In the first article, the question is raised whether the angels are the movers of the celestial bodies.

I have thought that the best way of responding to this is to say that it is not only proved by the philosophers in many ways but also clearly asserted by the holy doctors. For Augustine says in the third book of On the Trinity: as more dense and lower bodies are ruled in a certain order by more subtle and and higher bodies, so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life.¹ Also, in the book on the eighty-three questions, he says, every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it.² Gregory also says in the fourth book of the Dialogues: nothing in this visible world is able to be arranged except by an invisible creature.³

In the second article, the question is raised whether some have always judged this to be infallibly proved.

To this I respond that the books of the philosophers abound with such proofs, which they hold to be demonstrations. It also seems to me that one is able to prove demonstratively that celestial bodies are moved by some intellect—whether by God immediately or by means of the angels. But that he moves them by means of the angels is more fitting with the order of things, which Dionysius declared to be unfailing; namely, that in the usual course of events, inferior things are directed by God through intermediaries.

In the third article, the question is raised whether the angels move the celestial bodies by their own command, by the power handed over to them by God.

I do not fully see how one can have a doubt about this because I do not think anyone would doubt that everything which the angels do is done in virtue of power given them by God. If, however, it were to be called into question because they are said to move the celestial bodies by their own power, this too, would seem to be an unreasonable doubt. After all, since the angels are incorporeal, they are not able to move some body by physical quantitative contact, but only by a contact of power. For nothing is higher in the angels than their intellects, since they themselves are named intellects or minds by Dionysius. Accordingly, their motions go forth from the power of their intellect. Inasmuch as the conception itself of the intellect has some power to change something, it is called a command. Accordingly, if they move, they are in no way able to do so except by a command.

In the fourth article, the question is raised whether the angels moving the celestial bodies belong to the angelic rank of the virtues.

This does, indeed, seem to me to be the case, especially if the angelic rank of the virtues is said to be in the middle of the second hierarchy as Dionysius says.¹ For this rank holds the first place among the orders that carry out exterior ministries.² Accordingly, Dionysius says in the eighth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy that the name 'virtue' exhibits a certain divine and immovable strength for all godlike operations. For there seems to be no greater external service than the ordering of universal causes. Thus, the administration of the celestial bodies seems to pertain most of all to the order of the virtues. Commenting on the words of the twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew, the powers [virtutes] of the heavens will be shaken,³ Origen argues it follows that the rational powers of the heavens will be amazed when they are removed from their primary tasks. It does not seem, however, that this ought to be altogether maintained.

In the fifth article, the question is raised whether an angel by its power is able to move the whole mass of the earth even to the sphere of the moon.¹

It seems to me this ought not to be asserted. For the powers of creatures only extends to natural effects. Therefore, the angels are able to move the celestial bodies inasmuch as the motion is in accordance with their nature. They are not, however, able to move the other motions by their own power (although this can be done by divine miracle).

Now it is able to to occur, not only by the power of an angel but also by the power of man, that some part of the earth could be carried above by force; but I do not believe the angelic power is able to place one element outside of its order in its entirety. And the fact that the power of an an angel is infinite in relation to inferior things¹ is not to be understood as if it were not determined to specific effects, but that it is not subject to weariness or defect in its effects.

In the sixth article, the question is raised whether one is able to soundly interpret Ecclesiastes 1:6 which says round and round goes the spirit as follows: the angelic spirit goes round and round inasmuch as by its action it moves the heavens in a circular pattern.

I do not see any reason it is not able to be soundly explained in this way since this sentence and way of speaking is true when understood in accordance with what was said above. Sacred Scripture intimates as much since the principle is laid down in Romans 8 that the Spirit intercedes, which means he [the Holy Spirit] makes [the angelic spirit] to intercede.

In the seventh article, the question is raised whether the angel has an infinite power in relation to inferior things.

This is able to be either understood well or badly. For if it is so understood in the sense that an angel has infinite power over that which is below it, the interpretation is false and erroneous because some angel would then be able to create something below itself and to turn anything at all into anything at all, which is clearly false. It must be understood, then, that the power of an angel follows upon its nature. For just as the finite and the infinite are found in its nature, so also are they found in its power.¹ Now the angel has a finite nature in comparison to what is superior to it; namely God, who is the infinite good and infinite being in whose likeness an angel finitely participates. Since, however, an angel does not have its form in matter, it is not limited or contracted by some matter as natural forms are. Accordingly, the power of an angel is also finite inasmuch as it is extended to determinate effects to the degree that it finitely participates in the likeness of the first cause. It is, however, infinite inasmuch as its power is not contracted as material and bodily forms are since they must act according to the exigency of matter and of an organic body. And in this way it should be said that it has an infinite power in regard to subsequent duration because its nature is such that it is able to endure perpetually since it is not measured by some period of time.

In the eighth article, the question is raised whether the angels are the cause of all the things which are naturally generated and corrupted in this world.

This necessarily follows if they are the cause of the motion of heaven, which is the cause of generation and corruption in inferior bodies, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names. For whatever is the cause of the cause is the cause of what is caused.

In the ninth article, the question is raised whether the angels can be said to be the makers of all naturally composed bodies—whether of men or of others—since to cause something is to make from something.

One can find fault in this opinion because we usually use the word 'making' in works of art and not in works of nature. For it is not customarily said that a father makes a son. Accordingly, in the sixth book of the Ethics, the Philosopher speaks in this way when he says that art is right reason about makeable things. Considering the matter in this way, it seems unfitting to say angels or celestial bodies make human bodies or other composite bodies that have been generated naturally. For we make things according to the disposition of our judgment, such as works of art. But the works of nature are not subject to [our] judgment about natural causes because they follow the necessity of the natural order and are subject to the judgment of God, who is the institutor of nature. Accordingly, natural effects are usually attributed to God. Nevertheless, the word 'to make' is found attributed to natural causes inasmuch as it is customary to say that 'every agent makes something like to itself' just as fire is said to make [something] hot.¹ And according to this way of speaking, one can say celestial bodies and even angels make lower composite bodies. In such things, however, the common use of speech usually ought to be followed because, according to the Philosopher, words should be used in their more common signification² and it seems vain to contend about words when the reality is agreed upon.

In the tenth article, the question is raised whether a workman is able to handle a hammer or do something else naturally without the angels moving the celestial bodies.¹

There is no manifest truth in regard to this. It is clear, indeed, that all mixed bodies are conserved in being by the motion of the celestial bodies¹ because they are both conserved and destroyed due to the manner of celestial motion and are generated, conserved, and destroyed depending upon the withdrawal or approach of certain celestial bodies. If, then, what was said is understood in such a way that if the motion of the heavenly bodies which comes about by the angels were to cease, the consequence would be that the arms of the workers would lose their strength, the noise of the hammers would no longer be heard, and human bodies—and indeed all mixed bodies—would be corrupted in accordance with the ordering of nature (unless preserved by a supernatural power), what is said would hold true. For if the body of a craftsman were to decompose, it is manifest that he would not be able to move his hand to the hammer. But if, on the contrary, we understand what was said such that human bodies would be preserved in being by the supernatural power of God even if the motion of heaven were to cease, it would be necessary to say that human bodies would remain and either have the same relationship to the souls which they now have or even that they would be more subject to them. Accordingly, as the soul of a craftsman is now able to move the hand towards the hammer, it would be able to do so even if the motion of heaven were to cease. This would only be the case, however, if the divine wisdom would preserve hammers in the same state just as human bodies would be conserved, which seems unlikely. Nor does what is said stand in opposition to what is said about the division of the air because even if the air were incorruptible in the case of the motion of heaven ceasing, it would not lose its own nature; inasmuch as it is easily divisible on account of its humidity and subtlety, it could be an instrument of vocal praise.²

In the eleventh article, the question is raised whether all corruptible bodies composed of elements would instantly be separated into these elements if the movement of the celestial bodies were to cease.

I believe that this proposition is true or false according to the way it is understood. For it is necessary that the motion of the sky—just as any given movement—would cease in a moment because the last instant of time corresponds to the last instant of motion. If, then, it is understood that the corruption of these bodies or their disintegration into elements is instantaneous, this is true in regard to the beginning [of the process] but false in regard to its terminus. Indeed, celestial bodies are causes that cause and preserve things just as moving causes do. Accordingly, both the corruption and disintegration that occurs due to the removal of such a cause comes about through motion. But the terminus and the beginning of a motion is not able to be at the same moment because every motion requires some amount of time. It would be different, however, if the divine conservation were removed; for God himself is the cause of being for things operating immovably. In other words, since he produced things in a moment by creating in a way that was not temporal, if his activity were to cease things would come to an end—and they would not do so by means of some movement.

In the twelfth article, the question is raised whether God ceased moving any body immediately [i.e., without an intermediary] after the works of the six days.

This is true in regard to those motions of a body that a creature can perform. For there are certain bodily movements that are not able to be accomplished by any creature (as when the dead are raised, the blind are made to see and the like). And such transformations God does immediately in regard to their principle effect, although in regard to certain effects, the ministry of the angels is not lacking.

In the thirteenth article, the question is raised whether God is neither able to move nor wills to some kind of body immediately.

The meaning of this question is not put forward in an explicit manner. For on the one hand, it is said that God is able to move every body immediately by his power and supreme will,¹ which seems necessarily repugnant to the notion found here that he is not able to move a body immediately—unless, perhaps, the notion that God could "move some kind of body immediately" is understood as implying that God acts in such a way that his movement is divisible and measured by time. Now God neither wills nor is able to bring it about that his action which is his essence be divisible and measured by time. But when it is said, "God moves some kind of body," by this word, 'moves,' a divisible action that is measured by time is not implied, but rather a simple action that is his own essence. For not only God but even any intellect moves by command as was said above.² The command of an intellect, however, is nothing other than a concept ordered towards bringing about an effect. But the willing and understanding of God is nothing other than his essence. Accordingly, the action by which God created things and the action by which God is able to immediately move a body is nothing other than his understanding and his willing.

In the fourteenth article, the question is raised whether if there were no starlight nor motion of the celestial bodies, all corruptible animals would instantaneously perish.

My opinion about this was related above.¹ For death comes about by separation of the soul from the body, which does not occur except by the body departing from its own natural disposition, which cannot be entirely instantaneous. Its cause and beginning, however, can be in an instant.

In the fifteenth article, the question is raised whether God brings miracles about by the ministry of the angels.

I deem this to be true, yet in such a way that the activity of the angels is not able to extend itself to the principle effects in all miracles.

In the sixteenth article, the question is raised whether God not only brings about some miracles but even all miracles by the visible or invisible ministry of the angels.

I also deem this to be true in regard to some ministry of the angels, although the ministry of the angels is not extended to everything that comes about in a miracle as is clear in the previous examples and in the formation of Christ's body from the Virgin.

In the seventeenth article, the question is raised whether the divinity in Christ performed miracles as a principle cause while his humanity performed these miracles in a subordinate way.

It should be said that this is true because the divinity of Christ was working by means of the humanity as by an instrument, as Damascene says. Now the notion of an instrument and of a subordinate is the same in actions because both move inasmuch as they are moved by another.

In the eighteenth article, the question is raised whether all the miracles which come about by the ministry of some creature come about by divine authority; i.e., by the divine power, without which nothing can be done.

This is true if understood in regard to true miracles (and I call those miracles true which are able to be accomplished by no natural power of any creature). There are, however, some miracles that are not miracles simply speaking but are only such in regard to those who are ignorant of the causes - just as there are certain things done by a human art or skill that seem marvelous to those who have no knowledge of the techniques. Even more so, things done by an angelic art or skill seem to be miraculous even though they are able to be accomplished by the power of some creature (though such things do not exclude the divine power).

In the nineteenth article, the question is raised whether the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible in three ways after the day of judgment; namely, by divine justice, by glory, and by nature (i.e., naturally).

One is not able to find fault with this in regard to the first two points, but as regards the third, one can find fault if it is understood such that nature alone suffices for the incorruption of the human body as if the incorruption of the human body were caused by nature as by an agent. For the power of some created nature does not extend itself to this that it is able to confer incorruptibility upon corruptible things. It was also said above¹ that according to the order of nature, human bodies and all mixed bodies would be corrupted if the motion of heaven were to cease. The immortality of human bodies after the resurrection will not, therefore, be from the power of nature but from the divine power, through which human bodies will be preserved in being. But it is true that the natural cause of corruption, which is the motion of heaven, will have been taken away. For just as the motion of the heavens is the cause of the generation of mixed bodies, so is it the cause of their corruption. Supposing, therefore, the preservation of human bodies by the divine power, there will not be some agent cause of their corruption. And in this way, one might be able to maintain that such incorruption would be by nature since the natural cause of corruption will have been taken away. In this manner of speaking, one could say the submersion of a ship is due to the helmsman because it is imperiled by his absence.

In the twentieth article, the question is raised whether after the day of judgment the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible in two ways; namely, by divine justice and by by nature (i.e., naturally).

The resolution to this question is the same as the preceding one.

In the twenty-first article the question is raised whether the bodies of the damned will be capable of suffering when they are in hell, and if they will suffer from the fire of hell because they will receive the form of the fire of hell in an injurious and harmful way.¹

I do not see how one could find fault with this. For as impassibility is commonly posited to be the gift bestowed upon glorified bodies, it follows that non-glorified bodies will be passible. But that they will receive the form of fire in themselves in a painful manner cannot be denied except by one who denies that bodies of this sort perceive the fire of hell. For it is necessary that a sensible form be perceived if suffering is to follow.

In the twenty-second article, the question is raised whether one is able to dispute in places of learning whether the soul of Christ and all other rational souls are transmitted [from the parent].¹

I do not see why this would not be permitted—unless, perhaps, raising the question would cause scandal for some people. For it does sometimes happen that simple souls hear that even those things that are of the Faith are disputed in places of learning and they think they are disputed because the truth of the Faith is itself called into question. However, in order to eliminate such a false understanding, someone who debates the issue could testify that he does not call the truth of the matter into doubt and that he merely raises the question for the sake of examining the foundation of the truth.

The twenty-third article raises the question whether Christ principally came to take nothing but original sin away.

It should be said in response to this that Christ principally came for the sake of leading men towards eternal life, as he himself says in John 10:10, I came that they might have life. Accordingly, he came to remove every impediment to eternal life and to subsequently take away every sin. But as the common good is better than the particular good of an individual, so the common evil of many is worse. Thus he more principally came to take away the original sin which had corrupted the whole of human nature than to take away particular sins. For this reason a marginal note¹ is added to the words, behold the one who takes away the sin of the world (John 1:29) which says the sin of the world is named original sin, which is common to the whole world. And further below, a note says, grace loosens both original sin and all the sins added to it. It seems better, therefore, to say affirmatively that Christ principally comes to take away original sin rather than other sins instead of saying something negatively such as what is posited; namely, that Christ came principally not to take anything but original sin away. For it also pertains to the principal intention of Christ to take away actual sins, which is indicated by the words of Luke 5:32, which says, I came to call sinners to repentance.

In the twenty-fourth article, the question is raised whether hell is in the center or around the center of the earth.

It seems to me nothing ought to be rashly asserted about this especially since Augustine maintained that no one knows where it is. For I do not think that it is in the center of the earth because that is the place to which heavy things are naturally brought. Nor does it seem fitting to say the intention of nature is frustrated, which would follow if heavy things were to not reach the center. And again, if the earth were naturally hollowed out around the center, one would not be able to find a natural cause to explain how the whole weight of the earth is held back from arriving at the center. Now if it is said that this is done by a miraculous divine power, no reason would justify this miracle. Moreover, the preparation of hell, according to a marginal note on Isaiah 30:33 (the valley of hell was prepared from yesterday), was from the beginning of the world. Now in regard to the first arrangement of things, one ought not to consider what God could do but rather what arises from the nature of things (as Augustine says in the second book of On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis).¹ Now Christ is not said to have descended to the lowest parts of the earth but to the lower parts, and what is related to us suffices for the truth of this regardless of how exactly those parts are lower.

In the twenty-fifth article, the question is raised whether the distance from the earth's surface to hell, supposing hell to be in the center or around the center of the earth, is able to be known.¹

I hold that it is possible for the distance from the earth's surface to its center to be known, but not the distance to hell, because I do not believe it can be known by man where hell is.

In the twenty-sixth article,¹ the question is raised whether the statement that the material of the semen² that the spirit (the power of the soul's beginning) goes out with is separate from the body and is a divine thing that, as such, is called the intellect,³ can or ought to be explained as follows: that the spirit or generative power is called the intellect by way of likeness because as the intellect operates without an organ, so also does a power.

The Commentator [Averroes] puts forward this explanation while commenting on these words from the seventh book of the Metaphysics: therefore as it is said that in substances, the principle is. He says, for that reason, Aristotle says in De Animalibus that the powers that are in the semen are like the intellect because they act by the activity of the intellect and powers do not act by a bodily instrument.¹

In the twenty-seventh article, the question is raised whether it can be conjectured without danger that after the common resurrection, the moon will shine as much as the sun now shines, while the sun will shine sevenfold more than it does now and the bodies of the good will shine seven times more than the sun.¹

I see no danger if the assertion is devoid of that which could be attributed to presumption.

In the twenty-eighth article, the question is raised whether something is said to enter into the composition of another in two ways: in one way, by its own essence by way of a material and formal principle (and thus in no way does something of the nature of a heavenly body enter into the composition of a human body or of other mixed bodies); in the second way, something enters into composition of another by an effect of its power (and in this way the nature of a heavenly body enters into the composition of a human body and of all mixed bodies).

This is necessarily true since heavenly bodies are the cause of generation and corruption in these inferior things, as Dionysius says.

Articles 29-30

In the twenty-ninth and thirtieth article, the question is raised whether the angels neither grieve nor shed tears but nevertheless act like those who do so.

This is necessarily true and it is the teaching of Augustine, who says in De Civitate Dei, bk. 9, ch. 5, The holy angels punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to be punished while feeling no anger, assist those who are suffering while not feeling compassion, and rescue from peril those whom they love without feeling their fear. And nevertheless, the names of these passions are used by the custom of human speech due to a certain resemblance between our actions and theirs, and not because of the frailty of our own passions.

In the thirty-first article,¹ the question is raised whether after the miraculous transubstantiation of the substance of bread into the substance of the body of Christ, the substance of the body of Christ is naturally and without miracle in the sacrament of the altar under the dimensions of the host which remain because a substance, by the very fact that it is a substance, is not prevented from being in a large or small dimension.

I believe the first point¹ to be false because just as the substance of the bread is not naturally but miraculously turned into the substance of the body of Christ, so also it is preserved miraculously under certain dimensions and not naturally. For as Augustine says in the eighth book of On the Litteral Interpretation of Genesis, God preserves things in the same manner by which he brings them about. Indeed, he is not like a builder who only works to build a house and then no longer cares for it, but God exerts a continual action on his work by preserving it in being in accordance with the words of John 5:17, my Father is at work until now. Now as to the idea that a substance inasmuch as it is a substance is not prevented from being in a large or small dimension, one should not understand this as meaning that it is proper to any substance to be able to be in a large or small dimension. On the contrary, this ability does not belong to a substance inasmuch as it is a substance just as it does not pertain to an animal inasmuch as it is an animal to be rational—even though it is not necessary for it to be irrational either. If, then, it belonged to the notion of a substance [as substance] that it would not be prohibited from being in a large or a small dimension, it would follow that the substance of the body of Christ would naturally have to be equal under a large or small dimension. But the fact that it does not belong to the notion of a substance [as substance] that it be able to be in a large or small dimension and that it is not, however, contrary to the notion of a substance for it to be so, makes it clear that to posit that the substance of the body of Christ is in a large or small dimension does not imply a contradiction because a contradiction occurs when something is attributed to another that is repugnant to the other's nature. The introduction of that idea [that substance is not prevented from being in a large or a small dimension], then, excludes the possibility of a contradiction [when it is said that the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament under the dimensions of the host] although it is not demonstrated to be natural on account of it.

In the thirty-second article, the question is raised whether the proper dimensions of the body of Christ and the dimensions of bread that remain¹ are unequal.

It is manifestly true to say this and something said to the contrary would be heretical because it would follow that the whole body of Christ would not be found in a small portion of a host.

In the thirty-third article, the question is raised whether the body of Christ in this sacrament is not in a place.¹

It is not true to say this because the body of Christ is in the place where an altar or a church is.¹ But it is true that the body of Christ is not in the sacrament as in a place because it is not compared to the sacrament as located in a place since it is not commensurate with it in regard to its own dimensions.²

In the thirty-fourth article, the question is raised whether the body of Christ in the sacrament is not moved when the host is moved.¹

It is true to say that his body is not moved as bodies are moved per se or accidentally in a place because it is not in the place in which the sacrament is in the way in which bodies are in a place per se or accidentally. His body has another relationship to the sacramental dimensions than a body has to its own dimensions (according to which it is moved per se or accidentally). But in the way in which it belongs to the body of Christ to be in a place by reason of the sacramental dimensions, it belongs to it to be moved in place.

In the thirty-fifth article, the question is raised whether the sacramental species remaining without a subject are able to act naturally and to change and be corrupted just as before.

In one way, it is true to say this and in another it is not. For nothing is able to either undergo something in a passive way or to act unless it already exists. Now for something to be preserved in being without a subject is miraculous. Thus, any action that follows upon its being preserved in this way is miraculous just as anything it passively undergoes. But presupposing conservation in being, an action proceeds further according to its natural disposition and even in accordance with some kind of passivity. In this way, a miraculously subsisting dimension has the miraculous function of the subject and the matter, which function is to undergo something [e.g., change or corruption].

In the thirty-sixth article, the question is raised whether the demons can know all the thoughts of the heart—including images in the imagination or certain concomitant passions in the body.

I think this is true in regard to the thoughts that accompany certain bodily motions. Augustine also says this in the work, The Divination of Demons in which he says: with greatest facility the demons attain in-depth knowledge of the intentions of men whether made known vocally or even when, conceived in thought, they are expressed by the body.¹ He also makes mention of this statement in the book of Retractions when he qualifies, I made this declaration more emphatically than I should have. It has, in fact, been made known through the experience of more than one that such thoughts come to be known by demons. But whether there are certain sensible signs that are hidden to us and yet given to the demons through the bodies of those who are thinking or whether the demons come to know [the intentions of men] by some other spiritual power is something that is either most difficult for men to know or is altogether unable to be ascertained.² But if they know thoughts by means of a spiritual power, even more so do they know bodily motions from which even men sometimes know interior dispositions. Accordingly, the second statement does not exclude the first, but goes further. Nevertheless, it does not seem to me that forms of knowledge only existing in the imagination are sufficient for the demons to know human thoughts. After all, by virtue of his reason and free will, man is able to use a species preserved in his imaginative power as a basis for a variety of thoughts and he can even refrain from acting upon it in any way at all.

Epilogue

These things, most dear brother, that I say in response to the articles sent by you are more expansive than you have asked because it was not possible to perfectly respond to those things that were able to have a variety of meanings. This is especially so since you did not write objections that were put forward against articles of this sort. If you had, it would have been possible to more perfectly and certainly respond. May your charity thrive yet more and may you compensate me for this labor by intercessory prayer.