1. There are certain precepts for treating the Scriptures which, as I see it, can be handed on to those who study them without disadvantage, so that they may make progress not only by reading others who have opened up what is hidden in the divine writings, but also by themselves opening it up to others. I have undertaken to hand these on to those who are willing and able to learn, if our Lord and God does not deny me, as I write, what he is accustomed to suggest to me when I think about this subject.

Before I begin, however, it seems to me that I should reply to those who are going to find fault with this work, or who would find fault with it if I did not first appease them. And if some still find fault even after this, at least they will not influence others or call them back from a useful pursuit to the sloth of ignorance—others whom they could have influenced had they not found them forewarned and prepared.

2. For some will find fault with this work of ours because they do not understand the things we are going to teach. Others, however, when they have wished to make use of what they have understood and have tried to treat the divine Scriptures according to these precepts but have not been able to open up and explain what they desire, will think that I have labored in vain; and because they themselves are not helped by this work, they will judge that no one can be helped by it.

There is a third kind of critic: those who either treat the divine Scriptures well in truth or think that they treat them well. Since, without having read any observations of the kind I have now undertaken to hand on, they either see or suppose that they have attained the ability to expound the holy books, they will cry out that these precepts are necessary for no one, but rather that everything which is praiseworthily opened up out of the obscurities of those writings can come about by a divine gift.

3. Replying briefly to all of these, to those who do not understand what we write I say this: that I am not to be blamed because they do not understand these things. It is as though they wished to see the moon, whether old or new, or some star that is hardly bright, which I pointed out with outstretched finger, and the keenness of their eyes was not even sufficient to see my finger itself; they ought not on that account to be angry with me. As for those who, even when these precepts have been known and grasped, are still unable to discern what is obscure in the divine Scriptures, let them suppose that they can indeed see my finger, but cannot see the stars it is stretched out to point to. Let both these and those, then, cease to find fault with me, and let them pray that the light of their eyes may be granted them from above. For even if I can move my limb to point something out, I cannot also kindle the eyes by which either my very pointing or even the thing I wish to point out may be perceived.

4. As for those who exult in a divine gift and boast that, without precepts of the kind I have now undertaken to hand on, they understand and treat the holy books, and who therefore think that I have wished to write what is superfluous—their agitation must be soothed in this way: that, although they rightly rejoice in a great gift of God, they should nevertheless remember that they too learned even their letters through human beings,

and that they ought not on that account to be sneered at by the holy and perfect Egyptian monk Antony, Antony was the first, or almost the first, hermit in the Egyptian desert. He died in 356 at the age of 105, two years after Augustine was born. Saint Athanasius, whom he had supported with his immense prestige in his life-long battle against the Arians, wrote his life. who is reported, without any knowledge of letters, both to have held the divine Scriptures in memory by hearing them and to have understood them by prudent reflection; or by that Christian barbarian slave, about whom we have recently heard from most weighty men, most worthy of belief, (Two manuscripts give his name as Macarius)

who received the knowledge of letters themselves, with no human being teaching him, by praying that they might be revealed to him, obtaining it by three days of prayer, so that he could even read through a manuscript handed to him, as those present looked on in amazement.

5. Or if anyone thinks these things are false, I will not contend stubbornly. For surely, since we are dealing with Christians who rejoice that they know the holy Scriptures without any human guide and who, if that is so, rejoice in a true and no slight good, they must necessarily grant that each one of us learned his own tongue from the very beginning of childhood by the habit of hearing it, and acquired some other tongue—Greek or Hebrew or any of the rest—either likewise by hearing or through a human teacher.

Now then, if it please them, let us advise all the brethren not to teach their little ones these things, since in a single moment of time the apostles, filled with the coming of the Holy Spirit, spoke in the tongues of all nations; (See Acts 2:1–4. It is as well, perhaps, to point out that he is being sarcastic) or else let anyone to whom such things have not happened not think himself a Christian, or let him doubt that he has received the Holy Spirit.

On the contrary, let a person learn without pride even what must be learned through another human being; and let the one through whom another is taught hand on without pride and without envy what he has received. For the linking of these two vices in a pair, see Sermon 399.7, where he calls pride the mother of envy. See note 13 there for other references. Let us not tempt the one in whom we have come to believe, (See Matt 4:7; Deut 16:16) lest, deceived by such cunning and perversity of the enemy, we become unwilling even to go to the churches to hear and learn the Gospel itself, or to read the manuscript, or to listen to a person reading and preaching, and instead wait to be caught up even to the third heaven, whether in the body or out of the body, as the Apostle says, and there to hear unspeakable words that are not lawful for a man to utter, or there to see the Lord Jesus Christ and to hear the Gospel from him rather than from human beings.

6. Let us beware of such most proud and most dangerous temptations, and let us rather consider that even the apostle Paul himself, although laid low and instructed by a divine and heavenly voice, was nevertheless sent to a man so that he might receive the sacraments and be joined to the Church; (See Acts 9:3–19) and that the centurion Cornelius, although an angel announced to him that his prayers had been heard and his almsgiving regarded, was nevertheless handed over to Peter to be instructed, through whom he might not only receive the sacraments but also hear what was to be believed, what to be hoped for, and what to be loved. (See Acts 10:1–6) And all this could certainly have been done through an angel, but the human condition would have been debased if God had seemed unwilling to minister his word to human beings through human beings.

For how would what was said be true—for the temple of God is holy, which you are—if God gave his responses from a human temple Temples very commonly housed oracles in the pagan world; and the same had been true of Israelite shrines, including the temple in Jerusalem. and yet wished everything that human beings must learn to be handed on from heaven and to resound through angels? Then, too, love itself, which binds human beings to one another in the knot of unity, would have no avenue for pouring minds together and, as it were, mingling them with one another, if human beings learned nothing through human beings.

7. And surely, in the case of that eunuch who was reading the prophet Isaiah and did not understand him, the Apostle neither sent him to an angel nor had what he did not understand explained to him through an angel, nor was it revealed to him from above in his mind without the ministry of a human being. Rather, by divine prompting Philip was sent to him—Philip, who knew the prophet Isaiah—and he sat with him and opened up in human words and language what was hidden in that Scripture. (See Acts 8:27–35)

Did not God speak with Moses, and yet Moses received counsel for ruling and administering so great a people from his father-in-law—a foreigner, that is—being most provident and least proud? (See Exod 18:13–26) For that man knew that, from whatever soul true counsel might proceed, it was to be attributed not to that soul but to him who is the truth, the unchangeable God. (See John 14:6)

8. Finally, whoever boasts that, instructed by no precepts, he understands by a divine gift whatever is obscure in the Scriptures, believes well indeed, and it is true, that this ability of his does not, as it were, exist from himself but has been given from above; for in this way he seeks the glory of God and not his own.

But when he reads and understands with no human being expounding to him, why does he himself aspire to expound to others, and not rather send them back to God, so that they too may understand not through a human being but with him teaching within? But no doubt he is afraid that he may hear from the Lord: You wicked servant, you should have given my money to the bankers.

Just as these people, then, disclose to others what they understand, whether by speaking or by writing, so I too, if I disclose not only the things I understand but also the things to be observed in understanding them, ought certainly not to be blamed by them. And yet no one ought to have anything as though it were his very own, except perhaps a lie. For everything true is from him who says: I am the truth. For what do we have that we have not received? But if we have received it, why do we boast as though we had not received it? (See 1 Cor 4:7)

9. Whoever reads aloud to listeners certainly pronounces the letters that he recognizes; but whoever teaches the letters themselves does so that others too may know how to read; yet each of them passes on what he has received.

So too, whoever expounds to listeners what he understands in the Scriptures pronounces, as it were, the letters he recognizes, performing the office of a reader. But whoever teaches how it is to be understood is like one who hands on the letters—that is, who teaches how to read;

so that, just as the one who knows how to read does not need another reader, when he has found a manuscript, to hear from him what is written there, so the one who has received the precepts we are trying to hand on, when he has found something obscure in the books, holds certain rules as though they were letters and does not require another interpreter through whom what is hidden may be uncovered for him, but, having traced out certain clues, arrives by himself at the hidden meaning without any error, or at least does not fall into the absurdity of a perverse opinion.

Therefore, although it can be sufficiently apparent in the work itself that no one rightly contradicts this dutiful labor of ours, nevertheless, if it seems fitting that an answer be given in a prologue of this kind to any who may object, such is the beginning that has occurred to us for this path that we wish to enter upon in this book.

1. 1. There are two things on which all treatment of the Scriptures rests: the way of discovering what is to be understood, and the way of presenting what has been understood. We shall discuss discovery first, presentation afterward. The way of discovery in books 1–3; the way of putting our discoveries across—that is to say, the art of preaching—in book 4. This makes it clear from the start that when he completed the work thirty years later, he did not depart in the least from his original plan.

It is a great and arduous work, and if it is difficult to sustain, I fear it may be rash to undertake—so indeed it would be if we were presuming upon ourselves. But as it is, since the hope of carrying through this work lies in him from whom we already hold much that has been handed to us in our thinking about this matter, there is no need to fear that he will cease to give the rest, once we have begun to spend what has been given.

For everything that is not diminished by being given is not yet possessed as it ought to be possessed, so long as it is kept and not given. For he says: To one who has, it will be given. He will give, then, to those who have—that is, to those who use with kindness what they have received; he will fill up and heap high what he has given.

Those five loaves, and those seven, were loaves before they began to be given to the hungry; and once that began to happen, they filled baskets and hampers when so many thousands of people had been satisfied. (See Mark 6:34–44, 8:1–9) Just as that bread increased while it was being broken, so the things that the Lord has already provided for undertaking this work will, once they have begun to be dispensed, be multiplied at his very prompting, so that in this ministry of ours we may not only suffer no lack, but rejoice in a wonderful abundance.

2. 2. All teaching is either of things or of signs, but things are learned through signs. Properly, however, I have here called things those which are not employed to signify something—such as wood, stone, cattle, and other things of this kind; but not that wood which we read Moses cast into the bitter waters so that they might lose their bitterness, nor that stone which Jacob had placed at his head, nor that beast which Abraham offered up in place of his son. See Exod 15:23–25; Gen 28:11–19, 22:9–14. The wood thrown into the water was a sign of the Cross healing the world; the stone Jacob rested on, and set up and anointed, was a sign of Christ the cornerstone; the ram Abraham saw caught in the thorn bush and sacrificed in place of Isaac was, like Isaac, a sign of Christ sacrificed on the Cross. For these are things in such a way that they are also signs of other things. But there are other signs whose whole use is in signifying, such as words. For no one uses words except for the sake of signifying something.

From this it is understood what I call signs: namely, those things which are employed to signify something. For this reason every sign is also some thing, since what is no thing is altogether nothing. But not every thing is also a sign. And so, in this division of things and signs, when we speak of things, we shall speak in such a way that, even if some of them can be employed to signify, this will not impede the arrangement by which we discuss things first and signs afterward; and let us hold firmly in mind that what is now to be considered in things is what they are, not what else, besides themselves, they may also signify.

3. 3. Some things, then, are to be enjoyed, others to be used, and others that both enjoy and use. Those which are to be enjoyed make us happy; by those which are to be used we are helped and, as it were, supported as we strive toward happiness, so that we may attain and cling to those things which make us happy.

But we ourselves, who both enjoy and use, are set between the two; and if we wish to enjoy the things that are to be used, our course is impeded and sometimes even diverted, so that we are either delayed or even called back from obtaining the things that are to be enjoyed, held back by love of lower things.

4. 4. For to enjoy is to cling with love to something for its own sake. To use, however, is to refer what has come into use to obtaining what you love, provided that it is something to be loved. For an illicit use should rather be called abuse or misuse.

How, then, if we were travelers in a foreign land who could not live happily except in our homeland, and being wretched in that wandering and longing to put an end to our wretchedness, we wished to return to our homeland, we would need vehicles, whether by land or by sea, which we would have to use so that we might be able to reach the homeland, which was to be enjoyed;

but if the pleasantness of the journey and the very riding in the vehicles delighted us, and we turned to enjoying the things we ought to have used, we would be unwilling to finish the journey quickly, and, entangled in a perverse sweetness, we would be estranged from the homeland whose sweetness would make us happy:

so, traveling in this life of mortality away from the Lord, if we wish to return to the homeland where we can be happy, we must use this world, not enjoy it, so that the invisible things of God may be seen and understood through the things that have been made—that is, so that from corporeal and temporal things we may grasp things eternal and spiritual.

5. 5. The things, therefore, that are to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the same Trinity—one supreme thing, common to all who enjoy it; if indeed it is a thing and not the cause of all things, if indeed it is even a cause. For a name that befits such great excellence cannot easily be found, except that this Trinity is better called the one God from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things. Thus the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and each one of these, is God; and all together are one God; and each one of these is a full substance, and all together are one substance.

The Father is neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit; the Son is neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son; but the Father is only the Father, the Son only the Son, and the Holy Spirit only the Holy Spirit. The three have the same eternity, the same unchangeableness, the same majesty, the same power. In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality. And these three are all one because of the Father, all equal because of the Son, all bound together because of the Holy Spirit.

6. 6. Have we said anything, have we sounded anything worthy of God? Indeed, I feel that I have wished to do nothing but speak; yet if I have spoken, it is not what I wished to say. How do I know this, except because God is ineffable; but what has been said by me, if it were ineffable, would not have been said?

And for this reason God is not even to be called ineffable, because when this too is said, something is said. And a kind of contradiction in words arises, since if that is ineffable which cannot be spoken, then what can be called even "ineffable" is not ineffable. This contradiction in words is rather to be avoided by silence than resolved by speech.

And yet God, although nothing can be said of him worthily, has accepted the homage of the human voice, and has willed us to rejoice in his praise by means of our words. For this is why he is called God. For he is not in truth recognized in the noise of these two syllables, but nevertheless, when that sound has touched their ears, it moves all who know the Latin language Of course, Augustine says the Latin language, and talks of the two syllables of the word Deus. to think of a certain most excellent and immortal nature.

7. 7. For when that one God of gods is thought of—even by those who both suspect and call upon and worship other gods, whether in heaven or on earth—he is thought of in such a way that the thought tries to reach something than which nothing is better or more sublime.

To be sure, since they are moved by different goods—some by those that pertain to the senses of the body, some by those that pertain to the understanding of the mind—those who are given over to the senses of the body suppose that either the sky itself, or what they see most brilliant in the sky, or the world itself, is the God of gods.

Or, if they strive to go beyond the world, they imagine something luminous and, by an empty supposition, set it up as either infinite or in whatever shape seems best; or they think of the figure of a human body, if they prefer it to the rest.

But if they do not think there is one God of gods, but rather many or innumerable gods of equal rank, even these too they hold fashioned in their mind according to whatever bodily feature seems to each to be most excellent.

Those, however, who proceed by understanding to see what God is, prefer him to all natures visible and corporeal, and indeed to all intelligible and spiritual ones, and to all that is changeable.

Yet all He has in mind, in general, all the old Greek philosophers, from the early pre-Socratics up to the Stoics and Neoplatonists. strive eagerly, as in a contest, on behalf of the excellence of God, and no one can be found who believes God to be that than which something is better. And so all agree that God is that which they set above all other things.

8. 8. And since all who think about God think of something living, only those can hold views about God that are not absurd and unworthy who think of life itself. And whatever bodily form occurs to them, they determine that it either lives or does not live by life, and they prefer the living to the nonliving; and they understand that this very living bodily form, however brightly it may shine with light, however greatly it may stand out in magnitude, however much it may be adorned with beauty, is one thing, and the life by which it is animated another; and they prefer that life, with an incomparable dignity, to the mass which is animated and given life by it.

Then they proceed to examine life itself, and if they find it animating without sensation, as in trees, they set above it the sentient life, as in cattle; and above this, again, the intelligent life, as in human beings. When they see that this too is still changeable, they are compelled to set above it some unchangeable life as well—namely, that life which is not at one time foolish and at another wise, but is rather Wisdom itself. For a wise mind—that is, one that has attained wisdom—was not wise before it attained it; but Wisdom itself never was unwise, nor can it ever be. And if they did not see this, they would by no means with full confidence set unchangeably wise life above changeable life. For they see that the very rule of truth by which they proclaim that life to be better is unchangeable; and they see it nowhere except above their own nature, since they see that they themselves are changeable.

9. 9. For no one is so impudently foolish as to say: "How do you know that unchangeably wise life is to be preferred to changeable life?" For the very thing he asks about—how I know it—is available to all in common and unchangeably for contemplation. Here we have the basic tenet of Augustine’s illuminationist epistemology: that we know whatever we do know in the light of unchanging—that is, divine—truth, which is always illuminating our minds. And whoever does not see this is like a blind man in the sun, who gains nothing from the brilliance of so clear and present a light poured upon the very seats of his eyes. But whoever sees it and shrinks from it has a mind whose keenness of sight has been weakened by the habit of carnal shadows. By the contrary winds, as it were, of depraved habits, then, human beings are driven back from their very homeland, pursuing things later and lower than that which they confess to be better and more excellent.

10. 10. Therefore, since we are to enjoy fully that truth which lives unchangeably, and in it God the Trinity, the author and founder of the universe, takes thought for the things he has founded, the mind must be purified so that it may be able both to perceive that light and to cling to what it has perceived. Let us regard this purification as a kind of walking, a kind of voyage, to the homeland. For we do not move by spatial places to him who is everywhere present, but by good zeal and good habits. (See Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.8, 6.7.36)

11. 11. This we could not do unless Wisdom itself had deigned to accommodate itself even to such great weakness of ours and had offered us an example of living, in no other way than in a man, since we too are human beings. But because, when we come to it, we act wisely, while it, when it came to us, was thought by proud men to have acted as if foolishly; and because, when we come to it, we grow strong, while it, when it came to us, was regarded as if weak. But what is foolish of God is wiser than men, and what is weak of God is stronger than men. Since, therefore, it is itself the homeland, it also made itself the way for us to the homeland. (See John 14:6)

12. 11. And although to the sound and pure inner eye it is everywhere present, it deigned to appear to the bodily eyes as well of those who have that inner eye weak and unclean. For since, in the wisdom of God, the world could not through wisdom know God, it pleased God to save believers through the foolishness of preaching.

12. 12. He is said to have come to us, then, not by traversing spatial distances, but by appearing in mortal flesh to mortals. He came there, therefore, where he was, because he was in this world, and the world was made through him. See John 1:10. Augustine is indeed in complete accord with the mind of the writer of this text in identifying the Word of God with the Wisdom of God. But because human beings, conformed to this world through the desire of enjoying the creature in place of the Creator and "most fittingly" called by the name of the world, (See Rom 12:2) did not recognize it, the Evangelist therefore said: and the world did not know it. And so, in the wisdom of God, the world could not through wisdom know God. Why, then, did it come, when it was here, except because it pleased God to save believers through the foolishness of preaching?

13. 12. How did it come, except that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us? (See John 1:14) Just as, when we speak, in order that what we hold in mind may glide into the mind of the listener through the ears of flesh, the word we bear in our heart becomes sound and is called speech; and yet our thought is not turned into that same sound, but, remaining whole in itself, takes on the form of a voice by which it may make its way to the ears, without any blemish of change in itself: so the Word of God, though not changed, was nevertheless made flesh so that it might dwell among us.

14. 13. Now just as treatment is the way to health, so this treatment took up the task of healing and restoring sinners. And as physicians, when they bind up wounds, do so not haphazardly but fittingly, so that a certain beauty too may attend the usefulness of the bandage, so the medicine of Wisdom, by taking up a human being, was accommodated to our wounds, healing some by contraries and some by likenesses. Just as one who tends a wound of the body applies certain contrary things—cold to hot, say, or moist to dry, or anything else of this kind—and also applies certain like things, such as fitting a round cloth to a round wound, or an oblong one to an oblong wound, and adapts the very bandage not the same to all limbs, but like to like: so the Wisdom of God, healing the human being, presented itself for the healing—itself the physician, itself the medicine.

Since, therefore, the human being fell through pride, he applied humility for the healing. We were deceived by the wisdom of the serpent; we are set free by the foolishness of God. And just as that was called wisdom but was in fact foolishness in those who despise God, so this which is called foolishness is wisdom in those who conquer the devil. We made bad use of immortality so that we died; Christ made good use of mortality so that we might live. Through the corrupted mind of a woman the disease entered; through the intact body of a woman salvation came forth. To the same class of contraries it belongs that our vices, too, are healed by the example of his virtues.

Now the like things, applied as bandages, as it were, to our limbs and wounds are these: that, having been deceived through a woman, we are set free through one born of a woman; that, being human, he set free human beings; being mortal, mortals; by death, the dead. Many other things too, both from contraries and from likenesses, reveal the instruction of the Christian medicine to those who consider them more carefully—those whom the necessity of carrying through the work in hand does not hurry along.

15. 14. Now indeed the belief in the Lord’s Resurrection from the dead and his ascension into heaven supports our faith with great hope. For he showed clearly how willingly he laid down his life for us, who had it so within his power to take it up again. (See John 10:17–18) With how great a confidence, then, does the hope of believers console itself, when it considers how great a one suffered such great things for those who did not yet believe!

But when he is awaited from heaven as judge of the living and the dead, he strikes great fear into the negligent, so that they may turn themselves to diligence and may long for him by doing good rather than dread him by doing evil.

But with what words can it be told, or by what thought grasped, what reward he will give in the end—since, for the consolation of this journey, he has given so much of his Spirit, by which we may hold, amid the adversities of this life, such great confidence and love of him whom we do not yet see, and gifts proper to each for the building up of his Church, (See 1 Cor 12–14) so that what he has shown must be done we may do not only without murmuring but even with delight!

16. 15. For the Church is his body, as the apostolic teaching commends, (See Eph 1:22–23, 5:28–33) which is also called his spouse. His body, then, with its many members performing different offices, (See Rom 12:4–5; Eph 4:3; Col 3:14) he binds together with the knot of unity and love as with health. And at this present time he exercises and purifies it by certain medicinal hardships, so that, having rescued it from this world, he may join to himself forever as his spouse the Church, having no spot or wrinkle or anything of the kind.

17. 16. Furthermore, since we are on the way—and this way is not one of places but of dispositions, which the malice of past sins was blocking off like a kind of thorny hedge—what more generous and merciful thing could he do, who willed to lay himself down beneath us as the way by which we might return, (See John 14:6) than to forgive all sins to those who turn, and, crucified for us, to tear up the heavily fixed barriers of our return? (See Col 2:13–14)

18. 17. These keys, then, he gave to his Church, so that whatever it loosed on earth should be loosed also in heaven, and whatever it bound on earth should be bound also in heaven (See Matt 16:19)—namely, that whoever in his Church did not believe his sins were forgiven him should not have them forgiven, but whoever did believe and, corrected, turned away from them should, being established in the bosom of that same Church, be healed by that same faith and correction. For whoever does not believe that his sins can be forgiven him becomes worse by despairing, as though nothing remained for him better than to be evil, since he is faithless about the fruit of his own conversion.

19. 18. Now just as there is a certain death of the mind, the abandonment of one’s former life and habits, which comes about by repenting, so too there is a death of the body, the dissolution of its former animation. And just as the mind after repentance, by which it has destroyed its lost former habits, is reformed for the better, so too the body, after this death which we all owe by the bond of sin, is to be believed and hoped to be changed for the better at the time of resurrection,

so that flesh and blood may not possess the kingdom of heaven—which cannot be—but rather this corruptible thing may put on incorruption, and this mortal thing may put on immortality, and, causing no hardship because it will suffer no want, may be animated by the happy and perfect soul in the highest repose.

20. 19. But the person whose mind does not die to this world and does not begin to be conformed to the truth is dragged by the death of the body into a graver death; and he comes back to life not for a change into a heavenly condition, but to pay penalties.

21. 19. This, then, is what faith holds, and this is how the matter is to be believed to stand: that neither the human mind nor the human body undergoes total destruction, but that the impious rise to incalculable punishments and the pious to eternal life. (Cf. Matt 25:46)

22. 20. In all these things, then, those alone are to be enjoyed which we have called eternal and unchangeable; the rest are to be used so that we may be able to arrive at the full enjoyment of those. And so we, who both enjoy and use other things, are ourselves things of a kind. For the human being is a great thing, made to the image and likeness of God, not insofar as he is enclosed in a mortal body, but insofar as by the honor of a rational soul he excels the beasts. And so there is a great question, whether human beings ought to enjoy one another, or use one another, or both.

For we have been given the precept to love one another, (See John 13:34, 15:12) but the question is whether a human being is to be loved by another for his own sake or for the sake of something else. For if for his own sake, we enjoy him; if for the sake of something else, we use him.

But it seems to me that he is to be loved for the sake of something else. For that which is to be loved for its own sake is that in which the happy life consists; and even if we do not yet have the reality of it, the hope of it nonetheless consoles us at this present time. But cursed is the one who places his hope in man.

22. 21. But no one ought to enjoy even himself, if you observe carefully, because he ought not to love himself for his own sake either, but for the sake of him who is to be enjoyed. For a person is at his best when his whole life makes for the unchangeable life (This is just another name, here, for God) and clings to it with his whole affection. But if he loves himself for his own sake, he does not refer himself to God, but, turned to himself, he is not turning to anything unchangeable. And therefore he then enjoys himself with some defect, since he is better when he clings wholly and is bound fast to the unchangeable good than when he relaxes from it even to himself.

If, then, you ought to love yourself not for your own sake, but for the sake of him in whom is the most rightful end of your love, let no other person be angry if you love him too for the sake of God. This is where Augustine’s sticking so uncompromisingly to his guns can appear to us rather dauntingly inhuman, even inhumane. But we need to make an effort of sympathetic imagination or, in older phraseology, of pious interpretation, and see that while by loving you for your own sake or loving myself for my own sake, he means doing it without reference to God; by loving you or myself for God’s sake he does not mean “and not also for your or my sake.” When I love you for God’s sake, I thereby (in Augustine’s use of the term) necessarily love you for your own sake, for your truest, deepest sake, because it means I am loving you, and hence “enjoying” you, in God, where you properly belong, and am wanting you to join me in enjoying God for ever. For this is the rule of love divinely established: you shall love, he says, your neighbor as yourself, but God with your whole heart, with your whole soul, with your whole mind, so that you may direct all your thoughts and all your life and all your understanding toward him from whom you have those very things that you direct toward him.

And when he says with your whole heart, your whole soul, your whole mind, he leaves no part of our life that ought to be free and, as it were, to give room so that one might wish to enjoy some other thing; but whatever else comes into the mind as a thing to be loved, let it be swept along to where the whole impulse of love runs.

Whoever, therefore, rightly loves his neighbor ought to bring it about with him that he too love God with his whole heart, his whole soul, his whole mind. For loving him thus as himself, he refers the whole love of himself and of his neighbor to that love of God which suffers no little stream to be led off from itself, by whose diversion it might be diminished.

23. 22. But not all things that are to be used are to be loved, but only those which either, by a certain fellowship, are referred together with us to God, such as a human being or an angel, or, being referred to us, stand in need of the kindness of God through us, such as the body. For surely the martyrs did not love the wickedness of their persecutors, which they nevertheless used to merit God.

Since, then, there are four things to be loved—one that is above us, a second that is ourselves, a third that is alongside us, and a fourth that is below us—about the second and the fourth no precepts had to be given. For however far a human being may fall away from the truth, (See 2 Tim 2:18) there remains in him love of himself and love of his body. For the mind, fleeing from the unchangeable light that rules over all, acts so as to reign over itself and its own body, and therefore it cannot but love both itself and its body.

23. 23. But he thinks he has attained something great if he has been able to dominate even his fellows—that is, other human beings. For it is innate in a vicious mind to crave the more, and to claim for itself as though owed, what is properly owed to God alone. Such love of self is better called hatred. For it is unjust, since he wishes what is below him to serve him while he himself refuses to serve his superior; and it has been most rightly said: but he who loves iniquity hates his own soul.

And therefore the mind becomes weak and is tormented by the mortal body. For it must necessarily love it and be weighed down by its corruption. (See Wis 9:15) For the immortality and incorruption of the body arises from the health of the mind, and the health of the mind is to cling most firmly to the higher, that is, to the unchangeable God. But when it also desires to dominate those who are by nature its equals—that is, human beings—this is altogether intolerable pride.

24. 24. No one, then, hates himself. And on this point indeed there has been no dispute with any sect. But neither does anyone hate his own body. For what the Apostle says is true: no one ever hated his own flesh. And as for what some say, that they would prefer to be altogether without a body, they are altogether mistaken. For it is not their body that they hate, but its corruptions and weight.

And so it is not no body at all, but an incorrupt and most swift body, that they wish to have; but they think such a thing would be no body at all, because they think the soul is something of that kind. Does he have in mind here some philosophical school, or more vaguely different groups of Christian ascetics? He goes on, at least, to present briefly a picture of true and false asceticism, the latter in section 25 possibly being that of the “perfect” among the Manichees; also perhaps of some orthodox Christians influenced by Manichee extremism.

But as for the fact that by a certain self-restraint and by labors they seem, as it were, to persecute their own bodies: those who do this rightly do not act so as not to have a body, but so as to have it subdued and ready for necessary works. For they aim, by a certain laborious soldiering of the body itself, to extinguish the lusts that make bad use of the body—that is, the soul’s habits and inclinations toward enjoying lower things. For they do not destroy themselves, but take care of their own health.

24. 25. But those who do this perversely wage war, as if naturally, upon their own body as an enemy. In this they are misled by what they read: the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to one another. For this was said because of the untamed carnal habit, against which the spirit lusts—not so as to destroy the body, but so that, its concupiscence (that is, its bad habit) having been tamed, it may make the body subdued to the spirit, as the natural order requires.

For because after the resurrection it will be the case that the body, in every way subject to the spirit with the highest repose, will thrive immortally, this too is to be practiced in this life, so that the carnal habit may be changed for the better and may not resist the spirit by disordered motions.

Until this comes about, the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh—the spirit resisting not through hatred but through sovereignty, since it rather wishes what it loves to be subject to the better; and the flesh resisting not through hatred but through the bond of habit, which, grown old even from the line of our parents, has taken root by the law of nature. The spirit, then, in taming the flesh, acts so as to break the perverse covenants, as it were, of bad habit, and so that the peace of good habit may come about.

Yet not even those who, depraved by a false opinion, detest their own bodies would be ready to lose one eye, even without the sensation of pain, even if as much power of seeing remained in the other as there had been in the two, unless some thing that ought to be preferred pressed upon them. By this and similar evidence it is shown clearly enough, to those who seek the truth without obstinacy, how certain is the Apostle’s judgment where he says: for no one ever hated his own flesh. He added also: but nourishes and cherishes it, as Christ also does the Church.

25. 26. A measure of loving, then, is to be prescribed to a person—that is, how he should love himself so as to benefit himself; for to doubt that he loves himself and wishes to benefit himself is the mark of a madman. He must also be taught how to love his own body, so as to provide for it in an orderly and prudent way. For that he loves his own body too, and wishes to keep it safe and whole, is equally manifest. And so a person can love something more than the safety and wholeness of his own body.

For many are found to have taken upon themselves both pains and the voluntary loss of certain members, in order to obtain other things which they loved more. No one, therefore, is to be said not to love the safety and soundness of his own body just because he loves something more. For the miser too, although he loves money, nevertheless buys himself bread; and in doing so he gives the money he loves so much and longs to increase, but he does so because he values more highly the safety of his own body, which is sustained by that bread. It is superfluous to dispute longer about a most manifest matter, which, however, the error of the impious often compels us to do. (Here he almost certainly means the Manichees)

26. 27. Therefore, since there is no need of a precept that one should love himself and his own body—that is, since we love what we are and what is below us but belongs to us by an unshaken law of nature, which has been promulgated even to the beasts (for the beasts too love themselves and their bodies)—it remained that we should receive precepts both about that which is above us and about that which is alongside us. You shall love, he says, the Lord your God with your whole heart and with your whole soul and with your whole mind, and you shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two precepts the whole Law and all the Prophets depend. The end of the precept, therefore, is love, and that twofold—namely, of God and of neighbor.

But if you understand yourself as a whole—that is, your mind and your body—and your neighbor as a whole—that is, his mind and his body (for a human being consists of mind and body)—no kind of thing to be loved has been left out in these two precepts. For since the love of God comes first and the prescribed measure of that love appears, in such a way that everything else flows together into it, nothing seems to have been said about your love of yourself. But when it was said, you shall love your neighbor as yourself, your love of yourself was at the same time not left out.

27. 28. Now that person lives justly and holily who is an undistorted appraiser of things. And he is the one who has an ordered love, so that he neither loves what is not to be loved, nor fails to love what is to be loved, nor loves more what is to be loved less, nor loves equally what is to be loved either less or more. Every sinner, insofar as he is a sinner, is not to be loved, and every human being, insofar as he is a human being, is to be loved for the sake of God, but God for his own sake. And if God is to be loved more than any human being, each one ought to love God more than himself. Likewise another human being is to be loved more than our own body, because all these things are to be loved for the sake of God, and another human being can enjoy God together with us, which the body cannot, since the body lives through the soul by which we enjoy God.

28. 29. But all are to be loved equally. Yet since you cannot do good to all, you must especially provide for those who, by the opportunities of place and time or any other circumstances, are bound to you more closely as though by a kind of lot. For just as, if you had an abundance of something that you ought to give to one who did not have it, and it could not be given to two, if two were to meet you, neither of whom surpassed the other either in need or in any tie of relationship toward you, you would do nothing more just than to choose by lot to whom should be given what could not be given to both: so among the human beings for all of whom you cannot provide, it must be treated as a matter of lot, according as each is able to cling to you more closely in time.

29. 30. Of all those who can enjoy God together with us, we love some whom we ourselves help, some by whom we are helped, some whose help we both need and whose need we relieve, and some to whom we neither confer any benefit nor look to have any conferred on us by them. Nevertheless, we ought to wish that all may love God together with us, and the whole of what we either do for them or are helped in by them is to be referred to that one end.

For if, in the theaters of vice, one who loves some actor and enjoys his art as a great or even supreme good loves all who love that actor along with him—not for their own sake, but for the sake of the one whom they love together; and the more fervent he is in his love of him, the more he acts in whatever ways he can so that the actor may be loved by more people, and the more he longs to show him to others,

and whomever he sees rather cool toward him he rouses, as much as he can, by praising the actor; but if he finds someone opposing him, he vehemently hates in that person the hatred of his beloved, and by whatever means he can he presses to remove it:

what is it fitting for us to do in the fellowship of the love of God, to enjoy whom fully is to live happily; and from whom all who love him have both their being and the fact that they love him; about whom we have no fear that he could displease anyone once he is known; and who wishes to be loved, not so that anything may be conferred on him, but so that an eternal reward may be conferred on those who love him—that is, himself, the very one whom they love?

From this it follows that we love even our enemies. For we do not fear them, since they cannot take from us what we love, but we rather pity them, because the more they hate us, the more they are separated from him whom we love. And if they turn to him, they must necessarily love both him as the good that makes happy, and us as fellows in so great a good.

30. 31. But at this point a certain question arises about the angels. For they too are happy by enjoying the very one whom we also desire to enjoy; and the more we enjoy him in this life, whether through a mirror or in an enigma, the more bearably we endure our pilgrimage and the more ardently we long to end it. But whether the love of the angels also pertains to those two precepts can be asked, not unreasonably. For that the one who gave the precept that we love our neighbor excepted no human being, both the Lord himself shows in the Gospel and the apostle Paul. For the man to whom he had set forth those two precepts and had said that on them depended the whole Law and all the Prophets, when he questioned him, saying: And who is my neighbor? In fact, in Luke’s account of the episode it was the lawyer who quoted the two commandments when Jesus asked him how he read the law. Augustine is mixing up Luke’s account with Matthew’s—or very possibly using a translation of Tatian’s harmony of the gospels, the Diatessaron. he set before him a certain man who, going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, had fallen among robbers and, gravely wounded by them, had been left wounded and half-dead. (See Luke 10:30–33) And he taught that no one was neighbor to him except the one who showed mercy toward refreshing and tending him, so that the very one who had asked the question, when questioned himself, confessed this. To him the Lord said: go and you also do likewise, so that, namely, we may understand that one to be a neighbor to whom the duty of mercy either is to be shown, if he is in need, or would be shown, if he were in need.

From this it now follows that the one by whom this duty is to be shown to us in turn is also our neighbor. For the name "neighbor" is relative to something, and no one can be a neighbor except to a neighbor. But that no one has been excepted to whom the duty of mercy is to be denied—who does not see this, since it has been extended even to enemies, the same Lord saying: love your enemies, do good to those who hate you?

30. 32. So too the apostle Paul teaches when he says: for, you shall not commit adultery, you shall not commit murder, you shall not steal, you shall not covet, and if there is any other commandment, it is summed up in this saying: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. Love does the neighbor no wrong. The Latin has dilectio proximi malum non operatur, which is the Vulgate reading, and which is most naturally translated, “Love of neighbor does no wrong.” But the Greek has “neighbor” in the dative case, not the genitive—“Love does no wrong to the neighbor”; and the end of this section strongly suggests that is how Augustine understood the text; either because his Old Latin version correctly had dilectio proximo, and it was later copyists who here “vulgatized” the text, as often happened; or else because he shrewdly construed the genitive proximi with the noun malum that follows it, rendering, literally, “Love does not work neighbor’s wrong.” This was as peculiar in Latin as it is odd in English, but was getting the right meaning from a faulty text. Whoever, therefore, thinks that the Apostle gave the precept not about every human being is compelled to confess what is most absurd and most wicked: that it seemed to the Apostle to be no sin if someone committed adultery with the wife of a non-Christian or of an enemy, or killed such a one, or coveted his property. But if it is the mark of a madman to say this, it is manifest that every human being is to be reckoned a neighbor, because evil is to be done to no one.

30. 33. Now indeed, if either the one to whom the duty of mercy is to be shown, or the one by whom it is to be shown to us, is rightly called a neighbor, it is manifest that by this precept by which we are commanded to love our neighbor the holy angels too are included, by whom such great duties of mercy are bestowed upon us as it is easy to observe in many passages of the divine Scriptures. From this our God and Lord himself willed to be called our neighbor. For the Lord Jesus Christ signifies himself to be the one who came to the aid of the man lying half-dead on the road, afflicted and abandoned by the robbers. (See Luke 10:30–33) And the Prophet says in prayer: as a neighbor, as our brother, so was I pleasing.

But because the divine substance is more excellent and above our nature, the precept by which we love God has been distinguished from the love of neighbor. Here two manuscripts add the following sentence: “But because we are all equal by nature, and when all boasting is set aside we are all nothing else but human beings, the commandment bidding us love our neighbor was not distinguished from loving ourselves.” For he shows mercy to us on account of his own goodness, but we to one another on account of his; that is, he has mercy on us so that we may enjoy him fully, but we have mercy on one another so that we may enjoy him.

31. 34. For this reason it still seems doubtful, when we say that we enjoy fully that thing which we love for its own sake, and that we are to enjoy only that thing by which we are made happy, while the rest are to be used. For God loves us, and the divine Scripture much commends his love toward us to us.

How, then, does he love us? So as to use us, or so as to enjoy us? But if he enjoys us, he is in need of our good, which no sane person would say. For all our good is either himself or from himself. And to whom is it obscure or doubtful that the light does not need the brightness of those things which it has itself illuminated?

The Prophet also says most plainly: I said to the Lord: You are my Lord, since you have no need of my goods. Therefore he does not enjoy us, but uses us. For if he neither enjoys nor uses us, I do not find how he loves us.

32. 35. But neither does he use us as we use things; for we refer the things we use to this end, that we may enjoy fully the goodness of God; God, however, refers his use of us to his own goodness. But not as a means toward his enjoyment of his goodness. It will emerge shortly that God “uses” us for our own good, as means indeed toward our enjoyment of his goodness. For because he is good, we exist; and insofar as we exist, we are good. Furthermore, because he is also just, we are not evil with impunity; and insofar as we are evil, to that extent we also exist less. For he supremely and primarily exists who is altogether unchangeable, and who could say most fully: I am who I am, and: you shall say to them: He who is has sent me to you—so that the other things that exist both cannot exist except from him, and are good to the extent that they have received that they may exist.

That use, then, which is called God’s, by which he uses us, is referred not to his benefit but to ours, and only to his goodness. But when we have mercy on someone and provide for him, we do this for his benefit indeed and have that in view; yet somehow our own benefit also follows, since God does not leave without reward the mercy we expend on the needy. And this is the highest reward: that we may enjoy him fully, and that all of us who enjoy him may also enjoy one another fully in him.

33. 36. For if we do this in ourselves, we remain on the way and place the hope of our happiness in a human being or in an angel. This both a proud human being and a proud angel claim for themselves, and they rejoice to have the hope of others fixed in them. But a holy human being and a holy angel, even when we are weary and desire to rest and remain in them, rather refresh us—either with the provision they have received for our sake, or with that which they have received for their own sake, but received nonetheless. And so, having refreshed us, they compel us to go on to him by enjoying whom we are alike made happy.

For the Apostle too cries out: Was Paul crucified for you? Or were you baptized in the name of Paul? and: neither is he who plants anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase. And an angel warns a man who is worshiping him to worship rather the one under whom, as Lord, he himself is also a fellow servant. (See Rev 19:10)

33. 37. But when you enjoy a human being in God, you enjoy God rather than the human being. For you enjoy the one by whom you are made happy, and you will rejoice to have come to him in whom you place your hope of coming. Hence Paul says to Philemon: so, brother, let me enjoy you in the Lord. For if he had not added in the Lord, but had said only let me enjoy you, he would have placed in him the hope of his happiness.

And yet "to enjoy" is said very nearly the same as "to use with delight." Cum delectatione; two venerable manuscripts have cum dilectione, to use with love. For when what is loved is present, it necessarily brings delight with it. And if you pass through this delight and refer it to that in which one must abide, you use it, and you are said to enjoy it improperly, not properly. But if you cling to it and abide in it, placing in it the end of your joy, then you are to be said to enjoy it truly and properly. And this must not be done except in that Trinity, that is, the supreme and unchangeable good.

34. 38. See how, although Truth itself, and the Word through whom all things were made, had become flesh so that it might dwell among us, (See John 1:3, 14) the Apostle nevertheless says: and even if we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know him so no longer. For he who willed to offer himself not only as the possession to those who arrive, but also as the way to those who are coming to the beginning of the ways, willed to take on flesh.

Hence too is that saying: the Lord created me in the beginning of his ways, so that from there those who wished to come might begin. The Apostle, therefore, although he was still walking on the way and was following God who called toward the prize of the heavenly calling, yet, forgetting the things that are behind and stretching out toward the things that are ahead, had already passed the beginning of the ways—that is, he no longer needed that from which the journey must nevertheless be begun and undertaken by all who desire to reach the truth and to abide in eternal life.

For he says thus: I am the way and the truth and the life—that is, "through me one comes, to me one arrives, in me one abides." For when one comes to him, one comes also to the Father, since through one who is equal the one to whom he is equal is recognized; (See John 14:9) the Holy Spirit binding and, as it were, gluing us fast, so that we may be able to abide in the supreme and unchangeable good.

From this it is understood how no thing ought to hold us on the way, since not even the Lord himself, insofar as he deigned to be our way, willed to hold us, but rather that we should pass on, lest we cling weakly to temporal things—even though taken up and accomplished by him for our salvation—but rather run eagerly through them, so that we may deserve to be carried forward and brought through to him who freed our nature from temporal things and placed it at the right hand of the Father.

35. 39. Of all the things, then, that have been said since we began to treat of things, this is the sum: that it be understood that the fullness and the end of the Law and of all the divine Scriptures is love of the thing that is to be enjoyed, and of the thing that can enjoy that thing together with us, since there is no need of a precept that each should love himself.

So that we might know and be able to do this, the whole temporal dispensation was carried out for our salvation by divine providence, which we ought to use, not with an abiding love and delight, as it were, but rather with a passing one, as toward a way, as toward vehicles or any other instruments, or whatever can be said more fittingly; so that we may love the things by which we are carried for the sake of that toward which we are carried.

36. 40. Whoever, then, thinks that he has understood the divine Scriptures, or any part of them, in such a way that by that understanding he does not build up that twofold love of God and neighbor, has not yet understood. (See 1 Cor 8:1–2) But whoever has drawn from them such an opinion as is useful for building up this love, and yet has not said what the one he reads is shown to have meant in that place, is not perniciously deceived, nor does he lie at all. For in one who lies there is the will to say what is false, and therefore we find many who are willing to lie, but no one who is willing to be deceived.

Since, then, a person does the one thing knowingly but suffers the other unknowingly, it is sufficiently apparent that, in one and the same matter, the one who is deceived is better than the one who lies, since it is better to suffer injustice than to do it. (Cf. 1 Pet 3:17) But everyone who lies does injustice; and if a lie seems useful to anyone at some time, injustice can seem useful at some time. For no one who lies keeps faith in what he lies about. For he certainly wishes that the one to whom he lies should have faith in him, which faith he nevertheless does not keep toward him by lying. But every violator of faith is unjust. Either, therefore, injustice is sometimes useful—which cannot be—or a lie is always useless. See Augustine’s works, Lying, and Against Lying, in which occurs his famous explanation, and exculpation, of Jacob’s far from white lie in Gen 27:19–29, non est mendacium sed mysterium, it is not a lie but a mystery (Against Lying 24).

36. 41. But whoever understands something different in the Scriptures from what the one who wrote them meant is deceived, though they do not lie. Yet, as I had begun to say, if he is deceived by an opinion that builds up love, which is the end of the precept, he is deceived in the same way as someone who, leaving the road by mistake, nevertheless makes his way across a field to the place to which that road also leads.

He must nevertheless be corrected, and it must be shown to him how much more useful it is not to leave the road, lest by the habit of going astray he be compelled to go even crosswise or in the wrong direction.

37. 41. For by rashly asserting what the one he reads did not mean, he often runs into other things that he cannot weave together with that opinion. And if he agrees that these are true and certain, then what he had thought cannot be true; and somehow it comes about in him that, by loving his own opinion, he begins to be more offended at the Scripture than at himself. And if he allows this evil to creep on, he will be overturned by it. For we walk by faith, not by sight; but faith will totter if the authority of the divine Scriptures wavers; and further, with faith tottering, love itself also grows faint. For if anyone falls from faith, he must also fall from love. For he cannot love what he does not believe to exist.

Furthermore, if he both believes and loves, by acting well and obeying the precepts of good morals he brings it about that he also hopes that he will come to that which he loves. And so these are the three by which all knowledge and prophecy are sustained: faith, hope, love. (See 1 Cor 13:8–13)

38. 42. But faith will give way to the sight that we shall behold, and hope will give way to the very happiness to which we shall come; love, however, even as these pass away, will rather be increased. For if by believing we love what we do not yet see, how much more when we have begun to see it? And if by hoping we love that to which we have not yet come, how much more when we have come to it?

For between things temporal and things eternal there is this difference: that a temporal thing is loved more before it is possessed, but grows cheap once it has arrived; for it does not satisfy the soul, whose true and certain seat is eternity. But the eternal is loved more ardently when attained than when desired. For no one who desires it is permitted to esteem it more than it actually is, so that it would grow cheap to him when he found it less; but however much each one coming to it could esteem it, he will find more upon arriving.

39. 43. A person, therefore, supported by faith and hope and love, and holding fast to them unshaken, does not need the Scriptures except for instructing others. And so many live by these three even in solitude without books. Hence in them, I think, that has already been fulfilled which was said: whether prophecies will be done away, or tongues will cease, or knowledge will be done away.

Yet by these as by a kind of scaffolding so great a structure of faith and hope and love has risen up in them that, holding something perfect, they do not seek the things that are in part (See 1 Cor 13:10)—perfect, that is, as far as is possible in this life. For in comparison with the future life, this life of no just and holy person is perfect. Therefore there remain, he says, faith, hope, love, these three. But the greatest of these is love, because even when one has come to the eternal things, with those two passing away, love will remain, fuller and more certain.

40. 44. Therefore, when anyone has recognized that the end of the precept is love from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned, and is going to refer the whole understanding of the divine Scriptures to those three, let him approach the treatment of those books with confidence.

For when he said love, he added from a pure heart, so that nothing else might be loved than that which is to be loved.

And he joined a good conscience on account of hope. For he despairs of coming to that which he believes and loves who has within him the prick of a bad conscience.

Third, he says and faith unfeigned. For if our faith is free of falsehood, then we both do not love what is not to be loved, and by living rightly we hope so that our hope may in no way be disappointed. For this reason I have wished to say about the matters that pertain to faith as much as I judged sufficient for the present, since on other matters many things have already been said, whether by others or by ourselves, in other volumes.

Let this, then, be the measure of this book. The rest, concerning signs, we shall discuss as far as the Lord shall grant.

1. 1. Since, when I was writing about "things," I first gave warning that no one should attend in them to anything but what they are, not also to whether they signify something else besides themselves; in turn, discussing signs, I say this: that no one should attend in them to what they are, but rather to the fact that they are signs—that is, to what they signify. For a "sign" is a thing which, besides the appearance it presents to the senses, causes something else of itself to come into thought; just as, when we see a footprint, we think that the animal whose footprint it is has passed by; and when we see smoke, we recognize that fire is beneath it; and when we hear the voice of a living being, we notice the disposition of its mind; and when the trumpet sounds, soldiers know that they ought either to advance or to retreat, and whatever else the battle demands.

1. 2. Of signs, then, some are natural, others given. Natural signs are those which, without any will or any desire of signifying, cause something else besides themselves to be known from themselves, such as smoke signifying fire. For it does not signify by willing to do so, but by the observation and noting of things experienced it is recognized that fire is beneath, even if smoke alone appears. But the footprint of a passing animal also belongs to this class; and the face of an angry or sad person signifies the disposition of the mind, even though there is no will on the part of the one who is angry or sad; or if any other motion of the mind is betrayed by the indicating face, even when we are not acting so that it be betrayed.

But it is not my purpose now to discuss this whole class. Since, however, it has fallen within our division, it could not be passed over altogether, and let it suffice to have noted it thus far.

2. 3. Given signs, however, are those which living beings give one another to show, as far as they can, the motions of their minds, or anything they have sensed or understood. And we have no reason for signifying—that is, for giving a sign—except to bring forth and transfer into another’s mind what the one who gives the sign bears in his own mind. We have determined, then, to consider and treat this class of signs, insofar as it concerns human beings, since even the divinely given signs contained in the holy Scriptures have been indicated to us through the human beings who wrote them down.

Some beasts, too, have signs among themselves by which they disclose the appetite of their minds. For the cock, when it has found food, gives a sign by its voice for the hen to run up, and the male dove calls the female by cooing or is in turn called by her, and many things of this kind are commonly observed. Whether these, like the face or the cry of one in pain, follow the motion of the mind without any will to signify, or are truly given in order to signify, is another question, and does not pertain to the matter in hand. We remove this part from this work as not necessary.

3. 4. Of the signs, then, by which human beings communicate their thoughts to one another, some pertain to the sense of the eyes, very many to that of the ears, and very few to the other senses. For when we nod, we give a sign only to the eyes of the one whom we wish to make, by this sign, a sharer in our will. And some signify very many things by the motion of the hands; and actors, by the motions of all their limbs, give certain signs to those in the know and converse, as it were, with their eyes; and military banners and standards convey through the eyes the will of the commanders. And all these are, as it were, certain visible words.

But those that pertain to the ears, as I said, are more numerous, especially in words. For the trumpet, the flute, and the lyre also for the most part give a sound that is not only pleasant but also significant. Yet all these signs, compared with words, are very few. For words have plainly obtained the chief place among human beings for signifying whatever is conceived in the mind, if anyone wishes to bring it forth.

For the Lord too gave a certain sign by the odor of the ointment with which his feet were anointed, See John 12:3–7; the trigger phrase here is and the house was filled with the odor of the ointment. This is a sign directed to the sense of smell. Jesus explains its meaning in words—that it was done for his burial. But see also Song 1:3, Latin: attract me; we will run after you in the odor of your ointments. Instead of The Maurists’ “the odor of the ointment,” CCL rather oddly reads, “the anointing odor,” odore ungenti. and by the sacrament of his body and blood he signified through taste what he willed, See Luke 22:19–20. Reading with CCSL and several manuscripts, per gustatum. The Maurists follow earlier editors in reading praegustato, giving the sense, “and by first tasting the sacrament, the Lord signified . . . ” But there is very little manuscript support for this; and in Luke’s account of the last supper, at least, Jesus deliberately refrained then from eating the passover; and finally, Augustine is clearly wishing to give an instance of a sign directed to the sense of taste. He was no doubt prompted by Wis 16:20, the versicle sung at Benediction. and when the woman by touching the hem of his garment was made well, it signifies something. See Mark 5:27–34, a sign given through the sense of touch. The act of touching signified for Augustine the act of faith. See Sermons 243.21, 244.3, 245.3. He also says somewhere that the hem of the Lord’s garment represents Saint Paul, the last and least of the apostles (1 Cor 15:8–9); and thus the episode of this woman and her cure represents the conversion of the gentiles. See Sermons 63A.3, 63B.3. But the countless multitude of signs by which human beings bring forth their thoughts is established in words. For all those signs whose classes I have briefly touched on I could express in words, but words I could in no way express by those signs.

4. 5. But because, when the air is struck, they at once pass away and do not last longer than they sound, signs of words were established through letters. Thus utterances are shown to the eyes, not through themselves, but through certain signs proper to them. These signs, then, could not be common to all nations, because of a certain sin of human discord, when each one seizes the chief place for himself. A sign of this pride is that tower raised up to heaven, where impious human beings deserved to have not only their minds but even their voices discordant. (See Gen 11:1–9. Augustine also possibly had in mind, as hinting at dissension and ambition, Gen 10:9–10)

5. 6. From this it came about that the divine Scripture too, by which such great diseases of human wills are relieved, having set out from one language by which it could opportunely be disseminated throughout the world, and spread far and wide through the various languages of translators, became known to the nations for their salvation. Those who read it seek nothing else than to find the thoughts and the will of those by whom it was written down, and through them the will of God, according to which we believe such men spoke.

6. 7. But by many and manifold obscurities and ambiguities those are deceived who read rashly, taking one thing for another; and in some places they do not even find what they might falsely suspect, so darkly are certain things said that they cast a most dense fog. I do not doubt that all this was provided by God in order to subdue pride by labor and to renew the understanding from disdain, since for the most part things easily searched out grow cheap to it.

For what is it, I ask, that if someone were to say that they are holy and perfect human beings, by whose life and morals the Church of Christ cuts off from any superstitions those who come to it, and by the imitation of the good incorporates them somehow into itself—those good, faithful, and true servants of God who, laying aside the burdens of the world, (As those about to be baptized laid aside all their clothes) have come to the holy bath of Baptism, and rising from there, by the conception of the Holy Spirit bring forth the fruit of twofold love, that is, of God and of neighbor;

what is it, then, that if someone says these things, it delights the hearer less than if he expounds toward the same sense that place from the Song of Songs where it is said to the Church, when she was being praised as a beautiful woman: your teeth are like a flock of shorn ewes coming up from the washing, which all bear twins, and there is none barren among them? Does a person learn anything else than when he hears that in the plainest words without the help of this likeness? And yet somehow I gaze more sweetly upon the saints when I see them as the teeth of the Church, cutting human beings off from errors and, their hardness having been softened, transferring them as though bitten off and chewed into her body. I also recognize most delightfully the sheep, shorn, having laid aside their worldly burdens as fleeces, and coming up from the washing—that is, from Baptism—all bearing twins, that is, the two precepts of love, and I see that none is barren of this holy fruit.

6. 8. But why I should see it more sweetly than if no such likeness were drawn from the divine books, when the matter and the knowledge are the same, is difficult to say and is another question. For now, however, no one doubts both that everything is learned more readily through likenesses, and that what is sought with some difficulty is found much more pleasingly. For those who do not find at all what they seek labor under hunger; but those who do not seek, because they have it at hand, often wither from disdain: in both cases languor is to be guarded against.

Magnificently and healthfully, then, the Holy Spirit so regulated the holy Scriptures that by the more open places he might meet hunger, while by the more obscure ones he might wipe away disdain. For almost nothing is dug out of those obscurities which is not found stated most plainly elsewhere.

7. 9. Before all things, then, it is necessary to be turned by the fear of God He is here running through the gifts of the Holy Spirit, Isa 11:2–3, LXX, backward from the last, the fear of the Lord, to the first, the spirit of wisdom. He does this because the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, Ps 111 (110):10. He also interweaves the beatitudes into the gifts. toward knowing his will, what he commands us to seek and what to avoid. And this fear must necessarily strike into us the thought of our mortality and of our future death, and, as though our flesh were pierced with nails, fasten all the motions of pride to the wood of the Cross. Then it is necessary to grow gentle through piety, and not to contradict the divine Scripture, whether understood, if it strikes at some vices of ours, or not understood, as though we could be wiser and command better; but rather to think and believe that what is written there is better and truer, even if it lies hidden, than what we can be wise about by ourselves.

7. 10. After those two steps of fear and piety one comes to the third step, that of knowledge, of which I have now undertaken to treat. For in it every student of the divine Scriptures exercises himself, about to find in them nothing else than that God is to be loved for the sake of God, and the neighbor for the sake of God; and to love him indeed with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, but the neighbor as oneself, (See Mark 12:30–31) that is, so that the whole love of neighbor, like the love of ourselves, may be referred to God. We treated of these two precepts in the previous book when we were dealing with things.

It is necessary, then, that each one first find in the Scriptures that he, entangled in love of this world—that is, of temporal things—is far removed from such great love of God and such great love of neighbor as the Scripture prescribes. Then indeed that fear by which he thinks of the judgment of God, and that piety by which he cannot but believe and yield to the authority of the holy books, compel him to mourn for himself. For this knowledge makes the person of good hope not boast but lament; and by this disposition he obtains, by diligent prayers, the consolation of the divine help, lest he be broken by despair, and he begins to be on the fourth step, that of fortitude, on which one hungers and thirsts for righteousness. See Matt 5:6. We have just had the previous beatitude, those that mourn, connected with the gift of knowledge. The first one, the poor in spirit, was connected by implication with the two gifts (only one in the Hebrew text) of fear and piety. For by this disposition he extracts himself from every deadly delight in passing things, and turning away from there, he turns to the love of eternal things—namely, the unchangeable unity and the same Trinity.

7. 11. When he has glimpsed this, as far as he can, radiating in the distance, and has felt that by the weakness of his sight he cannot bear that light, on the fifth step—that is, in the counsel of mercy (See Matt 5:7)—he purifies his soul, which is in a way tumultuous and clamoring against him because of the filth contracted from the appetite for lower things. Here he diligently exercises himself in the love of neighbor and is perfected in it. And now full of hope and sound in strength, when he has come even to the love of his enemy, he ascends to the sixth step, (That of understanding) where now he purifies that very eye by which God can be seen, as far as he can be by those who die to this world as far as they can. For they see to the extent that they die to this world, but to the extent that they live here, they do not see.

And therefore, although the appearance of that light now begins to appear more certain and not only more bearable but even more pleasant, it is nevertheless still said to be seen in an enigma and through a mirror, because we walk by faith rather than by sight while we are on pilgrimage in this life, although our way of life is in heaven. (See 2 Cor 5:7, 6; Phil 3:20)

On this step, however, he so purifies the eye of the heart that he does not prefer or even compare his neighbor to the truth; therefore not himself either, since not even the one whom he loves as himself. This holy person, then, will be of such a simple and cleansed heart (See Matt 5:8) that he will neither be turned aside from the truth by zeal to please human beings, nor by regard for avoiding any of his own discomforts that are opposed to this life. Such a son ascends to wisdom, which is the last and seventh, which he enjoys fully, at peace and tranquil. (See Matt 5:9) For the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. For from that one stretches and comes, through these steps, to wisdom itself.

8. 12. But let us refer our consideration back to that third step, (That of knowledge, yoked to the beatitude of those who mourn) concerning which I have undertaken to discuss and treat whatever the Lord may suggest. He, then, will be the most skillful investigator of the divine Scriptures who first has read them all and become acquainted with them, and, if not yet by understanding, at least by reading—that is, those which are called canonical.

For the rest That is, the apocryphal books. The African Church in Augustine’s time was one of the first Latin-speaking regional Churches to publish a list of the books it accepted as canonical, in councils held at Hippo Regius in 393 and at Carthage in 397. Their list is exactly the same as the one put out over a thousand years later by the Council of Trent. he will read more safely, instructed in the faith of the truth, The Latin says, “in the faith of truth,” in fide veritatis, an inversion of the genitive which occurs not infrequently in the sermons. lest they preoccupy a weak mind and, deluding it with dangerous lies and phantasms, prejudge something against sound understanding.

But in the canonical Scriptures let him follow the authority of as many of the Catholic Churches as possible, among which let those certainly be that have deserved to have apostolic Sees and to receive epistles.

He will hold, therefore, this measure in the canonical Scriptures: that he prefer those which are received by all the Catholic Churches to those which some do not receive. But among those which are not received by all, let him prefer those which the more numerous and weightier Churches receive to those which fewer Churches and of lesser authority hold.

But if he finds some held by the more numerous, others by the weightier—although he cannot easily find this This translation is following the Maurists; quamquam hoc facile inveniri non possit. But the CCSL omits facile, giving the sense, in my paraphrase, “though this could not happen.”—I think they are nevertheless to be held of equal authority.

8. 13. The whole canon of the Scriptures, in which we say this consideration is to be exercised, (In the stage of the gift of knowledge) is contained in these books: the five of Moses, that is, Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, and one book of Jesus Nave, Joshua, son of Nun; but I have to keep Augustine’s Septuagint version of Joshua’s name, because he and his contemporaries were very conscious of the identity of his name with that of our Lord, and hence of his prefiguring Jesus in a very special way. one of Judges, one little book called Ruth, which seems to pertain rather to the beginning of Kingdoms; then four of Kingdoms (Which we now call 1 and 2 Samuel, 1 and 2 Kings) and two of Chronicles, (The Greek name for Chronicles, meaning something like “The left-overs.”) not following in sequence but, as it were, joined on at the side and proceeding alongside. This is the history that contains times connected together and the order of events. There are others, as it were of a different order, which are connected neither to this order nor to one another, such as Job and Tobit and Esther and Judith and the two books of Maccabees and the two of Esdras, (That is, Ezra and Nehemiah) which seem rather to follow upon that ordered history brought to a close at Kingdoms or Chronicles.

Then the Prophets, among which there is one book of David, the Psalms, and three of Solomon: Proverbs, the Song of Songs, and Ecclesiastes. For those two books, one inscribed Wisdom and the other Ecclesiasticus, are said to be of Solomon by a certain likeness. For it is most consistently held that Jesus Sirach wrote them; See the extract from the Revisions at the beginning of this work. yet, since they have deserved to be received into authority, they are to be numbered among the prophetic books. The remaining books are those of the ones properly called Prophets, the individual books of the twelve Prophets, which, being connected to one another, since they have never been separated, are reckoned as one; the names of which Prophets are these: Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi. Then there are four Prophets of larger volumes: Isaiah, Jeremiah, Daniel, Ezekiel. (It is curious that he reverses the order of the last two, departing from the order of the Septuagint) With these forty-four books the authority of the Old Testament is brought to a close;

but that of the New is brought to a close with the four books of the Gospel: according to Matthew, according to Mark, according to Luke, according to John; the fourteen Epistles of the apostle Paul: to the Romans, to the Corinthians two, to the Galatians, to the Ephesians, to the Philippians, to the Thessalonians two, to the Colossians, to Timothy two, to Titus, to Philemon, to the Hebrews; two of Peter; three of John; one of Jude and one of James; the one book of the Acts of the Apostles There are several idiosyncratic changes of order in his New Testament list; the most striking being this placing of Acts after the epistles; and among them, the placing of Colossians after Thessalonians, and of James as the last instead of the first of the so-called “catholic” or general epistles. and the one book of the Apocalypse of John.

9. 14. In all these books those who fear God and are gentle through piety seek the will of God. The first observance of this work and labor is, as we have said, to know these books, and, even if not yet to the point of understanding, at least by reading either to commit them to memory or not to leave them altogether unknown. Then those things which are openly set down in them, whether precepts for living or rules for believing, are to be investigated more skillfully and diligently. And each one finds the more of these the more capacious his understanding is. For in those things which are set down openly in the Scriptures are found all those which contain faith and the morals of living—namely, hope and love, of which we treated in the previous book.

Then indeed, once a certain familiarity with the very language of the divine Scriptures has been gained, one must proceed to opening up and discussing the things that are obscure, so that examples may be taken from the more manifest passages for illustrating the more obscure expressions, and certain testimonies of established statements may remove doubt from uncertain ones. In this matter memory is of the greatest value; and if it is lacking, it cannot be supplied by these precepts. A guess at the meaning of a very elliptical phrase: “if it is lacking, non potest his praeceptis dari”; literally, “it”—what? the memory?—“cannot be given to these precepts.” Augustine himself clearly had a prodigious memory, and not only came as close as is possible to knowing the Bible by heart, but also had in his memory a marvelous system of cross-references.

10. 15. There are two causes why the things that are written are not understood: if they are concealed by either unknown or ambiguous signs. Now signs are either literal or figurative. They are called literal when they are employed to signify those things on account of which they were instituted, as when we say "ox" when we mean the animal that all who share the Latin language with us call by this name. They are figurative when the very things which we signify by literal words are taken to signify something else, as when we say "ox" and by these two syllables understand the animal that is usually called by this name, but again, through that animal, we understand the Evangelist, Paul appears in this passage to have been referring rather to himself. Is the reason Augustine says the evangelist that the ox was already in his time accepted as the symbol of Luke’s Gospel, being one of the four living creatures supporting God’s throne, Rev 4:6–7? whom Scripture signified, as the Apostle interprets, saying: you shall not muzzle the ox that treads out the grain.

11. 16. Against unknown literal signs the great remedy is knowledge of the languages. And those who speak the Latin language, whom we have now undertaken to instruct, need two others for the knowledge of the divine Scriptures—namely, Hebrew and Greek—so that one may have recourse to the prior exemplars if the boundless variety of the Latin translators has brought any doubt. Although we also often find Hebrew words not translated in the books, such as amen and alleluia and racha (See Matt 5:22) and hosanna and any others there may be.

Of these, some, on account of a more sacred authority, have had their antiquity preserved, although they could have been translated, such as amen and alleluia; It is surprising that he does not give the translation of these words, which he is always ready to do in his sermons, as occasion arises; telling us, correctly, that Amen means “It’s true,” and Alleluia means “Praise the Lord.” others, however, are said not to have been able to be carried over into another language, such as the other two we set down. For there are certain words of particular languages which cannot pass into the use of another language through translation. And this happens especially with interjections, which are words that signify a motion of the mind rather than any part of a connected thought. Reading sententiae connexae with three manuscripts, instead of sententiae conceptae, “of a thought out sentence,” with the CCSL, the PL, and the rest of the manuscripts. CCSL does not even mention this variant in its apparatus. For these two also are reported to be such; for they say that racha is the voice of one indignant, hosanna of one rejoicing.

But not on account of these few things, which it is very easy to note and inquire about, but on account of the diversities, as has been said, of the translators of those languages, the knowledge is necessary. For those who translated the Scriptures from Hebrew into Greek He presumably had in mind Origen’s Hexapla, which besides the official Septuagint version included three others, those of Symmachus, Theodotion, and Aquila. can be counted, but the Latin translators in no way. For as in the first times of the faith a Greek manuscript came into anyone’s hands and he seemed to himself to have a little ability in both languages, he ventured to translate.

12. 17. This very thing has helped understanding more than it has hindered it, provided only that the readers are not negligent. For the inspection of several manuscripts has often clarified some of the more obscure statements, as in that saying of the prophet Isaiah, where one translator says: and you shall not despise the members of your own seed, (See Isa 58:7) but another says: and you shall not despise your own flesh; each bears witness to the other in turn. For the one is explained by the other, since "flesh" could be taken literally, so that each would think himself admonished not to despise his own body; and "the members of one’s own seed" could be understood figuratively as Christians, born spiritually with us from the same seed of the word. (See Jas 1:18; 1 Pet 1:23; John 1:13)

But now, the sense of the translators having been compared, the more probable view is that the precept is literally about not despising blood relatives, since, when you refer "the members of one’s seed" to the flesh, blood relatives most readily come to mind. Hence I think comes that saying of the Apostle: if by any means I may provoke to emulation my own flesh, that I may save some of them; that is, that by provoking to emulation those who had believed, they too might believe. For he called the Jews his own flesh, on account of blood relationship.

Likewise that saying of the same Isaiah: unless you believe, you will not understand, another translated: unless you believe, you will not abide. Which of them followed the words is uncertain, unless the exemplars of the prior language are read. But nevertheless from both something great is conveyed to those who read knowingly. For it is difficult for translators to become so different from one another that they do not touch one another by some nearness.

Therefore, since understanding is in the eternal vision, but faith nourishes the little ones, as if with milk, in certain cradles of temporal things, and now we walk by faith, not by sight, See 1 Cor 3:2; Heb 5:12; 1 Pet 2:2. The prime object of faith, for Augustine, is not the eternal truths and mystery of God, but the temporal mystery of the Incarnation—more precisely, the flesh of the Word incarnate. See The Trinity, 13.25, 14.3. and unless we walk by faith we cannot arrive at the vision which does not pass away but abides, when we cleave to the Truth through a purified understanding—for this reason the one said: unless you believe, you will not abide, and the other: unless you believe, you will not understand.

12. 18. And from the ambiguity of the prior language a translator is often deceived who does not know the meaning well, and he carries over that signification which is utterly foreign to the sense of the writer. As certain manuscripts have: their feet are sharp to shed blood; Augustine probably thought he was quoting Ps 14:3, because Paul in Romans joins several other texts onto it—this particular verse comes from Prov 1:7—and as a result the whole of Paul’s chain of quotations, Rom 3:10–18, got incorporated into Ps 14:3 in the Septuagint (where it is numbered Ps 13:3). for the Greek word means both "sharp" and "swift." He, then, saw the meaning who translated: their feet are swift to shed blood; but that other one, dragged off in the other direction by the double sign, went astray. And some things indeed are not obscure, but false. Their condition is different; for one must rather prescribe that such manuscripts are not to be understood but corrected. Hence too comes this: that, since the Greek word for "calf" is so spelled, some did not understand that the other Greek word means "plantings" and translated it calf-shoots. But when I look up vitulamen in Lewis & Short, they give as its meaning, “a shoot, sucker, sprig.” They also derive it from the verb vitulo, to celebrate, and not from vitulus, a calf. However, the only text they refer to in support is from a letter of Saint Ambrose, 37, 57, and then this Vulgate text from Wisdom. So very possibly Augustine is right about the proper meaning of the word, and Ambrose is very sensibly interpreting its occurrence in Wis 4:3 to mean what it ought to mean. This error has preoccupied so many manuscripts that it is scarcely found written otherwise. And yet the meaning is most manifest, because it becomes clear from the following words; for adulterous plantings will not put down deep roots is more fittingly said than calf-shoots, which walk on the ground with their feet and do not cling by roots. The rest of the context in that place also preserves this rendering.

13. 19. But since even what the meaning itself is, which several translators each try to express according to his own ability and judgment, does not appear unless it is examined in the language they are translating, and since the translator for the most part wanders astray from the sense of the author if he is not most learned;

either knowledge of those languages from which Scripture has come into Latin is to be sought, or the translations of those who have bound themselves too closely to the words are to be kept—not because they suffice, but so that from them the liberty or the error of others may be detected, those who preferred to follow in translating the meanings rather than the words.

For not only single words but also expressions are often carried over which cannot pass into the use of the Latin language at all, if one wishes to keep to the custom of the ancients who spoke Latin. These sometimes take nothing from the understanding, but nevertheless they offend those who take more delight in things, since even in the signs of things a certain integrity of their own is preserved.

For what is called a solecism is nothing else than when words are not fitted together by the law by which those fitted them together who spoke before us not without some authority. For whether one says inter homines or inter hominibus (The right and wrong way of saying “among men,” with the accusative and the ablative cases respectively) does not concern one who knows things.

Likewise, what else is a barbarism than a word uttered not with those letters or that sound with which it is usually uttered by those who spoke Latin before us? For whether one says ignoscere with the third syllable long or short does not much concern the one who asks God to forgive his sins, in whatever way that word may have been able to sound. What, then, is integrity of expression except the preservation of another’s custom, confirmed by the authority of the ancient speakers?

13. 20. But nevertheless people are the more offended by such things the weaker they are, and they are the weaker the more they wish to seem learned—not in the knowledge of things, by which we are built up, but in that of signs, by which it is altogether difficult not to be puffed up, (See 1 Cor 8:1) since even the knowledge of things itself often raises the neck, unless it is held down by the Lord’s yoke. (See Matt 11:29–30)

For what harm does it do to one who understands that it is written thus: What is the land in which these dwell upon it, whether it is good or bad; and what are the cities in which they themselves inhabit in them? A pair of characteristic Hebraisms, Hebrew lacking any equivalent to relative pronouns, and having instead simply a relative particle. Sesotho and related African languages have a similar idiom. I think this expression belongs rather to a foreign language than to any deeper sense.

That too, which we can no longer remove from the mouth of the singing peoples—but upon him shall my sanctification flourish—takes nothing at all from the meaning. The more skilled hearer, however, would prefer this to be corrected, so that it might be said not floriet but florebit; and nothing hinders the correction except the custom of the singers. These things, then, can easily even be disregarded, if one is unwilling to guard against things that take nothing from sound understanding.

But as for what the Apostle says: what is foolish of God is wiser than men, and what is weak of God is stronger than men, (From here to the end of the section I just paraphrase, for reasons that will be obvious) if anyone had wished to preserve the Greek expression in it, so as to say, "what is foolish of God is wiser of men; and what is weak of God is stronger of men," (The Greek genitive of comparison instead of the Latin ablative) the attention of a watchful reader would indeed reach the truth of the meaning, but nevertheless someone slower would either not understand or even understand perversely. For such an expression in the Latin language is not only faulty, but it also falls into ambiguity, so that "the foolish of men" or "the weak of men" might seem to be wiser or stronger than that of God. And yet even wiser than men is not free of ambiguity, even though it is free of solecism. For whether hominibus is said as the dative or the ablative does not appear except by the illumination of the meaning. (If it were the dative, I suppose it would mean, “… is wiser for men … is stronger for men.”) It is therefore better said thus: "is wiser than men," and "is stronger than men."

14. 21. About ambiguous signs we shall speak later; now we are dealing with unknown ones, of which there are two forms, as far as words are concerned. For either an unknown word makes the reader stick, or an unknown expression. If these come from foreign languages, either they must be sought from people who know those languages, or those very languages, if there is both leisure and ability, must be learned, or a comparison of several translators must be consulted. But if we are ignorant of some words and expressions of our own language, they become known by the habit of reading and hearing. Indeed, nothing is more to be committed to memory than those kinds of words and expressions that we do not know; so that when either someone more skilled occurs about whom we can inquire, or such a reading as may show, from what precedes or what follows or both, what force it has, or what that which we do not know signifies, we may, with memory helping, easily notice and learn.

And yet so great is the force of habit even for learning that those who have somehow been nourished and brought up in the holy Scriptures wonder more at other expressions and think them less Latin than those which they learned in the Scriptures and which are not found in the authors of the Latin language.

Here too the great number of translators, examined and discussed by comparing manuscripts, helps very much. Only let falsity be absent; for the skill of those who desire to know the divine Scriptures ought first of all to keep watch over correcting the manuscripts, so that the uncorrected may yield to the corrected, at least when they come from one and the same kind of translation.

15. 22. But among the translations themselves, let the Itala be preferred to the rest; for it holds more closely to the words together with clarity of meaning. And for correcting any Latin versions, let the Greek ones be employed, among which, as far as the Old Testament is concerned, the authority of the Seventy translators excels. The Septuagint, or 70, LXX. The PL list some of the Fathers who retailed the story of the 70 separate cells. And they also say that Saint Jerome poured scorn on the story, and said that Aristeas, whose letter is at the base of it, only wrote that the 70 scholars were housed by King Ptolemy II Philadelphus, about 250 BC, in a “basilica, where they were collaborating, not prophesying”; and that this is how the Jewish historian Josephus also tells the story. See City of God 18.42–43. These, throughout all the more skilled Churches, Not necessarily Greek-speaking Churches. He would have had primarily in mind the Churches of Carthage, Rome, and Milan—and would soon have won the right to include the Church of Hippo Regius among them. are now said to have translated with such great presence of the Holy Spirit that there was one mouth of so many men.

And if, as is reported—and many not unworthy of belief proclaim it—when, separated each into his own cell, they had each translated, nothing was found in the manuscript of any one of them that was not found in the same words and in the same order of words in the rest, who would dare to compare anything with this authority, let alone prefer anything to it?

But if they conferred so that out of the common treatment and judgment of all there might be one voice, not even so does it befit or become any one man, of whatever skill, to aspire to correct the consensus of so many elders and learned men.

For this reason, even if something is found in the Hebrew exemplars otherwise than these set down, I think we must yield to the divine dispensation that was carried out through them: that the books which the Jewish nation was unwilling, whether out of religion or out of envy, to betray to the other peoples, were betrayed so long beforehand, by the power of King Ptolemy through his minister, to the nations who would believe through the Lord. And so it can be that they translated in such a way as the Holy Spirit, who was driving them and who had made one mouth for all, judged fitting for the nations. But nevertheless, as I said above, the comparison of these translators too, who clung more closely to the words, is not useless for often explaining the meaning.

The Latin manuscripts, then, of the Old Testament, as I had begun to say, are to be corrected, if necessary, by the authority of the Greek ones, and especially of those who, being the Seventy, are reported to have translated with one mouth. As for the books of the New Testament, if anything wavers among the Latin variants, there is no doubt that they ought to yield to the Greek, and especially to those found among the more learned and diligent Churches.

16. 23. But in figurative signs, if perhaps any unknown ones force the reader to stick, they are to be investigated partly by knowledge of the languages, partly by knowledge of things. For the pool of Siloam has some value for likeness and without doubt conveys something secret—where the man whose eyes the Lord had anointed with mud made from spittle was ordered to wash his face. Yet, this being a name of an unknown language, unless the Evangelist had translated it, so great an understanding would lie hidden. See John 9:6–7. As the name means “Sent,” the pool signifies Christ, in whom we wash in the sacrament of baptism, thereby having the eyes of our faith illuminated. This provides Augustine with the key by which to interpret the whole passage in terms of the salvation brought to humanity (born blind in original sin) through the Word becoming flesh (spittle mixed with soil).

So too many Hebrew names which were not translated by the authors of those same books are, there is no doubt, of no small force and help for solving the enigmas of the Scriptures, if one could translate them. Certain men skilled in that language have conferred no small benefit on posterity by translating all those same words separately out of the Scriptures; and what Adam is, what Eve, what Abraham, what Moses; or even the names of places, what Jerusalem is, or Zion, or Jericho, or Sinai, or Lebanon, or Jordan, and whatever other names in that language are unknown to us. When these are opened up and translated, many figurative expressions in the Scriptures are made manifest.

16. 24. But ignorance of things makes figurative expressions obscure, when we are ignorant of the natures of animals, or stones, or herbs, or other things, which for the most part are set down in the Scriptures for the sake of some likeness. For as to what is known about the serpent—that it offers its whole body to those who strike it in place of its head—how greatly it illuminates that sense in which the Lord bids us be cunning as serpents, (See Matt 10:16) so that, namely, in place of our head, which is Christ, (See Eph 4:15) we may rather offer our body to persecutors, lest the Christian faith be, as it were, killed in us if, sparing our body, we deny God!

Or that other thing—that, squeezed through the narrows of a cave, it lays aside its old tunic and is said to receive new strength—how well it harmonizes with imitating that very cunning of the serpent and putting off the old man, as the Apostle says, that we may be clothed with the new; (See Eph 4:22–24; Col 3:9–10) and putting it off through narrows, the Lord saying: enter through the narrow gate!

As, then, knowledge of the nature of the serpent illuminates the many likenesses that Scripture is accustomed to draw from this animal, so ignorance of certain animals, which it mentions no less by likenesses, hinders the interpreter very much. So too of stones, so of herbs, or whatever things are held by roots. For knowledge of the carbuncle, that it shines in the dark, illuminates many obscure things of the books too, wherever it is set down for the sake of likeness; and ignorance of the beryl or the diamond often shuts the doors of understanding. Nor for any other cause is it easy to understand that perpetual peace is signified by the little olive branch which the dove brought back when returning to the ark, (See Gen 8:11) except that we know both that the gentle touch of oil is not easily corrupted by another fluid, and that the tree itself is leafy perennially. But many, on account of ignorance of hyssop—while they do not know what force it has either for cleansing the lung or, as is said, for penetrating rocks with its roots, though it is a short and lowly herb—cannot at all find why it was said: you shall sprinkle me with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed.

16. 25. Ignorance of numbers, too, makes many things set down figuratively and mystically in the Scriptures not understood. He is not referring to ignorance of elementary arithmetic, but of what one may call theological or mystical arithmetic, the symbolism of numbers—let us call it arithmology. For a native wit, so to speak, cannot but be moved by what it means that Moses and Elijah and the Lord himself fasted for forty days. (See Exod 24:18; 1 Kgs 19:8; Luke 4:2; Matt 4:2) A certain figurative knot of this action is not loosed except by knowledge and consideration of this number. For it has ten taken four times, as though the knowledge of all things woven into times. For by the number four both daily and yearly courses are accomplished: the daily by the morning, midday, evening, and nocturnal spaces of the hours; the yearly by the spring, summer, autumn, and winter months. But while we live in times, we must abstain and fast from the delight in times, for the sake of the eternity in which we wish to live, although by the very courses of the times the very teaching of despising times and seeking eternal things is conveyed to us.

Furthermore, the number ten signifies the knowledge of the Creator and of the creature; for the Trinity is of the Creator, and the number seven indicates the creature, on account of life and body. For in that life there are three, whence also God is to be loved with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind; but in the body the four elements of which it consists appear most manifestly. (The four elements of ancient chemistry, earth, water, air, and fire)

In this ten, then, while it is conveyed to us temporally—that is, multiplied by four—we are admonished to live chastely and continently away from the delight in times; that is, to fast for forty days. This the Law, whose person is in Moses, this prophecy, whose person Elijah bears, this the Lord himself admonishes; who, having as it were testimony from the Law and the Prophets, shone forth in the midst between them on the mountain, with three disciples seeing and amazed. (See Mark 9:2–8; Matt 17:1–4)

Then it is asked thus, how fifty arises from the number forty—a number not slightly hallowed in our religion on account of Pentecost (See Acts 2)—and how, multiplied by three, on account of the three times, before the Law, under the Law, under grace, and on account of the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, with the Trinity itself more eminently added, it is referred to the mystery of the most purified Church and arrives at the one hundred and fifty-three fish which the nets caught when cast to the right side after the Resurrection of the Lord. See John 21:6–11. The fish represent the Church of the blessed after the resurrection of the dead. This gives us Augustine’s earliest way of interpreting this number 153. See Sermon 229M.2–3 for his more mature preference in this matter, treating 153 as the “triangle” of 17; that is, 17+16+15 . . . +1 = 153. See also Sermons 250, 251, 252A, 270. In Sermon 252, on the other hand, an earlier sermon preached in 396, about the time he was writing this work, he treats the number as here in our text. To us it may all seem rather bizarre; and yet surely Augustine is right in assuming that the evangelist regarded the number 153 as significantly symbolic. Thus by many and various other forms of numbers certain secrets of likenesses are set down in the holy books, which are closed to readers on account of ignorance of numbers. It is I who impose this word on Augustine; he just says unskilled in numbers; but we have seen what a very special “science of numbers” he has in mind.

16. 26. Ignorance of certain musical matters also closes off and conceals not a few things. For someone has not inelegantly opened up some figures of things from the difference between the psaltery and the lyre. And it is asked, not without point, among the learned whether the psaltery of ten strings has some law of music that compels it to such a number of strings; or whether, if it does not, the very number is for that reason all the more to be received in a sacred sense, either on account of the Decalogue of the Law—about which number too, if it is asked, it is to be referred only to the Creator and the creature With the first three commandments, as Augustine counted them, referring to our duties to God, and the next seven to our duties to our neighbor.—or on account of the ten itself expounded above.

And that number of the building of the temple, which is mentioned in the Gospel—namely, forty-six years—sounds something musical See The Trinity 4.1–10. and, referred to the structure of the Lord’s body, on account of which the mention of the temple was made, compels some heretics to confess that the Son of God was clothed not with a false but with a true and human body. For we find both number and music honorably set down in many places in the holy Scriptures.

17. 27. For the errors of the gentile superstitions are not to be heeded, which have feigned that the nine Muses are the daughters of Jupiter and Memory. Two manuscripts have Minerva instead of Memory. But in his work On Order 2.41, he mentions the same myth, and there too the Muses are daughters of Memory. Varro refutes them, than whom I do not know whether anyone among them could be more learned or more curious about such matters. For he says that some city—I do not recall the name—commissioned from three craftsmen three statues each of the Muses, to place as a gift in the temple of Apollo, so that whichever of the craftsmen had fashioned the more beautiful ones, they would choose and buy from him especially. And so it happened that those craftsmen too produced their works equally beautiful, and all nine pleased the city and all were bought to be dedicated in the temple of Apollo. He says that the poet Hesiod afterward imposed names upon them. Therefore Jupiter did not beget the nine Muses, but three workmen created three each.

But that city had not commissioned three because it had seen them in dreams, or because they had shown themselves in that number to the eyes of any of those men, but because it was easy to observe that every sound, which is the material of songs, is by nature threefold. For it is either produced by the voice, as is that of those who sing with the throat without an instrument; or by breath, as of trumpets and flutes; or by striking, as in lyres and drums and any other things that are tuneful by being struck. Whether this “rational” explanation of the three original Muses, so to say, comes from Varro or Augustine himself, I cannot tell. Given the derivation of the word “music” from “muse,” the explanation seems likely enough. Of the nine to whom Hesiod is said to have given names, Euterpe was conventionally the Muse of music, and Polyhymnia, presumably, of choral singing; Calliope possibly of instrumental music. But they do not seem to have been allotted the spheres of influence which Augustine suggests. The other six were Clio, the Muse of history, Thalia of comedy, Melpomene of tragedy, Terpsichore of dancing, Urania of astronomy, and Erato, presumably, of lyric poetry.

18. 28. But whether what Varro related is so or not, we nevertheless ought not, on account of the superstition of profane people, to flee music, if we can seize from it anything useful for understanding the holy Scriptures; nor to turn aside to their theatrical trifles, if we discuss something about lyres and instruments that has value for grasping spiritual things.

For neither ought we to have refused to learn letters because they say Mercury is their discoverer; nor, because they dedicated temples to Justice and Virtue and preferred to adore in stones what ought to be borne in the heart, must justice and virtue therefore be fled by us.

On the contrary, let whoever is a good and true Christian understand that truth, wherever he finds it, belongs to his Lord; and, conferring and acknowledging it even in the sacred writings, let him repudiate superstitious figments, and let him grieve over and beware of those who, knowing God, did not glorify him as God or give thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened; for, saying that they were wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of an image of corruptible man and of birds and of four-footed beasts and of serpents.

19. 29. But, to explain this whole topic more diligently, for it is especially necessary: there are two kinds of teaching that are practiced even in gentile customs. One is of those things which human beings have instituted, the other of those which they have observed as already done or as divinely instituted. (See section 41 onward) That which is according to human institutions is partly superstitious, partly not.

20. 30. Superstitious is whatever has been instituted by human beings pertaining to the making and worshiping of idols, or to worshiping the creature or any part of the creature as God, or to consultations and certain pacts of significations agreed and confederated with demons—such as are the endeavors of the magical arts, which the poets are accustomed rather to mention than to teach. They were of a quasi licentiore vanitate, because they were the official diviners employed by the Roman state, before it was formally converted to Christianity. Of this kind, but as it were with a more licensed vanity, are the books of the soothsayers and augurs. To this kind belong also all amulets and remedies, which the discipline of physicians too condemns, whether in incantations or in certain marks which they call "characters," or in any objects to be hung up and bound on, or even, in a way, to be danced—not for the tempering of bodies, but for certain significations either hidden or even manifest,

which they call by the milder name "physical," so that they may seem to entangle one not in superstition, as it were, but to benefit one by nature—such as are earrings on the top of each ear, or little rings made from the bones of ostriches on the fingers, or when you are told, while hiccupping, to hold your left thumb with your right hand.

20. 31. To these are joined thousands of most empty observances: if some limb has twitched; if, when friends are walking arm in arm, a stone or a dog or a boy has come between them. And the fact that they tread on a stone, as though it were a sunderer of friendship, is less troublesome than when they strike an innocent boy with a fist, if he runs between them as they walk together. But it is amusing that the boys are sometimes avenged by the dogs. For some are often so superstitious that they dare to strike even a dog that has come between them—not with impunity; for sometimes the dog quickly sends his striker from a vain remedy to a true physician.

Hence too are these: to tread on the threshold when one passes in front of one’s house; to go back to bed if anyone sneezes while putting on his shoes; to go back home if, setting out, he has stumbled; when a garment is gnawed by mice, to tremble more at the suspicion of future evil than to grieve at the present loss. Hence that elegant saying of Cato, who, when he was consulted by a certain man who said that his boots had been gnawed by mice, replied that this was no portent, but that it would truly have had to be reckoned a portent if the boots had gnawed the mice.

21. 32. Nor are those to be separated from this kind of pernicious superstition who are called genethliacs on account of their consideration of birthdays, but now are commonly called mathematicians. The casters of horoscopes. The Oxford English Dictionary does give “genethliac” as an English word; the Greek genethlia means first of all a birthday party—an important element of which, no doubt, was the casting of the host’s horoscope. The Latin word translated “astrologers” is mathematici. The superstition he is here attacking is of course both very common and very lucrative today. For these, although they pursue the true position of the stars when anyone is born, and sometimes even investigate it beforehand, The text, both CCSL and the PL, has et aliquando etiam pervestigent; but pervestigent adds nothing to the previous verb, consectentur; it simply means to investigate thoroughly. So I am guessing that Augustine wrote praevestigent—possibly inventing the word, as it does not figure in Lewis & Short. He would have been thinking, I assumed, of forecasts of eclipses and other such celestial phenomena made by astrologers. nevertheless, in that they try from this to predict either our actions or the outcomes of our actions, they err too greatly and sell to unskilled people a wretched slavery. For when any free man has gone in to a mathematician of this kind, he gives money so that he may come out a slave either of Mars or of Venus, or rather of all the heavenly bodies, on which those who first went astray and proffered their error to posterity imposed names, either of beasts on account of likeness, or of human beings for honoring those very human beings. He is referring to the names of the signs of the zodiac, as well as of certain constellations. The human beings would be Gemini, the twins Castor and Pollux, Virgo, Sagittarius, Aquarius, and constellations such as Orion.

For it is not to be wondered at, since even in nearer and more recent times they tried to dedicate the star which we call Lucifer to the honor and name of the Roman Caesar. And perhaps it would have been done and would have passed into antiquity, had not his grandmother Venus preoccupied this estate of the name, and could by no right transmit to her heirs what she had never possessed while alive or sought to possess. (Presumably what he means is that the goddess Venus never actually existed)

For where a place was empty and was not held by the honor of any of the earlier dead, what usually happens in such matters was done. For instead of the months Quintilis and Sextilis The old names for July and August, counting the months from March. As no other imperial worthies emerged to match the two founders of the Julian dynasty, the next months remained the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth; September, October, November, December. we call them July and August, named from the honors of the men Julius Caesar and Augustus Caesar, so that anyone who wishes may easily understand that those stars too formerly wandered the sky without these names; but when those men died, whose memory people were either compelled by royal power to honor or were pleased by human vanity to honor, by imposing their names on the stars they seemed to themselves to lift those very dead men into heaven.

But by whatever names they are called by human beings, they are nevertheless stars which God instituted and ordered as he willed, and there is a fixed motion of theirs, by which times are distinguished and varied. To note this motion, how it stands when anyone is born, is easy by means of the rules found and written down by those whom holy Scripture condemns, saying: for if they were able to know so much that they could estimate the world, how did they not more easily find its Lord?

22. 33. But to wish, from that noting, to predict the morals, acts, and outcomes of those being born is a great error and a great madness. And among those, indeed, who have unlearned such things to be learned, this superstition is refuted without any doubt. For what they call constellations is a noting of the stars, Literally, “constellations”; but the use of this word in its astrological sense is obsolete in English, while its nearest equivalent, “conjunctions,” is a respectable term of scientific astronomy. how they stood when the one was born about whom these wretched people are consulted by the more wretched. But it can happen that some twins are brought forth from the womb in such close succession that no interval of time between them can be apprehended and noted in the numbers of the constellations. Hence it is necessary that some twins have the same constellations, while they do not have equal outcomes of the things they either do or suffer, but for the most part so unequal that one lives most happily, the other most unhappily,

as we have received that Esau and Jacob were born twins, so that Jacob, who was being born later, was found holding with his hand the heel of his preceding brother. Certainly the day and hour of these men being born could not be noted otherwise than that the constellation of both would be one. But how great a difference there is between the morals, deeds, labors, and successes of both, Scripture is witness, now spread abroad through the mouth of all the nations.

22. 34. For it is not to the point that they say the very smallest and narrowest moment of time which marks off the birth of twins has great power in the nature of things and in the most rapid swiftness of the heavenly bodies. For even if I should grant that it has the greatest power, nevertheless it cannot be found by the mathematician in the constellations, by inspecting which he professes to tell the fates. What, then, he does not find in the constellations—which he must necessarily inspect as one and the same, whether he is consulted about Jacob or about his brother—what does it profit him if it differs in the sky, which he rashly and securely defames, and does not differ on the chart, which he vainly and anxiously gazes upon?

For this reason these opinions too, established by human presumption upon certain signs of things, are to be referred to those same things as though to certain pacts and agreements with demons.

23. 35. For from this it comes about that, by a certain hidden divine judgment, people desirous of evil things are handed over to be mocked and deceived according to the merits of their wills, by the prevaricating angels who mock and deceive them, to whom this lowest part of the world, according to the most beautiful order of things, has been subjected by the law of divine providence. See Eph 2:2; Luke 10:18; Rev 12:9. It was a common Jewish belief that the lower atmosphere was infested with evil spirits. By these mockeries and deceptions it comes about that, by those superstitious and pernicious kinds of divinations, many past and future things are told, and happen no otherwise than they are told, and many things turn out for the observers according to their observations; and entangled in these, they become more curious and insert themselves more and more into the manifold snares of a most pernicious error.

This kind of fornication of the soul the divine Scripture has healthfully not passed over in silence, nor did it so deter the soul from it as to deny that such things are to be shunned merely because they are spoken falsely by their professors, but it says even: if they tell you, and it should so happen, do not believe them. For not because the image of the dead Samuel foretold true things to King Saul are such sacrileges, by which that image was presented, any the less to be execrated; nor, because in the Acts of the Apostles a ventriloquist woman bore true testimony to the apostles of the Lord, did the apostle Paul therefore spare that spirit, rather than cleanse the woman by the rebuke and expulsion of that demon. (See 1 Sam 28:8–19; Sir 46:23; Acts 16:16–18)

23. 36. All such arts, then, of either trifling or harmful superstition, established from a certain pestilent fellowship of human beings and demons as though by pacts of a faithless and deceitful friendship, are utterly to be repudiated and fled by a Christian: not that an idol is anything, says the Apostle, but that what they sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God; and I do not wish you to become partners of demons. But what the Apostle said about idols and about the sacrifices that are offered for their honor must be thought about all imaginary signs which draw one either to the worship of idols, or to worshiping the creature and its parts as God, or which pertain to the care of remedies and other observances. These are not established divinely, as though publicly, for the love of God and neighbor, but through private appetites for temporal things they scatter the hearts of the wretched.

In all these teachings, then, the fellowship of demons is to be dreaded and avoided, who, together with their prince the devil, try nothing else than to close and bar our return. The only return Scripture mentions as being barred to us is the return to paradise, Gen 3:24, and that was barred by an angelic sentry placed there by God. Augustine is writing rather loosely here; but that seems to have been the image at the back of his mind. But just as, concerning the stars which God founded and ordered, human and deceptive conjectures have been established by human beings, so too, concerning whatever things come into being at birth, or exist in any way by the administration of divine providence, many people have committed to writing many things conjectured by human suspicions, as though by rule, in case they should happen unusually—as if a mule should give birth or something should be struck by lightning.

24. 37. All these have as much power as they have been confederated with demons by the presumption of minds, as though by a certain common language. Yet all these are full of pestilent curiosity, tormenting anxiety, deadly slavery. For they were not observed because they had power, but by observing and marking them it came about that they had power. And therefore they turn out differently for different people according to their thoughts and presumptions. For those spirits who wish to deceive procure such things for each one as they see him entangled by, through his suspicions and consents.

For just as, for example, the single shape of the letter "X," which is marked crosswise, The letter X—ten in Roman numerals, the letter chi in the Greek alphabet, the equivalent of the guttural German “ch” in achtung. means one thing among the Greeks and another among the Latins, not by nature but by agreement and consent in signifying; and therefore one who knows both languages, if he wishes to signify something in writing to a Greek, does not put this letter in that signification in which he puts it when he writes to a Latin; and "beta" is, with one and the same sound, the name of a letter among the Greeks, of a vegetable among the Latins; (It means a beet root in Latin) and when I say "lege," in these two syllables a Greek understands one thing, a Latin another; In Greek it means “say,” in Latin “choose” or “read.” For Augustine personally it would primarily have meant “read,” recalling the dramatic incident of his conversion, when he heard a child’s voice singing Tolle, lege, tolle, lege—“Pick up and read, pick up and read”—and he picked up the volume of Paul’s letters, opened it at random, and read Rom 13:3–14 (Confessions 8.12).

just as, then, all these significations move minds according to the consent of each one’s society, and because the consent is different, they move differently; nor did human beings consent to them because they already had power for signification, but they have power because human beings consented to them;

so too those signs by which the pernicious fellowship of demons is procured have power according to the observances of each one. This is shown most manifestly by the rite of the augurs, who both before they observe and after they have held the observed signs act so as not to see the flights or hear the voices of birds, because these are no signs at all unless the consent of the observer is added. Augury was the art of divination by bird watching. Augustine seems here to be assuming what he is setting out to prove, namely, that such things are only signs when they are being observed as such. The fact, if it was a fact, that augurs only observed them when divining, and not at other times, hardly implies that they did not regard them as being signs of their very nature. The fact that I am not always reading a book does not imply that I think it only has a significant content when, and because, I am reading it.

25. 38. When these have been cut away and uprooted from the Christian mind, the institutions of human beings that are not superstitious are next to be considered—that is, those established not with demons but with human beings themselves. For all things that have power among human beings because it has pleased them that they should have power are institutions of human beings; of which some are superfluous and luxurious institutions, some convenient and necessary.

For if those signs which actors make by dancing had power by nature, not by the institution and consent of human beings, in former times a herald would not have announced beforehand to the people of Carthage, while the pantomime danced, what the dancer wished to be understood. Many old men still remember this, by whose account we are accustomed to hear these things. And this is to be believed, because even now, if anyone unskilled enters a theater of such trifles, unless it is told him by another what those motions signify, he is wholly intent in vain.

Yet all seek a certain likeness in signifying, so that the signs themselves may, as far as they can, be like the things that are signified. But because something can be like something else in many ways, such signs do not hold among human beings unless consent is added.

25. 39. But in pictures and statues and other such imitative works, especially those of skilled craftsmen, no one errs when he sees likenesses, so as to recognize what things they are like. And this whole class is to be numbered among the superfluous institutions of human beings, except when it matters which of them is made for what cause and where and when and by whose authority. Finally, thousands of feigned fables and falsehoods, by whose lies human beings are delighted, are human institutions. And nothing is to be reckoned more proper to human beings, as having it from themselves, than whatever is false and mendacious.

But convenient and necessary institutions of human beings with human beings are whatever difference in the dress and adornment of the body has been agreed upon for distinguishing the sexes or ranks, and the innumerable kinds of significations without which human society is either not at all or less conveniently carried on; and whatever in weights and measures, and in the stamping or valuing of coins, are proper to each city and people, and other things of this kind, which, unless they were human institutions, would not be various among the different peoples, nor would they be changed even among the individual peoples at the discretion of their rulers.

25. 40. But this whole part of human institutions, which serves the necessary use of life, is by no means to be fled by a Christian; rather, it is even to be considered and retained in memory as far as is sufficient.

26. 40. For certain human institutions are shadowy and somehow like natural things. Of these, those which pertain to the fellowship of demons, as has been said, are utterly to be repudiated and detested; but those which human beings have with human beings are to be taken up, insofar as they are not luxurious and superfluous—and especially the shapes of letters without which we cannot read, and the variety of languages as far as is sufficient, about which we disputed above. (See sections 15–25 above) Of that kind too are the marks which those who have learned them are now properly called notaries for knowing. (Literally, “. . . notes, learned by those who are called notaries.”)

These are useful, and they are not learned unlawfully, nor do they entangle one in superstition, nor enervate one with luxury, provided only that they occupy one so far as not to be an impediment to the greater things which they ought to serve in being attained. That is to say, the holy Scriptures and how to expound them. Augustine does not want the clergy so to specialize in some secular branch of learning that they neglect their proper theological studies, and the application of them to their pastoral duties.

27. 41. But now those things which human beings have brought forth not by instituting, but by investigating things either accomplished in past times or divinely instituted, wherever they are learned, are not to be reckoned human institutions. Of these, some pertain to the sense of the body, others to the reason of the mind. But those which are reached by the sense of the body, we either believe when narrated, or perceive when demonstrated, or conjecture when experienced. There he leaves these arts and sciences—his Latin just says “these things/matters”—which pertain to the senses. We have to remind ourselves that all the time he is talking about signs; and the only reason I do not translate here as “those signs,” but as “those arts and sciences,” is that we do not naturally talk about history, natural science, logic, etc., which he goes on to discuss at length, as signs. So, coming to those which pertain to the senses, it will transpire that he includes history among them—I presume because it deals with external, physical events and realities; also astronomy and all practical arts and crafts.

28. 42. Whatever, then, that which is called history indicates about the order of past times helps us very much toward understanding the holy books, even if it is learned outside the Church in childhood education. For we are often asked about many things by means of the Olympiads and by the names of the consuls. Respectively the official Greek and Roman methods of dating events. An olympiad was a period of four years between Olympic games, the first games having been traditionally celebrated in what we now call 776 B.C. As Roman consuls held office just for a year, dating events by who were the consuls that year was about the clumsiest method imaginable, requiring huge lists of consuls dating back to the expulsion of the kings from Rome. So a rather better way of dating was ab urbe condita, from the founding of the city, traditionally put in 753 B.C. Our AD/BC chronology was only introduced some 100 years after Augustine’s death; and as is well known, the ingenious monk who invented it, Dionysius Exiguus, or Denis the Short, got it wrong by about 6 years, Jesus in fact being born about 6 B.C, seeing that Herod the Great, in whose reign he was born, died in 4 B.C. But we should not be too hard on Denis the Short; collating all those different calendar systems—there was also the Seleucid one of the Hellenistic kingdoms, dating events from “the year of the Greeks,” from 312 B.C., to be found in the books of the Maccabees—must have been mind-boggling. And ignorance of the consulship in which the Lord was born and in which he suffered compelled some to err, so that they thought the Lord suffered at the age of forty-six, because it was said by the Jews that the temple was built over so many years, which had the image of the Lord’s body. (See John 2:20–21)

And we hold, indeed, by the authority of the Gospel that he was baptized at about thirty years of age; (See Luke 3:23) but how many years he afterward spent in this life, although it can be noticed from the very text of his actions, The accepted period of three years for Christ’s ministry derives entirely from John’s Gospel. From the synoptic account it could have lasted as little as one year or as long as four or five. Presumably Augustine thought it lasted three years—but he is not really interested; his only concern here is to save the number 46 from being taken literally as applying to Christ’s age, and so to preserve its mystical sense. nevertheless, lest a fog of doubt arise from elsewhere, it is gathered more clearly and certainly from the history of the nations compared with the Gospel. For then it will be seen not to have been said in vain that the temple was built in forty-six years, so that, since this number could not be referred to the Lord’s age, it may be referred to the more secret instruction of the human body, which the only Son of God, through whom all things were made, did not disdain to put on for our sake.

28. 43. But as for the usefulness of history—to pass over the Greeks—how great a question our Ambrose resolved, against the slanderers who are readers and lovers of Plato, who dared to say that our Lord Jesus Christ learned from the books of Plato all those sayings of his which they are compelled to admire and proclaim, since it cannot be denied that Plato existed long before the human coming of the Lord! Did not the said bishop, having considered the history of the nations, when he had found that Plato had set out for Egypt in the times of Jeremiah, where that Prophet then was, show that it is more probable that Plato was rather instructed in our writings through Jeremiah, so that he could teach or write those things which are rightly praised? See the passage from Revisions given above, before book 1.

For before the writings of the Hebrew nation, in which the worship of the one God shone forth, from which according to the flesh our Lord came, not even Pythagoras himself existed, from whose successors these people assert that Plato learned theology. Thus, with the times considered, it becomes much more credible that these people rather had from our writings whatever good and true things they said, than that the Lord Jesus Christ had them from Plato’s—which is most insane to believe.

28. 44. But when, in a historical narration, the past institutions of human beings too are narrated, history itself is not to be numbered among human institutions, because things that have passed and cannot now be made undone are to be held in the order of times, of which God is the founder and administrator.

For it is one thing to narrate things done, another to teach things to be done. History narrates things done faithfully and usefully; but the books of the soothsayers and any similar writings aim to teach things to be done or observed, with the boldness of an adviser, not with the faithfulness of an informant.

29. 45. There is also a narration like demonstration, by which not past but present things are indicated to those who do not know them. In this class are whatever things are written about the situation of places and the natures of animals, trees, herbs, stones, or other bodies.

We dealt with this class above (In section 24 above) and taught that knowledge of it has value for solving the enigmas of the Scriptures, not so that it may be employed as certain signs, as though for the remedies or contrivances of some superstition; for we have already distinguished and separated that kind from this lawful and free one. For it is one thing to say, "if you drink this herb ground up, your stomach will not hurt," and another to say, "if you hang this herb on your neck, your stomach will not hurt." There the healthful tempering is approved; here the superstitious signification is condemned.

Although, where there are no incantations and invocations and "characters," See section 30 above. It is these “characters” that would often be little scriptural texts, frequently the divine name. it is for the most part doubtful whether the thing which is bound on or in any way attached for healing the body has power by the force of nature, which is to be freely employed, or comes about by a certain significative obligation. That such a superstitious signification could be effective Augustine did not doubt; it would be so thanks to demonic collaboration. This a Christian ought to beware of the more prudently the more efficaciously it will seem to benefit. But where it lies hidden by what cause something has power, it matters with what intention each one uses it—at least in healing or tempering bodies, whether in medicine or in agriculture.

29. 46. But of the stars to be known there is not a narration but a demonstration, very few of which Scripture mentions. Now just as the course of the moon, which is also solemnly employed for celebrating the Lord’s Passion annually, is known to very many, so to very few are the rising or setting or any other moments of the other stars also most well known, without any error. This knowledge by itself, although it does not bind one in superstition, nevertheless helps the treatment of the divine Scriptures not much—indeed almost nothing—and by its fruitless intentness rather hinders; and because it is familiar to the most pernicious error of those who sing foolish fates, it is more conveniently and honorably disregarded. But besides the demonstration of present things, it also has something like the narration of past things, since from the present position and motion of the stars one may regularly run back to their past traces as well.

It also has regular conjectures of future things, not suspicious and ominous but settled and certain; not so that we may try to draw something from them onto our own fates Reading fata with six manuscripts mentioned by the PL, instead of the facta “our deeds,” of both the PL’s and CCSL’s text. CCSL does not even mention this alternative reading. and outcomes, such as are the deliriums of the genethliacs, but only insofar as it pertains to the stars themselves.

For just as one who reckons the moon, when he has observed today what its phase is, can say what phase it was however many years before and what phase it will be however many years after, so about each of the stars those who reckon them skillfully are accustomed to answer. About this whole knowledge, as far as concerns its use, I have disclosed what seems to me.

30. 47. Of the other arts too, by which something is fabricated—whether what remains after the operation of the craftsman as something made by him, such as a house and a bench and some vessel and other such things; or those which exhibit a certain ministry to God as he works, such as medicine and agriculture and navigation; or those whose whole effect is the action, such as those of dances and runnings and wrestlings: of all these arts, then, experiences of past things also make future things to be conjectured.

For no craftsman of these moves his limbs in working unless he weaves the memory of past things together with the expectation of future things. But the knowledge of these is to be employed slightly and in passing in this human life, not for working—unless perhaps some duty compels it, about which we are not now treating—but for judging, lest we be altogether ignorant of what Scripture means to convey when it inserts some figurative expressions about these arts.

31. 48. There remain those things which pertain not to the senses of the body but to the reason of the mind, where the discipline of argument and of number reigns. But the discipline of argument is of the greatest value for penetrating and resolving all the kinds of questions that are in the holy writings. Only there is the lust for wrangling and a certain childish ostentation of deceiving an adversary to be guarded against.

For there are many things called sophisms, false conclusions of reasonings, and for the most part so imitating true ones that they deceive not only the slow but also the clever who are less diligently attentive. For someone proposed, saying to the one with whom he was speaking: "What I am, you are not." And the other agreed. For it was true in part, even by the very fact that the one was insidious, the other guileless. Then the first added: "But I am a human being." And when he had received this too from the other, he concluded, saying: "You, therefore, are not a human being."

This kind of captious conclusion Scripture, as I judge, detests in that place where it is said: he who speaks sophistically is hateful. Although even speech that is not captious, but nevertheless pursues ornaments of words more abundantly than gravity befits, is called sophistical. Since public speaking and argument were, in civil life, almost exclusively confined to the law courts, it is lawyers and their tricks and their rhetorical tours de force that he primarily has in mind in this section.

31. 49. There are also true connections of reasoning that have false statements, which follow upon the error of the one with whom the discussion is held. Yet these are brought in by a good and learned man for this purpose, that the one whose error they follow upon, blushing at them, may abandon that same error; for if he should wish to remain in it, he is necessarily compelled to hold also those things which he condemns. For the Apostle was not bringing in true things when he said: neither has Christ risen, and those other things: our preaching is empty, and your faith is also empty; and then other things which are altogether false, since both Christ has risen, and the preaching of those who announced this was not empty, nor the faith of those who had believed it. But these false things were most truly connected to that statement by which it was said that there is no resurrection of the dead. And when these false things have been rejected, since they were true if the dead do not rise, the consequence will be the resurrection of the dead.

Since, then, there are true connections not only of true but also of false statements, it is easy to learn the truth of connections even in those schools which are outside the Church. But the truth of statements is to be investigated in the holy ecclesiastical books. This, of course, is not itself a universal statement about the truth of all statements. We must again not forget that Augustine’s work is concerned with teaching Christianity, and so the only statements or opinions he is interested in are religious and theological ones.

32. 50. The very truth of connections, however, was not instituted but noticed and noted by human beings, so that they could either learn or teach it. For it is perpetual in the reason of things and divinely instituted. For just as one who narrates the order of times does not himself compose it, and one who shows the situations of places or the natures of animals or plants or stones does not show things instituted by human beings; and one who demonstrates the stars and their motions does not demonstrate a thing instituted by himself or by any human being: so too one who says, "When that which follows is false, it is necessary that that which precedes be false," says most truly, and does not himself make it to be so, but only demonstrates that it is so.

From this rule is that which we mentioned about the apostle Paul; for the premise is that there is no resurrection of the dead, which those said whose error the Apostle wished to destroy. Now upon that preceding statement, by which they said there is no resurrection of the dead, there necessarily follows: neither has Christ risen. (1 Cor 15:13) But this which follows is false; for Christ has risen: therefore that which precedes is also false. But that which precedes is that there is no resurrection of the dead; therefore there is a resurrection of the dead. The whole of which is briefly said thus: if there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen; but Christ has risen, therefore there is a resurrection of the dead.

This, then—that when the consequent is removed, that which precedes is also necessarily removed—human beings did not institute but showed. And this rule pertains to the truth of connections, not to the truth of statements.

33. 51. But in this place, when the resurrection was being treated, both the rule of connection is true, and the statement itself in the conclusion. In false statements, however, the truth of connection is in this manner: let us suppose that someone has conceded, "If a snail is an animal, it has a voice." This being conceded, when it has been proved that the snail does not have a voice, since, the consequent being removed, that which precedes is removed, it is concluded that the snail is not an animal. This statement is false, but from the false thing conceded the connection of the conclusion is true.

And so the truth of a statement has value through itself, but the truth of a connection Here, by the word connexio, which I have been translating “logical inference,” he must mean the conclusion inferred, not the valid rule by which it is inferred. consists in the opinion or concession of the one with whom the discussion is held.

But, as we said above, what is false is inferred by a true connection so that the one whose error we wish to correct may repent of having held the premises, whose consequences he sees are to be rejected. From this it is now easy to understand that, just as in false statements there can be true conclusions, so in true statements there can be false ones.

For suppose that someone has proposed, "If that man is just, he is good," and it has been conceded; then has assumed, "But he is not just"; this likewise being conceded, has drawn the conclusion, "Therefore he is not good." And although all these may be true, nevertheless the rule of the conclusion is not true.

For just as, the consequent being removed, that which precedes is necessarily removed, it is not so that, the antecedent being removed, that which follows is necessarily removed. For it is true when we say, "If he is an orator, he is a human being"; from which proposition, if we assume, "But he is not an orator," it will not follow when you infer, "Therefore he is not a human being."

34. 52. For this reason it is one thing to know the rules of connections, another the truth of statements. In the former is learned what is "consequent," what "not consequent," what "incompatible." Consequent: "If he is an orator, he is a human being"; inconsequent: "If he is a human being, he is an orator"; incompatible: "If he is a human being, he is a quadruped." Here, then, judgment is made about the connection itself.

But in the truth of statements the statements themselves through themselves, not their connection, are to be considered. But when uncertain statements are joined to true and certain ones by a true connection, they too necessarily become certain.

But some boast of themselves, when they have learned the truth of connections, as though it were the truth of statements itself. And again, some, for the most part holding a true statement, wrongly despise themselves because they are ignorant of the laws of conclusion; whereas the one who knows that there is a resurrection of the dead is better than the one who knows that it is consequent that, if there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen.

35. 53. Likewise the science of defining, dividing, and partitioning, although it is for the most part employed even on false things, is nevertheless not itself false, nor instituted by human beings, but discovered in the reason of things. For it is not, because the poets have been accustomed to employ it in their fables, and false philosophers, or even heretics—that is, false Christians—in the opinions of their error, therefore false that, neither in defining nor in dividing or partitioning, anything is to be embraced which does not pertain to the matter itself, or anything that pertains to be passed over. This is true even if the things that are defined or distributed are not true.

For the false itself too is defined, when we say that the false is the signification of a thing not standing as it is signified, or in some other way; which definition is true, although the false cannot be true. We can also divide, saying that there are two kinds of the false: one of those which can in no way be, the other of those which are not, although they could be. For one who says that seven and three are eleven says what can in no way be; but one who says, for example, that it rained on the Kalends of January, although it did not happen, nevertheless says what could happen. The definition, therefore, and division of false things can be most true, although the false things themselves are certainly not true.

36. 54. There are also certain precepts of richer argument which is now named eloquence, which are nonetheless true, although false things too can be persuaded by them; The essential aim of eloquence in classical antiquity was to persuade, above all to persuade judges and juries, since it was before all else a forensic art. but because true things too can, the faculty itself is not blameworthy, but the perversity of those who use it badly.

For neither was this instituted by human beings—that the expression of love should win over the hearer, or that a brief and open narration should easily convey what it intends, and that its variety should hold the attentive without disdain, and the other such observances, which, whether in false or in true causes, are nevertheless true insofar as they make something to be either known or believed, or move minds to seeking or fleeing; and they were discovered rather because they are so, than instituted in order that they should be so.

37. 55. But this part, when it is learned, is to be employed more for bringing forth the things that have been understood than for understanding. That other part, of conclusions and definitions and distributions, helps the interpreter very much: only let there be absent the error by which people seem to themselves to have learned the very truth of the happy life when they have learned these things. Although it for the most part happens that people more easily attain those things for the attaining of which these are learned, than the most knotty and thorny disciplines of such precepts.

As if someone wishing to give precepts of walking should warn that the hinder foot is not to be lifted unless you have set down the front one, and then should describe in detail how the hinges of the joints and knees ought to be moved. For he speaks the truth, nor can one walk otherwise; but people more easily walk by doing these things than they notice when they do them, or understand when they hear them. But those who cannot walk care much less for the things which they cannot attend to even by experience. Thus for the most part the clever person more quickly sees that a conclusion is not valid than he grasps its precepts, but the slow person does not see it, and much less what is prescribed about it.

And in all these things the very spectacles of truth often delight us more than we are helped by them in arguing or judging—except perhaps that they render minds more practiced, provided they do not also render them more malicious or more puffed up; that is, so that those who have learned these things either love to deceive by verisimilar speech and questions, or think they have attained something great by which they may set themselves before the good and innocent.

38. 56. But now it is clear to even the slowest person that the discipline of number was not instituted by human beings, but rather searched out and discovered. For not as Virgil willed the first syllable of "Italia," which the ancients pronounced short, Cf. Virgil, Aeneid 1.2. and it was made long, can anyone bring it about, when he wills, that three times three either not be nine, or not be able to make a square figure, or not be triple in relation to the number three, sextuple in relation to six, and double in relation to none—since intelligible numbers do not have a half. Cf. Augustine, Letter 3.2, On Free Choice of the Will 2.8.22. Whether, then, numbers are considered in themselves, or applied to the laws of figures or of sounds or other motions, (To geometry, music, and astronomy) they have unchangeable rules, in no way instituted by human beings, but discovered by the sagacity of the clever.

38. 57. But whoever so loves all these things that he wishes to boast of himself among the unskilled, and does not rather seek whence are true the things which he has only felt to be true, and whence certain things are not only true but even unchangeable, which he has comprehended to be unchangeable, and thus, passing from the form of bodies up to the human mind, when he has found that this too is changeable, since it is now learned, now unlearned, yet set between the unchangeable truth above it and the changeable other things below it, so as to turn all to the praise and love of the one God, from whom he knows all things to be—he can seem learned, but to be wise in no way.

39. 58. For this reason it seems to me that it is healthfully prescribed to studious and clever young people who fear God and seek the happy life, that they not dare to follow securely any teachings which are practiced outside the Church of Christ, as though for laying hold of the happy life, but that they judge them soberly and diligently; and if they find any instituted by human beings, various on account of the diverse will of those instituting them, and unknown on account of the suspicions of those in error, especially if they also have a fellowship entered into with demons through certain significations as though by certain pacts and agreements, let them repudiate and detest them utterly; let them also estrange their zeal from the superfluous and luxurious institutions of human beings.

But those institutions of human beings which have value for the society of those living together, let them not neglect on account of the very necessity of this life. But in the other teachings which are found among the nations, besides the history of things either of past or present time pertaining to the senses of the body—among which the experiences and conjectures of the useful corporeal arts too are numbered—and besides the reason of argument and of number, I think there is nothing useful. In all of which this is to be held: nothing too much! Terence, Andria 1.61. and especially in those things which, pertaining to the senses of the body, are revolved in times and contained in places.

39. 59. But just as certain people have made it possible for all the Hebrew and Syriac (That is, Aramaic; its later form is known as Syriac, the language of several Christian liturgies) and Egyptian words and names, or any in another language that can be found in the holy Scriptures placed in them without translation, to be translated separately, and as Eusebius Augustine is here probably referring, not to Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History, but to his Chronicon, a summary of world history. Eusebius did write a book on biblical topography, Bible place names, called the Onomasticon, which Augustine was presumably unaware of. did concerning the history of times for the sake of the questions of the divine books which demand its use—what these, then, did about these matters, so that it should not be necessary for a Christian to labor in many things for the sake of a few;

so I see it can be done, if it should delight any of those who are able to expend kindly effort indeed on fraternal usefulness, that whatever places of the earth, or animals, or herbs and trees, or stones, or unknown metals, and whatever kinds of things Scripture mentions, he may, arranging them by class, commit to writing the exposition of them alone. It can also be done concerning numbers, that the explained reason only of those numbers which the divine Scripture mentions may be written down.

Some or all of which things have perhaps already been done, just as we have found many things which we did not think had been worked out and written down by good and learned Christians; but they lie hidden either on account of the throngs of the negligent or on account of the concealments of the envious.

Whether this can be done concerning the reason of argument I do not know. And it seems to me it cannot, because it is bound together throughout the whole text of the Scriptures in the manner of sinews; and therefore it helps readers more for resolving and explaining ambiguities, about which we shall speak later, than for knowing unknown signs, about which we are now treating.

40. 60. But the philosophers, as they are called, if they have perhaps said anything true and accommodated to our faith—especially the Platonists—are not only not to be dreaded, but are even to be claimed from them, as from unjust possessors, for our use. For just as the Egyptians had not only idols and heavy burdens, which the people of Israel detested and fled, but also vessels and ornaments of gold and silver, and clothing, which that people, going out from Egypt, secretly claimed for itself as though for a better use—not by its own authority, but by the precept of God, the Egyptians themselves unknowingly lending the things which they were not using well; (See Ex 3:22, 11:2–3, 12:35–36)

so all the teachings of the gentiles have not only simulated and superstitious figments and heavy loads of superfluous labor, which each one of us, going out from the fellowship of the gentiles under Christ’s leadership, ought to abominate and avoid, but they also contain liberal disciplines more apt for the use of truth, and certain most useful precepts of morals; and some true things are found among them concerning the worship of the one God himself.

This gold and silver of theirs, as it were—which they did not institute themselves, but dug out, as from certain mines of divine providence, which is everywhere infused, and which they perversely and injuriously abuse for the service of demons—the Christian, when he separates himself in mind from their wretched fellowship, ought to take from them for the just use of preaching the Gospel. Their clothing too—that is, institutions indeed of human beings, but nevertheless accommodated to human society, which we cannot lack in this life—it is lawful to receive and to have, to be turned to Christian use.

40. 61. For what else have many good believers of ours done? Do we not see with how much gold and silver and clothing Cyprian, that most sweet teacher and most blessed martyr, came out laden from Egypt? With how much Lactantius? With how much Victorinus, Optatus, Hilary, to be silent about the living? Lactantius, an apologist, an older contemporary of Eusebius’, who died about 320 as a very old man, and tutor to Constantine’s eldest son Crispus, who was murdered by his imperial father a year or two later; Victorinus, an older contemporary of Augustine’s, also an African, something of a philosopher, whose conversion in Rome fairly late in his life made a great impression on Augustine (Confessions 8.2); Optatus, also an older contemporary, and bishop of Milevis in Numidia, an anti-Donatist writer who died about 400; Hilary, bishop of Poitiers from about 353 till his death in 367, a staunch ally of Athanasius in the fight against Arianism. As Augustine does not mention Ambrose, for whom he had the greatest admiration, one may infer that he wrote this work, or at any rate reached this part of it, before Ambrose’s death in 397. With how much innumerable Greeks? This very thing Moses, that most faithful servant of God, had done before, of whom it is written that he was instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians.

To all of these men the superstitious custom of the nations—and especially in those times when, shaking off the yoke of Christ, it persecuted Christians—would never have lent the disciplines which it held useful, had it suspected that they would be turned to the use of worshiping the one God, by which the vain worship of idols would be cut down. But they gave their gold and silver and clothing to the people of God going out from Egypt, not knowing how the things they gave would be rendered to the service of Christ. For that which was done in Exodus was without doubt figurative, so as to prefigure this. (See, for example, 1 Cor 10:1–11) Let me have said this without prejudice to another understanding either equal or better.

41. 62. But the student of the divine Scriptures, instructed in this way, when he begins to approach them for searching them out, let him not cease to think of that apostolic saying: knowledge puffs up, but love builds up. For thus he perceives that, although he comes out rich from Egypt, nevertheless, unless he has kept the Passover, he cannot be saved. But Christ our Passover has been sacrificed, and nothing teaches us more by the sacrifice of Christ than what he himself cries out, as though to those whom he sees laboring in Egypt under Pharaoh: Come to me, you who labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you. Take my yoke upon you and learn from me, for I am gentle and humble of heart; and you will find rest for your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light. To whom, except to the gentle and humble of heart, whom knowledge does not puff up, but love builds up?

Let them remember, then, that those who celebrated the Passover at that time through the imaginary forms of shadows, (See Heb 10:1) when they were ordered to mark the doorposts with the blood of the lamb, marked them with hyssop. This herb is humble and gentle, and nothing is stronger and more penetrating than its roots, so that, rooted and grounded in love, we may be able to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth—that is, the Cross of the Lord.

Of which the breadth is said to be in the transverse wood, on which the hands are stretched out; the length, from the ground up to that breadth, where the whole body from the hands downward is fixed; the height, from the breadth upward to the top, where the head adheres; but the depth is that which, fixed in the earth, is hidden.

By this sign of the cross every Christian action is described: to work well in Christ and to adhere to him perseveringly, to hope for heavenly things, not to profane the sacraments. Doing good works in Christ is signified by the breadth of the cross on which his hands were stretched, hands standing for works; persevering in adhering to him is signified by its length, where his whole body was fixed; hoping for heavenly things is represented by its upper part where his head was, he the head of the body being now in heaven; not profaning the sacraments is represented by its depth hidden in the ground, because it meant observing the discipline of the secret. Purified by this action, we shall be able to know also the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge, by which he is equal to the Father, through whom all things were made, (See John 1:3) so that we may be filled unto all the fullness of God.

There is also in hyssop a purgative power, lest, with knowledge puffing one up over the riches carried off from Egypt, the swollen lung breathe out something proudly: you shall sprinkle me, he says, with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed; you shall wash me, and I shall be made whiter than snow. To my hearing you shall give exultation and gladness. Then he consequently adds, to show that purification from pride is signified by hyssop: the humbled bones shall exult.

42. 63. But by however much smaller is the supply of gold, silver, and clothing which that people carried off with itself from Egypt, in comparison with the riches which they afterward obtained at Jerusalem, which are shown especially in King Solomon, (See 1 Kgs 3:13) so great becomes all the knowledge—useful knowledge, that is—gathered from the books of the gentiles, if it is compared with the knowledge of the divine Scriptures. For whatever a person has learned outside, if it is harmful, is condemned there; if it is useful, is found there. And when anyone has found there all the things he usefully learned elsewhere, he will find there much more abundantly the things which are learned nowhere else at all, but only in the wonderful sublimity and wonderful lowliness of those Scriptures. What Augustine probably meant by the lowliness or humility of scripture was its lack of the polished style of the classical Latin authors. It was this that had put him off Christianity and its scriptures as a very young, and very conceited, student and teacher of rhetoric.

Endowed, then, with this instruction, when unknown signs do not hinder the reader, gentle and humble of heart, gently subjected to Christ and burdened with a light load, grounded and rooted and built up in love which knowledge cannot puff up, let him approach the consideration and discussion of the ambiguous signs in the Scriptures, about which I shall undertake to speak in the third volume, as the Lord shall deign to grant.

1. 1. The person who fears God diligently inquires after his will in the holy Scriptures. And lest he love quarrels, he is made gentle by piety; he is also forearmed with knowledge of the languages, lest he stick at unknown words and expressions; forearmed too with knowledge of certain necessary things, lest he be ignorant of the force or nature of those which are employed for the sake of likeness;

aided too by the correctness of the manuscripts, which the skillful diligence of correction has procured; let him come thus instructed to discussing and resolving the ambiguities of the Scriptures.

And so that he may not be deceived by ambiguous signs, insofar as he can be instructed by us—but it can happen that he may laugh at these ways, which we wish to show, as childish, either by the greatness of his native ability or by the clarity of greater illumination; but nevertheless, as I had begun to say, insofar as he can be instructed by us who is in such a state of mind as to be able to be instructed by us—let him know that the ambiguity of Scripture is either in literal words or in figurative ones, which kinds we demonstrated in the second book.

2. 2. But when literal words make Scripture ambiguous, the first thing to be seen is that we have not divided or pronounced it badly. When, therefore, applied attention has perceived that it is uncertain how it is to be divided or how pronounced, let it consult the rule of faith, which it has received from the plainer places of the Scriptures and from the authority of the Church; about which we treated sufficiently when we spoke of things in the first book. But if both, or even all the parts of the ambiguity, should there be several, sound according to the faith, the text of the discourse itself, from the preceding and following parts which placed that ambiguity in the middle, remains to be consulted, so that we may see to which of the several meanings that present themselves it casts its vote and allows itself to be woven together.

2. 3. Now consider examples. The examples that follow are, of course, all in Augustine’s Latin text of scripture, and do not usually occur in an English translation, which may well have its own. So I regret that the rest of this section will be full of Latin texts, phrases and words, which will be translated and explained as necessary in the notes. That heretical division: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was, so that the sense is different: This Word was in the beginning with God, refuses to confess that the Word is God. But this is to be refuted by the rule of faith, by which it is prescribed for us, concerning the equality of the Trinity, that we say: and the Word was God, then subjoin: this was in the beginning with God. “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was”; so the next phrase reads, “This Word was in the beginning with God.” The orthodox phrasing is, “. . . the Word was with God, and the Word was God; this was in the beginning with God.”

2. 4. But that ambiguity of division which resists the faith on neither side, and is therefore to be judged by the text of the discourse itself, is where the Apostle says: and what I should choose I do not know. But I am pressed from the two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ; for that is by much the best: to remain in the flesh is necessary on your account. For it is uncertain whether it should be having a desire from the two, or I am pressed from the two, so that the other is joined on, having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ. But since it follows thus: for that is by much the best, it appears that he says he has a desire for that best, so that, although he is pressed from the two, he nevertheless has a desire for the one, a necessity for the other—namely, a desire to be with Christ, a necessity to remain in the flesh.

This ambiguity is judged by one following word, which is placed there: for. Those translators who took away this particle were led rather by that meaning, so that he should seem not only to be pressed from the two, but also to have a desire for the two. So, then, it is to be divided thus: and what I should choose I do not know. But I am pressed from the two; which division is followed by: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ. And as though it were asked why he has a desire for this rather: for that is by much the best, he says. Why, then, is he pressed from the two? Because there is a necessity of remaining, which he subjoined thus: to remain in the flesh is necessary on your account.

2. 5. But where the ambiguity can be unfolded neither by the prescript of faith nor by the text of the discourse itself, nothing prevents dividing it according to whichever of the meanings that present themselves. As is that passage to the Corinthians: Having therefore these promises, dearly beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of flesh and spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God. Receive us; we have wronged no one. “Having therefore these promises, dearly beloved, let us purify ourselves from every defilement of the flesh and of the spirit perfecting sanctification in the fear of God receive us; we have done nobody wrong.” The first alternative offered—the universally accepted one—is to phrase the sentence, “let us purify ourselves from every defilement of the flesh and of the spirit,” so that it would continue, though he neglects to say this, “perfecting our sanctification in the fear of God. Receive us.” The other is to phrase, “let us purify ourselves from every defilement of the flesh,” so that the next part of the sentence would be, “and perfecting the sanctification of the spirit in the fear of God receive us”—that is, in more tolerable English, “And receive us as we perfect the sanctification of the spirit in the fear of God.” For it is doubtful whether it is let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of flesh and spirit, according to that meaning: that she may be holy both in body and in spirit, or let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of flesh, so that the sense is different: and, perfecting the sanctification of the spirit in the fear of God, receive us. Such ambiguities of division, then, are in the power of the reader.

3. 6. But whatever we have said about ambiguous divisions, the same things are to be observed also in ambiguous pronunciations. For these too, unless they are vitiated by the excessive carelessness of the reader, are corrected either by the rules of faith or by the connection of the preceding or following discourse. And if neither of these is employed for correction, they will nonetheless remain doubtful, so that in whatever way the reader pronounces, he is not at fault.

For unless faith calls one back—by which we believe that God will not accuse against his elect and that Christ will not condemn his elect—that passage can be pronounced thus: Who shall accuse against the elect of God? so that, as it were, this answer follows the question: God who justifies; and likewise it is asked: Who is it that condemns? and it is answered: Christ Jesus who died.

Since to believe this is most insane, it will be pronounced so that a question of inquiry precedes and a question expecting yes or no follows. Now between an inquiry and such a question the ancients said this difference exists: that to an inquiry many things can be answered, but to such a question either "no" or "yes."

It will be pronounced, then, so that, after the inquiry by which we say Who shall accuse against the elect of God? what follows is uttered in the tone of one questioning: God who justifies? so that the silent answer is "no"; and likewise we inquire: Who is it that condemns? and again we ask: Christ Jesus who died, or rather who rose again, who is at the right hand of God, who also intercedes for us? so that everywhere the answer is "no."

But in that place where he says: What then shall we say? That the gentiles who did not pursue righteousness have laid hold of righteousness, unless, after the inquiry by which it was said, What then shall we say? the answer is subjoined, that the gentiles who did not pursue righteousness have laid hold of righteousness, the following text will not cohere. But in whatever tone of voice that which Nathanael said is pronounced: From Nazareth can anything good be—whether of one affirming, so that only what he says, From Nazareth? pertains to the question; “Can anything good come from Nazareth?” The alternative in the Latin to this universally accepted way of reading the sentence is; “From Nazareth? Something good can come”—very far-fetched, even in the Latin. or the whole with the doubt of one questioning—I do not see how it is to be distinguished. But either sense does not impede the faith.

3. 7. There is also ambiguity in the doubtful sound of syllables, and this certainly pertains to pronunciation. For what is written: My bone is not hidden from you, which you have made in secret, (“My bone/mouth is not hidden from you, which you have made in secret.”) does not show clearly to the reader whether he should pronounce the word with the vowel short or long. For if he shortens it, it is understood from the word for "bones"; but if he lengthens it, from the word for "mouths," in the singular number. But such things are judged by inspection of the prior language. For in the Greek it is not the word for "mouth" but the word for "bone" that is set down. (The Greek for “bone” and “mouth” respectively) Hence for the most part the common custom of speaking is more useful for signifying things than literate correctness. For I should prefer that it be said, with a barbarism, "My ossum is not hidden from you," than that it should be less open because it is more Latin.

But sometimes the doubtful sound of a syllable is judged even by a neighboring word pertaining to the same statement, as is that passage of the Apostle: which I foretell to you, as I foretold, that those who do such things will not possess the kingdom of God. “About which I am warning you, as I have warned you before, that those who do such things will not gain possession of the kingdom of God”; praedico with a long i, perfect praedixi, meaning literally “say beforehand.” The alternative, praedico with a short i, perfect praedicavi, means to preach or proclaim. If he had only said which I foretell to you and had not subjoined as I foretold, one would have to have recourse only to the manuscript of the preceding language, in order to know whether, in what he said praedico, the middle syllable was to be lengthened or shortened. But now it is manifest that it is to be lengthened. For he does not say "as I preached," but as I foretold.

4. 8. But not only these, but also those ambiguities which pertain neither to division nor to pronunciation, are to be considered similarly; such as that one to the Thessalonians: therefore we have been consoled, brothers, in you. “That is why we have taken comfort, brothers, among you.” But the alternative, he says, could be to read “brothers” as accusative, not vocative—and also incidentally, though he does not mention this, to read consolati sumus as a deponent active verb, rather than as passive reflexive—which would give the sense, “For this reason we have comforted the brothers among you.” For it is doubtful whether it is "O brothers" or "these brothers"; but neither of these is against the faith. But the Greek language does not have these cases alike, and so, when that is inspected, the vocative is reported—that is, "O brothers." But if the translator had wished to say "therefore we have had consolation, brothers, in you," the words would have been less served, but there would be less doubt about the meaning; or at least "our" would be added. For hardly anyone would doubt that it is the vocative case when he heard: therefore we have been consoled, our brothers, in you. (“That is why we have taken comfort, our brothers, among you.”)

But now this is permitted rather riskily. Literally he says, “But now this”—that is, adding a word—“is permitted rather riskily.” But the instance he goes on to give does not illustrate how risky this procedure can be, but how it is occasionally permissible. So it was done in that passage to the Corinthians, when the Apostle says: I die daily, by your glory, brothers, which I have in Christ Jesus. For a certain translator says: I die daily, by your glory I swear, because in the Greek the voice of one swearing is manifest, without doubtful sound. In the Latin, and literal English, “I die every day by your glory” could be taken to mean “Your glory is making me die every day.” The PL adds the Greek word ne, which indicates the swearing of an oath, the text running, literally, “because in the Greek the voice of one swearing (ne) is clear . . .” Most rarely, therefore, and most with difficulty, can ambiguity be found in literal words, as far as the books of the divine Scriptures are concerned, which is not resolved either by the very circumstance of the discourse, by which the writer’s intention is known, or by the comparison of translators, or by inspection of the prior language.

5. 9. But the ambiguities of figurative words, about which we must speak next, require no slight care and industry. For at the outset one must beware lest you take a figurative expression literally. And to this pertains what the Apostle says: the letter kills, but the spirit gives life. For when what is said figuratively is taken as though it were said literally, it is understood carnally. And no death of the soul is more fittingly called death than when that too which in it excels the beasts—that is, the understanding—is subjected to the flesh by following the letter.

For one who follows the letter holds figurative words as literal, and does not refer that which is signified by the literal word to another signification. But if he hears "Sabbath," for example, he understands nothing but one day of the seven which are repeated in a continuous cycle; and when he hears "sacrifice," he does not go beyond in thought that which is usually done with the victims of cattle and the fruits of the earth. This indeed is the wretched slavery of the soul: to take signs for things, and not to be able to lift the eye of the mind above the corporeal creation to drink in the eternal light.

6. 10. Yet this slavery in the Jewish people differed far from the death of the other nations, Reading a ceterarum gentium morte with one venerable manuscript mentioned by the PL, but not by the CCSL editor, instead of a ceterarum gentium more, “from the custom of other nations,” of the CCSL and PL text. since they were so subjected to temporal things that in all of them the one God was commended to them. And although they observed the signs of spiritual things in place of the things themselves, (As, for example, the laws about the sabbath and about sacrifices) not knowing to what they referred, they nevertheless had this implanted in them: that by such slavery they were pleasing the one God of all, whom they did not see. The Apostle writes that this watch-keeping was as though under the pedagogue of little ones. (A pedagogue; see Gal 3:24)

And therefore those who clung pertinaciously to such signs could not bear the Lord who despised them, when the time of their revelation had now come; (See Matt 12:1–14) and hence their leaders contrived slanders, because he healed on the Sabbath; (See Luke 6:7) and the people, bound to those signs as though to things, did not believe that he was God, or had come from God, who was unwilling to attend to them as they were observed by the Jews.

But those who believed, from whom the first Church of Jerusalem was made, showed sufficiently how great a usefulness it had been to be kept in that way under a pedagogue, so that the signs which had been temporally imposed on those who served might bind the opinion of the observers to the worship of the one God, who made heaven and earth.

For those people, because they were close to spiritual things—for even in their temporal and carnal vows and signs, although they did not know how these were to be understood spiritually, they had nevertheless learned to venerate the one eternal God—became so capable of the Holy Spirit that they sold all their possessions and laid the price of them before the feet of the Apostles to be distributed to the needy, and dedicated themselves wholly to God as a new temple, of whose earthly image—that is, the old temple—they had been servants.

For it is not written that any of the churches of the gentiles did this, because those who had idols made by hand as gods had not been found so near. (See Eph 2:17)

7. 11. And if ever any of them tried to interpret those things as signs, they referred them to worshiping and venerating the creature. For what does it profit me that the statue, for example, of Neptune is not itself to be held a god, but by it is signified the whole sea, or even all the other waters that burst forth from springs? As it is described by one of their poets, if I recall rightly, saying thus:

This husk rattles its sounding pebbles within a sweet shell; it is, however, the food not of human beings but of pigs. He who knows the Gospel knows what I mean. He is alluding to Luke 15:16, in the parable of the prodigal son, who would like to eat the pigs' carob pods.

What, then, does it profit me that the statue of Neptune is referred to that signification, except perhaps that I should worship neither? For to me any statue whatever, just as much as the whole sea, is not God. Yet I confess that those who think the works of human beings are gods are sunk deeper than those who think the works of God are. But we are commanded to love and worship the one God, (See Dan 6:5) who made all these things, whose images those people venerate, either as gods or as signs and images of gods. If, then, to follow a usefully instituted sign in place of the very thing for signifying which it was instituted is carnal slavery, how much more to take signs of useless things, instituted in place of things! And if you refer these to those very things which are signified by them, and bind your mind to worshiping them, you will nonetheless not lack a servile and carnal burden and veil. (See 2 Cor 3:12–4:4)

8. 12. For this reason Christian liberty freed those whom it found under useful signs, as having been found near, (See Eph 2:17) by interpreting the signs to which they were subject and raising them to the things of which those are signs. From these were made the Churches of the holy Israelites.

But those whom it found under useless signs it frustrated and removed not only the servile activity under such signs but also the signs themselves, all of them, so that the gentiles might be turned, from the corruption of a multitude of feigned gods—which Scripture often and properly calls fornication—to the worship of the one God; not now about to serve even under those useful signs, but rather to exercise the mind in their spiritual understanding.

9. 13. For he serves under a sign who works at or venerates some signifying thing without knowing what it signifies. But he who either works at or venerates a useful sign divinely instituted, whose force and signification he understands, does not venerate that which is seen and passes away, but rather that to which all such things are to be referred.

Such a person is spiritual and free, even in the time of slavery, when it is not yet fitting that those signs, under whose yoke carnal minds are to be tamed, be revealed to them. But such spiritual people were the Patriarchs and the Prophets, and all in the people of Israel through whom the Holy Spirit ministered to us the very aids and consolations of the Scriptures.

But at this present time, after the most manifest indication of our liberty has shone forth in the resurrection of our Lord, we are not burdened even by the heavy performance of those signs which we now understand, but the Lord himself and the apostolic discipline handed down certain few in place of many, and these very easy to do, most august to understand, and most chaste to observe—such as is the sacrament of Baptism and the celebration of the body and blood of the Lord. When each one receives these, instructed to what they are referred, he recognizes them, so that he may venerate them not with carnal slavery but rather with spiritual liberty.

But just as to follow the letter and to take signs for the things which are signified by them is the mark of servile weakness, so to interpret signs uselessly is the mark of badly wandering error. A reference to heretical sects, primarily to the Donatists, who did not appreciate that the ultimate thing, or res, signified by the sacraments is the grace of unity, the Catholic unity of the Church, the body of Christ. The persons referred to in the next sentence are presumably the ignorant Catholic faithful who have not been well instructed and who still bring an Old Testament mentality to the practice of their religion. But he who does not understand what a sign signifies, and yet understands that it is a sign, is not himself oppressed by slavery. It is better, however, to be oppressed by unknown but useful signs than, by interpreting them uselessly, to insert the neck, drawn out from the yoke of slavery, into the snares of error.

10. 14. But to this observance, by which we beware of following a figurative—that is, transferred—expression as though literal, this other too is to be joined: that we should not wish to take a literal one as though figurative. The method, therefore, of discovering whether an expression is literal or figurative is first to be demonstrated. And this method is altogether this: that whatever in the divine discourse can be referred literally neither to honesty of morals nor to the truth of faith, you should recognize to be figurative. Honesty of morals pertains to loving God and neighbor; the truth of faith to knowing God and neighbor. But each one’s hope is in his own conscience, He has in mind 1 Tim 1:5, where love and faith are mentioned, while hope only figures in the guise of a good conscience. according as he feels himself to be making progress toward the love of God and neighbor and the knowledge of them. Of all of which it was spoken in the first book.

10. 15. But since the human race is prone to estimate sins not from the weight of the desire itself, but rather from that of its own custom, it for the most part comes about that each one of human beings thinks that only those things are to be blamed which the people of his own region and time have been accustomed to censure and condemn; and that only those things are to be approved and praised which the custom of those with whom he lives admits.

And so it happens that if Scripture either commands something that is repugnant to the custom of the hearers, or blames something that is not repugnant, then, if the authority of the word has already bound their minds, they think it a figurative expression. (If they are not, they will simply treat such precepts as false and invalid) But Scripture commands nothing except charity, and blames nothing except cupidity, and in this way it forms the morals of human beings.

Likewise, if the opinion of some error has preoccupied the mind, whatever Scripture asserts otherwise, people think figurative. But it asserts nothing except the Catholic faith, concerning things past and future and present. Of past things there is narration, of future things foretelling, of present things demonstration; but all these have value for nourishing and corroborating that same charity, and for conquering and extinguishing cupidity.

10. 16. I call charity the motion of the mind toward enjoying God for his own sake, and oneself and one’s neighbor for the sake of God; but cupidity the motion of the mind toward enjoying oneself and one’s neighbor and any body whatever not for the sake of God. Now what untamed cupidity does for corrupting one’s own mind and body is called debauchery; what it does so as to harm another is called a crime. And these are the two kinds of all sins; but debauchery comes first. When it has emptied the mind and led it to a kind of want, one leaps forth into crimes, by which the impediments to debauchery may be removed or aids sought.

Likewise, what charity does so as to profit itself is usefulness; but what it does so as to profit the neighbor is named beneficence. And here usefulness comes first, because no one can profit another from what he does not have. But by however much the reign of cupidity is destroyed, by so much is that of charity increased.

11. 17. Whatever, then, is read in the holy Scriptures as harsh and, as it were, cruel to do or say, on the part of God or his saints, has value for destroying the reign of cupidity.

But if it sounds clearly, it is not to be referred to something else as though it were said figuratively. As is that saying of the Apostle: you store up for yourself wrath on the day of wrath and of the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to each one according to his works: to those indeed who, by patience in good work, seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life; but to those who are of contention and distrust the truth, but believe iniquity, wrath and indignation. Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of the human being who works evil, of the Jew first and of the Greek. But this is addressed to those in whom cupidity itself is being overthrown, who were unwilling to conquer it. He actually says, “those with whom greed itself is being overthrown,” evertitur, a very curious way of putting it. So one sympathizes with the copyist of one manuscript who substitutes versatur for that word, giving the sense, “those with whom greed itself is dwelling.”

But when, in the human being over whom they held dominion, the reigns of cupidity are overturned, that is an open expression: those who are of Jesus Christ have crucified their flesh with its passions and concupiscences. Except that here too certain transferred words are dealt with, such as the wrath of God, and have crucified. But they are not so many, nor so placed, as to obscure the sense and make an allegory or enigma, which I properly call a figurative expression.

But what is said to Jeremiah: behold, I have set you today over the nations and kingdoms, to pluck up and to destroy and to scatter and to ruin, there is no doubt that the whole is a figurative expression, to be referred to that end which we have stated.

12. 18. But those things which seem debauched to the unskilled, whether only said or even done, whether on the part of God or of human beings whose holiness is commended to us, are wholly figurative. Their secrets are to be unfolded for the nourishment of charity. But whoever uses passing things more restrictively than the morals of those with whom he lives are, is either temperate or superstitious. But whoever uses them so as to exceed the bounds of the custom of the good among whom he lives, either signifies something or is debauched. For in all such things it is not the use of things, but the desire of the one using, that is at fault.

And in no way would any sober person believe that the Lord’s feet were thus drenched with precious ointment by the woman (See John 12:3) in the manner of luxurious and worthless people, whose such banquets we detest. For a good odor is a good reputation, which whoever has by the works of a good life, while he follows in the footsteps of Christ, drenches his feet, as it were, with the most precious odor. Thus what in other persons is for the most part debauchery is, in a divine or prophetic person, the sign of some great thing. For the joining of a harlot is one thing in corrupt morals, another in the prophecy of the prophet Hosea. (See Hos 1:2) Nor, if bodies are stripped debauchedly in the banquets of the drunken and the lascivious, is it therefore debauchery to be naked in the baths. (He means the public baths)

12. 19. What, therefore, befits places and times and persons must be diligently attended to, lest we rashly reprehend debaucheries. For it can happen that a wise person, without any vice of daintiness or voracity, uses the most precious food; but a foolish one blazes with the most foul flame of gluttony toward the cheapest. And any healthy person would prefer to feed on fish, in the manner of the Lord, than on lentils, in the manner of Esau, the grandson of Abraham, (See Luke 24:42–43; Gen 25:29–34) or on barley, in the manner of beasts of burden.

For most beasts are not on that account more continent than we, because they are fed on cheaper foods. For in all things of this kind, what we do is to be approved or disapproved not from the nature of the things which we use, but from the cause of using and the manner of desiring.

12. 20. By an earthly kingdom the ancient just men imaged and foretold the heavenly kingdom. (See Heb 11) For the sake of supplying offspring, there was a blameless custom of one man having several wives at once. (See Gen 16:3, 25:1; 2 Kgs 5:13) And therefore it was not honorable for one woman to have several husbands; for a woman is not thereby more fruitful, but it is rather a harlot’s baseness to seek either gain or children indiscriminately. In morals of this kind, whatever the holy people of those times did without lust—although they did things which at this time cannot be done except through lust—Scripture does not blame. And whatever such thing is narrated there is to be interpreted not only historically and literally, but also figuratively and prophetically, up to that end of charity, whether of God or of neighbor or of both.

For just as among the ancient Romans it was a disgrace to have tunics reaching to the ankles and with sleeves, but now it is a disgrace for those born in an honorable station, when they are in tunics, not to have these, Non eas habere flagitium est. This could, I suppose, be translated, “it is not an infamy to wear them”; so the BAC Spanish translation, Madrid, 1957. But if Augustine had really meant that, I am sure he would have dictated, eas habere flagitium non est. so it must be noticed that in the rest of the use of things too lust ought to be absent—lust which not only basely abuses the very custom of those among whom it lives, but also, often going beyond its bounds, manifests its foulness, which lay hidden within the enclosures of customary morals, by a most debauched eruption.

13. 21. But whatever agrees with the custom of those with whom this life is to be passed, whether imposed by necessity or undertaken as a duty, is to be referred by good and great men to usefulness and beneficence, (See section 16 above) either literally, as we too ought, or even figuratively, as is permitted to the Prophets.

14. 22. When the unlearned of another custom run upon such deeds in reading, unless they are restrained by authority, they think them debaucheries; nor can they notice that their whole way of life, whether in marriages or in banquets or in clothing and the rest of human sustenance and adornment, seems debauched to other nations and other times. Moved by this variety of innumerable customs, certain people, drowsing, so to speak—who were neither lulled in the deep sleep of folly nor able to wake into the light of wisdom—supposed that there is no justice in itself, but that to each nation its own custom seems just; and since this is diverse among all nations, while justice ought to remain unchangeable, it becomes manifest that there is no justice anywhere.

They did not understand, not to mention many things: what you do not want done to yourself, do not do to another, (See also Matt 7:12) which can in no way be varied by any gentile diversity of theirs. When this maxim is referred to the love of God, all debaucheries die; when to that of the neighbor, all crimes. For no one wants his own dwelling to be corrupted; he ought not, therefore, to corrupt the dwelling of God, namely himself. And no one wants to be harmed by anyone; let him not, therefore, harm anyone himself.

15. 23. Thus, with the tyranny of cupidity overturned, charity reigns by the most just laws of the love of God for the sake of God, and of oneself and one’s neighbor for the sake of God. In figurative expressions, therefore, a rule of this kind is to be observed: that what is read be turned over by diligent consideration so long, until the interpretation is brought through to the reign of charity. But if this already sounds literally, let no figurative expression be supposed.

16. 24. If a preceptive expression forbids either debauchery or a crime, or commands either usefulness or beneficence, it is not figurative. But if it seems to command debauchery or a crime, or to forbid usefulness and beneficence, it is figurative. Unless you eat, he says, the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, you will not have life in you. He seems to command a crime or a debauchery. It is, therefore, a figure, prescribing that one is to share in the Lord’s Passion, and to store up sweetly and usefully in memory that his flesh was crucified and wounded for us.

Scripture says: if your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him drink. Here, with no one doubting, it prescribes beneficence. But what follows: for in doing this you will heap coals of fire upon his head, you might think a crime of ill will is commanded. Do not, then, doubt that it is said figuratively. And since it can be interpreted in two ways, one toward harming, the other toward bestowing, let charity rather recall you to beneficence, so that you understand the coals of fire to be the burning groans of repentance, by which the pride of one is healed who grieves that he had been the enemy of a man by whom his misery is relieved.

Likewise, when the Lord says: he who loves his soul will lose it, Reading perdat with four manuscripts instead of perdet, “will throw it away” with the PL and CCSL. These four are surely correct, in view of what he goes on to say. Perdet is the Vulgate reading, to which copyists were inclined to correct their author. he is not to be thought to forbid the usefulness by which each one ought to preserve his own soul, but it is said figuratively, let him lose his soul—that is, let him destroy and let go the use of it which he now has, namely the perverse and preposterous one, by which it is inclined toward temporal things, so as not to seek eternal ones.

It is written: give to the merciful, and do not receive the sinner. The latter part of this maxim seems to forbid beneficence; for it says: do not receive the sinner. Understand, then, that sinner is set figuratively for sin, so that you do not receive his sin.

17. 25. But it often happens that anyone who is, or thinks himself to be, at a higher level of the spiritual life supposes that the things commanded at the lower levels are said figuratively. For example, if someone has embraced the celibate life and has made himself a eunuch for the sake of the kingdom of heaven, he may contend that whatever the holy books command about loving and governing a wife (For example, Eph 5:25) must be taken not literally but figuratively; and if someone has resolved to keep his virgin unmarried, (See 1 Cor 7:37) he may try to interpret as figurative the saying, Give your daughter in marriage, and you will have done a great work (Sir 7:25).

This too, then, will be among the observations to be made in understanding the Scriptures: that we recognize that some things are commanded to all in common, others to each particular class of persons, so that the medicine may reach not only the universal state of health but also the proper weakness of each member. For what cannot be raised up to a better class must be cured within its own.

18. 26. Likewise, we must beware lest anyone suppose that what in the Old Scriptures, given the condition of those times, is no outrage or crime even when understood not figuratively but literally, can also be carried over into our own times for use in living. No one will do this unless cupidity is lording it over him and seeking the support of the very Scriptures by which it ought to be overthrown. And the wretched man fails to understand that these things are set down precisely for this benefit: that people of good hope may see, to their advantage, both that a custom they spurn can have a good use and that one they embrace can be damnable, if in the one case we attend to the love of those who use it and in the other to their cupidity.

18. 27. For if one man, given his time, could chastely make use of many wives, another can use a single wife lustfully. For I have more regard for the man who makes use of the fruitfulness of many for the sake of something else than for the one who enjoys the flesh of one for its own sake. In the former case what is sought is an advantage suited to the opportunities of the times; in the latter a cupidity entangled in temporal pleasures is being sated.

And those to whom the Apostle, by way of concession, grants carnal relations with their individual spouses on account of their lack of self-control (See 1 Cor 7:2, 7:7) are at a lower level on the way to God than those men who, though each had several wives, looked in their intercourse to nothing but the procreation of children, just as the wise man looks in food and drink to nothing but the health of the body.

And so, if the Lord's coming had found them in this life, when it was now a time not to scatter stones but to gather them, they would at once have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. (See Matt 19:12) For there is no difficulty in doing without something unless there is cupidity in having it.

Those men indeed knew that even with one's own spouse there can be the wantonness of intemperate misuse. The prayer of Tobias bears witness to this, when he was joined to his wife. For he says: Blessed are you, O Lord of our fathers, and blessed is your name for all the ages of ages. Let the heavens and all your creation bless you. You made Adam, and gave him Eve as a helper. And now, Lord, you know that I am not taking my sister for the sake of lust, but in truth itself, that you may have mercy on us, Lord (Tob 8:5–7).

19. 28. But those who, dissolute through unbridled lust, roam about in many debaucheries, or who, even with one and the same wife, not only exceed the measure pertaining to the procreation of children but also, with an utterly shameless license of a kind of servile freedom, pile up the squalor of an all too inhuman intemperance—these do not believe it could have happened that the men of old made temperate use of many women, observing nothing in that use but the duty, suited to the time, of propagating offspring. And what they themselves, bound by the snares of lust, do not do even with one woman, they suppose can in no way be done with many.

19. 29. But these people could say that good and holy men ought not even to be honored and praised, since they themselves, when honored and praised, swell up with pride, all the more greedy for the emptiest glory the more often and widely a flattering tongue fans them. By it they become so frivolous that the breeze of rumor, whether reckoned favorable or adverse, sweeps them into whatever abysses of disgrace, or dashes them against the very rocks of crime. Let them see, then, how arduous and difficult it is for a person neither to be enticed by the bait of praise nor pierced by the stings of abuse—and let them not measure others by themselves.

20. 29. Let them rather believe that our apostles were neither puffed up when they were looked up to by people, nor crushed when they were looked down upon. Neither temptation, in fact, was lacking to those men; for they were celebrated by the acclaim of believers and defamed by the curses of persecutors.

As these men, then, made use of all these things to suit their time and were not corrupted, so those men of old, relating their use of women to the suitability of their own time, did not suffer that domination of lust to which those who do not believe these things are enslaved.

20. 30. And therefore these people would in no way restrain themselves from an implacable hatred of their sons, if they learned that their wives or concubines had been approached or fondled by them—should anything of the sort happen to befall them.

21. 30. But King David, when he had suffered this from his impious and monstrous son, not only bore with him in his savagery but even mourned him when he was destroyed. (See the story of David and Absalom, 2 Sam 15–18, especially 16:21–22 and 18:32–33) For he was not ensnared and held by carnal jealousy; it was in no way his own injuries that moved him, but his son's sins.

For this reason, in fact, he had forbidden his son to be killed if he were defeated, so that, once subdued, a place for repentance might be preserved for him. And because he could not save him, he grieved at his death not for his own bereavement, but because he knew into what punishments a soul so impiously adulterous and parricidal was being snatched away. For earlier, when another son, who was innocent, lay dying—the son over whose sickness he had been afflicted—he rejoiced at his death. (See 2 Sam 12:15–23)

21. 31. And this appears especially from the moderation and temperance with which those men made use of women, in the fact that when this same king had unlawfully fallen upon one woman—carried away by a certain heat of his age and by the prosperity of temporal affairs, and having even ordered her husband to be killed—he was accused through the prophet.

When the prophet had come to him to convict him of his sin, he set before him a likeness about a poor man who had one ewe, whose neighbor, though he had many, at the arrival of his guest set out the poor man's single little ewe to be eaten instead. Roused against this man, David ordered him to be killed (Not quite accurate; he said the man deserved to die. See 2 Sam 12:1–14) and the ewe to be repaid fourfold to the poor man—so that, not knowing it, he condemned himself, who had sinned knowingly. And when this was made plain to him and the vengeance announced by God, he washed away his sin by repenting.

Yet in this likeness only the seduction was signified, by the ewe of the poor neighbor. But about the husband of the woman who was killed—that is, about the poor man himself who had one ewe, who was slain—David was not questioned by the likeness, so that he pronounced the sentence of his own condemnation upon the adultery alone. From this it is understood how great was the temperance with which he had many women, since over the one in whom he exceeded the measure he was compelled to punish himself. But in this man there was not a permanence of this immoderate lust, but a passing; and for this reason the prophet who reproved him called that illicit appetite a guest.

For he did not say that he had set out the poor neighbor's ewe to be eaten for his king, but for his guest. But in his son Solomon this lust did not pass through as a guest; rather, it took possession as a kingdom. Of this Scripture was not silent, blaming him for having been a lover of women. His beginnings, nevertheless, had blazed with desire for wisdom; and when he had attained it by spiritual love, he lost it by carnal love. See 1 Kgs 3:3–14, 11:1–13. The parallel account in 2 Chr 1–9 precisely does keep silent about Solomon's aberrations.

22. 32. Therefore, although all or nearly all the deeds contained in the books of the Old Testament are to be taken not only literally but also figuratively, still, even those that the reader takes literally, As Augustine certainly insisted all the historical narratives should be taken, among which he and his contemporaries, and their successors up to modern times, included narratives we now know to be mythical or fictional, like the stories of Job and Jonah, and most of Gen 1–11. if those who did them are praised, but the deeds themselves are abhorrent to the practice of good people who keep the divine precepts after the Lord's coming, let him refer the figure to understanding, but not transfer the deed itself to morals. For there are many things that were done dutifully in that time which now cannot be done except lustfully.

23. 33. But if anyone reads of the sins of great men, even though he may be able to notice and trace out in them some figure of things to come, Such as the famous one Augustine thought he could detect in the way Jacob cheated Esau out of his father's deathbed blessing (Gen 27:1–40), saying about Jacob's flagrant lie, verse 24, Non est mendacium sed mysterium (Against Lying 10.24), "It is not a lie but a mystery"—the mystery of Christ identifying himself with us sinners, and taking our sins upon himself, like the kidskins on Jacob's arms and neck. let him nonetheless apply the literal sense of the deed to this use: that he never dare to boast of his own good deeds and despise the rest as sinners in comparison with his own righteousness, when he sees both the storms to be guarded against and the shipwrecks to be wept over in men so great.

For the sins of those men were written down for this very reason: that everywhere that apostolic saying might be dreaded, when he says, Therefore let anyone who thinks that he stands take heed lest he fall (1 Cor 10:12). For there is scarcely any page of the holy books on which it does not resound that God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble (Jas 4:6; 1 Pet 5:5; see also Matt 23:12; Luke 14:11, 18:14).

24. 34. Above all, then, we must investigate whether the expression we are trying to understand is literal or figurative. For once we have found that it is figurative, by applying the rules about things which we set out in the first book it is easy to turn it over in every way until we arrive at the sense of truth—especially when the practice that has been strengthened by the exercise of piety is brought to bear. And we discover whether an expression is literal or figurative by attending to those things which have been said above.

25. 34. And when this has become clear, the words in which it is contained will be found to be drawn either from like things or from things touching upon some nearness to them.

25. 35. But since things resemble things in many ways, let us not suppose it to be laid down as a rule that what some thing has signified by likeness in one passage, we should believe it always signifies. For the Lord set leaven in a context of blame when he said, Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees (Matt 16:6), and in a context of praise when he said, The kingdom of heaven is like a woman who hid leaven in three measures of flour until it was all leavened (Matt 13:33).

25. 36. The observation of this variety, then, has two forms. For each several thing signifies one thing and another in such a way that things either contrary or merely diverse are signified. They signify contrary things when the same thing is set down by likeness now in a good and now in a bad sense, as in the case of leaven which we mentioned above.

Such too is the fact that the lion signifies Christ, where it is said, The lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered (Rev 5:5), and it also signifies the devil, where it is written, Your adversary the devil prowls around like a roaring lion, seeking someone to devour (1 Pet 5:8).

So too the serpent is in a good sense, wise as serpents (Matt 10:16), but in a bad sense, the serpent deceived Eve by his cunning (2 Cor 11:3).

Bread in a good sense: I am the living bread that came down from heaven (John 6:51); bread in a bad sense: Eat hidden bread with pleasure (Prov 9:17). And so with very many other things.

And these things which I have mentioned bear a meaning that is anything but doubtful, since for the sake of example only manifest things ought to have been mentioned.

But there are things about which it is uncertain in what sense they ought to be taken, as: In the hand of the Lord there is a cup of unmixed wine full of mixture (Ps 75:8 (74:9)). For it is uncertain whether it signifies the wrath of God not extending to the final punishment, that is, to the dregs; or rather the grace of the Scriptures passing over from the Jews to the Gentiles, because he pours it out from this to that, while there remain among the Jews the observances which they understand carnally, because its dregs are not drained out.

But when the same thing is set down with a signification not contrary but merely diverse, there is an example in the fact that water signifies both a people, as we read in Revelation, (See Rev 17:15, 19:6) and the Holy Spirit, whence comes the saying, Rivers of living water will flow from his belly (John 7:38)—and whatever else, according to the passages in which it is set down, water is understood to signify.

25. 37. So too other things, not singly but each of them, signify not only two diverse things but even sometimes many, according to the place in the sentence where they are found set down.

26. 37. But where things are set down more plainly, there we must learn how they are to be understood in obscure passages. For what is said to God, Take hold of weapon and shield, and rise up to help me (Ps 35:2 (34:2)), cannot be better understood than from that passage where we read, Lord, you have crowned us with the shield of your good will (Ps 5:12 (5:13))—yet not in such a way that, wherever we read shield set down for some defense, we should take it to mean only the good will of God. For there is also said the shield of faith, with which, he says, you can quench all the flaming arrows of the evil one (Eph 6:16). Nor again, on that account, ought we in spiritual armor of this kind to assign the shield only to faith, since in another place the breastplate too is said to be of faith: having put on, he says, the breastplate of faith and love (1 Thess 5:8).

27. 38. But when, from the same words of Scripture, not some one thing but two or more meanings are perceived, even if it is hidden what the one who wrote them meant, there is no danger, provided it can be shown from other passages of the Holy Scriptures that each of them agrees with the truth. The one who searches the divine utterances should, however, take pains to arrive at the will of the author through whom the Holy Spirit produced that Scripture—whether he attains this, or whether he carves out some other meaning from those words which does not run counter to right faith, having the support of some other passage of the divine utterances.

For that author, in the very words we wish to understand, perhaps saw that meaning too; and certainly the Spirit of God, who produced these things through him, foresaw without doubt that it would also occur to the reader or hearer—indeed, provided that it should occur, since it too rests upon the truth. Here he is making the very important point that the Holy Spirit, as well as being active in inspiring the authors of the Scriptures, is also present to inspire the readers and hearers, if their minds are open to his suggestions and his illumination. For what could have been more generously and richly provided by God in the divine utterances than that the same words should be understood in several ways, which other words, no less divine, attest and cause to be approved?

28. 39. But where such a sense is drawn out whose uncertainty cannot be cleared up by sure testimonies of the Holy Scriptures, it remains for it to be made plain by giving a reason—even if the one whose words we are seeking to understand perhaps did not mean it. But this practice is dangerous; for it is far safer to walk through the divine Scriptures. When we wish to search these, darkened as they are by metaphorical words, either let something emerge from them that admits of no controversy, or, if it does admit of controversy, let it be settled from that same Scripture by finding and bringing forward its witnesses wherever they may be.

29. 40. But let the learned know that our authors made use of all the modes of expression which the grammarians call by the Greek name tropes, and did so more manifoldly and abundantly than those can suppose or believe who do not know them and have learned about these things in other authors. Yet those who do know these tropes recognize them in the Holy Letters, and by their knowledge are helped somewhat toward understanding them. But it is not fitting here to hand these things over to the ignorant, lest we should seem to be teaching the art of grammar. I do indeed advise that they be learned elsewhere, although I have already given that advice above—that is, in the second book, where I treated of the necessary knowledge of languages. (See book 2.16 above) For letters—from which grammar itself takes its name, since the Greeks call letters grammata—are at any rate signs of the sounds belonging to the articulate speech by which we talk.

Of these tropes not only examples, as of all of them, but even the names of some are read in the divine books, such as allegory, enigma, This word will almost certainly not occur in any English translations; it occurs in the Greek and Latin versions in 1 Cor 13:12, and in Num 12:8. The best English equivalent, to my mind, is "riddle." and parable. Yet almost all of these tropes, which are said to be known by the liberal art, are also found in the speech of those who have heard no grammarians and are content with the language the common people use. For who does not say, "May you flourish so"? Is there anybody who ever does say this in English? But evidently the Latin Sic floreas was a common expression of good wishes; an English translation that we hardly think of now as metaphorical would be "May you flourish like that." The same consideration applies to fish pond, piscina, in the next sentence.—which trope is called metaphor. Who does not call a thing a fish pond, even one that has no fish and was not made for the sake of fish, and yet took its name from fish? This trope is called catachresis.

29. 41. It would take long to go through the rest in this manner. For the speech of the common people reaches even to those tropes that are the more remarkable because they signify the contrary of what is said, such as the one called irony or antiphrasis.

But irony indicates by its delivery what it wishes to be understood, as when we say to a man doing evil, "You are doing fine things." Antiphrasis, on the other hand, signifies the contrary not by the voice of the one uttering it, but either has its own words whose origin is from the opposite—as a grove is called lucus because it gives the least light (minime luceat)—or else something is customarily said in such a way that it is uttered, though not from the opposite, as when we ask to receive what is not there and are answered, "It is overflowing"; or else by added words we bring it about that what we say is understood from the opposite, as if we should say, "Beware of him, for he is a good man."

And who does not say such things, untaught and altogether ignorant of what these tropes are or what they are called? The knowledge of them is necessary for resolving the ambiguities of the Scriptures because, when the sense is absurd if it is taken according to the literal meaning of the words, we must surely ask whether perhaps what we do not understand was said by this or that trope; and in this way very many things that lay hidden have been discovered. The most important, and neglected, trope in this respect is in my opinion irony—especially perhaps in the gospels where our Lord's words are being reported. We can no longer hear his tone of voice, and irony is the last thing most readers will suspect Jesus of indulging in; I, though, suspect quite the contrary, that it was a way of speaking he made frequent use of—for example in Luke 7:43, in his answer to his host, the Pharisee Simon. If you take his words, "You have judged rightly," as ironic—because surely Jesus would not agree that love could be bought—the whole episode springs to life. On tropes, and in particular on enigma, see The Trinity 15.15.

30. 42. A certain Tyconius, who wrote most unanswerably against the Donatists though he was himself a Donatist—and is found there too to be of a most absurd heart, in that he was unwilling to leave them on every point—made a book which he called The Rules, because in it he followed out certain seven rules by which, as by keys, the hidden things of the divine Scriptures might be unlocked. The first of these he sets down as On the Lord and his body; the second, On the twofold body of the Lord; the third, On the promises and the Law; the fourth, On the species and the genus; the fifth, On the times; the sixth, On recapitulation; the seventh, On the devil and his body.

These rules, indeed, when considered as he expounds them, help not a little toward penetrating the things that are hidden in the divine utterances. Yet not all the things that are written in such a way that they are not easily understood can be discovered by these rules, but by many other means, which he is so far from having embraced in this number seven that he himself expounds many obscure passages in which he applies none of these rules, since there is no need. For nothing of the sort is treated or asked there as he asks in the Revelation of John, how the angels of the seven Churches, to whom he is bidden to write, are to be understood. And he reasons in many ways and arrives at this, that we should understand the angels themselves to be the Churches. See Rev 1:11, 20. Tyconius's Book of Rules was edited and published by Burkitt (Cambridge, 1894). See that edition, pages 1–9. The text may also be found in PL 18:15. In this most copious discussion there is none of those rules, and yet a most obscure matter is being asked there. Let this be said by way of example, for it would be too long and too laborious to gather together all the things in the canonical Scriptures that are so obscure that none of those seven need be sought in them.

30. 43. But this man, when he commended these as rules, attributed so much to them as though, once they were well known and applied, we could understand everything we find obscurely set down in the law—that is, in the divine books. For he began that same book by saying: I judged it necessary, before all the things that seem good to me, to write a little book of Rules and to fashion, as it were, keys and lamps for the secrets of the law. For there are certain mystical rules which hold the recesses of the whole law and make the treasures of truth, invisible to some, visible. If the system of these rules is received without envy, as we share it, all closed things will be laid open and obscure things made clear, so that anyone walking through the immense forest of prophecy, led by these rules along paths of light, as it were, may be kept from error.

Here, if he had said, "For there are certain mystical rules which hold some recesses of the law," or at least, "which hold great recesses of the law"—not, as he said, the recesses of the whole law; and if he had not said, all closed things will be laid open, but "many closed things will be laid open"—he would have spoken truly, and would not, by giving to his so elaborate and useful work more than the matter itself demands, have sent its reader and student into a false hope.

I thought this should be said so that the book itself may both be read by the studious, because it helps very much toward understanding the Scriptures, and not have hoped of it more than it possesses. It must of course be read with caution, not only on account of certain matters in which he erred as a man, but especially on account of those things which he speaks as a Donatist heretic. But what these seven rules teach or advise, I will briefly show.

31. 44. The first is On the Lord and his body. In it, knowing that one person is sometimes intimated to us of head and body—that is, of Christ and the Church (for it was not said in vain to the faithful, therefore you are Abraham's offspring (Gal 3:29), since there is one offspring of Abraham, which is Christ), let us not hesitate when there is a transition from the head to the body, or from the body to the head, and yet there is no departure from one and the same person. For one person speaks when it says, as on a bridegroom he set a miter upon me, and as a bride he adorned me with an ornament (Isa 61:10). And yet which of these two suits the head, which the body—that is, which suits Christ, which the Church—must of course be understood.

32. 45. The second is On the twofold body of the Lord, which indeed ought not to have been so called. For that is not really the Lord's body which will not be with him for eternity. But it ought to have been said, "On the true and intermingled body of the Lord," or "the true and the feigned," or something else; because hypocrites are to be said not to be with him not only for eternity but even now, although they appear to be in his Church. Hence this rule could also be named in this way, that it should be called "On the intermingled Church."

This rule requires a watchful interpreter, for at times Scripture, when it is already speaking to others, seems to speak as if to the very ones to whom it was speaking, or to speak about them when it is already speaking about others, as though the body of both were one, on account of their temporary intermingling and their common share in the sacraments. To this belongs the passage in the Song of Songs: I am dark and beautiful, like the tents of Kedar, like the curtains of Solomon (Song 1:5). For it does not say, "I was dark like the tents of Kedar and I am beautiful like the curtains of Solomon," but said that it was both, on account of the temporal unity of good and bad fish within one net. (See Matt 13:48) For the tents of Kedar belong to Ishmael, who will not be heir together with the son of the free woman. (See Gen 25:13; 21:10; Gal 4:30)

And so, when God says concerning the good part, I will lead the blind in a way they do not know, and they will tread paths they do not know, and I will turn darkness into light for them and crooked things straight. These words I will do, and I will not forsake them (Isa 42:16)—he immediately says, concerning the other part, which has been intermingled as the bad, but they themselves turned backward (Isa 42:17), although by these words others are now being meant. I have rephrased what he says to make it clearer, because he does in fact phrase it very badly! What he says literally is: "He immediately says about the other sort, which has been mixed in badly, They however turned backward, although others are now being meant by these words."

But since they are now in one, it speaks as if about the very ones about whom it was speaking; yet they will not always be in one. For that is the very servant mentioned in the Gospel, whose lord, when he comes, will divide him and put his portion with the hypocrites (Matt 24:51).

33. 46. The third rule is On the promises and the Law, which can be put another way as "On the Spirit and the Letter," as we called it when we wrote a book on this matter; it can also be put thus: "On grace and the commandment." But this seems to me a great question rather than a rule to be applied to resolving questions.

This is the question which the Pelagians, by failing to understand, either founded or enlarged their heresy. Tyconius labored at resolving it well, but not fully. For, disputing about faith and works, he said that works are given to us by God by the merit of faith, but that faith itself is from us in such a way that it is not from God for us. The original Pelagian statement, as criticized by Augustine, was that our good works proceed entirely from our own free will and not from God's grace. Later, under pressure from his arguments, they conceded that, in Paul's language, we are justified by faith and not by works, that good works without faith in Christ are valueless; but then they maintained that this faith is entirely our own act. Nor did he attend to the Apostle saying, peace to the brethren, and love with faith, from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ (Eph 6:23).

But he had not experienced this heresy which, arising in our own time, exercised us much in defending against it the grace of God which is through our Lord Jesus Christ; and—according to what the Apostle says, there must be heresies, so that those who are approved may be made manifest among you (1 Cor 11:19)—it rendered us far more watchful and diligent, so that we noticed in the Holy Scriptures what escaped this Tyconius, who was less attentive and less anxious because he was without an enemy: namely, that faith itself too is a gift of him who apportions to each one its measure (Rom 12:3).

From this saying it was said to certain people: to you it has been granted for Christ's sake not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him (Phil 1:29). Hence who can doubt that both are God's gift, who faithfully and intelligently hears that both are granted? There are also many other testimonies by which this is shown, but we are not now dealing with that. We have, however, dealt with these things very often in one place and another. In addition to some fifteen anti-Pelagian treatises listed as such among Augustine's writings, there are innumerable references to this heresy in his later letters. It was the great preoccupation, not to say obsession, of the last fifteen to twenty years of his life.

34. 47. The fourth rule of Tyconius is On the species and the genus. For so he calls it, wishing the species to be understood as the part, and the genus as the whole of which that is a part which he names the species. As each individual city is of course a part of the whole body of nations, Though no city states survived in Augustine's time, he still inhabited a culture inherited from Greece and ancient Rome, in which "city" could as often as not mean "state." this he calls the species, and all the nations the genus. Nor is that subtlety of distinguishing to be applied here which is handed down by the dialecticians, who dispute most acutely about what difference there is between "part" and species.

The same reasoning holds if something of this kind is found in the divine utterances not about each individual city, but about each individual province or nation or kingdom. For not only, for example, about Jerusalem or about some city of the nations—whether Tyre or Babylon or any other—is something said in the Holy Scriptures that exceeds its own measure and suits rather all the nations; but even about Judea, about Egypt, about Assyria and any other nation in which there are very many cities, yet which is not the whole world but a part of it, something is said that passes beyond its measure and fits rather the whole of which this is a part—or, as he calls it, the genus of which this is a species.

Hence these terms have come even into the common people's knowledge, so that even the unlearned understand what is established specifically and what generally in any imperial decree. This happens also with men; thus the things said about Solomon exceed his measure and become clear rather when referred to Christ or to the Church, of which he is a part.

34. 48. Nor is the species always exceeded; for often such things are said as suit most plainly either it too, or perhaps it only. But when there is a transition from the species to the genus, as if Scripture were still speaking of the species, there the reader's attention ought to be watchful, lest he seek in the species what he can better and more surely find in the genus.

For it is easy to understand what the prophet Ezekiel says: The house of Israel dwelt in the land, and they defiled it by their way and by their idols and by their sins; their way became before my face according to the uncleanness of a menstruous woman. And I poured out my wrath upon them, and scattered them among the nations, and winnowed them into the lands; according to their ways and according to their sins I judged them (Ezek 36:17–19). It is easy, I say, to understand this about that house of Israel about which the Apostle says, look at Israel according to the flesh (1 Cor 10:18), because the carnal people of Israel both did and suffered all these things.

The other things too which follow are understood to suit the same people. But when it begins to say, and I will sanctify my great holy name, which has been defiled among the nations, which you have defiled in their midst; and the nations will know that I am the Lord (Ezek 36:23), the one who reads ought now to be attentive to how the species is exceeded and the genus joined on. For it follows and says: and while I am sanctified among you before their eyes, I will take you from the nations, and gather you out of all the lands, and bring you into your own land, and I will sprinkle you with clean water, and you will be cleansed from all your images, and I will cleanse you; and I will give you a new heart, and put a new spirit within you, and I will take away the heart of stone from your flesh, and give you a heart of flesh, and I will put my spirit within you, and bring it about that you walk in my statutes and keep and do my judgments; and you will dwell in the land which I gave to your fathers, and you will be my people and I will be your God, and I will cleanse you from all your uncleannesses (Ezek 36:23–29).

That this was prophesied about the New Testament, to which belongs not only that one nation in its remnant—about which it is written elsewhere, if the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, the remnant will be saved (Isa 10:22; Rom 9:27)—but also the other nations, which were promised to their fathers, who are ours too: this no one doubts who observes that the washing of regeneration (Titus 3:5) is here promised, which we now see rendered to all the nations. (See Gen 17:15; Rom 4:16–17)

And that saying of the Apostle, when he was commending the grace of the New Testament so that it might stand out in comparison with the Old—you are our letter, written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God; not on tablets of stone, but on tablets of fleshly hearts (2 Cor 3:2–3)—he looks back upon and perceives to be drawn from this place where that prophet says, and I will give you a new heart, and put a new spirit within you; and I will take away the heart of stone from your flesh, and give you a heart of flesh (Ezek 36:26). For by the heart of flesh, from which the Apostle says on tablets of fleshly hearts, he wished a feeling life to be distinguished from the heart of stone, and by a feeling life he signified an understanding one. Thus there comes to be a spiritual Israel, not of one nation, but of all the nations that were promised to the fathers in their offspring, which is Christ (Gal 3:16).

34. 49. This spiritual Israel, then, is distinguished from that carnal Israel, which is of one nation, by the newness of grace, not by the nobility of fatherland, and by mind, not by descent.

But the prophetic loftiness, while it speaks of the one or to the one, passes over secretly to the other; and when it now speaks of this one or to this one, it still seems to speak of the other or to the other—not begrudging us the understanding of the Scriptures as if in hostility, but exercising it medicinally.

Hence too that saying, and I will bring you into your own land, and a little later, as if repeating the very same thing, and you will dwell, it says, in the land which I gave to your fathers, we ought to take not carnally, as the carnal Israel does, but spiritually, as the spiritual do.

For the Church without spot or wrinkle (Eph 5:27), gathered out of all the nations and destined to reign forever with Christ, is itself the land of the blessed, the land of the living (Ps 27:13 (26:13)). It is to be understood as given to the fathers when it was promised to them by the sure and unchangeable will of God, since by the very firmness of the promise or predestination it has already been given—the thing which the fathers believed would be given in its own time; just as, writing to Timothy about that grace which is given to the saints, the Apostle says, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given to us in Christ Jesus before the eternal ages, but is now made manifest through the coming of our Savior (2 Tim 1:9–10).

He said grace was given when there were not yet any to whom it might be given, since in the disposition and predestination of God that had already been done which was to be in its own time—which he says was made manifest.

Although these things can also be understood of the land of the age to come, when there will be a new heaven and a new earth (Rev 21:1; see Isa 65:17), in which the unrighteous will not be able to dwell. And therefore it is rightly said to the pious that this is their land which will in no part belong to the impious, because it too has likewise been given, when it was made firm that it was to be given. The CCSL edition here suggests that he may be alluding to Matt 5:5, Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth—"earth" and "land" being of course both terra in Latin. But in his frequent quotations of the beatitudes, he never refers to the recipients of this blessing as the pii, which is the word he uses here, but always as either the mites or the mansueti. I think he is in fact referring in a more general way back to Ezek 36, which he has been continually quoting.

35. 50. Tyconius sets down a fifth rule which he calls On the times, by which rule there can generally be discovered or conjectured the quantity of time lying hidden in the Holy Scriptures. He says this rule operates in two ways, either by the trope synecdoche or by mystical numbers. The trope synecdoche makes either the whole to be understood from a part or a part from the whole, as one Evangelist says that something happened after eight days which another says happened after six days, when on the mountain, with only three disciples present, the face of the Lord shone like the sun and his garments like snow (Matt 17:1–2; Luke 9:28–29).

For both statements about the number of days could not be true unless the one who said after eight days is understood to have put the last part of the day on which Christ foretold that this would happen, and the first part of the day on which he showed it fulfilled, for two whole and entire days; while the one who said after six days reckoned only the entire and whole days in between.

By this mode of expression, in which the whole is signified from a part, that question too about the resurrection of Christ is resolved. For unless the last part of the day on which he suffered is taken for the whole day—that is, with the preceding night added—and the night in the last part of which he rose is taken for a whole day—with, of course, the dawning Lord's day added—they cannot be the three days and three nights during which he foretold he would be in the heart of the earth (Matt 12:40).

35. 51. By mystical numbers he means those which divine Scripture commends more prominently, such as seven or ten or twelve and whatever others there are which the studious gladly recognize in their reading. For numbers of this kind are generally set down for the whole of time, as seven times a day I will praise you (Ps 119:164 (118:164)) is nothing other than his praise is always in my mouth (Ps 34:1 (33:2)). They have the same force also when they are multiplied, whether by ten, as seventy and seven hundred (whence the seventy years of Jeremiah too can be taken spiritually for the whole of the time during which the Church is among aliens), or by themselves, as ten times ten is a hundred, and twelve times twelve is a hundred and forty-four, by which number the whole company of the saints is signified in the Revelation. (See Rev 7:4; 14:3) Hence it appears that not questions of time alone are to be resolved by these numbers, but that their significations extend more widely and creep into many things. For that number in the Revelation does not pertain to times, but to men.

36. 52. Tyconius calls the sixth rule Recapitulation, discovered watchfully enough in the obscurity of the Scriptures. For some things are said as though they follow in order of time or are narrated in the continuation of events, when in fact the narrative secretly goes back to earlier things that had been passed over. Unless this is understood by this rule, one goes astray.

As in Genesis: and the Lord God planted, it says, a garden in Eden toward the east, and there he put the man whom he had formed; and God brought forth besides, out of the ground, every tree fair and good for food (Gen 2:8–9). So it seems to be said as though this happened after God had put the man, once made, in the garden; whereas, having briefly mentioned both—that is, that God planted a garden and put there the man whom he had formed—he returns by recapitulation and says what he had passed over, namely how the garden had been planted, because God brought forth besides, out of the ground, every tree fair and good for food.

Then, following on, he added: and the tree of life in the midst of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Gen 2:9). Next the river by which the garden was watered is unfolded, divided into four heads of four rivers (Gen 2:10)—all of which pertains to the establishing of the garden. And when he had finished this, he repeated what he had already said, and what in reality came after it, and says: and the Lord God took the man whom he had fashioned, and put him in the garden (Gen 2:15), and so on. For after these things were done the man was put there, as the order itself now shows. These things were not done after the man was put there, as the earlier statement might be supposed to mean, unless the recapitulation is watchfully understood there, by which there is a return to the things that had been passed over.

36. 53. Likewise in that book, when the generations of the sons of Noah were being recounted, it was said: these are the sons of Ham in their tribes, according to their tongues, in their regions and in their nations (Gen 10:20). When the sons of Shem too had been enumerated, it is said: these are the sons of Shem in their tribes, according to their tongues, in their regions and in their nations (Gen 10:31). And about all of them it is added: these are the tribes of the sons of Noah, according to their generations, according to their nations. From these the islands Faithfully translating the Greek Septuagint, which mysteriously inserts these islands here. I have kept the whole translation of the biblical text here absolutely literal. But it must have sounded as peculiar in the Latin as it does in the English. of the nations were dispersed over the earth after the flood. And the whole earth was one lip and one voice for all (Gen 10:32–11:1). This, then, which is added—and the whole earth was one lip and one voice for all, that is, one tongue of all—seems to be said as though at that time, when they had already been dispersed over the earth even according to the islands of the nations, there was for all one common tongue. This without doubt conflicts with the earlier words, where it was said, in their tribes, according to their tongues. For the individual tribes which had made the individual nations would not be said to have had their own tongues already, when there was for all one common one.

And therefore by way of recapitulation it was added, and the whole earth was one lip and one voice for all, the narrative secretly going back to tell how it came about that out of the one tongue of all they were divided into many. And immediately the building of that tower is narrated, where this punishment of pride was inflicted on them by divine judgment, after which deed they were dispersed over the earth according to their tongues.

36. 54. This recapitulation occurs even more obscurely, as in the Gospel where the Lord says: on the day that Lot went out from Sodom it rained fire from heaven and destroyed them all: so will be the day of the Son of man, when he will be revealed. In that hour, whoever is on the housetop, and his goods in the house, let him not come down to take them; and likewise whoever is in the field, let him not turn back. Let him remember Lot's wife (Luke 17:29–32; see Gen 19:26).

Are these things to be observed only when the Lord has been revealed, that no one look back, that is, seek again the past life which he has renounced? And not rather at this present time, so that, when the Lord has been revealed, each may find the recompense for the things he has kept or scorned?

And yet, because it was said in that hour, these things are supposed to be observed only when the Lord has been revealed—unless the reader's sense is watchful to understand the recapitulation, helped by another Scripture which, in the time of the apostles themselves, already cried out, children, it is the last hour (1 John 2:18). The very time, then, in which the Gospel is being preached, until the Lord is revealed, is the hour in which these things must be observed, because the Lord's revelation itself also pertains to the same hour, which will be ended on the day of judgment. (See Rom 2:5; 13:11)

37. 55. The seventh and last rule of Tyconius is On the devil and his body. For he too is the head of the impious, who are in a manner his body, destined to go with him into the punishment of eternal fire, (See Matt 25:41) just as Christ is the head of the Church, which is his body (Eph 1:22–23; Col 1:18), destined to be with him in the kingdom and in everlasting glory. As, then, in the first rule, which he calls On the Lord and his body, we must be watchful, when Scripture speaks of one and the same person, to understand what suits the head and what the body, so in this last rule too something is sometimes said of the devil which can be recognized not in himself but rather in his body, which he has not only in those who are most plainly outside, but also in those who, though they belong to him, are nevertheless for a time mingled with the Church, until each one departs from this life or the chaff is separated from the wheat by the final winnowing fan. (See Luke 3:17)

For what is written in Isaiah, how has Lucifer fallen, who rose in the morning (Isa 14:12), and the rest, which under the figure of the king of Babylon were said of the same person, or to the same person, in the very texture of the discourse, are of course understood of the devil. And yet what is said there, he who sends to all the nations is crushed to the earth (Isa 14:12), does not entirely suit the head himself. For although the devil sends his angels to all the nations, yet it is his body, not he himself, that is crushed to the earth—except insofar as he himself is in his body, which is crushed and becomes like the dust which the wind drives from the face of the earth (Ps 1:4).

37. 56. But all these rules, except the one called On the promises and the Law, cause one thing to be understood from another, which is proper to figurative expression—a thing which extends more widely than, as it seems to me, can be wholly grasped by anyone. For wherever, as it were, one thing is said so that another may be understood, even if the name of the trope itself is not found in the art of speaking, it is figurative expression.

And when this occurs where it usually occurs, understanding follows without effort; but when it occurs where it usually does not, there is effort in understanding it—by some more, by some less, just as the gifts of God are more or less present in the talents of men, or aids are bestowed.

Accordingly, just as with literal words, about which we disputed above, where things are to be understood as they are said, (See book 2.10) so with metaphorical words, which make up figurative expressions, where one thing is to be understood from another—about which we have so far dealt sufficiently, as far as seemed good;

students of the venerable Letters must not only be admonished to know the kinds of expression in the Holy Scriptures, and to attend watchfully and hold in memory how something is customarily said in them, but also—what is chief and most necessary—to pray that they may understand. For in those very Letters of which they are students they read that the Lord gives wisdom, and from his face come knowledge and understanding (Prov 2:6); from whom they have received the very study itself, if it is endowed with piety.

But let this be said as enough about signs too, as far as words are concerned. It remains for us to treat, in the following volume, with whatever the Lord may grant, of the setting forth of the things we perceive.

1. 1. This work of ours which is entitled Teaching Christianity I had, in the first distribution, divided into two parts, as it were. For after the preface, in which I answered those who were going to find fault with it, I said: there are two things on which the whole treatment of the Scriptures rests: the way of discovering what is to be understood, and the way of setting forth what has been understood. Of discovering we will treat first, of setting forth afterward. Since, then, we have already said much about discovering and have completed three volumes on this one part, with the Lord's help we shall say a few things about setting forth, so that, if it can be done, we may close everything in one book and end this whole work in four volumes.

1. 2. First, then, by this prefatory remark I restrain the expectation of readers who perhaps suppose that I am going to give the precepts of rhetoric which I both learned and taught in the secular schools, and I warn them not to expect such things from me—not because they have no usefulness, but because, if they have any, it must be learned separately, should some good man perhaps have the leisure to learn even these things; it is not, however, to be sought from me, either in this work or in any other.

2. 3. For since by the art of rhetoric both truths and falsehoods are urged, who would dare to say that, against falsehood, truth ought to stand defenseless in the persons of its defenders—so that, namely, those who try to persuade people of false things should know how to make a hearer well-disposed, attentive, and teachable by their preface, A rather free paraphrase, I have to admit. He is stating what any public speaker must set out to do from the moment he first opens his mouth; he must render his audience, literally, "benevolent, attentive, and docile." while these defenders of truth should not?

Should the one party narrate falsehoods briefly, clearly, and plausibly, while the other narrates truths in such a way that it is tiresome to listen, impossible to understand, and, in the end, unappealing to believe?

Should the one party assail the truth and assert falsehood with deceptive arguments, while the other is able neither to defend truths nor to refute falsehoods?

Should the one party, moving and driving the minds of hearers into error, by their speaking terrify, sadden, gladden, and ardently exhort, while the other, on behalf of truth, drowses sluggish and cold?

Who is so foolish as to think this wise? Since, then, the faculty of eloquence is set in the midst, which avails very much for persuading whether to crooked or to right things, why is it not procured by the zeal of the good, so that it may do service to truth, if the wicked usurp it for obtaining their perverse and empty causes in the uses of iniquity and error?

3. 4. But whatever observations and precepts there are on this matter—by which, when there is added the most skillful habit, in many words and verbal ornaments, of a more practiced tongue, there comes about what is called fluency or eloquence—must be learned outside these our Letters, by those who can do so quickly, with a suitable space of time set apart for it, at a fit and convenient age. For even the very leaders of Roman eloquence were not ashamed to say that no one can ever fully learn this art unless he can learn it quickly. See Cicero, The Orator 3.146. Whether this is true, what need is there to inquire? For even if these things could at last be learned in time by slower minds, we do not value them so highly as to wish the already mature, or even weighty, ages of men to be spent in learning them. It is enough that this be the concern of the young—and not of all of them whom we desire to be trained for the usefulness of the Church, but of those whom no more pressing necessity, which is without doubt to be put before this matter, has occupied.

For if a keen and fervent talent is present, eloquence clings more readily to those who read and hear the eloquent than to those who pursue the precepts of eloquence. Nor are there lacking ecclesiastical writings—even besides the canon wholesomely placed in the citadel of authority—by reading which a capable person, even if he is not aiming at it but is only intent on the things said there, is also imbued, while he is engaged in them, with the eloquence in which they are said; and this happens especially with the added exercise of writing or of dictating, and finally of speaking, what he thinks in accordance with the rule of piety and faith.

But if such a talent is lacking, those rhetorical precepts are not grasped; or, if they are grasped in however small a part by being drilled in with great labor, they are of no profit. Since indeed even those who have learned them and speak copiously and ornately cannot all, in order to speak according to them, think of those precepts while they speak, unless they are discussing them. Rather, I think there are scarcely any of them who can do both, both speak well and, in order to do so, think of those precepts of speaking while they speak.

For one must beware lest the things to be said slip from the mind while attention is given to saying them artfully. And yet in the sermons and discourses of the eloquent the precepts of eloquence are found fulfilled, of which those speakers did not think, either to be eloquent or while they were being eloquent—whether they had learned them or had not even touched upon them. For they fulfill those precepts because they are eloquent; they do not apply them in order to be eloquent.

3. 5. Therefore, since out of infants there come speakers only by learning the speech of speakers, why can they not become eloquent with no art of eloquence handed down, but by reading and hearing the utterances of the eloquent and, as far as it is granted to attain, by imitating them? Indeed, we observe by examples themselves that this is so. For without rhetorical precepts we know very many who are more eloquent than very many who have learned them; but without having read and heard the discourses or utterances of the eloquent, no one.

For children would not need even the art of grammar itself, by which the correctness of speech is learned, if it were granted them to grow up and live among people who spoke correctly. For, knowing no names of faults, whatever faulty thing they heard from the mouth of anyone speaking, they would by their own sound habit censure and avoid, just as the city-bred censure country folk, even those who do not know their letters.

4. 6. The treater and teacher of the divine Scriptures, then, the defender of right faith and vanquisher of error, ought both to teach good things and to unteach evil things, and in this work of speech to win over the hostile, rouse the slack, and make known to those who do not know what is going on what they ought to expect.

But when he has either found or himself made his hearers well-disposed, attentive, and teachable, the rest is to be carried through as the case demands. If those who hear are to be taught, it must be done by narration—if indeed there is need of it—so that the matter in question may become known. But that things which are doubtful may become certain, reasoning must be employed, with proofs brought to bear. Here he may well have had debates with the Donatists in mind, or talks to Catholics about Donatism; the true story of the original schism had to be told again and again, and appeal to be made to the documents of the case, whether to the court records of the time of Constantine, or also, as the dispute widened to include theological disagreements, to the works of Cyprian.

But if those who hear are to be moved rather than taught, so that they may not be sluggish in acting upon what they already know and may give their assent to things which they confess to be true, there is need of greater forces of speaking. There entreaties and rebukes, stirrings and restraints, and whatever else avails to move minds, are necessary.

4. 7. And all these things which I have mentioned nearly all people never cease to do in the matters they carry out by speaking.

5. 7. But since some do these things dully, unattractively, and coldly, while others do them keenly, ornately, and forcefully, the man who ought to come to this work (That is, in a word, preaching. He is writing for the African clergy, in particular, perhaps, for their bishops) of which we are treating is one who can discuss or speak wisely, even if he cannot do so eloquently, so as to profit his hearers—even if less than he would profit if he could speak eloquently as well.

But the one who overflows with foolish eloquence is the more to be guarded against the more the hearer is delighted by him in matters which it is useless to hear, and supposes, because he hears him speak fluently, that he is also speaking truly. This opinion did not escape even those who thought the art of rhetoric should be taught. For they confessed that "wisdom without eloquence is of little profit to states, but eloquence without wisdom is generally a great harm, and never a profit." Cicero, On Invention 1.1.

If, then, those who handed down the precepts of eloquence were compelled by the prompting of truth to confess this in the very books in which they did so—not knowing the true, that is, the heavenly wisdom which comes down from the Father of lights (Jas 1:17)—how much more ought we to think no otherwise, who are the children and ministers of this wisdom?

But a man speaks the more wisely or the less the more or less he has advanced in the Holy Scriptures—I do not mean in reading them much and committing them to memory, but in understanding them well and diligently searching out their meanings. For there are those who read them and neglect them: they read so as to retain, they neglect so as not to understand. Far to be preferred to these, without doubt, are those who retain their words less and see their heart with the eyes of their own heart. But better than both is the one who both can quote them when he wishes and understands them as he ought.

For this man, then, who ought to speak wisely even what he cannot speak eloquently, it is most necessary to retain the words of the Scriptures. Not entirely consistent with what he has just said in the previous paragraph—he uses the same expression in both places, verba tenere. But here he is urging clergymen of the second category of that paragraph, those who see into the heart of the Scriptures, to rise to the category of those who can also quote them at will—particularly if they lack the skill of eloquence.

For the poorer he perceives himself to be in his own resources, the richer he ought to be in these, so that what he says in his own words he may prove from theirs; and one who was the lesser in his own words may, by the testimony of great men, in a manner grow. The text reads qui propriis verbis minor erat—"one who was the lesser in his own words." The translator emends to quod propriis verbis minus erat, "what was the less in his own words." For by proving, he gives delight who is less able to delight by speaking.

Furthermore, the one who wishes to speak not only wisely but also eloquently—since he will surely profit more if he can do both—I more gladly send to read or hear and, by exercise, to imitate the eloquent than I bid him spend his time on masters of the art of rhetoric; provided, however, that those who are read and heard are praised by truthful report as having spoken or speaking not only eloquently but also wisely.

For those who speak eloquently are heard with pleasure; those who speak wisely, with profit. On account of which Scripture does not say, "a multitude of the eloquent," but a multitude of the wise is the health of the world (Wis 6:24).

But just as bitter things that are wholesome must often be taken, so harmful sweetness must always be avoided. Yet what is better than wholesome sweetness or sweet wholesomeness? For the more sweetness is sought there, the more easily does wholesomeness do its good. There are, then, ecclesiastical men who have treated the divine utterances not only wisely but also eloquently, Saints Cyprian of Carthage and Ambrose of Milan were his prime models of sound ecclesiastical eloquence; Saint Hilary of Poitiers very definitely in third place. for the reading of whom time is more likely to fail than they themselves to be lacking to those who study and have leisure.

6. 9. Here someone perhaps asks whether our authors, whose writings, divinely inspired, made for us a canon by their most wholesome authority, are to be called only wise or eloquent as well. This question, indeed, is most easily resolved in my own mind and in the minds of those who feel with me about what I say. For where I understand them, not only does nothing seem to me wiser, but also nothing more eloquent. And I dare to say that all who rightly understand what they say understand at the same time that they could not have spoken otherwise.

For just as there is a certain eloquence that better befits youthful age, and one that befits old age—and it is no longer to be called eloquence if it does not suit the person of the speaker—so there is a certain eloquence that befits men most worthy of the highest authority and plainly divine. This is what they spoke; and no other eloquence befits them, nor does theirs befit others. For it is suited to them; but others, the lowlier it seems, the more loftily it surpasses—not by windiness, but by solidity.

But where I do not understand them, their eloquence indeed appears less to me; yet I do not doubt that it is such as it is where I do understand. The very obscurity, too, of the divine and wholesome sayings had to be mingled with such eloquence, in which our understanding ought to make progress not only by discovery but also by exercise. A rather wordy paraphrase of an excessively succinct, and hence obscure, sentence. For the thought, see book 2.7–8 above.

6. 10. I could indeed, if there were leisure, show all the virtues and ornaments of eloquence—about which those people are puffed up who prefer their own tongue to the tongue of our authors not by its greatness but by its swelling—in the Sacred Letters of those whom divine providence provided for our instruction and for transferring us from this crooked age into the blessed age. (See Col 1:13) But it is not those features that delight me, more than can be told, in that eloquence which these men have in common with the orators or poets of the Gentiles.

I rather marvel and am amazed at this, that they used that eloquence of ours (Here "ours" means that of the Gentile—Latin—classics) by means of a certain other eloquence of their own, in such a way that it was neither lacking to them nor prominent in them, because it had neither to be disapproved by them nor to be paraded.

The one of these would happen if it were avoided, the other might be thought if it were easily recognized. And in whatever passages it is perhaps recognized by the learned, such matters are spoken that the words by which they are said seem not to have been applied by the speaker, but joined to the things themselves as if of their own accord—as though you were to understand wisdom proceeding from its own house, that is, from the breast of the wise man, and eloquence following like an inseparable handmaid, even uncalled.

7. 11. For who does not see what the Apostle wished to say, and how wisely he said it: we glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation produces patience, and patience trial, and trial hope; and hope does not disappoint, because the love of God has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:3–5)? Here, if anyone—unskillfully skilled, so to speak—should contend that the Apostle followed the precepts of the art of eloquence, will he not be laughed at by Christians learned and unlearned alike? And yet here is recognized the figure which is called climax in Greek, but in Latin by some gradatio ("a stepping up"), since they were unwilling to say "ladder," when words or thoughts are linked one from another; as here we see patience linked from tribulation, trial from patience, hope from trial.

Another grace too is recognized: that after several clauses, each ended by a pause of the voice, Literally, "by a voice of pronunciation," pronuntiationis voce; presumably a technical use of the word pronuntiatio. Here and in the rest of this section the allusions are mostly to Cicero and Quintilian, the arch-grammarian. Most English names for the figures of speech referred to derive from the Greek rather than the Latin, and have come to signify punctuation marks, which the ancients were quite innocent of, rather than kinds of phrase. which ours call "members" and "cuts," but the Greeks cola and commata, there follows the circuit or period, which they call periodos, whose members are held in suspense by the speaker's voice until it is ended by the last. For of those that precede the period, the first member is since tribulation produces patience, the second and patience trial, the third and trial hope. Then the period itself is joined on, which is carried through by three members, of which the first is and hope does not disappoint, the second because the love of God has been poured out in our hearts, the third through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. But these and the like are handed down in the art of elocution. As, then, we do not say that the Apostle followed the precepts of eloquence, so we do not deny that eloquence followed his wisdom.

7. 12. Writing to the Corinthians, in the second epistle he refutes certain false apostles who were of the Jews and who disparaged him. And since he is compelled to praise himself, attributing to himself this seeming foolishness, how wisely he speaks, and how eloquently! But with wisdom as his companion, with eloquence as his guide—following the one, going before the other, and not spurning it as it follows.

Again I say, he says, let no one think me foolish; but if you do, then accept me as foolish, that I too may boast a little. What I am saying I say not according to God, but as in foolishness, in this matter of boasting. Since indeed many boast according to the flesh, I too will boast. For you gladly bear with the foolish, being wise yourselves. For you tolerate it if anyone reduces you to slavery, if anyone devours you, if anyone takes from you, if anyone exalts himself, if anyone strikes you in the face. I speak according to dishonor, as though we had been weak (2 Cor 11:16–21).

But in whatever anyone dares (I speak in foolishness), I too dare. Are they Hebrews? So am I. Are they Israelites? So am I. Are they the offspring of Abraham? So am I. Are they ministers of Christ? (I speak as a fool) I more so (2 Cor 11:21–23).

In labors more abundantly, in prisons more frequently, in beatings beyond measure, in deaths often. From the Jews five times I received forty lashes less one. Three times I was beaten with rods, once I was stoned, three times I was shipwrecked; a night and a day I was in the deep of the sea; in journeys often, in dangers from rivers, in dangers from robbers, in dangers from my own race, in dangers from the Gentiles, in dangers in the city, in dangers in the wilderness, in dangers at sea, in dangers among false brethren; in toil and hardship, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness; besides those things which are external, my daily pressure, the anxiety for all the Churches (2 Cor 11:23–28).

Who is weak, and I am not weak? Who is made to stumble, and I am not inflamed? If I must boast, I will boast in the things that pertain to my weakness (2 Cor 11:29–30).

With how great wisdom these things were said, the watchful see; but with how great a river of eloquence they also concurred, even one who snores notices.

7. 13. Now anyone who knows recognizes that those cuts which the Greeks call commata, and the members and periods, about which I spoke a little before, when interposed with a most becoming variety, produced that whole appearance of the discourse and, as it were, its very countenance, by which even the unlearned are delighted and moved. For from where we began to insert this passage, they are periods.

The first is the smallest, that is, of two members; for periods cannot have fewer than two members, though they can have more. So that first one is: again I say, let no one think me foolish.

There follows another of three members: but if you do, then accept me as foolish, that I too may boast a little. The first clause, or membrum, here is, I think, the single word alioquin, "but if you do."

The third, which follows, has four members: what I am saying I say not according to God, but as in foolishness, in this matter of boasting.

The fourth has two: since indeed many boast according to the flesh, I too will boast.

And the fifth has two: for you gladly bear with the foolish, being wise yourselves.

The sixth too is of two members: for you tolerate it if anyone reduces you to slavery. From here on his analysis at times seems very idiosyncratic. But he was, unlike his translator, a trained rhetorician! Also, however, again unlike his translator, he did not have the benefit of punctuation in his texts.

There follow three cuts: if anyone devours you, if anyone takes from you, if anyone exalts himself.

Then three members: if anyone strikes you in the face, I speak according to dishonor, as though we had been weak.

A period of three members is added: but in whatever anyone dares (I speak in foolishness), I too dare.

From here on, individual cuts being set down by way of question, individual cuts likewise are rendered by way of answer, three to three: are they Hebrews? So am I. Are they Israelites? So am I. Are they the offspring of Abraham? So am I.

But a fourth cut being set down with a like question, he answers not with the opposition of another cut, but of a member: are they ministers of Christ? (I speak as a fool) I more so.

Now the four following cuts pour forth, the question being most becomingly removed: in labors more abundantly, in prisons more frequently, in beatings beyond measure, in deaths often.

Then a short period is interposed, since by a suspended delivery it must be marked off: from the Jews five times, so that this is one member, to which another is linked: I received forty lashes less one.

Thence there is a return to cuts, and three are set down: three times I was beaten with rods, once I was stoned, three times I was shipwrecked. A member follows: a night and a day I was in the deep of the sea.

Then fourteen cuts flow forth with a most becoming rush: in journeys often, in dangers from rivers, in dangers from robbers, in dangers from my own race, in dangers from the Gentiles, in dangers in the city, in dangers in the wilderness, in dangers at sea, in dangers among false brethren; in toil and hardship, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness.

After these he interposes a period of three members: besides those things which are external, my daily pressure, the anxiety for all the Churches.

And to this he subjoins two members by way of questioning: who is weak, and I am not weak? Who is made to stumble, and I am not inflamed?

Finally, this whole passage, as if panting, is ended by a period of two members: if I must boast, I will boast in the things that pertain to my weakness.

But that after this rush, by interposing a little narrative, he in a manner rests and makes the hearer rest—what grace, what delight this has, cannot be sufficiently told. For he goes on, saying: the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is blessed for ever, knows that I do not lie (2 Cor 11:31).

And then he narrates most briefly how he had been endangered and how he escaped. (See 2 Cor 11:32–33)

7. 14. It would take long to pursue the rest, or to point out these things in other passages of the Holy Scriptures. What if I had wished to show even the figures of speech which are handed down by that art, at least in those passages of the Apostle's eloquence which I have mentioned? All he has done so far is analyze the eloquent structure of the passages quoted; he has not noted the apostle's use of such figures of speech as irony, metaphor, hyperbole—or, in English, under- and over-statement, comparisons, and so forth. Would not serious people sooner think me excessive than any of the studious think me self-sufficient? I have supplied some such word as existimarent; the text does seem defective here. When all these things are taught by masters, they are held to be a great matter, bought at a great price, sold with great boasting. And I fear that I myself smack of that boasting while I discuss these things thus. But an answer had to be given to ill-taught people who think our authors to be despised, not because they do not have the eloquence which these people love too much, but because they do not parade it.

7. 15. But perhaps someone thinks that I have chosen the Apostle Paul as, so to speak, our eloquent man. For he seems, where he says, though unskilled in speech, yet not in knowledge (2 Cor 11:6), to have spoken thus as if by conceding to his detractors, not as if acknowledging it true by confessing it. But if he had said, "unskilled indeed in speech, but not in knowledge," it could in no way be understood otherwise. Knowledge he plainly did not hesitate to profess, without which he could not have been the teacher of the Gentiles (1 Tim 2:7).

Certainly, if we bring forward anything of his as an example of eloquence, we bring it of course from those Epistles which even his very detractors, who wished the speech of his presence to be thought contemptible, confessed to be weighty and strong (2 Cor 10:10).

I see, then, that I must say something also about the eloquence of the prophets, where many things are covered over by figurative language. The more they seem to be veiled by metaphorical words, the sweeter they are when they have been laid open. (See book 2.7 above)

But in this place I ought to mention something of such a kind that I am not compelled to expound what is said, but only to point out how it is said. And I will do this preferably from the book of that prophet who says that he was a shepherd or herdsman, and was thence taken away by God and sent to prophesy to the people of God. (See Amos 7:14–15) Yet not according to the Septuagint translators, The Greek Septuagint, or LXX for short. I think this may be the only place in which he states a preference for Jerome's Vulgate over earlier versions based on the Septuagint—perhaps as a kind of posthumous olive-branch to that redoubtable man, who had died in 420. who, having also translated by the divine Spirit, seem on that account to have said some things otherwise, so that the reader's attention might be the more directed to searching out the spiritual sense (whence some things of theirs are also more obscure because they are more figurative)—but as they have been translated from the Hebrew into Latin speech by the priest Jerome, skilled in both languages.

7. 16. When, therefore, he was rebuking the impious, the proud, the self-indulgent, and those most neglectful, on that account, of brotherly love, this prophet—a countryman, or sprung from a countryman—cried out, saying: Woe to you who are wealthy in Zion, and who trust in the mountain of Samaria, you nobles, heads of the peoples, entering the house of Israel with pomp! Pass over to Calneh and see, and go from there to great Hamath, and go down to Gath of the Philistines, and to all their best kingdoms, whether their boundary is wider than your boundary. You who are set apart for the day of evil, and draw near to the throne of iniquity; who sleep on beds of ivory and are wanton on your couches; who eat the lamb from the flock and the calves from the midst of the herd; who sing to the sound of the harp. Like David they thought they had instruments of song, drinking wine in bowls, and anointed with the finest ointment; and they suffered nothing over the affliction of Joseph (Amos 6:1–6).

Would those who despise our prophets as untutored and ignorant of elocution, like learned and eloquent men, if anything of this kind had had to be said by them or against such people, have wished to speak otherwise—those of them, at least, who would not have wished to rave?

7. 17. For what is there in this eloquence that sober ears could desire more? First, the very invective—with what a roar was it dashed against senses as if asleep, so that they might wake up? Woe to you who are wealthy in Zion, and who trust in the mountain of Samaria, you nobles, heads of the peoples, entering the house of Israel with pomp! (Amos 6:1) Then, to show them ungrateful for the benefits of God, who had given them the ample expanses of a kingdom, since they trusted in the mountain of Samaria, where of course idols were worshiped: pass over, he says, to Calneh and see, and go from there to great Hamath, and go down to Gath of the Philistines, and to all their best kingdoms, whether their boundary is wider than your boundary (Amos 6:2). At the same time, too, while these things are said, the speech is adorned with the names of places as if with lights: Zion, Samaria, Calneh, great Hamath, and Gath of the Philistines. Then the verbs joined to these places are most becomingly varied: you are wealthy, you trust, pass over, go, go down.

7. 18. Next it is announced that the coming captivity under an unjust king draws near, when there is added: you who are set apart for the day of evil, and draw near to the throne of iniquity. Then the deserts of self-indulgence are subjoined: who sleep on beds of ivory and are wanton on your couches; who eat the lamb from the flock and the calves from the midst of the herd.

These six members produced three periods of two members each. For he did not say: "you who are set apart for the day of evil, you who draw near to the throne of iniquity, you who sleep on beds of ivory, you who are wanton on your couches, you who eat the lamb from the flock, you who eat the calves from the midst of the herd." If it were said thus, this too would indeed be beautiful, that all six members should run on from a single repeated pronoun and each be ended by the voice of the one delivering it.

But it was done more beautifully, that to the same pronoun two clauses each were joined, which unfolded three thoughts: one for the foretelling of captivity, you who are set apart for the day of evil and draw near to the throne of iniquity; another for lust, you who sleep on beds of ivory and are wanton on your couches; and a third pertaining to gluttony, you who eat the lamb from the flock and the calves from the midst of the herd—so that it is in the power of the one delivering it whether he ends each one, and there are six members, or whether he holds the first and third and fifth in suspense by his voice, and, linking the second to the first, the fourth to the third, the sixth to the fifth, most becomingly makes three periods of two members each: one by which the impending calamity, another by which the impure bed, the third by which the prodigal table is shown.

7. 19. Then he gnaws at the self-indulgent pleasure of the ears. Here, when he had said, who sing to the sound of the harp—since music can be practiced wisely by the wise—with wonderful grace of speaking, the rush of the invective slackened, and now speaking not to them but about them, so as to admonish us to distinguish the music of the wise man from the music of the self-indulgent, he did not say, "you who sing to the sound of the harp, and like David think you have instruments of song," but, when he had said to them what the self-indulgent ought to hear—who sing to the sound of the harp—he in a manner indicated their lack of skill to others, adding: like David they thought they had instruments of song, drinking wine in bowls, and anointed with the finest ointment (Amos 6:5–6). These three are better delivered if, the two former members being held in suspense, they are ended by the third.

7. 20. Now indeed that which is added to all these, and they suffered nothing over the affliction of Joseph—whether it be said continuously so as to be one member, or more becomingly held in suspense: and they suffered nothing, and after this division there be brought in over the affliction of Joseph, so that it is a period of two members;

with wonderful grace it was not said, "they suffered nothing over the affliction of a brother," but in place of "brother" was put Joseph, so that any brother whatever might be signified by the proper name of him whose fame among his brothers is illustrious, whether in the evils he paid out or in the good he repaid. He is alluding to the story of Joseph and his brothers here, Gen 37–45. But Amos in all probability simply meant the northern kingdom of Israel by the name "Joseph," its two principal tribes being those descended from Joseph's sons, Ephraim and Manasseh; see Gen 48. Augustine alludes to him with a play on words which I cannot reproduce in English: vel in malis quae pendit, vel in bonis quae rependit. You can pay "penalties" in English, in the sense he uses pendit here, but not evils.

This trope, certainly, by which Joseph is made to be understood as any brother whatever, I do not know whether it is handed down by that art which we learned and taught. Why doesn't he know? Perhaps because it was so long since he had taught rhetoric. But this profession of ignorance is really just another device for insinuating that it is not really necessary formally to study the art of rhetoric in a school of rhetoric. Yet how beautiful it is, and how it affects those who read and understand, there is no need to tell anyone, if he does not feel it himself.

7. 21. And many more things indeed which pertain to the precepts of eloquence can be found in this very passage which we have set down as an example. But it does not so much instruct a good hearer, if it is diligently analyzed, as it kindles him, if it is ardently delivered. For these things were not composed by human industry, but poured out by the divine mind both wisely and eloquently—wisdom not intent upon eloquence, but eloquence not departing from wisdom.

For if—as certain most eloquent and most acute men have been able to see and to say See Cicero, The Orator 1.146; Brutus 30.46.—the things that are learned as if by the oratorical art would not be observed and noted and reduced into this teaching, unless they had first been found in the talents of orators, In their ingenia, a word for which there seems to be no good English equivalent. These eloquent and percipient men could doubtless be reduced to Cicero and Quintilian. what wonder if they are found also in those whom he sent who made the talents? Wherefore let us confess our canonical authors and teachers to be eloquent indeed, not only wise, with such eloquence as befitted persons of that kind.

8. 22. But even if we take some examples of elocution from those writings of theirs which are understood without difficulty, we ought by no means to think that we must imitate them in those things which they said with a useful and wholesome obscurity—in order, as it were, to exercise and refine the minds of readers, and to break through fastidiousness I take it he is remembering his own fastidiousness as a conceited young rhetorician, which had blocked his appreciation of the Scriptures, owing to the "rusticity" of their Latin. and sharpen the zeal of those wishing to learn, and also to veil Reading velandos for the celandos, "to conceal," of the text, there being, I take it, an allusion to 2 Cor 3:15. the minds of the impious, whether that they might be converted to piety or shut out from the mysteries.

For they spoke in such a way that later men, who should rightly understand and expound them, might find in the Church of God a second grace—unlike, indeed, (Following upon the law, which the prophets were sent to remind Israel of) yet nevertheless following on.

Their expositors, therefore, ought not to speak as though they were setting themselves forth to be expounded with like authority, but in all their discourses they should labor first and foremost to be understood, with such perspicuity of speaking as they can, so that either he is very slow who does not understand, or the cause why what we say can be understood less or more slowly lies in the difficulty and subtlety of the matters which we wish to explain and show, not in our manner of speaking.

9. 23. For there are certain things which by their own force are not understood, or scarcely understood, however much and however plainly the one who speaks may turn them over in his speech. These are to be brought before the hearing of the people either rarely, if something presses, or never at all.

But in books, which are so written that they in a manner hold the reader to themselves when they are understood, but when they are not understood are no trouble to those unwilling to read, and in conversations with some people, this duty is not to be abandoned: that truths, however difficult to understand, which we ourselves have already grasped, we should, with whatever labor of discussion, bring to the understanding of others—if the desire of learning holds the hearer or fellow-talker, and there is no lack of mental capacity which can in some way receive what is intimated; the one who teaches taking no care with how much eloquence he teaches, but with how much clearness.

10. 24. The diligent appetite for this clearness sometimes neglects the more refined words and does not care what sounds well, but what well indicates and intimates that which it intends to show. Whence a certain author, when he was treating of such a kind of speech, said that there is in it a certain "diligent negligence." Cicero, The Orator 23.75.

Yet this negligence so withdraws ornament that it does not contract filth. Although in good teachers there is, or ought to be, so great a care of teaching that a word which cannot be Latin unless it is obscure or ambiguous, but in the common people's way is said so that ambiguity and obscurity are avoided, should be said not as the learned say it, but rather as the unlearned are accustomed to say it. For if our translators were not ashamed to say, I will not gather their assemblies out of bloods (Ps 16:4 (15:4)), since they perceived it to be relevant to the matter that in that place this noun should be uttered in the plural, which in the Latin tongue is said only in the singular—the word "bloods," sanguinibus In fact the translators both of the Latin from the Greek and of the Greek from the Hebrew were simply being excessively literal, and not worried very much about the result being somewhat meaningless. No doubt they assumed, as Augustine did, that this indicated the divine mysteriousness of the text, and was grist to the mill of those seeking spiritual meanings.—why should a teacher of piety, speaking to the unskilled, be ashamed to say ossum rather than os for "bone," As a matter of fact, Lewis & Short, under os, does give ossum as a "collateral form," on the authority of Varro; but perhaps Varro quoted it as a vulgar solecism. Since African ears did not, as Augustine goes on to say, distinguish short from long syllables, they might understand os to mean a mouth (plural ora) rather than a bone (plural ossa). lest that syllable be understood not from "bones" (ossa) but from "mouths" (ora), where African ears pass no judgment about the shortening or lengthening of vowels?

For what does correctness of speech profit, which the hearer's understanding does not follow, since there is no reason at all for speaking if those for whose sake we speak, that they may understand, do not understand what we say? The one who teaches, then, will avoid all words that do not teach; and if in place of them he can say other correct ones that are understood, he will rather choose that. But if he cannot, either because there are none or because at present they do not occur to him, he will use even less correct words, provided only that the matter itself is taught and learned correctly.

10. 25. And this indeed not only in conversations—whether they are held with some one person or with several—but also, and much more, before the people when a sermon is delivered, we must insist on being understood; because in conversations each one has the power of asking, but where all are silent that one may be heard, and turn their faces, intent, upon him, there it is neither the custom nor the seemly thing for each to inquire about what he has not understood; and therefore the care of the speaker ought especially to come to the aid of the silent.

But a multitude eager to know is accustomed to signify by its own movement whether it has understood. Until it signifies this, the matter in hand must be turned over with a manifold variety of speaking—which those do not have in their power who deliver things prepared and retained by memory word for word.

But as soon as it has been established that the matter is understood, either the discourse must be ended or there must be a passing over to other things. For just as he is welcome who clears up what needs to be known, so he is burdensome who drives home what is already known—at least to those whose whole expectation was hanging on the resolving of the difficulty of the things being opened out. For things already known are said also for the sake of giving delight, where attention is paid not to them but to the manner in which they are said.

But if even the manner is already known and pleases the hearers, it makes almost no difference whether the one who delivers it is a speaker or a reader. For things that have been aptly written are accustomed to be read with pleasure not only by those to whom they first become known, but also to be reread, not without pleasure, by those to whom they are already known and whom forgetfulness has not yet erased them from memory, or to be gladly heard by both. But whatever each one has already forgotten, when he is reminded, he is taught.

But I am not now treating of the manner of giving delight; I am speaking of the manner in which those who desire to learn are to be taught. That is the best manner by which it comes about that the one who hears hears the truth and understands what he hears. When that end has been reached, then no further labor is to be spent on the matter itself, as though it had to be taught longer—but perhaps on commending it, that it may be fixed in the heart. And if this seems to be needed, it must be done so modestly that it does not arrive at weariness.

11. 26. This, in short, is eloquence in teaching, by which it comes about, through speaking, not that what was shuddered at becomes pleasing, or that what one was reluctant to do is done, but that what lay hidden appears. Yet if this is done unpleasantly, its fruit reaches only the few most studious, who desire to know the things that must be learned, however meanly and rudely they are said. And when they have attained these things, they feed delightfully on the truth itself; and it is the mark of good talents to love, in words, the truth, not the words.

For what does a golden key profit, if it cannot open what we wish? Or what harm does a wooden one do, if it can—since we seek nothing but that what is closed should lie open? But because those who eat and those who learn have a certain likeness to one another, on account of the fastidiousness of very many, even those very foods without which one cannot live must be seasoned.

12. 27. A certain eloquent man said, then, and said truly, that the eloquent man ought to speak in such a way that he teaches, that he delights, that he sways. Then he added: to teach belongs to necessity, to delight to charm, to sway to victory Cicero, The Orator 21.69. In fact Cicero wrote ut probet, etc.; probare necessitatis est—"to prove belongs to necessity"—a slightly more stringent requirement than "to teach.". Of these three, the one placed first—that is, the necessity of teaching—is established in the things we say; the remaining two in the manner in which we say them.

The one who speaks, then, when he wishes to teach, let him not, so long as he is not understood, think that he has yet said what he wishes to the one whom he wishes to teach; because, even if he has said what he himself understands, he is not yet to be thought to have said it to one by whom he has not been understood; but if he has been understood, then in whatever manner he has spoken, he has said it.

But if he wishes also to delight the one to whom he speaks, or to sway him, he will not do it in whatever manner he speaks, but it matters how he speaks, in order to do it. And just as, in order that he may be held to listening, the hearer must be delighted, so, in order that he may be moved to act, he must be swayed.

And just as he is delighted if you speak pleasantly, so he is swayed if he loves what you promise, fears what you threaten, hates what you blame, embraces what you commend, grieves at what, as a thing to be grieved over, you set forth at length, rejoices when you proclaim something to be rejoiced over, has pity on those whom you set before his eyes by your speaking as objects of pity, flees those whom, by terrifying, you propose as men to be guarded against; and whatever else can be done by grand eloquence to move the minds of hearers, not that they may know what is to be done, but that they may do what they already know is to be done.

12. 28. But if they do not yet know, they must of course be taught before they are moved. And perhaps, once the things themselves are known, they will be so moved that there is no need for them to be moved any further by greater forces of eloquence. Yet when there is need, it must be done; and there is need when, though they know what is to be done, they do not do it. And on account of this, teaching belongs to necessity.

For people can both do and not do what they know. But who would say that they ought to do what they do not know? And therefore swaying does not belong to necessity, because it is not always needed, if the hearer assents merely to one who teaches or even delights him. But swaying belongs to victory, because it can happen that one is both taught and delighted and does not assent. And what will those two profit, if this third is lacking?

But neither does delighting belong to necessity, since, when by speaking true things are shown (which pertains to the duty of teaching), it is not brought about by eloquence, nor is attention paid to this, that either the things or the eloquence itself should delight; rather, true things, being made manifest through themselves, delight because they are true.

Hence even false things, when laid open and refuted, generally delight. For they delight not because they are false, but because it is true that they are false; and so the statement by which it is shown that this is true also delights.

13. 29. But on account of those fastidious ones to whom the truth does not please if it is spoken in any other way than such that the speaker's discourse also pleases, no small place has been given to delight too in eloquence. Yet this, when added, is not enough for the hard, whom it has profited neither to have understood nor to have been delighted by the teacher's elocution.

For what do these two confer on the man who both confesses the truth and praises the eloquence, yet does not incline his assent—for the sake of which alone, when something is being urged, the speaker's attention keeps watch over the things that are said?

For if such things are taught as it suffices to believe or to know, to assent to them is nothing other than to confess that they are true. But when that is taught which is to be done, and is taught for this reason, that it may be done, in vain is it persuaded that what is said is true, in vain does the very manner in which it is said please, if it is not so learned that it is done.

It is fitting, therefore, that the ecclesiastical speaker, when he urges something that is to be done, not only teach in order to instruct and delight in order to hold, but also sway in order to conquer.

For that man remains to be swayed to consent by the grandeur of eloquence, in whom the truth demonstrated, with the added charm of expression, did not accomplish this up to his confession of it.

14. 30. So much labor has been expended by people on this charm that so many and so great evils and base things—which were urged most eloquently by base and evil men, not so that one should consent to them, but for the sake of delight alone—are not only not to be done but even to be fled from and detested, and are nevertheless read again and again merely for the sake of the delight.

But may God turn away from his Church what the prophet Jeremiah recounts about the synagogue of the Jews, saying: terror and horrible things have come to pass upon the land. The prophets prophesied iniquity, and the priests gave applause with their hands, and my people loved it so. And what will you do in the time to come? (Jer 5:30–31) O eloquence so much more terrible the purer it is, and so much more vehement the more solid it is! O truly an axe cutting the rocks in pieces! For God himself, through this very prophet, said that his word, which he made through the holy prophets, is like to this thing. (See Jer 23:29; 46:22)

Far be it, then, far be it from us, that the priests should applaud those who say iniquitous things and the people of God should love it so. Far be it from us, I say, so great a madness; for what shall we do in the time to come? And let the things that are said certainly be less understood, less pleasing, less moving—yet let true things be said, and just things, not iniquitous ones, be gladly heard. Which would surely not happen unless they were said charmingly.

14. 31. But among a serious people, of whom it was said to God, among a serious people I will praise you (Ps 35:18 (34:18)), that charm is not delightful by which, although iniquitous things are not indeed said, yet slight and frail goods are adorned with a foamy parade of words, with which not even great and stable things would be becomingly and seriously adorned.

There is something of this kind in a letter of the most blessed Cyprian, which I think either happened, or was done on purpose, so that it might be known by posterity from what kind of language the soundness of Christian teaching has called the tongue back from that redundancy, and restrained it to a more serious and more modest eloquence—such as in his subsequent letters is safely loved, religiously sought after, but most difficult to attain. He says, then, in a certain place:

These things are not said except with a marvelously overflowing fecundity of eloquence, but by their excessive profusion they displease seriousness. But those who love such things suppose that those who do not speak so, but utter themselves more chastely, cannot speak in that way—that they do not avoid such things by judgment. Wherefore this holy man both showed that he could speak so, because he did so somewhere, and that he was unwilling, since afterward he did so nowhere.

15. 32. This eloquent man of ours, then, when he says things just and holy and good—for he ought to say no others—acts, when he says these things, as much as he can, so that he may be heard with understanding, with pleasure, and with obedience.

And let him not doubt that he can do these things, if he can do them and insofar as he can, more by the piety of prayers than by the faculty of orators; so that, praying for himself and for those whom he is about to address, he may be a prayer before he is a speaker. He is punning on the two meanings of the word orator: an orator and a prayer (one who prays), and its close connection with oratio, prayer. When the very hour for speaking now draws near, before he puts forth the tongue that utters, let him lift up to God his thirsting soul, that he may belch forth what he has drunk, or pour out what he has been filled with.

For since, concerning each matter which is to be treated according to faith and love, there are many things that may be said, and many ways in which they may be said by those who know these things, who knows what it is expedient at the present time for us to say, or for it to be heard through us, except him who sees the hearts of all? And who brings it about that what is fitting, and in the way it is fitting, should be said by us, except him in whose hand are both we and our words (Wis 7:16)?

And on account of this, let the one who both wishes to know and to teach learn indeed all the things that are to be taught, and procure a faculty of speaking such as befits an ecclesiastical man. But for the hour of the speaking itself, let him think that this rather befits a good mind, which the Lord says: do not think how or what you are to speak; for it will be given you in that hour what you are to speak. For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you (Matt 10:19–20). If, then, the Holy Spirit speaks in those who are handed over to persecutors for Christ's sake, why not also in those who hand Christ over to learners?

16. 33. But whoever says that people are not to be given precepts about what or how they should teach, if the Holy Spirit makes the teachers, can say that we ought not to pray either, because the Lord says, your Father knows what is necessary for you before you ask him (Matt 6:8); or that the Apostle Paul ought not to have given precepts to Timothy and Titus about what or how they should give precepts to others. These three apostolic Epistles ought to be kept before the eyes of one on whom is laid the person of a teacher in the Church.

Is it not read in the First to Timothy: announce these things and teach them (1 Tim 4:11)? And what these things are has been said above. Is it not there: do not rebuke an elder, but entreat him as a father (1 Tim 5:1)?

Is it not said to him in the second: hold the pattern of sound words which you heard from me (2 Tim 1:13)? Is it not there said to him: be diligent, presenting yourself to God as an approved workman, not ashamed, rightly handling the word of truth (2 Tim 2:15)? There too is that: preach the word, be urgent in season, out of season; reprove, entreat, rebuke, with all long-suffering and teaching (2 Tim 4:2).

And likewise to Titus, does he not say that a bishop ought to be one who perseveres according to the teaching of the faithful word, so that he may be able both to exhort in sound teaching and to confute those who contradict (Titus 1:9)? There too he says: but you, speak the things that befit sound teaching, that the old men be sober (Titus 2:1–2), and what follows. There too is that: speak these things and exhort and rebuke with all authority. Let no one despise you. Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers (Titus 2:15–3:1), and the rest.

What, then, do we think? Does the Apostle hold an opinion against himself, who, while he says that teachers are made by the working of the Holy Spirit, himself gives them precepts about what and how they should teach? Or is it to be understood that even the duties of men ought not to cease in the very teaching of teachers, the Holy Spirit himself bestowing this; and yet that neither he who plants is anything nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase (1 Cor 3:7)?

Hence, even when holy men, or even holy angels, are at work as ministers, no one rightly learns the things that pertain to living with God unless he is made by God teachable to God, to whom it is said in the Psalm: teach me to do your will, for you are my God (Ps 143:10 (142:10)). Hence the Apostle too says to Timothy himself—speaking, of course, as a teacher to a disciple: but you, continue in the things which you have learned and which have been entrusted to you, knowing from whom you have learned them (2 Tim 3:14).

For just as the medicines of the body which are applied to people by people profit only those for whom God works health—who can heal even without them, while they cannot without him, and yet are applied; and if this is done dutifully, it is reckoned among the works of mercy or beneficence—so the aids of teaching, applied to the soul through a person, then profit when God works that they may profit, who was able to give the Gospel to a person even not from people nor through a person.

17. 34. The one, therefore, who strives by speaking to persuade what is good, spurning none of those three—namely, that he teach, that he delight, that he sway—let him pray and act that, as we said above, (At the beginning of section 32) he may be heard with understanding, with pleasure, and with obedience.

And when he does this aptly and fittingly, he can not undeservedly be called eloquent, even if the hearer's assent does not follow him.

For to these three—that is, that he teach, that he delight, that he sway—that author of Roman eloquence himself seems to have wished those other three also to pertain, when he likewise said: he, then, will be eloquent who can say small things subduedly, moderate things temperately, great things grandly Cicero, The Orator 29.101.,

as if he were adding those other three too, and thus unfolding one and the same thought, saying: "he, then, will be eloquent who, in order to teach, can say small things subduedly; in order to delight, moderate things temperately; in order to sway, great things grandly."

18. 35. These three things, as they were said by him, he could exhibit in forensic cases; but this is not so in ecclesiastical questions, in which the kind of discourse is engaged which we wish to form. For in those cases, those things are called small where the judgment concerns matters of money; those great where it concerns the safety and life of people. But those where none of these is to be judged, and nothing is done so that the hearer may act or decide, but only that he may be delighted, they called as if midway between the two, and on that account moderate, that is, restrained. For "moderate" (modica) takes its name from "measure" (modus), since we say "moderate" for "small" by misuse, not properly. (This final sentence does not apply in English as it does in Latin)

But in these matters of ours—since we ought to refer everything, especially what we say to the people from a higher place, (Meaning both from the pulpit and from our higher official position as bishops and priests) to the salvation of people, not temporal but eternal, where eternal destruction too is to be guarded against—all the things we say are great, to such a degree that not even concerning those matters of money, whether to be acquired or to be lost, ought the things an ecclesiastical teacher says to seem small, whether that money be great or small.

For justice is not small, which surely we ought to keep even in a small matter of money, the Lord saying: he who is faithful in the least is faithful also in much (Luke 16:10). What is least, then, is least; but to be faithful in the least is great. For just as the principle of roundness—that is, that from the center point all lines should be drawn equal to the edge—is the same in a great disk as in a tiny coin, so where small things are done justly, the greatness of justice is not diminished.

18. 36. About secular lawsuits, finally (and what are these but about money?), when the Apostle was speaking:

Does any of you, he says, having a matter against another, dare to be judged before the unjust, and not before the saints? Or do you not know that the saints will judge the world? And if the world is judged among you, are you unworthy to judge the smallest matters? Do you not know that we will judge angels, to say nothing of secular affairs? If, then, you have secular judgments, set those who are contemptible in the Church to judge them. I say this to your shame (1 Cor 6:1–5).

Is there not among you any wise man at all, who could judge between his brother? But brother goes to law with brother, and this before unbelievers. Now indeed it is altogether a fault that you have lawsuits among yourselves. Why do you not rather suffer wrong? Why are you not rather defrauded? But you do wrong and defraud, and this to brethren. Or do you not know that the unjust will not inherit the kingdom of God? (1 Cor 6:5–9)

What is it that the Apostle is so indignant about, so corrects, so reproaches, so rebukes, so threatens? What is it that he attests the feeling of his mind by so frequent and so harsh a change of voice? What is it, finally, that he speaks so grandly about the smallest matters? Did secular affairs deserve so much from him? Far from it! But he does this on account of justice, love, and piety, which, no sober mind doubting it, are great even in matters however tiny.

18. 37. To be sure, if we were advising people how they ought to conduct those secular affairs themselves, whether for themselves or for their own, before ecclesiastical judges, we should rightly admonish them to conduct them subduedly, as small matters. Ecclesiastical judges—that is, bishops—had to hear a great deal of secular litigation, disputes about inheritances and so forth brought to them for arbitration. But since we are discussing the eloquence of that man whom we wish to be the teacher of those things by which we are freed from eternal evils and arrive at eternal goods, wherever these things are dealt with—whether before the people or in private, whether to one or to many, whether to friends or to enemies, whether in continuous discourse or in conversation, whether in treatises or in books, whether in letters very long or very short—they are great.

Unless, perhaps, because a cup of cold water is a very small and very cheap thing, the Lord therefore said something very small and very cheap, that the one who gives it to his disciple will not lose his reward (Matt 10:42); or, indeed, when this teacher in the Church makes a sermon about it, he ought to think he is saying something small, and therefore that it must be said by him not temperately, not grandly, but subduedly. Did it not happen, when it fell to us to speak about this matter to the people, and God was present so that we spoke not unfittingly, that from that cold water, as it were, a kind of flame arose (See 2 Macc 1:32) which kindled even the cold breasts of people to do works of mercy, in the hope of a heavenly reward?

19. 38. And yet, although this teacher ought to be a speaker of great matters, he ought not always to speak them grandly, but subduedly when something is being taught, temperately when something is being blamed or praised. But when something is to be done, and we speak to those who ought to do it and yet are unwilling, then the things that are great must be said grandly, and in a manner suited to swaying minds. And sometimes about one and the same great matter it is said subduedly if it is taught, temperately if it is proclaimed, The difference between catechesis, or instruction, and kerygma, or the proclamation of the word. and grandly if a mind turned away from it is driven to be converted.

For what is greater than God himself? Is it therefore not learned? Or ought the one who teaches the unity of the Trinity to do it otherwise than by subdued discussion, so that a thing difficult to discern may, as far as is granted, be understood? Are ornaments sought here, and not proofs? Is the hearer here to be swayed in order to do something, and not rather to be instructed in order to learn?

Furthermore, when God is praised, whether for himself or for his works, what a face of beautiful and splendid expression arises for one who is able, as much as he is able, to praise him whom no one praises worthily, and whom no one in any way fails to praise! But if he is not worshiped, or if idols or demons or any creature whatever are worshiped along with him or even before him, how great this evil is, and how people are to be turned away from this evil, must of course be said grandly.

20. 39. There is an example of subdued expression in the Apostle Paul—to mention something rather plain—where he says: tell me, you who wish to be under the law, have you not heard the law? For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by the slave girl and one by the free woman; but he who was of the slave girl was born according to the flesh, while he who was of the free woman was born through the promise. These things are by way of allegory. For these are the two covenants: one indeed from Mount Sinai, bearing children into slavery, which is Hagar. For Sinai is a mountain in Arabia, which is joined to the Jerusalem that now is, and is in slavery with her children. But the Jerusalem that is above is free, and she is our mother (Gal 4:21–26).

And likewise where he reasons and says: brethren, I speak after the manner of men: yet no one annuls or adds to a man's testament once confirmed. The promises were spoken to Abraham and to his offspring. He does not say, "and to offsprings," as in the case of many, but as in one, "and to your offspring," which is Christ. But I say this: a testament confirmed by God the law, which came four hundred and thirty years after, does not invalidate so as to make the promises void. For if the inheritance is by the law, then it is no longer from the promise; but God granted it to Abraham through the promise (Gal 3:15–18).

And because it could occur to the hearer's thought, "Why, then, was the law given, if the inheritance is not from it?" he set this very objection to himself and said, as if asking, what then is the law? Then he answered: it was added for the sake of transgressions, until the offspring should come to whom the promise was made, ordained through angels by the hand of a Mediator. Now a mediator is not a mediator of one, but God is one (Gal 3:19–20).

And here too occurred what he set before himself: is the law, then, against the promises of God? And he answered: far from it! and gave the reason, saying: for if a law had been given which could give life, righteousness would altogether be from the law. But the Scripture has shut up all things under sin, that the promise by faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe (Gal 3:21–22), and the rest, or whatever is of this kind.

It pertains, therefore, to the care of teaching not only to open closed things and to loose the knots of questions, but also, while this is being done, to meet other questions which perhaps may have arisen, lest through them what we say be disproved or refuted—provided, however, that the solution of those questions too occurs to us at the same time, lest we stir up what we cannot remove.

But it happens that, when other questions falling in upon a question, and others again falling in upon those that have fallen in, are treated thoroughly and resolved, the attention is stretched to such a length of reasoning that, unless the memory is very strong and vigorous, the disputant cannot return to the head from which he set out.

But it is very good that whatever can be objected, if it occurs to us, be refuted, lest it occur where there will be no one to answer, or occur to one present indeed but silent, and he go away less healed.

20. 40. But in those apostolic words the expression is temperate: do not rebuke an elder, but entreat him as a father, younger men as brothers, older women as mothers, younger women as sisters (1 Tim 5:1–2). And in these: I entreat you, therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God (Rom 12:1). And almost the whole passage of that exhortation has the temperate kind of elocution. Where those things are more beautiful in which proper things are becomingly rendered to proper things, as if due to them, such as: having different gifts according to the grace that has been given to us: whether prophecy, according to the rule of faith; or ministry, in ministering; or one who teaches, in teaching; or one who exhorts, in exhortation; he who gives, in simplicity; he who presides, in carefulness; he who shows mercy, in cheerfulness. Let love be without pretense, hating evil, clinging to good, loving one another with the love of brotherhood, going before one another in mutual honor, not slothful in zeal, fervent in spirit, serving the Lord, rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation, persevering in prayer, sharing in the needs of the saints, pursuing hospitality. Bless those who persecute you, bless and do not curse. Rejoice with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep, being of the same mind toward one another (Rom 12:6–16).

And how beautifully all these things, so poured out, are ended by a period of two members: not minding high things, but consenting to lowly ones (Rom 12:16)! And somewhat later: persevering in this very thing, he says, render to all their dues: to whom tribute, tribute; to whom toll, toll; to whom fear, fear; to whom honor, honor (Rom 13:6–7). These things, poured forth member by member, are themselves also closed by a period which two members weave together: owe no one anything, except to love one another (Rom 13:8). And a little after: the night has gone before, he says, but the day has drawn near. Let us therefore cast off the works of darkness and put on the armor of light. Let us walk becomingly as in the day, not in revelings and drunkenness, not in chamberings and wantonness, not in strife and rivalry; but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh in its desires Rom 13:12–14; see Confessions 8.12.29..

But if anyone were to say it thus: "and make no provision in its desires for the flesh," he would no doubt soothe the ears with a more rhythmical close; What he is saying here really only applies in the Latin. The text runs et carnis providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis, translating the Greek word for word in the same order. Augustine is saying that to have written et carnis providentiam in concupiscentiis ne feceritis would have made a more rhythmic conclusion, a clausula numerosior. but the more serious translator preferred to keep even the order of the words. But how this sounds in the Greek speech in which the Apostle spoke, let those more learned in that speech see for themselves; to me, however, what has been translated for us in the same order of words does not seem to run rhythmically even there.

20. 41. To be sure, it must be confessed that this ornament of expression which comes from rhythmical closes is lacking to our authors. Whether this came about through the translators, or whether (which I rather think) they deliberately avoided these plausible devices, I do not dare to affirm, since I confess that I do not know. This, however, I do know: that if anyone skilled in this rhythm should arrange their closes by the law of those same rhythms—which is most easily done by changing certain words that have the same force in meaning, or by changing the order of those he finds—he will recognize that none of the things which he learned as if great in the schools of grammarians or rhetoricians was lacking to those divine men, and he will find many kinds of expression of such grace—which are indeed becoming in our language too, but most of all in their own—none of which is found in those writings over which these people are puffed up.

But care must be taken lest, while rhythm is added, weight be withdrawn from the divine and serious sentences. The word translated "rhythm" is numerus, literally "number"; and he is here alluding to the text of Wis 11:20. For that musical discipline, in which this rhythm is most fully learned, was so far from lacking to our prophets that the learned Jerome mentions the meters of some of them, in the Hebrew language at least. (See the prologue to Jerome's commentary on Job) But, to keep their truth in the words, he did not translate these things over from there. For my part, however—to speak of my own feeling, which is of course better known to me than to others, and than that of others—just as in my own speech I do not omit these rhythmical closes, as far as I think can modestly be done, so in our authors this pleases me the more, that there I find them most rarely.

20. 42. But the grand kind of speaking differs from this temperate kind chiefly in this, that it is not so much decked out with ornaments of words as it is violent with the affections of the mind. For it takes up even almost all those ornaments, but if it does not have them, it does not require them. For it is borne along by its own rush, and snatches up the beauty of elocution, if it occurs, by the force of the matters, not assuming it out of care for grace.

For it is enough for it, on account of the matter at hand, that fitting words be not chosen by the industry of the mouth, but follow the ardor of the breast.

For if a brave man be armed with weapons gilded and jeweled, most intent on the fight, he does indeed with those arms what he does, not because they are precious, but because they are arms; the same man is himself, and avails very much, even when anger furnishes a weapon to him who gropes for one Virgil, Aeneid 7.508..

The Apostle is acting so that, for the sake of the Gospel ministry, all the evils of this time may be patiently borne, with the consolation of God's gifts. It is a great matter, and is dealt with grandly, nor are ornaments of speaking lacking: behold, he says, now is the acceptable time, behold now is the day of salvation. Giving no offense to anyone, that the ministry be not blamed, but in all things commending ourselves as ministers of God: in much patience, in tribulations, in necessities, in distresses, in beatings, in prisons, in tumults, in labors, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity, in knowledge, in long-suffering, in kindness, in the Holy Spirit, in love unfeigned, in the word of truth, in the power of God; through the arms of righteousness on the right hand and on the left, through glory and dishonor, through ill repute and good repute; as deceivers and yet truthful, as unknown and yet recognized, as dying and behold we live, as chastened and not put to death, as sorrowful yet always rejoicing, as poor yet enriching many, as having nothing yet possessing all things (2 Cor 6:2–10). See him still ardent: our mouth is open to you, O Corinthians, our heart is enlarged (2 Cor 6:11), and the rest, which it would be long to pursue.

20. 43. Likewise, to the Romans he is acting so that the persecutions of this world may be conquered by love, with sure hope in the help of God. And he acts both grandly and ornately: we know, he says, that for those who love God all things work together for good, for those who are called according to his purpose. Since those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren. And those whom he predestined, them he also called; and those whom he called, them he also justified; and those whom he justified, them he also glorified. What then shall we say to these things? If God is for us, who is against us? He who did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us all, how has he not also with him given us all things? Who shall bring a charge against God's elect? Is it God who justifies? Who is it that condemns? Is it Christ Jesus who died, or rather who rose again, who is at the right hand of God, who also intercedes for us? Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Tribulation? or distress? or persecution? or famine? or nakedness? or peril? or the sword? As it is written, 'for your sake we are put to death all the day long, we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter.' But in all these things we more than conquer through him who loved us. For I am certain that neither death nor life nor angel nor principality nor things present nor things to come nor power nor height nor depth nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord (Rom 8:28–39).

20. 44. But to the Galatians—although that whole Epistle is written in the subdued kind of speaking, except in the last parts where the expression is temperate—he nevertheless interposes a certain passage with such emotion of mind that, even without any such ornaments as are in those passages we just set down, it could not be said except grandly.

You observe days, he says, and months and years and seasons. I fear for you, lest perhaps I have labored over you in vain. Be as I am, for I too am as you are. Brethren, I beg you, you have done me no wrong. You know that it was through weakness of the flesh that I preached the Gospel to you long ago, and you did not despise or spurn the trial to you in my flesh, but received me as an angel of God, as Christ Jesus. What, then, was your blessedness? I bear you witness that, if it had been possible, you would have plucked out your eyes and given them to me. Have I, then, become your enemy by preaching the truth to you? They are zealous for you, but not for good; they wish to shut you out, that you may be zealous for them. But it is good to be zealous in good always, and not only when I am present with you. My little children, with whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed in you. I could wish to be present with you now and to change my voice, for I am perplexed about you (Gal 4:10–20).

Were contrary words here rendered to contrary, or were any linked to one another by some gradation, or did cuts and members or periods sound forth? And yet the grand emotion, by which we feel the expression to grow fervent, did not on that account grow tepid.

21. 45. But these apostolic passages are so clear that they are also profound, and so written and committed to memory that they have need not only of a reader or hearer, but even of an expositor, if anyone, not content with the surface in them, seeks the depth. Wherefore let us look at these kinds of speaking in those who, by the reading of these authors, have advanced to the knowledge of divine and wholesome things and have ministered it to the Church.

The blessed Cyprian uses the subdued kind of speaking in that book where he disputes about the sacrament of the cup. Cyprian, Letter 63 to Caecilius, 2–4. For there a question is resolved in which it is asked whether the Lord's cup ought to have water alone or it mixed with wine. But for the sake of example something must be set down from it. After the beginning of the letter, then, now beginning to resolve the question proposed:

Know, then, that we have been admonished that in offering the cup the Lord's tradition be observed, and that nothing be done by us other than what the Lord first did for us, namely that the cup which is offered in commemoration of him be offered mixed with wine. For since Christ says, 'I am the true vine,' the blood of Christ is assuredly not water, but wine. Nor can his blood, by which we have been redeemed and given life, be seen to be in the cup when wine is lacking to the cup, by which the blood of Christ is shown forth—which is proclaimed by the sacrament and testimony of all the Scriptures Cyprian, Letter 63 to Caecilius, 2..

For we find in Genesis that, with respect to the sacrament of Noah, this same thing ran ahead, and a figure of the Lord's passion existed there: that he drank wine, that he was made drunk, that he was made naked in his house, that he lay reclining with thighs bare and uncovered, that that nakedness of the father was noted by the middle son, but covered by the elder and the younger (See Gen 9:20–23)—and the rest, which it is not necessary to pursue, since it is enough to embrace this alone: that Noah, showing forth a type of the truth to come, drank not water but wine, and thus expressed the image of the Lord's passion Cyprian, Letter 63 to Caecilius, 3..

Likewise in the priest Melchizedek we see the Lord's sacrament prefigured, according as the divine Scripture testifies and says: 'and Melchizedek king of Salem brought forth bread and wine. And he was a priest of the Most High God, and he blessed Abraham.' But that Melchizedek bore a type of Christ the Holy Spirit declares in the Psalms, saying from the person of the Father to the Son: 'before the morning star I begot you. You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek' Cyprian, Letter 63 to Caecilius, 4, citing Gen 14:18–19 and Ps 110:3–4 (109:3–4)..

These and the other things that follow in this letter keep the manner of subdued expression, which it is easy for readers to verify.

21. 46. Saint Ambrose too, when he is dealing with a great matter concerning the Holy Spirit, in order to show him equal to the Father and the Son, nevertheless uses the subdued kind of speaking, since the matter undertaken requires not ornaments of words, nor the emotion of stirring for swaying minds, but proofs of things. Therefore, among other things, at the beginning of this work he says: Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit 1, prologue.

and the rest, in which he chiefly bends his effort to teaching and proving the matter.

21. 47. Of the temperate kind is that praise of virginity in Cyprian:

And in another place, at the end of the letter:

21. 48. Ambrose too, in the temperate and ornate kind of speaking, sets before professed virgins, as if under the form of an example, what they may imitate in their conduct, and says:

But I have set these things down as an example of this temperate kind because here he is not acting so that those who have not yet vowed virginity may vow it, but so that those who are already vowed may be of such a kind as they ought to be. For in order that the mind may undertake so great and such a resolution, it must of course be roused and kindled by the grand kind of speaking. But the martyr Cyprian wrote about the dress of virgins, not about taking up the resolution of virginity; whereas this bishop kindles them even to this by great eloquence.

21. 49. But from what both of them dealt with, I will recall examples of grand expression. For both inveighed against those women who color, or rather discolor, their appearance with pigments. The former of them, when he was treating of this, says among other things:

It would be long to insert everything that follows.

21. 50. But the latter, speaking against such women:

It is sufficiently clear, as I judge, that women are vehemently driven, both to shame and to fear, by this eloquence, that they may not adulterate their own appearance with paints. Accordingly we recognize this kind of elocution to be neither subdued nor temperate, but altogether grand. And both in these two whom I wished to set forth out of all, and in other ecclesiastical men who say good things well—that is, as the matter demands, keenly, ornately, and ardently—these three kinds can be found through many of their writings or sayings, and can become ingrained in those who study by assiduous reading or hearing, with exercise also mixed in.

22. 51. Nor let anyone suppose it to be against the discipline to mix these kinds; rather, as far as can fittingly be done, expression must be varied through all the kinds. For when it is prolonged in one kind, it holds the hearer less. But when a passing is made from one to another, even if it is longer, the discourse proceeds more becomingly—although the single kinds also have their own varieties in the speech of the eloquent, by which they are not allowed to grow cold or tepid in the senses of those who hear. Nevertheless, the subdued alone can be borne longer more easily than the grand alone. For the stirring of the mind, the more it must be roused so that the hearer may assent to us, the less can it be held long in that state, once it has been roused as much as is enough.

And therefore care must be taken lest, while we wish to raise higher what is already raised, it fall away even from where it had been brought by rousing. But by interposing the things that are to be said more subduedly, there is a good return to the things that need to be said grandly, so that the rush of expression may alternate like the tide of the sea.

From which it comes about that the grand kind of speaking, if it is to be spoken at greater length, ought not to be alone, but to be varied by the interposition of the other kinds. Yet the whole expression is assigned to that kind whose abundance prevails.

23. 52. For it matters which kind is interposed in, or applied to, which kind, in fixed and necessary places. For in the grand kind too the beginnings ought always, or almost always, to be temperate; and it is in the power of the eloquent man that some things be said subduedly, even things that could be said grandly, so that the things said grandly may, by comparison with them, become grander, and be rendered, as if by their shadows, more luminous. But in whatever kind some knots of questions must be loosed, there is need of keenness, which the subdued kind properly claims for itself. And on account of this, that kind must be used in the other two kinds also, when these things fall to them:

just as, when something is to be praised or blamed, where neither the condemnation of anyone nor a liberation nor assent to any action is required, in whatever other kind it occurs, the temperate kind must be applied and interposed. In the grand kind, then, the other two find their places, and likewise in the subdued. But the temperate kind needs the subdued—not indeed always, yet sometimes—if, as I said, a question whose knot must be loosed comes up; or when some things that could be ornamented are on that account not ornamented, but said in subdued speech, so that they may give, as it were, certain cushions on which the ornaments may have a more eminent place. The grand kind, however, does not require temperate expression; for it is taken up to delight minds, not to move them.

24. 53. To be sure, if a speaker is applauded rather frequently and vehemently, he is not on that account to be thought to be speaking grandly. For the keen points of the subdued kind and the ornaments of the temperate kind do this too. But the grand kind generally presses down the voices by its own weight, but presses out tears. Voces premit is an allusion to Virgil's Aeneid 9.324, and is balanced against sed lacrimas exprimit.

In short, when at Caesarea of Mauretania Modern Cherchel in western Algeria, on the coast. The event he describes took place in 418 or 419. This text, oddly enough, seems to be the only reference to it in his writings. I was dissuading the people from a civil—or rather, more than civil—fight, which they called the "gang fight"; for not only fellow citizens, but even kinsmen, brothers, and finally parents and children, divided into two parties, used to fight one another with stones, in a customary way, for several days running, at a fixed time of year, and each killed whomever he could; I acted indeed grandly, as much as I was able, to tear and drive that so cruel and inveterate evil from their hearts and habits by speaking.

Yet I did not think I had accomplished anything when I heard them applauding, but when I saw them weeping. For by their applause they indicated that they were being taught and delighted, but by their tears that they were being swayed. And when I saw these, I believed that that monstrous custom, handed down from their fathers and grandfathers, and from their forebears far back, which besieged—or rather possessed—their breasts as an enemy, was conquered, before they showed it by the fact itself; and soon, the sermon ended, I turned their hearts and mouths to giving thanks to God. And behold, it is now nearly eight years or more, by the favor of Christ, since nothing of the kind has been attempted there.

There are also many other experiments by which we have learned that people have shown what the grandeur of a wise man's expression has done in them, not so much by shouting as by groaning, sometimes even by tears, and finally by a change of life.

24. 54. By the subdued kind of speaking too very many have been changed, but so that they knew what they did not know, or believed what seemed to them incredible—not, however, so that they did what they already knew was to be done and were unwilling to do. For to sway hardness of this kind, one must speak grandly.

For praises and blames too, when they are spoken eloquently—since they are in the temperate kind—so affect some people that they are delighted not only by the eloquence in the praises and blames, but also themselves desire to live praiseworthily and to flee living blameworthily. But are all who are delighted changed, as in the grand kind all who are swayed act, and in the subdued kind all who are taught know, or believe to be true what they did not know?

25. 55. From which it is gathered that those two kinds, in what they intend to accomplish, are most necessary to those who wish to speak wisely and eloquently. But that which is brought about by the temperate kind—that is, that the eloquence itself may delight—is not to be employed for its own sake, but so that to things which are usefully and honorably said—if they need eloquence neither to teach nor to move, because they have hearers both knowing and favorable—assent may come somewhat more readily, from the very delight of the elocution, or cling more tenaciously.

For since the universal duty of eloquence, in whatever of these three kinds, is to speak aptly for persuasion, and the end is what you have intended to persuade by speaking, in whatever of these three kinds the eloquent man does indeed speak aptly for persuasion, but unless he persuades he does not arrive at the end of eloquence. Now he persuades in the subdued kind that what he says is true; he persuades in the grand kind that the things be done which are already known to be done and are not done; he persuades in the temperate kind that he speaks beautifully and ornately. What need have we of this end? Let those desire it who glory in their tongue and boast themselves in panegyrics and such discourses, where the hearer is neither to be taught nor moved to do anything, but only to be delighted.

But let us (Would-be ecclesiastical orators) refer that end to another end—namely, that what we wish to accomplish when we speak grandly, this we may wish to accomplish by this kind also: that is, that the goods of conduct be loved, or its evils avoided, if people are not so estranged from this action that they seem to need to be urged to it by the grand kind of speaking; or, if they are already doing it, that they may do it more zealously and persevere firmly in it.

Thus it comes about that we use the ornament of the temperate kind too not boastfully, but prudently; not content with its end, by which the hearer is merely delighted, but rather acting so that even by it he may be helped toward the good which we wish to persuade.

26. 56. Those three things, then, which we set down above—that the one who speaks wisely ought, if he wishes also to speak eloquently, so to act that he be heard with understanding, with pleasure, and with obedience Emending id agere debere of the text to ita agere debere.—

are not to be so taken as though the single things are so assigned to those three kinds of speaking that to the subdued belongs being heard with understanding, to the temperate being heard with pleasure, and to the grand being heard with obedience; but rather so that he always aim at these three, and accomplish them as far as he can, even when he is engaged in any single one of those kinds.

For we do not wish that even what we say subduedly should be found tiresome; and on account of this we wish to be heard not only with understanding but also with pleasure.

And what do we accomplish by teaching what we say with divine testimonies, except that we may be heard with obedience—that is, that they may be believed, with the help of him to whom it was said: your testimonies have been made exceedingly worthy of belief (Ps 93:5 (92:5))?

And what does he desire but to be believed, who narrates something, even in subdued speech, to learners? And who would wish to hear him, unless he held the hearer by some charm too? For if he is not understood, who does not know that he can be heard neither with pleasure nor with obedience?

But the subdued expression itself, generally, while it resolves the most difficult questions and demonstrates them by an unexpected clarification; while it draws out and shows the keenest thoughts from I know not what hidden recesses, as it were, from which it was not hoped; while it convicts the adversary's error and teaches that what seemed to be said by him as unconquerable is false—

especially when there is present to it a certain grace not sought after but in a manner natural, and a certain rhythm of closes—not boastful, but as if necessary and, so to speak, arising from the very things themselves—rouses such applause that it is scarcely understood to be subdued.

For not because it neither advances ornamented nor armed, but engages as if naked, does it on that account fail to dash the adversary with its sinews and muscles, and to overthrow and destroy resisting falsehood with most powerful limbs.

But why are those who speak thus applauded frequently and much, except because truth so demonstrated, so defended, so unconquered, delights? And so in this subdued kind too, this teacher and speaker of ours ought to act so that he be heard not only with understanding but also with pleasure and with obedience.

26. 57. That eloquence too of the temperate kind, in the case of the eloquent ecclesiastic, is neither left unornamented nor unbecomingly ornamented. And it does not aim only at this, that it delight—which alone it professes among others—but even in the things it praises or blames, in seeking these or holding them more firmly, and in avoiding or spurning those, it surely wishes to be heard with obedience. But if it is not heard with understanding, it cannot be heard with pleasure either.

Accordingly those three things—that those who hear may understand, may be delighted, may obey—must be aimed at in this kind too, where delight holds the chief place.

26. 58. But now, where it is needful to move and sway the hearer by the grand kind—which is needful then, when he confesses that what is said is said both truly and pleasantly, and yet is unwilling to do what is said—then, without doubt, one must speak grandly.

But who is moved if he does not know what is said? Or who is held to listen if he is not delighted? Hence in this kind too, where a hard heart must be swayed to obedience by the grandeur of expression, unless the one who speaks is heard both with understanding and with pleasure, he cannot be heard with obedience.

27. 59. But, for being heard with obedience, the life of the speaker has greater weight than any grandeur of expression. For one who speaks wisely and eloquently, but lives wickedly, does indeed instruct many who are eager to learn, although he is useless to his own soul (See Sir 37:19), as it is written. Whence the Apostle says: whether in pretense or in truth, let Christ be proclaimed (Phil 1:18).

But Christ is the truth, (See John 14:6) and yet the truth can be proclaimed even not in truth—that is, so that things which are right and true are preached with a crooked and deceitful heart. For thus Jesus Christ is proclaimed by those who seek their own things, not the things of Jesus Christ (See Phil 2:21).

But since good faithful people hear with obedience not any man whatever, but the Lord himself, who says, do what they say; but what they do, do not do; for they say and do not do (Matt 23:3), on that account even those are heard with profit who do not act with profit. For they are eager to seek their own things, but they do not dare to teach their own things—from the higher place, that is, of the ecclesiastical seat which sound teaching has established.

On account of which the Lord himself, before he said about such people what I have mentioned, premised: they have sat on the seat of Moses (Matt 23:2). That seat, then—not theirs but Moses's—compelled them to say good things, even though they did not do good things. They acted their own things, then, in their own life; but the seat that was another's did not permit them to teach their own things.

27. 60. And so they profit many by saying the things they do not do, but they would profit far more by doing the things they say. For there are plenty who seek a defense of their own evil life from their very superiors and teachers, answering in their heart, or even, if they break out to this point with their mouth, saying: "What you command me, why do you not do it yourself?" Thus it comes about that they do not hear with obedience one who does not himself listen to himself, and they despise the word of God which is preached to them together with the preacher himself. Finally, the Apostle, writing to Timothy, when he had said, let no one despise your youth, added the means by which he should not be despised, and said: but be a pattern to the faithful in speech, in conduct, in love, in faith, in chastity (1 Tim 4:12).

28. 61. Such a teacher, in order to be heard with obedience, speaks not impudently—not only subduedly and temperately, but even grandly—because he does not live contemptibly. For he so chooses the good life that he does not neglect a good reputation either, but provides good things before God and men (See 2 Cor 8:21; Rom 12:17) as much as he can, fearing the one and taking thought for the others.

In his very speech, too, let him prefer to please by things rather than by words, and let him not think a thing better said unless it is more truly said; and let the teacher not be a slave to words, but words to the teacher.

For this is what the Apostle says: not in wisdom of word, lest the cross of Christ be made void (1 Cor 1:17). To this also pertains what he says to Timothy: do not wrangle about words; for it is of no use, except for the subversion of the hearers (2 Tim 2:14).

For this was not said in order that, when adversaries assail the truth, we should say nothing for the truth. And where would be that which, when he showed what kind of person a bishop ought to be, he said among other things: so that he may be able both to exhort in sound teaching and to confute those who contradict (Titus 1:9)? For to wrangle about words is not to care how error may be conquered by truth, but how your expression may be preferred to another's.

Furthermore, the one who does not wrangle about words, whether he speak subduedly or temperately or grandly, acts by words so that the truth may lie open, the truth may please, the truth may move; since not even love itself—which is the end of the precept and the fullness of the law (See 1 Tim 1:5; Rom 13:10)—can in any way be right, if the things that are loved are not true but false.

But just as one whose body is beautiful and whose mind is deformed is more to be grieved over than if he had a deformed body too, so those who eloquently say things that are false are more to be pitied than if they said such things unbecomingly.

What is it, then, to speak not only eloquently but also wisely, except to apply words sufficient in the subdued kind, splendid in the temperate, vehement in the grand—yet to true things, which it is fitting to be heard? But the one who cannot do both, let him say wisely what he does not say eloquently, rather than say eloquently what he says foolishly.

29. 61. But if he cannot even do this, let him so conduct himself that he not only procures a reward for himself, but also affords an example to others, and that his manner of living be, as it were, his abundance of speaking.

29. 62. There are indeed some who can deliver well, but cannot think out what they should deliver. But if they take from others something composed eloquently and wisely, commit it to memory, and deliver it to the people Si eam personam gerunt: if they bear the persona, the role, or possibly the dignity, the rank—presumably of a pastor. I did wonder whether this were not an early ecclesiastical use of the word persona in the sense that eventually resulted in the English use of the word "parson" for a beneficed clergyman, or indeed any clergyman.—if they bear that role, they do not act dishonestly.

For in this way too—which is surely useful—many become preachers of the truth and not many become masters, if all say the very same thing of the one true Master, and there are no schisms among them. (See 1 Cor 1:10; Matt 23:8)

Nor are these people to be deterred by the voice of the prophet Jeremiah, through whom God reproves those who steal his words, each one from his neighbor (Jer 23:30).

For those who steal take away what is another's; but the word of God is not another's to those who obey it; and rather it is he who speaks what is another's who, while he speaks well, lives badly. For whatever good things he says seem to be thought out by his own talent, but they are foreign to his own conduct. God therefore said that those steal his words who wish to seem good by speaking the things that are God's, while they are evil by doing the things that are their own.

Nor indeed do they themselves say the good things they say, if you attend diligently. For how do they say in words what they deny in deeds? For it is not in vain that the Apostle says about such people: they confess that they know God, but by their deeds they deny him (Titus 1:16). In one way, then, they themselves say it, and again in another way they do not themselves say it, since both are true which the Truth says. For speaking about such people, he says: do what they say; but what they do, do not do—that is, "what you hear from their mouth, do; what you see in their work, do not do"; for they say, he says, and do not do (Matt 23:3). Therefore, though they do not do it, they nevertheless say it. But in another place, reproving such people: hypocrites, he says, how can you speak good things, when you are evil? (Matt 12:34) And on account of this, even the things they say, when they say good things, they themselves do not say—by denying, that is, in will and in work, what they say.

Hence it comes about that an eloquent and evil man may himself compose a discourse, by which the truth may be preached, to be delivered by another who is not eloquent but good. When this happens, the one hands on from himself what is another's, the other receives from another what is his own.

But when good faithful people lend this service to good faithful people, both say their own things, because God too is theirs, whose are the things they say; and they make their own the things they could not themselves compose, who live in an orderly way according to them.

30. 63. But whether one is about to speak at once before the people or before any persons whatever, or is about to dictate what is to be said before the people or to be read by those who are willing or able, let him pray that God may give a good discourse in his mouth. For if Queen Esther prayed, when she was about to speak before the king for the temporal safety of her people, that God would give a fitting discourse in her mouth, (See Esth 14:13) how much more ought one to pray that he may receive such a gift who labors in word and teaching for the eternal salvation of people? (See 1 Tim 5:17)

But those who are about to say the things they have received from others, let them, even before they receive, pray for those from whom they receive, that there may be given to them what they wish to receive through them; and when they have received, let them pray both that they themselves may deliver it well and that those to whom they deliver it may take it in,

and for the prosperous outcome of the discourse let them give thanks to him from whom they do not doubt that they have received it, so that he who glories may glory in him (See 1 Cor 1:31; 2 Cor 10:17) in whose hand are both we and our words.

31. 64. This book has turned out longer than I wished and than I had supposed. But to the reader or hearer to whom it is welcome, it is not long. And let the one who wishes to have it known, but to whom it is long, read it in parts. But let the one who is loath to know it not complain about its length.

I, however, give thanks to our God that in these four books I have discussed, with whatever small faculty I could, not what kind of person I myself am, to whom many things are lacking, but what kind he ought to be who strives to labor in sound—that is, Christian—teaching, not only for himself but also for others.