Ad 1: The first objection, namely, that Our Lord gave a counsel to his disciples not to be masters, is misleading for several reasons.

Ad 2: The second objection, that the office of a religious is not to teach, but to mourn, carries no weight. St. Jerome meant, by the words quoted, that the chief duty of a monk, as a monk, is to do penance, not to teach. He thereby shows that a monk is not, by virtue of his profession, bound to teach; and he rebukes the presumption of those religious who claimed the function of teaching as their special prerogative. He writes in the same sense in his epistle to Vigilantius. But it does not by any means follow that although a monk has not the office of teaching, it may not at some future time be imposed upon him. It is not the duty of a subdeacon to read the Gospel, but that does not prove that this office will never fall to his share, as Gratian points out (Decretals, XVI, q. 1, Superiori): St. Jerome wished to emphasise the distinction between the person of a monk and that of a cleric, and to show that certain duties were peculiar to the office of each. One function belongs to a monk, as a monk; another to an ecclesiastic as an ecclesiastic. The duty peculiar to a monk, by reason of his state of life, is to mourn for his own sins and those of others.¹ The task especially allotted to an ecclesiastic is that of preaching to and instructing the people. This distinction appears still more clearly in another chapter of Gratian, in which he treats of the teaching conveyed by preaching, which is the special duty of prelates, not of scholastic teaching, in which they are not specially well practiced. Hence in raising this objection against the right of religious to teach, our adversaries are begging the question.

Ad 3: The third objection, that the exercise of the teaching office is contrary to the religious vows, is, on several accounts, ill-founded.

Ad 4: The fourth objection, which asserts that religious profess perfect humility, is absolutely untrue. They make no vow of humility. Their vow is of obedience. Neither humility, nor any other virtue, is a matter of vow. Acts of virtue, being a matter of precept, are a necessity. Vows are only concerned with that which is voluntary. Again, no one can make a vow of perfect humility, or of perfect charity. For perfection is a gift of God; it does not depend upon our will.

Ad 5: The fifth objection brought against the right of religious to teach is that Dionysius distinguishes monks as apart from deacons, priests, and bishops. We know from ecclesiastical history that the monks of the primitive Church, until the time of Eusebius, Zozimus, and Siricius, were not clerics (Decretals, XVI, q. 1, Superiori).¹ Therefore, as it is of these monks that Dionysius speaks, we cannot, from his words, come to any conclusion about the monks who were bishops, priests, or deacons. Any difficulty on the point arises from misunderstanding of the words of Dionysius. This author calls the sacraments of the Church ‘sacred actions.’ Baptism he terms cleansing and illumination. Confirmation and the Eucharist he names perfection (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, 4.).² Now it is not lawful for any, save bishops, priests or deacons, to perform these sacred functions. Teaching in the schools, however, is not one of the holy rites, or sacred actions, whereof he speaks; otherwise it could be undertaken by none save by a priest, or a deacon. Again, ordained monks can consecrate the Body of our Lord, a power pertaining to none but priests. Why then should they not exercise the function of teaching, for which no orders are required?

Ad 6: The sixth objection urges that, as no monk can be employed in ecclesiastical duties, and yet keep his monastic rule aright, much less can he combine the work of teaching with regular observance. Our answer is that, as we have already shown, this objection does not hold good with regard to the essentials of religious life. For these can be practiced by those who hold ecclesiastical office. As for such religious observances as silence, vigils, and the like, it is shown in another chapter that he who is obliged to serve daily in the ministry of the Church, practices the strictness of his monastic life.¹ But it is not unseemly if anyone neglect regular observance for the sake of performing an action such as teaching, which is for the common good. Thus religious who are called to the office of prelates—sometimes while they are still in their monastery—accept a dispensation for such reason. There are also religious living in their cloister in strict observance, who exercise the function of teaching, because it is enjoined by their rule.

Ad 7: The seventh objection to the right of a religious to teach is that by so doing, he oversteps his measure, or, as the Gloss says,¹ goes further than is permitted to him. Now when we say that a thing is permitted, we mean that it is not forbidden by any law. Hence if a religious do something not prohibited by his rule, even though the thing be not mentioned in the rule, he does not overstep his measure. Otherwise, religious who live under a mitigated rule would have no right to undertake the customs and usages of a more perfect life. Such a prohibition would be opposed to the sentiments of St. Paul, who says that, forgetting the things that were behind, he stretched forth himself to those that were before (Phil 3:13). We must further remember that some religious are, by the rule of their order, destined for teaching. To them, of course, the foregoing objection cannot apply.

Ad 1: To the first argument brought forward in support of this suggestion, it should be said that the authority of James 3:1: let not many of you become teachers, my brethren, applies as much to laymen as to religious. For in the New Testament, all Christians are called brethren; and the Church is called a society of Christians. Neither is a multitude of religious teachers more stringently forbidden by the authority cited than is a multiplicity of secular teachers. For, as St. Augustine says: by many teachers is meant teachers teaching contrary doctrines. Many who teach alike are but as one teacher.¹ Hence St. James’ prohibition is directed against divergence of doctrine, not against plurality of masters.

Ad 2: We can answer the second argument of our adversaries by saying that, although there be several masters in one community, they do not rule as a captain guides a ship, or a queen-bee reigns in a hive. Each master presides over his own school. Hence the words of St. Jerome cannot be understood in the sense in which our opponents use them. They only mean that there should not be many masters in the same school.

Ad 3: To the third argument brought against a multiplicity of religious teachers, we reply that the fact that there may be several religious houses, each containing many masters, does not debar laymen from the profession of teaching. There are not always in a community of religious enough men capable of teaching. Again, the fact that in any diocese there may be a sufficiency of teachers does not exclude seculars from this function. Religious and laymen ought to be judged on the same lines; and the most capable masters, be they secular or religious, ought to be selected without distinction of person. We need not fear that Sacred Scripture will fall into contempt on account of a multiplicity of teachers to expound them. There is more danger of this being the case when the professors of Scripture are few in number. Hence there is no reason why the number of teachers should be limited; or why, through fear of their being too many, men capable of teaching should be excluded from that office.

Ad 1: We are told, first of all, that men of different professions ought not to be associated in the same offices; and also, you shall not join together men of different professions. This objection is perfectly true if it be understood to mean that men of different professions should not be associated in matters upon which they differ. Hence laymen and clerics should not be associated in ecclesiastical matters. Therefore, the following words are found before the words just quoted: a bishop ought not to have a lay vicar; and the clergy ought not to be judged in lay courts of justice.¹ For the same reason, religious cannot associate with laymen in commercial and mercantile transactions, in which religious are forbidden to take part: no soldier on service for God gets entangled in civilian pursuits (2 Tim 2:4). But, as we have seen, the exercise of teaching and of learning concerns both seculars and religious. Hence there is no reason against religious being associated with laymen in scholastic affairs. For men of different conditions, who agree in unity of faith, form the body of the Church: there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus (Gal 3:28).

Ad 2: It was next objected that, although in an association of laymen and religious there are some points common to both classes, there are likewise some on which they differ. Thus there may be a purely secular society, formed of members whose interests are limited to secular affairs. Or there may be an exclusively religious institute, of which the system is directed towards the formation of the religious life. There is, however, one point which is common both to laymen sad to religious. For religious and seculars have this in common: that they belong to the society of the one Church of Christ, by that agreement in one faith whereby the unity of the Church is made perfect. Hence as teaching and learning are functions pertaining alike to seculars and religious, an association of study ought not to be known as exclusively either a lay or a religious college; but rather as a college including both seculars and religious.

Ad 3: The third objection, that no one can belong to two associations, is untenable for three reasons.

Ad 4: The fourth objection, given for the exclusion of religious from association with secular students, is that religious cannot either teach or study without the authorization and permission of their superiors, who have the power to absolve their subjects from their oaths and other engagements in order to enable them to belong to such an association. Now we must remember that as the perfection of a whole consists in the union of its parts, a whole cannot exist unless its parts agree. Hence any decrees drawn up for the welfare of a state and city ought to be formulated with a view to the advantage of all its members. Any statutes which would hinder the unity of a commonwealth ought to be abolished. For laws are established in order to preserve the concord of a state and not to promote internal dissension. In the same way, there ought not to exist in any scholastic association statutes which do not suit all students alike.

Ad 1: First because the words of St. Paul, I appeal to you, brethren (Rom 16:17), do not apply to religious, but to heretics, and to schismatics. This is clearly shown in the text, wherein St. Paul warns the Romans to avoid such as cause dissensions contrary to the doctrine which they had learned, learned that is, as the Gloss explains, from the true apostles.¹ Those against whom St. Paul gave this warning, were men who strove to impose the Jewish law upon the Gentiles.

Ad 2: Likewise, the words: now we command you, brethren (2 Thess 3:6), were not uttered against religious, but against men who passed their time in idleness and misdeeds. Of these St. Paul says: we hear that some of you are living in idleness, mere busybodies, not doing any work (2 Thess 3:11), or as, the Gloss says: providing for their necessities by iniquitous means.¹

Ad 3: Again the words: but understand this (2 Tim 3:1), were written not to religious, but to heretics, blasphemers as St. Paul calls them, who by their heresy blaspheme God (Gloss).¹ The Apostle continues: as Jannes and Jambres opposed Moses, so these men (i.e. heretics²) also oppose the truth, men of corrupt mind and counterfeit faith. Although he says that the heretics of whom he speaks had an appearance indeed of piety, that is, of religion,³ nevertheless religion in this passage signifies latria, which makes a profession of faith. In this sense, it is equivalent to piety, as St. Augustine says (City of God, X).⁴

Ad 1: The objection that, according to law,¹ no one can be forced to join an association against his will applies only to a private society, established by two or three members. But a man can be compelled to form part of a public association, which cannot exist without the consent of authority. Thus, a prince may force the inhabitants of a certain city to accept an individual as their fellow-citizen, and an ecclesiastical society can be compelled to accept a man as a canon or a brother. Therefore, as any general scholastic association is, in a certain sense, a society, any man may be obliged by the authority of a superior to belong to it.

Ad 2: The assertion that the apostolic authority is limited to ecclesiastical affairs is false. The president of a republic is bound to provide food for those over whom he rules, and to undertake the proper education and training of the young (Ethics, 10).¹ He is likewise obliged to supervise the legislation of his republic, and to establish rules for the well-being of the citizens (Ethics, 1).² Thus we see that the legislation concerning education is one of the duties of the president of a republic. It must, therefore, come under the authority of the apostolic See, by which the whole Church is governed.

Ad 3: The last objection is founded on an absolute falsehood. The association of religious with the laity in matters concerning education is not intended for the destruction, but rather for the advancement, of learning. Hence there can be no possible doubt that, by the authority of the apostolic See, seculars may be compelled to admit religious into their scholastic societies.

Ad 1: Their first argument is that the duty of monks is not to feed a flock, but to be fed. This saying is to be understood as meaning that monks do not have the office of instructing the faithful by right of their monastic profession. It was directed against the mistaken notion that sanctity of life alone is sufficient qualification for the ecclesiastical state. But it is equally true that it is not the duty of a secular priest to feed a flock unless he has the care of souls, or unless he bears a commission from those holding such a charge. Religious are as fitted as are the secular clergy for the office of preaching. The only difference between them is that religious require a double license, namely, the authorisation of a bishop and permission from the superior of their order, without which they may not act.

Ad 2: The second objection must be answered in exactly the same way. For the words, let none save the priests of the Lord dare to preach, is true, if we understand them to mean that no one may preach without a commission to do so. In like manner, the prohibition to monks to preach, which is quoted against us, is to be understood to mean that monks may not, merely because they are monks, arrogate to themselves the office of preaching.

Ad 3: And, in the same way, when it is said that it does not beseem a monk to preach, the words mean that the monastic state does not of itself confer a right to preach.

Ad 4: When it is objected that they who feed the people with the word of God ought likewise to supply their material necessities, we reply that this is perfectly true in cases where such charity is possible. For as St. John says: if any one has the world’s goods and sees his brother in need, yet closes his heart against him, how does God’s love abide in him? (1 John 3:17) But almsgiving is not always the necessary accompaniment to preaching; otherwise the apostles would not have preached, for they possessed nothing to give: I have no silver and gold (Acts 3:6). Nevertheless, religious, who themselves are poor, are able at times to provide for the wants of the poor out of the donations made to them by the wealthy. St. Paul tells us that when he was sent to preach to the Gentiles, he was careful to remember the poor (Gal 2:10).

Ad 5: To the objection that pastors are bound to feed their flocks, we reply that they cannot feed them entirely by their own efforts; they must be assisted by others to whom they entrust the task. For he by whose authority a deed is accomplished is held responsible for its performance.

Ad 6: When it is urged that none have a right to preach, save those who are sent, and that we only read of our Lord’s sending the twelve apostles and the seventy-two disciples, our answer is that they who are sent by God have power to send forth others. St. Paul sent Timothy to preach: therefore, I am sending to you Timothy (1 Cor 4:17). Thus likewise other men may be sent forth to preach at the bidding of bishops and priests. But all thus sent must be regarded as the emissaries of the Lord, because it is by his power that they receive their commission. And all who are thus authorised to preach must, although not archdeacons, be regarded as the coadjutors of the bishops, because they are rendering them important assistance, such indeed as Titus gave to St. Paul, or as archdeacons afford to their bishops (Gloss).¹ Hence it by no means follows that none save archdeacons can assist bishops in their labors. For, when any priest bearing the commission of a bishop preaches or hears confessions, these functions are accounted as having been performed by the bishop himself.² Although it may be true that only two orders were instituted by our Lord for the purpose of preaching; the Church, or the Pope to whom is confided all ecclesiastical power, could found a third order of preachers. For, as we are reminded by the Master of the Sentences,³ there were in the early Church two degrees only in Holy orders: priests and deacons; but in course of time other grades were established.

Ad 7: Our answer to the next objection which follows is that the decree to which it refers regards a certain order of men called "chorepiscopi," who were ordained not in cities but in hamlets and villages, and who were invested with certain faculties not granted to ordinary priests, such, for instance, as that of conferring minor orders. For some time, these "chorepiscopi" were recognised in the Church as invested with ordinary powers, but they were finally suppressed (as is related in the same distinction) on account of their usurpation of the episcopal functions.¹ Thus the decree mentioned in this objection bears no reference to those religious, who, not having ordinary faculties, act as confessors by commission from a bishop. Such an order of religious does not exist in opposition to the number of orders established by our Lord, since, as it has been instituted by his authority, it is rightly regarded as having been ordained by himself (see the words of Dionysius quoted above).²

Ad 8: The only conclusion concerning monks that can be drawn from his passage of Dionysius is that monks have not, on account of their profession, the status of prelates, or of those whose duty it is to guide others to God. There is, however, no reason why a monk should not receive ordinary power or a commission to guide others, especially as the decree quoted merely says that the monastic orders are not instituted in order to be in command of others or to guide.¹ It does not say that the members of these orders cannot or ought not hold such a position.

Ad 9: The argument that the ecclesiastical hierarchy is a copy of the heavenly hierarchy is only partially true. In the heavenly, but not in the earthly hierarchy, there is a distinction of gratuitous gifts, according to the distinction of orders.¹ Hence as the angelic nature is immutable, the angels of an inferior rank cannot be transferred to a superior grade, as is the case with mortals in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Nevertheless, in the celestial hierarchy, angels of an inferior order can remain in their own rank, and yet can perform the functions pertaining to a higher grade. Thus Dionysius says: the angel that cleansed Isaiah is called a seraph, because he fulfilled the office of the Seraphim (Celestial Hierarchy, 13).² And St. Gregory, in his homily on the hundred sheep, says that the spirits who are sent forth bear names denoting the order of their ministry.³ Hence it is not unseemly if in the ecclesiastical hierarchy a man belonging to one of the inferior orders be commissioned to perform duties specially pertaining to a higher rank.

Ad 10: To the objection that religious preach either with power or without power, we reply that they preach not with ordinary power, but by that conferred by special commission. It does not, therefore, follow that they have the right of demanding means of support; for this power has not been granted them. They could, however, exercise this power were it conferred on them by those to whom it belongs.

Ad 11: It is untrue to say that if religious have faculties to preach, they possess powers superior to those of bishops or patriarchs. For bishops and patriarchs can preach in any place by their ordinary power, but religious, who have not the care of souls, can never preach by ordinary power. They can preach not by ordinary power, but only by special commission, just as the bishop can exercise episcopal functions in a diocese belonging to another with the permission of the bishop of the diocese in which he is staying.

Ad 12: It is urged that no man ought to build on a foundation laid by another. This statement is untrue, and is against the teaching of St. Paul, who says: like a skilled master builder I laid a foundation, and another man is building upon it (1 Cor 3:10). This building is explained by the Gloss and by St. Ambrose to signify preaching and teaching.¹ When the Apostle says: I have preached the gospel not where Christ has already been named, lest I build on another man’s foundation (Rom 15:20), his word must be understood to signify, not that it would have been unlawful for St. Paul to have built upon another man’s foundation, but that he did not, at that moment, consider it expedient to do so. Hence the Gloss, commenting on these words, says: lest I should build upon another man’s foundation, that is, lest I should preach to those converted by other men. Not that St. Paul would not have so acted had such a course appeared to him desirable; but that he preferred to lay the foundations of the faith in some spot wherein it had not as yet been preached.²

Ad 1-2: It is easy to answer the objections to the propriety of religious hearing confessions. The decree quoted as opposed to it only forbids religious to act as confessors on their own authority. It does not prohibit their doing so at the bidding of the Pope or of a bishop. This is clearly shown in Decretals, XVI, q. 1, Pervenit.¹ Neither are religious less fit than are secular priests for this duty (Decretals, XVI, q. 1, Sunt tamen nonnulli).²

Ad 3: To the next objection, namely, that parish priests, pastors of souls, ought to study the faces of their flock, which they cannot do except by hearing confessions, we answer that confession is not the only means whereby we may know whether a man be good or bad. For we can draw a conclusion from the judgment passed upon him by his superior. Hence if a bishop absolves one of his flock, either by his own act, or through the agency of another commissioned by him, his parish priest ought to be as satisfied that he knows such a man as if he himself had been his confessor. He knows that his parishioner has been approved by the judgment of a superior, whom he himself has no right to criticize. And further, if according to the decretal he hear the confessions of his parishioners once a year,¹ it gives him sufficient opportunity for knowing them.

Ad 4: To the objection that everyone is bound once a year to confess his sins to his own priest, we reply that the expression "his own priest" applies not only to the parish priest, but to the bishop of the diocese and to the pope, who have, in a more extended sense than parish priests, the care of souls. The expression "his own priest" is used not in contradistinction to the bishop or pope, who is the common priest, but in contradistinction to a stranger. Hence he who has made his confession to his bishop, or to a viceregent appointed by him, has confessed to his own priest. And further, anyone who confesses once a year to his own parish priest, and makes himself intelligible to him, is not forbidden to make his confession at other times to any other priest who has faculty to give absolution.

Ad 5: The objection that unless a priest hears a man’s confession, he cannot know whether he is in a fit state to receive the Eucharist, is based upon an error. For a priest can know the state of a communicant’s soul by the judgement of the superior who has given him absolution, and whom he ought to trust as he would trust himself.

Ad 6: The argument that the permission to confess to a priest other than the parish priest affords opportunity for concealment of sins, is fallacious. For a priest ought to believe what a penitent says, whether it be for or against himself.¹ Therefore, if the penitent says that he has made his confession, it ought to be taken for granted that he is speaking the truth. Even if the parish priest were to act as his confessor, he might be deceived; for the penitent might confess his more venial offences, and conceal his grievous sins. And it must likewise be remembered that though the facility for confessing to different priests may be abused, it is nevertheless, as we have already shown, a safeguard against far greater evils.

Ad 7: The argument, that, a monk, having no power to correct others, cannot absolve them, is only true in a very limited sense. For, though monks have not this power in an ordinary way, they are able, by the commission of a bishop, both to correct and to absolve. The Demophilus to whom Dionysius wrote the words quoted was not a priest, nor even a deacon. This is clear from the Epistle quoted by our adversaries.

Ad 8: The same answer must be made to the objection that if religious can hear confessions anywhere, they can do so everywhere, and thus they become rulers of the Universal Church. Monks, on their own authority, can hear confessions nowhere. They can act as confessors only where they are commissioned to do so; and if the Head of the Church give them permission to hear confessions everywhere, they can do so everywhere. This, however, does not constitute them governors of the Church, since they absolve sinners not by their own power, but by the authority delegated to them. The Pope is not called the universal bishop not because he does not possess complete and direct power over every diocese in the Church, but because he does not rule any particular diocese as its peculiar and special pastor. Were he to do so, the powers of the other bishops would lapse. This reason is given in the chapter quoted.¹

Ad 1: The proposition that what a man gives away he does not still possess does not hold good in things spiritual. These are communicated not by the transference of some dominion over them (like physical things), but rather by an emanation of an effect from its cause. When one man communicates knowledge to another, he does not on this account deprive himself of this knowledge; for it remains in his power. In the same way, he that confers some power upon another does not by doing so deprive himself of that power. A bishop does not cease to be able himself to consecrate the body of the Lord by conferring on a priest the power to do so. St. Augustine, treating of the communication of spiritual things, says: everything that is not lessened by being imparted is not, if it be possessed without being communicated, possessed as it ought to be possessed (De doctrina Christiana, 1).¹ In like manner, when a bishop confers upon a priest the power of absolving, he does not himself lose that power unless the power of a priest in his parish is considered similar to that of a soldier in his town. This idea is, of course, ridiculous; for priests are not masters, but servants. This is how one should regard us, as servants of Christ, St. Paul writes (1 Cor 4:1). Our Lord also said to his apostles: the kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and those in authority over them are called benefactors. But not so with you; rather let the greatest among you become as the youngest, and the leader as one who serves (Luke 22:25–26).

Ad 2: The statement that a bishop, by committing the care of a parish to a priest, relieves himself of all responsibility connected with it, is untrue. For, a bishop is still answerable for the care of all the souls in his diocese (Decretals, X, q. 1, Quaecumque).¹ Hence St. Paul, after speaking of all his labors, concludes by saying: and, apart from other things, there is the daily pressure upon me of my anxiety for all the churches (2 Cor 11:28). His burden, however, is rendered supportable to a bishop, because he has assistants of an inferior rank. But, even granted that a bishop, by committing a parish to a priest, relieves himself of its responsibility, it would not, on that account, follow that he would abrogate his power in that parish. For, the ministers of Christ are able to labor for the salvation of the faithful, not only by freeing themselves from responsibility, but likewise by increasing their own merit, and producing greater fruit among souls. Thus St. Paul undertook much work for the salvation of the elect, which he might, without any danger to his salvation, have omitted.

Ad 3: The argument that a priest is subject to a bishop just as a bishop is under an archbishop is not quite correct. For an archbishop has not immediate jurisdiction over an episcopal diocese except in matters specially referred to him. Thus an archbishop cannot summon before him or excommunicate one who is the subject of a bishop. A bishop, on the other hand, has immediate jurisdiction over his parochial clergy, he can cite any of them to appear before him, and he has power to excommunicate them. The reason of this distinction is that the power of a priest is imperfect compared to that of a bishop: priests are by divine right subject to bishops, as Dionysius proves. The subjection of a bishop to an archbishop depends only on an ecclesiastical ordinance and is limited by it. But a priest, being by divine right subject to a bishop, is subject to him in all things. The jurisdiction of a bishop over his priests resembles in kind that of the Sovereign Pontiff over all Christendom. For the Roman Church has not been given supremacy over other churches by the decrees of any synod, but by the words of our Lord and Saviour himself (Decretals, XXI, Quamvis).¹

Ad 4: To the argument that parish priests are the bridegrooms of the churches committed to them, we answer that Christ is the Spouse of the Church strictly speaking, of whom are spoken the words: he who has the bride is the bridegroom (John 3:29). He, by his Church, begets children to bear his name. The other so-called spouses are in reality the servants of the Bridegroom, who cooperate with him exteriorly in this work of spiritual generation, but who do not beget spiritual children for themselves. Although they are but ministers, they are termed spouses, because they take the place of the true Spouse. Hence the Pope, who is the vicegerent of Christ throughout the entire Church, is called the spouse of the universal Church. In like manner a bishop is termed the spouse of his diocese, and a priest of his parish. But at the same time the Pope is the spouse of every diocese and the bishop is the spouse of all parishes within his See. But it does not follow from these words that there is in one church a plurality of spouses. For priests assist their bishop in his work, and bishops cooperate with the Pope, who is finally the direct minister to Christ. Thus Christ, the Pope, the bishops, and the priests are but the one spouse of the Church. Hence the fact that the Pope or the bishop hear the confessions of the faithful of a parish, or commit this office to another, is not proof that one church possesses a plurality of spouses. True plurality would consist in the appointment of two ecclesiastics of the same rank to the same office. Hence were there two bishops in one diocese, or two parish priests in one parish, there would be the plurality forbidden by the canons.

Ad 1: The first reason on which this assertion is grounded, that the authority of the Roman See cannot alter anything established by the statutes of the Fathers or institute anything contrary to these statutes. This is true with regard to those decrees which, in the judgment of the Saints, are of divine right: for example, the articles of the faith formulated by Councils. But those matters which the Holy Fathers have declared to be of positive right are left to the judgment of the Pope to be altered or abolished by him, according to the requirements of the times. For the holy Fathers assembled in councils cannot promulgate any decree save by the authorization of the Sovereign Pontiff, without whose permission no council is allowed even to meet. Again, if the Pope sees fit to act otherwise than in the manner established by the holy Fathers, he does not act counter to their statutes. For although in such a case the words of the statutes are not obeyed, the intention of those who have drawn up the statutes (namely, for the welfare of the Church) is fulfilled. For in matters which are of positive right, it may be impossible to adhere to the letter of a statute at all times and under every circumstance; although the intention with which it was framed is respected. One statute will necessarily be abrogated by a subsequent one. But the fact that certain religious, being neither bishops nor parish priests, exercise the functions of preaching and hearing confessions is not contrary to the statutes of the Holy Fathers, unless such religious act thus on their own initiative, unauthorized by the Pope or by a bishop.

Ad 2: In answer to the second objection, the Pope, as we have already shown, does not act contrary to St. Paul’s admonition by giving to religious the privilege of preaching or hearing confessions, for these religious do not preach to another man’s people. It is not true to say that the Pope cannot alter any apostolic decree; for the penalties pronounced against bigamy¹ and against fornication among the clergy² are sometimes dispensed with by authority of the Holy See. The power of the Pope is limited only in so far that he cannot alter the canonical scriptures of the apostles and prophets, which are fundamental to the faith of the Church.

Ad 3: To the objection that the privileges granted by sovereigns are to be understood in the sense that they are only granted insofar as they are not prejudicial to any other, we reply that an injustice is done to another when something is withdrawn from him which has been established for his gratification or advantage. Hence Ezechiel 34:2 says: woe, shepherds of Israel who have been feeding yourselves! Should not shepherds feed the sheep? But it is nowise prejudicial to a parish priest if one of his parishioners be withdrawn from his authority. In the same manner an abbot may, by the Pope, be withdrawn from the authority of a bishop, and a bishop from that of an archbishop, without injustice to either. In fact, if such a course tend to the salvation of their parishioners, far from being prejudicial, it is most beneficial to all pastors who seek the things of Christ, and not such as are their own.¹ On Numbers 11:29: are you jealous for my sake?, St. Gregory says: a spiritual pastor who seeks not his own honor, but the glory of his Creator, desires to be helped in his actions by all men. A faithful preacher would wish that if it were possible, the lips of all mankind should proclaim the truth which he alone is incompetent to utter.²

Ad 4: The argument that when a sovereign grants to a subject permission to make a will, it is with the understanding that such a will is only to be made in an ordinary and legal manner, holds good with regard to the Pope. When the sovereign Pontiff commissions anyone to preach and hear confessions, he only allows him to do so in a legitimate way; his preaching must be unto edification. But if a man hold a commission from the Pope to preach, he need not, in order to preach lawfully, seek a license from any other superior. Such a course would stultify the authority of the Pope. A man who has obtained permission from his sovereign to make a will need not have another license from anyone else. All that is required of him is to make his will in due form. A preacher licensed by the Pope requires no other authorization. He need only observe the proper rules of preaching, such as that of using one style in addressing the poor, and another in speaking to the rich, and such other points as are mentioned by St. Gregory (Pastorale).¹

Ad 5: When it is urged that a monk does not, at his ordination, receive power to exercise his priestly office unless he be placed in charge of souls, we reply by reminding those who make this objection that the priesthood is instituted for two ends.

Ad 6: The words quoted (from I, quaest. De doctrina) were written by Dionysius about lay monks, that is, monks who are neither bishops, priests nor deacons. But, even if they be applied to all religious, the Pope would not be disturbing the order of the ecclesiastical hierarchy by sending monks to preach. For, as we have said before, he who is of an inferior rank can exercise an office belonging to a higher grade, thus imitating the action of the celestial hierarchy. Furthermore, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy those of a lower order can be promoted to a higher rank. This cannot take place in the heavenly hierarchy. Hence Pope Innocent III, before a general council, sent some Cistercian monks to preach at Toulouse.¹

Reply to objection against seeking permission to preach or hear confessions

Ad 1: The last objection, brought against religious who preach, is that it is ambition on their part to seek permission to exercise this office. This is untrue, for a desire to preach inspired by charity is, on the contrary, praiseworthy. Isaiah offered himself to the Lord, saying: here am I; send me (Isa 6:8). This function may likewise be meritoriously declined out of humility. Thus Jeremiah said: ah, ah, ah, Lord God! Behold, I do not know how to speak, for I am only a youth (Jer 1:6), as is evident from the Gloss of St. Gregory.¹ The same view is found in the Decretals, VIII, q. 1, In scripturis.²

Ad 1: The first argument brought against us is that manual labor is an apostolic precept. To this objection we reply that it is a precept not of positive right, but of the natural law. This is clear from the words of St. Paul: keep away from any brother who is living inordinately (2 Thess 3:6), which the Gloss interprets to mean: who lives not according to the law of nature.¹ The Apostle is speaking of such as will not work. Now, the very constitution of our bodies teaches us that nature intends us to labor. We are not provided with clothing as other animals are furnished with hides. Neither has nature given us weapons such as cattle's horns or lion's claws. Nor is any food, save milk, supplied naturally to us, as Avicenna remarks.² In lieu of the gifts bestowed upon other animals, man is endowed with reason (which teaches him to supply his needs), and with hands to carry out the dictates of reason, as Aristotle says (De animalibus, 14).³ As the precepts of the natural law regard all men without distinction, the law of manual labor does not apply more to religious than to others.

Ad 2: To the second objection, which is based on the commentary of the Gloss on, if any one will not work, let him not eat (2 Thess 3:10), we answer that this saying must be understood as referring to physical, as distinguished from spiritual, work. It was directed against certain monks who interpreted this passage as signifying spiritual labors only, wishing that the servants of God would be forbidden to work wth their hands. The Gloss corrects this interpretation, and St. Augustine likewise finds fault with it (De opere monachorum).

Ad 3: To the third objection, we reply that the Apostle has given no absolute precept concerning manual work. He speaks of it as being preferable to theft: let the thief no longer steal, but rather let him labor, doing honest work with his hands, so that he may be able to give to those in need (Eph 4:28). Hence as religious can live without stealing, there is no reason why they should be bound to work.

Ad 4: To the fourth objection, our answer is that they who have sold all things in obedience to the counsel of our Lord ought to follow him. Therefore, Peter said: lo, we have left everything and followed you (Matt 19:27). Now men can follow Christ either by a life of contemplation or by one of action. They are equally his followers who leave all things in order to devote themselves to contemplation, or in order to give material alms, or to bestow spiritual assistance by preaching or teaching. The passage quoted from the Gloss, while it mentions one mode whereby the counsels of our Lord are observed, does not thereby intend to exclude the other way, or else it would contradict the gospel. For Luke 9:59 tells us how our Lord said to a certain man, follow me. But he to whom he spoke asked for time to bury his father. Christ answered him: leave the dead to bury their own dead; but as for you, go and proclaim the kingdom of God (Luke 9:60).Thus it was our Lord’s will that some men, when they had left all things, should follow him to proclaim the word of God. We can also say that this text, together with all that is contained about it in the Gloss, is a counsel. It is therefore binding only on such who are vowed to its observance.

Ad 5: Our answer to the fifth objection is that the manual labor of the apostles was sometimes a matter of necessity, and at other times a work of supererogation. When no one would supply the apostles with food, they were obliged to work (as is clear from the Gloss on 1 Corinthians 4:12¹). But we see in 1 Corinthians 9 that at other times manual labor was for them a matter of supererogation.² Now there are three reasons for which the apostles chose to do work that was not a necessity.

Ad 6: To the sixth objection, we reply that the decree quoted by it refers only to those clerics who are not sufficiently endowed with ecclesiastical revenues, or assisted by the alms of the faithful, to be able to live without working.

Ad 7: We reply to the seventh objection that St. Paul gives to bishops the example of manual labor in those cases in which he himself had recourse to it, namely, when such labor would not be an obstacle to the performance of their ecclesiastical duties, or when it would cause scandal to recent converts were they to be asked for material assistance.

Ad 8: Our answer to the eighth objection is that manual labor, according to the authority of St. Jerome,¹ is performed not only to earn a livelihood, but likewise to repress dangerous thoughts arising from idleness and self-indulgence. But sloth and the desires of the flesh are overcome not only by bodily toil, but likewise by spiritual exercises. Hence St. Jerome writes: love the knowledge of the Scripture, and you will not love the vices of the flesh.² There is no precept enjoining manual labor if idleness can be avoided by means of spiritual exercises, and if the body is subdued by means of other austerities such as watching, fasting and the like, among which penitential practices St. Paul mentions labor: labors, watching, hunger (2 Cor 6:5). The Gloss adds, in manual labor, the reason being because the Apostle worked with his hands.³

Ad 9: We reply to the ninth objection that at times it is advisable to work with the hands, and at other times it is better not to work in this manner. When manual labor does not call a man away from some more useful occupation, it is very praiseworthy both as a means of self-support and of charity to those in need. It is especially to be counselled in cases wherein those weak in faith or but recently converted would be scandalised if preachers, instead of earning their own livelihood, were to live on the alms of the faithful. It was on such occasions (as the Gloss remarks¹) that St. Paul had recourse to manual labor (1 Cor 9). When, however, such labor hinders a man from engaging in more useful occupation, it is better to set it aside. This lesson is given us by the commentary of the Gloss on the words: leave the dead to bury their own dead (Luke 9:60),² and also by the example of St. Paul, who ceased to work when he had an opportunity of preaching. Manual labor is naturally a greater hindrance to modern preachers than to those of the apostolic age. For the apostles were taught by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, whereas in our time preachers must prepare themselves for their office by constant study, as is evidenced by St. Gregory in the words already given.³

Ad 10: To the tenth objection, we reply that the monks whom St. Augustine condemns as contumacious belong to the class which is bound to work according to the apostolic precept, and which St. Paul says is worthy of excommunication (2 Thess 3).¹ Men of this description refuse to work because they prefer to live in sloth and to get their living by illicit means. That St. Augustine clearly refers to this class of person appears when he assigns a reason why those who leave an agricultural life in order to enter religion ought to employ themselves in physical labor: such men should work with their hands, because it is difficult to tell whether they become religious for the purpose of serving God, or in order to escape from a toilsome and penurious condition to a state wherein they may be clothed and fed, living in idleness and honored by those who hitherto have despised them and considered them nothing.² Such men evidently belong to the class denounced by the Apostle as slothful, and urged by him to do their work in quietness and to earn their own living (3 Thess 3:12). St. Augustine accuses them of contumacy chiefly because, perverting the words of St. Paul, they maintain that it is not lawful for the servants of God to work with their hands.

Ad 11: Our answer to the eleventh objection is that by the spiritual works to which this objection refers may be understood either the spiritual exercises that are for the common good, or such as are profitable to individuals. A man may either join in the prayers and psalmody of the divine office, and thus perform a work destined for the public edification of the Church, or he may, as do many laymen, occupy himself in private devotions. It is of the latter class that St. Augustine is speaking in the passage quoted in this objection. He is not alluding to those engaged in the public functions of the Church. This is clear from the words which follow. They can, he says, at the same time sing sacred canticles and work with their hands, after the example of craftsmen, who tell each other stories and listen with great attention, yet without ceasing to work.¹ This conduct would not be permissible to such as are reciting the canonical hours.

Ad 1: With regard to Proverbs 30:8: give me neither poverty nor riches, we answer that as there is no evil in riches themselves, but in the abuse of them, so beggary or poverty is not, in itself an evil. The only evil of poverty is its abuse, when there is impatience or reluctance in bearing the suffering resulting from it, or when there arises a covetous desire of the goods of others. Those who desire to be rich fall into temptation, into a snare (1 Tim 6:9). St. Chrysostom likewise says on St. Matthew: listen, you who are poor, and still more carefully you who desire to be rich. It is not a bad thing to be poor; the real evil is to be unwilling to be poor.¹ It is therefore evident that necessary poverty is accompanied by certain dangers from which voluntary poverty is free. For they who become poor by their own act do not desire to be rich. Hence the prayer of Solomon concerning beggary and riches refers to involuntary poverty. This is clear from the context: lest I be poor, and steal.² The Gloss likewise says on this text: the man who walks with God prays that he may not, either through abundance or scarcity of material goods, fall into forgetfulness of such as are eternal.³ Hence we see that Solomon teaches us that it is not poverty or riches themselves which are to be avoided, but the misuse of either of these conditions.

Ad 2: Ecclesiastes 7:12: wisdom with riches is more profitable, must be explained according to the rule laid down by Aristotle that the greatest good, such as happiness, joined to a lesser good is preferable to that lesser good (Ethics, 1).¹ Hence wisdom, which is amongst the greatest goods, is preferable to riches, which are an inferior good. But, according to this rule, the greatest good joined to another very great good is of more worth than if it be joined to a lesser good, or if it be considered by itself. Hence wisdom joined to evangelical perfection, which consists in poverty, and is one of the greatest goods, is worth more than wisdom considered by itself, or joined to riches.

Ad 3: The words, through poverty many have sinned (Sir 27:1), refers to compulsory poverty, which is necessarily accompanied by a desire for riches. We see this by the context: whoever seeks to get rich will avert his eyes. As the Gloss explains: he turns away the eye of his soul from the fear of the Lord.¹

Ad 4: The passage of the Gloss, quoted as a fourth objection, is mutilated and misinterpreted. This becomes clear if we subjoin its context: he does not say that it is not better to give everything; but, out of consideration to those who are weak in virtue, he recommends them to give in such a manner that they shall not suffer want.¹

Ad 5: The warning that poverty diminishes friendship, is to be understood of involuntary poverty, which causes covetousness. This is plain by the words that follow, while he seeks to be filled. Satiety implies that superabundance which those who are not satisfied with a little desire, unlike what 1 Timothy 6:8 says: if we have food and clothing, with these we shall be content. Hence he says below: those who desire to be rich fall into temptation, into a snare (1 Tim 6:9); for the desire of great wealth often causes men to fall away from justice.

Ad 6: The words of the Gloss that temporal possessions are not to be entirely rejected are to be interpreted to mean that we are to use our temporal means to procure food and clothing. This appears clearly from 1 Timothy 6:8: having food and clothing, with these we shall be content. The Gloss does not mean that man can ignore all provision for temporal needs.¹

Ad 7: To the seventh objection, we reply that some temporal things, such as food and clothing, are absolutely necessary for the support of life. If I have more of such things than I need, I ought to assist the destitute, but I ought not to deprive myself of necessary food or raiment. It is of such things as are acquired for our present needs that the Gloss speaks in the passage quoted in the seventh objection. But there are temporal things, such as money and property, which, though not needed at present, may in the future be necessary to our support. There is no reason why perfect men should not distribute these things to the poor; for, before they are needed, God may supply the lack of them in some other way; and we are commanded in the Scriptures to trust that he will do so.

Ad 8: To the eighth objection, we reply that although it be not a matter of precept to reserve money for our necessities, it is nevertheless a matter of counsel. Our Lord carried a purse not because he was unable otherwise to supply his needs, but for the sake of his weaker members, and in order that they might understand that it was lawful for them to do what they saw done by Christ. Hence the Gloss on the words: as he had the money box (John 12:6), says: he to whom the angels ministered carried a purse out of condescension to our weakness and for the assistance of the poor.¹ Again, on the verse in Psalm 104(103):14: you cause the grass to grow for the cattle, the Gloss says: the Lord had a purse for the use of those who were with him, and because in his own person he carried the infirmity of the weak, as when he said: "My soul is sorrowful."² He was followed by pious women who ministered to him of their substance. For he foresaw that in the future many of his followers would be weak and would seek material assistance.³ He did not fill his purse with his own property, but with alms given him by devout and faithful men.

Ad 9: Our answer to the ninth objection, is the rule laid down in Ethics, 2, namely, that the medium in virtue does not signify the distance from extremes, but the due proportion of circumstances, ordered by well balanced reason.¹ Hence the medium of virtue does not consist in preserving the right balance between superfluity and scarcity in any circumstance considered in itself, but in a circumstance considered in comparison with other circumstances. Thus, the medium of virtue may vary according to the variability of circumstances. In sobriety, for instance, the circumstance who is varied according to the variety of the circumstance what. An amount of food which would be a moderate quantity for one person would be too much for another, and too little for a third. Thus again, some virtue, such as magnanimity, existing in its highest degree, may be moderate in proportion to some other circumstance. The magnanimous man, says Aristotle, confers the greatest dignity on himself (Ethics, 4).² He who exceeds the virtue of magnanimity by superfluity does not thereby acquire greater dignity, but oversteps the limits of virtue; and those things which were moderation in him as a magnanimous man are now superfluous. Hence we see that the medium of virtue is not destroyed because one circumstance is in its highest degree, so long as that circumstance be proportioned to other circumstances. Thus, in a case of liberality, if we consider the quantity to be given, and if we attend only to the circumstance that in certain cases it is superfluous to give everything, we shall find the vice of prodigality. On the other hand, with a certain change of circumstances, this prodigality will become perfect liberality. For instance, if a man gives all that he possesses to save his country from danger, he will be an example of perfect liberality. In the same way, he who gives away all that he has in order to fulfil the counsel of our Lord acts not with prodigality, but with perfect virtue. If, however, such a man were to spend his all upon some unfitting object, or with some unseemly circumstances, he would be prodigal. We may say the same of virginity and of all other virtues in which there appears to be excess when the common mean of virtue is overstepped. Hence we see that to give everything for the love of Christ means not to give both what ought and ought not to be given, but to give only that which ought to be given. For, although all things are not in every case to be given, yet all things are to be given up for Christ.

Ad 10: Our reply to the tenth objection is that grace is the perfection of nature. Therefore, it cannot be its destruction. There are certain things, such as food and sleep, which pertain immediately to the preservation of nature. In connection with these things, virtue does not exceed the limits of the preservation of nature. Hence if anyone deprive himself of that which nature demands for its support, it is a vicious and unreasonable act. It is such conduct that is rebuked both by St. Paul and by the Gloss.¹ The Gloss says: let the service which you offer by the maceration of the flesh be reasonable, that is, tempered by discretion and not excessive. Chastise your body with moderation, so that it be not destroyed.² But nature can be preserved without luxury. Hence, if a man abstain from sensual pleasure, he is not performing a superfluous act, unless he should fall into sin by such abstention. For this reason, virginity is praiseworthy. Again, life can be preserved without material possessions if we trust that divine providence will assist us in many ways. Hence a man does nothing superfluous, in giving up all that he possesses for Christ. Consequently, voluntary poverty, practiced for the love of Christ, is no departure from the medium which ought to be observed in virtue.

Ad 11: To the next objection, we reply that although he who leaves all things for the love of Christ, does, to a certain extent, deprive himself of the means of existence; yet, he can always count on the assistance of divine providence, which will never fail him; he can also reckon on the charity of the faithful. St. Augustine, in his book, On Almsdeeds, thus expresses himself on this subject: do you think that anything will be lacking to a Christian, to a servant of God, to one devoted to good works, and to one precious in the sight of his Master? Shall he who feeds Christ not likewise be fed by him? Shall earthly things be wanting to him, on whom divine and heavenly gifts are bestowed? Where do such unbelief and such impious and sacrilegious ideas spring from? How then can any be found in the house of God with so little confidence in him? Does he who does not trust Christ absolutely deserve to be called a Christian? No, rather such a one should be named a Pharisee. For, as we read in the Gospel,¹ the Pharisees, hearing our Lord teach the duty of giving alms and of making to ourselves friends of earthly goods, derided him in their avarice. And even now we behold in the Church men who resemble the Pharisees, whose ears are closed and whose eyes are blinded, so that they can perceive no ray of the light of spiritual and salutary teaching. We have no reason then to wonder that such men hold the servants of God in contempt, when we know that the Lord himself was despised.² These words point out, clearly that it is sacrilegious to say that they who abandon all things for the love of Christ, expose themselves to the risk of suicide.

Ad 12: Our answer to the twelfth objection, is that he who leaves all things for God does not incur any danger of dying of hunger. For divine providence will never abandon him: I will never fail you nor forsake you (Heb 13:5). The Gloss thus comments on these words: but in case any should say: "what are we to do if necessary help should fail us?," the consoling words from the book of Joshua are added, "I will not fail you nor forsake you."¹ A man who should die of hunger would certainly be forsaken; but, as this will never happen, let no one be covetous. For God speaks these words to every man that trusts in him, as well as to Joshua.² He makes this promise to us on condition that we place our trust in him. His words are not spoken to the avaricious nor to the covetous, but to such as trust in God. It is not true to say that it is not lawful for a man to expose himself to danger; for a man may meritoriously expose himself to death for the name of Christ, even if it be possible for him to act otherwise. Thus, we read of many martyrs who, in the time of persecution, offered themselves to death by confessing their faith. If it were unlawful to expose oneself to peril, soldiers would not be justified in crossing the sea and incurring risks for the glory of God.

Ad 13: To the thirteenth objection, we reply that a man is a master of his own, not of his neighbour’s, property. He therefore injures another if he deprives him of what belongs to him; but he does no injury to himself by sacrificing his own possessions. Hence Aristotle says that a man cannot, strictly speaking, commit an injustice against himself (Ethics, 5).¹ Furthermore, he who deprives his neighbour of what belongs to him reduces him to involuntary poverty, which is dangerous. He who abandons his own possessions accepts voluntary poverty which, if it is embraced for the love of God, is meritorious.

Ad 14: Our answer to the next objection is that our Lord reserved a certain sum of money for necessary uses out of condescension to the weak; just as, out of condescension to human infirmity, he willed to eat and to drink wine with the Pharisees. It must not, then, be reputed as superstition in the holy fathers in the desert if they refused to keep money for their own use, or if they chose to abstain from wine or from delicate fare. The money which our Lord reserved was not his own private property; it had been given to him as alms. For we are told that some women . . . provided for him out of their means (Luke 8:3).

Ad 15: To the fifteenth objection, we likewise reply that, although the apostles reserved certain sums for themselves and to distribute among those holy men who had made themselves poor for Christ, that money was not their own, but was given them by the faithful in charity. When we are told that there were none needy among them, we are not to conclude that the apostles and Christians of the early Church did not endure much poverty for the love of Christ. For St. Paul says: to the present hour we hunger and thirst (1 Cor 4:11). And again: in afflictions, hardships, calamities (2 Cor 6:4), or, as the Gloss says, want of food and clothing.¹ We must understand by these texts that the apostles, insofar as they were able, supplied the poorer members of the community with such things as were needful to them.

Ad 16: To the sixteenth objection we reply that the prohibition given by our Lord to his disciples, go nowhere among the gentiles (Matt 10:5), was absolutely rescinded by him after the resurrection; because it then became necessary for the Jews to preach the word of God to the gentiles (Acts 13:46). But Christ did not, at the last supper, absolutely revoke his precept to the disciples to take nothing with them on the way. He only gave them a different order, which was to be obeyed during the time of persecution, when they would not have been able to procure the necessities of life. Hence on Luke 22:35: when I sent you out with no purse or bag or sandals, did you lack anything?, the Gloss says: the apostles are not told to observe the same rule in time of persecution as in time of peace. For when they were sent to preach, our Lord told them take nothing with them, for it was his will that those who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel. But, when his death was imminent, and the hour drew near when both the pastors and the flock should be exposed to persecution, he instituted a rule befitting the circumstances; and so he permitted his disciples to carry with them the means of sustenance till such time as the fury of their persecutors should have abated, and a fitting season for preaching the Gospel should have arrived.¹

Ad 17: The seventeenth objection is answered by the fact that the Church supports many that are sick; and that she could not do so without the possession of some material wealth. Hence it is right for a man to give up his own property and to hold that of the Church; and he should act this way, on account of the poor. But, it does not follow that it is not expedient for perfect men, who have sacrificed all that belongs to them, to lead a religious life in an order which possesses no common property. Apostolic perfection is not wanting to those who have possessions in common; but it appears more manifestly in those who relinquish their private property and have no property in common.

Ad 18: We reply to the eighteenth objection that the decree quoted by it does not forbid the choice of a life of poverty for the love of Christ.¹ It is simply a precept commanding bishops and all in possession of ecclesiastical property, which belongs to the poor, to provide for the poor, as far as they can, and to assist them in their needs. This will be easily perceived by anyone who studies the context of the chapter.

Ad 19: Our answer to the nineteenth objection is that they who have relinquished all things for Christ, in the trust that he will provide for them, neither sin by presumption, nor do they tempt God. For to have due confidence in God is not presumptuous, nor is it tempting him. Now the poor of Christ, especially the preachers of the truth, are bound to cherish this confidence in God. On Luke 10:4: take nothing for your journey, no staff, nor bag, nor bread, nor money, the Gloss says: a preacher ought to have such trust in God that even though he is not supplied with means to support him in this present life, he ought to be quite certain that necessary things will not be wanting to him, lest in his anxiety about temporal things, he fail to preach eternal truths.¹ Yes, unless he has this confidence in Providence, he is tempting God. On the words of 1 Corinthians 10:9: we must not put the Lord to the test, the Gloss says: let us not ask: "can God prepare a table in the desert?"²

Ad 20: The answer to the twentieth objection is that we are instructed to beg of God to supply our temporal necessities, and that we ought not reject temporal assistance until we are provided with the food and clothing that we need.

Ad 21: The statute, quoted in the twenty-first objection, was drawn up in favour of the ministers of the Church. But if any choose to serve the Church without stipend as a work of supererogation, they are so much the more praiseworthy in that they resemble St. Paul, who preached the Gospel without reward; he was a preacher ordained by God (1 Cor 9:14).

Ad 22: We reply to the twenty-second objection that although the holy Fathers have commended one course, they have not blamed the other. Therefore, it is not presumptuous to follow this other course; or else it would not be lawful to introduce into the Church any new ordinance. Nevertheless, the mode of life of which we speak cannot be called new,¹ as it was approved by many saints even in the primitive Church.²

Ad 23: Our answer to the twenty-third objection is that it is a duty for rich men to assist the needy. For as 1 John 3:17 says: if any one has the world’s goods and sees his brother in need, yet closes his heart against him, how does God’s love abide in him? But it is even more praiseworthy if a man, besides sacrificing all his possessions, consecrates himself to God. This is truly apostolic perfection. For as St. Jerome says: to offer oneself to God is a truly Christian act and worthy of the apostles, who, having renounced all they had, offered themselves to the Lord (ad Lucinum Beticum).¹

Ad 1: To the argument that temporal possessions blind the eyes of the wise, we reply that temporal possessions may be understood in a twofold sense.

Ad 2: There are two kinds of slavery, namely, the slavery of fear and the slavery of love. He who accepts gifts from cupidity is enslaved by fear; for the things acquired by cupidity are possessed in fear. Now we ought to be free from this servitude and we ought to be the servants of Christ. For, as St. Paul says, you did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear (Rom 8:15). They who accept gifts in charity are the bondsmen of love, and the servants of Christ are not free from this bondage. Hence St. Paul says, what we preach is not ourselves, but Jesus Christ as Lord, with ourselves as your servants for Jesus’ sake (2 Cor 4:5). Hence he who, in order to fulfil the duties of charity, accepts alms for his bodily sustenance, incurs not a bondage unworthy of the servants of Christ, but only such as befits the servants of the Lord.

Ad 3: The act of giving is, in itself, more meritorious than that of receiving. Hence Aristotle says (Ethics, 4), the act of liberality is greater in giving than in receiving, although a liberal man may both give and receive. There is nothing, however, to prevent the act of receiving from being, at times, from some special circumstance, the more commendable. It would then although exceptionally, be more praiseworthy than that of giving.¹ If then nothing is considered in a poor man, save the fact that he accepts charity, the rich man who gives the alms, is more blessed than the poor man who receives it, But circumstances may render the recipient of charity more meritorious, than the giver. Thus a man who, for the love of Christ, has made himself voluntarily poor and accepts alms is more blessed than the rich man who bestows the gift. Hence the Gloss remarks: the Lord does not prefer rich men who give alms to the poor who have renounced all for his sake; but he gives the greatest glory to those who, after forsaking all their possessions, labor with their hands in order to have something to give to those in need.² Now this conduct is certainly very commendable in those who are not engaged in more important occupations. And, it would be most perfect, if religious, without detriment to such occupation could, as we have before said, perform some manual labor and give their earnings in charity. But religious are not bound to do everything that is perfect; they are only bound to accomplish what their vows oblige them to.

Ad 4: It is no burden to the Church if religious live on alms, seeing that although they produce great fruits in the Church, their wants are very small. In fact, such religious do, in reality, lighten the expenses of the Church; for they perform at very small cost labor for which others, who are not satisfied with so little, would require much larger sums. Neither do mendicant orders deprive the poor of their rights; for, by their counsel and influence, much larger sums are given to the poor than they themselves receive. And further, these religious before entering their monastery, gave away all their goods to the poor, who have thus received far more than the alms bestowed on mendicant orders.

Ad 5: The decree cited in this objection is misquoted. This is evident by the words of Gratian, given in the next chapter: These authorities forbid the Church to receive not such as were originally rich but left all things, as did Peter, Matthew and Paul, or who, like Zechaeus, distributed their goods to the poor, or presented them to the Church, as did the early Christians who sold all that they had, and laid the price at the feet of the apostles. What is forbidden to the Church is to receive those who, while living in the house of their parents, or refusing to sacrifice their patrimony, desire at the mine time to enjoy ecclesiastical benefices.¹ And this is proved through the following chapters.

Ad 6: St. Augustine speaks of those religious who live idle lives and, being of no use to those who maintain them, are forced to gain their bread by flattery. For no one will support a useless person unless his favour be secured by adulation. But those religious to whom charity is extended for the love of Christ and who, in exchange for material assistance, confer spiritual benefits, have no need to flatter their benefactors. For those who relieve them do so for the love of Christ, who has said, he who receives you receives me (Matt 10:40). Now as the Gloss says, nothing is received in the apostles save what is in Christ.¹ Hence they who, for the love of God, become poor, and beg and live on alms need not resort to flattery. Those who are really driven to servility and adulation are wealthy sycophants who, in order to preserve and increase their riches, are obliged to flatter the sovereigns on whom, they depend. Thus St. Chrysostom writes: princes and soldiers and subjects are obliged to flatter, and to stand in need of many things. They are reduced to ignominious servility; they live in fear; hence they are exposed to the suspicion and calumny of those that envy them. Far other is the lot of the poor (super Matth.).²

Ad 7: It is true that to receive is not an act of liberality (excepting in so far as receiving stands in relation to giving). But, in those who, for the love of Christ, have made themselves poor, it is an act of humility to accept as alms the necessities of life; and humility is a greater virtue than liberality.

Ad 8: St. Augustine, in the place quoted in the objection, had two reasons for rebuking monks who desired to live on alms.

Ad 9: There is nothing inconsistent in the fact that one man accepts assistance as his due, and that another receives it as a favour and charity. The alms given to a preacher are but the just return for his labor; but assistance may be rendered to all poor men, not as their due recompense, but out of a spirit of charity.

Ad 10: More harm was done in the Church by the teaching of the false prophets, from whom St. Paul, by laboring with his hands, took away the occasion of living on the charity of the faithful, than was done by the Apostle’s supporting himself by his own labor. Now on the contrary, the Church derives profit from the example of humility set by the mendicant orders who live on alms and devote themselves to the salvation of souls instead of to manual labor. This advantage outweighs the harm done by a few men who live on charity as an excuse for their sloth. There is, therefore, no reason why the poor of the Church should cease to receive alms, in order to take away the occasion of those who make bad use of them.

Ad 11: It was the custom amongst the Jews that their teachers should be maintained by the people. At the preaching of the Gospel, this custom became general among the faithful. When the Gentiles were first converted, the apostles refused to ask or accept assistance from them, fearing lest they might take scandal. There is now, however, no reason to fear such scandal. Indeed, the example of moderation in food and clothing set by religious, is a subject rather of edification than of scandal. They who profess to be scandalized at the sight of religious accepting alms are like the Pharisee who, as we are told in Matthew 15, took scandal at our Lord, and whom he told his disciples to ignore.¹ The case would be very different were religious to accept alms, not in order to provide for themselves the necessities of life, but for the sake of amassing wealth or of indulging in riotous living.

Ad 12: To the twelfth objection, we may reply, as St. Jerome replied to Vigilantius that according to the same reasoning virginity is not a good thing, for if all were virgins, the human race would cease.¹ Again, virtue is rare and desired by few; it would be wonderful if all men resembled those few of whom it is said: "many indeed are called but few are chosen.”² This is the answer to the aforesaid objection. The works of perfection are so difficult that but very few attempt to accomplish them. There is, therefore, no grounds for fearing that the world will cease to exist on account of the perfection of its inhabitants.

Ad 13: To the thirteenth, we may reply that in that citation "stipend" is used widely for everything that that is not acquired by manual labor, whether inherited or from any source of revenue. So following this passage are the words: not only those who take pride in being sustained by their parents' money or the work of servants or the fruits of their farms, but also kings of the world certainly are sustained by this agape, that is, alms. For the fathers included under agape all that we consume in our daily living which did not arise from the work of our hands.¹ Thus it is clear that his is not speaking about the harm of blame; otherwise everyone would surely be guilty of sin by not using his own hands to prepare his food, even if the food is his own. But he is speaking of the nutriment of perfection, which consists in distributing one's possessions to the poor and working one's body by manual labor, even though, according to the Apostle, the work of piety, such as preaching and teaching and all such like are preferable.²

Ad 14: To the fourteenth, we may replay that Jerome is speaking about himself, as is clear if you examine his letter. He is talking a about when he was living solitary in a hermitage, where he did not teach or preache. And yet, we cannot conclued that he did this because of precept, but voluntarily, unless the statutes of hermits had prescribed manual labor.

Ad 1: The words: there shall be no poor man and no beggar amongst you,¹ do not forbid persons to embrace the condition of poverty and mendicity. These words prohibit men to leave their neighbours in a condition of misery, which forces them to beg. This is proved by the words. occurring in the same chapter of Deuteronomy: of your countrymen and neighbour you shall not have power to demand it again.² On these words, the Gloss observes: although all men be our neighbours, we are chiefly bound to show mercy to those who, together with ourselves, are the members of Christ.³ Hence although charity is enjoined, mendicity is not forbidden.

Ad 2: The Gloss interprets the words, I have not seen the just man forsaken by God, to mean: I have not seen the seed of the just man perishing for want of spiritual food, that is, the Word of God; for the Word of God is always with him.¹ But, if this text be understood to refer to material bread, it means that the just are not reduced to beggary by necessity, or because God has deserted them; since it is said: I will never fail you nor forsake you (Heb 13:5). The words do not mean that just men may not, for love of God, embrace poverty, although they did not do so in the days of the Psalmist. For such works of perfection were reserved for the time of grace.

Ad 3: It is not unfitting that what indicted on one man as a penalty may be, in another, a self-imposed work of justice. Criminals have their goods confiscated as a legal punishment; but this is no reason why other men may not despoil themselves of their possessions for the love of God. Again, beggary may fall upon sinners as a divine chastisement; but this is no reason why mendicity, voluntarily embraced for Christ, should not be a work of justice.

Ad 4: The Gloss understands the text quoted in the fourth objection to mean that men are not to beg avariciously. Otherwise the commentary would not be in harmony with the text. The text says: that you want nothing of any man’s.¹ Now they beg avariciously who seek, not merely necessary food and clothing, but who further desire to amass riches. This, as has been already pointed out, is made clear by the words in 1 Timothy 6:8-9, quoted above.

Ad 5: There are two kinds of mendicity, namely, voluntary and compulsory. Those reduced to beggary against their will, are liable to be tempted to impatience. Voluntary mendicity, which does not proceed from avarice, has the merit of humility. Hence St. Augustine does not forbid voluntary mendicity. He simply teaches that the occasion of compulsory beggary should be avoided by the poor of Christ by means of manual labor. This is evident by his words: that they may not be compelled by need.¹

Ad 6: The sixth objection is quite irrelevant to the matter in hand. For the words of St. Jerome refer to the habit of asking for and accepting superfluities. This is evident by what he says in his letter to the priest Nepotian.

Ad 7: The law referred to, applies to sturdy beggars who were useless to the state and who, living idle lives, defrauded other poor people of their rights. The law in question speaks of them as slothful men.¹ Of this class are gluttons who beg for food which they may eat in idleness. Religious cannot, except in malice, be held to belong to this class. It need not always be a heinous sin which is punished severely; for chastisement is inflicted not merely as a penalty for guilt, but also as a warning to the offender or to others. Hence at times a heavy penalty is awarded to an offence which, though not heinous in itself, is habitual. This is done in order that it may act as a deterrent to the criminal. The chapter quoted in the objection refers only to punishment inflicted to avenge sin.

Ad 8: Those of whom St. Augustine speaks begged not merely for necessities, but for superfluities. Their holiness, therefore, was not true, but hypocritical. This is made clear by the fact that he speaks of their desiring luxurious poverty, or the recompense of feigned sanctity.¹ In thus acting they were, of course, reprehensible.

Ad 9: Shame results from a base action: baseness is opposed to beauty. Hence baseness, and the shame consequent upon it, must be distinguished according to the kind of beauty to which it is opposed. Beauty may be either spiritual or physical. Spiritual beauty consists in a well ordered soul, and in abundance of spiritual gifts. Hence all that arises from a deficiency of spiritual good, or which points to spiritual disorder, is base. Physical beauty consists in symmetry of body and in the due proportion of such things as pertain to corporeal perfection. Bodily deformity or deficiency is, in a certain sense, base. And as both spiritual and physical beauty are loved and desired, spiritual and physical deformity cause a certain shame. Thus, a man is ashamed of being poor or unsightly or ignorant or awkward. Since spiritual deformity is always reprehensible, all that produces the shame of such deformity ought to be avoided. We speak not of the confession of sins, for the shiner is ashamed, not of his confession, but of the guilt which he acknowledges. But holy men think little of physical defect or deformity. In fact, they embrace it willingly for the love of Christ and for the sake of perfection. Hence the ignominy that accompanies such physical deformity is not always an object of contempt. Sometimes, indeed, it is worthy of high praise, as when it is assumed for the sake of humility. Now beggary is shameful, inasmuch as it is a disgrace attached to a material deficiency. For a beggar acknowledges that he is poor and is often subject to the one to whom he appeals for the relief of his needs. But beggary undertaken for the sake of Christ deserves honor rather than contempt.

Ad 10: A man who is asked for charity ought not to be wearied, if the petition is properly made. And if he is wearied, the fault lies in him for giving alms in order to free himself from importunity, rather than with him who asks in a becoming manner, for the relief of his needs. But, if the petition is not rightly made, the fault lies with the petitioner.

Ad 1: It by no means follows that because preachers live on alms, they must necessarily be flatterers. When they preach without flattery, they often find but small favour among wicked and carnal-minded men, although they are approved of by the good; in face, sometimes they have to suffer at the hands of those whose favour they could not win without adulation. At other times they are well received by good men who do not wish to be flattered. They thus resemble Lord who, at times, had no roof to shelter him, and at other times was entertained by many and who received the ministry of women who followed him, as we read in Luke 8:3. Thus likewise the apostles sometimes endured great distress; and at other times they were well supplied, behaving with discretion under both circumstances. I know, says St. Paul, how to be abased, and I know how to abound (Phil 4:12). Vicissitudes of this description are the common experience of poor preachers in our own days.

Ad 2: Preachers, by asking for charity, do nothing that can be an occasion of avarice. Avarice is an inordinate love of possessing. It is not inordinate to wish to have necessary food and clothing. If we have food and clothing, with these we shall be content (1 Tim 6:8). Hence poor men are not, by begging for the necessities of life, exposed to any danger of avarice.

Ad 3: Preachers ought not to desire material assistance as their primary end or object. They may, however ask for such temporal goods as a secondary end, or as the means whereby they may be enabled to achieve their primary end, which is the preaching of the Gospel. Commenting on the words, seek first his kingdom and his righteousness (Matt 6:36), the Gloss says: by these words, our Lord shows us that we are not to desire temporal things as our chief and most necessary good. We are to seek the Kingdom of Heaven, and to set it before us as our end, and do all things for the attainment of that end. Let us then eat in order to preach, but not preach in order to eat.¹

Ad 4: The stipend which preachers receive is due to them for their work. They have a twofold right to the alms which they accept. A debt may be due by a double right. Some have a right to payment as a debt of legal justice due to them. Such a debt is the one resulting from the compact made between a workman and his employer, whereby the laborer can sue his employer for his wages. Others can likewise claim a reward as a debt of friendly justice. For when one man does a service to another, it is only fair that the other should make the best return within his power, although his friend cannot legally compel him to make any return. Aristotle speaks of this twofold sort of justice in Ethics, 8.¹ I maintain, therefore, that when a prelate is set over the people, they have a right to demand spiritual ministrations from him; and he has a right to claim material assistance from them. But the people cannot claim spiritual service from any save prelates. Neither on the other hand, even though they preach by the permission of prelates, can any of the clergy who are not prelates, claim material assistance from the laity. They can only do so if they are appointed to be, in all things, the vicars of prelates. Hence we see that the poor who render no service whatsoever stand on a different footing in the matter of accepting alms, to religious who preach by permission of prelates, and are not themselves prelates, and to prelates themselves. For the poor accept everything gratis; and thus are mere mendicants. But preachers who are not prelates accept charity as a recompense due to them, although they cannot enforce its payment. Bishops, however, have compulsory power and can exact payment as a right. Nevertheless, if he who has the right to demand something does not assert this right, but begs for what he needs as if it were a free gift, he does no harm to anyone; but by his example he shows the beauty of humility.

Ad 5: The fifth objection is answered by saying that St. Paul wished to show that he had as good a right as the other apostles to receive the donations of the faithful. And in order to make good this point, he began by proving that he was an Apostle just like the other apostles.

Ad 6: The false apostles were unjust usurpers when they accepted the contributions of the faithful. Three reasons prove this.

Ad 7: Preaching religious beg for what is, according to the second mode of justice, due to them; for a debt is a matter of justice. But they are the more to be commended, in as much as they ask for that which is their due as though it were a free gift.

Ad 8: Prelates who receive tithes and offerings from their people, and who duly minister to them, may elect certain coadjutors to assist them more efficiently in so doing. Such conduct is not unfair to the faithful. For if the laity give more temporal alms than is agreed upon, they receive, in return, more spiritual assistance than the prelates are obliged to give. Furthermore, their alms are not taken as a right, but are accepted thankfully and humbly.

Ad 9: Everyone may renounce what is owing to him. Thus, although bishops are bound to support those whom they send to preach, the preachers may renounce their claim to such support. They do not, for this reason, become a burden on the people to whom they are sent. For they ask nothing from them but necessary food; and this they do not claim as a right but beg for as alms, according as each one of their hearers may have determined in his heart. They thus imitate the example of St. Paul (2 Cor 8:7).

Ad 10: Hypocrites were rebuked by our Lord for seeking gain by means of prayer and of superstitious practices. The Gloss says: woe to you Scribes and Pharisees, for by your superstitions you aim at nothing save at despoiling those who listen to you.¹ But it is rash to pass this judgment on anyone, for his private motive is the secret of each man’s own heart.

Ad 11: Preachers have no right to consort with persons of bad character, if there is danger that the vices of such persons may be attributed to them also, and if their preaching may, for this reason, fall into discredit. St. Gregory says: if a man’s conduct is despised, his preaching will be contemned.¹ The Gloss speaks in like manner.² If, however, preachers, without losing their own reputation, make friends with men of bad character in order to reform them, it is a praiseworthy act. It is done in imitation of our Lord. For we read in Matthew 9:11, the scribes and Pharisees said to his disciples: why does your Master eat with publicans and sinners? The Gloss observes that Christ, by so doing, gave his disciples an example of mercy.³ But if sinners do not esteem it a favour that the preachers of the Gospel should consort with them, the fault lies with them, not with the preachers,

Ad 12: If those who preach the Word accept from their hearers the necessities of life, they do not sell the Gospel. For, as we have already said, material gain is not their primary motive in preaching. The Gloss, on the words: let the priests that rule well be considered worthy of double honor (1 Tim 5:17), remarks: good and faithful dispensers of the Word ought not to attain heavenly glory only, but likewise earthly honor that so they may not have cause for sadness. Again, alms are given from charity, and accepted through necessity. Nevertheless the Gospel is not venal. It is not preached in exchange for earthly goods. They who proclaim it do so for the sake of eternal happiness. For, were they to sell so great a treasure, they would show that they held it in contempt. Let preachers then, accept from the people as a necessity the means of existence, and let them receive from the Lord the reward of their labors. For they do not regard the alms of the faithful as a recompense or a motive for their work. Their ministry is one of love. They accept what is given them as a stipend whereby they may procure the supplies which are necessary to enable them to continue their labors.¹

Ad 13: Although there might have been some appearance of evil in the conduct of the apostles if they had taken alms from the Gentiles to whom they preached the faith, and if they had thereby introduced a new custom, it cannot now be considered disedifying if preachers accept alms from the faithful. For this custom is sanctioned by the Gospel; and those to whom charity is given need it not for superfluities, but for the necessities of life. It is evident also that religious do not preach for the sake of gain; for the alms that they receive are far inferior in amount to the worldly possessions which they renounced for the love of Christ.

Ad 1: The words call the poor, from whom you have at present nothing to expect,¹ mean only that in giving alms the intention of receiving a reward must not be present to the mind, though they may receive it in the future. For there is no one so poor that he may not, in some case of emergency, be of use to us. This is made clear by the following words of the Gloss: if you invite others in order to be invited yourself, you may deceive yourself.² Neither are we to understand that there will be no eternal reward for those who call together rich men or their own kinsfolk, for such an invitation may proceed from charity, and may be given for the love of God. Hence the Gloss says: those who invite the poor expect a future recompense; those who call together their friends and brethren, or wealthy people, have their reward now. But if, like the sons of Job, they entertain rich persons for the love of God, then he who commands us to practice brotherly love will reward such hospitality equally with other works of charity.³ But we are not to conclude that it is a sin to entertain our kinsfolk, even from mere natural affection, but only that such hospitality does not deserve an everlasting recompense. The Gloss remarks: our Lord does not forbid us to call together our wealthy friends, and our kinsmen, as if it were criminal to do so. He only tells us that such an invitation, will not be rewarded with eternal life.⁴

Ad 2: The saying of St. Augustine, adduced in the second objection, is to be understood in the same sense as that of Sirach 12:4: give to the godly man, but do not help the sinner. The Gloss observes on this text: do not encourage sinners in their sinful ways; do not hold communication with them, as they do who entertain actors, and suffer the poor of Christ to hunger.¹ But he who gives to a sinner who is in want, not in order to encourage him to sin, but because he recognises him as a man, assists not a sinner but a just man, because he loves not the sinner but human nature. It is better, however, to withhold an alms, than to give it to a man because he is a sinner, or in order to cause him to sin. But it does not follow that we may not bestow charity on the poor of Christ who do no manual work. For, as we have already shown, they commit no sin by omitting to perform such labor. And even were their omission criminal, we would not be assisting them because they are sinners, but because they are in distress.

Ad 3: He who asks in an unbecoming manner should not obtain what he demands; he should rather but corrected. But he who begs befittingly should, if possible, receive what he asks for. Hence St. Gregory (Moral., 21), says on the words of Job: if I have denied to the poor what they desired,¹ that the holy man, in this saying, bears testimony to himself that he not only assisted the poor in their needs, but condescended to their desires. But what is to be done when the poor ask for things that are not expedient for them to have? Or, since in Sacred Scripture, the poor are spoken of as being humble, are we to consider that they ought to have only those things for which they ask with humility? It is certain that we ought to give them those things that they beg humbly for, that is, that they ask for out of necessity, not out of covetousness. For it would be great pride if they were to beg for what is unsuited to their condition of poverty.² We should, therefore, unhesitatingly, assist the poor in their necessities, and we should. rebuke those who ask for superfluities.

Ad 4: As it is said in the fourth objection, we must refuse alms when, by giving them, we would encourage the recipients to commit injustice; but we should not refuse such assistance in cases of extreme necessity. But as mendicant religious ask for alms not for criminal purposes, but for the furtherance of their sacred labors, this proposition does not apply to them.

Ad 5: St. Ambrose does not say, in the words referred to, that infirmity of health or the shame experienced by those who beg are to be considered as reasons for giving alms. We give alms on account of the need of those who ask for them. What St. Ambrose says is that we should give more abundantly to those who are sick and to those who are ashamed of begging. He does not say that we are not to give to those who are in good health, and to those who are not ashamed to beg; but that, other things being equal, the sick and retiring are especially deserving of our charity. But sickness and reluctance to beg are not the only conditions which should, excite our charity. We must also consider the reputation of the one who asks us, his claims upon us, his needs, etc. It is not only those who have lost their fortune by accident who feel ashamed to beg. Religious, who have voluntarily renounced all things for the love of God, experience the reluctance. For they often belong to noble families; and shame at begging is therefore natural to them. But in religious this natural shame, like other passions, is perhaps more fully subject to reason than is the case with laymen.

Ad 6: Although there may be many reasons for giving more abundant alms to one man than to another, we cannot conclude for any one reason that one man always deserves more assistance than others. Thus the fact that a man is in greater need than are others is not always a reason why he should be helped more than others. For a man in less distressed circumstances might be able to show cause why he should receive more assistance from us than a neighbour poorer than he. Aristotle teaches (Ethics, 9) that the preponderating reason for relieving another is his claim upon us.¹ For, except under very peculiar circumstances, we are more strictly bound to pay a debt than to give a favour.² Now as we owe preachers the necessities of life as a stipend for their labors, we are bound in a special manner to bestow our alms upon them, especially when they are in distress. This is a debt of justice. This, therefore, we ought to pay, unless there are many grave reasons to prevent our so doing.

Ad 7: In reply to the seventh difficulty we must say that there are two sorts of happiness, spiritual and material. There are likewise two kinds of misery, spiritual and material. Religious, who have made themselves voluntarily poor have not to suffer spiritual misery, which is absolute misery. Rather, our Lord calls them blessed (Matt 5:3, Luke 6:20). They are, however, subject to physical distress, and are therefore worthy objects of material relief.

Ad 8: Kinship is one reason for giving alms more abundantly in some cases than in others. It is not, however, the only standard whereby our charity is to be proportioned. Therefore, it does not follow, as we have already said, that we are always to give most assistance to those most nearly related to us.

Ad 1: The fact that false prophets make use of sheep’s clothing to deceive the faithful is rather in favour of the habit of wearing poor clothing than against it. For hypocrites would not thus disguise their malice, unless a contemptible garb carried with it an appearance of good. Otherwise the Scriptures which, as we are told, that heretics abuse (2 Pet 3:16), ought to be reprobated. The same might be said of piety, which heretics often pretend (2 Tim 3:5). Hence the Gloss says, on Matthew 7:15, that false prophets are recognised not by their garments, but by their works.¹ Again, the Gloss adds that sheep should not lay aside their clothing, even though, at times wolves may assume it as a disguise.²

Ad 2: The devil would not clothe his emissaries in a religious habit if this habit were not, in itself a token of goodness. But this is no reason why virtuous persons should not wear the religious habit; nor is it a reason why all who wear it should be accounted wicked (Gloss on Matt 7:16).¹ Hence St. Jerome asks in his book against Helvidius, does the fact that it is sinful to pretend to be a virgin, make virginity itself a crime?²

Ad 3: The prohibition, quoted in this objection was not published because poverty of clothing is in itself reprehensible, but because it is assumed by some men or the purposes of deception.

Ad 4: The quotation of St. Augustine, cited in this objection, applies, only, to such rigour of life as causes dissension amongst those with whom we have to live. For, if it be understood absolutely, everyone who fasts when others do not fast would deserve blame. This idea is, of course, absurd.

Ad 5: The words here quoted from St. Jerome apply not to the use, but to the abuse, of a poor and lowly garb. He utters a warning against the vainglory which may arise from such a custom. In his epistles to the monk Rusticus, and to the nobleman Pammachius, he commends poverty and humility of clothing.¹ This is evident from his epistle to Pammachius on the death of Paulina.²

Ad 6: The use of exterior things may be regarded from a double point of view. Their use is indifferent if we consider the nature of the things themselves. If, however, we regard the end for which we use them, their use is commendable in proportion to the excellence of that end. For example, fasting practiced as a means of overcoming lust is more commendable than the eating of ordinary food with giving of thanks. Jovinian denied this proposition; but he was refuted in this and in his other errors by St. Jerome.¹ Hence poverty of clothing, when it is intended as humiliation for the soul and as a conquest over the body, is in itself more to be commended than ordinary clothing. Consequently, as religion is evidenced by fasting, so, on the same grounds, is it seen in humility of attire.

Ad 7: The fact that the assumption of poor garments for hypocritical purposes is a great sin does not prove that poverty of apparel is itself more sinful than extravagance of attire. For poverty of clothing is not as closely connected with hypocrisy as splendour of attire is related to pride and luxury. Ostentation in dress leads of itself and directly to pride and luxury. It is therefore in itself culpable. But meanness of attire does not of itself directly tend to hypocrisy. Hypocrisy results from the abuse of a humble fashion of dress, just as it may result from the abuse of any other good work. Now the more excellent a work is, the more reprehensible is its abuse. Therefore, the heinousness of hypocrisy is a testimony in favour of poverty of apparel and of the other external penitential works of which hypocrisy is the abuse. We do not mean, however, that hypocrisy is absolutely speaking the greatest of sins. For unbelief, whereby a man lies against God, is a more heinous crime than dissimulation, whereby he lies against himself.

Ad 8: It is not credible that our Lord Jesus Christ should have been clad in costly clothing. For he commended St. John in that he was not clothed soft garments.¹ The Pharisees laid great stress on exterior sanctity. They accused Christ himself of being a glutton, a wine bibber, and a friend of publicans; so would they have accused the Baptist had he worn soft garments. The soldiers who mocked our Lord would not have clothed him in a purple garment as a mark of sovereignty, if his own tunic had been woven with silk and gold. The soldiers who cast lots for his seamless coat did so, not because it was of costly material, but for the sake of their own profit. For, had it been divided, it would have been of no use to any of them. This alone suffices to prove that his garment was not valuable. Had it been of rich material, they would have divided it. But, as the Gloss says, our Lord’s seamless coat was a figure of the unity of the Church.²

Ad 9: Certain stations in life have a dress proper to them, just as each religious order has its own habit. The robes of the kings of old, and of the Sovereign Pontiff at the present time must be considered as the insignia of their office. And, just as a religious has no right to wear a meaner habit than the one belonging to his order, (though it is praiseworthy in him to wear the poorest allowed by the statutes of his rule), so neither would it have been lawful for monarchs of former days, nor for the Sovereign Pontiff in these times, to wear apparel unbecoming their dignity. But the case is different with regard to princes and other men, who have no fixed robes of state. It is not reprehensible in them if they wear the poorest garments compatible with their station.

Ad 1-2: Nevertheless, two faults are nevertheless to be avoided in the exercise of this fraternal charity.

Ad 3: To the third charge we answer that according to the explanation of the Gloss, those occupations are to be called secular, in which men are engaged in making money, but not by manual labor.¹ To this class belong all mercantile pursuits. Religious are forbidden to involve themselves in any business of this description. They may not, for instance, trade in another man’s interest. There is no reason, however, against their performing charitable offices for their neighbours, such as giving him advice, or interceding for him.

Ad 1: By these words is typified the unfruitfulness of journeys which are undertaken through frivolous motives. The Apostle blames the men of whom we have been speaking for the levity, or inordinate desires, which cause them to travel abroad. The Gloss says that the words of St. Jude refer to those who seek food by unworthy means or inquisitive disquiet.¹

Ad 2: St. Augustine, when he speaks of monks, who, although they bear no commission, are never settled, never quiet, means that their journeys are undertaken from frivolous or avaricious motives. This is clear by the context, wherein he blames them for running about in quest of lucre.¹

Ad 3: The words quoted from Mark 6 and Luke 10 plainly allude to men whose inordinate desires induce them to run from house to house in hopes of being supplied more abundantly with food by one family than by another.

Ad 4: The text of Isaiah 30:7 warns us against that inconstancy of mind, which tempts the man whose soul does not rest in God, to flit from one object to another, finding rest in none. The words, in their literal sense, refer to the Jews who, not satisfied with the divine assistance accorded to them, desired to go down into Egypt to seek protection from the Egyptians.

Ad 5: The words quoted from Jeremias are likewise a warning against that love of wandering about which arises from lightness of mind. This appears by the context, these people have loved to move their feet.¹ For, they who move easily, delight in motion. And the Gloss, on this passage, explains the movement of the feet to mean movement of the affections.²

Ad 1: The words, always being instructed and never arriving at a knowledge of the truth (2 Tim 3:7), are a rebuke, not to such as are ever learning, but to those whose study withdraws them from the Faith, and who, therefore, never attain to the knowledge of the truth. Such men are reprobates at heart and blinded to the faith.¹

Ad 2: When St. Gregory says that the preachers of Antichrist are learned in the knowledge of this world, he refers to those preachers who make use of earthly learning to draw their hearers to sin and to worldly desires. For, in the context to the words we have quoted, he cites the following verse of Isaiah: ah, land of whirring wings beyond the rivers of Ethiopia, sending ambassadors by the Nile in vessels of papyrus on the waters! (Isa 18:1) Upon these words, St. Gregory makes this comment: paper is made from the reed papyrus. What then shall we understand by the bulrushes, or reeds, of which the prophet is speaking, save earthly learning? The vessels of bulrushes then ate the hearts of worldly men; and to send ambassadors upon the waters in vessels of bulrushes, is to base our preaching on the arguments of carnal wisdom, and to attract our hearers to sin.¹

Ad 3: The words of the Gloss, quoted in the third objection, refer (as may be plainly seen by comparing this passage with many others) to preachers whom Antichrist will, at his coming into the world, send forth. Neither is the fact that the knowledge of the Old and the New Testament may be abused an argument against religious possessing such knowledge; unless we likewise say that because they may make a hypocritical display of innocence and purity of life, these virtues are therefore to be reprobated.

Ad 4: To the objection that science puffs up, we reply that it certainly does so, unless it is accompanied by charity. Thus, the Gloss says: knowledge alone puffs up, and again;¹ and further on: add charity to your knowledge, and your knowledge will be useful.² Hence to those who practice works of mercy, learning will not be very dangerous. But if we are to avoid knowledge because it leads to pride, we ought, on the same grounds, to desist from any good work. For, St. Augustine says, pride insinuates itself into good actions, in order to render them worthless.³

Ad 5: To the argument, founded on the example of St. Benedict, we reply that this Saint did not forego study from a dread of learning, but from fear of the effects of a worldly life and society. Thus, St. Gregory tells us that being in Rome, St. Benedict applied himself to liberal studies, and to literature; but perceiving that many of those around him fell into sin, he withdrew the foot with which he had stepped out into the world, fearing lest, if he attained to worldly learning, he might likewise fall into the abyss of sin.¹ Therefore, they are worthy of all praise who abandon the life of worldly students and retire into a monastery, where they may prosecute their studies.

Ad 6: To the last objection proposed, we reply that idle and inordinate curiosity is a danger attendant not only on study, but on all other mental occupation; and that superfluous anxiety, which is engendered by curiosity, is reprehensible. But in the words of St. Paul (2 Tim 3), quoted as an argument against religious, the Apostle, as the Gloss points out, rebukes those who, from an undue desire for material gain, entangle themselves in their neighbours’ concerns.¹ To speak of study of Sacred Scripture as a life of idleness is flatly to contradict the Gloss. For, on the words of Psalm 118, my eyes have fainted, the Gloss says: as he is not idle who only studies the word of God, neither can he who performs manual labor be more justly accused of sloth, than he who is occupied with the study of divinity. Such learning is the greatest of all work; and Mary, who listened to our Lord, is preferred before Martha, who ministered to him.²

Ad 1-2: But, we must remember that although an elegant style of preaching is at times commendable, it is likewise under certain circumstances reprehensible. It is reprehensible when it is used from motives of vainglory, or when beauty of language or a show of learning are esteemed as the chief essentials in preaching, and lead to the neglect or denial of the articles of faith which, being beyond the ken of human reason, are esteemed but lightly by earthly science.

Ad 3: To the third argument, we will reply in the words of St. Augustine (De doctrina Christiana, 4). When commenting on the words, although I be rude in speech, yet not in knowledge,¹ he observes that St. Paul spoke thus, in condescension to his detractors, but that he does not acknowledge that he was ignorant.² This is a proof that in a teacher learning is more profitable than eloquence. St. Augustine continues that the Apostle did not hesitate to declare that he possessed learning, without which he could not have been the doctor of the Gentiles. But even if we understand this text as an affirmation, we cannot assume that St. Paul made no use of eloquence in preaching. All that we can conclude is that he did not, like rhetoricians, make fluency and elegance of style his main object in preaching, or else that he had some defect in his speech. The Gloss understands the words, although I be rude in speech, to mean, although I do not use ornamental language or although I have an impediment in my speech.³ Now the false apostles considered eloquence to be the essential part of preaching.⁴ They were, therefore, preferred by the Corinthians to St. Paul.

Ad 4: To the fourth argument we reply that when one substance is wholly transformed into another, there no longer exists a mixture.¹ In a true mixture, one of two substances is converted into a third. Hence when a preacher, in expounding Sacred Scripture, makes use of human learning subject to the truths of faith, the wine of Sacred Scripture is not adulterated; it remains pure. Adulteration of the Scripture would consist in adding something to it which would destroy its truth. The Gloss observes: he who, instead of correcting his hearers by means of the Scriptures, makes the Scriptural precepts subservient to their auditors does, by his teaching, adulterate the wine of truth.²

Ad 5-6: The passage from the Gloss quoted in the fifth argument refers to that human wisdom which is hostile to God. Now human wisdom is always set up in opposition to the divine wisdom when men consider human learning to be paramount in importance, and when they endeavour to make the truths of faith subservient to the teaching of human science. This error is the origin of all heresy. The Gloss gives the same explanation of the text which was quoted from Proverbs in the sixth objection.

Ad 7: To the seventh argument we reply that good men ought not to be prevented from doing good for fear that others, who do not equally well, should be despised. It is, rather, those who make themselves contemptible who ought to be suppressed. Thus, the fact that certain prelates, from their worldly mode of life, are disedifying, when compared to religious, is no reason why religious should desist from a life of perfection. Again, the eloquence of religious is not to be blamed because the preaching of certain prelates is, on account of its lack of eloquence, but lightly esteemed.

Ad 1: The words quoted from the Gloss on Romans 16, about those who falsely commend their traditions refer, as we see by the context, to the traditions of false preachers who endeavoured to induce the Gentiles to follow Hebrew customs, and tried by their fluent language to commend these rites to the ignorant heathens.¹ The word “tradition” is not applied to any state of true religion, but to false doctrine and heresy. Our Lord rebuked the Pharisees (Matt 23:15) not for their anxiety to make proselytes, but for imbuing their converts with erroneous ideas, or for setting them so bad an example that at the sight of their vices, their proselytes relapsed into paganism. For this cause, the Pharisees deserved greater condemnation (see Gloss on Matt 23²).

Ad 2: The words quoted from 2 Corinthians 3:1, do we begin to commend ourselves, mean that the apostles extolled themselves, not from vainglory, but inspired by the motives mentioned by St. Gregory above.

Ad 3: To the third argument we reply that St. Paul did not prohibit the use of letters of recommendation. He merely showed that they were not needful for true apostles, as they were for false teachers who had no virtues to commend them as the Gloss explains.¹ At times, however, holy men do need letters of commendation. They want them, not on their own account, but for the sake of others, who know neither their virtue nor their authority. Thus, St. Paul commended Timothy, saying: when Timothy comes, see that you put him at ease among you, for he is doing the work of the Lord, as I am (1 Cor 16:10). And in Philippians 2:19 he says, I hope in the Lord Jesus to send Timothy to you soon, so that I may be cheered by news of you. And in Colossians 4:10, he writes, Mark the cousin of Barnabas, concerning whom you have received instructions. And writing to the Romans, he says: I commend to you our sister Phoebe (Rom 16:1). Thus we see that in the apostolic times, it was customary to provide teachers or other persons who must be sent to distant churches with testimonials, or letters of recommendation.

Ad 4: To the fourth argument, we answer that as holy men do not commend themselves, for the sake of their own glory, but for the advantage of others, so they likewise sometimes prefer themselves to others. Thus just men prefer themselves to sinners, in order that sinners may be avoided and justice imitated. Thus St. Paul says: are they servants of Christ? I am a better one—I am talking like a madman (2 Cor 11:23). Sometimes, also, good men commend themselves in order that they may be held in credit by men; for if they are despised by those to whom they preach, they cannot influence them. We know that St. Paul preferred himself, in one point, to the other apostles, though they were true apostles. For he says: his grace toward me was not in vain. On the contrary, I worked harder than any of them (1 Cor 15:10). Now they are the less reprehensible who prefer their state to one less perfect, in proportion as such a comparison is divested of anything that savours of vainglory. In this manner, St. Paul (2 Cor 3) compares the ministers of the New Testament to those of the Old Law; and he prefers the status of Doctor, to which he belonged, to the other ranks in the Church. On this point he says: let the priests who rule well be considered worthy of double honor, especially those who labor in preaching and teaching (1 Tim 1:17). It may be said that the Gloss, on this passage, as quoted above,¹ is misinterpreted. For St. Paul speaks of the recommendation, not of words, but of deeds; whereby the apostles commended themselves to the conscience of men. He shows likewise that the true apostles proved themselves by their works to be better than the false apostles. Hence when the Gloss says, without comparing them to their adversaries, the signification is that the apostles did incomparably more than their adversaries. Hence the true meaning of the Gloss, is the exact contrary of that assigned to it.

Ad 5: The answer to the fifth objection is given in the following words of the Gloss: we preach not ourselves, that is, our preaching is directed not to our own honor or advantage, but to the glory of Christ.¹ Now the saints at times commend themselves; but they do so not for their own glory, but to the praise of God, and for the spiritual benefit of their neighbour.

Ad 6: The sixth argument is answered by the following words from the Gloss: we do not communicate with certain other men (that is, false apostles), who are not sent by God nor approved by him, but who commend themselves by certain actions.¹ From these words, we cannot conclude that they who are sent by the prelates of the Church, may not commend themselves, when God commends them so munificently by bestowing the gifts of grace upon them.

Ad 7: This is likewise the answer to the seventh objection.

Ad 8-9: To the eighth and ninth objections we reply that the authors cited in them, speak of the self-praise whereby some men commend themselves inspired by motives of vain glory.

Ad 10: The tenth objection is answered by the following passage from the interlinear commentary on the words, if I glorify only myself.¹ The glory of those who glorify themselves is nothing. But the case is far otherwise with those whom God glorifies by the bestowal of his heavenly favours.

Ad 1: True Christians bear reproof, when administered to them for the sake of correction. They resist, however, accusations brought against them in order to overthrow their work. More especially do they resist, when such charges are blasphemies, directed not only against their person, but against the truth which they preach.

Ad 2: Apostolic men ought certainly to practice patience. When they resist detraction, they do so not out of impatience, but from love of truth.

Ad 3: Carnal-minded men hate those who rebuke them in charity. It is not, however, carnal minded to oppose those who calumniate the truth.

Ad 4: The passage of the Gloss quoted in the fourth argument refers to men who unreasonably slander the truth and injure its preaching. They who, under pretext of patience, permit falsehoods about the truth to be disseminated are like the dumb dogs, unable to bark, of which Isaiah 56:10 speaks.

Ad 5: If they who will not suffer the truth to be defended at their own expense show that they love themselves more than the truth, they equally love themselves better than the truth who, rather than suffer their own peace to be disturbed, leave the assailants of truth unanswered. Hence it is love of truth which inspires holy men to resist its detractors.

Ad 6: The following reply will serve as an answer to all the remaining objections. The authors quoted in these objections counsel us to love those who correct us justly, and they forbid us to pursue, with hatred or impatience, those that malign us. They advise us, on the contrary, to love and pray for our detractors. Holy men amply fulfil this duty; even while they refute the charges brought against them by their enemies.

Ad 1: By the words of St. Paul, quoted in the first objection, some things are forbidden to all men; others are forbidden to the perfect only. All men, as we know by the Gloss,¹ are forbidden to plead a cause before a heathen tribunal, or to assert their rights by contention or by fraud. Perfect men are forbidden to go to law in order to obtain the restoration of their property. This rule applies, however, as Gratian tells us (Decretals, 19, q. I, Episcopus),² to the restoration of private property. It is as lawful for them to recover common possessions, as it is for them to hold them. For their common property belongs not to themselves, but to the Church. Therefore, when they sue for its restitution, they are seeking to recover what they hold for the Church. This Gloss is not authentic but magisterial.³ It is taken from St. Augustine, who holds that it is allowable and pardonable for imperfect men to go to law, but that such a course is not becoming in the perfect.⁴ But, if it be not lawful for those in a state of perfection to appeal to a legal tribunal, such a course cannot be permissible for bishops, since the episcopal state is one of higher perfection than is the religious. Otherwise, an appointment to a bishopric would not be promotion for a religious.

Ad 2-3: We answer the second objection, that, as the Gloss says, the perfection of justice is established in three precepts.¹

Ad 4: Our Lord ordered his apostles to shake the dust from their feet as a witness against those who refused to receive them. The Gloss, commenting on the words, shake off the dust from your feet (Matt 10:14), says: do so, as a witness of the travail which you have fruitlessly endured on their behalf.¹ This shall be an appeal to to divine judgment. That this is what our Lord meant, we know by his words: truly, I say to you, it shall be more tolerable on the day of judgment for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah than for that town (Matt 10:15). By these words, our Lord instructs his disciples, to depart from those that will not receive them. For they, like infidels, are reserved for the final judgment of God. St. Paul says of unbelievers: God judges those outside (1 Cor 5:13). Those that are within are committed to the judgment of the Church. Hence if any man desire to be received into the Church, and those who belong to the fold refuse to communicate with him, he should appeal not to the judgment of God, but to the tribunal of the Church.

Ad 5: Contention is forbidden to all those who are weak in faith. The words of St. Paul, to have lawsuits at all (1 Cor 6:7), are thus explained by the Gloss: the audacious clamour of contention wars against the truth.¹ The same explanation is given of the words in Romans 1:29: full of envy, murder, strife.² Hence they who appeal for justice, without noisy assertion of their claim, are not contentious.

Ad 6: It is not true that none can, without a violation of charity, demand the restitution of their goods. What is true is that when avarice leads a man to demand such restitution, he is not acting in charity. On the words, charity seeks not her own, the Gloss says: charity seeks not her own, for she does not love money.¹ However, as we have seen from a passage of St. Gregory, already quoted, zeal for fraternal correction may at times stimulate a man to demand the restoration of his property.²

Ad 7: If a man go to law, he need not necessarily be in discord with his neighbour. Although peace of heart should not be lost for the sake of any earthly gain, it does not follow that it is never permissible to make a legal claim to our property. Peace of mind may be preserved in a law court, as on a battle field. Otherwise, war would be always unlawful.

Ad 8: A man who justly claims the restitution of his goods does not actively give scandal. If scandal is taken at his action, he is merely the passive cause of such scandal. There are two kinds of scandal. There is a Pharisaical scandal, by which men, out of malice, take scandal at their neighbour and cause scandal to him. When our Lord was told that the Pharisees were scandalized at him, he said: let them alone; they are blind guides. And if a blind man leads a blind man, both will fall into a pit (Matt 15:14). There is likewise the scandal taken by weak and ignorant persons. When possible, we must avoid giving this scandal; but we must not do anything wrong out of fear of occasioning it. Now it is wrong to suffer the property of the Church to be pillaged; and, even at the risk of giving scandal, we must resist such injustice. Thus St. Thomas of Canterbury defended the rights of the Church, at the sacrifice of his life, making no account of the scandal taken by the King of England.¹ Even if he could, without sin, have suffered the Church to be robbed, the fear of being a passive cause of scandal, would not have been sufficient cause to justify him in permitting such pillage to take place. It is also possible to obviate giving scandal to weaker brethren by speaking to them gently and pointing out that it is really more to our neighbour’s advantage to check him in a course of injustice than it would be to suffer him, by indulgence, to fall into a habit of dishonesty. Furthermore, a man is more strictly bound to preserve himself from taking scandal than to avoid scandalizing others. Therefore, if he knows that unless he reclaims his own possessions, he will himself be scandalized, it is his duty to demand them.

Ad 9: Though it be true that food is essential to the preservation of life, this proposition does not apply to every kind of food. A man may abstain from one dish, and live on another. Hence it may be better, for the sake of avoiding scandal, to refrain from one kind of food, rather than to abandon certain temporal possessions. For, by not requiring their restitution, we may, as has been said, occasion sin.

Ad 1: It has already been proved that when holy men cause punishment to be inflicted on their enemies, they act not out of malice, but out of love. Hence they do their enemies good, rather than harm.

Ad 2: Preachers ought not, in causing their adversaries to be punished, to make their discomfiture their chief object. Their aim in chastising their enemies ought to be their conversion, or the benefit of others.

Ad 3: He who, out of zeal for virtue, causes another to be punished, does not return “evil for evil,” but rather good for evil; since the punishment inflicted is of benefit to him who suffers it. Punitive measures are at times remedial, says Aristotle (Ethics, 2).¹ And Dionysius observes (On the Divine Names, 4): it is not an evil thing to be punished, but to deserve punishment.² The prohibition against returning blow for blow means that we must not strike another out of malice or from revenge.

Ad 4: The Saints, as we have said, never punish others, nor cause, them to be punished, save out of desire for their amendment, or for the public welfare. If men are suffered to commit crime with impunity, they wax bold and become hardened in sin. Because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear (Sir 8:11). Therefore, the Saints inflict penalties on evildoers; but, when they see that indulgence would be more profitable to them, they remit the punishment that is due. The Gloss remarks on the words, you do not know what manner of spirit you are (Luke 9:55), it is not well always to take vengeance on the guilty, for at times mercy will avail more in bringing them to patience, and the fallen to amendment.¹ For this reason, Simon and Jude averted punishment from their enemies.

Ad 5: The lovers of this world unjustly, as St. Augustine says, persecute those who love God; and they, in turn, are justly persecuted by them.¹

Ad 6: The saints, as we have already said, do not cause others to be punished, save in the hope of causing them to amend. The benefit of their neighbour they count as their reward. Hence they cannot be said to incur the stigma of vain glory.

Ad 7: The seventh objection is answered by the Gloss.¹ The apostles, it explains, were untutored men at the time they spoke thus; they were ignorant of the way in which they might cause others to amend. Therefore, they spoke, not out of zeal for their neighbour’s correction; nor out of desire to check vice; but from a spirit of revenge. our Lord reproved them for their ignorance. At a later time, however, when he had instructed them in a spirit of true charity, he gave them authority to punish sinners. Such power they exercised towards Ananias and Saphira, whose death was profitable both in inspiring the living with awe, and in preventing the guilty man and woman from adding to their crimes. The same comment is made by the Gloss on the words in 1 Corinthians 5:3, to hand over such a one to Satan.² Or we may say that our Lord forbade the disciples to call down fire on the Samaritans, because he knew that they would be more easily converted by mercy. The Gloss also accepts this view: the Samaritans who, in this place, were saved from fire, believed with greater firmness.³

Ad 1: God has scattered the bones of those who please men, is to be understood, as applying to those who make the favour of men the chief object of their ambition, and who, in order to please mortals, are ready to offend God.

Ad 2: The words of Galatians 1:10, if I should please men, are to be understood in the same sense.

Ad 3: Although preachers of the truth may be hated by sinners who are unwilling to amend their lives, they gain the favour of those who desire instruction: reprove a wise man, and he will love you (Prov 9:8).

Ad 4: The words of St. Gregory, quoted as an objection to our proposition, refer to those who make it their sole ambition to find favour with men, and who desire to be loved with a love due to God alone, even though they do not commit any overt offence against him. That this is the sense of the passage is clearly shown by its context, which runs as follows: he is an enemy to our Redeemer, who desires, for the sake of his good works, to be loved by the Church.¹

Ad 5: The words of St. Gregory, quoted in the fifth objection, are to be understood, as referring to that inordinate self love which causes men to seek, merely for their own sake, to please their neighbour.

Ad 6: The word to seek popularity (esse placidum) used in the sixth objection, means not simply one who seeks to please men, but one who desires to an excessive degree to please them, and who is willing to do wrong for the sake of pleasing them. He who merely seeks to please others in an ordinate manner ought to be called a friend, and is so called by the Philosopher.¹

Ad 1: The words, do not rejoice in this, that the spirits are subject to you (Luke 10:20), are to be understood as an order to the apostles to rejoice, not on account of their victory over evil spirits, but on account of the glory of God. The Gloss says: they are forbidden to rejoice at the abasement of the devil, who fell through pride; they are rather to exult at the honor given to God.¹ Or else we may understand that the apostles were commanded not to rejoice at the fall of Satan as if that were the highest good. For he might have been overcome without any merit on their part.² Their chief joy was to be, as our Lord told them, that their names are written in heaven (Luke 10:20).

Ad 2: The words quoted from Job 31:25 are to be understood of the joy which produces elation of spirit. For it is pride for a man to rejoice in the works wrought by God through his agency as if they were a subject for vain glory.

Ad 3: He who refers the glory of his works to God, rejoices not in himself, but in God, to whom he refers all that can be a cause for glory.

Ad 1: The words quoted from Matthew 11:8, behold, those who wear soft raiment are in kings’ houses, as is clear enough, apply to those who frequent the houses of kings for the sake of luxury.

Ad 2: The words of the Gloss, quoted in the same objection, refer to those who dwell idly in cities, or indolently enjoy high offices. But the saints repose only in God; they find their rest in him alone. To be obliged to consort with a number of men, or to accept posts of honor is to them weariness, rather than an enjoyment.

Ad 3: St. Jerome’s advice to Paulinus, is a warning against leading a public life, for the sake of pleasure, instead of for utility. He shows this plainly by speaking of banquets and all such pleasures. He makes this evident by the words which are subjoined: you should flee from these as from the chains of pleasure.

Ad 4: The words of Boethius contain a great truth. But it does not follow, because they who glory in power seek the company of the powerful, that therefore everyone who frequents the society of the powerful must necessarily glory in power. For, as we have already shown, the saints seek the company of men in high station, from a very different motive.

Ad 5: Again, though it be an honorable function to preach to a great concourse of men, the Saints do so not from desire of celebrity, but for the glory of God, imitating him who said: I do not seek my own glory (John 8:50).