Nature and Grace

Augustine of Hippo · Against Pelagianism
contra Pelagium
against Pelagius
ad Timasium et Iacobum
to Timasius and James
Revisions II
C. 42Nature and Grace, one bookDe natura et gratia, liber unus
Venit etiam tunc in manus meas quidam liber Pelagii, ubi hominis naturam contra Dei gratiam, qua iustificatur impius et qua christiani sumus, quanta potuit argumentatione defendit. Librum ergo quo huic respondi, defendens gratiam non contra naturam sed per quam natura liberatur et regitur, De natura et gratia nuncupavi.
There also came into my hands at that time a certain book of Pelagius, in which he defended human nature against the grace of God, by which the ungodly is justified and by which we are Christians, with as much argument as he could muster. The book, then, by which I answered him, defending grace not against nature but as that by which nature is set free and governed, I called Nature and Grace.
DNeG
In quo verba quaedam quae velut Xysti Romani episcopi et martyris Pelagius posuit ita defendi, tamquam re vera eiusdem Xysti essent (De nat. et grat. 64, 77; cf. Hieron., Ep. 133, 3; Comm. in Ier 22; Comm. in Ezech 18); id enim putaveram. Sed postea legi Sexti philosophi esse non Xysti christiani.
In it I defended certain words that Pelagius had set down as though they were those of Xystus, the Roman bishop and martyr, as if they really were the words of that same Xystus (De nat. et grat. 64, 77; see Jerome, Ep. 133, 3; Comm. in Ier 22; Comm. in Ezech 18); for so I had thought. But afterward I read that they belong to Sextus the philosopher, not to Xystus the Christian.
DNeG
Hic liber sic incipit: Librum quem misistis.
This book begins thus: The book that you sent.
DNeG
Bk. 1The occasion for publishing this little work.Occasio huius opuscoli edendi.
1. 1. Librum quem misistis, carissimi filii Timasi et Iacobe, intermissis paululum, quae in manibus erant, cursim quidem, sed non mediocri intentione perlegi et vidi hominem zelo ardentissimo accensum adversus eos, qui cum in suis peccatis humanam voluntatem debeant accusare, naturam potius accusantes hominum per illam se excusare conantur. Nimis exarsit adversus hanc pestilentiam, quam etiam litterarum saecularium auctores graviter arguerunt exclamantes: Falso queritur de natura sua genus humanum (SALLUSTIO, Bellum Iugurthinum 1, 1). Hanc prorsus etiam iste sententiam quantis potuit ingenii viribus aggeravit. Verumtamen timeo ne illis potius suffragetur, qui zelum Dei habent, sed non secundum scientiam; ignorantes enim Dei iustitiam et suam volentes constituere iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti (Rom 10, 2-3). Quae sit autem iustitia Dei de qua hic loquitur consequenter aperit adiungens: Finis enim legis Christus ad iustitiam omni credenti (Rom 10, 4).
1. 1. The book that you sent, my dearest sons Timasius and James, I read through, setting aside for a little while the matters that were in hand, hastily indeed but with no slight attention; and I saw a man kindled with the most ardent zeal against those who, when they ought to accuse the human will for their sins, instead accuse the nature of human beings and try to excuse themselves through it. He blazed exceedingly against this plague, which even the authors of secular literature gravely censured, exclaiming: Falsely does the human race complain of its own nature (Sallust, The War with Jugurtha 1, 1). This very opinion he too heaped up with all the force of intellect he could. Yet I fear that he rather lends support to those who have a zeal for God, but it is not enlightened; for, being ignorant of the righteousness of God, and seeking to establish their own, they did not submit to the righteousness of God (Rom 10:2-3). What this righteousness of God is, of which he here speaks, he then discloses by adding: For Christ is the end of the law, that everyone who has faith may be justified (Rom 10:4).
DNeG.1.1.1
Hanc itaque iustitiam Dei non in praecepto legis, quotimor incutitur, sed in adiutorio gratiae Christi, ad quam solam utiliter legis velut paedagogi timor ducit (Cf. Gal 3, 24), constitutam esse qui intellegit, ipse intellegit quare sit christianus. Nam si per legem iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est (Gal 2, 21). Si autem non gratis mortuus est, in illo solo iustificatur impius, cui credenti in eum qui iustificat impium deputatur fides ad iustitiam (Rom 4, 5). Omnes enim peccaverunt et egent gloria Dei iustificati gratis per sanguinem ipsius (Rom 3, 23-24). Quicumque autem non putantur pertinere ad hos omnes, qui peccaverunt et egent gloria Dei, profecto nullam necessitatem habent ut cristiani fiant, quia non est opus sanis medicus, sed aegrotantibus; unde non venit ille vocare iustos, sed peccatores (Cf. Mt 9, 12-13).
Whoever understands, then, that this righteousness of God is established not in the precept of the law, by which fear is struck into us, but in the help of the grace of Christ, to which alone the fear of the law as a tutor profitably leads (See Gal 3:24), he understands why he is a Christian. For if justification were through the law, then Christ died to no purpose (Gal 2:21). But if he did not die to no purpose, then it is in him alone that the ungodly is justified, for whom, believing in him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is reckoned as righteousness (Rom 4:5). For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, being justified freely by his blood (Rom 3:23-24). But whoever are thought not to belong to all those who have sinned and fall short of the glory of God surely have no need to become Christians, since those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick; whence he came to call not the righteous, but sinners (See Matt 9:12-13).
DNeG.1.1.1
Fides in Christum non esset ad salutem necessaria, si homo sine illa posset iuste vivere.
Faith in Christ would not be necessary for salvation if a human being could live righteously without it.
2. 2. Ac per hoc natura humani generis ex illius unius praevaricatoris carne procreata, si potest sibi sufficere ad implendam legem perficiendamque iustitiam, de praemio debet esse secura, hoc est, de vita aeterna,"etiamsi in aliqua gente aut aliquo superiore tempore fides eam latuit sanguinis Christi.
2. 2. And on this account, if the nature of the human race, begotten from the flesh of that one transgressor, can suffice of itself to fulfill the law and to perfect righteousness, then it ought to be secure of the reward, that is, of eternal life, even if in some nation or in some earlier time faith in the blood of Christ lay hidden from it.
DNeG.1.2.2
Non enim iniustus Deus, qui iustos fraudet mercede iustitiae, si eis non est annuntiatum sacramentum divinitatis et humanitatis Christi, quod manifestatum est in carne (Cf. 1 Tim 3, 16). Quomodo enim crederent quod non audierunt? aut quomodo audirent sine praedicante (Cf. Rom 10, 14)? Fides enim ex auditu, sicut scriptum est, auditus autem per verbum Christi. Sed dico, inquit: Numquid non audierunt? In omnem terram exiit sonus eorum et in fines orbis terrae verba eorum (Rom 10, 17-18; cf. Ps 18, 5).
For God is not unjust, that he should defraud the righteous of the wages of righteousness, if to them the sacrament of the divinity and humanity of Christ, which was manifested in the flesh, has not been announced (See 1 Tim 3:16). For how are they to believe what they have not heard? Or how are they to hear without a preacher (See Rom 10:14)? For faith, as it is written, comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes by the word of Christ. But I say, he says: Have they not heard? Their voice has gone out to all the earth, and their words to the ends of the world (Rom 10:17-18; see Ps 19 (18):4).
DNeG.1.2.2
Sed antequam hoc inciperet fieri, antequam denique usque ad fines totius orbis terrae praedicatio ipsa perveniat - quoniam non desunt adhuc ultimae gentes, licet ut perhibetur paucissimae, quibus hoc nondum fuerit praedicatum - quid faciat humana natura vel quid fecit, quae vel ante non audierat hoc futurum vel adhuc non comperit factum nisi credendo in Deum, qui fecit caelum et terram (Cf. Act 4, 24), a quo et se factam naturaliter sentit et recte vivendo eius impleat voluntatem nulla fide passionis Christi et resurrectionis imbuta?". Quod si fieri potuit aut potest, hoc et ego dico, quod de lege dixit Apostolus: Ergo Christus gratis mortuus est (Gal 2, 21).
But before this began to happen, before, that is, this very preaching reached to the ends of the whole world—since there are still wanting some remotest nations, very few, it is reported, to whom this has not yet been preached—what is human nature to do, or what has it done, when either it had not earlier heard that this was to come, or has not yet learned that it has been done, except believe in God, who made heaven and earth (See Acts 4:24), by whom it perceives that it was naturally made, and by living rightly fulfill his will, imbued with no faith in the passion and resurrection of Christ? But if this could be done or can be done, then I too say what the Apostle said of the law: Then Christ died to no purpose (Gal 2:21).
DNeG.1.2.2
Si enim hoc ille dixit de lege quam accepit gens una Iudaeorum, quanto iustius dicitur de lege naturae, quam accepit universum genus humanum: "Si per naturam iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est". Si autem Christus non gratis mortuus est, ergo omnis humana natura iustificari et redimi ab ira Dei iustissima, hoc est a vindicta, nullo modo potest nisi per fidem et sacramentum sanguinis Christi.
For if he said this of the law, which one nation, the Jews, received, how much more justly is it said of the law of nature, which the whole human race received: "If righteousness comes through nature, then Christ died to no purpose." But if Christ did not die to no purpose, then the whole of human nature can in no way be justified and redeemed from the most just wrath of God, that is, from his vengeance, except through faith and the sacrament of the blood of Christ.
DNeG.1.2.2
Sana condita est natura, postea corrupta est peccato.
Nature was created sound; afterward it was corrupted by sin.
3. 3. Natura quippe hominis primitus inculpata et sine ullo vitio creata est; natura vero ista hominis, qua unusquisque ex Adam nascitur, iam medico indiget (Cf. OROSIO, Excerpta 3-13), quia sana non est. Omnia quidem bona, quae habet in formatione, vita, sensibus, mente, a summo Deo habet creatore et artifice suo. Vitium vero, quod ista naturale bona contenebrat et infirmat, ut illuminatione et curatione opus habeat, non ab inculpabili artifice contractum est, sed ex originali peccato, quod commissum est libero arbitrio. Ac per hoc natura poenalis ad vindictam iustissimam pertinet. Si enim iam sumus in Christo nova creatura (Cf. 2 Cor 5, 17), tamen eramus natura filii irae sicut et ceteri; Deus autem, qui dives est in misericordia, propter multam dilectionem, qua dilexit nos, et cum essemus mortui delictis, convivificavit nos Christo cuius gratia sumus salvi facti (Eph 2, 3-5).
3. 3. The nature of the human being was indeed at first created blameless and without any fault; but this present nature of the human being, by which each one is born from Adam, now needs a physician (See Orosius, Excerpta 3-13), because it is not sound. All the good things, indeed, that it has in its formation, life, senses, and mind, it has from the supreme God, its creator and maker. But the fault that darkens and weakens these natural goods, so that it has need of enlightenment and healing, was not contracted from the blameless maker, but from original sin, which was committed by free choice. And on this account this penal nature pertains to a most just vengeance. For if we are now in Christ a new creation (See 2 Cor 5:17), yet we were by nature children of wrath, like the rest; but God, who is rich in mercy, out of the great love with which he loved us, even when we were dead through our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ, by whose grace we have been saved (Eph 2:3-5).
DNeG.1.3.3
Salus est tantum a gratia Dei.
Salvation is from the grace of God alone.
4. 4. Haec igitur Christi gratia, sine qua nec infantes nec aetate grandes salvi fieri possunt, non meritis redditur, sed gratis datur, propter quod gratia nominatur. Iustificati, inquit, gratis per sanguinem ipsius (Rom 3, 24). Unde hi qui nonper illam liberantur, sive quia audire nondum potuerunt (Cf. Rom 10, 14) sive quia oboedire noluerunt sive etiam, cum per aetatem audire non possent, lavacrum regenerationis (Cf. Tit 3, 5) quod accipere possent, per quod salvi fierent, non acceperunt, iuste utique damnantur, quia sine peccato non sunt, vel quod originaliter traxerunt vel quod malis moribus addiderunt. Omnes enim peccaverunt - sive in Adam sive in se ipsis - et egent gloria Dei (Rom 3, 23).
4. 4. This grace of Christ, therefore, without which neither infants nor those grown in years can be saved, is not rendered for merits but given freely, on account of which it is called grace. Being justified, he says, freely by his blood (Rom 3:24). Hence those who are not set free through it—whether because they have not yet been able to hear (See Rom 10:14), or because they were unwilling to obey, or even because, when through their age they could not hear, they did not receive the bath of regeneration (See Titus 3:5), which they could have received and through which they would have been saved—are surely justly condemned, because they are not without sin, whether that which they drew from their origin or that which they added by evil conduct. For all have sinned—whether in Adam or in themselves—and fall short of the glory of God (Rom 3:23).
DNeG.1.4.4
Iustitiae erat damnari omnes.
It would have been just for all to be condemned.
5. 5. Universa igitur massa poenas debet et, si omnibus debitum damnationis supplicium redderetur, non iniuste procul dubio redderetur. Qui ergo inde per gratiam liberantur, non vasa meritorum suorum, sed vasa misericordiae nominantur (Cf. Rom 9, 23). Cuius misericordiae nisi illius, qui Christum Iesum misit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos facere (Cf. 1 Tit 1, 15), quos praescivit et praedestinavit et vocavit et iustificavit et glorificavit (Cf. Rom 8, 29-30)? Quis igitur usque adeo dementissime insaniat, ut non agat ineffabiles gratias misericordiae quos voluit liberantis, qui recte nullo modo posset culpare iustitiam universos omnino damnantis?
5. 5. The whole mass, therefore, owes a penalty, and if the due punishment of condemnation were rendered to all, beyond doubt it would not be rendered unjustly. Those, then, who are set free from it by grace are called not vessels of their own merits, but vessels of mercy (See Rom 9:23). Of whose mercy, if not of him who sent Christ Jesus into this world to save sinners (See 1 Tim 1:15), whom he foreknew and predestined and called and justified and glorified (See Rom 8:29-30)? Who, then, would rave so utterly out of his mind as not to give ineffable thanks to the mercy that sets free those whom it willed, since he could in no way rightly find fault with the justice that condemns absolutely all?
DNeG.1.5.5
Et in parvulis et in maioribus natura humana medico indiget.
Both in little ones and in the grown, human nature needs a physician.
6. 6. Hoc si secundum Scripturas sapiamus, non cogimur contra christianam gratiam disputare et ea dicere, quibus demonstrare conemur naturam humanam neque in parvulis medico indigere, quia sana est, et in maioribus sibi ipsam ad iustitiam, si velit, posse sufficere. Acute quippe videntur haec dici, sed in sapientia verbi, qua evacuatur crux Christi (Cf. 1 Cor 1, 17): Non est ista sapientia desursum descendens (Iac 3, 15). Nolo quod sequitur dicere, ne amicis nostris, quorum fortissima et celerrima ingenia non in perversum, sed in directum currere volumus, facere existimemur iniuriam.
6. 6. If we are wise according to the Scriptures in this matter, we are not driven to dispute against Christian grace and to say the things by which we would try to show that human nature neither needs a physician in little ones, because it is sound, nor in the grown is unable, if it wills, to suffice of itself for righteousness. These things, indeed, seem to be cleverly said, but with the wisdom of words, by which the cross of Christ is emptied (See 1 Cor 1:17): This is not the wisdom that comes down from above (Jas 3:15). I do not wish to say what follows, lest we be thought to do an injury to our friends, whose most vigorous and quick minds we wish to run not in the wrong direction, but straight ahead.
DNeG.1.6.6
Nulla est salus sine Christo.
There is no salvation without Christ.
7. 7. Quanto igitur zelo accensus est libri huius, quem misistis, conditor adversus eos qui peccatis suis patrocinium de naturae humanae infirmitate perquirunt, tanto et multo ardentiore zelo nos oportet accendi, ne evacuetur crux Christi (Cf. 1 Cor 1, 17). Evacuatur autem, si aliquo modo praeter illius sacramentum ad iustitiam vitamque aeternam perveniri posse dicatur. Quod in libro isto agitur, nolo dicere ab sciente, ne illum qui cum scripsit ne christianum quidem habendum iudicem, sed, quod magis credo, a nesciente, magnis sane viribus; sed eas sanas volo, non quales phrenetici habere consuerunt.
7. 7. With however great a zeal, then, the author of this book that you sent was kindled against those who seek patronage for their sins in the weakness of human nature, with that much and far more ardent a zeal ought we to be kindled, lest the cross of Christ be emptied (See 1 Cor 1:17). But it is emptied if it is said that one can in any way come to righteousness and eternal life apart from his sacrament. That this is what is done in this book I do not wish to say is done knowingly, lest I should judge that the man who wrote it is not even to be held a Christian; but rather, as I more readily believe, by one who did not know, and indeed with great force—but I would have that force sound, not such as the frenzied are wont to have.
DNeG.1.7.7
Distinctio Pelagii inter esse et posse.
Pelagius's distinction between being and being able.
7. 8. Nam prius distinguit "aliud esse quaerere an possit aliquid esse, quod ad solam possibilitatem pertinet, aliud, utrumne sit". Hanc distinctionem veram esse nemo ambigit; consequens enim est, ut quod est esse potuerit, non est autem consequens, ut quod esse potest etiam sit. Quia enim Dominus Lazarum suscitavit (Cf. Io 11, 43-44), sine dubio potuit; quia vero Iudam non suscitavit, numquid dicendumest: "non potuit"? Potuit ergo, sed noluit. Nam si voluisset, eadem etiam hoc potestate fecisset, quia et Filius quos vult vivificat (Cf. Io 5, 21). Sed hac distinctione vera atque manifesta quo tendat et quid efficere conetur advertite. "Nos, inquit, de sola possibilitate tractamus; de qua nisi quid certum constiterit, transgredi ad aliud gravissimum esse atque extra ordinem ducimus". Hoc versat multis modis et sermone diuturno, ne quis eum aliud quam de non peccandi possibilitate quaerere existimet.
7. 8. For first he distinguishes that "it is one thing to ask whether something can be, which pertains to possibility alone, and another, whether it actually is." No one doubts that this distinction is true; for it follows that what is could have been able to be, but it does not follow that what can be also is. Because the Lord raised up Lazarus (See John 11:43-44), without doubt he was able; but because he did not raise up Judas, is it to be said: "He was not able"? He was able, then, but he was unwilling. For if he had willed, he would have done this too by the same power, since the Son also gives life to whom he wills (See John 5:21). But note where, by this true and manifest distinction, he is tending and what he is trying to effect. "We," he says, "are dealing with possibility alone; and unless something certain be established about it, we hold it most serious and out of order to pass on to anything else." This he turns over in many ways and in a lengthy discourse, lest anyone should suppose that he is asking about anything other than the possibility of not sinning.
DNeG.1.7.8
Unde inter multa quibus id agit etiam hoc dicit: "Idem iterum repeto: Ego dico posse esse hominem sine peccato. Tu quid dicis? Non posse esse hominem sine peccato? Neque ego dico, inquit, hominem esse sine peccato neque tu dicis non esse hominem sine peccato; de posse et non posse, non de esse et non esse contendimus".
Among the many ways in which he pursues this, he also says this: "Again I repeat the same thing: I say a human being can be without sin. What do you say? That a human being cannot be without sin? Neither do I say," he says, "that a human being is without sin, nor do you say that a human being is not without sin; we are contending about being able and not being able, not about being and not being."
DNeG.1.7.8
Deinde nonnulla eorum quae adversus eos de Scripturis proferri solent ad istam quaestionem non pertinere, in qua quaeritur possitne annon possit homo esse sine peccato, ita commemorat: "Nam nullus, inquit, mundus est a sorde (Cf. Iob 14, 4); et: Non est homo qui non peccet (3 Reg 8, 46); et: Non est iustus in terra (Eccle 7, 21); et: Non est qui faciat bonum (Ps 13, 1. 3); et cetera his similia, inquit, ad non esse, non ad non posse proficiunt. Huiusmodi enim exemplis ostenditur, quales homines quidam tempore aliquo fuerint, non quod aliud esse non potuerint; unde et iure inveniuntur esse culpabiles. Nam si idcirco tales fuerunt, quia aliud esse non potuerunt, culpa carent".
Then he recounts that certain things that are wont to be brought forward against them from the Scriptures do not pertain to this question, in which it is asked whether or not a human being can be without sin, thus: "For no one," he says, "is clean from filth (See Job 14:4); and: There is no one who does not sin (1 Kgs 8:46); and: There is no one righteous on the earth (Eccl 7:20 (7:21)); and: There is no one who does good (Ps 14 (13):1. 3); and the rest like these," he says, "avail toward not being, not toward not being able. For by examples of this kind it is shown what sort of human beings certain ones were at some time, not that they could not be otherwise; whence they are also rightly found to be culpable. For if they were such because they could not be otherwise, they are free of fault."
DNeG.1.7.8
Infantium posse.
The "being able" of infants.
8. 9. Videte quid dixerit. Ego autem dico parvulum natum in eo loco, ubi ei non potuit per Christi baptismum subveniri, morte praeventum idcirco talem fuisse, id est, sine lavacro regenerationis exisse (Cf. Tit 3, 5), quia esse aliud non potuit. Absolvat ergo eum et aperiat ei contra sententiam Domini (Cf. Io 3, 5) regnum caelorum; sed non eum absolvit Apostolus qui ait: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12). Recte ergo ea damnatione, quae per universam massam currit, non admittitur in regnum caelorum, quamvis christianus non solum non fuerit, sed, nec esse potuerit.
8. 9. See what he has said. But I say that a little one, born in a place where he could not be helped by the baptism of Christ, and overtaken by death, was such—that is, departed without the bath of regeneration (See Titus 3:5)—because he could not be otherwise. Let him then absolve such a child and open to him, against the sentence of the Lord (See John 3:5), the kingdom of heaven; but the Apostle does not absolve him, who says: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). Rightly, then, by that condemnation which runs through the whole mass, he is not admitted into the kingdom of heaven, although he not only was not a Christian, but could not even be one.
DNeG.1.8.9
Maiorum posse.
The "being able" of the grown.
9. 10. Sed: "non damnatur, inquiunt, quia in Adam peccasse omnes (Cf. Rom 5, 12) non propter peccatum nascendi origine adtractum, sed propter imitationem dictum est". Si ergo ideo dicitur Adam auctor omnium qui subsecuti sunt peccatorum, quia primus peccator in hominibus fuit, cur non potius Abel quam Christus ponitur caput omnium iustorum, quia primus in hominibus iustus fuit? Sed de infante non loquor; iuvenis vel senexin ea regione defunctus est, ubi non potuit Christi nomen audire. Potuit fieri iustus per naturam et liberum arbitrium an non potuit?
9. 10. But "he is not condemned," they say, "because that all sinned in Adam (See Rom 5:12) was said not on account of sin drawn down by the origin of birth, but on account of imitation." If, then, Adam is for this reason called the author of all the sins that followed, because he was the first sinner among human beings, why is not Abel rather than Christ set down as the head of all the righteous, because he was the first righteous one among human beings? But I am not speaking of the infant; a young man or an old man has died in a region where he could not hear the name of Christ. Could he have become righteous through nature and free choice, or could he not?
DNeG.1.9.10
Si potuisse dicunt, ecce quod est crucem Christi evacuare (Cf. 1 Cor 1, 17) "sine illa quemquam per naturalem legem et voluntatis arbitrium iustificari posse contendere". Dicamus et hic: Ergo Christus gratis mortuus est (Gal 2, 21); hoc enim omnes possent, etiamsi mortuus ille non esset; et si iniusti essent, quia vellent, essent, non quia iusti esse non possent.
If they say he could, behold what it is to empty the cross of Christ (See 1 Cor 1:17)—"to contend that someone can be justified without it, through the natural law and the choice of the will." Let us say here too: Then Christ died to no purpose (Gal 2:21); for all could do this even if he had not died; and if they were unrighteous, they would be so because they willed it, not because they could not be righteous.
DNeG.1.9.10
Si autem sine Christi gratia iustificari omnino non potuit, etiam istum, si audet, absolvat secundum verba sua, quia "si idcirco talis fuit, quod aliud esse non potuit, culpa caruit".
But if without the grace of Christ he could not be justified at all, let him too, if he dares, absolve this man according to his own words, because "if he was such because he could not be otherwise, he was free of fault."
DNeG.1.9.10
Versute gratiam confitetur Pelagius.
Pelagius craftily confesses grace.
10. 11. Sed obiecit sibi quasi ab alio dictum et ait: "Potest quidem esse, sed per Dei gratiam, inquies", Deinde velut respondendo subiungit: "Ago humanitati tuae gratias, quod assertionem meam, quam dudum oppugnabas, non modo non oppugnare aut non confiteri solum contentus non es, verum etiam non refugis comprobare. Nam dicere: Potest quidem, sed per illud aut illud, quid aliud est quam non solum consentire quod possit esse, verum etiam quomodo vel qualiter possit ostendere? Nullus itaque magis alicuius rei possibilitatem probat quam qui eius etiam qualitatem fatetur, quia nec absque re esse qualitas potest".
10. 11. But he raised an objection against himself as though said by another, and he says: "It can indeed be, but through the grace of God, you will say." Then, as if in reply, he adds: "I give thanks to your kindness, that you are not content not merely to fail to attack or to fail to confess my assertion, which you were lately attacking, but you do not even shrink from approving it. For to say: It can indeed be, but through this or that—what else is it than not only to consent that it can be, but even to show in what way or by what means it can be? And so no one proves the possibility of anything more than he who confesses also its character, since character cannot exist apart from a thing."
DNeG.1.10.11
His dictis iterum sibi obicit: "Sed tu, inquies, hoc in loco Dei gratiam, quando quidem eam non commemoras, videris abnuere". Deinde respondit: "Ego ne abnuo, qui rem confitendo confitear necesse est et per quod effici res potest, an tu, qui rem negando et quidquid illud est per quod res efficitur procul dubio negas?". Oblitus est iam se illi respondere, qui rem non negat, cuius obiectionem paulo ante proposuerat dicentis: "Potest quidem esse, sed per Dei gratiam".Quomodo ergo illam pro qua iste multum laborat possibilitatem negat, qui ei iam dicit: "Potest esse, sed per Dei gratiam?". Verumtamen quia isto dimisso qui rem iam confitetur agit adhuc adversus eos qui negant esse possibile hominem esse sine peccato, quid ad nos? Contra quos vult agat, dum tamen hoc confiteatur, quod impietate sceleratissima negatur, sine gratia Dei hominem sine peccato esse non posse. Dicit ergo: "Sive per gratiam sive per adiutorium sive per misericordiam et quidquid illud est per quod esse homo absque peccato potest, confitetur quisquis rem ipsam fatetur".
Having said this, he again objects to himself: "But you," you will say, "in this place seem to refuse the grace of God, since indeed you make no mention of it." Then he replies: "Do I refuse it, who, by confessing the thing, must of necessity confess also that through which the thing can be effected—or rather you, who, by denying the thing, beyond doubt deny also whatever it is through which the thing is effected?" He has already forgotten that he is replying to one who does not deny the thing, whose objection he had a little before set forth, saying: "It can indeed be, but through the grace of God." How, then, does he deny the possibility for which he labors so much, when he already says to him: "It can be, but through the grace of God"? Yet, since, having dismissed the one who already confesses the thing, he is still arguing against those who deny that it is possible for a human being to be without sin, what is that to us? Let him argue against whomever he wills, provided he confesses this, which is denied with most wicked impiety—that without the grace of God a human being cannot be without sin. He says, then: "Whether through grace, or through help, or through mercy, and whatever it is through which a human being can be without sin, whoever acknowledges the thing itself confesses it."
DNeG.1.10.11
Cum disputatur de gratia, non de ea loquimur quae ad naturae institutionem pertinet, sed ad reparationem.
When grace is discussed, we are not speaking of the grace that pertains to the establishment of nature, but to its repair.
11. 12. Fateor dilectioni vestrae, cum ista legerem, laetitia repente perfusus sum, quod Dei gratiam non negaret, per quam solam homo iustificari potest; hoc enim in disputationibus talium maxime detestor et horreo. Sed pergens legere cetera primo ex datis similitudinibus coepi habere suspectum. Ait enim: "Nunc si dixero: Homo disputare potest, avis volare, lepus currere, et non etiam per quae haeceffici possint commemoravero, id est, linguam, alas, pedes, num ego officiorum qualitates negavi, qui officia ipsa confessus sum?".
11. 12. I confess to your love that when I read these things I was suddenly suffused with joy, that he did not deny the grace of God, by which alone a human being can be justified; for this above all I detest and shudder at in the disputations of such men. But as I went on to read the rest, I first began to hold him suspect from the comparisons he gave. For he says: "Now if I say: A human being can dispute, a bird can fly, a hare can run, and I do not also mention the things by which these can be effected, that is, the tongue, the wings, the feet, have I denied the characters of these functions, when I have confessed the functions themselves?"
DNeG.1.11.12
Videtur certe haec eum commemorasse, quae natura valent; creata sunt enim haec membra huiusmodi naturis, lingua, alae, pedes. Non tale aliquid posuit, quale de gratia intellegi volumus, sine qua homo non iustificatur, ubi de sanandis, non de instituendis naturis agitur. Hinc iam ergo sollicitus coepi legere cetera et me non falso comperi suspicatum.
It is clear that he has here mentioned things that have their power from nature; for these members were created for natures of this kind: the tongue, the wings, the feet. He has not set down anything such as we wish to be understood concerning grace, without which a human being is not justified, where the matter at issue is the healing of natures, not their establishing. From this point, then, anxious, I began to read the rest, and I found that I had not suspected falsely.
DNeG.1.11.12
Peccata venialia et gratia.
Venial sins and grace.
12. 13. Quo priusquam veniam, videte quid dixerit. Cum tractaret quaestionem de differentia peccatorum et obiceret sibi, quod quidam dicunt levia quaedam peccata ipsa moltitudine, quod saepe irruant, non posse cuncta vitari, negavit "debere argui ne levia quidem correptione, si vitari omnino non possunt", Scripturas utique non advertens Novi Testamenti, ubi didicimus (Cf. OROSIO, Excerpta 13-21) hanc esse intentionem legis arguentis, ut propter illa quae perperam fiunt confugiatur ad gratiam Domini miserantis velut paedagogo concludente in eadem fide (Cf. Gal 3, 23-24), quae postea revelata est, ubi et remittantur quae male fiunt et eadem gratia iuvante non fiant.
12. 13. Before I come to that, see what he has said. When he was treating the question of the difference among sins, and objected to himself that certain people say that some light sins, by their very multitude, because they often rush upon us, cannot all be avoided, he denied "that even light sins ought to be censured by rebuke, if they cannot at all be avoided," not noticing the Scriptures of the New Testament, where we have learned (See Orosius, Excerpta 13-21) that this is the intent of the law in convicting: that, on account of those things which are done wrongly, recourse may be had to the grace of the Lord who shows mercy, the tutor as it were shutting us up in the same faith (See Gal 3:23-24) which was later revealed, where both the things done evilly are forgiven and, by the same grace helping, are no longer done.
DNeG.1.12.13
Proficientium est enim via, quamvis bene proficientes dicantur perfecti viatores. Illa est autem summa perfectio, cui nihil addatur, cum id quo tenditur coeperit possideri.
For there is a road of those who advance, although those who advance well are called perfect travelers. But that highest perfection, to which nothing can be added, is when that toward which one is striving begins to be possessed.
DNeG.1.12.13
Pelagium hortatur Aug. ad orationem.
Augustine exhorts Pelagius to prayer.
13. 14. Iam vero illud quod ei dicitur: "Ipse tu sine peccato es?"; revera non pertinet ad eam rem de qua vertitur quaestio. Sed quod dicit "neglegentiae suae potius imputari, quod non est sine peccato", bene quidem dicit, sed dignetur inde et orare Deum m, ne illi haec iniqua neglegentia dominetur, quem rogabat quidam, quando dicebat: Itinera mea dirige secundum verbum tuum et non dominetur mihi omnis iniquitas (Ps 118, 133), ne, dum suae diligentiae quasi propriis viribus fidit, neque hic ad veram iustitiam neque illic, ubi sine dubio perfecta desideranda est et speranda, perveniat.
13. 14. Now indeed that which is said to him: "Are you yourself without sin?" truly does not pertain to the matter about which the question turns. But when he says that "it is to be imputed rather to his own negligence that he is not without sin," he says well indeed; but let him deign for that reason also to pray to God, that this unjust negligence may not lord it over him—he whom a certain man was entreating when he said: Direct my steps according to your word, and let no iniquity have dominion over me (Ps 119 (118):133)—lest, while he trusts in his own diligence as in his own powers, he attain neither here to true righteousness nor there, where without doubt the perfect is to be desired and hoped for.
DNeG.1.13.14
Nemo praeter Christum est sine peccato ex testimonio Scripturae.
No one except Christ is without sin, by the testimony of Scripture.
14. 15. Et illud quod a quibusdam ei dicitur: "nusquam esse scriptum his omnino verbis posse esse hominem sine peccato", facile refellit, "quia non ibi est quaestio, quibus verbis dicatur quaecumque sententia". Non tamen fortasse sine causa, cum aliquotiens in Scripturis inveniatur homines dictos esse sine querella, nemo invenitur, qui sit dictus sine peccato nisi unus solus (Cf. Iob 1, 8; Lc 1, 6; Phil 3, 6) de quo aperte dictum est: Eum qui non noverat peccatum (2 Cor 5, 21), et eo loco, ubi de sacerdotibus sanctis agebatur: Etenim expertus est omnia secundum similitudinem sine peccato (Hebr 4, 15): in illa scilicet carne, quae habebat similitudinem carnis peccati (Cf. Rom 8, 3), quamvis non esset caro peccati; quam tamen similitudinem non haberet, nisi cetera omnis esset caropeccati.
14. 15. And that which is said to him by certain people, "that nowhere is it written in these exact words that a human being can be without sin," he easily refutes, "because the question there is not in what words any opinion is expressed." Yet perhaps not without cause, though sometimes in the Scriptures human beings are said to be without reproach, no one is found who is said to be without sin except one alone (See Job 1:8; Luke 1:6; Phil 3:6), of whom it is openly said: Him who knew no sin (2 Cor 5:21), and, in that place where it was a question of holy priests: For he was tried in all things in our likeness, without sin (Heb 4:15)—namely, in that flesh which had the likeness of the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3), although it was not the flesh of sin; yet it would not have this likeness unless all other flesh were the flesh of sin.
DNeG.1.14.15
Iam illud quomodo accipiendum sit: Omnis qui natus est ex Deo non peccat et non potest peccare, quia semen eius in ipso manet (1 Io 3, 9), cum ipse apostolus Ioannes, quasi non sit natus ex Deo aut eis loqueretur qui nondum essent nati ex Deo, aperte posuerit: Si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus et veritas in nobis non est (1 Io 1, 8); in libris, quos de hac re ad Marcellinum scripsi (Cf. AUG., De pecc. mer. et rem. 2, 7, 9 - 8, 10), sicut potui, explicare curavi. Et illud, quod dictum est: Non potest peccare (Cf. 1 Io 3, 9), pro eo dictum esse, ac si diceretur "non debet peccare", non improbanda mihi videtur huius assertio. Quis enim insanus dicat debere peccari, cum ideo sit peccatum, quia non debet fieri?
Again, how this is to be taken: Everyone who is born of God does not sin and cannot sin, because his seed abides in him (1 John 3:9), when the apostle John himself, as though he were not born of God or were speaking to those who were not yet born of God, openly set down: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us (1 John 1:8)—this I have taken care to explain, as I was able, in the books that I wrote on this matter to Marcellinus (See Aug., De pecc. mer. et rem. 2, 7, 9 - 8, 10). And that which is said: He cannot sin (See 1 John 3:9), was said as if it were said "he ought not to sin"—this assertion of his does not seem to me to be disapproved. For who that is sane would say that one ought to sin, since sin is sin precisely because it ought not to be done?
DNeG.1.14.15
Corrumpit Pelagius Iacobi apostoli locum, addita interrogationis nota.
Pelagius corrupts a passage of the apostle James by adding a mark of interrogation.
15. 16. Sane quod apostolus Iacobus ait: Linguam autem nullus hominum domare potest (Iac 3, 8), non mihi videtur ita intellegendum, ut exponere voluit, "quasi per exprobationem dictum, tamquam diceretur: Ergone linguam nullus hominum domare potest? tamquam obiurgans et dicens: Domare feras potestis, linguam non potestis? quasi facilius sit linguam domare quam feras". Non puto quod iste sit sensus hoc loco. Si enim hoc sentiri vellet de facilitate domandae linguae, cetera sequerentur in bestiarum comparatione. Nunc vero sequitur: Inquietum malum, plena veneno mortifero (Iac 3, 8), utique nocentiore quam bestiarum est atque serpentium; nam illud carnem interficit,hoc vero animam; Os enim quod mentitur, occidit animam (Sap 1, 11). Non ergo quasi id esset facilius quam mansuefactio bestiarum, sanctus Iacobus illam sententiam pronuntiavit aut ea voce voluit pronuntiari, sed potius ostendens quantum sit in homine linguae malum, ut a nullo homine domari possit, cum ab hominibus domentur et bestiae. Neque hoc ideo dixit, ut huius in nos mali dominationem per neglegentiam permanere patiamur, sed ut ad domandam linguam divinae gratiae poscamus auxilium. Non enim ait: Linguam "nullus" domare potest, sed "nullus hominum", ut, cum domatur, Dei misericordia, Dei adiutorio, Dei gratia fieri fateamur. Conetur ergo anima domare linguam et, dum conatur, poscat auxilium; et oret lingua, ut dometur lingua donante illo qui dixit ad suos: Non enim vos estis qui loquimini, sed Spiritus Patris vestri qui loquitur in vobis (Mt 10, 20). Itaque praecepto facere commonemur, quod conantes et nostris viribus non valentes adiutorium divinum precemur.
15. 16. Indeed, what the apostle James says: But the tongue no human being can tame (Jas 3:8), does not seem to me to be understood as he wished to expound it, "as though said by way of reproach, as if it were said: Then can no human being tame the tongue? as if rebuking and saying: You can tame wild beasts, can you not tame the tongue? as though it were easier to tame the tongue than wild beasts." I do not think that this is the sense in this place. For if he wished it to be understood of the ease of taming the tongue, the rest would follow in a comparison with beasts. But as it is, there follows: A restless evil, full of deadly poison (Jas 3:8), surely more harmful than that of beasts and serpents; for the one kills the body, but the other the soul; for the mouth that lies kills the soul (Wis 1:11). Holy James, then, did not pronounce that sentence as though it were easier than the taming of beasts, nor did he wish it to be pronounced in that tone, but rather showing how great is the evil of the tongue in a human being, that it can be tamed by no human being, since even beasts are tamed by human beings. Nor did he say this so that we should suffer the dominion of this evil over us to remain through negligence, but so that for the taming of the tongue we should beg the help of divine grace. For he did not say: The tongue "no one" can tame, but "no human being," so that, when it is tamed, we may confess it to be done by the mercy of God, the help of God, the grace of God. Let the soul, then, try to tame the tongue, and, while it tries, let it beg help; and let the tongue pray that the tongue may be tamed, by the gift of him who said to his own: For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you (Matt 10:20). And so by the precept we are admonished to do what, in trying and not prevailing by our own strength, we should beg divine help to accomplish.
DNeG.1.15.16
Evolvitur idem Iacobi locus.
The same passage of James is unfolded.
16. 17. Proinde et ipse, cum exaggerasset linguae malum (Cf. Iac 3, 6) inter haec dicens: Non oportet, fratres mei, haec ita fieri (Iac 3, 10), continuo monuit consummatis his quae hinc dicebat, quo adiutorio ista non fierent, quae dixit fieri non oportere: Quis enim sapiens et disciplinatus inter vos? Ostendat ex bona conversatione operationem suam in mansuetudine sapientiae. Quodsi zelum amarum habetis et contentiones in cordibus vestris, nolite gloriari et mendaces esse adversus veritatem. Non est ista sapientia desursum descendens, sed terrena, animalis, diabolica. Ubi enim zelus et contentio, ibi inconstantia et omne opus pravum. Quae autem desursum est sapientia, primum quidem pudica est, deinde pacifica, modesta, suadibilis, plena misericordia et fructibus bonis, inaestimabilis, sine simulatione (Iac 3, 13-17).
16. 17. Accordingly he too, when he had magnified the evil of the tongue (See Jas 3:6), saying among other things: This ought not to be so, my brothers (Jas 3:10), at once, when he had finished what he was saying on this point, admonished by what help these things should not be done, which he said ought not to be done: Who is wise and instructed among you? Let him show his work out of his good conduct in the meekness of wisdom. But if you have bitter zeal and contentions in your hearts, do not boast and be false against the truth. This is not the wisdom that comes down from above, but earthly, unspiritual, devilish. For where there is zeal and contention, there is inconstancy and every evil work. But the wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, modest, open to persuasion, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, without dissimulation (Jas 3:13-17).
DNeG.1.16.17
Haec est sapientia, quae linguam domat, desursum descendens, non ab humano corde prosiliens. An et istam quisquam abrogare audet gratiae Dei et eam superbissima vanitate ponit in hominis potestate? Cur ergo oratur ut accipiatur, si ab homine est ut habeatur? An et huic orationi contradicitur, ne fiat iniuria libero arbitrio, quod sibi sufficit possibilitate naturae ad implenda omnia praecepta iustitiae? Contradicatur ergo eidem ipsi apostolo Iacobo ammonenti et dicenti: Si quis autem vestrum indiget sapientia, postulet a Deo, qui dat omnibus afluenter et non improperat, et dabitur ei; postulet autem in fide nihil haesitans (Iac 1, 5-6). Haec est fides, ad quam praecepta compellunt, ut lex imperet, et fides impetret. Per linguam enim, quam nullus hominum domare potest, sed sapientia desursum descendens (Cf. Iac 3, 8. 15), in multis offendimus omnes (Iac 3, 2). Non enim et hoc iste Apostolus alio modo pronuntiavit sicut illud quod ait: Linguam nullus hominum domare potest (Iac 3, 8).
This is the wisdom that tames the tongue, coming down from above, not springing up from the human heart. Or does anyone dare to take this too away from the grace of God and, with most arrogant vanity, place it in the power of a human being? Why then is it prayed for, that it may be received, if it is from the human being that it is had? Or is this prayer too contradicted, lest an injury be done to free choice, which suffices for itself by the possibility of nature for fulfilling all the precepts of righteousness? Then let that same apostle James also be contradicted when he admonishes and says: But if any of you lacks wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all generously and does not reproach, and it will be given him; but let him ask in faith, with no doubting (Jas 1:5-6). This is the faith to which the precepts compel us, that the law may command and faith may obtain. For through the tongue, which no human being can tame, but the wisdom coming down from above (See Jas 3:8. 15), we all offend in many things (Jas 3:2). For this too the Apostle pronounced in no other way than that which he said: The tongue no human being can tame (Jas 3:8).
DNeG.1.16.17
Utrum qui vivunt secundum spiritum ad hoc indigeant gratia Dei, an sibi sufficiant.
Whether those who live according to the spirit need the grace of God for this, or suffice for themselves.
17. 18. Nec illud quisquam istis pro impossibilitate non peccandi similiter obiecerit, quod dictum est: Sapientia carnis inimica est in Deum; legi enim Dei non est subiecta, nec enim potest. Qui autem in carne sunt, Deo placere non possunt (Rom 8, 7-8). Sapientiam quippe carnis dixit, non sapientiam desursum descendentem (Cf. Iac 3, 15) et in carne esse non eos, qui nondum de corpore exierunt, sed eos, qui secundum carnem vivunt (Cf. Rom 8, 12), significatos esse manifestum est. Non autem ibi est quaestio quae versatur. Illud est quod exspecto ab isto audire, si possim, eos qui secundum spiritum vivunt, et ob hoc etiam hic adhuc viventes iam quodam modo in carne non sunt, utrum gratia Dei vivant secundum spiritum an sibi sufficiant iam data cum creantur possibilitate naturae et sua propria voluntate, cum plenitudo legis non sit nisi caritas (Cf. Rom 13, 10) et caritas Dei diffusa sit in cordibus nostris non per nos ipsos, sed per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis (Cf. Rom 5, 5).
17. 18. Nor should anyone object to these men, in the same way, on behalf of the impossibility of not sinning, what was said: The wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can it be. And those who are in the flesh cannot please God (Rom 8:7-8). For he said the wisdom of the flesh, not the wisdom coming down from above (See Jas 3:15); and it is manifest that those signified as being in the flesh are not those who have not yet departed from the body, but those who live according to the flesh (See Rom 8:12). But the question that is at issue is not there. This is what I wait to hear from him, if I can: whether those who live according to the spirit, and on this account, though still living here in the flesh, are now in a certain way not in the flesh, live according to the spirit by the grace of God or suffice for themselves by the possibility of nature already given when they are created and by their own proper will—since the fullness of the law is nothing but love (See Rom 13:10), and the love of God has been poured out in our hearts not by ourselves, but by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (See Rom 5:5).
DNeG.1.17.18
Peccata ignorantiae.
Sins of ignorance.
17. 19. Tractat etiam iste de peccatis ignorantiae et dicit: "Hominem praevigilare debere, ne ignoret, ideoque esse culpandam ignorantiam, quia id homo nescit neglegentia sua, quod adhibita diligentia scire debuisset", dum tamen omnia potius disputet quam ut oret et dicat: Da mihi intellectum et discam mandata tua (Ps 118, 73).
17. 19. He also treats of sins of ignorance and says that "a human being ought to keep watch beforehand, lest he be ignorant, and therefore ignorance is to be blamed, because a human being does not know through his own negligence what, had he applied diligence, he ought to have known"—while yet he disputes about everything rather than pray and say: Give me understanding, that I may learn your commandments (Ps 119 (118):73).
DNeG.1.17.19
Aliud est enim non curasse scire, quae neglegentiae peccata etiam per sacrificia quaedam legis videbantur expiari (Cf. Lev 4, 2-3), aliud intellegere velle nec posse et facere contra legem non intellegendo quid fieri velit. Unde ammonemur petere a Deo sapientiam, qui dat omnibus afluenter (Iac 1, 5), utiquehis omnibus qui sic petunt et tantum petunt quomodo et quantum res tanta petenda est.
For it is one thing not to have cared to know—the sins of which negligence were seen to be expiated even by certain sacrifices of the law (See Lev 4:2-3)—and another to wish to understand and not be able, and to act against the law by not understanding what it wills to be done. Hence we are admonished to ask wisdom of God, who gives to all generously (Jas 1:5), surely to all those who so ask, and ask only in such manner and measure as so great a thing is to be asked.
DNeG.1.17.19
Quam orationem Pelagius necessariam admiserit.
What prayer Pelagius admitted to be necessary.
18. 20. "Divinitus tamen expianda esse peccata commissa et pro eis Dominum exorandum" fatetur, propter veniam scilicet promerendam, "quia id quod factum est facere infectum" multum ab isto laudata "potentia illa naturae et voluntas hominis" etiam ipso fatente "non potest". Quare hac necessitate restat, ut oret ignosci. Ut autem adiuvetur, ne peccet, nusquam dixit, non hic legi, mirum de hac re omnino silentium, cum oratio dominica utrumque petendum esse commoneat, et ut dimittantur nobis debita nostra et ut non inferamur in temptationem (Cf. Mt 6, 12-13); illud, ut praeterita expientur, hoc, ut futura vitentur.
18. 20. He confesses that "nevertheless sins committed are to be expiated divinely, and the Lord is to be entreated for them"—namely, for obtaining pardon, "because that what has been done should be made undone" even by his own admission "that much-praised power of nature and will of the human being cannot do." Therefore by this necessity it remains that he prays to be forgiven. But that he may be helped not to sin, he nowhere said—I did not read it here; the silence on this matter is altogether astonishing, since the Lord's Prayer admonishes that both are to be asked: both that our debts may be forgiven us, and that we may not be led into temptation (See Matt 6:12-13)—the one, that past sins may be expiated; the other, that future ones may be avoided.
DNeG.1.18.20
Quod licet non fiat, nisi voluntas adsit; tamen ut fiat, voluntas sola non sufficit; ideo pro hac re nec superflua nec impudens Domino immolatur oratio. Nam quid stultius quam orare ut facias quod in potestate habeas?
Although this does not happen unless the will is present, yet for it to happen the will alone does not suffice; therefore for this matter the prayer offered to the Lord is neither superfluous nor shameless. For what is more foolish than to pray that you may do what you have in your own power?
DNeG.1.18.20
Negat Pelagius naturam humanam peccato depravatam aut corruptam esse.
Pelagius denies that human nature has been depraved or corrupted by sin.
19. 21. Iam nunc videte, quod ad rem maxime pertinet, quomodo humanam naturam, tamquam omnino sine vitio ullo sit, conetur estendere et contra apertissimas Scripturas Dei luctetur sapientia verbi, qua evacuetur crux Christi (Cf. 1 Cor 1, 17). Sed plane illa non evacuabitur, ista potius sapientia subvertetur. Nam cum hoc ostenderimus, aderit fortasse misericordia Dei, ut et ipsum haec dixisse paeniteat. "Primo, inquit, de eo disputandum est, quod per peccatum debilitata dicitur et immutata natura (Cf. EUGIPPO, Excerpta 297). Unde ante omnia quaerendum puto, inquit, quid sit peccatum: substantia aliqua an omnino substantia carens nomen, quo non res, non exsistentia, non corpus aliquod, sed perperam facti actus exprimitur". Deinde adiungit: "Credo, ita est. Et si ita est, inquit, quomodo potuit humanam debilitare vel mutare naturam, quod substantia caret?".
19. 21. Now then see what pertains most of all to the matter: how he tries to show that human nature is altogether without any fault, and how he struggles against the most manifest Scriptures of God with the wisdom of words, by which the cross of Christ is emptied (See 1 Cor 1:17). But plainly that cross will not be emptied; rather, this wisdom will be overthrown. For when we have shown this, the mercy of God will perhaps be present, so that he too may repent of having said these things. "First," he says, "we must dispute about that on account of which nature is said to be weakened and altered by sin (See Eugippius, Excerpta 297). Hence before all things I think it must be asked," he says, "what sin is: some substance, or a name altogether lacking substance, by which not a thing, not an existence, not any body, but the act of a wrongly done deed is expressed." Then he adds: "I believe it is so. And if it is so," he says, "how could that which lacks substance weaken or change human nature?"
DNeG.1.19.21
Videte, quaeso, quomodo nesciens nitatur evertere medicinalium eloquiorum saluberrimas voces: Ego dixi: Domine, miserere mei, sana animam meam, quoniam peccavi tibi (Ps 40, 5). Quid sanatur, si nihil est vulneratum, nihil sauciatum, nihil debilitatum atque vitiatum? Porro si est quod sanetur, unde vitiatum est? Audis confitentem, quid desideras disputantem? Sana, inquit, animam meam (Ps 40, 5). Ab illo quaere, unde vitiatum sit, quod sanari rogat, et audi quod sequitur: Quoniam peccavi tibi (Ps 40, 5). Hunc iste interroget, ab isto quaerat quod quaerendum putat et dicat: "O tu qui clamas: Sana animam meam, quoniam peccavi tibi (Ps 40, 5), quid est peccatum? Substantia aliqua an omnino substantia carens nomen, quo non res, non exsistentia, non corpus aliquod, sed tantum perperam facti actus exprimitur?".
See, I beg, how, in his ignorance, he strives to overthrow the most healthful words of the medicinal Scriptures: I said: Lord, have mercy on me; heal my soul, for I have sinned against you (Ps 41 (40):4). What is healed if nothing has been wounded, nothing injured, nothing weakened and corrupted? Further, if there is something that is healed, from what has it been corrupted? You hear one confessing; what do you require of one disputing? Heal, he says, my soul (Ps 41 (40):4). Ask of him from what it has been corrupted, which he asks to be healed, and hear what follows: For I have sinned against you (Ps 41 (40):4). Let him question this man, let him ask of him what he thinks should be asked, and say: "O you who cry out: Heal my soul, for I have sinned against you (Ps 41 (40):4), what is sin? Some substance, or a name altogether lacking substance, by which not a thing, not an existence, not any body, but only the act of a wrongly done deed is expressed?"
DNeG.1.19.21
Respondet ille: "Ita est ut dicis; non est peccatum aliqua substantia, sed tantum hoc nomine perperam facti actus exprimitur". Et contra iste: "Quid ergo clamas: Sana animam meam, quoniam peccavi tibi (Ps 40, 5)? Quomodo potuit vitiare animam tuam quod substantia caret?". Nonne ille, maerore confectus vulneris sui, ne disputatione ab oratione averteretur, breviter responderet et diceret: "Recede a me, obsecro? Cum illo potius disputa, si potes, qui dixit: Non est opus sanis medicus, sed aegrotantibus. Non veni vocare iustos, sed peccatores (Mt 9, 12-13), ubi iustos utique sanos, peccatores autem appellavit aegrotos".
That man answers: "It is as you say; sin is not some substance, but only by this name is the act of a wrongly done deed expressed." And against this the other: "Why then do you cry out: Heal my soul, for I have sinned against you (Ps 41 (40):4)? How could that which lacks substance corrupt your soul?" Would not that man, worn out with grief at his wound, lest he be turned away from prayer by disputation, briefly answer and say: "Depart from me, I beg you. Dispute rather, if you can, with him who said: Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick. I came not to call the righteous, but sinners (Matt 9:12-13), where by the righteous he surely meant the well, and the sinners he called the sick"?
DNeG.1.19.21
Peccato, etsi substantia non sit, quomodo natura vitiata fuerit.
How nature has been corrupted by sin, even though sin is not a substance.
20. 22. Cernitisne quo tendat et quo manus porrigat haec disputatio (Cf. EUGIPPO, Excerpta 297)? ut omnino frustra dictum putetur: Vocabis nomen eius Iesum; ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum (Mt 1, 21). Quomodo enim salvum faciet, ubi nulla est aegritudo? Peccata quippe, a quibus dicit Evangelium salvum faciendum populum Christi, substantiae non sunt et secundum istum vitiare non possunt.
20. 22. Do you see where this disputation is tending and where it stretches out its hand (See Eugippius, Excerpta 297)? That it may be thought said altogether in vain: You shall call his name Jesus, for he will save his people from their sins (Matt 1:21). For how will he save, where there is no sickness? For sins, from which the Gospel says the people of Christ are to be saved, are not substances, and according to this man cannot corrupt.
DNeG.1.20.22
O frater, bonum est ut memineris te esse christianum. Credere ista fortasse suffecerit; sed tamen quia disputare vis nec obest, immo etiam prodest, si firmissima praecedat fides nec existimemus peccato humanam naturam non posse vitiari, sed divinis credentes Scripturis peccato cam esse vitiatam quomodo id fieri potuerit inquiramus. Quoniam peccatum iam didicimus non esse substantiam, nonne adtenditur, ut alia omittam, etiam non manducare non esse substantiam? A substantia quippe receditur, quoniam cibus substantia est. Sed abstinere a cibo non est substantia et tamen substantia corporis, si omnino abstinetur a cibo, ita languescit, ita valitudinis inaequalitate corrumpitur, ita exhauritur viribus, ita lassitudine debilitatur et frangitur, ut, si aliquo modo perduret in vita, vix possit ad eum cibum revocari, unde abstinendo vitiata est. Sic non est substantia peccatum, sed substantia est Deus summaque substantia et solus verus rationalis creaturae cibus. A quo per inoboedientiam recedendo et per infirmitatem non valendo capere, quo debuit et gaudere, audis quemadmodum dicat: Percussum est sicut faenum et aruit cor meum, quoniam oblitus sum manducare panem meum (Ps 101, 5)?
O brother, it is good that you remember you are a Christian. To believe these things will perhaps suffice; but yet, because you wish to dispute, and it does no harm, indeed even profits, provided a most firm faith goes before and we do not suppose that human nature cannot be corrupted by sin, but, believing the divine Scriptures that it has been corrupted by sin, inquire how this could have come about: since we have already learned that sin is not a substance, is it not observed—to omit other things—that not eating, too, is not a substance? For one withdraws from a substance, since food is a substance. But to abstain from food is not a substance, and yet the substance of the body, if one abstains from food altogether, so languishes, is so corrupted by the unevenness of its condition, is so drained of strength, is so weakened and broken by weariness, that if in some way it endures in life, it can scarcely be recalled to that food by abstaining from which it was corrupted. So sin is not a substance, but God is a substance, indeed the supreme substance and the only true food of the rational creature. By withdrawing from him through disobedience and being unable through weakness to take in that in which it ought to have rejoiced, you hear in what manner one says: My heart was struck like grass and withered, for I forgot to eat my bread (Ps 102 (101):4)?
DNeG.1.20.22
Magna hominis miseria, de qua non liberat nisi Christi gratia.
The great misery of the human being, from which nothing sets free but the grace of Christ.
21. 23. Adtendite autem quomodo se adhuc urgueat verisimilibus rationibus contra Scripturae sanctae veritatem. Dominus Iesus dicit, qui propterea Iesus vocatur, quia ipse salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum (Mt 1, 21); dicit ergo Dominus Iesus: Non est opus sanis medicus, sed aegrotantibus. Non veni vocare iustos, sed peccatores (Mt 9, 12-13). Unde dicit et Apostolus: Fidelis sermo et omni acceptione dignus, quia Christus Iesus venit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos facere (1 Tim 1, 15). Et iste contra fidelem sermonem et omni acceptione dignum dicit "non debuisse hanc aegritudinem contrahi peccatis, ne ad hoc esset ista poena peccati, ut committerentur plura peccata".
21. 23. But notice how he still presses on with verisimilar reasonings against the truth of holy Scripture. The Lord Jesus says—he who is called Jesus for this very reason, that he saves his people from their sins (Matt 1:21)—the Lord Jesus, then, says: Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick. I came not to call the righteous, but sinners (Matt 9:12-13). Hence the Apostle also says: This is a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners (1 Tim 1:15). And this man, against the faithful saying and worthy of all acceptance, says "that this sickness ought not to have been contracted by sins, lest the punishment of sin should be this, that more sins should be committed."
DNeG.1.21.23
Quaeritur etiam parvulis tantus medicus opitulator et iste dicit: "Quid quaeritis? Sani sunt propter quos medicum quaeritis. Nec ipse primus homo ideo morte damnatus est; nam postea non peccavit". Quasi aliquid postea de perfectione iustitiae eius audierit, nisi quod commendat Ecclesia et ipsum Domini Christi misericordia liberatum. "Eius quoque posteros, iste dicit, non solum illo non esse infirmiores, sed etiam plura implevisse praecepta, cum ille unum implere neglexerit".
So great a physician and helper is sought even for little ones, and this man says: "Why do you seek? They are well, those for whom you seek a physician. Nor was the first man himself condemned to death for this reason; for afterward he did not sin." As though he had heard anything afterward about the perfection of his righteousness, except that the Church commends him too as set free by the mercy of the Lord Christ. "His descendants, too," this man says, "are not only not weaker than he, but have even fulfilled more precepts, whereas he neglected to fulfill the one."
DNeG.1.21.23
Quos posteros videt ita nasci, quomodo certe ille factus non est, non solum praecepti incapaces, quod omnino non sentiunt, sed vix capaces papillae cum esuriunt, eos tamen in matris Ecclesiae gremio cum salvos gratia sua facere velit, qui salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum (Cf. Mt 1, 21), contradicunt homines et, quasi creaturam, quae per illum condita est, melius illo inspicere noverint, voce non sana sanos esse pronuntiant.
These descendants, whom he sees being born in such a way as that man certainly was not made—not only incapable of a precept, which they do not perceive at all, but scarcely capable of the breast when they hunger—these very ones, when he wishes to save them by his grace in the bosom of mother Church, he who saves his people from their sins (See Matt 1:21), human beings contradict, and, as though they knew how to look upon the creature, which was made through him, better than he does, with an unsound voice pronounce the unsound to be sound.
DNeG.1.21.23
Idem peccatum est poena peccato.
Sin itself is the punishment for sin.
22. 24. "Materiam peccati, dicit, esse vindictam, si ad hoc peccator infirmatus est, ut plura peccaret", nec cogitat praevaricatorem legis quam digne lux deserat veritatis; qua desertus utique fit caecus et plus necesse est offendat et cadendo vexetur vexatusque non surgat, ut ideo tantum audiat vocem legis, quo ammoneatur implorare gratiam Salvatoris. An nulla poena est eorum, de quibus dicit Apostolus: Quia cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt aut gratias egerunt, sed evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum (Rom 1, 21)?
22. 24. "The occasion of sin," he says, "is vengeance, if the sinner has been weakened to this end, that he should sin more"—and he does not consider how worthily the light of truth deserts the transgressor of the law; deserted by which, he surely becomes blind, and of necessity offends more, and by falling is afflicted, and being afflicted does not rise up, so that for this reason only he hears the voice of the law, that he may be admonished to implore the grace of the Savior. Or is there no punishment of those of whom the Apostle says: Because, although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their senseless heart was darkened (Rom 1:21)?
DNeG.1.22.24
Utique ista obscuratio vindicta et poena iam fuit; et tamen per hanc poenam, id est, per cordis caecitatem, quae fit deserente luce sapientiae, in paura et gravia peccata collapsi sunt; Dicentes enim esse se sapientes stulti facti sunt (Rom 1, 22). Gravis haec poena est, si quis intellegat, et ex hac poena vide quo ierunt: Et immutaverunt, inquit, gloriare incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptiblis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium (Rom 1, 23,). Ista fecerunt ex peccati poena, qua obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum (Rom 1, 21). Et propter haec tamen, quia licet poenalia etiam ipsa peccata sunt, adiungit et dicit: Propterea tradidit illos Deus in desiderio cordis illorum, in immunditiam (Rom 1, 24).
Surely this darkening was already a vengeance and a punishment; and yet through this punishment, that is, through the blindness of heart that comes when the light of wisdom deserts it, they slid into more and graver sins; for claiming to be wise, they became fools (Rom 1:22). This is a grave punishment, if one understands it, and from this punishment see where they went: And they changed, he says, the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of an image of corruptible man and of birds and of four-footed beasts and of serpents (Rom 1:23). These things they did from the punishment of sin, by which their senseless heart was darkened (Rom 1:21). And yet for these things—because, although penal, they are themselves also sins—he adds and says: Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to uncleanness (Rom 1:24).
DNeG.1.22.24
Ecce quemadmodum Deus gravius condemnavit tradens illos in desiderio cordis illorum, in immunditiam. Videte etiam ex hac poena quae faciant: Ut contumeliis, inquit, afficiant corpora sua in semetipsis (Rom 1, 24). Et quia poena est ista iniquitatis, cum sit et iniquitas, evidentius commendat dicens: Qui transmutaverunt veritatem Dei in mendacium et coluerunt et servierunt creaturae potius quam Creatori, qui est benedictus in saecula. Amen. Propter hoc, inquit, tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominiae (Rom 1, 25-26). Ecce quotiens vindicat Deus et ex eadem vindicta plura et graviora peccata consurgunt: Nam feminae eorum mutaverunt naturalem usum in eum usum qui est contra naturam. Similiter autem etmasculi relicto naturali usu feminae exarserunt in appetitum suum in invicem, masculi in masculos deformitatem operantes (Rom 1, 27). Atque ut ostenderet sic esse ista peccata, ut etiam poenae sint peccatorum, etiam his adiunxit: Et mercedem mutuam, quam oportuit, erroris sui in semetipsis recipientes (Rom 1, 27). Videte quotiens vindicet eademque vindicta quae pariat pulluletque peccata. Adhuc adtendite: Et sicut non probaverunt, inquit, Deum habere in notitia, tradidit illos Deus in reprobam mentem, ut faciant quae non conveniunt, repletos omni iniquitate, cum circumventione, malitia, avaritia, plenos invidia, homicidio, contentione, dolo, malignitate, susurrones, detractores, Deo odibiles, contumeliosos, superbos, elatos, inventores malorum, parentibus non oboedientes, insipientes, incompositos, sine affectu, sine misericordia (Rom 1, 28-31). Hic nunc iste dicat: "Non debuit sic vindicari peccatum, ut peccator per vindictam paura committeret".
Behold how God condemned them more gravely, giving them up in the lusts of their hearts to uncleanness. See also from this punishment what they do: That they should dishonor, he says, their own bodies among themselves (Rom 1:24). And because this is a punishment of iniquity, while it is also iniquity, he more evidently commends it, saying: Who exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen. For this reason, he says, God gave them up to passions of ignominy (Rom 1:25-26). Behold how often God takes vengeance, and from that same vengeance more and graver sins arise: For their women exchanged the natural use for that which is against nature. And likewise the men, giving up the natural use of the woman, were inflamed in their appetite for one another, men with men committing shamelessness (Rom 1:27). And to show that these sins are such that they are also punishments of sins, he added to these too: And receiving in themselves the due recompense of their error (Rom 1:27). See how often he takes vengeance, and that the same vengeance gives birth to and multiplies sins. Attend still further: And as they did not see fit, he says, to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a reprobate mind, to do what is not fitting, filled with all iniquity, with deceit, malice, avarice, full of envy, murder, contention, guile, malignity; gossips, slanderers, hateful to God, insolent, proud, haughty, inventors of evils, disobedient to parents, foolish, disorderly, without affection, without mercy (Rom 1:28-31). Here now let this man say: "Sin ought not to have been so avenged that the sinner through vengeance should commit more sins."
DNeG.1.22.24
Ad peccandum nobis ipsis sufficimus, ad iustitiam vero ut redeamus non item.
We suffice of ourselves for sinning, but not likewise for returning to righteousness.
23. 25. Fortasse respondeat Deum ad ista non cogere, sed dignos deseri tantum deserere. Si hoc dicit, verissime dicit; deserti quippe, ut dixi, luce iustitiae et per hoc contenebrati quid pariant aliud quam haec omnia quae commemoravi opera tenebrarum, donec dicatur eis, si dicto obaudiant: Surge qui dormis et exsurge a mortuis, et illuminabit te Christus (Eph 5, 14)?
23. 25. Perhaps he will answer that God does not compel to these things, but only deserts those who are worthy to be deserted. If he says this, he says most truly; for those deserted, as I said, by the light of righteousness, and thereby darkened, what do they bring forth but all those works of darkness I have mentioned, until it be said to them, if they will obey the word: Rise, you who sleep, and arise from the dead, and Christ will give you light (Eph 5:14)?
DNeG.1.23.25
Mortuos veritas dicit - unde est et illud: Sine mortuos sepelire mortuos suos (Mt 8, 22; Lc 9, 60) -, mortuos ergo veritas dicit, quos iste dicit laedi et vitiari non potuisse peccato, quia videlicet didicit peccatum non esse substantiam.
The Truth calls them dead—whence comes also that saying: Let the dead bury their dead (Matt 8:22; Luke 9:60)—the Truth, then, calls them dead, whom this man says could not have been harmed and corrupted by sin, because, forsooth, he has learned that sin is not a substance.
DNeG.1.23.25
Nemo ei dicit: "sic hominem factum, ut de iustitia quidem posset in peccatum ire et de peccato ad iustitiam redire non posset"; sed ut in peccatum iret, suffecit ei liberam arbitrium, quo se ipse vitiavit; ut autem redeat ad iustitiam, opus habet medico, quoniam sanus non est, opus habet vivificatone, quia mortuus est.
No one says to him: "The human being was so made that he could indeed go from righteousness into sin, but could not return from sin to righteousness"; but to go into sin, free choice sufficed him, by which he corrupted himself; but to return to righteousness, he has need of a physician, since he is not well, he has need of being given life, since he is dead.
DNeG.1.23.25
De qua gratia omnino iste nihil dicit, quasi sola sua voluntate se possit sanare, quia eum potuit sola vitiare. Non ei dicimus "mortem corporis ad peccatum valere", ubi sola vindicta est - nemo enim peccat corpore moriendo -, sed ad peccatum valet mors animae, quam deseruit vita sua, hoc est, Deus eius, quae necesse est mortua opera faciat, donec Christi gratia reviviscat. "Famem et sitim et ceteras molestias corporales, absit ut dicamus, necessitatem habere peccandi", quibus molestiis exercitata vita iustorum splendidius enituit et eas per patientiam superando maiorem gloriam comparavit, sed adiuta gratia Dei, adiuta spiritu Dei, adiuta misericordia Dei, non superba voluntate se extollens, sed humili confessione fortitudinem promerens. Noverat enim Deo dicere: Quoniam tu es patientia mea (Ps 70, 5).
Of this grace this man says nothing at all, as though by his own will alone he could heal himself, because by it alone he could corrupt himself. We do not say to him "that the death of the body avails toward sin," where there is vengeance alone—for no one sins by dying in the body—but toward sin avails the death of the soul, which its life, that is, its God, has deserted; and it must of necessity do dead works until it comes to life again by the grace of Christ. "Hunger and thirst and the other bodily troubles—far be it that we should say" that they "have a necessity of sinning"; by which troubles the life of the righteous, exercised, has shone the more brightly, and by overcoming them through patience has gained a greater glory—but helped by the grace of God, helped by the Spirit of God, helped by the mercy of God, not lifting itself up by a proud will, but earning fortitude by humble confession. For it knew how to say to God: For you are my patience (Ps 71 (70):5).
DNeG.1.23.25
De qua gratia et adiutorio et misericordia, sine qua bene non possumus vivere, nescio quare omnino iste nihil dicit; immo etiam velut sibi ad iustitiam sufficientem, si sola voluntas adsit, defendendo naturam gratiae Christi, qua iustificamur, apertissime contradicit. Cur autem soluto per gratiam peccati reatu ad exercitationem fidei mors corporis maneat, quamvis venerit de peccato, iam et hoc in illis ad sanctae memoriae Marcellinum libris, ut valui, disserui (AUG., De pecc. mer. et rem. 2, 30, 49-34, 56; cf. GIROLAMO, Contra Pelagianos 3, 19).
Of this grace and help and mercy, without which we cannot live well, I do not know why this man says nothing at all; indeed, defending nature as sufficient for itself unto righteousness, if only the will be present, he most openly contradicts the grace of Christ, by which we are justified. But why, when the guilt of sin has been loosed by grace, the death of the body should remain for the exercise of faith, although it came from sin, I have already discussed this too, as I was able, in those books to Marcellinus of holy memory (Aug., De pecc. mer. et rem. 2, 30, 49 - 34, 56; see Jerome, Contra Pelagianos 3, 19).
DNeG.1.23.25
Christus mortuus est sua potestate.
Christ died by his own power.
24. 26. Quod vero "Dominum, dicit, sine peccato mori potuisse", illi etiam nasci potestas misericordiae, non condicio naturae fuit, sic etiam mortuus est potestate et hoc est pretium nostrum, quo nos a morte redimere. Et hoc istorum disputatio evacuare contendit, cum ab eis ita natura humana defenditur, ut possit liberum arbitrium isto pretio non egere, ut a potestate tenebrarum et praepositi mortis in regnum Christi Domini transferantur. Et tamen quando Dominus ad passionem perrexit: Ecce, inquit, veniet princeps huius mundi et in me nihil inveniet (Io 14, 30) - et utique nihil peccati, unde praepositus mortis iure suo ageret, ut perimeret -, sed ut sciant omnes, inquit, quia voluntatem Patris mei facio, surgite, eamus hinc (Io 14, 31), id est, quia non morior necessitate peccati, sed oboedientiae voluntate.
24. 26. But as for what he says, "that the Lord could die without sin," to be born too was for him a power of mercy, not a condition of nature; so likewise he died by power, and this is our price, by which he redeemed us from death. And this the disputation of these men strives to empty, when by them human nature is so defended that free choice can have no need of this price, by which they might be transferred from the power of darkness and of the one set over death into the kingdom of Christ the Lord. And yet when the Lord went on to his passion: Behold, he says, the prince of this world will come, and in me he will find nothing (John 14:30)—surely nothing of sin, on which ground the one set over death might by his own right act to destroy him—but that all may know, he says, that I do the will of my Father, rise, let us go hence (John 14:31), that is, that I die not by the necessity of sin, but by the will of obedience.
DNeG.1.24.26
Etiam mala prosunt misericordia Dei.
Even evils profit by the mercy of God.
24. 27. Dicit "Nullum malum boni alicuius esse causam" quasi poena bonum sit, qua tamen multi emendati sunt; sunt ergo mala quae prosunt mirabili misericordia Dei. Numquid ille boni aliquid passus est, qui dixit: Avertisti faciem tuam a me et factus sum conturbatus (Ps 29, 8)? Non utique; et tamen haec ei conturbatio contra superbiam fuit medicinalis quodammodo. Dixerat enim in abundantia sua: Non movebor in aeternum (Ps 29, 7), et sibi tribuebat quod a Domino habebat.
24. 27. He says, "No evil is the cause of any good," as though punishment were a good, by which nevertheless many have been corrected; there are, then, evils that profit by the wonderful mercy of God. Did that man suffer anything good who said: You turned away your face from me, and I was troubled (Ps 30 (29):7)? Surely not; and yet this trouble was for him, in a certain way, medicinal against pride. For he had said in his abundance: I shall never be moved (Ps 30 (29):6), and was attributing to himself what he had from the Lord.
DNeG.1.24.27
Quid enim habebat quod non acceperat (Cf. 1 Cor 4, 7)? Quare ostendendum ei fuerat unde haberet, ut reciperet humilis, quod superbus amiserat. Ideo: Domine, inquit, in voluntate tua praestitisti decori meo virtutem (Ps 29, 8). In qua ego abundantia mea dicebam: Non movebor (Ps 29, 7), cum hoc mihi esset abs te, non a me. Denique avertisti faciem tuam a me et factus sum conturbatus (Ps 29, 8).
For what had he that he had not received (See 1 Cor 4:7)? Therefore it had to be shown him from whom he had it, that, humbled, he might receive back what, proud, he had lost. Therefore: Lord, he says, by your will you gave strength to my beauty (Ps 30 (29):7). In which abundance of mine I was saying: I shall not be moved (Ps 30 (29):6), when this was mine from you, not from myself. Then: You turned away your face from me, and I was troubled (Ps 30 (29):7).
DNeG.1.24.27
Cum haereticis quibusdam non tam disputationibus quam orationibus agendum est.
With certain heretics one must deal not so much by disputations as by prayers.
25. 28. Hoc superbus animus omnino non sapit; sed magnus est Dominus, quid id persuadeat quomodo ipse novit. Nam procliviores sumus quaerere potius quid contra ea respondeamus, quae nostro obiciuntur errori, quam intendere quam sint salubria, ut careamus errore. Unde cum istis non tam disputationibus quam pro eis sicut pro nobis orationibus est agendum. Non enim hoc eis dicimus, quod sibi iste opposuit, "ut essetcausa misericordiae Dei, necessarium fuisse peccatum" - utinam non fuisset miseria, ne ista esset misericordia necessaria! -, sed iniquitatem peccati tanto graviorem, quanto facilius homo non peccaret, quem nulla adhuc tenebatinfirmitas. Poena iustissima subsecuta est, ut mercedem mutuam peccati sui in semetipso reciperet amittens sub se positam sui corporis quodammodo oboedientiam, quam praecipuam sub Domino suo ipse contempserat. Et quod nunc cum eadem lege peccati nascimur, quae in membris nostris repugnat legi mentis (Rom 7, 23), neque adversus Deum murmurare neque contra rem manifestissimam disputare, sed pro poena nostra illius misericordiam quaerere et orare debemus.
25. 28. A proud mind has no taste for this at all; but the Lord is great, who in his own way persuades of it. For we are more prone to seek what we may answer against the things that are objected to our error than to attend to how healthful they are, that we may be free of error. Hence with these men one must deal not so much by disputations as by prayers for them, as for ourselves. For we do not say to them what this man set against himself, "that, in order that there be an occasion for the mercy of God, sin was necessary"—would that there had been no misery, so that this mercy were not necessary!—but that the iniquity of sin is the graver, the more easily the human being might not have sinned, whom as yet no weakness held back. A most just punishment followed, that he should receive in himself the due recompense of his sin, losing the obedience, set as it were under him, of his own body, which preeminent obedience, set under his Lord, he himself had despised. And as for the fact that we are now born with that same law of sin, which fights in our members against the law of the mind (Rom 7:23), we ought neither to murmur against God nor to dispute against a most manifest matter, but to seek his mercy for our punishment and to pray.
DNeG.1.25.28
Dei gratia faciendo operi bono necessaria est.
The grace of God is necessary for doing a good work.
26. 29. Adtendite sane vigilanter quomodo dixerit: "Adhibet quidem etiam huic parti, si quando necessarium fuerit, misericordiam suam Deus, quia homini post peccatum ita subvenire necesse est, non quia Deus causam huius necessitatis optaverit". Videtisne quemadmodum non dicat necessariam misericordiam Dei ut non peccemus, sed quia peccavimus? Deinde subiungit: "Sed et medicus ad curandum iam vulneratum paratus esse debet; non debet autem ut sanus vulneretur optare". Si ista similitudo rebus de quibus agimus congruit, certe vulnerari non potest natura humana peccato, quoniam peccatum nulla substantia est. Sicut ergo vulnere, verbi gratia, claudicans ideo curatur, ut sanato malo praeterito futurus dirigatur incessus; sic mala nostra non ad hoc solum supernus medicus sanat, ut illa iam non sint, sed ut de cetero recte ambulare possimus; quod quidem etiam sani non nisi illo adiuvante poterimus.
26. 29. Attend carefully and watchfully to how he has said: "God indeed brings his mercy to this part too, whenever it is necessary, because it is necessary so to help the human being after sin, not because God desired the cause of this necessity." Do you see how he says that the mercy of God is necessary not that we may not sin, but because we have sinned? Then he adds: "But the physician too ought to be ready to cure one already wounded; yet he ought not to desire that one who is well should be wounded." If this comparison fits the matters of which we are treating, surely human nature cannot be wounded by sin, since sin is no substance. As, then, one limping from a wound, for example, is cured for this end, that, the past evil being healed, his future walking may be set straight, so the heavenly physician heals our evils not only that they should no longer be, but that for the rest we may be able to walk rightly; which indeed even when well we shall be able to do only by his help.
DNeG.1.26.29
Nam medicus homo cum sanaverit hominem, iam de cetero sustentandum elementis et alimentis corporalibus, ut eadem sanitas apto subsidio convalescat atque persistat, Deo dimittit, qui praebet ista in carne viventibus, cuius erant etiam illa quae, dum curaret, adhibebat. Non enim quemquam medicus ex his rebus, quas, ipse creaverit, sanat, sed ex illius opibus, qui creat omnia necessaria sanis atque vitiosis. Ipse autem Deus, cum per mediatorem Dei et hominum hominem Christum Iesum (Cf. 1 Tim 2, 5) spiritaliter sanat aegrum vel vivificat mortuum, id est, iustificat impium (Cf. Rom 4, 5), et cum ad perfectam sanitatem, hoc est, ad perfectam vitam iustitiamque perduxerit, non deserit, si non deseratur, ut pie semper iusteque vivatur.
For a human physician, when he has healed a human being, leaves him thereafter to God to be sustained by the bodily elements and nourishments, that the same health may grow strong and persist by fitting support—God, who furnishes these things to those living in the flesh, whose also were the very things that the physician applied while curing. For a physician heals no one from those things which he himself created, but from the resources of him who creates all things necessary for the well and the diseased. But God himself, when through the mediator of God and human beings, the man Christ Jesus (See 1 Tim 2:5), he spiritually heals the sick or gives life to the dead, that is, justifies the ungodly (See Rom 4:5), and when he has brought him to perfect health, that is, to perfect life and righteousness, he does not desert him, if he is not deserted, that one may always live piously and righteously.
DNeG.1.26.29
Sicut enim oculus corporis etiam plenissime sanus nisi candore lucis adiutus non potest cernere, sic homo etiam perfectissime iustificatus, nisi aeterna luce iustitiae divinitus adiuvetur, recte non potest vivere. Sanat ergo Deus non solum ut deleat quod peccavimus, sed ut praestet etiam ne peccemus.
For as the eye of the body, even when most fully sound, cannot see unless helped by the brightness of light, so a human being, even most perfectly justified, cannot live rightly unless he is divinely helped by the eternal light of righteousness. God, then, heals not only to wipe out what we have sinned, but also to grant that we may not sin.
DNeG.1.26.29
Peccato peccatum tollitur.
Sin is taken away by sin.
27. 30. Acute sane tractat et versat et, quantum sibi videtur, redarguitatque convincit quod eis dicitur "etiam necessarium fuisse homini ad auferendam superbiae vel gloriae occasionem, ut absque peccato esse non posset. Absurdissimum quippe et stultissimum putat, peccatum fuisse ne peccatum esset, quoniam et ipsa superbia utique peccatum est"; quasi non et ulcus in dolore est et sectio dolorem operatur, ut dolor dolore tollatur. Hoc si experti non essemus et in aliquibus terris, ubi ista numquam contigerant, audiremus, sine dubio utique deridentes fortassis etiam verbis huius uteremur et diceremus: "Absurdissimum est dolorem necessarium fuisse, ne ulceris dolor esset".
27. 30. He treats and turns the matter cleverly indeed, and, as it seems to him, refutes and convicts what is said to them, "that it was even necessary for the human being, in order to take away the occasion of pride or vainglory, that he should not be able to be without sin. For he thinks it most absurd and most foolish that there should be a sin lest there be a sin, since pride too is surely a sin"—as though both a sore is in pain, and the cutting works pain, that pain may be taken away by pain. If we had not experienced this, and in some lands where these things had never happened we were to hear of it, without doubt, deriding, we would perhaps use even this man's words and say: "It is most absurd that pain should be necessary lest there be the pain of a sore."
DNeG.1.27.30
Superbia est peccatum pericolosissimum.
Pride is the most dangerous sin.
27. 31. "Sed Deus, inquiunt, potest omnia sanare". Hoc utique agit, ut sanet omnia, sed agit iudicio suo nec ordinem sanandi accipit ab aegroto. Procul dubio quippe firmissimum Apostolum volebat efficere, cui tamen dicit: Virtus in infirmitate perficitur (2 Cor 12, 9), et non ei totiens oranti aufert nescio quem stimulum carnis, quem sibi dicit datum, ne in magnitudine revelationum extolleretur (Cf. 2 Cor 12, 7-8). Cetera enim vitia tantum in male factis valent, sola autem superbia etiam in recte factis cavenda est.
27. 31. "But God," they say, "can heal all things." This indeed he does, that he may heal all things; but he does it by his own judgment, nor does he receive the order of healing from the sick one. For without doubt he wished to make the Apostle most firm, to whom nevertheless he says: Power is made perfect in weakness (2 Cor 12:9), and he does not take from him, though he prayed so often, some sting of the flesh, which he says was given him lest he be exalted in the greatness of the revelations (See 2 Cor 12:7-8). For the other vices avail only in evil deeds, but pride alone is to be guarded against even in deeds rightly done.
DNeG.1.27.31
Unde ammonentur illi, ne dona Dei suae potestati tribuendo seseque extollendo gravius pereant quam si nihil operarentur boni, quibus dicitur: Cum timore et tremore vestram ipsorum salutem operamini: Deus enim est qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate (Phil 2, 12-13). Quare ergo cum timore et tremore et non potius cum securitate, si Deus operatur, nisi quia propter voluntatem nostram, sine qua bene non possumus operari, cito potest subrepere animo humano, ut quod bene operatur suum tantummodo existimet et dicat in abundantia sua: Non movebor in aeternum (Ps 29, 7)? Ideo qui voluntate sua praestiterat decori eius virtutem, avertit paululum faciem suam, ut qui hoc dixerat fieret conturbatus (Cf. Ps 29, 8), quoniam ipse est ille tumor sanandus doloribus.
Hence they are admonished, lest by attributing the gifts of God to their own power and exalting themselves they perish more grievously than if they had done no good, to whom it is said: Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who works in you both to will and to work according to good will (Phil 2:12-13). Why, then, with fear and trembling, and not rather with security, if God works, except that, on account of our will, without which we cannot work well, it can quickly steal upon the human mind to think that what one works well is one's own alone, and to say in one's abundance: I shall never be moved (Ps 30 (29):6)? Therefore he who by his will had given strength to his beauty turns away his face for a little while, so that he who had said this should be troubled (See Ps 30 (29):7), since it is that very swelling that must be healed by pains.
DNeG.1.27.31
Deserit aliquantum Deus unde superbimus, ne superbiamus.
God deserts for a little while that wherein we are proud, lest we be proud.
28. 32. Non itaque dicitur homini: "Necesse est peccare, ne pecces", sed dicitur homini: "Deserit aliquantum Deus, unde superbis, ut scias non tuum, sed eius esse et discas superbus non esse". Nam illud etiam Apostoli quale est! nonne ita mirabile, ut nisi quia ipse dicit, cui vera dicenti contradicere nefas est, non sit credibile?
28. 32. It is not, then, said to a human being: "It is necessary to sin, lest you sin"; but it is said to a human being: "God deserts for a little while that wherein you are proud, that you may know it to be not yours, but his, and may learn not to be proud." For that saying of the Apostle, too, what is it like! Is it not so wonderful that, were it not that he himself says it, to whom, speaking the truth, it is wicked to contradict, it would not be credible?
DNeG.1.28.32
Quis enim nesciat fidelium a satana venisse primam peccati suasionem (Cf. Gen 3, 1-6) et quod ille primus auctor sit omnium peccatorum? Et tamen quidam traduntur satanae, ut discant non blasphemare (Cf. 1 Tim 1, 20).
For who among the faithful does not know that the first persuasion to sin came from Satan (See Gen 3:1-6), and that he is the first author of all sins? And yet certain ones are handed over to Satan, that they may learn not to blaspheme (See 1 Tim 1:20).
DNeG.1.28.32
Quomodo igitur opus satanae excluditur opere satanae? Haec atque huiusmodi intueatur, ne videantur ei nimis acuta, quae acutule sonant et discussa inveniuntur obtunsa. Quid quod etiam similitudines adhibet, quibus magis ammoneat quid ei debeat responderi? "Quid amplius dicam, inquit, nisi quia credi potest quod ignes ignibus exstinguuntur, si credi potest quod peccatis peccata curentur?". Quid si ignes quisquam exstinguere non potest ignibus, sed tamenpossunt, ut docui, dolores curari doloribus? Possunt etiam, si quaerat et discat, venenis venena depelli. Nam si et advertit aliquando calores febrium quibusdam caloribus medicinalibus frangi, etiam ignes ignibus fortasse concedet exstingui.
How, then, is the work of Satan excluded by the work of Satan? Let him consider these and like things, lest those things seem to him too clever which sound subtle and, when examined, are found blunt. What of the fact that he even brings forward comparisons, by which he the more admonishes us what should be answered him? "What more shall I say," he says, "except that it can be believed that fires are extinguished by fires, if it can be believed that sins are cured by sins?" What if one cannot extinguish fires by fires, but yet pains can, as I have taught, be cured by pains? Poisons too, if he seeks and learns, can be driven out by poisons. For if he notices that sometimes the heats of fevers are broken by certain medicinal heats, perhaps he will grant that fires too can be extinguished by fires.
DNeG.1.28.32
Quomodo superbia initium est omnis peccati.
How pride is the beginning of all sin.
29. 33. "Quonam modo, inquit, superbiam ipsam a peccato separabimus?". Quid enim hoc urget, cum manifestum sit etiam ipsam esse peccatum? "Tam peccare, inquit, superbire est quam superbire peccare. Nam quaere quid sit quodcumque, peccatum et vide, si invenies aliquod sine superbiae appellatione peccatum". Hanc autem sententiam sic exsequitur et sic probare conatur: "Omne, inquit, peccatum, nisi fallor, Dei contemptus est et omnis Dei contemptus superbia est. Quid enim tam superbum quam Deum contemnere? Omne ergo peccatum et superbia est etiam Scriptura dicente: Initium omnis peccati superbia est (Eccli 10, 15)". Quaerat diligenter, et inveniet in lego multum discretum esse a ceteris peccatis peccatum superbiae. Multa enim peccata per superbiam committuntur, sed neque omnia superbe fiunt, quae perperam fiunt - certe a nescientibus, certe ab infirmis, certe plerumque a flentibus et gementibus - et quidem superbia, cum magnum sit ipsa peccatum, ita sine aliis per se ipsa est, ut etiam plerumque, ut dixi (Cf. sopra, 27, 31), non in peccatis, sed in ipsis recte factis pede celeriore superveniat et obrepat. Sed ideo verissime dictum est, quod iste aliter intellexit: Initium omnis peccati superbia (Eccli 10, 15), quoniam diabolum, a quo exstitit origo peccati, ipsa deiecit et subsequente invidentia hominem stantem unde ipse cecidit inde subvertit. Nam utique iactantiae ianuam, qua intraret, serpens ille quaesivit, quando ait: Eritis sicut dii (Gen 3, 5). Ideo dictum est: Initium omnis peccati superbia; et: Initium superbiae hominis apostatare a Deo (Eccli 10, 14-15).
29. 33. "In what way," he says, "shall we separate pride itself from sin?" But why does this press him, when it is manifest that it too is a sin? "To sin," he says, "is as much to be proud as to be proud is to sin. For seek what any sin whatever may be, and see whether you will find any sin without the name of pride." And he pursues this opinion thus, and thus tries to prove it: "Every sin," he says, "unless I am mistaken, is a contempt of God, and every contempt of God is pride. For what is so proud as to despise God? Therefore every sin is also pride, as Scripture too says: The beginning of all sin is pride (Sir 10:13 (10:15))." Let him seek diligently, and he will find in the law that the sin of pride is much distinguished from other sins. For many sins are committed through pride, but not all things that are done wrongly are done proudly—certainly not by the ignorant, certainly not by the weak, certainly often by those weeping and groaning—and indeed pride, though it is itself a great sin, is so by itself without others that even, as I have said (See above, 27, 31), very often it comes upon and creeps in, with a swifter foot, not amid sins but amid the very things rightly done. But for this reason it was most truly said, which this man understood otherwise: The beginning of all sin is pride (Sir 10:13), since pride cast down the devil, from whom the origin of sin arose, and, envy following, it subverted the human being, standing, from the place from which the devil himself had fallen. For surely that serpent sought the door of boasting by which to enter, when he said: You will be like gods (Gen 3:5). Therefore it was said: The beginning of all sin is pride; and: The beginning of human pride is to apostatize from God (Sir 10:12-13 (10:14-15)).
DNeG.1.29.33
Quomodo suum est hominis peccatum, licet gratia indigeat ut sanetur eius infirmitas.
How sin is the human being's own, although he needs grace that his weakness may be healed.
30. 34. Quid autem sibi vult quod dicit: "Deinde quomodo Deo pro illius peccati reatu subditus esse poterit, quod suum non esse cognoverit? Suum enim non est, inquit, si necessarium est. Aut si suum est, voluntarium est; et si voluntarium est, vitari potest". Nos respondemus: "Suum est omnino, sed vitium quo committitur nondum omni ex parte sanatum est; quod quidem ut inolesceret, de non recte usa sanitate descendit; ex quo vitio iam male valens vel infirmitate vel caecitate plura committit pro quo supplicandum est, ut sanetur et deinceps in perpetua sanitate vivatur, non superbiendum, quasi homo eadem potestate sanetur qua potestate vitiatus est".
30. 34. But what does he mean by saying: "Then how will he be able to be subject to God for the guilt of that sin which he has come to know is not his own? For it is not his own," he says, "if it is necessary. Or if it is his own, it is voluntary; and if it is voluntary, it can be avoided." We answer: "It is altogether his own; but the fault by which it is committed has not yet been wholly healed in every part; which fault indeed, that it might grow ingrained, came down from health not rightly used. From this fault, already ailing through either weakness or blindness, he commits more, for which entreaty must be made, that he may be healed and thereafter live in perpetual health—not be proud, as though the human being is healed by the same power by which he was corrupted."
DNeG.1.30.34
Superbiam ipsam cur Deus non cito sanet.
Why God does not quickly heal pride itself.
31. 35. Et haec quidem ita dixerim, ut altius Dei consilium me fatear ignorare cur etiam ipsam superbiam, quae et in recte factis animo insidiatur humano, non cito Deus sanet; pro qua sananda illi piae animae cumlacrimis et magnis gemitibus supplicant, ut ad eam superandam et quodammodo calcandam et obterendam dexteram conantibus porrigat. Ubi enim laetatus homo fuerit in aliquo bono opere se etiam superasse superbiam, ex ipsa laetitia caput erigit, et dicit: "Ecce ego vivo, quid triumphas? Et ideo vivo, quia triumphas".
31. 35. And this indeed I have said in such a way that I confess I am ignorant of the deeper counsel of God, why he does not quickly heal even pride itself, which lies in wait for the human mind even in deeds rightly done; for the healing of which those pious souls supplicate him with tears and great groanings, that to those striving to overcome it and in a manner to trample it down and crush it he may stretch out his right hand. For when a human being has rejoiced that in some good work he has overcome pride too, from that very joy it lifts its head and says: "Behold, I live; why do you triumph? And I live for this reason, because you triumph."
DNeG.1.31.35
Ante tempus enim fortasse de illa quasi victa triumphare delectat, cum extrema eius umbra illo meridie, quantum arbitror, absorbebitur, qui meridies Scriptura dicente promittitur: Et educet sicut lumen iustitiam tuam et iudicium tuum sicut meridiem (Ps 36, 6); si fiat quod supra scriptum est: Revela ad Dominum viam tuam et spera in eum, et ipse faciet (Ps 36, 5), non, sicut quidam putant, quod ipsi faciant. Nullos enim videtur adtendisse, cum dixit: Et ipse faciet, nisi eos qui dicunt: Nos facimus, id est, nos ipsi nos ipsos iustificamus.
For perhaps it delights him to triumph over it as though conquered before the time, when its last shadow will, at that noonday—as I judge—be absorbed, which noonday Scripture promises, saying: And he will bring forth your righteousness like the light, and your judgment like the noonday (Ps 37 (36):6); if that be done which is written above: Reveal your way to the Lord, and hope in him, and he himself will do it (Ps 37 (36):5)—not, as certain people think, that they themselves do it. For he seems to have attended to none, when he said: And he himself will do it, except those who say: We do it, that is, we ourselves justify ourselves.
DNeG.1.31.35
Ubi quidem operamur et nos, sed illo operante cooperamur, quia misericordia eius praevenit nos (Cf. Ps 58, 11). Praevenit autem, ut sanemur, quia et subsequetur ut etiam sanati vegetemur; praevenit, ut vocemur, subsequetur ut glorificemur; praevenit, ut pie vivamus, subsequetur ut cum illo semper vivamus, quia sine illo nihil facere possumus (Cf. Io 15, 5). Utrumque enim scriptum est et: Deus meus, misericordia eius praeveniet me (Ps 58, 11); et: Misericordia tua subsequetur me per omnes dies vitae meae (Ps 22, 6). Revelemus ergo ad eum viam nostram (Cf. Ps 36, 5) confessione, non defensione laudemus. Si enim non est ipsius via, sed nostra, procul dubio non est recta. Revelemus eam confitendo, quia non eum latet, etiamsi operire conemur. Bonum est autem confiteri Domino (Ps 91, 2).
Where indeed we too work, but, with him working, we cooperate, because his mercy goes before us (See Ps 59 (58):11). It goes before, that we may be healed, because it will also follow, that even when healed we may be strengthened; it goes before, that we may be called, it will follow, that we may be glorified; it goes before, that we may live piously, it will follow, that we may live with him forever, since without him we can do nothing (See John 15:5). For both are written: My God, his mercy will go before me (Ps 59 (58):11); and: Your mercy will follow me all the days of my life (Ps 23 (22):6). Let us, then, reveal our way to him (See Ps 37 (36):5) by confession, let us praise it not by defense. For if it is not his way, but our own, beyond doubt it is not straight. Let us reveal it by confessing, since it is not hidden from him, even if we try to cover it. But it is good to confess to the Lord (Ps 92 (91):1).
DNeG.1.31.35
Superbia etiam in recte factis cavenda est.
Pride is to be guarded against even in deeds rightly done.
32. 36. Ita enim quod ei placet dabit nobis, si quod ei displicet in nobis, displiceat et nobis. Avertet, sicut scriptum est, semitas nostras a via sua et nostram faciet esse quae sua est (Cf. Ps 43, 19), quoniam ab ipso praebetur credentibus in eum et sperantibus in eum ut ipse faciat (Cf. Ps 36, 5). Ipsa est enim via iusta, quam ignorantes qui zelum Dei habent, sed non secundum scientiam, et suam volentes constituere iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti. Finis enim legis Christus ad iustitiam omni credenti (Rom 10, 2-4), qui dixit: Ego sum via (Io 14, 6). In qua iam ambulantes tamen terruit vox divina, ne quasi de propriis in ea viribus extollantur. Nam quibus propter hoc ait Apostolus: Cum timore et tremore vestram ipsorum salutem operamini; Deus enim est qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate (Phil 2, 12-13); eis propter hoc ipsum dicit etiam psalmus: Servite Domino in timore et exsultate ei cum tremore. Adprehendite disciplinam, ne quando irascatur Dominus et pereatis de via iusta, cum exarserit in brevi, ira eius super vos (Ps 2, 11-13).
32. 36. For thus he will give us what pleases him, if what displeases him in us displeases us too. He will turn aside, as it is written, our paths from his way, and will make to be ours what is his (See Ps 44 (43):19), since it is furnished by him to those who believe in him and hope in him that he himself may do it (See Ps 37 (36):5). For this is the righteous way, which they, being ignorant of, who have a zeal for God, but not enlightened, and wishing to establish their own, did not submit to the righteousness of God. For Christ is the end of the law, that everyone who has faith may be justified (Rom 10:2-4), who said: I am the way (John 14:6). Yet those already walking in it the divine voice has terrified, lest they exalt themselves as though by their own strength in it. For to those to whom, on this account, the Apostle says: Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who works in you both to will and to work according to good will (Phil 2:12-13), to them, on account of this very thing, the psalm too says: Serve the Lord in fear, and rejoice in him with trembling. Lay hold of instruction, lest at any time the Lord be angry and you perish from the righteous way, when his wrath blazes up in a short while upon you (Ps 2:11-13).
DNeG.1.32.36
Non ait "Ne quando irascatur Dominus", et non "vobis ostendat viam iustam"aut "non vos introducat in viam iustam", sed iam illic ambulantes sic terrere potuit, ut diceret: Ne pereatis de via iusta (Ps 2, 12). Unde, nisi quia superbia, quod totiens dixi et saepe dicendum est, etiam in ipsis recte factis cavenda est, id est, in ipsa via iusta, ne homo, dum quod Dei est deputat suum, amittat quod Dei est et redeat ad suum?
He did not say "Lest at any time the Lord be angry" and not "show you the righteous way" or "not bring you into the righteous way," but he was able so to terrify those already walking there that he said: Lest you perish from the righteous way (Ps 2:12). Whence, except that pride—which, as I have so often said and must often say, is to be guarded against even in the very deeds rightly done, that is, in the very righteous way—lest a human being, while he reckons what is God's to be his own, lose what is God's and return to his own?
DNeG.1.32.36
Ideo quo psalmus ipse concluditur faciamus: Beati omnes qui confidunt in eum (Ps 2, 13), utique ut ipse faciat, ipse ostendat viam suam, cui dicitur: Ostende nobis, Domine, misericordiam tuam (Ps 84, 8); ipse det salutem, ut ambulare possimus, cui dicitur: Et salutare tuum, Domine, da nobis (Ps 84, 8); ipse in eadem via deducat, cui dicitur: Deduc me, Domine, in via tua et ambulabo in veritate tua (Ps 85, 11); ipse ad illa, quo via ducit, promissa perducat, cui dicitur: Etenim illuc manus tua deducet me et perducet me dextera tua (Ps 138, 10);
Therefore let us do that with which the psalm itself concludes: Blessed are all who trust in him (Ps 2:13), surely that he himself may do it, he himself may show his way, he to whom it is said: Show us, Lord, your mercy (Ps 85 (84):7); he himself may give salvation, that we may be able to walk, he to whom it is said: And your salvation, Lord, give to us (Ps 85 (84):7); he himself may lead us in the same way, he to whom it is said: Lead me, Lord, in your way, and I will walk in your truth (Ps 86 (85):11); he himself may bring us through to those promised things to which the way leads, he to whom it is said: For even there your hand will lead me, and your right hand will bring me through (Ps 139 (138):10);
DNeG.1.32.36
ipse ibi pascat recumbentes cum Abraham, Isaac et Iacob, de quo dictum est: Faciet eos recumbere et transibit et ministrabit eis (Lc 12, 37). Non enim, cum ista commemoramus, arbitrium voluntatis tollimus, sed Dei gratiam praedicamus. Cui enim prosunt ista nisi volenti, sed humiliter volenti, non se de voluntatis viribus, tamquam ad perfectionem iustitiae sola sufficiat, extollenti?
he himself may there feed those reclining with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, of whom it is said: He will make them recline, and he will pass by and minister to them (Luke 12:37). For in mentioning these things we do not take away the choice of the will, but we proclaim the grace of God. For to whom do these things profit except to one willing, but humbly willing, not exalting himself by the strength of his will, as though it alone sufficed for the perfection of righteousness?
DNeG.1.32.36
Esse sine ullo omnino peccato non aequat hominem Deo.
To be without any sin at all does not make the human being equal to God.
33. 37. Absit autem ut ei dicamus, quod a quibusdam contra se dici ait, "comparari hominem Deo, si absque peccato esse asseratur" (Cf. GIROLAMO, Ep. 133, 8); quasi vero angelus, quia absque peccato est, comparetur Deo. Ego quidem hoc sentio, quia etiam cum fuerit in nobis tanta iustitia, ut ei addi omnino nihil possit, non aequabitur creatura Creatori. Si autem aliqui putant tantum nostrum futurum esse provectum, ut in Dei substantiam convertamur et hoc efficiamur prorsus quod ille est, viderint quemadmodum astruant sententiam suam; mihi hoc fateor non esse persuasum.
33. 37. But far be it that we should say to him what he says is said against him by certain people, "that a human being is compared to God, if he is asserted to be without sin" (See Jerome, Ep. 133, 8)—as though indeed an angel, because he is without sin, were compared to God. For my part I hold this: that even when there shall be in us so great a righteousness that nothing at all can be added to it, the creature will not be made equal to the Creator. But if some think that our advancement will be so great that we are turned into the substance of God and become outright what he is, let them see how they would prop up their opinion; for myself, I confess I am not persuaded of this.
DNeG.1.33.37
Laus humilitatis non est ponenda in parte falsitatis.
The praise of humility is not to be placed on the side of falsehood.
34. 38. Iam sane hoc multum faveo libri huius auctori, quod adversus eos qui dicunt: "Rationabile quidem videtur esse quod asseris, sed superbum est dici hominem absque peccato esse posse"; ita respondet, ut omnino, si verum est, nullo modo superbum esse dicendum est. Ait enim acutissime atque verissime: "In qua magis parte humilitas collocando est? sine dubio falsitatis, si in ea quae veritatis probatur esse superbia est". Ac per hoc placet illi, et recte placet, ut in parte veritatis, non in parte falsitatis magis humilitas collocetur. Ex quo est consequens, ut ille, qui dixit: Si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipimus et veritas in nobis non est (1 Io 1, 8); verum dixisse minime dubitetur, ne causa humilitatis hoc falsum dixisse videatur. Propterea enim addidit: Et veritas in nobis non est, cum forte sufficeret dicere: Nos ipsos decipimus, nisi adtenderet quosdam putare posse ideo dictum "nos ipsos decipimus", quia etiam de vero bono qui se laudat extollitur. Addendo itaque "Et veritas in nobis non est" manifeste ostendit, sicut etiam huic rectissime placet, hoc omnino verum non esse: Si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, ne humilitas constituta in parte falsitatis perdat praemium veritatis.
34. 38. Now indeed I much favor the author of this book in that, against those who say: "What you assert seems reasonable indeed, but it is proud to say that a human being can be without sin," he answers in such a way that, altogether, if it is true, it is in no way to be called proud. For he says most cleverly and most truly: "On which side should humility rather be placed? Without doubt on the side of falsehood, if on the side that is proved to be of truth there is pride." And on this account it pleases him, and rightly pleases him, that humility should rather be placed on the side of truth, not on the side of falsehood. From which it follows that he who said: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us (1 John 1:8), should least of all be doubted to have spoken truly, lest for the sake of humility he should seem to have said this falsely. For he added: And the truth is not in us, when perhaps it would have sufficed to say: We deceive ourselves, had he not attended to the fact that some could think it was said "we deceive ourselves" because one who praises himself even for a true good is exalted. By adding, then: And the truth is not in us, he manifestly showed—as this man too most rightly judges—that this is altogether untrue: If we say that we have no sin, lest humility, placed on the side of falsehood, lose the reward of truth.
DNeG.1.34.38
Ipse est Creator qui Salvator.
The same one is Creator who is Savior.
34. 39. Porro autem quod Dei causam sibi agere videtur defendendo naturam, non adtendit, quod eamdem naturam sanam esse dicendo medici reperit misericordiam. Ipse est autem Creator eius qui Salvator eius. Non ergo debemus sic laudare Creatorem, ut cogamur, immo vere convincamur dicere superfluum Salvatorem. Naturam itaque hominis dignis laudibus honoremus easque laudes ad Creatoris gloriam referamus; sed quia nos creavit, ita simus grati, ut non simus, quia sanat, ingrati. Vitia sane nostra, quae sanat, non divino operi, sed humanae voluntati iustaeque illius vindictae tribuamus; sed ut in nostra potestate fuisse ne acciderent confitemur, ita ut sanentur in illius magis esse misericordia quam in nostra potestate fateamur. Hanc iste misericordiam et medicinale Salvatoris auxilium tantum in hoc ponit, "ut ignoscat commissa praeterita, non ut adiuvet ad futura vitanda". Hic perniciosissime fallitur; hic etsi nesciens prohibet nos vigilare et orare ne intremus in temptationem (Cf. Mc 14, 38), cum hoc ne nobis accidat, in nostra tantum potestate esse contendit.
34. 39. But further, in that he seems to himself to plead the cause of God by defending nature, he does not attend to the fact that, by saying that this same nature is sound, he removes the mercy of the physician. But the same one is its Creator who is its Savior. We ought not, then, so to praise the Creator that we are compelled—indeed truly convicted—to call the Savior superfluous. Let us therefore honor the nature of the human being with worthy praises, and refer those praises to the glory of the Creator; but, just as we are grateful because he created us, so let us not be ungrateful because he heals us. Our faults indeed, which he heals, let us attribute not to the divine work, but to the human will and to his just vengeance; but, as we confess that it was in our power that they should not have happened, so let us confess that for them to be healed lies in his mercy rather than in our power. This mercy and medicinal help of the Savior this man places only in this, "that he forgives past misdeeds, not that he helps toward avoiding future ones." Here he is most perniciously deceived; here, though unknowingly, he forbids us to watch and pray that we enter not into temptation (See Mark 14:38), when he contends that for this not to befall us is in our power alone.
DNeG.1.34.39
Nec desperatio non peccandi nec peccandi securitas.
Neither despair of not sinning nor security in sinning.
35. 40. "Quorumdam" sane "exempla, quos peccasse legimus", non "ideo scripta" dicit, qui sanum sapit, "ut ad desperationem non peccandi valeant et securitatem peccandi nobis quodammodo praebere videantur", sed ut disceremus vel paenitendi humilitatem vel etiam in talibus lapsibus non desperandam salutem. Quidam enim in peccata prolapsi desperatione plus pereunt nec solum paenitendi neglegunt medicinam, sed ad explenda inhonesta et nefaria desideria servi libidinum et sceleratarum cupiditatum fiunt; quasi perdant, si non fecerint quod instigat libido, cum eos iam mancat certa damnatio. Adversus hunc morbum nimium periculosum et exitiabilem valet commemoratio peccatorum etiam in quae iusti sanctique prolapsi sunt.
35. 40. Indeed, the "examples of certain ones whom we read to have sinned" were not, he says—whoever is soundly wise—"written for this, that they should avail toward a despair of not sinning and seem in a manner to offer us a security of sinning," but that we might learn either the humility of repentance or, even in such falls, that salvation is not to be despaired of. For some, fallen into sins, perish the more through despair, and not only neglect the medicine of repentance, but, to fulfill base and wicked desires, become slaves of lusts and criminal cupidities; as though they would lose something if they did not do what lust instigates, when a certain condemnation already remains for them. Against this too dangerous and deadly disease the recollection of the sins into which even the righteous and holy have fallen avails.
DNeG.1.35.40
Vivere sine peccato, mori sine peccato.
To live without sin, to die without sin.
35. 41. Sed acute videtur interrogare, "Quomodo istos sanctos de hac vita abisse credendum sit, cum peccato an sine peccato", ut,si responsum fuerit "cum peccato", putetur eos secuta damnatio, quod nefas est credere; si autem sine peccato dictum fuerit eosexisse de hac vita, probet hominem saltem propinquante morte fuisse sine peccato in hac vita. Ubi parum adtendit, cum sit acutissimus, non frustra etiam iustos in oratione dicere: Dimitte nobis debita nostra sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris (Mt 6, 12). Dominumque Christum, cum eamdem orationem docendo explicuisset, veracissime subdidisse: Si enim dimiseritis peccata hominibus, dimittet vobis Pater vester peccata vestra (Mt 6, 14). Per hoc enim cotidianum spiritale quodammodo incensum, quod ante Deum in altare cordis, quod sursum habere admonemur, infertur, etiamsi non hic vivatur sine peccato, licet mori sine peccato, dum subinde venia deletur, quod subinde ignorantia vel infirmitate committitur.
35. 41. But he seems to ask cleverly, "How are we to believe that these saints departed from this life—with sin or without sin?" so that, if it be answered "with sin," they may be thought to have been followed by condemnation, which it is wicked to believe; but if it be said that they departed from this life without sin, he may prove that a human being was at least, with death drawing near, without sin in this life. Here he too little attends, sharp as he is, that not in vain do even the righteous say in prayer: Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors (Matt 6:12). And that the Lord Christ, when he had unfolded this same prayer in teaching it, most truthfully added: For if you forgive the sins of human beings, your Father will also forgive your sins (Matt 6:14). For through this daily, spiritual, as it were, incense, which is offered before God upon the altar of the heart, which we are admonished to have on high, even if one does not live here without sin, yet one may die without sin, while again and again that is wiped away by pardon which again and again is committed through ignorance or weakness.
DNeG.1.35.41
Quaestio de peccato et sancta Virgo Maria.
The question of sin and the holy Virgin Mary.
36. 42. Deinde commemorat eos, "qui non modo non peccasse, verum etiam iuste vixisse referuntur: Abel, Enoch, Melchisedech, Abraham, Isaac, Iacob, Ioseph, Iesu Nave, Phinees, Samuel, Nathan, Elias, Heliseus, Micheas, Daniel, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Ezechiel, Mardocheus, Simeon, Ioseph, cui desponsata erat virgo Maria, Ioannes". Adiungit etiam feminas: "Debboram, Annam Samuelis matrem, Iudith, Ester, alteram Annam filiam Phanuel, Elisabeth, ipsam etiam Domini ac Salvatoris nostri matrem, quam" dicit, "sine peccato confiteri necesse esse pietati".
36. 42. Then he mentions those "who are reported not only not to have sinned, but even to have lived righteously: Abel, Enoch, Melchizedek, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Joshua son of Nun, Phinehas, Samuel, Nathan, Elijah, Elisha, Micaiah, Daniel, Hananiah, Azariah, Mishael, Ezekiel, Mordecai, Simeon, Joseph to whom the virgin Mary was betrothed, John." He adds also women: "Deborah, Hannah the mother of Samuel, Judith, Esther, the other Anna daughter of Phanuel, Elizabeth, and also the very mother of our Lord and Savior, whom," he says, "piety requires us to confess to be without sin."
DNeG.1.36.42
Excepta itaque sancta virgine Maria, de qua propter honorem Domini nullam prorsus,cum de peccatis agitur, haberi volo quaestionem - unde enim scimus quid ei plus gratiae collatum fuerit ad vincendum omni ex parte peccatum, quae concipere ac parere meruit, quem constat nullum habuisse peccatum? -, hac ergo Virgine excepta, si omnes illos sanctos et sanctas, cum hic viverent, congregare possemus et interrogare, utrum essent sine peccato, quid fuisse responsuros putamus? utrum hoc quod iste dicit, an quod Ioannes apostolus, rogo vos. Quantalibet fuerint in hoc corpore excellentia sanctitatis, si hoc interrogari potuissent, una voce clamassent: Si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipimus et veritas in nobis non est (1 Io 1, 8). An id humilius responderent fortasse quam verius? Sed huic iam placet et recte placet "laudem humilitatis in parte non ponere falsitatis". Ita hoc si verum dicerent, haberent peccatum; quod humiliter quia faterentur, veritas in eis esset; si autem hoc mentirentur, nihilominus haberent peccatum, quia veritas in eis non esset.
With the exception, then, of the holy virgin Mary, concerning whom, for the honor of the Lord, I wish no question whatever to be raised when sins are being discussed—for whence do we know what greater grace was conferred on her for overcoming sin in every part, who deserved to conceive and bear him whom it is agreed had no sin?—with this Virgin excepted, then, if we could gather together all those holy men and women, while they lived here, and ask them whether they were without sin, what do we think they would have answered? Whether that which this man says, or that which the apostle John says, I ask you. However great the excellence of holiness they had in this body, had they been able to be asked this, with one voice they would have cried out: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us (1 John 1:8). Or would they perhaps have answered this more humbly than truly? But it now pleases this man, and rightly pleases him, "not to place the praise of humility on the side of falsehood." Thus, if they said this truly, they had sin; and because they confessed it humbly, the truth was in them; but if they lied in this, they had sin none the less, because the truth was not in them.
DNeG.1.36.42
Cur non omnium peccata Scriptura commemoret.
Why Scripture does not record the sins of all.
37. 43. "Dicent forsitan" inquit "numquid omnium potuit Scriptura commemorare peccata?". Et verum ei dicent quicumque dicent.Nec eum contra hoc aliquid validum video respondisse, quamvis videam tacere noluisse. Quid enim dixerit, quaeso, adtendite. "Hoc" inquit "recte dici potest de his, quorum neque bonorum neque malorum Scriptura sit memor; de illis vero, quorum iustitiae meminit, et peccatorum sine dubio meminisset, si qua eos peccasse sensisset". Dicat ergo non pertinuisse ad iustitiam tantam illorum fidem, qui magna moltitudine praecedentes et consequentes cum laudibus Domini asellum etiam inter frementes quare hoc facerent inimicos clamabant: Osanna, fili David, benedictus qui venit in nomine Domine (Mt 21, 9)! Audeat ergo iste, dicere, si potest, neminem fuisse in tanta illa moltitudine, qui ullum haberet omnino peccatum. Quod si absurdissimum est dicere, cur nulla peccata eorum Scriptura commemoravit, quae tantum bonum fidei eorum commemorare curavit?
37. 43. "They will say perhaps," he says, "could Scripture have recorded the sins of all?" And whoever says it will say what is true to him. Nor do I see that he has answered anything valid against this, although I see that he was unwilling to be silent. For attend, I beg, to what he has said. "This," he says, "can rightly be said of those of whose good or evil deeds Scripture is not mindful; but of those whose righteousness it mentions, without doubt it would also have mentioned their sins, if it had perceived that they had sinned in any way." Let him then say that the faith of those did not pertain to so great a righteousness, who, in a great multitude, going before and following with the praises of the Lord, were even crying out around the ass, amid raging enemies who wondered why they did this: Hosanna, son of David, blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord (Matt 21:9)! Let this man dare, then, to say, if he can, that in that great multitude there was no one who had any sin at all. But if it is most absurd to say this, why did Scripture mention none of their sins, when it took care to mention so great a good as their faith?
DNeG.1.37.43
Quid sentiat Pelagius de innocentia Abelis.
What Pelagius thinks of the innocence of Abel.
37. 44. Sed hoc etiam ipse forsitan vidit et ideo subiecit atque ait: "Sed esto, aliis temporibus turbae numerositate omnium dissimulaverit peccata continere in ipso statim mundi primordio, ubi non nisi quattuor homines erant, quid" inquit "dicimus, cur non omnium voluerit delicta memorare? Utrumne ingentis multitudinis causa, quae nondum erat, an quia illorum tantum qui commiserant meminit, illius vero qui nulla commiserat meminisse non potuit?". Adhuc adiungit verba, quibus ista sententia uberius et planius astruatur: "Certe" inquit "primo in tempore Adam et Eva, ex quibus Cain et Abel nati sunt, quattuor tantum homines fuisse referuntur. Peccavit Eva - Scriptura hoc prodidit (Cf. Gen 3, 6) -, Adam quoque deliquit - eadem Scriptura non tacuit (Cf. Gen 3, 6) -, sed et Cain peccasse ipsa aeque Scriptura testata est (Cf. Gen 4, 8), quorum non modo peccata, verum etiam peccatorum indicat qualitatem. Quodsi et Abel peccasset, hoc sine dubio Scriptura dixisset; sed non dixit: ergo nec ille peccavit, quin etiam iustum ostendit. Credamus igitur quod legimus et quod non legimus nefas credamus astruere".
37. 44. But perhaps he himself saw this too, and therefore added and said: "But be it so; suppose that in other times, by reason of the numerousness of the crowds, it passed over in silence the sins of all; what," he says, "do we say of the very beginning of the world, where there were but four human beings? Why did it not wish to record the misdeeds of all? Was it on account of a vast multitude, which did not yet exist, or because it mentioned only those who had committed sins, but could not mention the one who had committed none?" He further adds words by which this opinion may be more amply and plainly propped up: "Surely," he says, "in the first time there are reported to have been only four human beings: Adam and Eve, from whom were born Cain and Abel. Eve sinned—Scripture made this known (See Gen 3:6)—Adam too transgressed—the same Scripture did not keep silent (See Gen 3:6)—but Cain too the same Scripture equally testified to have sinned (See Gen 4:8), of whom it indicates not only the sins but even the character of the sins. But if Abel too had sinned, Scripture without doubt would have said so; but it did not say so: therefore neither did he sin, indeed it shows him to be righteous. Let us therefore believe what we read, and let us hold it wicked to prop up what we do not read."
DNeG.1.37.44
Etiam Abel potuit venialiter peccare.
Even Abel could sin venially.
38. 45. Haec dicens parum adtendit quod paulo ante ipse dixerat "iam exorta multitudine generis humani turbae numerositate potuisse Scripturam dissimulare omnium peccata contexere". Hoc enim si satis adtendisset, videret etiam in uno homine turbam et multitudinem levium peccatorum vel non potuisse vel, si etiam potuit, non debuisse conscribi. Ea quippe scripta sunt, quibus et modus adhibendus fuit et paucis exemplis ad multa necessaria lector instruendus.
38. 45. In saying these things he little attends to what he himself had said a little before, that "once the multitude of the human race had arisen, Scripture could, on account of the numerousness of the crowds, pass over the weaving together of the sins of all." For if he had attended sufficiently to this, he would see that even in one human being a crowd and multitude of light sins either could not, or, even if it could, ought not to have been written down. For those things were written for which a measure had to be observed, and by which, with few examples, the reader had to be instructed in the many things that are necessary.
DNeG.1.38.45
Nam cum ipsos tunc homines licet adhuc paucos, quotvel qui fuerint, id est, Adam et Eva, quot filios et filias procreaverint et quae illis, nomina imposuerint, Scriptura commemorare noluerit (undenonnulli parum considerantes quam multa Scriptura tacite praetereat ipsum Cain cum matre concubuisse putaverunt, unde prolem quae commemorata est procrearet (Cf. Gen 4, 17), putantes illis filiis Adam sorores non fuisse, quia eas Scriptura tunc tacuit, postea recapitulando inferens quod praetermiserat Adam filios et filias procreasse (Gen 5, 4) nec tempus quo nati sunt nec numerum nec vocabula ostendens):
For since Scripture was unwilling to record even those human beings then, though still few—how many, or who they were, that is, Adam and Eve, how many sons and daughters they begot, and what names they imposed on them (whence some, considering too little how many things Scripture silently passes over, supposed that Cain himself lay with his mother, that he might beget the offspring that is mentioned (See Gen 4:17), thinking that those sons of Adam had no sisters, because Scripture was then silent about them, afterward, in recapitulating, bringing in what it had omitted, that Adam begot sons and daughters (Gen 5:4), showing neither the time when they were born, nor the number, nor the names):
DNeG.1.38.45
ita nec commemorandum fuit, si Abel, quamvis merito iustus appellatus est (Cf. Mt 23, 35; Hebr 11, 4), paulo immoderatius aliquando risit vel animi remissione iocatus est vel vidit aliquid ad concupiscendum vel aliquanto immoderatius poma decerpsit vel plusculo cibo crudior fuit vel cum oraret cogitavit aliquid unde eius in aliud avocaretur intentio, et quotiens illi ista ac similia multa subrepserint!
so neither was it to be recorded, if Abel, though deservedly called righteous (See Matt 23:35; Heb 11:4), ever laughed somewhat immoderately, or jested in a relaxing of the mind, or saw something to be coveted, or plucked fruit somewhat too immoderately, or was somewhat dyspeptic from a little too much food, or when he prayed thought of something by which his attention was called away to other things—and how often these and many like things crept upon him!
DNeG.1.38.45
An forte peccata non sunt, de quibus generaliter cavendis atque cohibendis admonemur praecepto apostolico, ubi dicit: Non ergo regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore ad oboediendum desideriis eius (Cf. Rom 6, 12)? His quippe ne oboediamus ad ea, quae non licent vel minus decent, cotidiana et perpetua conflictatione certandum est. Nam utique ex hoc vitio mittitur vel dimittitur oculus, quo non oportet; quod vitium si convaluerit et praevaluerit, etiam adulterium perpetratur in corpore, quod in corde tanto fit citius quanto est cogitatio celerior et nullum impedimentum morarum.
Or are those perhaps not sins against which, that they may be generally guarded and held in check, we are admonished by the apostolic precept, where he says: Let not sin, then, reign in your mortal body, to obey its desires (See Rom 6:12)? For lest we obey these in things that are not lawful or are less fitting, we must contend in a daily and perpetual struggle. For surely from this fault the eye is sent or directed where it ought not; and if this fault gains strength and prevails, adultery too is perpetrated in the body, which in the heart is committed the more quickly the swifter the thought is and the more there is no hindrance of delay.
DNeG.1.38.45
Hoc peccatum, id est, hunc vitiosae affectionis adpetitum, qui magna ex parte frenarunt, ut non oboedirent desideriis eius nec exhiberent ei membra sua arma iniquitatis (Cf. Rom 6, 12-13), etiam iusti appellari meruerunt et hoc adiutorio gratiae Dei. Verum quia saepe in levissimis et aliquando incautis obrepit peccatum, et iusti fuerunt et sine peccato non fuerunt. Postremo si in Abel iusto caritas Dei, qua una vere iustus est quicumque iustus est, adhuc erat quo posset et deberet augeri, quidquid minus erat ex vitio erat (Cf. AUG., De spir. et litt. 36, 65; De perf. iust. hom. 6, 15). Et cui non minus sit, donec ad illam eius fortitudinem veniatur, ubi tota hominis absorbeatur infirmitas?
Those who have for the most part bridled this sin, that is, this appetite of vicious affection, so as not to obey its desires nor present their members to it as weapons of iniquity (See Rom 6:12-13), have deserved even to be called righteous, and this by the help of the grace of God. But because sin often creeps in, in the very slightest things and sometimes upon the unwary, they both were righteous and were not without sin. Finally, if in the righteous Abel the love of God, by which alone whoever is righteous is truly righteous, was still such that it could and ought to be increased, whatever was less in it was from a fault (See Aug., De spir. et litt. 36, 65; De perf. iust. hom. 6, 15). And in whom is it not less, until one comes to that fortitude of love in which the whole weakness of the human being is absorbed?
DNeG.1.38.45
Nihil tenendum est contra Scripturas.
Nothing is to be held against the Scriptures.
39. 46. Magna plane sententia conclusit hunc locum cum ait: "Credamus igitur quod legimus et quod non legimus nefas credamus astruere, quod de cunctis etiam dixisse sufficiat". Contra ego dico nec omne quod legimus credere nos debere propter illud, quod ait Apostolus: Omnia legite, quae bona sunt tenete (1 Thess 5, 21), et astruere aliquid etiam quod non legimus nefas non esse. Possumus enim aliquid bona fide testes astruere quod experti sumus, etiam si forte non legimus. Hic fortasse respondet: "Ego cum hoc dicerem, de Scripturis sanctis agebam ". O utinam, non dico aliud quam in illis litteris legit, verum contra id quod legit nihil vellet astruere! Fideliter et oboedienter audiret quod scriptum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12), et non infirmaret tanti medici gratiam, dum fateri non vult naturam humanam esse vitiatam. O utinam sicut christianus legeret praeter Iesum Christum nullum esse nomen sub caelo, in quo oportet salvos fieri nos (Cf. Act 4, 12), et non possibilitatem naturae humanae ita defenderet, ut homo per liberum arbitrium etiam sine isto nomine salvus esse posse credatur!
39. 46. He concluded this passage with a great sentence indeed, when he said: "Let us therefore believe what we read, and let us hold it wicked to prop up what we do not read; let this suffice to have been said about all matters." On the contrary, I say that we ought not to believe everything we read, on account of what the Apostle says: Read all things; hold fast what is good (1 Thess 5:21), and that to prop up something even that we do not read is not wicked. For we can, as witnesses in good faith, prop up something that we have experienced, even if perhaps we have not read it. Here perhaps he answers: "When I said this, I was dealing with the holy Scriptures." O would that he wished to prop up nothing against what he reads—I do not say anything other than what he reads in those writings! He would faithfully and obediently hear what is written: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12), and he would not weaken the grace of so great a physician, while he is unwilling to confess that human nature has been corrupted. O would that, as a Christian, he might read that besides Jesus Christ there is no name under heaven in which we must be saved (See Acts 4:12), and would not so defend the possibility of human nature that a human being should be believed able to be saved through free choice even without this name!
DNeG.1.39.46
Christum ad quid necessarium nobis fuisse putavit Pelagius.
For what end Pelagius thought Christ was necessary for us.
40. 47. Sed putat fortasse, ideo necessarium esse Christi nomen, ut per eius Evangelium discamus quemadmodum vivere debeamus,non etiam ut eius adiuvemur gratia, quo bene vivamus. Vel hinc saltem confiteatur esse miserabiles tenebras in animo humano, qui scit quemadmodum debeat leonem domare et nescit quemadmodum vivere. An et hoc ut sciat sufficit ei liberum arbitrium lexque naturalis? Haec est sapientia verbi, qua evacuatur crux Christi (Cf. 1 Cor 1, 17). Sed qui dixit: Perdam sapientiam sapientium (1 Cor 1, 19), quia ista crux non potest evacuari, profecto istam sapientiam per stultitiam praedicationis, qua credentes sanantur, evertit (Cf. 1 Cor 1, 21). Si enim possibilitas naturalis per liberum arbitrium et ad cognoscendum quomodo vivere debeat et ad bene vivendum sufficit sibi, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est (Gal 2, 21); ergo evacuatum est scandalum crucis (Gal 5, 11). Cur non etiam ego hic exclamem? immo exclamabo et istis increpitabo dolore christiano: Evacuati estis a Christo, qui in natura iustificamini, a gratia excidistis (Cf. Gal 5, 4)! Ignorantes enim Dei iustitiam et vestram volentes constituere, iustitiae Dei non estis subiecti (Cf. Rom 10, 3). Sicut enim finis legis, ita etiam naturae humanae vitiosae salvator Christus est ad iustitiam omni credenti (Cf. Rom 10, 4).
40. 47. But he thinks perhaps that the name of Christ is necessary for this reason, that through his Gospel we may learn how we ought to live, not also that we may be helped by his grace to live well. Or at least from this let him confess that there are miserable shadows in the human mind, which knows how it ought to tame a lion and does not know how to live. Or does free choice and the natural law suffice it even to know this? This is the wisdom of words, by which the cross of Christ is emptied (See 1 Cor 1:17). But he who said: I will destroy the wisdom of the wise (1 Cor 1:19), because that cross cannot be emptied, surely overthrows that wisdom through the foolishness of preaching, by which believers are healed (See 1 Cor 1:21). For if natural possibility through free choice suffices of itself both for knowing how one ought to live and for living well, then Christ died to no purpose (Gal 2:21); then the scandal of the cross has been emptied (Gal 5:11). Why should not I too here cry out? Indeed I will cry out and rebuke them with Christian grief: You have been emptied of Christ, you who are justified in nature; you have fallen from grace (See Gal 5:4)! For, being ignorant of the righteousness of God and wishing to establish your own, you have not submitted to the righteousness of God (See Rom 10:3). For as Christ is the end of the law, so too he is the Savior of corrupted human nature unto righteousness for everyone who has faith (See Rom 10:4).
DNeG.1.40.47
Quomodo accipiendi omnes in Rom. 3, 23.
How "all" in Romans 3:23 is to be understood.
41. 48. Quod autem sibi opposuit ab eis dici contra quos loquitur: Omnes enim peccaverunt (Rom 3, 23), "Manifestum est quod de his dicebat Apostolus qui tunc erant, hoc est, de Iudaeis et gentibus". Sed plane illud, quod commemoravi: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12), et antiquos et recentiores et nos et posteros nostros sententia ista complectitur. Ponit etiam illud testimonium, unde probet cum dicuntur "omnes" non semper omnes omnino nullo praetermisso intellegi oportere. "Sicut perunius, inquit, delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem sic et per unius iustitiam in omnes homines in iustificationem vitae (Rom 5, 18), cum per Christi, inquit, iustitiam non omnes, sed eos tantum, qui illi oboedire voluerunt et baptismi eius ablutione purgati sunt, sanctificatos esse non dubium sit". Non plane isto testimonio probat quod vult. Nam sicut dictum est: Sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem (Rom 5, 18), ut nullus praetermitteretur sic et in eo, quod dictum est: per unius iustitiam in omnes homines in iustificationem vitae (Rom 5, 18), nullus praetermissus est, non quia omnes in eum credunt et baptismo eius abluuntur, sed quia nemo iustificatur nisi in eum credat et baptismo eius abluatur. Itaque "omnes" dictum est, ne aliquo modo alio praeter ipsum quisquam salvus fieri posse credatur. Sicut uno litterarum magistro in civitate constituto rectissime dicimus: "Omnes iste hic litteras docet", non quia omnes cives litteras discunt, sed quia nemo discit, nisi quem ille docuerit, sic nemo iustificatur, nisi quem Christus iustificaverit.
41. 48. But as for what he set against himself as said by those against whom he speaks: For all have sinned (Rom 3:23), "it is manifest that the Apostle was speaking of those who then existed, that is, of Jews and gentiles." But plainly that which I mentioned: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12), this sentence embraces both the ancients and the more recent, and us, and our posterity. He also sets down a testimony by which to prove that, when "all" are spoken of, it is not always to be understood as absolutely all, none excepted. "As through one man's transgression upon all human beings unto condemnation, so also through one man's righteousness upon all human beings unto the justification of life (Rom 5:18)," he says, "when by Christ's righteousness," he says, "not all, but only those who were willing to obey him and were purified by the washing of his baptism, were without doubt sanctified." Plainly he does not prove by this testimony what he wishes. For just as it was said: As through one man's transgression upon all human beings unto condemnation (Rom 5:18), so that none was passed over, so too in that which was said: through one man's righteousness upon all human beings unto the justification of life (Rom 5:18), none was passed over—not because all believe in him and are washed by his baptism, but because no one is justified unless he believes in him and is washed by his baptism. And so "all" was said, lest in any way someone be believed able to be saved otherwise than through him. Just as, when one teacher of letters has been established in a city, we say most rightly: "This man teaches all here their letters," not because all the citizens learn letters, but because no one learns unless he teaches him, so no one is justified unless Christ justifies him.
DNeG.1.41.48
Potest homo sine peccato esse, sed gratia auxiliante.
A human being can be without sin, but with grace helping.
42. 49. "Sed esto, inquit, consentiam quia omnes peccatores fuisse testatur. Dicit enim quid fuerint, non quod aliud esse non potuerint. Quamobrem et si omnes homines, inquit, peccatores possent probari, definitioni tamen nostrae nequaquam id obesset, qui non tam quid homines sint quam quid possint esse defendimus". Hic recte facit aliquando consentire, quoniam non iustificabitur in conspectu Dei omnis vivens (Cf. Ps 142, 2), non tamen ibi esse quaestionem, sed in ipsa non peccandi possibilitate contendit, in qua nec nos adversus dum certare opus est.
42. 49. "But be it so," he says, "I will grant that he testifies all to have been sinners. For he says what they were, not that they could not be otherwise. Wherefore, even if all human beings," he says, "could be proved sinners, it would in no way be an obstacle to our definition, who defend not so much what human beings are as what they can be." Here he rightly does well sometimes to grant, since no living person will be justified in the sight of God (See Ps 143 (142):2); yet he contends that the question is not there, but in the very possibility of not sinning, in which there is no need for us to contend against him.
DNeG.1.42.49
Nam neque illud nimis curo, utrum fuerint hic aliqui vel sint vel esse possint, qui perfectam, cui nihil addendum esset, habuerint vel habeant vel habituri sint caritatem Dei (ipsa est enim verissima, plenissima perfectissimaque iustitia), quoniam id, quod voluntate hominis adiuta per Dei gratiam fieri posse confiteor et defendo, quando vel ubi vel in quo fiat nimium certare non debeo. Neque de ipsa possibilitate contendo, cum sanata et adiuta hominis voluntate possibilitas ipsa simul cum effectu in sanctis proveniat, dum caritas Dei, quantum plenissime natura nostra sana atque purgata capere potest, diffunditur in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis (Cf. Rom 5, 5). Melius itaque Dei causa agitur (quam se iste agendo dicit defensare naturam), cum et Creator et Salvator agnoscitur quam cum defensa velut sana viribusque integris creatura opitulatio Salvatoris inanitur.
For neither am I too anxious whether there have been here, or are, or can be any who have had, or have, or will have a perfect love of God to which nothing should be added (for this is the truest, fullest, and most perfect righteousness), since that which I confess and defend can come to be by the will of the human being helped through the grace of God, I ought not to contend overmuch when, or where, or in whom it comes to be. Nor do I contend about the possibility itself, since, when the will of the human being has been healed and helped, that very possibility comes forth together with its effect in the saints, while the love of God—as fully as our nature, healed and purified, can take it in—is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (See Rom 5:5). The cause of God, therefore, is better pleaded (which this man says he is pleading by defending nature) when both the Creator and the Savior are acknowledged, than when the creature, defended as though sound and of unimpaired powers, is left without the aid of the Savior.
DNeG.1.42.49
Medicina potest bomo quod vitio non potest.
By medicine a human being can do what by his fault he cannot.
43. 50. Verum est autem quod ait: "Quod Deus tam bonus quam iustus talem hominem fecerit, qui peccati malo carere sufficeret, sed si voluisset". Quis enim eum nescit sanum et inculpabilem factum et libero arbitrio atque ad iuste vivendum potestate libera constitutum?
43. 50. But true is that which he says: "that God, as good as he is just, made the human being such that he was able to be free of the evil of sin, if only he had willed." For who does not know that he was made sound and blameless, and established with free choice and a free power to live righteously?
DNeG.1.43.50
Sed nunc de illo agitur, quem semivivum latrones in via reliquerunt (Cf. Lc 10, 30-34), qui gravibus saucius confossusque vulneribus non ita potest ad iustitiae culmen ascendere, sicut potuit inde descendere, qui etiam si iam in stabulo est adhuc curatur. Non igitur Deus impossibile iubet, sed iubendo admonet et facere quod possis et petere quod non possis. Iam nunc videamus unde possit, unde non possit. Iste dicit: "Voluntate non est, quod natura potest". Ego dico: "Voluntate quidem non est homo iustus, si natura potest, sed medicina poterit quod vitio non potest".
But now we are dealing with that man whom robbers left half-alive on the road (See Luke 10:30-34), who, gravely wounded and pierced with wounds, cannot ascend to the summit of righteousness in the way he was able to descend from it, and who, even if he is now in the inn, is still being cured. God, then, does not command the impossible, but by commanding he admonishes you both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot. Now let us see whence one can, and whence one cannot. This man says: "It is not by the will, what nature can do." I say: "By the will, indeed, a human being is not righteous, if nature can do it; but medicine will be able to do what by the fault it cannot."
DNeG.1.43.50
Antiqui iusti eadem qua nos Christi fide salvati.
The ancient righteous were saved by the same faith of Christ as we.
44. 51. Quid ergo iam opus est in pluribus immorari? Veniamus interius ad causam, quam in hac dumtaxat quaestione vel solam vel paene solam cum istis habemus. Sicut enim ipse dicit,"ad quod nunc agit non pertinere ut quaeratur, utrum fuerint vel sint aliqui homines in hac vita sine peccato, sed utrum esse potuerint sive possint", ita ergo etiamsi fuisse vel esse consentiam nullo modo tamen potuisse vel posse confirmo nisi iustificatos gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum et hunc crucifixum (Cf. Rom 7, 25; 1 Cor 2, 2). Ea quippe fides iustos sanavit antiquos, quae sanat et nos, id est, mediatoris Dei et hominum hominis Christi Iesu (Cf. 1 Tim 2, 5), fides sanguinis eius, fides crucis eius, fides mortis et resurrectionis eius; habentes ergo eumdem spiritum fidei et nos credimus, propter quod et loquimur (2 Cor 4, 13).
44. 51. What need, then, to dwell longer on more points? Let us come within, to the cause that we have with these men in this question alone, or almost alone. For just as he himself says "that it does not pertain to what he is now treating to ask whether there have been or are any human beings in this life without sin, but whether they could be or can be," so therefore, even if I should grant that there have been or are such, yet I affirm that they in no way could be or can be, except as justified by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, and him crucified (See Rom 7:25; 1 Cor 2:2). For that faith healed the ancient righteous, which heals us too, that is, the faith of the mediator of God and human beings, the man Christ Jesus (See 1 Tim 2:5), faith in his blood, faith in his cross, faith in his death and resurrection; having therefore the same spirit of faith, we too believe, and therefore we also speak (2 Cor 4:13).
DNeG.1.44.51
Pelagii ambiguitas.
Pelagius's ambiguity.
44. 52. Iste vero obiecta sibi questione, in qua revera intolerabilis videtur cordibus christianis, quid respondeat adtendamus. Ait enim: "Sed hoc est quod multos movet, inquies, quod non per Dei gratiam hominem sine peccato esse posse defendis". Prorsus hoc est quod movet, hoc est quod obicimus. Rem ipsam dicit; hoc omnino aegerrime sustinemus, hinc a christianis talia disputari ea quam in alios et in ipsos habemus dilectione non ferimus.
44. 52. But this man, when an objection has been raised against him in which he truly seems intolerable to Christian hearts, let us attend to what he answers. For he says: "But this is what moves many, you will say, that you defend that a human being can be without sin without the grace of God." Precisely this is what moves us, this is what we object. He says the very thing; this we bear most grievously, that such things should be disputed by Christians; we do not endure it, out of the love we have toward others and toward these men themselves.
DNeG.1.44.52
Audiamus igitur quomodo se ab obiectione quaestionis huius expediat: "O ignorantiae caecitas" inquit "o imperitae mentis ignavia, quae id sine Dei gratia defensari existimat, quod Deo tantum audiat debere reputari!". Si nesciremus quae sequantur, his tantummodo auditis falsa nos de illis iactante fama et quibusdam fratribus idoneis testibus asseverantibus credidisse putaremus. Quid enim dici brevius potuit et verius quam possibilitatem non peccandi, quantacumque est vel erit in homine, non nisi Deo debere reputari? Hoc et nos dicimus, iungamus dexteras.
Let us hear, then, how he extricates himself from the objection of this question. "O blindness of ignorance," he says, "O sloth of an untrained mind, which supposes that to be defended without the grace of God which it hears must be ascribed to God alone!" If we did not know what follows, hearing only these things, we would think we had believed false things about him from rumor's boasting and from certain suitable brothers asserting them as witnesses. For what could be said more briefly and more truly than that the possibility of not sinning, however great it is or will be in a human being, must be ascribed to none but God? This we too say; let us join right hands.
DNeG.1.44.52
Pelagii disquisitiones circa gratiam.
Pelagius's inquiries concerning grace.
45. 53. An audienda sunt cetera? Audienda plane et corrigenda utique vel cavenda. "Nam cum dicitur" inquit "ipsum posse arbitrii humani omnino non esse, sed naturae, sed auctoris naturae, Dei scilicet, ecqui fieri potest ut absque Dei gratia intellegatur, quod ad Deum proprie pertinere censetur?". Iam coepit apparere quid dicat; sed ne forte fallamus, latius id explanat et clarius. "Sed ut hoc manifestius" inquit "fiat, paulo latius disputandum est. Dicimus enim cuiuscumque rei possibilitatem non tam in arbitrii humani potestate quam in naturae necessitate consistere".
45. 53. Or are the rest to be heard? Plainly they are to be heard, and surely to be corrected or guarded against. "For when it is said," he says, "that this very being-able belongs not at all to human choice, but to nature, but to the author of nature, namely God, how can it possibly be that it should be understood to be without the grace of God which is judged to pertain properly to God?" Now it has begun to appear what he says; but lest perhaps we are mistaken, he explains it more broadly and more clearly. "But that this may be made more manifest," he says, "we must dispute a little more broadly. For we say that the possibility of anything whatever consists not so much in the power of human choice as in the necessity of nature."
DNeG.1.45.53
Exemplis etiam vel similitudinibus quid dicat illustrat. "Ut puta" inquit "loqui possum. Quod loqui possum, meum non est; quod loquor meum est, id est, propriae voluntatis; et quia quod loquor meum est, utrumque facere possum, id est, et loqui et non loqui. Quia vero quod loqui possum meum non est, id est,arbitrii mei atque voluntatis, necesse est me semper loqui posse; et si voluero non posse loqui, non possum tamen non posse loqui, nisi forte membrum illud adimam, quo loquendi impleri officium potest". Multa quidem dici possent, quibus, si velit, homo adimat sibi possibilitatem loquendi non adempto illo membro quo loquimur. Velut si aliquid fiat unde vox ipsa tollatur, loqui nemo poterit manentibus membris; non enim vox hominis membrum est; vexato sane aliquo interiore membro fieri potest, non adempto. Sed ne verbo premere videar mihique contentiose dicatur: "Etiam vexare adimere est", possumus quidem id efficere et ore aliquibus vinculis sic clauso atque obserato, ut id aperire minime valeamus neque ut aperiatur in nostra sit potestate, cum in potestate fuerit ut clauderetur manente integritate et sanitate membrorum.
He illustrates what he says by examples or comparisons. "For instance," he says, "I can speak. That I can speak is not mine; that I speak is mine, that is, of my own will; and because what I speak is mine, I can do either, that is, both speak and not speak. But because that I can speak is not mine, that is, of my own choice and will, it is necessary that I can always speak; and if I should will not to be able to speak, I still cannot not be able to speak, unless perhaps I take away that member by which the office of speaking can be fulfilled." Many things indeed could be said by which, if he wished, a human being might take from himself the possibility of speaking without taking away that member by which we speak. For instance, if something be done whereby the voice itself is removed, no one will be able to speak though the members remain; for the voice of a human being is not a member; if indeed some inner member be injured, this can come about, even without removal. But lest I seem to press a word, and lest it be said to me contentiously: "To injure too is to take away," we can indeed effect this by closing and barring the mouth with certain bonds, so that we are not at all able to open it, nor is it in our power that it be opened, though it was in our power that it be closed, while the integrity and soundness of the members remains.
DNeG.1.45.53
Necessitas naturalis non tollit voluntatem.
Natural necessity does not take away the will.
46. 54. Sed quid ad nos? Videamus quid deinde contexat. "Voluntatis enim arbitrio" inquit "ac deliberatione privatur quidquid naturali necessitate constringitur". Et hic nonnulla quaestio est. Per enim absurdum est, ut ideo dicamus non pertinere ad voluntatem nostram quod beati esse volumus, quia id omnino nolle non possumus,nescio qua et bona constrictione naturae nec dicere audemus ideo Deum non voluntatem, sed necessitatem habere iustitiae, quia non potest velle peccare.
46. 54. But what is that to us? Let us see what he weaves together next. "For whatever is constrained by natural necessity," he says, "is deprived of the choice and deliberation of the will." And here there is some question. For it would be too absurd that we should say it does not pertain to our will that we wish to be happy, because we cannot at all not wish it, by some—and that a good—constraint of nature; nor do we dare to say that God has not the will but the necessity of righteousness, because he cannot will to sin.
DNeG.1.46.54
Voluntas humana influit in necessitatem naturalem.
The human will has influence upon natural necessity.
47. 55. Adtendite etiam quae sequuntur. "Hoc" inquit "et de auditu, odoratu vel visu sentiri possibile est, quod audire, odorari, videre potestatis nostrae sit, posse vero audire vel odorari vel videre potestatis nostrae non sit, sed in naturali necessitate consistat". Aut ego non intellego quid dicat aut ipse. Quomodo enim in potestate nostra non est videndi possibilitas, si in potestate nostra est non videndi necessitas, quia in potestate est caecitas, qua id ipsum videre posse nobis, si volumus, adimamus? Quomodo autem in nostra potestate est videre, si velimus, cum etiam salva integritate naturae corporis oculorumque nostrorum nec volentes videre possimus sive per noctem luminibus quae forinsecus adhibentur ademptis sive nos quisquam in tenebroso loco aliquo includat? Item si quod audire possumus vel non possumus in nostra potestate non est, sed in naturae constrictione, quod vero audimus vel non audimus, hoc est propriae voluntatis, cur non adtendit, quanta audiamus inviti, quae penetrant in sensum nostrum etiam auribus obturatis, sicuti est de proximo serrae stridor vel grunnitus suis? Quamquam obturatio aurium ostendit non in potestate nostra esse apertis auribus non audire, facit etiam fortasse talis obturatio, quae ipsum sensum nostrum adimat, ut in nostra potestate sit etiam audire non posse.De odoratu autem quod dicit, nonne parum adtendit, "non esse in nostra potestate posse odorari vel non posse, sed in nostra potestate esse", hoc estin libera voluntate, "odorari vel non odorari", cum inter odores graves et molestos quando constituti fuerimus, si quis nos illic manibus ligatis constituat, servata prorsus integritate ac salute membrorum velimus non odorari nec omnino possimus, quia cum spiritum ducere cogimur, simul et odorem quem nolumus trahimus?
47. 55. Attend also to what follows. "This," he says, "can be perceived also of hearing, smelling, or seeing: that to hear, to smell, to see is in our power, but that we can hear or smell or see is not in our power, but consists in natural necessity." Either I do not understand what he says, or he himself does not. For how is the possibility of seeing not in our power, if the necessity of not seeing is in our power, since blindness is in our power, by which we take from ourselves the very ability to see, if we will? And how is it in our power to see if we will, when even with the integrity of the nature of our body and of our eyes preserved, we cannot see even when willing, whether through night, the lights that are supplied from without being removed, or if someone shut us up in some dark place? Likewise, if what we can or cannot hear is not in our power, but in the constraint of nature, while what we hear or do not hear is of our own will, why does he not attend to how many things we hear unwillingly, which penetrate to our sense even with the ears stopped, as is the screech of a saw nearby or the grunting of a pig? Although the stopping of the ears shows that it is not in our power, with open ears, not to hear; perhaps such a stopping is even possible as would take away the very sense, so that it would be in our power even to be unable to hear. But as to what he says of smell, does he not attend too little, "that it is not in our power to be able to smell or not, but it is in our power"—that is, in free will—"to smell or not to smell," when, if we have been set among heavy and offensive odors, and someone places us there with hands bound, with the integrity and health of the members wholly preserved, we may will not to smell and yet not be able at all, because, when we are compelled to draw breath, we at the same time draw in the odor we do not will?
DNeG.1.47.55
Voluntas humana non sufficit ad non peccandum.
The human will does not suffice for not sinning.
48. 56. Sicut ergo istae similitudines falsae sunt, ita et illud propter quod eas voluit adhibere, sequitur enim et dicit: "Simili ergo modo de non peccandi possibilitate intellegendum est, quod non peccare nostrum sit, posse vero non peccare non nostrum". Si de integra et sana hominis natura loqueretur (quam modo non habemus; Spe enim salvi facti sumus; spes autem quae videtur non est spes. Si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam exspectamus (Rom 8, 24-25)), nec sic recte diceret, quod non peccare nostrum tantummodo sit, quamvis peccare nostrum esset; nam et tunc esset adiutorium Dei et tamquam lumen sanis oculis, quo adiuti videant, se praeberet volentibus.
48. 56. As, then, these comparisons are false, so too is that for whose sake he wished to bring them in; for he goes on and says: "In a like manner, then, it is to be understood of the possibility of not sinning, that not to sin is ours, but that we can not-sin is not ours." If he were speaking of the whole and sound nature of the human being (which we do not now have; for in hope we have been saved; but hope that is seen is not hope. But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience (Rom 8:24-25)), not even so would he say rightly that not to sin alone is ours, although to sin would be ours; for even then there would be the help of God, and, like light to sound eyes, it would offer itself to those willing, that, helped, they might see.
DNeG.1.48.56
Quia vero de hac vita disputata ubi corpus quod corrumpitur adgravat animam et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem (Sap 9, 15); miror quo corde etiam sine adiutorio medicinae Salvatoris nostri nostrum putet esse non peccare, posse vero non peccare naturae esse contendat, quam sic apparet esse vitiatam, ut hoc maioris vitii sit non videre.
But because he is disputing about this life, where the body that is corruptible weighs down the soul, and the earthly dwelling presses down the mind that ponders many things (Wis 9:15), I wonder with what heart he thinks that, even without the help of the medicine of our Savior, not to sin is ours, and contends that to be able not to sin belongs to nature—a nature that appears so corrupted that not to see this is the mark of a greater fault.
DNeG.1.48.56
Confractis pedibus homo non babet possibilitatem ambulandi.
With broken feet a human being does not have the possibility of walking.
49. 57. "Quia non peccare" inquit "nostrum est, possumus peccare et non peccare". Quid, si alius dicat: "Quia nolle infelicitatem nostrum est, possumus eam et velle et nolle"? Et tamen eam velle omnino non possumus. Quis enim ullo modo velle esse possit infelix, etiamsi aliud vult ubi eum et nolentem infelicitas consequatur? Deinde quia Dei multo magis est non peccare, num audebimus eum dicere et peccare posse et non peccare? Absit a nobis ut Deum posse peccare dicamus! Non enim, ut stulti putant, ideo non erit omnipotens, quia nec mori potest et negare se ipsum non potest (2 Tim 2, 13).
49. 57. "Because not to sin," he says, "is ours, we are able both to sin and not to sin." What if another should say: "Because to be unwilling to be wretched is ours, we are able both to will it and not to will it"? And yet we cannot at all will it. For who could in any way will to be wretched, even if he wills something else by which wretchedness pursues him even unwilling? Then, since not to sin belongs much more to God, shall we dare to say of him that he can both sin and not sin? Far be it from us that we should say God can sin! For not, as the foolish suppose, will he therefore not be omnipotent, because he can neither die nor deny himself (2 Tim 2:13).
DNeG.1.49.57
Quid est ergo quod loquitur et quibus locutionum regulis conatur persuadere, quod non vult considerare? Adhuc addit et dicit: "Quia vero posse non peccare nostrum non est, et, si voluerimus non posse non peccare, non possumus non posse non peccare". Intorte hoc dixit et ideo subobscure. Sed ita posset dici planius: Quia posse non peccare nostrum non est, seu velimus seu nolimus, possumus non peccare. Non enim ait: seu velimus seu nolimus, nonpeccamus; sine dubio enim peccamus, si volumus; sed tamen velimus nolimus habere nos asserit non peccandi possibilitatem, quam naturae insitam dicit.
What is it, then, that he says, and by what rules of speech does he try to persuade of what he is unwilling to consider? He further adds and says: "But because the being-able-not-to-sin is not ours, even if we should will not to be able not to sin, we cannot not be able not to sin." This he said in a twisted way, and therefore rather obscurely. But it could be said more plainly thus: Because the being-able-not-to-sin is not ours, whether we will or will not, we are able not to sin. For he does not say: whether we will or will not, we do not sin; for without doubt we sin if we will; but yet he asserts that, will we or will we not, we have the possibility of not sinning, which he says is implanted in nature.
DNeG.1.49.57
Sed de homine sanis pedibus tolerabiliter dici potest: velit nolit habet ambulandi possibilitatem; confractis vero, et si velit, non habet. Vitiata est natura de qua loquitur: Quid superbit terra et cinis? (Eccli 10, 9). Vitiata est, medicum implorat: Salvum me fac, Domine (Ps 11, 2), clamat: Sana animam meam (Ps 40, 5) clamat. Quid intercludit has voces, ut defendendo quasi praesentem possibilitatem futuram impediat sanitatem?
But of a human being with sound feet it can tolerably be said: will he or will he not, he has the possibility of walking; but of one with broken feet, even if he wills, he has it not. The nature of which he speaks has been corrupted: Why is earth and ashes proud? (Sir 10:9). It has been corrupted, it implores a physician: Save me, Lord (Ps 12 (11):1), it cries out; Heal my soul (Ps 41 (40):4), it cries out. What blocks these cries, that, by defending an as-it-were-present possibility, it should hinder a future health?
DNeG.1.49.57
Pelagius humanae naturae tribuit inalienabilem possibilitatem non peccandi.
Pelagius attributes to human nature an inalienable possibility of not sinning.
50. 58. Et videte quid adiungat, unde illud confirmare existimat: "Quia nulla" inquit "adimere voluntas potest, quod inseparabiliter insitum probatur esse naturae". Unde ergo illa vox: Ut non quae vultis illa faciatis (Gal 5, 17)? Unde etiam illa: Non enim quod volo facio bonum, sed quod odi malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 15. 19)? Ubi est possibilitas, quae inseparabiliter insita probatur esse naturae? Ecce homines non ea quae volunt faciunt. Et de non peccando utique agebat, non de volando, quia homines non alites erant. Ecce homo quod vult bonum non agit, sed quod non vult malum, hoc agit; velle illi adiacet, perficere autem bonum nonadiacet (Cf. Rom 7, 18).
50. 58. And see what he adds, whereby he thinks to confirm this: "Because no will," he says, "can take away what is proved to be inseparably implanted in nature." Whence, then, that voice: So that you do not do the things that you will (Gal 5:17)? Whence too this: For I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I hate, this I do (Rom 7:15. 19)? Where is the possibility that is proved to be inseparably implanted in nature? Behold, human beings do not do the things they will. And he was surely treating of not sinning, not of flying, since human beings were not birds. Behold, the human being does not do the good he wills, but the evil he does not will, this he does; to will lies near at hand for him, but to accomplish the good does not lie at hand (See Rom 7:18).
DNeG.1.50.58
Ubi est possibilitas, quae inseparabiliter insita probatur esse naturae? Quemlibet enim in se transfiguret (Cf. 2 Cor 11, 13-15), si de se ipso ista non dicit Apostolus, hominem certe in se transfigurat. Ab isto autem ipsa humana natura inseparabilem nihil peccandi possibilitatem habere defenditur. Sed his verbis id agitur etiam a nesciente qui loquitur, non autem nesciente illo qui haec loquenda incautis etiam Deum timentibus suggerit, ut evacuetur Christi gratiae humana sibi ad iustitiam suam quasi sufficiente natura.
Where is the possibility that is proved to be inseparably implanted in nature? For into whomever he may transfigure himself (See 2 Cor 11:13-15), even if the Apostle does not say these things of himself, he certainly transfigures into himself a human being. But by this man the very human nature is defended as having an inseparable possibility of sinning in nothing. But by these words this is brought about even by him who speaks unknowingly, yet not unknowingly by him who suggests these things to be spoken to the unwary, even to those who fear God, that the grace of Christ may be emptied, nature being as it were sufficient of itself for its own righteousness.
DNeG.1.50.58
Gratia iuxta Pelagium est ipsa possibilitas naturalis non peccandi.
According to Pelagius, grace is the very natural possibility of not sinning.
51. 59. Ut autem declinetur invidia, qua christiani pro salute sua clamant et dicunt: "Quare sine adiutorio gratiae Dei dicis hominem posse non peccare?". "Ipsa" inquit "non peccandi possibilitas non tam in arbitrii potestate quam in naturae necessitate est. Quidquid in naturae necessitate positum est, ad naturae pertinere non dubitatur auctorem, utique Deum. Quomodo ergo" inquit "absque Dei gratia dici existimatur, quod ad Deum proprie pertinere monstratur?". Expressa est sententia quae latebat, non est quemadmodum possit abscondi. Ideo Dei gratiae tribuit non peccandi possibilitatem, quia eius naturae Deus auctor est, cui possibilitatem non peccandi inseparabiliter insitam dicit. Cum vult ergo, facit; quia non vult, non facit. Ubi enim est inseparabilis possibilitas, ei accidere non potest voluntatis infirmitas vel potius voluntatis adiacente et perfectionis indigentia. Si ergo ita est, unde venit: Velle adiacet,perficere autem bonum non adiacet (Rom 7, 18)? Si enim iste qui hunc librum scripsit de illa hominis natura loqueretur, quae primo inculpata et salva condita est, utcumque acceptaretur hoc dictum; quamquam inseparabilem habere possibilitatem, id est, ut ita dicam, inamissibilem, non debuit illa natura dici, quae vitiari posset, et medicum quaerere, qui caeci oculos sanaret et videndi possibilitatem restitueret, quae fuerat amissa per caecitatem, quoniam caecus puto quod velit videre, sed non potest; si autem vult et non potest, inest voluntas, sed amissa est possibilitas.
51. 59. But that the ill will may be turned aside by which Christians cry out for their salvation and say: "Why do you say that a human being can not-sin without the help of the grace of God?"—"This very possibility of not sinning," he says, "is not so much in the power of choice as in the necessity of nature. Whatever is placed in the necessity of nature, it is not doubted, pertains to the author of nature, namely God. How, then," he says, "is it thought to be said without the grace of God, which is shown to pertain properly to God?" The opinion that lay hidden has been expressed; there is no way it can be concealed. He attributes the possibility of not sinning to the grace of God for this reason, that God is the author of that nature in which he says the possibility of not sinning is inseparably implanted. When, then, he wills, he does it; because he does not will, he does not do it. For where there is an inseparable possibility, there cannot befall it a weakness of the will or rather a lack present in the will and in its perfecting. If, then, it is so, whence comes: To will lies at hand, but to accomplish the good does not lie at hand (Rom 7:18)? For if this man who wrote this book were speaking of that nature of the human being which was at first created blameless and sound, this saying might somehow be accepted; although that nature ought not to have been said to have an inseparable possibility, that is, so to speak, an unlosable one, which could be corrupted and seek a physician to heal the eyes of the blind and restore the possibility of seeing, which had been lost through blindness—since the blind man, I think, wills to see, but cannot; but if he wills and cannot, the will is present, but the possibility has been lost.
DNeG.1.51.59
Pelagii contradictio in natura humana existimanda in baptizatis et in non baptizatis.
Pelagius's contradiction in his estimate of human nature in the baptized and the unbaptized.
52. 60. Adhuc videte quas moles conetur, qua suam sententiam ducat, irrumpere, si valeret. Obicit enim sibi quaestionem dicens: "Sed caro nobis secundum Apostolum contraria est (Cf. Gal 5, 17), inquies". Deinde respondet: "Qui fieri potest, ut cuicumque baptizato sit caro contraria, cum secundum eumdem Apostolum in carne non esse intellegatur? Ita enim ait: Vos autem in carne non estis (Rom 8, 9)". Bene, quod baptizatis dicit carnem contrariam esse non posse; quod utrum verum sit post videbimus. Nunc vero quia non potuit penitus se oblivisci esse christianum, sed id licet tenuiter recordatus est, recessit a defensione naturae.
52. 60. See still what masses he tries to break through, by which to drive his opinion, if he could. For he objects a question to himself, saying: "But the flesh, according to the Apostle, is contrary to us (See Gal 5:17), you will say." Then he answers: "How can it be that the flesh should be contrary to anyone baptized, when according to the same Apostle he is understood not to be in the flesh? For thus he says: But you are not in the flesh (Rom 8:9)." Well that he says the flesh cannot be contrary to the baptized—whether this is true we shall see afterward. But now, because he could not utterly forget that he is a Christian, but recollected it, however faintly, he withdrew from the defense of nature.
DNeG.1.52.60
Ubi est ergo inseparabilitas possibilitatis? An forte nondum baptizati in natura hominum non sunt? Hic prorsus, hic posset vigilare et, si advertat, potest. "Qui fieri potest" inquit "ut cuicumque baptizato sit caro contraria?". Ergo non baptizatis potest caro esse contraria. Exponat quemadmodum, cum sit etiam in ipsis illa ab eo multum defensa natura. Certe vel in eis concedit esse vitiatam, si iam in baptizatis ille saucius sanus de stabulo egressus est, aut sanus in stabulo est, quo eum curandum misericors Samaritanus advexit (Cf. Lc 10, 30-35).
Where, then, is the inseparability of the possibility? Or are the not-yet-baptized perhaps not among the nature of human beings? Here precisely, here he could be watchful, and, if he would attend, he can be. "How can it be," he says, "that the flesh should be contrary to anyone baptized?" Therefore to the unbaptized the flesh can be contrary. Let him explain in what way, since in them too is that nature, by him so much defended. Certainly even in them he grants it to be corrupted, if in the baptized that wounded man has come out of the inn sound, or is sound in the inn to which the merciful Samaritan brought him to be cured (See Luke 10:30-35).
DNeG.1.52.60
Porro si vel istis concedit carnem esse contrariam, dicat quid contigerit, cum sit utrumque, hoc est, et caro et spiritus, creatura unius eiusdemque Creatoris procul dubio bona, quia boni, nisi quia hoc est vitium, quod propria inflictum est voluntate; et hoc ut in natura sanetur, eo ipso opus est Salvatore, quo instituta est natura Creatore. Hoc Salvatore eaque illius medicina, qua Verbum caro factum est, ut habitaret in nobis (Cf. Io 1, 14), si opus esse fateamur parvis et magnis, id est, a vagitibus infantum usque ad canos senum, tota quae inter nos est huius quaestionis controversia dissoluta est.
Further, if he grants that even to these the flesh is contrary, let him say what has happened, since both, that is, both flesh and spirit, are the creation of one and the same Creator, and without doubt good, because made by the Good—except that this is the fault that has been inflicted by one's own will; and that it may be healed in nature, there is need of that very Savior by whom nature was established as its Creator. If we confess that there is need of this Savior, and of that medicine of his by which the Word was made flesh, that he might dwell among us (See John 1:14), for the small and the great, that is, from the wailings of infants to the gray hairs of the old, then the whole controversy of this question that is between us is dissolved.
DNeG.1.52.60
Caro est contraria etiam baptizatis.
The flesh is contrary even to the baptized.
53. 61. Nunc iam videamus, utrum et baptizatis legatur caro esse contraria. Ubi quaero, quibus dicebat Apostolus: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur, ut non ea quae vultis faciatis (Gal 5, 17)? Ad Galatas, ut opinor, id scripsit, quibus dicit: Qui ergo tribuit vobis Spiritum et virtutes operatur in vobis, ex operibus legis an ex auditu fidei (Gal 3, 5)? Unde apparet eum christianis loqui et quibus Deus tribuerat Spiritum, ergo etiam baptizatis.
53. 61. Now let us see whether the flesh is read to be contrary even to the baptized. Here I ask, to whom was the Apostle saying: The flesh desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to one another, so that you do not do the things that you will (Gal 5:17)? He wrote this, I think, to the Galatians, to whom he says: He, then, who supplies the Spirit to you and works powers in you, does he do so from the works of the law or from the hearing of faith (Gal 3:5)? Whence it appears that he is speaking to Christians, and to those to whom God had supplied the Spirit, therefore to the baptized.
DNeG.1.53.61
Ecce et baptizatis caro invenitur esse contraria et non adesse possibilitas illa, quam inseparabiliter insitam dicit esse naturae. Ubi est quod ait: "Qui fieri potest ut cuicumque baptizato sit caro contraria?". Quomodolibet intellegat carnem, quia revera non natura eius, quae bona est, sed vitia carnalia carnis hoc loco nomine nuncupantur, ecce tamen etiam baptizatis caro contraria est. Et quomodo contraria? ut non quod volunt faciant. Ecce adest voluntas in homine; ubi est possibilitas illa naturae? Fateamur gratiam necessariam, clamemus: Miser ego homo! quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Et respondeatur nobis: Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 24-25).
Behold, even to the baptized the flesh is found to be contrary, and that possibility is not present which he says is inseparably implanted in nature. Where is that which he says: "How can it be that the flesh should be contrary to anyone baptized?" In whatever way he understands the flesh—because in truth it is not its nature, which is good, but the carnal faults of the flesh that are here called by the name—behold, nevertheless, the flesh is contrary even to the baptized. And how contrary? So that they do not do what they will. Behold, the will is present in the human being; where is that possibility of nature? Let us confess that grace is necessary, let us cry out: Wretched man that I am! Who will set me free from the body of this death? And let it be answered us: The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:24-25).
DNeG.1.53.61
Gratia qua homo est conditus et gratia qua fit salvus.
The grace by which the human being was created and the grace by which he is made safe.
53. 62. Quando enim istis rectissime dicitur: "Quare sine adiutorio gratiae Dei dicitis hominem posse esse sine peccato?". Non tunc de illa gratia quaestio est, qua est homo conditus, sed de ista, qua fit salvus per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum. Fideles enim orantes dicunt: Ne nos inferas in temptationem, sed libera nos a malo (Mt 6, 13). Si adest possibilitas ut quid orant? Aut a quo malo se liberari orant nisi maxime de corpore mortis huius (Rom 7, 24), unde non liberat nisi gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 25)?
53. 62. For when it is most rightly said to these men: "Why do you say that a human being can be without sin without the help of the grace of God?" the question is not then about that grace by which the human being was created, but about that by which he is made safe through Jesus Christ our Lord. For the faithful say in prayer: Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil (Matt 6:13). If the possibility is present, why do they pray? Or from what evil do they pray to be delivered, if not chiefly from the body of this death (Rom 7:24), from which nothing delivers except the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:25)?
DNeG.1.53.62
Non utique de substantia corporis, quae bona est, sed de vitiis carnalibus, unde non liberatur homo sine gratia Salvatoris nec quando per mortem corporis discedit a corpore. Et hoc ut diceret Apostolus, quid supra dixerat? Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivum me ducentem in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis (Rom 7, 23).
Surely not from the substance of the body, which is good, but from the carnal faults, from which a human being is not delivered without the grace of the Savior, not even when through the death of the body he departs from the body. And that the Apostle might say this, what had he said above? I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind and leading me captive in the law of sin, which is in my members (Rom 7:23).
DNeG.1.53.62
Ecce quod vitium naturae humanae inoboedientia voluntatis inflixit. Orare sinatur, ut sanetur. Quid tantum de naturae possibilitate praesumitur? Vulnerata, sauciata, vexata, perdita est: vera confessione, non falsa defensione opus habet. Gratia ergo Dei, non qua instituatur, sed qua restituatur, quaeratur; quae ab isto sola clamatur non esse necessaria, cum tacetur. Qui si omnino nihil de gratia Dei diceret nec eam quaestionem solvendam sibi proponeret, ut a se de hac re invidiam removeret, posset putari hoc quidem sentire, quod veritas habet, sed non dixisse, quia non ubique omnia dicenda sunt. Proposuit de gratia quaestionem, id respondit quod habebat in corde; definita quaestio est, non quam volebamus, sed ubi quid sentiret dubitabamus.
Behold the fault that the disobedience of the will inflicted upon human nature. Let him be allowed to pray, that he may be healed. Why is so much presumed concerning the possibility of nature? It is wounded, injured, harassed, ruined: it has need of a true confession, not a false defense. Let the grace of God, then, be sought—not that by which nature is established, but that by which it is restored—which by this man is alone proclaimed not to be necessary, when it is passed over in silence. If he had said nothing at all about the grace of God, nor proposed to himself this question to be solved, in order to remove from himself the ill will about this matter, he might have been thought to hold indeed what truth holds, but not to have said it, because not everything is to be said everywhere. He proposed the question about grace; he answered what he had in his heart; the question is settled—not the one we wished, but the one in which we were in doubt as to what he held.
DNeG.1.53.62
Quod contraria est caro spiritui, vitium est, non natura.
That the flesh is contrary to the spirit is a fault, not nature.
54. 63. Deinde multis verbis Apostoli conatur estendere, unde non est controversia, "quod caro ab illo ita saepe nominetur, ut velit intellegi non substantiam, sed opera carnis". Quid hoc ad rem? Vitia carnis contraria sunt voluntati hominis; non natura accusatur,sed vitiis medicus quaeritur. Quid est quod interrogat: "Quis fecit homini spiritum?", et respondet sibi: "Sine dubio Deus". Et item interrogat: "Carnem quis creavit?". Itemque respondet: "Idem, credo, Deus". Interrogat tertio: "Bonus est qui utrumque creavit Deus?".Respondet: "Nulli dubium est". Adhuc interrogat: "Et utrumque quod bonus auctor creavit, bonum est?", et ad hoc respondet: "Confitendum est". Deinde concludit: "Si igitur et spiritus bonus et caro bona ut a bono auctore condita, qui fieri potest, ut duo bona possint sibi esse contraria?".
54. 63. Then with many words of the Apostle he tries to show—whereof there is no controversy—"that flesh is so often named by him that he wishes it to be understood not as the substance, but as the works of the flesh." What is this to the matter? The faults of the flesh are contrary to the will of the human being; nature is not accused, but a physician is sought for its faults. What is it that he asks: "Who made the spirit for the human being?" and answers himself: "Without doubt God." And again he asks: "Who created the flesh?" And again he answers: "The same, I believe, God." He asks a third time: "Is God good, who created both?" He answers: "There is no doubt to anyone." He still asks: "And is each thing that the good author created good?" and to this he answers: "It must be confessed." Then he concludes: "If, then, both the spirit is good and the flesh good, as established by a good author, how can it be that two goods should be contrary to one another?"
DNeG.1.54.63
Omitto dicere quia tota huius ratiocinatio turbaretur, si quis ab eo quaereret: "Aestum et frigus quis fecit?". Responderet enim: "Sine dubio Deus". Non ego multa interrogo, ipse concludat, utrum aut ista possint dici non bona aut non appareant inter se esse contraria. Hic forte dicit: "Qualitates sunt istae substantiarum, non substantiae". Ita est, verum est, sed qualitates naturales et ad Dei creaturam sine dubio pertinentes; substantiae quippe non per se ipsas, sed per suas qualitates, sicut aqua et ignis, dicuntur sibi esse contrariae. Quid, si ita sunt caro et spiritus? quod quidem non affirmamus, sed ut ratiocinationem eius non necessaria illatione conclusam ostenderemus, hoc diximus. Possunt enim et contraria non invicem adversari, sed ex alterutro temperari et bonam valitudinem reddere, sicut in corpore siccitas et humiditas, frigus et calor quorum omnium temperatione bona corporalis valitudo consistit. Sed quod contraria est caro spiritui, ut non ea quae volumus faciamus, vitium est, non natura. Gratia medicinalis quaeratur et controversia finiatur.
I forbear to say that his whole reasoning would be thrown into confusion if someone should ask him: "Who made heat and cold?" For he would answer: "Without doubt God." I do not ask many questions; let him himself conclude whether either these can be called not good, or do not appear to be contrary to one another. Here perhaps he says: "These are qualities of substances, not substances." So it is, it is true; but natural qualities, and without doubt pertaining to the creation of God; for substances are said to be contrary to one another not through themselves, but through their qualities, as water and fire. What if the flesh and the spirit are so? Which indeed we do not affirm, but we have said this in order to show that his reasoning was concluded by no necessary inference. For contraries can even not be opposed to one another, but be tempered from one and the other and yield good health, as in the body dryness and moisture, cold and heat, by the tempering of all of which good bodily health consists. But that the flesh is contrary to the spirit, so that we do not do what we will, is a fault, not nature. Let medicinal grace be sought, and let the controversy be ended.
DNeG.1.54.63
Concedat iam tandem aliquando Pelagius humanam medico Christo indigere naturam.
Let Pelagius at length at some time grant that human nature needs Christ as its physician.
54. 64. Duo quippe ista bona a bono Deo condita quomodo contra huius ratiocinationem in non baptizatis hominibus possunt sibi esse contraria? An et hoc eum dixisse paenitebit, quod affectu aliquo fidei christianae locutus est? Cum enim dixit: "Qui fieri potest, ut cuicumque iam baptizato sit caro contraria", significavit non baptizatis carnem posse esse contrariam. Nam cur addidit "iam baptizato", cum posset etiam hoc non addito dicere: "Qui fieri potest, ut cuicumque sit caro contraria" atque ad hoc probandum subicere illam ratiocinationem suam, quia utrumque bonum est a bono conditum et ideo non potest inter se esse contrarium? Si ergo non baptizati, quibus certe fatetur carnem esse contrariam, suis illum interrogationibus urgeant et dicant: "Quis fecit homini spiritum?". Iste respondebit: "Deus". Itemque illi: "Carnem quis creavit?". Respondet iste: "Idem, credo, Deus". Illi tertio: "Bonus est qui utrumque creavit Deus?". Et iste: "Nulli dubium est". Atque illi unum quod restat inquirant: "Et utrumque quod bonus auctor creavit bonum est?"; iste fatebitur.
54. 64. For these two goods, established by the good God, how, against this man's reasoning, can they be contrary to one another in unbaptized human beings? Or will he repent of having said this too, which he spoke from some affection of the Christian faith? For when he said: "How can it be that the flesh should be contrary to anyone already baptized?" he signified that to the unbaptized the flesh could be contrary. For why did he add "already baptized," when he could have said this too without that addition: "How can it be that the flesh should be contrary to anyone?" and, to prove this, subjoin that reasoning of his, that each is good, established by the Good, and therefore cannot be contrary to one another? If, then, the unbaptized, to whom he certainly confesses the flesh to be contrary, should press him with his own questions and say: "Who made the spirit for the human being?" this man will answer: "God." And again they: "Who created the flesh?" This man answers: "The same, I believe, God." They a third time: "Is God good, who created both?" And this man: "There is no doubt to anyone." And let them inquire the one thing that remains: "And is each thing that the good author created good?"; this man will confess it.
DNeG.1.54.64
Tunc illi eum suo gladio iugulabunt inferentes conclusionem eius et dicentes: "Si igitur spiritus bonus et caro bona ut a bono auctore condita, qui fieri potest, ut duo bona sibi possint esse contraria?". Hic forte ille respondebit: "Date veniam, quia non debui dicere cuicumque baptizato carnemnon posse esse contrariam, ut hoc modo vobis non baptizatis contrariam confiterer, sed sine ulla exceptione dicere debui carnem nulli esse contrariam".
Then they will cut his throat with his own sword, bringing in his own conclusion and saying: "If, then, the spirit is good and the flesh good, as established by a good author, how can it be that two goods should be contrary to one another?" Here perhaps he will answer: "Pardon me, for I ought not to have said that the flesh cannot be contrary to anyone baptized, so as in this way to confess it contrary to you unbaptized, but I ought to have said without any exception that the flesh is contrary to no one."
DNeG.1.54.64
Ecce quo se ipse compingit, ecce quae loquitur, qui non vult clamare cum Apostolo: Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 24-25). "Sed cur" inquit "clamem iam baptizatus in Christo? illi hoc clament, qui nondum tale beneficium perceperunt, quorum in se voces figurabat Apostolus; si tamen vel hoc dicunt".
Behold into what he wedges himself, behold what he says, who is unwilling to cry out with the Apostle: Who will set me free from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:24-25). "But why," he says, "should I cry out, now baptized in Christ? Let those cry it out who have not yet received such a benefit, whose voices the Apostle was figuring in himself—if indeed they say even this."
DNeG.1.54.64
Sed naturae ista defensio nec illis hac voce exclamare permittit. Neque enim in baptizatis natura est et in non baptizatis natura non est. Aut si vel in illis vitiata esse conceditur, ut non sine causa clament: Infelix homo! quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius (Rom 7, 24)? eisque subveniatur in eo quod sequitur: Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 25), concedatur iam tandem aliquando humanam medico Christo indigere naturam.
But this defense of nature does not even permit those to cry out with this voice. For nature is not in the baptized and absent in the unbaptized. Or if even in those it is granted to be corrupted, so that not without cause they cry out: Wretched man! Who will set me free from the body of this death (Rom 7:24)? and they are helped in what follows: The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:25), let it now at length at some time be granted that human nature needs Christ as its physician.
DNeG.1.54.64
Gratia est necessaria ut homo de praeteritis peccatis sit impunitus et ad non peccandum de caetero sit fortis et validus.
Grace is necessary that the human being may be unpunished for past sins and strong and able for not sinning thereafter.
55. 65. Quaero autem, ubi natura istam perdiderit libertatem, quam sibi dari exoptat, cum dicit: Quis me liberabit (Rom 7, 24)?non enim et ille substantiam carnis accusati cum dicit liberari se cupere de corpore mortis huius (Rom 7, 24), cum etiam corporis sicut animae natura Deo bono auctori tribuenda sit, sed utique de vitiis corporis dicit. Nam de corpore mors corporis separat; sed contracta ex illo vitia cohaerent, quibus iusta poena debetur, quam etiam in inferno ille dives invenit (Cf. Lc 16, 22-26). Hinc se non poterat utique liberare qui dicit: Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius (Cf. Rom 7, 24)?
55. 65. But I ask, where did nature lose that liberty which it longs to be given it, when it says: Who will set me free (Rom 7:24)? For neither does that man accuse the substance of the flesh when he says he desires to be set free from the body of this death (Rom 7:24), since the nature of the body too, like that of the soul, is to be attributed to God, the good author, but surely he speaks of the faults of the body. For death separates the body from the body; but the faults contracted from it cling, for which a just penalty is owed, which that rich man found even in hell (See Luke 16:22-26). From this surely he could not set himself free, who says: Who will set me free from the body of this death (See Rom 7:24)?
DNeG.1.55.65
Ubicumque autem istam perdiderit libertatem, certe inseparabilis est possibilitas illa naturae, habet posse per naturale subsidium, habet velle per liberum arbitrium; cur quaerit baptismatis sacramentum? An propter commissa praeterita, ut ea tantum ignoscantur, quae fieri infecta non possunt? Dimitte hominem, clamet quod clamabat. Non enim tantum desiderat, ut per indulgentiam sit de praeteritis impunitus, sed etiam ut sit de cetero ad non peccandum fortis et validus. Condelectatur enim legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem, videt autem aliam legem in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae (Cf. Rom 7, 22-23); videt esse, non recolit fuisse; praesentibus urgetur, non praeterita reminiscitur.
But wherever it lost this liberty, surely that possibility of nature is inseparable; it has the being-able through natural support, it has the willing through free choice; why does it seek the sacrament of baptism? Is it on account of past misdeeds, that those alone may be forgiven which cannot be made undone? Let the human being be left be, let him cry out what he was crying out. For he does not desire only that, by indulgence, he be unpunished for past sins, but also that he be strong and able for not sinning thereafter. For he delights in the law of God according to the inner man, but he sees another law in his members fighting against the law of his mind (See Rom 7:22-23); he sees it to be, he does not merely recall it to have been; he is pressed by present things, he does not remember past ones.
DNeG.1.55.65
Nec tantum repugnantem videt, verum etiam captivantem se in lege peccati (Cf. Rom 7, 23), quae est in membris eius, non quae fuit. Hinc est quod clamat: Infelix homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius (Rom 7, 24)? Sinatur orare, sinatur adiutorium Medici potentissimi flagitare. Quid contradicitur? quid obstrepitur? quid miser misericordiam Christi petere prohibetur et hoc a christianis? Nam et illi cum Christo ambulabant, qui caecum lumen clamando petere prohibebant (Cf. Mc 10, 46-52); sed etiam inter tumultum contradicentium audit ille clamantem. Unde huic responsumest: Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 25).
Nor does he see it merely fighting, but even leading him captive in the law of sin (See Rom 7:23), which is in his members, not which was. Hence it is that he cries out: Wretched man, who will set me free from the body of this death (Rom 7:24)? Let him be allowed to pray, let him be allowed to beg the help of the most powerful physician. Why is he contradicted? Why is he clamored against? Why is the wretched man forbidden to seek the mercy of Christ, and this by Christians? For those too walked with Christ who by their clamor forbade the blind man to seek light (See Mark 10:46-52); but even amid the tumult of those contradicting, he hears the one crying out. Whence to this man it was answered: The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:25).
DNeG.1.55.65
55. 66. Porro si ab istis vel hoc impetramus, ut nondum baptizati implorent auxilium gratiae Salvatoris, non est hoc quidem parum adversus illam falsam defensionem tamquam sibi sufficientis naturae et potestatis liberi arbitrii; neque enim sibi sufficit qui dicit: Infelix homo! quis me liberabit (Rom 7, 24)? aut plenam libertatem habere dicendus est, qui se adhuc postulat liberari.
55. 66. Further, if we obtain even this from these men, that the not-yet-baptized should implore the help of the grace of the Savior, this indeed is no small thing against that false defense of nature as though sufficient for itself and of the power of free choice; for he does not suffice for himself who says: Wretched man! Who will set me free (Rom 7:24)? nor is he to be said to have full liberty who still asks to be set free.
DNeG.1.55.66
Gratia omnibus, baptizatis et non baptizatis, necessaria est.
Grace is necessary for all, the baptized and the unbaptized.
56. 66. Verumtamen etiam illud videamus, utrum illi qui baptizati sunt faciant bona quae volunt nulla carnis concupiscentia repugnante. Sed quid hinc dicamus, ipse commemorat, ubi concludens hunc locum: "Ut diximus" inquit "illud quo continetur: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum (Gal 5, 17), non de carnis substantia, sed de operibus sentire necesse est". Hoc et nos dicimus non de carnis substantia, sed de operibus dictum, quae veniunt de carnali concupiscentia, de peccato scilicet, de quo praecipit ut non regnet in nostro mortali corpore ad oboediendum desideriis eius (Cf. Rom 6, 12).
56. 66. Yet let us also see this, whether those who have been baptized do the good things they will with no carnal concupiscence resisting. But what we should say on this point he himself mentions, where, concluding this passage, he says: "As we have said, that statement: The flesh desires against the spirit (Gal 5:17), must of necessity be understood not of the substance of the flesh, but of the works." This we too say, that it was said not of the substance of the flesh, but of the works, which come from carnal concupiscence, that is, from sin, of which he commands that it should not reign in our mortal body, so that we obey its desires (See Rom 6:12).
DNeG.1.56.66
Lex timoris et spiritus dilectionis.
The law of fear and the spirit of love.
57. 67. Sed adtendat etiam ipse iam baptizatis fuisse dictum: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem, ut non ea quae vultis faciatis (Gal 5, 17). Et ne ab ipsa pugna desides faceret et per hanc sententiam laxamentum peccandi dedisse videretur, adiungit: Quodsi spiritu ducimini, non adhuc estis sub lege (Gal 5, 18).
57. 67. But let him too attend that it was said to those already baptized: The flesh desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, so that you do not do the things that you will (Gal 5:17). And lest he should make them slothful in that very struggle, and seem by this sentence to have given a license for sinning, he adds: But if you are led by the spirit, you are no longer under the law (Gal 5:18).
DNeG.1.57.67
Sub lege est enim, qui timore supplicii quod lex minatur, non amore iustitiae se sentit abstinere ab opere peccati, nondum liber nec alienus a voluntate peccandi. In ipsa enim voluntate reus est, qua mallet, si fieri posset, non esse quod timeat, ut libere faciat quod occulte desiderat.
For he is under the law who feels that he abstains from the work of sin through fear of the punishment that the law threatens, not through love of righteousness, not yet free nor estranged from the will of sinning. For in that very will he is guilty, by which he would prefer, if it could be, that there were nothing he fears, so that he might freely do what he secretly desires.
DNeG.1.57.67
Ergo si spiritu, inquit, ducimini, non adhuc estis sub lege (Gal 5, 18); utique lege, quae timorem incutit, non tribuit caritatem, quae caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris non perlegis litteram, sed per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis (Rom 5, 5). Haec est lex libertatis, non servitutis, quia caritatis utique, non timoris, de qua et Iacobus apostolus ait: Qui autem perspexerit in legem perfectam libertatis (Iac 1, 25). Unde et ille non quidem iam lege Dei terrebatur ut servus, sed condelectabatur ei secundum interiorem hominem (Cf. Rom 7, 22); videt tamen adhuc aliam legem in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae (Rom 7, 23). Ita et hic: Si spiritu, inquit, ducimini, non adhuc estis sub lege (Gal 5, 18). In quantum quisque spirito ducitur, non est sub lege, quia in quantum condelectatur legi Dei, non est sub legis timore, quia timor tormentum habet (1 Io 4, 18), non delectationem.
Therefore if you are led by the spirit, he says, you are no longer under the law (Gal 5:18)—surely the law that strikes fear, that does not bestow love, that love of God which has been poured out in our hearts not through the letter of the law, but through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5). This is the law of liberty, not of slavery, because it is the law of love, surely, not of fear, of which the apostle James too says: But he who has looked into the perfect law of liberty (Jas 1:25). Whence that man too was no longer terrified by the law of God as a slave, but delighted in it according to the inner man (See Rom 7:22); yet he still sees another law in his members fighting against the law of his mind (Rom 7:23). So here too: If you are led by the spirit, he says, you are no longer under the law (Gal 5:18). Insofar as anyone is led by the spirit, he is not under the law, because insofar as he delights in the law of God, he is not under the fear of the law, because fear has torment (1 John 4:18), not delight.
DNeG.1.57.67
Pelagiani tantam tribuunt potestatem voluntati ut pietati auferant orationem.
The Pelagians attribute such great power to the will that they take prayer away from piety.
58. 68. Proinde si recte sentimus, sicut pro membris sanatis gratias agere, ita pro sanandis orare debemus, ut absolutissima cui nihil addi possit sanitate, perfecta Dei suavitate, plena libertate perfruamur. Non enimabnuimus humanam naturam posse esse sine peccato aut ullo modo negare debemus perfici posse, quam proficere non negamus, sed gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Cf. Rom 7, 25); eo adiuvante fieri dicimus, ut iusta et beata sit, a quo creata est ut sit.
58. 68. Accordingly, if we are rightly minded, just as we ought to give thanks for our members that have been healed, so we ought to pray for those that are to be healed, that we may enjoy a most complete health, to which nothing can be added, a perfect sweetness of God, a full liberty. For we do not deny that human nature can be without sin, nor ought we in any way to deny that it can be perfected, which we do not deny can advance—but by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (See Rom 7:25); we say it comes to be just and blessed by the help of him by whom it was created to be.
DNeG.1.58.68
Facile itaque refellitur, quod a quibusdam sibi dicit opponi: "Diabolus nobis adversatur". Prorsus huic oblectioni eadem verba respondemus, quae ipse respondit: "Resistamus illi, et fugiet. Resistite, inquit beatus Apostolus, diabolo, et fugiet a vobis (Iac 4, 7). Unde animadvertendum quid possit his nocere quos fugit vel quam virtutem habere intellegendus sit, qui solis praevalere non resistentibus potest". Haec et mea verba sunt; verius enim dici non potest.
And so it is easily refuted, what he says is objected to him by certain people: "The devil is opposed to us." We answer this objection precisely with the same words that he himself answered: "Let us resist him, and he will flee. Resist, says the blessed Apostle, the devil, and he will flee from you (Jas 4:7). Whence it is to be noted what harm he can do to those whom he flees, or what power he is to be understood to have, who can prevail only against those who do not resist." These are my words too; for nothing truer can be said.
DNeG.1.58.68
Sed hoc interest inter nos et istos, quod nos etiam cum diabolo resistitur poscendum Dei adiutorium non solum non negamus, verum etiam praedicamus, isti autem tantam voluntati tribuunt potestatem, ut pietati auferant orationem. Nam utique ut diabolo resistamus et fugiat a nobis, ideo precantes dicimus: Ne nos inferas in temptationem (Mt 6, 13); ideo et admoniti sumus tamquam ab imperatore milites exhortante et dicente: Vigilate et orate, ne intretis in temptationem (Mc 14, 38).
But this is the difference between us and these men: that we, even when the devil is resisted, not only do not deny that the help of God is to be sought, but even proclaim it; whereas they attribute such great power to the will that they take prayer away from piety. For surely it is that we may resist the devil and that he may flee from us that, praying, we say: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13); for this too we have been admonished, as soldiers by a commander exhorting and saying: Watch and pray, that you enter not into temptation (Mark 14:38).
DNeG.1.58.68
Silentitium Pelagii de gratia.
Pelagius's silence about grace.
59. 69. Quod vero contra eos disputata qui dicunt: "Et quis nolit sine peccato esse, si hoc in hominis esset positum potestate?". Recte quidem disputat "hoc ipso eos confiteri non esse impossibile, quia hoc vel multi vel omnes volunt"; sed hoc unde sit possibile confiteatur, et pax est. Ipsa est enim gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 25), qua omnino iste nos orantes adiuvari, ut non peccemus, nusquam dicere voluit. Quod si forte latenter sentit, ignoscat aliter suspicantibus. Ipse enim hoc facit, qui cum tantam de hac re patiatur invidiam, sentire id vult et confiteri vel profiteri non vult.
59. 69. But as for his disputing against those who say: "And who would not wish to be without sin, if this lay within the power of a human being?" he disputes rightly indeed, "that by this very thing they confess it is not impossible, since either many or all wish it"; but let him confess whence this is possible, and there is peace. For it is the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:25), by which this man nowhere wished to say that we, praying, are helped that we may not sin. But if perhaps he secretly holds this, let him pardon those who suspect otherwise. For he himself does this, who, though he suffers such great ill will about this matter, wishes to hold it and is unwilling to confess or profess it.
DNeG.1.59.69
Quid erat magnum ut hoc diceret, cum praesertim sibi hoc tamquam ex persona adversariorum oppositum tractare et aperire susceperit? Cur illic solam naturam defendere voluit et quia ita homo creatus est, ut non peccare posset, si peccare noluisset, asseruit ac per hoc quod ita creatus est eam possibilitatem ad gratiam Dei pertinere definivit, qua possibilitate, si noluerit peccare, non peccat, et noluit aliquid dicere de eo, quod ipsa natura gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Cf. Rom 7, 25) vel sanatur, quia vitiata est, vel quia sibi non sufficit adiuvatur?
What was the great thing in saying this, especially since he undertook to treat and to open this objection put to him as it were from the person of his adversaries? Why did he there wish to defend nature alone, and assert that the human being was so created that he could not sin if he had been unwilling to sin, and on this account, because he was so created, define that this possibility pertains to the grace of God—the possibility by which, if he is unwilling to sin, he does not sin—and yet was unwilling to say anything about that whereby this very nature is either healed by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (See Rom 7:25), because it has been corrupted, or, because it does not suffice for itself, is helped?
DNeG.1.59.69
Certissima est perfectibilitas hominis per gratiam.
The perfectibility of the human being through grace is most certain.
60. 70. Utrum enim in hoc saeculo fuerit vel sit vel possit esse aliquis ita iuste vivens, ut nullum habeat omnino peccatum, potest esse aliqua quaestio inter veros piosque christianos; posse tamen esse certe post hanc vitam quisquis ambigit desipit. Sed ego nec de ista vita volo contendere. Quamquam enim mihi non videatur aliter intellegendum quod scriptum est: Non iustificabitur in conspectu tuo omnis vivens (Ps 142, 2) et si qua similia, tamen utinam possit ostendi velhaec testimonia melius aliter intellegi posse vel perfectam plenamque iustitiam, cui prorsus nihil addendum sit, et heri fuisse in aliquo, dum in isto corpore viveret, et hodie esse et eras futuram, dum tamen longe plures sint, qui cum sibi usque ad ultimum vitae huius diem necessarium esse non dubitent, ut veraciter dicant: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris (Mt 6, 12), spem suam tamen in Christo atque in eius promissionibus veram, certam, firmam esse confidant! Nullo tamen modo nisi adiuvante gratia salvatoris Christi crucifixi et dono Spiritus eius vel quoslibet ad plenissimam perfectionem vel quemquam ad qualemcumque provectum verae piaeque iustitiae pervenire qui negaverit, nescio utrum recte possint in qualiumcumque christianorum numero deputari.
60. 70. For whether in this age there has been, or is, or can be anyone living so righteously that he has no sin at all, there may be some question among true and pious Christians; yet whoever doubts that it can certainly be after this life is a fool. But I do not wish to contend even about this life. For although it does not seem to me that what is written should be understood otherwise: No living person will be justified in your sight (Ps 143 (142):2), and whatever is like it, yet would that it could be shown either that these testimonies can be better understood otherwise, or that perfect and full righteousness, to which nothing at all should be added, both was yesterday in someone while he lived in this body, and is today, and will be tomorrow—provided that there are far more who do not doubt that, up to the last day of this life, it is necessary for them to say truthfully: Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors (Matt 6:12), yet trust that their hope in Christ and in his promises is true, certain, and firm! Yet whoever denies that, only by the help of the grace of the Savior Christ crucified and the gift of his Spirit, either any persons whatever come to the fullest perfection, or anyone at all comes to any advance whatever of true and pious righteousness, I know not whether he can rightly be reckoned among the number of any sort of Christians.
DNeG.1.60.70
Testimonium anonymum Lactantii pro Pelagio.
An anonymous testimony of Lactantius for Pelagius.
61. 71. Ac per hoc et ea testimonia, quae non quidem de Scripturis canonicis, sed de quibusdam catholicorum tractatorum opusculis posuit volens occurrere his qui eum solum dicerent ista defendere, ita sunt media, ut neque contra nostram sententiam sint neque contra ipsius. In quibus nonnihil etiam de libris meis interponere voluit me quoque aliquem deputans, qui cum illis commemorari dignus viderer. Unde ingratus esse non debeo et familiariore affectu nolim ut erret, qui hunc mihi detulit honorem.
61. 71. And on this account those testimonies too, which he set down not indeed from the canonical Scriptures but from certain little works of Catholic writers, wishing to meet those who would say that he alone defends these things, are so neutral that they are neither against our opinion nor against his own. Among them he wished to insert something even from my books, reckoning me too to be someone who might seem worthy to be mentioned with them. Whence I ought not to be ungrateful, and with a friendlier affection I would not wish him to err who has paid me this honor.
DNeG.1.61.71
Prima enim quae posuit, quia nomen eius qui ea dixit non ibi legi, sive quia ille non scripsit sive quia codex quem misistis id aliqua forte mendositate non habuit pertractare quid opus est? Maxime quoniam me in huiusmodi quorumlibet hominum scriptis liberum (quia solis canonicis debeo sine ulla recusatione consensum), nihil movet quod de illius scriptis, cuius nomen non ibi inveni, ille posuit: "Oportuit magistrum doctoremque virtutis homini simillimum fieri, ut vincendo peccatum doceat hominem vincere posse peccatum (LATTANZIO, Div. instit. 4, 24)". Quomodo enim dictum sit, auctor huius sententiae viderit qualiter possit exponere, dum tamen nos minime dubitemus peccatum Christum non in se habuisse quod vinceret (Cf. 2 Cor 5, 21), qui natus est in similitudinem carnis peccati (Cf. Rom 8, 3), non in carne peccati.
For the first thing he set down—because the name of him who said it I did not read there, whether because he did not write it or because the manuscript you sent did not, perhaps through some defect, have it—what need to discuss? Especially since, being free in writings of this kind by whatever human beings (because to the canonical alone do I owe consent without any refusal), I am in no way moved by what he set down from the writings of him whose name I did not find there: "It was fitting that the master and teacher of virtue should be made most like to the human being, so that by conquering sin he might teach that the human being can conquer sin (Lactantius, Div. instit. 4, 24)." For in what way this was said, let the author of this opinion see how he can explain it, provided we least of all doubt that Christ had no sin in himself to conquer (See 2 Cor 5:21), who was born in the likeness of the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3), not in the flesh of sin.
DNeG.1.61.71
Aliud eiusdem ita posuit: "Et iterum: Ut desideriis carnis edomitis doceret non necessitatis esse peccare, sed propositi ac voluntatis (LATTANZIO, Div. instit. 4, 25)". Ego desiderio carnis, si non illicitarum concupiscentiarum hic dicuntur, accipio, sicuti est fames, sitis, refectio lassitudinis et si quid huiusmodi est. Per haec enim quidam, quamvis ea sint inculpabilia, in culpas decidunt; quod ab illo Salvatore abfuit, etiamsi haec in eo fuisse proptersimilitudinem carnis peccati Evangelio teste videamus.
Another saying of the same one he set down thus: "And again: That, with the desires of the flesh subdued, he might teach that to sin is not of necessity, but of purpose and will (Lactantius, Div. instit. 4, 25)." I take "the desire of the flesh," if illicit concupiscences are not here meant, as such things as hunger, thirst, the refreshment of weariness, and whatever is of this kind. For through these certain people, although they are blameless, fall into faults; which was far from that Savior, even if we see by the testimony of the Gospel that these were in him, on account of the likeness of the flesh of sin.
DNeG.1.61.71
Testimonium S. Ilarii.
A testimony of Saint Hilary.
62. 72. Beatus vero Hilarius, cuius haec verba posuit: "Non enim nisi spirito perfecti et immortalitate mutati, quod solis mundis corde dispositum est, hoc quod in Deo est immortale cernemus" (ILARIO, Comment. in Mt. 4, 7), quod dixit contra id quod dicimus vel quid istum adiuvet nescio, nisi quia posse esse hominem mundo corde testatus est. Quod quis negat? sed gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 25), non sola arbitrii libertate. Item quod eum dixisse commemorata "Quas Iob litteras legerat ut abstineret se ab omni re maligna? quia Deum sola mente vitiis non ammixta veneratur, Deum autem colere proprium iustitiae officium est (ILARIO, Tract. in Iob, fr. 2)".
62. 72. But the blessed Hilary, whose words he set down: "For only when made perfect in spirit and changed into immortality, which is appointed for the pure in heart alone, shall we see that which is immortal in God" (Hilary, Comment. in Mt. 4, 7)—what he said against what we say, or how it helps this man, I do not know, except that he testified that a human being can be pure in heart. Who denies it? But it is by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:25), not by liberty of choice alone. Likewise the saying he records as said by Hilary: "What letters had Job read that he should abstain from every evil thing? Because with mind alone, unmixed with vices, he venerated God; but to worship God is the proper office of righteousness (Hilary, Tract. in Iob, fr. 2)."
DNeG.1.62.72
Quid fecisset Iob dicit (Cf. Iob 1, 1) non quid in hoc saeculo perfecisset aut sine gratia Salvatoris, quem etiam prophetavit, vel fecisset vel perfecisset. Abstinet enim se ab omni re mala etiam qui habet peccatum quod in se regnare non sinit (Cf. Rom 6, 12), cui subrepit improbanda cogitatio, quam pervenire ad finem operis non permittit. Sed aliud est non habere peccatum, aliud non oboedire desideriis eius; aliud est implere quod praeceptum est: Non concupisces (Ex 20, 17) et aliud est per quemdam abstinentiae conatum saltem id agere quod item scriptum est: Post concupiscentias tuas non eas (Eccli 18, 30), nihil horum tamen scire se recte posse sine gratia SaIvatoris.
He says what Job did (See Job 1:1), not what he had perfected in this age, or what without the grace of the Savior—whom he too prophesied—he had either done or perfected. For even one who has sin, which he does not allow to reign in himself (See Rom 6:12), abstains from every evil thing, upon whom a thought to be reproved creeps in, which he does not permit to come to the end of a deed. But it is one thing not to have sin, another not to obey its desires; it is one thing to fulfill what is commanded: You shall not covet (Exod 20:17), and another by a certain effort of abstinence at least to do that which is likewise written: Do not go after your lusts (Sir 18:30)—and yet to know that one can rightly do none of these without the grace of the Savior.
DNeG.1.62.72
Facere est ergo iustitiam in vero Dei cultu cum interno concupiscentiae malo interna conflictatione pugnare, perficere autem omnino adversarium non habere. Nam qui pugnat et adhuc periclitatur, et aliquando percutitur, etiamsi non sternitur; qui autem non habet adversarium, plena pace laetatur. Et ipse esse sine peccato verissime dicitur, in quo nullum habitat peccatum, non qui per abstinentiam mali operis dicit: Iam non ego operor illud, sed id quod in me habitat peccatum (Rom 7, 20).
To do righteousness, then, in the true worship of God, is to fight with an inner struggle against the inner evil of concupiscence; but to perfect it is to have no adversary at all. For he who fights and is still in peril, and is sometimes struck, even if not laid low; but he who has no adversary rejoices in full peace. And he is most truly said to be without sin in whom no sin dwells, not he who by abstinence from an evil deed says: Now it is no longer I who do it, but the sin that dwells in me (Rom 7:20).
DNeG.1.62.72
Alia testimonia S. Ilarii.
Other testimonies of Saint Hilary.
62. 73. Nam et ipse Iob de peccatis suis non tacet et utique huic amico nostro merito placet humilitatem nullo modo in falsitatis parte ponendam; unde id quod Iob confitetur (Cf. Iob 1, 1), quia verax Dei cultor est, procul dubio veraciter confitetur. Et ipse Hilarius, cum locum psalmi exponeret, ubi scriptum est: Sprevisti omnes discedentes a iustificationibus tuis (Ps 118, 118), ait: "Si enim peccatores Deus sperneret, omnes utique sperneret, quia sine peccato nemo est. Sed spernit discedentes a se, quos apostatas vocat (ILARIO, In ps. 118, 15, 10)". Videtis quemadmodum non dixerit, quia sine peccato nemo fuerit, tamquam de praeteritis loquens, sed quod sine peccato nemo sit. Unde quidem, ut dixi, non contendo; quisquis enim non cedit Ioanni apostolo, qui nec ipse ait: Si dixerimus quia peccatum (1 Io 1, 8) "non habuimus", sed non habemus, episcopo Hilario quomodo cessurus est? Pro gratia Christi clamo, sine qua nemo iustificatur, tamquam sufficiente naturae libero arbitrio. Immo ipse pro ea clamat; ei cedatur dicenti: Sine me nihil potestis facere (Io 15, 5).
62. 73. For Job himself too is not silent about his sins, and surely it rightly pleases this friend of ours that humility is in no way to be placed on the side of falsehood; whence that which Job confesses (See Job 1:1), since he is a truthful worshiper of God, without doubt he confesses truthfully. And Hilary himself, when he was expounding a place of the psalm where it is written: You have despised all who depart from your justifications (Ps 119 (118):118), says: "For if God despised sinners, he would surely despise all, since no one is without sin. But he despises those who depart from him, whom he calls apostates (Hilary, In ps. 118, 15, 10)." You see how he did not say that no one has been without sin, as though speaking of past things, but that no one is without sin. About which indeed, as I have said, I do not contend; for whoever does not yield to the apostle John, who himself does not say: If we say that we (1 John 1:8) "had no sin," but "have"—how will he yield to bishop Hilary? I cry out for the grace of Christ, without which no one is justified, against free choice as though sufficient for nature. Indeed he himself cries out for it; let him be yielded to who says: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5).
DNeG.1.62.73
Testimonium S. Ambrosii.
A testimony of Saint Ambrose.
63. 74. Sanctus autem Ambrosius revera in eo loco, quem iste commemorat (AMBROGIO, Expos. in Ev. Lc 1, 17), illis resistit qui dicunt hominem non esse posse sine peccato in hac vita. Ut enim ea diceret, accepit occasionem de Zacharia et Elisabeth, quod in Evangelio commemorati sunt ambulasse in omnibus iustificationibus legis sine querella (Cf. Lc 1, 6). Numquid tamen negat gratia Dei fieri per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 25)? Ex qua fide etiam ante eius passionem iustos vixisse non dubium est, qui praestat Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis, per quem diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris (Cf. Rom 5, 5), qua una iusti sunt quicumque sunt iusti. Quem Spiritum memoratus episcopus etiam precibus impetrandum ammonet (ita illi voluntas divinitus non adiuta non sufficit), ubi in hymno suo dicit:
63. 74. But saint Ambrose, truly, in that place which this man mentions (Ambrose, Expos. in Ev. Lc 1, 17), resists those who say that a human being cannot be without sin in this life. For, that he might say these things, he took occasion from Zechariah and Elizabeth, because in the Gospel they are mentioned as having walked in all the justifications of the law without reproach (See Luke 1:6). Yet does he deny that this comes to be by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:25)? By which faith it is not doubted that the righteous lived even before his passion, he who furnishes the Holy Spirit who has been given to us, through whom love is poured out in our hearts (See Rom 5:5), by which alone they are righteous, whoever are righteous. Which Spirit the said bishop admonishes is to be obtained even by prayers (so the will, not divinely helped, does not suffice for him), where in his hymn he says:
DNeG.1.63.74
Votisque praestat sedulis
Sanctum mereri Spiritum 256.
And he grants to diligent prayers
to merit the Holy Spirit.
DNeG.1.63.74
DNeG.1.63.74
Alia testimonia S. Ambrosii.
Other testimonies of Saint Ambrose.
63. 75. Commemorabo et ego de hoc ipso opere sancti Ambrosii aliquid, ex quo iste commemoravit quod commemorandum putavit: "Visum est, inquit, mihi (Cf. Lc 1, 3). Potest non soli visum esse, quod visum sibi esse declarat. Non enim voluntate tantum humana visum est, sed sicut placuit ei, qui in me, inquit, loquitur Christus (2 Cor 13, 3), qui ut id quod bonum est nobis quoque bonum videri possit operatur; quem enim miseratur et vocat. Et ideo qui Christum sequitur potest interrogatus cur esse voluerit christianus respondere: Visum est mihi. Quod cum dicit, non negat Deo visum; a Deo enim praeparatur voluntas hominum (Prov 8, 35). Ut enim Deus honorificetur a sancto, Dei gratia est (AMBROGIO, Expos. in Ev. Lc 1, 10; cf. AUG., De dono persev. 19, 49)".
63. 75. I too will mention something from this same work of saint Ambrose, from which this man mentioned what he thought should be mentioned: "It seemed good, he says, to me (See Luke 1:3). It can have seemed good not to him alone, what he declares seemed good to him. For it seemed good not by human will only, but as it pleased him, who, he says, speaks in me, Christ (2 Cor 13:3), who works that what is good may seem good to us also; for whom he has mercy on, he also calls. And therefore he who follows Christ can, when asked why he wished to be a Christian, answer: It seemed good to me. When he says this, he does not deny that it seemed good to God; for by God the will of human beings is prepared (Prov 8:35). For that God may be honored by a holy person is the grace of God (Ambrose, Expos. in Ev. Lc 1, 10; see Aug., De dono persev. 19, 49)."
DNeG.1.63.75
Ecce quid iste sapiat, si verbis Ambrosii delectatur, quod a Deo praeparatur voluntas hominum, et nulla vel non magna questio est, quis vel quando perficiatur, dum tamen sine Christi gratia id ipsum fieri posse minime dubitetur. Deinde quantum erat, ut adtenderet iste unum versum de Ambrosii verbis quae posuit! Cum enim ille dixisset: "Nam cum Ecclesia ex gentibus, hoc est, ex peccatoribus, congregata sit, quomodo ex maculatis immaculata potest esse, nisi primo per Christi gratiam quod abluta delicto sit, deinde quod per qualitatem non peccandi abstineat a delictis?".
Behold what this man would hold, if he delights in the words of Ambrose: that by God the will of human beings is prepared, and that there is no question, or no great question, who is perfected or when, provided it be least of all doubted that this very thing can come to be without the grace of Christ. Then, how much it would have been for this man to attend to one verse from the words of Ambrose that he set down! For when Ambrose had said: "For since the Church is gathered from the gentiles, that is, from sinners, how can she be immaculate from the spotted, unless first, by the grace of Christ, because she has been washed from misdeed, and then because, by the quality of not sinning, she abstains from misdeeds?"
DNeG.1.63.75
Ille addidit, quod iste apparet cur addere noluerit. Ait namque ille: "Nec ab initio immaculata (humanae enim hoc impossibile naturae), sed per Dei gratiam et qualitatem sui, quia iam non peccat, fit ut immaculata videatur (AMBROGIO, Expos. in Ev. Lc 1, 17)".
Ambrose added that which it is clear why this man was unwilling to add. For he says: "Nor immaculate from the beginning (for this is impossible to human nature), but by the grace of God and by her own quality, because she now does not sin, it comes about that she appears immaculate (Ambrose, Expos. in Ev. Lc 1, 17)."
DNeG.1.63.75
Haec verba iste cur non addiderit quis non intellegat? Hoc agitur utique nunc in hocsaeculo, ut ad istam, quam omnes sancti cupiunt, immaculatissimam puritatem Ecclesia sancta perveniat, quae in futuro saeculo neque aliquo malorum hominum sibi permixto neque aliqua in se lege peccati resistente legi mentis (Cf. Rom 7, 23) ducat mundissimam vitam in aeternitate divina. Tamen adtendat iste quid secundum Scripturas Ambrosius episcopus dixerit: "Nec ab initio immaculata; humanae enim hoc impossibile naturae (AMBROGIO, Expos. in Ev. Lc 1, 17)". Utique enim "ab initio" dicit, quo ex Adam nascimur. Nam et ipse Adam immaculatus procul dubio factus est; sed in eis, qui sunt natura filii irae (Cf. Eph 2, 3) ducentes ex illo quod vitiatum est in illo, ab initio esse immaculatos humanae naturae impossibile definivit.
Why this man did not add these words, who does not understand? For this is what is being done now, in this age: that holy Church may come to that most immaculate purity which all the saints desire, that in the age to come, with no evil human beings mingled with her, and no law of sin in her resisting the law of the mind (See Rom 7:23), she may lead a most pure life in the divine eternity. Yet let this man attend to what, according to the Scriptures, bishop Ambrose said: "Nor immaculate from the beginning; for this is impossible to human nature (Ambrose, Expos. in Ev. Lc 1, 17)." For surely he says "from the beginning," by which we are born from Adam. For Adam himself too was without doubt made immaculate; but in those who are by nature children of wrath (See Eph 2:3), deriving from him what was corrupted in him, he has defined that to be immaculate from the beginning is impossible to human nature.
DNeG.1.63.75
Testimonia S. Ioannis Chrysostomi.
Testimonies of Saint John Chrysostom.
64. 76. Item Ioannes Constantinopolitanus episcopus, cuius posuit sententiam, "dicit peccatum non esse substantiam, sed actum malignum". Quis hoc negat? "Et quia non est naturale, ideo contra illud legem datam, et quod de arbitrii libertate descendit (Cf. GIROLAMO, Ep. 133, 3)". Etiam hoc quis negat? Sed non id agitur de humana natura quae in hac vita est; sed agitur de gratia Dei, qua sanatur per medicum Christum, quo non indigeret, si sana esset, quae ab isto tamquam sana vel tamquam sibi sufficiente voluntatis arbitrio posse non peccare defenditur.
64. 76. Likewise John, bishop of Constantinople, whose opinion he set down, "says that sin is not a substance, but a malignant act." Who denies this? "And because it is not natural, therefore a law was given against it, and it descends from the liberty of choice (See Jerome, Ep. 133, 3)." This too, who denies it? But it is not human nature, such as it is in this life, that is at issue; rather it is the grace of God that is at issue, by which it is healed through Christ the physician, of whom it would have no need if it were sound—the nature that by this man is defended as though sound, or as though sufficient for itself by the choice of the will, as able not to sin.
DNeG.1.64.76
Testimonia Xixti.
Testimonies of Xystus.
64. 77. Quis item christianus ignorat, quod beatissimum Xystum Romanae Ecclesiae episcopum et Domini martyrem dixisse commemorat, "Quia libertatem arbitrii sui permisit hominibus Deus, ut pure et sine peccato viventes similes fiant Deo"? Sed ad ipsum arbitrium pertinet vocantem audire et credere et ab eo in quem credit non peccandi adiutorium postulare. Nam utique cum dicit "similis fiant Deo", per caritatem Dei futuri sunt similes Deo, quae diffusa est in cordibus nostris non naturae possibilitate nec libero arbitrio quod est in nobis, sed per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis (Cf. Rom 5, 5).
64. 77. Again, what Christian is ignorant of that which he records the most blessed Xystus, bishop of the Roman Church and martyr of the Lord, to have said: "That God permitted to human beings the liberty of their own choice, so that, living purely and without sin, they might become like to God"? But it pertains to that very choice to hear the one who calls and to believe, and to ask of him in whom one believes the help of not sinning. For surely when he says "they may become like to God," they are to become like to God through the love of God, which has been poured out in our hearts not by the possibility of nature nor by the free choice that is in us, but by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (See Rom 5:5).
DNeG.1.64.77
Et quod dicit idem martyr: "Templum sanctum est Deo mens pura et altare optimum est ei cor mundum et sine peccato", quis nescit ad istam perfectionem perducendum cor mundum, dum interior homo renovatur de die in diem (Cf. 2 Cor 4, 16), non tamen sine gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Cf. Rom 7, 25)?
And as for what the same martyr says: "A pure mind is a holy temple to God, and a clean heart, without sin, is the best altar to him," who does not know that a clean heart is to be led through to this perfection, while the inner man is renewed from day to day (See 2 Cor 4:16), yet not without the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (See Rom 7:25)?
DNeG.1.64.77
Item quod ait ipse: "Vir castus et sine peccato potestatem accepit a Deo esse filius Dei", utique ammonuit, ne cum quisque factus fuerit ita castus et sine peccato (quod ubi et quando in eo perticiatur nonnulla quaestio est, sed inter pios bene quaeritur, inter quos tamen constat fieri posse et sine mediatore Dei et hominum homine Christo Iesu fieri non posse (Cf. 1 Tim 2, 5)),
Likewise, what he himself says: "A chaste man, without sin, has received from God the power to be a son of God," surely he admonished that, when anyone has been made so chaste and without sin (where and when this is perfected in him there is some question, but it is well asked among the pious, among whom, nevertheless, it is agreed that it can come to be, and cannot come to be without the mediator of God and human beings, the man Christ Jesus (See 1 Tim 2:5)),
DNeG.1.64.77
tamen, ut dicere coeperam, prudenter Xystus ammonuit, ne cum fuerit quisque talis factus et per hoc recte inter Dei filios deputatus, putetur ipsius, fuisse potestatis, quam per gratiam accepit aDeo, cum eam non haberet in natura iam vitiata atque depravata,
yet, as I had begun to say, Xystus prudently admonished, lest, when anyone has been made such and on this account rightly reckoned among the sons of God, it be thought to have been of his own power, which he received through grace from God, since he did not have it in a nature already corrupted and depraved,
DNeG.1.64.77
sicut in Evangelio legitur: Quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri (Cf. Io 1, 12); quod utique non erant per naturam nec omnino essent, nisi cum recipiendo accepissent per eius gratiam huiusmodi potestatem. Haec est potestas, quam sibi vindicat fortitudo caritatis, quae non est in nobis nisi per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis (Cf. Rom 5, 5).
as is read in the Gospel: But to as many as received him, he gave the power to become sons of God (See John 1:12); which surely they were not by nature, nor would they be at all, unless, by receiving, they had received this kind of power through his grace. This is the power that the fortitude of love claims for itself, which is not in us except through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (See Rom 5:5).
DNeG.1.64.77
Testimonia Hieronymi.
Testimonies of Jerome.
65. 78. Quod vero presbyter venerabilis Hieronymus dixit in his, quae illum dixisse commemorat, cum exponeret quod scriptum est: Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt (Mt 5, 8): "Quos non arguit conscientia ulla peccati", et adiecit: "Mundus mundo corde conspicitur, templum Dei non potest esse pollutum (GIROLAMO, Comment. in Ev. Mt 1, 5, 8)". Hoc utique agitur in nobis conando, laborando, orando, impetrando, ut ad illam perfectionem, in qua possimus Deum mundo corde conspicere, eius gratia perducamur per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Cf. Rom 7, 25).Item quod ait a memorato dictum esse presbytero: "Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad virtutem nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur; alioquin ubi necessitas, nec corona est" (GIROLAMO, Contra Iovinianum 2, 3), quis non agnoscat, quis non toto corde suscipiat, quis aliter conditam humanam neget esse naturam? Sed in recte faciendo ideo nullum est vinculum necessitatis, quia libertas est caritatis.
65. 78. But as for what the venerable presbyter Jerome said, among the things that this man records him to have said, when he was expounding what is written: Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God (Matt 5:8): "Whom no conscience of any sin accuses," and added: "The pure is seen by the pure heart; the temple of God cannot be polluted (Jerome, Comment. in Ev. Mt 1, 5, 8)." This surely is being done in us by striving, laboring, praying, obtaining, that by his grace we may be led through to that perfection in which we can behold God with a pure heart, through Jesus Christ our Lord (See Rom 7:25). Likewise, what he records the said presbyter to have said: "God created us of free choice, and we are drawn neither to virtue nor to vices by necessity; otherwise, where there is necessity, there is no crown" (Jerome, Contra Iovinianum 2, 3)—who does not acknowledge it, who does not receive it with his whole heart, who denies that human nature was otherwise created? But in doing rightly there is therefore no bond of necessity, because there is the liberty of love.
DNeG.1.65.78
Tristis necessitas peccandi.
The sad necessity of sinning.
66. 79. Redi ergo ad apostolicam sententiam: Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis (Rom 5, 5). A quo, nisi ab illo qui ascendit in altum, captivavit captivitatem, dedit dona hominibus (Eph 4, 8)? Quod autem ex vitiis naturae, non ex conditione naturae sit quaedam peccandi necessitas, audiat homo, atque ut eadem necessitas non sit discat Deo dicere: De necessitatibus meis educ me (Ps 24, 17), quia et in huiusmodi oratione certamen est adversus temptatorem de ipsa contra nos necessitate pugnantem, ac per hoc opitulante gratia per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum (Cf. Rom 7, 25) et mala necessitas removebitur et libertas plena tribuetur.
66. 79. Return, then, to the apostolic sentence: The love of God has been poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5). By whom, if not by him who ascended on high, led captivity captive, and gave gifts to human beings (Eph 4:8)? But that there is a certain necessity of sinning from the faults of nature, not from the condition of nature, let the human being hear; and, that the same necessity may be no more, let him learn to say to God: Bring me out of my necessities (Ps 25 (24):17), because even in prayer of this kind there is a struggle against the tempter who fights against us out of that very necessity, and on this account, with grace helping through our Lord Jesus Christ (See Rom 7:25), both the evil necessity will be removed and full liberty bestowed.
DNeG.1.66.79
Testimonia quae Pelagius pro se protulerat ex scriptis ipsius Augustini.
Testimonies that Pelagius had brought forward for himself from the writings of Augustine himself.
67. 80. Veniamus ad nos. "Item, inquit, Augustinus episcopus in libris De libero arbitrio: Quaecumque ista causa est voluntatis, si non potest ei resisti, sine peccato ei ceditur; si autem potest, non ei cedatur, et non peccabitur. An forte fallit incautum? Ergo caveat, ne fallatur. An tanta fallacia est, ut caveri omnino non possit? Si ita est, nulla ergo peccata sunt. Quis enim peccat in eo quod caveri nullo modo potest? Peccatur autem; caveri igitur potest (AUG., De lib. arb. 3, 18, 50)". Agnosco, verba mea sunt; sed etiam ipse dignetur agnoscere superius cuncta quae dicta sunt.
67. 80. Let us come to ourselves. "Likewise," he says, "Augustine the bishop in the books On Free Will: Whatever this cause of the will is, if it cannot be resisted, it is yielded to without sin; but if it can, let it not be yielded to, and there will be no sin. Or does it perhaps deceive the unwary? Then let him beware lest he be deceived. Or is the deception so great that it cannot at all be guarded against? If it is so, then there are no sins. For who sins in that which can in no way be guarded against? But sin is committed; therefore it can be guarded against (Aug., De lib. arb. 3, 18, 50)." I acknowledge them: they are my words; but let him too deign to acknowledge all the things that were said above.
DNeG.1.67.80
De gratia quippe Dei agitur, quae nobis per Mediatorem medicina opitulatur, non de impossibilitate iustitiae. Potest ergo ei causae, quaecumque illa est, resisti, potest plane. Nam inhoc adiutorium postulamus dicentes: Ne nos inferas in temptationem (Mt 6, 13); quod adiutorium non posceremus, si resisti nullo modo posse crederemus. Potest peccatum caveri, sed opitulante illo, qui non potest falli. Nam et hoc ipsum ad cavendum peccatum pertinet, si veraciter dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris (Mt 6, 12). Duobus enim modis etiam in corpore cavetur morbi malum: et ut non accidat et ut, si acciderit, cito sanetur. Ut non accidat, caveamus dicendo: Ne nos inferas in temptationem (Mt 6, 13); ut cito sanetur, caveamus dicendo: Dimitte nobis debita nostra (Mt 6, 12). Sive ergo immineat sive insit, caveri igitur potest.
For the matter at issue is the grace of God, which helps us as a medicine through the mediator, not the impossibility of righteousness. That cause, then, whatever it is, can be resisted—it plainly can. For it is on this account that we ask help, saying: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13); which help we would not seek if we believed it could in no way be resisted. Sin can be guarded against, but with the help of him who cannot be deceived. For this very thing too pertains to guarding against sin, if we say truthfully: Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors (Matt 6:12). For in two ways too the evil of disease is guarded against in the body: both that it may not happen, and that, if it has happened, it may be quickly healed. That it may not happen, let us guard against by saying: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13); that it may be quickly healed, let us guard against by saying: Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12). Whether, then, it threatens or is present, it can therefore be guarded against.
DNeG.1.67.80
Explicat Augustinus suam sententiam contra Pelagium.
Augustine explains his opinion against Pelagius.
67. 81. Sed ut non tantum illi, verum etiam his, qui, eosdem libros meos, quos iste legit, De libero arbitrio non legerunt atque illis non lectis hunc forsitan legunt, de hac re sententia mea satis appareat, ex ipsis libris commemorare me oportet, quod iste si sentiret atque in suis litteris poneret nulla inter nos de hac re controversia remaneret (Cf. AUG., Retract. 1, 9, 5). Continuo quippe post verba mea, quae iste commemoravit quod occurrere poterat ipse subieci et, quantum potui, pertraetavi dicens: "Et tamen etiam per ignorantiam facta quaedam improbantur et corrigenda iudicantur, sicut in divinis auctoritatibus legimus (AUG., De lib. arb. 3, 18, 51)". Atque hinc adhibitis exemplis etiam de infirmitate locutus sum (AUG., De lib. arb. 3, 18, 51) dicens: "Sunt etiam necessitate facta improbanda, ubi vult homo recte facere et non potest. Nam unde sunt illae voces: Non enim quod volo facio bonum, sed quod odi malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 15. 19)?".
67. 81. But, so that my opinion on this matter may sufficiently appear, not only to that man but also to those who have not read those same books of mine that he read, On Free Will, and who, not having read them, perhaps read this, I must mention from those very books what, if this man held it and set it down in his writings, no controversy on this matter would remain between us (See Aug., Retract. 1, 9, 5). For immediately after my words, which this man mentioned, I myself subjoined what could be objected, and, as much as I could, I dealt with it, saying: "And yet certain things done even through ignorance are disapproved and judged to be in need of correction, as we read in the divine authorities (Aug., De lib. arb. 3, 18, 51)." And from this point, with examples adduced, I spoke also of weakness (Aug., De lib. arb. 3, 18, 51), saying: "There are also things done by necessity that are to be disapproved, where a human being wishes to do rightly and cannot. For whence are those voices: For I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I hate, this I do (Rom 7:15. 19)?"
DNeG.1.67.81
Atque aliis in hac sententia commemoratis testimoniis divinorum eloquiorum (AUG., De lib. arb. 3, 18, 51): "Sed haec, inquam, omnia hominum sunt voces ex illa mortis damnatione venientium. Nam si non est ista poena hominis, sed natura, nulla ista peccata sunt".
And with other testimonies of the divine words mentioned in this sentence (Aug., De lib. arb. 3, 18, 51): "But all these," I said, "are the voices of human beings coming from that condemnation of death. For if this is not the punishment of the human being, but his nature, then these are no sins."
DNeG.1.67.81
Deinde paulo post (AUG., De lib. arb. 3, 18, 51): "Relinquitur ergo, inquam, ut haec poena iusta de damnatione hominis veniat. Nec mirandum est quod vel ignorando non habet arbitrium liberum voluntatis ad eligendum quid recte faciat vel resistente carnali consuetudine, quae violentia mortalis successionis quodam modo naturaliter inolevit, videat quid recte faciendum sit et velit nec possit implere. Illa est enim peccati poena iustissima, ut amittat quisque quo bene uti noluit, cum sine ulla posset difficultate, si vellet.
Then a little later (Aug., De lib. arb. 3, 18, 51): "It remains, then," I said, "that this just punishment comes from the condemnation of the human being. Nor is it to be wondered at that either, through ignorance, he does not have the free choice of the will to choose what he may do rightly, or, with carnal habit resisting—which by the violence of mortal succession has in a manner grown ingrained naturally—he sees what should rightly be done and wills it, and cannot accomplish it. For that is the most just punishment of sin, that each one lose what he was unwilling to use well, when he could without any difficulty have done so if he had willed.
DNeG.1.67.81
Id est autem, ut qui sciens recte non facit, amittat scire quid rectum sit, et qui recte facere cum posset noluit, amittat posse cum velit. Nam sunt revera omni peccanti animae duo ista poenalia, ignorantia et difficultas. Ex ignorantia dehonestat error, ex difficultate cruciatus affligit.
That is to say, that he who, knowing, does not do rightly, lose the knowledge of what is right, and that he who, being able to do rightly, was unwilling, lose the power when he wills it. For there are indeed these two penal things for every sinning soul: ignorance and difficulty. From ignorance, error disgraces; from difficulty, torment afflicts.
DNeG.1.67.81
Sed approbare falsa pro veris, ut erret invitus, et resistente atque torquente dolore carnalis vinculi non posse a libidinosis operibus temperare non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati. Cum autem de libera voluntate recte faciendi loquimur, de illa scilicet, in qua homo factus est, loquimur".
But to approve false things for true, so that one errs unwillingly, and, with the pain of the carnal bond resisting and torturing, not to be able to refrain from lustful works, is not the nature of the human being as established, but the punishment of the condemned. But when we speak of the free will to do rightly, we are speaking, namely, of that in which the human being was made."
DNeG.1.67.81
Hinc iam hominibus de ipsius ignorantiae difficultatisque in prolemprimi hominis traiectis vitiis atque transfusis velut iustam querellam deponentibus ita responsum est (AUG., De lib. arb. 3, 19, 53): "Quibus breviter, inquam, respondetur, ut quiescant et adversus Deum murmurare desistant. Recte enim fortasse quererentur, si erroris et libidinis nullus hominum victor exsisteret; cum vero ubique sit praesens, qui multis modis per creaturam sibi Domino servientem aversum vocet, doceat credentem, consoletur sperantem, diligentem adhortetur, conantem adiuvet, exaudiat deprecantem, non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod invitus ignoras, sed quod neglegis quaerere quod ignoras; neque illud quod vulnerata membra non colligis, sed quod volentem sanare contemnis".
From here, then, to human beings laying down as it were a just complaint about the faults of ignorance and difficulty transmitted and poured into the offspring of the first man, it was thus answered (Aug., De lib. arb. 3, 19, 53): "To whom," I said, "it is briefly answered, that they may be quiet and cease to murmur against God. For perhaps they would rightly complain, if no human being existed as victor over error and lust; but since he is everywhere present who in many ways, through the creature serving him as Lord, calls back the one turned away, teaches the believer, consoles the one who hopes, exhorts the one who loves, helps the one who strives, and hears the one who entreats, it is not reckoned to you as a fault that you are unwillingly ignorant, but that you neglect to seek what you do not know; nor that you do not bind up your wounded members, but that you despise him who is willing to heal you."
DNeG.1.67.81
Ita et exhortatus sum, quantum potui, ad recte vivendum et gratiam Dei non evacuavi, sine qua natura humana iam contenebrata atque vitiata illuminari non potest et sanari. De qua re cum istis tota vertitur quaestio, ne gratiam Dei, quae est in Christo Iesu Domino nostro, perversa naturae defensione frustremus.
Thus I both exhorted, as much as I could, to living rightly, and did not empty the grace of God, without which human nature, now darkened and corrupted, cannot be enlightened and healed. And about this matter the whole question with these men turns, lest by a perverse defense of nature we make void the grace of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.
DNeG.1.67.81
De qua natura item paulo post dixi (AUG., De lib. arb. 3, 19, 54): "Etiam ipsam naturam aliter dicimus, cum proprie loquimur naturam hominis in qua primum in suo genere inculpabilis factus est, aliter istam, in qua ex illius damnati poena et ignari et carni subditi nascimur. Iuxta quem modum dicit Apostolus: Fuimus enim et nos naturaliter filii irae sicut et ceteri (Eph 2, 3)".
About which nature, likewise, a little later I said (Aug., De lib. arb. 3, 19, 54): "We speak of nature in one way when we speak properly of the nature of the human being in which he was first made blameless in his kind, and in another of this nature in which, from the punishment of that condemned one, we are born both ignorant and subject to the flesh. According to which mode the Apostle says: For we too were by nature children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:3)."
DNeG.1.67.81
Quomodo hortandi sunt homines ad fidem, ad paenitentiam, ad profectum.
How human beings are to be exhorted to faith, to repentance, to advancement.
68. 82. Si ergo volumus "animos ad recte vivendum frigidos et pigros christianis exhortationibus excitare et accendere", primitus exhortemur ad fidem, qua christiani fiant et eius nomini subiciantur, sine quo salvi esse non possunt. Si autem iam christiani sunt et recte vivere neglegunt, verberentur terroribus et praemiorum laudibus erigantur; ita sane, ut non solum ad bonas actiones, verum etiam ad pias orationes eos exhortari meminerimus atque hac instruere sanitate doctrinae, ut et illinc gratias agant, cum instituerint bene vivere, quod aliquid sine difficultate fecerint, et ubi difficultatem aliquam sentiunt, fidelissimis et perseverantissimis precibus et misericordiae promptis operibus facilitatem a Domino impetrare persistant.
68. 82. If, then, we wish "to rouse and kindle by Christian exhortations minds cold and slothful toward living rightly," let us first exhort to faith, by which they may become Christians and be made subject to his name, without which they cannot be saved. But if they are already Christians and neglect to live rightly, let them be lashed with terrors and lifted up by the praises of rewards; yet so that we remember to exhort them not only to good actions but also to pious prayers, and to instruct them with this soundness of doctrine, that both from that quarter they may give thanks, when they have begun to live well, because they have done something without difficulty, and where they feel any difficulty, they may persist, by most faithful and most persevering prayers and by works of mercy promptly performed, in obtaining facility from the Lord.
DNeG.1.68.82
Sic autem proficientes ubi et quando plenissima iustitia perficiantur non nimis curo; ubicumque autem et quandocumque perfecti fuerint, non nisi gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Cf. Rom 7, 25) perfici posse confirmo. Sane quando liquido cognoverint nullum peccatum se habere, non se dicant habere peccatum, ne veritas in eis non sit (1 Io 1, 8), sicut in eis veritas non est, qui cum habeant non habere se dicunt.
But where and when those thus advancing are perfected in fullest righteousness, I am not overly anxious; but wherever and whenever they have been made perfect, I affirm that they cannot be perfected except by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (See Rom 7:25). Indeed, when they have clearly come to know that they have no sin, let them not say that they have sin, lest the truth be not in them (1 John 1:8), just as the truth is not in those who, when they have it, say that they do not.
DNeG.1.68.82
Nihil impossibile Deus praecipit, quia omnia facilia sunt caritati.
God commands nothing impossible, because all things are easy to love.
69. 83. Valde autem "bona sunt praecepta", si legitime his utamur (Cf. 1 Tim 1, 8). Eo quippe ipso quo firmissime creditur "Deum iustumet bonum impossibilia non potuisse praecipere", hinc admonemur et in facilibus quid agamus et in difficilibus quid petamus. Omnia quippe fiunt facilia caritati, cui uni Christi sarcina levis est (Mt 9, 30) aut ea una est sarcina ipsa quae levis est.
69. 83. "The precepts" are exceedingly "good, if we use them lawfully (See 1 Tim 1:8)." For by the very fact that it is most firmly believed "that God, being just and good, could not have commanded the impossible," from this we are admonished both what to do in things easy and what to ask in things difficult. For all things become easy to love, to which alone the burden of Christ is light (Matt 11:30), or that burden alone is the one that is light.
DNeG.1.69.83
Secundum hoc dictum est: Et praecepta eius gravia non sunt (Io 5, 30), ut cui gravia sunt, consideret non potuisse divinitus dici: Gravia non sunt, nisi quia potest esse cordis affectus cui gravia non sunt, et petat quo destituitur, ut impleat quod iubetur.
According to this it was said: And his commandments are not heavy (1 John 5:3), so that he to whom they are heavy may consider that it could not have been said divinely: They are not heavy, except because there can be an affection of the heart to which they are not heavy, and let him ask for that in which he is wanting, that he may fulfill what is commanded.
DNeG.1.69.83
Et quod dicitur ad Israel in Deuteronomio, si pie, si sancte, si spiritaliter intellegatur, hoc idem significat, quia utique, cum hoc testimonium commemorasset Apostolus: Prope te est verbum in ore tuo et in corde tuo (Deut 30, 14; Rom 10, 8) (quod hic habet "in manibus tuis"; in corde sunt enim spiritales manus), hoc est, inquit, verbum fidei quod praedicamus (Rom 10, 8).
And what is said to Israel in Deuteronomy, if it be understood piously, holily, spiritually, signifies this same thing; for surely, when the Apostle had mentioned this testimony: The word is near you, in your mouth and in your heart (Deut 30:14; Rom 10:8) (which here has "in your hands"; for in the heart are the spiritual hands), this is, he says, the word of faith that we preach (Rom 10:8).
DNeG.1.69.83
Conversus ergo quisque, sicut ibi praecipitur, ad Dominum Deum suum ex toto corde suo et ex tota anima sua (Cf. Deut 20, 2) mandatum Dei non habebit grave. Quomodo est enim grave, cum sit dilectionis mandatum? Aut enim quisque non diligit, et ideo grave est, aut diligit, et grave esse non potest. Diligit autem, si, quod illic ammonetur Israel, conversus fuerit ad Dominum Deum suum ex toto corde suo et ex tota anima sua. Mandatum, inquit, novum do vobis, ut vos invicem diligatis (Io 13, 14); et: Qui diligit proximum, legem implevit (Rom 13, 8. 10); et: Plenitudo legis caritas (Rom 13, 10). Secundum hoc et illud dictum est: Si ambularent semitas bonas, invenissent utique semitas iustitiae leves (Prov 2, 20). Quomodo ergo dicitur: Propter verba labiorum tuorum ego custodivi vias duras (Ps 16, 4), nisi quia utrumque verum est? Durae sunt timori, leves amori.
Each one, then, turned, as is there commanded, to the Lord his God with his whole heart and with his whole soul (See Deut 30:2), will not have the commandment of God heavy. For how is it heavy, when it is the commandment of love? For either one does not love, and so it is heavy, or one loves, and it cannot be heavy. But he loves, if, as Israel is there admonished, he has been turned to the Lord his God with his whole heart and with his whole soul. A new commandment, he says, I give you, that you love one another (John 13:34); and: He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law (Rom 13:8. 10); and: Love is the fullness of the law (Rom 13:10). According to this that too was said: If they had walked in the good paths, they would surely have found the paths of righteousness easy (Prov 2:20). How, then, is it said: For the words of your lips I have kept hard ways (Ps 17 (16):4), except because both are true? They are hard to fear, easy to love.
DNeG.1.69.83
Caritatis gradus faciunt gradus sanctitatis.
The degrees of love make the degrees of holiness.
70. 84. Caritas ergo inchoata, inchoata iustitia est; caritas provecta, provecta iustitia est; caritas magna, magna iustitia est; caritas perfecta, perfecta iustitia est, sed caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta (1 Tim 1, 5), quae tunc maxima est in hac vita, quando pro illa ipsa contemnitur vita (Cf. Io 15, 13). Sed miror si non habet quo crescat, cum de mortali excesserit vita. Ubicumque autem et quandocumque ita plena sit, ut ei non sit quod adiciatur, non tamen diffunditur in cordibus nostris vel naturae vel voluntatis opibus quae sunt in nobis, sed per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis (Cf. Rom 5, 5) qui et infirmitati nostrae opitulatur et sanitati cooperatur. Ipsa est enim gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Cf. Rom 7, 25), cui est cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto aeternitas, bonitas, in saecula saeculorum. Amen.
70. 84. Love, then, begun is righteousness begun; love advanced is righteousness advanced; love great is righteousness great; love perfect is righteousness perfect—but love from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned (1 Tim 1:5), which is then greatest in this life when life itself is despised for the sake of it (See John 15:13). But I wonder whether it has not somewhere to grow, when it has departed from mortal life. Yet wherever and whenever it is so full that nothing can be added to it, it is nevertheless not poured out in our hearts by the resources either of nature or of will that are in us, but by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (See Rom 5:5), who both helps our weakness and cooperates with our health. For it is the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (See Rom 7:25), to whom belongs, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, eternity and goodness, forever and ever. Amen.
DNeG.1.70.84

Notebook

Full View