said to be made like God and thus sons of God freely by his grace. Hence, the ‘good’ put in the definition of virtue indicates a fittingness to some pre-existent nature, essential or participated. This good is not attributed to grace, save as to the principle and cause of such goodness in man. — Mind as it is put in the definition of virtue means a power of the soul, which is the subject of virtue; but potency in the definition of grace means the essence of the soul, which is the subject of grace.

Ad 1. It should be said that living as it occurs in the definition of virtue pertains to action, as was said earlier.

Ad 2. It should be said that spiritual existence is from grace, not from virtue, for grace is the principle of existing spiritually, but virtue is the principle of acting spiritually.

Ad 3. It should be said that the power is not of itself a subject, but only insofar as it is sustained by the soul.

Ad 4. It should be noted that we are speaking now of human virtues. Therefore, powers which cannot in any way be human, since the sway of reason does not extend to them, cannot be subjects of virtue, e.g., the vegetative powers. However, whatever resistance arises from such powers is mediated through sense appetite to which the sway of reason extends and which can therefore be called human and be the subject of human virtue.

Ad 5. It should be said that only the agent intellect and the powers of the vegetable soul are active powers of soul, and they are not subjects of any habit. But the passive powers of the soul are the principles of acts only insofar as they are moved by their active causes.

Ad 6. It should be said that it is not necessary to regress infinitely, because we will come to an accident that is not in potency to another accident.

Ad 7. It should be said that there is no quality of quality such that one quality would be the per se subject of another, which is not the case here, as was said above.

Ad 1. It should be said that virtue and mortal sin can be considered as acts or as habits. For the acts of the concupiscible and irascible, considered in themselves, are not mortal sins, but turn into mortal sin when, with reason consenting or moving, they tend to what is contrary to divine law. Some of these acts then, taken as such, cannot be acts of virtue, but only when they concur in following the command of reason. Thus the act of mortal sin and of virtue pertain in a way to the irascible and concupiscible, and that is why the habit of either can be in the irascible and concupiscible. And so in the case in point: just as the act of virtue consists in this that the irascible and concupiscible follow reason, so the act of sin consists in this, that reason is drawn to follow the inclination of the irascible and concupiscible. That is why sin and the virtues of the irascible and concupiscible are often attributed to reason as to their proximate cause.

Ad 2. It should be said that, as has been pointed out already, the act of virtue cannot be of the irascible and concupiscible alone, apart from reason. Choice, the chief thing in the act of virtue, comes from reason, and, as in any activity, the action of the agent is prior to the passion of the patient. But reason commands the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore, virtue is not said to be in the irascible or concupiscible as if the whole act of virtue or even its chief part were accomplished by them, but insofar as, by the habit of virtue, the ultimate fulfillment of goodness is conferred on the act of virtue, such that the irascible and concupiscible follow the command of reason without difficulty.

Ad 3. It should be said that, supposing that the irascible and concupiscible do not actually remain in the separated soul, they would still remain in it as in their root, for the essence of the soul is the root of the powers. Similarly, virtues which are ascribed to the irascible and concupiscible remain in reason as in their root, for reason is the root of all the virtues, as will be shown later.

Ad 4. It should be said that a certain hierarchy is found in forms. For some forms and powers are totally immersed in matter and their activities are wholly material, as is evident of the forms of elements. But the intellect is wholly free from matter, so its operation does not involve any sharing in matter. The irascible and concupiscible are in a midway condition. For the bodily change conjoined to their acts shows that they use a bodily organ, but that they are in some way lifted above matter is shown by this, that they are moved on command and obey reason. So there is virtue in them insofar as they are lifted above matter and obey reason.

Ad 5. It should be said that although the order of reason in which the irascible and concupiscible participate is not something subsistent and cannot be a subject as such, yet it can be the reason why something is a subject.

Ad 6. It should be said that the powers of sense knowledge are naturally prior to reason since reason receives from them, but the appetitive naturally follow the order of reason since the lower appetite naturally obeys the higher, and so it is not similar.

Ad 7. It should be said that the rebellion against reason by the irascible and concupiscible cannot be wholly removed by virtue; since of their very nature the irascible and concupiscible tend to that which is good according to sense, they sometimes resist reason. But this can be brought about by the divine power which is even capable of changing natures. Nevertheless, this rebellion is diminished by virtue insofar as these powers become accustomed to being subject to reason, and thus, they have what pertains to virtue from outside, namely, from the dominion of reason over them. Of themselves they retain something of the movements proper to them which are sometimes contrary to reason.

Ad 8. It should be said that although there is in man the principle of reason, the integrity of human nature requires not only reason, but also the lower powers, and the body too. So it is that left to itself the condition of human nature is such that there is resistance to reason on the part of the lower powers, something which follows on the fact that these lower powers of the soul have their own activities. It is otherwise in the state of innocence and of glory, since reason thanks to its union with God draws strength to contain entirely the lower powers.

Ad 9. It should be said insofar as the detestation of evil is said to pertain to the irascible, it not only implies a turning away from evil but a move by the irascible to destroy evil, much like one who not only flees evil but is moved by anger to extirpate evil. But this is to do something good. Although evil thus detested, it is not only this that pertains to the irascible and concupiscible, for to pursue an arduous good pertains to the irascible, in which there is not only the motion of wrath and boldness but of hope.

Ad 10. It should be said that those words must be understood by way of adaption and not properly, for in every power of the soul there is a desire for a proper good, so the irascible desires victory as the concupiscible desires pleasure. But because the concupiscible is drawn to something simply or absolutely good for the whole animal, every desire of the good is attributed to it.

Ad 11. It should be said that, although the irascible and concupiscible, considered as such, are acted upon and do not act, however, insofar as in man they participate somewhat in reason they also in a way act and are not wholly acted upon. Hence, in the Politics the Philosopher says the reason’s dominion over these powers is pofitical, because such powers retain their own activities and do not obey reason completely. The soul’s dominion over body is not royal but despotic, because the members of the body instantly obey the soul so far as their activities go.

Ad 12. It should be said that although these powers are found in brutes, in them they do not participate in reason and thus they cannot have moral virtues.

Ad 13. It should be said all evil can be laid to concuptscence as to its ultimate, but not to its proximate, root. All passions take their rise from the concupiscible and irascible, as was shown when we dealt with the emotions. Indeed, the perversity of reason and will most often come about because of the emotions. Or we could say that we understand by concupiscence not only the concupiscible power itself but what is common to all appetitive powers, in each species of which there is to be found something of concupiscence, because of which sin occurs. One cannot otherwise sin than by desiring and seeking.

Ad 1. It should be said that the judgment of reason suffices for the will to command, since will naturally seeks the good according to reason, as the concupiscible seeks what is pleasurable to the sense.

Ad 2. It should be said that the natural inclination of will is not only to the ultimate end, but to the good shown to it by reason. For the good as understood is the object of will and to it the will is naturally ordered, as any power is ordered to its own object, so long as it is its proper good, as was said earlier. But one can sin in this regard insofar as the judgment of reason is intercepted by emotion.

Ad 3. It should be said that knowledge comes about through some likeness ( species ), nor does the power of intellect suffice of itself for knowing unless it receives an intelligible species. That is why in things that we know naturally there must be some habit which also takes its rise from the senses, as is said at the end of the PosteriorAnalytics . But will does not need any species in order to will, so the case is not similar.

Ad 4. It should be said that the virtues which concern emotions are in the lower appetite, nor is any virtue of the higher appetite required for them, for the reason already given.

Ad 5. It should be said that friendship is not a virtue properly speaking, but something following on virtue. For because one is virtuous it follows that he will love those like himself It is otherwise with charity, which is a friendship with God that lifts man up to that which exceeds the limits of his nature. Hence, charity is in the will, as we said.

Ad 6 & 7. From this the reply to six and seven are obvious, for the virtue joining the will to God is charity.

Ad 8. It should be said that certain dispositions are prerequisites to happiness, such as the acts of the moral virtues by which impediments to happiness are removed, such as disturbance of the mind by passions and external distractions. But there is an act of virtue which when it is complete is essentially happiness, namely, the act of reason or intellect. For contemplative happiness is nothing else than the perfect contemplation of the highest truth; but active happiness is the act of prudence by which a man governs himself and others. But there is something perfective of happiness, namely, pleasure which completes happiness as comeliness does youth, as is said in Ethics 10. This pertains to will, and if we are speaking of celestial happiness which is promised to the saints, the will is ordered to it by charity, but if we are speaking of contemplative happiness, the will is ordered to it by a natural desire. Thus, it is clear that not all virtues need be in the will.

Ad 9. It should be said that one lives rightly or sinfully by will which commands all the acts of virtues and vices, although not as eliciting, so it is not necessary that the will be the proximate subject of every virtue.

Ad 10. It should be said that every sin is in the will as in its cause insofar as every sin comes about by consent of the will, but it is not necessary that every sin be in the will as in its subject: Gluttony and dissipation are in the concupiscible, and pride is in the irascible.

Ad 11. It should be said that from will’s closeness to reason it happens that will is in harmony with reason just because of what it is, and therefore, there is no need of any habit of virtue besides, as there is with the lower powers, namely, the irascible and concupiscible.

Ad 1. It should be said that charity and hope which are in the will are not included in this division of philosophy, for they are another kind of virtue called theological. justice is included among the moral virtues, for the will like other appetites participates in reason in the sense that it is directed by reason. For although will belongs by nature to the same intellectual part as reason, it is not the same power as reason.

Ad 2. It should be said that with respect to the things to which a virtue of the irascible or concupiscible relates, there need be no virtue in will, for the reason already given.

Ad 1. It should be said that the Philosopher is speaking there of practical science, and prudence implies more than practical science. Practical science makes a universal judgment of things to be done, for example, fornication is evil, theft ought not he committed, and the like. This knowledge can be present yet reason’s judgment concerning the particular act be intercepted with the result that one does not judge correctly. That is why moral science is said to avail little for the acquisition of virtue, because even when it is had a man can sin against virtue. It is the task of prudence to judge correctly concerning singular things to be done, to be done now, a judgment that is indeed corrupted by any sin. Therefore, while prudence remains, a man does not sin. Hence, it avails not a little but much for virtue, indeed it causes virtue, as has been said.

Ad 2. It should be said that a man can take general advice from another concerning what is to be done, but that he rightly follow it in action against all passions can only result from the rectitude of prudence without which virtue simply would not be.

Ad 3. It should be said that the ignorance which is the opposite of prudence is ignorance of choice according to which every evil is due to the ignorance which follows on the interception of reason’s judgment by the inclination of appetite. And this is no excuse for sin, since it constitutes it, but the ignorance which is opposed to practical science excuses or diminishes sin.

Ad 4. It should be said that Cicero’s remark is to be understood as applying to the inclination of appetite tending to some general good, such as acting courageously and the like. But if this inclination is not directed by the judgment of reason, it is frequently led astray and so much the more as it is more vehement, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 6 of the blind man who is the more injured by hitting the wall the faster he runs.

Ad 5. It should be said that the good and true are objects of different parts of the soul, namely, of the intellective and the appetitive, which two are so related that both act on the act of the other, as win wishes the intellect to understand and intellect understands the will to will. Therefore, these two, good and true, include one another, since the good is a kind of truth, insofar as it is grasped by intellect when intellect understands the will to be willing the good or even insofar as it understands that something is good. So too the true is a good of intellect which thus falls to the will insofar as a man wills to understand the true. Nevertheless, the truth of the practical intellect is the good, which is the end of action, for good does not move appetite save insofar as it is understood. Therefore, nothing prevents there being a virtue in practical intellect.

Ad 6. It should be said that the Philosopher defines moral virtue in Ethics 2 and intellectual virtue in Ethics 6. The virtue that is in practical intellect is not moral but intellectual, since the Philosopher numbers prudence among the intellectual virtues, as is evident in Ethics 2.

Ad 1. It should be said that a habit of speculative intellect is ordered to its proper act which makes it perfect, that is, to the consideration of truth, but it is not ordered to some external action as to an end: Its end lies in its proper act. But practical intellect is ordered to an external action as to its end, for the consideration of what ought to be done or made pertains to practical intellect for the sake of acting or doing. Thus, the habit of speculative intellect makes its act good in a more noble way than does the habit of practical intellect, the former as an end, the latter as for an end, even though the habit of practical intellect, insofar as it orders to the good as good, and presupposes the will, is more properly called virtue.

Ad 2. It should be said that a man is not said to be simply good when he is only partially good but only when he is good as a whole, which comes about by the goodness of will. The will commands the acts of all human powers, because every act is the good of its power. Thus, a man will be called simply good when he has a good will. But he who has goodness with respect to some power, not presupposing a good will, is called good insofar as he has good sight or hearing or is said to see and hear well. It is clear from this that a man is not said to be absolutely good just because he knows; he is only said to think well, and the same is true with respect to art and other like habits.

Ad 3. It should be said that science is distinguished from moral virtue yet is an intellectual virtue; it is also distinguished from virtue in the most proper sense, for it is not that kind of virtue, as has been said.

Ad 4. It should be said that the speculative intellect is not ordered to something outside itself, but it is ordered to its own act as to an end. Ultimate, that is, contemplative, happiness consists in its activity. Hence, the acts of speculative intellect are closer to ultimate happiness by way of similarity than the habits of practical intellect, though the habits of practical intellect are perhaps closer by way of preparation or merit.

Ad 5. It should be said that by the act of such a habit as science a man can merit insofar as it is commanded by will without which there is no merit. However, science does not perfect intellect in that way, as has been said. A man is not made willing to use it from the fact that he has knowledge, but only capablc.Thcrcf0rc, a bad will Is not opposed to science or art as It is to prudence, faith, or temperance. Hence, the Philosopher says that he who sins voluntarily in things to be done is less prudent, though it is the opposite in science and art: The grammarian who deliberately commits a solecism is no less a grammarian.

Ad 1. It should be said that virtues are called natural because of the natural beginnings of virtue in a man, not because of their perfection.

Ad 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The same answer applies to all these.

Ad 6. It should be said that the ability to be good is in us from nature simply speaking in that the powers are natural; but to will and to know are in us by nature in a manner of speaking, namely, according to some general beginning, but this does not suffice for virtue. For good action, which is the effect of virtue, requires that a man promptly and for the most part infallibly attain the good, which no one can do without the habit of virtue. Clearly someone may know generally how to make a work of art, for example to argue, to saw, or to make something, but to do so readily and without error, he has need of art, and it is the same with virtue.

Ad 7. It should be said that for man to turn away from evil is in a way natural, but to do this promptly and infallibly the habit of virtue is needed.

Ad 8. It should be said that virtue is not said to be partly from nature because some part of it is from nature and another not, but because it is from nature according to an imperfect way of being, namely, according to potency and aptitude.

Ad 9. It should be said that God is of himself perfected in goodness; hence, there is no way in which he needs to pursue goodness. The higher substances close to him need little from him in order to achieve the perfection of goodness. But man, who is more remote, needs many things for the pursuit of perfect goodness, because he is capable of happiness. Creatures who are not capable of happiness need fewer things than a man does. Hence, man is more worthy than they, even though he needs more things, just as one who can acquire perfect health by much exercise is better disposed than another who can achieve only a little even though by slight exercise.

Ad 10. It should be said that there can be a natural inclination with respect to the object of one virtue but not with respect to all because the natural disposition which inclines to one virtue inclines to the opposite of another virtue. For example, one naturally disposed to courage, which is the pursuit of the arduous, is less disposed to patience, which consists in restraining the passions of the irascible. Thus we see that animals naturally inclined to the act of one virtue are inclined to a vice contrary to another virtue, as the Eon who is bold is also naturally cruel. Such natural inclinations to this or that virtue suffice for animals who are incapable of achieving the perfect good according to virtue but pursue some limited good. But men are made to achieve the perfect good according to virtue and must therefore have an inclination to all the acts of virtue, which, since it cannot be from nature, must come from reason, in which are found the seeds of all the virtues.

Ad 11. It should be said that the mean of virtue is not determined by nature as is the middle of the earth toward which heavy things tend. The mean of virtue must be determined by right reason, as is said in Ethics 2, because what is enough for one is too little or too much for another.

Ad 12. It should be said that mode, species, and order constitute any good, as Augustine says in On the nature ofgood 2. Hence, mode, species, and order, in which the good of nature consists, are naturally present in man nor are they taken away by sin. Sin can be called the deprivation of mode, species, and order insofar as the good of virtue consists of these.

Ad 13. It should be said that the will does not produce its act through some species informing it, as the possible intellect does. Therefore, no natural habit for a natural desire is needed in the will, and all the less so because the will is moved by the natural habit of intellect insofar as the known good is the object of will.

Ad 14. It should be said that although the principle of virtue, namely, reason, is within man, this principle does not work in the mode of nature, and that is why what comes from it is not called natural.

Ad 15. The same response suffices for 15.

Ad 16. It should be said that their malice was natural insofar as it was due to custom, since custom is a second nature. But we were by nature the sons of wrath because of original sin, which is a sin of nature.

Ad 17. It should be said that it is natural that the lower powers be subject to reason, but not that they be subject to it according to a habit.

Ad 18. It should be said that motion is said to be natural because of the natural aptitude of the moveable when the mover moves to one determinate thing in the manner of nature, as do the generator of the elements and the mover of the heavenly bodies. But that is not how it is in the case in point, so the argument does not work.

Ad 19. It should be said that the natural inclination to virtue, thanks to which some almost from birth are brave and temperate, does not suffice for perfect virtue, as has been said.

Ad 20. It should be said that nature does not fail man in necessary things, for although it does not provide everything that is necessary for him, it enables him to acquire all necessary things by means of reason and the powers that obey it.

Ad 1. It should be said that Augustine is speaking of the virtues ordered to eternal happiness.

Ad 2, 3, 4. The same remark applies to these.

Ad 5. It should be said that acquired virtue does not cause us always to turn from sin, but only for the most part, just as things that come about naturally are only for the most part. But it does not follow from this that anyone is simultaneously vicious and virtuous, because one act of a power does not remove the acquired habit of vice or virtue, and one cannot by acquired virtue avoid every sin. Through acquired virtue, the sin of infidelity is not avoided, nor the other sins opposed to the infused virtues.

Ad 6. It should be said that we do not arrive at heavenly bliss by means of the acquired virtues, but at a certain happiness that a man has been fashioned to achieve in this life by what is naturally proper to him according to the act of perfect virtue of which Aristotle treats in Ethics 10.

Ad 7. It should be said that acquired virtue is not the greatest good simply speaking, but the greatest among human goods; infused virtue is the greatest good simply speaking, since by it a man is ordered to the highest good, which is God.

Ad 8. It should be said that a thing considered in the same way cannot form itself, but when there is in a thing one principle that is active and another that is passive, it can form itself partly, namely, such that one of its parts forms and another is formed, just as something moves itself insofar as one of its parts is mover and another moved, as is said in Physics 8. So it is in the generation of virtue, as has been shown.

Ad 9. It should be said that science is acquired by intellect not only by discovery but also by teaching, which is from another; so too in the acquisition of virtue, a man is helped by correction and discipline, which are from another. The less one needs these, the more disposed to virtue he is, just as the more one is ingenious of mind, the less need he has of external doctrine.

Ad 10. It should be said that active and passive powers come together in man’s action, and something comes forth from the powers insofar as they are active and nothing is received by them; to the passive as passive it falls to acquire something by way of receiving. Hence, in a power which is active alone, such as the agent intellect, no habit is acquired by action.

Ad 11. It should be said that the more efficacious the action of the agent, the quicker it induces the form. Thus, in intellectual matters we see that one powerful demonstration can cause science in us. But opinion, though it is less than science, is not caused in us by one dialectical syllogism, but requires many because of their weakness. Hence, in things to be done, because activities of the soul are not efficacious as are demonstrations, because things to be done are contingent and probable, one act does not suffice to cause virtue but many are required. And though these many are not simultaneous, they still cause a habit, because the first act causes some disposition and the second act, finding the matter disposed, disposes it even more, and third yet more and thus the ultimate act acting in virtue of all the preceding completes the generation of virtue, like the many drops that hollow the stone.

Ad 12. It should be said that Avicenna intends to define natural virtue which follows on the form which is an essential principle; hence, his definition is not apropos.

Ad 13. It should be said that virtue is generated by acts that are in a way virtuous and in a way vicious. For the acts preceding virtue are indeed virtuous with respect to what is done, insofar as a man does brave and just things, but not with respect to the manner of acting, because before acquiring the habit of virtue a man does not do the works of virtue as the virtuous man does, namely, promptly and without doubt and with pleasure and easily.

Ad 14. It should be said that reason is more noble than the virtue generated in the appetitive part, since such a virtue is only caused by a certain participation in reason. Therefore, the act which precedes virtue can cause virtue insofar as it is from reason, which confers that which is of perfection in it. For its imperfection is in the appetitive power in which the habit is not yet caused by which a man with pleasure and with expedition brings off that which is commanded by reason.

Ad 15. It should be said that virtue is said to be the utmost of a power, not because it is always something of the essence of the power, but because it inclines to that of which the power is ultimately capable.

Ad 16. It should be said that man is good according to his own nature in a manner of speaking, not absolutely. In order for something to be absolutely good it must be totally perfected, just as in order for something to be beautiful absolutely there must be no deformity or defilement in any part. Someone is called simply and totally good because he has a good will, because it is by will that a man uses all the other powers. Therefore, a good will makes a man good simply speaking, and because of this the virtue of the appetitive part, thanks to which the Will becomes good, is that which simply speaking makes the one having it good.

Ad 17. It should be said that the acts which are prior to virtue can indeed be called natural because they proceed from natural reason, insofar as natural is distinguished from acquired. But they cannot be called natural insofar as natural is distingu’ ished from what is of reason. Thus, it is said that we do not become accustomed, or the opposite, to what is natural, insofar as nature is distinguished from reason.

Ad 18. It should be said that grace is called the form of infused virtue, not because it gives it its specific being, but insofar as by it its act is informed in a certain way. Hence, there is no need that political virtue be had by the infusion of grace.

Ad 19. It should be said that virtue is made strong in weakness, not because weakness causes virtue, but because it provides an occasion for some virtue, namely, humility. It is also the matter of a virtue, namely, patience, and even of charity, insofar as someone ministers to the weakness of his neighbor. And it is naturally a sign of virtue, because the more virtuous the soul the less effort is required to move the body to the act of virtue.

Ad 20. It should be said that properly speaking a thing is not said to be altered when it acquires its proper perfection. Thus, since virtue is man’s proper perfection, a man is not said to be altered when he acquires virtue, save perhaps incidentally, insofar as the alteration of the sensible part of the soul which is the seat of the soul’s emotions pertains to virtue.

Ad 21. It should be said that a man can be said to be such and such [qualis] or according to a quality which is in the intellective part, and this is not.from the natural make-up of the body nor the influence of the heavenly bodies since the intellective part is free of any body. Or a man can be called such and such according to a disposition in the sensitive part, which can indeed be due to the natural make-up of the body, or from the influence of celestial bodies. However, since this part naturally obeys reason, it can be diminished by custom or even totally removed.

Ad 22. From this the response to 22 is evident, for according to the disposition that is in the sensitive part, some are said to have a natural inclination to vice or virtue, etc.

Ad 1. It should be said that a man is perfected in two ways when he first comes into being. First, with respect to the nutritive and sensitive powers, by a perfection that does not indeed exceed the capacity of corporeal matter. Second, with respect to the intellective part which does exceed the natural and bodily. It is by the latter that a man is perfect simply speaking, but by the former only in a certain respect. So too a man can be perfected in two ways with respect to the perfection of the end of man, first, according to the capacity of his nature and, second, by a supernatural perfection. It is by the latter that a man is called perfect simply speaking, but by the former only in a certain respect. So it is that man has a twofold virtue, one that answers to the first perfection, which is not virtue in the fullest sense, and another that answers to ultimate perfection, and this is the true and perfect virtue of man.

Ad 2. It should be said that nature provides man with what is necessary according to his power; hence, with respect to the things which do not exceed the capacity of nature, a man has from nature not only receptive principles but also active principles. But with respect to the things which exceed the capacity of his nature, a man has from nature only an aptitude to receive.

Ad 3. It should be said that man’s seed acts according to the whole power of man, but the seeds of the virtues naturally placed in human nature do not act according to the whole power of God; hence, it does not follow that they can cause whatever God can cause.

Ad 4. It should be said that since there is no merit without charity, the act of acquired virtue cannot be meritorious without charity. But other virtues are infused along with charity; hence, the act of acquired virtue can only be meritorious by the mediation of infused virtue. For the virtue ordered to an inferior end does not produce an act ordered to the superior end without the mediation of the superior virtue. just as courage, which is a virtue of man as man, does not order its act to the political good except by the mediation of the courage, which is the virtue of man insofar as he is a citizen.

Ad 5. It should be said that when an action proceeds from several agents ordered to one another, its perfection and goodness can be impeded by one of those agents, even if the other is perfect; however perfect the artisan he does not cause perfect operation if there is a defective instrument. In human activities which become good thanks to virtue, this must be taken into account: The action of the higher power does not depend on the inferior power, but the action of the inferior depends on the superior. Therefore, in order for the acts of the inferior powers – the irascible and concupiscible – to be perfect, not only must intellect he ordered to the ultimate end by faith, and the will by charity, but the inferior powers too, namely, the irascible and concupiscible, have their own activities in order that their acts might be good and orderable to the ultimate end.

Ad 6. The response to the sixth is clear from this.

Ad 7. It should be said that God can produce a form of the same kind that nature produces by himself without the operation of nature. For this reason, the health which is brought about miraculously by God is of the same species as the health that nature causes. Hence, it does not follow that every form that God can make can also be made by nature, nor is it necessary that infused virtue, which is immediately from God, should be of the same species as acquired virtue.

Ad 8. It should be said that infused and acquired temperance agree in matter, for both are concerned with what is pleasant to touch, but they do not agree in the form of their effects or acts, for although each seeks the mean, infused temperance attains it in one way and acquired temperance in another. For infused temperance seeks the mean according to the reasons of divine law, which are taken from their order to the ultimate end, but acquired temperance takes its mean according to inferior reasons, as ordered to the good of the present life.

Ad 9. It should be said that the ultimate end does not specify in moral matters except insofar as there is a due proportion to the ultimate end on the part of the proximate end. For the things which are for the sake of the end must be proportioned to the end, something the goodness of counsel also requires in order that one might decide on the fitting means to the end, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 6

Ad 10. It should be said that the act of any habit, as commanded by that habit, takes its moral species, formally speaking, from the act itself. Hence, when one fornicates in order to steal, although his act is materially one of intemperance, it is formally one of avarice, for it is not specific to intemperance that its act be commanded by avarice. But insofar as an act of temperance or courage is commanded by charity ordering it to the ultimate end, the acts formally are specified and formally speaking become acts of charity, but it does not follow that it is from this that temperance and courage are specified. Therefore, infused temperance and courage do not differ specifically from the acquired in this, that their acts are commanded by charity, but rather because their acts are constituted in a mean orderable to the ultimate end which is the object of charity.

Ad 11. It should be said that infused temperance is in the irascible, but the irascible and concupiscible take on the name of reason or rational insofar as they share in some way in reason, that is, by obeying it. Therefore, they have the name of mind in the same way, insofar as they obey mind, so what Augustine says is true: Infused virtue is a good quality of mind.

Ad 12. It should be said that man’s vice comes about when he is reduced to inferior things, but his virtue when he is elevated to the higher. That is why only virtue, and not vice, can be from infusion.

Ad 13. It should be said that when something passive is fashioned to acquire different perfections from different ordered agents, there is a difference and order of passive powers in the recipient responding to the difference and order of the active powers of the agents, because the passive power responds to the active. Thus, it is that water or earth have a potency according to which they are moved by fire, and another insofar as they are fashioned to be moved by the heavenly body, and yet another according to which they can be moved by God. For water or earth can become something in virtue of a supernatural agent that they cannot become by the power of a natural agent. For this reason we say that in every creature there is an obediential potency, insofar as every creature obeys God in receiving whatever God wills. There is in the soul a potency fashioned to be actuated by a connatural agent, and in this way it is in potency to acquired virtues. In another way there is a potency in the soul which is fashioned to be actuated only by the divine power, and in this way the infused virtues are potentially in the soul.

Ad 14. It should be said that passions inclining to evil are not completely taken away by either acquired or infused virtue, except maybe miraculously. There always remains the struggle between the flesh and the spirit, even with moral virtue. The Apostle speaks of this in Galatians 5:17: “For the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.” But these passions are modified by both acquired and infused virtue, such that a man is not moved by them in an unbridled way, but acquired virtue in some degree prevails and so too infused virtue. Acquired virtue prevails in this, that the struggle is felt less, and this is due to its cause, since it is by frequent acts that a man is accustomed to virtue, and a man becomes unaccustomed to obey such passions when he has learned to resist them and that is why he feels their troubling less. But infused virtue prevails in this, that while such passions are felt they in no way dominate, for infused virtue brings it about that the concupiscence of sin is in no way obeyed, and while it remains, it does this infallibly. But acquired virtue fails in this, though rarely, just as other natural inclinations fail infrequently. Hence, the Apostle says in Romans 7:5, “For when we were in the flesh, the sinful passions which were aroused by the Law, were at work in our members so that they brought forth fruit unto death. But now we have been set free from the Law, having died to that by which we were held down, so that we may serve in a new spirit and not according to the outworn letter.”

Ad 15. It should be said that because from the outset infused virtue does not always take away the feeling of the passions like acquired virtue, they are not from the outset performed with pleasure, but this is not out of keeping with what is meant by virtue, because sometimes it suffices for virtue that we act without sadness, and it is not required that we act with pleasure or fail to feel annoyance. The Philosopher says in Ethics 3 that it is enough if the brave man acts without sadness.

Ad 16. It should be said that an acquired habit is not corrupted by one simple act; still the act of contrition corrupts the habit of vice through the power of grace. Thus, in one who has the habit of intemperance and is contrite there does not remain with the virtue of infused temperance the habit of intemperance in the sense of a habit, but it is on the way to corruption, as a certain disposition. But a disposition is not the contrary of a perfect habit.

Ad 17. It should be said that, although infused virtue is not caused by acts, still acts can dispose to it, hence it is not unfitting that it be corrupted by acts, because form is taken away by the indisposition of matter, as the soul separated from body because of the indisposition of matter.

Ad 18. It should be said that moral virtue is not named from Mos insofar as it signifies the accustoming of the appetitive power, for in this way the infused virtue could be called moral, although they are not caused by accustoming.

Ad 19. It should be said that the acts of infused virtue do not cause a habit, but due to them pre-existing habits are increased. No more by the acts of acquired virtue is any habit generated, otherwise habits would be multiplied ad infinitum.

Ad 1. It should be said that just as we speak of increase in charity and other qualities by way of similarity, so too do we attribute quantity to them, as is clear from what has been said.

Ad 2. It should be said that form is invariable because it is not subject to variation, but it can be called variable insofar as its subject is varied and participates in it more and less.

Ad 3. It should be said that the motion of a thing can be understood to be according to essence in two ways. In one way, with respect to that which is proper, namely, essential existence or non-existence, and this motion according to essence is nothing other than motion with respect to existence and non-existence, that is, generation and corruption. In another way motion according to essence can be understood to be according to something adhering to the essence, as we say that a body is moved essentially when it is moved according to place, because its subject is transferred from place to place. just so a quality is said to be changed essentially in its own way insofar as it varies when the subject has more or less of it, as has been explained in the Response.

Ad 4. It should be said that what is predicated essentially of charity is not predicated according to more and less, for it is not said to be more or less a virtue, But greater charity is said to be more a virtue on account of the mode of signifying, because it is signified as a substance; still, because it is not predicated essentially of its subject, what is subject to it receives more and less, as a subject having more or less charity, and what has more charity is more virtuous.

Ad 5. It should be said that charity is not diminished because it does not have a cause of decrease, as Ambrose proves. But it has a cause of increase, namely, God.

Ad 6. It should be said that the increase that comes about through ad dition is increase of the quantified substance. But charity does not increase in this way, as was said in the body of the article.

Ad 7. From which the answer to 7 is clear.

Ad 8. It should be said that charity is said to be increased or changed, not because it is the subject of motion, but because its subject is moved or increased in its regard.

Ad 9. It should be said that although God is invariable yet he varies things without varying himself. For it is not necessary that every mover be moved, as is proved in the Physics . And this belongs chiefly to God, because he does not act from any necessity of nature, but by his will.

Ad 10. It should be said that the notion of magnitude mentioned is common to all qualities and forms, namely, their perfection in the subject. Other qualities, apart from this magnitude or the quality belonging to them as such, have another magnitude or quantity which belongs to them accidentally. And this in two ways. In one way, by reason of the subject, as whiteness is quantified incidentally because its subject is quantified; hence, when the subject is increased, the whiteness increases incidentally. But on this basis when something is called whiter, it is not said to be more of a white thing but of a greater whiteness. For what pertains to increase in this sense is not said otherwise of white and of the subject, because its whiteness is said accidentally to increase. But this kind of quantity and increase does not belong to qualities of the soul such as sciences and virtues.

Ad 11. It should be said that the motion of increase of charity is reduced to alteration, not insofar as alteration is between contraries, as it always is in sensible things, and in the sensible part of the soul, but insofar as alteration and passion refer to reception and perfection, as sensing and understanding are a kind of receiving and being altered. Thus, the Philosopher distinguishes alteration and passion in On the Soul 2.

Ad 12. It should be said that God increases charity not by infusing new charity but by perfecting that which already exists.

Ad 13. It should be said that just as the act coming forth from an agent can cause acquired virtue because of the impression of active powers on the passive, as was said above, so too it can increase it.

Ad 14. It should be said that charity and the other infused virtues are not increased actively by acts, but only dispositively and meritoriously, as has been said. However, it is not necessary that any perfect act correspond to the quantity of virtue, for it is not necessary that one having charity should always act according to the full force of charity; the use of habits is subject to will.

Ad 15. It should be said that the notion of virtue does not consist in the superlative with respect to itself, but with respect to its object, because by virtue a man is ordered to the utmost of a power, which is to act well; hence, the Philosopher says in Physics 7 that virtue is the disposition of the perfected to the best. However, one can be more or less disposed to this optimum, and in this respect, virtue receives more or less. Or it might be said that it is not called the utmost simply, but the utmost of a kind, as fire is in kind the most subtle body and man the most worthy of creatures, yet one man is more worthy than another.

Ad 16. It should be said that the notion of virtue does not consist in the indivisible in itself, but by reason of its subject, insofar as it seeks the mean, for the seeking of which it can comport itself in different ways, well or badly. However, the mean itself is not in every way indivisible, but has a certain latitude, since it suffices for virtue that it approach the mean, as is said in Ethics 2, and for this reason one act is said to be more virtuous than another.

Ad 17. It should be said that the virtue of charity with respect to its end, God, is infinite, but charity finitely disposes to that end and hence is susceptible of more or less.

Ad 18. Not every perfect thing is most perfect, but only that which is in ultimate actuality; thus there is no impediment to someone already perfected by virtue to become more perfect.

Ad 1. It should be said that moral matters are specified by proximate ends, which, however, are not infinite if we consider in them only their formal difference. For the proximate end of any virtue is the good that is done by means of it, which goods provide their different definitions, as was shown in the body of the article.

Ad 2. It should be said that the argument works in things which act from the necessity of their nature, since they attain the end by one action and one form. But man has reason because he must reach his end by many different ways, and that is why many virtues are necessary for him.

Ad 3. It should be said that accidents are not multiplied numerically in the same thing, but only specifically; hence, the unity or multitude of virtues ought not be looked for according to their subject, which is the soul, or its potencies, unless a different notion of good follows on the diversity of powers, since virtues are distinguished according to that, as has been said.

Ad 4. It should be said that a thing is not the object of a power and of a habit for the same reason, for a power is that thanks to which we can do something, simply, for example, wax wrathful or trust, but a habit is that thanks to which we do something wen or badly, as is said in the Ethics . Therefore, where there is a different sense of the good, there is a difference sense of object with respect to habit, but not with respect to power, since there are many habits in one Potency.

Ad 5. It should be said that nothing prevents a thing from being the efficient cause of that which is its final cause, as medicine is the efficient cause of health, which is the end of medicine, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 1. Therefore, habits are the efficient cause of acts, but acts are the ends of habits, and, therefore, habits are formally distinguished according to their acts.

Ad 6. It should be said that with respect to the end proportioned to human nature, natural inclination suffices in order for a man to be well related to it; that is why the philosophers spoke of various virtues whose object is happiness. But the end in which we hope for happiness, God, exceeds the proportion of our nature, which is why above the natural inclination virtues are necessary which raise us to the ultimate end.

Ad 7. It should be said that to attain God in whatever imperfect way is of greater perfection that to attain other things perfectly. Hence, the Philosopher says in the Properties ofanimals and On the heatens 2, that what we grasp of higher things is more worthy than to know much of other things. Therefore, nothing prevents faith and hope from being virtues although by means of them we attain God imperfectly.

Ad 8. It should be said that the affections are ordered to God both through hope, whereby we trust in him, and through charity, whereby we love him.

Ad 9. It should be said that love is the principle and root of all affections, for we do not rejoice in a present good if it is not loved, and the same thing is clear in other affections. Therefore, every virtue which orders some passion also orders love, nor does it follow that charity which is love is not a special virtue, but it must be, as it were, the principle of all the virtues insofar as it moves them all to its end.

Ad 10. It should be said that it is not necessary that all the divine attributes give rise to theological virtues, but only insofar as they move our appetite as an end, and in this respect there are three theological virtues, as was said in article 10 of this question.

Ad 11. It should be said that God is the end of religion, not its object; its object is those things involved in reverencing Him. So it is not a theological virtue. Likewise, the wisdom whereby we contemplate God now does not look immediately to God, but to His effects which are the present means of contemplating him. Moreover, fear looks to something other than God for its object - either punishments or one’s insignificance, by thinking of which a man is brought reverently to submit himself to God.

Ad 12. It should be said that just as in speculative matters there are principles and conclusions, so in action there are ends and means. Therefore, for perfect and expeditious knowledge it does not suffice that a man have true knowledge of principles, he also needs knowledge of conclusions. So it is that in action, over and above the theological virtues by which we are well related to the ultimate end, there must be other virtues which order us to the means.

Ad 13. It should be said that, although the good as such is the object of the appetite and not the intellectual part, the good can be found in the intellectual part as well, for to know the true is a kind of good, and thus the habit perfecting intellect in knowledge of the truth has the note of virtue.

Ad 14. It should be said that in its essence prudence is an intellectual virtue, but it has moral matter; therefore, sometimes it is numbered with the moral as existing in a way between intellectual and moral virtues.

Ad 15. It should be said that, although intellectual virtues are distinguished from the moral, they fall to moral science insofar as their acts are subject to will, for we use science when we want to, and likewise with the other intellectual virtues. Something is called moral because it is related in some way to the will.

Ad 16. It should be said that the right reason of prudence is not put in the definition of moral virtue as something of its essence but either as its efficient cause or because of participation, for moral virtue is nothing other than the appetitive part’s participation in right reason, as was said in what has gone before.

Ad 17. It should be said that external makeables are the matter of art whereas the matter of prudence are things to be done which are within us. Therefore, just as art requires rectitude in exterior things, which it disposes according to some form, so prudence requires a correct disposition in our passions and affections. For this reason prudence needs moral virtues in the appetitive part, but art does not.

Ad 18. We concede. The appetite of the intellective part, that is, will, bears on a universal good grasped by intellect, but the appetite of the sensitive part does not bear on a universal good anymore than sense can grasp the universal.

Ad 19. It should be said that although appetite is naturally moved by the good as apprehended, in order for it to be inclined easily to the good that reason perfected by prudence grasps, it must have virtue. Particularly when appetite left to itself is drawn to the opposite, it needs true reason deliberating about and showing the good. For example, the is fashioned to be moved by what is delightful to sense and the irascible by revenge, but sometimes, after deliberation, reason forbids these. Likewise the will, with respect to the things that fall to man’s use, is so fashioned as to desire what is necessary for its life, but reason after deliberation sometimes commands that it be shared with another. That is why a habit of virtue is needed in the appetitive part in order for it to obey reason with ease.

Ad 20. It. should be said that knowledge pertains immediately to prudence, but action pertains to it through the mediation of the appetitive power; therefore, in the appetitive power there must be the habits that are called moral virtues.

Ad 21. It should be said that there is one notion of truth in an moral virtues, for in all there is the true contingent thing to be done, but there is not the same notion of good, which is the object of virtue. Therefore, there is one knowing habit for all moral matters, but not one moral virtue.

Ad 22. It should be said that the mean is found differently in different matter, and therefore, the diversity of matter in the moral virtues causes a formal difference insofar as moral virtues differ in species.

Ad 23. It should be said that some special moral virtues with their own special matter appropriate to themselves what is common to all virtues and are denominated from it. Moreover, that which is common to all has a special difficulty and praise in some special matter. For it is clear that every virtue requires that its act be modified according to fitting circumstances by which it is constituted in a mean, and that it be ordered to the end or to something else outside, and again that it have firmness, for to act unchangingly is one of the conditions of virtue, as is clear in Ethics 3, and firmly to persist has especial difficulty and praise in mortal danger, and then the virtue bearing on this matter claims for its name fortitude. Restraint in the matter of the pleasures of touch especially involves difficulty and merits praise: the virtue bearing on this is called temperance. In the use of external things rectitude is especially needed and praised in the goods that men share. Therefore, the good of virtue in these is that a man be related to others according to equality, and justice is named from this. Therefore, speaking of virtues, men sometimes use the name of fortitude and temperance and justice, not insofar as they are special virtues with a determinate matter, but with respect to the general conditions from which they are named. That is why it is said that temperance should be brave, that is, have firmness, and fortitude be tempered, that is, to keep to a measure, and so too with the others. It is clear in the case of prudence that it is in some way general, insofar as it has all morals for its matter, and insofar as all moral virtues in a way participate in it, as was shown in this article and in ad 16. For this reason every moral virtue ought to be identical with prudence.

Ad 24. It should be said that a virtue is called cardinal, or principal, because other virtues are fixed on it as a door is on its hinges. And since the door is that through which one enters the house, the notion of cardinal virtue does not belong to the theological virtues, which look to the ultimate end from which there is no movement or going into the interior. It does belong to the theological virtues that other virtues are fixed on them as on something unchangeable, which is why faith is called a foundation, 1 Corinthians 3:11, “For other foundation no one can lay but that which has been laid...” and hope an anchor, Hebrews 6:19, “as a sure and firm anchor of the soul... “ charity a root, Ephesians 3:17, “being rooted and grounded in love...” Similarly, the intellectual virtues are not called cardinal because some of them are perfective of the contemplative life, namely, wisdom, science, and understanding, but the contemplative fife is the end; hence, it does not have the notion of a door. The active life, which moral virtues perfect, is a door to the contemplative. Although art does not have virtues attached to it that it might be called cardinal, prudence which is directive in the active life is counted among the cardinal virtues.

Ad 25. It should be said that there are two powers of the rational part, namely, the appetitive, which is called will, and the apprehensive, which is called reason. So there are two cardinal virtues in the rational part, prudence with respect to reason and justice with respect to will. In the concupiscible there is temperance and in the irascible fortitude.

Ad 26. It should be said that in any matter there should be a cardinal virtue bearing on that which is principal in that matter. Virtues concerned with other less principal aspects of the matter are called secondary or adjunct virtues. E.g, in concupiscible passions, desires and pleasure, are the chief things with respect to touch, and temperance is concerned with them and is called the cardinal virtue in such matter. But pleasantness (eutrapelia), which concerns the pleasures of games, can be posited as a secondary or adjunct virtue. Similarly with the irascible passions: Fear and boldness are the chief things which pertain to mortal peril, and fortitude deals with them, which is why it is called the cardinal virtue in irascible matters, and not meekness, which concerns anger, even though the irascible is denominated from anger: Fortitude concerns that which is ultimate in irascible passions. Magnanimity and humility, which are concerned with hope, and faithfulness is concerned with something greater. Hope and anger do not move a man as does the fear of death With regard to actions concerned with external things useful for fife, the first and foremost is that each be accorded what is his own, and this justice does. Absent this, neither liberality nor magnificence can occur, and, therefore, justice is a cardinal virtue and the others adjunct. To command or to choose is the principal act of reason, and this prudence does and to it are ordered eubulia , which is deliberative, and then judgment about what has been deliberated, which is the work of synesis . That is why prudence is the cardinal virtue and the others adjunct.

Ad 27. It should be said that other adjunct or secondary virtues are listed as integral or subjective parts of the cardinal virtues when they have a matter determined to a proper act, but as potential parts insofar as they participate in a particular way and bear in a lesser way on the mean which belongs principally and more perfectly to the cardinal virtue.

Ad 1. It should be said that the utmost of a power is taken from the utmost to which the power extends, and this is the most difficult, because it is most difficult to find the mean but easy to deviate from it. Thus, virtue is the utmost of a power because it lies in the mean.

Ad 2. It should be said that the good has the note of the ultimate by comparison to the movement of appetite, not by comparison to the matter in which that good is constituted, because it must lie in the mean of the matter, such that it neither exceeds nor is exceeded by the fitting rule and measure.

Ad 3. It should be said that virtue, with respect to the form which it takes from its measure, has the note of an extreme, and thus is opposed to evil as the formed to the unformed, and the commensurate to the incommensurate. But with respect to the matter in which such a measure is impressed, virtue lies in a mean.

Ad 4. It should be said that this argument takes supreme and mean according to the order of the powers of the soul and not according to the matter on which the mode of virtue, that is, the mean, is impressed.

Ad 5. It should be said that there is no mean in theological virtues, as has been said, but there is a mean in intellectual virtues, not between a contrariety in things, but as they are in intellect, according to the contrariety of affirmation and negation, as has been said. But in all moral virtues there is the common note that they he in a mean. to Although some of them attain a maximum, they do so according to the rule of reason, as the brave man faces the greatest peril following reason, namely, when he ought, as he ought, and because he ought. The too much and too little are not read from the quantity of the thing, but by comparison to the rule of reason, as for example it would be too much were one to face dangers when he ought not or for the wrong reason; too little if he does not face them when and how he should.

Ad 6. It should be said that virginity and poverty although they are extremes in reality he in the mean of reason because the virgin abstains from all venereal pleasure as she ought, namely, for the sake of God, and easily. If she should abstain for the wrong reason, for example, because she finds it hateful as such to have children or to have a spouse, this would be the vice of insensitiveness. But to abstain completely from venereal pleasure for a fitting end is virtuous; those who abstain from such things in order to devote themselves to military matters for the good of the republic are praised for their political virtue.

Ad 7. It should be said that the means spoken of by Boethius he in things and thus are not relevant to the mean of virtue which is determined by reason. justice seems to be an exception since it involves both a mean in things and another according to reason: The arithmetical mean is relevant to exchange and the geometrical to distribution, as is clear from Ethics 5.

Ad 8. It should be said that mean belongs to virtue not as mean but as the mean of reason, because virtue is the good of man, which is to live according to reason. Hence, it is not necessary that what saves the notion of mean best should pertain to virtue, but what is the mean of reason.

Ad 9. It should be said that the passions and activities of the soul are indivisible as such but divisible incidentally, insofar as more and less are found in them in diverse circumstances. And it is thus that virtue holds the mean in them.

Ad 10. It should be said that in voluptuous matters it is better to be doing than to have done, but ‘better’ here is not to be understood in terms of the true good, which pertains to virtue, but of the pleasurable good, which pertains to lust. That whose existence lies in its being done no longer exists after it has been done; hence pleasure lies in its occurrence, not in its having occurred.

Ad 11. It should be said that not just any means belongs to virtue, but the mean of reason, and this mean is not found in vices, and there cannot be virtue in vice in the proper sense of the term.

Ad 12. It should be said that justice does not attain the mean in external things when a man takes more for himself, for this disorder of his will is vicious. But that one’s property be taken by another is outside his goodness and does not involve the disorder of vice. But the passions of the soul with which the other virtues are concerned are within us; hence their superfluity or falling short amounts to vice in man. Therefore, the other moral virtues are between two vices, but justice is not, because it takes its mean in its proper matter, which pertains per se to virtue.

Ad 13. The mean of virtue, it should be said, is the mean of reason and not of things; it is not necessary, therefore, that it be equidistant between extremes, but rather it should be what reason determines. Thus when the good of reason consists chiefly in the restraint of passion, virtue is closer to the less than to the more, as is evident in temperance and patience, but when the good consists in that to which passion leads, virtue is closer to the more, as is clear from courage.

Ad 14. It should be said that, as the Philosopher writes in Physics 5, the mean is that which something undergoing continuous change reaches first and the ultimate what it reaches last. Hence it is only in continuous motion that there is passage from one extreme to the other through the mean. But the movement from vice to vice is not a continuous motion and neither are those of will and intellect as they bear on diverse things. So it is not necessary that one move from vice to vice through virtue.

Ad 15. It should be said that even when virtue is in a mean as regards the matter, where the mean is found, still as regards its form -thanks to which it is placed in the genus of the good - it is an extreme, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 2.

Ad 16. It should be said that although the mean in which virtue lies is in some way indivisible, still virtue can be more or less intense insofar as a man is more or less disposed to attaining the indivisible, as the bow is pulled more or less in order to hit the indivisible target.

Ad 17. It should be said that the mean of virtue is of reason not of things, as has been mentioned, a mean which lies in the proportion or measuring of things and of emotions to man, and this differs from man to man since something that is a lot for one is a little to another. This is why the virtuous is not the same for everyone.

Ad 18. It should be said that since the mean of virtue is the mean of reason, its indivisibility should be understood with reference to reason. But reason takes as indivisible what has only an imperceptible distance that cannot cause an error, for example, the whole body of the earth is taken as an indivisible point in comparison to the whole heaven. Therefore, the mean of virtue has some latitude.

To the first, it must be said that God is the life of the soul in the manner of a mover, and not in the manner of a formal principle.

To the second, it must be said that although it pertains to the effectiveness of a mover that it does not require any disposition in the subject, however, that mover displays its effectiveness if it impresses a strong disposition in that which receives or is moved. For, a great fire causes not only substantial form to appear, but also a strong disposition. That agent which moves to action, and which also impresses a form through that which it moves, is stronger than that mover which so moves to action that it impresses no form. Therefore, because the Holy Spirit is the most powerful mover, He so moves to love that He also causes a habit of charity.

To the third, it must be said that when it is written (1 Cor. vi. 17), He who is joined to the Lord, is one in spirit, this is not meant a unity of substance, but a unity of affection between the lover and the loved. By this union the habit of charity is regarded more as a principle of love than as a medium between the lover and the loved, for the act of love pass immediately to God as to the loved, but not immediately into the habit of charity.

To the fourth, it must be said that although the love by which we love our neighbor is God, it is however not denied that in addition to this created love there is in us a created love by which we love formally, has been said.

To the fifth, it must be said that God is said to be love or charity only causally, as He is said to be hope or patience only causally, but also essentially. This, however, does not deny that besides that love which God is essentially, there is also in us a created love.

To the seventh, it must be said that this text has the same difficulty whether a created habit of charity is posited in us or not. For, when Augustine said that he who loves his neighbor knows the love by which he loves more than he knows the neighbor whom he loves, he seems to understand the very act of love. Now no one holds that this act is something uncreated; therefore it cannot be concluded that the love thus known is God. Therefore when we perceive in ourselves an act of love, we feel a certain participation of God because God Himself is love, not because He is that very act of love which we perceive.

To the eighth, it must be said that a creature, insofar as it is more perfect, approaches more to a likeness to God. Whence, although any creature has a certain likeness to God in this, that it exists and is good, however a rational creature has, in addition, a further cause for similitude in this, that it is intellectual, and another in what it has been made. Thus in the act of charity God is more expressly perceived as in a closer likeness.

To the ninth, it must be answered that charity is a habit and is moved with difficulty. For he who has charity is not easily inclined to sin, even though charity is lost through sin.

To the tenth, it must be said that charity unites one to the infinite good not efficiently but formally, whence infinite power does not strive after charity, but rather the author of charity. However, infinite power would strive after charity if man were infinitely ordered to the infinite good through charity, which is clearly false. For, the manner follows the form of the thing.

To the eleventh, it must be said that a creature is vanity because it is from nothing, not because it is a likeness of God; and it is for this reason that created charity unites to First Truth.

To the twelfth, it must be said that according to the Pelagian heresy, natural principles of man are sufficient for meriting eternal life. It is not, however, heretical that we merit by something which exists as a certain nature in some category. For it is clear that we merit by our acts, and our acts, as created things, exist in some genus and are of a certain nature.

To the thirteenth, it must be said that God created natural being without an efficient medium, but not without a formal medium. For, to each thing He gave the form through which it exists. And likewise He gives existence in grace through some superadded form. But existence in nature and existence in grace are not entirely similar for, as St. Augustine says in Super Joan. , He who created thee without thee will not justify thee without thee. Therefore in justification, some operation of justifying is needed and thus it is necessary that there be present an active formal principle which is not present in creation.

To the fourteenth it must be said that an agent acting mediately is less effective if he uses that medium because of its necessity. But God does not use a medium because He is in need of the help of any creature; He acts mediately in order that He might preserve order in things. But if we speak of a formal medium, it is clearthat as the agent is more perfect, so much more will he induce a form. For an imperfect agent does not induce a form but only a disposition to the form, and the less perfect the agent is, the less is his power to induce that disposition.

To the fifteenth, it must be said that man and rational creatures are able to attain a higher end than other creatures. Whence, although they lack more things necessary to attain this end, nevertheless they are more perfect; just as a man who can attain health through the use of several medicines is better disposed than one who is not able to be completely cured, even though he needs only a few prescriptions.

To the sixteenth it must be said that the soul through created charity is raised above the possible limit of nature so that he can be ordered to a more perfect end than the capability of nature would supply. However, it is not so ordered to attain God perfectly, as He enjoys Himself, from the fact that no creature is proportionate to God.

To the seventeenth, it must be said that although the good which is God is through itself present to the soul,nevertheless there is need of a formal medium—on the part of the soul, not however on the part of God—for the soul to be ordered perfectly to Him.

To the eighteenth, it must be replied that God is form subsisting essentially; He is not that which is joined as form to something else.

To the nineteenth, it must be said that, granted that God is known through Himself by the soul—but this introduces another question—He is loved through Himself in the same way as He is known through Himself. When I say through Himself, this is understood on the part of the one loved, not of the one loving. For, God is loved by the soul not because of some other thing, but only because of Himself; and still the soul needs some formal principle in order to love God perfectly.

To the twentieth, it must be said that God cannot be loved by us to the extent that He is lovable, so that it does not follow that the love of charity by which we love God is infinite. This argument applies no less to an act than to a habit; but no one can say that the act of love by which we love God is something uncreated.

To the twenty-first, it must be said that we have need of a habit of charity insofar as we love God; this is not necessary for other creatures, although all creatures are loved by God.

To the twenty-second, it must be answered that no accident is more worthy than its subject as regards its manner of existing, because substance is being through itself, while accident is being existing in another. But when the accident is an act and the form of the substance, there is nothing to prevent the accident from being more worthy than the substance. For in this way the accident is related to the substance as act to potency, as the perfect to the perfectible; and it is thus that charity is more worthy than the soul.

To the twenty-third, it must be said that although the law by which we love God and our neighbor is uncreated, that by which we formally love God and our neighbor is something created. For, the uncreated law is the first measure and rule of our love.

To the twenty-fourth, it must be said that charity revives the dead in a spiritual way, formally, but not as an effective agent. Therefore it is not necessary that it be of infinite power, since neither was the soul of Lazarus which, as a form, revived Lazarus inasmuch as he was revived through a union of his soul with his body.

To the first, it must be said that virtue does concern that which is difficult in itself, but it nevertheless becomes easy to one possessing virtue.

To the third, it must be said that the difficulty is not only from contranies, but it is also from the excellence of the object. For, a thing is said to be difficult to understand for us because of the excellence of the intelligible, not because of some contrary.

To the fourth, it must be answered that the tendency which is present to us from nature is imperfect and weak as regards its freely obtaining things spiritual and gratuitous. For the Apostle also wrote in the same chapter (Rom. vii. 15), I do not that good which I will. Therefore there is need for the help of a gratuitous gift.

To the fifth, it must be said that hope lifts the affective power of man to the highest good so that it might be attained; but in addition, it is necessary that this good be loved in order for it to be a good of man, as was said above in the body of the Article.

To the sixth, it must be said that, concerning the nature of charity or love, it is that which unites in affection. For example, this union is considered in this respect: that a man consider his friend as another self, and wishes good for him as he does for himself. But to unite in reality, this is not the nature of charity. Therefore there can be a love both of what is possessed and what is not possessed. It makes one desire what is not possessed, and be delighted with what is possessed.

To the seventh, it must be said that grace unites us with God in the manner of assimilation. But it is necessary that we be made one with Him through the operation of the intellect and the will, which is done by charity.

To the eighth, it must be answered that friendship is not posited as a virtue, but as something following virtue. For one who has virtue and loves the good of reason, it follows from the inclination of virtue that he loves what is like himself, i.e., virtuous men in whom the good of reason is strong. But the friendship which is for God, Who is blessed and the author of beatitude, ought to be included among the virtues which order men to beatitude. Therefore, since it is not consequent to the other virtues, but precedes them, as has just been shown, friendship must be in itself a virtue.

To the ninth, it must be said that love, considered in its sensitive part, is a passion; indeed, this is the love of the good through the senses. But such a love is not the love of charity, therefore the argument does not apply.

To the tenth, it must be replied that when the Philosopher said that virtue is a mean between two extremes, he was referring to the moral virtues. This is not true of the theological virtues, among which is included charity, as has been shown in the preceding Question, Article 13.

To the eleventh, it must be answered that something understood as good moves the will; and therefore, although the intellect knows God as the highest good through some medium, from this it moves the will so that He can be loved immediately although He is understood through some medium. For, that by which the knowledge of the intellect is determined, moves the will.

To the twelfth, it must be answered that enjoyment does not express the operation, but something consequent upon the operation. Now, since virtue is the principle of operation, enjoyment is not listed among the virtues, but among the fruits, as is shown (Galat. v. 22), The fruit of the Spirit is, charity, joy, peace, patience.

To the thirteenth, it must be said that the object of charity, viz., God, transcends every human capability. Whence, however the human will tries to love God, it is unable to reach Him so that it might love Him as much as He ought to be loved. Therefore it is said that charity has no measure, because there is no fixed terminus of divine love which, if love would exceed, would go against the nature of the virtue. But this can happen with the moral virtues which are means between extremes. The measure of charity is this, that it has no such measure. It cannot be concluded from this that charity is not a virtue, but only that it does not stand as a mean like the moral virtues.

To the fourteenth, it must be said that charity is called patient and kind, as if named from the other virtues, inasmuch as it produces the acts of all the virtues.

To the fifteenth, it must be said that charity is not a virtue of man considered as man, but of man as considered as becoming, through participation in grace, like to God and the Son of God, according to which it is written (1 John iii. 1), Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God.

To the sixteenth, it must be said that the love of the highest good, considered as the principle of natural being, is in us from nature. However, considered as the object of that beatitude which exceeds the total capacity of created nature, it is not in us from nature but is above nature.

To the seventeenth, it must be answered that the gifts perfect the virtues by raising them above the human way of acting. Thus, the gift of understanding perfects the virtue of faith; and the gift of fear perfects the virtue of temperance from excesses that are beyond the human way of acting. But in the love of God, there is no such imperfection which needs to be perfected by a gift. Therefore charity, which is more excellent than all the gifts, is not considered as the gift of virtue.

To the first, it must be said that although charity does not give the proper species to any virtue, it gives, however, a common species to each virtue, on account of which we speak of virtue considered as the principle of meriting.

To the second, it must be said that there is no form of a form in the sense that one form is superior to the subject of another. But there is nothing to prevent several forms from existing in the same subject according to a certain order; so that one might be a proper form in respect to another, as color is the proper form in respect to what can be seen. It is in this way that charity can be the form of the other virtues.

To the third, it must be said that charity is included in the definition of a meritorious virtue, as is shown by the definition of Augustine, who says that virtue is a good quality of the mind by which it lives rightly; for it does not live rightly unless it is through that which orders our life to God. This charity does.

To the fourth, it must be said that this argument follows from the form which enters into the constitution of a thing. Charity is not called the form of the virtues in this way but in another way, as has been shown above.

To the fifth, it must be replied that charity, since it is the common form of the virtues, does indeed bring the virtues into one common species, a very special species, but not, however, into a proper species.

To the sixth, it must be said that charity can be called the exemplary form of the virtues; not an exemplar in whose likeness the virtues are generated, but an exemplar according to whose likeness the virtues operate in a certain way. Thus, whenever it is necessary to act according to virtue, charity is necessary.

To the seventh, it must be said that, although to create the virtues belongs only to God, however, to act according to virtue belongs also to a man possessing virtue. Therefore he needs charity.

To the eighth, it must be said that charity, considered as an act, not only is regarded as an exemplar, but also as a virtue which moves and causes. But the exemplar does not cause without producing that which is made in imitation of it, because it produces it in existence. And thus charity does not exist without the other virtues.

To the ninth, it must be said that each virtue has a special form from its proper end and its proper object, by which it becomes this virtue. But it has from charity a certain common form, by which it can merit eternal life.

To the tenth, it must be answered that God makes the virtues in us that are formed with a special form and a general form. The special form is derived from the object and the end, but the general form is derived from charity.

To the eleventh, it must be said that light is the form of colors considered as visible in act through light; likewise, faith is the form of the virtues considered as knowable by us. For, we know by faith what is virtuous and what is not virtuous. But the virtues, insofar as they are operative, are informed by charity.

To the twelfth, it must be said that the intellect, considered in itself, is prior to the will, because the known good is the object of the will. But in its operation and moving, the will is prior. For, the intellect does not understand or move unless the will gives its consent. Thus does the will move the intellect insofar as it is operative; for we use our intellect when we will. Therefore, since to believe is an act of the intellect as moved by the will—for we believe something because we wish to—it follows that charity gives form to faith more so than faith to charity.

To the thirteenth, it must be said that the act of the will is considered according to the one who wills in relation to things as they are in themselves. But the act of the intellect is considered according as things known are in the one who understands. Whence, when things are below the one who understands, then the intellect is higher than the will, because things exist in a higher manner in the intellect than in themselves, since everything which is in another is in it according to the manner of that in which it is. But when the things are above the one who understands, then the will rises higher than the intellect is able to attain. Thus it is that in moral matters, which concern things below man, the cognitive virtue informs the appetitive virtues, just as prudence informs the other moral virtues. But in the theological virtues which concern God, the virtue of the will, viz., charity, informs the virtue of the intellect, viz., faith.

To the fourteenth, it must be said that rational power confers a way of desiring on those things which are below us, but not in those which are above us, as was said in Article I of this Question and in the preceding Question, Articles 10 and 11.

To the fifteenth, it must be answered that faith precedes hope, and hope precedes charity in the order of generation, as the imperfect precedes the perfect. But charity precedes both faith and hope in the order of perfection. For this reason charity is said to be the form of them, as the perfect is the form of the imperfect.

To the sixteenth, it must be said that charity is not that form of the virtues which is a part of the essence of the virtues, so that it must follow the virtues or some matter of the virtues in time, as in the form of things generated. But charity is the form considered as informing; whence it must be, by its nature, prior to the other virtues.

To the seventeenth, it must be said that the vision of God, inasmuch as it is the end considered as a certain good, is the object of charity.

To the eighteenth, it must be said that the intrinsic form cannot be the end of a thing, although it is the end of the generation of a thing. But charity is not the intrinsic form, as has been said; but from the fact that it brings the other virtues to their end, it forms the virtues, as is clear from what has been said.

To the nineteenth, it must be said that the grace of God is called the form of the virtues according as it gives spiritual existence to the soul, so that it is able to receive the virtues. But charity is the form of the virtues according as it forms their operations, as was said in the body of the Article.

To the first, it must be said that our neighbor is not loved except for the sake of God; whence formally considered, both are one object of love, although materially they are two.

To the second, it must be said that since love looks to the good, there is a diversity of love according as there is a diversity of the good. There is, however, a certain good proper to each man considered as one person, and as far as loving this good is concerned, each one is the principal object of his own love. But there is a certain common good which pertains to this man or that man insofar as he is considered as part of a whole; thus there is a certain common good pertaining to a soldier considered as part of the army, or to a citizen as part of the state. As far as loving this common good is concerned, the principal object of love is that in which the good primarily exists; just as the good of the army is in the general, or the good of the state is in the king. Whence, it is the duty of a good soldier that he neglect even his own safety in order to save the good of his general. Thus also does a man naturally endanger his arm in order to save his head. And in this way charity regards the divine good as its principal object, which pertains to every one according as he is able to be a sharer in beatitude; thus we love out of charity only those objects which are able to participate in eternal happiness with us, as Augustine says in the De Doctrina Christiana .

To the third, it must be said that St. John, denying the major premise, argues not that one's fellow-men ought to be loved more, but that they are more accessible to one's love, because men are more inclined to love what can be seen rather than the unseen.

To the fourth, it must be said that although what is known is loved, it does not follow that what is more known is also more loved. For, a thing is not loved because it is known, but because it is good; thus that which is better is more lovable, even though it is not better known. For example, a man loves his servant or even his horse which he has had in constant use less than he loves some good man whom he knows only by reputation.

To the fifth, it must be said that charity regards the divine good as its formal object, as has been said in the previous Article and in the body of this Article. This good is related differently to God and to one's neighbor, therefore it is necessary that charity have a different mode as regards its primary and secondary objects. However, it has only one mode of operation in relation to its primary object.

To the sixth, it must be said that the precepts of the law concern the acts of the virtues and not the habits. Therefore, from a diversity of precepts it does not follow that there is a diversity of habits, but only a diversity of acts. These acts pertain to one habit because of the formal notion.

To the seventh, it must be said that in honoring our neighbor we also honor his proper good; and thus one kind of honor is due to him, another kind to God.

To the eighth, it must be said that the love of neighbor as well as the love of God is included within the contemplative life, as Gregory writes in Super Ezechiel . For prayer to God, which seems especially to pertain to the contemplative life, becomes prayer for fellow-man. So, too, the principle of the active life is, in a special way, the love of God in Himself. It does not follow, then, that if charity is the principle of different actions, it is not one.

To the ninth, it must be said that charity is not one by the unity of continuity, but it can be considered one by the unity of indivisibility inasmuch as it is one simple form. It is not called finite or infinite considered as a quantity with dimensions, but considered as the quantity of virtue. Here we are not treating of charity in this manner, but only insofar as it is considered one in essence; not indeed a numerical unity as is tunic and dress, but a unity of species, as Socrates and Plato are one in their human nature.

To the tenth, it must be answered that this argument would hold if the object of charity be considered in its temporal aspect, not in its eternal aspect, as has been said.

To the eleventh, it must be said that perfect friendship is not directed towards many, so that to each one it would be something proper to himself. But inasmuch as friendship towards one becomes more perfect as regards that one, the more perfect the love we have toward one, the better able are we to love others. Thus charity, because it is the most perfect friendship, extends itself to God and to all who are able to know God; it includes not only those whom we know, but also our enemies.

To the twelfth, it must be said that virtue, which acts for its principal object with enjoyment, is able in the same way to act for some secondary object; not with pleasure, but without sadness. And in this way charity acts with pleasure towards its principal object, although with regard to a secondary object it endures difficulty in such a way that it is able to act without sadness.

To the first, it must be said that this is a causal definition inasmuch as charity is the cause of the other virtues.

To the second, it must be answered that charity in loving fellow-man has God as the formal notion of the object, and not only as the final end, as it clear from the preceding Article. The other virtues have God, not as the formal notion of the object, but as their final end.

To the third, it must be said that charity does not produce the acts of the other virtues by eliciting them, but only by commanding them. For, the virtue draws out only those acts which are according to the notion of proper form, as justice acts rightly or temperance acts temperately. But virtue is said to command all the acts which it summons up to its end.

To the fourth, it must be said that the good in general is not the object of charity, but the highest good. Therefore it does not follow that charity is a general virtue, but that it is the highest virtue.

To the fifth, it must be said that charity is not the intrinsic perfection of the other virtues, but the extrinsic perfection, as was said in Article III of this Question. Therefore the objection does not follow.

To the sixth, it must be said that charity exists as in a subject in only one power, viz., the will which, through its command, moves the other powers. According to this, we are commanded to love God with our whole mind and our whole soul in order that all the powers of our soul might be summoned in submission to divine love.

To the seventh, it must be said that, just as charity commands the acts of the other virtues, so through this manner of commanding does it exclude the sins which are contrary to these virtues; and in this way charity resists temptations. However, it is necessary that there be other virtues which directly and in an elicited way drive out sins.

To the eighth, it must be said that, just as the acts of the other virtues are ordered to the end which is the object of charity, so also do sins, which are contrary to those virtues, oppose the end which is the object of charity. From this it happens that the contraries of the other virtues, viz., sins, drive out charity.

To the ninth, it must be said that, although charity adequately directs us through its manner of commanding in all things which pertain to a righteous life, nevertheless other virtues are required which, by eliciting their acts, carry out the command of charity so that man will act readily and without impediment.

To the tenth, it must be said that it sometimes happens that a thing which in itself is difficult and causes sadness may exist for the sake of an end; as one freely takes a bitter medicine for the sake of health, although he is much afflicted by its consumption. Charity, therefore, makes all things pleasing in respect to the end, but the other virtues are needed which make those things which are good in themselves more enjoyable, in order that we may more easily do them.

To the eleventh, it must be said that charity is generated at the same time as the other virtues, not because it is not distinct from the others, but because the works of God are perfect. Whence, when charity is communicated, all the virtues which are necessary for salvation are communicated at the same time. However, charity is corrupted at the same time as the virtues because whatever is opposed to the other virtues is opposed to charity, as has been said.

To the first, it must be said that the words of Origen should not be understood to mean that a man sinning mortally, howsoever perfect he was, does not suddenly lose charity. The words are to be interpreted to mean that it does not easily happen that a perfect man would suddenly commit a mortal sin at once, but through negligence; and many venial sins would be disposed finally to fall into mortal sin.

To the second, it must be answered that the text of Bernard does not seem to hold unless it be understood that charity was not extinct in Peter, only because it was soon resurrected; for those things which are not very far apart seem as if they are not separated at all, as is said in Book II of the Physics .

To the third, it must be said that a moral virtue which is acquired by acts consists in an inclination of power to act; and that inclination is not entirely taken away by one act. But by one act, the influence that God exerts in the operation of charity is taken away; therefore one act of sin takes away charity.

To the fourth, it must be said that, in general, the opposite of charity is hate; but indirectly all sins are opposed to charity insofar as they pertain to the contempt of God Who ought to be loved above all things.

To the fifth, it must be said that the higher reason, in which charity exists, moves the lower reason. Therefore sin, inasmuch as it is opposed to the movement of charity in the lower part of the soul, drives out charity. Or, it can be answered that mortal sin does not exist without consent, which is attributed to the higher faculty of reason in which charity exists.

To the sixth, it must be said that sin does not drive out charity by its own power, but only in virtue of the fact that man voluntarily subjects himself to sin.

To the seventh, it must be said that a man who sins mortally does not love God above all things, as He ought to be loved in charity; but there is something else that he prefers to the love of God, and on account of this thing, he despises the law of God.

To the eighth, it must be said that delight, which comes from speculative knowledge, does not have a contrary in the same genus so that the consideration of some other thing would be contrary to it. This is because the species of contraries are not contrary in the understanding; whence, the delight which comes from a consideration of white is not contrary to the delight which comes from a consideration of black. Since the act of the will consists in the movement of the soul toward the thing willed, and just as things in themselves are contraries, so the movements of the will towards these contraries are contraries. For, the desire of sweetness is contrary to the desire of the bitter. According to this, the love of God is contrary to the love of sin which excludes one from God. However, speculative knowledge, insofar as there is no contrary, is not a proper act of charity which is elicited by it, but charity is only commanded by it as its effect.

To the ninth, it must be said that charity which is the universal mover of the virtues, when it is impeded through mortal sin in regard to those things which pertain to one virtue, is impeded in regard to its own universal object; and because of this it is universally impeded in regard to all. However, this is not true when the object that is potentially movable is so hindered in regard to its particular effect, so that it is not hindered in regard to those things which pertain to universal virtue.

To the tenth, it must be said that although hope and faith have God as their object, they are not the form of the other virtues; as is true of charity and as was proved above in Article III. Therefore, although charity is not without form, hope and faith can exist without form.

To the eleventh, it must be said that a defect of any perfection doesnot render virtue without form, but only that defect which removes the order to the final end. Indeed, there is an order in the charity of this life, although the charity of this life does not have the perfection of the charity of heaven which is in accord with its proper and perfect enjoyment of God.

To the twelfth, it must be said that imperfect acts can be performed by one possessing charity, but they do not follow from charity. For, not every act of the agent is the act of each form in the agent, and this is especially true in a rational nature which possesses freedom to exercise those habits in it.

To the thirteenth, it must be said that although not every ignorance of proper principles excludes science, however the ignorance of common principles does take away science, and when these principles are unknown, it follows that there is an ignorance of art, as is said in Book I of the Elench . However, the final end is regarded as the most common principle to all. Therefore, a de-ordination from the final end through mortal sin completely removes charity. But every de-ordination of particular principles does not remove charity, as is clear with venial sins.

To the fourteenth, it must be said that whoever acts incontinently against a good which he loves, thinks that the good is not completely lost through that incontinent act which he is doing. For, if anyone who loves a certain state, or the health of his own body, would think that he would lose either of these through what he is doing, he would either abstain totally from those acts, or he would love that which he did more than his health or the good of the state. Whence, although one knows that he loses God through mortal sin—which is to know that he has sinned mortally—and nevertheless is doing that incontinent act, he clearly loves what he is doing more than he loves God.

To the fifteenth, it must be said that charity requires not only that there be a disposition to the universal, that God be loved above all things, but also that the act of choice and of the will be so disposed toward any particular that is chosen. And this particular choice is excluded through the choice of the contrary, viz., sin, which excludes one from God.

To the sixteenth, it must be answered that although acts are directly contrary to acts, and habits to habits, acts are also indirectly contrary to habits according as they conform to contrary habits. For, similar acts are generated from similar habits, and similar acts cause similar habits; although not all habits are caused by acts.

To the first, it must be said that we love virtue and beatitude out of charity inasmuch as we wish them for those for whom it is possible to have beatitude.

To the second, it must be said that God loves all things out of charity, not because He wishes beatitude for them, but He orders these things to Himself and to the other creatures which are able to enjoy beatitude.

To the third, it must be said that all goods are in God as in a first principle. In this way, Origen meant that it is one thing to love God and every other good.

To the fourth, it must be said that all things can be loved meritoriously by ordering them to those which have a capacity for beatitude, not by wishing beatitude for them.

To the fifth, it must be said that there is contained, as a principle, in the good of the universe, rational nature which is capable of beatitude, and to which all other creatures are ordered. According to this, it is fitting both for God and for us to especially love the good of the universe out of charity.

To the sixth, it must be said that, just as charity believes all things that are worthy of belief, so does it love all things according as they are lovable out of charity.

To the seventh, it must be said that we are not able to love God here with that perfection with which we will love Him in our home-land, seeing Him through His essence.

To the eighth, it must be said that the distance separating other creatures is not the reason why they are not loved in charity, but it is because they are not capable of beatitude.

To the ninth, it must be said that angels do not share with us in the life of nature as regards our species, but only as regards the genus of rational nature; but we are able to share with them in the life of glory. As to that which is said (Matt. xxv. 15), To every one He gave according to his proper ability, this must not be referred only to natural ability, for it is erroneous to say that the gifts of grace and glory are given according to natural measure, but rather here [in this text] must be understood also that ability which is by way of grace, through which it is granted to men that they can merit glory equal to that of the angels.

To the tenth, it must be said that the written law has been given as an aid to the law of nature, which had been obscured by sin. But the law was not rendered so obscure that it would not move one to love, so that man would not love himself or his body; but it was obscured to this extent that it was not moving man to love God and his neighbor. Therefore, in the written law, there had to be given precepts about loving God and neighbor, in which is, nevertheless, also included the precept that each one love himself. The reason for this is that as we are induced to love God, we are induced to desire Him, by which we especially love ourselves and wish for ourselves the highest good. But in the precept of loving neighbor, it is said, Love your neighbor as yourself. In this is included the love of self.

To the eleventh, it must be said that although, properly speaking, friendship cannot be had for self, on the other hand love is had for self. For, it is written in Book IX of the Ethics , that the feelings that constitute friendship for others are an extension of regard for self. But as charity signifies love, thus is one able to love himself in charity. But Gregory speaks of charity considered as it includes the aspect of friendship.

To the twelfth, it must be said that although friendship consists in a sharing with another, just as does justice; love, however, does not necessarily relate to another, which is sufficient for the notion of charity.

To the thirteenth, it must be said that those who love self are censured inasmuch as they love themselves more than they ought. Reproach, indeed, does not pertain to spiritual goods because no one is able to love virtue too much. But one can love himself to excess inasmuch as he loves external and corporeal goods.

To the fourteenth, it must be said that not everyone who loves himself in terms of his exterior nature is at fault, but rather he who seeks exterior goods beyond the measure of virtue. Thus we are able to love our body in charity.

To the fifteenth, it must be said that charity does not flee the body but the corruption of the body, inasmuch as it is said (Wis. ix. 15), For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul. Because of this the Apostle clearly has said the body of this death (Rom. vii. 24).

To the sixteenth, it must be said that it does not follow from the fact that man does not know for certain whether he has chariy that he is not able to love out of charity, but it does follow that he is not able to judge whether he loves out of charity. Thus, it can be required of us that we love out of charity, but not that we judge that we are loving out of charity. Whence the Apostle says (1 Cor. iv. 3), Neither do I judge my own self... but he that judgeth me, is the Lord.

To the seventeenth, it must be said that when one is said to love his neighbor out of charity, this preposition out of can designate a relation of final, efficient and formal causes; the final cause inasmuch as the love of neighbor is ordered to the love of God as to an end, whence it is written (1 Tim. i. 5), The end of the commandment is charity, because the love of God is the goal in observing the precepts. In the relationship of efficient cause, however, inasmuch as charity is a habit tending toward loving, being related to the act of loving as heat is to heating. In the reationship of formal cause, however, inasmuch as the act receives its species from the habit, as heating does from heat.

To the eighteenth, it must be said that the notion of being a neighbor is preserved both in him who gives favors and in him who receives, but not that whoever gives favors is a neighbor since it is required among neighbors that there be a sharing in some order. Therefore God, although He gives favors, cannot be said to be our neighbor; but Christ, inasmuch as He is man, is called our neighbor according as He gives favors to us.

To the first, it must be said that the love of enemies is contained in a precept, as has been said.

To the second, it must be said that we ought to love our enemies, just as much in deed as in affection, as has been said.

To the fourth, it must be said that those authorities of the Old Testament speak of the case of necessity when we are bound by a precept to do good to our enemies, as has been said in the body of the Article.

To the fifth, it must be said that what is written, Hate your enemy, is not found in the entire Old Testament, but this is from the tradition of the Scribes to whom it seemed that it should be added because the Lord commanded the sons of Israel to persecute their enemies. It should also be said that this saying, Hate your enemy, should not be interpreted as an order to the just but as a permission to the weak, as Augustine says in the De Sermone Domini in Monte . Or, as Augustine also writes in the Contra Faustum , men ought not to hate their enemy but only vice.

To the sixth, it must be said that one's enemy, considered as enemy, is not the object of love but is so only insofar as he pertains to God. Therefore we ought to hate in our enemy the fact that he hates us, and to desire that he would love us.

To the seventh, it must be said that man, by nature, loves all men, as the Philosopher says in Book VIII of the Ethic. But that one becomes an enemy is from something that is superadded to nature, and, accordingly, the inclination of nature ought not to be taken away. Therefore charity, when it moves to the love of enemies, perfects the natural inclination; the case is otherwise in things which are natural contraries, such as fire and water, or wolf and lamb.

To the eighth, it must be said that God does not hate anything that is His own, such as the natural good or any other thing; but He only hates what is not His, viz., sin. And so also we ought to love in men that which is of God, and to hate what is foreign to God, according as it is said (Psalms cxxxviii. 22), I have hated them with a perfect hatred.

To the ninth, it must be said that we ought not to wish those who are known to be damned to have eternal life, because they are already wholly excluded from this by the divine decree; but we can love them as works of God in which the divine justice is manifested. In this manner does God love them. But we ought to wish those who are not yet known to be damned to have life eternal. This foreknowledge is not given to us, and the foreknowledge of God does not exclude the possibility of their attaining eternal life.

To the tenth, it must be said that he whose office prescribes it, may lawfully punish evil-doers or even kill them while loving them out of charity. For, Gregory says in one of his Homilies that the just, while still loving, may cause a persecution; for if outwardly they create unrest by disciplining, inwardly, however, they may preserve their serenity by charity. Now we can desire or cause some temporal evil for those whom we love in charity for three reasons: first, we can do it in order to correct them; secondly, it may be because the temporal prosperity of some is detrimental to the good of some multitude or even the whole Church, whence Gregory writes in XXII Moral. It often happens that the ruin of our enemy can make us happy without our losing charity, and again, his glory can sadden us without incurring the fault of envy. This happens when, by his downfall, we believe that some are profited more, or when, by his advantage, we fear that many will be unjustly oppressed. Thirdly, our motive may be in order to preserve the order of divine justice, according as it is written (Psalms lvii. 11), The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge.

To the eleventh, it must be said that propositions of this kind, by which the Philosopher argues,3 are to be taken as evident in themselves. For, just as it is good to love a friend insofar as he is a friend, so it is evil to love an enemy because he is an enemy. But it is good to love an enemy insofar as he pertains to God.

To the twelfth, it must be answered that to love a friend as friend and an enemy as enemy are contraries. But to love a friend and an enemy insofar as they both belong to God is not contrary; just as it is not contrary to see white and to see black when both are considered as colored.

To the thirteenth, it must be said that to love an enemy as enemy is difficult, even impossible. But to love an enemy because of some greater love is easy. That is why the love of God makes easy that which seems to be impossible in itself.

To the fourteenth, it must be said that St. Thomas did not ask for the punishment of his assailant because of a desire for revenge, but as a manifestation of the divine justice and power.

To the fifteenth, it must be said that these pleas which are found in the Prophets should be understood as predictions, so that let them be blotted out ( deleantur ) means they will be blotted out ( delebuntur ). For, they used such a manner of speaking because they were conforming their own wills to the divine justice revealed to them.

To the sixteenth, it must be said that to love one for his own sake can be understood in two ways. First, in such a way that one is loved as a final end; and thus only God should be loved for His own sake. Secondly, that we love him for whom we wish some good, as is proper to a friendship for a noble person; but not as the good which we wish for ourselves, as is proper to a friendship for a pleasant or useful person, in which we love a friend as our own good. For, it is not that we seek pleasure or utility for a friend, but that we seek pleasure or utility for ourselves from a friend; just as we also love things pleasing and useful for ourselves, such as food or clothing. But when we love one out of virtue, we wish good for him, and we do not wish him for ourselves; this is especially proper to the friendship of charity.

To the seventeenth, it must be said that it is better to love an enemy than to love only a friend, because this shows more perfect charity, as was said above in the body of the Article. But if we consider these two absolutely, it is better to love a friend than an enemy; it is also better to love God than a friend. For, the difficulty which is found in loving an enemy does not constitute the reason for meriting, except insofar as perfect charity is demonstrated by it, which overcomes the difficulty. Thus, if there would be such a perfect charity as to take away all difficulty, to this extent it would be more meritorious. But we speak of one who loves a friend with such perfect charity that it even extends to the love of enemies; but this love operates with more ardor toward the friend, unless by chance it is considered accidentally insofar as it operates against something repugnant with a greater effort. For example, in natural things, water that is warm is with greater effort brought to the freezing point.

To the first, it must be said that the object of faith is the true, whence according as something happens to be more true, so is it more believed. But since truth consists in the conformity of intellect and thing, and if truth is considered according to the characteristic of equality which does not allow a greater or less degree, it does not then happen that a thing is more or less true. But if the being itself of the thing is considered, which is the basis of truth, as is said in II Metaphys. , then the disposition of things in being and in truth is the same. Thus, those things which are more in being are more true, and because of this, principles in scientific demonstrations are believed more than conclusions. And thus it happens also in regard to those things which concern faith. In this way the Apostle (1 Cor. xv) proves the future resurrection of the dead through the resurrection of Christ.

To the second, it must be said that the order of reason is as that which orders, but the order of the will is as that which is ordered. Therefore order is proper to charity.

To the third, it must be said that charity does not recognize a hierarchy of the lover to the loved because it unites the two. It does, however, recognize the hierarchy of two objects to be loved.

To the fourth, it must be said that although God is not greater in one than in another, however He is more perfectly in Himself than in creatures, and in one creature than in another.

To the fifth, it must be said that in the love whose principal object is the one loving, it is necessary that what is more similar to the one loving be loved more, as in a natural love. But in the love of charity, the principal object is God Himself. Thus other things being equal, that which is more one with God ought to be loved more out of charity.

To the sixth, it must be said that the Apostle (1 John iv. 20) was arguing according to those who are attached in a great degree to what is visible, and by these men, what can be seen is loved more than what cannot be seen.

To the seventh, it must be said that by a unity of nature nothing is more one than we ourselves. But by a unity of affection, whose object is the good, the highest good ought to be more one than we are.

To the eighth, it must be said that all men ought to be loved equally insofar as we ought to wish for all of them the same good, viz., eternal life.

To the ninth, it must be said that one is bound to love his neighbor as himself, but not however as much as himself. Because of this, it does not follow that all fellow-men ought to be loved equally.

To the tenth, it must be said that we speak of loving someone more not only because we wish a greater good for him, but also because we wish the same good for him with more intense affection. Thus, although we wish the one good, which is eternal life, for all; we do not, however, love all equally.

To the eleventh, it must be answered that we are not giving to a person that love which we ought to give if we love more one whom we ought to love less. For, it can happen that in the moment of necessity we give more to the latter, to the neglect of the former whom we ought to love more.

To the twelfth, it must be said that those who are in heaven are joined to their final end, and therefore their love is regulated solely by that end; thus there is no order of charity in them, except that which is concerned with their nearness to God. Because of this, those who are closer to God are loved more. But in this life, it is necessary for us to tend toward our end; and therefore the order of love is also established according to the measure of help in tending to that end which is obtained from others. And thus it is not always those who live better lives that are loved more, but there also arises a factor of propinquity, so that the reason for greater love is found jointly in each of these factors.

To the fourteenth, it must be said that any prelate of the Church does not confer benefices insofar as he is Peter or Martin, but only insofar as he is a master of the Church. Therefore, in the collection for ecclesiastical benefices he ought not to regard any closeness to himself but rather the closeness to God and the usefulness to the Church; just as the overseer of any household in attending to the affairs of his master ought to consider the service as being rendered to his master and not to himself. But in one's own private affairs, such as the goods of patrimony, or those things which are acquired by one's own personal effort as an individual, in these goods one ought to observe an order of closeness in doing good.

To the fifteenth, it must be said that concerning those things which properly pertain to the individual person of anyone, he ought to show more of the effects of love towards his parents than toward someone who is not a member of his family; except if by chance, when the common good which each one ought also to desire for himself would depend on the good of someone who is not a member of one's family, as when one would expose himself to the danger of death in order to save the general of the army in war time, or to save the leader of a state insofar as the welfare of the entire community depends on these men. But considering those things which pertain to some other thing by reason of a certain bond, such as the fact that one is a citizen or a soldier, he ought to obey the ruler of the state or his general more than his parents.

To the sixteenth, it must be said that when we refer to those whom we receive from the sacred fountain, the text of Gregory ought to be understood as meaning that which pertains to a spiritual regeneration.

To the seventeenth, it must be said that this argument applies only to those things which pertain to our social life, in which is founded friendship for someone who is not a member of one's family.

To the eighteenth, it must be said that according to that love by which one loves himself, he loves his wife and children more than his parents because a wife is some part of the husband, and the son of the father. Therefore the love which one has for his wife and son is more included in the love by which a person loves himself than is the love which he has for his parents. But this is not to love the son for the son's sake, but rather for one's own sake. But according to the mode of love by which we love another for the other's sake, a father ought to be loved more than a son insofar as we receive greater benefit from the father, and also insofar as the honor of the son depends more on the honor of the father than vice versa. Therefore in a display of reverence, in obedience, in doing the will of another, and in other similar things, man is bound more to his father than to his son. But in providing the necessities, he is bound more to the child than to the parent, because parents ought to lay away treasures for their children and not vice versa, as is said in 1 Corinth., iv.

To the first, it must be said that when it is written, Love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, this is understood to be a precept according to which the totality excludes everything that prevents a perfect adherence to God; and this is not a precept but the end of a precept. For us this does not mean that we should do it, but rather that we should tend toward it, as Augustine says.

To the second, it must be said that man is not able to love better things more than their goodness demands; just as he is not able to have perfect charity, as has been said.

To the third, it must be said that in the union which makes the lover one with the loved, there are various grades found. Our soul will then be one with God perfectly when it is always actually directed toward Him, which is not possible in this life.

To the fourth, it must be answered that the perfection which is found in a thing according to its species is found in it always; just as man, because of his rational soul, is perfect at any time or at any age. Whence, the perfection of charity which is according to all time is the perfection which is found in charity according to its species. But it is of the very essence of charity that God be loved above all things and that no creature be preferred to Him in love. Whence, since every temptation occurs from the love of some created good, or from the fear of a contrary evil which is derived from love, charity, in whatever degree, has from its species that it is able to resist any temptation in such way that man is not led into mortal sin through it, not however that man is affected in no way by temptation; for this pertains to the perfection of heaven.

To the fifth, it must be said that in heaven God will be both wholly seen and wholly loved in the same way, viz., insofar as wholly is regarded on the part of the one who loves and the one who sees, for the entire power of the creature will be applied to seeing and loving God. Likewise, it can also be understood that God will be wholly seen and loved because there is no part of Him which is not seen and loved, since He is not composite but simple. But according to another way of understanding this, He is not wholly loved or seen, because He will not be seen or loved by any creature to the degree that He can be seen or is lovable. In this life, however, God cannot even be wholly seen or loved according to the first or second way, for He is not seen through His essence, nor is it possible for man living in this life that his affective power be perfectly directed toward God without any interruption. Nevertheless, God is wholly loved in some way by man in this life according as there is nothing in his affective power contrary to the divine love.

To the sixth, it must be said that the will is the mistress of its own act in regard to that which it does, but not in regard to the fact that it perseveres continually in one act, since a condition of this life requires that acts and the will be directed toward many things. Or, it can be said that the will is the mistress of its acts in those things which are connatural to man, but the perfection of charity which will be greatest in heaven is above man, especially if man is considered according to his state in the present life.

To the seventh, it must be said that an action can cease to be lovable not only on the part of the object, but also on the part of the agent because he is deficient in the power of acting. Thus it must be said that what is always actually directed toward God is lovable on the part of the object. However, such a love, on the part of one living in this life, cannot be continual, because the contemplation of the human mind is not without the action of the imaginative power and of the other corporeal powers, which must be released from continuous action because of the weakness of the body; and for this reason delight is impeded. Thus it is written (Eccle. xii. 1), Much study is an affliction of the flesh.

To the eighth, it must be said that the perfection of charity is not according to a quantitative increase, but according to a qualitative intensity. This intensity is not opposed to the simplicity of charity.

To the ninth, it must be said that the objects of the other moral virtues are human goods which do not exceed the powers of man. Therefore man can arrive at the complete perfection of these in this life. But the object of charity is the uncreated good which does exceed the powers of man. Therefore the argument does not apply.

To the first objection given in the On the contrary, it must be said that a man can live in this life without mortal sin, but not without venial sin; this is not contrary to the perfection of this life but to the perfection of the life in heaven which consists in being always actually directed toward God. Venial sin does not take away the habit of charity, but it impedes its act.

To the second, it must be said that we are not able to know God perfectly in this life so that we know what He is. However, we can know what He is not, as Augustine says, and in this consists the perfection of the knowledge of this life. Likewise, we are not able to love God perfectly in this life so that we are always actually directed toward Him, but the mind is never directed to what is contrary to God.

To the third, it must be said that in this life charity is neither perfect without qualffication nor according to human nature, but only according to time. But those things which are perfect in this way possess that by which they grow, as is clear in the example given of boys. Therefore charity in this life always has that by which it increases itself.

To the fourth, it must be said that perfect charity drives out servile and initial fear, but not a chaste or filial fear, or even a natural fear.

To the second kind of perfection, without which charity can exist, men are not bound, since any sort of charity is sufficient for salvation. And even less are they bound to the third or fourth perfections, since no one is bound to the impossible.

To the first, it must be said that the wholeness of heart, considered as coming under the precept of charity, pertains to that perfection without which charity cannot exist.

To the second, it must be said that to order all things actually to God is not possible in this life; just as it is not possible to be always thinking of God, for this pertains to the perfection of heaven. But that all things be ordered to God by virtue does pertain to the perfection of charity, to which all are bound. To prove this, it must be understood that just as in efficient causes the power of the primary cause remains in all the subsequent causes, so also does the intention of the principal end virtually remain in all the secondary ends. Thus, whoever actually intends some secondary end, virtually intends the primary end. For example, a physician, while actually gathering herbs, intends the end of preparing a prescription, while perhaps not thinking about health; yirtually, however, he intends health as the end for which he administers the prescription. In the same way, he who orders himself to God as to an end, in all things which he does for his own sake, the intention of the final end which is God remains virtually. Thus he is able to gain merit in all things if he has charity. It is in this manner, therefore, that the Apostle wrote that everything should be ordered to the glory of God.

To the third, it must be said that it is one thing to order things to God habitually and another thing to do so virtually. For, habitually one orders to God who does nothing, nor does he actually intend anything, as sleeping. But to order something to God virtually is the act of an agent ordering to God because of the end. Therefore to order to God habitually does not come under a precept, but to do so virtually does come from a precept since this is nothing other than to have God as the ultimate end.

To the fourth, it must be said that the saying, Be ye perfect, etc., seems to have reference to the love of enemies which in one way is from the perfection of a counsel; in another way from the necessity of a precept, as has been shown above.

To the fifth, it must be said that the perfection of eternal life consists principally and essentially in certain things, but secondarily and accidentally it consists in others. Principally and essentially, this perfection consists in those things which pertain to an interior disposition of the mind, and especially in the act of charity which is the root of all the virtues. But secondarily and accidentally, this perfection also consists in certain external things, such as virginity, poverty, and other such things. These things are said to pertain to perfection in a threefold manner. They pertain to perfection, first, insofar as through them the hindrances of the manifold activities of ordinary life are taken away from man, and when they are removed, the mind is more freely directed to God. Thus the Lord, when He said (Matt. xix. 21), If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give it to the poor, He then added, and come follow me. He did this to show that poverty does not pertain to perfection unless it dispose one to follow Christ. For, we follow Him not with the movements of our body, but with the affections of the soul. In this way, the Apostle gave counsel about not marrying (1 Cor. vii. 34), for she who is a virgin thinkest on the things of the Lord, how to please Him. And this same reasoning concerns similar cases.

To the sixth, it must be said that there is a difference between a friendship for a noble person and a friendship for a pleasant person, because in a friendship for a pleasant person, the friend is loved for the sake of pleasure; but in a friendship for a noble person, the friend is loved for his own sake, although pleasure is a result of this. Therefore it is proper to the perfection of a friendship for a noble person that one who is occupied in serving a friend should sometimes even abstain from a pleasure which he experiences in the friend's presence for the sake of that friend. So, according to this friendship, he who would absent himself from a friend for the friend's sake would love him more than he who would not wish to depart from the presence of that friend even for that friend's sake. But if anyone be willingly and easily deprived of the friend's presence and be more pleased with other things, this proves that he loves the friend either not at all, or only a little. We can, therefore, consider these three grades in charity, but God ought to be most especially loved for His own sake. For, there are some who freely, or without great vexation, are separated from the leisure of divine contemplation so that they are concerned with earthly affairs, and in these there is apparent either no charity, or very little. Some, however, so delight in the leisure of divine contemplation that they do not want to turn away from it even to apply their service to God to the salvation of their fellowmen. The highest degree, the third, are those who rise to the heights of charity so that even as they advance in divine contemplation, although they are very much delighted in it, serve God in order to save their fellowmen. This is the perfection meant by St. Paul (Rom. ix. 3), For I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, i.e., separated from Him, for my brethren; and (Philip. i. 23-24), I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ,... But to abide still in the flesh, is needful for you. This is the perfection proper to prelates, preachers, and all the other religious whose life is dedicated to looking after the salvation of others. This is what is meant by the angels on the ladder, in Jacob's dream, ascending through contemplation, but descending through the responsibility which they bear over the salvation of their neighbor (Gen. xxviii. 11-12). The status of church dignitaries, however, cannot become less perfect because of some who misuse this state and seek that position for the sake of temporal goods, as if not attracted to the delightfulness of contemplation; just as the disbelief of many does not destroy faith in God, as is said (Rom. iii. 27).

To the seventh, it must be said that in the teaching of the Gospels, certain things are said to the Apostles in the person of all the faithful, viz., those things which pertain to the necessity of salvation. Thus, it is written (Mark xiii. 37), What I say to you, I say to all: watch. By watch is meant that solicitude which man ought to have so that he will not be found unprepared by Christ. But other things are said to the Apostles which concern the perfection of this life and the duties of prelates, and these cannot be included in, What I say to you, I say to all. However, it should be understood that what the Lord said to His disciples (Luke ix. 3), Take nothing for your journey, etc., as Augustine has explained in the De Consen. Evangelist. , does not pertain to the perfection of life but to the power of apostolic dignity, through which the Apostles, while carrying nothing with them, were able to live on that which was provided for them by those to whom they preached the Gospel. Thus it was written in the same place (Luke x. 7), The labourer is worthy of his hire, i.e., of his food; but this was neither a precept nor a counsel, but a concession. Because of this, St. Paul who carried his necessities about with him, not using this concession, paid over and above, as if striving against his own wages. This is clear from 1 Cor. ix. 7.

To the eighth, it must be said that there are two affections in man; the one of charity by which the soul desires to be with Christ; the other, however, a natural affection by which the soul resists the separation from the body—which is natural to man; for not even was the old man taken away from Peter, as Augustine says in Super Joan. 2 . Thus, by uniting these two affections, the soul wishes to be united in such a way to God so that it would not be separated from the body. For this reason, the Apostle wrote (1I Cor. v. 4), We would not be unclothed, but clothed upon, that that which is mortal may be swallowed up by life. But since this is impossible, While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord (2 Cor. v. 6), opposition arises among these mentioned affections, and the more perfect charity is, the more does the affection of charity sensibly overcome the affection of nature. This pertains to the perfection of charity. Whence the Apostle adds (1I Cor. v. 8), But we are confident, and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with the Lord. But in those in whom charity is imperfect, if only the affection of charity conquers, then from the repugnance of the natural affection, the victory of charity is rendered imperceptible. Therefore the Apostle clearly, unhesitatingly, and even boldly said, I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ (Philip. i. 23); this is perfect charity. It is from the necessity of charity that the soul prefers in any way, even imperceptibly, the enjoyment of God to the union with the body.

To the ninth, it must be said that to give up your life, i.e., this present life for your brother is, in one way, from the necessity of charity, and in another way from the perfection of it. For, man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body. Therefore, in the case where one is bound to look after the salvation of his neighbor, he is also bound to expose his bodily life to dangers for the sake of that salvation. But this is perfect charity, that he also expose his bodily life to dangers for those to whom he is not bound as to a neighbor.

To the tenth, it must be said that, although every one is bound to live without mortal sin, it is not for every one to have complete assurance in this matter; but only for the perfect who have completely overcome sin.

To the eleventh, it must be said that man is bound to return to parents, and even more to God, all that he can. But according to the common mode of human life, no one is bound from the necessity of a precept to give more than he is able.

To the twelfth, it must be said that no one promises perfect charity, but some promise a state of perfection which consists in those things which are ordered as means to the perfection of charity, such as poverty or fastings. They are not bound to all things of this kind, but only to those which they promise. Thus, the perfection of charity does not accrue to them by their vows, but it is as an end to which they attempt to arrive by means of what they vow.

To the first, it must be said that what St. John wrote (1 John iii. 9), should be understood according to the power of the Holy Spirit moving the soul, Who unfailingly operates as He wishes.

To the second, it must be said that Augustine speaks of charity as the power of charity itself; for charity is sufficient that it will never wither away. But that it is lost, is due to the indetermination of the subject, as has been said.

To the third, it must be said that true love has an essential note that is never lost; for he who truly loves man has foremost in his soul that he will never diminish that love. But when this commitment in the soul is changed, that which was true love is lost. Further, if anyone would have this commitment that he would sometimes cease loving, his love would not be true. Whence it is clear that charity, considered according to its own power cannot be lost; but it can be lost because of the indeterminate power of the subject.

To the fourth, it must be said that Prosper also speaks of charity according to the power of charity itself, and not according to the power of the subject.

To the fifth, it must be said that charity, if it is present, has an inclination to do great works, and Gregory wished to speak in this manner according to the quality of his own virtue. But sometimes one can fail from this because of the indetermination of the subject.

To the sixth, it must be said that since there is in man a twofold nature, viz., the intellectual which is primary, and the sensitive which is lesser; he truly loves himself who loves himself for the good of reason. But when a man loves himself and wants sensual goods for himself which are contrary to the good of reason, he hates himself more than he loves himself, because it is written (Psalms x. 6), He that loveth iniquity hateth his own soul. And this the Philosopher also said in Book IX of the Ethics . According to this, true love of self is lost through the contrary sin; just as the love of God is also lost.

To the seventh, it must be said that charity excludes every movement of sin according to its own determination. For, it pertains to the essence of charity that it wishes not to desire concupiscibly, nor to love self inordinately. But sometimes the contrary happens because of the indetermination of free choice and the corruption of nature; thus the Apostle said (Rom. vii. 19), For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do.

To the eighth, it must be said that whenever one follows the movement of the Holy Spirit, he does not sin; but when he resists it, then he sins.

To the ninth, it must be said that the being (esse) of charity is not always to be in operation, otherwise when one sleeps, he would not have charity. But it is said that the love of God is never idle according to the determination of charity, whose whole purpose is that a man give himself completely to God.

To the tenth, it must be said that a loss is related to the thing had, as corruption is related to the thing existing. Therefore, as corruption begins in an existing thing and terminates in its non-being ( non-esse ), because the change is from being ( esse ) to non-being ( non-esse ); so does a loss, since it is a change from having to non-having, begin in having and terminate in non-having. Therefore the beginning of the loss of charity is when charity is had; its end, however, is when charity is not had.

To the eleventh, it must be said that charity ceases to exist in the soul in some way according to these four modes. For, the subject of charity, although it is incorruptible according to its substance, becomes indisposed to this form through the contrary disposition of sin. Likewise, although the cause of charity is incorruptible, the influence of this cause is impeded by sin which separates us from God. Also, charity fails on the part of its object insofar as the will diverts itself from the unchangeable good. Charity even fails through the contrary movement to sinning; for, essentially speaking, although sin is weaker than charity, in some instances sin can be stronger, viz., when charity is not operating in act and the movement of sin directs toward some other particular operation. The Philosopher also showed in Book VII of the Ethics , that science, although it is stronger, can be overcome by passion; this is considered insofar as the agent is not in act but is bound up in habit because of passion. For, just as science is strongest in the universal, passion however operates in the particular; so also charity is strongest when acting toward the final end, but it allows the movement of sin which has strength in some particular act.

To the twelfth, it must be said that the Philosopher did write that the good of one virtue is not contrary to the good of another, and this is what he intended to say in the Praedicamentis and in Book II of the Ethics . But in nature, one good is contrary to another, for each of the contraries is a certain good of nature. Therefore, the good which moves the appetite to sin is contrary to the divine good which is the object of charity, insofar as the end is found in the divine good. For there can be only one final end; just as in a kingdom, where there can be only one king, he who makes himself to be a king is contrary to the actual king, according to what is written (John xix. 12), Whosoever maketh himself a king, speaketh against Caesar.

To the thirteenth, it must be said that charity is not driven out by sin as by an agent, but as by its contrary. Thus, that intervening of sin is the expulsion of charity; just as the coming of light is the expulsion of darkness. For, the light drives out darkness by its own becoming; but a movement to sin drives out charity according as it pre-exists in the understanding of the soul.

To the fourteenth, it must be said that when man stands in mortal sin, this is done by a certain deliberation of reason; for without a deliberating consent, there can be no mortal sin. But this deliberation is a measured movement of time in the last moment of which sin exists in the soul. But before that final instant, the nearest instant in which charity exists cannot be designated; because these moments are not regarded as moments following one another, for time is a continuum. Therefore in the entire time which precedes the moment that terminates in the final instant, charity exists in the soul; after the last instant of this time, sin exists. Thus it is not possible to designate the final instant in which charity exists, but the final time, as is shown by the Philosopher in Book VIII of the Physics .

To the fifteenth, it must be said that if the Master understood of charity that it is the charity of heaven, it is true that it is not lost, according to the proofs given above. But if he meant the charity of this life insofar as it is perfect, it is not true that it cannot be lost because of the mode of inhering in its subject, but only by virtue of the movement of the Holy Spirit; and thus it is said that those who were strengthened, were strengthened in this life.

To the sixteenth, it must be said that just as the first truth is understood in the knowledge of anything that is true, as the first exemplar is understood in an image or vestige, so is the highest good loved in the love of anything that is good. But such a love of the highest good is not sufficient for the definition of charity; it is necessary that the highest good be loved as the object of beatitude.

To the eighteenth, it must be said that, as Augustine says explaining this text (John x. 27), My sheep hear my voice and do not hear the voice of others, there is a certain voice of Christ which no one hears unless he be His sheep through a predetermination. This voice says, He who perseveres to the end will be saved. And in this way he understands that he who does not remain faithful to the words of Christ is not a true disciple, because he has not learned from Him to persevere effectively. However, he can be a temporary disciple when he loves God for a time and his neighbor.

To the nineteenth, it must be said that as long as charity is actually dominant in man, man is not moved by a contrary motion, but he follows the movement of charity. Therefore the greatest remedy against sin is for man to return into his heart, converting it to the love of God. But when man is not moved in act according to charity, he is under pressure from the contrary movement of sin.

To the twentieth, it must be said that to be corrupted and to be generated or to become, is proper to that which has being (esse); i.e., only a thing subsisting in its being ( esse ). But accidents and forms that are not subsisting are not called being because they have existence, but rather because by them something exists. Therefore, to become and to be corrupted are not proper to accidents and to forms, but to subjects. For example, when any thing becomes white, this is whiteness in becoming; just as for any thing to be white, is this existing whiteness. And the same reasoning holds for corruption. Therefore corruptible and incorruptible are not attributed directly to accidents, but only to substance. Whence, there is nothing that prevents the charity of this life and of heaven from being the same in number; although the charity here can be lost while the charity of heaven cannot be lost.

To the twenty-first, it must be said that, as has already been said, charity, properly speaking, is not corrupted; but the subject ceases to participate in charity. Whence it is not proper to say that charity is corrupted either in something or in nothing.

To the twenty-second, it must be said that because of the indetermination of the subject, just as charity that overshadows sin destroys it, so also does sin overshadowing charity, drives it out; for contraries are mutually exclusive.

To the twenty-third, it must be said that if a gift can be taken away by violence, then it seems that the giver who must preserve the gift for the one to whom he has bestowed it, is defeated. But if he to whom the gift is given voluntarily rejects it, it does not seem that this causes the donor, who ought not to force men to virtue, to be defeated.

To the twenty-fourth, it must be said that a wife in marriage loses the power over her own body. But the soul, through charity, does not lose the power of free choice. Whence the argument does not follow.

To the first, it must be said that this saying of Origen can be understood in this way, that a man who is in a perfect state does not suddenly fall into the act of mortal sin, but does so through some previous negligence. But because he adds, If one undergoes a slight fall, etc., it seems better to say that he understood one who completely falls away falls so that he sins by malice, which fall does not come about suddenly. For, as the Philosopher says in Book I of the Ethics , it is not easy for a just man to perform unjust works suddenly as an unjust man does them, viz., by choice. Therefore one loses charity through one act of mortal sin, but some of the previous perfection remains if he has not lost charity out of malice.

To the second, it must be said that charity is lost in two ways; directly and indirectly. It is lost directly through an actual contempt for God, as happens with those who say to God (Job xxi. 14), Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of thy ways. In another way, it is lost indirectly; just as one who is not thinking of God, consents to something that is against the law of God on account of some passion of fear or of concupiscence, and as a consequence loses charity. Therefore Bernard intended to say that charity was not extinct in Peter according to the first manner; but Peter lost it according to the second manner, and therefore Bernard calls it inactive. In the same way, the words of Leo should be understood, and this is clear from what he further adds, The cleansing remedy will not be far away where there was no judgment of the will; for the denial of Peter was driven by fear more than by a deliberate judgment of the will.

To the fourth, it must be said that an acquired virtue has its cause in the subject and is not entirely extrinsic, as is true of charity. Therefore the comparison between acquired virtue and charity cannot be made.

To the fifth, it must be said that in contraries, one contrary can be driven out without the other contrary coming in. But the habits of virtue and vice are mediated contraries; whence the Philosopher says in the Praedicamentis , there is a medium between good and evil. Whence it is not necessary to say that a man loses the habit of one virtue only when the habit of the contrary vice is generated in him.

To the sixth, it must be said that a habit, of itself, regards the formal notion of its object more than the material notion of the object; therefore if the formal notion (ratio) of the object is taken away, the species of habit does not remain. However, the formal notion in the object of faith is the first truth manifested through the teaching of the Church; just as the formal notion of science is the medium of demonstration. Therefore, just as one who remembers the conclusions of geometry does not have the science of geometry if he does not assent to these conclusions because of the reasons of geometry, but he holds these conclusions only as opinion; so also one who holds those things which are of faith but does not assent to them because of the authority of Catholic teaching, does not have the habit of faith. For, he who asserts to anything because of Catholic teaching assents to all those things which that teaching contains. Otherwise, he would believe himself more than the teaching of the Church. From this it is clear that he who obstinately denies one article of faith does not have faith in the other articles—that faith, I say, which is an infused habit, for he holds the conclusions of faith as opinion.

Ad 1. It should be said that people speak in two ways of the four cardinal virtues mentioned, for some use these four names to signify general modes of the virtues, for example, calling any directive knowledge prudence, any rectitude that equalizes human acts justice, any moderation that restrains man’s appetite for temporal goods temperance, and all firmness of soul stabilizing man in the good against the assault of whatever evils, fortitude. It is in this way that Augustine seems to use these words in On the morals of the church, and in this way too that the remark of Gregory can be understood, because only one of the conditions of the true virtue does not suffice: All the conditions must be satisfied. On this basis the four are called virtues not because of different species of habits drawn from diverse objects, but according to different formal notions.

Ad 2. It should be said that man’s appetite rests in the end, and, therefore, the principality of the theological virtues, which bear on the ultimate end, is not compared to a hinge, which moves, but rather to a foundation or root, which is standing and at rest, according to Ephesians 3, 17: “rooted and grounded in love.”

Ad 3. It should be said that, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6, prudence is right reason with respect to things to be done. But things to be done are called moral works, as is clear from what is said there. Therefore, prudence agrees with the moral virtues because of its matter, and on account of this is numbered among them, although with respect to its essence or subject it is an intellectual virtue.

Ad 4. It should be said that wisdom, because it is concerned with the divine and not the human, does not have its matter in common with the moral virtues, and hence is not numbered among them as if together with them it might be called a cardinal virtue. The notion of hinge is repugnant to contemplation, which is not like a door, whereby one enters into something else, but moral action is the door through which entry is made to the contemplation of wisdom.

Ad 5. It should be said that if the foregoing four virtues are taken to signify the general conditions of virtue, then all the special virtues of which the Philosopher treats in the Ethics are reduced to these four as species to genera. But if they be taken as special virtues dealing with the most basic matters, the others are reduced to them as the secondary to the principal; for example, eutrapelia , which moderates the pleasure of play, can be reduced to temperance which moderates the pleasures of touch. Hence, Cicero in Rhetoric 2 says that the other virtues are parts of these four. That can be understood in two ways: They are subjective parts if these virtues are taken in the first way, whereas they are potential parts if they are taken in the second way. Thus, sense is a potential part of the soul because it does not name the whole power of the soul, but something of it.

Ad 6. It should be said that it is not of the meaning of temperance that it excludes all depraved desires, but that the temperate person does not experience as vehement and strong desires as those who do not try to restrain them. Therefore, Paul suffered inordinate desires because of the corruption of lust, but not strongly or vehemently, because he sought to repress them by castigating his own body and bring it into subjection. Hence, he was truly temperate.

Ad 7. It should be said that justice, by which we are related to the other, does not deal with one’s own passions but with the activities by which we communicate with others, such as buying and selling and the like: But temperance and fortitude are concerned with one’s own passions and therefore, Just as there is one appetitive power without passion, namely, will, and two with passion, namely, the concupiscible and irascible, so there is one cardinal virtue ordered to the neighbor, and two ordering a man to himself.

Ad 8. It should be said that charity is called the whole of virtue not essentially but causally, because charity is the mother of all the virtues. But the effect is always more multiplied than the cause, and therefore the other virtues must be greater in number than charity.

Ad 9. It should be said that the different senses of reception can be taken either from the side of the matter which is receptive of form, and such diversity causes diversity of genus, or from the side of the form which is diversely receivable in matter, and such diversity causes diversity of species. And so it is in the objection.

Ad 10. It should be said that the moral virtues involve reason as their proximate measure, but God as their first measure. Things are specified according to proper and proximate principles, not according to first principles.

Ad 11. It should be said that the rational is the principal part of man, but something is rational in two ways, essentially or by way of participation and, just as reason itself is more principal that the powers participating in reason, so prudence is more principal than the other virtues.

Ad 12. It should be said that the cardinal virtues are called more principal, not because they are more perfect than all the other virtues, but because human life more principally turns on them and the other virtues are based on them. But it is manifest that human life turns more on justice than on liberality, for we use justice in regard to all, but liberality in regard to a few. And liberality itself is founded on justice, for there would not be a liberal gift if one did not give of his own, but one’s own is distinguished from that of others through justice.

Ad 13. It should be said that humility strengthens all virtues indirectly by removing what can undermine the good works of the virtues and cause them to perish; but the other virtues are directly strengthened by the cardinal virtues.

Ad 14. It should be said that patience is included in fortitude, for the brave person has what the patient person has, but adds even more, namely, that he drives off imminent evils in the way that he should.

Ad 15. It should be said that, from the fact that magnanimity adorns the other virtues, it is clear that it presupposes the other virtues in which it is grounded, and from this it is also clear that the others are more principal than it. —

Ad 1. It should be said that because of an inclination one has to the work of one virtue rather than another, which is either natural or a gift of grace, it happens that one more promptly performs the act of one virtue than another; and in this way the saints are said to have some virtues on which they are prompt to act and not to have others on which they are less prompt to act.

Ad 2. It should be said that although habits as such make someone act promptly and with pleasure, this can be impeded by something supervening, as one having the habit of science is sometimes impeded from using it by sleepiness or drunkenness or something of the like. Therefore, one who repents receives by grace charity and all the other virtues but because of the lingering dispositions from his prior sins he experiences difficulty in the performance of virtues which he has received habitually. This does not happen with virtues acquired through the practice of acts, which at the same time remove contrary dispositions and generate the habits of the virtues.

Ad 3. It should be said that those who are baptized receive prudence along with charity and all the other virtues too, but it is not of the necessity of prudence that a man deliberate well in everything, for example, in trade and military matters and the like, but only in the things necessary for salvation, which are not lacking to those in grace, however simple they be, according to 1 John 2:27: “But his anointing teaches you concerning all things”; unless perhaps in some of the baptized the act of prudence be impeded on account of the bodily defect of age, as in children or those of deformed dispositions, such as the retarded and mad.

Ad 4. It should be said that artifacts of different types have wholly different principles, so nothing prevents someone having one kind of art and not another. But the principles of morals are so interrelated to one another that the failure of one would entail the failure in others. For example, if one were weak on the principle that concupiscence is not to be followed, which pertains to desire, then sometimes in pursuing concupiscence, he would do injury and thus violate justice. So too in one and the same art or science, for example, geometry, an error about one principle leads to error in the whole science. Thence it is that one cannot be sufficiently prudent with regard to the matter of one virtue unless he is prudent with regard to them all.

Ad 5. It should be said that it happens that someone can be called liberal but not high-minded with respect to an act, because someone having little can use what he has to perform an act of liberality but not of magnificence, although he might have the virtue by which he could also perform the act of magnificence if he had the wherewithal. Similarly, it must be said of moderation and magnanimity. This solution is to be held without reservation in the case of infused virtues, but in virtues acquired through acts it can be said that he who acquired the habit of liberality in the use of little, not yet having acquired the habit of magnificence but actually having the habit of liberality, is in proximate potency to acquiring the habit of magnificence with but slight effort. Therefore, because what is close to being had seems the same as being had, what is lacking only a little seems not to be lacking at all, as is said Physics 2.

Ad 6. It should be said that in those words of the Apostle wisdom and knowledge are understood neither as intellectual virtues, which, however, have no connection, as will be said below, nor as gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are connected through charity, but insofar as they are of grace freely given: namely, insofar as someone abounds in knowledge and wisdom so that he can spur others to the end and to the knowledge of God, convincing those who object. Hence, the Apostle does not say that to one is given wisdom and to another knowledge, but to one is given the utterance of wisdom, to other the utterance of knowledge. Hence, Augustine, in On the Trinity 14, says that many believers are not strong in such knowledge although they might be strong in faith itself. Faith does not mean here unformed faith, as some say, because the gift of faith is common to all, but means the constancy of faith or its certitude, which sometimes abounds even in sinners.

Ad 7. It should be said that some hold that virginity is not the name of a virtue so much as of a more perfect state of virtue. But it is not necessary that anyone who has a virtue have it in its perfect grade. Therefore, chastity and the other virtues can be had without virginity. Or, if virginity is taken to be a virtue, this will be insofar as it implies a habit of mind by which one chooses to preserve virginity for the sake of Christ. And this habit can exist even in those who are not intact in the flesh, just as the habit of magnificence can be without a lot of wealth.

Ad 8. It should be said that the intellectual virtues are not interconnected and this for three reasons. First, because virtues concerned with different kinds of things are not related to one another, as has been said of the arts. Second, because in the sciences principles and conclusions are not convertible, such that whoever has the principles has the conclusions, as has been said about moral matters. Third, because intellectual virtue is not related to charity by which man is ordered to his ultimate end. Therefore, such virtues are concerned with particular goods, for example, geometry with measuring abstract entities, Physics with mobile things, and so on with the others. Hence, they are not connected for the same reason that imperfect virtues are not, as was said about in the body of the article.

Ad 9. It should be said that there are some virtues which order man with respect to the things that occur in human fife, such as temperance, justice, patience, and the like, and with them a man Must either, while actually performing the act of a virtue, simultaneously perform the acts of the other virtues and thus acquires all habits of the virtues together, or he must be good in the one and bad in the others. But in the latter case, he acquires a habit contrary to a virtue and consequently the corruption of prudence without which, as has been said above in the body of the article, the disposition acquired through the act of any virtue cannot properly be called a virtue. Such acquired habits bearing on things that commonly occur in fife are already virtually had as it were in proximate disposition if one has other virtues whose acts frequently occur in human intercourse, as was said of magnificence and magnanimity in the solution of argument 5.

Ad 10. It should be said that acquired virtues are caused purposely, and must be all caused together in a man who proposes to himself to acquire one of them, nor are they acquired unless at the same time one acquires prudence with which all are had, as was said in the body of the article. But infused virtues are caused immediately by God, and they are also caused by charity as by their common root, as was said in the body of the article.

Ad 11. It should be said that in speculative sciences principles and conclusions are not convertible as they are in morals, as was said in the body of the article. Therefore, he who has one conclusion does not necessarily have another. If this were the case, it would be necessary that whoever has the principles has the conclusions, as the objection assumes.

Ad 12. It should be said that Augustine is speaking there of imperfect virtues which are dispositions to the acts of virtues; hence, he himself proves their connection in On the Trinity 6.

Ad 13. It should be said that virtues are connected by reason of the proximate principle of their genus, which is either prudence or charity, not by reason of the remote and common, which is God.

Ad 14. It should be said that among the intellectual virtues prudence has a special connection with the [moral] virtues by reason of its matter, for it is concerned with changeable things.

Ad 15. It should be said that in heaven where hope and faith disappear certain more perfect things succeed them, namely, vision and comprehension, which are conncctcd with charity.

Ad 16. It should be said that In the angels and separated souls there is not temperance or fortitude with respect to such acts as are performed in this life, namely, moderating the passions of the sensible part, but to other acts, as is evident in Augustine On the Trinity 14.

Ad 17. It should be said that the powers of the soul are not convertible with its essence, for although no power of the soul can exist apart from essence, yet the essence of the soul can exist without some powers, for example, without sight and hearing because of the corruption of the organs of which such powers are properly the acts.

Ad 18. It should be said that a man is not the best because he has all the virtues but because he has them to the greatest degree.

Ad 1. This argument, it should be said, is based on the inequality of the virtues themselves, not of the inequality in the way they inhere, of which we are now speaking. For charity, as has been said, taken as such, is greater than all other virtues, and yet, as it grows in a person, all the other virtues grow proportionately, as the fingers of the hand are unequal to one another, yet grow proportionately.

Ad 2-7. Similarly, it should be replied to the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth, and the seventh too, which in the same fashion argued that fortitude was greater than the other virtues.

Ad 8. Similarly to the eighth, which proceeds in the same way concerning justice; although justice is the whole of virtue, it is not justice in that sense that is called a cardinal virtue.

Ad 9. And we should answer the ninth objection in the same way, because it is insofar as the virtues are in man that greater or less perfection of a species of virtue is distinguished.

Ad 10. Similarly it should be replied to the tenth, because in this way the vices too are unequal.

Ad 11. It should be said that a person is more praised for one virtue than for another because of a greater promptitude to act.

Ad 12. It should be said that where there is a greater habit there should be a greater act according to the inclination of the habit. But there can be something in a man that either impedes action or disposes to it yet is incidentally related to the habit, as one might be impeded from exercising the habit of science because of drunkenness. Therefore, with respect to such impediments or aids to action there can sometimes be an increase in the act without an increase in the habit.

Ad 13. It should be said that in acquired habits greater exercise causes a greater habit; however, a habit acquired through many acts can still be incidentally impeded and not produce its act, as was said in the body of the article.

Ad 14. It should be said that in natural things where there is equal form there can be inequality of act due to some incidental impediment.

Ad 15. It should be said that powers are unequal in themselves, insofar as one power is more perfect than another according to its proper definition. And it has been said that virtues are unequal in this way too.

[Ad 16. It should be said that powers are in a subject proportionally, as has been said. So it does not follow that they are had unequally.]

Ad 17. It should be said that virtues inhere proportionately, as has been said; hence, the condition of heaven is opposed to faith by reason of open vision which one does not attain through an increase of charity; so it does not follow that faith decreases as charity increases.

Ad 1-4. The answers are evident from what has been said.

Ad 5. It should be said that Damascene understands the virtues to be equally in all.

Ad 6. It should be said that the essential reward responds to the root of charity; therefore, even if it be granted that the virtues are not equal, still the same reward is owed to a given man because of the identity of charity.

Ad 7. We concede this point. —

Ad 1. It should be said that such virtues perfect man in the active life, as on a kind of path leading to the term of contemplation in heaven; and they remain in heaven in the acts consummated by the end.

Ad 2. It should be said that the cardinal virtues deal with what is for the sake of the end, notas if these might be their ultimate term, as the ultimate term of the ship is navigation, but insofar as they are ordered to the ultimate end by way of the things that are for the sake of the end. The temperance infused by grace does not have for its ultimate end the moderation of the pleasures of touch, but does this for the sake of celestial similitude.

Ad 3. It should be said that the civil good is not the ultimate end of the infused cardinal virtues, of which we speak, but of the acquired virtues of which philosophers spoke, as was said in the body of the article.

Ad 4. It should be said that nothing prevents one and the same thing from being the end of different virtues or arts. The preservation of the civil good is the end and term of both the army and of positive law; hence both arts and virtues have acts concerned with it as a final good, but the military provides for the preservation of the civil good insofar as brave battles bring it about, whereas positive law rejoices in the same end insofar as the civil good is preserved by the ordinances of law. Therefore, the enjoyment of God in heaven is the end of all the cardinal virtues, and there each rejoices in it, insofar as it is the end of his acts. That is why it is said that in heaven there win be one virtue, inasmuch as one subject will have that in which all the virtues rejoice; however, there will be different acts and different virtues according to the different reasons for rejoicing.

Ad 5. It should be said that something is called the object of a virtue in two ways. In one way, as that to which the virtue is ordered as to its end, as the highest good is the object of charity and eternal happiness the object of hope. In another way, as the matter on which it acts, as tending from it to another, and in this way the pleasures of coition are the object of temperance, for temperance does not intend attachment to such pleasures but intends the good of reason by constraining them. Similarly, fortitude does not intend to dwell on perils but by overcoming them to attain the good of reason, and the same is the case with reason with respect to doubts, and of justice in respect to the necessities of this fife. Therefore, the greater the distance from these as the spiritual fife develops, the more perfect the acts of these virtues, because the foregoing words refer to these virtues by way of a term from which rather than of a term toward which, which specifies the act.

Ad 6. It should be said that not every difference in acts points to a diversity of habits, as has already been said in the body of the article.

Ad 7. It should be said that the virtues of the purged soul that Plotinus defined can belong to the blessed, for there prudence only intuits the divine, temperance forgets desire, fortitude ignores the passions, and justice consists in a perpetual covenant with God. But the political virtues of which he speaks are ordered only to the civil good of the present life, as was said in the body of the article.

Ad 8. It should be said that the ultimate of the virtues of master and servant and of husband and wife are ordered to one another, such that from one there can be a transition to the other, so the case is not similar.

Ad 9. It should be said that facilitation of the works of the virtues, that comes about or is perfected by glory, pertains to these habits of virtue.

Ad 10. It should be said that faith is ordered to a truth that is not seen and hope to something arduous not yet had, and these specify them. Therefore, although they are more excellent than the cardinal virtues with respect to their higher object, nonetheless they pass away because they are specified by what does not remain.

Ad 11. It should be said that knowledge is not destroyed as a habit but it has another act.

Ad 12. It should be said that patience does not remain in heaven according to the act that it has in this life, namely, tolerating tribulations, but remains according to an act appropriate to the end, as was said of the other virtues in the body of the article.

Ad 13. It should be said that some teach that the irascible and concupiscible, the subjects of temperance and fortitude, are in the higher part, not in the sensitive part of the soul. But this conflicts with what the Philosopher says in Ethics 3, namely, that virtues are in the irrational parts.

Ad 14. It should be said that all four of these pertain to each act of the cardinal virtues in the manner of end, insofar as celestial happiness consists of them.

Ad 15. It should be said that sobriety does not make us like the angels according to the act of this life which bears on the matter of food and drink, but according to the act of heaven where it bears on the ultimate end, like the other virtues.