Reply Obj. 1: Power is a principle not only of the operation but also of the effect. Hence, it does not follow that, if power be in God as the principle of his effect, that there is also some principle of God’s essence, which is his operation.

Reply Obj. 2: Although all that is most perfect should be attributed to God, it does not follow that everything that is attributed to him is the most perfect; rather, it is necessary that it be suitable for designating the most perfect thing. For something might be attributed to what is most perfect by reason of its particular perfection, even though there is something still more perfect which nevertheless lacks the particular perfection in question.

Reply Obj. 3: Power is said to be a principle not as though it were the very relation signified by the name “principle,” but because it is that which is a principle.

Reply Obj. 4: Habit is never in an active power, but only in a passive power, and is more perfect than it; such a power, however, is not attributed to God.

Reply Obj. 5: It is absurd to say that though God works by his essence there is no power in God, for that which is a principle of action is a power. Therefore, the mere fact that God works by his essence implies that there is power in God. Hence, the account of power in God does not derogate from his simplicity or his primacy, since it does not indicate something in addition to his essence.

Reply Obj. 6: The statement that in everlasting things there is no difference between what is and what can be, is understood in terms of passive power. Consequently, it has no bearing on the point at issue, because no such power is in God. Nevertheless, since it is true that active power in God is identical with his essence, we must reply that, although the divine essence and power are the same in reality, nevertheless, since power mostly by its mode of signification indicates something in addition, it requires a special name. For names correspond to ideas, as the Philosopher says.¹

Reply Obj. 7: This argument proves that there is no passive power in God, and this we grant.

Reply Obj. 8: God’s power is always united to act, that is, to operation (for the operation is the divine essence); but the effects follow according to the command of his will and the order of his wisdom. Consequently, it does not follow that his power is always united to its effect, or that creatures have existed from eternity.

Reply Obj. 9: God’s essence suffices for him to act by it, and yet his power is not superfluous, because it is understood not as some reality in addition to his essence, but as adding, according to understanding, the mere relation of a principle; for the essence itself, from its being the principle of action, has the account of power.

Reply Obj. 10: Something corresponds to the intellect in two ways.

Reply Obj. 11: The power that is in the second species of quality is not ascribed to God. For this belongs to creatures, which do not act immediately through their essential forms but through the medium of accidental forms. But God acts immediately by his own essence.

Reply Obj. 12: Something does indeed correspond in the divine reality to the various accounts of the divine attributes, but that something is one and the same. Because of his incomprehensibility, our intellect is compelled to represent the most simple reality, who is God, by means of various forms; and thus these various forms which our intellect conceives about God are indeed in God as in the cause of truth, insofar as the very reality that is God can be represented by all these forms. But nevertheless, they are in our intellect as their subject.

Reply Obj. 13: The saying of the Philosopher applies to active and effective powers and the like, as applied to the productions of art and human activities; for not even in natural realities is it always true that an active power is for the sake of its effects. For it would be absurd to say that the power of the sun is for the sake of the worms produced by its power. Much less is the divine power for the sake of its effects.

Reply Obj. 14: God’s power is not a medium according to reality, since it does not differ from his essence except in account (and this suffices for our speaking of it as though it were a medium). But God does not work through a medium that is distinct from himself in reality; therefore, the argument fails.

Reply Obj. 15: There are two kinds of action. One is accompanied by transmutation of matter; the other kind presupposes no matter (as in creation). And God can act in either way, as we shall see further on. Hence, active power may rightly be ascribed to God, although he does not always act by causing a change in something.

Reply Obj. 16: The Philosopher’s statement is not universal but particular, namely when something moves its very self, like an animal. When, however, one thing is moved by another, then the power of being acted upon and the power of action are not the same.

Reply Obj. 17: The privation that is contrary to power is lack of power. But we must not speak of contraries in connection with God, because nothing in God has a contrary, since he is not in a genus.

Reply Obj. 18: We do not remove action from God simply speaking, but only action in the manner of natural things, which act and are acted upon simultaneously.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing in God can be called “in vain,” for the vain is what is directed to an end that it cannot attain, whereas God and all that is in him are not for an end, but are the end. Or we may reply that the Philosopher is speaking of a natural active power. For natural things, and even all created things, are coordinated with each other. But God is outside that order since this whole order is ordered to him as its extrinsic good, like the army to the general, according to the Philosopher.¹ Consequently, there is no need that there be something in created things corresponding to what is in God.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Commentator on Physics 8, this demonstration drawn from the proportion between time and the mover’s power proceeds in reference to a magnitude’s infinite power, which is proportionate to an infinity of time, since they both belong to one definite genus, namely, continuous quantity;¹ but it does not hold for an infinity apart from magnitude, which is not proportionate to an infinity of time, since it is of a different account. It may also be replied, as hinted in the objection, that, since God acts by his will, he adapts the movement of whatever he moves according as he wills.

Reply Obj. 3: Although God’s will cannot change his power, it nevertheless can determine its effect. For the will moves power.

Reply Obj. 4: The very account of being made or created is incompatible with the infinite. For from the very fact that it comes to be from nothing, it has a certain defect and is in potency, not pure act: consequently, it cannot be equated with the infinite as though it also were infinite.

Reply Obj. 5: “Infinity” spoken of privatively, which is an attribute of quantity, is repugnant to simplicity; but “infinity” spoken of negatively is not.

Reply Obj. 6: This argument applies to infinity taken as a privation.

Reply Obj. 7: A thing may be distinct in two ways.

Reply Obj. 8: Since an end belongs to perfection, it is ascribed to God in the noblest way—namely, that he himself is essentially the end and not denominatively finite.

Reply Obj. 9: As in quantities we may consider infinity in regard to one dimension and not in regard to another (or again, in regard to all dimensions), even so may we consider infinity in effects. For it is possible for a creature considered in itself to be able to produce an infinity of effects in some particular respect—for instance, as regards number in one species. And then the nature of all those effects is finite, being confined to one particular species, such as if one were to take an infinite number of men or asses. But it is impossible for a creature to be able to produce an infinity of effects in every way, in point of number, species, and genera. Rather, this belongs to God alone; and hence his power alone is simply infinite.

Reply Obj. 10: The reply to the tenth objection is the same as to the eighth.

Reply Obj. 11: This argument takes infinity as a privation.

Reply Obj. 12: The same answer applies to the twelfth objection.

Reply Obj. 13: God always works with the whole of his power. But his effect is limited according to the determination of his will and the order of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine’s words quoted in the Gloss do not mean that God is unable to do otherwise than nature does, since he often acts contrary to the customary course of nature; but that whatever he does in things is not contrary to nature, but is by nature for them, in that he is the one who founds and orders nature. For in natural realities we observe that when a lower body is moved by a higher, the movement is natural to it, although it may not seem congruent to the movement that it has naturally from its very self. In this way, the tidal ebb and flow of the sea is caused by the moon; and this movement is natural to it (as the Commentator observes) even though the natural motion of water according to its very self is to be borne downward.¹ And in this way, all created things have as natural, as it were, whatever occurs in them from God. And therefore, we distinguish two kinds of potency in them: a natural potency in respect of their proper operations and movements, and another that is called a “potency of obedience,” as regards the things that they receive from God.

Reply Obj. 2: Every impossibility involves an affirmation and a denial being simultaneous insofar as it is impossible. Those things, however, that are impossible by reason of a deficiency of the natural power (such as a blind man becoming one who sees, and the like), because they are not impossible according to their very selves, do not imply such an impossibility according to their very selves but only in relation to the natural power to which they are impossible. Thus, were we to say that nature can make a blind man see, the statement would involve an impossibility of this kind, because nature’s power is bounded in relation to something, whereas the effect that is being ascribed to it is beyond this.

Reply Obj. 3: The impossibilities of rational philosophy are not in relation to a certain power but to their very selves, because things that are in within rational philosophy are not applied to matter or to certain natural powers.

Reply Obj. 4: That which is false in its nature is false simply speaking. Hence there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 5: There is not the same account of every impossibility, since some things are impossible in themselves, and some with respect to a certain power, as above stated. Nor does the fact that they stand in diverse ways to the divine power impede the divine power’s infinity or the creature’s obedience.

Reply Obj. 6: God does not destroy what is already true, because he does not make that which was true not to have been. But he does make that which otherwise would have been true, not to be true. Thus, when he raises a dead man to life, he makes it to be untrue that he is dead, which would have been true otherwise.

Reply Obj. 7: God cannot make an affirmation and a denial be true at the same time—not because it is unbecoming but for the reason stated above.

Reply Obj. 8: God’s art extends not only to the things made but to many others also. Hence, when he changes the course of nature in anything, he does not therefore act against his art.

Reply Obj. 9: That Socrates has not run if he has run is called “impossible accidentally” because Socrates’s running or not running, considered in itself, is contingent; yet, since it would imply that the past has not existed, it becomes impossible in itself. Hence, it is said to be impossible accidentally, that is, through some adventitious circumstance. But this circumstance is impossible according to its very self, and clearly involves a contradiction; for to say that a thing has been and that it has not been is contradictory, which would be the case if the past were made not to have been.

Reply Sed Contra 1: “Word” names not only what is uttered by the lips but also what is conceived in the mind. Now, the mind cannot conceive an affirmation and denial as true at the same time, and therefore it cannot conceive anything in which this is involved, as is proved in Metaphysics 4.¹ For because contrary opinions are things that belong to contrary things, according to the Philosopher, it would follow that the same person would have contrary opinions at the same time. Thus, it is not contrary to the angel’s word to say that God cannot do the above-mentioned kind of impossibility.

Reply Sed Contra 2: God cannot do this kind of impossibility because it defects from the account of the possible; and hence God’s power is not said to be limited even though he cannot do it.

Reply Sed Contra 3: God is said to be unable to do this not as though he were prevented by the free will, as stated above, but because this cannot be the terminus of an active power’s action.

Reply Sed Contra 4: Privation in reference to itself does not admit of more and less, but it can admit of this in respect of its cause. Thus, a man who has lost an eye is more blind than one who is prevented from seeing by some disease of the eye. In like manner, that which is impossible in reference to itself may be said to be more impossible than a thing which is impossible simply speaking.

Reply Sed Contra 5: As stated above,¹ God is said to be unable to do this not because something prevents him, but for the reasons given.

Reply Obj. 1: The wise men of the world are said to be foolish because they judged things that are impossible with regard to lower causes to be absolutely and simply impossible, even to God.

Reply Obj. 2: The possible is compared to power not as the thing measured is compared to its measure but as object to power. And yet it happens that the divine power is the measure of all powers.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the first cause influences the effect most of all, nevertheless its influence is determined and specified by the proximate cause; and therefore the effect imitates its likeness.

Reply Obj. 4: Although to make the blind see is possible to God, it cannot be said to be possible in every way.

Reply Obj. 5: That the world will exist was possible with respect to the higher causes; hence this does not pertain to the question at issue. Therefore, the statement “the world will exist” is possible not only as regards the divine power but also in its very self, because the terms do not contradict each other.

Reply Sed Contra 1: This argument considers the nature of the effect that is in question.

Reply Sed Contra 2: Although what is possible with respect to inferior causes is also possible with respect to higher causes, this does not apply to the impossible; rather, it is the other way around. Consequently, we must not form a universal judgment on the matter or judge that a thing is possible or impossible in every case with respect to lower causes.

Reply Sed Contra 3: We do not judge certain things to be possible or impossible in reference to certain causes because they are like those causes in their possibility or impossibility, but rather because they are possible or impossible for those causes.

Reply Sed Contra 4: The theologian would say that whatever is not impossible in itself is possible, according to Mark 9:22, all things are possible to him that believes, and Luke 1:37, no word shall be impossible with God.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Though none of those things are found in the higher causes, they are subject to those higher causes; hence, this argument considers passive power, and not active power, of which we are now speaking.

Reply Obj. 1: The expression “God is not able to do anything except what he has foreknown that he would do” is ambiguous because the exception may refer either to the power signified in the word “able,” or to the act signified in the word “do.”

Reply Obj. 2: In God, nothing is past or future; rather, whatever is in him, is a whole in the present of eternity. Nor is a past or future speech signified in him except in reference to us. Therefore, an objection about the necessity of the past has no place here. Nonetheless we must also say that the objection is not to the point, since his foreknowledge is not commensurate with his power to do (which is the object of our inquiry) but only with the divine action, as already stated.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who maintained that God acts from a necessity of nature held the opinion we are discussing not only on account of the unchangeableness of nature but also on account of the determination of nature to one thing. But divine wisdom is not determined to one, and it extends to many things that can be known. Hence, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 4: Christ was not able to wish to say those words absolutely speaking that indicate a lie, without prejudice to his goodness. But this does not apply to the question at issue, as we have already indicated; hence, the conclusion does not follow.

Reply Obj. 5: The absolute and the ruled are attributed to the divine power solely from our own consideration. This attributes something to God’s power considered in itself (which is called the “absolute power”) that it does not attribute to him insofar as it is compared to his wisdom, insofar as it is called “ordered.”

Reply Obj. 6: God’s power is never in a thing without his wisdom; but the power is considered by us without the account of his wisdom.

Reply Obj. 7: God has done whatever is actually just, not whatever is just potentially. For he is able to do that which at present is not just because it does not exist—nevertheless, if it did exist, what he does would be just.

Reply Obj. 8: The divine goodness is able to communicate itself in an orderly fashion, not only in the way in which a thing acts, but in many other ways.

Reply Obj. 9: Though God does not wish to do anything but what he does, he can nevertheless wish to do other things. Therefore, absolutely speaking, he can do other things.

Reply Obj. 10: Those reasons of which Dionysius is speaking he understands to be productive of existing things absolutely, but not only of those that actually now exist.

Reply Obj. 11: The question is whether there is in God an idea of those things that neither exist, nor will exist, nor have existed, and that nevertheless God is able to make. It seems that we should reply that, if we take an idea according to its complete account—namely, insofar as “idea” names an art’s form not only as thought out by the intellect but also as ordered to the work by the will—then of such things God has no idea. On the other hand, if we take an idea according to its incomplete account, that is, as merely thought out in the craftsman’s intellect, then God has an idea of those things. For this is clear in the created craftsman that he thinks out certain actions that he has no intention of executing. In fact, in God, whatever he knows is in him through the mode of what is thought out; for in him to know actually and habitually are not different. For he knows his whole power and everything he is able to do; hence, in him are the accounts of everything he is able to make, as thought out.

Reply Obj. 12: This means that God is unable to do what he does not wish to be able to do; hence, it is not to the point.

Reply Obj. 13: Though God is unchangeable, his will is not determined to one thing as regards things that should be done: hence, he has free decision.

Reply Obj. 14: The best reason, for which God does all things, is his own goodness and wisdom; these would remain even if he made other things or acted otherwise.

Reply Obj. 15: What God does is the best through its order to the goodness of God; and therefore, whatsoever else can be ordered to his goodness according to the order of his own wisdom is still the best.

Reply Obj. 1: This comparison must not be taken universally, but only as between man and brute animals.

Reply Obj. 2: That which is said in praise of man is not always becoming to the praise of God; it might even be a blasphemy, as if I were to say that God repents and the like. For, as Dionysius says, what is praised in a lower nature is blamed in a higher.¹

Reply Obj. 3: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as conditional to the will. For this conditional statement is true, “God can do base things if he will,” for nothing prevents a conditional from being true while both its antecedent and consequent are impossible. In the same way, it is clear that if a man flies, he has wings.

Reply Obj. 4: Nothing prevents an act that in itself would be a mortal sin from becoming virtuous through the addition of a circumstance. Thus, absolutely speaking, it is a mortal sin to kill a man, yet it is not a sin but an act of justice for the judge’s minister to put a man to death for justice’s sake on the judge’s command. Now, even as the ruler of the city holds the authority over men in matters of life and death and whatever else pertains to the end of his regime (which is justice), so God holds all things at his disposal to direct them to the end of his own regime (which end is its goodness). And therefore, though it would be able to be, in itself, a mortal sin to slay an innocent son, yet if this be done at God’s command for an end foreseen and set in order by God, even though it be unknown to the man, it is not a sin but a meritorious act. The same applies also to the fornication of Hosea, for it is certain that God is the orderer of all human generation. Some, however, assert that this did not happen in reality but only in a prophetic vision.

Reply Obj. 5: The sinful act, insofar as it has being and actuality, is to be referred to God as its cause; but insofar as it has the deformity of sin, it must be referred to the free decision and not to God, just as all that there is of movement in limping comes from the power of walking, but its deformity comes from the curvature of the leg.

Reply Obj. 6: God is said to incline man’s will to evil not as though he infused malice into it or helped move it toward malice, but rather by permitting and setting it in order—for instance, those who consent to the exercise of cruelty God judges to be deserving of the things that they do to others.

Reply Obj. 7: Although man is made to God’s image, it does not follow that whatever is found in man is also found in God. Nevertheless, as to the point raised, God’s will is open to both things because it is not determined to one object. For he is able either to do a thing or not to do it, to do this or to do that; yet it does not follow that in either case he can do evil, which is to sin.

Reply Obj. 8: This argument applies to those things that pertain to the perfection of power but not to those that indicate a lack of power.

Reply Obj. 9: Though God is able to do many good things which he does not do, he does not neglect them, for he is not obligated to do those things, which latter is required for the account of neglect.

Reply Obj. 10: The same answer applies here, since a man is not guilty of a sin through failing to prevent it unless he is obligated to do so.

Reply Obj. 11: The words of Amos are understood with respect to the evil of punishment. Moreover, the words of the Book of Wisdom, God has not made death,¹ refer either to the cause of death (which is the merit of fault) or to the original formation of nature, whereby he made man in his own way immortal.

Reply Obj. 1: God is called omniscient because he knows all things knowable. Now, false things are not knowable and therefore he does not know them. But things impossible in themselves are compared to power as the false are compared to knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: This account would stand if the distribution were confined within the genus of possible things in such a way that it did not extend to all possible things.

Reply Obj. 3: Concerning the other account of omnipotence, one should say that to be able to do whatever he wills to do is not a sufficient account of omnipotence, though it is a sufficient sign of omnipotence. It is in this sense that we must take the words of Augustine.

Reply Obj. 4: To the third account we reply that God is called omnipotent because he is able to do all things that are absolutely possible; hence, the objection does not proceed correctly as regards things possible to God or to nature.

Reply Obj. 5: To the last question we reply that in things done through will, power and knowledge are determined to the work done by the will, as stated in Metaphysics 9;¹ hence the power and knowledge in God are described as not universally determined, as when he is called omniscient and omnipotent. But the will, which determines them, cannot be for all things but only for those to which it determines his power and knowledge; hence God cannot be called omnivolent.

Reply Obj. 1: The power which we attribute to God is, properly speaking, neither active nor passive, since the categories of action and passion are not in him; rather, his action is his own substance. But there is a power here signified through the mode of an active power. Nor must the Son be brought about or made, just as neither must there be action or passion here, properly speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: While receiving is completed at having as its end, there are two ways something is said to be receiving, just as there are two ways of having.

Reply Obj. 3: God begotten is not distinguished from God begetting by some added essence, since (as stated above)¹ there is no need for any matter as a recipient of the divine nature; they are distinguished, however, by the relation itself, which is having the nature from another, such that in the Son, the very relation of sonship takes the place of all individuating principles in things created (for which reason it is called a “personal property”), while the divine nature itself takes the place of the specific nature. Yet, since the relation itself does not differ in reality from the divine nature, no composition arises there, as with us a certain composition results from the principle of the species and from the individuating principles.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument follows when that power differs from the act, whether or not it is united to the act. But this is not the case in God.

Reply Obj. 5: And thus the reply to the fifth objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 6: Anything that is a principle of an action, as that by which an action is done, holds the account of a power, whether it be an essence or some accidental medium, like some quality standing between the essence and the action. In corporeal creatures, however, seldom or never do we find any action of some substantial nature without some mediating accident; for the sun illumines by means of the light within it. For the soul vivifies the body through the soul’s essence. But “to vivify,” although it is said through the mode of action, is not in the genus of action, since it is a first act rather than a second.

Reply Obj. 7: In creatures, generation is impossible without a distinction of essence or nature with respect to existence, since their nature is not their existence. Consequently, generation is among creatures along with a certain lack of dignity; hence, generation is unbecoming to the nobler creatures. But in God, a generation of this sort can be without this or any other imperfection, and so nothing forbids us to ascribe it to God.

Reply Obj. 8: This argument considers material generation. Therefore, it is not to the point.

Reply Obj. 9: It is true that the object of an active or passive power must be possible and contingent when the action or passion is accompanied by movement (since all movable things are possible and contingent). Such, however, is not the generative power in God, as stated above. And thus the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 10: The Son of God is not the effect of the generative power, for we confess our belief that he is begotten, not made. If, however, he were the effect, the power of the begetter would not be bounded by him even though he cannot beget another Son, because he himself is infinite. Now, the reason there cannot be another Son in the divine is that sonship itself is his personal property, and by it, so to say, he is individuated. And the individuating principles of each individual belong to it alone; otherwise, it would follow that a person or an individual thing would be communicable in account.

Reply Obj. 11: The saying of Avicenna should be understood as meaning when that which is received from another is not numerically the same in recipient and giver, as happens in creatures in relation to God. Hence, everything received in a creature is, as it were, a unit in comparison with the divine being, since a creature cannot receive being according to that perfection that is in God. On the other hand, in God, the Son receives from the Father numerically the same nature that the Father has. Hence, the argument fails.

Reply Obj. 12: The Son has nothing that is really divided from the essence that he receives from the Father. But from the very fact that he receives from the Father, it follows that in him is a relation by which he is referred to and distinguished from the Father. And yet this relation does not differ from the essence.

Reply Obj. 13: Though the same nature is in Father and Son, it is in each by a different mode of existing—that is, with a different relation. Consequently, it does not follow that whatever befits the Father through his own nature befits the Son.

Reply Obj. 14: Creatures reach a divine likeness by participating in their specific nature. Hence, the fact that some created supposit subsists in a created nature is itself ordered to something else as to its end; and therefore, if the end be sufficiently attained by one individual according to a perfect and proper participation in the specific nature, there is no need for another individual subsisting in that nature. But God’s nature is the end and is not for the sake of any end. Moreover, it befits the end to be communicated in every possible way. Hence, though in God it is found perfectly and properly in one supposit, nothing forbids its also being found in another.

Reply Obj. 15: Generation is a species of change insofar as by generation the communicated nature is received in some matter, which is the subject of change. This is not the case in the divine generation, so the conclusion does not follow.

Reply Obj. 1: Power conveys the account of a principle in relation to activity, which latter (as already stated) is not said of God notionally.

Reply Obj. 2: In created realities, one category is accidental to another, on account of which one thing cannot result from the two, except what is one accidentally. But in God, relation is in reality his very essence, and thus there is no likeness.

Reply Obj. 3: Among created realities, there are two principles of generation: the generator and that by which he generates. The generator, however, is distinguished from the thing generated by the generation since nothing generates its very self. But that by which the generator generates is not distinguished but rather is common to both, as stated above.¹ Consequently, it does not follow that there is a distinction in the divine nature as by a power of generating, since a power is a principle by which the effect is produced.

Reply Obj. 4: By reason of the implied relation, the generative power is not common but proper.

Reply Obj. 5: In every generation, the principle of generation is not fundamentally some form of the individual but rather the form that pertains to the nature of the species. Further, there is no need for the thing generated to be like the generator in regard to individual conditions, but in regard to the nature of the species. Now, paternity is not in the Father through the mode of the form of a species, as humanity is in a man, for the divine nature is in him in this way; rather, paternity is in him (so to speak) as an individual principle, for it is a personal property. Consequently, it does not follow that in him it is the principle of generation fundamentally; rather, it is in a certain way understood along with it (for the reason given above). Otherwise it would follow that the Father by begetting would communicate not only divinity but fatherhood, which is incongruous.

Reply Obj. 6: The generative power is really the same thing as the divine nature, such that the nature is included in its account, but this is not so with the paternity, so the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 7: Knowledge or will is not the principle of generation, since generation belongs to the nature, which, insofar as it is a principle of action, has the account of a power. Hence it is that, in God, power is consignified with that which is toward-something, whereas this is not the case with knowledge or will.

Reply Obj. 1: Hilary is speaking of the necessity that denotes violence. This is evident from the words that follow: not led by natural necessity, since he willed to beget the Son.¹

Reply Obj. 2: The antecedent will is in respect of no reality in God; for whatever God wills at a certain time he has willed from eternity. But his concomitant will is in respect of all the goods that are both within him and within created things; for he wills himself to be and the creature to be. But the temporally preceding or antecedent will is in fact only in respect to the created, which has not existed from eternity. The intellect is preceding as regards those eternal acts that are signified as to be terminated in creatures, such as the plan, predestination, and the like. But the generation of the Son is neither a creature nor is it signified as to be terminated in a creature. Therefore, with regard to it, the will is not preceding either in time or in understanding but is only a concomitant will.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the act of the intellect seems to follow the act of the will insofar as it is commanded by the will, so too, conversely, the act of the will seems to follow the act of the intellect insofar as will’s object, namely, the good understood, is offered to it by the intellect. Hence, we would go on to infinity unless we came to a stop either in the act of the intellect or in the act of the will. But we cannot come to a stop in an act of the will, since its object is presupposed by its act. Therefore, we must come to a stop in an act of the intellect that follows the intellect naturally, such that it is not commanded by the will. It is in this way that the Son of God proceeds as the Word, according to the act of the divine intellect, as we have already stated.

Reply Obj. 4: The act of the divine intellect is natural insofar as it terminates in God himself, who is the principle of his own cognition. But insofar as it is signified as to be terminated in creatures, to which it stands in a certain way as our intellect does to its conclusions, it advances from the intellect not naturally but voluntarily. And therefore some of the acts of the intellect in the divine are signified as commanded by the will.

Reply Obj. 5: With regard to those things to which nature can extend according to its own essential principles, nature does not need to be determined by another, but only with regard to those things for which its own principles do not suffice. Consequently, philosophers were not being led by the effects of heat and cold, considered in themselves, when they said that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence; for even those who said that natural things happen due to the necessity of matter traced all the works of nature back to these things. However, they were so led by those effects for which the power of hot and cold (and such qualities) could not suffice, such as the way the members in an animal’s body are ordered in such a way that the nature is preserved. Therefore, since generation is the work of the divine nature according to itself, there is no need for it to be determined to this action by some will. Or it may also be replied that nature is determined by something as to its end. But to be determined by something is not suitable to that nature that is itself the end and not for the sake of the end.

Reply Obj. 6: When considering them in diverse things, the action of will precedes the action of nature. Therefore, the action of the whole of nature proceeds from the will of the one governing it. But within the same thing, the action of its nature must precede the act of its will. For nature is prior to will according to understanding, since nature is understood to be the principle whereby a thing subsists, whereas the will is the final principle whereby it is ordered to its end. Yet it does not follow that the account of will is taken away. For although according to the inclination of the nature, the will is determined to a certain single thing, which is the ultimate end intended by the nature, it nevertheless remains undetermined with regard to other things. This is clear in the case of man, who wills his happiness, but not other things, naturally and of necessity. Accordingly, in God the action of the nature precedes the act of the will both naturally and according to understanding; for the generation of the Son is the type¹ of all things that are produced from the divine will—that is to say, of all created things.

Reply Obj. 7: Though it was within the Word of God begotten of the Father that all created things would come to be, it does not follow that if the Word proceeds naturally, then created things also proceed naturally. For example, although our intellect knows principles naturally, it does not follow that it knows naturally the conclusions that follow from them. For the will makes use of what we naturally possess as open to alternatives.

Reply Obj. 8: The Father begot voluntarily, but this indicates nothing other than his concomitant will.

Reply Obj. 9: If these words are understood as referring to the eternal generation, the Father’s love for the Son should not be taken as the type of that giving whereby the Father from all eternity gave all things to the Son, but rather as its sign. For likeness is the reason for love.

Reply Obj. 10: Dionysius is speaking of the formation of creatures, not of the generation of the Son.

Reply Obj. 11: The Holy Spirit is said to proceed through the mode of the will because he proceeds through an act that is naturally from the will—namely, the mutual love of the Father and the Son. For the Holy Spirit is Love just as the Son is the Word by which the Father has spoken his very self.

Reply Obj. 12: Again, this argument proves only that the Father wills the generation of the Son, which pertains to the concomitant will, which regards the generation as an object, not as something of which it is the principle.

Reply Obj. 13: Human generation is effected through a natural capacity, namely, the generative power, through the medium of the motive power that is subject to the command of the will, whereas the generative power is not. But this does not apply to God, and so the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 14: Augustine does not mean to deny a necessity of immutability, as the argument suggests, but a necessity of coercion.

Reply Obj. 15: When it is said that the Son is will of will, the sense is, “will of the Father, who is will.” Hence, this preposition “of” denotes the generative principle that is the begetter and not the principle by which generation is effected, which is the point of our inquiry.

Reply Obj. 1: Although in the Father generation is in a certain way an activity of the divine nature, nevertheless it belongs to it with a certain concomitance to the Father’s personal property, as stated above:¹ therefore, it does not follow that it belongs to the Son, in whom the divine nature is found without that property.

Reply Obj. 2: The Father communicates to the Son all that divine might that follows the divine nature absolutely. But the generative power follows the divine nature along with the personal property of the Father, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3: An image is like that of which it is the image in reference to the latter’s species, not as regards its relation. For if the image is from something of which it is the image, it does not follow that the latter is also from another; for likeness is not properly considered with regard to relation, but with regard to form.

Reply Obj. 4: Even as the Son is like the Father in the divine nature and not in a personal property, so too is he like him in an action that goes with the nature, provided it does not go with a personal property. Such, however, is not generation: therefore, the argument fails.

Reply Obj. 5: Although the Father’s generative power is not exhausted or diminished by his begetting the Son, yet the Son equals the infinity of that power, for he is an infinite intellect and not a finite creature. Hence, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 6: In an argument leading to the incongruous, the avoiding of the incongruity is not necessarily the only reason for denying the assertion from which the incongruity follows; rather, it is also for the sake of manifesting the incongruity. Hence, it is not only because an infinity of generations in God would be the result that there is not more than one son in God.

Reply Obj. 7: The Holy Spirit proceeds through the mode of love. Now, “love” does not signify something that is formed and specified by the likeness of the lover or of the beloved, just as “word” signifies the species of the speaker and of that which is said to possess it. Consequently, as the Son proceeds through the mode of Word, by the very account of his procession, it belongs to him to proceed into a species like his begetter and such that he is his Son, and his procession is called a “generation.” On the other hand, this belongs to the Holy Spirit not by reason of his procession but rather from a property of the divine nature, because in God there can be nothing that is not God; and thus the divine love itself is God precisely because it is divine, not because it is love.

Reply Obj. 8: “To speak” may be taken in two senses: strictly and broadly. To speak, in a strict sense, is to send forth a word; and in this way it is notional and belongs to the Father alone. And Augustine, in the beginning of On the Trinity 6, takes “speaking” in this sense when he says that the Father alone speaks himself.¹ Second, “to speak” may be taken broadly, insofar as speaking is the same thing as understanding; and then it pertains to the essence. And in this sense Anselm, in his Monologion, writes when he says that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit speak themselves.²

Reply Obj. 9: Even as “to beget” in God belongs to the Father alone, so also does “to conceive”; therefore, the Father alone conceives his own likeness in the intellect, although the Son and the Holy Spirit understand it; for no relation is expressed in “understanding,” except perhaps only according to our mode of understanding, whereas “begetting” and “conceiving” express a real origin.

Reply Obj. 10: This argument holds in regard to an action that follows the nature absolutely without any relation to a property. Such, however, is not generation; therefore, the argument fails.

Reply Obj. 11: In God, there can be no other than spiritual procession, and this is only according to intellect and will. Consequently, another divine person cannot proceed from the Holy Spirit, because he proceeds through the mode of the will as Love, and the Son through the mode of the intellect as Word.

Reply Obj. 12: A personal property must be incommunicable, as stated above: therefore, joy does not demand that it should be shared with another.

Reply Obj. 13: This comparison does not necessarily apply in every respect.

Reply Obj. 14: Even as paternity in the Father and filiation in the Son are the one essence, so too their dignity and goodness are one.

Reply Obj. 15: When we speak of the power of generating, the gerund, “generating,” may be taken in three ways.

Reply Obj. 1: The power to beget pertains to omnipotence, but not as it is in the Son, as stated above in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 2: In these words, Augustine does not intend to explain the entire account of omnipotence in those words, but to indicate a sign of omnipotence. Nor is he speaking of omnipotence except in reference to creatures.

Reply Obj. 3: The possible things to which omnipotence extends must not be confined to those that are contingent, since even necessary things are brought into being by the divine power. Hence, there is no reason why the begetting of the Son should not be counted among the things possible to the divine power.

Reply Obj. 4: Though omnipotence absolutely considered is not proper to the Father, nevertheless, as considered together with its determinate mode of existence, or definite relation, it becomes proper to the Father. In the same way, the expression “God the Father” is proper to the Father, although God is common to the three persons.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as the three persons have one and the same essence but not under the same relation, or with the same mode of existence in the three persons, so is it with their omnipotence.

Reply Obj. 6: The generation of the Son and the production of creatures are of the same account not univocally but only by analogy. For Basil says that the fact that the Son receives he has in common with every created thing.¹ In this sense, he is called the firstborn of every creature (Col 1:15), and for the same reason his generation can be placed under one common head with the production of creatures.

Reply Obj. 7: The generation of the Son is subject to omnipotence not in such a way that “subject” would designate inferiority, but only in the way that it designates the object of a power.

Reply Obj. 8: The generation of the Son signifies the relation through the mode of action, and the Son signifies the relation through the mode of a subsisting hypostasis; thus, there is no reason why we should not refer omnipotence to these things.

Reply Obj. 1: Although in creatures, nature and purpose are distinct, in God they are one and the same in reality. Or we may reply that “power to create” does not name purpose or will but power as commanded by will, whereas the power to beget acts as inclined by nature. But this does not necessitate a distinction of powers, since there is nothing to prevent the same power from being commanded to one act by the will and inclined to another by nature. For example, our intellect is inclined to believe by the will and is led to understand first principles by nature.

Reply Obj. 2: The higher the power, the wider its scope, and the less distinguishable it is through a diversity of objects. Thus, the imagination is one power covering all objects of sense relative to which the proper senses are distinguished. Now, the divine power is raised above all others; therefore, a difference of acts requires no distinction in the power itself as a power; rather, God by his one power is able to do all things.

Reply Obj. 3: The generative and creative powers, considered as to their very substance, so to speak, are not merely spoken of univocally but are one. But the fact that they are spoken of analogically is because of the order of act.

Reply Obj. 4: There is no order of first and second between these powers except according to how they are distinct. Whence their order is viewed only in reference to their acts. Hence, it is clear that the generative power is prior to the creative power just as generation is prior to creation. But in relation to the essence, they are the same thing, and there is no order between them.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher says that it is a common conception or opinion of the students of nature that nothing comes to be from nothing because the natural agent, which they considered, does not act except by movement.¹ Consequently, there must be a subject of movement or change; but this, as we have stated, is not required for a supernatural agent.

Reply Obj. 2: Before the world was, it was possible for the world to be, but it does not follow that there preexisted any matter on which the potential would be founded. For it is stated in Metaphysics 5¹ that sometimes a thing is called “possible” not in respect of some potency, but because it involves no contradiction of terms, in which sense the possible is opposed to the impossible. Accordingly, it is said that before the world was, it was possible for the world to come to be, because the statement involved no contradiction between subject and predicate. We may also reply that it was possible by reason of the active potency of the agent, but not on account of any passive potency of matter. The Philosopher uses this argument in treating of natural generations against the Platonists, who maintained that separate forms are the principles of natural generation.²

Reply Obj. 3: Between a being and non-being simply speaking, there always is an infinite distance in a certain sense, but not always in the same way. Sometimes it is infinite on both sides, as when we compare non-existence with the divine existence, which is infinite, as if one compares infinite whiteness with an infinite blackness. But sometimes it is finite on one side only, as when we compare non-existence simply speaking with created existence, which is finite, as if one compares infinite blackness with a finite whiteness. Accordingly, then, from non-existence, it is impossible to pass to an existence that is infinite, but it is possible to pass to an existence that is finite, inasmuch as the distance from non-existence to that sort of existence is bounded on the one side, although there is no passage properly speaking. For so it is in continuous movements, through which one part passes after another. But there can be no such passage for the infinite.

Reply Obj. 4: When a thing comes to be from nothing, non-existence (that is, nothing) does not stand as a patient, except accidentally, but rather stands as the opposite relative to the thing coming to be through the action. Nor again in natural things does the opposite stand as the patient, except accidentally, but rather the subject is the patient.

Reply Obj. 5: If heat were deprived of matter, it would indeed act without that matter which is a requisite on the part of the agent, but not without that matter which is required on the part of the patient.

Reply Obj. 6: In the acts of reason, to conclude is like being moved in the acts of nature, because in reaching a conclusion reason discourses from one thing to another. Therefore, as all natural movement is from something, so also is every conclusion of reason. And as the understanding of principles, which is the principle of things to be concluded, is not from something as a conclusion, so too creation, which is the principle of all movement, is not from something else.

Reply Obj. 7: A thing is said to come to be from nothing in two ways, as Anselm says in his Monologion.¹ For the negative implied in the word “nothing” can negate the preposition “from,” or it may be included under that preposition.

Reply Obj. 8: This definition is understood of a natural active power.

Reply Obj. 9: God does not produce things from necessity of nature, but from the order of his own wisdom. Hence, it does not follow that diversity among things arises from their matter, but from the ordering of divine wisdom, which established diverse natures for the completion of the universe.

Reply Obj. 10: When a thing comes to be from nothing, the being of what comes to be is first in an instant, and its non-being is not in that instant nor in anything real, but only in something imaginary. For as outside the universe there is not a real but only an imaginary dimension, in respect of which we may say that God is able to make something outside the universe or just so far from the universe, so too, before the beginning of the world there was no real time, but only an imaginary time; in this it is possible to imagine some instant in which was the last non-being. Nor does it follow that there must have been a time between those two instants, since true time is not continuous with imaginary time.

Reply Obj. 11: That which comes to be from nothing simultaneously comes to be and has come to be; and the same applies to all instantaneous changes, for the air is illuminated and has been illuminated at the same time. For in such things, having come to be is itself called “coming to be,” insofar as it exists in the first instant in which it has come to be. Or it may also be replied that a thing which comes to be from nothing is said to come to be when it has been made not according to movement, which is from one terminus to another, but according to an outflow from the agent into the thing made. For these two things are to be found in natural generation: namely, transition from one terminus to another and the outflow from the agent into the thing made; but of these, the latter alone has a place in creation.

Reply Obj. 12: Properly speaking, neither matter nor form nor accident is said to come to be; rather, what comes to be is the subsisting reality. For, since coming to be terminates in being, coming to be belongs properly to that to which being belongs through itself, namely, to a subsistent reality. Therefore, neither matter nor form nor accident is said, properly speaking, to be “created,” but rather to be “concreated.” But a subsistent reality, whatever it may be, is properly said to be “created.” Yet if the force is not stressed in this way, we may reply that prime matter has a likeness to God insofar as it has a share of being. For just as a stone, as a being, is like God (although it has no intelligence, as God has), so prime matter, insofar as it is a being (and yet not as an actual being), is like God. For being is in a certain way common to potency and act.

Reply Obj. 13: The reply to this objection follows from this, for properly speaking there is no idea of matter but only of the composite, since the idea is the form by which something is made. Yet we may say that there is a certain idea of matter insofar as matter in some way imitates the divine essence.

Reply Obj. 14: If one of two creatures be of greater dignity than the other, it does not follow that the less worthy is imperfect; for imperfection designates a lack of something that it is naturally apt to have or should have. Hence, in glory, although one saint exceeds another, none will be imperfect. Nevertheless, if there be some imperfection in creatures, it is not necessary that it be from God or matter, but it may be due to the fact that the creature is from nothing.

Reply Obj. 15: Something is said to come to be from nothing as from an opposite according to one of the senses explained above. Yet it does not follow that a being of one genus can come to be from a being of another genus—for instance, a shape from a color; for being and non-being cannot be together, whereas color and shape can be together. But that from which something comes to be should be incompatible with what comes to be, as is said in Physics 1,¹ because it is not possible that they be together.

Reply Obj. 16: If “from” names causality, something does not come to be from its opposite except accidentally—that is, by reason of the subject. If, however, it names the order, a thing comes to be from its opposite even essentially. Hence privation is even said to be the principle of a thing’s becoming, but not of its being. It is in this sense, as stated above,¹ that a thing is said to come to be from nothing.

Reply Obj. 17: God at the same time gives being and produces that which receives being; thus, it does not follow that he acts based on something preexisting.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the body of the article, the word “change” denotes the existence of one thing after another in reference to some same thing. But this is not the case in creation.

Reply Obj. 2: In generation, whereby a thing comes to be in respect of part of its substance, there is some common subject of privation and form that is not actually existent. Therefore, just as in generation we find a terminus, properly speaking, so also do we find transition, properly speaking; but it is not so with creation.

Reply Obj. 3: It is true that the greater the distance of the termini, the greater the change, provided that the subject is identical.

Reply Obj. 4: That which is otherwise now than it was before changes, provided the subject remains; otherwise, non-being simply speaking would change, for non-being simply is neither the way it was before nor is it otherwise than it was before. But in order that there be a change, one thing must be otherwise than it was before.

Reply Obj. 5: A passive potency is the subject of change, not an active potency. Hence, that which goes from passive potency to act changes, but that which goes from active power to act does not, and so the objection proves nothing.

Reply Obj. 1: In creation, the recipient of the divine action is not non-being but that which is created, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: “Creation,” taken actively, signifies the divine action along with a certain relation that is understood, and thus, it is uncreated. But taken passively, as stated above, it is really a certain relation signified through the mode of a change with the account of implied newness or beginning. Now, this relation is a certain creature, taking “creature” in a broad sense for anything that comes from God. Nor is it necessary to proceed to infinity, since the relation of creation is not referred to God by some other real relation but by its very self. For no relation is related by another relation, as Avicenna says.¹ If, however, we take “creature” in a stricter sense only for that which subsists (which properly speaking comes to be and is created, just as properly speaking it has being), then the aforesaid relation is not something created but rather is concreated, just as properly speaking it is not a being but something inherent. The same applies to all accidents.

Reply Obj. 3: This relation is an accident and, considered in its own existence, inasmuch as it inheres in a subject, is posterior to the thing created. In the same way, an accident, both in the intellect and in nature, is posterior to its subject, although it is not an accident such as is caused by the principles of its subject. If, however, we consider it according to its own account, insofar as the aforesaid relation arises from the action of the agent, then it is, in a certain way, prior to its subject, as the divine act itself is its proximate cause.

Reply Obj. 4: In generation, there is both a change and a relation by which the thing generated is referred to the generator. Considered as change, its subject itself is not the thing generated but its matter; but considered as implying a relation, its subject is the very thing generated. But in creation there is a relation but not a change, properly speaking, as already stated.¹ Hence, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 5: This relation is not to be understood as of a being to a non-being, for such a relation cannot be real, as Avicenna says, but as of the created being to its Creator.¹ Therefore, it is clear that it is a relation of supposition.

Reply Obj. 6: Creation indicates the aforesaid relation together with newness of existing. Hence it does not follow that whenever a thing exists, it is being created, even though it is always being referred to God. Yet, it would not be incongruous to say that just as the air, as long as it is luminous, is being illuminated by the sun, so too a creature, as long as it has existence, is coming to be from God, as Augustine says in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis.¹ But this is only a distinction of words, inasmuch as “creation” may be understood with the newness or without.

Reply Obj. 7: That from which creation’s relation chiefly derives is the subsisting reality, from which creation’s very relation, which is itself a creature, differs; and it differs from it not principally but secondarily (as it were), as something concreated.

Reply Obj. 8: Movement is traced back to the genus of its terminus insofar as it proceeds from potency to act; for in the movement itself, the terminus of the movement is in potency, and potency and act are traced back to the same genus. But in creation there is no going from potency to act; therefore, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 1: In bringing things to their end, the means to that end are already in existence; therefore, it is not impossible for something to cooperate with God in its action such that some things are brought to their ultimate end. But in the universal bringing of things into being, nothing is presupposed; hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents our imagining a distance infinite on one side and finite on the other. But we imagine a distance infinite on either side when each of the opposites is given as infinite—for instance, if there are an infinite heat and an infinite cold. But the imagined distance will be finite on one side when one of the opposites is finite, for instance, infinite heat and finite cold. Accordingly, the distance of infinite being from non-being, simply speaking, is infinite on both sides, whereas the distance of finite being from non-being, simply speaking, is infinite on one side only, yet it requires an infinite active power.

Reply Obj. 3: The third objection we grant, since it makes no difference to the point at issue whether both opposite extremes be a nature or one only.

Reply Obj. 4: Things are said to come to be in our intelligence in respect of knowledge only, not according to the account of an operative power; therefore, things are brought into being by God not by the mediating actions of angels but only with their knowledge.

Reply Obj. 5: Something is said to be impossible to someone not only on account of the distance between the extremes, but also because it is altogether impossible to be done. For instance, we might say that God cannot come to be from a body, because it is altogether impossible for God to come to be. Accordingly, we reply that omnipotence cannot come to be from a power not only on account of the distance between them, but also because omnipotence utterly cannot come to be. For whatever comes to be cannot be pure act since, from the very fact that it has its being from another, it is proved to have potency and, consequently, cannot have infinite power.

Reply Obj. 6: Bodily light multiplies itself not by creating a new light but by shedding itself over matter. This cannot be said of the angels, since they are self-subsistent substances.

Reply Obj. 7: A form may be considered in two ways.

Reply Obj. 8: In the work of justification, man does something, but only as a minister by employing the sacraments. Hence, as the sacraments are said to justify instrumentally and dispositively, the solution comes to the same as the preceding one.

Reply Obj. 9: Although there cannot be a generic or specific likeness between God and the creature, there can nevertheless be a certain likeness of analogy, as there is between potency and act, and substance and accident. This is said in one way insofar as created realities imitate, in their own way, the idea of the divine mind, as the work of a craftsman imitates the form in his mind. In another way, it is true that created realities become in a certain way like the very nature of God, insofar as the different things are beings from the first being, their goods from the good, and so on. However, this objection is not to the point, for even granted that creatures proceed from God through the mediation of some created power, the same difficulty will remain—namely, how this first nature can be created by God, and yet not be like God.

Reply Obj. 10: This error is contained explicitly in The Book of Causes, whose author holds that the lower creatures were created by God by means of the higher;¹ therefore, in this matter, the authority of this book should not be accepted.

Reply Obj. 11: The same is to be said of the eleventh objection.

Reply Obj. 12: Augustine is speaking there of the soul, which communicates existence and species to the body not through the mode of creating but through the mode of a form.

Reply Obj. 13: Although an angel does not know realities by a knowledge that is taken from the realities, still it does not follow that he knows by such a knowledge that is a cause of the realities; for his knowledge is a mean between the two kinds of knowledge mentioned. For he knows realities by a natural knowledge, which occurs through the likenesses of the realities flowing into his intellect from the divine intellect, so that in this way his knowledge is not for the reality as the cause of the realities, but is a likeness of the divine intellect, which causes the realities.

Reply Obj. 14: In bringing things from potency to act, many degrees may be observed, inasmuch as a thing may be brought from a more or less remote potency to act, and more or less easily as well. Hence, if the angel’s power surpasses that of material nature, it does not follow that he is able to make a thing from absolute non-being because nature is able to lead forth a thing from potency to act; rather, it follows that he can do this much more easily than nature. Thus, Augustine says that demons are able to apply the seeds of nature more secretly and efficaciously than we are aware.¹

Reply Obj. 15: No power is greater than the power to create, nor does this prove that the creative power must include the bestowal on a creature of the power to create, since it is utterly incommunicable to a creature. For that a thing be impossible may be due not only to one’s lack of ability to do it, but also sometimes to the very making of the thing that cannot come to be. Thus, God cannot make God, not because of a lack of his power, but because God cannot be made by anyone. In like manner, the creative power cannot be finite, nor can it be communicated to a creature, because it is infinite.

Reply Obj. 16: A thing is difficult to do in two ways.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the first cause, which is God, does not enter into the essence of created realities, yet the being which is in created realities cannot be understood except as derived from the divine being, just as a proper effect cannot be understood save as derived from its proper cause.

Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that being is ascribed to a quiddity, not only is the quiddity said to be but also to be created; for before it had being it was nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the creator, where it is not a creature but the creative essence.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that prime matter is not created through itself, but it does not follow that it is not created under a form; for it is thus that it has actual being.

Reply Obj. 1: As we have shown above, evil is not a being but a lack of being, and consequently, cannot be made through itself, essentially speaking. In this sense, Dionysius says that good is not the cause of evil, and not as though evil were to be traced back to a first cause.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true of an effect that can have a cause through itself. Such is not evil, which therefore cannot properly be described as an effect.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil is incidental to effects, but it is not made, essentially speaking; this is clear from the fact that it is not intended. And yet, it does not follow that it is a first principle, unless it be added that evil is a nature. For just as evil, since it is not a being but a privation of being, lacks the proper account of an effect, so much more indeed does it lack the account of a cause, as we have shown.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine, God is so good that he would never allow an evil to exist unless he were so powerful as to be able to draw good from each and every evil.¹ Hence, it is due to neither lack of power nor ignorance on God’s part that evils occur in the world; rather, it is owing to the order of his own wisdom and to the greatness of his goodness, whence come the many and diverse grades of goodness in things, many of which would be lacking were he to allow no evil to exist. For there would be no good of patience without the occurrence of the evil of persecution, nor the good of the preservation of life in a lion, without the evil of the destruction of the animals on which it lives.

Reply Obj. 5: Evil occurs only in the minority of cases if we compare effects with their proper causes. This is clear in natural things, because there is no fault or evil in the action of nature, except when the active cause is affected by some impediment, and this is only in the minority of cases, as when there are monstrosities in nature, and other such things. On the other hand, in voluntary matters, evil would seem to be more frequent in deeds, insofar as art fails only for the less part, because it imitates nature.¹ But in actions, which are affected by vice and virtue, there are two moving appetites, namely, the rational and the sensual, and that which is good in relation to the one appetite is evil in relation to the other. Thus, the pursuit of pleasure is good with reference to the sensual appetite, which is called “sensuality,” but it is evil with reference to the appetite of reason. And, since the majority follow their senses rather than their reason, bad men are consequently found to be more numerous than good. On the other hand, he who follows reason’s appetite for the most part behaves well and not badly except in a few things.

Reply Obj. 6: There are two kinds of accidental cause. One does something towards the effect, but it is called an “accidental cause” because the effect follows from the cause outside its intention; such is the man who finds a treasure while digging a grave. The other accidental cause does nothing towards the effect, but it is called an “accidental cause” because it is accidental to the agent cause, just as the white may be said to be an accidental cause of the house because it is an accident of the builder.

Reply Obj. 7: Evil, though it is not a certain nature, is not a pure negation but a privation; and this, according to the Philosopher, is a negation inhering in a subject, for a privation is a negation in a subject; whence inasmuch as it is accidental to something, it can have an accidental cause, in the sense already explained.¹

Reply Obj. 8: Evil was in the devil with a priority in time relative to others but not with a priority in nature, as though wickedness were his essence or an accident deriving from the principles proper to his nature. Nor does it matter that he is worse than others, since this is not on account of any connaturality of wickedness to him but is accidental, through his having sinned more fully. But a thing is said to be a principle in relation to other things with regard to that which is said of it essentially and not accidentally.

Reply Obj. 9: It is owing to its perfection that good happens in but one way, because a thing cannot be perfect unless all those conditions come together from which its perfection is, as it were, integrated. If any of these be lacking, the thing is imperfect and therefore evil; and consequently, the imperfection of evil is the reason why evil is so manifold. And thus, evil has less of the account of a being than good does.

Reply Obj. 10: The statement of the Philosopher refers to the opinion of Pythagoras, who maintained that good and evil are genera, as we have said above. This opinion, however, has some truth in it. For, as we have observed, good indicates something positive, but evil indicates a privation; just as every form holds the account of the good, so does every privation hold the account of an evil. And in this way good and evil are in a certain way convertible with being and the privation of being. Now, it is shown in Metaphysics 10¹ that in all contraries, there is an implication of privation and possession, such that the contrary that is the more perfect always is reducible to a good, while the other that is less perfect is reducible to an evil. Hence, the Philosopher says that one of two contraries pertains to an evil action,² and in this sense, good and evil may be described as contrary genera.

Reply Obj. 11: Evil, which is contrary to a good, indicates not only a privation but a certain possession with that privation; this possession does not hold the account of evil insofar as it has something of being, but insofar as it has the privation of a due perfection joined to it.

Reply Obj. 12: Evil, inasmuch as it is merely a privation, does not differentiate the vicious habit except with the addition of the intention of an undue end, which intention does not include the account of evil except insofar as the end in question is inconsistent with a due end. Thus, the end of carnal pleasure is inconsistent with the good of reason. The reason why good and evil are assigned as specifying the habits of the soul is that moral acts, and consequently habits, are specified by the end, which is, as it were, the form of the will, which is the proper principle of evil deeds. And good and evil denote relation to the end.

Reply Obj. 13: The meaning is not that good is set against evil as one first principle against another first principle, but that they both derive from one first principle, the one essentially, the other accidentally. This is clear from what follows: and so look upon all the works of the Most High, etc.

Reply Obj. 14: Evil is not intensified by approach to a terminus, but by recession from a terminus; for as a thing is said to be good by participating in the good, so is it said to be evil by withdrawing from the good.

Reply Obj. 15: By the good tree our Lord means a cause of good—not the first cause, but a proximate cause in relation to some singular effect. The same applies to the evil tree. Hence, by the evil tree, he indicates heretics, who are known from their works as a tree from its fruit. This is clear if we consider the comparison, for the first cause of the fruit is not the tree but the root. If, however, we take the tree to signify universally any cause, as Dionysius apparently does, then we reply, as in the answer to the first objection, that good is not the essential cause of evil.

Reply Obj. 16: The darkness mentioned as existing at the beginning of the creation was not a creature but simply the absence of light in the atmosphere. It was not, however, an evil, since the absence of good is an evil only when that good can and ought to be present. For it is not an evil in a stone that it cannot sense, nor is it an evil in a newborn child that it cannot walk. Nor was it owing to imperfection in the agent that the air was created without light, but owing to his wisdom, the order of which requires that something is brought from imperfection to perfection.

Reply Obj. 17: This argument follows only if evil has a cause through itself, and above we have shown this to be false.

Reply Obj. 18: The eighteenth objection is met with the same reply.

Reply Obj. 19: Nature stands in relation to generation otherwise than to corruption. For the form that is the terminus of generation is through itself intended by nature both universal and particular, whereas the privation of a form is outside the intention of a particular nature, although it is according to the intention of universal nature—not indeed as intended through itself, but because without the privation of a certain form another form cannot be introduced. Hence, generation is natural in every way, whereas corruption is sometimes against nature, if we refer it to a particular nature.

Reply Obj. 20: Whatever there is of entity or action in a sinful act is traced back to God as first cause, while what there is of deformity is traced back to the free decision as to its cause. For example, when a man limps, his walking is traced back to the motive power as to its first cause, but that he walks awry is due to a bend in his leg.

Reply Obj. 21: This argument applies to two agents entirely unrelated, but not when one of them operates in the other, for then one effect can proceed from both. Now, God operates in every nature and in every will; hence, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 22: This argument refers to an agent that acts of natural necessity, and one such agent produces one effect. Nor does it follow that an effect must be simple because its cause is simple, because an effect need not equal its cause either in universality or in simplicity. But God does not act through a natural necessity but through his own will; therefore, he is able to make both simple things and composite things, things mutable and things immutable.

Reply Obj. 23: The stain of sin does not impose a nature on the soul but only the privation of grace, which privation is referred to the preceding sinful act that caused or was able to cause it. Consequently, it does not follow that one who has not committed the act of a particular sin has the stain of that sin.

Reply Obj. 24: God’s works continue forever not in number, but in species or genus; and in their substance, but not in their mode of being, for the fashion of this world passes away (1 Cor 7:31).

Reply Obj. 25: Although God is a spirit, his wisdom contains the accounts of bodies, to which the bodies are assimilated in the same way as works of art are like the artist in respect of his art. However, bodies are like God in respect of his nature insofar as they exist and are good and have a certain unity.

Reply Obj. 26: Nature always does what is better not with regard to the part, but with regard to the whole; otherwise, it would make a man’s body all eye or all heart, for this would be better for each part but not for the whole. In like manner, although it would be better for this or that thing to be placed in a higher order, it would not be better for the universe, which would remain imperfect if all creatures were of one order.

Reply Obj. 1: The active and passive powers of a natural thing suffice for action in their own order, yet the divine power is required, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the activity of a natural power relative to God and that of an elemental body relative to the heavenly body are in a sense similar, the comparison does not apply in every respect.

Reply Obj. 3: In the activity by which God works by moving the nature, the nature is not at work; but the very activity of the nature is also the activity of the divine power, just as the activity of an instrument occurs through the power of the principal agent. Nor does this prevent nature and God from working for the same effect, on account of the order between God and nature.

Reply Obj. 4: Both God and nature act immediately, although (as is clear from what was stated) they are ordered according to priority and posteriority.

Reply Obj. 5: It belongs to the account of a lower power to be in a certain way a principle of activity in its own order, namely, such that it acts as an instrument of a higher power; therefore, apart from the higher power, it has no activity.

Reply Obj. 6: God is the cause of nature’s activity not only as preserving the natural power in being, but in other ways also, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 7: The natural power that has been bestowed on natural things at their formation are in them as a certain form possessing a fixed and firm existence in the nature. But that which comes from God in a natural thing, whereby it actually acts, is as a mere intention, possessing a certain incomplete being in the manner in which colors are in the air and an art’s power is in the craftsman’s tool. Hence, just as the art can give the axe its sharpness as a permanent form within it but not the power of the art as some permanent form (unless it were endowed with intelligence), so it is possible for a natural thing to be given its own proper power as a permanent form within it but not the power to act so as to cause being as an instrument of the first cause, unless it were given to be the universal principle of being. Nor could it be given to a natural power to move its very self or to preserve itself in being. Consequently, just as it clearly cannot be given to the craftsman’s instrument to work without the motion of the art, so neither can it be given to a natural thing to act without the divine activity.

Reply Obj. 8: The natural necessity whereby heat acts is the result of the order of all the preceding causes; therefore, the power of the first cause is not excluded.

Reply Obj. 9: Although nature and will are disparate as regards their being, there is a certain order between them as regards their acting. For just as the action of nature precedes the action of our will, by reason of which in the works of an art, which proceed from a will, one needs the activity of nature, so too the will of God, which is the origin of all natural movement, precedes the activity of nature; whence also its activity is required in every activity of nature.

Reply Obj. 10: The creature has a certain likeness to God by partaking in his goodness, insofar as it exists and acts, but not such that it can become equal to him through that likeness being perfected; therefore, as the imperfect needs the perfect, so the power of nature in acting needs the divine activity.

Reply Obj. 11: One angel is less distant from another in the degree of nature than God from created nature; yet, in the order of cause and effect, God and the nature come together, but two angels do not. Whence God acts in the nature but one angel does not act in another.

Reply Obj. 12: God is said to have left man in the hand of his counsel not as though he did not act in the will, but because he gave man’s will dominion over its own act, such that it would not be bound to one side of a contradiction; this dominion he did not bestow on nature, since by its form it is determined to one thing.

Reply Obj. 13: The will is said to have dominion over its own act not to the exclusion of the first cause but inasmuch as the first cause does not act in the will so as to determine it of necessity to one thing, as it does determine nature; therefore, the determination of the act remains in the power of the reason and will.

Reply Obj. 14: Not every cause excludes freedom, but only one that is coercive, and it is not thus that God causes our activity.

Reply Obj. 15: Inasmuch as the first cause has more influence in the effect than the second cause, whatever there is of perfection in the effect is to be traced back principally to the first cause, while all defects must be traced back to a second cause, which does not act as efficaciously as the first cause.

Reply Obj. 16: God acts perfectly as first cause, yet the activity of nature is required as a secondary cause. Nevertheless, God could produce the nature’s effect even without the nature, but he wishes to act by means of nature in order to preserve the order in things.

Reply Obj. 1: In these words, Augustine ascribes creation to God in the works of nature by reason of nature’s powers, which in the beginning God implanted in matter by the work of creation, not as though something were created in each and every work of nature.

Reply Obj. 2: In these words of Augustine, “creation” is to be taken in its proper sense, yet it is not to be referred to natural effects but to the powers by which nature works, which were planted in nature by the work of creation.

Reply Obj. 3: Since grace is not a subsistent form, neither to be nor to come to be properly belongs to it through itself; consequently, properly speaking, it is not created in the same way as self-subsistent substances are created. Nevertheless, the infusion of grace approaches the account of creation insofar as grace has not a cause in its subject—neither an efficient cause nor the sort of material cause wherein it preexists potentially in such a way that it can, like other natural forms, be brought forth into act by a natural agent.

Reply Obj. 4: Hence, the reply to this objection is clear because when we say that a thing comes to be from nothing, we deny that it has a material cause. And it in some way pertains to the absence of matter that a form cannot be brought out from the natural potency of matter.

Reply Obj. 5: Although nature contains no efficient principle with regard to artificial forms, such forms do not surpass the order of nature, as grace does; in fact, they stand under that order, because everything natural is nobler than the artificial.

Reply Obj. 6: From the fact that a form has no matter as part of it, it would follow that being created would belong to it, if like a self-subsistent thing it could come to be, properly speaking.

Reply Obj. 7: Although the rational soul has matter in which it exists, it is not brought out from the potency of matter, since its nature is raised above the entire material order, as is evidenced by its intellectual activity. Moreover, this form is a self-subsistent thing that remains when the body dies.

Reply Obj. 8: The form that is the terminus of generation was in matter before generation was complete, not actually but potentially. Moreover, it is not incongruous that of two contraries one is in act and the other in potency.

Reply Obj. 9: The reply to the ninth is thus made clear, since Anaxagoras held that forms preexist in matter not actually but in a latent state.¹

Reply Obj. 10: The form preexists in matter imperfectly, not as though a part of it were actually there and another part not, but because it is wholly there in potency, and is afterwards led forth wholly into actuality.

Reply Obj. 11: Hence, we may gather the reply to the eleventh objection, for it is clear that existence of the form is not perfected by adding something extraneous that was not already in the matter potentially.

Reply Obj. 12: To be in potency and to be in act do not signify diverse accidental modes, from the diversity of which alteration would arise, but rather substantial modes. For even substance is divided by potency and act, like any other genus.

Reply Obj. 13: An accidental form acts in the power of the substantial form as its instrument, just as a fire’s heat, in On the Soul 2, is called the instrument of the nutritive power.¹ Therefore, it is not incongruous if the action of an accidental form terminate in a substantial form.

Reply Obj. 14: Again, the heat in the seed also acts as the instrument of the soul’s power, which is within the seed. And though this power is imperfect, it is a certain impression left by a perfect soul; for it is in seed from the soul of the generator, and it also acts in the power of a heavenly body to whom it belongs as an instrument, as it were. Hence, we do not say that the seed begets, but rather that the soul and the sun do.¹

Reply Obj. 15: Animals engendered from putrefaction are of a less perfection than are other animals; hence, in engendering them, the strength of the heavenly body, impressed on the lower matter, has the same effect as the heavenly body does in engendering of more perfect animals with the power of seed.

Reply Obj. 16: Although a mule is unlike a horse or ass in species, it is like them in the proximate genus, by reason of which likeness its own species (an intermediate species, as it were) is engendered from different species.

Reply Obj. 17: Just as the divine power (namely, the first agent) does not exclude the action of a natural power, so neither does the first exemplary form, which is God, exclude the derivation of forms from other lower forms that effect forms like themselves.

Reply Obj. 18: Hence, we gather the reply to the eighteenth objection, for Boethius means to say that forms that are in matter derive from forms that are without matter not as from proximate causes but as from the first exemplars.¹

Reply Obj. 19: Being is said to be the result of creation insofar as every second cause, when it gives being, does so insofar as it acts in the power of the first creating cause; for being is the first effect and presupposes nothing else.

Reply Obj. 20: A natural form that is in matter cannot be traced back to a self-subsistent form of the same species, because a natural form has matter in its own account; rather, it is traced back to a self-subsistent form, as we have stated.

Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted, the part stands for the whole, namely, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche; and this because the soul is the chief part of man, and a whole seems to be its most fundamental part, so that the soul or intellect seems to be the whole man, according to what is said in Ethics 9.¹

Reply Obj. 2: The whole man comes from the thigh of the begetter—insofar as the power of the seed coming from the thigh conduces to the union of soul and body by giving the matter its ultimate disposition, which necessitates the form, by reason of which union a man is a man—but not as though each part of man were caused by the power of the seed.

Reply Obj. 3: Original sin is called the sin of the entire nature, just as actual sin is called the personal sin; therefore, the comparison between actual sin and the one individual person is the same as that between original sin and the entire human nature handed on from our first parent, in whom was the beginning of sin and by whose will original sin is imputed as voluntary to all men. Therefore, original sin is in the soul insofar as it pertains to the human nature. Now, human nature is passed on from parent to child by the passing on of flesh into which subsequently the soul is infused; and from this the soul contracts the infection that makes it one nature with the transmitted flesh. For were it not united thereto so as to constitute one nature, it would not contract the infection, as neither does an angel by assuming a human body.

Reply Obj. 4: As within Adam’s nature was the nature of us all as in its origin, so too original sin, which is in us, was in that original sin as in its origin. For the nature, as already stated, receives original sin through itself, while the soul does so as a consequence.

Reply Obj. 5: A man begets his like in species through the power of his own form, namely, his rational soul, not that this is the immediate active principle in human generation, but because the generative force and things that act in the seed do not dispose the matter so as to make it a body fit to be perfected by a rational soul except insofar as they act as certain instruments of a rational soul. Nevertheless, this action does not go so far as to produce a rational soul, for the reasons already given.

Reply Obj. 6: The generator begets his like in species insofar as the begotten is produced by the action of the generator in order that it may share in his species; and this comes to pass by the begotten receiving a form like that of the generator. If, then, that form is not subsistent, and its own being consists merely in that it is united to that of which it is the form, it will be necessary for the generator to be the cause of the form itself, as is the case with all material forms. If, on the other hand, it is a form such that it has subsistence, and its own being is not entirely dependent on its union with matter, as in the case of the rational soul, then it suffices that the generator is the cause of the union of such a form with matter by disposing the matter for the form; nor need it be the cause of the form itself.

Reply Obj. 7: The disposition of the rational soul follows the very disposition of the body, both because it receives something from the body, and because forms are also diversified according to the diversity of their matter. This is why children are like their parents even in things pertaining to the soul, and not because one soul is transmitted by another.

Reply Obj. 8: Because properly speaking a soul is the act of a living body, and life is conditional upon heat and humidity, which are preserved in an animal by means of its blood, this is why it is said that the soul is in the blood, thus indicating the proper disposition of the body as matter perfected by the soul.

Reply Obj. 9: There are several opinions about the life of the embryo.

Reply Obj. 10: Before it has the rational soul, the embryo is not a perfect being, but is on the way to perfection; and therefore, it is not in a genus or species save by reduction, just as the incomplete is reduced to the genus or species of the complete.

Reply Obj. 11: Although the soul is not in the seed from the beginning, the power of the soul is there, as stated above, which power is established in the spirit that is contained in the semen, and it is called the “power of the soul” because it comes from the soul of the generator.

Reply Obj. 12: Before the advent of the rational soul, the embryo is alive and has a soul, as stated above; therefore, we grant this argument.

Reply Obj. 13–15: The same answer applies to the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth objections.

Reply Obj. 16: The formative power that is from the outset in the seed remains even after the advent of the rational soul, just as the spirits also remain into which nearly the whole substance of the semen is converted. This power, which at first was formative of the body, afterwards regulates the body, just as heat also, which at first disposes matter to the form of fire, remains after the advent of the form of fire as an instrument of the form in activity.

Reply Obj. 17–18: This answer applies to the seventeenth and eighteenth objections.

Reply Obj. 19: Although the rational soul is not from the generator, its union with the body is in a manner from the generator, as stated above. Consequently, we say that a man is begotten.

Reply Obj. 20: There is not a twofold being in man, for the body should not be understood as from the begetter and the soul from the Creator in such a way that the being acquired by the body from its begetter is distinct from that which the soul acquires from its Creator; rather, the Creator gives being to the soul in the body, and the begetter disposes the body to participate in this being through the soul united to it.

Reply Obj. 21: Two agents that are altogether disparate cannot combine so that the one’s action terminates in the matter and the other’s in the form; but this is possible in the case of two coordinate agents, one of which is the instrument of the other. For the action of the principal agent sometimes extends to something that is beyond the range of the instrument’s action. Now, nature is as a certain instrument of the divine power, as we have shown above.¹ Therefore, it is not incongruous that the divine power alone produces the rational soul, while the action of nature extends no further than to giving the body the requisite disposition.

Reply Obj. 22: An intelligence existing in a body needs nothing corporeal to understand that which is, together with the intellect, the principle of the intellectual activity, as happens in sight; for the principle of vision is not only sight, but an eye composed of pupil and sight. However, it needs a body as an object, just as the sight needs the wall on which is the color, because images are compared to the intellect as colors to sight, as is said in On the Soul 3.¹ This is why the intellect is prevented from understanding when the organ of the imagination is injured; for so long as it is in the body, it needs images, not only as receiving from the images when it is acquiring knowledge, but also as referring the intelligible species to the images when it uses knowledge already acquired. For this reason, examples are necessary in the sciences.

Reply Obj. 23–24: From this we gather how to reply to the twenty-third and twenty-fourth objections.

Reply Obj. 25: This was the argument of Apollinaris,¹ according to Gregory of Nyssa.² He was deceived, however, in failing to distinguish the action of nature, which is the procreation of the child, to which action God gives the complement, from the voluntary act of adultery wherein the sin consists.

Reply Obj. 26: The soul, being more perfect than material forms, would be able to produce its like if a rational soul could be produced otherwise than by creation, which is impossible. And this is owing to its perfection, as may be gathered from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 27: In God alone can there be one nature in several supposits; therefore, in him alone can there be generation without the imperfection of change and division. Thus, the higher creatures, which are indivisible and unchangeable in substance, such as the rational soul and the angels, are not generated; therefore, the lower creatures are, being divisible and corruptible.

Reply Obj. 28: The power that is in the seed is called “intellect” by the Philosopher, according to the Commentator, on account of a certain likeness,¹ inasmuch as, like the intellect, the power’s action, is exercised without an organ.

Reply Obj. 29: This saying of the Philosopher refers to the sensitive but not the rational soul.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis, and especially in his work On the Origin of the Soul, speaks as inquiring rather than asserting, as he himself declares.¹

Reply Obj. 2: The universe in its beginning was perfect as regards species and not as regards all individuals—or it was as regards the causes of natural things from which afterwards other things could be propagated, not as regards all their effects. And though rational souls do not come to be from natural causes, the bodies into which they are infused by God as being connatural with them, do come to be through the action of nature.

Reply Obj. 3: In a play one does not seek something else because of the play. But in the movement by which God moves corporeal creatures, something is sought because of that very movement, namely, the complete number of the elect, and when that is reached the movement will cease, although not the substance of the world.

Reply Obj. 4: The multitude of souls pertains to the ultimate essential perfection of the universe, but not to its first, since the entire transformation of mundane bodies is ordered in some way to the multiplication of souls; and this requires a multiplication of bodies, as we have proved above in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 5: The Platonists maintained that the nature of souls is complete in itself, and that they are united to bodies accidentally; therefore, they also affirmed the transmigration of souls from one body to another. Especially were they led to hold this opinion because they held that human souls are immortal, and that generation never stops. Hence, in order to avoid an infinite number of souls, they imagined a kind of circle, such that souls, after leaving a body, were subsequently reunited to them. Macrobius expresses himself in accordance with this opinion, which is false; and consequently, on this point, his authority cannot be admitted.

Reply Obj. 6: The Philosopher does not state that the soul is the efficient cause of the body, but the cause whence the body’s movements originate, insofar as it is the principle of locomotion, growth, and other like movements in the body, as he himself explains in the same passage.¹

Reply Obj. 7: The meaning of the authority quoted is that irascibility and concupiscibility are in the soul before its union with the body by a priority of nature, not one of time; for the soul does not derive this from the body, but rather the body from the soul.

Reply Obj. 8: The soul is measured by time according to the being whereby it is united to the body, although considered as a certain spiritual substance, it is measured by aeviternity. But it does not follow that it began to be measured by aeviternity when the angels did as well.

Reply Obj. 9: Although there is no before and after in aeviternity as regards the things it measures, nothing prevents one thing from participating in aeviternity before another.

Reply Obj. 10: Although the angel and the soul agree in intellectual nature, they differ in that the angel is a nature complete in itself, so he could be created through himself; but the soul, through having the perfection of its own nature in its being united with the body, required that it be created, not in heaven, but in that body whose perfection it is.

Reply Obj. 11: Although the soul is in itself more simple than any body, it is nevertheless the form and perfection of a body composed of elements, and to which a middle place is due, and together with this body, it must be created here.

Reply Obj. 12: The first perfection of the soul regards its own natural being, which perfection consists in the soul’s union with the body; therefore, in its beginning, it needed to be created in the place of the body. However, its ultimate perfection regards that which it has in common with other intellectual substances, and this perfection will be given to it in heaven.

Reply Obj. 13: Souls that are created now, although they are new creatures numerically, yet they are old according to their own species; for they already existed in the works of the six days in those who were like them in species, namely, in the souls of our first parents.

Reply Obj. 14: It was fitting for the work of creation by which the principles of nature were established to precede the work of propagation, but the creation of souls is not a work of that kind.

Reply Obj. 15: It belongs to justice to render what is due; therefore, it is contrary to justice if unequal things are given to equal persons when debts are being paid, but not when things are being given gratuitously, as when souls are created. We may also reply that this diversity does not arise from a diversity of merit in souls but from a diversity of dispositions in bodies; therefore, Plato said that forms are infused by God according to the deserts of matter.¹

Reply Obj. 16: Although the soul depends on the body for its beginning, in order to begin its existence in the perfection of its own nature, nevertheless it does not depend on the body for its end, because it acquires existence in the body as a subsistent reality; whence when the body is destroyed, it still remains in its own being, though not in the completion of its nature, which it has in its union with the body.

Reply Obj. 17: It is not the nature of the body but its corruption that is a load upon the soul, as the text itself declares.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the sensitive soul in man and dumb beasts is of the same account as regards its genus, it is not of the same account as regards its species, just as a man and a beast are not the same animal in species. Consequently, the activities of the sensitive soul are far more noble in man than in beasts, as is clear with touch and the interior powers of apprehension. Nor is it necessary that things that are in a genus, if they differ in species, have the same manner of coming into being, as is clear in the case of animals engendered from seed and from decomposition, since these agree in genus but not in species.

Reply Obj. 2: In man, the sensitive soul is said to be as a disposition not as though it differed in substance from the rational soul, and were a disposition thereto, but because the sensitive is distinguished from the rational in man only as one power is from another. On the other hand, in a beast the sensitive soul differs from the rational soul in man as one substantial form from another. Nevertheless, as the sensitive and vegetative powers in man flow from the essence of the soul, so do they in beasts and plants. But with this difference: in plants there flow only vegetative powers from the essence of the soul, in beasts not only vegetative but also sensitive powers, from which latter their soul is denominated, while in man besides these flow also the intellectual powers, from which he is denominated.

Reply Obj. 3: The substance from which the sensitive power flows, both in beasts and in man, is the substantial form, while in both cases the power is an accident.

Reply Obj. 4: The sensitive soul is not actually in the seed according to its own proper species, but as in an active power, just as a house is actually in the mind of the builder as in an active power; and thus are bodily forms in the heavenly powers.

Reply Obj. 5: An instrument is understood to be moved by the principal agent so long as it retains the power communicated to it by the principal agent; thus, the arrow is moved by the archer as long as it retains the force wherewith it was shot by him. Thus, in heavy and light things, that which is generated is moved by the generator, as long as it retains the form transmitted thereby, so that the seed also is understood to be moved by the soul of the begetter, as long as it retains the power impressed by that soul, although it is corporeally separated from it. And the mover and the thing moved must be together at the commencement of the movement but not throughout the whole movement, as is evident in the case of projectiles.

Reply Obj. 6: The soul’s appetitive power has no command except on the body united to it; therefore, the separated part does not obey the behest of the appetitive soul. Nor is the seed moved by the begetter’s soul through a command, but through the transfusion of a certain power that remains in the seed even after its separation.

Reply Obj. 7: The sensitive and vegetative souls are brought out from the potency of matter just as other material forms are as well, for the production of which a power is needed that transforms matter. Now, the power that is in the seed has this power, although it falls short of the soul’s other actions. For just as the soul transforms matter so as to change it entirely into the body in the action of self-nourishment, so by the aforesaid power matter is transformed so as to result in conception. Consequently, nothing hinders this same power from working, in its power, in this respect for the sake of the sensitive soul’s action.

Reply Obj. 8: This same power is rooted in the spirit enclosed within the seed as its subject. Now, according to Avicenna, nearly all the seed is changed into spirit.¹ Therefore, although the corpulent matter, from which the embryo is formed, undergoes many changes in generation, the subject of that power is not destroyed.

Reply Obj. 9: As heat acts as the instrument of the substantial form of fire, so there is nothing to prevent it from acting as the instrument of the sensitive soul in bringing a sensitive soul into act, though it cannot do so by its own proper power.

Reply Obj. 10: Matter is transmuted not only by an accidental but also by a substantial change, for both forms preexist in the potency of matter. Therefore, a natural agent, which transmutes matter, is the cause not only of the accidental but also of the substantial form.

Reply Obj. 11: The sensitive soul, since it is not a subsistent reality, is not a whatness, just as neither are other material forms; rather, it is part of a whatness, and its own being is in its concretion with matter. Therefore, the sensitive soul’s being produced is nothing more than the matter’s being transmuted from potency to act.

Reply Obj. 12: The more imperfect a thing is, the fewer the requisites for its constitution. Therefore, since animals engendered from decomposition are more imperfect than those engendered from seed, in the former only the power of a heavenly body is sufficient, which power is at work also in the seed, although it does not suffice without the power of the soul for the production of animals from seed. For the power of a heavenly body remains in the lower bodies insofar as they are transmuted by it as by the first cause of alteration. For this reason, the Philosopher says, in On Animals, that all these lower bodies are full of a soul’s powers.¹ But the heaven, though not alike in species to the animals engendered from decomposition, is like them insofar as an effect virtually persists in its active cause.

Reply Obj. 13: Although the heavenly body is not alive, it acts in the power of a living substance by whom it is moved, whether this be an angel or God. According to philosophers, however, heavenly bodies are ensouled and living.

Reply Obj. 14: The power of a spiritual substance moving it is found in a heavenly body and its movement, not as a form having complete natural being, but after the manner of an intention, as power is in the craftsman’s tool.

Reply Obj. 15: As stated above, the rational soul surpasses the entire order of corporeal principles; therefore, no body can act even instrumentally for its production.

Reply Obj. 16: The sensitive soul is produced in the embryo neither by the action of the body nor by a separation from a soul, but by the action of the formative power that is in the seed from the soul of the begetter, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 17: It is denied that a cognitive power comes from the action of the elements, as though the powers contained in the elements would suffice for them just as they suffice to cause hardness or softness. But it is not denied that they can cooperate in some way instrumentally.

Reply Obj. 18: The sensitive soul causes movement by its appetite. Now, the function of the sensitive appetite belongs not only to the soul but also to the composite; hence, this power has a determinate organ. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the sensitive soul has an activity independent of the body.

Reply Obj. 19: A body can cause a movement without itself moving with the same species of movement as that which it causes, although it cannot move another unless it is moved in some way; for the heavenly body causes alteration without itself being altered, but it does move locally; and in like manner, the organ of the appetitive power causes local movement, without being so moved, whereas it is in a certain way altered locally. For the sensitive appetite’s activity does not occur without a corporeal alteration, as is clear in cases of anger and like passions.

Reply Obj. 20: The motive force that executes a movement is a disposition of the movable thing, whereby it is naturally apt to be moved by such a mover, more than it is a mover through itself.

Reply Obj. 1: The body of a living thing, for example, that of a lion or an olive, is not a soul but rather is the seed of the body only before the soul, and before the power that acts toward a soul. For the proportion of the seed to such a power is the same as that of a body toward the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: There is this difference between the rational and other souls, that the rational soul is not from the power of the seed, as the other souls are, although no soul is in the seed from the beginning.

Reply Obj. 3: This power is likened to a son going forth from his father’s house not as regards the completion of the species, but as regards the acquisition of things that each of them lacks for a certain completion. For a first perfection is often made manifest through a likeness of second perfection.

Reply Obj. 4: The likeness between this power and art consists in the fact that just as the artwork pre-exists within the art as in an active power, so too are living things that are to be generated within the formative power.

Reply Obj. 5: The cutting apart of a segmented animal is violent and against nature because the part cut away was actually a part and perfected by the soul; whence by the cutting of the matter the soul remains in either part, which soul was actually one in the whole body and potentially several. This happens because in animals of this kind the whole body is composed of almost homogeneous parts, for their souls, being of a lower degree of perfection than others, require but little diversity of organs. Therefore, when a part is severed, it can be receptive to the soul as having sufficient organs for receiving soul, as happens in the case of other like bodies such as wood, stone, water, and air. The Philosopher proves from this, in On Animals, that the seed was not actually a part before its separation, for the reason that its separation would not have been natural but a sort of corruption;¹ therefore, it does not follow that the soul remains in the seed itself after its separation.

Reply Obj. 6: The male is said to provide the soul inasmuch as the seed of the male contains a power that acts for the sake of the soul.

Reply Obj. 7: The diseases mentioned in the objection are not transmitted together with the seed as though they were actually in the seed, but because their principles are in the seed through a certain indisposition of the seed.

Reply Obj. 8: Seeing that the semen is a certain surplus, it has certain channels proper to it, like other superfluities, and if these outlets be cut off, generation is prevented, and not because something of what was an actual part of the body has been destroyed.

Reply Obj. 9: It is the same with the immoderate emission of seed as with the immoderate discharge of other superfluities, which destroys what has already been converted, a destruction that is violent and unnatural. But things that happen contrary to nature must not be ascribed to the action of nature.

Reply Obj. 10: The seed is a surplus in the sense that, although it is not actually a part of the father’s substance, it is potentially the whole thereof, and for this reason, the child is said to be of his father’s substance.

Reply Obj. 11: Although the seed is not actually animate, it is animate by power; whence it is not simply speaking inanimate.

Reply Obj. 1: If “need” denotes a defect or lack of what is needed, then that which always exists does not need something so that it might exist. But if it denotes only the order of origin in reference to that whence a thing exists, nothing hinders a thing that always exists from needing something so that it might exist, insofar as it has being not from itself but from another.

Reply Obj. 2: Before receiving something, the recipient does not have it; rather, he has it when he has received it. Whence if he receives it from eternity, he has it from eternity.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument applies to generation in which there is movement, since that which is being moved to existence does not exist. And this is true in the sense that what is being generated is not, while what has been generated, is. Consequently, where there is no distinction between being generated and having been generated, it does not follow that what is generated at some time does not exist.

Reply Obj. 4: What has its being from another is not a being when considered in itself, if it be something other than the very being that it receives from another; however, if it is the very being that it receives from another, then considered in itself it cannot be a non-being, for it is not possible to consider non-being in being, although in what is other than being it can be considered. For that which exists can have something mixed with it, but being itself cannot, according to Boethius in De Hebdomadibus.¹ The first condition applies to creatures, the second to the Son of God.

Reply Obj. 5: The Son of God cannot be called an effect, because he does not come to be, but is begotten. For that is said to come to be whose being is distinct from its maker. Therefore, neither can the Father be called the cause of the Son, properly speaking, but his principle. Nor is it necessary for every cause to precede its effect in its duration, but only by priority of nature, as is clear in the case of the sun and its shining.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the question from the point of view of the power of the maker, but not from that of the thing made, which is supposed not to have existed at some time.

Reply Obj. 2: Even if creatures had always existed they would not be equal to God simply speaking, but insofar as they imitate him. There is nothing unreasonable in this, and so the objection has but little force.

Reply Obj. 3: In the divine person, there is nothing that is supposed not to have existed at some time, as there is in every essence other than God.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument considers the power of the maker, which indeed is not diminished by his will except insofar as it was by the decree of the divine will that creatures did not always exist.

Reply Obj. 5: This suffices for the reply to the fifth objection.

Reply Obj. 6: If it be stated that creatures existed before any given time, the position of the faith is safeguarded because it is stated that nothing except God existed always, but it is not safeguarded if we say that creatures have always existed; hence, the comparison fails. It must also be noted that the argument is lacking in form. For God is able to make any creature better, yet he cannot make a creature of infinite goodness, because infinite goodness is incompatible with the account of being created, whereas determinate goodness is not, however great it be.

Reply Obj. 7: The Platonists did understand this, but they were not guided by the truth of the faith, since it was unknown to them.

Reply Obj. 8: This argument proves nothing more than that to be made and to always exist are not incompatible considered in themselves; whence it considers that which is possible absolutely.

Reply Obj. 9: This argument considers possibility in reference to an active power.

Reply Sed Contra 1: According to Boethius, in The Consolation of Philosophy, even if the world had always existed, it would not be coeternal with God, because its duration would not be wholly simultaneous, which is essential to eternity. For eternity is the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life.¹ Now, the succession of time is caused by movement, as is clear from the Philosopher.² Hence, whatsoever is subject to change, even if it always exist, cannot be eternal; this is why Augustine says that no creature can be coeternal with the unchangeable nature of the Trinity.³

Reply Sed Contra 2: Damascene speaks on the supposition of the Catholic faith; this is clear from his saying: that which is brought into being from nothingness, etc.¹

Reply Sed Contra 3: Changeableness by its very account excludes eternity but not an infinite duration.

Reply Sed Contra 4: It is true that what depends on another can never exist unless it be upheld by that whence it proceeds, yet if the latter always existed, the former also existed always.

Reply Sed Contra 5: From the fact that God was able to do a thing, it does not follow that he did it, because he acts by his will and not by a natural necessity. And where it is said that in eternal things there is no difference between what can be and what is, this refers to passive and not to active power. For a passive power not joined to its act is a principle of corruption, and therefore, repugnant to eternity; whereas it is not prejudicial to an active power that its effect be not actually in existence, especially if the active power be a voluntary cause. For the effect is not the perfection of an active power in the same way as the form is of a passive power.

Reply Obj. 1: The comparison of Dionysius must be understood to refer to the universality of diffusion; for the sun sheds its rays on all bodies without differentiating one from another, and it is similar with God’s goodness. But this is not understood in reference to the absence of will.

Reply Obj. 2: It is owing to the perfection of the divine nature that by the power of the divine nature its likeness is communicated to creatures, yet this communication was made not of natural necessity but voluntarily.

Reply Obj. 3: This suffices for the reply to the third objection.

Reply Obj. 4: Nature is not subject to will from within, but in externals nothing prevents nature from being subject to the will. Thus, in the local movements of animals nature in their muscles and sinews is subject to the command of their appetite. Consequently, it is not unreasonable if by virtue of the divine nature creatures be brought into existence according to the decision of the divine will.

Reply Obj. 5: The good is the proper object of the will, hence the goodness of God as willed and loved by him is the cause of a creature by the mediation of his will.

Reply Obj. 6: Although will and nature are the same thing in reality in God, they still differ in account insofar as they express respect to creatures in different ways; for nature indicates a respect to some one thing determinately, whereas will does not.

Reply Obj. 7: It is owing not merely to the unchangeableness of nature that it produces a particular effect of necessity, but to its being determined to one thing; this does not apply to the divine will, although it is supremely unchangeable.

Reply Obj. 8: Although God’s activity belongs to him naturally, seeing that it is his very nature or essence, the created effect follows the activity, which, in our way of understanding, is considered as the principle of his will, just as even the effect of heating follows according to the mode of the heat.

Reply Obj. 9: Although God is infinite, he is the end of all things. For he is not infinite in a deprived way, as being finite is a passion of quantity, which is naturally apt to have an end; for in this he is neither an end, nor infinite, nor does he have an end. However, he is infinite in a negative sense, because he is altogether without an end.

Reply Obj. 10: It is true that God acts inasmuch as he is good, and that goodness is in him of necessity, but it does not follow that he acts of necessity. For his goodness works the mediation of his will insofar as it is its object or end. Now, the will is not inclined of necessity to things that are for the sake of the end, although it is necessitated in respect of the last end.

Reply Obj. 11: As regards the things which are in God himself, nothing can be described as potential: all is naturally and absolutely necessary. But in respect of creatures we can call certain things potential there, not in regard to a passive potency but in regard to an active power, which is not limited to one thing.

Reply Obj. 12: Were God to deny his own goodness by doing something contrary thereto, or wherein his goodness were not expressed, we should arrive at the impossible conclusion that he denied his very self. But this would not follow if he were not to communicate his goodness to anything, since his goodness would suffer nothing by not being communicated.

Reply Obj. 13: Although the Word of God proceeds from the Father naturally, it does not follow that creatures proceed from God naturally. But the Father by his own Word speaks his creatures according as they are in the Father himself, and in him they exist as to be produced not necessarily but voluntarily.

Reply Obj. 14: The ultimate end is not the communication of the divine goodness, but the divine goodness itself, for love of which God wills to communicate it. For he works for his goodness’ sake not as desiring to have what he has not but as wishing to communicate what he has, for he acts not from a desire for the end but from love of the end.

Reply Obj. 15: As in God there is naught but good, so in him is there naught but what is necessary. But it does not follow that whatsoever proceeds from him does so of necessity.

Reply Obj. 16: As stated above,¹ God’s will inclines naturally to his own goodness; whence he cannot will but what is becoming to him, namely, the good. Yet he is not determined to this or that good; therefore, it does not follow that the goods which exist proceed from him necessarily.

Reply Obj. 17: Though the same nature is in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, it has not the same mode of existence in each one of the three, and when I say, “mode of existence,” I mean in respect of the relations. In the Father, it is as not received from another; in the Son, as received from the Father. Consequently, we must not infer that whatsoever belongs to the Father by virtue of his nature, belongs also to the Son or the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 18: The effect follows from the action according to the mode of the principle of the action; therefore, since the divine will, which has no necessary connection with creatures, is considered, in our way of thinking, to be the principle of the divine action in regard to creatures, it does not follow that the creature proceeds from God by natural necessity, although the action itself is God’s essence or nature.

Reply Obj. 19: The creature is like God as regards general conditions but not as to the mode of participation. For being is in God otherwise than in creatures, and so too is goodness. Hence, although from the first good all goods derive, and all beings from the first being, yet all do not derive supreme goodness from the supreme good, nor from the necessary being do all things proceed of necessity.

Reply Obj. 20: God’s will is his essence; therefore, his working by his will does not prevent his working by his essence. For God’s will is not an intention in addition to his essence, but is his very essence.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as God is one, so too that which he produced is one, not only because each thing is one in itself but also because all things taken together are in a sense one perfect thing, and this unity requires diversity of parts, as we have already shown.

Reply Obj. 2: The creature is like God in unity, inasmuch as each thing is one in itself, and inasmuch as all things together are one by a unity of order, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Wickedness consists entirely in privation of being, whereas multitude is caused by being. For the very difference between one being and another is a certain being. Therefore, since God is not the source of a thing tending to non-being but is the source of all being, he is not the principle of wickedness, but he is the cause of multitude. It must be observed, however, that oneness is twofold. There is a one that is convertible with being, which adds nothing to being save non-division; and this one excludes multitude, insofar as multitude results from division—not the extrinsic multitude that the one constitutes as a part, but intrinsic multitude that is opposed to one. For when we say that a thing is one, we do not deny the existence of other things extrinsic thereto with which it constitutes a multitude; rather, we deny a division of it itself into many. The other kind of one is the principle of number, and to the account of being it adds that of measure; and multitude is a privation of this unity, since number results from the division of the continuous. Yet multitude does not entirely exclude unity, since when a whole is divided the parts still remain undivided; but it does exclude the unity of a whole. But wickedness, considered in itself, excludes goodness, since in no way does it constitute a good nor is it constituted thereby.

Reply Obj. 4: Being stands to things contained under being in a different way than animal (or any other genus) stands to its own species. For a species adds to its genus (such as man adds to animal) a difference that is outside the essence of the genus; for “animal” names merely the sensitive nature, which latter does not contain “rational.” But things contained under “being” add nothing to being that is outside the essence of being. Therefore, it does not follow that the cause of an animal as such is the cause of the rational as such. But it does follow that the cause of being as such must be the cause of all the differences of being, and consequently, of the entire multitude of beings.

Reply Obj. 5: Appropriateness of a cause to its effect regards the likeness of the effect to its cause. Now, the likeness of the creature to God is viewed according to the creature’s fulfilling what, in reference to it, exists in God’s intellect and will, just as the products of the craftsman’s art are like him insofar as the form of the art is expressed in them and they reveal the craftsman’s will in reference to their constitution. For just as the natural agent acts through its own form, so does the craftsman act through his own intellect and will. Accordingly, God is the proper cause of each creature inasmuch as he understands each creature and wills it to be. However, the statement that the same thing cannot be proper to many is true of an appropriateness of equality and does not apply to the case in point.

Reply Obj. 6: The reply to the sixth objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 7: Although there is a certain likeness between the creature and God, it is not one of equality. Hence, it does not follow that, because unity in God is altogether free of multitude and composition, therefore, the same unity is to be found in the creature.

Reply Obj. 8: Although an effect cannot surpass its cause, a cause can surpass its effect, and consequently, several effects can proceed from one cause, although one effect cannot proceed immediately from several causes.

Reply Obj. 9: Although in God the generative and the creative power are the same in reality, they do not connote the same respect. Rather, the generative power connotes relationship to that which proceeds by nature, and which therefore can be but one, while the creative power implies relationship to what proceeds by the will, and which consequently need not be one.

Reply Obj. 10: As we have already indicated, although the creature imitates the unity of God, it does not follow that its unity is of the same kind as God’s.

Reply Obj. 11: Although God’s action is one and simple, for it is his essence, we must not infer that it has only one effect, but that it has many; for from the divine action effects proceed according to the order of his wisdom and the decree of his will.

Reply Obj. 12: When what is based on an exemplar perfectly represents the exemplar, there can be but one thing based on the exemplar (except accidentally through the copies differing materially). Creatures, however, do not perfectly imitate their exemplar; therefore, they can imitate it in various ways, and so there are many things based on the exemplar. But there is but one perfect mode of imitation, for which reason there can be but one Son, who is the perfect image of the Father.

Reply Obj. 13: Although the form of the divine intellect is but one in reality, it is many in account according to its diverse relations to creatures, inasmuch as creatures are understood to imitate the form of the divine intellect in many ways.

Reply Obj. 14: These various respects to creatures are not only in our intellect but also in God’s. And yet there are not diverse things in the divine intellect by which God understands, for he understands by one thing only, which is his essence; but many things are there, as understood by him. For just as we understand that the creature can imitate God in many ways, so also does God understand this; and consequently, he understands the various respects of creatures to him.

Reply Obj. 15: Just as God understands all things by one thing, so does he understand them all by one apprehension. For the act of the intellect must be one or many according to the unity or multitude of the principle by which a thing is understood.

Reply Obj. 16: Although a multitude apart from the many things exists only in reason, still the multitude within the many is in the nature of things, just as animal in general is only in reason, whereas the nature of animal is within the individuals. Consequently, both multitude and the nature of animal must be traced to God as their cause.

Reply Obj. 17: The universe that has been created by God is the best possible in respect of the things that exist, but not in respect of the things that God is able to make.

Reply Obj. 18: This argument would hold if that which is done in order to obtain an end can gain the end wholly and perfectly by way of equality, and this is not the case in the question at issue.

Reply Obj. 19: This argument, which is used by Origen, is not very convincing.¹ For there is no injustice in dealing unequally with equal persons except when one is giving them their due, and this cannot be said of the first creation of things. For that which is given out of one’s own liberality may be given more or less liberally as the giver wills and as his wisdom dictates.

Reply Obj. 20: Although other creatures are beneath the angels, their production requires infinite power in their maker, inasmuch as they are brought into being by creation, since they are not made from preexistent matter. Consequently, we must hold that all creatures as not being made from preexistent matter are created by God immediately.

Reply Obj. 21: Since being is the terminus and proper effect of creation, it is impossible that the things created by God receive their forms from the angels, because every being derives from a form.

Reply Obj. 22: Whatsoever God makes is indeed one in itself, yet this unity, as stated above, does not exclude all manner of multitude, since that multitude whereof unity is a part remains.

Reply Obj. 23: When the Philosopher says that God understands nothing outside himself, he should not be understood as though he meant that God does not understand the things that are outside him, but that even those things that are outside God he beholds in himself, not outside himself; for he knows all other things through his own essence.

Reply Obj. 24: The creature is said to be in God in two ways.

Reply Obj. 1: It is proper to divine goodness to bring things into being by means of the will, of which it is the object. Consequently, it does not follow that whenever the divine goodness existed, things would be brought into being, but rather that this would be according to the plan of the divine will.

Reply Obj. 2: The heavenly body, being incorruptible, is capable of always being, but no capability, whether of being or of operating, regards the past, but only the present or the future; for no one has power over his past actions, since he cannot cause to have been done that which he has not done, but he does have the power to do it now or in the future. Consequently, the capability in the heavens of existing always regards not the past but the future.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that the heavens would return into nothingness if God ceased to uphold them does not make them corruptible, simply speaking. Seeing, however, that God’s preservation of the creature in being depends on God’s unchangeableness, not on natural necessity (in which case it could be said that it is necessary absolutely), since it is necessary solely on the supposition that God wills and has unchangeably decreed that preservation, it may be granted that the heavens are corruptible in a certain respect, that is, with this condition: if God were not to uphold them.

Reply Obj. 4: Every effect carries a necessary relationship to its efficient cause, whether the cause is natural or voluntary. But we have already proved that God is the cause of the world not by a necessity of his nature but by his will;¹ therefore, it was necessary for the divine effect to follow not whenever the divine nature existed, but when the divine will planned that it should exist, and in the very manner in which he willed it to exist.

Reply Obj. 5: A thing may exist before time in two ways.

Reply Obj. 6: Since every agent produces its like, an effect must follow from an effectively operating cause so as to bear a likeness to its cause. Now, as that which proceeds from a cause that acts by its nature bears a likeness thereto in that it has a form like the form of its agent, so too that which proceeds from a voluntary agent bears a likeness thereto in that it has a form like its cause, insofar as what is brought forth in the effect is according to the plan of the will, as instanced in the work produced by the craftsman. But the will plans not only the effect’s form but also its place, time, and all its conditions; whence the effect of the will follows when the will plans it and not when the will exists. For the effect is like the will not as regards being but as regards what the will plans. Consequently, though the will remain ever the same, it does not follow that its effect should flow from it from eternity.

Reply Obj. 7: God necessarily wills his own goodness and everything without which his goodness cannot exist. Such is not the production of creatures, and consequently, the objection fails.

Reply Obj. 8: Since God made created things in order to manifest himself, it was more fitting and better that they should be made in such wise as to be able to manifest him in a more fitting manner and more expressly. Now, he is more expressly manifested by creatures if they do not always exist; for this brings into greater evidence the fact that they have been brought into being by another, and that God does not need created things, and that they are entirely dependent on the divine will.

Reply Obj. 9: God’s will to create the world was eternal, yet not that the world should always exist, but that it should come to be when he made it.

Reply Obj. 10: Before the world was, the coming to be of the world was possible not by any passive potency, but only by the active power of the agent. Or we may reply that it was possible not by reason of some power, but because the terms of the proposition “the world exists” are not in contradiction to each other. For according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5, a thing may be said to be possible in this way, without reference to a potency.¹

Reply Obj. 11: This suffices for the reply to the eleventh objection.

Reply Obj. 12: This argument stands in the case of an agent that begins a new action, but God’s action is eternal, since it is his substance. He is said, however, to begin to act by reason of the new effect that results from his eternal action according to his will’s plan, which is considered as the principle of his action in its order to the effect. For the effect follows from the action according to the condition of the form that is the principle of that action, just as something is heated through the fire’s heating according to measure of the fire’s heat.

Reply Obj. 13: This argument considers the agent that produces its effect in time without being the cause of time: this does not apply to God, as is clear from things stated above.¹

Reply Obj. 14: If “movement” be taken properly, God’s will does not move, but metaphorically speaking it is said to be “moved” by the thing willed; and thus, God’s goodness alone moves his will, according to the saying of Augustine that God moves himself independently of place and time.¹ Nor does it follow that creatures were produced whenever God’s goodness existed; for creatures proceed from God not as though they were owed it or by a necessity of his goodness—since the divine goodness does not need them, nor does he gain anything by them—but by his simple will.

Reply Obj. 15: Since the first succession of time is caused by movement, as is said in Physics 4, it is true that every instant is a beginning and an end of time, insofar as it is true that every moment of motion is a beginning and an end of movement;¹ this is why, if we suppose that movement neither always existed nor will always exist, there will be no need to say that every instant is a beginning and an end of time; rather, there will be a certain instant that will be only a beginning, and a certain instant that will be only an end. Hence, this objection argues in a circle, and consequently is not a demonstration; yet it serves the purpose of Aristotle, who employs it to attack a position, as we have said above in the body of the article. In fact, many arguments serve to rebut an opinion on account of the statements advanced by its holders and yet in themselves are not simply speaking efficacious.

Reply Obj. 16: The instant is indeed always considered as flowing, yet not always as flowing from one thing to another, but sometimes as only flowing from something (for example, the last instant of time), sometimes as flowing only towards something (as the first instant).

Reply Obj. 17: This argument does not prove that movement has always existed, but that a circular movement can always exist, because from mathematics we cannot efficaciously conclude anything about movement; therefore, Aristotle does not prove the eternity of movement from its being circular; rather, from the fact that a movement is eternal, he shows that it must be circular, because no other movement can be eternal.¹

Reply Obj. 18: This suffices for the reply to the eighteenth objection.

Reply Obj. 19: As the knowable is related to our knowledge, so is God’s knowledge is to creatures. For God’s knowledge is the cause of creatures just as the knowable is also the cause of our knowledge. Therefore, just as a thing can be knowable even without our knowledge existing, as is said in the Categories,¹ so God’s knowledge can exist without the knowable thing having existence.

Reply Obj. 20: God does indeed precede the world by duration, not one of time but of eternity, since God’s existence is not measured by time. Nor was there a real time before the world, but only an imaginary one, inasmuch as now we can imagine an infinite space of time existing alongside eternity and to have been able to have revolved before the beginning of time.

Reply Obj. 21: If the relation of lordship be understood as consequent to the action whereby God actually governs creatures, then God was not Lord from eternity. But if it be understood as consequent on the very power of governing, then it belongs to God from eternity. Nor does it follow that creatures must have existed from eternity, except in potency.

Reply Obj. 22: This is Augustine’s argument to prove that the Son is coeternal and coequal with the Father.¹ But this argument is not applicable to the world. For, since the Son’s nature is the same as the Father’s, it requires an eternity and equality with the Father; otherwise, were this denied him, it would savor of envy. The nature of the creature, however, does not require this, and consequently, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 23: The Greek text reads: the Lord shall reign for age upon age and beyond; and Origen, as quoted by a Gloss,¹ says that by age we are to understand the space of one generation, the limits of which are known to us; by age upon age we are to understand an immense space of time, which has an end, yet it is unknown to us; and that God’s reign will extend even beyond this. Hence, eternity here means the duration of time. Anselm in the Proslogion, however, takes eternity to mean aeviternity, which has no end;² and yet, God is said to reign beyond it because, in the first place, aeviternal things can be thought of as non-existent; second, because they would not exist if God ceased to uphold them, and in this sense, of themselves they do not exist; third, because they do not possess their whole existence at once, but in them there is a certain succession of change.

Reply Obj. 24: That which has a beginning must have a measure of its duration because it begins through movement. But time does not begin thus by creation; therefore, the argument does not follow. However, it may be said that every measure is measured by itself within its own genus; thus, a line is measured by a line, and time by a time.

Reply Obj. 25: Time is not like permanent things, which have their whole substance at once, so that there is no need for the whole of time to exist as soon as it begins to exist. Consequently, nothing prevents saying that time begins in an instant.

Reply Obj. 26: God’s action is eternal, but its effect is not, as we have stated above; hence, though God was not always a cause, since his effect did not always exist, still it does not follow that he was not the cause potentially, since his action always existed, unless we refer the potency to the effect.

Reply Obj. 27: According to the Philosopher, the true is in the mind, not in things, for it is the intellect’s becoming equal to the things.¹ Therefore, whatsoever has existed from eternity has been true by the Truth of the divine intellect, which is eternal.

Reply Obj. 28: Whatsoever things are said to be true from eternity do not vary in their truth, but are true by the one same Truth of the divine intellect, yet with reference to the various things that are going to be in their own proper being; and thus there can be a certain distinction in that truth resulting from their various relations.

Reply Obj. 29: The saying of the Philosopher refers to the speech existing in our intellect, or in our oral statements, since the truth of our intellect or word is caused by the existence of the reality; but conversely, the truth of the divine intellect is the cause of the realities.

Reply Obj. 30: On the part of God, there is no difference between “to make” and “to speak,” for God’s action is not an accident but his substance; nevertheless, “to make” connotes the effect existing in its own proper nature, whereas “to speak” does not.

Reply Obj. 1–3: This suffices for the replies to the first three objections, which follow the lines of the second opinion.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Basil at the beginning of the Hexameron, the lawgiver Moses at the commencement of Genesis began by relating the origin of visible creatures, omitting spiritual creatures who had been created before; the reason for this omission was that he was addressing himself to an uneducated people incapable of grasping spiritual things.¹ Augustine, on the other hand, held that by “the heavens” Moses denoted the spiritual creature, and by “the earth,” the corporeal, when it says: in the beginning God created heaven and earth. And the reason why he expressed the creation of the angels under the metaphor of the heavens and not clearly may be the same as that given above, namely, because the people were uneducated; and also in order to avoid idolatry, to which they were inclined, and of which they would be afforded an occasion if they were told of other spiritual substances besides one God, which would be nobler than the heavens (and all the more, seeing that these very substances were called “gods” by the gentiles). According to Strabo and others before him, “the heavens” in the text quoted signify the empyrean heaven, which is the abode of the holy angels, by the figure of metonymy, as when what contains is given in place of what it contains.²

Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine, the angels’ knowledge of God is not derived from visible creatures;¹ therefore, the visible creature was made so that it might manifest God not to the angels but to the rational creature, which is man; from this, man is shown to be the end of the creatures. Now, the end, though it is first in intention, is the last in execution; therefore, man was made last.

Reply Obj. 6: According to Augustine, the creation of heaven and earth did not precede in duration the formation or production of light; therefore, he does not mean to say that the spiritual nature was created before the first day by a priority of duration, but by a kind of natural order;¹ for the spiritual substance and formless matter, considered in their respective essences, are not subject to the changes of time. Consequently, we cannot infer that the spiritual creature was formed before the corporeal, since even before the formation of light, mention is made of the creation of the corporeal creature, denoted by “the earth.” According to others, the creation of heaven and earth belongs to the first day, because together with them time was created, although the division of time into day and night began with light; hence, time is stated to be one of the four things first created: namely, the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless matter, and time.

Reply Obj. 7: Jerome is expressing himself in accordance with the opinion of the early doctors.

Reply Obj. 8: This argument would avail were each creature brought into being as existing absolutely by itself, for then it would be fitting for each one to be created separately according to the degree of its goodness. Seeing, however, that all creatures are produced as parts of one universe, it was fitting that all should be produced together so as to form one universe.

Reply Obj. 9: Although it would pertain to a certain dignity of the spiritual creature were it created before the visible creature, it would not conduce to the dignity and unity of the universe.

Reply Obj. 10: Although the heart is formed before the other members, there is but one continual generation of the animal’s body, the heart is not formed by a separate generation and the other members afterwards by a succession of generations at various intervals. Moreover, it cannot be said of the creation of the angels and corporeal creatures that they were produced by one formative act, that is, the spiritual creature before the corporeal, as though the universe were produced continuously; for successive production occurs in things produced from matter, in which one part is nearer than another to the final completion. Consequently, there was no place for succession in the first creation of things, although it could obtain in the formation of things from created matter. Therefore, the doctors who held that the angels were created before the world maintained that the creation of the former was entirely distinct from the creation of bodies, and that there was a long interval between. Moreover, there is need for the heart in an animal to be formed first because its activity conduces to the formation of the other members, while no spiritual creature cooperates in the creation of corporeal creatures, since God alone can create. Hence, the Commentator finds fault with Plato for asserting that God first created the angels and then committed to them the creation of corporeal creatures.¹

Reply Obj. 11: Augustine is referring to the making of corporeal creatures as regards not their first creation but their formation.

Reply Obj. 12: If it be maintained that all things were created together in their form and matter, the spiritual creature is said to have known the corporeal creature that was to be made, not because this formation would be future in time, but because it was known as future, insofar as it was contemplated in its cause, wherein it existed as what could proceed from it; for example, one who considers a box in the principles from which it is made may be said to know it as something to be made.

Reply Obj. 13: God’s “speaking” refers to the eternal generation of the divine Word, in whom from eternity was the type of all things to be made. Nor does the frequent repetition in each work of the phrase God said imply that God spoke in time, for although the Word is one in himself, he contains the proper type of every single creature. Accordingly, God’s Word prefaces each work as the proper type of the work to be produced, lest the work being complete, it be necessary to ask why that particular work was done, while it had already been stated before the production of the work, that God spoke; this is just as, when we wish to indicate the cause of a thing, we start from the knowledge of the cause.

Reply Obj. 14: The existence of things in the Word is the cause of their existence in themselves, while the existence of things in the angelic mind is not the cause of their existence in themselves; therefore, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 15: A thing is directed to its end by means of its own activity, while it is not brought into being by its own activity, but only by the activity of its efficient cause. Therefore, it is more fitting that the higher creatures should cooperate with God in bringing things to their end than in their production.

Reply Obj. 16: Although corporeal and spiritual creatures are disparate in regard to their own proper natures, they are connected in regard to the order of the universe. Therefore, it is necessary for them to be created together.

Reply Obj. 17: According to Augustine, these words of Sirach refer to created wisdom abiding in the angelic nature, and he holds that it was created first by priority not of duration but of dignity.¹ According to Hilary, in On Synods, they refer to the uncreated Wisdom, namely, the Son of God,² and it is said to be both created and begotten, as may be gathered from Proverbs 8:22 and various other passages of Scripture, in order to exclude any imperfection from the birth of God’s Son. Thus, “creation” implies an imperfection on the part of the creature insofar as it is brought to being from nothing, but it implies perfection on the part of the Creator, who produces creatures without himself changing. But in “birth” the converse holds, for it implies perfection on the part of the one born, insofar as he receives the nature of the begetter, while it implies an imperfection on the part of the begetter, according to the manner of generation here below, inasmuch as begetting is accompanied by change or division of substance in the begetter. Hence, the Son of God is said to be both created and begotten, in order that creation may exclude change in the begetter and birth exclude imperfection in the begotten, the two combining to give us one perfect idea.

Reply Obj. 18: Hilary’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the early doctors.

Reply Obj. 19: God is the cause of the angelic nature, but the latter is not the cause of the corporeal nature; and thus, there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 20: The angels are said to have been always in existence, not because they existed from eternity, but because they existed from all time; for whenever time was, the angels were. In this sense, corporeal creatures existed always.

Reply Obj. 21: The mover does not of necessity precede in point of time the thing moved, but in dignity, as is clear with the soul and the body.

Reply Obj. 22: In the action of fire on bodies, a twofold order is to be observed, of position and of time. There is order of position in its every action, because all its actions are local, and it exercises its action more fully on the bodies nearest to it; therefore, by spreading forth, its effect is weakened so much that at last it is entirely spent. On the other hand, the order of time is not viewed in its every action, but only in those that it performs by movement. Therefore, as fire illumines and heats bodies, in the heating an order of position and time is preserved, but in illumination, which is not movement but the terminus of a movement, there is only an order of position. Since, then, God’s action in creating is without movement, the comparison is true not as regards order of time but as regards order of position. For in spiritual action the various degrees of nature are the same as the diversity of position in corporeal action. Accordingly, the comparison of Dionysius is verified in this, that as fire pours forth its power more fully on the bodies nearest to it, so too God bestows his goodness more plentifully on things that are nearest to him in the grade of dignity.

Reply Obj. 1: The distinction of two angels does not impede their being in one indivisible place, but the confusion of their activities does; hence, the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2: Even now, nothing prevents angels from not being in a place, if they so will, although they are also always in a place on account of the order by which the spiritual creature presides over the corporeal, as Augustine states.¹

Reply Obj. 3: As Boethius himself explains, angels need bodies only for their ministry, and not for the completion of their nature.

Reply Obj. 4: The angels are in the empyrean heaven as being a place befitting contemplation, not as though contemplation were impossible elsewhere.

Reply Obj. 5: This before and after do not force us to assert that there was real time before the world, but only imaginary time, as we have stated above when discussing the eternity or creation of the world.¹

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of formless matter understood as being devoid of all form; in this case, we must say that its formlessness preceded its formation by an order of nature alone. In the next article, we shall state his view on the order of the formation.

Reply Obj. 2: There are several opinions on this point.

Reply Obj. 3: In the opinion of Basil and other holy men, by a certain formlessness existing in things, at the beginning of things, does not imply that the elements lacked their natural qualities. Rather, each had its form, both substantial and accidental.

Reply Obj. 4: The position of the elements may be considered in two ways.

Reply Obj. 5: With regard to the waters that are above the heavens, there have been various opinions.

Reply Obj. 6: The sixth objection we grant.

Reply Obj. 7: If, according to the exposition of Basil and his followers, we take “the earth” to signify the element of earth itself,¹ we may consider it first as the principle from which certain things originate, like plants, of which it is like a mother (as is said in the book On Vegetables), and with respect to them, it was void before it produced them; for we do say that a thing is void or vain if it fails to attain its proper effect or end.² Second, we may consider it as a certain abode and place of the animals, in respect of which it is said to have been empty.

Reply Obj. 8: It pertains to the liberality of a giver not only that he give quickly, but also that he give ordinately and each gift at a suitable time. Hence, when the text continues, when you can give at present, we must understand the possibility not only of giving absolutely, but also of giving most suitably. Therefore, in order to observe a suitable order, God instituted his creatures at first in a certain imperfection, so that by degrees they might proceed from nothingness to perfection.

Reply Obj. 9: As we have already stated, the position that pertains to the nature of the elements was in the elements; hence, the objection does not avail against this opinion.

Reply Obj. 10–11: The same answer applies to the tenth and eleventh objections.

Reply Obj. 12: A perfect effect belongs to a perfect agent. But this effect need not be simply perfect from the very beginning, according to the mode of its own nature; rather, it will suffice if it be perfect according to that time, in the way in which a child may be described as perfect as soon as it is born.

Reply Obj. 13: According to the view that we are defending at present, matter is not said to have been formless because it lacks all form, or because it had but one form that would be in potency to all forms, (as the ancient naturalists maintained, who asserted that there was only one principle), or a form under which many forms are contained in power (as happens in mixed bodies). Rather, matter had the various elemental forms in its various parts. Nevertheless, matter was said to be formless because the forms of mixed bodies had not yet come to matter, to which forms the forms of the elements were in potency; nor was the position of the elements yet suitable for their generation, as we have already stated.

Reply Obj. 14: Nothing, neither the authority of Genesis in Scripture nor any argument, forces us to say that at the beginning of things matter was subject to the elemental forms in a different way than they are now; however, it was possible that something rose from the waters as vapor to the place of the air, as happens now, and then perhaps in greater volume, seeing that the earth was wholly covered by the waters.

Reply Obj. 15: There are several opinions about the firmament, which was created on the second day.

Reply Obj. 16: This is clear from what has already been said, since the formless condition of matter does not imply that it is devoid of all form, but is to be taken as already explained.

Reply Obj. 17: The opinion of Augustine, who held that the “earth” and “water” previously mentioned signify not the elements but primary matter, is not incompatible with the gathering together of the waters.¹ Thus, he says himself that as the words let a firmament be made indicate the formation of the heavenly bodies on the second day, so the words let the waters be gathered together signify the formation of the lower elements on the third day.² Hence, as the words let the waters be gathered together mean that the water received its form, so the words let the dry land appear denote the same with regard to the earth. The reason for these words being used in the formation of these elements instead of words significant of making, like “let water and earth be made”—as when the heaven was mentioned, for example, let a firmament be made—was in order to indicate the imperfection of these forms and their affinity to formless matter. The expression gathered together is used in connection with water to denote its mobility, and the word appear in connection with the earth to signify its stability. Hence, Augustine says: of the waters it is said ‘Let them be gathered together,’ and of the earth ‘Let it appear,’ because water glides and flows away, whereas the earth abides.³

Reply Obj. 18: Seeing that mineral bodies do not show any evident superiority of excellence over the elements, as living bodies do, they are not described as having been formed apart from the elements; but they can be understood as having been produced at the same time as the elements. Hence, nothing prevents the existence of hollow places before the waters were gathered together, so that the earth could afterwards provide room for the waters to be gathered together in the depressions of its surface. However, the words used by Augustine in his allusion to this view seem to mean that these hollow places did not already exist beneath the surface, but that they were formed on the surface of the earth when the waters were gathered together. For he says the following: by subsiding in all directions, the earth was able to provide these hollow places into which the waters flowing and rushing together were received, and the dry land appeared in those parts that the waters had abandoned.¹ The same view is expressed by Basil in The Hexameron: when the waters were commanded to gather together, a place for their gathering was at once formed, so that by God’s command sufficient place was provided to receive the confluence of the many waters.² It may be that sufficient place was made by depressions in the earth’s surface, since we also see that certain parts are accidentally higher, as is clear with hills and mountains.

Reply Obj. 19: If the hollow places did not already exist, in accordance with what we have said in the last reply, this objection is to no purpose. If, however, they were already in existence, we reply that, although it is contrary to nature for water or air to be situated beneath the earth if this be left to itself, it is not so if the earth be somehow hindered in its movement. For in caverns beneath the earth we find the earth held up by little supports that arise from the floor, along with air, since nature does not allow a vacuum. But if it be contended that the shallow waters spread over the whole surface of the earth were subsequently gathered together into greater depths, as stated above, these objections will cease.

Reply Obj. 20: If we consider the position natural to the elements and befitting their nature absolutely, then it is natural for water to cover the whole earth on all sides just as the air covers the waters. But if we consider the elements in their order to the generation of mixed bodies, in which the heavenly bodies also take an active part, then such position as what was given to them afterwards befits them. Hence, as soon as the dry land appeared in some part of the earth, we are told at once that the plants were produced. That the heavenly bodies should exercise an active influence on the elements is not contrary to nature, as the Commentator says in On the Heavens 3: thus, the ebb and flow of the sea, although it is not the natural movement of water as a heavy body, since it is not towards the center, nevertheless is natural to water as moved by a heavenly body instrumentally.¹ Much more truly may this be said to occur in the elements by the divine ordination, whereby the whole nature of the elements subsists. As regards the point at issue, both would seem to work together in the gathering together of the waters—the divine power principally and the heavenly power secondarily. Hence, immediately after the formation of the firmament, the text refers to the gathering of the waters together. Yet a certain aptitude can be found even from the very nature of water. For in the elements, the container is more formal than the contained, as is clear from the Philosopher in Physics 8;² hence, water fails to be a perfect container of the earth to the degree that it is not perfectly formal, as are fire and air, it more approaching an earthlike consistency than a fire-like rarity.

Reply Obj. 21: The state of confusion ascribed to the world in its beginning is not viewed in reference to a mingling of the elements; rather, it was in reference to a contrast with the present state of things, the various parts of the world being distinct from one another and favorable to the generation and preservation of living beings.

Reply Obj. 22–23: This suffices for the replies to the twenty-second and twenty-third objections.

Reply Sed Contra 1: Gregory’s¹ words express the view that we have already upheld. They do not mean, however, that when things were first created the matter of all things was made devoid of species of form, but without certain forms (namely, those of living things) and the order requisite for their generation, as we have explained above.²

Reply Sed Contra 2: The desire for form is not any action of matter, but a certain orientation of matter to form, insofar as matter is in potency to it, as the Commentator explains regarding Physics 1.¹

Reply Sed Contra 3: Were God to make a being only in potency, he would do less than nature, which makes a being in act. For the perfection of an action is viewed in reference to the terminus to which it tends more than to the terminus from which it originates. Moreover, the very argument involves a contradiction: namely, that anything might come to be that exists only in potency; for what has been made must exist when it exists, as is proved in Physics 6,¹ whereas what exists only in potency does not exist, simply speaking.

Reply Sed Contra 4: If, as Augustine holds, the words of Scripture the earth was void and empty are taken as being about matter utterly devoid of form, we are not to suppose that there was a time when it was actually so, but that its nature was such, if we consider it apart from inherent forms.

Reply Sed Contra 5: The formation of a spiritual creature may be understood in two ways: first, by the infusion of grace; second, by the consummation of glory.

Reply Obj. 1: In the divine works, the order of nature and origin and not that of duration was observed. For formless spiritual and corporeal natures were formed first by priority of nature and origin, and later they were formed. And though both natures were formed at the same time, still, because the spiritual nature is naturally of greater dignity than the corporeal, its formation needed to precede that of the corporeal nature in the order of nature. Again, since an incorruptible corporeal nature is of greater dignity than a corruptible nature, it behooved the former to be formed first in the very order of nature. Therefore, on the first day, the formation of the spiritual nature is signified by the creation of light, whereby the mind of the spiritual creature was illumined through its conversion to the Word. On the second day, the formation of the corporeal nature, heavenly and incorruptible, is signified by the creation of the firmament, which we understand to include the production of all the heavenly bodies and their distinction in respect of their various forms. On the third day, the formation of the corporeal nature of the four elements is signified by the gathering together of the waters and the appearance of the dry land. On the fourth day, the adornment of the heaven is signified by the creation of the luminaries, and this in the order of nature should precede the adornment of the waters and the earth, which took place on the following days. Thus, God’s works were wrought in order indeed, not of duration but of nature.

Reply Obj. 2: The formation of things was not accomplished successively or in diverse parts of time; rather, all these days which the text assigns to God’s works are but one day presented in six distinctions of things, according to which it is numbered, even as the Word, by whom all things were made, is one, namely, the Son of God, and yet we read repeatedly, God said. And just as those works persevere in his subsequent works, which are propagated from them by the agency of nature, so too do those six days continue throughout the succession of time. This may be made clear as follows. The angelic nature itself is intellectual and is properly called “light,” and thus, the enlightening of the angel should be called “day.” Now, the angelic nature, when things were first created, was given the knowledge of these things, so that in a way the light of the angel’s intellect was made present to the things created, insofar as they were known by the light of his mind. Hence, this very knowledge of things, implying that the light of the angelic intellect is made present to the things known, is called “day,” and various days are distinguished and ordered according to the various genera and order of the things known. Thus, the first day is the knowledge of God’s first work in forming the spiritual creature through turning it to the Word. The second day is the knowledge of the second work, whereby the higher corporeal creature was formed by the formation of the firmament. The third day is the knowledge of the third work of the formation of the corporeal creature in respect of the lower part, namely, the earth, water, and neighboring air. The fourth day is the knowledge of the fourth work or the adornment of the higher part of the corporeal creature, that is, of the firmament, by the production of luminaries. The fifth day is the knowledge of the fifth divine work, whereby the air and water were adorned by the creation of birds and fishes. The sixth day is the knowledge of God’s sixth work, namely, of the adornment of the earth by the production of terrestrial animals. The seventh day is the angelic knowledge as referred to the Maker’s rest in that he rested in himself from the production of new works.

Reply Obj. 3: The statement that light properly speaking is not in spiritual things is untrue. For Augustine says that in spiritual things the light is better and more certain,¹ and that Christ is not called “light” the way he is called “stone,” for the former is said properly, the latter metaphorically. The reason is that all that is made manifest is light (Eph 5:13), and manifestation belongs more properly to spiritual than to corporeal things. Hence, in On the Divine Names, ch. 4, Dionysius numbers “light” among the intelligible names of God, and intelligible names are said properly of spiritual things.² In proof of the opposite statement, it is said that the name “light” was first employed to signify the cause of manifestation to the sense of sight, and in this way, light is a quality sensible through itself, and is not said properly in spiritual things. It has later been extended by common use so as to signify anything that causes a manifestation in any kind of knowledge, and so it is in the common usage of speech; and in this way, light is said more properly in spiritual things.

Reply Obj. 4: As we have stated above, these days are differentiated not in respect of succession in knowledge, but according to the natural order of the things known. Hence, Augustine holds that these seven days are one day presented by things in seven ways.¹ Consequently, the order of the days should be referred to the natural order of the works, which are assigned to days insofar as they are known by the light of the angelic mind together in the Word.

Reply Obj. 5: The six days wherein God is said to have created the heaven, the earth, the sea, and all that are in them do not signify a succession of time, but the angelic knowledge as related to six genera of things created by God, while the seventh day is the angel’s knowledge itself as related to the rest of the Maker. For in Augustine’s opinion, God is said to have rested on the seventh day inasmuch as he revealed to the angelic mind his own proper rest, that whereby he rests in his very self from the things created, whereby he is blessed, in no need of creatures, being all-sufficient to himself, and this knowledge Augustine calls “day.”¹ And God is said to have rested from work on the seventh day because afterwards he did nothing new that did not in some way already exist, either materially or causally or in respect of some specific or generic likeness in the works of the six days.

Reply Obj. 6: Every new work of God, as referred to the angelic knowledge, is called a “day,” and as there were only six kinds of things created in the beginning by God and made known to the angelic intellect, as stated above, so are there but six days, to which the seventh is added, namely, the same angelic knowledge as referred to God’s rest in himself. For God produced nothing in nature without first, in the order of nature, making it known to the angel’s mind.

Reply Obj. 7: The solution is clear from what has been said, because these days are not differentiated in relation to a difference in the angelic knowledge, but by the different primordial works as referred to that knowledge; and thus, those first days are distinct in reference to different works and not in reference to different knowledges. Hence, these six days are distinct according as the light of the angelic mind is shed on the six kinds of things made known to it.

Reply Obj. 8: According to Augustine, these three denote a threefold being of things.

Reply Obj. 9: An angel is unable primarily and principally to understand several things in their own natures; but he is well able to understand several things in a consequent way, insofar as they have an order to one intelligible thing. And because all things that were produced in their own proper nature were, by the order of nature, first impressed according to their own likenesses on the angelic mind, the angel, by knowing himself, at the same time in a way knows those six kinds of realities, which hold a natural order among themselves; for by knowing himself, he knows whatsoever has being in himself.

Reply Obj. 10: One power can exercise two activities at the same time, if one of these is referred and ordered to the other; and it is evident that the will at the same time wills the end and the means, and the intellect at the same time understands the principles and the conclusions through the principles when he has acquired knowledge. Now, the angels’ evening knowledge is referred to their morning knowledge, according to Augustine, just as natural knowledge and love are ordered to the knowledge and love belonging to glory.¹

Reply Obj. 11: Just as, in the opinion of Augustine, the formlessness of matter preceded its formation not in time but in order, as sound and voice precede the song, so the formation of the spiritual nature (signified in the creation of light), since this is of greater dignity than the corporeal nature, preceded the formation of the latter in the order of nature and origin, but not in the order of time.¹ Now, the formation of the spiritual nature consists in its being enlightened so as to adhere to the Word, not indeed by perfect glory, with which it was not created, but by perfect grace, with which it was created. Accordingly, by this light the distinction was made from darkness, that is, from the formless condition of the corporeal creature as yet unformed but, in the order of nature, to be formed afterwards.

Reply Obj. 12: If we suppose that all things were created at the same time as to both matter and form, then the angel is said to have knowledge of the future creation of the corporeal creature, not because the corporeal creature was future in time but because it was known as future, inasmuch as it was considered in its cause, wherein it existed already as something that could issue therefrom. This is as he who knows a chest in the materials of which it is made may be said to know the chest as a future thing. For the knowledge of things in the Word is called “morning knowledge” whether the thing is already made or is going to be made, and it refers indifferently to present or future things, since it is conformed to the divine knowledge whereby God knows all things simply speaking before they come to be as well as after they have been made.

Reply Obj. 13: Just as morning precedes evening, so the morning knowledge precedes the evening knowledge in the order of nature, not as regards one and the same work but as regards different works. But the evening knowledge of a prior work is understood to be prior by order of nature to morning knowledge of a later. For the work of the first day was the creation of light, whereby we understand the formation of the angelic nature by the enlightenment of grace, while the knowledge whereby the spiritual creature naturally knows his very self follows on its being in its own proper nature. Hence, in the order of nature, the spiritual creature knew himself in his own proper nature by evening knowledge, whereby he knew himself as already created, before he knew himself in the Word, in whom he knew God’s work as something yet to be done.

Reply Obj. 14: Augustine gives the name “morning knowledge” to that which is in full light, so it includes midday knowledge; in fact, he sometimes calls it “day knowledge,” and sometimes “morning knowledge.” Or it may be said that all knowledge of the angelic intellect has a mixture of darkness on the part of the knower, so no knowledge of any angelic intellect can be called “midday knowledge,” but only that knowledge whereby God knows all things in his very self. Again, since God is full light and no darkness is in him, the knowledge of God himself in himself and absolutely, being full light, may be called “midday knowledge”; but because a creature, being made from nothing, has the darkness of possibility and imperfection, the very knowledge of a creature is mixed with darkness. And this mixture is signified by “morning” and “evening,” insofar as the creature itself can be known in two ways: in the Word, insofar as the creature issues from the divine art—and thus, the knowledge thereof is called “morning knowledge” because as morning is the end of darkness and the beginning of light, so the creature after darkness (namely, after nonexistence) receives a beginning of light from the Word itself. For the creature is knowable as existing in its own proper nature through the created species, and such knowledge is called “evening knowledge,” since as evening is the end of light and tends into night, so the creature subsisting in itself is the end of the activity of the Word, who is light, as made by him, and insofar as of itself it tends to the darkness of non-existence unless it were upheld by the Word.

Reply Obj. 15: Although created in grace, the angel was not beatified from the very beginning of his creation, nor did he see God’s Word by its essence; therefore, neither had he morning knowledge of his own self, which signifies knowledge of a thing through the species of the Word. Rather, at first he had evening knowledge of his own self, inasmuch as he knew himself in himself naturally, because in each thing natural knowledge precedes supernatural knowledge as the latter’s foundation, and an angel’s knowledge naturally follows his being in his own proper nature; therefore, when he was first created, he had not morning but evening knowledge of himself. But this knowledge he referred to the praise of the Word, and by so doing he merited coming to morning knowledge.

Reply Obj. 16: As we have already explained, it is possible to know a thing already made as something to be made, if it be considered in the causes whence it issues; and thus, the angels received knowledge in the Word of things to be made, for the Word is the supreme art of things. For all knowledge of a thing in the Word, which is called “morning,” is said to be of a thing as something to be made, whether or not the thing has already been made, inasmuch as “to be made” indicates not time but the issue of the creature from the Creator, as stated above.¹ Therefore, though the corporeal creature was made at the same time as the spiritual nature, the angel is said, by morning knowledge, to know in the Word the thing as something to be made. Why the first day had no morning but only evening has been explained in the previous reply.

Reply Obj. 17: The spiritual creature does not derive his knowledge from things; rather, he understands them naturally through innate or concreated species. Now, the species in an angel’s mind do not equally refer to the present and the future. For those things that are present are actually like forms that are in the angels, and thus by those forms present things can be known, whereas things that are future are not yet actually like those forms; therefore, by those forms future things cannot be known, since knowledge is effected by an actual assimilation of the knower and the known.

Reply Obj. 18: Although the angel has being in the Word before he has being in his own nature, nevertheless, seeing that knowledge presupposes the existence of the knower, he could not know himself before he existed. Now, his knowledge of himself in his own nature is natural to him, whereas his knowledge of the Word is supernatural. Hence, it behooved him to know himself first in his own nature, before knowing himself in the Word, because in everyone, natural knowledge precedes supernatural as its foundation. Other things, however, by his morning knowledge he knew in the Word by a priority of the natural order before knowing them in their respective natures by his evening knowledge; whence in respect of the subsequent works morning preceded evening, as already stated.

Reply Obj. 19: As one total science embraces under itself various particular sciences by which various conclusions are known, so also the one angelic knowledge itself, which is, as it were, a certain whole, embraces under itself morning and evening knowledge as its parts, just as morning and evening are parts of the day, albeit of diverse accounts. For things that are of diverse accounts, if ordered to each other, can constitute something one; thus, matter and form, which are of diverse accounts, constitute one composite, and flesh, bones, and sinews are parts of one composite. Now, the divine essence, whereby things are known in the Word by morning knowledge, is the type of all the concreated forms in the angelic mind, seeing that these derive from it as from their exemplar, and through them things are known in their own nature by evening knowledge; this is just as even the angel’s essence is the type by which he understands the being that he knows; yet, it is not a perfect type, for which reason he needs other superadded forms.

Reply Obj. 20: Because the intellect is the place of the intelligible species, it follows that the science that implies the order of intelligible species, or some skill and ability of the intellect for using those species, must remain after death, as does the intellect itself, the subject of those species. On the other hand, the mode in which it actually uses such species in the present state of life, namely, by turning to phantasms that are within the sensitive powers, will not remain after death; for, seeing that the sensitive powers are destroyed, the soul will be unable, either by the species acquired here or by the species impressed on it in its very separation, to understand by turning to phantasms, but it will be able to understand by a mode congruent with it according to the mode of being that it will have like the angels. Hence, knowledge will be destroyed not as to the habit nor as to the substance of the cognitive act that is specified by the species of the object, but as to the mode of knowing, which will not be by turning to the phantasms; and this is the meaning intended by the Apostle.

Reply Obj. 21: The light caused in the air by the sun and that produced by a candle are of the same account, and seeing that two forms of the same account cannot coexist in a perfect act in the same subject, it follows that sun and candle together produce one light in the air, not two. Now, the divine essence, whereby things are known in the Word, differs in account from the species whereby an angel knows things in their proper natures; therefore, the comparison fails. For when perfection is present, the opposite imperfection is made void, just as at the presence of the vision of God, faith, which is of things unseen, is made void. But the imperfection of evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of morning knowledge, since knowledge of a thing in its very self is not opposed to knowledge of it in its cause; nor again does it involve a contradiction that a thing be known through two media, one of which is more perfect than the other, just as we may hold the same conclusion by a demonstrative medium and a dialectical medium.

Reply Obj. 22: Augustine holds that, at the very beginning of creation, certain things distinct through their own species were produced in their proper nature, such as the four elements, which were produced from nothing, as well as the heavenly bodies and spiritual substances.¹ For this kind of production requires no matter, either out of which or in which a thing is made. Also, the other things are stated to have been created only in seedlike principles (for example, animals, plants, and men), all of which were subsequently produced in their proper natures in that work by which God, after the six days, attends to nature previously established, of which work it is said: my Father works until now (John 5:17). Moreover, he holds that in the production and distinction of things we should see an order not of time but of nature. For all the works of the six days were wrought simultaneously in the one instant of time, either actually or potentially in their causal principles, in that afterwards they could come to be from preexistent matter, either by the Word or by the active powers impressed on the creature at its very creation.

Reply Obj. 23: The reply is clear from what has been said. For the human body was not brought into actual existence in those six days, just as neither were the bodies of other animals, but only as regards causal principles, since God, in the very creation of the elements, implanted in them a power, that is, certain principles, such that animals could be produced by the power of either God, or the stars, or seeds. Accordingly, those things that were actually produced in those six days were created not successively but at the same time, and the others were brought into existence at the same time according to their seedlike principles in their like.

Reply Obj. 24: As was said in the reply to the sixteenth objection, knowledge of things through implanted species and proportionate to the things is called “evening knowledge,” and is of things in their proper nature, whether already made or yet to be made.

Reply Obj. 25: In Augustine’s opinion, the angels from the very beginning saw in the Word the things to be made.¹ For the things which, we are told, were made in the works of the six days were all made at the same time; therefore, those six days were all right away from the very outset of the creation of things, and consequently, the good angels must have known the Word and creatures in the Word from the very beginning. For created realities have a threefold being, as already stated.

Reply Obj. 26: It is not possible that an angel see the Word or divine essence as the type of things to be made without also seeing it as the end of the blessed and the object of beatitude; for the divine essence in itself is the object of beatitude and the end of the blessed. But it is not possible to see the divine essence as the type of things to be made and not see it in itself; therefore, the whole argument is granted.

Reply Obj. 27: Some with the object of distinguishing between prophetic knowledge and the knowledge of the blessed contended that the prophets see the divine essence itself, which they call the mirror of eternity, not however in the way in which it is the object of the blessed and the end of the beatitude, but as the type of things to be done, inasmuch as it contains the types of future events, as stated in the argument.

Reply Obj. 28: In Augustine’s opinion, the words let the earth bring forth the green herb do not signify that plants were actually produced then and in their own nature, but that the earth then received a certain seedbearing power to produce plants by the work of propagation; thus, we may understand that the earth did then bring forth the green herb and the tree yielding fruit, in the sense that then it received the power to bring them forth. This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture where we read: these are the generations of the heaven and the earth when they were created in the day that the Lord God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew (Gen 2:4).

Reply Obj. 29: It belongs to the wisdom of an artificer whose works, like God’s, are all perfect to make neither the whole separate from its chief part, nor the parts separate from the whole; for neither the whole separate from the chief part nor the parts separate from the whole have perfect being. Since, then, the angels in their own species, together with the heavenly bodies and the four elements, are the chief parts constituting the one universe—inasmuch as they have an order to one another and serve each other—it follows that it belongs to God’s wisdom to produce the whole universe, together with all its parts, at the same time and not by degrees. For of one whole together with all its parts there should be but one production, and one is not produced before the other except due to a defect in the agent. Now, God has infinite power without any weakness, and the whole universe is his principal effect. Therefore, he created by one single productive act the whole universe together with all its principal parts.

Reply Obj. 30: The luminaries were produced in act, and not merely in power, as the plants were; for the firmament has no power productive of luminaries, as the earth has power enabling it to bring forth plants. Hence, Scripture does not say: “let the firmament produce lights,” as it says: let the earth bring forth the green herb, that is, let it receive the power to produce them. Therefore, the luminaries were actually produced before the plants were actually produced, although the latter were produced in power and causally before the luminaries were produced actually.

Reply Obj. 31: According to Augustine, the earth and water mentioned at the beginning before the creation of the firmament do not signify the elements of earth and water, but formless prime matter devoid of all species.¹ For Moses, seeing that he was addressing an uneducated people, could not mention prime matter except under the guise of things known to them and most akin to formlessness through having more of matter and less of form. For this reason, he expresses it by combining a twofold likeness, and instead of calling it “earth” only or “water” only, he calls it “earth and water,” lest if he mentioned only one of these, it might be thought that prime matter was really that and nothing else. Yet, it bears a certain likeness to earth inasmuch as it supports and underlies forms, as earth supports plants and other things. Again, earth of all the elements has the least of species, being a more solid element and having much of matter, and having little of form. It also bears a likeness to water in that it has a natural aptitude for receiving various forms, for liquid (which belongs to water) is very receptive and susceptible to boundaries.

Reply Obj. 32: Augustine holds that it was not fitting for Moses to omit the production of the spiritual creature, so he contends that in the words in the beginning God created heaven and earth, heaven signifies the spiritual creature as yet unformed, and earth, formless corporeal matter.¹ And seeing that the spiritual nature is more worthy than the corporeal, it behooved it to receive its formation first. Accordingly, the formation of the spiritual nature is signified in the creation of light, which denotes spiritual light, because the formation of a spiritual nature consists in its being enlightened so as to adhere to the Word of God, not indeed by perfect glory, in which it was not created, but by that which is conferred with the light of grace, in which it was created. And this spiritual light preceded the firmament in the order of nature.

Reply Obj. 33: The order of the production of these animals, since they belong to the adornment of the parts of the universe, depends on the order of the parts they adorn rather than on their own proper dignity. Now, air and water, which are adorned by fishes and birds, are prior and more dignified in the order of nature than earth, which is adorned by the animals that walk on its surface; therefore, it behooved the production of flying creatures and of fishes or swimming creatures to be described before that of the creatures that walk. It might also be said that, in the process of generation, perfection follows imperfection, and is ordered in such wise that the more imperfect things are produced first in the order of nature, because this process requires that the more perfect a thing is and the greater its likeness to the active cause, the later its production in point of time, although in the order of nature and dignity it is prior. For this reason, since man is the most perfect of all animals, it behooved him to be made after all the others and not immediately after the heavenly bodies, which are not ordered with the lower bodies in the order of generation, since they have no matter in common with them, but rather have a matter of a different account.

Reply Obj. 34: Birds and fishes, as regards the matter from which they are produced, have more in common with each other than with terrestrial animals. For fishes and birds are said to be composed of water: the former as regards that which is, in water itself, the more dense, the latter as regards that which is more subtle in it, that is resolved into vapor, as though a mean between air and water; thus, the birds arose into the air while the fishes sank into the deep. Now, animals are assigned to various days or to one day according as their bodies are produced from different matters or from the same matter. Since, then, fishes and birds are said to be produced from the waters inasmuch as, considering their respective constitutions in comparison with the constitution peculiar to the common genus, they have more water in their composition than other animals have, while other animals are said to have been produced from the earth; therefore, one day is assigned to the production of fishes and birds and another day to the production of the terrestrial animals. Moreover, the production of animals is related solely with respect to their being intended for the adornment of parts of the world; therefore, the days on which the animals were produced are distinguished solely with respect to their likeness or difference in the point of adorning some part of the world. As to fire and air, seeing that the common people do not regard them as parts of the world, Moses does not mention them expressly, but comprises them with the intermediate element, namely water, especially as regards the lower parts of the air. Consequently, one day is assigned to the birds and fishes, which adorn the water and the air, as to its lower part, which is akin to water, while one other day is assigned to all the terrestrial animals, which pertain to the adornment of the earth.

Reply Sed Contra 1: On the day when God created heaven and earth—namely, the heavenly bodies and the four elements with their substantial forms—he also created every plant of the field, not actually or before it sprang up from the earth, but potentially so that afterwards on the third day it was produced into actual existence.

Reply Sed Contra 2: According to Gregory, when God created the angel, he created man also, not actually or in himself but potentially or in his likeness, insofar as he is like the angels in regard to his intellect.¹ But afterwards, on the sixth day, man was produced actually and in himself.

Reply Sed Contra 3: The disposition of a thing that is already complete is not the same as its disposition while yet in the coming to be; therefore, although the nature of a perfect and complete world requires that all the essential parts of the universe exist together, it could be otherwise when the world was as yet in its beginning; for example, in a complete man there cannot be a heart without his other parts, yet in the formation of the embryo, the heart is fashioned before any other part. Or it may be replied that in this beginning of things, the heavenly bodies and all the elements with their substantial forms were produced together with the angels, all of which are principal parts of the universe, and that on the following days, something was accomplished within the nature already created, and pertaining to the perfection and adornment of the parts already produced.

Reply Sed Contra 4: Although the Greek doctors maintained that the spiritual creature was created before the corporeal, the Latin doctors held that the angels were created at the same time as the corporeal nature, so as to ensure the simultaneous production of the universe in respect of its principal parts. For, seeing that corporeal creatures are one in created matter, and that the matter of corporeal creatures was created at the same time as the angels, it may be said that all things were in a sense created at the same time, either actually or potentially. Now, angels have no matter in common with the corporeal creature; therefore, when the angels were created, corporeal nature would nowise have been created, and consequently, neither the universe itself; therefore, it is reasonable that they should be created together with the corporeal nature. Accordingly, all corporeal things were created at the same time, not actually but in respect of matter in some way formless; and afterwards, by degrees they were brought into actual existence by the distinction and adornment of the already existing creature.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Just as a creature has no being of itself, so neither has it perfection otherwise than from God; therefore, just as to indicate that the creature has being from God and not of itself, it was his will that it should come into existence after non-existence, so too, to indicate that the creature does not have perfection of itself, it was God’s will that it should be at first imperfect, and afterwards, by degrees be perfected by the work of distinction and adornment. Or it may be replied that it behooved the creation of things to show forth not only the might of God’s power, but also the order of his wisdom, so that things having precedence in nature have priority of production; therefore, it was not due to inability on the part of God, as though he needed time for his works, that all things were not produced, distinguished, and adorned at the same time, but rather it was so that the order of wisdom might be observed in the institution of things. Therefore, it was fitting that different days should be assigned to the different states of the world. For after the work of creation, the following work always added a new state of perfection to the world; therefore, in order to indicate this perfection and newness of state, it was God’s will that one day should correspond to each distinction and adornment, and not because he was weak or tired.